

Nietzsche and Freud

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Many of the things that Freud said were pre-empted by Nietzsche, for example the idea of the subconscious. Both Freud and Nietzsche were thinkers who were trying to understand what an honest intellectual response to the historical phenomenon of modernity could look like. Modernity is where

... the people have lost their ancient beliefs; the parson sits at home and unravels his vestments, one after another ... (Franz Kafka, A Country Doctor, 141)

epistemological crisis “I was in great perplexity” (136)

the efficiency of aimlessness “you never know what you are going to find in your own house” (137)

the twinning of pathology and sex the boy's wound (141) Kafka's bisexuality? See Foucault's *History of Sexuality*

lack of agency first, the doctor cannot help because the boy is healthy; then he cannot help because the boy is past helping (141)

collapse of eschatology “it cannot be made good, not ever” (143)

Ontogenesis vs. Phylogenesis

Another parallel between Nietzsche and Freud is that both were trying to do to psychology what Darwin did with respect to life: explain by revealing its history. The important difference for Freud is that he used **ontogenesis** instead of **phylogenesis** for his explanation (25). Here are some key concepts in psycho-analysis.

drives irrational drives determine human behaviour; rational explanations are epiphenomenal (confabulation)

neurosis conflict between the unconscious and the conscious creates repression

subconscious the wall between the unconscious and the conscious is porous, but information which passes through is encrypted in symbols (dreams, myths, jokes, Freudian slips)

psycho-analysis therapy is bringing-to-consciousness and transference (32)

Oedipus Complex early childhood amnesia obscures the Oedipus complex

Id Ego Superego the rational identity is confronted with an animalic identity and with a repressive identity (double object selection, separated by latency, 37) (for “id” see the groom in “A Country Doctor” (137), for “superego” see the priest in “The Trial”)

sex the explanatory power of sex (16), although sexual desire ultimately must be sublimated (19, 26) (and, sometimes, a cigar is just a cigar, 40)

Highlights of Infantile Sexuality

- primeval history and amnesia: “infantile amnesia turns the childhood of each individual into something like a prehistoric past” (37)
- the importance of latency
- sexual innocence and exaggerated sexual desire (16)
- notice how Freud struggles to define abnormality (19, see his dam analogy on page 26)

It is a well-known trope in psychotherapy that the water will eventually find its way downhill, but it is in some sense left to the will to bar or encourage its flow. Freud identifies three psychological dams:

- disgust
- feelings of shame
- aesthetic and moral ideals

One way in which Freud stands in contrast to Nietzsche is the way in which Freud encourages development into a “normal and enculturated individual” (39). One of Freud’s famous tools for this development is **sublimation**: “diversion of sexual driving forces from sexual aims and their direction to new ones” (39).

Both Freud and Nietzsche have their misogynist moments, but in quite different ways.

- “the preference for the hand already suggests the important contribution that the drive for mastery will later make toward masculine sexual activity” (48)
- “under ordinary conditions, she may remain normal sexually, but if led on by a skillful seducer, she will develop a taste for every sort of perversion” (50)

The holy grail of psychology:

- identify the principal explanatory tokens of behaviour
- provide a causal rather than a teleological explanation of behaviour

The phenomenology of an action is such that it appears to be caused by a volitional state, by a willing. This is a primeval delusion.

Riccardi's *Inner Opacity* view implies the following:

- it is false that we are directly aware of our mental states
- self-knowledge (privacy) is not privileged over other-knowledge (mind-reading)

The following play a crucial role in the Inner Opacity view:

folk psychology language and the phenomenology of conscious attitudes

consciousness consciousness is a surface and sign world, a world of generalities, “all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization” (Gay Science, 354)

drives homuncularist and dispositionalist interpretation (Riccardi’s functionalist reading)

Some views from cognitive science that are informative with respect to Nietzsche's view:

Alvin Goldman mind-reading is primarily simulation

Alison Gopnik mind-reading is primarily theory

Peter Carruthers self-knowledge is primarily theory

According to the IO view, “the same set of cognitive capacities enables both introspective self-knowledge and outward-directed mind-reading” (226). James Sully’s “obscure region of self-consciousness” (231).

Freedom: The Interpretive Riddle

Nietzsche appears to reject the following:

- freedom
- self
- will
- responsibility

John Richardson takes this wholesale rejection as an indication that there is another (superordinate) kind of freedom that Nietzsche endorses (127f). It is important to note that the type of freedom that Nietzsche rejects is not only illusory and non-existent, but its pursuit is damaging and diminishing.

Naturalizing Freedom

Richardson is on board with Leiter's project of naturalizing Nietzsche. Richardson claims that Nietzsche primarily wants to naturalize freedom


$$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{animality} \\ \text{evolution} \\ \text{history} \end{array} \right] \longleftrightarrow \text{freedom of metaphysical subject}$$

If the freedom of a metaphysical subject were a thing, it would have to be conceptually simple. The historically grown freedom of an animal, however, in all its contingencies is complex (compare the complexities of a natural language to the relative simplicity of an artificial language such as logic or python).

There is a characteristic Nietzschean critique of epistemology here: we tend to embrace metaphysical beliefs that are adapted to our epistemological apparatus. It is as if concepts were percepts and we hold true what is visible to us based on our perceptual equipment.

Naturalizing Freedom

Freedom in the Nietzschean sense is the feeling of power while commanding another. Its opposite is the constraint to obey, which creates internal pressure that cannot be released freely.



Freedom advances to a higher level when the drives “coalesce into an overall viewpoint” (134). (Note that Nietzsche objects to diversity on the grounds that it attenuates the unity needed for freedom.)

Three candidates (135) for a more general and high-level freedom (on the level of organism rather than drive):

coherence “drives are individually strong, but also synthesized, organized, and unified so as to maximize the organism’s overall success”

stable structure “the organism keeps a consistent view of its interests and runs its behaviour with a steady aim”

pyramid hierarchy “one ruler of the set of drives . . . multiplicity and disaggregation of the impulses, lack of system among them results in a weak will”

The deliberative self in Nietzsche is often said to be either illusory or epiphenomenal. Richardson disagrees with this assessment: “agency is indeed a kind of drive itself” (137), comparable to Freud’s superego. It is deluded into thinking of itself as Plato’s charioteer, but this doesn’t make it less of a force (and an effective cause of behaviour) in favour of herd instincts that cripple individuality.

Gay Science the history of language and consciousness

- predicated on the herd, not useful for the solitary individual
- consciousness always presses towards herd mentality
- consciousness and language tame us into good herd animals
- therefore, consciousness is not epiphenomenal

Genealogy of Morals the ability to promise

- needs memory
- needs inhibitive capacity (the first preschooling for spirituality)
- trains ultimately not in keeping individual, personalized promises; but to remember, internalize, and abide by social norms
- is deeply ascetic (140)
- turns drives of mastery into enforcing drives

Richardson now proceeds to describe Nietzsche's affirmation of power and freedom in agency (142).

- my drives are more 'me' than my conscious thinking and choosing
- the masters are individuals in which this coincidence of drives and conscious will is achieved
- there is a sense in which Nietzsche is an Aristotelian here: masters cannot yet exist because the narrative of asceticism has too much of a grip on the current generation → virtue (in Nietzsche's case, aristocracy) can only come from an aristocratic habit and upbringing that breaks with asceticism

The reader will already have conjectured what took place on the stage and behind the scenes of this drama. That will for self-torture, that inverted cruelty of the animal man, who, turned subjective and scared into introspection (encaged as he was in "the State," as part of his taming process), invented the bad conscience so as to hurt himself, after the natural outlet for this will to hurt, became blocked—in other words, this man of the bad conscience exploited the religious hypothesis so as to carry his martyrdom to the ghastliest pitch of agonized intensity.

Owing something to God: this thought becomes his instrument of torture. He apprehends in God the most extreme antitheses that he can find to his own characteristic and ineradicable animal instincts, he himself gives a new interpretation to these animal instincts as being against what he 'owes' to God (as enmity, rebellion, and revolt against the 'Lord,' the 'Father,' the 'Sire,' the 'Beginning of the world'), he places himself between the horns of the dilemma, 'God' and 'Devil.'

Every negation which he is inclined to utter to himself, to the nature, naturalness, and reality of his being, he whips into an ejaculation of 'yes,' uttering it as something existing, living, efficient, as being God, as the holiness of God, the judgment of God, as the hangmanship of God, as transcendence, as eternity, as unending torment, as hell, as infinity of punishment and guilt.

This is a kind of madness of the will in the sphere of psychological cruelty which is absolutely unparalleled: man's will to find himself guilty and blameworthy to the point of inexpressibility, his will to think of himself as punished, without the punishment ever being able to balance the guilt, his will to infect and to poison the fundamental basis of the universe with the problem of punishment and guilt, in order to cut off once and for all any escape out of this labyrinth of 'fixed ideas,' his will for rearing an ideal—that of the 'holy God' —face to face with which he can have tangible proof of his own unworthiness.

Alas for this mad melancholy beast man! What phantasies invade it, what paroxysms of perversity, hysterical senselessness, and mental bestiality break out immediately, at the very slightest check on its being the beast of action! All this is excessively interesting, but at the same time tainted with a black, gloomy, enervating melancholy, so that a forcible veto must be invoked against looking too long into these abysses.

Here is disease, undubitably, the most ghastly disease that has as yet played havoc among men: and he who can still hear (but man turns now deaf ears to such sounds), how in this night of torment and nonsense there has rung out the cry of love, the cry of the most passionate ecstasy, of redemption in love, he turns away gripped by an invincible horror—in man there is so much that is ghastly—too long has the world been a mad-house.

Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment

How could anything originate out of its opposite?

good as in “good and bad”	evil
cruelty	bad conscience

Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment

Two foundational type facts about humans:

- ① Human beings tend to gain pleasure from inflicting suffering.
- ② When a drive is prevented from discharging itself outwardly, it seeks to do so inwardly.

The social environment triggers the type facts to become effective.
For Freud, repression is a similar mechanism with similar outcomes.

Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment

psychological hedonism

the deepest motive of all human behaviour is the attainment of pleasure und the avoidance of pain (128)

will to power

above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power

Flow Chart

