

Country: Iran

Years: 1945-1950

Leader: Mohammed Reza

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies leader party as none. Perspective monde does not identify leader party. Rulers notes that Reza “secured passage of a bill in the Majles (parliament) to nationalize the vast British petroleum interests in Iran.” The Historical Dictionary of Iran (1955) notes that Reza was “armed with a vision of Iran free of foreign influence and competitive in world markets, single-handedly pulled his developing nation into the modern world... [with] the government assumed complete control of the economy, adopted strict regulations regarding foreign trade and devised policies aimed at the rapid industrialization and modernization of the country.” Metz (1987) notes “Reza Shah introduced the concept of centralized economic planning to Iran at the expense of older societal values and traditions.... Reza Shah’s policies favored... the wealthy over other classes, and industry in general over architecture... [and although] developing this new order gradually cost Reza Shah most of his base of support. Nevertheless, government centralization enabled him to achieve full control over the economy.” Kauz et al. (2001) note “[the] first period of the rule of Reza Shah's son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, until 1953, allowed for a gradual political opening. Delicate issues, such as the role of foreign economic interests and the nationalization of the oil industry, came to the front of the political debate. They were pushed by Mohammad Mosaddeq's ‘National Front’ and signaled a rising national consciousness. [but] this political upheaval between 1941 and 1953 did not deprive the traditional ruling classes of their power.”

Years: 1951-1952

Leader: Mohammad Mossadegh

Ideology: Leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as NF (National Front). *An Historical Dictionary of Political Parties in the Middle East and North Africa* identifies NF as left: “The National Front is a Democratic opposition party founded by Muhammad Mossadegh and other secular Iranian leaders of the Nationalist, Liberal, and Social-Democratic Orientation.”

Years: 1953-1978

Leader: Mohammed Reza

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies leader party as none. The Historical Dictionary of Iran (1955) notes that Reza was “armed with a vision of Iran free of foreign influence and competitive in world markets, single-handedly pulled his developing nation into the modern world... [with] the government assumed complete control of the economy, adopted strict regulations regarding foreign trade and devised policies aimed at the rapid industrialization and modernization of the country.” The Dictionary also adds “Reza Shah acquired an immense personal fortune through misappropriation of public funds.” Metz (1987) notes “Reza Shah introduced the concept of centralized economic planning to Iran at the expense of older societal values and traditions.... Reza Shah’s policies favored... the wealthy over other classes, and industry in general over agriculture... [and although] developing this new order gradually cost Reza Shah most of his base of support. Nevertheless, government centralization enabled him to achieve full control over the economy.”

Years: 1979-1988

Leader: Ayatollah Khomeini

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies leader party as none. Perspective monde does not identify leader party. Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes “No man has had more impact on Iranian politics in the last half of the twentieth century than Ayatollah Khomeini, the driving force behind the Islamic Revolution... [where] he proposed an Islamic state headed by theologians as the most satisfactory form of government. He continually called for revolutionary activism directed at ousting the monarchy and re-forming the government with its basis in Islamic ideology.” Continuing, the dictionary notes that “As the guiding light of the new government, Khomeini was cast in the role of the supreme political and religious authority. Khomeini controlled both the presidency and parliament and... was reluctant to place any real authority in the hands of the elected president. The first presidents of the government were frustrated by the lack of power accorded to the position.” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “throughout his rule, Khomeini... [stood] above the Constitution and often acting as legislative authority.” Pooya, Siamak and Potter (1999) note “one of the most complex tasks that Ruhollah Khomeini has mastered in his ascent to power was the difficult act of balancing conservative and Islamic leftist forces. To retain both pillars of support, Khomeini often resorted to contradictory messages in various speeches, one day praising the concept of ownership as one that is guaranteed and encouraged by Islam, and the next one speaking to the grievances

of the *mostaz'afan* (oppressed and poor masses)... Khamenei was to maintain good relations with the conservative clergy and the powerful merchant class... Meanwhile, the Islamic leftist were to be gradually pushed out of the country's political scene." Pooya, Siamak and Potter also note of his supreme authority, saying "Notwithstanding, Khamenei is still the highest-ranking official of the Islamic Republic, and the Leadership as an institution maintains a great deal of power and authority." Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes "Unlike the socialist revolutions of the last century, the Islamic Revolution of Iran did not identify itself with the working class or the peasantry, and did not bring a well-defined economic strategy to reorganize the economy. Apart from eliminating the interest rate from the banking system, which was achieved in name only, the revolution put forward few specific economic policies that could be called an Islamic economic development strategy. To be sure, its populist and pro-poor rhetoric was quite distinct from the Pahlavi regime it replaced, but its actual policies could be found in the toolboxes of most developing countries and international organizations. For the most part, pragmatism and the worldviews of individual leaders who commanded the state machinery—prime ministers in the 1980s and presidents afterwards—determined the direction in which the economy moved. The strong anti-market policies of the 1980s, when the government rationed goods and took over banks and large industries, were more the result of circumstances than ideology—the eight-year war with Iraq and the flight of the Pahlavi-era upper class."

Years: 1989-1996

Leader: Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader's party as none. Perspective monde identifies leader's party as Society of Militant Clerics. Perspective monde identifies leader ideology as "moderate left". Iran Data Portal (2020) notes that the Assembly of Militant Clerics (MRM) was founded in 1988 as a result of a split within the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran (JRM). Some left-wing members departed JRM over differences in the associations stance towards economic policy... In contrast to JRM, the newly founded MRM believed in state intervention in the economy to support lower segments of society... in 1988... Speaker Akbar Rafsanjani (a prominent member of the JRM) was elected president." In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify leader party's ideology as "Center-right" (1.584) in 1992 and "Right" (1.692) in 1996. Wells (1999) identifies JRM as right: "Opposed to them are the so-called *Hujjatis*. This faction is Islamic Iran's equivalent of a radical right, and is comprised of both economic conservatives and cultural extremists... Their main political organization

throughout the 1980s and 1990s has been the Society of Combatant Clergymen (JRM).” Political Handbook of the World (2015) describes JRM as “hard-line, conservative... [which] vehemently opposed the reformist agenda and has remained committed to perpetuating the country’s rigid political and cultural restrictions... [and although] the JRM essentially concurred with the SC in the mid-1990s regarding proposed economic reform, it argued that ultimate political authority should remain with the nation’s religious leaders”. Pooya, Siamak and Potter (1999) notes “in the duet comprised by of Khamenei and Rafsanjani... Rafsanjani took the a moderate position, appealing to the Iranian technocrats and intellectuals. Meanwhile, the Islamic leftists were to be gradually pushed out of the country’s political scene... [as] during his eight years in power, Rafsanjani filled executive seats with his supporters... moderates and technocrats close to him, with few compromises to conservatives.” Pooya, Siamak and Potter also note of Rafsanjani’s agency from Komenini, saying “Concurrent with the appointment of Ali Khamenei as the new leader, Rafsanjani was elected the new president of the republic and the post of prime minister was eliminated. In effect, the politics authority of Khomeini was now embodied in a Khamenei-Rafsanjani dyad. This arrangement attested to the political skills of Rafsanjani, who has proved himself adept at increasing the power of the political institution he controls.” They also note “The pragmatist faction of the Islamic Republic is formed around the personality and ideas of Hashemi Rafsanjani.” Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “In the early 1990s, to the surprise of the visiting teams from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the government’s rhetoric and policies radically shifted to become pro-market. Without any benefits in terms of loans from these organization, the administration of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) implemented structural adjustment.”

Years: 1997-2004

Leader: Hojatolislam Mohammad Khatami

Ideology: Leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify leader’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader’s party as Society of Militant Clerics. In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.356) in 1996. Iran Data Portal (2020) notes that the Assembly of Militant Clerics (MRM) was founded in 1988 as a result of a split within the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran (JRM). Some left-wing members departed JRM over differences in the associations stance towards economic policy... In contrast to JRM, the newly founded MRM believed in state intervention in the economy to support lower segments of society” The Portal continues “ In 1997, Mohammad Khatami, a leading member of the MRM ran for the presidency and won in a landslide

victory.” Perspective Monde identifies leader’s ideology as “moderate left”. Fairbanks (1998) also identifies MRM as left: “The MRM is considered ‘leftist’ on the Islamic Republic’s ideological spectrum for its statist economics and social egalitarianism.” Alaedini, Namazi and Potter (1999) note that “The leftist faction in the Islamic Republic is formed mainly around an organization known as *Majma’-e Ruhaniyyun-e Mabarez* (MRM).” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “The presidential elections of 1997 were the first free contest between clerical conservative hard liners and a leftist and liberal reformist coalition headed by Sayyid Mohammad Khatami.”

Years: 2005-2012

Leader: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as AII (Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran). Perspective monde identifies head of government’s party as Alliance of the Builders of Islamist Iran. Perspective monde identifies head of government’s ideology as “moderate right”. Political Handbook of the World (2015) notes that AII “first emerged in the local elections of February 2003... with strong backing from senior conservatives in the political establishment. [They] Employ[ed] vague slogans calling for economic progress and adherence to “Islamic values”... [and now are] encompassing a range of views on economic policy but without a clear ideological vision, the group has become the most prominent conservative party, at least in the public arena. Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “the shift from the populist administrations of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13) to the neoliberal Hassan Rouhani administration starting in 2013 did not amount to a break with economic ideology of the Islamic Republic.”

Years: 2013-2020

Leader: Hojatolislam Hassan Rouhani

Ideology: Centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as MDP. Varieties of Democracy identifies party affiliation as Combatant Clergy Association. Perspective monde identifies head of government’s party as Moderation and Development party. The Political Handbook of the World identifies Rouhani’s party as Society of Combatant Clergy (JRM). World Statesmen identifies head of government’s party as JRM. The Tehran Times (2017) identified Rouhani’s party as Moderation and Development party, noting that “The Moderation and Development Party will back Hassan Rouhani.” Perspective monde identifies head of government’s ideology as “center”.

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