

Country: Lebanon

Year: 1945-1951

Leader: El Khoury

Ideology: Center

Description: Perspective monde does not identify leader's party. CHISOLS identifies leader's party as DP. DPI does not identify party ideology. World Statesmen identifies leader's party as DP, "al-Kutla ad-Dustuuriyya (Constitutional Bloc, Hizb al-Ittihad ad-Dustuuri [Constitutional Union Party], liberal nationalist, nonsectarian, pro-National Pact, centrist, 1934-1958)" Salibi (1961) writes, "[The National and Constitutional Blocs] were developments of mahsübiyya groups, based on loyalties to individuals and families, and certainly not the political parties they pretended to be. . . The Dusturi bloc represented the popular group loyal to the Khoury family, backed by the Greek Catholic Pharaon and the Greek Orthodox Chiha, both banking families."

Year: 1952-1957

Leader: [Camille Nimer] Chamoun

Ideology: Center

Description: Perspective monde does not identify leader's party. CHISOLS identifies leader's party as SNF. DPI does not identify party ideology. Rulers notes that Chamoun "was a member of a political faction known as Constitutional Block." World Statesmen (2020) identifies Constitutional Bloc party as centrist: "DP = al-Kutla ad-Dustuuriyya (Constitutional Bloc, Hizb al-Ittihad ad-Dustuuri [Constitutional Union Party], liberal nationalist, nonsectarian, pro-National Pact, centrist, 1934-1958)".

Year: 1958-1963

Leader: [Fouad Abdallah] Chehab

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS identifies leader's party as none. Perspective monde does not identify leader's party. World Statesmen (2020) identifies "Mil" (Military) as affiliation. CHISOLS writes, "[General Fuad Chehab] was considered to be non-partisan and thus acceptable to a wide range of political factions." Encyclopedia Britannica (2020) writes, "[Fuad Chehab] maintained a balance between the myriad sectarian, economic, and geographic interests that filled the Lebanese political scene." Barnett (2019) writes, "[Chehab's] main goal was to reduce some of the social and economic imbalances that had begun to emerge in Lebanese society and which were reflected in the political system by the dominance of the

zyu'ama' (old semifeudal elites). . . Chehab also tried to enhance the role of the Lebanese state in development activities." Collelo (1987) writes, "President Shihab, having cultivated nonpartisanship during the 1958 Civil War, enjoyed considerable support from the various political factions." Traboulsi (2012: 139143) writes, "Shihab called for 'comprehensive social reform' and the 'building of a new society'. The message was clear: 'those who benefited from prosperity should take care of the deprived Lebanese. . . some should sacrifice and the others should be patient.' . . . The state [under Chehab] played an active role in regional development and in improving the social distribution of economic growth. . . a favored Shihabist reform was the development of public education. . . the Shihab project [was] described by Waddah Sharara as 'the extension of the roots of the state into the heart of society.'" Salibi (1966) writes, "Whereas the government of the 'merchant republic,' under Khoury and Chamoun, was mainly interested in securing the maximum freedom for economic enterprise, to the advantage of a business oligarchy, the Chehab government tried to act on the principle that some economic controls were necessary. . . the regime made a sincere effort to secure a fairer distribution of national income, and to make the fruits of economic growth available to as large a section of the population and as many parts of the country as possible. Business interests did not favor the regime's attitude in the economic field, although the activities of these interests were not restricted in any serious way."

Year: 1964-1969

Leader: [Charles Alexandre] Helou

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Perspective monde does not identify leader's party. CHISOLS identifies leader's party as KPL. DPI does not identify party ideology. World Statesmen (2020) identifies leader's party as KPL, "Hizb al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniya (Lebanese Phalanges Party "Phalange", christian democratic, National conservative, Phoenicianist, mainly Maronite Christian, est.1 Aug 1936)." In V-Party (2020) 5 experts identify leaders party's ideology as "Right" (2.743) in 1972. Stoakes (1975) writes, "The party's position in the political spectrum, despite its militia and the accusations of its left-wing critics, might be described as central. [Kataeb's] alternative title, which its more radical members prefer, is the Social Democratic Party of Lebanon. Its tenets embrace intense Lebanese patriotism, modern liberal democracy and state-assisted private enterprise." Collelo (1987) writes, "The impetus for socially oriented economic development declined under Shihab's successor, Charles Hilu (also cited as Helou), and disappeared entirely under President Sulayman Franjiyah (also cited as Franjeh)." Stoakes (1975) writes, " The party's position in the political spectrum, despite its militia and the

accusations of its left-wing critics, might be described as central. Its alternative title, which its more radical members prefer, is the Social Democratic Party of Lebanon. Its tenets embrace intense Lebanese patriotism, modern liberal democracy and state-assisted private enterprise.” Russell (1985) writes, “Phalange Party: Pierre Gemayel modelled this rightwing party on European fascist groups of the mid-1930’s; the leading Maronite party.” CHISOLS writes:“(Cahoon (2010) states that the LF was ‘a right-wing coalition, mainly Christian, including KPL and NLP.’ Encyclopedia Britannica (2019) writes, “On [Pierre Gemayel’s] return to Lebanon he helped found the right-wing authoritarian youth movement called the Phalange. He became the leader of the Phalange Party (also called Kataeb Party) in 1937, retaining that position until 1980.”Collelo (1987) writes, “Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideology has been on the right of the political spectrum. Although it has embraced the need to “modernize,” it has always favored the preservation of the sectarian status quo. The Phalange Party motto is “God, the Fatherland, and the Family,” and its doctrine emphasizes a free economy and private initiative.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Kataeb-Phalangist Party (Kataeb) as 7.1.

Year: 1970-1975

Leader: [Suleiman Kabalan] Franjieh

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Perspective monde does not identify leader’s party. CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as LF, and writes, “(Cahoon (2010) states that the LF was ‘a right-wing coalition, mainly Christian, including KPL and NLP.’ DPI does not identify party ideology. World Statesmen (2020) identifies leader’s party as MM + LF and writes, “MM = Tayyar al-Marada (Marada Movement, nationalist, christian democratic, center-right, officially secular, mainly Christian, est.1967);” “LF = Jabhat al-Lubnaniyya (Lebanese Front, right-wing mainly Christian coalition, incl. KPL, MM, Lebanese Forces, NLP, 1976-1990).” In V-Party (2020) 5 experts identify leaders party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.2006) in 2005. Stoakes (1975) writes, “ The party's position in the political spectrum, despite its militia and the accusations of its left-wing critics, might be described as central. Its alternative title, which its more radical members prefer, is the Social Democratic Party of Lebanon. Its tenets embrace intense Lebanese patriotism, modern liberal democracy and state-assisted private enterprise.” Russell (1985) writes, “Phalange Party: Pierre Gemayel modelled this rightwing party on European fascist groups of the mid-1930’s; the leading Maronite party.” CHISOLS writes:“(Cahoon (2010) states that the LF was ‘a right-wing coalition, mainly Christian, including KPL and

NLP.” Encyclopedia Britannica (2019) writes, “On [Pierre Gemayel’s] return to Lebanon he helped found the right-wing authoritarian youth movement called the Phalange. He became the leader of the Phalange Party (also called Kataeb Party) in 1937, retaining that position until 1980.” Collelo (1987) writes, “Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideology has been on the right of the political spectrum. Although it has embraced the need to “modernize,” it has always favored the preservation of the sectarian status quo. The Phalange Party motto is “God, the Fatherland, and the Family,” and its doctrine emphasizes a free economy and private initiative.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Kataeb-Phalangist Party (Kataeb) as 7.1.

Year: 1976-1981

Leader: [Elias Youssef] Sarkis

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. Perspective monde does not identify leader’s party. CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as none. Rulers notes that “as a recognized moderate, he [Sarkis] was elected.”

Year: 1982-1987

Leader: Amin Gemayel

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. Perspective monde does not identify leader’s party. CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as Kataeb-Phalanges Libanaises (KPL). DPI does not identify party ideology. Rulers notes that “He [Gemayel] was co-founder of the rightist French-language daily newspaper *Le Reveil*.” Stoakes (1975) writes, “[Kataeb’s] alternative title, which its more radical members prefer, is the Social Democratic Party of Lebanon. Its tenets embrace intense Lebanese patriotism, modern liberal democracy and state-assisted private enterprise.” In V-Party (2020) 5 experts identify leader’s party’s ideology as “Right” (2.743) in 1972. Stoakes (1975) writes, “The party’s position in the political spectrum, despite its militia and the accusations of its left-wing critics, might be described as central. Its alternative title, which its more radical members prefer, is the Social Democratic Party of Lebanon. Its tenets embrace intense Lebanese patriotism, modern liberal democracy and state-assisted private enterprise.” Russell (1985) writes, “Phalange Party: Pierre Gemayel modelled this rightwing party on European fascist groups of the mid-1930’s; the leading Maronite party.” CHISOLS writes:“(Cahoon (2010) states that the LF was ‘a right-wing coalition, mainly Christian, including KPL and NLP.” Encyclopedia Britannica (2019) writes, “On [Pierre Gemayel’s] return to Lebanon he helped found the right-wing authoritarian youth movement called the Phalange. He

became the leader of the Phalange Party (also called Kataeb Party) in 1937, retaining that position until 1980.” Collelo (1987) writes, “Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideology has been on the right of the political spectrum. Although it has embraced the need to “modernize,” it has always favored the preservation of the sectarian status quo. The Phalange Party motto is “God, the Fatherland, and the Family,” and its doctrine emphasizes a free economy and private initiative.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Kataeb-Phalangist Party (Kataeb) as 7.1.

Year: 1988

Leader: [Michel Naim] Aoun

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. Perspective monde does not identify leader’s party. CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as non-party. World Statesmen identifies leader’s affiliation as “Military government, in opposition.” Zeidan (2020) writes, “[Aoun]’s anti-occupation Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) ran for parliamentary elections in June and emerged as the largest Christian party in the [National Assembly](#). On February 6, 2006, in a surprise move, Aoun signed a memorandum with Hezbollah’s leader [Hassan Nasrallah](#), and the FPM joined the Syria-oriented “March 8” parliamentary bloc.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right score of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) as 5.7, with a salience score (0-10) of 5.8 and a party cohesion score (0-10) as 6.0.

Year: 1989-1997

Leader: Elias Hrawi

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS does not identify leader’s party. Perspective monde does not identify leader’s party. World Statesmen (2020) identifies leader’s party identification as “Non-party”. Rulers notes “Parliament extended his [Hrawi] six-year term by three years on Oct. 18, 1995, to continue to provide stability while Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri pressed ahead with economic reconstruction.” World Statesmen does not identify leader’s party. Ortiz de Zarate (2018) writes, “[Hrawi] left the economic management and reconstruction of the country in the hands of his prime ministers, the last of whom, Rafiq Hariri, appointed in October 1992, took center stage.”

Year: 1998-2006

Leader: Emile Lahoud

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS identifies leader's party as none. Perspective monde does not identify leader's party. World Statesmen does not identify leader's party. Nizameddin (2006) writes, "In 2004, discussions began about the future of the two highly profitable companies. . . Lahoud, however, believed that the contract award was unfair from the beginning and that the state should directly manage the country's cellular phone network. In a broad economic sense this was a classic privatization-nationalization debate. . . Lahoud's position received a further setback when, to offset Western fridity, he and Qordahi began floating the idea that rather than nationalizing the companies a third party would be employed, through Lahoud, to run the mobile phone." Nizameddin (2006) writes, "Hariri was able to resist pressure in the cellular debate because of Lahoud's erroneous calculation that by floating the idea of nationalizing the cellular phone sector he would gain public support." Nizameddin (2006) adds, "More damaging for Lahoud was that his promise to stamp out corruption and political favoritism was not only unfulfilled but Lebanon's political system arguably had become more overtly corrupt as it was clear that any business that needed doing merely required connections with a military office." Barnett (2020) writes, "Lahoud's popularity, political neutrality, and strong ties with Syria and the United States made him well-suited for the Lebanese presidency." East (2003) writes, "Lahoud's popularity coupled with his. . . staunch creed of apoliticism made him a perfect candidate for president."

Years: 2007

Leader: Fouad Siniora

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. Perspective monde does not identify leader's party. CHISOLS identifies leader's party as Future Movement (FM). DPI does not identify party ideology. World Statesmen identifies Siniora's party as M14, a coalition headed by FM (Future Movement), and FM as right: "M14 = Tahaluf 14 Adhar (March 14 Alliance, anti-Syrian coalition of FM, FPM [to 2006], KPL, KW, NLP, and PSP [to 2011], est.2005) [...] FM = Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (Future Movement, Hariri personalist, center-right, officially secular mainly Sunni, est.1992)". In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of The Future Movement (FM) as 7.4. In V-Party (2020) 5 experts identify leaders party's ideology as "Center-right" (.839) in 2005.

Year: 2008-2013

Leader: Michel Suleiman

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS identifies leader's party as none. Perspective monde does

not identify leader's party. World Statesmen (2020) identifies leader's party as "Non-party". Political Handbook of the World (2015) notes that "a compromise between Hezbollah and the March 14th coalition resulted in the election of General Michel Suleiman". World Statesmen identifies M14 as a coalition headed by FM (Future Movement), and FM as right. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of The Future Movement (FM) as 7.4. Berti (2015) writes, "Michel Suleiman himself was elected as a consensus candidate through the Qatar-brokered May 2008 Doha Agreement, which—also through Saudi-Syrian behind the scenes mediation—ended eighteen months of political paralysis and temporarily bridged the sectarian-political gap between the March 8 and March 14 camps."

Year: 2014-2015

Leader: Tammam Salam

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS does not identify leader's party. Perspective monde identifies leader's party as independent. World Statesmen (2020) does not identify leader's party. Rowell (2013) writes, "Analysts thus summarized [Salam] as a March 14 dove—'between Future and [Caretaker PM Najib] Miqati'—a label further borne out in his somewhat conciliatory attitude toward March 8 magnate Hezbollah."

Year: 2016-2018

Leader: Michel Aoun

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS identifies leader party as FPM (Future Movement Party). In V-Party (2020) 5 experts identify leaders party's ideology as "Center-right" (.931) in 2009.

Year: 2019

Leader: Hassan Diab

Ideology:

Description: World Statesmen (2020) identifies head of government's party as none. Perspective Monde identifies head of government's party as none.

Year: 2020

Leader: Saad Hariri

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. Perspective monde identifies head of government's party as M14 Alliance of the Future. Perspective monde identifies

leader ideology as moderate right. World Statesmen (2020) identifies Hariri's party as M14, a coalition headed by FM (Future Movement), and FM as right: "M14 = Tahaluf 14 Adhar (March 14 Alliance, anti-Syrian coalition of FM, FPM [to 2006], KPL, KW, NLP, and PSP [to 2011], est.2005) [...] FM = Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (Future Movement, Hariri personalist, center-right, officially secular mainly Sunni, est.1992)". In the Global Party Survey 2019, 12 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of The Future Movement (FM) as 7.4. In V-Party (2020) 5 experts identify leaders party's ideology as "Center-right" (.931) in 2009.

Note on alternative spellings:

Fouad Abdallah Chehab: Fuad Chehab, or Fuad Shihab, or Fuad Shehab

Elias Hrawi: Ilyas Hrawi

Michel Aoun: Michel Awn

Camille Chamoun: Camille Shamun

Charles Helou: Charles Hilu

Suleiman Franjeh: Sulayman Frianjiyah

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