

KTRW

The journey to build a debuggable iPhone

Brandon Azad

36c3

whoami

Brandon Azad - @_bazad

Google Project Zero

macOS / iOS security research





imac-nickname:~ nickname\$ astris
astris v2.6.5 [Astris-827.50.7~274 (Electric tools)]

Probe address: KongSWD-
Probe type: kong
Probe firmware: 0.52
Probe tckrate: 1950000

Listening on port 8000 for CPU0, CPU1
Listening on port 8002 for IOP
Listening on port 8003 for AE2
Listening on port 8004 for ISP
Detected HSP C0

KongSWD- - CPU0:Run CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff
NO CPU > cpu cpu0

KongSWD- - CPU0:Run CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff

CPU0 > halt
CPU0: ASTRIS_ERR_OK
r0: 0x00000001 r1: 0xbffffc080 r2: 0x00000004 r3: 0x00000000
r4: 0x00000001 r5: 0xbffffc080 r6: 0xbffffc084 r7: 0xbff60700
r8: 0xbffffc080 r9: 0x00000000 r10: 0x00000001 r11: 0x00000400
ip: 0x3f200020 sp: 0xbff606f4 lr: 0xbff0e709 pc: 0xbff0e768
cpsr: 0x80000073 N-----FT Supervisor
0xbff0e768: 0xbf28 it cs

KongSWD- - CPU0:Halt CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff

CPU0 > save ~/Desktop/iBoot 0xbff00000 0x50000
.....
327680 bytes received in 9.527 sec, 34395 bytes per second

KongSWD- - CPU0:Halt CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff

CPU0 >

I do not use dev-fused
devices

I do not use dev-fused
devices

But they sure would make
my security research easier...

Goal: Build my own "home-brewed dev phone"

- Patch kernel memory (`__TEXT_EXEC`)
- Breakpoints, watchpoints
- Use with LLDB / IDA Pro
- Can update iOS version
- Only parts you can get at an Apple store



axi0mX

@axi0mX

Bootrom exploit philanthropist. Advanced persistent troublemaker. Thought follower. Bringing iOS jailbreaking back from the dead. #checkm8 #alloc8 #kloader64

⌚ checkra.in

🔗 github.com/axi0mX

🏢 Joined October 2015

🖼 36 Photos and videos



axi0mX
@axi0mX

Follow



EPIC JAILBREAK: Introducing checkm8 (read "checkmate"), a permanent unpatchable bootrom exploit for hundreds of millions of iOS devices.

Most generations of iPhones and iPads are vulnerable: from iPhone 4S (A5 chip) to iPhone 8 and iPhone X (A11 chip).



axi0mX/ipwndfu

open-source jailbreaking tool for many iOS devices -

axi0mX/ipwndfu

[github.com](https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwendfu)

4:15 AM - 27 Sep 2019

7,477 Retweets 16,436 Likes



970



7.5K



16K



axi0mX @axi0mX · Sep 27

1/ The last iOS device with a public bootrom exploit until today was iPhone 4, which was released in 2010. This is possibly the biggest news in iOS jailbreak community in years. I am releasing my exploit for free for the benefit of iOS



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checkra1n
@checkra1n



Pwn20wnd
@Pwn20wnd



Siguza

KTRR


Goal: Build my own "home-brewed dev phone"

- **Patch kernel memory (__TEXT_EXEC)**
- Breakpoints, watchpoints
- Use with LLDB / IDA Pro
- Can update iOS version
- Only parts you can get at an Apple store

low addresses

high addresses


kernelcache



low addresses

high addresses

kernelcache




Read/write data

low addresses

high addresses

kernelcache




Executable code

low addresses

high addresses


kernelcache



low addresses

high addresses

Protected by KTRR



KTRR (Kernel Text Readonly Region)


Strong form of W^X (write-xor-execute) protection

Apple A10 and later

All writes to memory in the KTRR region fail

All instruction fetches from outside the KTRR region fail

CPU cores




MMUs


L2 cache


DRAM


AMCC


Memory
controller
















CPU core
WRITE
0x839a6c000



MMUs



Memory
controller

CPU core
WRITE
0x839a6c000

MMUs


L2 cache

Memory controller





DRAM


AMCC




CPU core
WRITE
0x839a6c000

OK






CPU core
WRITE
0x803280000



MMUs



Memory
controller

CPU core
WRITE
0x803280000

MMUs


L2 cache

Memory controller


AMCC




DRAM



CPU core
WRITE
0x803280000




MMUs




Memory
controller

CPU core


~~WRITER~~
0x80320000




MMUs




Memory
controller



CPU core
EXEC
0x839a6c000




MMUs




Memory
controller

CPU core
EXEC
0x839a6c000




MMUs




Memory
controller

CPU core
EXEC
0x839a6c000




MMUs




Memory
controller

CPU core
0x839a5c000




MMUs

L2 cache




Memory
controller

CPU cores





MMUs


L2 cache




Memory
controller








CPU cores




MMUs


L2 cache




AMCC



CPU cores




L2 cache




AMCC


CPU cores



L2 cache



AMCC



MMU registers lose state
during core sleep

FFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase
FFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4
FFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF
...
FFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin
FFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]
FFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr
FFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end
FFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]
FFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr
FFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOWER_EL1, x17
FFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, x19, #4, LSL#12
FFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_UPPER_EL1, x19
FFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1
FFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOCK_EL1, x17
FFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF
...
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]
FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]
FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOWER_EL1, x17
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, X19, #4, LSL#12
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_UPPER_EL1, x19
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOCK_EL1, x17
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

MMU KTRR
bounds

FFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin

FFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end

FFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]

FFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOWER_EL1, x17

FFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB X19, X19, #4, LSL#12


FFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_UPPER_EL1, x19

FFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV X17, #1

FFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOCK_EL1, X17

FFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

MMU KTRR registers



Breaking KTRR

iOS 10.1.1: The Yalu KTRR bypass

Luca Todesco found that Apple accidentally left an MSR
TTBR1_EL1 instruction executable


Use that instruction to set a new page table base

KTRR is still initialized (so no new kernel code), but readonly
pages could now be made read/write

low addresses

high addresses

Protected by KTRR



low addresses

high addresses

Protected by KTRR



r w -

r w -

r - x

r w -

r - x

r w -

iOS 11.1.2: Build your own iOS kernel debugger

Ian Beer found that self-hosted debugging could be enabled using ROP

Built an iOS kernel debugger with breakpoints for iOS 11.1.2 that works with LLDB

KTRR is still fully enabled, but existing instructions can be executed in arbitrary order

Attempts to bypass KTRR

iBoot bug: no

TLB corruption: no

L2 cache corruption: no



panic-base-2019-08-30-143759.i...



"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12 20:32:02 PST 2018;
root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/RELEASE_ARM64_T8015",
"incident" : "479333C7-BAA2-4D77-8ABD-FD6C3B36B40C",
"crashReporterKey" : "ce81d5ec16fcde03b706d6a939240745a65782a2",
"date" : "2019-08-30 14:37:52.07 -0700",
"panicString" : "Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 1\ncpu 1 failed to halt with
error -5: halt not supported for this configuration\nDebugger
synchronization timed out; waited 10000000 nanoseconds\npanic(cpu 0
caller 0xffffffff00b5c96bc): \\"WDT timeout: CPU 1 failed to respond\\"@/\nBuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleARMPlatform/\nAppleARMPlatform-700.230.2/AppleARMWatchDogTimer.cpp:
501\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0xff\nOS version:
16C101\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12
20:32:02 PST 2018; root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/\nRELEASE_ARM64_T8015\nKernelCache UUID:
EE1D833E1AF3B367B764DA9719881315\nKernel UUID:
94463A80-7B38-3176-8872-0B8E344C7138\niBoot version:
iBoot-4513.230.10\nsecure boot?: YES\nPaniclog version: 11\nKernel slide:
0x0000000000500000\nKernel offset: 0x0000000000400000\nFirmware slide:



panic-base-2019-08-30-143759.i...



"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12 20:32:02 PST 2018;
root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/RELEASE_ARM64_T8015",
"incident" : "479333C7-BAA2-4D77-8ABD-FD6C3B36B40C",
"crashReporterKey" : "ce81d5ec16fcde03b706d6a939240745a65782a2",
"date" : "2019-08-30 14:37:52.07 -0700",
"panicString" : "Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 1\ncpu 1 failed to halt with
error -5: halt not supported for this configuration\nDebugger
synchronization timed out; waited 10000000 nanoseconds\n**panic(cpu 0**
caller 0xffffffff00b5c96bc): \\"WDT timeout: CPU 1 failed to respond\\"@/
BuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleARMPlatform/
AppleARMPlatform-700.230.2/AppleARMWatchDogTimer.cpp:
501\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0xff\nOS version:
16C101\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12
20:32:02 PST 2018; root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/
RELEASE_ARM64_T8015\nKernelCache UUID:
EE1D833E1AF3B367B764DA9719881315\nKernel UUID:
94463A80-7B38-3176-8872-0B8E344C7138\niBoot version:
iBoot-4513.230.10\nsecure boot?: YES\nPaniclog version: 11\nKernel slide:
0x0000000000500000\nKernel offset: 0x00000000_00400000\nFault type:



panic-base-2019-08-30-143759.i...



"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12 20:32:02 PST 2018;
root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/RELEASE_ARM64_T8015",
"incident" : "479333C7-BAA2-4D77-8ABD-FD6C3B36B40C",
"crashReporterKey" : "ce81d5ec16fcde03b706d6a939240745a65782a2",
"date" : "2019-08-30 14:37:52.07 -0700",
"panicString" : "**Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 1\ncpu 1 failed to halt with
error -5: halt not supported for this configuration\nDebugger**
synchronization timed out; waited 10000000 nanoseconds\npanic(cpu 0
caller 0xffffffff00b5c96bc): \"WDT timeout: CPU 1 failed to respond\"@/\nBuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleARMPlatform/\nAppleARMPlatform-700.230.2/AppleARMWatchDogTimer.cpp:
501\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0xff\nOS version:
16C101\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12
20:32:02 PST 2018; root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/\nRELEASE_ARM64_T8015\nKernelCache UUID:
EE1D833E1AF3B367B764DA9719881315\nKernel UUID:
94463A80-7B38-3176-8872-0B8E344C7138\nBoot version:
iBoot-4513.230.10\nsecure boot?: YES\nPaniclog version: 11\nKernel slide:
0x0000000000500000\nKernel offset: 0x00000000_00400000\nFault type:

IDA - kernelcache.iPhone10,1.16G77.decompressed.i64 (kernelcache.iPhone10,1.16G77.decompressed) /Users/bazad/Developer/binaries/iOS/16G77/iPhone10,1/kernelcache.iPhone10,1.16G77.decompressed.i64

Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function

Functions window IDA View-A Pseudocode-A Strings window Structures Program Segmentation Local Types Hex View-1

Function name

sub_FFFFFFFF0076274EC
sub_FFFFFFFF007627788
sub_FFFFFFFF00762786C
sub_FFFFFFFF007627964
sub_FFFFFFFF007627A30
sub_FFFFFFFF007627B0C
sub_FFFFFFFF007627CFC
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C000
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C064
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C088
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C11C
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C128
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C12C
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C180
sub_FFFFFFFF00762C298
sub_FFFFFFFF00762CA54
sub_FFFFFFFF00762CD54
sub_FFFFFFFF00762CE28
sub_FFFFFFFF00762D020
sub_FFFFFFFF00762D3A4
sub_FFFFFFFF00762D55C
_KLD_InitFunc_0
_KLD_TermFunc_0

Line 80633 of 80634

0000E0000 FFFFFFFF0070E4000: LowResetVectorBase (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

Output window

```
FFFFFFFFFF0070B9478: using guessed type __int64 *kernel_pmap;
FFFFFFFFFF0070B96E8: using guessed type __int64 gPhysBase;
FFFFFFFFFF0070B9700: using guessed type __int64 qword_FFFFFFFF0070B9700;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type __int64 kernel_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type __int64 page_size;
```

Python

AU: idle Down Disk: 51GB

Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000 ; Attributes: noreturn
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4008 MOVK X0, #0x4455, LSL#48
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E400C MOVK X0, #0x4455, LSL#32
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4010 MOVK X0, #0x6466, LSL#16
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4014 MOVK X0, #0x6677
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4018 BL sub_FFFFFFFF0070E85A0
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E401C ADRP X4, #_aprr_jit@PAGE
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4020 LDRB W5, [X4, #_aprr_jit@PAGEOFF]
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4024 CMP W5, #0
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4028 B.NE loc_FFFFFFFF0070E4044
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E402C MOVK X0, #0x4545, LSL#48
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4030 MOVK X0, #0x101, LSL#32
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4034 MOVK X0, #0x6767, LSL#16
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4038 MOVK X0, #0x101
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E403C BL sub_FFFFFFFF0070E8578
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4040 B loc_FFFFFFFF0070E4058
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4044 ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+28+j
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4044 MOVK X0, #0x4545, LSL#48
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4048 MOVK X0, #0x101, LSL#32
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E404C MOVK X0, #0x6567, LSL#16
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4050 MOVK X0, #0x101
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4054 BL sub_FFFFFFFF0070E8578
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4058 loc_FFFFFFFF0070E4058 ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+40+j
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4058 MOVK X0, #0, LSL#48
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E405C MOVK X0, #0, LSL#32
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4060 MOVK X0, #0, LSL#16

bazad@bazad-macbookpro: ~/Developer/source/xnu — zsh

Last login: Mon Dec 16 15:05:24 on ttys025

bazad@bazad-macbookpro ~ % cd ~/Developer/source/xnu

bazad@bazad-macbookpro ~/Developer/source/xnu (git)-[master] % grep -RF "Attempting to fo
rcibly halt" .

./osfmk/arm/model_dep.c: paniclog_append_noflush("Attempti
ng to forcibly halt cpu %d\n", cpu);

bazad@bazad-macbookpro ~/Developer/source/xnu (git)-[master] % █

Line E
Out
FFFF
FFFF

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type __int64 qword_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type __int64 kernel_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type __int64 page_size;

Python

```
101 ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu(int cpu_index, uint64_t timeout_ns)
102 {
103     cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
104     if ((cdp == NULL) || (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] == 0))
105         return DBGWRAP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
106
107     /* Only one cpu is allowed to initiate the halt sequence, to prevent cpus from cr
108        oss-halting
109        * each other. The first cpu to request a halt may then halt any and all other c
110        pus besides itself. */
111     int curcpu = cpu_number();
112     if (cpu_index == curcpu)
113         return DBGWRAP_ERR_SELF_HALT;
```

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

0 112,0-1

36%

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type __int64 qword_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type __int64 kernel_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type __int64 page_size;

Python

```
114     (halt_from_cpu != (uint32_t)curcpu))
115     return DBGWRAP_ERR_INPROGRESS;
116
117     volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *dbgWrapReg = (volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] + DBGWRAP_REG_OFFSET);
118
119     if (ml_dbgwrap_cpu_is_halted(cpu_index))
120         return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
121
122     /* Clear all other writable bits besides dbgHalt; none of the power-down or reset
123    bits must be set. */
124     *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
125
126     if (timeout_ns != 0) {
```

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

9

125,1-4

41%

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type __int64 qword_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type __int64 kernel_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type __int64 page_size;

Python

```
114     (halt_from_cpu != (uint32_t)curcpu))
115     return DBGWRAP_ERR_INPROGRESS;
116
117     volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *dbgWrapReg = (volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] + DBGWRAP_REG_OFFSET);
118
119     if (ml_dbgwrap_cpu_is_halted(cpu_index))
120         return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
121
122     /* Clear all other writable bits besides dbgHalt; none of the power-down or reset
123    bits must be set. */
124
125     if (timeout_ns != 0) {
126
127         if (timeout_ns > 0) {
128             /* Set the timeout value */
129             *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT | (timeout_ns << 16));
130
131             /* Wait for the halt to complete */
132             while ((*dbgWrapReg & DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) != DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) {
133                 /* Do nothing */
134             }
135
136             /* Clear the timeout value */
137             *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT & ~((uint32_t)1 << 16));
138
139             /* Return success */
140             return DBGWRAP_SUCCESS;
141
142         } else {
143             /* Set the timeout value to 0 */
144             *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT | (0 << 16));
145
146             /* Wait for the halt to complete */
147             while ((*dbgWrapReg & DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) != DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) {
148                 /* Do nothing */
149             }
150
151             /* Clear the timeout value */
152             *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT & ~((uint32_t)1 << 16));
153
154             /* Return success */
155             return DBGWRAP_SUCCESS;
156
157         }
158
159     }
160
161     /* If we reach here, the CPU is already halted */
162     return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
163 }
```

MMIO
register

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

9

125,1-4

41%

```
114     (halt_from_cpu != (uint32_t)curcpu))
115     return DBGWRAP_ERR_INPROGRESS;
116
117     volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *dbgWrapReg = (volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] + DBGWRAP_REG_OFFSET);
118
119     if (ml_dbgwrap_cpu_is_halted(cpu_index)) CoreSight?
120         return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
121
122     /* Clear all other writable bits besides dbgHalt; none of the power-down or reset
123     bits must be set. */
124     *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
125
126     if (timeout_ns != 0) {
```

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

9

125,1-4

41%

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type __int64 qword_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type __int64 kernel_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type __int64 page_size;

Python

```
dbgwrap_status_t
ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state(int cpu_index,
        uint64_t timeout_ns, dbgwrap_thread_state_t *state) {
cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
...
/* Ensure memory-mapped coresight registers can be written */
*((volatile uint32_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_ED]
+ ARM_DEBUG_OFFSET_DBGLAR)) = ARM_DBG_LOCK_ACCESS_KEY;
...
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
    instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
    ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
    state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
}
...
return status;
```

```
dbgwrap_status_t
ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state(int cpu_index,
                                uint64_t timeout_ns, dbgwrap_thread_state_t *state) {
    cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
...
    /* Ensure memory-mapped coresight registers can be written */
    *((volatile uint32_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_ED]
        + ARM_DEBUG_OFFSET_DBGLAR)) = ARM_DBG_LOCK_ACCESS_KEY;
...
    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
        instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
        ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
        state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
    }
...
    return status;
```

```
dbgwrap_status_t
ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state(int cpu_index,
        uint64_t timeout_ns, dbgwrap_thread_state_t *state) {
cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
...
/* Ensure memory-mapped coresight registers can be written */
*((volatile uint32_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_ED]
+ ARM_DEBUG_OFFSET_DBGLAR)) = ARM_DBG_LOCK_ACCESS_KEY;
...
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
    instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
    ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
    state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
}
...
return status;
```

```
dbgwrap.c:111 ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr()
cpuid(0x1, &eax);
...
/* ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr() is executing
 * dynamically-generated instructions!
 */
...  
*/
```

```
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
    instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
    ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
    state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
}

...
return status;
```

voucher_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher_swap on bazad-iphone8

27

```
896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.
897 uint32_t edlsr = kernel_call_7(ldr_w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));
898 INFO(" edlsr = %x", edlsr);
899 kernel_call_7(str_w0_x1_ret, 2, 0xc5acce55, (ed_mmio + 0xFB0));
900 edlsr = kernel_call_7(ldr_w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));
901 INFO(" edlsr = %x", edlsr);
902 }
903
904 // Try to call ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state.
905 uint64_t dbgwrap_thread_state = kernel_vm_allocate(0x4000);
906 uint32_t halt_status = kernel_call_7(ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state, 3, 2, 10000000,
907                                     dbgwrap_thread_state);
908 INFO("halt_status = %x", halt_status);
909 arm_thread_state64_t state = {};
910 kernel_read(dbgwrap_thread_state, &state, sizeof(state));
911 for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(state._x) / sizeof(state._x[0]); i++) {
912     printf(" x[%2d] = %016llx\n", i, state._x[i]);
913 }
914 printf(" fp = %016llx\n", state._fp);
915 printf(" lr = %016llx\n", state._lr);
916 printf(" sp = %016llx\n", state._sp);
917 printf(" pc = %016llx\n", state._pc);
918 printf(" cpsr = %08x\n", state._cpsr);
919 sleep(1);
```

No Debug Session



```
x[23] = 0000000000000000
x[24] = 0000000000000000
x[25] = 0000000000000000
x[26] = 0000000000000000
x[27] = 0000000000000000
x[28] = 0000000000000000
fp = 0000000000000000
lr = 00000008942e466c
sp = 0000000000000000
pc = 00000008942e4120
cpsr = 600003c5
```



voucher_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher_swap on bazad-iphone8

27

voucher_swap > app > AppDelegate.m -application:didFinishLaunchingWithOptions:

```
896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.  
897     uint32_t edlsr = kernel_call_7(ldr_w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));  
  
x[23] = 0000000000000000  
x[24] = 0000000000000000  
x[25] = 0000000000000000  
x[26] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5  
  
acce55, (ed_mmio + 0xFB0));  
1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));  
  
e.  
locate(0x4000);  
rap_halt_cpu_with_state, 3, 2, 10000000,  
  
zeof(state));  
of(state._x[0]); i++) {  
state._x[i]);  
  
All Output
```

```
x[23] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5
```

All Output



Auto



All Output



voucher_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher_swap on bazad-iphone8

896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.

897 uint32_t edlsr = kernel_call 7(ldr w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));

x[23] = 0000000000000000
x[24] = 0000000000000000
x[25] = 0000000000000000
x[26] = 0000000000000000
x[27] = 0000000000000000
x[28] = 0000000000000000
fp = 0000000000000000
lr = 00000008042e406c
sp = 0000000000000000
pc = 00000008042e4120
cpsr = 600003c5

No Debug Sess

All Output

Kernel mode

acce55, (ed_mmio + 0xFB0));
1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));
e.
locate(0x4000);
rap_halt_cpu_with_state, 3, 2, 10000000,

zeof(state));
of(state._x[0]); i++) {
state._x[i]);

voucher_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher_swap on bazad-iphone8

896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.

897 uint32_t edlsr = kernel_call 7(ldr w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));

x[23] = 0000000000000000
x[24] = 0000000000000000
x[25] = 0000000000000000
x[26] = 0000000000000000
x[27] = 0000000000000000
x[28] = 0000000000000000
fp = 0000000000000000
lr = 00000008042e406c
sp = 0000000000000000
pc = 00000008042e4120
cpsr = 600003c5

No Debug Sess

All Output

acce55, (ed_mmio + 0xFB0));
1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));
e.
locate(0x4000);
rap_halt_cpu_with_state, 3, 2, 10000000,

zeof(state));
of(state._x[0]); i++) {
state._x[i]);

Reset vector!

x[28] = 0000000000000000
x[27] = 0000000000000000
x[28] = 0000000000000000
fp = 0000000000000000
lr = 00000008042e406c
sp = 0000000000000000
pc = 00000008042e4120
cpsr = 600003c5

All Output

We've halted execution in
the reset vector, before the
MMU has been turned on!

We've halted execution in
the reset vector, before the
MMU has been turned on!

How do we use this?

What exactly is this
CoreSight thing
anyway?

H8.4 Memory-mapped accesses to the external debug interface

Support for memory-mapped access to the external debug interface is OPTIONAL. When memory-mapped access to the external debug interface is supported, the external debug interface is accessed as a little-endian memory-mapped peripheral.

If the external debug interface is CoreSight compliant, then an OPTIONAL Software Lock can be implemented for memory-mapped accesses to each component.

The Software Lock is OPTIONAL and deprecated. If [ARMv8.4-Debug](#) is implemented, the Software Lock is not implemented. If it is not implemented, the behavior is as if it is unlocked. The Software Locks are controlled by [EDLSR](#) and [EDLAR](#), [PMLSR](#) and [PMLAR](#), and [CTILSR](#) and [CTILAR](#). See [Management registers and CoreSight compliance](#) on page K2-7237.

With the exception of these registers and the effect of the Software Lock, the behavior of the memory-mapped accesses is the same as for other accesses to the external debug interface.

Note

The recommended memory-mapped accesses to the external debug interface are not compatible with the memory-mapped interface defined in ARMv7. In particular:

- The memory map is different.
 - Memory-mapped accesses do not behave differently to Debug Access Port accesses when [OSLSR.OSLK](#) = 1, meaning that the OS Lock is locked.
-

The following sections give more information about these memory-mapped accesses:

Nailgun Attack

Break the privilege isolation in ARM devices

Overview

Processors nowadays are consistently equipped with debugging features to facilitate the program debugging and analysis. Specifically, the ARM debugging architecture involves a series of CoreSight components and debug registers to aid the system debugging, but the security of the debugging features is under-examined since it normally requires physical access to use these features in the traditional debugging model.

The idea of Nailgun Attack is to misuse the debugging architecture with the inter-processor debugging model. In the inter-processor debugging model, a processor

CoreSight External Debug Interface

On-chip debug architecture

Per-CPU debug registers accessible via MMIO

Extensively documented in the ARMv8 manual

Can set breakpoints/watchpoints, execute instructions, etc

The memory-mapped version of the debug registers used by Ian Beer in "Build your own iOS kernel debugger"

Use External Debug
to single-step
`LowResetVectorBase`
and skip KTRR lockdown

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF
...
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]
FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [x19]
FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOWER_EL1, x17
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, x19, #4, LSL#12
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_UPPER_EL1, x19
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOCK_EL1, x17
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Challenges

We can halt a CPU core, and we can execute instructions on it to modify state, but how do we resume execution after making our modifications?

We are using one CPU core to hijack another as it executes the reset vector, so how do we handle subsequent core resets?

```
344 } while ((dbgwrap & (1 << 28)) == 0);
345
346 // The CPU is now halted in Debug state at reset.
347 DEBUG_TRACE(1, "Halted CPU %u in Debug State", cpu_id);
348 DEBUG_TRACE(1, "DBGWRAP = %llx", (dbgwrap = kernel_ioread64(dbgwrap_reg)));
349 print_edprsr();
350
351 // TODO: If this operation actually prevents the CPU from resetting, we should observe no
352 // panic later.
353
354 // Restart.
355 DEBUG_TRACE(1, "Restarting CPU %u", cpu_id);
356 kernel_iowrite64(dbgwrap_reg, (1 << 30) | (1 << 29) | (1 << 26));
357 DEBUG_TRACE(1, "DBGWRAP = %llx", kernel_ioread64(dbgwrap_reg));
358 print_edprsr();
359 kernel_iowrite64(dbgwrap_reg, (1 << 29) | (1 << 26));
360 DEBUG_TRACE(1, "DBGWRAP = %llx", kernel_ioread64(dbgwrap_reg));
361
362 sample_cpus();
363
364 for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
365     print_edprsr();
366     sleep(1);
367 }
```

```
[D] Restarting CPU 2
[D] DBGWRAP = 4000000
[D] EDPRSR: SDR=1 H=0 SR=0 R=0 SPD=0 PU=-
[D] DBGWRAP = 24000000
[D] Available cpus: 3f
[D] EDPRSR: SDR=0 H=0 SR=0 R=0 SPD=0 PU=-
[D] EDPRSR: SDR=0 H=A SR=0 R=0 SPD=0 PU=-
[D] EDPRSR: SDR=0 H=A SR=0 R=0 SPD=0 PU=
```

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOWER_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, X19, #4, LSL#12

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_UPPER_EL1, x19

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOCK_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Take this
branch

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [x19]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOWER_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, x19, #4, LSL#12

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_UPPER_EL1, x19

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_LOCK_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Take this
branch

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, _rorgn_begin

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, _rorgn_end

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [x19]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_Lo_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB X19, X17, LSL#1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_Upper_EL1, X19


FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV X17, #1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64_REG_KTRR_Lo_EL1, X17


FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Take this branch

CPU cores




L2 cache




AMCC

CPU cores




MMUs

L2 cache



AMCC



Kernel shellcode
mode activated!

The diagram illustrates a memory hierarchy. At the bottom, there are two sets of memory blocks: one set is light red and the other is light blue. Each set contains two purple rectangular components. Arrows point from these components to the text "MMUs" and "AMCC" respectively. Above the red blocks is a large white box containing the text "Kernel shellcode mode activated!". To the right of this box is a green rounded rectangle labeled "1". A black arrow points from the top of the red blocks up towards the white box. Another black arrow points from the top of the blue blocks up towards the green rectangle. A third black arrow points from the "AMCC" component up towards the green rectangle.

MMUs


AMCC

Building KTRW


Steps to building a kernel debugger

- Remapping the kernel
- Loading a kernel extension
- Interrupt handling
- Communication channel
- GDB stub

CPU cores




L2 cache




AMCC



CPU cores




MMUs



AMCC

RoRgn pages
are still readonly





Remapping the kernel


We need to modify page table permissions to make the kext's memory executable

Root page tables are in the KTRR region (still readonly)

Solution: Remap the kernel onto fresh, writable pages and set **TTBR1_EL1** to point to the new page tables







Loading kernel extensions

Allocate kernel memory for the kext

Copy in the kext binary

Dynamically link against kernel symbols

Modify page tables to make it executable

Call the `kext_start()` function

KTRW: High-level design

One (monitor) core reserved for KTRW

Other (debugged) cores run XNU normally

Breakpoints/watchpoints cause the debugged core to halt and enter Debug state

Monitor core polls for entry to Debug state and notifies LLDB over some communication channel



panic-base-2019-12-20-114431.ips



"panicString" : "Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 0\ncpu 0 successfully
halted\nDebugger synchronization timed out; waited 10000000
nanoseconds\npanic(cpu 1 caller 0xffffffff02609fd64): **AOP PANIC - No
pulse on 0x113dc60 - power(1)**\nNo pulse on 0x113dc60\nRTKit:
RTKit_iOS-973.250.56.release - Client:
AppleSPUFirmwareBuilder-160.260.5~351\nUUID:
7868b171-9329-390a-88b2-1acbe5a3e67f\nTime:
0x0000000063a3995b\n\nFaulting task 0 Call Stack:
0x000000000106b8b2 0x000000000106b564 0x000000000105dd0a
0x000000000106c3c0 0x000000000106184a 0x00000000010635cc
0x000000000105e26a 0x000000000100059c 0x000000000106b0d0
0x000000000106ae6c 0x0000000001060ce8\nMailbox (0): (0)\n Inbox
AKF_KIC_INBOX_CTRL = 0x00026601, AKF_KIC_MAILBOX_SET =
0x00001001\n Outbox AKF_AP_OUTBOX_CTRL = 0x0081d501,
AKF_AP_MAILBOX_SET = 0x00000000\n\n dir endpoint timestamp
msg\n ======\n ======\n [TX] user10 0x000000005fd3c3e8
0x0085000000000000\n [TX] user07 0x000000005fd869ac

Problem 1: AOP interrupts

The Always-On Processor (AOP) sends periodic interrupts to the AP that must be handled or else the AOP will panic

WatchDog Timer can be disabled by reversing AppleS5L8960XWatchDogTimer.kext

I could not find a way to disable the other interrupts

Hack 1: Service interrupts on the monitor core

Problem 2: IRQ deadlock

Execution on the monitor core could jump to the IRQ handler while a debugged core is halted holding an IRQ-critical spinlock

Hack 2: Only halt a debugged core if interrupts are enabled (and thus is not in an IRQ critical region)

Need some channel for
LLDB to communicate with
the KTRW kext

Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi

Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi
Easy	Fast	An option

Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi
Easy	Fast	An option
Requires <i>special</i> hardware	Write a custom USB stack	Write a custom WiFi driver

Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi
Easy	Fast	An option
Requires <i>special</i> hardware	Write a custom USB stack	Write a custom WiFi driver



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DesignWare Hi-Speed USB 2.0 On-the-Go Controller

The DesignWare® Hi-Speed USB 2.0 On-The-Go (HS OTG) Controller provides designers with high-quality USB IP for the most demanding USB 2.0 peripherals. The controller performs as a standard Hi-Speed Dual-Role Device (DRD), operating as either a USB 2.0 Hi-Speed peripheral, or Hi-Speed USB 2.0 Host. Based on Synopsys' success in building and deploying Hi-Speed USB 2.0 Host, Device and PHY designs, the DesignWare USB 2.0 HS OTG Controller incorporates Synopsys expertise in Reuse Methodology, Constrained Random Verification, and USB PHY interoperability to deliver flexible, quality IP in Verilog source. The controller is optimized for area- and power-sensitive markets such as Internet of Things (IoT).

 [DesignWare IP Prototyping Kit for USB 2.0 HS OTG](#)

 [DesignWare IP Prototyping Kits](#)



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REGISTER - CREATE ACCOUNT

FORGOT PASSWORD



raspberrypi / linux

Watch

721

Star

6.3k

Fork

3.1k

Code

Issues 243

Pull requests 28

Projects 0

Wiki

Security

Insights

Tree: c0e4ca1745 ▾

linux / drivers / usb / host / dwc_otg / dwc_otg_regs.h

Find file Copy path



popcornmix Add dwc_otg driver

132ff67 on May 13

1 contributor

2550 lines (2376 sloc) | 70.3 KB

Raw

Blame

History



```
1173 * This union represents the bit fields in the Device Control
1174 * Register. Read the register into the <i>d32</i> member then
1175 * set/clear the bits using the <i>b</i>it elements.
1176 */
1177 typedef union dctl_data {
1178     /** raw register data */
1179     uint32_t d32;
1180     /** register bits */
1181     struct {
1182         /** Remote Wakeup */
1183         unsigned rmtwkupsig:1;
1184         /** Soft Disconnect */
1185         unsigned sftdiscon:1;
1186         /** Global Non-Periodic IN NAK Status */
1187         unsigned gnpinnaksts:1;
1188         /** Global OUT NAK Status */
1189         unsigned goutnaksts:1;
```



Library function

Regular func

Instruction

Data

explored

External symbol  Lumina function

Function names

```
f syn_otg_stall_ep  
f syn_otg_reset_data_0  
f syn_otg_is_ep_stalled  
f syn_otg_do_xxx_  
f syn_otg_abort_ep  
f syn_otg_deactivate_ep  
f init_usb_task  
f usb_task_func  
f syn_otg_do_initial_res  
f syn_otg_begin  
f retire_ioreq_chain  
f find_next_tx_fifo  
f begin_rx_dma  
f sub_1000052F8  
f syn_otg_int_handler  
f send_current_ioreq_on  
f add_just_finished_iore  
f do_ep_in_timeout  
f recv_current_ioreq_on  
f sub_100005E48
```

Line 140 of 583

In general, the decompiler checks the segment permissions, class, and name to determine if it is read-only.

1000052EC: restored microcode from idb

Python

```
50     out_daint = (unsigned int)daint >> 16;
51     in_daint = (unsigned __int16)daint;
52     for ( diepint_reg_off = 0x908LL; ; diepint_reg_off += 0x20LL )
53     {
54         if ( !(in_daint | out_daint) || ep_num > 5 )
55             goto DONE;
56         if ( in_daint & 1 )
57         {
58             diepint = *(_DWORD *) (diepint_reg_off | 0x230100000LL); // DIEPINT
59             syn_otg.endpoints[ep_idx_in].depint |= diepint;
60             *(_DWORD *) (diepint_reg_off | 0x230100000LL) = diepint;
61             if ( syn_otg.endpoints[ep_idx_in].is_active )
62             {
63                 if ( diepint & 1 ) // xfercompl -- when is this signalled? When all packets have been a
64                     // Well I'm dealing with control transfers, so it's on each transaction
65             {
66                 endpoint_off = (int *)__shifted(syn_otg_endpoint, -0x10))(&syn_otg.pending_setup_pkt
67                                         + ep_idx_in * 80);
68                 cur_ioreq = syn_otg.endpoints[ep_idx_in].current_io_req;
69                 if ( cur_ioreq )
70                 {
71                     cur_ioreq->transferred_size += ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_transfer_size;
72                     *(_QWORD *)&ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_transfer_size = 0LL;
73                     cur_ioreq = ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_io_req;
74                     if ( cur_ioreq->transferred_size >= cur_ioreq->size )
75                     {
76                         cur_ioreq->state = 0;
77                         cur_ioreq = ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_io_req;
78                         endpoint_off = (int *)__shifted(syn_otg_endpoint, -0x10))(&syn_otg.pending_setup_pkt
79                                         + ep_idx_in * 80);
80                     }
81                 }
82             }
83         }
84     }
85 }
```

A Express

USB 3.1 Bus

▼ USB 3.1 Bus

KTRW

KTRW:


Product ID:	0x1337
Vendor ID:	0x05ac (Apple Inc.)
Version:	0.00
Serial Number:	Google Project Zero
Speed:	Up to 480 Mb/s
Manufacturer:	Brandon Azad
Location ID:	0x14200000 / 3
Current Available (mA):	500
Current Required (mA):	500
Extra Operating Current (mA):	0

```
.. (up a dir)
</Developer/exploits/ktrw/
▼ ktrw_gdb_stub/
  ▼ source/
    ▼ gdb_stub/
      gdb_cpu.c
      gdb_cpu.h
      gdb_internal.c
      gdb_internal.h
      gdb_packets.c
      gdb_packets.h
      gdb_platform.c
      gdb_platform.h
      gdb_rsp.c
      gdb_rsp.h
      gdb_state.h
      gdb_stub.c
      gdb_stub.h
    ▶ third_party/

```

```
799
800 // ---- m packet -----
801
802 static sends_a_packet
803 gdb_pkt__m(struct packet *pkt) {
804     uint64_t address;
805     uint64_t length;
806     bool ok = pkt_read_hex_u64(pkt, &address)
807         && pkt_read_match(pkt, ",")
808         && pkt_read_hex_u64(pkt, &length)
809         && pkt_empty(pkt);
810     if (!ok) {
811         return send_error_bad_packet("m");
812     }
813     uint8_t data[GDB_RSP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE / 2];
814     if (length > sizeof(data)) {
815         return send_error_invalid_length("m");
816     }
817     size_t read = gdb_stub_read_memory(gdb.current_cpu, ad
818     if (read == 0 && length > 0) {
```

```
1 ktrw_gdb_stub/source/gdb_stub/gdb_packets.c [c,utf-8,unix] 0>
```



DEMO

<https://github.com/googleprojectzero/ktrw>

<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/10/ktrw-journey-to-build-debuggable-iphone.html>