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TABLE OF CONTENT

MANAGEMENT SUMMARY.....	1
1 INTRODUCTION	2
1.1 SCOPE.....	2
1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE	2
1.3 DOCUMENT STRUCTURE	2
2 GLOSSARY AND REFERENCES.....	4
2.1 GLOSSARY.....	4
2.2 REFERENCES	5
3 BACKGROUND INFORMATION.....	6
3.1 SIGNATURES ON THE DUTCH VEHICLE REGISTRATION CARD CHIP	6
3.2 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE	6
3.3 VERIFICATION OF DATA GROUPS A AND B CONFORM 2003/127/EC.....	9
3.4 PASSIVE AUTHENTICATION	9
3.5 ACTIVE AUTHENTICATION	10
4 VERIFICATION PROCESS	11
4.1 FLOW CHART	11
4.2 READING AND VERIFICATION OF THE DUTCH VEHICLE REGISTRATION CARD CHIP	13
5 COMMUNICATION CARD – READ & VERIFICATION SOFTWARE	18
6 INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH VERIFICATION SOFTWARE	19
APP 1 LOGICAL DATA STRUCTURE	20
APP 1.1 OVERVIEW OF ELEMENTARY FILES.....	20
APP 1.2 EF.AA.....	20
APP 1.2.1 RSA	20
APP 1.2.2 ECC.....	21
APP 1.3 EF.SECURITYINFOS	22



APP 1.4	EF.SOD	22
APP 1.4.1	VERIFY THE HASH OF A DATA GROUP	27
APP 1.5	EF.C.IA_A.DS.....	27
APP 1.6	EF.C.IA_B.DS	27
APP 1.7	EF.REGISTRATION_A	28
APP 1.8	EF.REGISTRATION_B	30
APP 1.9	EF.REGISTRATION_C	32
APP 1.9.1	REGISTRATION DATA	32
APP 1.9.2	INDIVIDUAL VEHICLE INFORMATION	32
APP 1.9.2.1	INDIVIDUALVEHICLEINFORMATION (XML)	33
APP 1.9.2.2	INDIVIDUALVEHICLEINFORMATION (COMPRESSED XML)	33
APP 1.9.2.3	INDIVIDUALVEHICLEINFORMATION (TLV)	34
APP 1.10	EF.SIGNATURE_A	54
APP 1.11	EF.SIGNATURE_B	54
APP 2	NL-EVRC COMMANDS AND RESPONSES.....	55
APP 2.1	SELECT APPLICATION	55
APP 2.1.1	COMMAND APDU	55
APP 2.1.2	RESPONSE APDU	55
APP 2.2	SELECT FILE	56
APP 2.2.1	COMMAND APDU	56
APP 2.2.2	RESPONSE APDU	56
APP 2.3	READ BINARY.....	56
APP 2.3.1	COMMAND APDU	56
APP 2.3.2	RESPONSE APDU.....	57



APP 2.4	INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	57
APP 2.4.1	COMMAND APDU	57
APP 2.4.2	RESPONSE APDU	57
APP 2.4.3	STATUS WORDS	57
APP 2.5	STATUS WORDS SUMMARY	58
APP 3	TRACES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN READING AND VERIFICATION SOFTWARE AND THE CHIP (INFORMATIVE)	59
APP 3.1	READING OF THE DUTCH VEHICLE REGISTRATION CARD CHIP	59
APP 4	SPECIMEN CSCA CERTIFICATE	67



MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

The Dutch Vehicle Registration Card (NL-eVRC) is provided with a chip. This document describes how the chip of the Dutch Vehicle Registration Card can be read and verified. Reading of the chip does not require access rights and is therefore available to all parties. To read the chip only a PC/SC card reader and reading software are required. For verification a PKI certificate and the corresponding Certificate Revocation List (CRL) are required. These data can be downloaded from the RDW website.

The Dutch vehicle registration card complies to European regulation 2003/123/EC [1]. The chip contains the data as specified in the regulation and is secured as specified. Furthermore, the chip of the Dutch vehicle registration card contains additional registration data and may contain Certificate of Origin (CVO) data. Besides, the chip of the Dutch vehicle registration card is additionally secured via two extra security mechanisms. All data on the vehicle registration card chip is secured via Passive Authentication (PA) [2]. This means that over all data on the chip an electronic signature has been placed by the issuing organisation, RDW, which ensures that can be verified that the data in the data groups is unaltered and belongs together. The authenticity of the chip can be verified by means of Active Authentication (AA) [2]. This means the chip can prove it is genuine via a challenge-response protocol.

This document describes how the Dutch vehicle registration card chip should be read and verified. The document also describes reading and verification of foreign vehicle registration card chips complying with [1]. Since Dutch vehicle registration cards comply with this regulation, they could be read and verified in the same way. However, then no use is made of the additional security mechanisms in the Dutch vehicle registration card chip. This is not advised.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope

The Dutch Vehicle Registration Card (NL-eVRC) is provided with a chip. This document describes how the chip of the Dutch Vehicle Registration Card can be read and verified. Reading of the chip does not require access rights and is therefore available to all parties. To read the chip only a PC/SC card reader and reading software are required. For verification a PKI certificate, obtained via a trusted channel, and the corresponding Certificate Revocation List (CRL) are required. These data can be downloaded from the RDW website. However, this does not fully guarantee the authenticity of the certificate. To guarantee the certificate's authenticity, the initial certificate needs to be exchanged in a secure way. RDW will set up a process with recognized parties which should be able to verify the Dutch vehicle registration card chip, the so-called recognized relying parties.

The Dutch vehicle registration card complies to European regulation 2003/123/EC [1]. The chip contains the data as specified in the regulation and is secured as specified. Furthermore, the chip of the Dutch vehicle registration card contains additional registration data and may contain Certificate of Origin (CVO) data. Besides, the chip of the Dutch vehicle registration card is additionally secured via two extra security mechanisms. All data on the vehicle registration card chip is secured via Passive Authentication (PA) [2]. This means that over all data on the chip an electronic signature has been placed by the issuing organisation, RDW, which ensures that can be verified that the data in the data groups is unaltered and belongs together. The authenticity of the chip can be verified by means of Active Authentication (AA) [2]. This means the chip can prove it is genuine via a challenge-response protocol.

This document describes how the Dutch vehicle registration card chip should be read and verified.

1.2 Target Audience

This document is meant for all parties which want to read and verify the chip of the vehicle registration card. The document contains the required information to implement reading and verification software. Reading and verification software may be developed by a party itself, but will for recognized relying parties also be provided by RDW. The document also contains information about how the reading and verification software can be provided with the required PKI certificates and CRLs.

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with asymmetric cryptography and public key infrastructures.

1.3 Document Structure

Chapter 1 contains the scope, target audience and document structure. Chapter 2 contains the glossary and references. In Chapter 3 background information about the vehicle registration card chip, the public key infrastructure and the security mechanisms is provided. In Chapter 4 the reading and verification process is discussed in detail: section 4.1 contains a high-level flow chart, section 4.2 a step by step description of how a Dutch vehicle registration card chip should be read. Chapter 5 provides information about the communication between the vehicle registration card chip and the reading and verification software. Chapter 6 discusses the information exchange between the reading and verification software and other sources, like RDW.

The appendices contain the following information:



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- App 1 contains the chip's Logical Data Structure,
 - App 2 contains the APDUs for the Dutch vehicle registration card chip in the operational phase,
 - App 3 provides an example of the communication trace between reading and verification software and the chip of a Dutch specimen vehicle registration card.,
 - App 4 contains the CSCA certificate that has been used for the specimen vehicle registration card used in App 3.



2 GLOSSARY AND REFERENCES

2.1 Glossary

Term	Explanation
AA	Active Authentication, cryptographic mechanism to prove the authenticity of the chip via an AA public-private key pair and a challenge-response mechanism.
Challenge	(Partly) random number generated by an entity to verify the authenticity of another entity. The challenge needs to be signed by the latter entity with its private key.
CSCA	Country Signing Certificate Authority, the highest certificate issuing entity in the PKI chain for signing data of the eVRC issuing organisation RDW.
CSCA private key	The secret key of the CSCA key pair which is only available in the CSCA and used to sign certificates.
CSCA public key	The non-secret key of the CSCA key pair which can be used to verify certificates and CRLs signed with the CSCS private key.
CSCA root certificate	A certificate issued by the CSCA with its own CSCA public key. The certificate links the public key to the CSCA and has a limited validity period. The CSCA root certificate is signed with the CSCA private key which belongs to the CSCA public key in the certificate. The certificate (the signature) can be verified with the public key from the certificate itself. The CSCA root certificate is available on the RDW website, but recognized relying parties with an official responsibility to verify vehicle registration cards (like Dutch and foreign police) should also obtain the certificate in a trusted way via separate process since the website does not provide enough assurance for these parties about the authenticity of the initial CSCA certificate.
CSCA link certificate	A certificate issued by the CSCA containing a new CSCA public key. The certificate is signed with the current CSCA private key and can be verified with the current CSCS public key. This enables a CSCA link certificate to be exchanged via an unsecured channel like the RDW website. The certificate links the new trust point to the current trust point.
CRL	Certificate Revocation List, a list with revoked certificates issued by the CSCA. The CSCA signs the CRL to enable the authenticity of the CRL to be verified. The CRL is available at the RDW website and is refreshed periodically. A new version is also published if a certificate is added to the CRL. For each CSCA key pair a separate CRL is issued.
DS	Document Signer, an entity within RDW which signs the data to be placed on the vehicle registration card chip. The DS has a key pair and a DS certificate issued by the CSCA.
DS private key	The secret key of the DS key pair which is only available in the DS and used to sign vehicle registration card chip data.
DS public key	The non-secret key of the DS key pair which can be used to verify data signed by the DS private key. This DS public key is available in the DS certificate issued by the CSCA.
DS certificate	A certificate issued by the CSCA containing the DS public key. The DS certificate is signed by the CSCA private key and can be verified with the corresponding CSCA public key which should be available in the verification software. The DS certificate is available on the chip. The DS certificate has a limited validity period.
NL-eVRC	Dutch electronic Vehicle Registration Card, secure document with a contact chip containing information about the vehicle registration.
Hash	A unique number calculated over data via a hash or digest algorithm, normally to be signed afterwards by a private key. When the data changes, the hash also

	changes. The original data cannot be derived from the hash. RDW uses the SHA-256 hash algorithm.
Key Pair	Mutually linked public and private keys used in asymmetric cryptographic algorithms as used for signing hashes and challenges.
PA	Passive Authentication, cryptographic mechanism to proof the authenticity of the chip data via a signature over the data with the DS private key.

2.2 References

Ref.	Title	Author	Version	Date
[1]	2003/127/EU	European Commission	n.a.	23-12-2003
[2]	ISO/IEC 18013-3	ISO/IEC WG 10	n.a.	2009
[3]	ICAO Doc 9303	ICAO	6	2006
[4]	RFC 5280	D. Cooper <i>et. al.</i>	n.v.t.	May 2008
[5]	CP/CPS NL-eVRD-PKI, see: http://www.rdw.nl/	RDW	2.0	30-12-2013
[6]	RFC 5652	R. Housley	n.a.	September 2009
[7]	ISO/IEC 7816-4	ISO/IEC JTC 1	2	15-01-2005
[8]	ISO/IEC 7816-8	ISO/IEC JTC 1	2	01-06-2004
[9]	RFC 4055	J. Schaad <i>et. al.</i>	n.a.	June 2005
[10]	ISO 9796-2	ISO	2	01-10-2002
[11]	DA12 – Kentekencard uitleesdocumentatie, interface specificatie	RDW ICT	2.1.1	30-12-2013
[12]	TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography	BSI	2.10	2018-06-01



3 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The European regulation 2003/127/EU [1] allows issuance of vehicle registration documents on credit card format provided with a contact chip. Both the vehicle registration card and the chip shall comply with the requirements stated in Annex 1 and 2 of [1]. The regulation prescribes amongst others the data structure of the chip and the presence of files which guarantee the authenticity of the data and make it verifiable. The Dutch vehicle registration cards comply with this regulation. Besides, the chips of Dutch vehicle registration cards contain two additional security mechanisms with corresponding data groups on the chip to guarantee the authenticity of the chip and all data on the chip. The data groups present on the Dutch vehicle registration card are described in App 1.

The authenticity of the Dutch vehicle registration card chip can be verified by a relying party via the Active Authentication (AA) security mechanism. This mechanism depends on the other security mechanism that has been added to the Dutch vehicle registration card chip and that also guarantees the authenticity of all data on the chip and that the different data groups belong together, namely Passive Authentication (PA).

Both AA and PA have been implemented conform the international ISO/IEC driving licence standard [2]. These security mechanisms are also used to secure passports as described in ICAO Doc 9303 [3] and to secure European residence permits and Dutch and some foreign national identity cards.

The security mechanisms are explained in this chapter, to support parties which develop verification software on basis of this document to implement the verification of the security mechanisms in the correct way. A detailed description of the steps to be performed by the verification software can be found in Chapter 4, section 4.2. In this chapter, in section 3.2, the used PKI structure is discussed.

3.1 Signatures on the Dutch Vehicle Registration Card Chip

On a Dutch vehicle registration card chip three electronic signatures are present to guarantee the authenticity of the data on the chip and to make it verifiable. Two of these signatures are required according to the European regulation [1]. The third signature has been added by the Netherlands to enable PA and AA. The signatures present are:

- the signature in EF.Signature_A over the data in EF.Registration_A;
- the signature in EF.Signature_B over the data in EF.Registration_B;
- the signature in EF.Sod over all data groups on the chip.

Dutch vehicle registration cards are issued by RDW. RDW has chosen to generate all signatures present on one vehicle registration card with the same DS private key and thus make them verifiable with the same public key certificate. This public key certificate, the DS certificate, is available on the chip. To comply to the European regulation [1] and the ISO/IEC 18013 [2] standard it is present on the chip 3 times, namely in EF.C.IA_A.DS, EF.C.IA_B.DS and in the EF.Sod.

3.2 Public Key Infrastructure

For generation of the signatures and required certificates RDW has established a PKI with a Country Signing Certificate Authority (CSCA) as highest trust point (root). The CSCA issues certificates to Document Signers (DS) which generate signatures over data groups to be placed on the card. This is represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Public Key Infrastructure for vehicle registration cards

The CSCA has a key pair and corresponding (self-signed) CSCA root certificate. A CSCA root certificate has a validity period of 20 years. It is used for a period of 10 years to issue DS certificates. Shortly before the usage period ends a new key pair and corresponding CSCA root certificate are generated. Also, a CSCA link certificate is generated then. This certificate contains the new public key and is signed by the current private key. This enables the authenticity of the certificate to be verified via the current public key. This is represented in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Relation between CSCA root certificates, CSCA link certificates and DS certificates

Relying parties require the CSCA certificate to verify the DS certificates. Therefore, RDW makes the CSCA certificates available on its website. Recognized relying parties with an official responsibility to verify vehicle registration cards (as the Dutch and foreign police) additionally need to obtain the certificate in a trusted way via a separate process, since the website does not provide sufficient assurance for these parties about the authenticity of the initial CSCA certificate. New CSCA certificates can successively be downloaded from the website since the authenticity of the link certificate for the new public key can be verified.

A DS has a key pair. The DS generates signatures over data groups with its private key of the key pair. The corresponding public key is available in the DS certificate issued by the CSCA. A DS certificate has a validity period of 10 years and 3 months. It is used at most 3 months to generate signatures. The validity period of a DS certificate always expires before the validity period of the CSCA certificate.

If the DS certificate has expired, in principle it cannot be used anymore for verification of signatures on the vehicle registration card chip. However, this does not mean that the vehicle registration card loses its validity. Also a vehicle registration card with expired certificates or with a non-functioning chip is valid.

If the DS private key is compromised or a suspicion of compromise exists, it is no longer used to generate signatures. The DS certificate is revoked and placed on the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). Signatures generated on basis of the revoked certificate are no longer valid.

The CRL is issued and signed by the CSCA. For each valid CSCA certificate a CRL will be published. The authenticity of the CRL shall be verified by relying parties on basis of the CSCA public key certificate. RDW publishes CRLs on its website. The location is indicated in the CDP extension of the DS and CSCA certificates. Periodically (every 180 days) a new CRL is generated and published. The CRL has a validity period of 200 days. RDW also generates a new CRL if a DS certificate is revoked. Recognized relying parties will be informed by RDW about this extra CRL.

The policy and procedures of the PKI are described in the combined Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) [5]. The object identifier (OID) of the CP/CPS is indicated in the Certificate Policy Extension of the DS and CSCA certificates.

3.3 Verification of Data Groups A and B conform 2003/127/EC

Conform the European regulation 2003/127/EC [1] electronic signatures are placed by the issuing organization over the data groups A and B on the chip (EF.Registration_A and EF.Registration_B). These signatures can be found in the files EF.Signature_A and EF.Signature_B. In these files also the used asymmetric algorithm and the hash algorithm can be found (for the format see App 1). The public key certificates with which the signatures and therewith the authenticity of the data in the data groups A and B can be verified, are stored in EF.C.IA_A.DS and EF.C.IA_B.DS. The format is X.509V3 (see [4]) conform the requirements in [1].

When reading the data groups A and B and verifying their authenticity according to the European regulation, first the authenticity of the certificates needs to be verified, then the signatures need to be verified ('deciphered') and then the hashes over which the signatures were placed need to be compared with the hashes over the data groups. Only if follows from this process that the data in the data groups A and B is authentic, it should be shown to the user. Step-by-step this process is described in section 4.2.

The DS certificates need to be verified for their validity period. The Dutch DS certificates have been issued by the Dutch CSCA and need to be verified with the CSCA public key certificate. Dutch DS certificates also need to be verified versus the certificate profile as described in the CP/CPS [5] and versus the CRL of which the URL is indicated in the certificate extension.

For most foreign certificates the DS certificate will be signed by the national CSCA. For verification the verification software needs to have these foreign CSCA certificates. Possibly RDW will provide in time foreign CSCA certificates via a reliable method to recognized relying parties or via its website. It is however possible that the foreign CSCA certificate is not available in the verification software. In that case the DS certificate cannot be verified and the software needs to issue a warning.

It could be that for some countries the DS certificates are not issued by a CSCA, but are self-signed certificates. Regulation 2003/127/EC does not require a CSCA, although this is obvious from the viewpoint of conformity with passports, driving licences and European residence permits. If the DS certificate has not been issued by a CSCA the verification software needs the DS certificate from a reliable source. Possibly RDW will in time provide the foreign DS certificates for these cases via a reliable method to recognized relying parties or via its website. It is possible however that a self-signed DS certificate is not available from a reliable source. In that case the DS certificate needs in any case to be verified with the public key from the certificate itself and the software needs to issue a warning.

If certificate verification is unsuccessful or incomplete, this needs to be reported to the user of the reading and verification software.

Since all data groups in the Dutch vehicle registration card chip are secured via Passive Authentication the verification described above does not need to be performed for the Dutch vehicle registration cards if verification is performed via Passive Authentication (see sections 3.4 and 4.2). Passive Authentication is preferred over the process described in this section since it also guarantees and verifies the authenticity of EF.Registration_C if present, it guarantees and verifies that the data groups belong together and it enables Active Authentication.

3.4 Passive Authentication

Before the data is written to the chip of a Dutch vehicle registration card, a signature is placed over this data by the issuing organisation RDW. This signature is also placed on the chip. The signature enables

verification of the data authenticity when the data is read from the chip. That means that by using the signature it can be verified that the data comes from RDW and has not been changed.

The electronic signature is placed by an entity which is called the Document Signer (DS). The DS has a public-private key pair. The DS certificate is issued by the CSCA, the highest trust point (the root) in the PKI (see section 3.2).

To generate a signature during the personalisation process first hashes are calculated over each data group which will be written to the chip. These hashes are included in the RDWIdsSecurityObject. The RDWIdsSecurityObject is part of the data object over which a signature is generated by the DS private key. The RDWIdsSecurityObject, the signature and the corresponding DS certificate are placed on the card as part of the EF.Sod (see App 1 for the exact format of the EF.Sod).

When reading and verifying the data on the Dutch vehicle registration card chip, first the authenticity of the certificate from the EF.Sod needs to be established, then the correctness of the signature from the EF.Sod needs to be verified and subsequently the authenticity of the data groups on basis of a comparison of the hash values (see section 4.2 for the full process). This is done conform RFC 5652 [6]. Only if it is clear that the data in the data groups is authentic, it should be shown to the user.

Verification on basis of Passive Authentication needs to be done instead of the process described in section 3.3 since Passive Authentication guarantees and verifies also the authenticity of EF.Registration_C if present, guarantees and verifies the data groups belong together and enables Active Authentication.

In the Passive Authentication process described here only verification of the correctness of the data on the chip is taken into account. Active Authentication to verify the authenticity of the chip itself is described in section 3.5. Active Authentication however is only possible since the authenticity of the AA public key (present in EF.AA) follows from the Passive Authentication verification. EF.AA is one of the data groups which is verified via PA. The full process for reading and verification of the Dutch vehicle registration card chip including AA is described in section 4.2.

3.5 Active Authentication

The chip of Dutch vehicle registration cards is provided with an Active Authentication (AA) key pair during personalisation. With this key pair the authenticity of the chip can be verified by the verification software. The AA key pair is unique for each chip. The AA private key is stored in secure memory of the chip and cannot be read. The AA private key can only be used by the chip. The AA public key is placed on the chip in EF.AA (see App 1 for the exact format) and can be freely read. EF.AA is part of the signature over all data groups. The hash over EF.AA is stored in the RDWIdsSecurityObject in the EF.Sod. This enables verification of the authenticity of the AA public key via Passive Authentication.

To verify the authenticity of the chip, the verification software can send a challenge (random) to the chip with the request to sign it with the AA private key. The response sent by the chip to the verification software can be verified with the AA public key from the chip. If from the response after verification ('decryption') the original challenge is recovered, then the authenticity of the chip has been proven.



4 VERIFICATION PROCESS

4.1 Flow Chart

The flow chart below describes at a high level the process for verifying of a Dutch vehicle registration card (see Figure 3). In section 4.2 the reading and verification of the chip are elaborated step by step.

Note:

All vehicles registered in The Netherlands are registered in the vehicle register that is maintained by RDW. The content of this register is leading. To facilitate verification and to enable verification offline, RDW issues vehicle registration cards. In case of doubt about the authenticity of a vehicle registration card, the register needs to be consulted.




Figure 3: Flow chart for verification of a Dutch vehicle registration card (and vehicle)

4.2 Reading and Verification of the Dutch Vehicle Registration Card Chip

The process described below indicates what the reading and verification software needs to do to read and verify the chip of a Dutch vehicle registration card. The reading and verification software starts by selecting the eVRC application. The AID is identical for all eVRCs complying with [1]. Subsequently the reading software tries to select the EF.Sod. If this succeeds, the process as described in this section is followed. If selection of the EF.Sod is unsuccessful, the reading software follows the process described in section **Error! Reference source not found.** from step 2 onwards.

For reading the commands from App 2 need to be used. The process described below describes the happy-flow. In case the response to one of the commands is not the expected response, the process is terminated and an error message is shown to the user. Potentially in second line verification more advanced reading and verification software can establish the chip problem.

1. Select eVRC application (AID = 'A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31')

T→C: '00 A4 04 00 0B A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31 00'
C→T: 'XX ... XX 90 00'

2. Passive Authentication (1st part)

a. Select and read EF.Sod (File ID = '00 1D')

Use the Select File command as defined in App 2.2 followed by one or more Read Binary commands as defined in App 2.3 to read the file. In case no EF.Sod is present (Response: Status Words '6A 82' File not found on the Select File command), it is a foreign card and the reading procedure as described in section **Error! Reference source not found.** from step 2 onwards needs to be followed.

The Sod (EF.Sod data) complies with RFC 5652 [6].

b. Verify DS certificate from EF.Sod

i. Extract DS certificate from EF.Sod data

DS certificate is located in the EF.Sod data under:

T: '30' (ContentInfo)

T: 'A0' (Content)

T: '30' (SignedData)

T: 'A0' (Certificates)

V: '30 XX XX ...XX'

(DS certificate starts with tag '30')

ii. DS certificate profile complies to CP/CPS

CP/CPS OID can be found in the DS certificate extension CertificatePolicies
RDW publishes the CP/CPS in the following location:

<http://www.diensten.rdw.nl/>

Most of the time the reading software will already know the certificate profile. The reading software verifies that the critical extensions are present and that the indicated KeyUsage is solely DigitalSignature.



iii. DS certificate not present on CRL

CRL location can be found in the DS certificate extension
CRLDistributionPoints. RDW publishes CRLs in the following location:

<http://www.diensten.rdw.nl/crl/>

The reading software shall use the most recent CRL for verification. Most of the time the reading software will already have the current CRL (see further chapter 6).

iv. DS certificate is issued by CSCA (verification against CSCA certificate)

The CSCA by which the DS certificate has been issued can be found in the DS certificate field Issuer and in the extension AuthorityKeyIdentifier.

The reading software requires the corresponding CSCA public key certificate for verification of the signature of the DS certificate (see chapter 6). The CSCA certificate is an X.509V3 certificate according to RFC 5280 [4].

The reading software uses the public key from the trusted CSCA certificate for verification of the signature (field signatureValue) from the DS certificate.

The signature has been placed by the CSCA over the TBSCertificate.

It has used the algorithm indicated in the field signatureAlgorithm and in the field Signature from the TBSCertificate.

v. Store DS public key from DS certificate in memory

c. Verify signature from Ef.SOd with public key from DS certificate

i. Extract signature and algorithm from Ef.SOd

The signature is located in Ef.SOd data under:

```
T: '30' (ContentInfo)
  T: 'A0' (Content)
    T: '30' (SignedData)
      T: '31' (SignerInfos)
        T: '30' (SignerInfo)
          T: '04' (Signature)
```

The algorithm used can be found in the Ef.SOd data under:

```
T: '30' (ContentInfo)
  T: 'A0' (Content)
    T: '30' (SignedData)
      T: '31' (SignerInfos)
        T: '30' (SignerInfo)
          T: '30' (SignatureAlgorithm)
            T: '06' (algorithm)
```

This can be sha256WithRSAEncryption (OID ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11) or id-RSASSA-PSS (OID ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10). In the latter case the RSA PSS parameters can be found under Tag '30'.

ii. 'Verify' / 'Decrypt' with DS public key

By 'verification' / 'decryption' of the signature with the DS public key from the DS certificate follows the signedAttrs TLV field with the proviso that this field starts with tag '31' instead of tag 'A0'.

iii. Store signedAttrs from signature in memory

Store signedAttrs in memory after having replaced the starting tag by 'A0'.



iv. Extract signedAttrs from Ef.SOD

The signedAttrs field is located in the Ef.SOD data under:

```
T: '30' (ContentInfo)
  T: 'A0' (Content)
    T: '30' (SignedData)
      T: '31' (SignerInfos)
        T: '30' (SignerInfo)
          T: 'A0' (signedAttrs)
```

v. Compare signedAttrs from Ef.SOD to signedAttrs from signature (memory)

vi. Extract AttributeValue from signedAttrs

Within signedAttrs the AttributeValue is located under:

```
T: '30' (Attribute)
  T: '31' (AttrValues)
    T: '04' (AttributeValue)
```

This is the hash over eContent (= RDWIdsSecurityObject)
Store this has in memory.

The hash algorithm is located in Ef.SOD under:

```
T: '30' (ContentInfo)
  T: 'A0' (Content)
    T: '30' (SignedData)
      T: '31' (SignerInfos)
        T: '30' (SignerInfo)
          T: '30' (digestAlgorithm)
            T: '06' (algorithm)
```

The NL-eVRC uses sha256 (OID ::= 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)

vii. Extract eContent (=RDWIdsSecurityObject) from Ef.SOD

eContent is located in the Ef.SOD under:

```
T: '0' (ContentInfo)
  T: 'A0' (Content)
    T: '30' (SignedData)
      T: '30' (encapContentInfo)
        T: 'A0' (explicit eContent)
          T: '04' (eContent)
```

viii. Calculate hash over eContent

Use the hash algorithm from vi. (sha256)

ix. Compare hashes

Compare hash over eContents to hash from vi. (AttributeValue from signedAttrs).

If these 2 match the first part of PA is successful.

d. Store eContent = RDWsecurityobject in memory

3. Active Authentication

a. Select and read EF.AA (File ID'= '00'0D')

Use the Select File command as defined in App 2.2 followed by one or more Read Binary commands as defined in App 2.3 to read the file.

b. Verify authenticity EF.AA (Passive Authentication (2nd part))



Use the procedure from App 1.4.1 to verify the authenticity of the data group.

c. Store AA public key from EF.AA in memory

The AA public key is located in EF.AA under:

```
T: '6F' (ActiveAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo)
  L: '30' (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
    T: '03' (subjectPublicKey)
```

The algorithm can be found in EF.AA under:

```
T: '6F' (ActiveAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo)
  T: '30' (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
    T: '30' AlgorithmIdentifier
      T: '06' (algorithm)
        (rsaEncryption = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 or
         id-ecPublicKey = 1.2.840.10045.2.1)
```

RDW uses RSA or ECC.

If the algorithm indicated in EF.AA is id-ecPublicKey, select and read EF.SecurityInfos (File ID= '00'0E'). Use the Select File command as defined in App 2.2 followed by one or more Read Binary commands as defined in App 2.3 to read the file. Verify the authenticity of EF.SecurityInfos by using the procedure from App 1.4.1.

d. Generate 8-byte challenge (RND.IFD)

The reading and verification software generates an 8 bytes random.

e. Chip authentication

Send 8-byte challenge (RND.IFD) to the card via Internal Authenticate command.

T→': '00 88 00 00 08 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX'00'
C→': 'XX ... XX 90'00'

f. Verify response with AA public key

Use the AA public key from EF.AA (stored in memory) to 'verify' the data from the response to the Internal Authenticate command (without the status word's '90'00') with the algorithm from step d.

In case of RSA:

This produces a string which according to ISO 9796-2 [10] Digital Signature Scheme 1¹ should consist of:

'6A ++ M1 ++ hash (M1 ++ RND.IFD) ++ 34 CC'

where M1 is a nonce generated by the chip.

¹ Digital Signature Scheme 1 with the modification that the 'alternative' signature production function is used. M will consist of M1 en M2, where M1 is a nonce of c-4 bits generated by the VR application and M2 is RND.IFD ('M', 'M1', 'M2' and 'c' as defined in ISO 9796-2 [10]). The SHA-256 hashing algorithm and trailer option 2 will be used.



Extract `M1` from the response.

Calculate with sha256 the hash over `M1 ++ RND.IFD`.

Compare this hash with the hash value from the response.

If the 2 match Active Authentication of the chip is successful.

In case of ECC:

The card returns ECC Signature in plain format as defined in [12], i.e. the concatenation `R ++ S`. Use the algorithm as specified in [12] clause 4.2.1.2 with the public key from `EF.AA`, the algorithm indicated in `EF.SecurityInfos`, the 8 byte nonce send in the Internal Authenticate command and the returned `R ++ S` concatenation.

4. Read and verify data

a. Select and read EF.Registration_A ('D0 01')

Use the Select File command as defined in App 2.2 followed by one or more Read Binary commands as defined in App 2.3 to read the file.

b. Verify authenticity EF.Registration_A (Passive Authentication (2nd part))

Use the procedure from App 1.4.1 to verify the authenticity of the data group.

c. Show EF.Registration_A data to user

d. Select and read EF.Registration_B ('D0 11')

Use the Select File command as defined in App 2.2 followed by one or more Read Binary commands as defined in App 2.3 to read the file.

e. Verify authenticity EF.Registration_B (Passive Authentication (2nd part))

Use the procedure from App 1.4.1 to verify the authenticity of the data group.

f. Show EF.Registration_B data to user

g. Select and read EF.Registration_C ('D0 21')

Use the Select File command as defined in App 2.2 followed by one or more Read Binary commands as defined in App 2.3 to read the file.

h. Verify authenticity EF.Registration_C (Passive Authentication (2nd part))

Use the procedure from App 1.4.1 to verify the authenticity of the data group.

i. Show EF.Registration_C data to user



5 COMMUNICATION CARD – READ & VERIFICATION SOFTWARE

The vehicle registration cards complying with the European regulation are smart cards (ID-1 format) with a contact chip complying to ISO/IEC 7816-4 and -8 [7], [8]. The chips support in any case the T=1 protocol. Support of the T=0 protocol is optional. The chips can be read with a reader working according to ISO/IEC 7816.

Regarding the commands supported by the Dutch vehicle registration card chips the choices as indicated in App 2 have been made.

The vehicle registration card application on the chip has as Application Identifier
AID = 'A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31'.

6 INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH VERIFICATION SOFTWARE

For verification of the Dutch vehicle registration card chip the verification software needs to have the CSCA certificate on basis of which the DS certificates of the chip can be verified. This CSCA certificate can be downloaded from the RDW website, but to be sure of its authenticity the certificate needs to be exchanged via a trusted channel. RDW will set up a process with recognized relying parties. If parties use the RDW reading and verification software the CSCA certificate will be present in (delivered with) the software.

After 10 years RDW will generate and use a new CSCA certificate. Possibly due to circumstances this may already be done earlier. Also the new certificate will be available on the website. Additionally, RDW will generate and make available on the website a CSCA link certificate in which the new CSCA public key is present and which is issued by the current key pair. Relying parties need to download from the website periodically, but in any case before the current CSCA certificate expires, the new CSCA (link) certificate, to verify its authenticity with the current certificate and to load and activate the new CSCA certificate in the reading and verification software. If RDW will generate and use a new CSCA certificate earlier than planned, known recognized relying parties will be informed.

For verification of the Dutch vehicle registration card chip the verification software needs to have the most recent CRL on basis of which the revocation status of a DS certificate of the chip can be verified. The CRLs can be downloaded from the RDW website. The authenticity of the CRL needs to be verified with the CSCA public key certificate that has been used to sign the CRL. A CRL is valid for 200 days and is re-issued every 180 days. Relying parties need to download from the RDW website periodically, but in any case every 200 days, a new CRL to be used in the reading and verification software. RDW may issue a new CRL earlier than planned if there are circumstances giving motive. Recognized relying parties will be informed about this. These relying parties need to use immediately after notification the new CRL in the reading and verification software.

In time RDW may possibly also make available CSCA certificates and CRLs (and possibly DS certificates) for verification of foreign vehicle registration cards.

App 1 LOGICAL DATA STRUCTURE

App 1.1 Overview of Elementary Files

File ID	File Name	Description
00 0D	EF.AA	Active Authentication Public Key Info
00 0E	EF.SecurityInfos	SecurityInfos
00 1D	EF.SOd	Document Security Object
C0 01	EF.C.IA_A.DS	X.509v3 certificate of the issuing organisation that is used to verify the signature in EF.Signature_A (see [1]).
C0 11	EF.C.IA_B.DS	X.509v3 certificate of the issuing organisation that is used to verify the signature in EF.Signature_B (see [1]).
D0 01	EF.Registration_A	Registration data according to chapters II.4 en II.5 from [1].
D0 11	EF.Registration_B	Registration data according to chapter II.6 from [1].
D0 21	EF.Registration_C	Additional registration data and possibly CVO data.
E0 01	EF.Signature_A	Electronic signature over all data of EF.Registration_A (see [1]).
E0 11	EF.Signature_B	Electronic signature over all data of EF.Registration_B (see [1]).

Table 1: File identifiers in the NL-eVRC application

App 1.2 EF.AA

The structure of EF.AA is identical to that of the electronic driving licence (ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009, section 8.4.2 [2])

Tag = Tag, Len = Length, Val = Value.

The length is not specified but calculated during construction of the TLV object. This clause specifies two structures, i.e. RSA and ECC. The RSA structure is used for eVR generation 1 and 2, from 2024 onwards, the ECC structure shall be used.

App 1.2.1 RSA

Tag	Len	Val
6F		ActiveAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo
	Tag	Len Val
	30	subjectPublicKeyInfo
	Tag	Len Val
	30	AlgorithmIdentifier
	Tag	Len Val
	06	rsaEncryption = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (algorithm (OID))
	05	NULL (Parameters (ANY DEFINED BY algorithm– OPTIONAL))
	Tag	Len Val
	03	subjectPublicKey (BITSTRING)

Table 2: Format of EF.AA for RSA



App 1.2.2 ECC

Tag	Length	Value
'6F'	X	ActiveAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo
'30'	X	subjectPublicKeyInfo
'30'	'82 01 1D'	AlgorithmIdentifier
'06'	'07'	'2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01'
'30'	'82 01 10'	
'02'	'01'	'01'
'30'		
'06'	'07'	'2A 86 48 CE 3D 01 01'
'02'	'29'	'00 D3 5E 47 20 36 BC 4F B7 E1 3C 78 5E D2 01 E0 65 F9 8F CF A6 F6 F4 0D EF 4F 92 B9 EC 78 93 EC 28 FC D4 12 B1 F1 B3 2E 27'
'30'	'54'	
'04'	'28'	'3E E3 0B 56 8F BA B0 F8 83 CC EB D4 6D 3F 3B B8 A2 A7 35 13 F5 EB 79 DA 66 19 0E B0 85 FF A9 F4 92 F3 75 A9 7D 86 0E B4'
'04'	'28'	'52 08 83 94 9D FD BC 42 D3 AD 19 86 40 68 8A 6F E1 3F 41 34 95 54 B4 9A CC 31 DC CD 88 45 39 81 6F 5E B4 AC 8F B1 F1 A6'
'04'	'51'	'04 43 BD 7E 9A FB 53 D8 B8 52 89 BC C4 8E E5 BF E6 F2 01 37 D1 0A 08 7E B6 E7 87 1E 2A 10 A5 99 C7 10 AF 8D 0D 39 E2 06 11 14 FD D0 55 45 EC 1C C8 AB 40 93 24 7F 77 27 5E 07 43 FF ED 11 71 82 EA A9 C7 78 77 AA AC 6A C7 D3 52 45 D1 69 2E 8E E1'
'02'	'29'	'00 D3 5E 47 20 36 BC 4F B7 E1 3C 78 5E D2 01 E0 65 F9 8F CF A5 B6 8F 12 A3 2D 48 2E C7 EE 86 58 E9 86 91 55 5B 44 C5 93 11'
'02'	'01'	'01'
'03'	X	'00'
		04 XX .. XX YY .. YY

App 1.3 EF.SecurityInfos

This datagroup shall be present when ECC is used for Active Authentication, this datagroup shall be absent in case Active Authentication is based on RSA.

Tag	Length	Value	Comment
'6E'	'2F'		DG14 tag
'31'	'2D'		SET OF
'30'	'17'		SEQUENCE ActiveAuthenticationInfo
'06'	'06'	'67 81 08 01 01 05'	OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.23.136.1.1.5 id-AA
'02'	'01'	'01'	INTEGER Version 01
'06'	'0A'	'04 00 7F 00 07 01 01 04 01 03'	OBJECT IDENTIFIER 0.4.0.127.0.7.1.1.4.1.3 ecdsa-plain-SHA256

App 1.4 EF.SOd

The two tables below define the Document Security Object (SOd).

The SOd is a CMS Signed Data object (RFC 5652 [6]). The two tables below can be considered the chosen profile for the CMS Signed Data object and indicate which specific choices have been made, plus some additional information: the first number in each row is the (hexadecimal) tag for the TLV-field (tag value '??' indicates that the tag can be derived from the content); where applicable the value of a field is indicated.

The meaning of the 'Use' column is: m = mandatory, x = must not be used, c = conditional. Notice that the structure of a CMS Signed Data object is rather complex, comprising several choices, sets and series. In case of doubt RFC 5652 [6] needs to be consulted. Also notice that the final signature is calculated *after* replacing the tag number.

Except for the fields Certificate(Choices), Issuer and rSASSA-PSS-SHA256-Params, the full TLV tree structure for the SOd is indicated below.

The full SOd shall be DER encoded (RFC 5652 [6] allows infinite length BER encoding to be compatible to outdated tape drive equipment).

The choice for sid is issuerAndSerialNumber (according to the electronic driving licence [2] and passport standards [3]), but notice that according to RFC 5652 [6] the alternative option subjectKeyIdentifier for sid should also be supported by implementations.

The current preference for the RSA signature algorithm is PKCS#1v1.5, but the option to use instead RSA-PSS is left open. The same signature algorithm needs to be used for the signatures over the CSCA certificate, DS certificate, Signature_A, Signature_B and the SOd.



Field name			Use	Reference section (in RFC 5652 [6])	Field value	Comment
30	ContentInfo		m	3		
	06	contentType	m	3	id-signedData ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2	OID
	A0	Content	m	3		
		30 SignedData	m	5.1		
		02 Version	m	5.1, 10.2.5	3	INTEGER
		31 digestAlgorithms	m	5.1		
		30 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier	m	10.1.1		
		06 Algorithm	m	2.1 in RFC 4055 [9]	id-sha256 ::= 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1	OID
		-- Parameters	x			
		-- ...	x			Only one digest algorithm is required
		30 encapContentInfo	m	5.2		
		06 eContentType	m		id-RDW-IdsSecurityObject ::= 2.16.528.1.1010.3.1.1	OID
		A0 explicit eContent	m			
		04 eContent	m		RDWIdsSecurityObject	OCTEST STRING, see next table (Table 4: Format of RDWIdsSecurityObject) for values
		A0 Certificates	m	5.1, 10.2.3		
		?? CertificateChoices	m	10.2.2	Certificate	This is the DS X.509 certificate (starting with tag '30'), see RFC 5280 [4]
		-- ...	x			Only one certificate required
		-- Crls	x			CRLs are not used
		31 signerInfos	m	5.1		
		30 SignerInfo	m	5.3		



Field name						Use	Reference section (in RFC 5652 [6])	Field value	Comment
				02	Version	m	5.3, 10.2.5	1 (sid=issuerAndSerialNumber), or 3 (sid=subjectKeyIdentifier)	INTEGER value depends on the choice for sid
				...	Sid	-			Formally a choice needs to be made between EITHER issuerAndSerialNumber OR subjectKeyIdentifier. In practice issuerAndSerialNumber is used.
				30	...	c			
					?? issuer	m	4.1.2.4 in RFC 5280 [4]		Issuer DN Name of DS X.509 certificate (starting with tag '30')
				02	serialnumber	m	4.1.2.2 in RFC 5280 [4]	CertificateSerialNumber	INTEGER Serial Number of DS X.509 certificate
				A0	...	c			subjectKeyIdentifier is only incorporated to be compliant to RFC 5652 [6], but is not used in practice.
					04 SubjectKeyIdentifier	m	4.2.1.2 in RFC 5280 [4]		subjectKeyIdentifier is only incorporated here to be compliant to RFC 5652 [6], but is not used in practice. OCTET STRING subject key identifier from DS X.509 certificate SKI extension
				30	digestAlgorithm	m	5.3		
				06	algorithm	m	2.1 in RFC 4055 [9]	id-sha256 ::= 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1	OID
				--	parameters	x			
				A0	signedAttrs	m			
				30	Attribute	m	11.1		
				06	attrType	m	11.1	id-contentType ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3	OID



Field name										Use	Reference section (in RFC 5652 [6])	Field value	Comment
								31	attrValues	m	11.1		
								06	AttributeValue	m	11.1	id-RDW-IdsSecurityObject ::= 2.16.528.1.1010.3.1.1	OID
								--	...	x	11.1		Only one AttributeValue is allowed here
								30	Attribute	m	11.2		
								06	attrType	m	11.2	id-messageDigest ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4	OID
								31	attrValues	m	11.2		
													This OCTET STRING contains the hash value over the <i>value</i> of the eContent OCTET STRING (e.g. over the RDWIdsSecurityObject).
								04	AttributeValue	m	11.2, 5.4		
								--	...	x	11.2		Only one AttributeValue is allowed here
								--	...	x			More Attributes are not required
								30	signatureAlgorithm				
								06	Algorithm	c	2.1 in RFC 4055 [9]	sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	Conditional: use this field if the signature algorithm is PKCS#1v1.5.
								05	Parameters	c	5 in RFC 4055 [9]	null	Conditional: use this field if the signature algorithm is PKCS#1v1.5. Here the parameters must be set to NULL.
								06	Algorithm	c	RFC 4055 [9]	id-RSASSA-PSS ::= 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10	Conditional: use this field if the signature algorithm is RSA-PSS.
								30	Parameters	c	RFC 4055 [9]	rSASSA-PSS-SHA256-Params structure	Conditional: use this field if the signature algorithm is RSA-PSS. RSA PSS parameters must be used (mgf1, SHA256, saltlength 32).
								04	Signature	m	11.2, 5.5		This OCTET STRING contains the signature over the signedAttrs TLV vels <i>as if encoded</i>



Field name	Use	Reference section (in RFC 5652 [6])	Field value	Comment
				as EXPLICIT TAG OF (i.e. replace the leading tag 'A0' by '31').
-- unsignedAttrs	x			No unsigned attributes are required
-- ...	x			Only one signerInfo is required.

Table 3: Format of EF.SOd

Field name	Use	Field value	Comment
30 RDWIdsSecurityObject	m		
02 Version	m	0	INTEGER
30 hashAlgorithm	m		
06 algorithm	m	id-sha256 ::= 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1	OID
-- parameters	x		
30 dataGroupHashValues	m		
30 DataGroupHash	m		
04 dataGroupFileIdentifier	m		This is the two-byte OCTET STRING file-identifier
04 dataGroupHashValue	m		This is the 32-byte OCTET STRING SHA-256 hash of a data group
30 ...	m		Repeat for each data group, order on basis of file ID

Table 4: Format of RDWIdsSecurityObject

App 1.4.1 Verify the hash of a data group

The RDWIdsSecurityObject specified in Table 5 contains hashes over each data group ordered on basis of the File ID. During the inspection of a Kentekencard, the hash of each individual datagroup shall be verified by:

Calculate hash over the data group

Use the hash algorithm indicated in the RDWIdsSecurityObject. The hash algorithm is located in eContent under:

```
T: '30' (RDWIdsSecurityObject)
  T: '30' (hashAlgorithm)
    T: '06' (algorithm)
```

RDW uses sha 256 (OID ::= 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

The hash is calculated over the data of the data group.

Extract hash value from RDWIdsSecurityObject

The hash value of data group is located in eContent under:

```
T: '30' (RDWIdsSecurityObject)
  T: '30' (dataGroupHashValues)
    T: '04' (dataGroupFileIdentifier)
    T: '04' (dataGroupHashValue)
```

The applicable hash can be found by looking up the applicable file identifier.

Compare the hash values

If the hash value from RDWIdsSecurityObject matches the calculated hash over data group. the data from the in data group is authentic and can be processed.

App 1.5 EF.C.IA_A.DS

Conform 2003/127/EC the content of this data group is an X.509v3 formatted DS certificate used to generate the EF.Signature_A signature over the data in EF.Registration_A. The certificate profile for the DS certificate is defined in the CP/CPS [5].

App 1.6 EF.C.IA_B.DS

Conform 2003/127/EC the content of this data group is an X.509v3 formatted DS certificate used to generate the EF.Signature_B signature over the data in EF.Registration_B. The certificate profile for the DS certificate is defined in the CP/CPS [5].

App 1.7 EF.Registration_A

Conform 2003/127/EC the content of this data group is formatted in BER-TLV structure according the profile in 2003/127/EC Annex I, III.11, Table 2 [1].

Tag				Code	Field description	EU m/o	NL m/x	Corresponding DD10 XML element	Typical field value on the chip
78					Compatible tag allocation authority	m	m		n/a
	4F				application identifier	m	m		'A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31'
71					inter-industry template corresponding to mandatory data	m	m		n/a
	80				version of tag definition	m	m		'00'
	9F 33				name of the member state	m	m	LidstaatVanUitgifte	"Nederland"
	9F 34				another designation of document	o	x		
	9F 35				name of competent authority	m	m	Autoriteit	"RDW"
	9F 36				name of authority issuing registration certificate	o	x		
	9F 37				Character set used	m	m		'00'
	9F 38				Unambiguous consecutive number of the document	m	m	Documentnummer	"1234567890"
	81			A	Registration number	m	m	Kenteken	"44-JBT-4"
	82			B	Date of first registration	m	m	DatumEersteToelatingEU	"20121231"
	A1			C	Personal data	m	m		n/a
		A2		C.1	Holder of the registration certificate	m	m		n/a
			83	C.1.1	Surname or business name	m	m	NaamHouder	"Achternaam-Houder"
			84	C.1.2	Other names or initials	o	m	Voorletters	"V.L."
			85	C.1.3	Address in the Member State	m	m	Adreshouder	"Talingweg 76, 8218 NX, Lelystad"
		86		C.4	vehicle owner yes/no/unknown	m	m	Eigendomssituatie	'02'
	A3			D	Vehicle	m	m		n/a
		87		D.1	Make	m	m	Merk	"TOYOTA"
		88		D.2	Type	m	m	Type	"LM ZVW30(H) ZVW30L-AHXEBW(1A)"

Tag				Code	Field description	EU m/o	NL m/x	Corresponding DD10 XML element	Typical field value on the chip
		89		D.3	commercial descriptions	m	m	Handelsbenaming	"TOYOTA PRIUS"
	8A			E	Vehicle identification number	m	m	Voertuigidentificatienummer	"JTDKN36U801019282"
	A4			F	Mass	m	m		n/a
		8B		F.1	maximum technically permissible laden mass	m	m	TechMaxMassa	"12345 kg"
	8C			G	Mass of the vehicle in service with bodywork	m	m	MassaRijklaar	"12345 kg"
	8D			H	Period of validity	m	m	GeldigheidsDuur	""
	8E			I	Date of registration	m	m	DatumAanvangAansprEU	"210121231"
	8F			K	Type approval number	m	m	Typegoedkeuringsnummer	"e11*2001/116*0264*00"
	A5			P	Engine	m	m		n/a
		90		P.1	Engine capacity	m	m	Cilinderinhoud	"1798"
		91		P.2	Engine maximum net power	m	m	Vermogen	"1234,23 kW"
		92		P.3	Engine type of fuel	m	m	BrandstofEU	"B/E"
	93			Q	Power weight ratio	m	m	VermogenGedeeldDoorMasRijklaar	"9,99 kW/kg"
	A6			S	Seating capacity	m	m		n/a
		94		S.1	Number of seats	m	m	Zitplaatsen	"5"
		95		S.2	Number of standing places	m	m	Staanplaatsen	"0"

Table 6: Format of EF.Registration_A



App 1.8 EF.Registration_B

Conform 2003/127/EC the content of this data group is formatted in BER-TLV structure according to the profile in 2003/127/EC Annex I, III.11, Table 3 [1].

Tag				Code	Field description	EU m/o	NL m/x	Corresponding DD10 XML element	Typical field value on the chip
78					Compatible tag allocation authority	m	m		n/a
	4F				application identifier	m	m		'A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31'
72					inter-industry template corresponding to optional data	m	m		n/a
	80				version of tag definition	m	m		'00'
	A1			C	Personal data	o	x		
		A7		C.2	Vehicle owner	o	x		
			83	C.2.1	Surname or business name	o	x		
			84	C.2.2	Other names or initials	o	x		
			85	C.2.3	Address in the Member State	o	x		
		A8		C.2	Second vehicle owner	o	x		
			83	C.2.1	Surname or business name	o	x		
			84	C.2.2	Other names or initials	o	x		
			85	C.2.3	Address in the Member State	o	x		
		A9		C.3	Person who may use the vehicle	o	x		
			83	C.3.1	Surname or business name	o	x		
			84	C.3.2	Other names or initials	o	x		
			85	C.3.3	Address in the Member State	o	x		
	A4			F	Mass	o	m		n/a
		96		F.2	Maximum permissible laden mass of the vehicle in service	o	m	ToegestMaxMassa	"12345 kg"
		97		F.3	Maximum permissible laden mass of the whole vehicle in service	o	m	ToegestMaxMassaComb	"12345 kg"
	98			J	Vehicle category	o	m	Voertuigcategorie	"M2G"
	99			L	Number of axles	o	x		
	9A			M	Wheelbase	o	x		



Tag		Code	Field description	EU m/o	NL m/x	Corresponding DD10 XML element	Typical field value on the chip
	AD		N Distribution among axles	o	x		
		9F 1F	N.1 Axle 1	o	x		
		9F 20	N.2 Axle 2	o	x		
		9F 21	N.3 Axle 3	o	x		
		9F 22	N.4 Axle 4	o	x		
		9F 23	N.5 Axle 5	o	x		
	AE		O maximum towable mass of the trailer	o	m		n/a
		9B	O.1 Braked	o	m	TechMaxMassaGeremd	"12345 kg"
		9C	O.2 Unbraked	o	m	TechMaxMassaOngeremd	"12345 kg"
	A5		P Engine	o	x		
		9D	P.4 Rated speed	o	x		
		9E	P.5 Engine identification number	o	x		
	9F 24		R Colour	o	m	Kleur	"Oranje/Oranje"
	9F 25		T Maximum speed	o	m	MaxSnelheid	"999 km/h" or "999/999 km/h"
	AF		U Sound level,	o	x		
		9F 26	U.1 Stationary	o	x		
		9F 27	U.2 Engine speed	o	x		
		9F 28	U.3 Drive by	o	x		
	B0		V Exhaust emissions	o	m		n/a
		9F 29	V.1 CO	o	x		
		9F 2A	V.2 HC	o	x		
		9F 2B	V.3 NOx	o	x		
		9F 2C	V.4 HC+NOx	o	x		
		9F 2D	V.5 Particulates of diesel	o	x		
		9F 2E	V.6 diesel absorption coefficient	o	x		
		9F 2F	V.7 CO2	o	x		
		9F 30	V.8 Combined fuel consumption	o	x		
		9F 31	V.9 environmental category	o	m	Milieuklasse	"70/222*1970/222"
	9F 32		W Fuel tanks capacity	o	x		

Table 7: Format of EF.Registration_B

App 1.9 EF.Registration_C

Tag	Length	Value			
BF8700	X	Registration_C Template			M
	Tag	L	Value		
	9F8701	X	Version (current = 1)	Binary	M
	BF8710	X	RegistrationDates		M
	conditional	C	IndividualVehicleInformation (1)	C	C
	conditional	C	IndividualVehicleInformation (2)	C	C
	conditional	C	IndividualVehicleInformation (3)	C	C
	conditional	C	IndividualVehicleInformation (4)	C	C
	conditional	C	IndividualVehicleInformation (5)	C	C

Table 8: Format of EF.Registration_C

App 1.9.1 Registration data

EF.Registration_C always contains registration data as indicated in Table 9. This data contains in addition to the data in EF.Registration_A, the date of first registration in the Netherlands.

Tag	L	Value	Format	M/O	Corresponding DD10 XML element	Typical value
9F8711		Date of first registration of the vehicle	YYYYMMDD	M	DatumEersteToelatingEU	19970702
9F8712		Date of first registration of the vehicle in the Netherlands	YYYYMMDD	M	DatumEersteInschrijvingEU	20110701
9F8713		Date of registration to which this certificate refers (Laatste Tenaamstelling)	YYYYMMDD	M	DatumAanvangAansprEU	20130628
9F8714		Registration number (Kenteken)		M	Kenteken	44-JBT-4

Table 9: Format of registration data in EF.Registration_C

App 1.9.2 Individual Vehicle Information

EF.Registration_C contains an arbitrary number (0, 1, 2, 3,) of IndividualVehicleInformation data elements. For each applicable COC/CVO there will be an IndividualVehicleInformation data element. For each individual IndividualVehicleInformation data element three choices are allowed for formats and

only one representation (XML, Compressed XML or TLV) will be present (for each individual IndividualVehicleInformation data element).

IndividualVehicleInformation	Tag	L	Value		
(choice 1)	9F8702	X	IndividualVehicleInformation (XML)	A-N	C
(choice 2)	BF8703	X	IndividualVehicleInformation (Compressed XML)		C
(choice 3)	BF8100	X	IndividualVehicleInformation (TLV)		C

Table 10: Format of Individual Vehicle Information

App 1.9.2.1 IndividualVehicleInformation (XML)

XML encoded Vehicle Information will be specified later.

App 1.9.2.2 IndividualVehicleInformation (Compressed XML)

Tag	L	Value		
9F8704	X	Compression Algorithm Identifier (zie Table 12:)	Binary	M
9F8705	X	XML geëncodeerde Vehicle Information zoals gespecificeerd zal worden, gecomprimeerd volgens het algoritme aangegeven in het veld met tag 9F8704	Binary	M

Table 11: Format of IndividualVehicleInformation (Compressed XML)

Identifier	Algorithm
0	GZIP
*	RFU

Table 12: Compression Algorithm Identifiers



App 1.9.2.3 IndividualVehicleInformation (TLV)

L(max) indicates the maximum allowed length (in bytes) of the corresponding value field.

Tag	L(max)	Value		
BF8101	X	Header		
	Tag	L(max)	Value	
	9F8102	36	Messageld	
Tag	L(max)	Value		
BF8103	X	Body		
	Tag	L(max)	Value	
	BF8104	X	CocDataGroup (TLV)	
		Tag	L(max)	Value
		9F8105	17	VehicleIdentificationNumber
		9F8106	17	BaseVin
		9F8107	1	StageOfCompletionCode
		9F8108	1	ProvisionalApprovalIndicator
		9F8109	3	TypeApprovalTypeCode
		9F810A	1	IndividualApprovalTypeCode
		9F810B	4	ProductionYear
		9F810C	4	ProductionSequentialNumber
		9F810D	4	NumberOfTheMemberState
		9F810E	50	Type
		9F810F	25	Variant
		9F8110	35	Version
		9F8111		RevisionDate
		9F8112	150	MeansOfIdentificationOfType
		9F8113	150	ManufacturerPlateLocation
		9F8114	150	ManufacturerPlateMethodOfAffix
		9F8115	10	VehicleCategoryCode
		9F8116	1	AdditionalVehCat23WheelCode
		9F8117	2	LocOfTheStatutoryPlatesCode



Tag	L(max)	Value		
		9F8118	2	MethodOfAttachmStatPlatesCode
		9F8119	2	LocationOfTheVinCode
		9F811A	50	LocationOfTheVinCode23Wheel
		9F811B	80	NumericAlphanumIdentifCode
		9F811C	1	CompletedAlteredCode
		9F811D	500	DescriptionOfCompletion
		9F811E	35	TypeApprovalNumber
		9F811F		TypeApprovalDateOfIssue
		9F8120	1	RightLeftHandTrafficCode
		9F8121	1	MetricImperialSpeedometerCode
		9F8122		DateOfApplicationIndividualApp
		9F8123	35	IndividualApprovalNumber
		9F8124	2	IndividualApprovalVersionNr
		9F8125	2	NumberOfAxles
		9F8126	2	NumberOfWheels
		9F8127	2	NumberOfAxlesWithTwinWheels
		9F8128	2	NumberOfSteeredAxles
		9F8129	2	NumberOfPoweredAxles
		9F812A	2	NumberOfBrakedAxles
		9F812B	1	ReversibleDrivingPositionInd
		9F812C	5	Wheelbase
		9F812D	5	WheelbaseMinimum
		9F812E	5	WheelbaseMaximum
		9F812F	5	Length
		9F8130	5	LengthMinimum
		9F8131	5	LengthMaximum
		9F8132	5	MaximumPermissibleLength
		9F8133	4	Width
		9F8134	4	WidthMinimum
		9F8135	4	WidthMaximum
		9F8136	4	MaximumPermissibleWidth



Tag	L(max)	Value		
		9F8137	4	Height
		9F8138	4	HeightMinimum
		9F8139	4	HeightMaximum
		9F813A	4	MaximumPermissibleHeight
		9F813B	150	MaxPermPosCOGCompletedVeh
		9F813C	5	LengthOfTheLoadingArea
		9F813D	5	LengthOfTheLoadingAreaMinimum
		9F813E	5	LengthOfTheLoadingAreaMaximum
		9F813F	4	RearOverhang
		9F8140	4	RearOverhangMinimum
		9F8141	4	RearOverhangMaximum
		9F8142	4	MaximumPermissibleRearOverhang
		9F8143	6	MassOfTheVehicleInRunningOrder
		9F8144	6	ActualMassOfTheVehicle
		9F8145	6	UnladenMassVehRunningOrderMin
		9F8146	6	UnladenMassVehRunningOrderMax
		9F8147	6	UnladenMassOfTheVehicle
		9F8148	6	MassIncompleteVehRunningOrder
		9F8149	6	MinMassVehCompleted
		9F814A	6	TechnPermMaxLadenMass
		9F814B	6	TechnPermMaxMassCombination
		9F814C	6	BallastMassTotal
		9F814D	50	BallastMassMaterial
		9F814E	2	BallastMassNumberOfComponents
		9F814F	15	BallastMassNumberOfComponents
		9F8150	1	BodyIndicator
		9F8151	2	PrimaryColourCode
		9F8152	2	SecondaryColourCode
		9F8153	5	TankCapacityTankerVehicle
		9F8154	1	NumberOfDoors
		9F8155	40	ConfigurationOfDoors



Tag	L(max)	Value		
		9F8156	50	FrameOrCabMake
		9F8157	40	EcTypeApprovalNrFrameCab
		9F8158	1	PositionRollOverHoopCode
		9F8159	2	TypeOfRollOverHoopCode
		9F815A	40	MakeRollOverHoop
		9F815B	40	EcTypeApprovalNrRollOverHoop
		9F815C	3	NrOfSeatingPositionExclDriver
		9F815D	3	NrOfSeatingPositions
		9F815E	40	PositionOfSeats
		9F815F	3	SeatForUseOnlyWhenTheVehStat
		9F8160	3	NrOfPassSeatingPosLowerDeck
		9F8161	3	NrOfPassSeatingPosUpperDeck
		9F8162	3	NrOfWheelchairUserAccessPos
		9F8163	3	NumberOfStandingPlaces
		9F8164	5	LoadPlatformDimensionsLength
		9F8165	5	LoadPlatformDimensionsWidth
		9F8166	5	LoadPlatformDimensionsHeight
		9F8167	6	LoadPlatformTechPermLoad
		9F8168	150	OptionalLightSignallingDevices
		9F8169	1	HydrLiftThreePointCouplingInd
		9F816A	1	TypeApprTranspDangerGoodsInd
		9F816B	1000	Remarks
		9F816C	1	ExceedingDimensionsIndicator
		9F816D	200	Exemptions
		9F816E	400	AdditionalInformation
		9F816F	7	OdometerReading
		9F8170	1	OdometerUnitCode
		9F8171	3	IntendedCountryOfRegistrCode
		9F8172	2	VersionCoc
		9F8173		VersionDateIVI
		9F8174	1	VehicleFittedWithEcoInnovInd



Tag	L(max)	Value			
		9F8175	5	TotalCO2EmisSavingDueEcolnnov	
		9F8176	1	FuelTypeCode	
		BF8177		BrakingTable	
			Tag	L(max)	Value
		BF8178			BrakingGroup
			Tag	L(max)	Value
			9F8179	200	BrakingDesc
		Tag	L(max)	Value	
		BF817A		FiscalPowerOrNatCodeNrsTable	
			Tag	L(max)	Value
		BF817B		FiscalPowerOrNatCodeNrsGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value
			9F817C	3	FiscPowOrNatCodeNrsCountryCode
			9F817D	40	FiscalPowerOrNatCodeNrs
		Tag	L(max)	Value	
		BF817E		SigningAuthorityTable	
			Tag	L(max)	Value
		BF817F		SigningAuthorityGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value
			9F8200	80	NameOfSigner
			9F8201	80	PositionOfSigner
			9F8202	80	PlaceOfSignature
			9F8203		DateOfSignature
		Tag	L(max)	Value	
		BF8204		GearGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value
			9F8205	1	GearboxTypeCode
			9F8206	2	NumberOfRatiosFront
			9F8207	2	NumberOfRatiosRear
		BF8208		GearRatioTable	
			Tag	L(max)	Value



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				BF8209		GearRatioGroup
					Tag	L(max) Value
					9F820A	1 DrivingDirectionCode
					9F820B	2 GearNumber
					9F820C	7 GearRatio
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF820D		RegulationsTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF820E		RegulationsGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F820F	5	RegulActInclLastAmendSubjNr
				9F8210	25	RegulationAct
				9F8211	25	RegulActInclLastAmend
				9F8212	200	RegulActInclLastAmendRemark
				9F8213	1	RegulActApprovalCode
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8214		MakeTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8215		MakeGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8216	52	Make
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8217		CommercialNameTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8218		CommercialNameGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8219	50	CommercialName
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF821A		StageNrOfManufacturingTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF821B		StageNrOfManufacturingGroup	



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F821C	2	StageManufacturerNumber
				9F821D	80	StageManufacturerName
				9F821E	40	StageEcTypeApprovalNumber
				9F821F		StageDate
				BF8220		AddressTable
					Tag	L(max)
				BF8221		AddressGroup
					Tag	L(max)
						Value
					9F8222	3
						AddressTypeCode
					9F8223	80
						Name
					9F8224	150
						AddressLine1
					9F8225	150
						AddressLine2
					9F8226	150
						AddressLine3
					9F8227	80
						PlaceOfResidence
					9F8228	80
						CountryOfResidence
					9F8229	20
						PhoneNumber
					9F822A	130
						EMailAddress
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF822B		TypeApprTranspDangerGoodsTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF822C		TypeApprTranspDangerGoodsGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F822D	30	TypeApprTranspDangerGoodsClass
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF822E		BodyworkTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF822F		BodyworkGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8230	2	CodeForBodywork
				9F8231	3	NumberForBodywork



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				9F8232	2	CodeForBodyworkSpecPurpVeh
				BF8233		VehicleClassTable
					Tag	L(max) Value
					BF8234	VehicleClassGroup
					Tag	L(max) Value
					9F8235	5 ClassOfVehicleCode
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8236		TyreTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8237		TyreGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8238	100	TyreSpecification
				9F8239	6	TechnPermMaxLadenMassTyreSpec
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF823A		AxleTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF823B		AxleGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F823C	2	AxleNumber
				9F823D	1	TwinWheelsAxleInd
				9F823E	1	SteeredAxleInd
				9F823F	4	TrackOfEachSteeredAxle
				9F8240	1	PoweredAxleInd
				9F8241	1	BrakedAxleInd
				9F8242	4	AxleTrack
				9F8243	4	AxleTrackMinimum
				9F8244	4	AxleTrackMaximum
				9F8245	4	TrackOfAllOtherAxles
				9F8246	1	LiftAxleInd
				9F8247	1	LoadableAxleInd
				9F8248	1	RetractableOrLoadableAxleInd



Tag	L(max)	Value				
			9F8249	1	DriveAxleWithAirSuspOrEquivInd	
			9F824A	1	AxleWithAirSuspOrEquivInd	
			9F824B	5	AxleSpacing	
			9F824C	5	AxleSpacingMinimum	
			9F824D	5	AxleSpacingMaximum	
			9F824E	5	DistrOfMassRunningOrderAxle	
			9F824F	5	DistribUnladenMassAxle	
			9F8250	5	DistribMassIncompleteVehAxle	
			9F8251	5	DistribMassCompletedVehAxleMin	
			9F8252	5	TechnicallyPermMassAxle	
			BF8253		MaxPermLadenMassAxleNatTable	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
			BF8254			MaxPermLadenMassAxleNatGroup
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8255	2	MaxPermLadenMassAxleCountrCode
				9F8256	5	MaxPermLadenMassAxleNational
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8257		MaxPermLadenMassAxleIntTable	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
			BF8258		MaxPermLadenMassAxleIntGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8259	40	MaxPermLadenMassTrafficRegul
				9F825A	5	MaxPermLadenMassAxleInt
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF825B		InterconnWithPoweredAxleTable	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
			BF825C		InterconnWithPoweredAxleGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F825D	1	InterconnWithPoweredAxleNumber
				9F825E	40	InterconnOfPoweredAxles
			Tag	L(max)	Value	



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				BF825F		InterconnWithBrakedAxleTable
					Tag	L(max) Value
					BF8260	InterconnWithBrakedAxleGroup
					Tag	L(max) Value
					9F8261	1 InterconnWithBrakedAxleNumber
					9F8262	80 InterconnOfBrakedAxle
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				BF8263		TyreAxleTable
					Tag	L(max) Value
					BF8264	TyreAxleGroup
					Tag	L(max) Value
					9F8265	6 DistrMaxLadenMassTyreAxleSpec
					9F8266	6 TechnPermisMaxMassAxle
					9F8267	5 DistrTechnPermisMassAxle
					9F8268	6 TechPermMaxStatVertLoadCouplPt
					9F8269	20 TyreSize
					9F826A	3 LoadCapacityIndexSingleWheel
					9F826B	3 LoadCapacityIndexTwinWheel
					9F826C	2 SpeedCategorySymbol
					9F826D	20 RimSizeIncludingOffSet
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF826E		AxleGroupTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF826F		AxleGroupGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8270	2	AxleGroupNumber
				9F8271	6	TechPermMassAxleGroup
				BF8272		MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrNatTable
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				BF8273		MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrNatGroup
				Tag	L(max)	Value



Tag	L(max)	Value						
						9F8274	2	MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrCCCode
						9F8275	5	MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrNat
				Tag	L(max)	Value		
				BF8276		MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrIntTable		
					Tag	L(max)	Value	
					BF8277		MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrIntGroup	
						Tag	L(max)	Value
						9F8278	40	MaxPermLadenMassGrTrafficRegul
						9F8279	5	MaxPermLadenMassAxleGrInt
		Tag	L(max)	Value				
		BF827A		EngineTable				
			Tag	L(max)	Value			
			BF827B		EngineGroup			
				Tag	L(max)	Value		
				9F827C	52	ManufacturerOfTheEngine		
				9F827D	40	EngineCodeAsMarkedOnTheEngine		
				9F827E	40	EngineEcTypeApprovalNumber		
				9F827F	25	EngineNumber		
				9F8300	80	IdentEngineTypeLocation		
				9F8301	80	IdentEngineTypeMethodAffixing		
				9F8302	2	WorkingPrincipleCode		
				9F8303	1	DirectInjectionIndicator		
				9F8304	1	PureElectricIndicator		
				9F8305	1	HybridIndicator		
				9F8306	2	NumberOfCylinders		
				9F8307	3	ArrangementOfCylindersCode		
				9F8308	7	EngineCapacity		
				9F8309	1	ElectricEngineIndicator		
				9F830A	1	OffVehicleChargingIndicator		
				9F830B	1	LpgFuellingSystemIndicator		
				9F830C	1	CngFuellingSystemIndicator		



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				9F830D	5	MaxPercentBiofuelAcceptInFuel
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF830E		TrailerBrakeTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF830F		TrailerBrakeGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
				9F8310	3	TrailerBrakeConnectionsCode
				9F8311	7	PressFeedLineTwoLineBraking
				9F8312	7	PressFeedLineSingleLineBraking
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8313		MechanicalCouplingTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8314		MechanicalCouplingGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
				9F8315	40	MechanicalCouplingType
				9F8316	52	MechanicalCouplingMake
				9F8317	4	HeightCouplingAboveGroundMax
				9F8318	4	HeightCouplingAboveGroundMin
				9F8319	4	FifthWheelLead
				9F831A	4	FifthWheelLeadMinimum
				9F831B	4	FifthWheelLeadMaximum
				9F831C	5	DistFrontVehCentreCouplDev
				9F831D	5	DistFrontVehCentreCouplDevMin
				9F831E	5	DistFrontVehCentreCouplDevMax
				9F831F	5	DistCentreCouplDevRearVeh
				9F8320	5	DistCentreCouplDevRearVehMin
				9F8321	5	DistCentreCouplDevRearVehMax
				9F8322	4	DistAxisFifthWheelForemost
				9F8323	4	DistAxisFifthWheelForemostMin
				9F8324	4	DistAxisFifthWheelForemostMax
				9F8325	6	TechPermMaxTowMassBrakedTrail



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				9F8326	6	TechPermMaxTowMassDrawbarTrail
				9F8327	6	TechPermMaxTowMassSemiTrailer
				9F8328	6	TechPermMaxTowMassCentAxTrail
				9F8329	6	TechPermMaxTowMassUnbrTrailer
				9F832A	6	TechPermMaxTowableMassTrailer
				9F832B	6	TechPermMaxStatVertMassCouplPt
				9F832C	6	TechPermMaxStatMassCouplPoint
				9F832D	6	DistanceCouplPointFirstAxle
				9F832E	6	DistanceCouplPointFirstAxleMin
				9F832F	6	DistanceCouplPointFirstAxleMax
				9F8330	6	IndependBrakedTowableMass
				9F8331	6	InertiaBrakedTowableMass
				9F8332	6	ContinuousBrakedTowableMass
				9F8333	35	ApprovalNrCouplingDevice
				9F8334	6	CouplCharTechnPermTrailerMass
				BF8335		CouplingDevicesFittedTable
					Tag	L(max) Value
					BF8336	CouplingDevicesFittedGroup
					Tag	L(max) Value
					9F8337	80 TypeOfCouplingDeviceFitted
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8338	6	CouplingCharacteristicValueD
				9F8339	6	CouplingCharacteristicValueDC
				9F833A	6	CouplingCharacteristicValueV
				9F833B	6	CouplingCharacteristicValueS
				9F833C	6	CouplingCharacteristicValueU
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF833D		EcolInnovationsTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF833E		EcolInnovationsGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value	



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				9F833F	120	GeneralCodeOfTheEcoInnovations
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8340		FuelTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8341		FuelGroup	
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
				9F8342	2	FuelCode
				9F8343	6	MaximumNetPower
				9F8344	5	EngineSpeedMaximumNetPower
				9F8345	6	MaximumContinuousRatedPower
				9F8346	3	PowerMassRatio
				9F8347	4	PowerPowerTakeOff
				9F8348	5	EngineSpeedPowerPowerTakeOff
				9F8349	5	CalculatedMaximumSpeed
				9F834A	5	MaximumSpeed
				9F834B	35	ExtSoundLevelNrBaseRegulAct
				9F834C	5	SoundLevelStationary
				9F834D	5	SoundLevelStatEngineSpeed
				9F834E	5	SoundLevelDriveBy
				9F834F	35	DriverPercSoundLevNrBaseRegAct
				9F8350	3	DriverPerceivedSoundLevel
				9F8351	10	ExhaustEmissionLevelEuro
				9F8352	40	OtherEmissionLegislation
				9F8353	35	NrBaseRegulActLastAmendMotVeh
				9F8354	35	NrBaseRegulActLastAmendEngines
				9F8355	9	SmokeCorrectedAbsorptionCoeff
				9F8356	3	UrbanConditionsCO2
				9F8357	4	UrbanConditionsFuelConsumption
				9F8358	3	ExtraUrbanConditionsCO2
				9F8359	4	ExtraUrbanConditionsFuelCons
				9F835A	3	CombinedCO2



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				9F835B	4	CombinedFuelConsumption
				9F835C	9	WeightedCombinedCO2
				9F835D	5	WeightedCombinedFuelCons
				9F835E	9	CombinedCO2ConditionA
				9F835F	9	CombinedCO2ConditionB
				9F8360	5	CombinedFuelConsConditionA
				9F8361	5	CombinedFuelConsConditionB
				9F8362	7	ElectricEnergyConsConditionA
				9F8363	7	ElectricEnergyConsConditionB
				9F8364	7	ElectricEnergyConsPureElectric
				9F8365	7	ElectricEnergyConsWeightedComb
				9F8366	5	ElectricRange
				9F8367	5	ElectricRangeExternChargeable
				BF8368		TestprocedureType1Group
					Tag	L(max)
						Value
					9F8369	9
					9F836A	9
					9F836B	9
					9F836C	9
					9F836D	9
					9F836E	9
					9F836F	9
					9F8370	2
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				BF8371		TestprocedureType2Group
					Tag	L(max)
						Value
					9F8372	9
					9F8373	9
					9F8374	6
					9F8375	5
					9F8376	5



Tag	L(max)	Value					
					9F8377	6	TestprocType2COAtHighIdleSp
					9F8378	5	TestprocType2EngSpHighIdleMin
					9F8379	5	TestprocType2EngSpHighIdleMax
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
				BF837A		TestprocedureEscGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
					9F837B	9	TestprocEscCO
					9F837C	9	TestprocEscTHC
					9F837D	9	TestprocEscNOx
					9F837E	9	TestprocEscParticulates
					9F837F	9	TestProcEscNumberOfParticles
					9F8400	2	TestProcEscExponentParticles
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
				BF8401		TestprocedureNrscGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
					9F8402	9	TestprocNrscCO
					9F8403	9	TestprocNrscHC
					9F8404	9	TestprocNrscNOx
					9F8405	9	TestprocNrscNMHC_NOx
					9F8406	9	TestprocNrscParticulates
					9F8407	9	TestprocNrscNumberOfParticles
					9F8408	2	TestProcNrscExponentParticles
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
				BF8409		TestprocedureWhscGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
					9F840A	9	TestprocWhscCO
					9F840B	9	TestprocWhscTHC
					9F840C	9	TestprocWhscNOx
					9F840D	9	TestprocWhscNMHC
					9F840E	9	TestprocWhscCH4
					9F840F	9	TestprocWhscNH3



Tag	L(max)	Value					
					9F8410	9	TestprocWhscParticulates
					9F8411	9	TestprocWhscNumberOfParticles
					9F8412	2	TestProcWhscExponentParticles
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
				BF8413		TestProcedureElrGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
					9F8414	9	TestProcElrSmokeValue
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
				BF8415		TestprocedureEtcGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
					9F8416	9	TestprocEtcCO
					9F8417	9	TestprocEtcNOx
					9F8418	9	TestprocEtcNMHC
					9F8419	9	TestprocEtcTHC
					9F841A	9	TestprocEtcCH4
					9F841B	9	TestprocEtcParticulates
					9F841C	9	TestprocEtcNumberOfParticles
					9F841D	2	TestProcEtcExponentParticles
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
				BF841E		TestprocedureNrtcGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value	
					9F841F	9	TestprocNrtcCO
					9F8420	9	TestprocNrtcNOx
					9F8421	9	TestprocNrtcNMHC
					9F8422	9	TestprocNrtcNMHC_NOx
					9F8423	9	TestprocNrtcTHC
					9F8424	9	TestprocNrtcCH4
					9F8425	9	TestprocNrtcParticulates
					9F8426	9	TestprocNrtcNumberOfParticles
					9F8427	2	TestProcEscExponentParticles
				Tag	L(max)	Value	



Tag	L(max)	Value				
				BF8428		TestprocedureWhtcGroup
					Tag	L(max) Value
					9F8429	9 TestprocWhtcCO
					9F842A	9 TestprocWhtcNOx
					9F842B	9 TestprocWhtcNMHC
					9F842C	9 TestprocWhtcTHC
					9F842D	9 TestprocWhtcCH4
					9F842E	9 TestprocWhtcNH3
					9F842F	9 TestprocWhtcParticulates
					9F8430	9 TestprocWhtcNumberOfParticles
					9F8431	2 TestProcWhtcExponentParticles
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8432		InServiceMaxMassNatTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8433		InServiceMaxMassNatGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8434	2	MaxPermMassNatTraffCountryCode
				9F8435	6	MaxPermLadenMassNational
				9F8436	6	MaxPermMassCombinationNational
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		BF8437		InServiceMaxMassIntTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8438		InServiceMaxMassIntGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8439	40	MaxPermMassIntTrafficRegul
				9F843A	6	MaxPermLadenMassInternational
				9F843B	6	MaxPermMassCombinationInt
	Tag	L(max)	Value			
	BF843C		TechnicalAdditionalDataGroup			
		Tag	L(max)	Value		
		9F843E		DateOfProduction		



Tag	L(max)	Value		
		9F843F	1	BrakeAssistSystemIndicator
		9F8440	1	ProtectionPedestriansIndicator
		9F8441	1	DaytimeRunningLightsIndicator
		9F8442	1	ElectronicStabilityProgramInd
		9F8443	1	TyrePressureMonitoringSystInd
		9F8444	1	LaneDepartureWarningIndicator
		9F8445	1	AdvancEmergencyBrakingSystInd
		9F8446	1	BrakeRetarderIndicator
		9F8447	1	PressureChargerInd
		9F8448	1	InterCoolerIndicator
		9F8449	1	CatalyticConvertorInd
		9F844A	1	OxygenSensorInd
		9F844B	1	AirInjectionInd
		9F844C	1	ExhaustGasRecirculationInd
		9F844D	1	EvaporativeEmisControlSysInd
		9F844E	1	ParticulateTrapInd
		9F844F	1	OnBoardDiagnosInd
		9F8450	1	AntilockBrakeSysInd
		9F8451	1	FrontAirbagInd
		9F8452	1	SideAirbagInd
		9F8453	1	BeltPreloadDeviceInd
		9F8454	1	HeadAirbagInd
		9F8455	1	LowerAirbagInd
		9F8456	1	BeltForceLimiterInd
		9F8457	1	RearRegistrationPlateCode
		9F8458	10	CodeEmissionCategory
		9F8459	8	NumberRegistrationCertifPart2
		9F845A	378	RemarksExceptions
		9F845B	4	CodeOfManufacturer
		9F845C	3	CodeOfType
		9F845D	5	CodeOfVariantVersion



Tag	L(max)	Value				
		9F845E	1	CheckDigitCodeOfVariantVersion		
		BF845F		TechnAddDataGrAxleTable		
			Tag	L(max)	Value	
			BF8460		TechnAddDataGrAxleGroup	
				Tag	L(max)	Value
				9F8461	2	TechnAddDataGrAxleNumber
				9F8462	1	PendulumAxleIndicator
				9F8463	1	SelfTrackingAxleIndicator
	Tag	L(max)	Value			
	BF843D		NationalDataGroup (no children defined)			

Table 13: Format of IndividualVehicleRegistration



App 1.10 EF.Signature_A

Tag	Len	Val		
30		SIGNATURE		
	Tag	Len	Val	
	30		AlgorithmIdentifier	
		Tag	Len	Val
		06		algorithm (OID)
		??		Parameters (ANY DEFINED BY algorithm– OPTIONAL)
	Tag	Len	Val	
	03		signatureValue (BITSTRING)	

Table 14: Format of EF.Signature_A

The current preference for the RSA signature algorithm is PKCS#1v1.5, but the possibility is kept to use instead RSA-PSS. Reading and verification software should also support the RSA-PSS signature algorithm.

The same signature algorithm is used for the signatures over the CSCA certificate, DS certificate, Signature_A, Signature_B and the EF.SOd.

Notice that for RSA PKCS#1v1.5 the optional parameters must have the NULL value (RFC 4055 [9]).

App 1.11 EF.Signature_B

Tag	Len	Val		
30		SIGNATURE		
	Tag	Len	Val	
	30		AlgorithmIdentifier	
		Tag	Len	Val
		06		algorithm (OID)
		??		Parameters (ANY DEFINED BY algorithm– OPTIONAL)
	Tag	Len	Val	
	03		signatureValue (BITSTRING)	

Table 15: Format of EF.Signature_B

The current preference for the RSA signature algorithm is PKCS#1v1.5, but the possibility is kept to use instead RSA-PSS. Reading and verification software should also support the RSA-PSS signature algorithm.

The same signature algorithm is used for the signatures over the CSCA certificate, DS certificate, Signature_A, Signature_B and the EF.SOd.

Notice that for RSA PKCS#1v1.5 the optional parameters must have the NULL value (RFC 4055 [9]).



App 2 NL-EVRC COMMANDS AND RESPONSES

For an explanation of the Command and Response APDUs and the abbreviations used see ISO/IEC 7816-4 and 7816-8 [7], [8].

App 2.1 SELECT APPLICATION

App 2.1.1 Command APDU

Field	Value	Description
CLA	00	
INS	A4	
P1	04	Select by DF Name
P2	00	Return FCI Data
Lc	0B	Length of the Data field
Data	A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31	AID of the VR Application
Le	00	

Table 16: SELECT APPLICATION Command APDU

App 2.1.2 Response APDU

Field	Value	Description
FCI Template		
Tag	6F	
Length	XX	
Value	XX ... XX	
SW1 SW2	90 00	Successful processing

Table 17: Response on successful processing



App 2.2 SELECT FILE

App 2.2.1 Command APDU

Field	Value	Description
CLA	00	
INS	A4	
P1	02	Select EF under current DF
P2	04	Return FCP Data
Lc	02	
Data	XX XX	File Identifier
Le	00	

Table 18: SELECT FILE Command APDU

App 2.2.2 Response APDU

Field	Value	Description
FCP Template		
Tag	62	
Length	XX	
Value	XX ... XX	
SW1 SW2	90 00	

Table 19: Response on successful processing

As part of the FCP template, the value of tag 80 encodes the File Size of the selected file.

App 2.3 READ BINARY

App 2.3.1 Command APDU

Field	Value	Description
CLA	00	
INS	B0	
P1	XX	Offset, most significant byte, value between 00 and 7F
P2	XX	Offset, least significant byte
Lc	-	Absent
Data	-	Absent
Le	XX	Maximum number of bytes expected in the response data, 0x00 codes for 256.

Table 20: READ BINARY Command APDU

Note: Possibly this command needs to be repeated with the correct offset in order to read the complete file.



App 2.3.2 Response APDU

Field	Value	Description
Response Data	XX ... XX	Le data bytes, starting at offset P1P2
SW1 SW2	90 00	

Table 21: Response on successful processing

App 2.4 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE

App 2.4.1 Command APDU

Field	Value	Description
CLA	00	
INS	88	
P1	00	
P2	00	
Lc	08	
Data	XX ... XX	RND.IFD 8-byte random value generated by the off-card entity
Le	00	

Table 22: INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command APDU

App 2.4.2 Response APDU

Field	Value	Description
Response Data	XX ... XX	Signature
SW1 SW2	90 00	

Table 23: Response on successful processing

Field	Value	Description
SW1 SW2	XX XX	See section App 2.4.3

Table 24: Response in case of an error condition

App 2.4.3 Status Words

Value	Description	
90 00	Successful processing	
66 00	Error: Security related issues	Signature generation has failed
67 00	Error: Wrong Length	Le is not equal to 00 Lc is not equal to 08
69 85	Error: Conditions of use not satisfied	Active Authentication Session Flag is set or Maximum Active Authentication Counter exceeds the Active Authentication Counter Maximum.
6A 81	Error: Function not supported	The card has been blocked



6A 86	Error: Incorrect parameters P1-P2	The bytes P1 P2 do not have the value 00 00.
6A 88	Error: Referenced Data not found	The Active Authentication Private Key has not been personalized.

Table 25: INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Status Words

App 2.5 Status Words Summary

Value	Description
90 00	Successful processing

Table 26: Status Words indicating successful processing

Value	Description
62 82	Warning: End of file reached before reading Ne bytes
63 00	Warning: No information given (authentication failure)

Table 27: Status Words indicating a warning

Value	Description
66 00	Error: Security related issues
67 00	Error: Wrong Length
68 81	Error: Logical Channel not supported
69 82	Error: Security Status not satisfied
69 85	Error: Conditions of use not satisfied
69 86	Error: Command not allowed
6A 80	Error: Incorrect parameters in the command data field
6A 81	Error: Function not supported
6A 82	Error: File not Found
6A 84	Error: Not enough memory space in the file
6A 86	Error: Incorrect parameters P1-P2
6A 87	Error: Nc inconsistent with parameters P1-P2
6A 88	Error: Referenced Data not found
6B 00	Error: Wrong parameters P1-P2
6D 00	Error: Instruction code not supported or invalid
6E 00	Error: Class not supported

Table 28: Status Words indicating an error condition



App 3 TRACES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN READING AND VERIFICATION SOFTWARE AND THE CHIP (INFORMATIVE)

The APDU traces have been made on basis of a specimen Dutch vehicle registration card. The DS certificates in the APDU trace can be validated with the CSCA certificate from App 4.

App 3.1 Reading of the Dutch Vehicle Registration Card Chip

APDU trace according to the inspection procedure specified in 4.2.

1. Select eVRC application (AID = 'A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31')

```
T→C: '00 A4 04 00 0B A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31 00'  
C→T: '6F 0D 84 0B A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31 90 00'
```

2. Passive Authentication

a. Select EF.SOD (File ID = '00 1D')

```
T→C: '00 A4 02 04 02 00 1D 00'  
C→T: '62 08 83 02 00 1D 80 02 08 9C 90 00'
```

b. Read EF.SOD (length = 'LL LL')

```
T→C: '00 B0 00 00 00 00'  
C→T: '30 82 08 98 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 07 02 A0 82 08 89 30 82  
08 85 02 01 03 31 0D 30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 30 82 01  
6B 06 09 60 84 10 01 87 72 03 01 01 A0 82 01 5C 04 82 01 58 30 82 01  
54 02 01 00 30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 30 82 01 40 30 26  
04 02 00 0D 04 20 E6 AC A0 C2 08 A2 53 C5 82 C8 DC BA D9 A2 06 BE 83  
F1 A8 2A 76 0F 16 4F 1A 78 4E 0F 47 EB 32 32 30 26 04 02 C0 01 04 20  
63 3A E7 9A 1D E8 B8 80 1D 1D 2E 99 09 AF 7E 59 B7 D1 9E 59 2F 1A C1  
70 61 36 DD 16 45 36 1F 55 30 26 04 02 C0 11 04 20 63 3A E7 9A 1D E8  
B8 80 1D 1D 2E 99 09 AF 7E 59 B7 D1 9E 59 2F 1A C1 70 61 36 DD 16 45  
36 1F 55 30 26 04 02 D0 01 04 20 77 89 04 A9 1F D3 BB A2 A2 56 15 75  
D9 AA 21 0E 22 33 F0 64 17 90 7F D5 9E EC 06 A2 F6 04 70 57 30 26 04  
02 D0 11 04 20 90 00'  
  
T→C: '00 B0 01 00 00 00'  
C→T: 'C1 55 02 FC A1 28 16 60 04 1B BA DD 03 93 E1 A6 23 D4 B8 BC 80  
EB B4 61 01 9B 8E 56 DD D0 34 A2 30 26 04 02 D0 21 04 20 18 F0 83 CB  
FD 72 92 B6 34 B3 2E 96 79 15 B3 78 D4 81 B7 B2 9E 2F C6 09 0A 4E 65  
9E 3D 13 91 91 30 26 04 02 E0 01 04 20 8E E7 D9 80 DF 89 0D A1 08 09  
09 77 4F 9D 53 B0 7D 5A AF A7 B7 F5 9C D3 D9 0D 2F 64 CE 94 DB E1 30  
26 04 02 E0 11 04 20 10 4A 20 74 C1 0B 96 67 87 34 A5 F2 C4 D0 79 C6  
D8 67 9E E1 8B AC F1 35 3F 8E 3F B8 3F 41 E6 E5 A0 82 05 0B 30 82 05  
07 30 82 02 EF A0 03 02 01 02 02 11 00 FA 27 62 08 72 1F DE F1 64 23  
4E CE 0F 92 AC F7 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 66  
31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13 10 43 53 43 41 20 47 41 54 20 4E 4C 20
```



65 56 52 44 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 05 13 02 30 31 31 0C 30 0A 06 03
55 04 0B 13 03 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 02 00 00'

C→T: '52 44 57 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04 0A 13 18 53 74 61 74 65 20 6F
66 20 74 68 65 20 4E 65 74 68 65 72 6C 61 6E 64 73 31 0B 30 09 06 03
55 04 06 13 02 4E 4C 30 1E 17 0D 31 33 31 31 32 36 30 31 33 33 32 36
5A 17 0D 32 34 30 32 32 34 30 31 33 33 32 37 5A 30 63 31 0B 30 09 06
03 55 04 06 13 02 4E 4C 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04 0A 0C 18 53 74 61 74
65 20 6F 66 20 74 68 65 20 4E 65 74 68 65 72 6C 61 6E 64 73 31 0C 30
0A 06 03 55 04 0B 0C 03 52 44 57 31 16 30 14 06 03 55 04 03 0C 0D 44
53 2D 30 32 20 4E 4C 20 65 56 52 44 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 05 13 02
32 31 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82
01 0F 00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 C8 FE E0 20 75 27 77 40 BD 19 66
64 EE 5A 07 07 27 24 EA 82 3D D0 41 2C BE EC 5A AC 6C 8B 15 F1 B4 E9
E4 F6 47 33 76 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 03 00 00'

C→T: '5A 16 96 41 74 32 C4 30 50 B6 65 1B 22 4F F1 6F 68 A1 4C D0 E5
ED 28 B0 8A 26 D3 27 C1 B5 C9 B7 55 70 1B DE C3 8E 2F BB B8 B0 79 73
BD DF 81 B9 AA 4C D4 2D D6 87 FF 51 CF 6C C1 6F E4 4E EF 51 27 37 C0
CA 64 24 E0 66 CE AE 66 B0 3A E2 11 EA 94 12 0F DA A3 06 6F 25 57 E9
7A 54 0A 8C 08 06 6E 32 C2 57 30 48 F6 4F 80 DE 29 62 B9 E0 99 45 DE
DF 6A 90 93 4B BB 32 78 B8 F5 BB 47 9F 7E 1E 82 7B 6E E2 50 9A 8B 77
A5 52 57 6B 9F BE E8 BF C5 68 94 1C AB CB 2F 7C 14 18 A9 A9 C0 98 60
0A 58 B2 3F 70 95 D0 66 97 86 66 3B BE 96 C9 6F D9 4E C6 2F 44 19 4F
21 43 E3 04 5F 0C 1C 8A 7B 94 8F 81 83 28 03 3A 29 D9 5F 8D E6 F7 B5
4B C9 4F 24 C6 07 B3 BA 99 AF 58 41 02 03 01 00 01 A3 81 B2 30 81 AF
30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 66 E4 AB D3 C8 03 26 55 B9 A0 3E D6
BB EF 85 68 41 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 04 00 00'

C→T: 'C5 5B 74 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 92 51 87 BD 8D
E7 DF BF 32 3C 66 69 29 7F DA EB 8A B4 AB B4 30 17 06 03 55 1D 20 04
10 30 0E 30 0C 06 0A 60 84 10 01 87 72 02 01 03 01 30 44 06 03 55 1D
1F 04 3D 30 3B 30 39 A0 37 A0 35 86 33 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 77 77 77
2D 64 69 65 6E 73 74 65 6E 2E 72 64 77 2E 6E 6C 2F 63 72 6C 2F 43 53
43 41 47 41 54 4E 4C 65 56 52 44 2D 30 31 2E 63 72 6C 30 0E 06 03 55
1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
0B 05 00 03 82 02 01 00 82 FC C7 80 1E 6D 47 35 1D 40 7B B5 B4 F7 77
09 C7 4F 6F DF C7 CF 32 CF 6F 48 5C 29 99 E7 E2 3C 71 87 70 26 9C 6F
E1 E7 6F 22 BB BB BE 53 5A 4B F3 C5 3A 2F 84 56 1D 7A 69 24 26 C8 50
C1 7E C7 06 8E 35 67 82 A5 28 22 C4 82 DC 7E 70 2F FF 1D C4 3D 52 FD
86 88 19 44 1A 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 05 00 00'

C→T: 'AB CA 36 92 B4 70 2D B4 11 85 E8 AC 6A 55 57 BA 55 DA 42 56 73
A5 49 88 1E 6D CD 22 4A 88 99 A5 D6 C1 90 96 09 07 5F 89 5D 35 20 8D
70 13 C7 B9 7A 6F 9F 6B DB 17 CE EC 0D 56 FC 45 92 B2 E4 4F 9E 3F 16
14 7F CF D7 DE 38 A5 01 BE F4 0E BE D9 AC 79 76 19 C0 4E 33 AB 8C BB
F6 BA 7E 78 6B 8A 6C 93 5F AB BB 0A E5 31 DA 2C 7B 4C 3C 48 9C 1B A9
78 0D 56 55 20 48 72 80 A9 16 6F 92 5D F0 CD F9 2F 49 B6 CC 4C 47 42



```

F8 64 4A 73 1C 57 0B 95 04 AE 24 E9 24 6E 33 B3 DD 06 AA B3 EA 2C A3
0D 2E 0F 5B 0A 8D 51 BE 21 C5 62 F4 FA 7B FE A5 A8 65 CE EE E5 2D A9
49 E4 11 B0 93 4D B7 92 83 DA 69 75 70 E1 0B 7C 84 4E B8 1F 06 CE 7A
FE 92 ED DF 77 12 FA A4 49 FE A4 11 4E F4 41 CA 6C 57 11 38 21 96 D7
E6 73 3F 0B 66 6A 93 0B 4E 04 9F 4D 2D 4B 24 78 36 20 A5 01 C2 AD BD
06 AB D4 D7 EA 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 06 00 00'
C→T: '4D E9 EB 40 9F C8 A7 3C D7 9C 8D 91 65 ED FA 7C C3 8B FA 2E B9
E7 C7 54 C1 9D 2E 6D B4 17 8B 0F 38 72 24 A9 39 CD 60 96 BE 4D 14 FA
61 22 88 0F B1 9E E4 46 DF 5A 26 93 3E 93 CB D7 5B C0 9E F4 3E 25 EA
38 DC 4A DD 1C 48 4A B5 F3 A4 B1 8C 36 4A 91 25 3C B0 0E 79 37 F2 04
E1 59 92 8A DD 0E 5B D2 FE 90 00 C4 BE 66 19 FE 9A 90 EC C7 30 CD 49
A7 0B A7 30 19 42 D3 42 2C ED 5A A4 38 D7 C8 2C BE 41 6A C7 00 E0 00
E7 2C EC 1B E0 D2 79 79 CC 15 D7 6A CF FC 30 40 43 FC C1 9C FD 4A 4C
9C 96 56 F0 44 33 18 74 31 82 01 F1 30 82 01 ED 02 01 01 30 7B 30 66
31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13 10 43 53 43 41 20 47 41 54 20 4E 4C 20
65 56 52 44 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 05 13 02 30 31 31 0C 30 0A 06 03
55 04 0B 13 03 52 44 57 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04 0A 13 18 53 74 61 74
65 20 6F 66 20 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 07 00 00'
C→T: '74 68 65 20 4E 65 74 68 65 72 6C 61 6E 64 73 31 0B 30 09 06 03
55 04 06 13 02 4E 4C 02 11 00 FA 27 62 08 72 1F DE F1 64 23 4E CE 0F
92 AC F7 30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 A0 4B 30 18 06 09 2A
86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 03 31 0B 06 09 60 84 10 01 87 72 03 01 01 30 2F
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 04 31 22 04 20 A9 56 9F B9 20 04 CD 19
0F A1 14 0E 97 D2 35 99 13 3A 84 28 2A 65 1D FD F4 AE 10 9B C3 C5 F8
73 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 04 82 01 00 72 26 A5
37 A4 83 EB 5D 64 36 2E EE E6 01 8C 04 B9 06 75 B2 08 F5 18 88 A4 76
CB 17 3D 71 C7 FF 0A A5 0B 40 75 DD 36 E0 74 33 53 05 72 72 BE D3 60
93 15 A1 F7 5F D2 19 93 A2 36 E1 D1 CA 56 E4 B4 3E 57 94 D7 8E 71 AB
B5 81 EB EB AD 3A 18 85 1C 49 45 3C 12 F4 CF 93 DA 9A 97 AA D9 05 C2
7B 71 8C 67 C8 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 08 00 00'
C→T: 'E4 AA AD 1C 22 B7 B9 DA D5 1A EA EE 09 23 B4 7F 9E 8F 8F 63 2D
4C 1B 0D 5B 8C 95 0F 0A A4 38 9A BB BE 0C 3B A5 B2 D1 0E 36 F0 DD C9
14 A3 F9 EC 18 74 FC F0 9E B8 0D 65 29 FC 6F BB 9B F8 9E 16 DF F5 74
72 27 86 A7 46 9A 06 D5 4B 31 23 C1 8E 4C B8 1E 14 9D EA B0 5C 4D 16
D7 DA 2E F6 AD 80 F2 BD 57 91 CB 73 27 5C E6 A4 B6 93 27 C1 8F 89 5E
51 CC EE 85 DA 33 58 88 87 8B 3E 1A A7 CC A8 5E 3A CD 20 83 44 B6 21
D4 42 8D 4E 1D 18 01 EF BB DE 07 77 26 C4 A5 56 CE 57 29 3A 90 00'

```

3. Active Authentication

a. Select EF.AA (File ID = '00 0D')

```

T→C: '00 A4 02 04 02 00 0D 00'
C→T: '62 08 83 02 00 0D 80 02 01 2A 90 00'

```

b. Read EF.AA



```
T→C: '00 B0 00 00 00'
C→T: '6F 82 01 26 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01
05 00 03 82 01 0F 00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 B7 59 31 B3 75 FE 3A
40 40 C6 B1 07 54 AB 07 42 B5 D8 88 FE 30 07 93 FE F5 EC C4 E0 54 DE
84 E9 10 32 DC 79 E5 46 3F 28 E4 DD 50 0D DD 55 A9 A5 71 32 53 63 63
48 9E 6E 20 DB FB 93 EA 77 B2 A4 64 AC 1F 15 DB 21 AA 9E 45 31 0F B3
F0 04 1C 66 F7 60 3E 14 F9 C8 2E AE 40 FF 16 F3 31 98 9D 5A B6 50 F5
00 09 BD DE CC 94 D2 09 F4 6F 91 83 C9 6F BB 14 7C A4 5D 9B FD 6C F8
7F 6D C1 AE AB 7F FA CD 3F 2E A4 43 83 8A 14 61 27 9B 68 7F 38 32 9E
6B D5 16 51 B6 02 76 AF 8D F3 CD 76 A8 B5 DA 12 DC 5B 66 8E C4 13 1F
FF AF 5A B2 23 19 A6 3A A3 B6 A7 3F 95 AE 0B A5 4F 50 83 59 E6 6D 48
C2 16 64 39 12 AF 82 1F DA 13 9A CC 25 A5 9E FC F2 6A B7 63 19 7E DF
E4 50 4B 4C 94 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 01 00 00'
C→T: '3C 75 86 C5 48 AA 31 BB 5A 9B B4 C5 B5 FF C9 F5 2F 39 AA 91 D8
67 D3 2D 55 7E 8B E9 AC 72 E2 6F 35 DD 90 94 9B 02 03 01 00 01 90 00'
```

c. Chip authentication

```
T→C: '00 88 00 00 08 AB C6 06 94 68 B5 44 3A 00'
C→T: 'B4 EB 4B 65 14 01 CC 0E 91 4E 2A 11 74 60 2C 16 5F 52 CB 98 A1
56 38 74 B4 41 C0 44 75 33 B7 FC 64 9E 8C BE 29 6D F8 07 31 7D C0 59
FF 93 81 6C 0A 6F CC 1B A0 A1 85 71 AA C3 AC 8A 22 D3 73 41 49 5A C6
3E AE 98 65 CB F0 B1 D2 0B 32 46 CF 57 13 E6 D3 72 AC 01 6B 34 ED 2C
A8 17 44 3B A9 E7 B6 3C 24 E9 2A 35 53 68 52 0D 6E 7B DB E2 BA C6 F3
2A 87 64 9D 0A AB 2A 54 6D 40 D6 BD 1A CB 28 CD 78 BF 14 BD CE B2 C6
CB 66 27 41 C6 BE 1B 49 EE DB 41 D8 51 8D 2A 2E FC DA 0F D3 81 AE 0F
5B E5 FC E4 F2 80 66 76 D2 C5 A7 1C 9D 56 02 BE 3D B3 B1 B5 96 2A 04
08 6F 47 2F 4C EE 93 6B 93 9E 1E 90 4E 0C AA 78 E4 7F 2D 06 AC D6 D8
CC 0C B3 87 96 E2 98 4B 3C 7B FE CF C6 47 1D 19 EB 92 24 1F 0C 8A 6A
F3 B9 CB 78 72 06 0E A0 7F 51 FC 34 B5 DD 90 86 51 0F 47 A8 8D 8D A2
3F 65 D0 30 03 90 00'
```

4. Read and verify data

a. Select EF.Registration_A ('D0 01')

```
T→C: '00 A4 02 04 02 D0 01 00'
C→T: '62 08 83 02 D0 01 80 02 01 18 90 00'
```

b. Read EF.Registration_A

```
T→C: '00 B0 00 00 00'
C→T: '78 0D 4F 0B A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31 71 82 01 05 80 01
00 9F 33 09 4E 65 64 65 72 6C 61 6E 64 9F 35 03 52 44 57 9F 37 01 00
9F 38 0A 30 30 39 33 39 32 33 38 38 34 81 08 31 2D 52 44 57 2D 30 31
82 08 32 30 31 34 30 31 30 31 A1 34 A2 2F 83 08 56 69 73 73 63 68 65
72 84 03 57 20 47 85 1E 53 6B 61 67 65 72 20 52 61 6B 20 31 30 20 39
36 34 32 20 43 5A 20 20 56 65 65 6E 64 61 6D 86 01 02 A3 1A 87 07 43
49 54 52 4F 45 4E 88 0A 4B 46 20 52 48 43 20 38 2F 50 89 03 44 53 35
8A 11 56 46 37 4B 46 52 48 43 38 43 53 31 32 33 34 35 36 A4 09 8B 07
32 32 36 35 20 6B 67 8C 07 31 37 33 35 20 6B 67 8D 01 30 8E 08 32 30
```



```
31 34 30 31 30 31 8F 12 65 32 2A 32 30 30 37 2F 34 36 2A 30 31 35 36
2A 30 31 A5 1A 90 08 31 39 39 37 20 63 6D 33 91 09 31 32 30 2C 30 30
20 6B 57 92 03 90 00'
```

T→C: '00 B0 01 00 00'

C→T: '45 2F 44 93 06 6E 2E 76 2E 74 2E A6 0B 94 01 35 95 06 6E 2E 76
2E 74 2E 90 00'

c. Select EF.Registration_B ('D0 11')

T→C: '00 A4 02 04 02 D0 11 00'

C→T: '62 08 83 02 D0 11 80 02 00 68 90 00'

d. Read EF.Registration_B

T→C: '00 B0 00 00 00 00'

C→T: '78 0D 4F 0B A0 00 00 04 56 45 56 52 2D 30 31 72 57 80 01 00 A4
11 96 07 32 32 36 35 20 6B 67 97 06 6E 2E 76 2E 74 2E 98 05 4D 31 20
41 46 AE 10 9B 06 38 30 30 20 6B 67 9C 06 35 30 30 20 6B 67 9F 24 05
42 4C 41 55 57 9F 25 06 6E 2E 76 2E 74 2E B0 15 9F 31 12 37 31 35 2F
32 30 30 37 2A 36 39 32 2F 32 30 30 38 41 90 00'

e. Select EF.Registration_C ('D0 21')

T→C: '00 A4 02 04 02 D0 21 00'

C→T: '62 08 83 02 D0 21 80 02 09 73 90 00'

f. Read EF.Registration_C

T→C: '00 B0 00 00 00 00'

C→T: 'BF 87 00 82 09 6D 9F 87 01 01 01 BF 87 10 30 9F 87 11 08 32 30
31 34 30 31 30 31 9F 87 12 08 32 30 31 34 30 31 30 31 9F 87 13 08 32
30 31 34 30 31 30 31 9F 87 14 08 31 2D 52 44 57 2D 30 31 BF 87 03 82
09 2E 9F 87 04 01 00 9F 87 05 82 09 23 1F 8B 08 00 00 00 00 04 00
EC BD 07 60 1C 49 96 25 26 2F 6D CA 7B 7F 4A F5 4A D7 E0 74 A1 08 80
60 13 24 D8 90 40 10 EC C1 88 CD E6 92 EC 1D 69 47 23 29 AB 2A 81 CA
65 56 65 5D 66 16 40 CC ED 9D BC F7 DE 7B EF BD F7 DE 7B EF BD F7 BA
3B 9D 4E 27 F7 DF FF 3F 5C 66 64 01 6C F6 CE 4A DA C9 9E 21 80 AA C8
1F 3F 7E 7C 1F 3F 22 1E FF 1E EF 16 65 7A 99 D7 4D 51 2D 3F FB 68 77
BC F3 51 9A 2F A7 D5 AC 58 5E 7C F6 D1 BA 3D DF 3E F8 E8 F7 38 FA 8D
93 C7 67 CB 59 71 59 CC D6 59 F9 93 F9 BC 98 96 F9 D9 F2 BC AA 17 59
4B EF D1 F7 69 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 01 00 00 00'

C→T: 'FA F8 49 35 BB E6 DF E8 F7 93 6A FA 34 6B B3 CF EB 6A BD D2 CF
E8 53 F3 E6 2C 5F B6 C5 79 31 E5 97 5F AC 17 93 BC 3E FA C9 67 0F 7E
AF 67 AF BE 7D 72 70 F2 FA FE EE CE FD 87 F7 1F DF DD D4 DC C2 7C DD
66 17 F9 97 E7 27 D5 62 55 E6 68 70 52 CD F2 A3 93 C7 77 E3 5F D8 F7
DE 5C AF F2 E3 D5 AA AE 2E B3 12 BF F3 B7 A7 F4 5E F4 8B E0 B5 A3 DF
EB 99 34 F3 46 96 D5 45 B6 6C 8F 68 00 84 B7 FE E1 8D 9B C9 7B 74 70
F7 25 46 25 7F D8 6F 5F E5 97 05 3E 21 82 E5 47 7B 3B BB BB DB 3B F7
B7 F7 3E 7D 7C 37 F8 A2 4B C4 13 FA F0 A2 AA AF 19 BD 2F 76 2D B5 82
CF ED 4B CF AB E9 97 E7 6F E6 39 11 A5 5D B7 F4 F5 CB 92 DA 35 DC E8



78 E7 F1 DD 4D DF 5B 20 5F E4 ED BC 9A 7D 79 7E DC B6 D9 74 BE 40 5B
1F CC BD C7 77 37 B7 F0 B1 E1 B9 E4 2E 7F B2 58 FA 68 F4 BF 88 4E 99
B2 41 BE F7 AD 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 02 00 00'

C→T: 'BD 9D 9D 07 77 F7 3F FD D6 CE EE 7D FC 13 4E 60 97 5B FC EF 40
D6 2F CF CF 9A 66 1D 92 7D A8 8D 9B B0 E2 62 DE 3E CF CF DB 6F 67 CB
D9 9B 3A 3B 27 DE 64 4C 9F D0 9C 0D 7D E7 53 B1 2E A6 67 8B 55 4E 5C
52 BE 5E E5 F9 AC 5A E4 6D 5E 1B 10 9B 1B 58 38 32 34 A2 F5 BB 32 6F
8E F6 1E DF 0D 3F E8 B5 FB EE 3C CF CB E6 68 DF 35 D4 4F 7A 2D 5F 56
57 79 9D CF 7A 80 83 CF ED 5B 0C 65 92 35 44 C4 07 7B 0F 1E DF 75 7F
BB F9 CE 97 17 ED FC 68 FF FE 3D CC B1 FC E1 DE 2F 66 F4 E7 EE C1 03
9A 3A F9 DD 7E F5 ED 1C D4 3C DA BD 7F EF E1 E3 BB FA 87 A3 63 D6 34
C2 27 46 1F BD 5A 2F 97 A4 B6 BE AC 67 34 E5 BB 07 F7 69 2E 6F 68 E4
F8 22 9F CE 97 2F F3 7A F1 45 F6 EE 79 46 0A 07 2F 1E ED ED 7D 4A 6A
28 FE 5D F4 55 7C 43 0A 67 52 2C 45 2F EE 3D E8 02 E8 B6 B0 60 5E D6
C5 22 83 D8 96 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 03 00 00'

C→T: 'D5 5A 66 9A E8 D1 FF B0 37 59 4F AB AA 0E 66 55 3E B0 ED 4E AA
E5 79 71 B1 AE 55 AE E4 DB BD E7 A3 BD 57 8F EF 46 BF 73 3D 10 B0 D7
39 7D B7 BC 78 59 35 05 DA 34 47 34 9C E8 E7 F6 AD B3 65 9B 2F 67 F9
EC A4 5A 2F DB FA FA CB F3 57 F9 45 D1 B4 82 FD 8B E7 8F EF 6E 6C D0
55 99 64 47 8E C8 26 59 AD 89 BF 6D 9B 67 EB DC 69 E8 2F 1E DF 0D FE
76 06 A2 B8 C0 84 1F AF 49 35 D5 45 7B FD 26 9B 94 EE EB 48 83 D0 68
09 29 B2 05 A9 01 34 24 A6 F9 A2 98 CE F3 32 FD C9 E3 E7 A7 6F 88 1A
FE 57 C1 4B 86 38 F6 5B 1A 03 99 85 2B A2 F2 2C 2F 8B 9F 7E 9B A7 AF
AF 97 ED 3C 6F F2 F4 65 5D 5D D4 D9 62 91 37 F4 AB AA FD 94 30 AA 16
D5 A4 20 71 4B 4F 8A B6 AE F2 25 B1 44 17 6A D8 67 99 4D 15 1D 52 E4
75 7E F4 92 6C D1 4F 37 F4 5A F7 8B E0 35 51 73 EE 4B 5F 1D 76 BF F3
28 77 77 90 74 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 04 00 00'

C→T: '3F F6 FE 64 FD FC F4 F4 C5 E9 8B F4 F9 E9 97 1F 48 D4 6F 13 D1
CA EA 82 18 34 7F 5A E4 CB A6 7D 6F A2 3D A9 D7 4D 93 97 5F 83 6A 7B
A0 DA CE 83 AF 49 B5 81 EF 43 8E 25 C5 F7 36 EF 31 31 3E 8C 50 18 1F
1F 59 DE E1 BF 7C 4C FA 6F C9 67 9D 1E 49 61 2D F2 7A 4A D6 08 13 D3
EB 3B FC 3A 82 45 D8 E0 E8 E9 EB FB D0 3D C1 67 3E 56 9B E0 75 BF ED
60 CA 4E 1F 14 D4 17 D9 72 7D 9E 4D 89 F6 44 C9 BE C8 47 9B F5 31 4F
1F 1F CF 66 75 DE 34 5D 08 FE 77 91 D7 FC 37 8D 42 7A F9 9A 54 54 F7
C3 DE 5B 4C 8C 40 F0 CF DE BC FA F2 F4 85 C8 C4 60 2F CF 8B 65 BE 7B
F4 E9 28 AD D7 79 FA AC 5E 4F DB 62 56 D5 B6 3F F9 7A D3 CB 7B 47 0F
EE EF EC 3E 08 DE D8 EB BF A1 02 F1 2A 6F 0A 32 84 53 D1 2F 4E BD B8
CF F1 E6 8F E9 4B 9E A6 37 5F 3F 23 A1 9D E6 98 CC DE 57 1D 22 1B 84
22 6C 65 A9 D9 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 05 00 00'

C→T: '9D DE BB B7 99 DF A1 56 3E 34 8E 69 AE AA FA AD 7C 98 A6 F6 65
F3 45 94 DB 67 F9 B3 AA 36 2D 8E 8E 9F 61 9C E1 67 DE 0B 8F EF C6 61
B9 CF 3B 3C 0E FF AB 37 64 7C 18 C1 05 1F AB 0F 4C EE 84 F7 57 D0 CA
73 EC 28 CC 3B FA 7D A0 30 83 4F 7A 30 C9 B3 9D BE 25 C7 EC 60 4F A0
CA DF BD 66 AF 57 D9 94 48 AA 9E A1 FF 49 D0 94 1D 24 8A EF CA F2 5A



```
DC A4 A6 41 DB A3 5D F2 ED D5 7D 8A 7C EB 8D FE CD 75 9D 3B B2 58 C0
3E 95 4D 93 01 69 C5 D7 AF 8B 1F 90 12 BF 77 FF EE FE FD F4 D5 EE 01
22 01 FD B0 D7 FC 79 95 CD 4E 32 8C A5 BD 26 02 E5 EF 5E D3 A0 CA 9C
7D DF A3 87 F7 10 C9 6C 68 D0 03 C7 4E BE 89 DC 5E 5F 2F 26 55 79 F4
93 C4 A0 91 8F 7B EF BE 2A 16 C0 F1 6C 39 2D D7 88 DA BF 3C 27 EF AC
3D 3A 18 EF EC BC DB 3D 48 B7 F2 CF F6 1E DC 41 60 12 6D 16 0A D4 30
91 DE 8F 7E 3B 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 06 00 00'
C→T: '44 BF 87 FF 5F A7 DF 7D A2 DF 43 A6 DF C3 DB D1 6F 23 01 DF 83
82 7B F7 EF DE 07 05 1F FC 7F 9B 82 0F 98 82 0F 84 03 D3 6A 9D E6 DF
04 21 DD 57 1B 84 FD 6E EC D5 5B E8 48 D5 66 DF A8 8E FC 74 E7 E1 A0
8E 1C 54 7C BB 0F 6F A5 F8 BA 9A EF 47 0A EF 47 0A EF EB D3 EF 47 0A
EF C3 28 F8 7E 0A CF 57 58 7D 4A A6 81 42 EB AB BD 90 8D 03 2A AB B6
09 9D C6 D3 E5 05 79 F4 3D B7 51 3E 8E 06 8E C6 25 46 4E 89 12 68 D2
F2 C8 86 23 43 0D 02 28 F2 19 9C DF E3 E6 8B AC 7E 9B CF BE 5C BA A6
AF BE BD 43 0A 77 73 9B 00 DC 77 C9 19 26 02 52 56 6C 39 2D 56 A5 E6
EC 29 F7 15 FD 22 54 DF 84 E7 69 99 4F 39 B5 4A 4B 19 94 67 AE EA 23
1A 47 FC 8B E0 DD 6F 5F 4F EA 62 E6 BE FC 0E 25 23 3B 1F 05 ED 4D 26
EE E4 BA 2C 88 0F C3 F4 9C FB 30 34 18 35 45 44 17 F9 82 96 3A BC 36
3C 8E E7 67 34 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 07 00 00'
C→T: 'A3 C3 5F C7 08 AE 52 70 B4 FB F0 E1 03 4B 61 F3 A1 6F 24 38 65
D6 33 1D F8 74 40 68 F1 15 77 BB B7 23 09 B7 78 18 4B 99 CE 62 B1 5E
BC C8 5B B6 92 F0 E4 C7 F0 E5 BB 9F F7 5E 14 5C 59 0A BB 6D EF 1D DC
DF 31 83 89 36 18 C2 82 1B 1F ED ED EE DA FE E5 93 B0 75 5F 43 50 6C
3A 7B 9E 5F E6 25 D6 31 28 7B 44 99 58 8A 92 49 47 C4 BE B8 E1 75 0F
ED A3 BD 83 83 83 2E 14 FF FB 0D A0 9E D6 C5 65 FE 84 D0 D8 1F 1F EC
F8 30 CC 17 7D 82 BE 9B 67 EB A6 3D 5D 14 0D 92 8A DC F8 74 5D 57 47
F8 27 A5 D1 0C 36 E8 81 7A 51 3F A1 B4 3E A5 6B D7 E5 F1 B4 7D 9E 35
ED 31 31 E4 EC 8B AA A5 EC FA D1 83 DD FB 77 B1 16 F3 AD 4F 1F EE E1
97 83 63 A4 8A 37 BD C1 1D 98 24 C1 EB 45 F5 96 E4 B6 AE 49 14 C9 A9
9A 34 55 BD 92 55 BB FC FC FC 68 67 7C 9F 66 6F 73 9B 1E BE 5F D5 93
8C BE 23 21 E5 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 08 00 00'
C→T: '1C F5 C9 97 7B E4 58 11 D5 22 9F DF F4 AE 70 FA B2 59 2F B8 C3
A3 FD F1 5E 1F 50 B7 51 64 2E DA 3A 8B 61 B5 C3 F3 10 FF F2 56 50 4C
D7 84 18 C4 6C 63 93 1E 40 59 8F 20 B3 C7 A8 3C E0 14 9B FD 60 B0 75
9F 24 A0 ED D0 B7 1D 30 E4 F9 36 2D F8 B1 4D F3 19 E9 5F A4 C3 76 E3
0A C7 6B CA AD 4E BE 24 5E D8 7D F8 00 EB 74 9D CF 6F 7A F5 C5 97 EF
F0 EE BD FB 92 54 E8 7C 73 D3 DB DF 3E F9 FD 15 C0 FD FD BD 2E 00 FD
F2 26 18 94 2C 6B 8B E9 9A 57 44 8F A0 10 77 0E EE 75 20 05 4D 7A B4
B7 6D 6F 20 9B A8 E6 D8 57 BA 4A 62 55 BE F9 34 E2 08 98 0F 83 C6 EF
ED 48 C4 6D F6 E9 B0 CD FE 31 40 53 83 2C 50 9D 99 A5 A8 6B E8 AB 1B
AD 9A FD 66 C0 B2 A9 69 20 A6 A5 95 AD 75 B5 6E 5E D1 1C CC C4 B2 84
D6 2B DA A4 6B 3F BE 91 29 88 CF 01 D6 90 A7 F3 8C 43 43 4A A0 AE C8
1B E8 A7 B8 FB 90 00'

T→C: '00 B0 09 00 00'
```



```
C→T: '4D 62 31 0E 35 D2 85 C9 37 D5 15 AF 4D 92 87 71 FC 8E 42 D5 A2
3C 3A 10 41 D9 D4 E4 06 68 5F 2D 27 35 37 24 02 A9 D8 6D 6A 32 04 0D
06 92 D6 79 5A 59 3C A5 D1 BC 6C D9 10 DF D0 C4 82 C3 9A FA 66 6A C4
5A 84 7C 4F 9A 6D 4A 8B 3A 99 7B 4F 12 B4 F4 2B D6 34 67 C5 65 31 5B
67 A5 5D 67 3E AF EA 85 2C F1 FE 3F 01 00 00 FF FF 4A 5E B2 FC 63 23
00 00 90 00'
```




App 4 SPECIMEN CSCA CERTIFICATE

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIGHjCCBAagAwIBAgIRAKx4L8nRF1m12piT8OIPZ+UwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
ZjEzMmcGA1UEAxMQQ1NDQSBHQQVQgTkWgZVZSRDELMAkGA1UEBRMCMDExDDAKBgNV
BAStA1JEVzEhMB8GA1UEChMYU3RhdGUgb2YgdGhlIE5ldGhlcmxhbmRzMQswCQYD
VQQGEwJOTDAeFw0xMzAzMTQwODQ5NDlaFw0zMzAzMTQwODQ5NTBaMGYxGTAXBgNV
BAMTEENTQ0Egr0FUIE5MIGVWUkQxXzA1BjBGNVBAUTajAxMQwwCgYDVQQLEwNSRfcx
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kKQG1MONvYi9aUVHgWPZmyfWIIghLqiPXa72Ext6FV1u4eMZKoW7yVW3/9tFk7KO
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DNypKgyfsac9wsd9Hdvvt+3alTkftGsXil93S2wLThBgEU6VhChuhSeMwxhR64T4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DRWDZNU8SIuD4SLliDqAPAGEPlyLp+/kx7WE/eMagZAXlGSXggwhM8fFAH+F/pYn
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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