

Computational sensorimotor learning and control: a game-theoretic approach for human/machine interaction

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The challenge

- Natural model for interaction between human/machine is an *imperfect information game*.
- While interacting with a machine, humans will naturally formulate beliefs about the machine's behavior, and these beliefs will affect the interaction.
- Little work on **continuous sensorimotor games** that arise in dynamic closed-loop human/machine interaction.





Figure 1: Computational model of multiple *optimal control agents* in a dynamic environment. Agent i observes y_i and outputs action u_i to control the environment's state x such that its cost J_i is minimized.

Mathematical model

- Rational agents in a dynamic world asymptotically converge to an equilibrium with each other, see *Figure 1*. Modeling rationally is the premise of the field of game theory.
- We study these games experimentally and theoretically through following concepts:
 - Markovian system with **continuous dynamics**
 $x \in \mathbb{R}^p$, $f \in C^2$, $u_i \in \mathbb{R}^q$, $\dot{x} = f(x, u_1, \dots, u_n)$
e.g. linear: $\dot{x} = Ax + B_1u_1 + \dots + B_nu_n$
 - Rational agent model via **optimal control**
minimize $J_i(x, u_i, u_{-i})$ subject to $\dot{x} = f(x, u_i, u_{-i})$
e.g. maximize utility, minimize energy
 - Fixed point (u_i^*, u_{-i}^*) is a **Nash equilibrium** when
 $J_i(u_i^*, u_{-i}^*) \leq J_i(u_i, u_{-i}^*)$, $\forall u_i, \forall i$
e.g. continuous games: $D_i J_i = 0$, $D_{ii}^2 J_i \succeq 0$



Experimental setup

- We study trajectories of agent-agent and agent-human interactions with a **dynamics simulator**, see *Figure 2*.
- In human interactions, user is provided with **visual** and **haptic feedback**. Various **cost models**, **information structures**, and **belief estimation** explored, see *Figure 3*.




Figure 2: We study the interaction of rational agents in a dynamically coupled environment by “combining” optimal controllers in a coupled settings. Do agents learn equilibria?





Figure 3: Testbench with multiple haptic controllers interfaced with a dynamics simulator. User receives information via visual and force feedback, and controllers estimate belief and cost models.

Theoretical results

- We derive **predictive models** for behaviors of humans interacting with other agents (humans and machines).
 - Steady-state behaviors (i.e. equilibrium)
 - Transient (i.e. learning)
- Provably convergent computational model using **gradient-based learning**. [1] Suppose agent i 's controller is parameterized by θ_i , then the learning mechanism is

$$\theta_i^+ = \theta_i - \gamma_i D_i f_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i})$$



- Negative result:** Learning converge to **non-Nash equilibrium points**. [2]
 - Non-Nash stable points (i.e. saddles)
 - Limit cycles (i.e. period orbits)

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Next steps

- Design experiments for hypothesis testing
 - Agents learn to minimize a quadratic cost function in environment with linear dynamics?
 - Convergence to equilibrium depends on information structure?
 - Belief estimation improves mutual prediction?
- Extend theoretical work to other settings
 - Learning and optimization with constraints for bounded-rationality model of cognition.
 - Develop coordination methods for effective learning with multiple agents.

References

- [1] Benjamin Chasnov, Lillian J. Ratliff, Daniel Calderone, Eric Mazumdar, and Samuel A. Burden. Finite-Time Convergence of Gradient-Based Learning in Continuous Games. In *AAAI Workshop on RL in Games*, 2019.
- [2] Eric Mazumdar and Lillian J. Ratliff. On the Convergence of Competitive, Multi-Agent Gradient-Based Learning. *arXiv:1804.05464*, 2018.