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New rules from http://www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crook…

…s_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan.  New normalizations.rules
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Champ Clark III
Champ Clark III committed Feb 23, 2018
1 parent d89f52c commit 87080d02714d0cb73b379bfbf4458daae3f6d012
Showing with 106 additions and 1 deletion.
  1. +1 −1 .last_used_sid
  2. +44 −0 normalization.rulebase
  3. +16 −0 sagan-sid-msg.map
  4. +9 −0 windows-auth.rules
  5. +23 −0 windows-correlated.rules
  6. +13 −0 windows-sysmon.rules
@@ -1 +1 @@
5003375
5003381
@@ -410,3 +410,47 @@ rule=: %-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %username:word% %-:string-to:Cal
rule=: %-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %username:word% %-:string-to:Called Station Identifier:%Called Station Identifier: %nasMAC:char-to :\ x3a%:%-:string-to:Calling Station Identifier:%Calling Station Identifier: %userMAC:char-to :\ x20% %-:string-to:NAS IPv4 Address:%NAS IPv4 Address: %nasIP:ipv4% %-:string-to:NAS Identifier:%NAS Identifier: %nasHost:word% %-:string-to:Result:%Result: %reasonCode:word% %-:rest%
# -- HERE
# Zscaler rule update
rule=: act=Blocked%-:string-to:dst=%dst=%dst-ip:ipv4% src=%src-ip:ipv4%%-:string-to:suser=%suser=%username:char-to:\x40%%-:rest%
#Cylance rule update
rule=: %-:string-to:Event Type:%Event Type: Threat%-:string-to:Device Name:%Device Name: %username:char-to:\x2D%%-:char-to:\x28%(%src-ip:char-to:\x29%%-:rest%
#NPS IAS rule
rule=: %-:string-to:IAS%%-:string-to:User-Name%%-:char-to:\x3E%>%username:char-to:\x3C%</User-Name><NAS-IP-Address data_type=%-:char-to:\x3E%>%src-ip:char-to:\x3C%%-:string-to:Calling-Station-Id%%-:char-to:\x3E%>%filename:char-to:\x3C%<%-:rest%
# Windows Account Lockout: There are 2 rules for the first log. The idea is if there is a caller computer both rules will fire off and the 2nd rule will just not have a caller computer name. If there is not a caller computer, only rule 2 will fire and rule 1 will not work... in theory
#4740: A user account was locked out. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: XXXXX$ Account Domain: XXXXXX Logon ID: 0x3E7 Account That Was Locked Out: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2455855555-3858555555-3953555555-55555 Account Name: XXXXX Additional Information: Caller Computer Name: XXXXXX
#Rule 1
rule=: 4740: A user account was locked out. %-:string-to:Locked Out%%-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %username:word% %-:string-to:Computer Name:%Computer Name: %filename:word%
#Rule 2
rule=: 4740: A user account was locked out. %-:string-to:Locked Out%%-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %usernameser:word% %-:rest%
#Kerberos ticket request
#10.21.8.10.log:10.21.8.10|user|info|info|0e|2017-08-30|10:16:31|Security| 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested. Account Information: Account Name: XXX@XXXXX Account Domain: XXXXXX Logon GUID: {B7666966-6666-6666-6666-666666666666} Service Information: Service Name: XXXXXX$ Service ID: S-1-5-21-1716666666-1105666666-319566666-1166666 Network Information: Client Address: ::ffff:172.27.1.1 Client Port: 49350 Additional Information: Ticket Options: 0x40810000 Ticket Encryption Type: 0x12 Failure Code: 0x0 Transited Services: - This event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested. This event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket. Ticket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.
rule=: %-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %username:char-to:\x40%%-:string-to:Client Address:%Client Address: ::ffff:%src-ip:ipv4% %-:rest%
# SSH login
#10.144.11.8|syslog|info|info|2e|2017-08-28|09:49:19|03362| auth: User 'XXXXXX' logged in from 10.10.10.10 to SSH session
rule=: %-:string-to:User%User %username:word% logged in from %src-ip:ipv4% %-:rest%
#10.78.11.51|user|info|info|0e|2017-08-28|13:20:31|1,2017/08/28| 13:20:31,0008C101111,SYSTEM,general,0,2017/08/28 13:20:31,,general,,0,0,general,informational,User XXXXXX logged in via CLI from \ j10.10.10.10,809792,0x0,0,0,0,0,,XXXXXX
rule=: %-:string-to:User%User %username:word% %-:char-to:\\%\ %src-ip:char-to:\x2c%%-:rest%
# Account logged on - Windows event id 4624
#10.41.43.253|user|info|info|0e|2017-08-28|13:02:55|Security| 4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Type: 3 Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2466666666-3858666666-3953666666-130966 Account Name: xxxx Account Domain: XXXXXX Logon ID: 0x5A31095D Logon GUID: {55555555-5555-5553-6666-966666666666} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: 10.10.10.10 Source Port: 52526 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Kerberos Authentication Package: Kerberos Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
rule=: %-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %-:string-to:Account Name:%Account Name: %username:word% %-:string-to:Network Address:%Network Address: %src-ip:ipv4% %-:rest%
@@ -3228,6 +3228,22 @@
5003373 || [PasswordState] Password Reset Removed from Queue || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003373 || url,www.clickstudios.com.au/downloads/version8/Passwordstate_Security_Administrators_Manual.pdf
5003374 || [PasswordState] Password Reset Task Updated || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003374 || url,www.clickstudios.com.au/downloads/version8/Passwordstate_Security_Administrators_Manual.pdf
5003375 || [PasswordState] Brute Force Login Attempt [5/5] || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003375 || url,www.clickstudios.com.au/downloads/version8/Passwordstate_Security_Administrators_Manual.pdf
5003376 || [WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious network login || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003376 || url,indingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003377 || [WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious network login from non-RFC1918 || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003377 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003378 || [WINDOWS-SYSMON] IP detect in command line || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003378 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003379 || [WINDOWS-SYSMON] Command line $\\ type request || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan sid:5003379 || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003379 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003380 || [WINDOWS-SYSMON] Powershell execution || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003380 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003381 || [WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [dst -> src] || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003381 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003382 || [WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [XBIT SET] || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003382 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003383 || [WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [src -> dst] || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003383 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003384 || [WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [XBIT SET] || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003384 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003385 || [WINDOWS-CORRELATED] wmiprvse.exe [XBIT SET] || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003385 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003386 || [WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Possible remote WMIC command execution || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003386 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003387 || [WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious WMIC/Net/Powershell execution || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003387 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003388 || [WINDOWS-SYSMON] SYSMON Possible CMD detected || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003388 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003389 || [WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious Mount of a $ share || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003389 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003390 || [WINDOWS-SYSMON] Possible credential dumper execution || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003390 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
5003391 || [WINDOWS-SYSMON] Possible credential dumper execution || url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan || url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003391 || url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html
6000510 || [OSSEC] Level 7 - Host-based anomaly detection event (rootcheck). (ossec_rules.xml:ossec)
6000513 || [OSSEC] Level 9 - Windows malware detected. (ossec_rules.xml:ossec)
6000518 || [OSSEC] Level 9 - Windows Adware/Spyware application found. (ossec_rules.xml:ossec)
@@ -252,4 +252,13 @@ alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[SYSLOG] Possible Windows Br
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-AUTH] SAM Database Unable to Lock Account"; program: "Directory-Services-SAM"; content: "12294|3a| "; classtype: unsuccessful-user; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003203; reference: url,technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc733228(v=ws.10).aspx; sid:5003203; rev:1;)
# 2017-02-22 - Rule create by Champ Clark III based off Jack Crook's work. See:
# From Jack Crook via https://www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan/
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious network login"; program: *Security*; content: " 4624|3a| "; content: "Logon Type|3a| 3"; pcre: "/^((?!Account Name: (.*)\$ ).)*$/"; content:!"Workstation Name|3a| Source Network Address|3a|"; reference: url,indingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003376; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:suspicious-login; sid:5003376; rev:1;)
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious network login from non-RFC1918"; program: *Security*; content: " 4624|3a| "; content: "Logon Type|3a| 3"; parse_src_ip: 1; meta_content:!"Source Network Address|3a| %sagan%",10.,192.168.,-,|3a 3a|1,127.0.0.1,172.16.,172.17.,172.18.,172.19.,172.20.,172.21.,172.22.,172.23.,172.24.,172.25.,172.26.,172.27.,172.28.,172.29.,172.30.,172.31.; meta_nocase; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003377; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; sid:5003377; classtype:suspicious-login; rev:1;)
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious WMIC/Net/Powershell execution"; program: *Security*; content: " 4648|3a| "; content:!"Account Name|3a| -"; content:!"Target Server Name|3a| localhost"; pcre: "/Target Server Name: (.*)\$ /"; pcre: "/Process Name: (.*)(net\.exe|wmic\.exe|powershell\.exe)(.*)/i"; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003387; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:misc-attack; sid:5003387; rev:1;)
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-AUTH] Suspicious Mount of a $ share"; program: *Security*; content: " 5140|3a| "; pcre: "/^((?!Account Name: (.*)\$ ).)*$/"; pcre: "/Share Name: (.*)\$/"; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003389; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:misc-attack; sid:5003389; rev:1;)
@@ -33,3 +33,26 @@ alert any $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Success
alert any $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Successful RDP login after honeypot activity"; pcre: "/ 528: | 4624: /";content: "Logon Type|3a| 10 ";content:!"Source Network Address|3a| 0.0.0.0"; program: *Security*; xbits:isset,by_src,honeypot; parse_src_ip: 1; default proto: tcp; classtype: correlated-attack; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003341; sid:5003341; rev:1;)
# 2017-02-22 - Rule create by Champ Clark III based off Jack Crook's work. See:
# From Jack Crook via https://www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan/
# -- dst -> src
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [dst -> src]"; program: *Security*; content: " 5145|3a| "; content: "Object Type|3a| File"; pcre: "/Share Name: (.*)\$ /"; meta_content: "Access Mask|3a| %sagan%",0x100180,0x80,0x130197; xbits: isset,by_src,dst_src_suscopy; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003381; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:misc-attack; sid:5003381; rev:1;)
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [XBIT SET]"; program: *Security*; content: " 5145|3a| "; content: "Object Type|3a| File"; pcre: "/Share Name: (.*)\$ /"; meta_content: "Access Mask|3a| %sagan%",0x100180,0x80,0x130197; xbits: set,dst_src_suscopy,1; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003382; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:misc-attack; sid:5003382; rev:1;)
# -- src -> dst
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [src -> dst]"; program: *Security*; content: " 5145|3a| "; content: "Object Type|3a| File"; pcre: "/Share Name: (.*)\$ /"; meta_content: "Access Mask|3a| %sagan%",0x100181,0x80,0x120089; xbits: isset,none,src_dst_suscopy;reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003383; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:misc-attack; sid:5003383; rev:1;)
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Suspicious file copy to a share [XBIT SET]"; program: *Security*; content: " 5145|3a| "; content: "Object Type|3a| File"; pcre: "/Share Name: (.*)\$ /"; meta_content: "Access Mask|3a| %sagan%",0x100181,0x80,0x120089; xbits: set,src_dst_suscopy,1; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003384; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; classtype:misc-attack; sid:5003384; rev:1;)
# -- WMIC commands/execution across a network
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] wmiprvse.exe [XBIT SET]"; content: " 4688|3a| "; pcre: "/Process Name: (.*)wmiprvse\.exe(.*)/i"; xbits: set,wmiprvse,1; xbits:nounified2; classtype: suspicious-command; program: *Security*; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003385; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; sid:5003385; rev:1;)
alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-CORRELATED] Possible remote WMIC command execution"; program: *Security*; content: " 4624|3a| "; content: "Logon Type|3a| 3"; content:!"Source Network Address|3a| -"; xbits: isset,src_xbitdst,wmiprvse; parse_src_ip: 1; parse_port; reference: url,findingbad.blogspot.cz/2017/12/a-few-of-my-favorite-things-continued.html; reference: url,wiki.quadrantsec.com/bin/view/Main/5003386; reference: url,www.quadrantsec.com/about/blog/using_jack_crooks_log_analysis_concepts_with_sagan; sid:5003386; classtype:suspicious-login; rev:1;)
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