



US Chartbook

v0.0; Last updated: October 21, 2022

Open source notes on US economic activity

Warning

Early stage draft!

This chartbook is an early draft; please report errors by email or through GitHub.

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About the Chartbook

I like a place with a lot of items on a menu. Because you know they do them all beautifully.
Will Ferrell

This chartbook offers a big menu of US economic and social indicators. To keep the data fresh and cover a wide-variety of topics, shortcuts are made on the back-end. Most of the text is generated by simple scripts. The charts are standardized with each other in ways that reduce how well they represent a topic.

As a result of these shortcuts, it is unlikely that you will be completely satisfied with the content of the chartbook. Therefore, I offer the content in combination with links to the data and [source code](#). Hopefully the end-result can inspire and facilitate your own examination of topics of interest or relevance.

Please be aware that this chartbook is an early-stage draft. Content is being added, removed, and improved. In the meantime, the current draft contains many errors and is not particularly comprehensible without lots of patience. I'm correcting the errors as I find them and gradually editing the text for clarity.

Version 0.1 release planned for Winter 2022

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Overall Economic Activity

This analysis of the United States economy begins with the most popular measure of economic activity, **Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**. GDP estimates the production of goods and services in a given location during a given period of time. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the seasonally-adjusted annualized value of goods and services produced in the US was \$25,248 billion in the second quarter of 2022, compared to an inflation-adjusted equivalent of \$24,386 billion in 2019 Q4, and \$11,079 billion in the first quarter of 1989.

The US population is growing by about three-tenths of a percent per year. GDP per capita (see —), adjusted for inflation to 2022 Q2 dollars, had increased to \$73,628 in 2019 Q4 from \$45,370 in 1989 Q1, and is currently \$75,835, as of the second quarter of 2022.

GDP per capita

in thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Types of Economic Activity

GDP calculated using the **expenditures approach** is the sum of major types of domestic spending on finished goods and services: consumer spending, private investment, and government spending and investment. To capture only domestic production, foreign spending on US produced goods and services is added, while imports (spending on non-US-produced goods and services) are subtracted.

Expenditure Types

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Much of the increase in real GDP per capita over the past 30 years comes from consumer spending. Domestic consumer spending (see —) is equivalent to \$51,845 per person in 2022 Q2, a price-adjusted increase of \$22,788 since 1989. Gross private domestic investment (see —) is equivalent to \$13,846 per person in 2022 Q2, and government spending and investment (see —) totals \$13,254 per person. Net exports equivalent to \$3,110 per person are subtracted to reflect only domestic production (see —).

Expenditure Types

per capita, annualized, 2022 Q2 dollars

| | 2022 Q2 | 2019 Q4 | 2000 Q1 | 1989 Q1 |
|--------------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| — Gross Domestic Product | \$75,835 | 73,628 | 58,356 | 46,895 |
| — Consumer Spending | 51,845 | 48,886 | 37,191 | 29,057 |
| — Gross Private Domestic Investment | 13,846 | 12,832 | 9,872 | 6,353 |
| — Government Spending and Investment | 13,254 | 13,250 | 12,279 | 11,992 |
| — Net Exports | -3,110 | -1,820 | -1,363 | -452 |
| Exports | 9,127 | 9,375 | 5,724 | 2,989 |
| Less: Imports | 12,238 | 10,610 | 6,837 | 3,200 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


The less-discussed **income approach** calculates the level of overall economic activity from the sum of income payments from production and certain expenses incurred in production. Income from production is the payout to labor and capital. Income for labor is referred to as “compensation of employees, paid” in the national accounts and includes wages and salaries as well supplements to wages and salaries such as employer-paid health insurance premiums and retirement account contributions. Income received as profit is referred to as the “net operating surplus” in national accounts and includes interest payments, rental profits, business proprietor profits, and corporate profits.

Additionally some income does not get paid out to these groups. Taxes on imports and production, such as tariffs, sales tax, property tax, and licensing fees are tracked separately. If the government provides subsidies, which are income payments for production that did not occur, they must be subtracted from income measures of production. Lastly, a growing portion of potential income goes toward replacing and maintaining buildings and equipment used in production. This expense is recorded as “consumption of fixed capital” in the national accounts and referred to as depreciation below.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis [report](#) seasonally-adjusted and annualized **Gross Domestic Income** (GDI) of \$25,572 billion in 2022 Q2, compared to an inflation-adjusted equivalent of \$24,504 billion in 2019 Q4. Real GDI per capita was \$76,805 in 2022 Q2 and \$73,984 in 2019 Q4.

Income Types

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Gross labor income per capita is equivalent to \$40,496 in 2022 Q2 (see —) and \$39,449 in 2019 Q4, on an annualized, seasonally-adjusted, and inflation-adjusted basis. Profits per person total \$18,606 in 2022 Q2 (see —) and \$17,734 in 2019 Q4, following the same adjustments. Indirect taxes less subsidies per capita total \$4,962 in 2022 Q2 (see —) and \$4,976 in 2019 Q4. Lastly, depreciation per capita is \$12,741 in 2022 Q2 (see —) and \$11,825 in 2019 Q4.

Income Types

per capita, annualized, 2022 Q2 dollars

| | 2022 Q2 | 2019 Q4 | 2000 Q1 | 1989 Q1 |
|---------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| Gross Domestic Income | \$76,805 | 73,984 | 59,258 | 46,745 |
| — Labor | 40,496 | 39,449 | 33,584 | 26,209 |
| Wages and Salaries | 33,406 | 32,179 | 27,763 | 21,629 |
| Supplements | 7,090 | 7,270 | 5,821 | 4,580 |
| — Profit | 18,606 | 17,734 | 13,232 | 10,483 |
| — Indirect Taxes | 4,962 | 4,976 | 3,813 | 3,089 |
| Taxes on Production and Imports | 5,333 | 5,256 | 4,076 | 3,327 |
| Less: Subsidies | 371 | 280 | 263 | 238 |
| — Depreciation | 12,741 | 11,825 | 8,629 | 6,964 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


The **production approach** to GDP identifies how individual industries contribute to domestic production by calculating the **value added** by each industry during the production process. The value added by an industry or sector group is its sales or gross output minus any **intermediate inputs** used in production. The Bureau of Economic Analysis [report](#) GDP by industry, which is summarized briefly in this subsection by grouping the various private industries into broad categories.

The first category combines private goods producing industries: agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (1.2 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2); mining (2.1 percent of GDP); construction (3.9 percent); and manufacturing (11.0 percent), with trade, transportation, and utilities (TTU, combined 17.1 percent of GDP). The second category is finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE, 20.2 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2) combined with the information industry (5.4 percent of GDP), labeled as FIRE+.

The remaining private services-providing industries include: professional and business services (13.0 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2); education, health care, and social services (8.3 percent of GDP); and arts, entertainment, and recreation (4.1 percent). Separately, public-sector value added in production, at the federal, state, and local levels, is captured by the government category (11.6 percent of GDP).

Production Types

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

In 2022 Q2, private goods-producing industries and trade, transportation, and utilities combined value added per person is \$26,740, on an annualized basis, compared to \$27,829 in 2019 Q4 (see —). Private finance, insurance, real estate, and information industry services combined value added per person is \$19,425 in 2022 Q2 and \$17,750 in 2019 Q4 (see —).

All other private services-producing industries combined value added per person is \$20,856 in 2022 Q2 and \$19,532 in 2019 Q4 (see —). Government value added is \$8,815 per person in 2022 Q2 and \$8,874 in 2019 Q4 (see —).

Production Types

per capita, annualized, 2022 Q2 dollars

| | 2022 Q2 | 2022 Q1 | 2019 Q4 | 2005 Q1 | 1997 (A) |
|-------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| — Goods and TTU | \$26,740 | 27,205 | 27,829 | 26,214 | 22,418 |
| Manufacturing | 8,314 | 8,504 | 8,317 | 7,760 | 6,396 |
| Construction | 2,967 | 3,132 | 3,331 | 4,416 | 4,147 |
| Retail Trade | 4,364 | 4,351 | 4,664 | 4,457 | 3,509 |
| — FIRE+ | 19,425 | 19,349 | 17,750 | 13,842 | 10,772 |
| Finance & Insurance | 6,006 | 5,978 | 5,564 | 4,938 | 3,656 |
| Information | 4,101 | 4,088 | 3,383 | 1,782 | 1,122 |
| — Other Services | 20,856 | 20,652 | 19,532 | 15,691 | 13,282 |
| Education & Healthcare | 6,322 | 6,282 | 6,121 | 4,711 | 4,049 |
| Professional & Business | 9,890 | 9,794 | 8,534 | 6,223 | 5,050 |
| — Government | 8,815 | 8,825 | 8,874 | 9,273 | 9,061 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Household Inputs to Production


It's useful to consider household inputs when analyzing economic output. For example, is the population growing? Are more people working? Are people working more hours? Is the economy more productive in its use of labor? These questions all add important context to discussion of economic activity.

The US population is increasing (see —), though at a slower rate than in the past. Over the past 30 years, the US has added 80 million people, a total population growth rate of around 30 percent. For each person to maintain the same standard of living, GDP would need to increase by the same amount.

GDP is produced by workers. The employment rate (see —) measures the share of the population that is working, and is affected by existing economic conditions. The rate nears 50 percent during the peak of economic expansions and falls during recessions. Demographics also affect this measure. Over the past 30 years, the aging of the population has gradually reduced the employment rate.


A third measure of household inputs to production is the amount people work. As with the employment rate, hours of work are influenced by existing economic conditions. Workers' average weekly hours of work (see —) increase during an economic expansion, as more work is available. Average hours fall during a recession, when demand for goods and services is relatively low.

Population
millions of people



Source: BEA

Employment Rate
share of population, percent



Source: CPS Microdata

Hours Worked
average hours per worker per week




Source: CPS Microdata

The **productivity of labor** is a key determinant in GDP, and can be measured as the GDP per hour of work (see —). The total hours of work in a quarter or year can be estimated by multiplying the population, employment rate, and average hours worked. Over the past 30 years, this measure of labor productivity has increased substantially.

In 2022 Q2, real GDP was equivalent to roughly \$80.91 per hour of work, compared to \$81.57 in 2022 Q1, \$76.50 in 2019 Q4, \$74.25 in 2015 Q4, and \$49.74 in the first quarter of 1989.

Comparing the latest data to the pre-COVID data covering 2019 Q4, annualized real GDP is \$25,248 billion in the latest data and \$24,386 billion in 2019 Q4. Aggregate hours worked total 312 billion in the latest quarter and 319 billion in 2019 Q4.

Labor productivity
GDP per hour of work, 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Author's Calculations



Economic Growth

Economists are concerned with changes in economic activity, or economic growth. This subsection discusses economic growth, recessions, and their contributors.

Real GDP Growth


Real GDP growth [measures](#) changes in economic activity. As seen in the previous subsection, real GDP has increased steadily over the long-term. Since 1989, growth averaged 2.5 percent per year (see ■). Growth rates were relatively high during the mid- to late-1990s, averaging 3.8 percent from 1993 to 2000.

In the 2000s, the housing bubble boosted GDP but then collapsed, leading to average growth of only 1.8 percent from 2001 to 2013. Growth was slightly boosted from 2014 to 2019, averaging 2.4 percent per year.

In 2020, COVID-19 caused an economic shutdown, followed by monetary and fiscal stimulus, resulting in large swings in GDP. Real GDP decreased 29.9 percent in Q2, and increased by 35.3 percent in Q3, by far the largest changes in recent history. Since 2020, economic growth averaged 2.5 percent.

Real Gross Domestic Product Growth

quarterly growth at seasonally adjusted annual rate, percent



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

The bottom left chart shows annual growth, to make trends more visible. The bottom right chart shows the most-recent four quarters and the estimate for the current quarter. In the **latest data**, covering the second quarter of 2022, real GDP decreased at an annual rate of 0.6 percent, compared to a decrease of 1.6 percent in Q1, and an increase of seven percent in 2021 Q4.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta uses available economic indicators to **nowcast** the current growth rate. The latest nowcast for 2022 Q3 is 2.9 percent, as of October 19, 2022 (see ●).

Recessions

The long-term pattern in economic growth is often described as the business cycle. Typically, periods of economic growth lasting 7–12 years are interrupted by an **economic recession**, a period where economic activity decreases. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) [identifies](#) four recessions since 1989.

During the early 1990s recession, output contracted for eight months and unemployment was higher than its pre-recession average for 63 months. The drop in output was smaller during the early 2000s recession, but unemployment rates took almost 16 years to recover.

The 2008–2009 great recession, caused by the collapse of a housing bubble, was very severe. The recession lasted 18 months, with higher rates of unemployment lasting 89 months. The most-recent COVID-19 recession was extremely severe and also extremely short-lived, lasting only two months, but with output reduced 9.6 percent.

US Recessions Since 1989

| | Start Month | End Month | Recession Duration, Months | GDP Percent Change | Unemp. Rate Change* | Unemp. Rate Recovery, Months** |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------|----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Early '90s Recession | Aug 1990 | Mar 1991 | 8 | -1.4 | +2.4 | 63 |
| Early '00s Recession | Apr 2001 | Nov 2001 | 8 | -0.1 | +2.1 | 191 |
| Great Recession | Jan 2008 | Jun 2009 | 18 | -3.8 | +5.2 | 89 |
| COVID-19 Recession | Mar 2020 | Apr 2020 | 2 | -9.6 | +10.8 | 20 |


Sources: NBER, BEA, BLS

*Percentage point change from average unemployment rate during three years prior to recession to peak unemployment rate. **Months from recession start until unemployment rate returns to pre-recession three-year average.

The most-reliable indication that the US has entered a recession (see ■) was identified by [Claudia Sahm](#), and is called the **Sahm rule**. The Sahm rule indicates the start of a recession (see ♦) when the three-month moving average unemployment rate rises by half a percentage point or more above its low during the previous twelve months (see —). In effect, the Sahm rule identifies increases in unemployment that are significant enough to cause or indicate a recession.

The Sahm Rule

three-month moving average of unemployment rate, percentage points above one-year low



Components of Growth

The **expenditure approach** also gives insight into the sources of changes in overall economic activity. In the second quarter of 2022, consumer spending (see ■) contributed 1.38 percentage points to overall real GDP growth. Private domestic investment (see ■) subtracted 2.83 percentage points from real GDP growth, government spending and investment (see ■) subtracted 0.29 percentage point, and net exports (see ■) contributed 1.16 percentage points.

Real GDP Growth by Expenditure Type

percentage point contribution to GDP growth



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

The **income approach** enables decomposing annualized production growth into gross labor income (see ■), profit (see ■), indirect taxes less subsidies (see ■), and depreciation (see ■).

In the second quarter of 2022, gross domestic income was virtually unchanged, following an increase of 0.8 percent in 2022 Q1 and an increase of 6.7 percent in 2021 Q4. In the latest quarter, labor income subtracted 1.30 percentage points from overall growth, following a subtraction of 0.75 percentage point in 2022 Q1. Profit income contributed 0.57 percentage point in the second quarter of 2022 and subtracted 1.68 percentage points in 2022 Q1. Changes in indirect tax revenue and surpluses contributed 0.18 percentage point to aggregate income growth in the latest quarter and contributed 2.44 percentage points in 2022 Q1.

Real Gross Domestic Income Growth

percentage point contribution to GDI growth



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


The **production approach** calculates GDP as the sum of value added–gross output minus intermediate inputs–in each sector. The broad groupings discussed above are used to identify contributions from: goods-producing sectors combined with trade, transportation, and utilities (see ■), finance, insurance, and real estate plus information (see ■), other service-providing sectors (see ■), and government (see ■).

In 2022 Q2, the combined contribution to GDP growth from private goods-producing industries and trade, transportation, and utilities is -2.2 percentage points, following a subtraction of 1.8 percentage points in 2022 Q1, and compared to a subtraction of 0.4 percentage point in 2019 Q4. The group of private service-providing industries that include finance, insurance, real estate, as well as the information industry, contributed 0.5 percentage point in 2022 Q2, subtracted 0.4 percentage point in 2022 Q1, and contributed 1.4 percentage points in 2019 Q4.

Other private services-providing industries, which are wide-ranging and described above, contributed 1.2 percentage points to real GDP growth in 2022 Q1, following a contribution of 0.4 percentage point in 2022 Q1, and compared to a contribution of 0.2 percentage point in 2019 Q4. Combined federal, state, and local government did not contribute in 2022 Q2, contributed 0.2 percentage point the prior quarter, and contributed 0.7 percentage point in 2019 Q4, prior to the pandemic.

Real GDP Growth by Industry Group

percentage point contribution to GDP growth



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



Changes to GDP can also be assigned to changes in **household inputs**: population (see ■), employment rates (see ■), average hours worked (see ■), and total economy productivity (see ■).

In 2022 Q2, population growth contributed 0.23 percentage point to annualized GDP growth, and, for comparison, added 0.59 percentage point in 2019 Q4. Changes in the employed share of the population contributed 2.23 percentage points in the latest quarter, and added 1.49 percentage points in the fourth quarter of 2019. Changes in average hours worked added 0.18 percentage point to GDP growth in the latest quarter and added 0.34 percentage point in 2019 Q4. Lastly, productivity subtracted 3.21 percentage points to GDP growth in 2022 Q2, compared to a reduction of 0.64 percentage point in 2019 Q4.

Real GDP Growth by Household Inputs

percentage point contribution to GDP growth



Source: Author's Calculations



Components of Economic Growth*annualized percentage point contribution to real GDP/GDI growth**moving averages*

| | 2022 Q2 | 2022 Q1 | 2021 Q4 | 2021 Q3 | 2021 Q2 | 3-year | 10- year | 30- year |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------|-------------|-------------|
| ■ Gross Domestic Product | -0.6 | -1.6 | 7.0 | 2.7 | 7.0 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
| ■ Consumer Spending | 1.38 | 0.91 | 2.14 | 1.98 | 7.84 | 2.18 | 1.77 | 1.88 |
| Durable Goods | -0.24 | 0.64 | 0.44 | -2.22 | 0.92 | 0.78 | 0.53 | 0.50 |
| Non-durable Goods | -0.37 | -0.66 | 0.12 | 0.26 | 1.74 | 0.57 | 0.42 | 0.37 |
| Services | 1.99 | 0.93 | 1.58 | 3.94 | 5.19 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 1.01 |
| ■ Gross Investment | -2.83 | 0.98 | 5.14 | 1.78 | 0.30 | 0.71 | 0.74 | 0.73 |
| Non-residential | 0.01 | 0.98 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 1.29 | 0.30 | 0.47 | 0.58 |
| Residential | -0.93 | -0.15 | -0.05 | -0.29 | -0.24 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.06 |
| Change in inventories | -1.91 | 0.15 | 5.01 | 1.96 | -0.75 | 0.23 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| ■ Government | -0.29 | -0.40 | -0.16 | -0.02 | -0.54 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.21 |
| Federal | -0.22 | -0.36 | 0.01 | -0.51 | -0.50 | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.08 |
| State and Local | -0.06 | -0.04 | -0.17 | 0.49 | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.14 |
| ■ Net Exports | 1.16 | -3.13 | -0.16 | -1.08 | -0.60 | -0.52 | -0.31 | -0.24 |
| Exports | 1.51 | -0.53 | 2.37 | -0.13 | 0.51 | 0.03 | 0.22 | 0.44 |
| Imports | -0.35 | -2.60 | -2.53 | -0.95 | -1.11 | -0.55 | -0.53 | -0.69 |
| ■ Goods and TTU | -2.24 | -1.79 | 1.84 | -1.96 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.57 | 0.87 |
| Manufacturing | -0.97 | -0.34 | 1.47 | -0.47 | 0.69 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.38 |
| Construction | -0.84 | -0.06 | -0.57 | -0.53 | 0.15 | -0.11 | 0.03 | -0.00 |
| Retail Trade | 0.08 | -0.93 | 0.43 | -0.86 | -0.74 | -0.01 | 0.10 | 0.18 |
| ■ FIRE+ | 0.47 | -0.36 | 2.48 | 1.19 | 2.04 | 1.05 | 0.74 | 0.78 |
| ■ Other Services | 1.21 | 0.35 | 2.59 | 2.90 | 4.44 | 1.22 | 0.90 | 0.74 |
| Education & Healthcare | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.21 |
| Professional & Business | 0.54 | 0.43 | 1.68 | 1.45 | 1.77 | 0.78 | 0.56 | 0.42 |
| Information | 0.08 | -0.13 | 0.86 | 0.50 | 1.23 | 0.45 | 0.37 | 0.28 |
| ■ Government | -0.03 | 0.21 | -0.02 | 0.51 | 0.30 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.09 |
| ■ Population | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0.59 | 0.89 |
| ■ Employment Rate | 2.25 | 4.05 | 4.89 | 3.88 | 3.28 | 0.56 | 0.70 | 0.20 |
| ■ Average Hours | 0.19 | -0.18 | -0.67 | -0.39 | 0.65 | -0.14 | 0.10 | 0.00 |
| ■ Productivity | -3.25 | -5.69 | 2.37 | -1.18 | 2.99 | 1.87 | 0.94 | 1.48 |
| Gross Domestic Income | 0.1 | 0.8 | 6.7 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.7 |
| ■ Labor | -1.30 | -0.75 | 2.58 | 2.16 | 2.20 | 1.02 | 1.24 | 1.28 |
| ■ Profit | 0.57 | -1.68 | -1.25 | -0.87 | 4.59 | 0.78 | 0.41 | 0.77 |
| ■ Depreciation | 0.59 | 0.77 | 0.76 | 0.75 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.42 | 0.44 |
| ■ Indirect Taxes | 0.18 | 2.44 | 4.62 | 2.51 | -4.21 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.18 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Author's Calculations

Real GDP Growth by State

percentage point change in real GDP



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

*For the year ending 2022 Q2, no states had real GDP growth of more than ten percent, one state (Idaho) had real GDP growth between five and ten percent, 41 states had less than five percent GDP growth, and nine states had negative GDP growth.

Real GDP Growth by State

quarterly growth at seasonally adjusted annualized rate

total growth, 2022 Q2

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | 1-year* | 3-year | 10-year |
|-----------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|
| United States | -0.6 | -1.6 | 7.0 | 2.7 | 7.0 | 1.8 | 5.6 | 23.0 |
| Pacific | -0.4 | -8.3 | 6.8 | 4.2 | 8.0 | 0.4 | 6.8 | 35.7 |
| Washington | 0.6 | -4.8 | 7.0 | -0.3 | 7.5 | 0.5 | 9.6 | 45.0 |
| California | -0.5 | -9.5 | 6.8 | 5.2 | 8.2 | 0.3 | 6.9 | 36.7 |
| Oregon | -1.6 | -0.4 | 11.5 | 1.2 | 5.1 | 2.6 | 6.9 | 32.2 |
| Hawaii | 0.6 | -4.5 | -3.5 | 11.3 | 19.1 | 0.8 | -4.9 | 5.0 |
| Alaska | -0.9 | -15.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 0.1 | -3.4 | -7.9 | -15.1 |
| Mountain | -1.5 | -0.5 | 9.6 | 4.0 | 6.0 | 2.8 | 8.6 | 30.9 |
| Utah | -1.1 | -0.6 | 10.6 | 2.4 | 4.6 | 2.7 | 11.7 | 46.8 |
| Idaho | -0.8 | 3.5 | 17.8 | 3.4 | -0.7 | 5.7 | 14.2 | 43.4 |
| Colorado | -2.0 | 2.9 | 8.8 | 2.8 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 9.3 | 39.2 |
| Arizona | -1.9 | -2.2 | 10.3 | 4.4 | 6.4 | 2.5 | 10.4 | 30.5 |
| Nevada | 1.0 | -3.3 | 7.4 | 9.8 | 18.5 | 3.6 | 6.1 | 26.1 |
| Montana | -1.1 | -2.0 | 9.3 | 1.5 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 6.2 | 16.8 |
| New Mexico | -2.3 | -5.1 | 8.6 | 4.2 | -0.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 6.2 |
| Wyoming | -4.8 | -1.4 | 1.2 | -0.1 | -0.6 | -1.3 | -5.6 | -9.1 |
| South Atlantic | 0.0 | -0.8 | 7.8 | 3.5 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 7.3 | 24.3 |
| Florida | 1.6 | -1.5 | 10.4 | 5.9 | 13.6 | 4.0 | 11.2 | 37.0 |
| Georgia | -0.7 | 1.7 | 5.9 | 1.3 | 10.9 | 2.0 | 6.9 | 31.6 |
| South Carolina | -0.5 | 2.0 | 5.5 | 0.9 | 8.3 | 2.0 | 6.8 | 26.1 |

continued on next page . . .

Overall Economic Activity

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | 1-year* | 3-year | 10-year |
|------------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|
| continued from previous page . . . | | | | | | | | |
| North Carolina | -0.7 | 1.6 | 10.1 | 2.9 | 5.4 | 3.4 | 9.9 | 24.1 |
| District of Columbia | -0.9 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 5.5 | 7.5 | 1.9 | 4.6 | 15.4 |
| Virginia | -0.9 | -3.3 | 7.7 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 1.7 | 5.4 | 14.5 |
| Maryland | -0.9 | -4.1 | 4.4 | 3.0 | -3.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 9.7 |
| Delaware | 1.2 | -1.7 | 7.4 | 1.8 | 5.3 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 2.5 |
| West Virginia | 1.4 | -5.6 | 4.5 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.0 | -1.7 | 0.3 |
| West South Central | 0.9 | -0.7 | 5.1 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 1.4 | 3.3 | 24.0 |
| Texas | 1.8 | 0.5 | 5.7 | 1.4 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 5.6 | 32.3 |
| Arkansas | -3.0 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 2.2 | 3.8 | 2.3 | 8.0 | 15.4 |
| Oklahoma | -1.6 | -6.7 | 5.3 | -6.2 | -0.2 | -2.4 | -5.1 | 8.9 |
| Louisiana | -3.0 | -8.9 | 0.8 | -1.4 | 10.9 | -3.2 | -9.3 | -9.5 |
| East South Central | -0.6 | 2.1 | 6.7 | 1.7 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 7.5 | 17.0 |
| Tennessee | 0.3 | 3.7 | 10.3 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 11.1 | 28.4 |
| Kentucky | -1.8 | 2.1 | 5.0 | 1.0 | 4.1 | 1.6 | 5.2 | 12.4 |
| Alabama | -0.9 | -0.4 | 5.8 | 0.3 | 5.6 | 1.2 | 5.0 | 11.7 |
| Mississippi | -1.1 | 1.3 | -0.2 | -1.4 | 4.1 | -0.3 | 4.5 | 2.9 |
| New England | -2.8 | -0.6 | 6.1 | 3.6 | 9.9 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 15.9 |
| Massachusetts | -2.6 | -0.9 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 8.3 | 1.8 | 5.8 | 22.7 |
| New Hampshire | -2.5 | -14.1 | 13.8 | 2.1 | 22.5 | -0.7 | 7.0 | 21.6 |
| Maine | -1.2 | -0.5 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 6.0 | 1.6 | 9.4 | 19.2 |
| Rhode Island | 0.6 | -4.6 | 7.4 | 0.1 | 16.4 | 0.8 | 3.4 | 6.9 |
| Vermont | -0.2 | 2.6 | 7.1 | 2.4 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 4.6 | 6.8 |
| Connecticut | -4.7 | 5.5 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 10.0 | 1.7 | -0.2 | 4.2 |
| Middle Atlantic | -0.0 | -0.2 | 8.3 | 4.1 | 6.8 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 15.7 |
| New York | 0.7 | -0.5 | 8.8 | 5.8 | 9.2 | 3.6 | 5.0 | 19.5 |
| New Jersey | -1.0 | 1.7 | 6.7 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 11.6 |
| Pennsylvania | -0.9 | -1.1 | 8.4 | 1.3 | 4.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 11.5 |
| East North Central | -2.0 | 1.3 | 6.6 | 0.7 | 7.3 | 1.6 | 4.0 | 13.5 |
| Ohio | -1.1 | -1.7 | 7.9 | 1.4 | 6.5 | 1.6 | 5.0 | 17.0 |
| Indiana | -3.3 | 4.0 | 7.1 | -0.7 | 5.4 | 1.7 | 4.8 | 16.7 |
| Michigan | -1.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 | -0.3 | 14.0 | 0.7 | 5.2 | 15.8 |
| Wisconsin | -1.9 | 0.3 | 7.6 | 1.3 | 5.1 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 11.6 |
| Illinois | -2.5 | 2.4 | 7.5 | 1.2 | 5.5 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 9.0 |
| West North Central | -1.6 | 1.6 | 2.6 | -2.7 | 5.9 | -0.0 | 3.5 | 13.5 |
| Nebraska | -1.7 | 5.0 | -0.0 | -0.5 | 6.7 | 0.6 | 5.7 | 20.7 |
| Minnesota | -1.3 | -0.7 | 4.5 | -2.0 | 11.5 | 0.1 | 3.3 | 17.0 |
| Kansas | -2.5 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 0.3 | 7.3 | 1.0 | 3.5 | 12.2 |
| Iowa | -0.8 | 2.5 | 1.6 | -14.4 | -3.9 | -3.0 | 3.9 | 11.9 |
| South Dakota | -1.7 | 1.7 | 3.2 | -1.2 | 4.6 | 0.5 | 7.7 | 11.6 |
| Missouri | -2.0 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 0.4 | 5.7 | 1.1 | 3.8 | 9.8 |
| North Dakota | -0.7 | -5.3 | -4.2 | 1.8 | 2.1 | -2.1 | -6.1 | 7.8 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Financial Accounts

The Federal Reserve [report](#) transactions and levels for US assets and liabilities in the **financial accounts**. This section provides a high-level overview of the financial accounts, including liabilities, sectoral balances, wealth, and investment.

Liabilities


Total liabilities are the sum of debts and other financial obligations at a point in time. While the vast majority of US borrowing comes from US lending, meaning the net result on US balance sheets is zero, it is still useful to consider how total liabilities vary by major sector and over time.

Private business liabilities, corporate- and non-corporate, total \$34.4 trillion in the second quarter of 2022, equivalent to 136.4 percent of GDP (see —). In 2019, business liabilities were equivalent to 143.5 percent of GDP, and during the 1990s they were 99.6 percent of GDP, on average. Private household and nonprofit liabilities are equivalent to 74.9 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 (see —), 76.0 percent in 2019, and 64.2 percent in the 1990s.

Federal government liabilities are equivalent to 114.4 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 (see —), compared to 98.5 percent of GDP in 2019 and 66.2 percent of GDP during the 1990s. Combined state and local government liabilities total 35.3 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 (see —), 39.3 percent in 2019, and 26.8 percent in the 1990s.

Total Liabilities by Sector

share of GDP, percent



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis




Calculating each sector's contribution to the **total change in borrowing** can highlight economic risks. For example, the tech bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s shows up as a large increase in corporate borrowing. The housing bubble from the 1990s to 2007 shows up as an increase in household borrowing. Government borrowing increased following the collapse of the housing bubble, in an effort to compensate for the massive fall in wage income. Keep in mind, however, that the vast majority of liabilities in the domestic economy are to other domestic parties.

Total domestic liabilities increased 0.2 percent over the year ending 2022 Q2, after adjusting for inflation. Federal government borrowing subtracted 0.21 percentage point from the total (see ■), while the state and local government contributed 0.32 percentage point (see ■). Households and nonprofits contributed 0.10 percentage point to total annual growth (see ■), corporate businesses did not contribute (see ■), and non-corporate businesses subtracted 0.13 percentage point (see ■).

Real Debt Growth

contribution to one-year percent change in liabilities, adjusted by PCE price deflator



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis



Real Debt Growth

contribution to one-year real growth

moving averages

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | 3- year | 10- year | 30- year |
|----------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total | 0.17 | -0.73 | -1.29 | -1.12 | -0.54 | 3.17 | 3.03 | 3.73 |
| ■ Corporate Business | 0.09 | -0.30 | -0.53 | -0.75 | -1.13 | 0.67 | 1.02 | 1.00 |
| Debt Securities | -0.43 | -0.33 | -0.22 | -0.09 | -0.10 | 0.21 | 0.34 | 0.34 |
| Loans | 0.61 | 0.36 | 0.17 | -0.03 | -0.29 | 0.38 | 0.26 | 0.13 |
| ■ Non-corporate Business | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.14 | -0.15 | -0.01 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.44 |
| Commercial Mortgages | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.07 |
| ■ Household & Nonprofit | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.31 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0.37 | 0.17 | 0.88 |
| Home Mortgages | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.25 | -0.03 | 0.57 |
| Consumer Credit | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 0.21 |
| ■ State & Local Government | 0.32 | -0.61 | -0.93 | -1.03 | -1.15 | -0.30 | 0.03 | 0.34 |
| ■ Federal Government | -0.21 | 0.21 | -0.00 | 0.37 | 1.25 | 2.29 | 1.48 | 1.07 |

Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis


Sectoral Balances

The **sectoral financial balances** provide a high-level summary of US financial activities. This measure divides the world into three sectors: the US private sector (see ■), the US government (see ■), and the rest of the world (see ■), then examines the net lending and borrowing between the groups. In any given period, one sector's borrowing is another sector's lending, and as such the total will always sum to zero.

A sector runs a surplus in a given accounting period when its income is higher than its outlays. When this occurs the sector becomes a lender of the savings created by having more income than expenses. Likewise, if a sector spends more than it receives, it borrows the difference. As an example, when the public sector runs a deficit and is a net borrower, it creates a surplus for other sectors by spending more than it takes in through taxes.

Sectoral Financial Balance

net lending (+) or borrowing (-), NIPA basis, by sector, as share of GDP




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

In 2022 Q2, the US private sector was a net borrower (running a deficit) of the equivalent of 0.5 percent of GDP, far below the 4.5 percent surplus in 2019. The rest of the world was a net lender to the US to the equivalent of 4.1 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2, compared to 2.2 percent in 2019. Balancing these transactions, the government (federal, state, and local combined) was a net borrower (running a deficit) of the equivalent of 3.6 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2, compared to 6.7 percent in 2019.

Breaking out the two main categories in the private sector, households were net lenders (ran a surplus) of the equivalent of 0.8 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 (see ■), while private businesses—corporate and noncorporate—were net borrowers of the equivalent of 1.3 percent of GDP (see ■). In 2019, households were net lenders of 5.4 percent, and private businesses were net borrowers of 0.9 percent.

Domestic Private Sector Financial Balance

net lending (+) or borrowing (-), NIPA basis, by sector, share of GDP, percent



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Wealth


Net wealth is the sum of domestic tangible assets, such as land (excluding public land), structures, and equipment, minus foreign financial claims on these assets, plus domestic claims on foreign assets. US wealth totals \$130.8 trillion in 2022 Q2, equivalent to \$392,900 per capita, or a 5.18 multiple of GDP (518.1 percent of GDP.)

The ratio of US wealth to GDP has increased 132.7 percentage points since 1989, driven largely by increases in the market value of corporate equities and residential real estate. The market value of corporate equities was equivalent to a 2.11 multiple of GDP in 2022 Q2, compared to 1.70 in 1999–2000, during the tech bubble, and to 0.60 in 1989 (see ■). The market value of domestic residential real estate was equivalent to a 1.80 multiple of GDP in 2022 Q2, compared to 1.85 in 2005–2007, during the housing bubble, and 1.34 in 1989 (see ■).

On a net basis, all other US wealth is equivalent to a 1.26 multiple of GDP in 2022 Q2 and a 1.91 multiple in 1989 (see ■). The other category includes tangible assets of noncorporate businesses and governments, and domestic financial claims on foreign assets. The category also subtracts foreign financial claims on US assets, for example foreign holdings of US corporate equities and Treasury bonds.

Net Wealth to GDP Ratio

total US wealth divided by GDP



Source: Federal Reserve



The tangible assets of each major domestic sector are shown below, along with the summary of financial claims between the rest of the world and the US.

Derivation of US Net Wealth

share of GDP, percentage points

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q2 | 2019 | 2005 -'07 | 1989 |
|--------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| US Net Wealth | 518.1 | 552.8 | 559.4 | 553.1 | 475.4 | 484.2 | 385.3 |
| Households & Nonprofits | 213.8 | 211.8 | 207.2 | 203.4 | 183.7 | 217.8 | 169.2 |
| Noncorporate Businesses | 75.5 | 75.5 | 74.8 | 72.3 | 67.3 | 72.4 | 71.1 |
| Domestic Corporations | 212.3 | 259.6 | 275.7 | 271.1 | 202.0 | 136.3 | 76.6 |
| Federal Government | 16.8 | 16.7 | 16.5 | 16.8 | 16.7 | 18.3 | 25.7 |
| State & Local Government | 59.1 | 58.0 | 56.8 | 56.5 | 55.5 | 48.8 | 41.9 |
| Net Claims on ROW | -59.5 | -68.8 | -71.6 | -66.9 | -49.7 | -9.3 | 0.8 |
| US Claims on ROW | 102.5 | 115.5 | 123.2 | 125.3 | 107.6 | 86.6 | 28.6 |
| Less: ROW Claims on US | 162.0 | 184.3 | 194.8 | 192.2 | 157.3 | 95.9 | 27.8 |

Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis



Investment

Investment is the exchange of a liquid asset, such as cash, for a less-liquid asset, such as a building.

Economic data use varying definitions of asset, for purposes of measuring investment. **Gross private fixed investment**, as measured in the national accounts, includes residential fixed investment, such as the construction and improvement of houses, apartment buildings, and other residential property (see ■), but does not include spending on durable goods, such as automobiles, appliances, or furniture.

Non-residential private fixed investment includes the construction and improvement of offices, warehouses, factories, and other commercial and industrial property (see ■), as well as purchases of equipment, software, and intellectual property products.


Additionally, the change in private inventories (see ■) at the end of the accounting period, whether intentional or unintentional, affects GDP growth in the period. Inventory investment is grouped in the national accounts with gross private investment, but is not fixed investment.

In the second quarter of 2022, private fixed investment, which does not include inventory investment, totals \$4.5 trillion, equivalent to 17.7 percent of GDP. Non-residential (business) fixed investment totals \$3.3 trillion, or 13.0 percent of GDP, while residential fixed investment totals \$1.2 trillion (4.6 percent of GDP).

During the quarter, private fixed investment subtracted 0.92 percentage point from real GDP growth. Non-residential fixed investment contributed 0.01 percentage point, while residential fixed investment subtracted 0.93 percentage point. The change in private inventories subtracted 1.91 percentage points.

Private Gross Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


Net Fixed Investment

Gross investment in fixed assets covers both depreciation, the wearing down of existing assets, and new investment. Fixed investment less depreciation is referred to as **net fixed investment**, and positive net investment represents new or expanded investment.

In 2022 Q2, gross fixed investment was \$5.3 trillion, depreciation was \$4.3 trillion, and net fixed investment was \$1.1 trillion, equivalent to 4.3 percent of GDP (see —). In 2019, net fixed investment was 4.9 percent of GDP.

Some economic measures also count consumer durable goods, such as autos, furniture, and appliances, as investments. Net investment in consumer durables was \$479 billion in 2022 Q2, or 1.9 percent of GDP (see —). Consumer durable goods net fixed investment was 1.2 percent of GDP in 2019.

Net Fixed Investment
share of GDP, percent




Source: Federal Reserve, BEA

Levels of net fixed investment vary by sector and over time. In 2022 Q2, household sector net fixed investment, excluding consumer durables, was equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, compared to 1.3 percent in 2019 (see ■). From 2003 to 2006, during the housing bubble, household net fixed investment averaged 3.5 percent of GDP. Business sector net fixed investment is equivalent to 2.3 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2, and 2.9 percent in 2019 (see ■). Government net fixed investment is equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 and 0.7 percent in 2019 (see ■).

Net Fixed Investment by Sector or Type

share GDP, percent



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q2 | 2019 | 2003 -'06 | 1999 -'01 |
|---------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------|--------------|--------------|
| — Net Fixed Investment | 4.25 | 4.60 | 4.45 | 4.79 | 4.94 | 7.33 | 8.03 |
| ■ Business | 2.28 | 2.34 | 2.12 | 2.38 | 2.89 | 2.55 | 4.27 |
| Nonfin. Noncorp. Business | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.58 | 0.61 |
| Nonfin. Corporations | 1.93 | 1.91 | 1.72 | 1.82 | 2.22 | 1.74 | 3.17 |
| ■ Government | 0.49 | 0.55 | 0.62 | 0.67 | 0.72 | 1.31 | 1.10 |
| State & Local Gov. | 0.36 | 0.41 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.60 | 1.08 | 1.13 |
| Federal Gov. | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.23 | -0.03 |
| ■ Household & Nonprofit | 1.49 | 1.71 | 1.71 | 1.74 | 1.34 | 3.46 | 2.67 |
| — / ■ Consumer Durables | 1.90 | 2.11 | 2.16 | 3.03 | 1.21 | 1.97 | 2.27 |

Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Households

This section covers the household sector of the economy. Households are the source of labor for production and savings for investment. Households are also the primary consumers in the economy. The core topics in the households section include demographics, personal and household income and outlays, consumer sentiment, residential investment, household balance sheets, home ownership, housing, and poverty.

Demographics

Demographics provide a foundation for examining the household sector. Demographics provide insight on the structure and characteristics of the population. The demographics subsection covers population, population growth, household formation and headship, age, life expectancy, and education.


Population

The Census Bureau provides [estimates](#) and [projections](#) of the **US population**. Population levels and growth rates affect the economy and are critical pieces of information in determining and evaluating economic policies and outcomes. Population projections are based on assumptions, for example about the future level of net migration to the US, but are useful for thinking about future US demographics.

The latest population estimates, released on December 21, 2021, show the US resident population is 333.0 million in September 2022 (see —). The 2017-based projections of the future US resident population show a 2025 population of 344.2 million people (see ●). The resident population under age 65 was estimated to be 274.2 million in 2019 (see —) and is projected to be 279.0 million in 2025 (see ▲).

Population Estimates and Projections

resident population, in millions of people



Source: Census Bureau

Population Estimates and Projections

resident population, in millions of people

| | Sep 2022 | 2019 | 2018 | 2010 | 2000 | 1990 | Projected 2025 |
|---------------------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------|
| Total Resident Population | 333.0 | 328.2 | 326.7 | 309.3 | 282.2 | 249.6 | 344.2 |
| Under Age 65 | - | 274.2 | 274.3 | 268.8 | 247.1 | 217.7 | 279.0 |
| Over Age 65 | - | 54.1 | 52.4 | 40.5 | 35.1 | 31.9 | 65.2 |


Source: Census Bureau

Population Growth

Population growth comes from two sources, natural increases (births minus deaths) and net migration. In the latest estimate, the US added 392,700 people over the year ending July 2021, a population growth rate of 0.1 percent. There were a total of 3.58 million births (see —), and 3.43 million deaths (see —), resulting in a natural increase of 148,000 people (see). In the same period, net migration from abroad increased the resident population by 244,600 people (see). For comparison, in 1989, there were 3.91 million births, 2.17 million deaths, and 578,200 net migrants to the US.

Components of US Population Growth

in millions of people



Source: Census Bureau



Related Measures

There are multiple measures of population, based on different definitions. As of September 2022, the **resident** population is 331.6 million, while the more-comprehensive resident population **including armed forces overseas** is 331.8 million, and the more-narrow **civilian noninstitutionalized** population, which is used in labor statistics, is 326.8 million. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) use midyear resident population estimates from the Census Bureau for per capita measures. Chartbook measures that use both population and BEA data use the resident population, while chartbook measures based on the Current Population Survey use the civilian noninstitutionalized population.

The Census Bureau further divides the population into those living in households and those living in group quarters. As of September 2022, the **household** population is 323.8 million, or 97.7 percent of the total resident population. The **group quarters** population is **measured** in depth as part of the 2020 Census. The 2020 group quarters population is 8.2 million, of which 3.8 million are institutionalized. Of these, two million are in prisons and jails, and 1.6 million are in nursing and skilled-care facilities. An additional 2.8 million people live in dormitories or student housing, 328,000 live in barracks, and 1.4 million live in other noninstitutional facilities such as shelters and group homes.


Lastly, an important related concept, **households**, are **measured** as occupied housing units. The number of households varies over time, separately from the population, as people make changes in their living arrangements. Over the year ending 2022 Q2, there were an average of 127.5 million households, compared to 94.2 million in 1990.

Household Formation

Households are measured as **occupied housing units**, whether occupied by the owner or rented. Over the year ending 2022 Q2, there were an average of 127.5 million total occupied housing units in the US, of which 44.0 million (34.5 percent) were rented, and 83.5 million (65.5 percent) were owner-occupied. Since 1989, the US has experienced the boom and bust of a major housing bubble. By 2016, the end result of the bubble bursting was a shortage of housing, as housing units per capita fell from 1995 to 2016.


Housing by Type

one-year moving averages
millions of units



Source: Census Bureau

change since 1989, units per capita, percentage points




Household formation measures the change in occupied housing units. During the housing bubble, housing construction exceeded population growth and the homeownership rate increased. Following the collapse of the housing bubble, household formation was often below population growth and homeownership decreased as foreclosures converted homeowners into renters.

From 2019 Q4 to 2022 Q2, the average annual **household formation rate** was 1.4 percent, while annual population growth averaged 0.3 percent. Changes in the number of owner-occupied households contributed 1.3 percentage points on an average basis (see ■), and changes in rented households did not contribute (see ■). Over the year ending 2022 Q2, the household formation rate averaged 1.0 percent, of which owner-occupied households contributed 0.1 percentage point, and rented households contributed 0.9 percentage point.

Contributions to Household Formation

one-year moving average of annual growth rates, percent



Source: Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership




Headship Rate

Individual decisions about starting a household or living with family are influenced by economic conditions. The ratio of households to people age 16 and older is referred to as the [aggregate headship](#) rate.

The headship rate fell following the collapse of the housing bubble and during the COVID-19 pandemic, as more people moved in with family. The headship rate reached a low of 49.17 percent during May 2020, and is currently 49.99 percent, as of September 2022 (see [—](#)).

Aggregate Headship Rate



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS



Age


In discussions on demographics, **aging** is often described as a serious headwind to economic growth in major advanced economies. The increased share of many countries' population that is of retirement age means a smaller share are working and borrowing and a larger share are receiving pension benefits and lending to the financial system. These trends can be overcome by a workforce that is more efficiently able to provide goods and services. In part due to a shorter life-expectancy in the US, this problem is more pronounced in Japan and western Europe, but is still an important issue for the US.

The **median age** is the midpoint for the age of a group; half of the group is older and half is younger. Tracking this point over time summarizes the age composition of the group. As a population ages, the median age will increase.

The median age of the overall civilian noninstitutionalized population, calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS), is 38.1, as of September 2022, compared to 31.3 in January 1990 (see —). The median worker is 41.1 in September 2022, and 35.5 in January 1990 (see —).

Median Age

by group, in years




Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

Economic indicators are sometimes based on specific **age groups**. As examples, labor statistics often exclude those under age 16, the retirement-age population is above a certain age, such as 64, and a popular measure of labor market slack is the age 25 to 54 employment rate. It is therefore useful to know what share of the overall population is in each major age group, and how the current age distribution compares with the past.

Age Groups

share of population, percent



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS


The noninstitutionalized civilian population used in most labor statistics totals 328.3 million in September 2022. Of this, 19.5 percent are under the working age of 16, equivalent to 64.0 million people. In 1989, the under-16 population was 23.4 percent of the total. The juvenile population, those under 18, is 73.3 million, equivalent to 22.3 percent of the population in September 2022, and compared to 26.3 percent in 1989.

The core of workforce is historically those between the ages of 25 and 54. The age 25-54 group contains 127.2 million people and comprises 38.8 percent of the population in September 2022. The group made up 42.3 percent of the population in 1989. The age 55 to 64 group makes up 12.8 percent of the total in the latest data and 8.9 percent in 1989. Those above the age of 65 comprise 17.4 percent in September 2022 and 11.9 percent in 1989.

Mapping American Community Survey data to commuter zones gives insight on the **age of local areas**. In 2021, among commuter zones with a population of at least 100,000, the commuter zone (listed by largest city) with the highest share of its population under 18 is Provo, UT (31.9 percent), followed by Laredo, TX (31.5 percent), and Brownsville, TX (30.7 percent). The commuter zones with lowest share of the local population under 18 were Sarasota, FL (15.1 percent), Pittsfield, MA (16.4 percent), and Ocala, FL (16.7 percent).

The age 65 and older population is disproportionately concentrated in Florida. The commuter zone with the highest share of its population over 64 is Sarasota, FL (34.0 percent), followed by Ocala, FL (32.9 percent), and Cape Coral, FL (30.4 percent). The commuter zones with lowest local over-64 population share were Provo, UT (8.4 percent), Laredo, TX (10.4 percent), and Odessa, TX (10.6 percent).

Age Group Share of Commuter Zone Population, 2021



Source: American Community Survey, Dorn




Life expectancy

Life expectancy at birth summarizes the health and mortality of a population. The measure indicates the number of years a newborn is expected to live if mortality rates do not change. Life expectancy estimates are **produced** by the National Center for Health Statistics.

Life Expectancy at Birth

by group, in years



Source: NCHS



In 2018, US life expectancy at birth is 78.7 years (see —), a decrease of 0.2 years since 2014, but an increase of 3.6 years since 1989. Life expectancy for men is 76.2 years in 2018, compared to 76.5 years in 2014 and 71.7 years in 1989 (see —). Women born in 2018 are expected to live 81.2 years, based on current mortality rates, compared to estimates of 81.3 years for 2014 and 78.5 years for 1989 (see —).

Falling life expectancy from 2014 to 2018 is generally associated with increased overdose deaths and the opioid epidemic. Life expectancy fell further during the COVID-19 pandemic, **according** to early estimates.


Education

Education is central in many discussions of the future of the US economy. Over the past few decades, college costs and college enrollment have both increased substantially. Households may be spending more on education as a response to changing job opportunities from globalization and other policy decisions. The end result is a much **more-educated population**, with much higher levels of student debt.

Over the year ending September 2022, 85.5 million people over the age of 25, or 37.9 percent of the total, have at least a bachelor's degree, with 32.5 million of those, or 14.4 percent of the total, holding an advanced degree such as a master's degree, medical or law degree, or PhD. An additional 56.4 million people have some college coursework but no degree or have an associate degree. A total of 63.9 million have a high school diploma but no college, while 19.8 million have no high school diploma.

Highest Level of Education

age 25+ population, in millions, September 2022




Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

The share of the population with a bachelor's degree or advanced degree increased by 12.0 percentage points since 2000. The increase is even more pronounced among those who are employed; 44.1 percent have a college degree or advanced degree in September 2022, an increase of 13.1 percentage points since 2000.

Increased household spending on education may be a response to a weak labor market and lack of worker bargaining power. Behind the increase in education is a large increase in student debt. The burden of this debt is severe for many, as the more-educated workforce is not necessarily receiving the historical wage premium from education.

Education Distribution


share of age 25+ population, percent
Total



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

September 2022 2000

Employed





Income, Spending, and Saving

The next subsections cover household and personal income, spending, and saving. This subsection offers an overview, with mean and median per capita measures.

Disposable personal income, or **after-tax income**, totals \$18.7 trillion, on an annualized basis, in August 2022, equivalent to \$56,021 per person (see —). Personal consumption expenditures, or **consumer spending**, totals \$17.5 trillion in August 2022, or \$52,425 per person (see —). **Saving**, calculated as after-tax income minus consumer spending, totals \$0.7 trillion, or \$1,959 per person (see —).

The Consumer Expenditure Survey [provides](#) data on typical income, spending, and saving, measured as the median rather than the average. Median income, spending, and saving are not affected by the activities of the highest income families, which skew mean or average data. Saving is calculated as after-tax income minus spending, excluding spending on pensions (which count as saving). In 2021, after-tax income is \$25,992 per person for the middle fifth of households (see —). Spending for these households is \$21,852 per person (see —), and saving is \$4,140 per person (see —).



Average Income, Spending, and Saving
per capita, annualized, August 2022 US dollars

| | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Jun '22 | May '22 | Aug '21 | Aug '19 |
|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Personal income | 65,705 | 65,697 | 65,417 | 65,707 | 67,411 | 63,418 |
| Personal current taxes | 9,684 | 9,703 | 9,658 | 9,721 | 8,591 | 7,456 |
| — After-tax income | 56,021 | 55,994 | 55,759 | 55,985 | 58,820 | 55,962 |
| — Consumer spending | 52,425 | 52,388 | 52,449 | 52,357 | 51,626 | 49,208 |
| — Personal saving | 1,959 | 1,966 | 1,672 | 1,995 | 5,610 | 4,863 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


Distribution by Income

Income varies massively by household. While some spending is non-discretionary, spending increases with income. The bottom 40 percent of households, by total money income, have expenses exceeding after-tax income. This includes retirees who are dissaving and low-income families taking on debt to cover expenses. Meanwhile, the top ten percent of households save nearly half of their income.

In 2021, after-tax household income (see ■) ranges from \$15,900 for the bottom 20 percent to \$233,600 for the top 10 percent. Spending, excluding pensions, (see ■) ranges from \$30,500 for the bottom 20 percent by income, to \$128,400 for the top 10 percent income group.

Household Income and Spending, by Income Percentile

thousands of 2021 dollars



Income is after taxes; spending does not include spending on pensions

Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey




Distribution by Age

Income and spending vary by age and tend to peak between ages 45 and 54. Saving, the difference between income and spending, also varies by age and generally peaks during ages 45 to 54. In 2019, the oldest and youngest age groups in the data have income near or below their expenses, resulting in low or negative saving rates. In contrast, during the pandemic in 2020, income was above average and spending was below average, and saving rates were positive and far above average.

In 2021, after-tax household income (see ■) ranges from \$43,200 for the oldest age group to \$103,500 for the 45-54 age group. Spending, excluding pensions, (see ■) ranges from \$38,100 for the youngest age group to \$72,800 for the 45-54 age group.

Household Income and Spending, by Age of Reference Person

thousands of 2021 dollars



Income is after taxes; spending does not include spending on pensions

Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey




Income to Persons

Personal income includes labor income (see ■), measured as compensation of employees, capital income (see ■), measured as the sum of proprietor income, rental income, and dividend and interest income, and welfare income (see ■), measured primarily as government social benefits less contributions to social insurance.

In August 2022, annualized personal income is \$65,705 per capita. Labor income totals \$41,083 per person; capital and proprietor income is \$18,015 per person; and welfare or transfer income is \$6,607 per person.

Personal Income

real per capita income, thousands of US dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Author



Personal Income by Source

per capita, annualized, August 2022 US dollars


| | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Jun '22 | May '22 | Aug '21 | Aug '19 |
|----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Personal income | 65,705 | 65,697 | 65,417 | 65,707 | 67,411 | 63,418 |
| ■ Labor | 41,083 | 41,072 | 40,723 | 40,934 | 40,505 | 38,948 |
| Wages and salaries | 33,916 | 33,905 | 33,597 | 33,760 | 33,286 | 31,723 |
| Supplements | 7,167 | 7,167 | 7,126 | 7,173 | 7,219 | 7,225 |
| ■ Capital | 18,015 | 18,005 | 17,996 | 18,037 | 18,341 | 18,573 |
| Proprietors' income | 5,583 | 5,536 | 5,542 | 5,579 | 5,737 | 5,508 |
| Rental income | 2,392 | 2,390 | 2,382 | 2,357 | 2,308 | 2,374 |
| Personal interest income | 5,158 | 5,183 | 5,187 | 5,191 | 5,291 | 5,618 |
| Personal dividend income | 4,882 | 4,896 | 4,884 | 4,909 | 5,004 | 5,073 |
| ■ Welfare | 6,607 | 6,620 | 6,698 | 6,736 | 8,565 | 5,897 |
| Social security | 3,640 | 3,646 | 3,636 | 3,668 | 3,577 | 3,513 |
| Medicare | 2,761 | 2,752 | 2,757 | 2,770 | 2,845 | 2,696 |
| Medicaid | 2,418 | 2,416 | 2,398 | 2,402 | 2,392 | 2,114 |
| Unemployment insurance | 57 | 56 | 55 | 55 | 1,023 | 91 |
| Veterans' benefits | 485 | 485 | 482 | 485 | 496 | 450 |
| Other | 2,103 | 2,122 | 2,145 | 2,189 | 2,964 | 1,691 |
| Less welfare contributions | -5,067 | -5,065 | -5,022 | -5,047 | -4,963 | -4,847 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



Personal Income

percentage point contribution to real personal income growth



Aggregate real personal income decreased at an annualized rate of 1.33 percent in 2022 Q2. Labor income subtracted 0.48 percentage point from overall growth, capital income contributed 0.09 percentage point, and welfare income subtracted 0.94 percentage point.

Personal Income by Source

percentage point contribution to real personal income growth


moving averages

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | 3- year | 10- year | 30- year |
|----------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Personal income | -1.33 | -4.15 | -2.98 | -3.68 | -24.56 | 3.01 | 2.91 | 2.87 |
| ■ Labor | -0.48 | -0.40 | 3.18 | 2.64 | 1.96 | 0.79 | 1.49 | 1.53 |
| Wages and salaries | -0.20 | -0.34 | 3.13 | 2.69 | 2.13 | 0.83 | 1.30 | 1.28 |
| Supplements | -0.28 | -0.06 | 0.05 | -0.05 | -0.17 | -0.03 | 0.19 | 0.25 |
| ■ Capital | 0.09 | -1.22 | -0.69 | -0.49 | 1.51 | -0.16 | 0.57 | 0.77 |
| Proprietors' income | -0.15 | -0.20 | -0.56 | -0.16 | 1.54 | -0.03 | 0.07 | 0.27 |
| Rental income | 0.33 | -0.15 | 0.11 | -0.01 | -0.28 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.16 |
| Personal interest income | 0.15 | -0.31 | -0.43 | -0.61 | -0.26 | -0.20 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| Personal dividend income | -0.24 | -0.57 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.50 | 0.05 | 0.38 | 0.29 |
| ■ Welfare | -0.94 | -2.53 | -5.47 | -5.83 | -28.02 | 2.38 | 0.85 | 0.57 |
| Social security | -0.24 | 0.94 | -0.13 | -0.14 | -0.22 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Medicare | -0.23 | -0.15 | -0.06 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.15 |
| Medicaid | 0.24 | 0.08 | -0.27 | -0.13 | 0.47 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.13 |
| Unemployment insurance | -0.10 | -0.20 | -3.99 | -3.90 | -1.87 | 0.41 | 0.08 | 0.03 |
| Veterans' benefits | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 |
| Less welfare contributions | 0.05 | -0.18 | -0.34 | -0.21 | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.25 | -0.18 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

The Bureau of Economic Analysis [report](#) an inflation-adjusted one-year change in after-tax income per person of -4.8 percent in August 2022, -5.0 percent in July 2022, and 0.3 percent in August 2021 (see [—](#)). Over the past year, the measure has averaged -5.1 percent. During the three years before the COVID-19 pandemic, per capita after-tax income grew at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent.

After-Tax Income Growth



Distribution of Personal Income

Labor income, which includes wages and salaries as well as self-employment income, is the vast majority of personal income. Over calendar year 2021, 50 percent of people have any labor income (see [■](#)). Only 43 percent of people have labor income above the single-person poverty threshold of \$12,880.

Total income, includes after-tax labor income plus welfare and capital income, (see [■](#)) reaches 71 percent of people in 2021. People who did not receive any income by the total income measure typically live with people who receive income.

In 2021, 4.6 percent of people have total income of more than \$150,000. Note that the chart cuts off income above \$150,000.

Distribution of Personal Income, 2021



Personal Income

number of recipients in thousands,
income amounts in 2021 USD

2021

2019

| | Total with income | Median income | Mean income | Total with income | Median income | Mean income |
|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Total | 237,500 | 37,522 | 57,143 | 235,292 | 38,127 | 57,364 |
| Earnings | 168,041 | 45,470 | 62,174 | 169,802 | 44,019 | 61,217 |
| Social Security | 55,324 | 16,278 | 17,201 | 54,985 | 16,451 | 17,482 |
| Supplemental Security Income | 6,035 | 8,707 | 8,661 | 5,715 | 8,930 | 8,969 |
| Public assistance | 1,545 | 2,398 | 4,128 | 1,383 | 2,873 | 4,296 |
| Veterans' benefits | 4,542 | 15,453 | 19,785 | 4,406 | 14,576 | 18,687 |
| Survivor benefits | 3,219 | 10,098 | 18,505 | 3,197 | 10,316 | 18,164 |
| Disability benefits | 2,732 | 7,583 | 12,566 | 2,729 | 9,385 | 14,706 |
| Unemployment compensation | 9,609 | 6,907 | 9,422 | 3,345 | 3,951 | 5,588 |
| Workers' compensation | 1,410 | 7,014 | 13,249 | 1,485 | 8,514 | 15,101 |
| Property income | 151,198 | 1,687 | 6,725 | 146,025 | 1,802 | 6,591 |
| Retirement income | 29,820 | 14,978 | 25,956 | 30,731 | 15,385 | 27,347 |
| Pension income | 20,341 | 15,104 | 23,930 | 20,850 | 16,869 | 27,081 |
| Alimony | 164 | 7,534 | 15,476 | 216 | 14,100 | 19,581 |
| Child support | 3,359 | 4,103 | 5,779 | 3,788 | 4,409 | 6,236 |
| Educational assistance | 7,333 | 5,704 | 9,110 | 7,848 | 5,537 | 9,201 |
| Outside financial assistance | 2,517 | 4,045 | 8,928 | 2,587 | 4,262 | 9,539 |
| Other | 1,698 | 1,690 | 7,095 | 2,407 | 1,929 | 13,730 |

Source: Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics

**Contributions to Personal Income Growth**


Annual data on personal income [describe](#) the number of people receiving various categories of income and the average payment. As a result, it is possible to match changes in aggregate personal income from changes in payment amounts (see [■](#)) and changes in who is receiving payments (see [■](#)).

From 2019 to 2021, aggregate pre-tax personal income increased by a total of 0.55 percent, after adjusting for changes in prices. Compared to 2019, fewer people received earnings from work, while mean earnings increased. Real income from pensions and retirement plans fell over the period. Unemployment compensation and property income contributed to the overall growth in real income.

Sources of Personal Income Growth, 2019 to 2021

percentage point contribution to real aggregate growth

Amount per recipient
Number of recipients



Source: Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics




Household Income

Given the variance in personal income, with many people receiving no income at all, individuals often live together and combine their income and expenses. This subsection covers household income, the combined income of all people in a given housing unit.

As with personal income, household income is distributed very unevenly in the US. The Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics [report](#) historical household income data, adjusted for changes in prices. The mean or average household income is \$102,316 in 2021 (see —), compared to \$102,020 in 2020, and \$103,949 in 2019. In 2000, real mean household income was \$90,142.

Real Household Income

thousands of 2021 US dollars



Source: Census Bureau

Real median household income (see —), the price-adjusted midpoint among household incomes, is \$70,784 in 2021, \$71,186 in 2020, and \$72,808 in 2019. For comparison, real median household income was \$66,248 in 2000. Since 2000, real median income increased by a total of 6.8 percent.


The price-adjusted income limit for the 90th percentile is \$211,956 in 2021 (see —), \$211,438 in 2020, \$213,171 in 2019, and \$176,702 in 2000. Ten percent of households make more than this level.

On the opposite end of the income distribution, the 10th percentile income limit is \$15,660 in 2021 (see —), \$16,386 in 2020, \$16,984 in 2019, and \$16,695 in 2000. Ten percent of households make less than this level.

The Census Bureau also report household income based on the race or ethnicity of the householder. Household income varies substantially by race, in the US, and the racial income gap has been persistent, over time.

Real Median Household Income

thousands of 2021 US dollars



Source: Census Bureau

Black median household income was \$48,297 in 2021, compared to an inflation-adjusted equivalent of \$48,175 in 2020 (see —). Non-Hispanic white median household income was \$77,999 in 2021 and \$78,912 in 2020 (see —). Hispanic (any race) median household income was \$57,981 in 2021 and \$58,015 in 2020 (see —). Asian median household income was \$101,418 in 2021 and \$99,622 in 2020 (see —).

Two values are shown for 2013 and 2017 to mark revisions to the survey design (2013) and the processing of survey data (2017). These data are not perfectly comparable over time.


Lastly, the Census Bureau [report](#) median household income by state, calculated using the American Community Survey. In 2021, the median US household income, using this measure, is \$69,717. In the same year, the median income in 19 states and the District of Columbia is above the national median, and the median income in 31 states is below the national median.

In 2021, Maryland tops the list, with a median household income of \$90,203. The District of Columbia has the second highest income (\$90,088), followed by Massachusetts (\$89,645). Other high-income states include New Jersey (\$89,296), New Hampshire (\$88,465), California (\$84,907), Hawaii (\$84,857), Washington (\$84,247), Connecticut (\$83,771), and Colorado (\$82,254).

The state with the lowest 2021 median household income is Mississippi (\$48,716), followed by West Virginia (\$51,248), Louisiana (\$52,087), Arkansas (\$52,528), Alabama (\$53,913), and New Mexico (\$53,992). Median household income in Puerto Rico is \$22,237.

Household Income, 2021

median household income by state, 2021 US dollars



Source: Census Bureau, American Community Survey



Household Spending and Saving

The previous subsection examines money coming into households while this section covers money leaving households. **Consumer spending** includes household purchases of goods and services, certain spending for households, such as Medicare and Medicaid, and estimates for services furnished without payment. As an example of a special estimate, homeowners are considered to rent their homes to themselves.

Over the past 30 years, increased consumer spending represents the majority of economic growth. Consumer spending usually increases when households have more income and falls when households have less income. This effect is visible in both the long-run and during the course of a business cycle, with consumer spending generally falling or slowing during a recession. During the COVID-19 pandemic, some categories of spending were lower as a result of business closures and restrictions.


Personal saving occurs when households have income in excess of their expenses. Savings are invested, often providing additional income, and are used for future expenses, such as costs incurred during retirement.

Spending

Consumer spending is comprised of two broad expenditure types: goods and services. Spending on goods includes durable goods (goods with a useful life of at least three years), such as cars, furniture, or recreational goods, and nondurable goods, such as groceries, clothing, and gasoline. Spending on services includes housing, health care, restaurants and bars, transportation services, financial services, and other services.

Expenditure Types

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Total consumer spending is \$17.3 trillion in 2022 Q2, compared to a price-adjusted \$17.2 trillion in 2022 Q1 and \$16.2 trillion in 2019 Q4. On a per person basis, consumer spending is \$51,845 in 2022 Q2, of which \$17,882 are spent on goods (see —) and \$33,963 on services (see —). In the fourth quarter of 2019, before the pandemic, consumer spending on goods was \$15,556 per person, and spending on services was \$33,262 per person, after adjusting for inflation.

Shelter Costs

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Within consumer spending on services, housing and utilities spending totals \$8,886 on an annualized and per person basis in 2022 Q2 (see —) and \$8,694 in 2019 Q4. Construction or improvement of housing is considered residential fixed investment, not consumer spending, but can be combined with spending to analyze patterns in shelter costs. In 2022 Q2, residential investment totals \$3,521 per person (see —), compared to \$3,227 in the pre-COVID data covering 2019 Q4.

The combined categories from the previous two charts cover spending on goods, spending on services other than shelter, and spending on housing, utilities, and residential construction. Including residential construction with other housing costs provides a more broad overview of household sector expenses.

Expenditure Types

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Consumer spending on services other than housing and utilities totals \$25,077 per person, on an annualized basis, in 2022 Q2 (see —), compared to \$24,734 in 2022 Q1, and \$24,568 in 2019 Q4. Spending on non-housing services has increased 2.1 percent since 2019 Q4.

Shelter costs, which combine housing, utilities, and residential fixed investment, are \$12,407 per person in 2022 Q2 (see —), \$12,573 in 2022 Q1, and \$11,921 in 2019 Q4. Shelter spending peaked at \$13,834 per person in the third quarter of 2005, during the housing bubble.

Expenditure Types

per capita, annualized, 2022 Q2 dollars


| | 2022 Q2 | 2019 Q4 | 2000 Q1 | 1989 Q1 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Total | \$51,845 | 48,886 | 37,192 | 29,057 |
| — Goods | 17,882 | 15,556 | 10,422 | 7,820 |
| Motor Vehicles and Parts | 2,176 | 2,023 | 1,756 | 1,321 |
| Furniture and HH Equipment | 1,577 | 1,311 | 624 | 432 |
| Recreational Durable Goods | 1,924 | 1,289 | 270 | 79 |
| Groceries | 3,786 | 3,653 | 3,118 | 3,097 |
| Clothes and Shoes | 1,467 | 1,243 | 924 | 686 |
| — Services ex. Shelter | 25,077 | 24,568 | 19,083 | 14,662 |
| Health Care Services | 8,064 | 8,090 | 5,346 | 4,841 |
| Transportation | 1,657 | 1,751 | 1,537 | 1,067 |
| Recreational | 1,833 | 1,934 | 1,539 | 1,098 |
| Food and Accommodations | 3,745 | 3,545 | 2,756 | 2,531 |
| Financial and Insurance | 3,932 | 3,677 | 3,833 | 2,271 |
| — Shelter | 12,407 | 11,921 | 11,935 | 10,243 |
| Housing Services and Utilities | 8,886 | 8,694 | 7,869 | 6,839 |
| Residential Fixed Investment | 3,521 | 3,227 | 4,066 | 3,404 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Next, we examine the affect on GDP growth from changes in consumer spending on goods (see ■), services excluding housing and utilities (see ■), and shelter (see ■), calculated as housing and utilities plus residential fixed investment). These categories contributed 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth in 2022 Q2 and contributed 0.9 percentage point in 2022 Q1, compared to an addition of 1.6 percentage points in 2019 Q4, before the pandemic.

Consumer Spending and Residential Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth, one-year moving average



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

In the the second quarter of 2022, household spending on goods subtracted 0.6 percentage point from GDP growth, household spending on services other than housing and utilities added 1.9 percentage points, and shelter spending and investment subtracted 0.8 percentage point.

Consumer Spending and Residential Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth


| | moving averages | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | 3-year | 10-year | 30-year |
| Total | 1.38 | 0.91 | 2.14 | 1.98 | 7.84 | 2.18 | 1.77 | 1.88 |
| ■ Goods | -0.61 | -0.02 | 0.55 | -1.96 | 2.65 | 1.35 | 0.95 | 0.87 |
| Motor Vehicles and Parts | -0.32 | 0.42 | 0.20 | -2.04 | 0.38 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Furniture and HH Equipment | -0.01 | -0.07 | -0.13 | -0.21 | -0.02 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.10 |
| Recreational Durable Goods | 0.04 | 0.26 | 0.29 | -0.06 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 0.22 | 0.24 |
| Groceries | -0.52 | -0.39 | 0.03 | -0.06 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.09 |
| Clothes and Shoes | 0.08 | -0.09 | -0.07 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| ■ Services (ex. Shelter) | 1.89 | 0.57 | 1.64 | 3.76 | 5.16 | 0.70 | 0.73 | 0.81 |
| Health Care Services | 0.05 | -0.05 | 0.42 | 0.57 | 1.19 | 0.18 | 0.27 | 0.26 |
| Transportation | 0.14 | -0.03 | 0.13 | 0.83 | 0.84 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Recreational | 0.21 | 0.05 | 0.35 | 0.53 | 0.71 | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Food and Accommodations | 0.72 | 0.01 | 0.17 | 0.85 | 2.11 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.10 |
| Financial and Insurance | 0.10 | -0.09 | 0.33 | 0.20 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.12 |
| ■ Shelter | -0.83 | 0.21 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.21 | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.27 |
| Housing Services and Utilities | 0.10 | 0.36 | -0.06 | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.20 |
| Residential Fixed Investment | -0.93 | -0.15 | -0.05 | -0.29 | -0.24 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.06 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Consumer spending is also [reported](#) on a monthly basis. Inflation- and population-adjusted consumer spending increased 1.5 percent over the year ending August 2022 (see —), far below the previous year rate (an increase of 7.5 percent over the year ending August 2021).

Consumer Spending Growth

annual growth, per capita real personal consumption expenditures, percent




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Changes to consumer spending (see —) are largely the result of changes to income (see ■) and changes to the rate at which income is saved (see ■). Changes to other outlays (see ■) reflect changes in interest payments, fines and fees, and charitable giving.

Real per capita consumer spending increased at an average rate of 2.1 percent over the four quarters ending 2022 Q2. Changes to disposable income subtracted 6.6 percentage points, changes to saving added 8.8 percentage points, and changes to other outlays subtracted 0.1 percentage point. During 2019, real per capita consumer spending increased at an average rate of 1.5 percent. Increased income contributed 3.3 percentage points, and a slight increase in saving subtracted 1.7 percentage points.

Contributions to Consumer Spending

percentage point contribution to real per capita PCE growth, one-year moving average



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Personal Saving

The after-tax income that people do not spend is **considered personal saving**, from an economic accounting perspective. Peoples' savings are invested through the financial system and become the current fixed investment or consumption activities of other groups in the economy. Savers generally receive a return from this investment.

In August 2022, the Bureau of Economic Analysis [report](#) a personal saving rate of 3.5 percent (see —). The personal saving rate decreased by a total of 5.8 percentage points since February 2020.

Personal Saving Rate

saving as a share of after-tax income, percent




Distribution of Saving

With such a wide distribution of after-tax income, **saving rates vary massively between households**. Some households dissave and others save more than two typical incomes. Saving by income quintile is calculated using the [Consumer Expenditure Survey](#) (CE) as after-tax income minus spending (other than spending on pensions). The following chart shows the average saving of each group divided by the US median personal income, thus reporting saving, or dissaving, in terms of a typical annual US income.

Saving Rate by Income Quintile

income quintile average saving, as share of US median personal income, percent



The 20 percent of households with the least income dissave the equivalent of 38.8 percent of the US median personal income in 2021 (see —). This group includes people going into debt and retirees dissaving. In the same period, the top 20 percent of households save the equivalent of 206.8 percent of the median income (see —).

The middle fifth of households by income, percentiles 40–60, saved the equivalent of 25.9 percent of the median income (see —). The fifth of households below the middle group, in percentiles 20–40, dissaved the equivalent of 12.1 percent of a median income in 2021 (see —).


Consumer Sentiment

The University of Michigan conducts a monthly [survey](#) of **consumer sentiment** (see [—](#)). The survey asks about personal finances, business conditions, and buying conditions. An increase in consumer sentiment means individuals feel more confident about economic conditions and are more willing to make large purchases or take on debt.

As of September 2022, the latest value of the consumer sentiment index is 58.6, following 58.2 in August 2022, and compared to 72.8 one year prior, in September 2021. As a pre-COVID baseline, the index average value was 97.3 during the year ending February 2020; the consumer sentiment index is currently 39.8 percent below this level.

Consumer Sentiment

index, 1966=100



Source: University of Michigan




The consumer sentiment index combines views on current and future economic conditions. In September 2022, the index tracking views on current economic conditions was 59.7, compared to 58.6 in August 2022, and 110.8 in 2019 (see [—](#)).

In September 2022, the index tracking consumer expectations for future economic conditions was 58.0, compared to 58.0 in August 2022, and 86.5 in 2019 (see [—](#)).

Consumer Sentiment Index Components

index, 1966=100



Source: University of Michigan



Household Balance Sheets


Liabilities

The liabilities of households and nonprofit institutions total \$18.92 trillion in 2022 Q2, as the Federal Reserve reported. Home mortgages are the main household liability, and total \$12.16 trillion (see ■). Consumer credit liabilities include auto loans, credit card debt, student loans, and other personal loans, and total \$4.58 trillion (see ■). The remaining liabilities are primarily attributable to nonprofits (see ■).

The ratio of household and nonprofit debt to disposable personal income has fallen to 102.7 percent in 2022 Q2 from its housing-bubble peak of 136.6 percent in 2007 Q4. Over the past three years, nominal household and nonprofit debt has increased 17.0 percent while nominal disposable personal income has increased 13.2 percent. As a result, the ratio of household and nonprofit debt to disposable personal income has increased by 3.4 percentage points.

Household and Nonprofit Debt

by type, as share of disposable personal income




Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) analysis of Equifax data shows \$16.2 trillion in total consumer debt in the second quarter of 2022, which is equivalent to 87.7 percent of disposable personal income. Over the past three years, total consumer debt has increased by \$2.29 trillion, compared to an increase of \$2.14 trillion in disposable personal income. As a result, the ratio of total consumer debt to disposable personal income increased 2.5 percentage points over this period.


Mortgages and Consumer Credit

share of disposable personal income, percent

Total Change, 2019 Q2-'22 Q2



Consumer Debt Trends



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bureau of Economic Analysis

Trends in **household debt** over the past three years, measured in both the US Financial Accounts and the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, show mortgage debt increasing as a share of income while consumer credit comprises roughly the same share of income.

The FRBNY data show mortgage debt, including home equity lines of credit, totals \$11.71 trillion in the second quarter of 2022, equivalent to 63.5 percent of disposable personal income. Student loans total \$1,589 billion, or 8.6 percent of income; auto loans total \$1,502 billion (8.2 percent of income); and credit card debt is \$887 billion (4.8 percent of income).

Over the past three years, the ratio of total mortgage debt to disposable personal income grew by 3.3 percentage points, compared to a decrease of 0.5 percentage point for student loans, an increase of 0.2 percentage point for auto loans, and a decrease of 0.5 percentage point for credit card debt.

Household Debt Outstanding

trillions of US dollars

share of disposable personal income

| | 2022 Q2 | 2022 Q1 | '22 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '19 Q2 | '13 Q1 | '03 Q1 |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Financial Accounts Total | \$18.92T | \$18.56T | 102.7 | 102.1 | 99.3 | 112.8 | 109.3 |
| ■ Mortgage Debt Total | \$12.16T | \$11.90T | 66.0 | 65.5 | 63.3 | 76.7 | 74.8 |
| ■ Consumer Credit | \$4.58T | \$4.46T | 24.9 | 24.6 | 24.9 | 23.6 | 24.0 |
| ■ Other | \$2.18T | \$2.20T | 11.8 | 12.1 | 11.1 | 12.5 | 10.5 |
| Consumer Credit Panel Total | \$16.15T | \$15.84T | 87.7 | 87.2 | 85.1 | 90.8 | 87.2 |
| Mortgage Debt Total | \$11.71T | \$11.50T | 63.5 | 63.3 | 60.2 | 68.6 | 62.5 |
| Mortgage | \$11.39T | \$11.18T | 61.8 | 61.5 | 57.8 | 64.1 | 59.6 |
| Home Equity Revolving | \$0.32T | \$0.32T | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 4.5 | 2.9 |
| Consumer Credit | \$4.45T | \$4.35T | 24.1 | 23.9 | 24.9 | 22.2 | 24.7 |
| ■ Auto Loan | \$1.50T | \$1.47T | 8.2 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 6.4 | 7.7 |
| ■ Credit Card | \$0.89T | \$0.84T | 4.8 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 8.3 |
| ■ Student Loan | \$1.59T | \$1.59T | 8.6 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 8.0 | 2.9 |
| Other | \$0.47T | \$0.45T | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 5.8 |

Source: Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Minor discrepancies between the two data sources arise because the Financial Accounts include debt of nonprofit institutions and the Consumer Credit Panel does not include people without a social security number.


Consumer Credit

The Federal Reserve also [report](#) consumer credit on a monthly basis. In the monthly measure, consumer credit totals \$4.68 trillion US dollars on a seasonally-adjusted and annualized basis in August 2022. Over the past year, consumer credit increased by 8.1 percent, while after-tax income increased by 1.5 percent. As a result, the ratio of consumer credit to disposable income increased by a total of 1.5 percentage points. In August 2022, total consumer credit is equivalent to 25.1 percent of annualized August 2022 disposable income (see —).

The latest comparable figure from the FRBNY data discussed in the previous section, which covers 2022 Q2, shows consumer credit is equivalent to 24.1 percent of annual disposable personal income (see —). Over the past year, the ratio increased by a total of 1.2 percentage points.

Consumer Credit

share of disposable personal income, percent



Source: Federal Reserve; FRBNY



Financial Obligations

Payments to service debt, along with rent, auto lease payments, homeowner's insurance, and property tax are considered financial obligations. The Federal Reserve [report](#) financial obligations as a share of disposable personal income. The ratio of debt service payments and financial obligations to income gives insight into the current aggregate financial burden facing households.

As of 2022 Q2, the **financial obligations ratio** is 14.3 percent (see —), and the **debt service ratio** is 9.6 percent (see —). The financial obligations ratio peaked at 18.1 percent in 2007 Q4, during the housing bubble.

Financial Obligations and Debt Service Ratios

share of disposable personal income, percent



Source: Federal Reserve



Assets


Household and nonprofit assets were valued at \$162.7 trillion in 2022 Q2, equivalent to 644 percent—or 6.44 years—of GDP. Of this, \$54.0 trillion, or 33.2 percent of the total, are tangible assets and \$108.7 trillion, or 66.8 percent, are financial assets.

Tangible, or non-financial, assets include peoples' homes as well as consumer durable goods, such as cars, furniture, and appliances. The market value of owner-occupied real estate is \$41.2 trillion in 2022 Q2, equivalent to 1.63 years of GDP (see ■). Consumer durable goods have a replacement value of \$7.7 trillion, or 0.3 years of GDP. Tangible assets are reported for the combined household and nonprofit sector and include real estate and equipment belonging to nonprofits, which totals \$5.1 trillion in 2022 Q2.

Financial assets include equity in businesses—corporate and non-corporate—with a market value of \$54.7 trillion, or 2.2 years of GDP (see ■), in 2022 Q2. Debt securities and loan assets total \$10.5 trillion, or 0.42 years of GDP (see ■). Cash and deposits, including money market accounts, total \$18.5 trillion, or 0.73 years of GDP (see ■). All other financial assets total \$25.0 trillion.

Selected Household and Nonprofit Assets

share of GDP




Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Household and nonprofit assets decreased in value by 4.5 percent over the year ending 2022 Q2. Owner-occupied real estate contributed 1.9 percentage points to total growth, and business equity subtracted 5.9 percentage points.

Contributions to Real Growth in Household and Nonprofit Assets

contribution to one-year percent change in assets, adjusted by PCE price deflator



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Household and Nonprofit Assets

| various measures: | trillions of USD | share of GDP | | real annual growth rate | | |
|------------------------------|------------------|--------------|---------|-------------------------|------------|---------|
| | 2022 Q2 | 2022 Q2 | 2021 Q2 | One-year | Three-year | 20-year |
| Total Assets | \$162.7 | 644.3 | 693.3 | -4.5 | 4.4 | 3.4 |
| Non-financial assets | 54.0 | 213.8 | 203.4 | 8.0 | 7.4 | 2.8 |
| Owner-occupied real estate | 41.2 | 163.2 | 154.3 | 8.6 | 8.0 | 2.9 |
| Consumer durable goods | 7.7 | 30.4 | 29.0 | 7.6 | 6.8 | 1.9 |
| Nonprofit assets | 5.1 | 20.3 | 20.1 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| Financial assets | 108.7 | 430.5 | 490.0 | -9.7 | 3.0 | 3.8 |
| Deposits, incl. money market | 18.5 | 73.3 | 76.5 | -1.4 | 9.8 | 4.1 |
| Debt securities and loans | 10.5 | 41.7 | 45.0 | -5.0 | -3.2 | 3.0 |
| Business equity | 54.7 | 216.6 | 263.5 | -15.5 | 4.1 | 4.6 |
| Corporate equities | 38.6 | 152.7 | 203.2 | -22.8 | 2.8 | 5.2 |
| Noncorporate business equity | 16.1 | 63.9 | 60.3 | 8.9 | 7.5 | 3.5 |


Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Return on Assets

Asset prices rising faster than income can be viewed as a decrease in the expected rate of return on total household assets. This can be measured by disposable income as a share of household assets. As of 2022 Q2, disposable income was equivalent to 11.3 percent of total assets (see —), compared to an average rate of 16.0 percent during the 1990s.

Return on Household Assets

disposable personal income as share of household and nonprofit total assets, percent




Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Wealth/Net Worth

Wealth *varies* substantially by race and ethnicity. Net worth, measured as total assets minus total liabilities, captures the overall financial position—or wealth—of families. In 2019, white non-Hispanic families' average net worth was \$980,550, compared to \$142,330 for black non-Hispanic families, and \$165,540 for Hispanic families of any race. Additionally, the wealth of a typical (median) family is much lower than the average wealth of families, the result of a concentration of wealth among the wealthiest families.

Racial Wealth Gap

net worth by race/ethnicity, thousands of US dollars, 2019




Source: Federal Reserve, Survey of Consumer Finances

Over the long run, the market value of household assets has risen much faster than the total level of household debt, resulting in a substantial increase in aggregate net worth. In 2022 Q2, household and nonprofit institution net worth was \$143.8 trillion, equivalent to 7.8 years of disposable personal income; the result of total assets of \$162.7 trillion and total liabilities of \$18.9 trillion.

In 2022 Q2, inflation-adjusted net worth decreased by 5.1 percent (see ■), and inflation-adjusted after-tax income decreased by 4.4 percent (see —). Over the past three years, real net worth grew at an average rate of 7.4 percent, while real after-tax income grew at an average rate of 1.8 percent

Net Worth and After-Tax Income Growth

one-year percent change, adjusted by PCE price deflator




Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

The Federal Reserve [report](#) net worth by percentile. The top one percent of households by wealth own 31.1 percent of US wealth, as of 2022 Q2 (see —), while the top 10 percent of households own 68.0 percent percent. The bottom half of households own 3.2 percent of US wealth (see —).

Since 1989, the wealth share of the top one percent increased 8.5 percentage points, while the share held by the bottom 50 percent decreased 0.5 percentage point. The wealth share of the 40 percent of households in wealth percentiles 50 through 90 decreased 7.5 percentage points since 1989.

Share of US Wealth

share of total net worth, by percentile, percent



Source: Federal Reserve




Wealth and Income

Wealth, when measured as assets minus liabilities, can be a source of income, but does not correspond perfectly to income. For example, early-career professionals with student debt may have a negative net worth and a high income. That said, data on family income by wealth percentile show that income tends to increase with wealth.

Additionally, the before-tax income of the wealthiest ten percent of families (see —) has [increased](#) substantially more than the income of other groups. The top ten percent of families by wealth, percentiles 90 to 100 with a mean wealth of \$5.7 million and a median wealth of \$2.6 million in 2019, have a median annual income of \$236,203 in 2019 and \$155,693 in 1989, after adjusting for inflation. Median income for the group increased \$80,510, or 51.7 percent, over the 30-year period.

Before-Tax Income by Wealth Percentile

median annual income, thousands of 2019 USD



Source: Federal Reserve (SCF)



In contrast, families in the third quartile of wealth (50th to 74.9th percentiles, mean wealth of \$700,000 in 2019, see —) have a median income of \$70,250 in 2019 and \$62,277 in 1989, an increase of \$7,973 (12.8 percent).


Median income for families in the second quartile (25th to 49.9th percentiles, mean wealth of \$236,000 in 2019, see —) increased \$3,239 (7.4 percent) to \$46,833 in 2019, from \$43,594 in 1989.

For the bottom quartile of families by wealth (see —), median income increased \$8,766 or 42.2 percent to \$29,525, over the 30 years ending 2019. The bottom quartile of families have a negative mean wealth in 2019 and a median wealth of virtually zero.

The US history of slavery and inter-generational white wealth show up in current data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The racial wealth gap discussed above cannot be explained by borrowing or access to credit. White families have substantially more financial assets including stocks and are much more likely to receive inheritance. Income for black families is also substantially lower—about half of white family income. Persistent structural inequalities are seen in income data, but are also evident from measures of wealth and assets.

Measures of Wealth and Income by Race or Ethnicity


by family, mean, thousands of 2019 USD



In 2019, among the 60.8 percent of white families who own stocks, the average value of stock holdings is \$433,900. The return on these assets is a supplement to labor income and the assets themselves provide cushion against unexpected expenses. Meanwhile, black families have relatively few financial assets; only 33.5 percent of black families own stocks, with average stock holdings of \$76,300.


Stock Holdings

mean value, thousands of 2019 USD



Stock Holdings

share of families with holdings, percent




Changes in net worth come mostly from changes in the value of assets and other holding gains (see ■), but also from saving of income, and decisions about how much to spend. Each period, households spend a portion of their income. The saved portion of income, after consumer spending and spending to cover depreciation of households assets, is considered net investment and increases net worth. Since 1989, household net investment has averaged 10 percent of disposable personal income.

In the chart, income invested at the historical-average rate (see ■) is visually separated from investment that is above or below trend (see ■). The separation distinguishes changes in disposable personal income from changes in decisions about how to use that income. Separately, changes in data sources or from natural disasters are identified as other volume changes (see ■).

Net Worth Growth

contribution to one-year percent change in net worth, nominal



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

In the the second quarter of 2022, holding gains subtracted 0.5 percentage point from the 1.1 percent change in net worth. Income invested at the 1989-onward average rate of 10.2 percent would have contributed 1.3 percentage points, but 0.3 percentage points were subtracted as household net investment was 7.9 percent of disposable person income in 2022 Q2. Other volume changes contributed 0.6 percentage point.


Over the past three years, net worth grew at an average rate of 10.6 percent. Holding gains contributed 8.1 percentage points to this total, on average; net investment of income contributed 2.2 percentage points; and other volume changes contributed 0.3 percentage point.

Homeownership

The **homeownership rate** measures the percent of occupied housing units that are owner-occupied, as opposed to rented. In 2004, near to the peak of the housing bubble, the overall homeownership rate reached 69.2 percent. As of 2022 Q2, the Census Bureau [report](#) a homeownership rate of 65.8 percent (see —). Over the past three years, the overall US homeownership rate increased by a total of 1.5 percentage points.

Homeownership Rate

share of households occupied by owners, percent



Source: Census Bureau

Census data also show large differences in homeownership rates by race and ethnicity. Around three-quarters (74.6 percent in 2022 Q2) of non-Hispanic white households own their home (see —), compared to fewer than half of black and Hispanic households.

During the housing bubble, the homeownership rate for black households increased by nearly ten percentage points, peaked at 49.7 percent in the second quarter of 2004, and fell to 40.6 percent in 2019 Q2. The current homeownership rate for black households is 45.3 percent, as of 2022 Q2 (see —). The rate for Hispanic households of any race is 48.3 percent in 2022 Q2, far below the 51.4 percent peak rate in the second quarter of 2020 (see —).


Use caution when interpreting homeownership rates during the COVID-19 pandemic. Individuals who are renters or homeowners are captured by the measure, but when an individual moves in with family and stops being a head of household, they are dropped from the measure. Therefore when renters move in with family the homeownership rate increases. The 2020 spike in homeownership rates reflects renters moving in with family.

As seen during the collapse of the housing bubble, it is possible for someone to be a homeowner but have no equity in their home, for example if the market price of the home falls below the principal remaining on the mortgage. Trends in owners' equity as a share of the market value of real estate show substantial improvement since the lows following the collapse of the housing bubble, when millions of homes were in foreclosure.

As of 2022 Q2, the Federal Reserve [report](#) owners' equity is 70.5 percent of residential real estate (see —). Over the past three years, the owners' equity share increased by a total of 5.6 percentage points. Over the past year, the share increased by a total of 2.2 percentage points. The current share is substantially above the 1989 average of 67.9 percent.

Owners' Equity Share of Real Estate

owners' equity as percent of real estate



Source: Federal Reserve

Housing Construction

The Census Bureau [tracks](#) the issuance of **new residential building permits**, which offer insight into planned residential construction. In September 2022, a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 1,564,000 new residential housing units were authorized by building permits (see —). Permits issued increased by 22,000 (1.4 percent) (annualized) over the previous month, decreased by 51,000 (-3.2 percent) over last September, and increased by 298,000 (23.5 percent) total over the past five years.

Residential Construction Permits

building permits issued, seasonally-adjusted annual rate, in thousands




Source: Census Bureau

In addition to data on permits, the Census Bureau also report how many residential construction projects are started and completed. Not all permitted projects are built and completion can be affected by economic conditions. In September 2022, a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 1,427,000 new residential units were completed (see —), compared to 1,345,000 in August and 1,411,000 in September 2021.

Residential Construction Completions

completed units, seasonally-adjusted annual rate, in thousands




Source: Census Bureau

In September 2022, a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 872,000 new single-family residential units were permitted and 1,049,000 were completed.

Single-Family Units

permits and completions, seasonally-adjusted annual rate, in thousands




Source: Census Bureau

In September 2022, a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 644,000 new multi-family residential units were permitted and 376,000 were completed.

Multi-Family Units

permits and completions, in thousands, seasonally-adjusted annual rate



Source: Census Bureau



New Residential Sales

In August 2022, seasonally-adjusted **annualized sales** of new single-family home sales were 685,000 (see —), as **reported** by the Census Bureau. Over the past year, new homes sales decreased 0.0 percent. Pre-COVID, in February 2020, the annualized rate of single family new home sales was 690,000. Since February 2020, new home sales have decreased 0.7 percent.

New Home Sales

new single family homes sold, in thousands, seasonally adjusted annual rate




Source: Census Bureau



The Census Bureau also tracks the **sales price** of new single-family homes. In August 2022, the median new home sold for \$436,800 (see —), and the average sales price was \$521,800. Adjusted for inflation by the CPI, the real median sales price has decreased 0.2 percent over the past year, and increased 15.7 percent over the past three years. Since 1989, the inflation-adjusted median new home sales price increased 58.1 percent.

New Home Sales Price

real median sales price, in thousands of August 2022 dollars




Source: Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics



The **inventory** of new homes for sale affects housing prices. The Census Bureau [report](#) a seasonally-adjusted total of 461,000 new houses for sale in August 2022, an increase of 87,000 since August 2021. At the current pace of new home sales, it would take 8.1 months to exhaust the supply of unsold homes (see —). Current inventory levels are slightly above both the year-prior supply of 6.5 months and the long-term average supply of 5.8 months.

Months' Supply

new single family homes for sale divided by monthly sales, in months




Source: Census Bureau

The monthly payment associated with new single-family home sales typically reflects both the sales price and the current mortgage interest rate. The monthly principal and interest payment for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage on the median new home sold is \$2,164, as of August 2022, compared to an average of \$2,239 over the past three months, and an average of \$1,361 in 2019.

New House Affordability

index, new house monthly principal and interest payment relative to 1/3rd median usual full-time earnings,



Source: Author's Calculations

The **affordability of a new house** depends on both the monthly payment and people's ability to make the payment, usually determined by their income. New homes are affordable when the monthly payment is a third of income, or less.

The new house affordability index (see —) compares the monthly payment with one-third of the median full-time wage. The median full-time wage is sufficient to afford the median new home when index values are 100 or greater.

New House Affordability

index components

| | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Jun '22 | Aug '21 | 2019 |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Affordability Index | — | 64.0 | 58.1 | 61.1 | 85.0 | 87.6 |
| Monthly Payment (\$) | — | 2,164 | 2,360 | 2,194 | 1,503 | 1,361 |
| Median Home Price (\$) | — | 436,800 | 466,300 | 428,300 | 404,300 | 319,267 |
| Mortgage Rate (%) | 6.11 | 5.22 | 5.41 | 5.52 | 2.84 | 3.93 |
| Median Monthly Earnings (\$) | 4,765 | 4,610 | 4,568 | 4,467 | 4,258 | 3,964 |

Source: Author's Calculations, Census Bureau, Freddie Mac, CPS


See also the more-comprehensive [Home Ownership Affordability Monitor](#) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

Housing Prices

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) **house price index** [measures](#) changes in the price of the same home. The seasonally-adjusted index increased 13.9 percent over the year ending July 2022 (see [—](#)). The average of the latest three months of data compared to the previous three months shows an annualized growth rate of 10.9 percent (see [—](#)). In June 2022, the one-year growth rate was 16.3 percent and the three-month growth rate was 17.5 percent. Home prices in the South Atlantic region, which includes the District of Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, increased 18.9 percent in July 2022, the highest one-year growth rate.

House Price Index

seasonally adjusted index, one-year percent change and three-month percent change



Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

House Price Growth

seasonally adjusted, one-year percent change

| | Jul '22 | Jun '22 | May '22 | Apr '22 | Jul '21 | Jul '20 | Jul '19 | '03-'05 Average | '09-'12 Average |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| South Atlantic | 18.9 | 22.0 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 20.6 | 7.4 | 5.0 | 11.3 | -3.7 |
| East South Central | 16.4 | 18.6 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 18.3 | 7.7 | 6.0 | 5.1 | -1.6 |
| Mountain | 15.1 | 18.1 | 22.7 | 23.5 | 25.4 | 8.6 | 7.2 | 11.0 | -4.2 |
| West South Central | 14.8 | 17.5 | 19.7 | 19.1 | 17.9 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 0.3 |
| United States | 13.9 | 16.3 | 18.4 | 19.0 | 19.3 | 7.0 | 5.0 | 9.2 | -2.5 |
| Middle Atlantic | 12.0 | 14.2 | 14.0 | 14.4 | 18.0 | 6.4 | 3.8 | 11.3 | -2.3 |
| East North Central | 11.9 | 12.9 | 15.1 | 15.2 | 16.4 | 7.1 | 5.4 | 4.3 | -2.4 |
| New England | 11.6 | 14.2 | 16.9 | 17.7 | 21.1 | 7.3 | 4.5 | 10.3 | -2.2 |
| West North Central | 11.3 | 12.4 | 14.5 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 6.7 | 4.2 | 5.4 | -1.2 |
| Pacific | 10.0 | 13.4 | 16.0 | 19.0 | 21.9 | 6.8 | 4.7 | 18.4 | -3.9 |

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

The purchase price of housing should move with the rental price. When housing prices exceed the rental equivalent, it may suggest that housing is overvalued.

During the housing bubble that caused the great recession, housing prices reached more than 40 percent above the rental equivalent. As of July 2022, housing prices are 50.6 percent above the rental equivalent (see [—](#)).

Housing Price to Rent Ratio

index, 1991=1



Source: FHFA; BLS


Poverty

In 2021, income from labor and capital ownership, called *market income*, was below the Census Bureau threshold for poverty for 78.2 million people in the US, equivalent to 23.8 percent of the population. An adjusted measure called *disposable income* includes market income plus income from government programs and tax credits, and subtracts taxes paid. According to the Census Bureau Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), **25.5 million people are in poverty** based on their disposable income, equivalent to 7.8 percent of the population. Government programs and tax credits moved the income of 52.7 million people above the poverty threshold.

For purposes of program eligibility and economic data, poverty is defined by having income below a certain threshold. The processes for calculating poverty vary, with the Official Poverty Measure (OPM) based on three times a price-adjusted 1963 minimal food budget, and the SPM based on food, shelter, clothing, and utilities costs and additionally capturing program benefits and taxes, along with other adjustments.


While some fully-employed people are in poverty, **the vast majority of poor people are either children, elderly, disabled, caregivers, or students**. These groups represent 69.0 percent of those in poverty in 2021. If the missing labor income required to keep a person out of poverty is not supplied in the form of capital income or welfare income, the person will be poverty, by definition. As a result, these groups that are disproportionately work-limited in some way have much higher rates of poverty.

In Poverty, 2021 millions of people



Source: CPS ASEC

Poverty Measures, 2021




Source: CPS ASEC; Author's Replication of Bruenig, see [link](#)

OPM is the Official Poverty Measure, and SPM is the Supplemental Poverty Measure. See text for description.

The share of a group whose combined labor, capital, and welfare income is below the poverty line is the poverty rate for the group. In 2021, students, caregivers, and the disabled had the highest rates of poverty. Those fully-employed have a low rate of poverty.


By age, market income (see ■) leaves the elderly particularly vulnerable to poverty as they are not as likely to have labor income. After social benefits and taxes (disposable income, see ■), the elderly have much lower rates of poverty than other age cohorts. Higher survivorship for the wealthy also has the effect of reducing poverty in very old ages. Disposable income still leaves young adults and those just below social security and medicare age (late 50s and early 60s) vulnerable to poverty, relative to other ages.



Source: CPS ASEC, 2014 adjusted for inflation with CPI-U-RS

Since 1989, the official poverty measure (see —) shows between 10.5 percent and 15.1 percent of people in poverty, with an average poverty rate of 13.0 percent during the period. Poverty rates were above average after the recession of 1991 and after the great recession, and below average around 2000.

In 2019, both the official US poverty measure and the more-comprehensive supplemental measure (see —) reached a new low. In 2021, the supplemental poverty measure fell further, to a new low of 7.8 percent, while the official measure increased. The official poverty rate does not include stimulus checks, housing assistance, or tax credits, while the supplemental rate does.



Source: Census Bureau


The Census Bureau [report](#) the number of people taken out of poverty by various programs, along with how many people are put in poverty by various expenses. In 2020, Social Security payments lift income above the poverty line for 26.5 million people, by far the most effective program for reducing poverty.

Economic impact payments, for example from the CARES act, prevented 11.7 million people from being in poverty. Unemployment benefits removed 5.5 million people from poverty. Refundable tax credits, which often fail to reach the poorest people, would remove 5.3 million people from poverty if participation rates were 100 percent.

Several elements add to the number of people in poverty, medical expenses are the most significant, and cause the disposable income of five million people to fall below the poverty line. Work expenses additionally put two and a half million people in poverty.

Effect of Individual Elements on Poverty Headcount

individual element effect on number of people in poverty, millions, 2020




Source: Census Bureau Supplemental Poverty Measure

Poverty can be geographically concentrated. In the United States, some regions have particularly high and persistent poverty rates. In 2020, one third of people in the US have income below \$21,495. In some regions of the US, more than half of the population has income below this threshold.

Dividing the US into 741 commuter zones, 66 of these zones, covering 3.4 million people, have a majority of the population in bottom third of US income. Among the most extreme examples are Brownsville, TX (62.3 percent), Corbin, KY (61.9 percent), Pikeville, KY (60.9 percent), and Gallup, NM (58.5 percent).

Low-Income Share of Commuter Zone, 2021

Share of commuting zone householders with income below \$21,495



Source: American Community Survey, Author's Calculations



Businesses

The factories, offices, and equipment that workers use to produce goods and services are all important to the economy. This section looks at the business sector, with data covering business investment, retail sales, industrial production, corporate profits, and the financial activities of private businesses.

Investment


Production by private businesses requires capital goods, such as buildings, equipment, and software. When businesses purchase such items, defined as having a useful life of more than one year, it is considered **fixed investment**, or investment in fixed assets. From an accounting perspective, these transactions are considered an exchange of assets (cash in exchange for capital goods) rather than an expense.

Over time, these capital goods wear down, a process called consumption of fixed capital or depreciation. Depreciation is the expense related to capital goods from an accounting perspective. Businesses must decide whether to replace or add to the existing stock of capital goods, and their new purchases of capital goods and inventory investment are considered **gross investment**. Accordingly, net investment is gross investment minus depreciation, and measures whether the stock of capital goods is expanding.

Net investment is important for many reasons. In the short run, the production and installation of capital goods adds directly to GDP and increases the level of economic activity. In the long run, **investments in fixed assets make workers more productive**, as they allow businesses to produce more goods and services with the same hours of work.

Investment and Depreciation

share of GDP, percent



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


In the the second quarter of 2022, gross private business investment totals \$3,406 billion on a seasonally-adjusted annualized basis, equivalent to 13.5 percent of GDP (see —). Private business investment in fixed assets totals \$3,292 billion, or 13.0 percent of GDP (see —). Private business depreciation totals \$2,736 billion in the quarter, or 10.8 percent of GDP (see —). As a result, net investment is \$669 billion, or 2.7 percent of GDP (see —).

In 2019 Q4, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, private business gross investment was \$2,880 billion. Since 2019 Q4, annualized gross investment increased 18.3 percent. Net investment was \$596 billion in 2019 Q4, and increased 12.2 percent from 2019 Q4 to 2022 Q2, as gross investment recovered from its pandemic lows.

Note that gross investment includes fixed investment and inventory investment, or the **change in private inventories**. Changes to private inventories capture the difference between sales and production. Reduced production of new inventory explains much of the overall reduction in gross investment during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Business investments in fixed assets are grouped into three categories: structures, equipment, and intellectual property (for example software and R&D). Investment in structures was \$631 billion in 2022 Q2, equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP (see —). Equipment investment was \$1,300 billion or 5.1 percent of GDP (see —), and intellectual property investment was \$1,361 billion or 5.4 percent of GDP (see —).

Business Fixed Investment by Type
share of GDP, percent




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Contribution to Growth

Business fixed investment contributed 0.01 percentage point to GDP growth in 2022 Q2, slightly below the average contribution of 0.30 percentage point over the three years prior to the pandemic. In 2022 Q2, investment in structures subtracted 0.34 percentage point from GDP growth (see —), investment in equipment subtracted 0.11 percentage point (see —), and investment in intellectual property products contributed 0.46 percentage point (see —).

Business Fixed Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Business Fixed Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | moving averages | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------|---------|---------|
| | | | | | | 3-year | 10-year | 30-year |
| Total | 0.01 | 0.98 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 1.29 | 0.30 | 0.47 | 0.58 |
| Structures | -0.34 | -0.11 | -0.35 | -0.18 | -0.08 | -0.17 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| Equipment | -0.11 | 0.55 | 0.10 | -0.09 | 0.73 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.34 |
| Information processing | -0.12 | 0.29 | 0.34 | -0.07 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.21 |
| Computers and peripherals | -0.15 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.01 | -0.14 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.11 |
| Industrial equipment | -0.08 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.30 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Transportation equipment | 0.10 | -0.03 | -0.34 | -0.12 | 0.42 | -0.08 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| Intellectual property products | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.64 | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.24 |
| Software | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.28 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.14 |
| Research and development | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.14 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.08 |


Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Productive business investments also show up as **new orders for core capital goods**. The category excludes the more-volatile aircraft orders as well as defense-related orders, and is derived from the Census Bureau [survey](#) of shipments, inventories, and orders.

New orders for manufactured core capital goods excluding aircraft totaled \$76 billion in August 2022, equivalent to 3.5 percent of GDP (see —). New orders increased 8.8 percent over the past year, and increased by 23.5 percent since February 2020.

New Orders for Core Capital Goods

nondefense capital goods ex-aircraft, share of GDP



Source: Census Bureau




Inventories

Changes in private inventories are often grouped with investment in national accounts. For purposes of flow measures such as GDP, inventory changes capture a situation where goods were produced but not sold and therefore are not included in consumption or investment. This situation can allow a drop in spending that was not predicted to be obscured in GDP growth figures. However, the Bureau of Economic Analysis [report](#) an inflation-adjusted ratio of inventories to sales in manufacturing and trade businesses (see —).

When thinking about the longer-term trends in these data, it's important to note that sales of businesses include services while inventories include only goods. Over the 30 years prior to COVID-19, sales shifted towards services, which reduced the inventories to sales ratio, all else equal. Following COVID-19, sales shifted back towards goods, increasing the inventories to sales ratio, all else equal, and affecting comparability of data over the period.

Inventories to Sales Ratio

total business



Source: FRED, BEA



Census [report](#) the nominal **ratio of inventories to sales** for the total business sector (see —). In August 2022, the ratio of total business inventories to sales was 1.33, compared to 1.32 in July 2022, 1.27 in August 2021, and 1.42 in February 2020.

The inflation-adjusted version from BEA shows inventories at 1.47 times sales in July 2022, following a ratio of 1.32 in June 2022, and 1.37 one year prior, in July 2021. In 2019, real monthly inventories were 1.50 times real monthly sales, on average.


Corporate Profits

The national accounts include detailed information on **aggregate corporate profits**. In the second quarter of 2022, corporate profits were \$3.00 trillion, equivalent to 15.6 percent of the income paid to US nationals after depreciation costs (net national income). Of this, \$1.74 trillion, equivalent to 9.0 percent of net national income, were paid out as dividends (see ■), \$782 billion were retained (corporate saving, see ■), and \$479 billion, 15.9 percent of corporate profits, went to corporate income tax (see ■).

In 2019, corporate profits were 14.6 percent of net national income. Dividends were equivalent to 9.3 percent, corporate savings were 3.5 percent, and corporate income taxes were 1.8 percent of net national income and 12.4 percent of corporate profits.

Destination of Corporate Profits


share of net national income



Aggregate corporate savings (corporate profits less dividends and corporate profit tax) are the result of net investment and non-business saving. Investment (see ■) is a source of aggregate profit because it is revenue for one party but not an expense for the other. Non-business saving, which includes household (see ■), government (see ■), and rest of world saving (see ■), necessarily reduces aggregate corporate profits because it is money that did not return to businesses as revenue.

Sources of Corporate Saving

contribution to corporate saving, as share of gross national income




Business Debt

As of 2022 Q2, **nonfinancial business debt**—the debt security and loan liabilities of nonfinancial businesses—both corporate and non-corporate—totals \$19,457 billion, with \$12,560 billion (64.6 percent) held by corporate businesses. Over the past three years, nonfinancial business debt has increased faster than overall economic activity. As a share of GDP, nonfinancial business debt increased by 1.8 percentage points to 77.1 percent in 2022 Q2 from 75.3 percent in 2019 Q2. The vast majority of the increase, 2.0 percentage points, comes from nonbank loans (see ■).

Nonfinancial Business Debt

by type, as share of GDP




Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

The debt of the domestic financial sector includes agency and government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) backed securities (see ■), corporate and foreign bonds, loans (see ■), and open market paper. The long-term increase in financial sector debt reflects the emergence and growth of various asset-backed securities. In addition to home mortgage-backed securities, the domestic financial sector issues debt securities based on commercial mortgages, auto loans, credit cards, student debt, and even restaurant revenue.

Domestic financial sector debt has fallen as a share of GDP to 74.9 percent in 2022 Q2 from a housing-bubble peak of 122.7 percent in 2008 Q4.

Financial Sector Debt

by type, as share of GDP



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Industrial Production


The Federal Reserve industrial production index [measures](#) the real output of the industrial sector, which includes manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities.

Industrial production increased 5.3 percent over the year ending September 2022, following an increase of 3.9 percent in August. The manufacturing-only index increased 4.7 percent over the year ending September, and contributed 3.4 percentage points to the growth of the total index. Mining contributed 2.1 percentage points, and utilities did not contribute.

By market group, finished consumer goods contributed one percentage point to one-year industrial production growth in September. Business equipment contributed 1.1 percentage points, nonindustrial supplies contributed 0.5 percentage point, and materials contributed 2.8 percentage points.

Industrial Production

index, 2012=100



Source: Federal Reserve



Industrial Production Growth

one-year growth,
seasonally-adjusted

contribution to total

rate, percent

| | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Sep '21 | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Sep '21 |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total index | 5.3 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 5.3 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| Manufacturing | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 3.7 |
| ■ Durable manufacturing | 2.2 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 6.0 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 4.4 |
| Motor vehicles & parts | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | -0.6 | 19.4 | 10.3 | 9.6 | -13.4 |
| ■ Non durable manufacturing | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 3.6 |
| ■ Mining | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 11.1 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.0 |
| ■ Utilities | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | -1.0 | 4.0 | 2.6 |
| ■ Consumer goods | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 3.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.3 |
| Consumer durables | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.2 | 8.9 | 4.2 | 3.0 | -3.7 |
| Automotive products | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.2 | -0.4 | 16.6 | 8.7 | 7.1 | -11.5 |
| Consumer nondurables | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.9 |
| Foods and tobacco | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.0 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 1.8 | -0.4 |
| Chemical products | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 7.7 |
| Consumer energy products | 0.1 | -0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 1.6 | -0.4 | 2.0 | 5.5 |
| ■ Business equipment & supplies | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 6.2 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 7.0 |
| Equipment | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 9.7 | 8.5 | 6.9 | 10.4 |
| Industrial equipment | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 6.4 | 7.6 | 6.1 | 11.7 |
| Nonindustrial supplies | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 4.5 |
| Construction supplies | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 6.2 |
| Business supplies | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| Materials | 2.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 5.8 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.0 |
| Consumer parts | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 10.3 | 4.3 | 3.7 | -4.5 |
| Equipment parts | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 8.2 |
| Chemical materials | 0.3 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 4.5 | 1.4 | -1.0 | 5.6 |
| ■ Energy materials | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 7.8 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 4.6 |

Source: Federal Reserve




Over the past 30 years, economic conditions and shifts in how production is organized have affected industrial growth. Much of the growth over the period is attributed to the production of materials, such as parts, chemicals, and energy, and to the production of business equipment and supplies. In contrast, there has been virtually no growth in domestic production of finished consumer goods, particularly from 2000 to 2020.

While the manufacturing industry dominated industrial growth in the 1990s, mining and utilities have played a relatively larger role since 2010. Manufacturing growth was relatively weak from 2013 to 2020, but increased starting in 2021.

Contributions to Industrial Production Growth

percentage point contribution to one-year growth, quarterly average




Source: Federal Reserve



Looking more closely at recent industrial production growth, the latest one-year growth rate, covering September 2022, is far above the five-year average, and slightly above the August growth rate. By both market group and industry group, the latest growth is broad-based, with categories contributing relatively evenly.

Recent Data in Detail



Source: Federal Reserve




As of September 2022, of a subset of 12 industries that contribute the majority of industrial production, two increased **production** since February 2020, nine decreased production, and one was unchanged (see ■). Since February 2020, aerospace & miscellaneous transportation equipment production decreased by 24.2 percent, chemical production decreased by 8.1 percent, machinery production decreased by 7.2 percent, and production of computer & electronic products decreased by 6.8 percent.

Since February 2020, eight of the 12 industries increased **capacity**, four decreased capacity, and none were unchanged (see ■). Production capacity for computer & electronic products decreased by 11.9 percent, mining capacity increased by 8.7 percent, and electric & gas utilities capacity decreased by 6.6 percent.

Industrial Production and Capacity

As of September 2022, percent change since February 2020




Source: Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve's monthly industrial production [report](#) also measures the economy's total industrial capacity. The extent to which the economy is using its industrial capacity is called **capacity utilization**, and calculated as industrial production as a share of total industrial capacity. Long-term, capacity utilization has fallen as many US factories and industrial production facilities closed.

In September 2022, the industrial capacity utilization rate was 80.3 percent (see —), and the manufacturing capacity utilization rate was 80.0 percent (see —). Total capacity utilization has fallen by 4.9 percentage points since January 1989.

Capacity Utilization

industrial production as a share of total capacity, percent



Source: Federal Reserve


Energy Production and Use

This subsection looks at the energy sector, and covers oil production and electricity generation and sales.

The Energy Information Administration [report](#) a large increase in US **crude oil production**, from around five million barrels per day in 2007 to nearly 13 million barrels per day at the end of 2019. Much of the increase comes from Texas, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Colorado. During July 2022, the US produced 11.8 million barrels per day.

Crude Oil Production

millions of barrels per day




Source: Energy Information Administration

Since 2011, annualized total US **electricity generation** has increased 2.3 percent. Over the same period, the US population has increased by 6.9 percent (see —) and real GDP has increased by 26.2 percent (see —). As a result, the electricity required to produce a unit of real GDP decreased by 19.3 percent (see —).

Electricity Generation, Population, and Production

cumulative percent change since 2011




Source: EIA, BEA

During the 12 months ending July 2022, the US generated 4,221 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. Of this, 1,635 billion kilowatt hours were generated using natural gas (see ■), 856 billion kilowatt hours were generated from coal (see ■), 773 billion from nuclear (see ■), and 919 billion from renewable sources (see ■).


Electricity Generation by Source

billion kilowatt hours, 12-month moving sum



Source: Energy Information Administration

Renewable Sources




Among renewable energy sources, over the year ending July 2022, 277 billion kilowatt hours of electricity were generated with conventional hydroelectric (see ■), 55 billion kilowatt hours were generated from biomass (see ■), 16 billion were generated from geothermal (see ■), 435 billion from wind (see ■), and 136 billion from solar (see ■).

The Energy Information Administration [report](#) the **retail sales of electricity** to each major sector. These data show a decrease in electricity sales to commercial and industrial sectors during the pandemic, offset in part by increased electricity sales to the residential sector.

Electricity Retail Sales by Sector

billion kilowatt hours, 12-month moving sum



Source: Energy Information Administration

Over the year ending July 2022, retail sales of electricity to the residential sector total 1,504 billion kilowatt hours, compared to 1,440 billion during 2019 (see —). Commercial sector electricity sales total 1,360 billion kilowatt hours over the year ending July 2022, and 1,361 billion kilowatt hours in 2019 (see —). Industrial sector sales total 1,008 billion kilowatt hours in the latest 12 months of data and 1,002 billion kilowatt hours in 2019 (see —).

Retail Sales


The Census Bureau [report](#) the monthly sales of retail businesses, restaurants, and bars. These retail trade figures can be a useful economic indicator. Retail trade includes brick and mortar stores as well as e-commerce and other nonstore sales to the general public.

In August 2022, **retail and food services sales** total \$684.0 billion. On an annualized basis, this is equivalent to 44.0 percent of disposable (after-tax) income (see —), 47.0 percent of consumer spending (see —), and 32.5 percent of GDP (see —). During the first two months of the US COVID-19 pandemic, retail sales were a smaller portion of overall economic activity, as many businesses were closed. Since the initial reopening, retail sales have comprised a larger share of economic activity, in part as other activities, like transportation, have recovered less.

Retail and food service sales, **adjusted for population growth and inflation**, provide additional context on economic developments. Per capita retail and food services sales, adjusted by the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, are \$2,053 during August 2022 (see —). Prior to the pandemic, in 2019, real per capita retail and food service sales averaged \$1,752 per month. Excluding automotive and gasoline sales, per capita sales were \$1,477 in August 2022 and \$1,255 per month in 2019, after adjusting for inflation (see —).


Retail and Food Services Sales

share of aggregate measure, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

real*, per capita, monthly, August 2022 dollars



*Adjusted by PCE price index

Changes in retail and food services sales can indicate shifts in consumer behavior, though these figures are also affected by changes in inflation rates. Retail and food services **sales growth** was 8.2 percent over the year ending September 2022. The three-month moving average growth rate was 9.2 percent (see —). Nonstore sales, for example from online retailers, have increased at a faster rate than other sales, since 1992. Over the past three months, one-year nonstore sales growth averaged 13.9 percent (see —).

Retail and Food Services Sales Growth

annual growth, percent, 3-month moving average



Source: Census Bureau

Since 1992, the share of after-tax income spent at different **kinds of businesses** has diverged wildly. In large part, this is due to the growth of e-commerce, with online sales replacing brick and mortar sales. However, there have also been shifts in other consumer preferences and relative prices.


Nonstore sales were 1.7 percent of after-tax income in January 1992 and 7.0 percent in August 2022, a shift that is equivalent to \$992 billion per year. Since 1992, sales as a share of after-tax income has decreased in food and beverage stores (-2.7 percentage points), clothing and accessories stores (-0.8 percentage points), and general merchandise stores (-0.6 percentage points).

Some sales categories were boosted by the housing bubble during the 2000s and its associated wealth effects, then fell sharply following the collapse of the bubble. Building and garden equipment, furniture and home furnishings stores, and motor vehicle sales all claimed a larger share of income during the 1990s and 2000s than during the 2010s. Meanwhile, food service and drinking places and health and personal care stores received a relatively stable share of income from 2000 until the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit restaurants and bars particularly hard.

Lastly, some categories are more affected by changes in relative prices. Sales at gasoline stations, for example, move with gasoline prices. Likewise, an increase in building material prices during the pandemic partially boosted the share of income spent at building and garden equipment stores.

Retail Sales by Kind of Business

share of disposable personal income, January 1992 to August 2022



Source: Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis



Government

Public institutions are collectively referred to as the *public-sector* or the *government*. In the United States, the government has the authority to spend, tax, and create money, as well as to regulate economic and financial activity. The government also enforces and determines the ownership of property. These activities are all extremely important to production and distribution in the economy.


This chartbook section covers government sector statistics, including contributions to current economic activity, receipts and expenditures, assets and liabilities, and government jobs.

Current Economic Activity

The government has several roles in society and there are multiple ways to interpret its contribution to current economic activity. The contribution to overall economic activity from the government sector can be measured as: 1) the gross output of the sector minus intermediate inputs used in production (value added); 2) the government income payments to people and on behalf of people and taxes and social insurance contributions; or 3) the sum of government expenditures on final goods and services, including investment.

The value added in production by the government sector is composed primarily of the compensation of government employees. These employees provide all types of services: education, health care, transportation, utilities, sanitation, etc. Government value added also includes a residual term called **gross operating surplus**, much of which reflects money spent replacing and maintaining government fixed assets.

Value Added in Domestic Production
per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



In the second quarter of 2022, the federal government value added in domestic production is \$913.7 billion, equivalent to \$2,744 per capita (see —). In 2019 Q4, federal government value added in production was equivalent to \$2,684 per capita, after adjusting for inflation.


State and local government value added in domestic production is \$2,021.0 billion in 2022 Q2 and \$1,846.9 billion in 2019 Q4, equivalent to \$6,070 and \$6,190 per capita, respectively (see —).

Payments from the government to people include both the wages and salaries of government workers and transfer payments, also referred to as government social benefits or welfare. Welfare is critically important to society, yet the word is stigmatized in the US. It's worth noting that a huge portion of US welfare payments are not cash transfers to people but payments to businesses on behalf of people. For example, the US overpays for prescription drugs and medical services on behalf of people. Those over-payments benefit shareholders and doctors. The US also structures certain welfare payments as complex phased-in tax credits, paid the following year, which have very high private administrative costs (around ten percent goes to tax preparation services) and exclude the poorest people.

Over the past thirty years, welfare payments, including those made to businesses, have mostly kept pace with consumer spending, while tax collection lagged behind income growth. Increased welfare payments on a per capita basis reflect price protections for the medical industry, as well as a larger share of the population receiving social security benefits. During the COVID-19 pandemic, consumer spending on services collapsed as businesses were closed, while government transfer payments to people hit record highs. As a result, estimates show seven million people taken out of poverty.

Personal Income and Outlays

per capita, thousands of 2022 Q2 dollars



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


In 2022 Q2, government worker wages and salaries, not including benefits, were equivalent to \$4,807 per capita, following a price-adjusted \$4,957 in 2019 Q4 (see —). Welfare payments were equivalent to \$11,441 per capita in 2022 Q2, compared to \$10,436 per capita in 2019 Q4 (see —). In 1989 Q1, welfare payments were equivalent to \$4,231 per person.

Personal current taxes and social insurance contributions total \$14,594 per capita in 2022 Q2, \$12,243 in 2019 Q4, and \$7,752 in 1989 (see —).

Another approach to calculating the government sector effect on current economic activity is to add up spending on final goods and services. Government consumption and investment tends to be more stable than consumer spending or private investment, and thus tends to rise as a share of economic activity during recessions. This category does not include government transfer payments, which mostly become consumer spending.

Consumption and Investment

share of GDP, percent



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

In 2022 Q2, federal non-defense spending and investment was \$704.4 billion, equivalent to 2.8 percent of GDP (see —), compared to 2.7 percent of GDP in 2019 Q4. Federal spending on national defense was equivalent to 3.6 percent of GDP in the latest quarter and 4.0 percent in 2019 Q4 (see —). National defense spending was 6.9 percent of GDP in 1989 Q1.

In 2022 Q2, state and local government spending and investment was equivalent to 11.1 percent of GDP, compared to 11.0 percent in 2019 Q4 (see —).


Government Consumption and Investment

Government consumption and investment directly affect economic growth in the short-term. In the second quarter of 2022, government consumption spending and investment subtracted 0.29 percentage point from the real GDP growth rate of -0.6 percent. Over the latest four quarters, government consumption and investment subtracted 0.22 percentage point to economic growth, on average. Since 1989, the average contribution has been 0.23 percentage points.

Over the four quarters ending 2022 Q2, by level of government, national defense subtracted 0.15 percentage point (see ■), other federal government subtracted 0.12 percentage point (see ■), and state and local government contributed 0.05 percentage point (see ■).

Government Consumption and Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth, one-year moving average



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



Government Consumption and Investment

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth

moving averages

| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q4 | '21 Q3 | '21 Q2 | 3- year | 10- year | 30- year |
|----------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total | -0.29 | -0.40 | -0.16 | -0.02 | -0.54 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.21 |
| Federal total | -0.22 | -0.36 | 0.01 | -0.51 | -0.50 | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.08 |
| ■ National defense | 0.05 | -0.33 | -0.20 | -0.12 | -0.10 | 0.00 | -0.04 | 0.02 |
| Consumption expenditures | 0.09 | -0.21 | -0.19 | -0.16 | -0.09 | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.01 |
| Gross investment | -0.04 | -0.11 | -0.01 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| ■ Nondefense | -0.28 | -0.03 | 0.21 | -0.39 | -0.40 | 0.16 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Consumption expenditures | -0.28 | -0.06 | 0.21 | -0.41 | -0.41 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Gross investment | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| ■ State & local total | -0.06 | -0.04 | -0.17 | 0.49 | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.14 |
| Consumption expenditures | 0.10 | 0.08 | -0.10 | 0.54 | 0.22 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
| Gross investment | -0.16 | -0.13 | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.26 | -0.05 | -0.00 | 0.02 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis




Government current expenditures include consumption and investment as well as transfers such as government social benefits to persons. Government spending provides services and income to people. Government current receipts come primarily from taxes. When government expenditures exceed receipts, it is referred to as a *government deficit*, and corresponds to a private sector surplus. A large government deficit, relative to GDP, means the government is increasing current household income and corporate profits.

Federal government expenditures total \$5.9 trillion, or 23.5 percent of GDP, in 2022 Q2. Receipts for the same period total \$5.1 trillion or 20.1 percent of GDP. In 2022 Q2, the federal government deficit was \$864 billion or 3.4 percent of GDP.

Combined state and local government expenditures total \$3.6 trillion, or 14.1 percent of GDP, in 2022 Q2. Receipts for the same period total \$3.5 trillion or 14.0 percent of GDP. In 2022 Q2, the combined state and local government deficit was \$38 billion or 0.2 percent of GDP.


Receipts and Expenditures as Share of GDP



The United States Treasury [report](#) federal government receipts and outlays in the Monthly Treasury Statement. Over the 12 months ending August 2022, **Federal government receipts** total \$4.9 trillion, of which \$2.6 trillion are from individual income taxes (see —). The remaining receipts (see —) are largely social insurance contributions (\$1.5 trillion) and corporate income taxes (\$0.4 trillion).

Federal Government Receipts

trillions of USD, one-year moving sum



Composition of Federal Government Spending

Over the long-term, there have been important shifts in the **composition of federal spending**. The ways federal spending varies from these long-term trends, in the short-term, are also important.


Over the long-term, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data [show](#) national defense spending fell to 15.2 percent of outlays in 2019 from 26.6 percent in 1989 (see [■](#)). Discretionary non-defense spending maintained a relative stable share of spending over the period (see [■](#)). Net interest expense, the cost of federal borrowing, fell along with long-term interest rates, to 8.4 percent of outlays in 2019 from 14.8 percent in 1989 (see [■](#)).

Offsetting the reduction in spending on interest and national defense, Medicare and Social Security now make up a larger share of federal spending, as a larger share of people are retirement age. Likewise, spending on the social safety net (means-tested benefits and Medicaid) increased as employment-to-population ratios fell and Medicaid was expanded. Medicare (see [■](#)), Social Security (see [■](#)), and the social safety net (see [■](#)) combine to comprise 54.8 percent of federal spending in 2019, compared to 34.7 percent in 1989.


Composition of Federal Government Outlays

share of total, percent

Since 1990, by Budget Enforcement Act Type



Recent Monthly, by Type*



* The two charts use different data sources with different categories and therefore do not match.

The Treasury Bureau of Fiscal Service [report](#) federal outlays by type on a monthly basis (see right chart above). The categories used in the Treasury monthly report are not the same as those used in the OMB data, so the two charts above should not be compared. The higher-frequency Treasury data, however, are helpful for showing short-term changes, and **recent changes in the composition of federal spending**.

Income security, which includes economic impact payments, the child tax credit, unemployment compensation, food and nutrition assistance, federal employee retirement and disability, and housing assistance, was 15.1 percent of federal spending over the 12 months ending August 2022 (see [■](#)). At its peak, over the 12 months ending March 2021, income security comprised 24.7 percent of federal spending. Pre-pandemic, in 2019, the category comprised 11.3 percent.

The category labeled “other” in the above right chart includes several subcategories worth examining. The category increased to 16.0 percent of federal spending during the 12 months ending August 2022, from 24.2 percent during the 12 months ending March 2021 (see ■). Prior to the pandemic, in 2019, the category was 12.8 percent of spending.

Within the “other” category, the biggest changes during the pandemic came from business and housing subsidies (commerce and housing credit) and transfers to state and local governments (general government). The category is described in the following table.

Composition of Federal Government Outlays

share of total, percent

| | Aug 2022 | Jul 2022 | Jun 2022 | Mar 2021 | 2019 | 2017 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------|------|
| ■ Income Security | 15.1 | 16.0 | 16.7 | 26.0 | 11.8 | 12.8 |
| ■ Health | 15.5 | 15.6 | 15.3 | 10.9 | 12.8 | 13.4 |
| ■ Medicare | 12.1 | 11.6 | 11.9 | 10.4 | 14.7 | 15.0 |
| ■ Social Security | 20.6 | 20.8 | 20.3 | 14.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 |
| ■ National Defense | 12.8 | 12.8 | 12.7 | 9.7 | 16.0 | 15.2 |
| ■ Net Interest | 7.9 | 7.7 | 7.3 | 4.1 | 8.3 | 6.6 |
| ■ Other: | 16.0 | 15.7 | 15.8 | 24.2 | 12.8 | 13.1 |
| Administration of Justice | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Agriculture | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| Commerce & Housing Credit | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.5 | 9.8 | -0.5 | -0.8 |
| Community & Regional Development | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Educ., Training, Employment, & Social Serv. | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 3.2 |
| Energy | -0.1 | -0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| General Government | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| General Science, Space, & Technology | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| International Affairs | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Natural Resources & Environment | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
| Transportation | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| Undistributed Offsetting Receipts | -3.7 | -3.7 | -3.6 | -1.5 | -2.3 | -2.3 |
| Veterans Benefits & Services | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 4.4 |


Source: Treasury Bureau of Fiscal Service

Government Jobs

Government workers provide public services to the population. As examples, federal government jobs include the Postal Service, state government jobs include teachers and social workers, and local governments employ firefighters and utilities workers. Additionally, government employment is traditionally a relatively-stable source of aggregate household income. Government jobs are also disproportionately likely to provide health insurance and retirement benefits.

Government Employment

share of age 16+ population, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

In September 2022, there were 22.3 million government jobs, equivalent to 8.4 for every 100 people in the age 16 and older population (see —). The previous year, in September 2021, there were 22.1 million government jobs, equivalent to 8.4 percent of the age 16 and older population. During the 1990s, there were 9.7 government jobs per person age 16 or older. If the rate was the same today, there would be 3.5 million additional government workers.

By level of government, there were 14.2 million local government workers in September 2022, equivalent to 5.4 percent of those age 16 or older (see —). In the same period, there were 5.2 million state government workers (2.0 percent of 16+ year olds, see —), and 2.9 million federal government workers (1.1 percent, see —).


Since 2019, the US has lost 449,000 total government jobs. Of these, 461,000, or 102.7 percent of the shortfall, are local government jobs. During the same period, state governments lost 16,000 jobs, while the federal government added 28,000 jobs.

Government Net Investment

Government gross investment, less depreciation, is the government's net investment in the tangible assets that make the economy more productive. Government investment includes infrastructure, buildings, equipment, intellectual property, and other capital goods. In the latest data, covering 2022 Q2, government net investment is \$127.7 billion. Government net investment is equivalent to 0.51 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 (see —), compared to 0.68 percent in 2021 Q2, and 0.94 percent in 2020 Q2.

Government Net Investment

government investment less depreciation, share of GDP



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



Government Balance Sheets


Public Wealth

Government balance sheets can be summarized and put into broader context by examining the **government share of US net worth**. Net worth, or assets minus liabilities, summarizes the overall financial position. Excluding public land, the federal government's debt exceeds the market value of its assets and its financial position is negative. State and local government instead have a sizable portion of US wealth.

The combined US government sector has a net worth of -\$20.6 trillion, as of 2022 Q2, equivalent to -7.8 percent of national wealth (see —). Federal government net worth (excluding land) is equal to -15.8 percent of national wealth (see —), while state and local government net worth is equivalent to 8.0 percent (see —).

Government Share of US Wealth

government share of US net worth, percent




Source: Federal Reserve



Liabilities

Treasury bonds are held by a mixture of investors, including private domestic investors, overseas investors, the Federal Reserve, and government agencies and trusts (referred to as intragovernmental holdings).

In the second quarter of 2022, total **public debt** was \$30.6 trillion, equivalent to 121.1 percent of GDP. Of this, \$10.7 trillion, or 35.1 percent of the total, is held by private domestic investors (see ■). An additional \$7.4 trillion, or 24.3 percent of the total, is held by foreign investors (see ■). The remainder is held by the Federal Reserve (see ■) and various government agencies and trusts (see ■), such as the Social Security Trust Fund.




Interest Expense

The ratio of public debt to GDP increased during the COVID-19 response, while the typical interest income from holding public debt fell because of lower interest rates. Treasuries and other government debt securities provide a safe asset for the balance sheets domestic households and businesses, and for foreign investors. The Federal Reserve has also absorbed some of the newly issued treasuries.

The Office of Management and Budget **report federal interest outlays** of \$352 billion in fiscal year 2021, compared to \$345 billion in fiscal year 2020. Put into the context of the size of the economy, federal interest outlays in fiscal year 2021 were equivalent to 1.56 percent of GDP (see —), following 1.64 percent of GDP in FY2020 and 1.77 percent in FY2019, and compared to an average of 2.9 percent in the 1990s, when interest rates were substantially higher.

Federal Interest Outlays



The actual interest expense is slightly lower than the reported figure, because interest paid to the Federal Reserve gets returned to the Treasury. In FY2021, the Fed returned more than \$90 billion to the Treasury. Adjusting for these remittances, the interest expense was 1.11 percent of GDP in FY2021 (see —).

Debt Sustainability

Changes in the ratio of federal government debt to GDP can be [decomposed](#) to understand how various economic forces affect the trajectory of the debt relative to our ability to service it. Specifically, **debt sustainability** is affected not only by borrowing but also by changes in real interest rates and economic growth.


In a mechanical way, government debt is the result of the accumulation of past deficits. When the government spends more than it takes in through taxes, it borrows the difference, which adds to the debt. Importantly, some government spending is interest payments on the debt. The *primary balance* measures the gap between spending excluding interest payments and revenue. Interest payments are a product of the interest rate and the existing debt. Higher real interest rates mean larger interest payments which increase deficits and, in turn, increase debt.

Federal debt is often divided by GDP as a way to capture the ability to repay the debt. The basic idea is that **a growing economy gradually erodes the burden of its debt**. As the economy grows, it is better able to produce the resources needed to repay its debt. Finally, there are often discrepancies between when borrowing occurs and when spending occurs, and the account balances at the Treasury vary over time. For example, the Treasury Secretary made more cash available to cover any potential short-term needs during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Stock-flow adjustments correct for the difference between the change in liabilities (the stock) and the current federal deficit or surplus (the flow).

In 2021, the debt to GDP ratio decreased by 3.6 percentage points (see ○). The primary balance added 9.7 percentage points to the debt to GDP ratio (see ■), economic growth subtracted 6.2 percentage points (see ■), and real interest rates subtracted 2.3 percentage points (see ■). These combined factors were greater than the actual change in liabilities; the adjustment to reconcile stocks and flows subtracted 4.9 percentage points (see ■).

Federal Government Debt Dynamics

contribution to change in debt to GDP ratio, percentage points



Source: Author's Calculations, Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Assets


US government assets include financial assets but are mostly comprised of the non-financial assets of state and local governments (SLG), such as buildings and equipment. Land is not included in US measures of government assets.

In the second quarter of 2022, the market value of government assets, excluding land, is \$27.6 trillion, equivalent to 109.2 percent of GDP. Of this, state and local government nonfinancial assets, such as buildings and equipment, are equivalent to 59.1 percent of GDP (see ■), and state and local government financial assets, such as insurance trust funds, are equivalent to 17.4 percent of GDP (see ■).

The market value of federal government nonfinancial assets is equivalent to 16.8 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2 (see ■). Federal government financial assets are valued at 15.8 percent of GDP (see ■).

Government Assets

does not include land, percent of GDP



Source: Federal Reserve



International Transactions

Transactions between the US and the rest of the world are recorded in the balance of payments as either current account transactions (which measure income) or capital and financial account transactions (which measure change in ownership of assets). This section discusses both types of transactions with a focus on the difference between payments from residents and payments to residents, referred to as the balance of payments. The section also covers trade in more detail and discusses trends in exchange rates.

Balance of Payments


The **current account balance** captures international payments for goods and services as well as international transfers of money and net income received from ownership of foreign assets. It is the result of a set of payments to US residents, called current receipts, which are largely for exports of goods and services and returns on foreign assets, and a set of payments from US residents to the rest of the world, called current payments. Current payments are for goods and services imports, as well as transfers and payments for foreign ownership of US-based assets.

The current account balance can be decomposed into the balance on trade in goods (see ■), the balance on trade in services (see ■), the balance on primary income (such as wages or income from assets [see ■]), and secondary income (such as remittances and taxes [see ■]).

As of 2022 Q2, the US runs a current account deficit of 4.0 percent of GDP, primarily as the result of a trade deficit on goods of 5.0 percent of GDP. In 2022 Q1, the current account deficit was equivalent to 4.5, and the trade deficit was equivalent to 5.5 percent of GDP.

Current Account Balance

balance on individual current account component, as percent of GDP



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

US current payments exceed current receipts and the US runs a persistent current account deficit. As a result, the extra flow of income (including in the form of goods and services) is balanced by an outflow of assets. Economic theory suggests that investment flows towards countries with lower labor costs and less capital per worker, as they have higher marginal productivity from additional capital. However, in the case of the US the opposite is happening, as net investment is flowing from less-developed countries with lower wages into the US. In other words, the US is borrowing money from less-developed countries to balance out its trade deficit, as shown in the financial accounts.

Components of Current Account

share of GDP, percent

| | 2022 | '22 | '21 | '21 | '21 | '21 | moving averages | |
|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------|---------|
| | Q2 | Q1 | Q4 | Q3 | Q2 | Q1 | 3-year | 10-year |
| Current receipts | 17.63 | 16.71 | 16.56 | 16.29 | 16.23 | 16.16 | 16.62 | 18.00 |
| Exports | 12.04 | 11.36 | 11.22 | 10.84 | 10.86 | 10.62 | 11.01 | 12.21 |
| Goods | 8.45 | 7.84 | 7.71 | 7.44 | 7.47 | 7.24 | 7.38 | 8.15 |
| Durable | 4.21 | 4.15 | 4.10 | 4.09 | 4.19 | 4.14 | 4.17 | 4.92 |
| Nondurable | 4.25 | 3.69 | 3.61 | 3.35 | 3.28 | 3.10 | 3.21 | 3.23 |
| Services | 3.58 | 3.52 | 3.51 | 3.40 | 3.39 | 3.38 | 3.63 | 4.06 |
| Income receipts | 4.88 | 4.64 | 4.60 | 4.70 | 4.61 | 4.74 | 4.84 | 5.01 |
| Transfer receipts | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.73 | 0.75 | 0.76 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 0.78 |
| Current payments | 21.67 | 21.19 | 20.29 | 20.18 | 19.89 | 19.65 | 19.75 | 20.48 |
| Imports | 16.14 | 15.88 | 14.98 | 14.62 | 14.48 | 14.24 | 14.33 | 15.24 |
| Goods | 13.45 | 13.30 | 12.44 | 12.10 | 12.18 | 12.07 | 11.86 | 12.53 |
| Durable | 8.38 | 8.45 | 7.90 | 7.74 | 7.96 | 7.99 | 7.65 | 7.93 |
| Nondurable | 5.06 | 4.84 | 4.54 | 4.36 | 4.22 | 4.08 | 4.21 | 4.59 |
| Services | 2.69 | 2.58 | 2.54 | 2.51 | 2.30 | 2.17 | 2.47 | 2.71 |
| Income payments | 4.05 | 3.87 | 3.86 | 3.99 | 3.98 | 3.85 | 3.91 | 3.79 |
| Transfer payments | 1.48 | 1.44 | 1.45 | 1.57 | 1.43 | 1.55 | 1.51 | 1.46 |
| Current account balance | -4.04 | -4.48 | -3.73 | -3.89 | -3.66 | -3.49 | -3.13 | -2.48 |


Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

The financial account measures transactions between the US and the rest of the world that result in changes in the ownership of assets. The **financial account balance** captures the difference between capital inflows and capital outflows, and offsets the current account balance. Each quarter, the US acquires foreign goods and services, and the rest of the world acquires US assets, on a net basis.

In the second quarter of 2022, the rest of the world acquired \$2.15 trillion in US assets, equivalent to 7.9 percent of GDP (see ■). The rest of the world incurred the equivalent of -2.7 percent of US GDP in liabilities (see ■) and issued -2.7 percent of US GDP of equity in foreign businesses (see ■).

Financial Account Balance

percent of GDP, one-year moving average




Source: Federal Reserve

Trade

Goods and services trade between the US and the rest of the world is **reported** each month by the Census Bureau. US purchases of foreign goods and services are imports and foreign purchases of US goods and services are exports. Trade in goods includes consumer goods, industrial equipment, and agricultural products. Trade in services includes travel and tourism, business services, and charges for the use of intellectual property, among other services.

US Imports and Exports, Monthly
billions of USD, seasonally adjusted



US imports of goods and services totaled \$326.3 billion in August 2022, following imports of \$330.0 billion in July (see —). Over the three months ending August 2022, imports averaged \$332.0 billion per month, compared to an average of \$284.8 billion per month one year prior, during the same three months. In 2019, imports averaged \$258.8 billion per month.

Trade Balance, Monthly
billions of USD, seasonally adjusted



The US exported \$258.9 billion of goods and services in August 2022, following \$259.6 billion in July (see —). The three-month average was \$259.1 billion in August, and \$214.1 billion one year prior. Exports were \$212.2 billion per month, on average, in 2019.

Spending on imports exceeds payments received for exports, so the US runs a trade deficit. In August, the trade deficit was \$67.4 billion, following \$70.5 billion in July (see —). Over the past three months, the trade deficit averaged \$72.9 billion, compared to an average of \$70.7 billion one year prior, during the same three months. In 2019, the trade deficit averaged \$46.6 billion per month.


Source: Census Bureau



Nonpetroleum goods and services imports (see —) were equivalent to 14.8 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2022, while exports of nonpetroleum goods and services (see —) were equivalent to 10.6 percent of GDP. In 2019 Q4, nonpetroleum imports were 13.1 percent of GDP, and exports were 10.7 percent.

Imports and Exports, Nonpetroleum

includes goods and services, but excludes petroleum products, share of GDP




Contribution to Overall Growth

The **trade balance** (exports of goods ■ and services ■ minus imports of goods ■ and services ■) acts as an adjustment to consumption and investment when calculating domestic production using the expenditure approach. A country with a positive trade balance, or trade surplus, produces more exports than its residents purchase in imports, therefore its trade balance is added to domestic purchases to calculate domestic production. The US runs a persistent trade deficit, which is instead subtracted from spending data to calculate domestic production.

Goods exports contributed 1.18 percentage points to GDP growth in the second quarter of 2022 while services exports contributed 0.33 percentage point. Good imports contributed 0.05 percentage point to GDP growth and services imports subtracted 0.41 percentage point.

International Trade

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth



Changes to the trade balance can come from many sources, such as changes in domestic or foreign preferences and income, changes in exchange rates, and changes in trade policy. The following table shows major categories of trade as a share of gross domestic product at various points over the past 30 years.

Exports and Imports by Type

percentage point share of GDP

| | period averages | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2022 Q2 | '22 Q1 | '21 Q2 | 2016 | 2012 -13 | 2005 -06 | 1998 -99 | 1989 -93 |
| Exports of goods and services | 12.04 | 11.36 | 10.86 | 11.94 | 13.61 | 10.31 | 10.41 | 9.42 |
| Exports of goods | 8.45 | 7.84 | 7.47 | 7.74 | 9.35 | 7.30 | 7.52 | 6.84 |
| Foods, feeds, and beverages | 0.80 | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.70 | 0.81 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.60 |
| Industrial supplies & materials | 3.45 | 2.98 | 2.64 | 2.07 | 2.95 | 1.92 | 1.55 | 1.65 |
| Petroleum and products | 1.43 | 1.15 | 0.89 | 0.53 | 0.90 | 0.28 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
| Capital goods, except automotive | 2.23 | 2.24 | 2.29 | 2.78 | 3.21 | 2.84 | 3.27 | 2.61 |
| Automotive vehicles, & parts | 0.62 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.77 | 0.79 | 0.67 |
| Consumer goods, ex. food & auto | 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 1.03 | 1.12 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.74 |
| Durable goods | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.56 | 0.61 | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.39 |
| Nondurable goods | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.35 |
| Exports of services | 3.58 | 3.52 | 3.39 | 4.20 | 4.26 | 3.01 | 2.90 | 2.58 |
| Transport | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.28 | 0.44 | 0.54 | 0.46 | 0.49 | 0.59 |
| Travel | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.27 | 1.03 | 0.98 | 0.71 | 0.93 | 0.90 |
| Intellectual property charges | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| Other business services | 2.11 | 2.13 | 2.20 | 2.00 | 1.92 | 1.19 | 0.92 | 0.60 |
| Imports of goods and services | 16.14 | 15.88 | 14.48 | 14.65 | 16.73 | 15.99 | 12.65 | 10.38 |
| Imports of goods | 13.45 | 13.30 | 12.18 | 11.87 | 13.87 | 13.48 | 10.59 | 8.45 |
| Foods, feeds, and beverages | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.80 | 0.70 | 0.69 | 0.54 | 0.46 | 0.43 |
| Industrial supplies & materials | 3.43 | 3.16 | 2.69 | 2.34 | 4.24 | 4.24 | 2.22 | 2.16 |
| Petroleum and products | 1.35 | 1.15 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 2.49 | 2.15 | 0.65 | 0.87 |
| Capital goods, except automotive | 3.43 | 3.48 | 3.30 | 3.18 | 3.36 | 3.00 | 3.03 | 2.04 |
| Automotive vehicles, & parts | 1.58 | 1.53 | 1.51 | 1.88 | 1.84 | 1.84 | 1.74 | 1.46 |
| Consumer goods, ex. food & auto | 3.60 | 3.69 | 3.28 | 3.13 | 3.18 | 3.20 | 2.47 | 1.83 |
| Durable goods | 1.87 | 1.98 | 1.75 | 1.64 | 1.71 | 1.75 | 1.29 | 0.97 |
| Nondurable goods | 1.72 | 1.71 | 1.53 | 1.49 | 1.47 | 1.46 | 1.18 | 0.86 |
| Imports of services | 2.69 | 2.58 | 2.30 | 2.78 | 2.87 | 2.51 | 2.06 | 1.93 |
| Transport | 0.65 | 0.58 | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.59 | 0.60 | 0.54 | 0.55 |
| Travel | 0.43 | 0.33 | 0.20 | 0.58 | 0.55 | 0.57 | 0.63 | 0.61 |
| Intellectual property charges | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.06 |
| Other business services | 1.31 | 1.31 | 1.35 | 1.32 | 1.32 | 0.91 | 0.57 | 0.38 |

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Import Penetration

Goods can be produced domestically, imported, or some combination of the two. The import share of the total US demand for goods, measured as US produced goods and imported goods less exported goods, is also referred to as **import penetration**. This measure has risen considerably over the past thirty years. The majority of the long-term increase has been concentrated in consumer goods, while the decrease since 2011 has come primarily from petroleum and related products.


From 1989 to 2011, imports of consumer goods excluding petroleum increased by the equivalent of 5.7 percent of domestic consumption of goods; petroleum-related imports increased by the equivalent of 6.3 percent; and all other goods imports increased by the equivalent of 6.2 percent.

Since 2011, imports of consumer goods increased by the equivalent of 0.1 percent of domestic goods demand; imports of petroleum products decreased by the equivalent of 4.7 percent; and other imports increased by the equivalent of 0.4 percent.

As of 2022 Q2, imports of consumer goods excluding petroleum and petroleum products are equivalent to 16.5 percent of domestic consumption of goods (see ■). Petroleum-related imports claim 3.7 percent (see ■) and imports of all other goods, primarily capital goods, industrial supplies, and materials, are equivalent to 16.6 percent (see ■).

Import Share of Goods

import share of domestic-produced and imported goods less exports, by category



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



International Transactions

The US Census Bureau [report](#) monthly data on US trade in goods, including by partner country. In August 2022, trade with the top 25 trading partners (see table) comprises 86.0 percent of total US trade in goods.

US Trade in Goods

*census basis, millions of USD,
not seasonally adjusted*

August 2022

August 2021

| | Imports | Exports | Total | Imports | Exports | Total |
|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total, All Countries | 283,770 | 180,259 | 464,029 | 245,277 | 147,906 | 393,183 |
| Mexico | 40,313 | 29,984 | 70,298 | 32,075 | 24,120 | 56,196 |
| Canada | 38,817 | 31,223 | 70,041 | 30,967 | 25,766 | 56,733 |
| China | 50,348 | 12,906 | 63,255 | 42,896 | 11,239 | 54,135 |
| Japan | 12,418 | 7,799 | 20,217 | 12,375 | 6,218 | 18,594 |
| Germany | 12,107 | 6,457 | 18,564 | 12,220 | 5,619 | 17,840 |
| South Korea | 9,530 | 6,077 | 15,607 | 8,486 | 5,444 | 13,931 |
| Vietnam | 12,411 | 986 | 13,398 | 9,370 | 956 | 10,326 |
| Taiwan | 8,393 | 3,960 | 12,354 | 6,742 | 3,002 | 9,745 |
| United Kingdom | 5,209 | 6,202 | 11,412 | 4,702 | 5,257 | 9,960 |
| India | 7,029 | 3,721 | 10,750 | 6,524 | 3,477 | 10,001 |
| Netherlands | 2,402 | 6,573 | 8,975 | 3,243 | 4,271 | 7,515 |
| Brazil | 3,574 | 4,793 | 8,367 | 2,780 | 4,900 | 7,681 |
| Italy | 6,342 | 1,878 | 8,220 | 5,310 | 1,863 | 7,173 |
| France | 4,500 | 3,615 | 8,116 | 3,825 | 2,524 | 6,350 |
| Switzerland | 4,155 | 3,573 | 7,729 | 5,209 | 2,796 | 8,005 |
| Ireland | 6,396 | 1,192 | 7,588 | 6,293 | 1,219 | 7,513 |
| Singapore | 2,705 | 4,282 | 6,987 | 2,191 | 2,913 | 5,105 |
| Thailand | 5,527 | 1,192 | 6,720 | 4,160 | 995 | 5,156 |
| Malaysia | 4,564 | 1,629 | 6,194 | 5,259 | 1,269 | 6,528 |
| Belgium | 2,056 | 2,862 | 4,918 | 1,546 | 2,873 | 4,420 |
| Spain | 2,136 | 2,390 | 4,526 | 1,816 | 1,201 | 3,017 |
| Indonesia | 3,004 | 861 | 3,866 | 2,366 | 768 | 3,135 |
| Australia | 1,306 | 2,371 | 3,678 | 1,208 | 2,354 | 3,563 |
| Colombia | 1,502 | 1,820 | 3,323 | 1,093 | 1,440 | 2,533 |
| Chile | 1,117 | 1,888 | 3,006 | 1,457 | 1,553 | 3,010 |

Source: Census Bureau


International Investment Position

The US **net international investment position (IIP)** measures the difference between residents' foreign assets and liabilities. The Bureau of Economic Analysis [report](#) US IIP data on a quarterly basis beginning in 2006, while prior data are annual.

In 2022 Q2, domestic holdings of foreign assets total \$31.0 trillion, equivalent to 122.7 percent of GDP (see [—](#)). In 2022 Q1, these assets were equivalent to 137.6 percent of GDP, and in 2019, they were equivalent to 129.7 percent. Domestic liabilities to the foreign sector total \$47.3 trillion, or 187.3 percent of GDP, in 2022 Q2, following 209.3 percent in 2022 Q1, and 181.4 percent in 2019 (see [—](#)).

The overall result of these financial positions, net IIP, or holdings of foreign assets minus liabilities, identifies the US as a net debtor to the rest of the world, to the equivalent of 64.6 percent of GDP in 2022 Q2, following 71.7 percent in 2022 Q1, and 51.7 percent in 2019 (see [—](#)).

International Investment
share of GDP, percent




Capital Flows

The [purchases and sales](#) of US bonds by the rest of the world give insight into overall **capital flows** and appetite for different types of debt. During the 2000s, other countries were accumulating US corporate and government bonds, as the US was borrowing from the rest of the world and running a very wide trade deficit. In 2020, the rest of the world was a net purchaser of US government agency bonds but a net seller of treasuries.

Over the year ending August 2022, the rest of the world was a net buyer of \$635 billion of US treasury bonds, equivalent to 2.5 percent of US GDP (see [■](#)). Over the same period, the rest of the world was a net buyer of \$302 billion of US agency bonds, (see [■](#)), and a net buyer of \$142 billion of US corporate bonds, (see [■](#)).

Long-Term Bond Flows

*purchases by foreigners minus sales by foreigners
trailing 12-month sum, billions of August 2022 US dollars*



Source: Treasury International Capital, Setser




Exchange Rates

Changes in the strength or weakness of the US dollar (USD) can affect trade and financial flows. The dollar is said to be relatively strong when more units of foreign currency, for example Japanese yen (JPY), British pounds (GBP), euros (EUR), or Canadian dollars (CAD), are required to buy one USD.

As of October 14, 2022, one US dollar buys approximately: 1.39 Canadian dollars (see —), 148 Japanese yen (see —), 1.03 euros (see —), and 0.89 British pounds (see —). Over the past three years, the nominal exchange rate between the US dollar and the Canadian dollar increased 11.4 percent, the USD-JPY rate increased 30.8 percent, the USD-EUR rate increased 18.8 percent, and the USD-GBP rate increased 21.7 percent.

Selected Exchange Rates

units of foreign currency required to purchase one US dollar




Source: Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve **trade-weighted dollar** indices **track** weighted-average foreign exchange rates based on 26 currencies that are important to US trade. The **weight** of each currency in the index is based on the bilateral trade share of total trade in goods and services. These US dollar indices can simplify analysis of the overall role of foreign exchange rates on US trade.

Dollar Indices

trade-weighted foreign exchange rate, index, January 2006=100



Source: Federal Reserve

The **broad dollar index** (see —) summarizes foreign exchange rates between the US and trading partners by weighting foreign currencies in the index by the total amount of goods and services trade with the relevant countries.

As of October 14, 2022, the broad dollar index is 28.5 percent above its value at inception in 2006. Over the past three years, the index value has averaged 116.8, compared to an average of 113.3 over the previous three-years.


The Fed separately calculates the trade-weighted exchange rate with **advanced economies**, and with **emerging markets**. Since 2006, the dollar has increased 33.7 percent against emerging market currencies (see —), and increased 24.9 percent against advanced economy currencies (see —).

Summarizing exchange rates using a trade-weighted index can be complicated by shifts in relative consumer prices between the US and trading partners. For example, the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Japanese yen has been relatively stable in nominal terms since the 1990s, but there has been less inflation in consumer prices in Japan than in the US. As a result, 100 yen buys more consumer goods in Japan than one dollar will buy in the US.

By incorporating the consumer price index in the US and in trading partners, again weighted by the amount of trade with each partner, it is possible to compare a basket of consumer goods across currencies. The measure is still affected by differences in the consumer basket between countries.

USD Real Effective Exchange Rate

trade-weighted foreign exchange rate,
index, January 2010=100



Source: BIS



The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) [calculates](#) **real effective exchange rates** for many countries, on a monthly basis. As of August 2022, the US dollar real effective exchange rate has increased 29.0 percent since 2010. In 2019, the index average was 117.1. Over the past three months, the index average value was 128.7.

Selected Exchange Rates

units of foreign currency required to buy one US dollar

| | Oct 14, 2022 | 1-month moving average | 1-year moving average | 2019 average | 1-month percent change | 1-year percent change | 5-year percent change |
|-----|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| EUR | 1.027 | 1.018 | 0.928 | 0.893 | 2.6 | 20.2 | 17.6 |
| GBP | 0.892 | 0.894 | 0.788 | 0.784 | 2.8 | 22.3 | 16.7 |
| JPY | 148.5 | 144.6 | 125.3 | 109.0 | 2.9 | 33.8 | 31.8 |
| CAD | 1.387 | 1.358 | 1.281 | 1.327 | 5.7 | 9.7 | 9.6 |
| MXN | 20.07 | 20.08 | 20.37 | 19.25 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 14.3 |
| CNY | 7.19 | 7.10 | 6.57 | 6.91 | 3.8 | 11.4 | 6.1 |
| CHF | 1.005 | 0.982 | 0.946 | 0.994 | 4.6 | 8.6 | 4.1 |
| HKD | 7.85 | 7.85 | 7.82 | 7.84 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.5 |
| INR | 82.28 | 81.18 | 76.97 | 70.38 | 3.5 | 11.4 | 27.8 |
| AUD | 1.608 | 1.538 | 1.410 | 1.439 | 8.7 | 17.1 | 25.6 |
| NZD | 1.796 | 1.739 | 1.531 | 1.518 | 8.0 | 25.9 | 31.7 |
| BRL | 5.30 | 5.25 | 5.24 | 3.94 | 2.2 | -1.1 | 66.4 |
| KRW | 1428.1 | 1415.5 | 1254.0 | 1165.8 | 4.0 | 21.4 | 26.6 |
| MYR | 4.70 | 4.61 | 4.31 | 4.14 | 4.3 | 12.3 | 9.6 |
| DKK | 7.64 | 7.57 | 6.91 | 6.67 | 2.7 | 20.2 | 17.6 |
| NOK | 10.66 | 10.55 | 9.30 | 8.80 | 5.9 | 24.0 | 30.1 |
| SEK | 11.31 | 11.08 | 9.70 | 9.46 | 6.3 | 30.0 | 35.8 |
| ZAR | 18.30 | 17.88 | 15.89 | 14.45 | 5.2 | 22.6 | 40.4 |
| SGD | 1.426 | 1.425 | 1.373 | 1.364 | 1.4 | 5.3 | 4.0 |
| TWD | 31.95 | 31.63 | 29.02 | 30.90 | 2.7 | 15.3 | 5.6 |

Source: Federal Reserve




Labor Markets

Labor is the primary source of income for US households and is essential to the production of goods and services. The portion of labor that is provided by a household member to others outside of the household or to other households is considered *employment*. As of September 2022, 160.5 million people are employed (including self-employment).

The number of people who are employed divided by the total population is the employment rate or employment-to-population ratio, which is 48.9 percent as of September 2022. Note that these values are not seasonally adjusted and include children, while BLS published values refer to those 16 or older.

Labor Force Status of Population

millions of people




When a member of a household is not employed but looked for a job during the past four weeks or is on temporary layoff, they are considered **unemployed**. As of September 2022, there are 5.6 million unemployed people. The combined group of employed and unemployed people is the labor force. The unemployment rate, unemployed people as a share of the labor force, is currently 3.4 percent. The labor force as a share of the population is the labor force participation rate, currently 50.6 percent.

People who are neither employed nor unemployed are considered *outside of the labor force*. Nonparticipants usually comprise about half of the population, and total 162.3 million in September 2022. The category includes children (59.6 million), students (18.7 million), unpaid caregivers (12.3 million), those unable to work due to disability or illness (13.8 million), those who want a job but have given up looking (5.8 million), and retirees and the elderly (50.3 million).

Labor Force Status Changes

percentage point contribution to one-year growth of age 15+ population



The labor force status of the US population varies by age, sex, and over time. Because very few people receive capital income, the share of the population with labor income is particularly important to overall levels of economic activity.

Labor Force Status

September 2022, thousands of people, not seasonally adjusted

| | Total, 16+ | Men, 16-29 | Men, 30-59 | Men, 60+ | Women, 16-29 | Women, 30-59 | Women, 60+ |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Population | 264,356 | 29,707 | 62,729 | 36,371 | 29,630 | 63,764 | 42,154 |
| Employed | 159,003 | 18,468 | 53,641 | 12,578 | 17,396 | 46,551 | 10,369 |
| Multiple jobs | 7,735 | 681 | 2,494 | 575 | 887 | 2,559 | 539 |
| Full-time | 121,318 | 13,230 | 46,747 | 9,008 | 10,308 | 35,812 | 6,214 |
| Part-time | 37,685 | 5,237 | 6,894 | 3,570 | 7,088 | 10,739 | 4,156 |
| Economic reasons | 3,524 | 744 | 930 | 229 | 595 | 843 | 183 |
| Unemployed | 5,460 | 1,301 | 1,290 | 251 | 1,098 | 1,259 | 261 |
| Not in Labor Force | 99,893 | 9,938 | 7,798 | 23,542 | 11,137 | 15,954 | 31,524 |
| Discouraged | 5,651 | 1,029 | 1,002 | 606 | 1,019 | 1,310 | 685 |
| Disabled/III | 13,930 | 783 | 3,782 | 2,280 | 580 | 3,730 | 2,776 |
| Family/Care | 12,349 | 392 | 888 | 126 | 2,044 | 7,907 | 992 |
| School | 15,194 | 7,195 | 342 | 25 | 7,065 | 529 | 37 |
| Retirement | 50,822 | 116 | 1,369 | 20,392 | 139 | 1,948 | 26,859 |

Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

Additionally, changes over time in labor force status are particularly important to understanding both secular and cyclical trends in the economy. The following table presents the net three-year change in labor force status, in number of people.

Labor Force Changes

Change from September 2019 to September 2022, thousands of people

| | Total, 16+ | Men, 16-29 | Men, 30-59 | Men, 60+ | Women, 16-29 | Women, 30-59 | Women, 60+ |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Population | 4,718 | -730 | 1,316 | 2,637 | -582 | 104 | 1,972 |
| Employed | 525 | -871 | 1,129 | 567 | -784 | 295 | 189 |
| Multiple jobs | -595 | -102 | -92 | 44 | -331 | -115 | 0 |
| Full-time | -330 | -621 | 82 | 351 | -856 | 527 | 187 |
| Part-time | 855 | -250 | 1,048 | 215 | 72 | -232 | 2 |
| Economic reasons | -472 | -82 | 22 | 27 | -117 | -293 | -31 |
| Unemployed | -5 | -17 | 8 | -15 | 82 | -53 | -10 |
| Not in Labor Force | 4,199 | 159 | 179 | 2,086 | 120 | -138 | 1,794 |
| Discouraged | 1,026 | 143 | 217 | 140 | 122 | 291 | 112 |
| Disabled/III | -631 | -95 | -63 | -72 | 44 | -276 | -170 |
| Family/Care | -198 | 27 | 91 | 31 | -177 | -275 | 103 |
| School | 144 | 22 | -88 | -4 | 138 | 53 | 23 |
| Retirement | 3,385 | -5 | -12 | 1,954 | -27 | -162 | 1,636 |


Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

Labor Force Status and Age

There is a clear relationship between age and employment. Children are not permitted to work and many young people attend school full time. During ages 25 to 54, around 80 percent of the population is employed. The remaining 20 percent include caregivers and those unable to work due to disability or illness. Retirement becomes more likely as workers reach their 60s and 70s; less than 10 percent of people continue to work into their 80s.

Labor Force Status, by Age

share of same-age population, percent, September 2022



change since September 2019 in share of age group, percentage points



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS, Bruenig




Gross Labor Force Status Changes

The changes in labor force status described above are net changes, rather than gross changes. That is, the one-year change in unemployment is the result of some people staying unemployed, some becoming unemployed, and some no longer being unemployed, as well as other flows like deaths and people becoming working age. This section looks at six categories of gross changes, specifically the share of people with a given labor force status who move to a different status in the following month.


Gross Labor Force Flows

share of initial labor force status, percent


Employed to Unemployed




Employed to Out of Labor Force




Unemployed to Employed




Unemployed to Out of Labor Force



Out of Labor Force to Employed



Out of Labor Force to Unemployed




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Labor Share of Income

compensation of employees as share of net domestic income, percent



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

The **labor share** (see —) measures the portion of net income paid to labor. While the laborer share of the population has fallen, cyclical patterns suggest worker bargaining power also affects labor's share.

As of the second quarter of 2022, labor receives 63.2 percent of net domestic income. Labor's share decreased 0.9 percentage point over the past year. The labor share is 1.9 percentage points above its 30-year low of 61.3 percent in 2014 Q3, and 4.5 percentage points below the 30-year high of 67.7 percent in 2020 Q2.


Gross Labor Income

Wages (the unit price of labor) tend not to be cut in response to a short-term decrease in demand; businesses typically instead employ fewer workers and/or cut hours. As a result, wage data give only a partial picture of the labor income received by households.

Gross labor income (compensation of employees in the national accounts), which captures both the amount of employment (see ■) and the rate of compensation (see ■), decreased at an annualized and inflation-adjusted rate of 0.77 percent in 2022 Q2. Changes in wages subtracted 1.13 percentage points, and changes in total hours worked contributed 0.36 percentage point.

Gross Labor Income Growth

percentage point contribution to gross labor income growth



Source: Author's Calculations

Employment

Employment is critical to production and as a source of income. This subsection covers payrolls and employment rates for different groups and places. Related topics, such as work arrangements, hours worked, and wages, are covered in later subsections.

Overview


Two primary sources of employment data are households and employers. Households report activities, including employment and self-employment, while employers report payrolls.

In September 2022, establishments report 153.1 million **nonfarm payroll employees** (see —). The pre-COVID peak was 153.1 million in November 2019. Households report 159.0 million employed people, including the self-employed but not including armed forces, in the latest month, compared to a pre-COVID peak of 159.1 million (see —).

Private production and nonsupervisory workers are engaged in production, including working supervisors, or in other activities but not above the working supervisor level. In September 2022, this group totals 106.4 million, compared to a pre-COVID peak of 106.9 million (see —). Production and nonsupervisory workers comprise 81.4 percent of private nonfarm payrolls in September 2022.


Employment Level

millions, not seasonally adjusted



Monthly Change

thousands, seasonally adjusted



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



In September 2022, seasonally-adjusted civilian employment increased by 204,000 (see ■), slightly above the 2019 average increase of 167,083 jobs per month. The US added a net total of 263,000 nonfarm payroll jobs in September 2022 (see ■), compared to a monthly average of 164,000 in 2019. The average of both surveys over the past three months shows an increase of 323,300 employees per month.

Employment Level

millions

| | seasonally adjusted | | not seasonally adjusted | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Sep 2022 | Aug 2022 | Sep 2022 | Aug 2022 | 2019 Avg. | 2017 Avg. | 2000 Avg. |
| Employed | 158.9 | 158.7 | 159.0 | 158.7 | 157.5 | 153.3 | 136.9 |
| Nonfarm Payrolls | 153.0 | 152.8 | 153.1 | 152.6 | 150.9 | 146.6 | 132.0 |
| Private Nonfarm Payrolls | 130.7 | 130.4 | 130.7 | 131.2 | 128.3 | 124.3 | 111.2 |
| Production & Nonsuperv. | 106.5 | 106.3 | 106.4 | 107.0 | 105.6 | 102.4 | 90.5 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Payroll Employment

The Current Employment Statistics Program [surveys](#) around 130,000 businesses and government agencies each month. Payroll data from this survey provide insight into the overall health of the economy by indicating the pace of job growth. The payroll data also reliably identify changes in employment in individual industries.


Nonfarm payrolls increased by 263,000 in September 2022, following 315,000 jobs added in August, and 537,000 added in July (see [■](#)). Average payroll growth was 371,700 over these three months, in line with the average of 349,000 during the previous three months.

During March and April 2020, the US lost a combined 22 million jobs. Since May 2020, a total of 22.5 million jobs have been added, equivalent to 102.3 percent of those lost.

To maintain a steady payroll employment rate with population growth, the US needed to add 124,000 jobs in September 2022. Pre-pandemic, in 2019, the US was adding an average of 164,000 jobs per month.

Nonfarm Payroll Growth

one-month change, in millions, seasonally adjusted



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics


Over the three years ending September 2022, nonfarm payrolls increased by a total of 1,562,000. By sector, combined government payrolls fell by 307,000 (see [■](#)), and private payrolls increased by a total of 1,869,000 over the three-year period. Private goods-producing industries added 127,000 jobs (see [■](#)), and private service-providing industries added 1.7 million jobs (see [■](#)).

Dividing the private industries into three wage groups, the lowest-wage industries lost 194,000 jobs since September 2019, the middle-wage industries gained 160,000 jobs, and the highest-wage industries added 1.84 million jobs (see [■](#)).


Three-Year Change in Payrolls (September 2019 to September 2022)

not seasonally adjusted, thousands of jobs

Major Sector



Industry Wage Group*



*Wage groups are derived from 2019 average hourly earnings by 3-digit NAICS industry. Private industries without wage information added 66,600 jobs over the period.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The establishment survey [provides](#) reliable industry-level estimates of payroll employment. Household surveys have a higher potential to misclassify industries and are considered less-reliable for industry-level estimates of payroll employment.

Over the three years ending September 2022, the industry groups with the largest increase in payrolls were professional and technical services (+941,200), transportation and warehousing (+773,200), retail trade (+217,600), and health care (+185,200). The private industry groups with the least job growth were accommodation (-362,200), food services and drinking places (-334,100), and arts, entertainment, and recreation (-129,400).

Nonfarm Payrolls by Industry Group

| | <i>seasonally adjusted</i> | | | | <i>not seasonally adjusted</i> | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|
| | Septem- ber 2022 | 1-month change | Jul '22- Sep '22 average | Apr '22- Jun '22 average | Septem- ber 2022 | 3-year change |
| Total nonfarm | 153,018 | 263 | 372 | 349 | 153,073 | 1,562 |
| Total private | 130,736 | 288 | 337 | 348 | 130,708 | 1,869 |
| Goods-producing | 21,232 | 44 | 47 | 56 | 21,402 | 127 |
| Mining & logging | 633 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 636 | -89 |
| Construction | 7,719 | 19 | 17 | 13 | 7,877 | 174 |
| Manufacturing | 12,880 | 22 | 29 | 35 | 12,889 | 42 |
| Private service-providing | 109,504 | 244 | 290 | 292 | 109,306 | 1,742 |
| Wholesale trade | 5,909 | 11 | 14 | 17 | 5,907 | 19 |
| Retail trade | 15,842 | -1 | 19 | -7 | 15,667 | 218 |
| Transportation & warehousing | 6,529 | -8 | 5 | 34 | 6,480 | 773 |
| Information | 3,043 | 13 | 11 | 24 | 3,044 | 177 |
| Financial activities | 8,957 | -8 | 2 | 15 | 8,956 | 168 |
| Real estate & rental & leasing | 2,367 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 2,380 | 40 |
| Professional & technical services | 10,533 | 11 | 26 | 51 | 10,447 | 941 |
| Management | 2,392 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2,388 | -34 |
| Administrative & support | 9,068 | 31 | 30 | 8 | 9,134 | 100 |
| Educational services | 3,860 | 14 | 21 | 14 | 3,834 | 108 |
| Health care | 16,516 | 60 | 59 | 46 | 16,518 | 185 |
| Social assistance | 4,269 | 15 | 16 | 18 | 4,246 | 71 |
| Arts, entertainment, & recreation | 2,317 | 16 | 7 | 13 | 2,360 | -129 |
| Accommodation | 1,727 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 1,760 | -362 |
| Food services & drinking places | 11,801 | 60 | 56 | 37 | 11,829 | -334 |
| Other services | 5,719 | 17 | 12 | 6 | 5,711 | -180 |
| Utilities and waste management | 1,021 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1,022 | 19 |
| Government | 22,282 | -25 | 35 | 1 | 22,365 | -307 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics




Summarizing employment changes by grouping industries can have the adverse effect of hiding changes within these industry groups. Additionally, industry groups can be vague or overly broad. The government and business chartbook sections contain more information on industry-level employment trends.

Employment Rates

The employed share of those ages 25 to 54 is an important measure of labor market utilization. In a tight labor market, the age group is employed at a very high rate. In September 2022, 80.2 percent of 25 to 54 years olds were employed, compared to 80.3 percent in August 2022. Over the past year, the age 25 to 54 employment rate increased 2.1 percentage points. The September 2022 rate was 1.2 percentage points (equivalent to 1.6 million workers) below the average rate of 81.4 during the tight labor market of 1999–2000.

Age 25 to 54 Employment Rate

employed share of age 25 to 54 population



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics




The monthly jobs report describes employment at a given point in time, by asking about activities during a specific week of the previous month. To instead examine activities over a period of time, annual data on weeks worked per year and hours worked per week can be combined to identify the *fully-employed*, or *full-time, full-year workers*, who usually work 35 hours per week or more for 50 weeks per year or more. The Census Bureau [report](#) 117.4 million fully-employed people in 2021, equivalent to 35.7 percent of the US population, compared to 105.5 million (32.3 percent) in 2020.

Employment rates vary dramatically by location. In 2021, 37.5 percent of commuter zones have at least a third of their population working full-time and full-year. A total of 19 commuter zones (out of 741), covering 2.6 million people, have a quarter of the population or less fully employed. The top ten and bottom ten commuter zones by fully-employed rate are listed below.

Commuter Zone Fully-Employed Rate

full-time, full-year worker share of population, 2021



Source: American Community Survey, Dorn, Author's Calculations



Employment Rates of Largest Commuter Zones, 2021

| | <i>all ages</i> | | <i>age 25 to 54</i> | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------|
| | full-time & full-year | employed | full-time & full-year | employed |
| Los Angeles, CA | 31.9 | 58.7 | 55.1 | 88.7 |
| New York, NY | 32.3 | 59.9 | 55.9 | 90.0 |
| Chicago, IL | 35.5 | 61.1 | 62.3 | 91.2 |
| Houston, TX | 34.1 | 58.3 | 59.4 | 89.0 |
| Newark, NJ | 35.2 | 61.4 | 61.3 | 91.0 |
| Philadelphia, PA | 35.0 | 61.8 | 61.9 | 91.2 |
| Washington, DC | 39.9 | 64.3 | 67.5 | 93.4 |
| Boston, MA | 36.4 | 65.5 | 63.0 | 93.4 |
| Atlanta, GA | 36.8 | 61.7 | 63.3 | 91.2 |
| Detroit, MI | 31.0 | 59.9 | 55.4 | 89.8 |
| San Francisco, CA | 35.7 | 62.9 | 61.0 | 91.5 |
| Dallas, TX | 38.6 | 61.0 | 65.7 | 90.6 |
| Phoenix, AZ | 34.8 | 59.0 | 61.9 | 89.6 |
| Seattle, WA | 35.9 | 63.7 | 60.1 | 92.4 |
| Miami, FL | 36.3 | 59.6 | 62.2 | 90.2 |


Source: American Community Survey, Dorn, Author's Calculations

The share of the age 16 and older population that is employed in any amount at a point in time varies by state and over time. In September 2022, the age 16 and older employment rate is below 60 percent in 21 states. One year prior, in September 2021, the employment rate was below 60 percent in 27 states. The rate is above 65 percent in eight states, in the latest month, and in seven states in September 2021.

The states with the highest employment rates in September 2022 are the District of Columbia (68.3%), Nebraska (68.1%), and North Dakota (67.8%). The states with the lowest employment rates are Mississippi (52.9%), West Virginia (53.2%), and New Mexico (53.7%).

Employment Rate by State

employed share of age 16+ population, percent




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

A tight local labor market will employ those ages 25 to 54 at a very high rate, barring any local labor supply constraints, for example availability or cost of child care or high rates of disability. In September 2022, the states with the highest employment rates for 25 to 54 year olds are Montana (87.2 percent), North Dakota (87.1 percent), and New Jersey (86.6 percent).

The age 25 to 54 employment rate is higher in September 2022 than it was in September 2019 in 28 states, and lower in 23 states. Comparing the latest three months to the previous three months, the seasonally-adjusted age 25 to 54 employment rate decreased in 29 states, increased in 19 states, and was unchanged in three states.

Age 25 to 54 Employment Rate by State


employed share of age 25 to 54 population, percent, not seasonally adjusted



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

Employment Rate by State

employed share of age 25 to 54 population, percent, not seasonally adjusted




Source: Author's Calculations from CPS


Employment rates vary over time, but also by age, gender, and education. Over the three months ending September 2022, the employment rate for most age and education subgroups is lower than it was before the pandemic (the three months ending September 2019).

Employment Rates ■ September 2022 ■ September 2019
employed share of age group, percent, three-month average


Total, Any Education




High School Degree or Less



Some College



Bachelor or Advanced Degree



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS



Changes in Employment by Occupation

The COVID-19 pandemic changed the occupational composition of the US workforce. Business closures reduced the share of the US population that is employed in personal care and related services, administrative support, and sales. Many workers trained in these occupations lost or changed jobs and, additionally, some full-time workers became part-time. While employment increased in some occupations, such as healthcare support, the share of people employed full-time decreased in most occupational groups during the past three months, which end September 2022, compared to the same three months prior to the pandemic (ending September 2019).

Change in Occupational Employment, September 2022

change in share of population employed, latest three months vs pre-pandemic, percentage points



Source: Author's Calculation from CPS




Unemployment

The headline unemployment rate, also known as the U3 unemployment rate, measures people who do not have a job but are looking for one or are on temporary layoff, as a share of the labor force (the employed and unemployed). BLS [reports](#) 5.8 million unemployed people in September 2022, and an unemployment rate of 3.5 percent (see [—](#)), slightly below the August 2022 rate of 3.7 percent.

BLS also [report](#) a broader measure of unemployment, known as U6 or labor underutilization. Labor underutilization includes U3 unemployment, as well as people who have given up looking for work and people who work part-time but want to work full-time. In September 2022, the labor under-utilization rate is 6.7 percent (see [—](#)).


Unemployment Measures



Periods of unemployment are more common for disadvantaged groups. The black or African American unemployment rate is typically double the white unemployment rate. Employment opportunities for disadvantaged groups are more-dependent on current labor market conditions. A very tight labor market reduces racial discrimination in hiring, while disadvantaged groups are more likely to lose jobs in a downturn. Since February 2020, the black unemployment rate has decreased by 0.2 percentage point to 5.8 percent (see [—](#)).

Unemployment Rate

unemployed share of labor force, percent, seasonally adjusted




Unemployment Measures

seasonally adjusted, percent


| | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Jun '22 | May '22 | Apr '22 | GFC peak | Date |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| Under-utilization Rate (U6) | 6.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 17.2 | Dec '09 |
| Unemployment Rate (U3) | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 10.0 | Oct '09 |
| by race/ethnicity: | | | | | | | | |
| White | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 9.2 | Oct '09 |
| Black | 5.8 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 16.8 | Mar '10 |
| Hispanic | 3.8 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 13.0 | Aug '09 |
| Asian | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 8.4 | Dec '09 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics


Current Population Survey microdata are used to calculate unemployment by race and ethnicity over the latest six months, on average, and for the same six months before the COVID-19 pandemic. The groups used to produce these estimates separate those with a non-Hispanic ethnicity by race: white alone, black alone, Asian or Hawaiian/Pacific Islander alone, Native American/American Indian or Alaskan Native alone, or more than one race, from those with a Hispanic ethnicity and any race.



Unemployment Rate



Unemployment Rate, Continued



Source: Author's calculations from CPS



Reasons for Unemployment


There are several **reasons for unemployment**. In September 2022, 2.5 million people, or 1.5 percent of the labor force, were unemployed from losing their job (see ■). An additional 0.5 percent voluntarily left a job (see ■). Re-entrants, people who left the labor force but are looking for a new job, comprised 1.1 percent (see ■). Lastly, 0.3 percent of the labor force were new entrants to the labor market, looking for their first job (see ■).

The mixture of reasons for unemployment may reflect the existing economic conditions. In a downturn, workers who lose jobs are a larger share of the unemployed. A downturn also makes it harder for young people to find their first job, increasing their share of the total. In contrast, an economic boom reduces job losses and improves job-finding.

Other reasons for unemployment claim a larger share of the total during a boom. An economic boom can entice people to re-enter the job market, and encourage workers to quit and look for a new job. The overall prevalence of these categories, however, is also *reduced* during a boom, by an improved job-finding rate.

Unemployment by Reason

share of labor force, percent, annual average



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Many job losses are temporary, particularly during the COVID-19 recession. Other job separations are permanent. In September 2022, temporary layoffs were 0.5 percent of the labor force. Permanent job losses were 0.7 percent of labor force.

Unemployment by Reason

share of labor force, percent

| | Sep 2022 | Aug 2022 | Jul 2022 | 12m Avg. | Apr 2020 | 2020 | 2019 | 2009 -'11 |
|------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|------|------|-----------|
| Unemployed, Any Reason | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 14.7 | 8.1 | 3.7 | 9.3 |
| ■ Job Loser | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 13.2 | 6.1 | 1.7 | 5.7 |
| Temporary Layoff | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 11.5 | 4.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| Permanent Separation | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 3.9 |
| ■ Re-entrant | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
| ■ New entrant | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| ■ Job Leaver | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| See also: | | | | | | | | |
| Employed, Not at Work* | 2.9 | 5.0 | 6.1 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 4.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Author

* During the COVID-19 shutdowns some unemployed were incorrectly counted as employed but not at work.

Duration of Unemployment

US unemployment benefits are available for a relatively short duration, compared with other advanced countries. Therefore, the long-term unemployed risk running out of unemployment benefits, causing a sharp reduction in income. Additionally, long periods of unemployment can make re-entering the labor market more challenging.

As of September 2022, BLS [reports](#) that 0.42 percent of the age 16 and older population have been unemployed for 27 weeks or longer, compared to 1.03 percent in September 2021 (see —). This measure of **long-term unemployment** peaked at 2.96 percent of the population in April 2010, but had fallen to 0.42 percent in December 2019.


In September 2022, 0.70 percent of those age 16 and older have been unemployed for at least 15 weeks (see —), following 0.73 percent in August 2022, and 0.65 percent in July 2022.

Long-Term Unemployed

unemployed 27+ weeks, share of population



unemployed 15+ weeks, share of population




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Among those who are unemployed, the average (mean) **duration of unemployment** is 20.2 weeks (see —), and the typical (median) duration of unemployment is 8.3 weeks (see —), as of September 2022. Over the year prior to COVID-19, ending February 2020, the average duration of unemployment was 21.7 weeks and the typical duration was 9.3 weeks.

Duration of Unemployment

in weeks



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics




Unemployment by Metro Area

The Bureau of Labor Statistics [produce](#) local area estimates of unemployment, including the **unemployment rate for metro areas**. The following map shows changes since 2019 in metro area unemployment rates. An increase in the unemployment rate is shown by a blue circle and a decrease is shown by a light green circle; circle size is the magnitude of the change.

From August 2019 to August 2022, unemployment rates fell by 0.3 percentage point or more in 183 metro areas, and increased by 0.3 percentage point or more in 126 metro areas. Recent local unemployment rates were within 0.2 percentage points of their pre-pandemic level in 78 metro areas.

Change in Unemployment Rate by Metro Area

from August 2019 to August 2022, percentage points



Largest MSAs:

| | Core City | Aug 22 | Aug 19 | Labor Force | Pct Ch* |
|-------|--------------------|--------|--------|-------------|---------|
| +1.1 | ● New York, NY | 4.8 | 3.7 | 10,119,300 | -3.5 |
| unch. | ○ Los Angeles, CA | 4.5 | 4.4 | 6,539,800 | -3.5 |
| +1.2 | ● Chicago, IL | 4.9 | 3.7 | 4,947,500 | -2.1 |
| +0.3 | ○ Dallas, TX | 3.7 | 3.4 | 4,255,700 | 7.9 |
| +0.6 | ● Houston, TX | 4.6 | 4.0 | 3,519,900 | 3.6 |
| +0.5 | ● Washington, DC | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3,382,700 | -5.0 |
| unch. | ○ Philadelphia, PA | 4.5 | 4.6 | 3,207,700 | 0.0 |
| -0.6 | ○ Atlanta, GA | 3.0 | 3.6 | 3,192,400 | 2.2 |
| -0.7 | ○ Miami, FL | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3,183,400 | 1.2 |
| +0.4 | ● Boston, MA | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2,816,800 | -1.9 |
| -1.0 | ○ Phoenix, AZ | 3.4 | 4.4 | 2,574,800 | 6.3 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Full Table: [Table](#)

*Pct Ch is percent change in labor force from August 2019 to August 2022


Unemployment by State

The Bureau of Labor Statistics [report](#) the **state unemployment rate**—unemployed people as a share of the state labor force—each month, around two weeks after reporting the national unemployment rate. In September 2022, all 50 states and DC had unemployment rates below eight percent, and the unemployment rate was above five percent in no states. Three months prior, in June 2022, no states unemployment rate was above eight percent, and two states were above five percent. In the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns, in April 2020, the unemployment rate was above eight percent in 49 states, and above five percent in every state.

The states with the highest unemployment rates in September 2022 are Nevada (4.8%), the District of Columbia (4.6%), and New Mexico (4.5%). The states with the lowest unemployment rates are North Dakota (1.7%), Missouri (1.8%), and South Dakota (1.8%).

Unemployment Rate by State

unemployed share of labor force, percent, not seasonally adjusted



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics




Jobless Claims

The Department of Labor [report](#) 178,369 actual **new claims for unemployment insurance** (UI) under state programs (see [—](#)) during the week ending October 15, 2022, a one-week decrease of 20,000. Over the past four weeks, new claims have averaged 174,500 per week. During the same four-week period last year, there were an average of 275,200 new claims per week.

For the week ending October 8, 2022, the Department of Labor [reports](#) 1,201,137 continued claims for unemployment insurance (insured unemployed) under state programs (see [—](#)), virtually unchanged from the previous week. One year prior, during the week of October 9, 2021, there were an average of 2,168,200 insured unemployed.

New UI Claims


*initial claims per week, in millions,
not seasonally adjusted*



Source: Department of Labor

Continued UI Claims

*insured unemployed, in millions,
not seasonally adjusted*



Source: Department of Labor

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, traditional state-run unemployment insurance was temporarily boosted by federal programs that expanded eligibility for benefits and increased the amount of benefit payments. These programs were ended on September 6, 2021, reducing the income of millions of families.

Labor Force Participation

People who currently have a job, are looking for a job, or are on temporary layoff are all considered labor force participants. The share of the US population that participates in the labor force at a given point in time, or the **labor force participation rate**, is affected by many factors, including demographics and short- and long-term economic conditions.

Over the past two decades, the age composition of the population has lowered labor force participation rates, all else equal. Reweighting the population to match the age composition in 2000 suggests the aging of the US population since 2000 has reduced total labor force participation by 3.9 percentage points.


In the latest data, covering September 2022, 62.3 percent of people age 16 and older are in the labor force (see —), compared to 62.4 percent in August and 62.1 percent in July. In February 2020, when US confirmed cases of COVID-19 were still low, the labor force participation rate was 63.4 percent.

In September 2022, 68.1 percent of men age 16 and older are in the labor force (see —), compared to 56.8 percent of women (see —). Since February 2020, labor force participation has decreased 1.2 percentage points among men, and decreased one percentage point among women.

Labor Force Participation Rate

labor force as share of age 16 and older population, percent

demographically adjusted rates are reweighted to the January 2000 age and sex distribution



Sources: BLS (Latest: September 2022); CPS (Latest: September 2022)




Reasons for Labor Force Non-Participation

The Current Population Survey (CPS) asks those who are not employed or looking for work about their major activities and **reasons for not participating in the labor market**. [Answers](#) vary by age in intuitive ways, and are influenced by labor market conditions.

Nonparticipants

share of age 16+ population, percent



Source: Author's CPS calculations

Nonparticipants age 16 and older total 98.7 million in September 2022, and make up 37.3 percent of the age 16 or older population, compared to 36.4 percent in September 2019. About half of nonparticipants, and 19.0 percent of the population, are retirees in September 2022 (see ■), compared to 18.1 percent in September 2019 (see ■).

Disability or illness keeps an additional 5.2 percent out of the labor force in September 2022, compared to 5.5 percent in September 2019. Students who are out of the labor force make up 5.7 percent in September 2022 and 5.7 percent in September 2019, while unpaid caregivers are 4.6 percent in September 2022 and 4.8 percent in September 2019.


While the recession of 2001 appears mild in measures of expenditure, it was followed by a substantial reduction in the share of the population receiving labor income. The economy was losing jobs at an alarming rate long after the 2001 recession had officially ended, though labor market weakness was [partially masked](#) by a major housing bubble. Seven years after the recession of 2001, the housing bubble collapsed, causing the great recession, which pushed many more people out of the labor force.

From March 2001 to the latest available twelve months of data, ending September 2022, an additional 2.8 percent of the age 18 to 64 population left the labor force. Changes in the demographic composition of the population affect the rate of participation. For example, the larger-than-normal population cohort born after World War II is reaching retirement age in this period. Changes in the age and sex distribution within the age group explain 1.1 percentage points of the cumulative decrease in participation since March 2001 (see —).

Additionally, young people are staying in school longer, on average, reducing the age 18 to 64 labor force by 1.6 percent (see —). Disability and illness reduce the labor force by another 0.5 percent (see —). Less retirement among those age 18 to 64 increases the labor force by 0.7 percent, over the period (see —).

Contribution to Labor Force Participation

Age 18 to 64, cumulative contribution since March 2001 percentage points, 12-month moving average



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS


Series in the chart are adjusted so that the distribution of the age 18–64 population by age and sex is constant and equal to its March 2001 value. The total effect of this adjustment on labor force participation is included separately in the chart, as [Age/Sex](#).

Young people's participation in the labor market, by working or looking for work, is affected by trends in educational attainment and by economic conditions. From 1994 to 2000, labor force participation among young people increased slightly. Following the recession of 2001, and carrying through the great recession, participation rates dropped sharply. From 2000 to 2014, labor force non-participation increased from 28.2 percent to 39.3 percent for 19 to 21 year olds and from 19.3 percent to 24.6 percent for 22 to 24 year olds (see —). The overall increase is nearly entirely accounted for by increased college enrollment (see —).

By February 2020, the labor market had improved and the annual non-participation rate was 38.3 percent for 19 to 21 year olds and 22.9 percent for 22 to 24 year olds. In the latest data, covering the 12 months ending September 2022, the rate of non-participation is 39.1 percent for 19 to 21 year olds and 24.1 percent for 22 to 24 year olds.

Reason for Labor Force Non-Participation, by Age

share of age group population, percent, 12-month moving average



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS




Labor Force Flows

The current population survey interviews households up to eight times over 16 months, allowing insight into the labor force status of the same individual over time, and in particular, into **flows between employment, unemployment, and other categories**. The Bureau of Labor Statistics [publish](#) many monthly indicators based on labor force flows, and others can be calculated directly from the public use data.

Among newly-employed workers, some were looking for work or otherwise considered unemployed the prior month, while others were not in the labor force. In September 2022, 6.4 million people were newly employed (on a gross basis). Of these, 73.2 percent were not looking for work in the prior month (see —). Over the past three months, an average of 72.6 percent of the newly employed were not looking for work the month prior (see —). When unemployment is low, the newly employed are more likely to come from outside of the labor force. Three years ago, in September 2019, 73.3 percent of the newly employed had not looked for work the previous month.

Newly Employed, Not Previously Looking For Work

share of newly employed that were not looking for work in the prior month



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



The great recession worsened job-finding prospects for those not in the labor force (NILF) due to disability or illness. As a result, the flow into employment for people age 25 to 54 who are out of the labor force due to a disability or illness slowed considerably. These prospects first recovered to pre-recession levels around 2017.

Over the year ending September 2022, 9.6 percent of 25 to 54 year olds who were out of the labor force due to disability or illness one year prior became employed (see —). Pre-pandemic, in 2019, 8.0 percent of those in the category found a job. The one-year rate of job-finding has increased substantially from its 2010–2013 average of 5.8 percent.

Flow, Disability to Work

NILF disability/illness, age 25 to 54, share employed one year later



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS



Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey

Some types of **turnover** in the labor market are healthy and mean people are better able find a new job if they do not like the one they have. Additionally, the job prospects outside of a firm affect the bargaining power of the workers inside of the firm. The Bureau of Labor Statistics [report](#) the number of job openings, hires, and separations in several industry groups on a monthly basis. Separations include layoffs, voluntarily leaving a job (*quits*), and other separations such as retirements, transfers to other locations, or separations due to death or disability.

In August 2022, there were 10.1 million total nonfarm job openings (see —) and 6.3 million hires completed (see —). In the same month, there were 6.0 million nonfarm separations, including 1.5 million layoffs (see —), 4.2 million quits (see —), and 358,000 other separations. In 2019, there were an average of 5.8 million hires completed and 5.7 million total separations, per month.

Job Turnover

job openings, hires, quits, and layoffs per month, in millions




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number of people who voluntarily separate from a job in a given month, divided by the total number employed is the **quits rate**. The rate typically increases when workers are confident enough to leave one job for another one, and a high quits rate, particularly in low-paying industries, can be a sign of a tight labor market.

Quits Rate

voluntary separations as share of workforce



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics


The quits rate is cyclical within the accommodations and food services industries (which includes restaurants), and tends to rise when a tight labor market pulls people out of restaurant jobs and into higher paying jobs in other industries.

In August 2022, the total quits rate in all industries was 2.7 percent (see —). The accommodations and food services quits rate was 6.5 percent (see —), the series high for the industry group.

A high ratio of job openings to unemployed indicates a tight labor market, for example from low levels of unemployment, or if completing a new hire is taking more time. In August 2022, there were 6.0 million unemployed people and 10.1 million job openings, therefore the ratio of job openings per unemployed person was 1.7 (see —). In July 2022 the ratio was 2.0, and during 2019 the average ratio was 1.2.

Job Openings Per Unemployed Person

job openings divided by total unemployment




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Monthly Quits Rate by Industry

share of employment, percent




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Monthly Job Openings Rate by Industry

share of employment, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Job Switching


Job switching is important for getting people into the jobs where they are most productive. Individuals boost labor productivity by switching to a more productive industry or moving from a less-productive firm to a more-productive firm.

The current population survey asks whether individuals have the same employer as they did the previous month. The rate at which people say they have **changed employers** had fallen to below two percent after the great recession, from an average of around three percent during the late 1990s.

More recent data show a slight increase in job switching rates. In September 2022, 2.5 percent of the workforce had a different employer than the previous month, after seasonal adjustment (see —). Smoothed data show an average of 2.4 percent of the workforce with a new employer during the three months ending September 2022 (see —). Prior to COVID-19, in 2019 Q4, a monthly average of 2.2 percent of the workforce switched jobs.

New Employer

percent of workforce, seasonally adjusted



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS


The monthly Survey of Consumer Expectations from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York asks people how likely they are to either **lose or leave a job**. **Expected separations** are specifically the average perceived probability, or likelihood, of separating from a job in the next 12 months.

In September 2022, the perceived likelihood of leaving one's job voluntarily in the next 12 months averages 19.4 percent, compared to 21.0 percent in 2019 (see —). In the latest month, the perceived probability losing one's job is 11.6 percent, compared to 14.3 percent in 2019 (see —).

During the pandemic, in April 2020, job loss expectations exceeded job leaving expectations. In September 2022, job leaving expectations exceed job loss expectations by 7.8 percentage points, compared to 6.8 percentage points in 2019.

Expected Separations

mean probability of separation, percent



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Hours Worked

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report **hours worked per week** in both Current Employment Statistics (CES) and Labor Force Statistics (LFS).


Actual hours worked by people at work in all industries during the survey reference week average 38.7 in September 2022 (see —), in line with the 38.9 average actual hours worked in February 2020. Average actual hours for this group average 39.6 from 1998 through 2000, and fell to a great recession low of 37.4 in February 2010.

Those in service occupations (see —) work fewer hours on average, with 34.9 average weekly hours in September 2022, slightly below the 35.2 average in February 2020. Those part-time for economic reasons (see —) work an average of 23.5 hours per week in September 2022.

In September 2022, production and non-supervisory workers (see —), about four of every five employees, worked 34.0 hours per week on average, slightly above the 33.7 average weekly hours in February 2020 and slightly below the 1998–2000 average of 34.4 hours.

Hours Worked

average hours per week



Source: BLS

Hours Worked, Various Measures

average hours per week, seasonally adjusted


| | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Sep '21 | Aug '21 | Jul '21 | Sep '20 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total Actual, CES | 34.5 | 34.5 | 34.5 | 34.8 | 34.7 | 34.8 | 34.8 |
| Total Actual, LFS (—) | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.6 | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.7 | 39.1 |
| Total Usual, CPS | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.7 | 38.7 |
| Production & Non-Supervisory, CES (—) | 34.0 | 33.9 | 34.0 | 34.3 | 34.2 | 34.3 | 34.2 |
| Services Occupations, LFS (—) | 34.9 | 34.7 | 34.8 | 35.0 | 34.9 | 34.9 | 34.1 |
| Part-time for Economic Reasons, LFS (—) | 23.5 | 22.9 | 22.6 | 22.7 | 22.4 | 22.6 | 22.0 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Author

BLS also [report](#) a quarterly index tracking aggregate hours worked in nonfarm businesses (see [■](#)). Total hours worked in nonfarm businesses increased at an annual rate of 2.7 percent in 2022 Q2, following an increase of 5.3 percent in 2022 Q1. From 2017 through 2019, total hours worked increased at an average rate of 1.4 percent. Since 2019, hours worked have increased by a total of 1.5 percent.

Aggregate Hours Worked

nonfarm businesses, quarterly growth at seasonally adjusted annual rate, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Nonstandard Work Arrangements

Many workers do not have standard work arrangements, either by choice or as the result of not being able to find standard work arrangements. Many workers work part-time, part-year, or both. Some workers have more than one job. Additionally, a portion of the workforce is considered self-employed.


Part-Time Work

Many people work fewer than 35 hours per week, and the reasons for doing so vary. The Bureau of Labor Statistics classify part-time workers who would prefer full-time work as involuntary or **part time for economic reasons**. This group is comprised of people who don't have enough hours because of slack business conditions or who are unable to find full-time work.

Voluntary part-time workers or those **part-time for non-economic reasons** do not want full-time jobs. The category includes those who work fewer hours for health, childcare, personal or family reasons, those who are retired or have a limit on earnings, and those with jobs where full-time is less than 35 hours per week.

Part Time, by Reason

percent of labor force



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

In September 2022, 3.8 million people worked part-time for economic reasons, equivalent to 2.3 percent of the labor force (see —). In 2019, an average of 2.7 percent of the labor force worked part-time for economic reasons; in 2010, following the great recession, the rate was 5.8 percent.


Voluntary part-time workers total 21.2 million in September 2022, or 12.9 percent of the labor force (see —). The category made up 13.1 percent of the labor force in 2019, on average.

More Than One Job

Multiple jobholding rates were fairly stable from 2000 to 2019. The household survey used to identify people with more than one job asks about a specific reference week. As a result, the multiple jobholding rate is not intending to capture people who rely on a patchwork of multiple jobs over time, but work at one job in the survey reference week.

Multiple Jobholders

percent of workers, 3-month moving average



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

In September 2022, a seasonally-adjusted total of 7.7 million people **worked more than one job** during the survey reference week, equivalent to 4.9 percent of workers. Over the three months ending September 2022, an average of 4.9 percent of workers were multiple jobholders (see —). In 2019, 5.1 percent of workers had more than one job during the survey reference week.


Self-Employment

Workers are considered **self-employed** if they work for profit or fees in their own business, profession, trade, or farm. Some self-employed have incorporated their business, and are similar to wage and salary workers in that they are paid by their business. Self-employment can offer more flexibility than traditional jobs, in some cases, but can also be less stable. The category includes people who work for profit but do not make any profits, for example.

As of September 2022, there are 9.9 million **unincorporated self-employed**, equivalent to 6.0 percent of the labor force (see —). Over the past year, the unincorporated self-employed made up an average of 6.1 percent of the labor force, compared to an average of 5.8 percent in 2019. From 1989 to 1994, the category made up an average of 8.0 percent of the labor force.

Self Employed

percent of labor force



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Author




The **incorporated self employed** total 6.7 million in September 2022, equivalent to 4.1 percent of the labor force (see —). In 2019, the category made up 3.8 percent of the labor force. Incorporated self-employed are not reported by BLS prior to 2000, but can be calculated from the CPS, and make up a average of 2.8 percent of the labor force from 1989 to 1994.

Wages

The **usual wages of full-time workers** can be measured at various points in the income distribution using the Current Population Survey. BLS report these data by decile and quartile, with the most commonly used measure being the median usual weekly earnings.

BLS [calculations](#) (see —) for 2022 Q3 show nominal first decile usual weekly earnings of \$560, compared to \$510 in 2021 Q3, resulting in one-year growth of 9.8 percent. In the previous quarter, 2022 Q2, first decile usual weekly earnings grew by 9.0 percent over the year. Author's calculations from the CPS (see —) show three-month moving average first decile usual weekly earnings of \$565 in September 2022, \$556 in August 2022, and \$509 in September 2021. One-year growth was 11.1 percent for the three months ending September 2022, 9.2 percent for the three months ending August 2022, and 8.7 percent for the three months ending July 2022.

Weekly Earnings, First Decile



Usual Weekly Earnings

full-time, wage and salary earners, age 16+, nominal USD

| | 2022 Q3 | 2022 Q2 | 2022 Q1 | 2021 Q4 | 2021 Q3 | 2020 Q3 | 2019 Q3 | 2018 Q3 | 2017 Q3 |
|----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| First decile | 560 | 547 | 531 | 520 | 510 | 490 | 461 | 431 | 413 |
| First quartile | 724 | 710 | 701 | 697 | 683 | 667 | 611 | 592 | 575 |
| Median | 1070 | 1041 | 1037 | 1010 | 1001 | 994 | 919 | 887 | 859 |
| Third quartile | 1696 | 1655 | 1635 | 1578 | 1577 | 1575 | 1462 | 1408 | 1357 |
| Ninth decile | 2583 | 2561 | 2512 | 2444 | 2412 | 2383 | 2275 | 2107 | 2024 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Weekly Earnings Growth

full-time, wage and salary earners, age 16+, one-year growth, percent

| | 2022 Q3 | 2022 Q2 | 2022 Q1 | 2021 Q4 | 2021 Q3 | 2020 Q3 | 2019 Q3 | 2018 Q3 | 2017 Q3 |
|----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| First decile | 9.8 | 9.0 | 9.3 | 6.6 | 4.1 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 4.4 | 4.6 |
| First quartile | 6.0 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 2.4 | 9.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 5.3 |
| Median | 6.9 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 8.2 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.9 |
| Third quartile | 7.5 | 6.3 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 0.1 | 7.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 1.4 |
| Ninth decile | 7.1 | 6.5 | 3.6 | 5.3 | 1.2 | 4.7 | 8.0 | 4.1 | 2.0 |


Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Nominal Hourly Wages

Over the year ending September 2022, **average hourly earnings** increased by five percent for all employees (see —) and increased by 5.8 percent for production and non-supervisory workers (see —), according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Comparing the latest three months to the previous three months, average earnings increased at an annual rate of 4.8 percent for all employees and increased at an annual rate of 5.3 percent for production and non-supervisory employees.

Average Hourly Earnings

nominal one-year growth, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

By industry, 1 of 12 groups experienced real wage growth (wage growth above the increase in prices indicated by the consumer price index). The transportation & warehousing industry had the fastest nominal growth rate, at 9.2 percent, followed by 7.9 percent in leisure & hospitality and 7.5 percent in financial activities.

Average Hourly Earnings Growth by Industry

production and non-supervisory workers, as of September 2022

one-year growth, percent




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The US has increasingly invested in education, boosting productivity and earnings. To examine the return on investment, this section discusses the relationship between **wages and education**, over the long-term and in recent data.

Over the three months ending September 2022, the median usual earnings of full-time wage and salary workers age 25 to 54 averaged \$1,122 per week. After adjusting for inflation, these earnings have increased by 9.6 percent, in total, since 1989. Digging deeper, the workforce is split into three groups by highest level of education attained. Real earnings increased 7.6 percent over the same period for workers with bachelor's degree or more, decreased 8.7 percent for workers with some college or an associate degree, and decreased 2.7 percent for those with a high school degree or less.

Real Earnings by Level of Education

median usual weekly earnings, full-time wage and salary workers age 25 to 54
August 2022 dollars, three-month moving average




Employment Cost Index

The Bureau of Labor Statistics [reports](#) the overall hourly labor costs faced by employers, using an index that is not influenced by short-term changes in the industry and occupation composition of the US workforce. Employer costs are reported separately for total compensation, wages and salaries, and benefits.

Benefits include health insurance, retirement, vacation, sick leave, and transportation benefits. Benefits access and participation vary, even within the same firm. The benefits costs in the index are averages [computed](#) across all workers, including the workers who do not have benefits.

Employment Cost Growth

*private industry wage and salary workers,
12-month percent change*



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics


In the second quarter of 2022, private industry wage and salary costs increased by 5.7 percent (one-year percent change, see —), following an increase of five percent in 2022 Q1, and an increase of five percent in 2021 Q4. In 2019, private wages and salaries costs increased by three percent, on average.

The cost of private sector benefits increased by 5.3 percent (see —) over the year ending 2022 Q2, following an increase of 4.1 percent in 2022 Q1. In 2019, private-sector benefits costs increased by two percent, on average.

Wage Growth Tracker

The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta [publish](#) a wage growth tracker that captures the distribution of one-year changes in the wages of the same people. This approach avoids some of the compositional changes that affect aggregate wage growth measures, though the sample used to calculate the data is affected by changes to respondents' employment status, and by survey response rates.

Replication of the wage growth tracker shows matched-observation hourly wage growth of 6.9 percent in September 2022 (see —), and average wage growth of 6.7 percent over the three months ending September 2022 (see —). One year prior, in September 2021, three-month moving average wage growth was 4.4 percent. Matched observation weekly wage growth, which is affected by changes in hours worked, increased 6.5 percent over the year ending September 2022 (see right chart).



By observing the same person's wage at two points, one year apart, we see how many people do not receive a wage increase. The Atlanta Fed measures this as the share of individuals who have one-year hourly wage growth of between -0.5 and 0.5 percent. The Atlanta Fed approach is replicated using the bd CPS, and smoothed with a 3-month moving average.

In September 2022, 11.8 percent of individuals had no hourly wage growth, compared to 11.2 in August 2022 (see —). One year prior, in September 2021, 13.6 percent of individuals had no wage growth.




Labor Productivity

Labor productivity is [reported](#) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and measured as **real output per hour of work**. The measure captures the rate at which people, with all of the resources and equipment and infrastructure available to them, are able to work together to produce goods and services. Labor productivity growth means real wages can increase without putting upward pressure on inflation. Alternatively, an increase in productivity means a society can meet its material needs with less work.

Over the longer-term, US labor productivity growth has averaged 2.0 percent per year. The trailing 20-year average growth rate was 1.6 percent in 2022 Q2 (see —). During the 1990s and early 2000s, labor productivity growth was above its long-term average. In contrast, from 2010 to 2017, productivity growth was below average. Over the year ending 2022 Q2, productivity growth averaged -2.3 percent (see —).

Labor Productivity Growth
quarterly growth at annual rate, percent




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

In 2022 Q2, labor productivity decreased at an annual rate of 4.1 percent (see ■), as the result of a decrease of 1.4 percent in real output and an increase of 2.7 percent in hours worked. In the prior quarter, 2022 Q1, labor productivity decreased at an annual rate of 7.4 percent, as real output decreased 2.5 percent and hours of work increased 5.3 percent. Over the past five years, labor productivity growth has averaged 1.3 percent, substantially below the 1989-onward average of 1.9 percent.

Labor Productivity Growth

nonfarm businesses, quarterly growth at annual rate, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

In the short-term, productivity growth is affected by changes in the composition of the workforce, and by volatility in both the number of hours worked and in production. In the longer-term, the level of business net investment in equipment and other capital goods, particularly relative to the size of the workforce, affects productivity growth. Such investment allows more goods and services to be produced by the same hours of work. Yet efforts to stimulate business investment directly through reducing corporate income taxes do not seem to have worked.


One theory of what drives long-term trends, sometimes called the *Kaldor-Verdoorn Law*, states that demand, and the capacity to meet that demand, determine productivity growth. An economy facing real resource constraints, where demand for goods and services exceeds the capacity to provide these services, is more likely to find ways to produce goods and services more efficiently. As one example, businesses invest more in labor-saving technologies when faced with a tight labor market.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics [report contributions to nonfarm business labor productivity growth](#). Some portion of productivity growth can be explained by businesses adding capital such as equipment and IT improvements. Additionally, the age, education, and gender composition of the labor force changes over time, which affects the average output per hour of work.

In 2021, labor productivity increased by 1.9 percent (see ○). Capital intensity subtracted 1.3 percentage points (see ■), and labor composition did not contribute (see ■). The remainder, called total factor productivity, added 3.2 percentage points (see ■).

Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

contribution to labor productivity, percentage points



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Union Membership


Membership in **unions and employee associations** has diminished in the United States over the past fifty years. Unionized jobs typically offer higher wages and better benefits and union membership tends to increase wages and benefits even in nonunion jobs. Many researchers argue that lower union membership increases income inequality.

Over the 12 months ending September 2022, the union membership rate averaged 10.1 percent (see ■). The coverage rate, which includes nonmembers that are covered under a union contract, was 11.3 percent. During the 12-month period, an average of 126.7 million workers were not represented by a union, 14.2 million workers were union members, and an additional 1.7 million workers, or 1.2 percent of the workforce, reported no union affiliation but were covered by a union contract (see ■).

One year prior, over the 12 months ending September 2021, the union membership rate was 10.4 percent, and the coverage rate was 11.7 percent. From September 2021 to September 2022, the 12-month average number of nonunion workers increased by 5.5 million, while the number of workers represented by unions increased by 193,000.

Union Membership and Coverage


union or employee association share of jobs, percent, one-year moving average



Source: Author's Calculations from Current Population Survey

Union Membership Rate by Industry

union or employee association member, percent



Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

Union membership rates vary substantially by industry. Public administration has the highest union membership rate, at 30.9 percent as of September 2022, followed by education and health with 17.2 percent, and construction and mining with 13.6 percent.

The manufacturing industry experienced the largest overall percentage point decrease in union membership rates over the past 30 years, and is currently 16.4 percentage points below its February 1989 rate of 23.5 percent.

The lowest union membership rate is in finance and business services (3.0 percent). The union membership rate of the industry was 7.2 percent at its 30-year peak in March 1992.

Financial Markets

The US equity and capital markets provide funding for borrowers' activities and provide a source of income and capital gains to lenders. This section discusses equity markets, interest rates and bond markets, and money and monetary policy.


Equity Markets

Equity markets, or **stock markets**, provide a method for businesses to raise capital by selling shares, which represent ownership claims on the business. Equity markets also provide a place for people to buy and sell existing shares. Investors purchase shares in hopes that the price will go up, allowing them to sell the shares at a higher price and receive capital gains, or to gain access to a stream of dividends, which are payments from businesses to shareholders.

In the US, there are several stock market indices that track the share price of a basket of companies. These measures are weighted by the market capitalization of the companies in the basket, which is the share price multiplied by the number of shares. Market capitalization measures the market value of the company. Note that stock market indices do not provide information about dividends, and the dividend yield varies substantially between companies and between the baskets or groups of companies used in stock market indices.

Stock Market Indices

adjusted close, index value, in thousands



The **S&P 500** (see —) is a market-cap-weighted stock market index based on 500 large companies listed on US exchanges. As of October 20, 2022, the S&P 500 has increased 151.9 percent since 2000, and increased 36.0 percent since 2018.

The **Nasdaq** composite index (see —) includes nearly all companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange, and is heavily-weighted towards large tech companies. The Nasdaq index increased 156.9 percent since 2000, and increased 51.5 percent since 2018.

The **Dow Jones** (see —) industrial average is an index based on 30 large and prominent companies listed on US exchanges. The measure is used as a proxy for the performance of the largest companies, and increased 167.1 percent since 2000 and increased 22.2 percent since 2018.

Lastly, the **Russell 3000** (see —) is a broad measure of the US stock market that seeks to be a benchmark of the performance of the overall market. Since 2000, the Russell 3000 has increased 243.3 percent. Since 2018, the measure increased 10.0 percent.

Stock Market Indices

adjusted close

annual index returns, not including dividends

| | Oct 20, 2022 | 1-year moving average | 2022 YTD | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------------|----------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| — S&P 500 | 3,666 | 4,247 | -23.1 | 26.9 | 16.3 | 28.9 | -6.2 | 19.4 |
| — Nasdaq | 10,615 | 13,153 | -32.2 | 21.4 | 43.6 | 35.2 | -3.9 | 28.2 |
| — Dow 30 | 30,334 | 33,394 | -16.5 | 18.7 | 7.2 | 22.3 | -5.6 | 25.1 |
| — Russell 3000 | 1,704 | 1,978 | -24.1 | 13.7 | 18.4 | 23.7 | -12.2 | 13.1 |


Source: Yahoo! Finance

Real Return

According to historical stock market [data](#) from Robert Shiller, the **inflation-adjusted trailing twenty-year annual rate of return** of the S&P 500 was 7.0 percent as of September 2022 (see —). Ultra-long-term real returns are currently low relative to the average trailing twenty-year real annual return of 10.1 percent during 1995–2005. The trailing ten-year real return was 9.5 percent, as of September 2022, and 10.7 percent during 1995–2005 (see —).

S&P 500 Real Return

trailing period annualized real return



One component of total returns is **dividend payments to shareholders**. The dividend payments per share over the previous four quarters divided by the share price is the dividend yield. The S&P 500 dividend yield has averaged around two percent, over the past few decades.

In September 2022, the dividend yield for the S&P 500 was 1.70 percent (see —), compared to 1.56 percent in August 2022, and 1.33 percent in September 2021. From 1990 to 2015, the dividend yield averaged 2.09 percent.

S&P 500 Dividend Yield

annual dividend per share divided by share price, percent



Source: Shiller




The total return on corporate equities includes both **dividends and stock buybacks**. US nonfinancial corporations have used stock buybacks to return money to investors, often at the expense of domestic fixed investment. To the extent that markets respond rationally, however, buybacks are no different from dividends.

In the second quarter of 2022, nonfinancial corporation net dividends are equivalent to 2.8 percent of GDP (see ■) and net equities issuance is equivalent to 2.1 percent of GDP (see ■). In 2019, net dividends were 3.3 percent of GDP and net issuance was 2.1 percent. From 1990 to 2015, net dividends averaged 2.6 percent of GDP and net issuance averaged 1.3 percent.

Corporate Equity Payout

nonfinancial corporation net dividends paid and net issuance of equities, percent of GDP



Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis



Valuation

The [cyclically-adjusted price to earnings](#) (CAPE) ratio compares the current price of the S&P 500 to the previous ten-years of total S&P 500 returns, including dividends and buybacks (treated as dividends). Valuations often use recent or forecasted earnings. Robert Shiller's CAPE ratio covers a normal business cycle so that valuations are less-affected by the idiosyncrasies of current economic conditions.

In October 2022, the Shiller total return CAPE ratio was 30.4, compared to 30.9 in September 2022 and 40.6 in October 2021 (see [—](#)). In 2019, the Shiller CAPE ratio was 32.1, on average. In 2000, during the stock market bubble, the Shiller CAPE ratio was 45.1, on average.

Price to Earnings Ratio

10-year total return PE ratio



Source: Shiller



Volatility

The Chicago Board Options Exchange uses S&P 500 options data to [identify](#) expectations of future volatility. This volatility measure, the VIX index (see [—](#)), was 30.8 on October 19, 2022, slightly above the average index value of 24.1 over the past three years. The VIX decreased by 2.8 points over the past week.

S&P 500 Volatility Index

index, monthly average shown



Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange



Interest Rates


The US Federal Reserve System (Fed) has a congressional [mandate](#) to promote price stability and maximum employment. In practice, a Fed committee (the FOMC) determines the **federal funds rate**, which aims to influence interest rates in the broader economy. There are several channels through which interest rates affect broader economic activity, for example, lower interest rates stimulate investment in capital goods and the production of these capital goods employs people, who in turn spend their wages on other goods and services. Through its influence on interest rates, the Fed's monetary policy can aim to be neutral or to stimulate or slow the economy.

The FOMC cut [interest rates](#) three times in 2019, for a total reduction of 75 basis points. Responding to the economic shock of the coronavirus, the FOMC cut rates twice in March 2020, by 150 basis points, bringing the lower bound of the federal funds rate range to zero. With at near zero, the Fed adopted several additional measures to increase liquidity in the global financial system.

In March 2022, the FOMC raised the base interest rate by 25 basis points. In May 2022, the FOMC raised the base interest rate by another 25 basis points. In June, July, and September 2022, the FOMC raised rates by 75 basis points, in each meeting. The effective fed funds rate is 3.08 percent, as of October 19, 2022 (see [—](#)).

Effective Federal Funds Rate

percent, monthly average except for latest value



Source: Federal Reserve, Author's Calculations



Economist John Taylor described a rule for setting the federal funds rate based on inflation and output. Versions of this *Taylor rule* track the actual federal funds rate fairly closely during the 1990s and 2000s. Former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke [described](#) a modified Taylor rule based on core PCE inflation and a stronger response to the output gap (see [—](#)). As of the second quarter of 2022, the modified Taylor rule suggests a federal funds rate of 4.7 percent, 1.63 percentage points above the current rate.

FOMC meeting participants provide [projections](#) which can be used to summarize policymaker views on the future path of the federal funds rate, as seen by the people who set it. As of September 21, 2022, the median projected federal funds rate rate is 4.4 percent for 2022, 4.6 percent for 2023, and 3.9 percent for 2024 (see [■](#)).

Real Interest Rates


Lenders charge higher interest rates to compensate for expected inflation. Real interest rates, which are adjusted for expected inflation, can offer insight into economic and financial conditions. Low real interest rates encourage borrowing and consumption and increased economic activity while high real interest rates discourage borrowing and encourage saving.

One measure of real interest rates is treasury inflation-indexed securities. The yield on these securities can be a proxy for the interest rate investors would charge for treasuries, without inflation.

On October 19, 2022, the real yield on ten-year treasuries was 1.72 percent (see —), compared to 0.59 percent three months prior, on July 18. Five-year treasuries yield 1.89 percent in the latest data, and 0.43 percent three months prior, after adjusting for expected inflation (see —).

Real Treasury Yields

derived from inflation-indexed treasuries, percent




Source: Federal Reserve

The previous approach has limitations, as the market for treasury inflation-indexed securities is relatively small and can be influenced by monetary policy. The Cleveland Fed model estimates real yields across the term structure, using a model based on treasury yields, inflation, and financial-market- and survey-based information, and avoids some limitations of the previous approach.

The model-based real yield on ten-year treasuries is 1.21 percent, as of September 2022 (see —). Ten-year treasury real yields averaged 3.30 percent during the 1990s. The model-based real yield for one-year treasuries is -2.57 percent in September 2022, compared to an average of 2.21 percent during the 1990s (see —).

Real Treasury Yields

model-based, percent




Source: Federal Reserve of Bank of Cleveland

Changes in nominal treasury yields can be **decomposed into changes in expected inflation and changes in real yields**. Changes in real yields reflect changes in expected path of the federal funds rate and the economic outlook. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland models **identify** inflation expectations across the term structure, which can be used to identify changes in real yields.

Over the three months ending September 2022, nominal two-year treasury yields increased 0.86 percentage point, real yields increased 0.86 percentage point, and inflation expectations were unchanged. Ten-year treasury nominal yields increased 0.38 percentage point, real yields increased 0.43 percentage point, and inflation expectations decreased 0.05 percentage point.

Over the three years ending September 2022, the nominal yield on two-year treasuries increased 2.21 percentage points, the real yield increased 0.56 percentage point, and inflation expectations increased 1.64 percentage points. For ten-year treasuries, the nominal yield increased 1.82 percentage points, the real yield increased 0.43 percentage point, and expected inflation increased 0.79 percentage point.

Recent Changes ■ Real Yields ■ Inflation Expectations ● Total
percentage points



Latest data from model as of: September 2022

Source: Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve of Bank of Cleveland



Government Bonds


United States Treasury securities, or **treasuries**, are the asset created by federal government borrowing. The treasuries market is traditionally considered both very low-risk and highly liquid. The yield on these securities has fallen over time, from an average ten-year treasury bond annual yield of 8.5 percent in 1989 to an average of 0.62 percent in July 2020. As of October 19, 2022, the constant maturity yield for ten-year treasury bonds is 4.14 percent (see —), compared to 1.59 percent one year prior.

Longer-term treasuries follow the same trend. In October 19, 2022, 30-year treasuries yield 4.15 percent (see —), compared to 8.45 percent in 1989. Over the past year, 30-year treasury yields increased 2.1 percentage points.

Shorter-duration treasury yield have also fallen since 1989, though shorter-duration treasuries are more acutely affected by changes in the key interest rate set by the Federal Reserve. Over the past year, two-year treasury yields have increased by 4.1 percentage points, as the Federal Reserve is expected to lower interest rates. As of October 19, 2022, the annual yield on two-year treasuries is 4.55 percent (see —).

Treasury Constant Maturity Yields

percent, monthly average shown except for latest value



Source: Federal Reserve

Selected US Treasury Rates

constant maturity yield, percent

averages

| | Oct 19, 2022 | Oct 18, 2022 | Oct 13, 2022 | Sep 2022 | Oct 2021 | 2019 | 2010 -'13 | 1998 -'00 | 1989 |
|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|------|--------------|--------------|------|
| One-month | 3.31 | 3.25 | 3.35 | 2.61 | 0.06 | 2.12 | 0.07 | – | – |
| Three-month | 4.07 | 4.04 | 3.79 | 3.22 | 0.05 | 2.11 | 0.08 | 5.23 | 8.39 |
| Six-month | 4.45 | 4.39 | 4.30 | 3.71 | 0.06 | 2.11 | 0.13 | 5.38 | 8.48 |
| One-year | 4.60 | 4.50 | 4.46 | 3.89 | 0.11 | 2.05 | 0.20 | 5.42 | 8.53 |
| Two-year | 4.55 | 4.43 | 4.47 | 3.86 | 0.39 | 1.97 | 0.43 | 5.61 | 8.57 |
| Three-year | 4.56 | 4.43 | 4.44 | 3.88 | 0.67 | 1.94 | 0.70 | 5.62 | 8.55 |
| Five-year | 4.35 | 4.21 | 4.21 | 3.70 | 1.11 | 1.95 | 1.35 | 5.62 | 8.50 |
| Seven-year | 4.26 | 4.12 | 4.11 | 3.64 | 1.40 | 2.05 | 1.93 | 5.76 | 8.52 |
| Ten-year | 4.14 | 4.01 | 3.97 | 3.52 | 1.58 | 2.14 | 2.54 | 5.65 | 8.49 |
| Twenty-year | 4.38 | 4.27 | 4.25 | 3.82 | 2.03 | 2.40 | 3.33 | 6.05 | – |
| Thirty-year | 4.15 | 4.04 | 3.97 | 3.56 | 2.06 | 2.58 | 3.63 | 5.80 | 8.45 |


Source: Federal Reserve

The **Treasury yield curve** shows the interest rates on different maturities of US Treasury bonds and bills, at a given point in time. The yield curve summarizes the term structure of interest rates, how much it costs to borrow for different periods of time, and has traditionally been considered an indicator of how markets view short-term economic conditions relative to longer-term conditions.

The yield curve is normally upward sloping as investors expect to be compensated for lending for a longer period of time. The shape of the yield curve changes over time and is affected by several factors, including the term premium, the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, and expectations about future inflation. The curve can become steeper, for example, if interest rates or inflation is expected to be higher in the future.

Treasury Yield Curve

constant maturity yield, percent



Source: Federal Reserve

The yield curve can also become *inverted* when yields on shorter-term debt are higher than yields on longer-term debt. An inverted yield curve can be a sign of worsening economic conditions. For example, short term rates may exceed longer-term rates if the Federal Reserve is expected to lower interest rates in the future, or if inflation is expected to fall due to weakened economic conditions.

Since 1989, the US has entered into four recessions and the 10-year to 2-year segment of the yield curve has newly inverted six times. The most recent such inversion started on April 1, 2022.

Another measure of the term structure of interest rates is the *spread* between treasuries with different maturities. **Treasury yield spreads** can be used to track changes in the term structure over time.


As of October 19, 2022, the spread between a 10-year treasury bond and a three-month treasury bill is 0.07 percentage point (see —), compared to 1.53 percentage points one year prior. The spread between 10-year and 2-year treasuries (see —) is -0.41 percentage point on October 19, 2022, and 1.15 percentage points one year prior.

Treasury Yield Spreads

percentage points



Source: Federal Reserve



Corporate Bonds

The US Treasury [publish](#) a yield curve for **corporate bonds** based on the market-weighted average of bonds rated AAA, AA, and A. The yield on high-quality corporate bonds with a maturity of 10 years is 5.27 percent in September 2022, following 4.57 percent in August 2022 (see [—](#)). One year prior, in September 2021, this spot rate was 2.43 percent, and Three years prior, in September 2019, it was 2.93 percent.

High Quality Corporate Bonds, 10-Year

spot rate, percent, monthly average



Source: Treasury



Corporate bonds rated below investment grade (a rating below BBB) are [tracked](#) by the ICE BofA high yield index. As of October 19, 2022, the effective yield for **high-yield corporate bonds** in the index is 9.3 percent (see [—](#)). In August 2022, the average effective yield was 7.6 percent. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2019, the average effective yield was 6.1 percent.

ICE BofA High Yield Index Effective Yield

percent



Source: Ice Data Indices




Mortgage Rates

The **mortgage rate** [available](#) to homebuyers can affect housing markets, which in turn can affect demand for other consumer goods. As of October 20, 2022, the average rate on a 30-year mortgage was 6.94 percent, compared to 5.3 percent on July 28, 2022, and 3.09 percent on October 21, 2021 (see [—](#)). In 2019, the average rate was 3.9 percent.

Mortgage Rate

average for 30-year fixed rate mortgages, percent



Source: Freddie Mac




Money and Monetary Policy

The Federal Reserve [publish](#) data on the **money supply**. A broad measure of the amount of money, called M2, includes cash and deposits such as savings accounts and checking accounts, as well as time deposits smaller than \$100,000, and retail accounts in money market funds.

In August 2022, the M2 money stock totals \$21.6 trillion. Put into the context of overall economic activity, M2 is equivalent to 85.9 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2022. During the 1990s, the ratio of money to economic activity was falling (see —). Following the great recession, the money supply has expanded relative to activity. Since 1989, the ratio has increased by a total of 52.0 percent.

M2 to GDP ratio

index, 1989=1



Source: Federal Reserve



A large increase in the amount of money held by individuals and institutions can be the result of a higher rate of saving, a larger government sector financial deficit, an increase in the money supply, a change in preferences for liquidity, or something else. The M2 money stock increased 4.1 percent over the year ending August 2022 (see —), compared to an increase of 5.3 percent over the year ending July 2022. The M2 money stock has increased 45.2 percent, in total, over the past three years.

M2 Money Stock Growth

not seasonally adjusted, one-year percent change



Source: Federal Reserve



Fed Asset Purchases

During periods where the Fed funds rate is at or near zero the Fed has engaged in **large scale asset purchases** in an effort to further improve financial market conditions. These asset purchases show up on the Fed balance sheet, which is [reported](#) weekly.

In response to the collapse of the housing bubble, the Fed purchased U.S. Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities. Total assets held by the Federal Reserve (see [—](#)) increased from \$0.9 trillion in August 2008 to \$2.2 trillion in November 2008. Additional rounds of asset purchases, referred to as quantitative easing, increased the balance sheet to \$4.5 trillion by January 2014. As bonds mature they were replaced until October 2017, when the Fed allowed the size of its balance sheet to normalize. Total assets fell below \$3.8 trillion in August 2019.

Balance sheet normalization ended in September 2019 when the Fed increased operations in overnight and term repurchase agreement (repo) markets, following a sharp increase in rates in these markets. The Fed balance sheet increased to \$4.1 trillion by December 2019.

Federal Reserve Balance Sheet

total assets, trillion of USD



Source: Federal Reserve

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Fed offered lending to businesses and currency swaps to major US trading partners, began to purchase commercial bonds, and expanded purchases of treasuries and mortgage-backed securities.

The Fed balance sheet increased from \$4.2 trillion in February 2020 to \$8.8 trillion, as of the latest data, covering October 12, 2022. The Fed currently holds \$5.6 trillion in Treasuries and \$2.7 trillion in mortgage-backed securities.

Federal Reserve Assets

billions of US dollars

| | Oct 12, 2022 | Oct 5, 2022 | Sep 14, 2022 | Oct 13, 2021 | Oct 14, 2020 |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Total (see —) | 8,759.0 | 8,759.1 | 8,832.8 | 8,480.9 | 7,151.4 |
| U.S. Treasury securities | 5,629.8 | 5,633.9 | 5,687.0 | 5,465.9 | 4,485.0 |
| Mortgage-backed securities | 2,698.2 | 2,698.2 | 2,718.5 | 2,494.8 | 2,046.8 |
| Central bank liquidity swaps | 3.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 7.5 |
| Repurchase agreements | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Loans | 20.1 | 21.4 | 20.6 | 55.4 | 74.7 |
| Payroll Protection Program | 12.4 | 13.8 | 14.4 | 55.0 | 65.6 |
| Net unamortized premium | 296.0 | 296.8 | 299.3 | 338.7 | 333.0 |
| Other | 99.2 | 94.6 | 92.7 | 70.8 | 137.9 |

Source: Federal Reserve

Prices

Changes in prices affect the amount of goods and services that can be purchased by a fixed income. When measuring changes in prices, researchers consider both the quantity that can be purchased by a unit of currency, and also changes in item quality. To understand the overall change in prices paid or charged by a certain group, such as consumers or manufacturers, researchers create a representative “basket” of the goods and services relevant to the group, and track the changes in the basket, and the price of the basket, over time. The end result of these methods is a price index.

Researchers can then use the price index to calculate the rate of inflation. Perhaps the most common way of measuring inflation is to calculate the 12-month percent change in the index values. This measures how prices in a given month compare to prices during the same month, one year prior.

Price Growth, Various Measures

one-year growth, percent

| | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Jun '22 | Sep '21 | Sep '20 | '17-19 Avg. | '00-Avg. |
|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|----------|
| CPI, All Items | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 5.4 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| CPI, ex. Food & Energy | 6.6 | 6.3 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| PPI, Final Demand | 8.5 | 8.7 | 9.8 | 11.3 | 8.8 | 0.3 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
| Imports Price Index | 6.0 | 7.8 | 8.8 | 10.7 | 9.3 | -1.3 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
| Exports Price Index | 9.5 | 10.7 | 12.9 | 18.6 | 16.3 | -1.8 | 1.6 | 2.2 |
| PCE, All Items | – | 6.2 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 4.7 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| PCE, ex. Food & Energy | – | 4.9 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| PCE, Trimmed Mean | – | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 |


Source: BLS, BEA, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

In effect, the 12-month percent change in prices is smoothed, relative to the one-month change in prices, by including information on price changes that happened over the past year. While the chartbook uses less-volatile 12-month inflation rates in most cases, the **one-month rate** can be more useful for examining short-term trends, for example by eliminating the base effects from changes in prices a year ago.

In September 2022, the annualized one-month change in the consumer price index (CPI) was 4.6 percent (see ■), following 1.4 percent in August 2022.

CPI One-Month Change

monthly percent change, annualized



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Consumer Price Index

Consumer prices increased 8.2 percent over the year ending September 2022 (see —), according to the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). The core CPI, which does not include the more-volatile food and energy prices, increased 6.6 percent over the same one-year period (see —).

Consumer Price Index

one-year growth, percent, not seasonally adjusted



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics


Recent changes in prices can be broad-based, that is derived from many prices changing at roughly the same rate, or narrow-based and driven by large changes in a subset of prices. Identifying each major spending category's **contribution to overall inflation** gives insight into whether inflation is broad-based and also into which groups of people face higher or lower rates of inflation.

In September 2022, housing prices contributed 3.4 percentage points to the CPI one-year inflation rate of 8.2 percent, far above the category's September 2021 contribution of 1.7 percentage points. Transportation prices added 2.3 percentage points to September 2022 inflation, substantially below the year-prior contribution of 2.9 percentage points. The energy category makes up 7.3 percent of the CPI basket, but accounts for 19.3 percent of September 2022 inflation. Energy prices increased the inflation rate by 1.6 percentage points in the latest data, compared to 1.8 percentage points in September 2021.

Food prices increased the inflation rate by 1.5 percentage points in September 2022, substantially above the year-prior contribution of 0.6 percentage point. Medical care prices make up 8.5 percent of the CPI basket and contributed 0.5 percentage point to overall inflation in the latest data, substantially above a contribution of 0.0 percentage point one year prior.

Contribution of Major Categories

contribution to one-year CPI inflation rate
percentage points, not seasonally adjusted



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The prices of some items are more volatile than others. Food and energy prices, for example, are sometimes separated from the rest of the CPI basket, which is referred to as the *core*, because swings in food and energy prices are larger and more frequent.


Core inflation includes core goods, core services other than shelter, and shelter. Core goods inflation was barely existent from 2013 through the start of the pandemic. Core goods prices are disproportionately affected by import prices and by changes in the quality of goods, for example from technological improvement. In contrast, domestic wage growth affects the prices for core services more than the other categories. Shelter prices are affected by housing supply and construction.

In September 2022, core goods contributed 1.2 percentage points to the one-year non-seasonally-adjusted CPI inflation rate of 8.2 percent (see ■), while core services excluding shelter contributed 1.7 percentage points (see ■). Shelter added 2.3 percentage points (see ■), and food & energy added 3.2 percentage points (see ■).

One year prior, in September 2021, the corresponding CPI inflation rate was 5.4 percent; core goods contributed 1.3 percentage points, core services excluding shelter contributed 0.7 percentage point, shelter contributed 1.1 percentage points, and food and energy added 2.4 percentage points.

CPI Decomposition

contribution to one-year change in CPI-U, percentage points



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Author's Calculations

Relative Prices

Some categories of spending are a small part of the overall price basket used to calculate the CPI, but have seen large cumulative increases in prices. Additionally, the price basket is based on averages across individuals, with some individuals dedicating a much larger share of spending to certain categories and other individuals have no expenses in certain categories. For example, day care costs are paid generally only for a few years of a child's life and only some households contain day-care-age children. But within those households, day care is a large share of overall spending.

The following section and table cover one-year inflation rates for different categories of goods and services, including some smaller categories. The table also shows the cumulative change in prices for each category since February 2020, the last month of data before the COVID-19 pandemic shutdown in the US. Additionally, the weight that a category has in the overall index—the category's share of the basket of goods and services used to calculate the CPI—is included as the last column in the table. This weight comes from each category's share of overall consumer spending during the most recent reference period, and is updated by changes in prices since the reference period.

Housing prices increased eight percent over the year ending September 2022, far above the pre-COVID rate of 2.9 percent (the average monthly rate during 2019). Medical care prices increased six percent, these prices grew at an average rate of 2.8 percent during 2019. In contrast, prices of food consumed at home (groceries) increased 13.0 percent in the year ending September 2022 compared to 0.9 percent during 2019.

Transportation prices increased 12.6 percent over the year ending September 2022, far above the pre-COVID 0.3 percent decrease. Energy prices increased 19.8 percent over the year, compared to an average 2.1 percent decrease on average in 2019. Energy prices are historically more volatile than other categories.

Selected CPI Categories

one-year growth, percent

| | Sep '22 | Aug '22 | Jul '22 | Sep '21 | 2019 | Since Feb '20 | Weight, Sep '22 |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|---------------|-----------------|
| All items | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 5.4 | 1.8 | 14.7 | 100.0 |
| Housing | 8.0 | 7.8 | 7.4 | 3.9 | 2.9 | 13.4 | 42.424 |
| Owners' equivalent rent | 6.7 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 11.1 | 23.977 |
| Rent of primary residence | 7.2 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 11.2 | 7.352 |
| Lodging away from home | 2.9 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 17.5 | 3.0 | 10.6 | 0.933 |
| Household furnishings & ops. | 9.3 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 5.1 | 1.8 | 17.1 | 4.790 |
| Household energy | 20.8 | 21.2 | 20.5 | 9.6 | -0.4 | 34.1 | 3.924 |
| Transportation | 12.6 | 13.4 | 16.4 | 16.6 | -0.3 | 28.1 | 18.438 |
| New vehicles | 9.4 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 8.7 | 0.4 | 18.6 | 4.056 |
| Used cars and trucks | 7.2 | 7.8 | 6.6 | 24.4 | 1.0 | 48.3 | 3.830 |
| Gasoline (all types) | 18.2 | 25.6 | 44.0 | 42.1 | -3.5 | 50.6 | 3.991 |
| Public transportation | 27.1 | 21.1 | 19.0 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 7.8 | 0.901 |
| Medical care | 6.0 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 0.4 | 2.8 | 8.3 | 8.368 |
| Professional services | 3.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 1.1 | 8.0 | 3.465 |
| Hospital and related services | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.1 | 8.9 | 2.510 |
| Health insurance | 28.2 | 24.3 | 20.6 | -9.4 | 14.5 | 22.0 | 0.918 |
| Food | 11.2 | 11.4 | 10.9 | 4.6 | 1.9 | 19.6 | 13.704 |
| Food at home | 13.0 | 13.5 | 13.1 | 4.5 | 0.9 | 21.6 | 8.507 |
| Food away from home | 8.5 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 4.7 | 3.1 | 16.4 | 5.197 |
| Full-service | 8.8 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 5.2 | 3.2 | 16.2 | 2.409 |
| Limited-service | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 6.7 | 3.1 | 19.0 | 2.507 |
| Recreation | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 3.5 | 1.3 | 7.8 | 4.983 |
| Communication | -1.9 | -1.4 | -1.0 | 1.5 | -0.9 | 1.5 | 3.437 |
| Wireless telephone services | -1.1 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -2.5 | 2.9 | 1.476 |
| Internet services | -0.1 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 0.904 |
| Education | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 6.2 | 2.589 |
| College tuition and fees | 2.1 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 1.430 |
| Day care and preschool | 5.1 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 8.9 | 0.629 |
| Apparel | 5.5 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 3.4 | -1.3 | 4.6 | 2.482 |
| Personal care | 6.6 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 9.6 | 2.189 |

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Inflation Expectations

Researchers gain insight on expected changes in prices through regular **surveys of consumers** and through **market data**. One market-based measure is known as the **inflation breakeven** and is calculated as the difference between the yield on a nominal treasury bond and the yield on a treasury inflation-protected bond of the same maturity. This difference represents the amount of inflation markets have priced in, on average, for the maturity of the bond.

Five-Year Expected Average Inflation

expected average annual rate, percent



Source: FRED; U. of Michigan


As of October 2022, surveyed consumers expect an average inflation rate of 2.9 percent over the next five years, (see —), compared to an expected rate of 2.9 percent in October 2021. Consumers had expected inflation to average 2.5 percent over the past five years, while actual inflation over the period was 3.4 percent.

As of October 18, 2022, markets expect an average inflation rate of 2.4 percent over the next five years (see —), compared to an expected rate of 2.7 percent on October 15, 2021. Markets had expected inflation to average 1.7 percent per year over the past five years, five years ago.

Both survey- and market-based estimates of expected inflation distinguish between near-term inflation and expected medium-term inflation. The survey-based measure asks about inflation over the next year. Respondents expect consumer prices to increase 5.1 percent over the year starting October 2022 (see —).

Survey of Expected Inflation

annual rate, percent



Source: University of Michigan

Market Expected Inflation

annual rate, percent



Source: FRED

The market-based measure can be used to calculate expected inflation over the five years starting five years from now. Over this five-year period, markets suggest 2.4 percent inflation per year. Inflation rates in the near-term are therefore expected to fall below inflation rates in the longer-term


PCE Price Index

The Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) price index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis [captures](#) both changes in the price of goods and services as well as monthly changes in consumer behavior. The index is additionally updated over time to the latest methodology.

As of August 2022, **PCE inflation**, measured as the one-year percent change in the overall index, is 6.2 percent (see —), compared to 6.4 percent in July 2022, and 4.5 percent in August 2021. Core PCE inflation, which excludes food and energy, was 4.9 percent in August 2022 (see —), 4.7 percent in July 2022, and 3.9 percent in August 2021.

Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index

one-year growth, percent




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas [publish](#) a variation of the PCE price index called the trimmed-mean index. The most volatile categories in the current month's index are removed, or *trimmed*, to smooth the data. As a result, the most extreme categories, which vary from month-to-month, do not affect inflation rates calculated using the trimmed-mean index.

The trimmed-mean PCE price index increased 4.7 percent over the year ending August 2022 (see —). By excluding top and bottom categories, the trimmed-mean rate was 1.5 percentage points below the all-items PCE rate. In July 2022, the **trimmed-mean inflation rate** was 4.5 percent, 1.9 percentage points below the all-items rate. From 2017–2019, the average trimmed-mean rate was 1.9 percent, 0.1 percentage point above the all-items rate.

Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index, Trimmed Mean

highest and lowest categories excluded, one-year growth, percent



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas


Producer Prices

The Bureau of Labor Statistics [report prices producers receive](#). The goods-only producer price index (PPI) for all commodities (see —) increased 14.3 percent over the year ending September 2022, far below the 12-month growth rate of 20.6 percent in September 2021. The index for final demand goods, services, and construction increased 8.5 percent over the year ending September 2022 (see —).

Note that the all commodities index includes goods at various stages of production and can count inflation multiple times in the production of the same goods. As a result, this measure can send an exaggerated inflation signal.

Producer Price Index

one-year growth, percent, not seasonally adjusted




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The one-month change in the prices producers receive can provide insight into recent trends. In September 2022, the annualized one-month change in PPI final demand prices was 4.6 percent (see ■), following -2.2 percent in August 2022. The one-month change in the all commodities index was -1.3 percent (see ■) in September 2022 and -12.1 percent in August 2022.

PPI One-Month Change

monthly percent change, annualized



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics


Import and Export Prices

The Bureau of Labor Statistics [report](#) changes in the prices of imports and exports. Over the year ending September 2022, **US import prices** grew six percent (see —), following an increase of 7.8 percent in August and 8.8 percent in July. Excluding fuels, US import prices increased 3.4 percent in September 2022 and grew 3.9 percent in August. Over the three years ending February 2020, prior to the US COVID-19 pandemic, US import prices increased at an average rate of 1.3 percent. Excluding fuels, import prices increased at an average rate of 0.3 percent during the same three-year pre-COVID period.

Prices of US exports (see —) grew 9.5 percent over the year ending September 2022, compared to 10.7 percent in August, 12.9 percent in July, and 1.5 percent on average during the three years ending February 2020.

Import/Export Price Index

one-year growth, percent



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Commodity Prices

Certain commodities have macroeconomic significance. An example is oil, which is a major input to production and transportation with a particularly volatile price history. Commodity prices are also important as a signal to domestic mining operations, for example.

Two commodities that are important to the construction and manufacturing industries are lumber and steel. From the producer price index, cold-rolled steel sheet and strip prices have decreased 32.2 percent over the year ending September 2022, and increased 102.1 percent total since December 2019. Lumber prices increased 6.4 percent over the year ending September 2022, and increased 39.5 percent total since 2019.

Steel

cold-rolled steel sheet and trim, index 1989=1



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



Lumber

lumber and wood products, index, 1989=1



Commodity Prices

On October 18, 2022, the [futures price](#) for a barrel of west Texas intermediate (WTI) **crude oil** is \$82.82 (see —). Over the past year, this measure of oil prices increased two percent. Over the past three years, the price increased 53.4 percent. The WTI price is currently \$51 below its peak monthly average price of \$134 per barrel in June 2008.

Oil Price

USD, west Texas intermediate crude, monthly average and latest value



Source: Energy Information Administration



On October 17, 2022, the US average [price](#) for a gallon of **gasoline** is \$3.99 (see —), a decrease of \$0.04 from the week prior. This gas price measure, which is the average across formulations, grades, and locations, was \$3.42 one year prior, and averaged \$2.69 in 2019. During 2011–2013, the average gas price was \$3.61.

Gasoline Price

dollars per gallon, all grades



Source: Energy Information Administration



As of October 20, 2022, one troy ounce of **gold** [sells](#) for \$1,633.20 (see —), compared to an average of \$1,774.50 one year prior. Following the great recession, the monthly average price of gold reached \$1,780.65 per ounce, in September 2011. In August 2020, the average monthly price reached \$1,971.17 per ounce.

Gold Price

USD, monthly average and latest value



Source: London Bullion Market Association



Acknowledgments

Gabriel Mathy, Iordan Koulov, Lara Merling, Kevin Cashman, Rebecca Watts, Dean Baker, Matt Bruenig, Eileen Appelbaum, John Schmitt, Mark Weisbrot, Ben Zipperer, Alberto Rodelgo, Yevgeniya Korniyenko, Magali Pinat, Robert Blecker, Teasri Thiruvadhanthai, Rainer Köhler, Gersenda Varisco, Venkat Josyula, Tom Augspurger, Claudia Sahm, Mike Sieferling, Andrew Paciorek, David Dorn, Skanda Amarnath, Ernie Tedeschi, Brad Setser, and Vikas Sharma.