. Stefan Lukits

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Name: Harvir Bains; Student Number: 10397164

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Galen Strawson
- · Michel Foucault
- · Charles Taylor
- · R. Jay Wallace
- · Bernard Williams
- Judith Butler
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Derek Parfit
- · Marya Schechtman
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Brian Leiter

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 2

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 3

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 4

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 5

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 6

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 7

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this

is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 8

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 9

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 10

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 11

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 12

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 13

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 15

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Part II.

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Topic A.

Describe the features of existentialism that are attractive to you and why they are attractive to you. Identify also points at which you disagree with existentialism or where you are critical and/or doubtful.

Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

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Derek Parfit
Edward Craig
Sigmund Freud
Raymond Geuss
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Karl Marx
Christopher Janaway
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Charles Taylor
Galen Strawson
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Name: Michael Ruby; Student Number: 10586162

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John Richardson
Jean-Paul Sartre
Jay Wallace
Christopher Janaway
Nancy Love
Bernard Williams
Marya Schechtman
Michel Foucault
Judith Butler
Edward Craig
Brian Leiter
Charles Taylor
Derek Parfit
Raymond Geuss
Mattia Riccardi
Galen Strawson
Sigmund Freud
Rebecca Solnit
Karl Marx
Brian Leiter

Name: Tarah Suleman; Student Number: 11481158

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- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Galen Strawson
- Mattia Riccardi
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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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Rebecca Solnit
Bernard Williams

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Yingxi (Celia) Zhu; Student Number: 15778160

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- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Galen Strawson
- Judith Butler
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- · Charles Taylor
- Mattia Riccardi
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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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Name: Tony Sing Chau Ng; Student Number: 16290141

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Name: Rafay Wagar; Student Number: 17058141

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Charles Taylor
Edward Craig
Rebecca Solnit
Nancy Love
Christopher Janaway
Mattia Riccardi
Jean-Paul Sartre
Marya Schechtman
John Richardson
Sigmund Freud
Michel Foucault
Brian Leiter
Karl Marx
Galen Strawson
Alexander Nehamas
Bernard Williams
Derek Parfit
Judith Butler
Jay Wallace
Brian Leiter
Raymond Geuss

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Yi Cheng (Eason) Shih; Student Number: 17193146

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Sigmund Freud
- Brian Leiter
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Galen Strawson
- · Bernard Williams
- · Derek Parfit
- · Mattia Riccardi
- Judith Butler
- · Christopher Janaway
- R. Jay Wallace
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Michel Foucault
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Charles Taylor

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 2

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 3

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 4

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 5

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 6

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 7

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 9

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 10

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 12

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 15

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Jean-Paul Sartre
Bernard Williams
Edward Craig
Derek Parfit
Alexander Nehamas
Christopher Janaway
Brian Leiter
Raymond Geuss
Judith Butler
Brian Leiter

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Nigel Tan; Student Number: 17568163

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Part I.

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- R. Jay Wallace
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Charles Taylor
- · Sigmund Freud
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Brian Leiter
- · Derek Parfit
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- · Galen Strawson
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Christopher Janaway

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 8

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 13

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Quote 14

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 15

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

Topic A.

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Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Karl Marx
Edward Craig
Rebecca Solnit
Tay Wallace
Alexander Nehamas
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson
Bernard Williams
Galen Strawson
Tudith Butler

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Karim Rukhsar; Student Number: 17748154

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Part I.

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- · Bernard Williams
- Marya Schechtman
- Galen Strawson
- · Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Charles Taylor
- Judith Butler
- Brian Leiter
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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Author
Karl Marx
Raymond Geuss
Alexander Nehamas
Jean-Paul Sartre
Jay Wallace
Bernard Williams
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John Richardson
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Christopher Janaway
Derek Parfit
Galen Strawson
Brian Leiter
Charles Taylor
Sigmund Freud
Mattia Riccardi
Nancy Love
Marya Schechtman
Michel Foucault
Edward Craig

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Matt Hangad; Student Number: 17934143

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

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- · Christopher Janaway
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
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- · Marya Schechtman

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 3

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 8

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 15

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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Judith Butler
Brian Leiter
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Michel Foucault
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Karl Marx
Jay Wallace
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson
Mattia Riccardi
Rebecca Solnit
Brian Leiter
Derek Parfit
Galen Strawson
Alexander Nehamas

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Natasha Vlajnic; Student Number: 19362152

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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Raymond Geuss
Karl Marx
Alexander Nehamas
Brian Leiter
Christopher Janaway
Brian Leiter
Charles Taylor
Bernard Williams
Marya Schechtman

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Jemima Leahana (Jemima) Ycasas; Student Number: 19673152

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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 13

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 14

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 15

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Marya Schechtman
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Jay Wallace
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter
Brian Leiter
Derek Parfit
Karl Marx
Jean-Paul Sartre
Galen Strawson
Rebecca Solnit
Nancy Love
Alexander Nehamas
Michel Foucault
Raymond Geuss
John Richardson
Judith Butler
Bernard Williams
Edward Craig
Christopher Janaway
Mattia Riccardi

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Aida Retta; Student Number: 20324133

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Derek Parfit
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Bernard Williams
- · Brian Leiter
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Christopher Janaway
- Mattia Riccardi
- Charles Taylor
- R. Jay Wallace
- Judith Butler
- · Marya Schechtman
- Michel Foucault
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Galen Strawson

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 2

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 3

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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Quote 5

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as

they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 6

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 7

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 8

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 9

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 10

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 11

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 12

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And

the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 13

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 14

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 15

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Bernard Williams
Jay Wallace
Derek Parfit
Karl Marx
Michel Foucault
Rebecca Solnit
Mattia Riccardi
Charles Taylor
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Manvir (Monie) Tutt; Student Number: 21241161

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- · Galen Strawson
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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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Jay Wallace
Rebecca Solnit
Bernard Williams
Christopher Janaway
Judith Butler
Brian Leiter
Galen Strawson
Sigmund Freud
Brian Leiter

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Jia Wen (Annie) Zheng; Student Number: 22491161

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Part I.

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- Mattia Riccardi
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Bernard Williams
- Brian Leiter
- · Christopher Janaway
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Sigmund Freud
- Galen Strawson
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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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Quote 5

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the

general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 6

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 7

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 14

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 15

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
John Richardson
Michel Foucault
Christopher Janaway
Edward Craig
Jean-Paul Sartre
Raymond Geuss
Jay Wallace
Rebecca Solnit
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter
Brian Leiter
Bernard Williams
Karl Marx
Mattia Riccardi
Alexander Nehamas
Marya Schechtman
Derek Parfit
Galen Strawson
Judith Butler
Nancy Love
Sigmund Freud

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Gianina Cojuangco; Student Number: 22768139

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Sigmund Freud
- Judith Butler
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Mattia Riccardi
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Christopher Janaway
- R. Jay Wallace
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Michel Foucault
- · Charles Taylor
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- Brian Leiter
- · Bernard Williams
- Friedrich Nietzsche
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Quote 3

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 4

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 5

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 15

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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erek Parfit
hristopher Janaway
lexander Nehamas
alen Strawson
ebecca Solnit
rian Leiter
ohn Richardson
fichel Foucault
Iarya Schechtman

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Rafael Mikayelyan; Student Number: 24253130

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- · Christopher Janaway
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- R. Jay Wallace
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- · Marya Schechtman
- · Bernard Williams
- Judith Butler

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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Bernard Williams
Raymond Geuss
Galen Strawson
Alexander Nehamas
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Sigmund Freud

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Valerie Hei Yu (Valerie) Cheng; Student Number: 26335159

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- Judith Butler
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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 4

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 8

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been

necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 12

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 13

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 14

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 15

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

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Jay Wallace
Edward Craig
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Nancy Love
Judith Butler
Bernard Williams
John Richardson
Alexander Nehamas
Christopher Janaway
Raymond Geuss
Rebecca Solnit
Brian Leiter
Brian Leiter
Derek Parfit
Michel Foucault
Mattia Riccardi
Karl Marx
Jean-Paul Sartre
Charles Taylor

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Sara Trnovska; Student Number: 27142413

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Part I.

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- Brian Leiter
- Judith Butler
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Galen Strawson
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- Mattia Riccardi
- · Christopher Janaway
- R. Jay Wallace
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
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- · Sigmund Freud
- · Charles Taylor
- · Michel Foucault
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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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Quote 11

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit nar-

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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Raymond Geuss
Derek Parfit
Galen Strawson
Mattia Riccardi
Jay Wallace
Karl Marx
Jean-Paul Sartre
Michel Foucault
Alexander Nehamas

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Sofia Tsairi; Student Number: 27704162

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Galen Strawson
Edward Craig
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Jay Wallace
Mattia Riccardi
Derek Parfit
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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Ashna Misra; Student Number: 28048149

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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Michel Foucault
Charles Taylor
Derek Parfit
Brian Leiter
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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Kennedy Dyck; Student Number: 28270163

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Emilia Aguilar; Student Number: 29588191

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Mia Gazley; Student Number: 31226137

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Brian Leiter
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Mattia Riccardi
- · Charles Taylor
- · Bernard Williams
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Marya Schechtman
- Judith Butler
- · Michel Foucault
- Galen Strawson
- · Derek Parfit
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 2

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 6

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible

breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 11

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind

us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 12

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Nicolas Huige; Student Number: 31279169

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Divija Madhani; Student Number: 31834203

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Judith Butler
Alexander Nehamas
Raymond Geuss
Galen Strawson
Jay Wallace
Rebecca Solnit
Edward Craig
Nancy Love
Brian Leiter
Jean-Paul Sartre
Charles Taylor
Derek Parfit
Mattia Riccardi
Bernard Williams
Michel Foucault
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson
Marya Schechtman
Karl Marx
Brian Leiter
Christopher Janaway

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Christopher (Kevin) Jonathan; Student Number: 31942155

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- R. Jay Wallace
- · Bernard Williams
- · Brian Leiter
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Derek Parfit
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Judith Butler
- · Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Charles Taylor
- · Galen Strawson
- · Michel Foucault

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 2

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 3

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 4

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 5

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 8

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 9

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 11

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 14

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 15

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Author
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Charles Taylor
Edward Craig
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Rebecca Solnit
Brian Leiter
Nancy Love
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson
Christopher Janaway
Karl Marx
Bernard Williams
Derek Parfit
Mattia Riccardi
Brian Leiter

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Wan-Chien (Winnie) Hsieh; Student Number: 31971154

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Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Derek Parfit
- Galen Strawson
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Bernard Williams
- · Michel Foucault
- · Charles Taylor
- Mattia Riccardi
- Brian Leiter
- Judith Butler
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Sigmund Freud
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Jean-Paul Sartre

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 2

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 3

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 6

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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Quote 13

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 14

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 15

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Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Galen Strawson
Mattia Riccardi
John Richardson
Brian Leiter
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Charles Taylor
Karl Marx
Alexander Nehamas
Tay Wallace
Rebecca Solnit

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Eddie Amaitum; Student Number: 32462146

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Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Charles Taylor
- Mattia Riccardi
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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 15

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

Topic A.

Describe the features of existentialism that are attractive to you and why they are attractive to you. Identify also points at which you disagree with existentialism or where you are critical and/or doubtful.

Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Nancy Love
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson
Karl Marx
Charles Taylor
Jay Wallace
Edward Craig
Galen Strawson
Judith Butler
Marya Schechtman
Brian Leiter
Jean-Paul Sartre
Rebecca Solnit
Derek Parfit
Michel Foucault
Mattia Riccardi
Brian Leiter
Bernard Williams
Alexander Nehamas
Raymond Geuss
Christopher Janaway

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Yong Tong (Zoe) Li; Student Number: 33114166

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Mattia Riccardi
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Bernard Williams
- · Galen Strawson
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Derek Parfit
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Michel Foucault
- · Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Judith Butler
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Brian Leiter
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Charles Taylor

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 2

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 3

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 4

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 5

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 6

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 7

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is

not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 8

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 9

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 10

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 11

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 12

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive

practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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Quote 14

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 15

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Author
Derek Parfit
Brian Leiter
Nancy Love
Edward Craig
Mattia Riccardi
Galen Strawson
Judith Butler
Sigmund Freud
Alexander Nehamas
Brian Leiter
Raymond Geuss
Karl Marx
Christopher Janaway
Bernard Williams
Rebecca Solnit
Marya Schechtman
Jean-Paul Sartre
John Richardson
Michel Foucault
Jay Wallace
Charles Taylor

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Jun Li; Student Number: 33412164

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- R. Jay Wallace
- Judith Butler
- · Charles Taylor
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Brian Leiter
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Galen Strawson
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- · Derek Parfit
- · Bernard Williams
- · Christopher Janaway

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 6

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 10

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 12

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 13

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 14

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 15

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

Topic A.

Describe the features of existentialism that are attractive to you and why they are attractive to you. Identify also points at which you disagree with existentialism or where you are critical and/or doubtful.

Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

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Christopher Janaway
Judith Butler
Michel Foucault
Rebecca Solnit
Marya Schechtman
Jean-Paul Sartre
John Richardson
Galen Strawson

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Xingren (Myke) Chen; Student Number: 33835159

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Part I.

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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into

the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 15

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Jay Wallace
John Richardson
Brian Leiter
Edward Craig
Nancy Love
Christopher Janaway
Brian Leiter
Rebecca Solnit
Raymond Geuss
Charles Taylor
Mattia Riccardi
Marya Schechtman
Michel Foucault
Sigmund Freud
Karl Marx
Alexander Nehamas
Derek Parfit
Judith Butler
Jean-Paul Sartre
Bernard Williams
Galen Strawson

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Abdelrahman (Abdo) Megahid; Student Number: 34456153

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Charles Taylor
- · Derek Parfit
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- · Galen Strawson
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- Judith Butler
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- Friedrich Nietzsche
- R. Jay Wallace
- Brian Leiter
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Mattia Riccardi

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 2

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 3

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 4

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is

also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 7

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 8

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 9

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 11

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Raymond Geuss
Charles Taylor
Jay Wallace
Edward Craig
Judith Butler
Galen Strawson
Jean-Paul Sartre
Sigmund Freud
Michel Foucault
Nancy Love

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Philippe Issa El-Khoury; Student Number: 36182146

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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Quote 15

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Brian Leiter
Alexander Nehamas
Edward Craig
Jay Wallace
John Richardson
Marya Schechtman
Rebecca Solnit
Judith Butler
Mattia Riccardi
Nancy Love

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Alisa Chirpicinic; Student Number: 36674159

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Part I.

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- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 8

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 10

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 12

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 13

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 14

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 15

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
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Jean-Paul Sartre
Judith Butler
Nancy Love
Charles Taylor
Jay Wallace
Galen Strawson
John Richardson
Brian Leiter
Christopher Janaway
Bernard Williams
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Sigmund Freud
Edward Craig
Alexander Nehamas
Mattia Riccardi
Marya Schechtman
Brian Leiter
Rebecca Solnit
Michel Foucault
Raymond Geuss

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Grace Ogolo; Student Number: 38804150

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Charles Taylor
- · Christopher Janaway
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Derek Parfit
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Galen Strawson
- · Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- Judith Butler
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- R. Jay Wallace
- Brian Leiter
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Bernard Williams

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 2

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 3

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 4

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 5

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 6

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 8

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 9

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 11

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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Jean-Paul Sartre
Nancy Love
Mattia Riccardi
Galen Strawson
Judith Butler
Karl Marx
Bernard Williams
Christopher Janaway
Charles Taylor

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Xin Yi (Joy) Ma; Student Number: 40370124

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- R. Jay Wallace

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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Galen Strawson
Mattia Riccardi
Nancy Love
Marya Schechtman
Bernard Williams
Jean-Paul Sartre
Rebecca Solnit
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Tatiana Rafter; Student Number: 40383101

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

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- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Sigmund Freud
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- · Christopher Janaway
- · Marya Schechtman
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- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Michel Foucault
- · Derek Parfit
- Mattia Riccardi
- R. Jay Wallace
- Judith Butler
- · Bernard Williams
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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 6

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 7

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally

stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 9

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 10

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 11

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 12

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this

is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 13

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 15

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
John Richardson
Raymond Geuss
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Sigmund Freud
Rebecca Solnit
Derek Parfit
Bernard Williams
Edward Craig
Mattia Riccardi
Brian Leiter
Michel Foucault
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter
Jay Wallace
Nancy Love
Galen Strawson
Alexander Nehamas
Christopher Janaway
Karl Marx
Marya Schechtman

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Zoe Hertz; Student Number: 41319147

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Brian Leiter
- Judith Butler
- · Michel Foucault
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Galen Strawson
- · Charles Taylor
- · Christopher Janaway
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Bernard Williams
- · Marya Schechtman
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Derek Parfit
- · Sigmund Freud
- R. Jay Wallace

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 2

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 3

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 4

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication?

That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 13

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 14

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 15

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Judith Butler
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Derek Parfit
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Michel Foucault
Sigmund Freud
Bernard Williams
Galen Strawson
Edward Craig
Rebecca Solnit
Charles Taylor
Mattia Riccardi
Karl Marx
Brian Leiter

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Julia Gao; Student Number: 41599151

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- · Christopher Janaway
- · Galen Strawson
- Brian Leiter
- Judith Butler
- · Sigmund Freud
- R. Jay Wallace
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Charles Taylor
- Derek Parfit
- · Mattia Riccardi
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- · Bernard Williams

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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Quote 11

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Brian Leiter
Sigmund Freud
Edward Craig
Alexander Nehamas
Marya Schechtman
Nancy Love
Christopher Janaway
Judith Butler
Michel Foucault

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Alara Sever; Student Number: 41719162

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

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- Sigmund Freud
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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 9

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course

of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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dward Craig	
ernard Williams	
lattia Riccardi	
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lexander Nehamas	
igmund Freud	
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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Yingqiu Zhao; Student Number: 46603163

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

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- Brian Leiter
- · Michel Foucault
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Marya Schechtman
- Mattia Riccardi
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Raymond Geuss
Judith Butler
Derek Parfit
John Richardson
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Karl Marx
Edward Craig
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Bernard Williams

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Jameson Thomas; Student Number: 46844156

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- · Sigmund Freud
- · Derek Parfit
- Charles Taylor
- · R. Jay Wallace
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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Etash Shah; Student Number: 47838157

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- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Bernard Williams
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Derek Parfit
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- R. Jay Wallace
- Judith Butler
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Charles Taylor
- · Brian Leiter
- · Galen Strawson
- · Sigmund Freud

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 2

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 3

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 5

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 6

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication?

That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Sherif Ashour; Student Number: 47878153

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Iqbal Sultani; Student Number: 48609721

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Rebecca Solnit
Marya Schechtman
Charles Taylor
Michel Foucault
Sigmund Freud
Galen Strawson
John Richardson
Jay Wallace
Jean-Paul Sartre
Alexander Nehamas
Brian Leiter
Derek Parfit
Nancy Love
Raymond Geuss
Judith Butler
Karl Marx
Edward Craig
Mattia Riccardi
Christopher Janaway
Brian Leiter
Bernard Williams

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Vincent Quenneville; Student Number: 49833643

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Christopher Janaway
- · Charles Taylor
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- · Judith Butler
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- · Bernard Williams
- · Sigmund Freud
- Derek Parfit
- Galen Strawson
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Mattia Riccardi
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- R. Jay Wallace

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 2

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 3

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 4

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 5

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 11

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 12

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty,

the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 13

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 14

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 15

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

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Charles Taylor
Marya Schechtman
Raymond Geuss
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Jay Wallace
Michel Foucault
Alexander Nehamas
John Richardson
Brian Leiter
Brian Leiter
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Rebecca Solnit
Nancy Love

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Suzanne Cobb; Student Number: 51781169

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- R. Jay Wallace
- Mattia Riccardi
- Brian Leiter
- · Charles Taylor
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Galen Strawson
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
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- · Marya Schechtman
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- · Sigmund Freud
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Michel Foucault
- Judith Butler
- · Bernard Williams

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 12

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Quote 13

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 14

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 15

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

Topic A.

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Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

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Karl Marx
Marya Schechtman
Galen Strawson
Sigmund Freud
Mattia Riccardi
John Richardson
Raymond Geuss
Derek Parfit
Brian Leiter

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Kevin Tin Chun (Kevin) Tse; Student Number: 52497625

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Part I.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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Quote 15

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Judith Butler
Brian Leiter
Nancy Love
Brian Leiter
Marya Schechtman
Derek Parfit
Michel Foucault
Alexander Nehamas
Sigmund Freud
John Richardson
Jean-Paul Sartre
Christopher Janaway
Mattia Riccardi
Bernard Williams
Rebecca Solnit
Galen Strawson
Raymond Geuss
Jay Wallace
Charles Taylor
Karl Marx
Edward Craig

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Alex Bowlin; Student Number: 52642148

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Charles Taylor
- Galen Strawson
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Bernard Williams
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Derek Parfit
- · Michel Foucault
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Brian Leiter
- · Marya Schechtman
- Judith Butler

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 2

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 4

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 5

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 10

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 11

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 13

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 14

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 15

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Raymond Geuss
Nancy Love
Jay Wallace
Mattia Riccardi
Bernard Williams
Jean-Paul Sartre
Judith Butler
Galen Strawson
Alexander Nehamas
Charles Taylor

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Harsh Trivedi; Student Number: 54651154

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- · Galen Strawson
- Friedrich Nietzsche
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- · Derek Parfit
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- · Bernard Williams

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Raymond Geuss
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Sigmund Freud
Karl Marx
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter
Michel Foucault
Derek Parfit
Judith Butler
Jay Wallace
Jean-Paul Sartre
John Richardson

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Meshi Maimoni; Student Number: 54917307

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Part I.

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- Judith Butler
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- · Charles Taylor
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- · Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- Friedrich Nietzsche
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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 13

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 15

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Judith Butler
Mattia Riccardi
Rebecca Solnit
Charles Taylor
Edward Craig
Alexander Nehamas
Brian Leiter
Marya Schechtman
Michel Foucault
Derek Parfit
Bernard Williams
Karl Marx
Nancy Love
Christopher Janaway
Jay Wallace
Sigmund Freud
Brian Leiter
Raymond Geuss
Galen Strawson
Jean-Paul Sartre
John Richardson

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Solomon (Solly) Behar; Student Number: 55300131

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- · Derek Parfit
- · Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Bernard Williams
- Brian Leiter
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Charles Taylor
- R. Jay Wallace
- Galen Strawson
- Judith Butler
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Jean-Paul Sartre

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 2

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 3

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 4

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 5

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 7

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 8

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 9

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 10

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 11

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 13

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 15

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

Topic A.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Author
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Sigmund Freud
Nancy Love
Bernard Williams
Marya Schechtman
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Brian Leiter
Rebecca Solnit
Galen Strawson
ohn Richardson
Christopher Janaway
ean-Paul Sartre
Mattia Riccardi

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Shoshana Messinger; Student Number: 55977152

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Charles Taylor
- Mattia Riccardi
- Brian Leiter
- · Bernard Williams
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Michel Foucault
- · Marya Schechtman
- Galen Strawson
- · Sigmund Freud
- Judith Butler
- Derek Parfit
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 2

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Quote 13

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 14

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 15

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Derek Parfit
Raymond Geuss
Galen Strawson
Judith Butler
Alexander Nehamas
Michel Foucault
Sigmund Freud
Karl Marx
Christopher Janaway
Brian Leiter
Jay Wallace
Rebecca Solnit
Nancy Love
Charles Taylor
Marya Schechtman
Edward Craig
Mattia Riccardi
Brian Leiter
Jean-Paul Sartre

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Sudarshan Iyer; Student Number: 57003139

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Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- R. Jay Wallace
- · Christopher Janaway
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- · Derek Parfit
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Galen Strawson
- · Sigmund Freud
- Mattia Riccardi
- Brian Leiter
- · Bernard Williams
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Charles Taylor
- Judith Butler
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Michel Foucault

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 2

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 9

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 10

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 11

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of

their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

Quote 12

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 13

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 14

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 15

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

Topic A.

Describe the features of existentialism that are attractive to you and why they are attractive to you. Identify also points at which you disagree with existentialism or where you are critical and/or doubtful.

Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Jean-Paul Sartre
Jay Wallace
Brian Leiter
Bernard Williams
John Richardson
Nancy Love
Galen Strawson
Judith Butler
Karl Marx
Sigmund Freud
Edward Craig
Michel Foucault
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter
Marya Schechtman
Rebecca Solnit
Raymond Geuss
Alexander Nehamas
Christopher Janaway
Mattia Riccardi
Derek Parfit

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Paige White; Student Number: 59840165

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Galen Strawson
- Brian Leiter
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Mattia Riccardi
- · Bernard Williams
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Charles Taylor
- · Derek Parfit
- Judith Butler
- Michel Foucault
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Christopher Janaway

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Quote 2

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 3

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 4

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 5

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 6

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 8

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 9

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Quote 10

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 11

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 12

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 13

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been

necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 14

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 15

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Michel Foucault
Bernard Williams
John Richardson
Judith Butler
Marya Schechtman
Brian Leiter
Brian Leiter
Alexander Nehamas
Rebecca Solnit
Galen Strawson
Christopher Janaway
Derek Parfit
Edward Craig
Jay Wallace
Charles Taylor
Jean-Paul Sartre
Karl Marx
Mattia Riccardi
Sigmund Freud
Nancy Love
Raymond Geuss

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Aarondeep (Aaron) Takhar; Student Number: 60119161

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Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- Judith Butler
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Derek Parfit
- · Charles Taylor
- · Michel Foucault
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Brian Leiter
- · Bernard Williams
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Galen Strawson
- · Marya Schechtman
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 13

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Quote 14

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 15

When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Author
Raymond Geuss
John Richardson
Brian Leiter
Sigmund Freud
Alexander Nehamas
Bernard Williams
Edward Craig
Karl Marx
Michel Foucault
Derek Parfit
Judith Butler
Galen Strawson
Jay Wallace
Nancy Love
Marya Schechtman
Mattia Riccardi
Jean-Paul Sartre
Rebecca Solnit
Charles Taylor
Brian Leiter
Christopher Janaway

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Lingxuan (Michael) Yu; Student Number: 60235165

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Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Marya Schechtman
- Galen Strawson
- · R. Jay Wallace
- Brian Leiter
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Christopher Janaway
- · Charles Taylor
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Judith Butler
- Derek Parfit
- Bernard Williams
- Michel Foucault
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- Friedrich Nietzsche

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 2

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 3

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Quote 4

The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

Quote 5

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 6

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

Quote 8

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

Quote 13

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 14

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 15

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author
Sigmund Freud
Galen Strawson
Michel Foucault
Edward Craig
John Richardson
Brian Leiter
Christopher Janaway
Bernard Williams
Judith Butler
Karl Marx
Mattia Riccardi
Brian Leiter
Jay Wallace
Alexander Nehamas
Nancy Love
Jean-Paul Sartre
Charles Taylor
Rebecca Solnit
Marya Schechtman
Raymond Geuss
Derek Parfit

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Zong Xi (Jonesy) Li; Student Number: 61752168

There are three parts to this final exam. In part I, you are asked to identify the authors of 15 passages that we have read in class (50 percent). In part II, you are asked to write a short essay on ONE of the topics provided (45 percent). In part III, you are asked to rank the authors of this course. I will use this information to develop the course in the future (5 percent). Make sure to complete parts I and III on the paper on which the questions of the final exam are provided to you, not on separate sheets.

Part I.

Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Christopher Janaway
- · Marya Schechtman
- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Derek Parfit
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Bernard Williams
- · Judith Butler
- Brian Leiter
- Mattia Riccardi
- · Michel Foucault
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Galen Strawson
- · Charles Taylor

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 2

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

Quote 3

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 14

A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

Quote 15

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

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Sigmund Freud
Karl Marx
Christopher Janaway
Mattia Riccardi
Nancy Love
Galen Strawson
Jean-Paul Sartre
Brian Leiter
Derek Parfit

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Silvana Alexia (Silvana) Martinez Zapata; Student Number: 64694276

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Part I.

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- · Bernard Williams
- Galen Strawson
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- · Charles Taylor
- · Michel Foucault
- · Christopher Janaway
- Mattia Riccardi
- Judith Butler
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- R. Jay Wallace
- · Sigmund Freud
- · Marya Schechtman

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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Christopher Janaway
Derek Parfit
Bernard Williams
Edward Craig
Raymond Geuss
Brian Leiter
Judith Butler
Sigmund Freud
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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Jillian Lim; Student Number: 74070954

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- Judith Butler
- Friedrich Nietzsche
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- · Charles Taylor
- · Christopher Janaway
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- Mattia Riccardi
- Galen Strawson

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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Standard phenomenalism, however, grants---in fact, presupposes---that we are, in some way or another, directly aware of (at least some of) our mental states. This, however, is the very assumption Nietzsche rejects in the quoted note. To have a handy label, I refer to the view he thereby defends as the Inner Opacity view.

Quote 6

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself

raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

Quote 10

The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society,

and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 15

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Part II.

Write a short essay (600-1200 words) about ONE of the following topics. You are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, to be personal and opinionated (in the good way of being opionated, i.e. where you give reasons for your opinions) in your essay and to incorporate narrative/biographical elements.

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Jay Wallace
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Derek Parfit
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Karl Marx
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Charles Taylor
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Michel Foucault
Christopher Janaway
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Brian Leiter
Rebecca Solnit
Judith Butler

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Ka Chon Kuok; Student Number: 75450833

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Clearly write the name of one of the following authors next to the quotes following the list of authors. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Michel Foucault
- · Charles Taylor
- R. Jay Wallace
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Galen Strawson
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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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Michel Foucault
Edward Craig
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Raymond Geuss
Karl Marx
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Alexander Nehamas
Galen Strawson
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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Hiu Fung (Ivan) Choi; Student Number: 76673797

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Saeyan Son; Student Number: 80897010

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- Bernard Williams
- · Charles Taylor
- Mattia Riccardi
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- R. Jay Wallace
- · Sigmund Freud

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

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All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit nar-

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Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

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What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

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One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 11

We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this

is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Sai Di; Student Number: 82217290

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Lisa Yeung; Student Number: 84625961

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Karl Marx

Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Puneetjot (Puneet) Sidhu; Student Number: 85649762

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- Galen Strawson
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
- Brian Leiter
- Mattia Riccardi
- Charles Taylor
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- · Bernard Williams
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- · Jean-Paul Sartre
- · Marya Schechtman
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- · Christopher Janaway
- R. Jay Wallace

M-Naturalism [methodological naturalism] requires the philosopher seeking to understand human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to develop a speculative psychology of human beings and human nature. This aligns Nietszche quite closely with Hume, as many scholars have now noted, though Hume had only Newtonian science as a paradigm, while Nietzsche had the benefit of extensive familiarity with developments in 19th-century science on which to draw, both substantively and speculatively.

Quote 2

One of Nietzsche's most striking qualities is the obstinacy with which he held to an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world, the fact that their existence has been necessary to everything that we value, or the further fact summarized in the slogan God is dead---that the traditional metaphysical conceptions which have helped us to make sense of the world, and in particular to bear its horrors, have terminally broken down.

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A subject who only evaluates weakly---that is, makes decisions like that of eating now or later, taking a holiday in the north or in the south---such a subject we might call a simple weigher of alternatives. And the other, who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, we might call a strong evaluator ... the strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. Reflection is not just a matter, where it is not calculation of consequences, of registering the conclusion that alternative A is more attractive to me, or draws me more than B.

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The articulation constraint: having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story of one's life to oneself or to anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an implicit narrative. Nonetheless, the narrative self-constitution view does not allow a person's self-narrative to remain entirely subterranean. A further requirement is that an identity-constituting narrative is capable of local articulation. This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels.

Quote 5

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism---man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.

Quote 6

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences "from the inside," as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.

What is the peculiar alliance presumed to exist between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of sex? If "identity" is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?

Quote 8

Because human beings have the instinctive drive of all living things to express power, which leads them to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering, human beings subjected to the restrictions of civilized society, and so constrained to internalize their instincts, satisfy their instinctive drive by inflicting suffering on themselves.

Quote 9

If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of duplication? That of a "non-corporal," a "soul," as Mably called it. The history of this "micro-physics" of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul." Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished---and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul.

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We can also venture an opinion about the mechanisms of such sublimation. The sexual feelings of these infantile years on the one hand could not be utilizable, since the procreating functions are postponed---this is the chief character of the latency period; on the other hand, they would in themselves be perverse, as they would emanate from erogenous zones and would be born of impulses which in the individual's course of development could only evoke a feeling of displeasure. They therefore awaken contrary forces (feelings of reaction), which in order to suppress such displeasure, build up the above mentioned psychic dams: loathing, shame, and morality.

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When I believed that my existence was a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.

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The fundamental emotional dynamic of the slave revolt is not the selection of means to an end that is set by one's desires. It is the expression of one's negative emotional orientation toward the powerful, in the embrace of an evaluative framework that makes sense of that basic orientation.

All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards---this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his soul. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom---punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark---had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying---all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of bad conscience. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be tamed; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness---this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of bad conscience. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man's sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based.

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Topic B.

Give an account of your personal identity in light of our readings, but also in light of your experience and your beliefs. Make reference to the debate between narrativists and anti-narrativists.

Topic C.

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Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

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Name: Teddy Wu; Student Number: 96916762

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Final Exam PHIL 375

Name: Alexander Charmchi; Student Number: 99456758

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Compare the hermeneutic and scientific tradition with reference to how you come to conclusions about important questions in life.

Topic D.

Do you consider yourself to be more of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" type person or a "hermeneutics of trust" type person (this distinction was made by Paul Ricoeur)? What has motivated you to fall into one or the other camp?

Topic E.

Does Butler's view of sex and gender resonate with you or not? Give a balanced mix of personal and rational arguments for your assessment.

Part III.

Clearly rank at least the top five of the following authors. You may rank more than the top five if you wish. Do this on the final exam (this document) and not on a separate piece of paper.

Author	
Brian Leiter	
Marya Schechtman	
fudith Butler	
Mattia Riccardi	
Brian Leiter	
Nancy Love	
Sigmund Freud	
Bernard Williams	
lean-Paul Sartre	
Karl Marx	
lay Wallace	
Rebecca Solnit	
Christopher Janaway	
Raymond Geuss	
Alexander Nehamas	
Edward Craig	
Galen Strawson	
Michel Foucault	
Charles Taylor	
ohn Richardson	
Derek Parfit	