Baptiste Souillard

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French citizen, Belgian resident
※ 26 years old (October 10, 1994)

Education

2017-	PhD in Economics, Université Libre de Bruxelles, advisor: Prof. Mathieu Parenti
2015 - 2017	Engineering degree in Statistics, ENSAE Paris, summa cum laude
2016 - 2017	MRes in Economics (2nd year), École Polytechnique, ENSAE Paris, HEC, Université Paris-Saclay,
	magna cum laude
2014 - 2015	MRes in Economics (1st year), Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,
	summa cum laude and valedictorian
2011-2014	BSc in Econometrics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, summa cum laude

Research fields

Primary	International economics, public economics, corporate tax avoidance
Secondary	Financial economics, industrial organization, labor economics

Positions

2019-2023	Research fellow, Fund for Scientific Research-FNRS
2020	Visiting researcher, Université du Québec à Montréal
2019	Research assistant, French Council of Economic Analysis
2017	Research assistant, Université Libre de Bruxelles
2016	Research assistant, CERDI and Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development

Awards and grants

2019-2023	Aspirant grant (2+2 years), Fund for Scientific Research-FNRS
2020	International mobility grant, Fund for Scientific Research-FNRS
2018	Hans Raupach Best Paper Award, European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (master
	thesis)
2016-2017	Excellence scholarship, Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique
2014-2015	Excellence scholarship, French Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation

Working papers and work in progress

Learning the ropes? Executive experience and location choices of multinational firms

What makes firms invest in foreign countries? In this paper, I show that beyond country- and firm-specific characteristics, experience of executives is crucial to understand multinational enterprises' location choices. Using a dataset on executives and subsidiaries of US-listed firms, I find that hiring an executive having previously worked for a company that had at least one subsidiary in a given country increases the average probability to own subsidiaries in this country by 14 percent after three years. Moreover, I observe a similar effect at the intensive margin and a wage premium for experience in managing multinational activities. A causal interpretation of the results is possible by using movements

due to unexpected events as sources of exogenous shocks (e.g., death of incumbent executives) and by exploiting the conferral of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations status on China as a quasi-natural experiment. Altogether, the findings suggest that executives develop country-specific knowledge, a valuable asset in the labor market that helps companies intensify their presence abroad. Because they notably hold for tax havens, they also shed light on the mechanisms whereby profit shifting activities spread across multinational corporations and imply that tracking executives could help public authorities detect aggressive tax planning.

The indirect effect of import competition on corporate tax avoidance (previously circulated with different titles)

The role played by competition in corporate tax avoidance is theoretically unclear in the existing literature. This paper empirically examines this, with a focus on import competition. I exploit financial statements to measure tax avoidance of US-listed firms and the conferral of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations status on China as a quasinatural experiment to establish causality. The results, supported by a series of sensitivity tests, reveal a positive effect of import competition on corporate tax avoidance. Furthermore, they are entirely driven by multinational enterprises. In response to the China shock, these firms invested in intangible assets to escape competition but these intangibles also allowed them to shift more profits towards low-tax countries. These findings shed light on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance. More generally, they help understand the decline in the average effective tax rate of US publicly listed firms and the recent backlash against large corporations and globalization.

Profit shifting, employee pay, and inequalities: Evidence from US-listed companies

Over the last few years, corporate tax avoidance has become a salient policy issue and has regularly been accused of aggravating income inequalities. Yet, systematic empirical evidence on its distributional implications remains lacking. In this paper, I explore the effect of profit shifting activities of multinational enterprises on employee pay. Using a rich database on executives, foreign subsidiaries, and financial statements of US-listed companies, I find that this effect substantially varies across occupations: while the compensation of chief executive officers and chief financial officers increases when their firm enters tax havens, non-executives, on the contrary, see their wage fall. Also, these reactions are more pronounced in intangible-intensive sectors. These new empirical findings are consistent with economic theory, cast light on the consequences of profit shifting, and might help explain recent trends in income inequalities.

Quantifying the effects of international tax reforms (with S. Laffitte, M. Parenti, and F. Toubal)

Many reforms have been proposed to ensure that multinational firms pay their income taxes where they carry on their activities. Assessing ex-ante their impact requires a counterfactual analysis that takes into account the level of corporate taxation and the set of factors influencing the location of sales, production, and profits of multinational firms. We build a quantitative general equilibrium model featuring multinational activities and international corporate taxation. The model is calibrated using recent data on bilateral trade of goods and services, multinational sales, and profits for 40 countries, including 7 major tax havens. Specifically, we propose a new methodology to infer the amount of bilateral profits shifted by multinational corporations. The model predicts the change in the relative attractiveness of countries, the variation of tax revenues and inequalities within countries, and the world-level efficiency induced by the implementation of a broad range of different reforms. These include scenarios that either reallocate taxing rights across countries and/or address profit shifting to entities subject to no or very low taxation. We show that reforms aimed at curbing profit shifting are more likely to gain political consensus than those which redistribute taxing rights. We also study the optimal parameters (minimum tax rate and allocation key) in different corporate tax configurations.

Conferences, seminars, and workshops

Talks

2020

CEPS Seminar (ENS Paris Saclay), ECARES Internal Seminar (Université Libre de Bruxelles), ECARES PhD Seminar (Université Libre de Bruxelles), Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (University of Nottingham), Econometric Society - Delhi Winter School (Delhi School of Economics), Graduate Student Chinese Economy Workshop (University of International Business and Economics), Graduate Student International Political Economy Workshop (Yale University), ITSG Annual Meeting (Università Politecnica delle Marche), JKU Economics Research Seminar (Johannes Kepler Universität Linz), Seminars in Economic Geography (UCLA and University College Dublin), 15th WIEM Annual Conference (University of Warsaw), Young Economists Symposium (University of Pennsylvania)

2019	5th DIAL Development Conference (Université Paris Dauphine), Doctoral Workshop in Economics
	(Université Catholique de Louvain), ECARES PhD Workshop (Université Libre de Bruxelles), 21st
	ETSG Annual Conference (World Trade Institute), 12th FIW Research Conference (Austrian Insti-
	tute of Economic Research), 21st INFER Annual Conference (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), 19th RIEF
	Doctoral Meeting (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)
2018	DG TAXUD Seminar (European Commission), 10th EACES/IOS/APB Workshop Akademie für Poli-

DG TAXUD Seminar (European Commission), 10th EACES/IOS/APB Workshop Akademie für Politische Bildung), ECARES PhD Workshop (Université Libre de Bruxelles), 20th ETSG Annual Conference (Warsaw School of Economics)

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Organization

2020-	Graduate Student	International Political	Economy Workshops	(online)

2019- ECARES PhD Seminars (Université Libre de Bruxelles)

2019 24th Spring Meeting of Young Economists (European Association of Young Economists)

Policy notes and media

How import competition contributes to corporate tax avoidance, FinReg Blog - Duke University School of Law, 2020

International corporate taxation after covid-19: Minimum taxation as the new normal (with S. Laffitte, J. Martin, M. Parenti, and F. Toubal), CEPII Policy Brief, 2020, 30

Profit shifting in France: Evidence from firm-level administrative databases (with S. Laffitte, M. Parenti, and F. Toubal), Focus du Conseil d'Analyse Économique, 2019, 36

Quel reporting pays par pays pour les futures réformes? (with S. Delpeuch, S. Laffitte, H. Paris, M. Parenti, and F. Toubal), Focus du Conseil d'Analyse Économique, 2019, 38

Teaching and faculty

Teaching assistantship

2018-2020	Graduate microeconomics (MRes, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
2018-2019	Advanced topics in international economics (MSc, Université Libre de Bruxelles), International trade
	theory (BSc, Université Libre de Bruxelles), Topics in economic integration (BSc, Université Libre de
	Bruxelles)

Faculty

2018- Member of the examination board of the admission exam (Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Other

Languages	French (native), English (fluent), German (basic)
Softwares	Stata, Matlab, Octave, R/RStudio, Dynare, EViews
Document	LATEX/BIBTEX, LyX, Microsoft Office