

tant to the Viennese than to the residents of Carmel, California, and in the same way the preferred trade-offs in population size will vary. On more prosaic grounds, certain places may need additional population to absorb the costs of existing road and sewer systems, however misguided the initial commitment to build them. People in some small towns may want a population increase in order to make rudimentary specialization possible in their public school system. In other instances, a past history of outmigration may have left behind a surplus of unused capacities, which would easily accommodate additional growth and provide public benefits of various sorts.

These variations notwithstanding, the evidence on fiscal health and economic or social problems indicates clearly that the assumptions of value-free development are false. In many cases, probably in most, additional local growth under current arrangements is a transfer of wealth and life chances from the general public to the rentier groups and their associates. Use values of a majority are sacrificed for the exchange gains of the few. To question the wisdom of growth for any specific locality is to threaten a benefit transfer and the interests of those who gain from it.

4

Homes: Exchange and Sentiment in the Neighborhood

The push for growth and rents is not the only force on the urban scene; there are also efforts, individual and collective, to enhance use values. The two processes together determine the patterns of neighborhood life—the ways in which people grow up, live, and die, interconnect with one another, and defend (or offend) the places in which they live. "Sentiment" is indeed at work in structuring the city, but this sentiment is "refracted" (Storper and Walker, 1983:25) through a larger system of material production and manipulation of rents. People's feelings about their daily round, their psychological attachments to place, and their neighborhood ethnic solidarities are very real to them, but these feelings are bound up with forces originating outside residents' immediate milieus, far beyond the social and geographical boundaries of their routines. Sentiment and structure cohere in various ways in "generating the actual events of everyday life" (Storper and Walker, 1983:27), in different places at different times. The city is a setting for the achievement of both exchange values and use values; and the neighborhood is the meeting place of the two forces, where each resident faces the challenge of making a life on a real estate commodity. From the point of view of residents, the creation and defense of the use values of neighborhood is the central urban question, and it is our topic in this chapter.

The Residual Neighborhood

Within the Marxian framework, neighborhood is essentially a residual phenomenon (Molotch, 1979). Since it is merely a site for the reproduction of labor (see Castells, 1976; Lamarche, 1976)—that is, for the daily sustenance of the working class—the neighborhood receives its shape and qualities from the dynamics of the accumulation process. The locations of neighborhoods and the goings-on within them are consequences of the needs of accumulation; accumulation is not, for example, a consequence of the location of the neighborhood. The needs of production come first.

Such notions of the residual quality of neighborhoods and the primacy of the production apparatus were also among the assumptions of the Chicago ecologists. Knowledge of neighborhood life could be derived from the subsocial, "biotic" level of reality. For Ernest W. Burgess, Homer Hoyt, Robert E. Park, and many of their followers in neo-Chicago location theory, the land commodity market allocates to the most strategic locations those uses most critical to the basic economy. These strategic locations are not going to be the residential areas of ordinary people, who find their "niches" in the interstices between more dominant uses.

It followed, therefore, in the classic Burgess concentric-zone model, that the "zone of transition" (in part, a neighborhood of last resort for the otherwise homeless) would naturally be "invaded" by business district expansion, just as the next ring (workingmen's homes) would then be replaced by the mixed uses of the former zone of transition. To this day, even in most instances of officially planned land use, such as programs of urban renewal and redevelopment, contemporary planning professionals assume that these zones of transition are crying out for the same sort of "higher and better uses" of the next transition.

More culturally oriented social scientists, some working at the same time and place as the Chicago ecologists, were also in search of general urban laws: they still chose, however, to derive their propositions from ecological foundations. In Louis Wirth's celebrated formulation of "urbanism as a way of life," inherited folkways of more traditional social orders give way, in the face of

"numbers, density, and heterogeneity," to more bureaucratic and formalistic modes of interpersonal relations. It is a vision of "community lost" (Wellman, 1979) under the press of demographic circumstance. The urban *gemeinschaft*, in which immediate locality is the basis of spiritual as well as material sustenance, is replaced by the community of limited liability (Janowitz, 1951). Neighborhood becomes only one of a number of bases for managing daily life—alongside the job, school, and extended kin groups located elsewhere. The result is a decrease in personal investment in, and in vulnerability to, locality—a limiting of liability that parallels the limiting of interpersonal commitment characteristic of the impersonal, *gesellschaft* social order generally. The city becomes an arena for the blasé individualistic strivings of its residents. It is essentially a container (at most a "crucible"), a function that complements the general patterns of social and geographical mobility that urbanism and modernity imply. In its boldest form, the classical position holds that a quality of urbanism itself, rather than nineteenth-century American capitalism or class structure, for example, leads to a universal form of modern life. But this is an inadequate theoretical basis for explaining why, for example, working-class Italian-American homeowners live one way, barrio Chicanos live another, and affluent professionals live still another.

Although Marxian scholars have given less attention to neighborhood life, they have also assumed a homogeneity among almost all neighborhoods, regardless of race, ethnicity, or location. At least for the great mass of working people, alienation from the productive apparatus colors their lives with one another and provides little basis for neighborhood variation. In a more recent variant, Marxian scholars argue that residents' shared dependence on the same urban services and other forms of collective consumption generate similar dynamics throughout neighborhoods (Castells, 1979, 1983).

Despite all the efforts at theorizing a general law, empirically based community studies have continuously exposed a variety of cultural patterns that directly challenge monolithic views. Beginning with Wirth's important contribution (1928) and the classic ethnographies of the pre-World War II period, the tenacity of neighborhood sentiment and its rich varieties have been apprecia-

tively recorded. Gans (1962) found in the late 1950s Italian inner-city residents very much tied to their neighborhood in a manner akin to a village culture. Even in suburban Levittown, whose residents were far less folklike in their observable ties to turf, Gans found at least the potential for "an intense identification with the community" that might have arisen "should something have threatened the community as a whole" (Gans, 1967). Scholars have numerous opportunities in contemporary settings to witness expressions of intense place identification: when routines are disrupted by school busing (Rubin, 1972), zoning changes (Rudel, 1983), oil spills (Molotch, 1970), toxic leaks (Levine, 1982), or other threats to residential tenancy (Fried and Gleicher, 1961; Trillin, 1979). Though only part of the story, residential place has meaning and significance for people and they act, sometimes passionately, on that meaning.

One concrete empirical observation runs counter to our concern for neighborhood: the high rate of residential mobility characteristic of urban residents. Seventeen percent of the U.S. population changes residence each year (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983a). But again, this mobility may not be *intrinsic* to urbanism, but instead contingent on the market mechanisms that induce, or coerce, mobility. The rootless "organization man," as a general personality description, may be a similarly misleading characterization.

The data supporting the main observation need to be examined more closely. Although there are a lot of moves each year, there are fewer movers. Certain kinds of people move a lot, in particular, young adults, who have approximately a 50 percent higher mobility rate than people over thirty-five.¹ Further, most people who do move look for housing near the place where they live. Over the 1975–1980 five-year census period, only 20 percent of Americans moved to a different *county*. A random sample of movers drawn from a University of Michigan panel study concluded that "movement across jurisdictional boundaries even within the same SMSA [standard metropolitan statistical area] is relatively rare" (Newman and Owen, 1980). Research by the National Insti-

1. Population figures are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1983b:16), and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1983a:377).

tute for Advanced Studies on those displaced from a San Francisco neighborhood found that almost half moved to another house within either the same or an adjacent planning district, and only 9 percent moved to another city (see Schill and Nathan, 1983). There is thus substantial residential stability in the United States, and this is especially true among certain age groups. Less than 5.0 percent of those over 65 move each year; for the 45 to 64 age group, only 7.7 percent move. Those between 35 and 44 have a 13 percent annual mobility rate. And within all these groups, a good number are people who move only reluctantly, clinging to their place almost for dear life.

The specific meaning residents give to place is shaped by the ways they use the material and social resources at hand to make their daily round. Ethnic identity, inherited folkways, or more modern moral codes can, depending on the specific neighborhood, group within it, and historical time, be the appropriate tools for survival. Given the wide variety of possible urban circumstances, the lives of urban peoples must come to differ. Even neighborhoods of similar social class can vary on all these issues in part because of how racial and ethnic characteristics are shaped in the struggle against exchange pressures. Let us look more closely, therefore, at the different kinds of use values people gain from neighborhood and at the drive for rents that makes instability a constant threat to the successful use of neighborhood.

Types of Use Values

Each neighborhood has its own individual mix of use values, forged through the historic development of its physical structure, ethnic and class relations, and connections to outside institutions. We discern six categories of use values—six factors that make up the basis of neighborhood.

The Daily Round

The place of residence is a focal point for the wider routine in which one's concrete daily needs are satisfied. Neighborhoods provide a place for shopping (particularly for food and

other essentials), schooling, child care, and routine health needs. For some, the locality is also a place of work. For others, it is a point of departure to a work place, affording access to appropriate means of transportation. Defining a daily round is gradually accomplished as residents learn about needed facilities, their exact locations and offerings, and how taking advantage of one can be efficiently integrated into a routine that includes taking advantage of others. Routes and timings have to be carefully worked out to achieve maximum benefits. The development of an effective array of goods and services within reach of residence is a fragile accomplishment; its disruption, either by the loss of one of the elements or by the loss of the residential starting place, can exact a severe penalty.

Informal Support Networks

Place of residence is the potential source of an informal network of people who provide life-sustaining products and services (Wellman, 1979). Examples range from friends and neighbors who baby-sit, do yard work, or shovel snow to friends, neighbors, and acquaintances who offer aid that can alter a way of life, such as referrals for an available job, a political connection to solve a problem, a welfare benefit, or lucrative criminal contact. Sometimes gains are achieved through an informal marketplace among proximate beneficiaries, in which money may change hands but more commonly operates according to a barter system. Reciprocity rules the loaning of cups of sugar or the minding of children (Stack, 1974). These, too, are hard-won gains; and along with other attributes of neighborhood, they form "the bonds people build with one another that enable them to rely on one another" (Mollenkopf, 1981:320).

** Especially for the poor, this income "in kind" represents a crucial resource and it is made possible only by a viable community. In order to situate themselves to capture such advantages, working-class people tend to live near their relatives and to draw their friends from a proximate group of neighbors (Komarovsky, 1962; Rainwater, Coleman, and Handel, 1959; Rubin, 1976). Though they have fewer friends than people in other classes (Fischer, 1982:93), they seem to depend upon their network more*

than do people in affluent areas (Fischer, 1984:131; Foley, 1950; Fried, 1963; Oliver, 1984). Since the community of poor people is less spatially "liberated" (Wellman, 1979) than that of the well-to-do, poor people's use values are particularly damaged when their neighborhood is disrupted. Even if it is only a "place on the corner" to hang out, home location can be the crucial foundation for making a life for those otherwise lacking standing in the larger metropolis (Anderson, 1976).

Security and Trust

A neighborhood also provides a sense of physical and psychic security that comes with a familiar and dependable environment. There are "eyes on the street" from friendly onlookers (Jacobs, 1961, chap. 2) and a variety of "social landmarks," individuals and institutions accepted as dependable, predictable actors with known reputations. Gerald Suttles (1968), in his effort to construct a general theory of urban life, or at least "the" social structure of the slum, portrays neighborhoods as bastions "defended" against the perceived dangers of interlopers drifting in from adjacent areas. Signs of commonality (skin color, diction, gait in walking) serve as a *prima facie*, if imperfect, basis for categorizing others as either members or nonmembers of the neighborhood circle of mutual trust. This process of "categoric knowing" (Lofland, 1973) is reinforced by various mechanisms in daily life that maintain the distinction between insiders and interlopers. Residents recognize it by their own sense of insecurity when they move around outside the neighborhood, by the contrasting responses of shopkeepers to "intimates" and outsiders, by the youth gangs' defense of turf, and by the periodic acts of incivility and violence for which the outsiders get more than their proper share of blame. Reassured by shared symbols, common cultures, kinship ties, and personal reputations, residents experience a sense of relative security, a sense they sorely need in the larger contexts of physical danger and, we would emphatically add to Suttles's picture, threats from the exchange system that surrounds them. Neighborhood can provide the benefit of *membership* in a social space that is viewed as orderly, predictable, and protective.

Although not as dependent on the local security net as the poor, the well-to-do also have a round of routines that cannot be reproduced overnight. Again, the affluent may less often depend upon neighborhood networks to get jobs, but face-to-face interaction still has its uses. Even in the highest circles, proximity matters; that's why we find that memberships on corporate boards of directors so frequently overlap within regions, rather than across them (see Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Palmer, Friedland, and Roussell, 1985). Business executives' networks of clubs and other social settings, some of which are based in neighborhoods, are part of the trust system that facilitates not only developing a mundane routine but also sharing strategic corporate information, shaping mutual understandings of ethical boundaries, and eliciting peer consensus on business and larger policy issues (Domhoff, 1970; Kanter, 1977; Koenig and Gogel, 1981; Mills, 1956; Ratcliff, Gallagher, and Ratcliff, 1979). More specifically, face-to-face contact in community settings can help executives avoid written correspondence ("paper trails") that can later be used in lawsuits, media exposés, or criminal proceedings. Even phone conversations can be dangerous; some surreptitiously recorded executive phone talk has ended up as courtroom evidence.² Sometimes the best place to discuss delicate business is the clubhouse or locker room.

For women with families, regardless of social status, neighborhood use values have special significance (see Hayden, 1981). Women must construct a path to appropriate schools, lessons, a job, shops, and friends. They must be "in so many places at a time." Involved are hours of daily work and a great deal of automobile driving or time on the bus (DeVault, 1984; Markusen, 1980; Shlay and DiGregorio, 1983). Working women's double burden of managing family life and employment (Berk, 1985) makes the neighborhood resource base that much more critical. Some women are involved in the largely "invisible work" of vol-

2. One telling example is a taped phone conversation in which the president of American Airlines proposed an air fare price-fixing scheme to the president of Braniff Airlines. The Braniff president turned the recording over to authorities for legal action. Perhaps with tighter social bonds, this corporate mishap would not have occurred; at least the tape-recording would have been less feasible had the conversation occurred at the country club (Sing, 1985).

unteer activities, which, while providing free resources to their community, build on women's knowledge of the unmet needs in the nearby life space (Daniels, 1986). Although often the basis for silly television stories, the work by women indicates a special connection to neighborhood, and this in turn is reflected in women's attitudes and behaviors toward location. Women have a greater aversion to moving, and women homeowners are apparently less eager than men to cash in on house equity when the opportunity arises (see Shlay and DiGregorio, 1983).

Identity

A neighborhood provides its residents with an important source of identity, both for themselves and for others. Neighborhoods offer a resident not only spatial demarcations but social demarcations as well. In the United States, people use place names to identify the general social standing of themselves and others. To do this people must have a sense of neighborhood boundaries and the connotations of names of other areas. Hunter reports that between 80 and 90 percent of his Chicago respondents were able to define clear boundaries for their place-named communities and, more important here, tended to manipulate these names and boundaries to increase or protect their own status. For example, "lower status individuals attempt through a 'halo' effect to become identified with a neighboring area of higher status," whereas those of higher status attempt to prevent this sort of borrowing of their status (Hunter, 1974:78). The linkage people make between their location and their social standing means that residents' stakes in place go well beyond the actual material conditions of a given place (for example, public services or park amenities), and involve the symbolic meanings that real estate takes on. These connotations are sustained through the evaluations of outsiders as perceived by residents and strangers alike. As Hunter and Suttles (1972:51) note, "Residential identities . . . are imbedded in a contrastive structure in which each neighborhood is known primarily as a counterpart to some of the others" (see also Logan and Colver, 1983).

This contrastive structure also means that community resources are desired not just to secure better material conditions, like nice

parks, but to display success compared to other neighborhoods seeking the same resources. That is one reason why it is impossible for city governments to satisfy neighborhood claims; since public facilities are needed for competitive advantage over other areas, the needs are infinite and insatiable. Resources are needed not only to sustain a daily round but also to sustain a daily identity. This is not simply a matter of a vague psychic reward; it is—in a competitive market society—also a way of gaining access to other rewards by establishing one's credentials, by demonstrating that one comes from a good place. This truth is sensed by urban people and helps fuel the rational fires of turf defense, which analysts have sometimes mistaken for vestiges of irrational, primordial folkways.

Agglomeration Benefits

A shared interest in overlapping use values (identity, security, and so on) in a single area is a useful way to define neighborhood. A neighborhood is far more than a mere collection of houses; rather, it is a shared experience of an agglomeration of complementary benefits.

The concentration of a large number of similar people stimulates the development of agglomerations especially appropriate to their needs. For example, the presence of many Mexican-Americans in one place provides the necessary base for a bodega, which then attracts still more Mexican-American residents, who then provide the still larger base needed to support a Spanish-language movie theater. These institutions become symbols of belonging and control, enhancing the feeling of turf security, which reinforces the base on which the ethnic businesses depend. Potentially at least, a successful indigenous business class can then play a supporting role in defending the neighborhood against external threats. Local business and social life become intertwined in a single support system.

All urban residents do not live in such "full" neighborhoods (Keller, 1968; Wellman, 1979), but most residential areas have some of the aspects described above, and a good number have them all. When a neighborhood is threatened by exchange value

machinations, the precise makeup of this "neighborhoodness" will have a bearing on the costs of residential displacement and on the ability of people to block it.

Ethnicity

Not infrequently, these benefits are encapsulated in a shared ethnicity. Everybody you need is a member of your ethnic group. When this occurs, ethnicity serves as a summary characterization of all the overlapping benefits of neighborhood life. Ethnicity works for these purposes because it does often accurately represent a shared life style, similar needs in the daily round, and the social boundaries for providing service and gaining interpersonal support. Ethnicity works because of its simple practicality; it neatly demarcates large numbers of people with a single term and, with greater or lesser degrees of accuracy, categorizes them on the basis of only a few gross indicators (such as skin color or diction). Ethnicity is a powerful force because it is part of the solution of many real problems, but also because it underlies many other problems. While one group uses common traits to mark off an arena of trust, another group uses the same traits to identify individuals to be feared, hated, or excluded. The two versions of reality ultimately meet and alter the perceptions of *both* groups and how they use the city.

This interaction suggests that ethnicity as a cognitive tool for organizing and sensing security is a real, but contingent, feature of urban life that, as Bonacich says, "must be constructed and activated" and not taken for granted by scholars as a natural phenomenon (Bonacich, 1980:11; see also Steinberg, 1981). For us, the critical point in understanding the construction of ethnicity is, not the interaction of ethnic groups on the streets, but the exchange and production forces that touch all groups and thereby help shape those interactions.

This raises the question of how ethnicity was influenced by the circumstances that first gave rise to America's neighborhoods. Compared to the European working classes, American workers lacked proletarian political organization and maintained a sharp separation between the work realm and the neighborhood. This

gave to residential space a more central life focus and to the American worker a more "divided consciousness" than would be found elsewhere (Katznelson, Gille, and Weir, 1982:231; also Katznelson, 1981). Again in contrast to other industrial countries, the U.S. system provided little security backup in the form of an income maintenance system, public medical care, or stable (non-market) housing. The social insecurities of particularly heterogeneous inner cities were compounded by a lack of security overall and by the active promotion of a complementary ideology of consumerist individualism (Ewen, 1976). Heterogeneity, in a context of such disruption and challenge, is pregnant with potential for the kind of daily anxiety and intergroup hostility that has been much observed by urban ethnographers. With no *systematic* policies to help immigrants as human beings (they were merely labor), it was perhaps inevitable that immigrants' struggle for residential space, jobs, and security would lead them to interethnic conflict.

The resulting ethnic patterns in American cities are clearly not a mirror of Old World cultures. Although population movements have slower velocities than capital (see chapter 2), *cultures* have the slowest velocity of all. Indeed time as well as distance defeats them, making their complete and wholesale transplanting a virtual impossibility. Our evidence of ethnic solidarity in the city, whether turf-linked gang violence or ethnic neighborhood festivals, is part of the current effort to derive use values from the circumstances at hand.

Summary: Neighborhood Use Values

Regardless of how they come about, the overlapping and intersecting methods of solving daily problems take on a life of their own. Bound up with the fears and triumphs of family life, safety at night, and daily sustenance, these patterns achieve emotional significance and go to the core of the human psyche. It may be that in any realm there is no absolute distinction between practical purposes and emotional attachments (see Hochschild, 1983; Leach, 1976); certainly when it comes to constituting a neighborhood, diffuse sentiment and concrete needs are intimately bound together.

The Exchange Value Threats to Neighborhood

Threats to neighborhood, forces with the potential for overturning the local systems of material and psychic accomplishment, vary according to time and place. Parting with the Wirthian tradition, we do not see "the city" or the "urban" as ipso facto undermining a neighborhood culture. Certainly we do not consider the unpredictability of outsiders from another gang or turf as the critical threat (cf. Suttles, 1968). For us, the major challenge to neighborhood, as a demographic-physical construct as well as a viable social network, comes from organizations and institutions (firms and bureaucracies) whose routine functioning reorganizes urban space. The stranger to fear may not be the man of different ethnicity on the street corner, but a bank president or property management executive of irrelevant ethnicity far from view. In their large-scale study of a national sample of neighborhoods, Schill and Nathan (1983) found that a large proportion of movers (22%) were, in effect, forced out by rent increases, property renovation or conversion, or the landlord's sale of the property. A study of locational conflicts in a large Canadian city (Janelle, 1977) found that over 60 percent resulted from development initiatives that were opposed by individual citizens and resident associations (rather than by competing entrepreneurs or government agencies). Studies like these receive little attention among urban sociologists despite omnipresent daily newspaper coverage of the same phenomena across North America.

Sometimes, of course, these changes can represent a use value gain; despite initial hardships from adjustment to even forced moves, many people end up with housing they judge to be at least as good as what they started with (Schill and Nathan, 1983:112, 115). And some commercial manipulations contribute to use values; residents may come to value their new grocery store on the corner or the new factory down the road. Nevertheless, residents ordinarily have little *control* over such changes and this contributes to the general anxiety resulting from the fact that market mechanisms, as currently structured, may well serve to undermine neighborhood.

The very nature of a neighborhood, including its future prospects, is shaped by its connection to the commodity system including, crucially, the place of the neighborhood within the system as a commodity. The daily round, informal networks, agglomeration benefits, and even ethnic identities take their form from this exchange value context. Robert Park (1967:40) described the city as "a mosaic of little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate." We agree there are "little worlds," but some of them are routinely capable of penetrating the others. Neighborhoods become vulnerable to exchange pressures for specific reasons. The commodity status of an area within the larger urban system, combined with its internal organization, will determine the fortune of a neighborhood.

"Reviving" Poor Neighborhoods

Poor people's neighborhoods are the most vulnerable to social and physical transformation, both by government bureaucrats and by property entrepreneurs. The poor are more likely than other groups to be displaced, and at least for the unemployed and those who have always had trouble finding a stable place to live, dislocation tends to result in higher rates of overcrowding and poorer housing (Schill and Nathan, 1983:57, 59, 111).³ Some must move several times before finding even a semipermanent place to live, and a large proportion of the displaced try to move back into their old area when they can (Stanfield, 1977).

The crux of poor people's urban problem is that their routines—indeed their very being—are often damaging to exchange values. Low-income people pay less rent than the affluent. Poor people's low buying power makes them disfavored customers and the rich, who do have money to spend, don't want to live near them. Some institutions, for example, elite universities and high-

3. In virtually all studies of the displaced, researchers encounter a severe methodological problem in their inability to interview the poorest and most marginal residents. With general response rates of only between 10 and 35 percent for all groups, researchers must consistently underestimate the social costs of displacement for those at the bottom. Even when samples are matched by income (respondents and nondisplaced controls), that individuals are unavailable for the follow-up interview may be a sign of a special hardship, particularly homelessness (see Schill and Nathan, 1983:66–69).

tech firms, similarly find their goals thwarted by proximity to low-income neighborhoods. Local officials often adopt an active role, therefore, in eliminating the daily round of the poor, even though the pawnshops, taverns, bookie joints, and so forth are as important to those without money as the analogous boutiques, restaurants, and corporate office complexes are to the rich. Indeed, efforts at urban "revival" are often schemes to break, through either wholesale land clearance or selective destruction, just this chain of complementary relationships within poor areas. The only strong debate revolves around strategy: whether to close the tavern, arrest the prostitutes, relocate the mission, or destroy a group of physical structures that serve a use for the useless.

Often justified by planning officials' misleading cost-benefit analyses that show that the disruption of poor people's neighborhoods will create the least loss in taxes and land values, the life chances of the poor are sacrificed on behalf of profits and rents enjoyed by people living elsewhere (see chapter 5).

The special vulnerability of poor people's neighborhoods also stems from the low standing of their residents in the larger systems of economic and political power, not only because of their poverty but also because of the relative ineffectiveness of the organizations that represent their interests. It takes very little to set destabilizing actions into motion, and the entrepreneur has little to fear from defenders of the poor. If an entrepreneur can make only a small profit by adding a wall or tearing one down, there is little standing in the way.

Locating Infrastructure. As cities grow and government bureaucrats seek sites for devalued projects (for example, sewage plants, jails, and halfway houses), they look first—if they have any occupational competence at all—to poor people's neighborhoods (cf. Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Seley and Wolpert, 1975). In addition to meeting a larger urban need, new projects located in a slum can clear out some "decay" and thus do "double duty." In Houston, Texas, whose population is 28 percent black (although blacks occupy less than 28 percent of the area), over three-fourths of the city-owned garbage incinerators are located in black neighborhoods, as are all city-owned garbage dumps (Bullard, 1983). Or again, Harlem was created as a black ghetto by

the dislocation of Midtown Manhattan blacks to make way for Pennsylvania Station (Osofsky, 1963:93). Poor people are double losers; they have the least to gain from the infrastructural development and much to lose by the choice of its location.

Urban Renewal. The postwar urban renewal programs (lasting into the late 1960s) were truly, in James Baldwin's phrase, "Negro removal," so frequently was residential clearance to afflict poor, black people's communities. Urban renewal used government authority and subsidy to make large-scale private investment attractive in areas where the potential payoff was too low to attract investors. The results were overwhelming in their costs to poor neighborhoods. In Atlanta, one in six city residents was dislocated through urban renewal, the great majority of whom were poor (Stone, 1976). For the country as a whole, urban renewal contributed substantially to the total "disruption rate" of the 1960s: the proportion of U.S. urban housing removed from the housing stock. Ten percent of all central city residences occupied by whites and 20 percent of units occupied by blacks were lost over the decade (Dahmann, 1982). This disruption rate does not include the displacement, beginning during the urban renewal years and continuing into the present, brought about by more routine market forces (evictions, rent increases).

The fact that a "neighborhood" cannot be rebuilt in a short period means that the disruption persists as an ongoing penalty in people's lives. The *threat* of disruption affects an even larger number. Whether it comes to imagining a family, a job search, or starting a small business, confronting the reality of residential instability must have at least some detrimental effect on the way people think about their lives together and make plans. And such "official disruptions" are only one of the forces making it difficult for low-income people to hold onto place. Marginality in the job market, vulnerability to changing welfare rules, and inability to cope with unexpected financial emergencies cause poor people to miss rent payments and be evicted from their dwellings. In her study of slum life in a midwestern city, Stack (1974) reports that one man killed his wife as the final result of the tension and family chaos stemming from an eviction. Stack describes a never-ending struggle of kin and friendship groups to maintain geographical

proximity in the face of the many difficulties imposed by economic marginality.

Gentrification. Poor neighborhoods are directly threatened by "gentrification," the "reinvasion" (London, 1980) of the central city by affluent young "urban pioneers," who displace the less affluent from urban locations. Real estate firms or individual buyers acquire buildings, which they upgrade, either for their own use or for sale to another. The neighborhood is often taken gradually, building by building, block by block, but the outcome—in which a certain kind of neighborhood is destroyed—can be just as complete as in wholesale urban renewal (see Newson, 1971; Tournier, 1980).

Sometimes neighborhood residents, particularly homeowners, help the process along. Touched by exchange value interests, these insiders forsake sentimental attachment in the face of newly discovered exchange value potential. Only one needs to sell to open the neighborhood to the process. Gentrification implies sales to affluent outsiders, and their very presence generates the kind of neighborhood-effects (such as increased property value) that make it increasingly likely that other residents will make deals with outsiders. Renters, with no property to sell, but higher rents to pay, are, as is the usual course, victimized.

Notwithstanding the harm often done to poor people's lives in the process and the real possibility of fiscal losses to the city caused by the pioneers' high service demands (see chapter 5), gentrification is not ordinarily seen as an urban problem. Whereas a "good neighborhood" into which poor people move (especially black poor) is usually considered a tragic example of urban decline, the invasion of affluent whites is considered—among the press, the public bureaucracies, and the entrepreneurs—grounds for celebration. They celebrate because this sort of transformation builds rents and is thought to make the city more attractive for other investments, including growth-driving additions to the basic economy. "Blockbusting" that "upgrades" a neighborhood into a more affluent residential zone or growth-promoting corporate center is no urban sin. The lack of disapproval means that violence against the blockbusters will not be tolerated by the police, that real estate regulatory agencies will not discipline brokers who par-

ticipate, and that those who sell their homes to outsiders will feel little shame for their disloyalty to neighbors, including renters who have no profits to make.

Racial Change

Neighborhood racial change resembles gentrification in its gradual nature, although it differs from gentrification as well as from other types of neighborhood transformation in its implications for rent returns and in the social groups it damages and helps. Blacks, including poor ones, make gains as whites, after evaluating their options, cede the neighborhood to black residency.

Departing white homeowners are often caught in a conflict between their local reputations and sentimental ties to neighborhood, on the one hand, and their desire for a good sale price, on the other. The trouble arises because general racist discrimination makes housing available to both races worth more to blacks than to whites; whites can choose from any housing in the metropolitan area but blacks cannot (Molotch, 1972; see also Osofsky, 1963:92; Philpott, 1978:149). One St. Louis study (Yinger et al., 1978) found that blacks paid 15 percent more than whites for similar housing in the same neighborhood, with overall housing costs 25 percent higher in black neighborhoods than their white counterparts. That means that although white sellers may not want to upset their neighbors by selling to blacks, they have no choice if they want to sell for the maximum price.

As the discrepancy grows between what whites and blacks will pay in a transitional area, white resistance is broken down by the "economic facts," and the process of racial change in the neighborhood, without any "white flight," becomes inexorable (Molotch, 1972; see also Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965). Even as local public policy and sentiment rail against the alleged "blockbusters," the special ways in which commodification intersects with ethnicity mean that resegregation occurs (albeit with new racial borders) and past patterns of discrimination, dual markets, and segregation are sustained. Racial change, the most common mechanism through which black housing opportunities are expanded, is the only known market process in which property en-

trepreneurs are commonly denounced (and even on occasion legally disciplined) for their transforming activities.

Site Assemblage

In contrast to the gradual nature of racial change and much gentrification, some forms of neighborhood change involve large-scale entrepreneurial land assemblage. Again, the conversion of much of Atlantic City from a decaying retirement and working-class residential zone into a gambling resort is a useful illustration. Developers of hotel-casino projects faced the time-consuming process of bargaining separately with each small homeowner. In this process developers run a major risk: holdouts can demand premium prices from desperate entrepreneurs. Trillin (1979) has poignantly described a technique for heading off such an eventuality, a method that, in effect, turns the social bonds of neighborhood into a force supporting the developer's goals. A large corporation wished to construct a casino-hotel on a street of individually owned working-class homes adjacent to the city's Boardwalk. In order to assemble the land, the corporation simultaneously offered each owner a price substantially above market value. But there was one special condition of the sale: the price was good only if *every* householder sold by a specified date. The younger families, seduced by the money, wanted out and were willing to give up the neighborhood benefit, but there were residents who did not want to sell at any price. Some of the old people had "nowhere to go," not because there would not be enough money for a new place, but because proximity to the daily round would be lost. For the old, the tie was less to the housing value than to the social network. Death was viewed as the alternative. The developer's strategy was to use the exchange value interest of the young as a lever against the social investment of the old. According to Trillin's account, the once placid little community became a battle zone as great pressures were put on the elderly holdouts by members of their own neighborhood. The two bases of neighborhood commitment are brought into vivid contrast as entrepreneurs manipulate homeowners' exchange value interest to overcome lingering sentimental ties.

A similar dynamic operates in the more affluent suburban con-

text when the land on which houses sit becomes valuable enough for more intense use. When suburban land outside Atlanta began selling for as much as \$1.3 million per acre in 1984, various groups of residents began offering their homes as a group to prospective developers (Schmidt, 1984). In the Dunwoody community, owners of upscale houses (worth \$100,000 each) moved their homes to other parcels to make way for more intensive development. At the Lake Helm subdivision, houses sold for approximately twice their market value (\$225,000) because their owners were able to offer all parcels as a single assemblage for development (*Changing Times*, 1985). Similar sales have been reported for the Courtlands neighborhood in Arlington, Virginia (22 homes), and the Ernie Pyle subdivision in Oak Brook, Illinois (46 homes). It especially helps when the neighbors get their land rezoned ahead of time and thus offer not only a package of contiguous parcels but also one for which the zoning and permit wars have already been fought and won for the developers. Other residents, like tenants with nothing to sell or homeowners not directly in the path of urban expansion, have little to gain by such deals. Those opposed to the changes come together and, using the environmental review process, may strive to protect their daily round. Indeed, one group of homeowners sued to block rezonings for one of the Atlanta assemblages and fought the reelection of local officials who supported it (Schmidt, 1984).

Suburbanization

Although not ordinarily considered an urban neighborhood issue, the transformation of rural areas into suburban residential zones involves similar patterns of collusion between insiders and outsiders, with specific results for various internal groups. The urbanization process means great rewards for the serendipitous speculators who happen to own property; the near-in farmers, the owners of land with the greatest profit potential, gain most from the conversion of properties to residential and industrial uses. Again, loss of community becomes easier to bear when substantial rents are in the offing. These "farmer-developers" (Rudel, 1983), taking advantage of their "old-timer" status and well-established political and social connections, are able to overcome any competing local interests supporting preservation (see Mans-

bridge, 1980; Rudel, 1983). They may be able to use their considerable political power, apparently preeminent in the rural setting (see Vidich and Bensman, 1960:218; Rudel, 1983), to forestall zoning controls and tight building regulations until their own property is subdivided and sold. For the unpropertied locals, suburbanization means that they will lose their status as insiders belonging to a small community and become leftover "hicks." The urban newcomers' ideas on schooling, religion, neighborliness, and consumption overwhelm the old folk patterns. In their effort to gain exchange value, the serendipitous entrepreneurs sell their fellow country people down the river; and the renters gain no compensatory rewards for the environmental degradation, higher taxes, and alteration of the cultural climate of the locality.

The newcomers often face troubles of their own. They must also contend with environments built with little concern for long-term livability. Lax controls allow the obliteration of virtually all open space, the destruction of irreplaceable recreational sites, and the construction of homes on flood plains, on unstable hillsides, and even adjacent to toxic dumps (Levine, 1982). New owners can find themselves living on sites where topsoil has been stripped away, adjacent to collapsing roadways, and with flooding basements and houses built with shoddy construction and cheap materials (Rudel, 1983). All of this is especially likely to occur in low-end neighborhoods built for unwary young families, whose former experience as apartment dwellers gave them few skills in detecting building defects. In what appears to be a general pattern in the suburban politics of land use (Rudel, 1983), the newcomers then demand land-use and building code reform, but at a late stage in the process. Besides paying for the individual defects in their homes, they are faced with the high taxes necessary to deal with the many irresponsible prior government decisions. One kind of life routine has been destroyed, and those trying to build another have to pay an extra price because their rentiers were uncontrolled in their place manipulations.

Defiling Affluent Neighborhoods

The well-to-do, least dependent on neighborhood networks, can buy many of their needed services and draw upon the whole city and region for their friendships. If they should have to

move for any reason, they may already have contacts in the new place; sometimes their corporate employers ease the transition into a new community with housing and school "tips," Welcome Wagon teas, and club introductions (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982:317). Nevertheless, the affluent do face certain distinctive challenges in protecting the sizable financial investments in their houses and in the social standing and networks that their neighborhood confers. The rich choose to live, as Suttles cogently puts it, "where the character of fellow residents is assured by the costs of living there and the presumed reputability of people so heavily rewarded by society" (Suttles, 1972:236). They oppose public housing, dense residential development, or any other land-use change that might lower the "tone" of their area. They favor large-lot zoning, which not only provides each family with the amenity of lawns and privacy but also produces a neighborhood of vast acreage, *ipso facto* isolating all but those who must live along the edges from contact with anyone who is not affluent. When physical distance is not feasible, as in dense inner-city zones, the affluent purchase social distance by paying for doormen, chauffeurs, and electronic security systems.

Affluent people's daily round is lucrative for those owning the property and businesses with which they make contact. The rich have a midas touch on geography. Affluent people as well as those who supply their provisions pay a lot of rent. They may get better value than the poor for their money (Caplovitz, 1963), but they do pay, in absolute terms, a lot. Clusters of high-spending consumers inflate the value of retail property, both within and adjacent to affluent neighborhoods. Although rentiers are always pressing for still more people with affluence, it is basically in the interests of rentiers and many retail businesses to sustain the character of these areas. This is the most important source of neighborhood power for the rich.

More broadly still, deluxe neighborhoods are often thought to be an asset for the urban growth machine; these "good places to live" can help sell outside executives on the local metropolis as a place in which to invest. "Showpiece" neighborhoods also serve as symbols of general urban vitality, and are occasionally featured in business magazine advertisements touting the local business climate. All in all, the rich neighborhood has a potential role to

play in both micro and macro growth strategies. The well-to-do community thus can rely upon "the protective shield provided by city administrators, highly placed politicians, and the leaders in certain businesses . . . [and] police policy toward trespassers" (Suttles, 1972:237). Community defense is substantially provided by the larger political structure within which the affluent routinely seek to institutionalize privilege, but probably less because of residents' personal wealth than the role their place plays in the geo-political economy.

This also means that even the rich neighborhoods can decline as their function in the local urban system shifts. Expansion of the basic economy (itself a result of growth machine strategies) attracts migrants who, inconvenient as it may be, must be put somewhere. The growth machine sets in motion classic residential succession sequences, which, as in the case of postwar ghetto expansions, impinge on neighborhoods throughout the metropolis (Duncan and Duncan, 1957; Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965). In addition to this "push" against the affluent areas, there is also the "pull" of a better life in the wealthy suburbs, enthusiastically marketed by rentiers using all manner of legal and financial instruments to make their speculative profits in the hinterlands. As the subsidized suburbanization process drains more and more of the affluent from the city, there are simply not enough of the rich (or even middle class) to go around, leaving the stragglers high and dry in a newly devalued and disrupted social environment.

A different problem for affluent areas comes from the extraordinary rents that can be collected by those able to intensively develop parcels of land within or adjacent to such ordinarily lower-density neighborhoods. There are several classic scenarios: high-rise apartments adjacent to mansions (along the Winnetka-Wilmette border outside Chicago); resort hotel complexes near the second homes of the wealthy (characteristic of some development in Palm Beach and Boca Raton, Florida); large-scale shopping centers near the towns of well-to-do (almost every posh suburb in America faces this pressure). The town politics of Beverly Hills, California, is driven by a constant effort by developers to overcome controls on hotel, retail, office, and apartment expansion (see Mitchell, 1984). To one degree or another, such battles have compromised use values in many affluent towns, like Purchase,

New York, Greenwich, Connecticut, and La Jolla, California. The political tensions in such areas represent the increasing disparity between the rent payoff of parcels under current low densities and the rent potential of the same parcels if they are turned over to more intensive uses. Exchange value pressures are sometimes so great that no community can withstand them, no matter how much wealth it has.

In the limited space we have here, we cannot explain why specific affluent areas seem able to withstand exchange value threats, but others fall more readily to this force. Although we reject the mechanistic determinism of the classical ecologists (under which all areas must give way to subsocial demographic expansion), we are also suspicious of those who would attribute stability to a vague, "ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness" tied to primordial attachments (Geertz, 1963:109). Firey's (1945) classic analysis of Boston's centrally located, but historically rich, Beacon Hill, for example, is often used to argue that precisely this sentimentality is sufficient to preserve a neighborhood in the face of all manner of pressures on it. But more than "sentiment" was involved in Beacon Hill's preservation. Firey described the political struggle through which its affluent residents protected themselves from those "insiders" who might have sold out, and also noted that much of the working-class North End, no less of a sentimental community, was completely wiped out by an expressway. It wasn't just sentiment; it was sentiment of organized and powerful people.

There also may have been an element of economic accident in the preservation of Beacon Hill, just as there is in other instances of preservation. The newly discovered precious historic districts of the country, such as Baltimore's Federal Hill, New Orleans's French Quarter, and many quaint Maine villages, were saved not so much by sentiment as by their decline in economic vitality. Modernization passed them by through no efforts of their own residents. Neighborhoods may be ignored because the costs of conversion exceed the rent anticipated through private redevelopment. This can give an area a breathing period during which, ignored by the active speculators and challenged only by the rain, wind, and poor, it can survive, to one day "come back"

as an architectural gem, yielding higher rents than anyone ever dreamed.

Our assumption is that virtually all neighborhoods are subject to *potential* threats from the rent intensification process. Rich neighborhoods are more capable of institutional resistance and this means that disrupting them requires a concomitantly greater economic divergence between current and potential rents to set disruptive change in motion. This gives the affluent one more reason to sleep soundly in their beds at night, but not without an edge of concern.⁴

All of our examples are meant to show that, whether among rich or poor neighborhoods, in the central city or urban fringe, neighborhood futures are determined by the ways in which entrepreneurial pressures from outside intersect with internal material stakes and sentimental attachments. The exchange value interest of some residents in their neighborhood property can generate the kind of commitment to neighborhood that not only can help to preserve a way of life but also can undermine it. The potential rent increase, along with neighborhood differences in ethnic solidarities, age, and gender, is important in determining which form the commitment will take. The simultaneous presence of both exchange and use values (often among different groups of people, such as homeowners and tenants) makes even internal neighborhood politics diverse.

We cannot deduce a rule, therefore, that will predict the outcome in all cases. Instead, we can only reiterate the critical determinants: (1) the strategic value of neighborhood in the larger system of places (i.e., its changing utility in the rent generation process); (2) the nature of the internal pressures for exchange value returns and the particular strategies used; (3) the power and status of residents in the larger political economy; and (4) the sentiments and cultural systems of residents that guide the pursuit of local use values. The conditions and fate of any neighborhood stem from the way these factors come to be arrayed. Let us apply

4. For some problems, wealth is less of a solution; for example, the rich are victims of ransom kidnapping and jewel theft. In general, of course, they are much less likely to be victims of crime than the poor, particularly young black men, whose murder victimization rate is by far the highest of any group.

these notions to the neighborhood whose existence poses the most vexing analytical and political issues of U.S. society, the black ghetto.

The Dilemma of the Ghetto

Just as there has been substantial variation in the rate and degree to which different immigrant and racial groups have acquired "a piece of the pie" (Lieberson, 1980), so there are variations in the ways these groups' neighborhoods function in the larger systems of individual and area stratification. At least since the turn of the century, there has been a "pattern of unequal autonomy" (Zunz, 1982:87) among minority neighborhoods. Some have been able to provide their residents with a stable daily round and strong informal support systems, with reliable political and economic linkages, including ties to the outside world. The neighborhood has been an effective melding of sentimental, economic, and political opportunities, an autonomous "proving ground" for developing ways to build both psychological and economic security. The word *quarter* (following Levine, 1980) or *enclave* (following Portes, 1981, 1982) describes these places. The prototypical cases are the neighborhoods of the immigrant Italians and Jews. For the contrasting case, in which autonomy is much more limited, we reserve the term *ghetto* (originally applied to Jewish areas of European cities). It still implies that castelike discrimination isolates people from other geographical settings as well as from mainstream economic roles. The neighborhoods of U.S. blacks, a people whose slave origins make them "immigrants" only by an awkward extension of language, are the exemplars.

There was at least an element of choice in the appearance of the European immigrants in the United States; they must have arrived with some hope and with kinship ties and other sorts of basic "human capital" intact. They took places in industrial job queues only partially rigged against them, found apartments, and built homes in areas more or less in line with their economic resources. For some, local political structures became avenues of mobility, providing lucrative municipal contracts for their own business firms and stable careers for cronies and kin (Bell, 1961; Cornwall, 1969; Handlin, 1951; Wilson, 1980). They built neighborhood

economies through which they employed coethnics, particularly relatives; some functioned as "middlemen," trading goods and brokering services among other groups (Bonacich, 1973). Within the neighborhoods, as streams of ethnographic accounts have indicated, the bulk of retailing and service trade was controlled by locals of the same ethnicity, with many businesses held intergenerationally (see Gans, 1962; Suttles, 1968; Whyte, 1943; Wirth, 1928). Some, like the Italian restaurants and Jewish delis, became "famous" and brought in outside money and fostered local pride. Others, like the Italian building firms and Irish insurance companies, were large enough to draw wealth from the entire metropolis and operate on a wide scale. Many residents owned their own homes, even in poor areas like the Polish workers' district of Detroit (Zunz, 1982:173). A significant number of residents became interested in place for its exchange returns as well as its use values. As long as these exchange interests did not lend themselves to schemes of profiting from neighborhood transformation, owners' parochial interests unproblematically called for preservation of neighborhood. This provides a system that binds residents to their own neighborhood while at the same time connecting neighborhood to its surrounding metropolis.

Although only approximating an ideal "multiple institutional" neighborhood model (Warren, 1963),⁵ such arrangements did exist, and even now persist among new immigrant groups, with consequences that are again quite real. Portes (1981), in examining the occupational structure of the Miami Cuban community (in 1976), found that about one third of the immigrants worked for other Cubans in the enclave economy; in San Francisco's Chinatown, the proportion is one half (Mar, 1984; Takagi, 1985). Portes remarks that although wages paid to workers under these conditions are low, they foster an indigenous bourgeoisie and a community of overlapping functions and allegiances. "The principle of ethnic solidarity, which entrepreneurs invoke to extract labor from new arrivals, may also cause them to promote and support the economic initiatives of other immigrants" (Portes, 1982:109;

5. This is the medieval ideal (Pirenne, 1925; Sjoberg, 1955), in which the town quarter contains "the major institutions of work, religion, family, leisure and, to a considerable degree, government and social control" (Yancey, Erickson, and Juliani, 1976:395).

see also Portes, 1981; Wilson and Portes, 1980, but see Mar, 1984).⁶ This manner of autonomous exploitation seems to be a factor in upward mobility for the Koreans in Los Angeles (Bonacich, Light, and Wong, 1977), Arabs in Detroit (Abraham and Abraham, 1983), and Vietnamese in a number of areas (Nguyen and Henkin, 1982), just as it was once the pattern for Germans in Milwaukee (Conzen, 1976) and Jews in New York (Howe and Libo, 1979).

This is the portrait of immigrant experience that dominates the imagination of both the lay public and the urban scholars as the trajectory against which the "performance" of other groups, particularly blacks, is measured (see Glazer, 1971; Rosen, 1959; Sowell, 1981). By this methodology, blacks don't do well and various characterological attributes are often used to explain the "failure" of the black "immigrant" group. The alternative is to see these groups as not parallel at all, and view each ethnic group (and each of its cohorts) as having different experiences in what Goering (1978:81) terms the "constantly shifting network of exchange and competition among rival interests and institutions." There were, even at the outset of the process, differences in internal resources, in external sources of opportunity and in levels of imposed degradation. And this brings us to the crucial point. If the trajectory of upward and outward social and geographical movement is identified as an intrinsic "immigrant" phenomenon, then institutional factors in the market structure, in the political system, and in the cultural realm *did not allow blacks to be immigrants*. The task, which can only be touched on here, is to learn how a slave past in the United States, intersecting with evolving internal and external forces, has led to current patterns of ghetto life—to a neighborhood ethnicity that has "emerged" (Yancey, Erickson, and Juliani, 1976), like all aspects of ethnicity, out of conditions in the new settlement as much as conditions in the old (see Blauner, 1972; Oliver and Glick, 1982:513).

The distinctive oppression of blacks, plausibly rooted in the material and ideological needs of European colonialism (Cox, 1948; Frazier, 1957; Jordon, 1974; Novak and Udry, 1983), has

6. Mar (1984) presents contrary data indicating that aggregate mobility is not increased among the San Francisco Chinese, although some do indeed become quite prosperous. Mar argues that class divisions within the ethnic community are sustained through the enclave wage structure.

been replicated under successive capitalist orders, including those that formed the modern U.S. city. Compared to blacks, no other urban workers were so excluded by the emerging industrial firms from core employment, paid at levels so much lower than prevailing wage scales, or so totally excluded from craft union membership. Although racism was by no means invented by U.S. industrialists, it was useful enough to be left intact by them. Henry Ford's exclusion of blacks from both work on his assembly lines and residence in his company town was probably a help to his "labor relations." Industrial firms actively promoted racial segregation within their work forces by creating separate lunch areas, washrooms, and toilets (Zunz, 1982:321). These racial manipulations, including the widespread use of blacks as scabs, had the considerable benefit (not coincidental) of restraining labor militance (Allen, 1974; Bonacich, 1973, 1980; Gutman, 1976), and shifting tension to the residential arena.

The pattern of institutional behavior in the larger metropolis had specific consequences for the black neighborhood. The immigrant scenario of mutually reinforcing individual mobility and community building was denied to blacks. This does not mean that the black neighborhood was *disorganized*, but instead that it was organized differently. Clues from the early phase of the development of ghettos in the United States indicate the nature of the differences. Black urban residents had a distinctive sex ratio (many men, few women), even compared to the immigrant groups. Blacks had extraordinarily high rates of infant mortality and low fertility rates, well below those of other poor urban people (Zunz, 1982:379). The earliest black urban elites in business and the professions tended to have white clients and to live in white neighborhoods. The imposition of urban segregation destroyed these social contacts and economic relationships. In another unusual twist, black segregation *increased* during the period of rapid industrialization (1910–1930), just when the residential concentrations of Italians and Poles, for example, were breaking up (Lieberson, 1980:268–70).⁷ As Zunz remarks, "Blacks lived

7. Lieberson (1980) argues that segregating blacks was a way to sustain the traditional low degree of white contact with blacks in neighborhood contexts. When there were few blacks in the urban North, the whiteness of the daily round remained even with a dispersed black population. But as black numbers grew, segregation was rigidly and blatantly imposed to sustain separation.

history in reverse" (1982:398). Blacks who had earlier lived among whites became, as the need arose, "the victims of many forms of terrorism . . . the ghetto sprang up, in part, as a reaction to a xenophobic violence which no other group of migrants to the city [of Detroit] had ever experienced" (Zunz, 1982:373; for the Los Angeles case, see Oliver and Johnson, 1984:68; Spaulding, 1946). And the location of these ghettos seems to have continuously placed black residential areas far from the factories and offices ("sunrise industries") of their day (Osofsky, 1963; Zunz, 1982).

Blacks' efforts to build equity in property and sustain indigenous business enterprises faced analogous challenges. We know very well that in settings otherwise governed by free market ideologies arbitrary forces can be unleashed against minority group members striving for business success. Markets are restructured for personal gain by socially dominant groups. The Japanese-Americans suffered severe material losses at the time of their detention during World War II (Broom and Riemer, 1973), just as Chinese-Americans were intermittently harassed long before that point (Saxton, 1971). The California Mexican-Americans lost their vast cattle ranches through lack of credit during periods of drought and price decline, as well as through the propensity of Anglo officials and "shyster" (Pitt, 1966) lawyers to reinterpret land deeds and tax laws to force property transfers to Yankee immigrants (Camarillo, 1979; Pitt, 1966).

New evidence from the South (Johnson and Roark, 1984a, 1984b) shows the tenuous threads by which the wealthy colored entrepreneurs and landowners of the mid-nineteenth century held on to their real estate enterprises, always wary that a wrong social move, a slight offense of etiquette, might bring ruin at the hands of offended whites. In the North, one of the few lucrative businesses open to blacks, real estate, was difficult and dangerous: entrepreneurs who tried to sell property outside the ghetto faced threats to their lives and repeated bombings of their homes and offices (Philpott, 1978:177). Blacks had little capacity to manipulate zoning and other political institutions on behalf of their enterprises. Structural speculation was precluded. More generally, black entrepreneurs consistently lacked access to credit, which tended to "wash out" black enterprises during downturns in the

business cycle (Osofsky, 1963:102).⁸ Even much of the corruption in the ghetto, such as the "policy" and other gambling rackets, was controlled by whites, particularly the machine political bosses (Drake and Cayton, 1945:483). Black business, like black mobility generally, was "curtailed by traditional attitudes toward colored persons and by the vested economic interests of white occupational groups" (Drake and Cayton, 1945:437). It is significant that black West Indian immigrants have been most active as entrepreneurs, "legendary in their frugality and thrift" (Drake and Cayton, 1945:133), for they have had the *least* exposure to the debilitating mores of the U.S. caste system. Although it may be true that the black American "lacks a business tradition or the experience of people who, over generations, have engaged in buying and selling" (Frazier, 1962:139), there were (and are) good reasons to keep such a tradition from developing.

Indeed, on almost all fronts, racist discrimination persists even in contemporary times, albeit at lower levels of intensity. Black job applicants are still disfavored by white employers (Alexander and Sapery, 1973; Bloom, Fletcher, and Perry, 1972; Butler, 1976), sometimes facing the same simple "door in the face" discrimination as in the past (Feagin, 1982:125–32). The same pattern is found in housing. Careful investigations of instances in which applicants matching in every way except race apply for the same housing vacancies reveal that black applicants are far less likely to be successful than whites (Wienk et al., 1979; see also Molotch, 1972; Pearce, 1976). Financial institutions take more money out of black neighborhoods (as deposits) than they put back in (as home mortgages), and finance a disproportionately small number of home buyers compared to the total amount of home purchasing in black areas (Taggart and Smith, 1981). These practices along with the redlining of whole sections of the city have detrimental effects on housing costs, homeownership rates,

8. Self-employed black farmers experience a similar squeeze today (although small-scale white farmers are also under pressure). In 1910, black farmers operated 15 million acres of land; in 1978 ownership was down to 4.7 million acres. The crisis was exacerbated by the agricultural downturn of the early 1980s, which may shake out virtually the last of the black farmers. The irony is that black farmers do as well as whites on a gross-return-per-acre basis, but because they have difficulty obtaining credit and have small farms, they are less able to survive cyclical downturns (Brooks, 1984).

and people's chances of using house equity to "trade up" to better areas (Bradbury, Downs, and Small, 1982; Darden, 1980). Similarly, blacks continue to suffer from the disruption of the neighborhoods they do occupy; even after the demise of urban renewal, the loss of black residential units continued in the 1970s, at 80 percent of the rate in the 1960s, while the white rate declined to the much lower levels of the 1950s (Dahmann, 1982).

The evidence clearly points to a pattern of ghetto dependency. Homeownership rates are low among urban blacks; 64 percent of U.S. whites owned their own homes in 1980; only 44 percent of blacks owned their own homes, with rural, small-town, or Southern blacks accounting for the bulk of black owners (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982b:110). Further, blacks are far more likely than whites to be paying rent to people of a different race and to people who live outside their neighborhood. This has other, indirect, impacts on use values. As Molotch (1972) observed in his study of the changing South Shore neighborhood of Chicago, through interviews with three hundred landlords throughout the metropolis, property owners and management firms often see racial change as a signal to cut back property maintenance and reinvestment in structures. The most efficient route to maximize exchange value is, if not a "milking" of the property for short-term gain, at least a decrease in maintenance. The pattern is strong enough to make black neighborhoods of high rates of homeownership virtually the only ones in which properties are maintained in a safe and respectful fashion.

We find the same patterns in business: blacks have a low rate of ownership. Even in black Harlem during the Negro Renaissance of the 1920s, blacks owned far fewer of the ghetto businesses than whites (about 20 percent of Harlem businesses). In 1938 in Chicago, blacks owned almost half of all businesses in the black belt, but because these establishments were small, 90 percent of all shoppers' money spent in the area went to the white entrepreneurs (Drake and Cayton, 1945:438).⁹ As in earlier decades, black businesses continued in the postwar years to be con-

9. The outside ownership pattern has an ethnic quality as well; in 1938 in Chicago, three-fourths of white-owned ghetto businesses were owned by Jews; in New Orleans Italians were the major entrepreneurs (Drake and Cayton, 1945:432).

centrated in personal services (barbershops, clothes cleaners, restaurants), which cannot easily be "exported" to other groups. Whites owned the groceries and clothing and furniture stores (Frazier, 1962:53; Osofsky, 1963:137; see also Drake and Cayton, 1945:438). As of 1977, less than 1.5 percent of the U.S. black labor force was employed by other blacks, a very low rate compared to the rates for other large ethnic groups (Brown, 1984; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1979). For every 1,000 blacks in the United States, only 9.2 businesses are owned by blacks; for Hispanics the rate is 19.5; for Asians, 28.8 (U.S. Minority Business Development Agency, 1982).

These patterns of discrimination and deprivation are obviously not the result of recent trends like suburbanization or high-tech displacement. These patterns represent a historically consistent, sequentially reinforcing practice of repression. The only people lower than blacks in their contemporary economic standing are the Native Americans (Sowell, 1981), also not "immigrants" but subjected, as despised "savages," to the harshest repression (indeed, genocide). Today, they live in residential areas that, whether as remote reservations or urban slums, have high levels of dependence on outside bureaucracies and a weak "business tradition." This situation, like that of the blacks, implies something about the difference between immigration and subjugation, not arrival times.

The ghetto is, *in the exchange value context of U.S. urban life*, "institutionally incomplete" (Breton, 1964), with, as Oliver (1984:24) states bluntly, "the dominant social institutions being churches and liquor stores." Donald Warren (1975:11) has observed that ghetto leaders rise to their positions "in social bureaucracies—church, welfare, drug-abuse programs, public schools, etc.—which are . . . consumption rather than production 'industries.'" Leaders of such institutions cannot provide economic links within the neighborhood, or exercise much clout outside it. Even the black churches, an important part of black neighborhood life (Frazier and Lincoln, 1973; Ley, 1974), cannot make up for the absence of an indigenous exchange value engine. No church organization is ever of crucial importance in metropolitan dynamics (except occasionally as a tourist site). And the black church, unlike the Catholic or Protestant churches of the immigrants, is not itself closely tied to the religious organizations of

the dominant white groups. Not only are black ministers not considered important to growth goals, they are also irrelevant to the personal salvation of white leaders.¹⁰

Taken together, the many examples of exclusion and harassment give rise in the contemporary ghetto to ways of dealing with this geographically organized vulnerability. Amid a special "forthrightness and camaraderie" (DeZutter, 1981; Kochman, 1981), there has evolved an extraordinary coping system built upon mutual exchange and reciprocity (Anderson, 1976; Liebow, 1967; Stack, 1974; Valentine, 1978, but see Fischer, 1982:254). There is a network of interpersonal support, and a density of internal organization that can be higher than that in white areas (Warren, 1975). But rich interpersonal relationships within the neighborhood may be relatively inconsequential for community defense if there are no effective extralocal ties (Guest, 1985). Hunter (1974) reports that Chicago's black residents have a "localized" and "primary group" orientation toward neighborhood, one that does not facilitate mobilization on instrumental issues (see also Greer, 1962:138; Rudzitis, 1982-83). Blacks' local networks are not able to profitably link their participants' everyday lives with the economic and political structures that provide mobility and neighborhood defense.

The critical fact is that in the ghetto, the pursuit of exchange values is almost totally in the hands of outsiders; the daily round is worth little to anyone with an exchange interest and the resources needed to back up those interests. The people who own and control the ghetto, through their market holdings or their bureaucratic positions, live elsewhere and thus have little stake in enhancing the use values of residents. The "mixed allegiance" to both use and exchange values characteristic of some small-scale retailers and resident property owners in other areas is missing and

10. Similarly, increased black participation in the union rank and file does not easily translate into a neighborhood resource. In the steel communities studied by Kornblum (1974), black steelworkers were unique among ethnic groups in their lack of stable ties to a specific community that could be used to build reputations and help in advancement in union politics; this, in turn, meant "one of their own" was not visible as a worker whose union connections at the plant could be used by neighbors as a basis for job advancement. Reputations built in the plant could not, as they did for the other groups, serve as a basis for furthering neighborhood solidarity.

cannot function to restrain exchange goals. This weakens the indigenous group's capacity to secure the turf against outsiders' entrepreneurial and bureaucratic schemes. To build upon Zeitlin's formulation (1984a; Zeitlin, Neuman, and Ratcliff, 1976), the personification of use value is distinct from the personification of exchange value.¹¹ This, through an indirect route, is one of the key neighborhood consequences of the racist subjugation of black Americans.

A conspicuous minority of ghetto residents, those with the weakest entitlements to a secure place, are more than mobile; their inability to pay rent makes them drifters, or, in the words of the streets, "hoodlums" or, if they drink, "wineheads" (Anderson, 1976). Their street corner is the starting point of their daily round, a round that is devalued by almost everyone except themselves. The presence of such people and related ghetto conditions makes it more difficult for a critical mass of respectability to develop and take spatial form, for the daily round of *anyone* to be consistently sanctioned as "decent" (see Wilson, forthcoming). It is not simply a matter of poor public services, high levels of air pollution, and decaying absentee-owned buildings. People may not put flowerpots on the housing project balcony, knowing that their very residence is stigmatized and that the pot will probably be knocked over by a vandal anyway. Residents may not worry about their trash; they may relate to public areas in the same way as higher-income groups treat their rooms at the Airport Hilton, showing little perception of shared responsibility with other "guests," the housekeeper, or the management. The litter and graffiti are taken as signs that many residents betray the tenets of middle-class "civility" (Lewis and Maxfield, 1980; Lewis and Salem, 1983); rates of violence are known to be higher, prison records more common, and welfare dependence more prevalent. These differences cannot

11. Zeitlin and his associates, in their analysis of class cleavage in Chile, argue that the conflict between the *roles* of landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie was muted because the families with large landholdings overlapped with members of the corporate elite; "contradictory interests and social cleavages did not coincide" (Zeitlin, Neuman, and Ratcliff, 1976:1025). The two forces coalesced in the form of persons with family ties to both spheres. The prominent political role played by such persons meant that State policy had to take into account both landlord and corporate interests, thus facilitating long-term political stability. (Michael Schwartz suggested the parallel to our work.)

be denied through a liberal doctrine that "we are all the same" (in Kochman's terms, a "politeness conspiracy"),¹² or obscured by mechanistic searches for a general description of urban life. But these conditions, resulting from the larger pattern of historical relations in production and rent collection, can then be mistaken by outsiders to mean that there is nothing worth preserving in the ghetto, making almost all black people's homelands appropriate candidates for any reuse that will serve the growth needs of the metropolis. Blaming the victims helps justify destroying their community.

Paradoxes of Community Organization

The inherent instability of U.S. places leads to the founding of neighborhood community organizations (COs); these voluntary organizations typically exist to enhance use values, often in the face of exchange threats. They are created to deal with problems that, in the residents' view, are beyond the reach of existing governmental and single-focus civic associations, an accurate perception in most cases, since the government and most civic agencies are linked to the growth machine system (see chapter 3). Many scholars, from Tocqueville to more modern commentators, have noted the tendency of Americans to join and support associations generally. This can be at least partially explained by the extreme degree to which land is treated as a commodity in the United States, which destabilizes places, and the decentralization of government authority, which puts growth tools as well as regulating controls within at least apparent reach of local citizens. Nevertheless, because use values rather than exchange values guide most urban residents' actions, they are "naturally disorganized" (Friedland and Palmer, 1984:396); only extraordinary circumstances bring them into effective play against business elites, who are, as they tend their speculations, "naturally organized" (Stone, 1982).

12. Higham (1975:115) puts it as an invitation: "Instead of washing all the specific color out of our ethnic fabric in our fear of propagating stereotypes, let us look for the realities behind them" (as cited in Zunz, 1982:7).

Though they need it least, residents of affluent areas are more likely than others to join community organizations, and to have organizations that achieve unity and become effective (Crenson, 1983:297-300; see also Ley and Mercer, 1980; Rich, 1980). People of higher socioeconomic status participate more in local issues (Burnett, 1983; Goodman and Clary, 1976), and show a stronger link between "sensing a problem" and "becoming active" (Cox and McCarthy, 1980). We attribute these class differences, not to personality attributes of race, class, or ethnic groups, but to the larger set of interrelated advantages of wealthy neighborhoods, which contribute to successful mobilization: financial and political resources, residential stability, social homogeneity, and an array of organizations long in place (Henig, 1982). Neighborhood collective action is particularly strategic for the affluent when political conflict over land use becomes inescapable and the mode of conflict shifts from individual clout to more organized (and public) forms of action. When land development matters are the bone of contention in affluent areas (which they often are), the result is that "well-organized homeowners face well-financed developers" with each side "spending liberally for legal counsel and technical expertise" (Rudel, 1983:114). There may be constant litigation as one entrepreneur after another strives for the bonanza that can result if opposition can be overcome.

When defending their turf, the rich don't have to invoke their own use values. Instead, they can enthusiastically argue that preservation of their neighborhood is consistent with the needs of the whole city (including its growth "vitality"), or even of civilization itself. Citizens of places like Pebble Beach, California, or Beacon Hill can claim that their turf is unique in the world and must be "saved," as if it were an endangered species. And given the propensity of the affluent to choose their neighborhoods well and then lavish money and attention on them, their arguments are not without a grain of truth. Joined by many others, including sympathetic outsiders of lower social status but elevated aesthetic sensibilities, the rich can often mobilize enough political muscle to bring about protective government action.

Poor people, in contrast, are not in a position to effectively claim that their neighborhood, *as used by them*, is either a national resource or useful for attracting capital. Instead they must make a

more "emotional," a less "public-regarding" (Banfield and Wilson, 1963) case for their rights to their homes and shops. Their claims can be dismissed as idiosyncratic, even if understandable, efforts to intervene in legitimate market and governmental planning processes. Given such problems and the general lack of internal resources needed to ward off disruption, community organization seems on its face to be one of the few viable defense strategies. It is no wonder, therefore, that so many analysts have looked to the urban poor as the natural wellspring for this, as well as so much other, effective organizational opposition. Whether in the radical populist tradition of Alinsky (1969), the more conventional practices of social workers, or the urban social movements of Castells (1983), poor people's neighborhoods are where most of the action is supposed to be.

The paradox, of course, is that the neighborhoods with the most serious need for community organizations are those with the least capacity to create and sustain them. A neighborhood's general standing affects its *internal* material and social workings, which in turn affect the likelihood of effective community organization. A critical problem, again especially common in ghetto areas, is the absence of local business leaders (retailers, service providers, and property owners) who might supply material resources as well as connections with outside entrepreneurs and political organizations. Although this helps prevent unholy alliances between internal entrepreneurs and outsiders, it also means that the internal coalitions upon which community organizations typically depend cannot take form either. It becomes more difficult to achieve simple goals like getting a stop sign, blocking a sewer plant, or having the police evict unruly neighbors without burning down the whole neighborhood in the process. This is what happened in Philadelphia in the 1985 eviction of MOVE cultists; through the authorities' "grossly negligent behavior" eleven people were killed and sixty-one homes destroyed (Secter, 1986:8).

Low-income people are difficult to mobilize; their day-to-day marginality makes it hard for them to contribute time or funds. And since they have little or no money after meeting basic needs, combining internal resources can represent little more than multi-

plying zero times zero; the result is still zero.¹³ Moreover, when organizations do somehow manage to get hold of some resources, the frequent result in a context of so much shortage is destructive internecine squabbles over the few available crumbs (Katz and Mayer, 1985:16). Particularly in ghetto areas, it is difficult even to identify a stable constituency because of high rates of mobility and a certain heterogeneity that brings the underclass into the daily round of even the affluent.

This kind of instability and heterogeneity seems to work against the residents' commitment to a spatially demarcated organization. Research on community attachment (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974) has demonstrated the strong positive effect of residential stability. Reactionary neighborhood defense organizations, like the Boston antibusing movement studied by Useem (1980), as well as more progressive organizations, require a stable local base. Greer (1962:147) suggests that suburban stability and social homogeneity are major sources of political consensus among residents, and Guest and Oropesa (1984:839) report that homogenous communities in the Seattle area are the most able to support ongoing community organizations.

In some degree of contrast, black ghettos produce a form of urbane sophistication, a stigmatized cosmopolitanism that comes from having economic fates tied to distant and somewhat arbitrary institutions. Just as Jencks (1983:38) was forced to the "painful conclusion" that chronic exclusion, instability, and poverty inhibit blacks' performance in school or at work, we think these same disadvantages provide difficulties, not assets, for a community organizer looking for an enthusiastic constituency upon which to build a base.

Under conditions of meager neighborhood resources and obvious overall deprivation, people must find alternatives to traditional community organization. Organization in the ghetto has taken a pan-neighborhood form that makes comprehensive demands for the benefit of all blacks in the metropolis. Ghetto organizers took the offensive against the larger urban system (for example, city hall or the school board) or the national govern-

13. John McKnight provided this formula in a conversation with Molotch.

ment. Ghettos are organized less as attempts to defend the ongoing social and institutional patterns of a specific neighborhood and more as assaults on the larger social order that denies basic resources to all deprived places and the people in them. It is organization around victimization (Warren, 1975; see also Pahl, 1970:63).¹⁴

Black people's access to use values was so casually and pervasively left to the whim of the exchange value apparatus (whether in labor or property markets) that opposition to the pattern had to be as comprehensive as the threat. At least during the time of the most energetic activity in poor black areas (the 1960s and early 1970s), the activist thrust was against the larger system, which was correctly perceived to be the source of both individual and neighborhood troubles. Both the special vulnerability of black neighborhoods to outside penetration and the difficulties of organizing around turf issues are caused by racist patterns of exploitation, exclusion, and stigma. The movements for black liberation were thus not "urban social movements" (Castells, 1983), but part of a worldwide crusade against caste oppression, albeit a rebellion that, like many in the modern age, occurs primarily in the city (Tilly, 1974; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, 1975).

The energy needed to fight on these larger and more diffuse grounds is difficult to sustain. The struggle requires a more profound ideology than that behind the immediate and concrete interests of protecting one's property values or daily round. Ironically, it is the latter sort of activity as carried out by the affluent that has been misleadingly identified as altruistic and "public-regarding." But the movements of the ghetto poor require the more thorough transcendence of competing "selfish" demands of everyday life (Flacks, 1976, forthcoming) and precisely for that reason are more difficult to sustain over long periods.

The strategy of broad-based, disruptive attack on the centers of power was appropriate given the ghetto's extreme *social* distance from those centers but close *geographical* proximity to them. Some black activists, following the Alinsky (1969) advice, resorted to "rubbing raw the sores of discontent" in order to make

14. As Pahl (1970:63) says, a community can take its form from "a common disaster or common restriction on freedom" as much as from a shared advantage.

the troubles of ghetto people felt as troubles in the larger system. The geographical proximity of blacks to sensitive elite places (central business districts, prestige medical centers, and universities) positions blacks to threaten the stability of the surrounding urban system (Hicks and Swank, 1983; Piven and Cloward, 1971), including its long-term growth prospects. This spatial configuration was part of the "organizational substructure of disorderly politics" (Von Eschen, Kirk, and Pinard, 1971). Ghetto residents' insurrections create the unstable conditions that imply a poor investment climate for the nearby areas; if protest and mayhem go too far, a liberal growth machine may emerge to seek accommodation (as an alternative to draconian repression). This was the explicit goal of civic leaders in Atlanta, Georgia, and other cities (see chapter 3) who proposed to the rest of the white citizenry that their city was, in the slogan of the day, "too busy to hate" (Rice, 1983). The goal appears to have been especially characteristic of cities with major corporate headquarters, where much was at stake in the outcome (Friedland, 1982).

Organizing the Organizers

All community organizations have vulnerabilities; even the most militant can be shaped by elites toward a *modus vivendi* that reestablishes urban routines. There are even ways in which community groups, including radical protest organizations, can be used to help the process of growth intensification, or at least to remove any acute threat.

Neighborhood Management

Community organizations are not moneymakers and have to struggle for the funds needed to survive—to pay staff and cover expenses. One way to survive is to abandon insurrection. Parallel to the classic process of co-optation (Selznick, 1949), community organizations and insurrectionary movements adapt to "the real world," especially to a liberal growth machine strategy that holds out a peaceful hand.

An example is The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) of Chi-

cago, accurately credited with stopping the University of Chicago and city hall from taking over its turf in the 1960s for campus expansion and a highway (Fish et al., 1966). TWO has evolved in the decades since its founding into an administrative funnel for government programs (job training, community mental health, and others), performing adjunct functions to the still-centralized welfare system. The organization's leaders have taken on the role of a locally based bourgeoisie: through government subsidies as well as the participation of outside private firms, the community organization operates a few modest retail businesses (such as the neighborhood supermarket) and sponsors housing rehabilitation and construction. A similar pattern is found in Boston and San Francisco, in which former activists were "tamed" (Mollenkopf, 1983:191) as their organizations evolved into alternative social service providers; "political leaders become program administrators [and] their constituents . . . become clients" (Mollenkopf, 1983:97). For blacks, it is by now a familiar pattern: upward mobility is made possible by being in charge of "social control programs specifically designed to deal with 'black issues'" (Allen, 1970, as cited in Oliver and Glick, 1982:521). It is much like the way rich countries relate to Third World societies. Government supports high-risk private capital, which then enters into partnership with indigenous elites. These elites' participation in turn helps stabilize the investment, and they share in the returns accordingly. The linkage of the external power structure to the ghetto remains paternalistic and ad hoc, with the black leadership possessing no structural leverage over the system (see Selye and Wolpert, 1975:281).

By the scale of neighborhood standards—an economy of groceries, taverns, and barbershops—such organizations are significant components of community life, although by metropolitan standards of corporate headquarters and world-class museums they are trivial. They are substantial enough, perhaps, to inject at least a simulated enclave provincialism into the ghetto: for those who have careers tied to the community organization and its various operations, there is a turf-related basis for getting ahead and making a life. With a parochial interest to defend, the leaders of the community organization become a force for stability—a stability that translates into a system of accumulation and rent collec-

tion outside the neighborhood that can proceed unimpeded. The old goals of opposition, of "smashing the state," of "power to the people" are displaced by the need to build turf and the institutions to which one's life chances are tied. This transformation from offensive urbanity to reactionary provincialism mitigates the insurrectionary threat.

Vanguard of the Bourgeoisie

When exchange value conditions are right, community organizations can facilitate the reuse of poor people's neighborhoods for more lucrative purposes. Operating through the community organization mechanism, the "better element" in an otherwise disadvantaged area can function as a vanguard for change. These higher-class elements can be leftovers from a previous transition, or pioneers in a new one, or they may simply be drawn into a community by conveniently adjusting boundary lines to "borrow" some desirables from an adjacent turf. Whatever their origins, these people can end up as an organizational leadership to "speak for the community" on behalf of "higher standards" and the sort of land uses that might facilitate them.

Not surprisingly, those who ordinarily join and become leaders in a community organization tend to be the middle-class (or aspiring middle-class) homeowners, even if present only in small numbers in any neighborhood. Those who are better-off can routinely take over even a longstanding community organization, not as a result of a coup or a conspiracy, but merely as a result of devoting their energy and resources to it. Their presence can be a wedge through which outsiders can introduce and foster transformation.

Sometimes, gentrifying pioneers, in forming their community organizations, come to be taken as primary neighborhood representatives. In defending their own financial and psychological investments, these volunteers strive to make the entire neighborhood more closely resemble their own way of life. They use community organization, in lieu of sufficient funds to buy into an affluent area, to create a critical mass of pleasant amenity. Often remaking their homes with their own "sweat equity," these people are notorious for their organizational hard work; like speculators who have only exchange value interests, they are "naturally or-

ganized" because their small-scale structural speculation forces them to be. They have bet on a land parcel by betting they can use organizational clout to make a new social structure become real.

Front Organization

A community organization can so completely identify with those who wish to recycle the neighborhood that the organization comes to owe its very existence to outsiders' efforts. In the renewal of the Hyde Park-Kenwood community in Chicago, the University of Chicago established and funded the Southeast Chicago Commission (Rossi and Dentler, 1961), a purported community group headed by a leader of the university community (and brother of the dean of the Law School).¹⁵ In the case of the transformation of Boston's South End, Mollenkopf (1983:175) reports an intimate connection between city authorities and the neighborhood "leadership." The Boston Redevelopment Authority, in finding "a group of elite homeowners and tenants who aspired to make the South End a respectable middle-class neighborhood," was able, in effect, "to organize the community in behalf of its own bureaucratic interests" (Mollenkopf, 1983:175).

Neighborhood leaders are useful in testifying in support of rezoning, redevelopment subsidies, or tax abatements for a favored project. They can also be used to dampen internal neighborhood opposition to entrepreneurs' development projects. In Santa Barbara, local growth elites have created a community group called Santa Barbara Futures, whose members routinely testify on growth-related projects. Exxon oil, in order to win one of its many land-use battles with the community, in 1985 paid for the creation of an organization called County Citizens for Local Control, a thinly disguised political arm of its own campaign effort to industrialize the area.

Community organizations are not always cynical expressions of outsiders' entrepreneurial interests. In the Chicago South

15. The organization's director was Julian Levi, whose brother Edward then went on to become president of the university and attorney general of the United States. The Southeast Chicago Commission was rival to the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, a grass-roots community group more representative of the area's embattled middle-class residents.

Shore, the community organization was the stimulus for efforts to build an industrial park that might, it was hoped, lure a higher class of resident to the area. Some entrepreneurs, watching these organizations in action, make grateful financial contributions. In some instances, the community organization becomes a legally constituted Local Development Corporation that acts as a recipient of government development funding, becoming the official agency for packaging new subsidized projects for developers (Katz and Mayer, 1985). The boundaries between community organizations and at least some elements of entrepreneurial growth virtually disappear.

White Integrator

Much of the work of community organizations focuses on the goal of racial integration; many neighborhood associations owe their very existence to this pursuit. Although people can have any of a number of reasons for supporting racial integration, one reason supported in particular by rentier and political elites is that whites are thought to be more effective than blacks in the rent intensification process. Even when not stated explicitly, this belief is part of the background against which media and public discourse proceeds.

There are two ways in which integration enters the agenda of a community organization. First, black migration into a previously white neighborhood raises the prospect of the neighborhood becoming a ghetto. Under these conditions, integration means preserving a substantial white presence. Second, through gentrification or "spot" redevelopment, white migrants move in. Here integration can be a method of bringing the advantages of white presence to a previously "abandoned" area.

Regardless of the context, whites become the prize and thus the group whose needs come first. Similarly, in both contexts, blacks are either displaced (when whites are coming in) or actively discouraged (when whites are moving out). Honor goes to whites; stigma to blacks. In both instances, organizational success effectively decreases the supply of housing available to blacks, thereby increasing the prices they will have to pay in the less desirable neighborhoods, which they must then turn to. The community

organization dynamic, with its pleasant connotations of democratic self-determination, links up with the growth machine's devaluation of black residents. The result undermines black people's use values by weakening their ability either to hold onto old turf or to claim new ground upon which to build their community.

The Iron Law of Upgrading

The temptation to partake in the social "upgrading" of a neighborhood is present even in the most progressive organizations; in the context of the tough problems of crime, poverty, and funding crises, the sincere yearning of the "decent" residents is seductive; and it is easy to exclude the winos, homeless, and hoodlums as a constituency. Given a realistic understanding of the dynamics that created the difficulties of the underclass, the finite resources of *any* community organization seem useless for helping such people. The most efficient way to solve neighborhood problems is perhaps through a triage system in which the best-off receive some attention, the poorest are abandoned, and the middle group receive the most. Raising the neighborhood's social class, even if only by a little, enables a community organization to show progress in "cleaning up the neighborhood." Just as even the rich neighborhoods strive, albeit subtly, to attract even more affluent residents, every slum needs a better class of slum dweller.¹⁶ And as the community organization itself builds a stake in local businesses and becomes an accepted voice of the community, its leaders need more local buying power to sustain the investments. They may also want a stronger and more dignified social base to represent. Once again, the community organization has reasons to support changes in land use and social climate that outside growth elites desire. Improving the use values of the better-off (at the expense of the poor) fits well with the rent intensification goals of outsiders, whose prospective projects need more socially benign

16. Donald Cressey was once asked to suggest the best way to ease the threat of riots in U.S. penitentiaries. Cressey replied that we needed a better class of prisoner. His point was this: A system that generates so many hardened criminals and then locks them up together is going to have to face some very unpleasant events within the walls. Cressey's remark applies to neighborhoods that perform an analogous role.

surroundings. Thus there may be a fruitful basis for coalition. From the standpoint of the community organization, and this is indeed another paradox, it becomes necessary to destroy at least part of the neighborhood in order to save it.

The methods and the stakes vary from place to place, but the organizational push of urban life tends to be the same in rich and poor areas: to discourage those who damage identities, who lower rents, who are not appropriate constituents of viable organizations. Although there may be some resistance to these changes, rooted in sentiment, ethnicity, and charity, overall they will be implemented. As Cox (1981:438) succinctly puts it, "The community can only be saved by treating [it] as *commodity*" (our emphasis). That is why we so rarely witness effective community organization (especially with government support) to halt social upgrading, or to actually encourage the filtering down of a neighborhood to the downtrodden social groups that need it most. Instead, the community organization commonplace (as opposed to the celebrated exception) is preserving rich neighborhoods for the affluent, helping young professionals pioneer an inner-city conversion, or ridding a striving ghetto of its worst element. For neighborhoods, in all such cases, there is nowhere worth going but up. And going up means attracting, from a finite supply, the prized land users. This locks communities (even poor ones) into the same zero-sum competition across the cityscape. Neighborhoods thereby become wedded to the general rent intensification dynamic, making at least some of them receptive to the entrepreneurs' occasional offers of "revitalization."

The result is a sort of Burgess-succession process in reverse, in which the system's energy is provided, not by general upward social mobility and outward geographical movement, but by a thrusting away—in all places in which it is feasible—of those most marginal. There is no inevitable march of development from the center to the hinterlands, or in any other direction. It is perhaps a reflection of new modes of economic organization of society (to be outlined in chapter 7) that the relevant land-use problem ceases to be a question of how to deploy vast migrations of success-oriented workers and becomes instead a problem of determining which locations will have to deal with those for whom there is least use.

At stake in the outcome of these and the other struggles we have been describing is the stability of life and its quality within the neighborhoods. Again, the likelihood of transformation and its direction vary by kind of neighborhood as well as type of city, the moment in history, and the presence or absence of urban programs that affect the form and durability of community organization. Also significant are the changing intraelite power configurations that give advantage to one particular structural speculator's development scheme, and not another's. One way or the other, the residents' quality of life results from the way in which their individual and collective standing intersects with the potential use of their turf in the larger process of production and rent generation.

5

How Government Matters

Social forces are always at work structuring markets; and sometimes the means to regulate the use and exchange of a commodity are governmental. The official apparatus for managing land and buildings includes departments of planning, zoning, urban development, and the like. In this chapter, we focus on two ways in which government affects urban fortunes: first, formal and quasi-formal planning at various governmental levels and, second, the home-rule mechanism, which disperses planning authority into thousands of separate jurisdictions, particularly the legally incorporated suburban towns. Government matters; and here we explain how.

U.S. Planning “Exceptionalism”

Compared to most other industrial societies, the United States organizes land use in a unique manner, both in the extent of authority given to private developers and in the extreme independence of local government agencies. Among market societies, Sweden perhaps offers the strongest contrast, with local authority exercised by metropolitan-wide agencies and a great share of property investment (and therefore locational choice) made directly by the State. In the 1960s, a boom decade of housing growth in Stockholm, for example, 65 percent of all housing was