COMP9121: Design of Networks and Distributed Systems

Week 10: Application layer 2
Network Security

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

DNS

DNS: domain name system

Internet hosts, routers:

- IP address (32 bit) - used for addressing datagrams
- "name", e.g., www.yahoo.com - used by humans

people: many identifiers:

- name, passport #

Q: how to map between IP address and name, and vice versa ?

Domain Name System:

- *distributed database* implemented in hierarchy of many *name servers*
- *application-layer protocol:* hosts, name servers communicate to *resolve* names (address/name translation)

DNS: services, structure

DNS services

- hostname to IP address translation
- host aliasing
  - canonical, alias names
- mail server aliasing
- load distribution
  - replicated Web servers: many IP addresses correspond to one name

why not centralize DNS?

- single point of failure
- distant centralized database
- scalability

DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database



client wants IP for www.amazon.com; 1st approx:

- client queries root server to find com DNS server
- client queries .com DNS server to get amazon.com DNS server
- client queries amazon.com DNS server to get IP address for www.amazon.com

DNS: root name servers



1 root level

13 root name "servers" worldwide

TLD, authoritative servers

top-level domain (TLD) servers:

- responsible for com, org, net, edu, aero, jobs, museums, and all top-level country domains, e.g.: uk, fr, ca, jp
- Network Solutions maintains servers for .com TLD
- Educause for .edu TLD

authoritative DNS servers:

- organization's own DNS server(s), providing authoritative hostname to IP mappings for organization's named hosts
- can be maintained by organization or service provider

Local DNS name server

- does not strictly belong to hierarchy
- each ISP (residential ISP, company, university) has one
  - also called "default name server"
- when host makes DNS query, query is sent to its local DNS server
  - has local cache of recent name-to-address translation pairs (but may be out of date!)
  - acts as proxy, forwards query into hierarchy

DNS name resolution example

– host at cis.poly.edu wants IP address for gaia.cs.umass.edu

iterated query:

- contacted server replies with name of server to contact
- "I don't know this name, but ask this server"



DNS name resolution example (cont'd)

Method 2

recursive query:

- puts burden of name resolution on contacted name server
- heavy load at upper levels of hierarchy?



DNS caching, updating records

Prefer UDP, because we want to be fast

- once (any) name server learns mapping, it *caches* mapping
  - cache entries timeout (disappear) after some time (TTL)
- cached entries may be *out-of-date* (best effort name-to-address translation!)
  - if name host changes IP address, may not be known Internet-wide until all TTLs expire
- update/notify mechanisms proposed IETF standard
  - RFC 2136

DHCP可以帮助 client 知道 local DNS

DNS records

DNS: distributed db storing resource records (RR)

RR format: **`(name, value, type, ttl)`**

type=A

- **`name`** is hostname
- **`value`** is IP address

type=NS

- **`name`** is domain (e.g., foo.com)
- **`value`** is hostname of authoritative name server for this domain

type=CNAME

- **`name`** is alias name for some "canonical" (the real) name
- **`www.ibm.com`** is really **`servereast.backup2.ibm.com`**
- **`value`** is canonical name

type=MX

- **`value`** is name of mailserver associated with **`name`**

Inserting records into DNS

- example: new startup "Network Utopia"
- register name networkuptopia.com at *DNS registrar* (e.g., Network Solutions)
  - provide names, IP addresses of authoritative name server
  - registrar inserts two RRs into .com TLD server:

    (networkutopia.com, dns1.networkutopia.com, NS)

    (dns1.networkutopia.com, 212.212.212.1, A)
- create at authoritative server

  type A record for www.networkuptopia.com;

  (www.networkutopia.com, 212.212.212.22, A)

  (www.home.networkutopia.com, www.networkutopia.com, CNAME)

Peer-to-Peer

P2P

Pure peer-to-peer model architecture

- *no* always-on server
- arbitrary end systems directly communicate
- peers are intermittently connected and change IP addresses

examples:

- file distribution (BitTorrent)
- Streaming (Zattoo, KanKan)
- VoIP (Skype)



File distribution: client-server vs. p2p

Question: how much time to distribute file (size *F*) from one server to *N* peers?

- peer upload/download capacity is limited resource



File distribution time: client-server

- *server transmission:* must sequentially send (upload) *N* file copies:
  - time to send one copy: F/u_s
  - time to send N copies: NF/u_s



- *client:* each client must download file copy
  - d_{min} = min client download rate
  - (worst case) client download time: F/d_{min}

更多用户会导致 Distributed Time 增加

time to distribute F to N clients using client-server approach

$$D_{c\text{-}s} \geq max\{NF/u_s, F/d_{min}\}$$

Distribution Time

increases linearly in N

由上限决定

File distribution time: p2p

- *server transmission:* must upload at least one copy
  - time to send one copy: F/u_s
- *client:* each client must download file copy
  - client download time: F/d_{min}



- *clients:* as aggregate must download *NF* bits = upload *NF* bits
  - Max upload rate $u_s + \Sigma u_i$
  - $NF/(u_s + \Sigma u_i)$

time to distribute F to N clients using P2P approach

$$D_{P2P} \geq max\{F/u_s, F/d_{min}, NF/(u_s + \Sigma u_i)\}$$

increases linearly in *N* …

… but so does this, as each peer brings service capacity

Client-server vs. p2p

client upload rate = u, F/u = 1 hour, $u_s = 10u$, $d_{min} \geq u_s$



P2P file distribution: BitTorrent

BitTorrent, a file sharing application

- 20% of European internet traffic in 2012.
- Used for Linux distribution, software patches, distributing r
- Goal: quickly replicate large files to large number of clients

- Web server hosts a .torrent file (w/ file length, hash, tracker's URL…)
- A tracker tracks downloaders/owners of a file
- Files are divided into chunks (256kB-1MB)
- Downloaders download chunks from themselves (and owners)
- Tit-for-tat: the more one shares (server), the faster it can download (client)

上传更多，下载更快

P2P file distribution: BitTorrent

› file divided into 256KB chunks

› peers in torrent send/receive file chunks

tracker: tracks peers participating in torrent

torrent: group of peers exchanging chunks of a file



Alice arrives …
… obtains list
of peers from tracker
… and begins exchanging
file chunks with peers in torrent

P2P file distribution: BitTorrent

- peer joining torrent:
  - has no chunks, but will accumulate them over time from other peers
  - registers with tracker to get list of peers, connects to subset of peers ("neighbors")



› while downloading, peer uploads chunks to other peers

› peer may change peers with whom it exchanges chunks

› *churn*: peers may come and go

› once peer has entire file, it may (selfishly) leave or (altruistically) remain in torrent

BitTorrent: requesting, sending file chunks

requesting chunks:

- at any given time, different peers have different subsets of file chunks
- periodically, Alice asks each peer for list of chunks that they have
- Alice requests missing chunks from peers, rarest first

sending chunks: tit-for-tat

- Alice sends chunks to those four peers currently sending her chunks *at highest rate*
  1. other peers are choked by Alice (do not receive chunks from her)
     - re-evaluate top 4 every10 secs
- every 30 secs: randomly select another peer, starts sending chunks
  2. "optimistically unchoke" this peernewly chosen peer may join top 4

BitTorrent: tit-for-tat

randomly chose Bob

(1) Alice "optimistically unchokes" Bob

(2) Alice becomes one of Bob's top-four providers; Bob reciprocates

(3) Bob becomes one of Alice's top-four providers



higher upload rate: find better trading partners, get file faster !

Network Security



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Network Security

Chapter goals:

- understand principles of network security:
  - cryptography and its *many* uses beyond "confidentiality"
  - authentication
  - message integrity
- security in practice:
  - firewalls and intrusion detection systems
  - security in application, transport, network, link layers

What is network security?

confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

access and availability: services must be accessible and available to users

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- well-known in network security world
- Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate "securely"
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Who might Bob, Alice be?

- … well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- on-line banking client/server
- DNS servers
- routers exchanging routing table updates

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

Q: What can a "bad guy" do?

A: A lot!

- *eavesdrop:* intercept messages
- actively *insert* messages into connection
- *impersonation:* can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- *hijacking:* "take over" ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- *denial of service:* prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

Principles of cryptography

The language of cryptography



m plaintext message

$K_A(m)$ ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

Breaking an encryption scheme

- cipher-text only attack:
  Trudy has ciphertext she can analyze
- two approaches:
  - brute force: search through all keys
  - statistical analysis

- known-plaintext attack:
  Trudy has plaintext corresponding to ciphertext
  - e.g., in monoalphabetic cipher, Trudy determines pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o,
- chosen-plaintext attack:
  Trudy can get ciphertext for chosen plaintext

Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K

- e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Simple encryption scheme

substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another

- monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another



e.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters to set of 26 letters

A more sophisticated encryption approach

- n substitution ciphers, $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$
- cycling pattern:
  - e.g., n=4: M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2; M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2; ..
- for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent substitution pattern in cyclic pattern
  - dog: d from M_1, o from M_3, g from M_4

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

- key need not be just n-bit pattern

A more sophisticated encryption approach

```
plaintext:   abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
```

```
M1:   asdfghmnbvcxzjklpoiuytrewq

M2:   oiuymnbvcxzasdfghjklptrewq

M3:   jklpoiuytrewqmnbvcxzasdfgh

M4:   iuybvcmnfghxzasdtrewqjklpo
```

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

- US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
- 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
- block cipher
- how secure is DES?
  - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
  - no known good analytic attack
- making DES more secure:
  - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES operation

initial permutation

16 identical "rounds" of function application, each using different 48 bits of key

final permutation



AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Public Key Cryptography

symmetric key crypto

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never "met")?

public key crypto

- radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- *public* encryption key known to *all*
- *private* decryption key known only to receiver

Public key cryptography



Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

1. need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

2. given public key K_B^+, it should be impossible to compute private key K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

Prerequisite: modular arithmetic

- x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n
- facts:

  $[(a \bmod n) + (b \bmod n)] \bmod n = (a+b) \bmod n$

  $[(a \bmod n) - (b \bmod n)] \bmod n = (a-b) \bmod n$

  $[(a \bmod n) * (b \bmod n)] \bmod n = (a*b) \bmod n$
- thus

  $(a \bmod n)^d \bmod n = a^d \bmod n$
- example: x=14, n=10, d=2:

  $(x \bmod n)^d \bmod n = 4^2 \bmod 10 = 6$

  $x^d = 14^2 = 196 \quad x^d \bmod 10 = 6$

RSA: getting ready

- message: just a bit pattern
- bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number
- thus, encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a number

example:

- m= 10010001 .This message is uniquely represented by the decimal number 145.
- to encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a new number (the ciphertext).

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. compute $n = pq$, $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
3. choose e (with $e<n$) that has no common factors with z (e, z are "relatively prime").
4. choose d such that $ed-1$ is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed mod $z = 1$).
5. *public* key is $\underbrace{(n,e)}_{K_B^+}$. *private* key is $\underbrace{(n,d)}_{K_B^-}$.

RSA: encryption, decryption

0. given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above

1. to encrypt message m ($<n$), compute

$$c = m^e \bmod n$$

2. to decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

$$m = c^d \bmod n$$

magic happens!

$$m = \underbrace{(m^e \bmod n)}_{c}{}^d \bmod n$$

RSA example:

Bob chooses *p=5, q=7*. Then *n=35, z=24*.

e=5 (so *e, z* relatively prime).

d=29 (so *ed-1* exactly divisible by z).

encrypting 8-bit messages.



Why does RSA work?

- must show that $c^d \bmod n = m$ where $c = m^e \bmod n$
- fact: for any x and y: $x^y \bmod n = x^{(y \bmod z)} \bmod n$
  - where $n = pq$ and $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
- thus,

$$c^d \bmod n = (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n$$
$$= m^{ed} \bmod n$$
$$= m^{(ed \bmod z)} \bmod n$$
$$= m^1 \bmod n$$
$$= m$$

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:

$$\underbrace{K_B^-(K_B^+(m))}_{\text{use public key first, followed by private key}} = m = \underbrace{K_B^+(K_B^-(m))}_{\text{use private key first, followed by public key}}$$

result is the same!

RSA: another important property

follows directly from modular arithmetic:

$$(m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = m^{ed} \bmod n$$
$$= m^{de} \bmod n$$
$$= (m^d \bmod n)^e \bmod n$$

Why is RSA secure?

- suppose you know Bob's public key (n,e). How hard is it to determine d?
- essentially need to find factors of n without knowing the two factors p and q
  - fact: factoring a big number is hard

RSA in practice: session keys

- exponentiation in RSA is computationally intensive
- DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA
- use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then establish second key – symmetric session key – for encrypting data

session key, K_S

- Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key K_S
- once both have K_S, they use symmetric key cryptography