

Country: Afghanistan

Year: 1945

Leader: Hashim Khan

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Lentz (1994: 18) writes that “Hashim was responsible for restoring the orthodox and conservative way of life that former King Amanullah’s reforms had threatened”. Not enough information to code ideology.

Years: 1946 - 1952

Leader: Mahmud Khan Ghazi

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Lentz (1994: 18) writes that Sardar Mahmud Shah Khan “was considered more progressive than his predecessor [Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan] and initiated a number of reforms during his term in office”. Not enough information to code ideology.

Years: 1953 - 1962

Leader: Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology of Daud as right. Lentz (1994: 17) writes that “Daud began a crackdown on communists”. The Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan identifies Muhammad Daud’s ideology as leftist, “[Muhammad Daud] relied on the support of leftists to consolidate his power [...] He thereby tried to limit the power of the left and create a left-of-center movement loyal to himself.” Country Studies identifies Daud’s ideology as leftist, writing “Daoud still favored a state-centered economy.” Britannica (2020) writes “Conservatives in government... supported the seizure of power in 1953 by Lieutenant General Mohammad Daud Khan... Prime Minister Daud Khan (1953–63) took a stronger line on Pashtunistan, and, to the surprise of many, turned to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. The Soviets ultimately became Afghanistan’s major aid-and-trade partner.” Bezhan (2013) writes “The PDPA... in a conversation with the American diplomat on 14 March 1965, Taraki described the party as a left of center political party. He said... “The party platform would be slightly left of center ... in order to preempt ... Daud who ... continues to talk of his fondness for “socialism.”””. Winger (2017) writes “Even though Daoud came to

power with Communist aid, he was no Marxist. Neumann, Kissinger, and the NSC all saw him as a nationalist who would not radically change course from Afghanistan's traditional nonalignment, despite forging closer ties with the Soviet Union. Even though the PDPA acquired a role in the new regime, the United States was confident that Afghanistan would not become a Communist country as long as Daoud dominated the government... In 1973, Daoud was seen to ally himself with leftist military officers and the Parcham PDPA faction in order to return to power. After assuming control of Afghanistan, Daoud gave leftists jobs in the government, including several cabinet posts and key military positions. The inclusion of Communists was not merely a payoff but also a means of solidifying Soviet support for the regime. During Daoud's visit to Moscow in 1974, Soviet officials indicated that Daoud's partnership with the PDPA was a necessary condition to receive Soviet aid. Lacking alternative sources for assistance—particularly military aid—Daoud cautiously accepted Soviet support, reasoning that it would prevent the Soviet Union from immediately seeking to replace him while also affording him time to consolidate his position. Yet the compromise government between Daoud and the PDPA was far from harmonious. The relationship was characterized by incessant jockeying for power and disagreements over the Marxist inclinations of the government or its shifts to favor the USSR. By 1975, the U.S. embassy saw Daoud as occupying an untenable middle ground in Afghan politics. On his left were the PDPA and the Soviet Union... Daoud's political right consisted of religious factions that had long been enemies of his modernization agenda... Upon resuming power, Daoud and the PDPA had begun a campaign to stamp out these religious fundamentalists... Daoud was not an ideologue, but a shrewd survivor whose desire to remain in power left him with no qualms about shifting his political tack to meet his changing needs. In the summer of 1975, faced with threats on both flanks, Daoud moved against his erstwhile PDPA allies". Rubinstein (1982) writes "Moscow... believed there would be even greater advantages in having a pro-Moscow leftist military group headed by Daoud in control in Kabul... Like Daoud, Taraki wrapped himself in republican cloth. But he was a communist bent on radical changes, not a conservative seeking reform within a basically traditional framework". Lentz (1994) writes "For ten years Daud ruled Afghanistan virtually alone, as he reduced King Zahir's role to that of a figurehead. The king was finally able to remove Daud as prime minister on March 10, 1963, by promoting a constitution which made it illegal for a member of the royal family to serve in the government."

Years: 1963 - 1964

Leader: Mohammad Yusuf

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Hannay (2013: 24) identifies Khan as a technocrat, writing that “it was the king’s decision to dismiss Daud and Naim and to call on a commoner technocrat, Mohammad Yusuf (previously Minister of Mines), who had no connection with the royal family, to take over as Prime Minister”. Not enough information to code ideology. Adamec (2003) suggests Zahir Shah was the leader of Afghanistan from 1963-1973, writing “Zahir Shah... during the early period of his reign (1933-1946), the young king reigned while his uncles Muhammad Hashim and Shah Mahmud Ghazi ruled, holding the powerful position of prime minister. His cousin, Muhammad Daud, succeeded as prime minister from 1953 to 1963, when Zahir Shah forced his resignation. In 1964 he promulgated a new constitution that excluded members of the royal family from certain government positions”. Perspective Monde (2020) identifies Zahir Shah as the leader of Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, writing “Mohammad Zahir Shah 1933 (8 novembre) 1973 (17 juillet) souverain [sovereign]”. Edwards (2002) writes “‘I am not a capitalist.’ These are the words of the king of Afghanistan. ‘But I also don’t want socialism. I don’t want socialism that would bring about the kind of situation [that exists] in Czechoslovakia. I don’t want us to become the servants of Russia or China or the servant of any other place. Here is the government. Here is the people. My effort is to work together with this government and the people. These have been my sincere efforts as king of Afghanistan, and I don’t lie to you.’ These were the words of Zahir Shah.” Bezhan (2013) writes “[in 1964] The Political Parties' Bill was never signed into law by the monarch, perhaps because Zahir Shah feared the emergence of leftist and Islamist parties... The existing political set-up enabled the monarch to nominate the prime minister, a means for him to exercise power over the executive. With the signing of the Political Parties' Bill and the emergence of formal political parties, Zahir Shah would have lost influence and most of his power to direct the government... Zahir Shah did not want any person or group to limit his power. While he had firm control over the army, and had a very close relationship with the tribal chiefs—the two most powerful institutions which could challenge his power—he did not want another organized group to emerge which might also challenge his rule... Credit for the creation of the first monarchist political party, Wahdat-e Melli (National Unity), which was established on the eve of the 1965 parliamentary election, goes to Khalilullah Khalili... In a conversation with the American chargé d'affaires in March 1966, Khalili stated that the party would “pursue a conservative course, basically anti-socialist, oriented toward the West, staunch in its support of the King, and favouring the rational and gradual development of popular parliamentary democracy in Afghanistan.”... Wahdat-e Melli was known as the king's party. But by sending Khalili as ambassador to Saudi Arabia soon after the establishment of the party, the monarch showed his

displeasure with the party, which disappeared quickly from the political landscape. Zahir Shah was disappointed with the party that contributed so little to the modernization of the country... the monarch was [also] not impressed with the slogans of... [Maiwandwal's] party, particularly socialism as a method of economic progress." Rulers (2021) writes "Zahir Shah, Mohammad... He came to the throne at the age of 19, after the assassination of his father. Until 1963 his older relatives ran the government, but then he took control and ushered in the constitution of 1964 which guaranteed civil rights, gave women the right to vote, and barred the royal family from holding high-level government posts. He followed a program of economic development, including irrigation and highway construction, accepting aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. He maintained Afghanistan's neutrality in the Cold War, as he had in World War II... In a bloodless coup on July 17, 1973, Zahir Shah, who was in Italy at the time, was deposed by his brother-in-law, Gen. Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, who proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with himself as president." World Statesmen (2020) writes "Kings 17 Oct 1929 - 8 Nov 1933 Mohammad Nadir Shah (s.a.) 8 Nov 1933 - 17 Jul 1973 Mohammad Zahir Shah (b. 1914 - d. 2007) President 17 Jul 1973 - 27 Apr 1978 Mohammad Daud Khan Mohammadzay". Lentz (1994) writes "HEADS OF STATE MOHAMMED ZAHIR SHAH (King, November 8, 1933-July 17, 1973)... In March of 1963 Zahir dismissed his powerful brother-in-law as prime minister. The following year he approved Afghanistan's first written constitution, which allowed a limited parliamentary democracy. Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan was also eased with the restoration of diplomatic relations. Zahir's rule was threatened during the late 1960s by outbreaks of civil disorder arising from demands for an increase in democratization. A drought also added to the country's financial woes. The king managed to remain in power until July 17, 1973, however."

Years: 1965 - 1966

Leader: Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Emadi (2005: 39) identifies later party affiliation as the Progressive Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), writing that "Maiwandwal formed the Progressive Democratic Party in 1966". DPI identifies PDPA as leftist. The Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan identifies PDPA's ideology as leftist, writing "MAIWANDWAL, MUHAMMAD HASHIM. Prime minister (1965-1967) and founder of the Progressive Democratic Party [...] [PDPA] recognised Zahir Shah as the "personification of national unity" and advocated a program of action "in accordance with [...] democracy and socialism." Country Studies identifies

Maiwandwal's ideology as leftist, writing "Former prime minister Maiwandwal, a democratic socialist, lost his seat when the government selectively influenced the elections." Britannica (2020) identifies PDPA as leftist, writing "Elections for both houses of the legislature were held in 1965 and 1969. Several unofficial parties ran candidates with platforms ranging from fundamentalist Islam to the extreme left. One such group was the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the major leftist organization in the country." Bezhan (2013) writes "Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal (1965-67), had to include aspects of Islam and socialism in the platform of his monarchist party Jamiat-e Demokrat-e Motaraqi (Progressive Democratic Party): "...our goal is socialism, i.e. building a flourishing society living by common interest." ... Maiwandwal needed to appear to reconcile the two political strands which had attracted the largest number of educated people. While he had intended to establish a nationalist-monarchist party in order to attract different sections of society, he was forced to include socialism as another goal of the party. Perhaps another reason for his approach was that he did not want to provoke the Russians, because Maiwandwal was largely regarded as pro American" and "The PDPA... in a conversation with the American diplomat on 14 March 1965, Taraki described the party as a left of center political party. He said... "The party platform would be slightly left of center ... in order to preempt ... Daud who ... continues to talk of his fondness for "socialism.""". Winger (2017) writes "Even though the PDPA acquired a role in the new regime, the United States was confident that Afghanistan would not become a Communist country as long as Daoud dominated the government... In 1973, Daoud was seen to ally himself with leftist military officers and the Parcham PDPA faction in order to return to power... During Daoud's visit to Moscow in 1974, Soviet officials indicated that Daoud's partnership with the PDPA was a necessary condition to receive Soviet aid... Yet the compromise government between Daoud and the PDPA was far from harmonious. The relationship was characterized by incessant jockeying for power and disagreements over the Marxist inclinations of the government or its shifts to favor the USSR. By 1975, the U.S. embassy saw Daoud as occupying an untenable middle ground in Afghan politics. On his left were the PDPA and the Soviet Union."

Years: 1967 - 1970

Leader: Nur Ahmad Etemadi

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Not enough information to code ideology.

Year: 1971

Leader: Abdul Zahir

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Lentz (1994: 19) writes that Zahir worked on “legislation designed to help lower-income Afghanistans”. Not enough information to code ideology.

Year: 1972

Leader: Mohammad Musa Shafiq

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as none. Not enough information to code ideology.

Years: 1973 - 1977

Leader: Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as non-party until 1976, and as National Revolutionary Party (NRP) afterwards. DPI does not identify NRP’s ideology. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology of Daud as right. Lentz (1994: 17) writes that “Daud began a crackdown on communists”. The Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan identifies Muhammad Daud’s ideology as leftist, “[Muhammad Daud] relied on the support of leftists to consolidate his power [...] He thereby tried to limit the power of the left and create a left-of-center movement loyal to himself.” Country Studies identifies Daud’s ideology as leftist, writing “Daoud still favored a state-centered economy.” Britannica (2020) writes “Mohammad Daud Khan sensed the stagnation of the constitutional processes and seized power on July 17, 1973... Leftist military officers and civil servants of the Banner Party assisted in the overthrow... During Daud Khan’s second tenure as prime minister, he attempted to introduce socioeconomic reforms... and to effect a gradual movement away from the socialist ideals his regime initially espoused... In March 1977... The two PDPA organizations... reunited against Daud Khan after a 10-year separation. There followed a series of political assassinations, massive anti-government demonstrations, and arrests of major leftist leaders” and “People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the major leftist organization in the country.” Bezhan (2013) writes “The PDPA... in a conversation with the American diplomat on 14 March 1965, Taraki described the party as a left of center political party. He said... “The party platform would be slightly left of center ... in order to preempt ... Daud who ... continues to talk of his fondness for "socialism."” Winger (2017) writes “Even though Daoud came to power with Communist aid, he was no Marxist. Neumann, Kissinger, and the NSC all saw him as a nationalist who would

not radically change course from Afghanistan's traditional nonalignment, despite forging closer ties with the Soviet Union. Even though the PDPA acquired a role in the new regime, the United States was confident that Afghanistan would not become a Communist country as long as Daoud dominated the government... In 1973, Daoud was seen to ally himself with leftist military officers and the Parcham PDPA faction in order to return to power. After assuming control of Afghanistan, Daoud gave leftists jobs in the government, including several cabinet posts and key military positions. The inclusion of Communists was not merely a payoff but also a means of solidifying Soviet support for the regime. During Daoud's visit to Moscow in 1974, Soviet officials indicated that Daoud's partnership with the PDPA was a necessary condition to receive Soviet aid. Lacking alternative sources for assistance—particularly military aid—Daoud cautiously accepted Soviet support, reasoning that it would prevent the Soviet Union from immediately seeking to replace him while also affording him time to consolidate his position. Yet the compromise government between Daoud and the PDPA was far from harmonious. The relationship was characterized by incessant jockeying for power and disagreements over the Marxist inclinations of the government or its shifts to favor the USSR. By 1975, the U.S. embassy saw Daoud as occupying an untenable middle ground in Afghan politics. On his left were the PDPA and the Soviet Union... Daoud's political right consisted of religious factions that had long been enemies of his modernization agenda... Upon resuming power, Daoud and the PDPA had begun a campaign to stamp out these religious fundamentalists... Daoud was not an ideologue, but a shrewd survivor whose desire to remain in power left him with no qualms about shifting his political tack to meet his changing needs. In the summer of 1975, faced with threats on both flanks, Daoud moved against his erstwhile PDPA allies". Rubinstein (1982) writes "Moscow... believed there would be even greater advantages in having a pro-Moscow leftist military group headed by Daoud in control in Kabul... Like Daoud, Taraki wrapped himself in republican cloth. But he was a communist bent on radical changes, not a conservative seeking reform within a basically traditional framework".

Year: 1978

Leader: Taraki

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as People's Democratic Party (HDK/PDPA). Manzano (2017) identifies Taraki as left. DPI identifies HDK's ideology as left. The Political Handbook (2010) elaborates, writing "**Homeland Party** (*Hizb-i-Watan*). Previously known as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)[...]the group's subsequent

activity was limited to occasional contact at meetings of international communist organizations.” Political Handbook of the World (2015) identifies Taraki’s ideology as leftist, writing “the Daoud regime was overthrown in a left-wing coup led by the deputy air force commander, Col. Abdul KHADIR. On April 30 a newly constituted Revolutionary Council designated Nur Mohammad TARAKI, secretary general of the formerly outlawed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).” Lentz (1994: 15) confirms Taraki to be leftist, identifying him as a “noted writer and Marxist intellectual”. Perspective monde (2020) identifies Taraki’s ideology as leftist, writing “Nur Mohammad Taraki | 1978 (30 avril) | 1979 (16 septembre) | Parti populaire démocratique d'Afghanistan (masses) | Accession autoritaire ou militaire | Gauche communiste.” Lentz (1994) identifies Taraki’s ideology as leftist, writing “Taraki, a noted writer and Marxist intellectual, founded the Maoist Khalq, or Masses, party in 1963 in opposition to King Zahir Shah.” World Statesmen (2020) identifies Taraki's party as HDK, and HDK's ideology as leftist, writing "30 Apr 1978 - 16 Sep 1979 Nur Mohammad Taraki (s.a.) HDK," and "HDK = Hizbi Dimokratiki Khalqi Afghanisan (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, communist, 1990 renounced Marxism, 1965-28 Jun 1990, then HW)."

Note: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is also known as Hezb-e dimūkrātīk-e khalq-e Afghānistān (HDK).

Years: 1979 - 1985

Leader: Karmal

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology; CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as People’s Democratic Party (HDK/PDPA). Manzano (2017) identifies Karmal as left. DPI identifies HDK’s ideology as left. The Political Handbook (2010) elaborates, writing “**Homeland Party** (*Hizb-i-Watan*). Previously known as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)[...]the group's subsequent activity was limited to occasional contact at meetings of international communist organizations.” Lentz (1994: 15) confirms Karmal to be leftist, writing that “he became active in leftist politics while a student in Kabul”. Perspective monde (2020) identifies Karmal’s ideology as leftist, writing “Babrak Karmal | 1979 (27 décembre) | 1986 (20 novembre) | Parti populaire démocratique d'Afghanistan (bannière), Parti populaire démocratique d'Afghanistan | Accession autoritaire ou militaire | Gauche communiste.” Lentz (1994) identifies Karmal’s ideology as leftist, writing “He became active in leftist politics while a student at Kabul University. In 1949 he began serving a five-year prison sentence for his Communist activities [...] In 1965 he was elected to the National Assembly as a member of the pro-Communist Khalq party.” World Statesmen (2020) identifies

Karmal's party as HDK, and HDK's ideology as leftist, writing "27 Dec 1979 - 23 Nov 1986 Babrak Karmal (s.a.) HDK," and "HDK = Hizbi Dimokratiki Khalqi Afghanisan (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, communist, 1990 renounced Marxism, 1965-28 Jun 1990, then HW)."

Note: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is also known as Hezb-e dimūkrātīk-e khalq-e Afghānistān (HDK).

Years: 1986 - 1991

Leader: Najibullah

Ideology: leftist

Description: CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as People's Democratic Party (HDK/PDPA). DPI identifies HDK's ideology as left. The Political Handbook (2010) elaborates, writing "**Homeland Party** (*Hizb-i-Watan*). Previously known as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)[...]the group's subsequent activity was limited to occasional contact at meetings of international communist organizations." Political Handbook of the World (2015) identifies Najibullah's ideology as leftist, writing "Among the first acts of the new rulers was to seize Najibullah, the former president, from the UN compound in which he had lived since April 1992 and to execute him [...] Mullah Rabbani justified the executions on the grounds that the former president had been "against Islam, a criminal, and a Communist." Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective monde (2020) identifies Najibullah's ideology as leftist, writing "Mohammad Najibullah | 1987 (30 septembre) | 1987 (30 novembre) | Parti populaire démocratique d'Afghanistan | Accession autoritaire ou militaire | Gauche communiste." Lentz (1994) identifies Najibullah's ideology as leftist, writing "Najib, nicknamed the "Ox," joined the Communist party while studying medicine at the University of Kabul in 1965. He joined the Parcham wing of the Communist party..."

World Statesmen (2020) identifies Najibullah's party as HDK and HW, and HDK and HW's ideology as leftist, writing "30 Nov 1987 - 16 Apr 1992 Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzay (s.a.) HDK;1990 HW," and "HDK = Hizbi Dimokratiki Khalqi Afghanisan (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, communist, 1990 renounced Marxism, 1965-28 Jun 1990, then HW); HW = Hizbi Watan (Fatherland Party, social-democratic, former HDK, 1990-1992)."

Note: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is also known as Hezb-e dimūkrātīk-e khalq-e Afghānistān (HDK).

Years: 1992 - 1995

Leader: Burhanuddin Rabbani

Ideology: rightist

Description: CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as JIA. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 11 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Islamic Society (JI) as 7.0.

Years: 1996 - 2000

Leader: Mullah Omar

Ideology: none

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies affiliation as Taliban. World Statesmen (2020) identifies affiliation as the Taliban and thus non-party. Brahimi (2010: 4) identifies Taliban's ideology as none, writing that "after the capture of Kabul the Taliban issued no manifesto. There was no administration and no foreign policy, no public services, and no economic plan". Fishstein and Amiryar (2015: 3) write that "after the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992, to the extent that the mujahideen and the Taliban can be said to have an economic policy, it continued with the historical mixed orientation – although the reality is better characterized as loot and plunder under the mujahideen and neglect under the Taliban." World Statesmen identifies Hekmatyar's party affiliation as HIG, writing "17 Jun 1993 - 28 Jun 1994 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (1st time) (b. 1949) HIG."

Years: 2001 - 2013

Leader: Hamid Karzai

Ideology: right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology; CHISOLS identifies affiliation as non-party until 2008, does not identify affiliation afterwards. *Political Handbook of the World* (2015: 3) identifies affiliation as non-party: "Hamid KARZAI (nonparty)." Manzano (2017) identifies ideology of Karzai as right.

Years: 2014 - 2015

Leader: Ahmadzai

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify party affiliation. *Political Handbook of the World* (2015: 3) identifies affiliation as non-party: "President: Ashraf GHANI Ahmadzai (nonparty)." Miles (2018) writes that "Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani made an investment pitch at a U.N. conference", claiming that "Afghanistan needed to focus on 'market building' with individual entrepreneurs forming creditworthy companies that could build value chains to take advantage of available trade preferences". Attah-Poku (2013: 27) identifies Ghani as a centrist, writing that "Ghani displayed his strong centrist position when explaining the issue of the Africa growth and development

paradox”. Tucker and Pierpaoli (2016: 331) confirm Ghani to be a centrist, writing that “a political independent and quintessential centrist, Ghani soon become involved in electoral politics”.

Years: 2016-2020

Leader: Ashraf Ghani

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify party affiliation. *Political Handbook of the World* (2015: 3) identifies affiliation as non-party: “President: Ashraf GHANI Ahmadzai (nonparty).” Miles (2018) writes that “Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani made an investment pitch at a U.N. conference”, claiming that “Afghanistan needed to focus on ‘market building’ with individual entrepreneurs forming creditworthy companies that could build value chains to take advantage of available trade preferences”. Attah-Poku (2013: 27) identifies Ghani as a centrist, writing that “Ghani displayed his strong centrist position when explaining the issue of the Africa growth and development paradox”. Tucker and Pierpaoli (2016: 331) confirm Ghani to be a centrist, writing that “a political independent and quintessential centrist, Ghani soon become involved in electoral politics”. Varieties of Democracy identifies party affiliation as none.

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