



G-8 Simulation: Country Final Report (Group) – A Canada

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(Simulation Exercise – Instructional Use Only)

Executive Summary

Through a combination of domestic intelligence gathering and international collaboration with Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia, Canada has developed a comprehensive understanding of a planned transnational terrorist attack, codenamed the “Festival.” The attack appears to be orchestrated primarily from Lebanon, with a network of operatives and support cells spanning Europe, North America, and potentially Russia. Intelligence indicates the target of this operation is a high-profile political event in the United States, where senior government officials are expected to be present. The threat includes a variety of weapons, such as firearms, explosives, and potentially components for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), obtained via international arms traffickers and smuggling networks.

Key figures identified in this plot include Sharif Mobley, acting as the primary recruiter and operational coordinator; Michael McKevitt, assisting in manpower recruitment and logistical support; Ramadan Shallah, overseeing financing and funding of the operation; and Viktor Bout, responsible for international weapons procurement and movement. The overarching leadership may involve an individual codenamed Castro, believed to be the final decision-maker in operational planning.

Canadian intelligence has also identified domestic elements of the operation, including fugitive operative Jaber Elbenah, whose activities in Cornwall, Ontario, indicate reconnaissance and potential staging within Canada. Additionally, the hijacking of a Canadian Forces transport vehicle carrying C-4 explosives demonstrates the operational reach and capability of the network within national borders. This report consolidates all available

intelligence to provide a comprehensive assessment of the plot, including the identification of key figures, financing mechanisms, weapons acquisition, and operational pathways.

Key Plot Figures

The terrorist network is composed of individuals with distinct and complementary roles. Sharif Mobley is a known Islamic extremist with prior affiliations to al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. Intelligence from Germany and Canada indicates Mobley is responsible for recruiting operatives and coordinating the assembly of personnel for the planned attack. He has demonstrated the ability to mobilize fighters across multiple countries and maintains communication with other key members of the network.

Michael McKevitt, recently released from prison in March 2025, retains extensive connections to major terrorist organizations. UK intelligence intercepts confirm that McKevitt has been tasked with delivering trained fighters for the Festival operation. The intercepted calls suggest McKevitt operates as a recruiter and logistic coordinator, managing the movement of personnel and maintaining contact with operational leadership.

Financial operations appear to be orchestrated by Ramadan Shallah, who manages the raising and allocation of funds via illicit activities, including extortion, drug trafficking, and other criminal networks. Shallah's communications indicate involvement in funding and supporting arms procurement, particularly with respect to coordination with Viktor Bout.

Viktor Bout, operating out of Russia under the alias Yuri Ivananov, has been identified as the primary facilitator for weapons acquisition. Intercepted communications and email exchanges reveal his coordination of arms transfers and potential explosives shipments, including the use of Moscow parks as exchange points. Bout's operations suggest the network is capable of acquiring and transporting sophisticated weapons, including explosives and firearms, potentially disguised as commercial goods.

The network leadership may involve an individual identified as Castro, whose true identity remains unknown. German intelligence suggests this figure serves as the ultimate decision-maker, with other operatives deferring to his authority. In addition, Russian FSB reports indicate possible involvement of Shamil Basayev, a known Chechen militant, in providing technical support for undetectable or specialized weapons.

Domestically, Jaber Elbenah has been observed in Canada, displaying suspicious behavior consistent with reconnaissance activities. The hijacking of a military transport vehicle carrying explosives and long-range weapons also indicates the presence of Canadian-based operatives, demonstrating the network's capacity to operate within Canada as part of a broader international operation.

Surveillance and Recruitment Activities

Intelligence reports indicate that Mobley traveled from Frankfurt to New York City under false identification, suggesting that operatives are actively positioning themselves to facilitate the attack in the United States. Surveillance of Mobley and his associates confirms that the recruitment effort is multinational, drawing fighters from Europe, the Middle East, and North America. Intercepted communications reveal the use of metaphorical language, including references to "sons" to denote weapons and "Italy in the cup" to indicate

operational progress, which underscores the sophistication and clandestine nature of the planning.

McKevitt's role as a recruiter is evidenced by calls intercepted in the UK, in which he is directed to identify and deliver capable fighters. Mobley's coordination role is further reinforced by Canadian and German intelligence, which confirms he is tasked with raising an operational "army" and facilitating logistical support for the Festival.

Canadian surveillance has directly observed operational activity by Elbenah in Cornwall, Ontario. Although initial police reports suggested random public behavior, further investigation and DNA identification confirmed his fugitive status and association with the network. Elbenah's activities indicate domestic reconnaissance and potential preparation for operational support or staging within Canada.

Weapons Procurement

Weapons for the Festival operation have been obtained through a combination of international purchase, smuggling, and potentially covert construction. Viktor Bout's involvement is central to the acquisition and movement of firearms, explosives, and other munitions. Intelligence confirms plans for weapons exchanges in Izmailovski and Sokol'niki Parks in Moscow, with explosives and firearms coordinated for separate transfer points. The use of commercial shipping and pretense, such as textile machinery, may serve to conceal the transport of illicit materials, including components with WMD potential.

Canadian intelligence documents indicate that a transport vehicle carrying 20 kilograms of C-4 plastic explosives, long-range anti-personnel weapons, and crowd control munitions was hijacked by operatives in Canada. The hijacking demonstrates the operational capability of the network to intercept and divert weapons within national borders. While the full inventory is still under verification, this incident highlights the seriousness and sophistication of weapons logistics planning.

Financing

The terrorist network relies on illicit funding channels, primarily coordinated by Shallah. Intercepted communications and allied intelligence indicate the use of extortion, kidnapping, theft, and trafficking networks to raise necessary capital. Despite these sources, intercepted reports suggest funding is a challenge for the network, requiring strategic prioritization of arms acquisition and operational expenditures. The financing appears to be highly centralized, with Shallah directing funds to weapons procurement through intermediaries such as Bout.

Timeline and Target

Available intelligence indicates the Festival attack is planned for mid-to-late 2025, with precise timing dependent upon the completion of recruitment, weapons acquisition, and reconnaissance. The primary target is a political event in the United States involving senior government officials, with attack modalities likely including firearms and explosives. WMD components may be present but remain unconfirmed.

While the operational network has discussed alternative targets metaphorically, such as references to symbolic Western figures, intelligence suggests that the central focus remains the U.S. political event. Attackers are expected to utilize conventional international transit channels, entering under false identities, and may stage weapons and personnel domestically in Canada prior to movement into the U.S.

False Leads and Intelligence Challenges

Several elements of communication have required careful interpretation due to metaphorical and coded language. Terms such as “sons” and “Italy in the cup” required analysis in context to avoid misidentifying weapons or personnel. Initial domestic surveillance, such as the Cornwall observation, could have been interpreted as innocuous behavior; however, further investigation confirmed operative relevance.


The identity of Castro, the network’s decision-making figure, remains unresolved. Additional intelligence gathering and international cooperation will be required to verify the true identity and operational role of this individual.

International Intelligence Integration

The success of this assessment relied upon robust collaboration with allied intelligence agencies. Germany provided confirmation of key operatives, weapons movement, and suspected WMD components. UK intelligence supplied critical call intercepts confirming recruitment and financial coordination, as well as Hezbollah affiliations. Russia verified the operational reach of Viktor Bout, including arms transfers, and provided indications of specialized weapon support from Chechen elements. Integration of Canadian domestic surveillance highlighted potential staging and reconnaissance within North America.

The combined intelligence confirms the plot is transnational, coordinated, and highly organized. Disruption requires ongoing collaboration, monitoring of cross-border movements, and interdiction of both personnel and weapons.

Conclusions



The Festival operation represents a highly sophisticated, networked, transnational threat to Western political leadership, with a primary target in the United States. Weapons will include firearms and explosives, with the possibility of WMD components, acquired through international trafficking networks and staged in both Europe and North America. Key operatives are clearly delineated, with Mobley and McKeivitt managing personnel, Shallah managing finances, and Bout managing weapons acquisition. Canadian-based elements demonstrate domestic operational capability.

This intelligence assessment underscores the critical need for international coordination to disrupt this network before operational execution.

Recommendations

- Enhance border security and transit monitoring to prevent movement of known operatives and weapons.
- Monitor financial transactions and arms shipments, particularly via Moscow and Lebanon, to intercept funding and materials.
- Decode and analyze metaphorical communications to preempt operational planning.
- Conduct surveillance on domestic operatives such as Elbenah and any Canadian-based network affiliates.
- Maintain continuous intelligence sharing among G-8 partners to enable early interdiction of all operational nodes.