# **MDEX Audit Report**

Version 1.0.0

Presented by CodeSafe

January 12th, 2021



# 01. Introduction

This document includes the results of the audit performed by the CodeSafe team on the mdex project, at the request of <u>the mdex team</u>.

The audited code can be found in the public <u>mdex Github repository</u>, and the version used for this report is commit

f7590ea34540179c946f37e1d71a0ece8e9520e8

The goal of this audit is to review mdex's solidity implementation for its decentralized exchange, study potential security vulnerabilities, its general design and architecture, and uncover bugs that could compromise the software in production.

We make observations on specific areas of the code that present concrete problems, as well as general observations that traverse the entire codebase horizontally, which could improve its quality as a whole.

# Disclaimer

Note that as of the date of publishing, the contents of this document reflect the current understanding of known security patterns and state of the art regarding smart contract security. And the solidity implementation was audited based on Ethereum's running environment. Whether or not this implementation can run on other blockchains or would encounter issues running on other blockchains is not covered by this audit. Risks or issues introduced by this implementation interacting with contracts from other projects are not covered by this audit. Given the size of the project, the findings detailed here are not to be considered exhaustive, and further testing and audit is recommended after the issues covered are fixed.

# — Methodology

mdex's codebase was studied in detail in order to acquire a clear impression of how the its specifications were implemented. The codebase was then subject to deep analysis and scrutiny, resulting in a series of observations. The problems and their potential solutions are discussed in this document and, whenever possible, we identify common sources for such problems and comment on them as well.

# Structure of the document

This report contains a list of issues and comments on different aspects of the project: Governance, Heco and Mainnet. Each issue is assigned a severity level based on the potential impact of the issue and recommendations to fix it, if applicable. For ease of navigation, an index by topic and another by severity are both provided at the beginning of the report.

### Documentation

For this audit, we used the following sources of truth about how the mdex system should work: <a href="https://mdex.com">https://mdex.com</a>

These were considered the specification, and when discrepancies arose with the actual code behavior, we consulted with the dmex team or reported an issue.

# — Comments from Auditee

All the bugs with critical, high and medium severities found in the mdex's codebase were fixed and the codebase Passed the audit performed by the CodeSafe team.

# 02. About CodeSafe

CodeSafe is a leading technology firm in the blockchain industry, providing consulting and security audits for organizations. CodeSafe has developed industry security standards for designing and deploying smart contract systems.

# 03. Severity level reference

Every issue in this report was assigned a severity level from the following:

**Critical** severity issues need to be fixed as soon as possible.

**High** severity issues will probably bring problems and should be fixed.

**Medium** severity issues could potentially bring problems and should eventually be fixed.

**Low** severity issues are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed but would be better fixed at some point in the future.

# 04. List of issues by severity

# A. Critical

#### Governance

- GovernorAlpha.sol

**Compiler Errors** 

Type Mismatch

- Timelock.sol

Compiler Version Mismatch

#### Heco

- Factory.sol

Incorrect Use of Price Feeds

- SwapMining.sol

**Redefinition Error** 

Incorrect Use of Price Feeds

Number of Input Parameters Mismatch

Incorrect Calculation
- HecoPool.sol
Undefined Variable
Mainnet
- CoinChef.sol
Edge Case Error
- MdxToken.sol
Inappropriately Setting Minter
B. High
Governance
- N/A
Несо
- SwapMining.sol
Unexpected User Experience Brought by Inappropriate Setting
Mainnet
- N/A
C. Medium
Governance
- N/A

# Heco

- HecoPool.sol

Missing "Require" Check

#### - SwapMing.sol

Missing "Require" Check

# **Mainnet**

#### - CoinChef.sol

Missing "Require" Check

# D. Low

#### **Governance**

# - GovernorAlpha.sol

Deprecated Usage

Inappropriate Assumption

#### - Timelock.sol

Deprecated Usage

#### Heco

#### - Factory.sol

Inappropriately Setting Variable

# - SwapMining.sol

Inappropriate Naming of Variable

**Unnecessary Functionality** 

Inappropriate Naming of Function

#### - HecoPool.sol

Inappropriate Naming of Variable

Repeated Use of Constant Number

# **Mainnet**

#### - CoinChef.sol

Repeated Use of Constant Number

# 05. List of issues by topic

# A. Governance

# - GovernorAlpha.sol

Compiler Errors: Critical

Type Mismatch: Critical

Deprecated Usage: Low

Inappropriate Assumption: Low

#### - Timelock.sol

Compiler Version Mismatch: Critical

Deprecated Usage: Low

#### B. Heco

# - Factory.sol

Incorrect Use of Price Feeds: Critical

Inappropriately Setting Variable: Low

# - SwapMining.sol

Redefinition Error: Critical

Incorrect Use of Price Feeds: Critical

Number of Input Parameters Mismatch: Critical

Incorrect Calculation: Critical

Unexpected User Experience Brought by Inappropriate Setting: High

Missing "Require" Check: Medium

Inappropriate Naming of Variable: Low

Unnecessary Functionality: Low

Inappropriate Naming of Function: Low

#### - HecoPool.sol

Undefined Variable: Critical

Missing "Require" Check: Medium

Inappropriate Naming of Variable: Low

Repeated Use of Constant Number: Low

# C. Mainnet

#### - CoinChef.sol

Edge Case Error: Critical

Missing "Require" Check: Medium

Repeated Use of Constant Number: Low

#### - MdxToken.sol

Inappropriately Setting Minter: Critical

# 06. Issue descriptions and recommendations by topic

# A. Governance

# - GovernorAlpha.sol

**Compiler Errors: Critical** 

Source:

Line 11:

function quorumVotes() public pure returns (uint) { return MdxToken.totalSupply() /
25; } // 400,000 = 4% of MDX

Line 14:

function proposalThreshold() public pure returns (uint) { return
MdxToken.totalSupply() / 100; }

Compilation couldn't pass.

Recommendation:

Consider using mdx instead of MdxToken and changing the property of both quorumVotes() and proposalThreshold() to view. Recommended changes are as follows:

Line 11:

function quorumVotes() public view returns (uint) { return mdx.totalSupply() / 25; }

Line 14:

function proposalThreshold() public view returns (uint) { return mdx.totalSupply()
/ 100; }

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by adopting the recommended changes

#### **Type Mismatch: Critical**

Source:

Line 268 - 278:

```
uint96 votes = mdx.getPriorVotes(voter, proposal.startBlock);

if (support) {
    proposal.forVotes = add256(proposal.forVotes, votes);
} else {
    proposal.againstVotes = add256(proposal.againstVotes, votes);
}

receipt.hasVoted = true;
receipt.support = support;
receipt.votes = votes;
```

In line uint96 votes = mdx.getPriorVotes(voter, proposal.startBlock);, the type of mdx.getPriorVotes(voter, proposal.startBlock) is uint256, while the type of votes is uint96.

These two types don't match. It is a type mismatch error and it was found in

```
proposal.forvotes = add256(proposal.forvotes, votes); and
proposal.againstvotes = add256(proposal.againstvotes, votes); as well.
```

Compilation couldn't pass.

Recommendation:

Consider changing

```
/// @notice The number of votes the voter had, which were cast
uint96 votes;
```

to:

```
/// @notice The number of votes the voter had, which were cast
uint256 votes;
```

```
and changing
```

```
uint96 votes = mdx.getPriorVotes(voter, proposal.startBlock);
```

to

uint256 votes = mdx.getPriorVotes(voter, proposal.startBlock);

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by adopting the recommended changes

#### **Deprecated Usage: Low**

Source:

Line 199:

```
timelock.executeTransaction.value(proposal.values[i])(proposal.targets[i],
proposal.values[i], proposal.signatures[i], proposal.calldatas[i], proposal.eta);
```

The usage of .value(...) is deprecated.

Compiler warnings were generated.

#### Recommendation:

```
Consider using {value: ...} instead. The recommended change is as follows:
```

```
timelock.executeTransaction{value:proposal.values[i]}(proposal.targets[i],
proposal.values[i], proposal.signatures[i], proposal.calldatas[i], proposal.eta);
```

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by adopting the recommended changes

#### **Inappropriate Assumption: Low**

Source:

Line 23:

function votingPeriod() public pure returns (uint) { return 86400; } // ~3 days in blocks (assuming 3s blocks)

This function implementation assumes blocks on Ethereum are generated once every 3 seconds. However this assumption doesn't always hold ture. If the rate of block generation is much lower than that, execution of this code may not follow the expected logic.

Recommendation:

Consider changing 86400 to 17280 (assuming blocks are generated once every 15 seconds) if this implementation will be deployed on Ethereum and changing 86400 to other values accordingly if it will be deployed on other EVM compatible blockchains.

**Update**: The mdex team prefers to keep it for now since the implementation will be delopyed in a non-Ethereum blockchain.

#### - Timelock.sol

#### **Compiler Version Mismatch: Critical**

Source:

The compiler version defined in this contract is pragma solidity  $^0.5.16$ ; .However the compiler version defined in SafeMath imported by import

"@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol"; is pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;

The two versions don't match. This is a compiler version mismatch error. Compilation couldn't pass.

#### Recommendation:

Consider changing the compiler version defined in the Timelock.sol contract to

pragma solidity ^0.6.0; and changing line 34

function() external payable { }

to

receive() external payable { }

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u>.

#### **Deprecated Usage: Low**

Source:

Line 99:

```
(bool success, bytes memory returnData) = target.call.value(value)(callData);
```

The usage of call.value(value) (callData) is deprecated.

Compiler warnings were generated.

Recommendation:

Consider changing

```
(bool success, bytes memory returnData) = target.call.value(value)(callData);
```

to

```
(bool success, bytes memory returnData) = target.call{value:value}(callData);
```

#### B. Heco

### - Factory.sol

#### **Incorrect Use of Price Feeds: Critical**

Source:

In Line 311 the function price takes instant price feeds as the prices for trading two tokens. However the prices can move significantly in a single block and this could cause the prices to be manipulated by an attacker.

#### Recommendation:

Consider using time weighted average prices from multiple blocks. Good examples can be found in Uniswap's <code>ExampleSlidingWindowOracle.sol</code> and <code>ExampleOracleSimple.sol</code>.

**Update**: The mdex team prefers to keep it for now since the function is only used as price inquiry rather than price feeds. It will not cause risks.

#### **Inappropriately Setting Variable: Low**

Source:

Code that sets initCodeHash

Two functions are used to retrieve the value and set the value of initCodeHash respectively. And only the feeToSetter is allowed to set the value and only allowed to set it once. If the value is inappropriately set there is no chance to reset it. This could cause potential risks.

#### Recommendation:

Consider setting the value in the constructor by adding the following statement in the constructor:

```
initCodeHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(type(MdexPair).creationCode));
```

and commenting out some of the lines that set the value in other functions of this contract and the <code>IMdexFactory.sol</code> contract.

Recommened code changes are as follows:

```
constructor(address _feeToSetter) public {
    feeToSetter = _feeToSetter;
    initCodeHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(type(MdexPair).creationCode));
}
```

and consider commenting out the following lines:

```
Line 330: bool public initCode = false;

Line 381: setInitCodeHash

Line 397: getInitCodeHash

Line 12: function initCodeHash() external view returns (bytes32); in the interface/IMdexFactory.sol contract

Line 28: function setInitCodeHash(bytes32) external; in the interface/IMdexFactory.sol contract
```

# - SwapMining.sol

#### **Redefinition Error: Critical**

Source:

Redefinition of IERC20 Interfaces.

Compilation couldn't pass.

#### Recommendation:

Consider making changes in the interface\IMdx.sol contract. The specific changes can be made in the interface\IMdx.sol contract by

changing

```
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";

to
import {IERC20 as SIERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
and changing
interface IMdx is IERC20

to
interface IMdx is SIERC20
```

Recommended changes are made in the interface\IMdx.sol contract as follows:

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
import {IERC20 as SIERC20} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
interface IMdx is SIERC20 {
   function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool);
}
```

#### **Incorrect Use of Price Feeds: Critical**

Source:

Line 326:

```
price = IMdexPair(IMdexFactory(factory).getPair(token,
anchorToken)).price(token, baseDecimal);
```

And

Line 333 - 334:

```
uint256 price0 = IMdexPair(IMdexFactory(factory).getPair(token,
base)).price(token, baseDecimal);
uint256 price1 = IMdexPair(IMdexFactory(factory).getPair(base,
anchorToken)).price(base, decimal);
```

This error is introduced by the incorrect use of price feeds in the function price of the Factory.sol contract. This could cause the prices to be manipulated by an attacked.

Recommendation:

Considering changing the implementation of the function price of the Factory.sol contract.

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by renaming the function getPrice to getQuantity and reimplementing its logic

#### **Number of Input Parameters Mismatch: Critical**

Source:

Line 242:

address pair = IMdexFactory(factory).pairFor(address(factory), input, output);

The function pairFor() takes three input parameters.

Compilation couldn't pass.

Recommendation:

Consider removing address (factory). The recommended change is as follows:

Changing

```
address pair = IMdexFactory(factory).pairFor(address(factory), input, output);
```

to

address pair = IMdexFactory(factory).pairFor(input, output);

#### **Incorrect Calculation: Critical**

Source:

Line 254:

uint256 quantity = price.mul(amount).div(10 \*\*
uint256(IERC20(targetToken).decimals()));

#### Recommendation:

Consider changing target to output. The recommended change is as follows:

uint256 quantity = price.mul(amount).div(10 \*\* uint256(IERC20(output).decimals()));

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by reimplementing the function swap.

#### **Unexpected User Experience Brought by Inappropriate Setting: High**

#### Source:

In line 151 the function setTargetToken changes the target token that is used as the unit of token quantity. When this function changes the target token it may change the existing quantity of a token that uses this target token as the unit. Affected lines include lines 258 and 261 as follows:

user.quantity = user.quantity.add(quantity);

#### Recommendation:

Consider removing the function setTargetToken and using a uniform token as the target token.

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by removing the function setTargetToken

#### Missing "Require" Check: Medium

#### Source:

In line 77 the implementation of the function addPair needs a "require" check for the \_pair input parameter. If \_pair is set to address(0) by the caller of the function addPair, execution of the function massMintPools will fail.

#### Recommendation:

Consider adding the following statement before the conditional check if (\_withUpdate) {:

```
require(_pair != address(0), "_pair is the zero address");。
```

#### **Inappropriate Naming of Variable: Low**

Source:

In line 319, the variables base, baseDecimal and decimal are inappropriately named in the function getPrice. The code is as follows:

```
uint256 baseDecimal = 10 ** uint256(IERC20(token).decimals());
address base = getWhitelist(index);
uint256 decimal = 10 ** uint256(IERC20(base).decimals());
```

These variables are named in a way that doesn't describe their behavior.

#### Recommendation:

Consider renaming baseDecimal to tokenDecimas, base to intermediate and decimal to interDecimal and making changes in all places where these variables are used accordingly.

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by renaming the function getPrice to getQuantity and reimplementing the function.

#### **Unnecessary Functionality: Low**

Source:

Line 146 the implementation of the function setFactory .

The factory contract has state variables(data) and therefore it is very unlikely the contract will be replaced by calling the function setFactory. And this functionality is unnecessary.

#### Recommendation:

Consider removing the function setFactory.

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by removing the function setFactory.

#### **Inappropriate Naming of Function: Low**

Source:

Line 305 the function getPoolList.

It is named in a way that doesn't describe its behavior.

Recommendation:

Consider renaming it to getPoolDetail.

**Update**: Fixed in  $\underline{90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735}$  by renaming <code>getPoolList</code> to <code>getPoolInfo</code>.

#### - HecoPool.sol

**Undefined Variable: Critical** 

Source:

Line 77:

devAddress = \_devAddress;

Variable devAddress is undefined. Compilation couldn't pass.

Recommendation:

Consider removing this variable and commenting out lines 72 and 77.

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by removing lines 72 and 77.

#### Missing "Require" Check: Medium

Source:

In line 149 the implementation of the function add needs a "require" check for the \_lpToken input parameter. If \_lpToken is set to address(0) by the caller of the function add , execution of the function massupdatePools will fail.

#### Recommendation:

Consider adding the following statement before the conditional check if (\_withUpdate) {:

require(address(\_lpToken) != address(0), "\_lpToken is the zero address");

**Update**: Fixed in  $\underline{90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735}$  by adding a require check for address( $\underline{1pToken}$ ) != address(0).

#### **Inappropriate Naming of Variable: Low**

Source:

In line 474 the function modifier notPause().

The variable pause is named in a way that doesn't describe its behavior.

In addition, notPause literally means "not paused". However what it does is to set pause == true which means "pause".

#### Recommendation:

Consider renaming pause to paused, setting "pause" to "false" and changing the implementation of the function modifier not Pause to make it behave what it literally means.

In addition, consider changing

```
require(pause == true) to
require(pause) and changing
require(pause == false) to
require(!false)
```

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by adopting partial recommended changes.

#### Repeated Use of Number Literal: Low

Source:

The number literal 1e12 is repeatedly used in multiple lines in the contract.

Recommendation:

Consider defining a constant and using that constant instead of 1e12 in all the lines where 1e12 is used.

**Update**: Acknowledged by the mdex team. And the team prefers to keep it for now and may make a change later.

#### C. Mainnet

#### - CoinChef.sol

# **Edge Case Error: Critical**

Source:

In line 139, implementation of the function updatePool.

When block.number > endBlock, execution of the function updatePool will set pool.lastRewardBlock to the current block's block.number in line 165

```
pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
```

and this will cause updatePool to fail in lines 158 - 159 shown as follows in all subsequent calls:

```
uint256 number = block.number > endBlock ? endBlock : block.number;
uint256 multiplier = number.sub(pool.lastRewardBlock);
```

Recommendation:

Consider changing the implementation of the updatePool fucntion, recommended changes are
as follows:

```
// Update reward variables of the given pool to be up-to-date.
function updatePool(uint256 _pid) public {
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
    uint256 number = block.number > endBlock ? endBlock : block.number;
    if (number <= pool.lastRewardBlock) {</pre>
        return;
    }
    uint256 lpSupply;
    if (isSushiLP(address(pool.lpToken))) {
        if (pool.totalAmount == 0) {
            pool.lastRewardBlock = number;
            return;
        lpSupply = pool.totalAmount;
    } else {
        lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this)); //100000000000000000
        if (lpSupply == 0) {
            pool.lastRewardBlock = number;
            return;
        }
    }
    uint256 multiplier = number.sub(pool.lastRewardBlock);
    uint256 mdxReward =
multiplier.mul(mdxPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
    bool minRet = mdx.mint(address(this), mdxReward);
    if (minRet) {
        pool.accMdxPerShare =
pool.accMdxPerShare.add(mdxReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
    pool.lastRewardBlock = number;
}
```

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by adopting the recommended changes.

#### Missing "Require" Check: Medium

Source:

In line 98 the implementation of the function add needs a "require" check for the \_lpToken input parameter. If \_lpToken is set to address(0) by the caller of the function add, execution of the function massupdatePools will fail.

#### Recommendation:

Consider adding the following statement before the conditional check if (\_withUpdate) {:

```
require(address(_lpToken) != address(0), "_lpToken is the zero address");
```

**Update**: Fixed in <u>90ab23fbd268610ddfca9a706fc6615d4a1f6735</u> by adding a require check for address(\_lpToken) != address(0).

#### Repeated Use of Number Literal: Low

Source:

The number literal 1e12 is repeatedly used in multiple lines in the contract.

#### Recommendation:

Consider defining a constant and using that constant instead of 1e12 in all the lines where 1e12 is used.

**Update**: Acknowledged by the mdex team. And the team prefers to keep it for now and may make a change later.

#### - MdxToken.sol

#### **Inappropriately Setting Minter: Critical**

Source:

The function setMinter has a modifier onlyowner which only allows the owner to call this function. Since the MdxToken.sol contract is Ownable, the owner himself/hersef or an attacker who compromises the owner right could exploit the contract by changing minter to mint tokens at will.

#### Recommendation:

Consider changing the minter setting and removing Ownable to reduce the attack surface. Recommended changes are as follows:

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
contract MdxToken is ERC20("MDX Token", "MDX") {
    uint256 private constant maxSupply = 30000000 * 1e18;  // the total
supply
   address public minter;
   // mint with max supply
   function mint(address _to, uint256 _amount) public onlyMinter returns (bool)
{
        if (_amount.add(totalSupply()) > maxSupply) {
            return false;
        }
        _mint(_to, _amount);
        return true;
    }
```

```
// set minter only once
function setMinter(address _newMinter) external {
    require(minter == address(0), "has set up");
    require(_newMinter != address(0), "is zero address");
    minter = _newMinter;
}

// modifier for mint function
modifier onlyMinter() {
    require(msg.sender == minter, "caller is not the minter");
    _-;
}
```