

Tutorials

Week 8

Pdf file on Blackboard	Dataset on Blackboard	Papers related to the datasets	Description
C.13.3	Kielmc.dta	K.A. Kiel and K.T. McClain (1995): House Prices During Siting Decision Stages: The Case of an Incinerator from Rumor Through Operation, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28, 241-255.	Dif-in-dif estimator
C.7.13	apple.dta	Van Ravenswaay, E.O and Blend, J.R. (1998): Consumer Demand for Ecolabeled apples: Survey Methods and Descriptive Results, AgEconsearch, 98-20, 1-45. 10.22004/ag.econ.11645	Estimation of Linear Probability Model (LPM).
C.7.8	loanapp.dta	W.C. Hunter and M.B. Walker (1996): The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 13, 57-70.	Estimation with probit model, calculation of marginal effects, comparison logit model.
C.17.2	loanapp.dta	W.C. Hunter and M.B. Walker (1996): The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 13, 57-70.	Estimation the restricted model, estimation with logit, probit fitted values, LPM.

C3 Use the data in KIELMC.RAW for this exercise.

- (i) The variable *dist* is the distance from each home to the incinerator site, in feet. Consider the model

$$\log(\text{price}) = \beta_0 + \delta_0 y81 + \beta_1 \log(\text{dist}) + \delta_1 y81 \cdot \log(\text{dist}) + u.$$

If building the incinerator reduces the value of homes closer to the site, what is the sign of δ_1 ? What does it mean if $\beta_1 > 0$?

- (ii) Estimate the model from part (i) and report the results in the usual form. Interpret the coefficient on $y81 \cdot \log(\text{dist})$. What do you conclude?
- (iii) Add *age*, *age*², *rooms*, *baths*, $\log(\text{intst})$, $\log(\text{land})$, and $\log(\text{area})$ to the equation. Now, what do you conclude about the effect of the incinerator on housing values?
- (iv) Why is the coefficient on $\log(\text{dist})$ positive and statistically significant in part (ii) but not in part (iii)? What does this say about the controls used in part (iii)?



(i) **Model Specification:** $\log(\text{price}) = \beta_0 + \delta_0 y_{81} + \beta_1 \log(\text{dist}) + \delta_1 y_{81} * \log(\text{dist}) + u$

```
. reg lprice y81 ldist y81ldist
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	321
Model	24.3172548	3	8.10575159	F(3, 317)	=	69.22
Residual	37.1217306	317	.117103251	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3958
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3901
Total	61.4389853	320	.191996829	Root MSE	=	.3422

lprice	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
y81	-.0113101	.8050622	-0.01	0.989	-1.59525	1.57263
ldist	.316689	.0515323	6.15	0.000	.2153005	.4180775
y81ldist	.0481862	.0817929	0.59	0.556	-.1127394	.2091117
_cons	8.058468	.5084358	15.85	0.000	7.058133	9.058803

Other things equal, homes farther from the incinerator should be worth more, so $\delta_1 > 0$. If $\beta_1 > 0$, then the incinerator was located farther away from more expensive homes.

Additional: interpret the coefficient on $\log(\text{dist})$ $\widehat{\beta}_1$ and its statistical significance. Is $\widehat{\delta}_1$ it statistically different from zero?

(ii) The estimated equation is:

$$\log(\text{price}) = 8.06 - .011 y81 + .317 \log(\text{dist}) + .048 y81 \cdot \log(\text{dist})$$

(0.51) (.805) (.052) (.082)

$$n = 321, R^2 = .396, \bar{R}^2 = .390.$$

While $\hat{\delta}_1 = .048$ is the expected sign, it is not statistically significant (t statistic $\approx .59$).

- For houses sold in 1981, a 1% increase in distance is associated with an additional 0.048% increase in the price of the house compared to houses sold in other years.
- However, due to its lack of statistical significance (p-value 0.556), we cannot confidently assert that this interaction has a meaningful impact on house prices.

(iii)

```
. reg lprice y81 ldist y81ldist age agesq rooms baths lintst lland larea
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 321		
Model	48.353762	10	4.8353762	F(10, 310)	=	114.55
Residual	13.0852234	310	.042210398	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.7870
				Adj R-squared	=	0.7802
Total	61.4389853	320	.191996829	Root MSE	=	.20545

lprice	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
y81	-.2254466	.4946914	-0.46	0.649	-1.198824	.7479309
ldist	.0009226	.0446168	0.02	0.984	-.0868674	.0887125
y81ldist	.0624668	.0502788	1.24	0.215	-.036464	.1613976
age	-.0080075	.0014173	-5.65	0.000	-.0107962	-.0052187
agesq	.0000357	8.71e-06	4.10	0.000	.0000186	.0000528
rooms	.0461389	.0173442	2.66	0.008	.0120117	.0802662
baths	.1010478	.0278224	3.63	0.000	.0463032	.1557924
lintst	-.0599757	.0317217	-1.89	0.060	-.1223929	.0024414
lland	.0953425	.0247252	3.86	0.000	.046692	.143993
larea	.3507429	.0519485	6.75	0.000	.2485266	.4529592
_cons	7.673854	.5015718	15.30	0.000	6.686938	8.660769

- When we add the list of housing characteristics to the regression, the coefficient on $y81 * \log(dist)$ becomes 0.062 (se=0.050). The estimated effect is larger – the elasticity of price with respect to $dist$ is 0.062 after the incinerator site was chosen - but its t-statistics is only 1.24.
- One could conclude that there is no evidence in favor of a positive effect. → **Show H_0 , H_1 , rejection area, etc.**

(iv) After including further home specifications, the variable distance is not significant anymore (p-value: 0.98 vs. 0.00). The controls used in part (iii) signaled that the housing characteristics capture differences between houses close and far away from the incinerator.

C13 Use the data in APPLE.RAW to answer this question.

- (i) Define a binary variable as $ecobuy = 1$ if $ecolbs > 0$ and $ecobuy = 0$ if $ecolbs = 0$. In other words, $ecobuy$ indicates whether, at the prices given, a family would buy any ecologically friendly apples. What fraction of families claim they would buy ecolabeled apples?
- (ii) Estimate the linear probability model

$$ecobuy = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ecoprc + \beta_2 regprc + \beta_3 faminc + \beta_4 hhsize + \beta_5 educ + \beta_6 age + u,$$

and report the results in the usual form. Carefully interpret the coefficients on the price variables.

- (iii) Are the nonprice variables jointly significant in the LPM? (Use the usual F statistic, even though it is not valid when there is heteroskedasticity.) Which explanatory variable other than the price variables seems to have the most important effect on the decision to buy ecolabeled apples? Does this make sense to you?
- (iv) In the model from part (ii), replace $faminc$ with $\log(faminc)$. Which model fits the data better, using $faminc$ or $\log(faminc)$? Interpret the coefficient on $\log(faminc)$.
- (v) In the estimation in part (iv), how many estimated probabilities are negative? How many are bigger than one? Should you be concerned?
- (vi) For the estimation in part (iv), compute the percent correctly predicted for each outcome, $ecobuy = 0$ and $ecobuy = 1$. Which outcome is best predicted by the model?

i) First, generate the dummy variable:

ecobuy = 1 if ecolbs > 0 → if at prices given, a family would buy ecological apples.

ecobuy = 0, if ecolbs = 0

ecolbs: quantity eco-labeled apples, lbs

```
. gen ecobuy= ecolbs>0
```

Create a table of frequency:

```
. tab ecobuy
```

ecobuy	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	248	37.58	37.58
1	412	62.42	100.00
Total	660	100.00	

62.42% of the families claim they would buy ecolabelled apples.

(ii) What are the price variables?

Ecoprc : price of eco-labeled apples

Regprc: price of regular apples

```
. reg ecobuy ecoprc regprc faminc hhsize educ age, rob
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 660

F(6, 653) = 14.93

Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.1098

Root MSE = .45939

ecobuy	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ecoprc	-.8026219	.1056678	-7.60	0.000	-1.010112	-.5951321
regprc	.7192675	.1302317	5.52	0.000	.463544	.9749911
faminc	.0005518	.0005245	1.05	0.293	-.0004781	.0015817
hhsize	.0238227	.0124672	1.91	0.056	-.0006579	.0483033
educ	.0247849	.0084565	2.93	0.003	.0081796	.0413901
age	-.0005008	.0012655	-0.40	0.692	-.0029858	.0019842
_cons	.4236865	.1677529	2.53	0.012	.0942864	.7530867

- If *ecoprc* increases by, say, 10 cents (.10), then the probability of buying eco-labeled apples falls by about .080, c.p.
- If *regprc* increases by 10 cents, the probability of buying eco-labeled apples increases by about .072, c.p.
- We can assume that both sorts of apples are substitutes. – cross-price elasticity.



(iii) There are four non price variables: *hhsiz*e, *faminc*, *educ* and *age*

```
. reg ecobuy ecoprc regprc faminc hhsiz educ age, rob
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 660

F(6, 653) = 14.93
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1098
Root MSE = .45939

```
. test faminc hhsiz educ age
```

(1) faminc = 0
(2) hhsiz = 0
(3) educ = 0
(4) age = 0

F(4, 653) = 4.24
Prob > F = 0.0021

*hhsiz*e: household size
faminc: family income,
thousands
educ: years schooling
age: in years

	ecobuy	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ecoprc		-.8026219	.1056678	-7.60	0.000	-1.010112 -.5951321
regprc		.7192675	.1302317	5.52	0.000	.463544 .9749911
faminc		.0005518	.0005245	1.05	0.293	-.0004781 .0015817
hhsiz		.0238227	.0124672	1.91	0.056	-.0006579 .0483033
educ		.0247849	.0084565	2.93	0.003	.0081796 .0413901
age		-.0005008	.0012655	-0.40	0.692	-.0029858 .0019842
_cons		.4236865	.1677529	2.53	0.012	.0942864 .7530867

They are jointly significant at 1% level of significance.

For the exam, you have to write all the statistical steps.

- The F test, with 4 and 653 df , is 4.23, with p -value = .0021. Thus, based on the usual F -test, the four non-price variables are jointly very significant. Of the four variables, *educ* appears to have the most important effect.
- For example, a difference of four years of education implies an increase of $.025(4) = .10$ in the estimated probability of buying eco-labeled apples. This suggests that more highly educated people are more open to buying products that is environmentally friendly, which is perhaps expected. Household size (*hhsiz*e) also has an effect.
- Comparing a couple with two children to one with no children – other factors equal – the couple with two children has a .048 higher probability of buying eco-labeled apples.



(iv) Compare both models and decide which fits better. Interpret log(faminc)

```
. gen lfaminc=ln(faminc)
```

```
. reg ecobuy ecoprc regprc lfaminc hhsize educ age, rob
```

Linear regression

```
Number of obs =    660
F(   6,   653) =   15.24
Prob > F       =  0.0000
R-squared      =  0.1116
Root MSE     =  .45893
```

	ecobuy	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ecoprc		-.8006664	.1055406	-7.59	0.000	-1.007906	-.5934265
regprc		.721377	.1298925	5.55	0.000	.4663197	.9764343
lfaminc		.0445162	.0292792	1.52	0.129	-.0129766	.102009
hhsize		.0227002	.0124989	1.82	0.070	-.0018426	.0472429
educ		.023093	.0085234	2.71	0.007	.0063564	.0398296
age		-.0003865	.0012645	-0.31	0.760	-.0028695	.0020964
_cons		.3037519	.1817885	1.67	0.095	-.0532087	.6607125

```
. reg ecobuy ecoprc regprc faminc hhsize educ age, rob
```

Linear regression

```
Number of obs =    660
F(   6,   653) =   14.93
Prob > F       =  0.0000
R-squared      =  0.1098
Root MSE     =  .45939
```

	ecobuy	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ecoprc		-.8026219	.1056678	-7.60	0.000	-1.010112	-.5951321
regprc		.7192675	.1302317	5.52	0.000	.463544	.9749911
faminc		.0005518	.0005245	1.05	0.293	-.0004781	.0015817
hhsize		.0238227	.0124672	1.91	0.056	-.0006579	.0483033
educ		.0247849	.0084565	2.93	0.003	.0081796	.0413901
age		-.0005008	.0012655	-0.40	0.692	-.0029858	.0019842
_cons		.4236865	.1677529	2.53	0.012	.0942864	.7530867

- The model with log(*faminc*) fits the data slightly better: the *R*-squared increases to about .112. (We would not expect a large increase in *R*-squared from a simple change in the functional form.)
- The coefficient on log(*faminc*) is about .045 ($t = 1.52$).
- **Level-log interpretation:** holding other factors fixed, one percentage increase in family income leads to 0.00045 higher probability of families buying eco-labelled apples.
- If log(*faminc*) increases by .10, which means roughly a 10% increase in *faminc*, then $P(ecobuy = 1)$ is estimated to increase by about .0045, a pretty small effect.



(v) To know how many probabilities are negative, and how to deal with that:

```
. predict yhat  
(option xb assumed; fitted values)
```

```
. gen above=yhat>1
```

```
. gen below=yhat<0
```

```
. tab above
```

above	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	658	99.70	99.70
1	2	0.30	100.00
Total	660	100.00	

```
. tab below
```

below	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	660	100.00	100.00
Total	660	100.00	

- The fitted probabilities range from about .185 to 1.051, so none are negative.
- There are two fitted probabilities above 1, which is not a source of concern with 660 observations.
- Probabilities can be above. However, we can assume (in this example) that the above 1 probabilities represent 1.
- None of the estimated probabilities are below 0.



(vi) We need to choose a cutoff value to convert the estimated probabilities into a dummy variable. Without additional information, we choose 50% as the cutoff value. If the estimated probability of purchasing eco-labeled apples is above 50%, our model predicts that the household will buy eco-labeled apples.

Cross-tabulate $ecobuy=1$ and $ecobuy=0$

```
. gen estecobuy=yhat>.5
. tab estecobuy ecobuy
```

estecobuy	ecobuy 0	1	Total
0	102	72	174
1	146	340	486
Total	248	412	660

- Using the standard prediction rule – predict one when $ecobuy_i \geq 0.5$ and zero otherwise –gives the fraction correctly predicted for $ecobuy = 0$ as $102/248 \approx .411$, so about 41.1%.
- The model correctly predicts $340/412 = 0.825$, that is 82.5% of the cases when a family bought eco-labeled apples.
- With the usual prediction rule, the model performs better for families that buy ecolabeled apples.
- The model correctly predicts 442 cases out of 660, which is 67%. This is a pseudo R^2 and describes the overall fit of the model.

- C8** Use the data in LOANAPP.RAW for this exercise. The binary variable to be explained is *approve*, which is equal to one if a mortgage loan to an individual was approved. The key explanatory variable is *white*, a dummy variable equal to one if the applicant was white. The other applicants in the data set are black and Hispanic.

To test for discrimination in the mortgage loan market, a linear probability model can be used:

$$\text{approve} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{white} + \text{other factors}.$$

- (i) If there is discrimination against minorities, and the appropriate factors have been controlled for, what is the sign of β_1 ?
- (ii) Regress *approve* on *white* and report the results in the usual form. Interpret the coefficient on *white*. Is it statistically significant? Is it practically large?
- (iii) As controls, add the variables *hrat*, *obrat*, *loanprc*, *unem*, *male*, *married*, *dep*, *sch*, *cosign*, *chist*, *pubrec*, *mortlat1*, *mortlat2*, and *vr*. What happens to the coefficient on *white*? Is there still evidence of discrimination against nonwhites?
- (iv) Now, allow the effect of race to interact with the variable measuring other obligations as a percentage of income (*obrat*). Is the interaction term significant?
- (v) Using the model from part (iv), what is the effect of being white on the probability of approval when *obrat* = 32, which is roughly the mean value in the sample? Obtain a 95% confidence interval for this effect.

(i) If the appropriate factors have been controlled for, $\beta_1 > 0$ signals discrimination against minorities: a white person has a greater chance of having a loan approved, other relevant factors fixed.

(ii) The simple regression results are

$$\text{approve} = .708 + .201 \text{ white} \\ (.018) \quad (.020)$$

$$n = 1,989, \quad R^2 = .049.$$

```
. reg approve white, rob
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 1989
F(1, 1987) = 55.75
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.0489
Root MSE = .3201

	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
approve						
white	.2005957	.0268651	7.47	0.000	.147909	.2532824
_cons	.7077922	.0259264	27.30	0.000	.6569465	.758638

- The coefficient on *white* means that, in the sample of 1,989 loan applications, an application submitted by a white applicant was 20 percentage points more likely to be approved than that of a nonwhite applicant.
- It is statistically significant 1% , and the *t* statistic is 7.47.
- 20% more chance of getting the application approved is a significant difference.

(iii) Is there still evidence for discrimination against non-whites?

```
. reg approve white hrat obrat loanprc unem male married dep sch cosign chist pubrec
mortlat1 mortlat2
> vr, rob
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 1971
 F(15, 1955) = 14.98
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.1656
 Root MSE = .30208

```
. des hrat obrat loanprc unem male married dep sch cosign chist pubrec mortlat1 mortlat2 vr
```

variable name	storage type	display format	value label	variable label
hrat	float	%9.0g		housing exp. % total inc
obrat	float	%9.0g		other oblgs. % total inc
loanprc	float	%9.0g		amt/price
unem	float	%9.0g		unemployment rate by industry
male	byte	%9.0g		=1 if applicant male
married	byte	%9.0g		=1 if applicant married
dep	byte	%9.0g		number of dependents
sch	byte	%9.0g		=1 if > 12 years schooling
cosign	byte	%9.0g		is there a cosigner
chist	byte	%9.0g		=0 if accnts deliq. >= 60 days
pubrec	byte	%9.0g		=1 if filed bankruptcy
mortlat1	byte	%9.0g		one or two late payments
mortlat2	byte	%9.0g		> 2 late payments
vr	byte	%9.0g		=1 if tract vac rte > MSA med

		Robust				
		Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
approve						
white		.1288196	.0258693	4.98	0.000	.0780852 .179554
hrat		.001833	.001467	1.25	0.212	-.0010441 .0047101
obrat		-.0054318	.001331	-4.08	0.000	-.0080421 -.0028215
loanprc		-.1473001	.0378351	-3.89	0.000	-.2215013 -.0730988
unem		-.0072989	.0037122	-1.97	0.049	-.0145792 -.0000187
male		-.0041441	.0193044	-0.21	0.830	-.0420035 .0337152
married		.0458241	.0172374	2.66	0.008	.0120186 .0796296
dep		-.0068274	.0069038	-0.99	0.323	-.0203669 .0067122
sch		.0017525	.017146	0.10	0.919	-.0318739 .0353789
cosign		.0097722	.0395825	0.25	0.805	-.0678561 .0874005
chist		.1330267	.0246202	5.40	0.000	.0847421 .1813114
pubrec		-.2419268	.0427922	-5.65	0.000	-.3258498 -.1580037
mortlat1		-.0572511	.0662234	-0.86	0.387	-.1871269 .0726247
mortlat2		-.1137234	.0910697	-1.25	0.212	-.2923274 .0648806
vr		-.0314408	.0144855	-2.17	0.030	-.0598493 -.0030322
_cons		.9367312	.0593886	15.77	0.000	.8202595 1.053203

- Yes, there is still evidence for discrimination against non-whites. It is represented by an increase of 12.9 percentage points in the probability of mortgage loan approval for white individuals compared to non-white individuals.
- The coefficient has fallen by some margin because we are now controlling for factors that should affect loan approval rates, and some of these differ by race.
- The race effect is still strong and very significant (t statistic = 4.98).

(iv) Now, create an interaction term: (other obligations * white)

```
. gen white_ohrat=white*ohrat

. reg approve white hrat ohrat white_ohrat loanprc unem male married dep sch cosign
chist pubrec mortl
> at1 mortlat2 vr, rob
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 1971
F(16, 1954) = 14.41
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1709
Root MSE = .30119

approve	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
white	-.1459751	.1050932	-1.39	0.165	-.3520816	.0601314
hrat	.0017897	.0014702	1.22	0.224	-.0010938	.0046731
ohrat	-.0122262	.0030209	-4.05	0.000	-.0181507	-.0063017
white ohrat	.0080879	.0031094	2.60	0.009	.0019897	.0141861
loanprc	-.1525356	.0381022	-4.00	0.000	-.2272607	-.0778105
unem	-.0075281	.0036972	-2.04	0.042	-.0147789	-.0002772
male	-.0060154	.0191269	-0.31	0.753	-.0435267	.0314958
married	.0455358	.0172009	2.65	0.008	.0118018	.0792699
dep	-.00763	.0068808	-1.11	0.268	-.0211245	.0058646
sch	.0017766	.0171474	0.10	0.917	-.0318526	.0354058
cosign	.0177091	.0386821	0.46	0.647	-.0581535	.0935716
chist	.1298548	.0245869	5.28	0.000	.0816354	.1780742
pubrec	-.240325	.0429733	-5.59	0.000	-.3246034	-.1560467
mortlat1	-.0627819	.0653656	-0.96	0.337	-.1909755	.0654116
mortlat2	-.1268446	.0903701	-1.40	0.161	-.3040764	.0503872
vr	-.0305396	.0144395	-2.12	0.035	-.0588579	-.0022212
_cons	1.180648	.1106498	10.67	0.000	.9636445	1.397652

- The white coefficient becomes statistically insignificant, while the interaction variable yields a significant, positive coefficient.
- The interactive effect suggests that the percentage of other obligations mattered less in the approval of mortgage requests by whites than by non-whites.

(v)

```
. nlcom _b[white]+_b[white_obrat]*32
```

```
    _nl_1:  _b[white]+_b[white_obrat]*32
```

	approve	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	+						
	_nl_1	.1128382	.0255754	4.41	0.000	.0627114	.162965

- Replace $white * obrat$ with $white * (obrat - 32)$; the coefficient on $white$ is now the race differential when $obrat = 32$.
- We obtain about .113 and $se = .025$. So, the 95% confidence interval is about $0.113 \mp 1.96(0.025)$ or about 0.063 to 0.162. This interval excludes zero, so at the average $obrat$ there is evidence of discrimination (or, at least loan approval rates that differ by race for some other reason that is not captured by the control variables).
- The effect of being white on the probability of successful application is estimated at 11.3% for people with 32% other obligations.



- C2** Use the data in LOANAPP.RAW for this exercise; see also Computer Exercise C8 in Chapter 7.
- (i) Estimate a probit model of *approve* on *white*. Find the estimated probability of loan approval for both whites and nonwhites. How do these compare with the linear probability estimates?
 - (ii) Now, add the variables *hrat*, *obrat*, *loanprc*, *unem*, *male*, *married*, *dep*, *sch*, *cosign*, *chist*, *pubrec*, *mortlat1*, *mortlat2*, and *vr* to the probit model. Is there statistically significant evidence of discrimination against nonwhites?
 - (iii) Estimate the model from part (ii) by logit. Compare the coefficient on *white* to the probit estimate.
 - (iv) Use equation (17.17) to estimate the sizes of the discrimination effects for probit and logit.



(i) Estimate the effect of white on approval in a Probit model.

The probit model predicts the probability of loan approval as: $P(Y = 1|X) = \phi(X\beta)$

```
. probit approve white
```

```
Iteration 0: Log likelihood = -740.34659
Iteration 1: Log likelihood = -701.33221
Iteration 2: Log likelihood = -700.87747
Iteration 3: Log likelihood = -700.87744
```

Probit regression

```
Number of obs = 1,989
LR chi2(1) = 78.94
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0533
```

Log likelihood = -700.87744

	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf. interval]	
white	.7839465	.0867118	9.04	0.000	.6139946	.9538985
_cons	.5469463	.075435	7.25	0.000	.3990964	.6947962

```
. mfx
```

Marginal effects after probit

```
y = Pr(approve) (predict)
= .8867641
```

variable	dy/dx	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% C.I.]		x
white*	.2005957	.02685	7.47	0.000	.147968	.253224	.845148

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

```
. predict lin_pred, xb
```

```
. list lin_pred in 1/10
```

	lin_pred
1.	1.330893
2.	1.330893
3.	1.330893
4.	1.330893
5.	1.330893
6.	1.330893
7.	1.330893
8.	1.330893
9.	1.330893
10.	1.330893

```
. display normal(1.3308928)
.90838786
```

- As there is only one explanatory variable that takes on just two values, there are only two different predicted values: the estimated probabilities of loan approval for white and nonwhite applicants.
- Rounded to three decimal places, these are .708 for nonwhites and .908 for whites.
- Without rounding errors, these are *identical* to the fitted values from the linear probability model.
- This is the case when the independent variables in a binary response model are mutually exclusive and exhaustive binary variables.
- Then, the predicted probabilities, whether we use the LPM, probit, or logit models, are simply the cell frequencies (in this case, how many loans were approved vs denied for the independent variable: white)
- In other words, 0.708 is the proportion of loans approved for nonwhites and .908 is the proportion approved for whites.

Additional: We can estimate the model with logit and compare it to the previous one.

```
. logit approve white
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -740.34659
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -709.1878
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -700.9007
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -700.87744
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -700.87744
```

```
Logistic regression                                Number of obs   =      1989
                                                    LR chi2(1)      =       78.94
                                                    Prob > chi2     =      0.0000
Log likelihood = -700.87744                      Pseudo R2       =      0.0533
```

approve	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
white	1.409422	.1511511	9.32	0.000	1.113172	1.705673
_cons	.8846854	.1252927	7.06	0.000	.6391162	1.130255

```
. mfx
```

```
Marginal effects after logit
      y = Pr(approve) (predict)
      = .8885343
```

variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% C.I.]		X
white*	.2005957	.02685	7.47	0.000	.147968	.253224	.845148

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1



```
. probit approve white hrat obrat loanprc unem male married dep sch cosign chist pubrec mor
> tlat1 mortlat2 vr
```

```
Iteration 0: Log likelihood = -737.97933
Iteration 1: Log likelihood = -603.5925
Iteration 2: Log likelihood = -600.27774
Iteration 3: Log likelihood = -600.27099
Iteration 4: Log likelihood = -600.27099
```

```
Probit regression                                Number of obs = 1,971
                                                LR chi2(15) = 275.42
                                                Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -600.27099                    Pseudo R2 = 0.1866
```

approve	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf. interval]	
white	.5202525	.0969588	5.37	0.000	.3302168	.7102883
hrat	.0078763	.0069616	1.13	0.258	-.0057682	.0215209
obrat	-.0276924	.0060493	-4.58	0.000	-.0395488	-.015836
loanprc	-1.011969	.2372396	-4.27	0.000	-1.47695	-.5469881
unem	-.0366849	.0174807	-2.10	0.036	-.0709464	-.0024234
male	-.0370014	.1099273	-0.34	0.736	-.2524549	.1784521
married	.2657469	.0942523	2.82	0.005	.0810159	.4504779
dep	-.0495756	.0390573	-1.27	0.204	-.1261266	.0269753
sch	.0146496	.0958421	0.15	0.879	-.1731974	.2024967
cosign	.0860713	.2457509	0.35	0.726	-.3955917	.5677343
chist	.5852812	.0959715	6.10	0.000	.3971805	.7733818
pubrec	-.7787405	.12632	-6.16	0.000	-1.026323	-.5311578
mortlat1	-.1876237	.2531127	-0.74	0.459	-.6837153	.308468
mortlat2	-.4943562	.3265563	-1.51	0.130	-1.134395	.1456823
vr	-.2010621	.0814934	-2.47	0.014	-.3607862	-.041338
_cons	2.062327	.3131763	6.59	0.000	1.448512	2.676141

```
. mfx
```

```
Marginal effects after probit
y = Pr(approve) (predict)
= .91065604
```

variable	dy/dx	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% C.I.]		X
white*	.105747	.02386	4.43	0.000	.058988	.152506	.846271
hrat	.0012721	.00113	1.13	0.258	-.000933	.003477	24.8001
obrat	-.0044726	.00098	-4.58	0.000	-.006387	-.002558	32.3898
loanprc	-.1634429	.03772	-4.33	0.000	-.237367	-.089519	.770431
unem	-.005925	.00282	-2.10	0.036	-.011456	-.000394	3.88853
male*	-.0058835	.0172	-0.34	0.732	-.039599	.027832	.813293
married*	.045491	.01701	2.68	0.007	.012161	.078821	.659564
dep	-.0080069	.0063	-1.27	0.204	-.020354	.00434	.771689
sch*	.0023787	.01564	0.15	0.879	-.028284	.033042	.770167
cosign*	.0131566	.03547	0.37	0.711	-.056364	.082677	.028919
chist*	.1213625	.0242	5.02	0.000	.073937	.168788	.836631
pubrec*	-.1867903	.04019	-4.65	0.000	-.265569	-.108012	.068493
mortlat1*	-.0341006	.05129	-0.66	0.506	-.134632	.066431	.01928
mortlat2*	-.1075809	.08988	-1.20	0.231	-.283752	.06859	.010654
vr*	-.0333289	.01381	-2.41	0.016	-.06039	-.006268	.407915

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

- With the set of controls added, the probit estimate on *white* becomes about .520 (se = .097). Therefore, there is still very strong evidence of discrimination against nonwhites.
- The effect of white is about 10.5 p.p. when calculated around the average approval rate.

(iii) When we use logit instead of probit, the coefficient (standard error) on *white* becomes 0.938 (0.173).

```
. logit approve white hrat obrat loanprc unem male married dep sch cosign chist pubrec mortlat1 mortlat2 vr, rob
```

```
Iteration 0: Log pseudolikelihood = -737.97933
Iteration 1: Log pseudolikelihood = -634.97536
Iteration 2: Log pseudolikelihood = -601.41194
Iteration 3: Log pseudolikelihood = -600.49724
Iteration 4: Log pseudolikelihood = -600.49616
Iteration 5: Log pseudolikelihood = -600.49616
```

```
Logistic regression                Number of obs = 1,971
                                Wald chi2(15) = 210.98
                                Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                Pseudo R2 = 0.1863

Log pseudolikelihood = -600.49616
```

approve	Coefficient	Robust std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf. interval]	
white	.9377643	.1747271	5.37	0.000	.5953054	1.280223
hrat	.0132631	.0135997	0.98	0.329	-.0133918	.039918
obrat	-.0530338	.0124078	-4.27	0.000	-.0773526	-.028715
loanprc	-1.904951	.508246	-3.75	0.000	-2.901095	-.9088075
unem	-.0665789	.0353345	-1.88	0.060	-.1358332	.0026755
male	-.0663852	.2068806	-0.32	0.748	-.4718638	.3390934
married	.5032817	.1838261	2.74	0.006	.1429891	.8635743
dep	-.0907336	.0739676	-1.23	0.220	-.2357075	.0542403
sch	.0412287	.1762664	0.23	0.815	-.3042471	.3867046
cosign	.132059	.3918293	0.34	0.736	-.6359124	.9000304
chist	1.066577	.1699995	6.27	0.000	.7333838	1.39977
pubrec	-1.340665	.227446	-5.89	0.000	-1.786451	-.8948791
mortlat1	-.3098821	.5171693	-0.60	0.549	-1.323515	.703751
mortlat2	-.8946755	.5675692	-1.58	0.115	-2.007091	.2177397
vr	-.3498279	.154458	-2.26	0.024	-.6525601	-.0470958
_cons	3.80171	.6333556	6.00	0.000	2.560356	5.043064

```
. mfx
```

Marginal effects after logit

```
y = Pr(approve) (predict)
= .91417919
```

variable	dy/dx	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% C.I.]		X
white*	.0967431	.02275	4.25	0.000	.052145	.141341	.846271
hrat	.0010406	.00107	0.97	0.330	-.001055	.003136	24.8001
obrat	-.0041608	.00095	-4.38	0.000	-.006021	-.0023	32.3898
loanprc	-.1494541	.03921	-3.81	0.000	-.226303	-.072605	.770431
unem	-.0052235	.00278	-1.88	0.060	-.010667	.00022	3.88853
male*	-.0051197	.01568	-0.33	0.744	-.035861	.025622	.813293
married*	.0423998	.01655	2.56	0.010	.009963	.074837	.659564
dep	-.0071186	.0058	-1.23	0.220	-.01849	.004253	.771689
sch*	.0032647	.01408	0.23	0.817	-.024335	.030865	.770167
cosign*	.0098414	.02772	0.36	0.723	-.044483	.064166	.028919
chist*	.1133208	.02299	4.93	0.000	.068255	.158386	.836631
pubrec*	-.1676967	.04081	-4.11	0.000	-.247682	-.087712	.068493
mortlat1*	-.0275065	.0516	-0.53	0.594	-.128634	.073621	.01928
mortlat2*	-.1002576	.08511	-1.18	0.239	-.26707	.066555	.010654
vr*	-.02826	.01296	-2.18	0.029	-.053654	-.002866	.407915

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

With a logit model, we obtain a bit lower estimate for the effect of white (9.7 p.p.), but it is still large, positive, and statistically significant.

(iv)

- Recall that, to make probit and logit estimates roughly comparable, we can multiply the logit estimates by 0.625.
- The scaled logit coefficient becomes $.625(.938) = .586$, which is reasonably close to the probit estimate.
- A better comparison would be to compare the predicted probabilities by setting the other controls at interesting values, such as their average values in the sample.