

HBS Security Guidelines [OWASP compliant]

| PRD Requirement Reference | ID | Description | Compatibility | | Comments | References |
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| | | | HB Desktop R7.5 | HB Desktop PAT R7.5.1 | | |

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| HBT-SEC-010 0 - Authentication | V1.1 | All pages used by the Application require authentication of the user prior to access (also NIST Control AC-2, AC-14) | Yes | Yes | Once after successful authentication via username-password validation, a unique secured random id is generated per user login. This unique id is later set in the current session. Henceforth every request for a page within the session, carry this unique id along, and the same is validated across the current session on the server. In case, if the unique id is not present or invalid then user gets redirected to the login/error page. Thus all the subsequent pages after login are authenticated. | |
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| V1.2 | All password fields (e.g. for login and password modification) shall not echo the user's password when it is entered and the fields shall not auto-complete . | Yes | Yes | This is implemented in all HBS Applications (even legacy) | |
| V1.3 | All Authentication controls shall fail securely to ensure attackers cannot log in. This means to disguise which part of the credentials failed to authenticate as well as redirecting the user to the same login page without any additional information about the system structure behind the login page | Yes | Yes | The failed authentication error messages in all HBS applications are in compliance and gives no indication of why the authentication failed | |
| V1.4 | User credentials shall not be traversed unencrypted (NIST Control AC-17) | Yes | Yes | All the applications (internal or on the public network) are secured using SSL (Secured Socket Layer). | |

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| | | | | | | <p>1. Browser connects to a application secured with SSL (https). Browser requests that the server identify itself.</p> <p>2. Server sends a copy of its SSL Certificate, including the server's public key.</p> <p>3. Browser checks the certificate root against a list of trusted CAs and that the certificate is unexpired, unrevoked, and that its common name is valid for the website that it is connecting to. If the browser trusts the certificate, it creates, encrypts, and sends back a symmetric session key using the server's public key.</p> <p>4. Server decrypts the symmetric session key</p> | |
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| | | | | using its private key and sends back an acknowledgment encrypted with the session key to start the encrypted session. 5. Server and Browser now encrypt all transmitted data with the session key. | |
| V1.5 | Verify that forgot password and other recovery paths do not send the existing or new passwords in clear text to the user. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Password recovery is not supported in any HBS application at this time. This feature is currently not in scope for all applications. | |
| V1.6 | Username enumeration shall not be possible via login or password reset. | Yes | Yes | The failed authentication error messages in all HBS applications are in compliance and gives no indication of why the authentication failed. | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_User_Enumeration_and_Guessable |
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| V1.7 | No default passwords (e.g. admin passwords of application frameworks) shall be used anywhere in the application | Yes | Yes | None of the HBS application uses a default password if not provided. | |
| V1.8 | A mechanism shall be in place to protect against vertical brute force attacks (see separate Requirement HBT-SEC-0400) | No | Yes | These features are handled as part of new HB Tools and HB Desktop starting R7.5.1. User account lock on repeated failed attempts. | See https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Blocking_Brute_Force_Attacks HBT-USM-0220 - User account soft lock on repeated failed logins. PAT-LOGIN-0360 - User lockout on repetitive failed login attempts |
| V1.9 | Authentication controls shall be enforced on the server side of the application | Yes | Yes | All authentication is done on the server side for all HBS applications as secured services. | |

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| V1.10 | Verify password entry fields allow or encourage the use of passphrases, and do not prevent long passphrases or highly complex passwords being entered, and provide a sufficient minimum strength to protect against the use of commonly chosen passwords. | Yes | Yes | All the password rules (in Tools and HB Desktop) are implemented as defined in the customer's requirement. The current password rule set defined in the system are not that complex, and the change in the same needs to be addressed by the PRM or customer. | Clarification Required from PRM on this. As per Cigital, our current password rules set (i.e with letters, numbers, etc) defined in the account preference are not strong enough especially in Non-VA mode. Should we re-consider it for PAT R 7.5.1 or are we okay with it. This might require change in existing data model and design. It looks like the currently used password rules set was enforced by customers (VA) |
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| V1.11 | Verify all account management functions (such as registration, update profile, forgot username, forgot password, disabled / lost token, help desk or IVR) that might regain access to the account are at least as resistant to attack as the primary authentication mechanism. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Feature to regain access to the existing account is not supported in any of the HBS applications (i.e Desktop, Tools etc). If the existing password is disabled/forgotten then the user needs to contact customer support for further assistance. | |
| V1.12 | User credential changes shall be handled as resistant to attacks than the main authentication on login. | Yes | Yes | HB Desktop users can only change their passwords after successful login to the application. | |
| V1.13 | User passwords shall expire after a period of time (HBT-SEC-04 10) | Yes | Yes | This is enforced via a password rule that can be configured at the account level. Need SOP for customers to enforce this rule. | HBT-ACT-0250 Edit Account - Password Rules Settings |

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| V1.14 | All authentication decisions (success, fail, softlock) shall be logged in an audit trail (Nist Control AC-2). | Partial | Yes | Login success entry is logged in LOGIN_ENT_SUCCESS_LOG. Login failure entry is logged in LOGIN_FAILURE_LOG. Failure in case of repeated attempts to login will be implemented as part of HB Desktop R7.5.1 | Implemented as part of R7.5.1 |
| V1.15 | All passwords are salted with a salt that is unique to the user (e.g. user ID). | Yes | Yes | A unique salt is generated and mapped for every password and stored in the database. | |

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| V1.15 | (2) All passwords shall be hashed before storage using SHA256. | Partial | Yes | Current implementation (from legacy) supports only MD5. Migration to the SHA-256 will be considered as part of HB Desktop R7.5.1 | Implemented as part of R7.5.1. Old users passwords if hashed with MD5 initially will be migrated to SHA 256 algorithm on the very first login to the system (HBS R 7.5.1) and thereafter the same will be compared during the authentication process. This design doesn't impact any change in user passwords. |
| V1.16 | Authentication credentials used to access external shall be encrypted/persisted in a secure location (not in source code) | No | Yes | All the sensitive data and user credentials for secured resources access (such as database etc) stored in the property files need to be encrypted. This is implemented in HB Desktop R7.5.1 release by using 'Jasypt' framework. | Implemented as part of R7.5.1. An encryption utility script is provided to aid the deployment team to get the encrypted passwords before being mapped in the db.properties. |
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| V1.17 | Recovery of Authentication information (e.g. forgot passwords, activation) shall provide time limited access (not applicable for HB Tools) | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Password recovery is not handled through web and is not currently supported feature of HB Dektop/Tools. In case of forgotton password, user needs to contact the support team for further assistance. | |
| V1.18 | Recovery of authentication information shall not lock out or disable the account automatically. (Not applicable for HB Tools) | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Password recovery is not handled through web and is not currently supported feature of HB Dektop/Tools. In case of forgotton password, user needs to contact the support team for further assistance. | |

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| V1.19 | The system shall not use security questions for authentication recovery (not applicable for HB Tools) | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Password recovery is not handled through web and is not currently supported feature of HB Dektop/Tools. In case of forgotton password, user needs to contact the support team for further assistance. | |
| V1.20 | User shall not reuse previous passwords (for details see HBT-SEC-0410). | Yes | Yes | This feature is supported across all HBS applications. | This again is dependent of the defined rules set in the account preferences. |

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| HBT-SEC-011 0 - Session Management | V2.1 | The framework's default session management control implementation shall be used | Yes | Yes | The Play framework is stateless and doesn't implicitly provide the session management. But it provides an option to handle session explicitly is used for HBS and Tools. We store a unique securely generated session id in the play provided session (cookie) for each login. The same session id is mapped/stored in the time dependent play cache (managed by play server) as a key and mapped to the corresponding user logged in details. | |
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| V2.2 | Sessions shall be invalidated on user log-out | Yes | Yes | Session is invalidated/cleared using the framework support and all the data in cache linked to the corresponding session id is removed on user log-out or timeout. | |
| V2.3 | Sessions shall time out after a configurable amount of time of inactivity (between 15 and 60 minutes) (NIST Control AC-2, AC-11) | Yes | Yes | This is implemented as defined and the session gets timed out as per the configured value in PLAY config. In case of any inactivity for the defined time limit, cache data corresponding to the logged in user's session-id is automatically removed by framework (PLAY) | |
| V2.4 | The application shall provide access to log-out functionality from all pages (NIST Control AC-12) | Yes | Yes | This feature is supported across all HBS applications. | |
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| V2.5 | The session ID shall not be disclosed other than in cookie headers (particularly urls, error messages or logs) | Partial | Yes | Session id is stored in the cookie (play provided) and the the server cache. Application never displays this information in the URL or error messages. But we found few traces of this data in the log files. Logs needs to be cleaned up in PAT R7.5.1. | This is already taken care in the current implementation. Corresponding to every session, a secured token along with the session id is generated. Only session tokens are printed in logs. This needs to be re-verified across all the features in HB Desktop R 7.5.1. |
| V2.6 | Session IDs shall be changed or cleared on log-out. | Yes | Yes | On user logout or session timeout, session id is removed from the session/cookie and all the data related to the session present in the play cache is cleared. | |

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| V2.7 | Authenticated session tokens using cookies shall be protected by "HttpOnly" | Yes | Yes | This feature is in-built provided by PLAY framework. The cookie created for the storing the session tokens is managed by PLAY. Cookies are signed with a secret key so the client can't modify the cookie data (or it will be invalidated) | |
| V2.8 | Authenticated Session tokens using cookies shall be protected with the "secure attribute" and strict transport security headers shall be present | Yes | Yes | This feature is in-built provided by PLAY framework. The cookie created for the storing the session tokens is managed by PLAY. Cookies are signed with a secret key so the client can't modify the cookie data (or it will be invalidated) | |
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| V2.9 | Session ID shall be changed on log-in to prevent session fixation. | Yes | Yes | A unique secured random number is generated for every new log-in anytime. (Secured random generation code needs to be enhanced.) | |
| V2.10 | Session ID shall be changed on re-authentication. | Yes | Yes | A unique secured random number is generated for every new log-in anytime. (Secured random generation code needs to be enhanced.) | |

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| V2.11 | Only session IDs generated by the application framework shall be recognized as valid. | Yes | Yes | Unique session id's generated is stored in a static hashmap on the server perm memory. Every request containing session id is validated against the hashmap contents. If the match is found, user is allowed to proceed else user is redirected to the login page. | |
| V2.12 | Authenticated session tokens shall be sufficiently long and random | Yes | Yes | Java secured random API is used to generate the session tokens/ids on the server side and later stored in the cookie and cache. | |

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| V2.13 | Authenticated Session Tokens using cookies shall have their path set to an appropriate restrictive value for the site. The domain cookie shall not be set. | Yes | Yes | <p>The cookie created for the storing the session tokens is managed by PLAY. Cookies are signed with a secret key so the client can't modify the cookie data (or it will be invalidated).</p> | <p>Cigital : The path gives the chance to specify a directory where the cookie is active. Usually the path is set to /, which means the cookie is valid throughout the entire domain. Cookie path should be set to the application restrictive path.</p> <p>Bosch : Play framework support. No change required.</p> |
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| | V2.14 | Duplicate concurrent user sessions from different machines shall be prevented (NIST SP 800-53 800-53 Control AC-10). | Yes | Yes | Same user cannot login through 2 different machines concurrently. Initially the second user trying to login is asked for a confirmation on whether he wants to logout from his already logged in session. If yes, then a new session is created and first user is logged out. This is handled using a static hashmap maintained for already logged users with username as a key. | |
| HBT-SEC-012 0 - Access Control | V3.1 | All functions in the system can be accessed only by authorized and authenticated users with the appropriate rights. | Yes | Yes | This is implemented using the deadbolt plugin for the PLAY framework. All the functions are provided access based on the user roles and permissions. | |
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| V3.2 | Users can only access secured urls for which the are authorized and authenticated | Yes | Yes | All HBS applications are SSL enabled. All the client-server communication is made over HTTPS protocol. | |
| V3.3 | Users shall only be able to access secure files, if they are authorized (not applicable for HB Tools, since no secure files are used) | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No secure files are ever accessed by the user directly. | Currently no feature in HBS enables access to the files on the server through web UI. |
| V3.4 | Direct Object references are protected so that only authorized users can get access | Yes | Yes | Object references not exposed or sent over the URL as a plain text. References such as patient id's etc are encrypted and sent to the server. | |
| V3.5 | Directory browsing is disabled unless desired for business reasons. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No function provides directory browsing. | |

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| V3.6 | The system shall ensure, that users do not access protected data for which they have no authentication | Yes | Yes | This is implemented using the deadbolt plugin for the PLAY framework. All the functions are provided access based on the user roles and permissions. | |
| V3.7 | Access Control shall fail securely. | Yes | Yes | Failure of any access control operations display a valid error message describing of the unauthorised access. | |
| V3.8 | All access control rules shall be applied on presentation layer as well as server side | Yes | Yes | Access control is handled at the controller level for every action defined. Few operations infact do check for some specific permissions for different conditions at the server side as per the defined | |
| V3.9 | Access controls shall not be manipulable by users. | Yes | Yes | Access control check is done on the server side and no user interaction is involved in the process. | |

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| V3.10 | All access controls shall be enforced on the server side. | Yes | Yes | Access control is handled at the controller level for every action defined. Few operations infact do check for some specific permissions for different conditions at the server side as per the defined requirements | |
| V3.11 | Access control decisions shall be logged (NIST SP 800-53 800-53 Control AU-2) | No | Yes | Access control decisions are logged only in the log files. | <p>Cigital : If we authorization is denied, log it to file as of now. Later can be invested to check with Splunk integration.</p> <p>Bosch : Unauthorized access are getting logged into the file.</p> |
| V3.12 | The Application or framework shall generate and verify strong random anti-CSRF tokens unique to the user as part of all high value transactions. | No | Yes | Play supports CSRF guard protection and is applied for every request. The implementation is In-Progress. | |
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| | V3.13 | The system shall protect against aggregate or continuous access of information requiring access control (Lower priority compared to previous controls) | Yes | Yes | All access controls currently implemented is managed deadbolt frameowrk and doesn't allow access, if the user is not authorised. As of now, this is not of high priority. | <p>Cigital : Velocity checking on access control is good option. If the number of attempts to access an authorized resources (even from an authenticated user) exceeds defined number, then just log him out.</p> <p>Bosch : Need to investigate more on implementation perspective if taken in consideration. Not of that priority as all the necessary check is in place to validate the access control and deny access if user is not authorised.</p> |
| HBT-SEC-013 0 - Input Validation | V4.1 | The runtime environment shall not be susceptible to buffer overflows or controls additional controls prevent buffer overflow. | Yes | Yes | Proper input validation is performed on all the request parameters. | HBT-SEC-013 0 - Input Validation |

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| V4.2 | The runtime environment shall not be susceptible to SQL Injection or shall provide security controls to prevent SQL Injection | Yes | Yes | Cigital didn't find any SQL injection within the system. Application is supported by Hibernate internally. | |
| V4.3 | The runtime environment shall not be susceptible to Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) or shall provide security controls to prevent Cross-Site-Scripting. | Yes | Yes | All input http request parameters are passed through an XSS filter to check for any vulnerabilities. | |
| V4.4 | The runtime environment shall not be susceptible to LDAP Injection (if applicable) | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not applicable to HB Desktop | |
| V4.5 | The runtime environment shall not be susceptible to OS Command injections or shall provide security controls to prevent OS Command injection. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | V32 is being eliminated from R7.5.1. No HBS application should have this vulnerability. | |
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| V4.6 | Input validation failures shall result in rejection of the input | Yes | Yes | All the input fields presented to the user are validated both on client and server and also passed through a XSS filter to check for CSRF attack. | |
| V4.7 | Input validation or encoding routines shall be performed and enforced on the server side of the application. | Yes | Yes | Input validations and Output encoding is handled as part of the current implementation. Input fields are validated across the XSS filter before being validated for across business rules set. | |
| V4.8 | The system shall properly escape output to HTML for untrusted data | Yes | Yes | Play supports scala programming in HTML. This supports mapping POJO to the HTML form fields directly. Output encoding is being incorporated. | |

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| V4.9 | The system shall specify a character set (e.g. UTF-8) for all sources of input | Yes | Yes | Application uses char set UTF-8 as defined. Meanwhile also supports ISO-8859-1 | |
| V4.10 | The system shall canonicalize input data for all downstream decoders or interpreters prior to validation | No | Yes | All the input request params are canonicalized and validated across a validation pattern. | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Canonicalization,_locale_and_Unicode |
| V4.11 | If the Application allows automatic mass parameter assignment (also called automatic variable binding) from the inbound request to the a model, it shall ensure that security sensitive fields such as role or password are protected from malicious automatic binding | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | | |
| V4.12 | The system shall provide defense against HTTP | Yes | Yes | Play server assigns the value of the last occurrence of same name | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_HTTP_Parameter_pollution |

Parameter
pollution
attacks.

HTTP
parameter
currently as
tested.

According to the OWASP, if existing input validation and other security mechanisms are sufficient on single inputs, and if the server assigns only the first or last polluted parameters, then parameter pollution does not reveal a vulnerability. If the duplicate parameters are concatenated, different web application components use different occurrences or testing generates an error, there is an increased likelihood of being able to use parameter pollution to trigger

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| | | | | | security vulnerabilities. | |
| HBT-SEC-0140 - Cryptography at rest | V5.1 | The system shall implement all cryptographic functions used to protect secrets from the user on the server side. | Yes | Yes | All the user credentials and other sensitive information like (patient id's) are passed encrypted. Hashing is used to store the passwords along with the salt. | |
| | V5.2 | All cryptographic modules shall fail securely, in case the fail. | Yes | Yes | In case of failure, proper error message is display to the user without mentioning the actual cause or any sensitive data. | |
| | V5.3 | All access to master secrets shall be protected from unauthorized access. | Yes | Yes | Encryption keys are not stored on the file. Its randomly generated on server startup and stored and a static variable. | |
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| V5.4 | All information generated using randomization (numbers, GUIDs, strings) shall use the cryptographic module's approved random number generator in case the values are intended to be unguessable by an attacker. | Yes | Yes | Java secured random API is used to generate. | |
| V5.5 | Cryptographic modules used by the Application shall be validated against FIPS 140-2. (Applicable for FISMA compliant applications) | No | Yes | MD5 is currently used for hashing for passwords. These will be modified in R 7.5.1 to SHA - 256. | |

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| HBT-SEC-015 0 - Secure Error handling and Logging | V6.1 | The Application shall not output error messages or stack traces containing sensitive data, that could assist an attacker (including session id and personal information) | Partial | Yes | All the user displayed error messages are clean and doesn't contain any sensitive data. Log file needs to be relooked for any PHI traces. This will be addressed in PAT R 7.5.1. | |
| | V6.2 | All error handling shall be performed on the application server as a trusted device. | Yes | Yes | | |
| | V6.3 | All logging controls shall be implemented on the server side. | Yes | Yes | Complete logging control is done on server side. This includes log4j framework logging and audit logs for specific event like login etc. | |
| | V6.4 | Error handling logic in security controls shall deny access by default. | Yes | Yes | By default system deny access from all the security controls. Example : False is set as default for the input validations controls. | |
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| V6.5 | Security logging controls (such as authentication) shall log both success and failure events | Yes | Yes | Login success entry is logged in LOGIN_ENT_SUCCESS_LOG. Login failure entry is logged in LOGIN_FAILURE_LOG. | |
| V6.6 | Log events shall include (NIST Control AU-14-2) | Yes | Yes | | |
| | - Time stamp | | | | |
| | - The originating component creating the audit log) | | | | |
| | - Indication, if the log event is originating from a security related control if mixed with other events | | | | |
| | - The user identity of the user causing the event | | | | |
| | - The source IP address associated with the event | | | | |
| | - Success or failure of the event | | | | |
| | - A description of the event | | | | |

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| V6.7 | Logs related to security events shall be protected from unauthorized access. | Yes | Yes | <p>Cigital : OS File system restriction is provided on all the log folders.</p> <p>Bosch : Is taken care by defining permissions by ETS infrastructure team for every user.</p> | |
| V6.8 | The application shall not log application specific sensitive data, which could assist an attacker (such as session IDs, or personal information such as clean names or PII beyond sole application specific identifiers) | Partial | Yes | Log file needs to be relooked for any PHI traces. This will be addressed in PAT R 7.5.1. | |
| V6.9 | The logs shall be accessible to log analysis tools for authorized personnel. | Yes | Yes | | |

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| HBT-SEC-016 0 - Data Protection | V7.1 | The Application shall disable client side caching (including auto-complete if not required for business reasons) for all forms containing sensitive information by default. Auto-compelte should be disabled per default. | Yes | Yes | Sensitive information is not cached on client side anywhere. | |
| | V7.2 | All sensitive data shall be sent to the server in the HTTP message body (e.g. URL parameters are not used to send sensitive data). | Yes | Yes | All the sensitive data is passed as POST request to server encrypted. | |

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| V7.3 | All cached or temporary copies of sensitive data sent to the client shall be protected from unauthorized access or shall be purged/invalidated after the authorized user accessed it (e.g. no-cache and no-store cache-Control headers are set) | Yes | Yes | Cookies and cached information is cleared and deleted on logout or session timeout. | |
| V7.4 | All cached or temporary copies of sensitive data stored on the server shall be protected from unauthorized access or shall be purged/invalidated after the authorized user accessed it. | Yes | Yes | Cached information on the server pertaining to the user is cleared on user logout or session timeout. | |

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| HBT-SEC-017 0 - Communications Security | V8.1 | The application shall ensure that a path can be built from a trusted Certificate Authority to each Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificate. | Yes | Yes | CA certified certificates are used with SSL enabled in play framework, | |
| | V8.2 | The application shall use valid server certificates. | Yes | Yes | Valid CA certified server certificates are used. | |
| | V8.3 | The application shall use TLS (most current version of TLS at implementation finish) for all connections that are authenticated or The application shall log TLS connection failures on the back-end | Yes | Yes | TLS [SSL 3.1] is used for all client-server communications. | |
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| V8.4 | The application shall ensure that connections to any external systems involving sensitive information are authenticated | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | | |
| V8.5 | The application shall ensure that connections to external systems that involve sensitive information or functions use a "user" that has the minimum required privileges necessary to perform the function | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | | |

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| HBT-SEC-018 0 - HTTP Security | V9.1 | The application shall accept only a defined set of HTTP Request methods such as GET and POST. Unused methods shall be explicitly blocked | Yes | Yes | All the requests are either GET or POST defined in routes config. Any request sent with request methods other than GET/POST or the one defined in the routes will be blocked implicitly by the PLAY. | |
| | V9.2 | The application shall ensure that every HTTP response contains a content type header specifying a safe character set (such as UTF-8) | Yes | Yes | Charset ISO-8859-1 is used. | |
| | V9.3 | HTTP headers shall be included protecting against click jacking attacks. | Yes | Yes | Configuring all pages within the application to send the XFRAME-OP TIONS header with the DENY or SAMEORIGIN values or using an frame-breaker script in the pages needed protection | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking_Protection_for_Java_EE |

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| | V9.4 | HTTP headers shall contain only printable ASCII characters in both request and response. | Yes | Yes | Charset ISO-8859-1 is used. | |
| HBT-SEC-019 0 - Business Logic Security | V11.1 | The application shall process all high value business logic in a trusted environment (such as a protected and monitored server) | Yes | Yes | All business process are executed on the server hosted in a secured environment. All communication with the server is over HTTPS. | |
| | V11.2 | The application shall prevent spoofing transactions such as allowing attacker "user A" to process a transaction as victim "user B" by tampering with sessions or replaying sessions, transaction states or user ID | Yes | Yes | Cookies are signed with a secret key so the client can't modify the cookie data (or it will be invalidated). | |
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| V11.3 | The application shall be protect against repudiation attacks including verifiable and protected transaction logs, audit trails or system logs. | Yes | Yes | All the user sensitive information identifying the valid system user is encrypted and sent through the POST request method to the server for every action. None of such data is stored in cookie or passed in URL parameter allowing attacker to forge | https://www.o-wasp.org/index.php/Repudiation_Attack |
| V11.4 | The application shall prevent information disclosure attacks such as direct object reference, tampering, session brute force or other | Yes | Yes | This is duplicate of V1.8 and V3.4 | |

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| V11.5 | The application shall have sufficient detection and controls to protect against brute force or denial of service attacks | Yes | Yes | <p>Brute force Duplicate of V3.4.</p> <p>DoS attack makes the resources unavailable for valid users and the entire system becomes unresponsive after some time. This may occur because of many programming vulnerability.</p> <p>The DoS attack is highly possible when dealing with XML entities through XML injection. Polluting the XML entity with dump values and falling in an endless loop.</p> <p>Pat/Tools application code is reviewed to verify for any such possibilities. Standard Proxy has taken care of XML injection attack.</p> | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Denial_of_Service |
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| V11.6 | The application shall prevent "elevation of privilege" attacks such as allowing anonymous users access of secure data or functions or allowing users to access each others detailed or privileged functions. | Yes | Yes | This is implemented using the deadbolt plugin for the PLAY framework. All the functions are provided access based on the user roles and permissions. | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation |
| V11.7 | The application shall only process business flow steps in sequential step order with all steps processed in realistic human time. It shall not process out of order, skipped steps, process steps of another user | Yes | Yes | Business implementation addresses this effectively. In web based applications, all the workflows are processed sequentially. | |
| V11.8 | The application shall ensure that url redirects and forwards do not include unvalidated data. | Yes | Yes | | |

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| HBT-SEC-020 0 - Files and Resources | V12.1 | The application shall canonicalize file names and path data from untrusted sources to eliminate path traversal attacks. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Need to be checked when trying to upload file during photo upload feature of user preferences. | |
| | V12.2 | In case files from untrusted sources are used, those files should be scanned by the system's anti virus scanner to prevent upload of known malicious code. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | System accepts only a set of file extensions like jpeg,gif etc | |
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| V12.3 | Parameters obtained from untrusted sources shall not be used in manipulating file names, path names or any file system object without being canonicalized and input validated to prevent local file inclusion attacks. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | <p>None of the features in HBS applications accepts parameters for usage in requires, include or similar functions. Does this have an impact on local file upload mechanism(e. g photo) in web based application ?</p> <p>Cigital : User input should not be used directly for constructing a file name present on the local server as such. Input should be first input validated and canonicalized.</p> <p>Bosch : Doesn't apply to us.</p> | |
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| V12.4 | Parameters obtained from untrusted sources shall be canonicalized, input validated and output encoded to prevent remote file inclusion attacks. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | <p>This is somewhat similar to the local file inclusion attacks, with the difference of file being injected from a remote server. Like local file inclusion, none of the features in HBS applications accepts parameters for usage in requires, include or similar functions.</p> <p>Cigital : User input should not be used directly for constructing a file name located remotely on the server as such. Input should be first input validated and canonicalized.</p> <p>Bosch : Doesn't apply to us.</p> | |
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| V12.5 | Remote IFRAMES and HTML 5 cross domain resource sharing shall not allow inclusion of arbitrary remote content. | Yes | Yes | Addressed as part of remedy for click jacking attack. | |
| V12.6 | The Application shall store files obtained from an untrusted source outside the webroot. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Data received from the files are stored in the db as clob. | |
| V12.7 | The Application server shall by default be configured to deny access to remote resources or systems outside the application server. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No feature in the existing system enables file access outside application server. | |
| V12.8 | The application code shall not execute uploaded data obtained from untrusted sources. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | | |
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| | V12.9 | In case Flash, Silverlight or other rich internet applications are used, the corresponding cross domain resource sharing configuration shall be configured to prevent unauthenticated or unauthorized remote access. | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No feature in the existing system supports this feature. | |
| HBT-SEC-0420 - General Audit Log Requirements | | The system shall keep an audit log on selected activities. These activities include at minimum | Yes | Yes | All the authentication (success, failure, softlock) are logged into the audit logs.Other activities are managed by log framework, audit log for such activities will not be addressed due to the performance issues. | |
| | | Authentication events | | | | |
| | | User Management events | | | | |
| | | Execution of SQL reports | | | | |
| | | Modifications of Account preferences | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | Audit logs shall include | | | | |
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| | | 1. Type of event | | | | |
| | | 2. Date/time of the Event)based on internal system time and mappable to UTC) | | | | |
| | | 3. Result of the event | | | | |
| | | 4. Description of the event | | | | |
| | | 5. Identity of involved users | | | | |

Please follow the link to find the update on the Cigital and VA audit issue remediation identified in R7 release.

[HBS R7.x Security issue remediation](#)