

United States

The Mortgage Analyst

Credit Strategy Research

What's special about dollar roll specialness?


Dollar rolls became less special recently

Mortgage dollar rolls have been trading special over the past few years, meaning that the implied financing costs of TBA through dollar rolls have been much lower than general repo rates. However, over the past six months, dollar rolls have trended less special.

We expect specialness to continue to decline on higher rates

We link dollar roll specialness to mortgage rates, MBS issuance, and Fed purchases. Under our baseline scenario, 10-year Treasury yields rise to 2.5% by year-end 2015 and to 3.0% by year-end 2016, driving 30-year mortgage rates to 4.2% and 4.8% at the end of 2015 and 2016, respectively. Higher mortgage rates suggest that the trend of lower dollar roll specialness is likely to extend over the coming quarters, supporting our view of favoring specified pools over TBAs.

We expect dollar rolls to become less special in coming quarters



Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Hui Shan

(212) 902-4447 hui.shan@gs.com
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

Marty Young

(917) 343-3214 marty.young@gs.com
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

Charles P. Himmelberg

(917) 343-3218 charles.himmelberg@gs.com
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

Chris Henson

(801) 741-5755 chris.henson@gs.com
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

Spencer Rogers


(801) 884-1104 spencer.rogers@gs.com
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

This research is focused on investment themes across markets, industries and sectors. It does not attempt to distinguish between the prospects or performance of, or provide analysis of, individual companies within any industry or sector we describe. Investors should consider this research as only a single factor in making investment decisions. For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.

What's special about dollar roll specialness?

The to-be-announced (TBA) market—where heterogeneous mortgages can be packaged and traded on a few parameters such as agency, coupon, and original mortgage term—makes agency MBS one of the most liquid fixed-income markets worldwide. MBS investors can finance their positions through repo transactions or dollar roll transactions. When the dollar roll is special, meaning its implied financing rate is lower than repo, MBS investors face different incentives when allocating assets. For example, dollar roll specialness implies low financing costs for buying mortgages, and therefore supports rich valuation in the TBA market. In addition, investors typically hedge their holdings of specified pools with TBA pass-throughs. Dollar roll specialness raises their hedging costs and makes specified pools less attractive to own. As shown in Exhibit 1, dollar roll specialness also correlates with the subsequent performance of agency MBS (measured by the Yield Book total return index). In this *Mortgage Analyst*, we examine the supply of and demand for mortgage dollar rolls and discuss our outlook for dollar roll specialness.

Exhibit 1: Dollar roll specialness correlates with subsequent performance of agency MBS
Specialness of FNM30 3.5 dollar roll and total returns of FNM30 3.5 over the next 26 weeks




Source: Yield Book, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

A primer on mortgage dollar rolls

Before diving into our statistical model, we provide a brief overview of how dollar rolls work. In essence, a dollar roll transaction is a combination of two TBA contracts: The first contract involves the roll seller selling MBS in month t (the front month) in exchange for cash. The second contract involves the roll seller buying back a substantially similar MBS at pre-determined prices in month $t+1$ (the back month).

As Exhibit 2 shows, dollar roll transactions differ from repo transactions in two ways: First, in a repo transaction, proceeds from mortgage prepayments belong to the original MBS owner (or cash borrower), whereas these proceeds go to the cash lender in a dollar roll transaction. Second, in a repo transaction, the cash borrower buys back the exact same CUSIP in the back month, whereas the cash lender only has to deliver a TBA pool of the same characteristics (e.g., FNM30 3.5) in a dollar roll transaction.

Exhibit 2: How a dollar roll transaction works


Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

In equilibrium, the front month and back month prices are set such that MBS owners are indifferent between holding the mortgages for one month vs. rolling them from month t to month $t+1$. These two prices, combined with expectations about scheduled and unscheduled payments of the MBS, yield an implied financing rate for the MBS owner. If this implied financing rate is below the prevailing market interest rate, such as the MBS repo rate, the dollar roll is traded special. Mathematically, dollar roll specialness equals the difference between the implied financing rate and the repo rate. The lower this number is, the more special the dollar roll is.


Determinants of dollar roll specialness

In the rest of our analysis, we focus on FNM30 3.5. There was significant issuance of FNM30 3.5 throughout our sample period of 2012-2015. FNM30 3.5 is also the most liquid TBA pass-throughs currently, accounting for nearly 60% of all conventional 30-year TBA trading volume. Compared to other securities, movements in FNM30 3.5 dollar roll specialness are driven more by the macro factors that we discuss below than by idiosyncratic market technicals.

Following Song and Zhu (2015), we look at two drivers of roll specialness: prepayment risk and supply effect.¹ Because any unscheduled prepayments go to the roll buyer, the original MBS owner (or roller seller) may demand a higher price in the front month and/or a lower price in the back month as compensation for prepayment uncertainties. Also, because the roll buyer only has to deliver a “substantially similar” MBS in the back month, the roll seller may require more compensation when there is significant variation in TBA quality. Both considerations imply that dollar rolls should trade more special when mortgage rates are low and households are in-the-money for refinancing (Exhibit 3).


Besides prepayment risk, the supply of MBS in the market also affects TBA prices and dollar roll specialness. Recall that specialness is calculated based on the difference between front month and back month TBA prices. When there is a lack of supply, the front month price rises, benefiting the roll seller and causing dollar rolls to trade special. In September 2012, the Fed began QE3 purchases. Large purchases by the Fed reduced the supply of agency MBS available to private investors and led to specialness in dollar rolls (Exhibit 4).

Exhibit 3: Roll is more special when mortgage rates fall...
FNM30 3.5 roll specialness and PMMS



Source: Freddie Mac, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Exhibit 4: ...and when Fed purchases increase
FNM30 3.5 roll specialness and weekly Fed purchases



Source: FRBNY, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Because prepayment risk and MBS supply are not independent (e.g., Fed purchases result in lower mortgage rates and higher prepayment risk), we resort to multivariate regressions to estimate the separate effects of mortgage rates and MBS supply. For the supply effect, we include both issuance and Fed purchase measures. In addition, we allow for both “stock” and “flow” effects in the model. For example, gross issuance of FNM30 3.5 captures the flow effect of total supply, while the amount of FNM30 3.5 outstanding captures the stock effect of total supply. Similarly, weekly Fed purchases capture the flow effect of mortgage QE, while the Fed holdings of FNM30 3.5 as a percentage of total FNM30 3.5 outstanding captures the stock effect of mortgage QE. In this way, our estimates can tell us about the mechanism through which Fed purchases affect dollar roll specialness.

Exhibit 5 shows the estimation results. First, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant. For example, higher mortgage rates push households out-of-the-money for refinancing and reduce prepay uncertainties. As a result, dollar rolls

¹ Song, Zhaogang and Zhu, Haoxiang, Mortgage Dollar Roll (April 5, 2015). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401319>

are less special when mortgage rates are high. Elevated issuance levels and large MBS outstanding imply ample supply and reduce specialness. On the other hand, large Fed purchases and significant Fed holdings cut the supply available to private investors, contributing to dollar roll specialness.

Second, based on t-statistics, mortgage rates appear to be the most important determinant of dollar roll specialness. Moreover, both “stock” and “flow” effects of mortgage supply are important in the dollar roll market. This finding suggests that the mortgage market may weaken when the Fed stops MBS reinvestments even if the size of the Fed balance sheet remains little changed. Collectively, mortgage rates and our supply measures account for 77% of the variation observed in the specialness of FNM30 3.5 dollar rolls over the sample period.

Exhibit 5: Both prepayment risk and MBS supply affect dollar roll specialness

Estimated coefficients and t-statistics of our model of FNM30 3.5 specialness

Dep Var = FNM30 3.5 Specialness	Prediction	Estimates
Prepayment Risk		
PMMS	Higher PMMS -> Lower Prepayment Risk -> Less Specialness -> +ve Coefficient	110.0 <i>20.8</i>
Supply Effect		
Total Supply		
Issuance (Flow Measure)	More Supply -> Less Specialness -> +ve Coefficient	1.2 <i>3.8</i>
Balance (Stock Measure)		0.1 <i>3.2</i>
QE		
Fed Purchase (Flow Measure)	More QE -> Less Supply Available to Private Investors -> More Specialness -> -ve Coefficient	-5.4 <i>5.1</i>
Fed Holding (Stock Measure)		-2.3 <i>3.2</i>
Number of Observations		190
R Squared		0.77

Note: Weekly data from January 2012 through August 2015. t-statistics in italics.


Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Higher rates point to less specialness

The framework described above can help us forecast dollar roll specialness based on our forward view on mortgage rates, issuance, and Fed purchases. Our rates strategy team currently expects the 10-year Treasury yields to reach 2.5% by the end of 2015 and 3.0% by the end of 2016. Building on this forecast, we project the 30-year fixed mortgage rate to rise to 4.2% and 4.8% by the end of this year and next year, respectively. Rising mortgage rates lead to less prepayment uncertainty and less dollar roll specialness. Under this scenario, we expect the issuance of FNM30 3.5 to fall, which offsets the mortgage rate effect to some degree and makes dollar rolls more special. On net, the mortgage rate effect outweighs the supply effect, and rolling MBS from one month to the next should become less attractive over time. By mid-2016, we expect the dollar roll specialness of FNM30 3.5 to come off 40bp from today's levels (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit 6: We expect dollar rolls to become less special in coming quarters


Actual, fitted, and projected dollar roll specialness for FNM30 3.5



Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Exhibit 7: Our forecast is critically dependent on the path of interest rates

Actual, GS forecast, and forward curve implied 10-year Treasury and 30-year mortgage rates



Source: FRB, Freddie Mac, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

What is the key risk to our projection? The projection is critically dependent on the interest rate path. As discussed earlier, mortgage rates are the most important determinant of dollar roll specialness in our regression model. At present, the forward curve implies a much slower pace of increases in the 10-year Treasury yields than our rates strategy team forecasts (Exhibit 7). If the forward curve is realized, mortgage rates will not increase much from today's levels, suggesting a much smaller decline in dollar roll specialness.

The implication of our baseline forecast is twofold: First, dollar rolls becoming significantly less special implies higher financing costs for investing in agency MBS. This is another reason why we are not constructive on agency MBS despite a dovish Fed. While our calculation suggests that the Fed is likely to still hold \$1 trillion of agency MBS by the end of 2020, we expect agency MBS to underperform relative to historical averages. Second, because specified pools are often hedged with TBAs, dollar rolls becoming less special implies lower hedging costs for owning specified pools. In addition to elevated local volatilities, this is another reason why we like specified pools even though we project interest rates to rise faster than the forward curve suggests.

Hui Shan and Marty Young

Disclosure Appendix

Reg AC

We, Hui Shan, Marty Young, Charles P. Himmelberg, Chris Henson and Spencer Rogers, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect our personal views about the subject company or companies and its or their securities. We also certify that no part of our compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs' Global Investment Research division.

Disclosures

Regulatory disclosures

Disclosures required by United States laws and regulations

See company-specific regulatory disclosures above for any of the following disclosures required as to companies referred to in this report: manager or co-manager in a pending transaction; 1% or other ownership; compensation for certain services; types of client relationships; managed/co-managed public offerings in prior periods; directorships; for equity securities, market making and/or specialist role. Goldman Sachs usually makes a market in fixed income securities of issuers discussed in this report and usually deals as a principal in these securities.

The following are additional required disclosures: **Ownership and material conflicts of interest:** Goldman Sachs policy prohibits its analysts, professionals reporting to analysts and members of their households from owning securities of any company in the analyst's area of coverage. **Analyst compensation:** Analysts are paid in part based on the profitability of Goldman Sachs, which includes investment banking revenues. **Analyst as officer or director:** Goldman Sachs policy prohibits its analysts, persons reporting to analysts or members of their households from serving as an officer, director, advisory board member or employee of any company in the analyst's area of coverage. **Non-U.S. Analysts:** Non-U.S. analysts may not be associated persons of Goldman, Sachs & Co. and therefore may not be subject to NASD Rule 2711/NYSE Rules 472 restrictions on communications with subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by the analysts.

Additional disclosures required under the laws and regulations of jurisdictions other than the United States

The following disclosures are those required by the jurisdiction indicated, except to the extent already made above pursuant to United States laws and regulations. **Australia:** Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd and its affiliates are not authorised deposit-taking institutions (as that term is defined in the Banking Act 1959 (Cth)) in Australia and do not provide banking services, nor carry on a banking business, in Australia. This research, and any access to it, is intended only for "wholesale clients" within the meaning of the Australian Corporations Act, unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. In producing research reports, members of the Global Investment Research Division of Goldman Sachs Australia may attend site visits and other meetings hosted by the issuers the subject of its research reports. In some instances the costs of such site visits or meetings may be met in part or in whole by the issuers concerned if Goldman Sachs Australia considers it is appropriate and reasonable in the specific circumstances relating to the site visit or meeting. **Brazil:** Disclosure information in relation to CVM Instruction 483 is available at <http://www.gs.com/worldwide/brazil/area/gir/index.html>. Where applicable, the Brazil-registered analyst primarily responsible for the content of this research report, as defined in Article 16 of CVM Instruction 483, is the first author named at the beginning of this report, unless indicated otherwise at the end of the text. **Canada:** Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. is an affiliate of The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and therefore is included in the company specific disclosures relating to Goldman Sachs (as defined above). Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. has approved of, and agreed to take responsibility for, this research report in Canada if and to the extent that Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. disseminates this research report to its clients. **Hong Kong:** Further information on the securities of covered companies referred to in this research may be obtained on request from Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. **India:** Further information on the subject company or companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited. Goldman Sachs may beneficially own 1% or more of the securities (as such term is defined in clause 2 (h) the Indian Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956) of the subject company or companies referred to in this research report. **Japan:** See below. **Korea:** Further information on the subject company or companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Seoul Branch. **New Zealand:** Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited and its affiliates are neither "registered banks" nor "deposit takers" (as defined in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989) in New Zealand. This research, and any access to it, is intended for "wholesale clients" (as defined in the Financial Advisers Act 2008) unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. **Russia:** Research reports distributed in the Russian Federation are not advertising as defined in the Russian legislation, but are information and analysis not having product promotion as their main purpose and do not provide appraisal within the meaning of the Russian legislation on appraisal activity. **Singapore:** Further information on the covered companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte. (Company Number: 198602165W). **Taiwan:** This material is for reference only and must not be reprinted without permission. Investors should carefully consider their own investment risk. Investment results are the responsibility of the individual investor. **United Kingdom:** Persons who would be categorized as retail clients in the United Kingdom, as such term is defined in the rules of the Financial Conduct Authority, should read this research in conjunction with prior Goldman Sachs research on the covered companies referred to herein and should refer to the risk warnings that have been sent to them by Goldman Sachs International. A copy of these risks warnings, and a glossary of certain financial terms used in this report, are available from Goldman Sachs International on request.

European Union: Disclosure information in relation to Article 4 (1) (d) and Article 6 (2) of the European Commission Directive 2003/126/EC is available at <http://www.gs.com/disclosures/europeanpolicy.html> which states the European Policy for Managing Conflicts of Interest in Connection with Investment Research.

Japan: Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd. is a Financial Instrument Dealer registered with the Kanto Financial Bureau under registration number Kinsho 69, and a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, Financial Futures Association of Japan and Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association. Sales and purchase of equities are subject to commission pre-determined with clients plus consumption tax. See company-specific disclosures as to any applicable disclosures required by Japanese stock exchanges, the Japanese Securities Dealers Association or the Japanese Securities Finance Company.

Ratings, coverage groups and views and related definitions

Credit Research assigns ratings to designated on-the-run ("OTR") debt securities of issuing companies. **Definitions of Ratings:** **OP = Outperform.** We expect the total return to outperform the median total return for the analyst's coverage group over the next 6 months. **IL = In-Line.** We expect the total return to perform in line with the median total return for the analyst's coverage group over the next 6 months. **U = Underperform.** We expect the total return to underperform the median total return for the analyst's coverage group over the next 6 months.

NR = Not Rated. The investment rating, if any, has been removed pursuant to Goldman Sachs policy when to Goldman Sachs is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving this company and in certain other circumstances. **NC = Not Covered.** Goldman Sachs does not cover this company. **RS = Rating Suspended.** Goldman Sachs Research has suspended the investment rating for this credit, because there is not a sufficient fundamental basis for determining, or there are legal, regulatory or policy constraints around publishing, an investment rating. The previous investment rating is no longer in effect for this credit and should not be relied upon. **CS = Coverage Suspended.** Goldman Sachs has suspended coverage of this company. **NA = Not Available or Not Applicable.** The information is not available for display or is not applicable.

Coverage views: The coverage view represents each analyst's or analyst team's investment outlook on his/her/their coverage group(s). The coverage view will consist of one of the following designations: **Attractive (A).** The investment outlook over the following 6 months is favorable relative to the coverage group's historical fundamentals and/or valuation. **Neutral (N).** The investment outlook over the following 6 months is neutral relative to the coverage group's historical fundamentals and/or valuation. **Cautious (C).** The investment outlook over the following 6 months is unfavorable relative to the coverage group's historical fundamentals and/or valuation.

Global product; distributing entities

The Global Investment Research Division of Goldman Sachs produces and distributes research products for clients of Goldman Sachs on a global basis. Analysts based in Goldman Sachs offices around the world produce equity research on industries and companies, and research on macroeconomics, currencies, commodities and portfolio strategy. This research is disseminated in Australia by Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd (ABN 21 006 797 897); in Brazil by Goldman Sachs do Brasil Corretora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A.; in Canada by either Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. or Goldman, Sachs & Co.; in Hong Kong by Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.; in India by Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Ltd.; in Japan by Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd.; in the Republic of Korea by Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Seoul Branch; in New Zealand by Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited; in Russia by OOO Goldman Sachs; in Singapore by Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte. (Company Number: 198602165W); and in the United States of America by Goldman, Sachs & Co. Goldman Sachs International has approved this research in connection with its distribution in the United Kingdom and European Union.

European Union: Goldman Sachs International authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority, has approved this research in connection with its distribution in the European Union and United Kingdom; Goldman Sachs AG and Goldman Sachs International Zweigniederlassung Frankfurt, regulated by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, may also distribute research in Germany.

General disclosures

This research is for our clients only. Other than disclosures relating to Goldman Sachs, this research is based on current public information that we consider reliable, but we do not represent it is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied on as such. We seek to update our research as appropriate, but various regulations may prevent us from doing so. Other than certain industry reports published on a periodic basis, the large majority of reports are published at irregular intervals as appropriate in the analyst's judgment.

Goldman Sachs conducts a global full-service, integrated investment banking, investment management, and brokerage business. We have investment banking and other business relationships with a substantial percentage of the companies covered by our Global Investment Research Division. Goldman, Sachs & Co., the United States broker dealer, is a member of SIPC (<http://www.sipc.org>).

Our salespeople, traders, and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and principal trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research. Our asset management area, principal trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.

We and our affiliates, officers, directors, and employees, excluding equity and credit analysts, will from time to time have long or short positions in, act as principal in, and buy or sell, the securities or derivatives, if any, referred to in this research.

The views attributed to third party presenters at Goldman Sachs arranged conferences, including individuals from other parts of Goldman Sachs, do not necessarily reflect those of Global Investment Research and are not an official view of Goldman Sachs.

Any third party referenced herein, including any salespeople, traders and other professionals or members of their household, may have positions in the products mentioned that are inconsistent with the views expressed by analysts named in this report.

Any trading recommendation in this research relating to a security or multiple securities within an industry or sector is reflective of the investment theme being discussed and is not a recommendation of any such security in isolation.

This research is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security in any jurisdiction where such an offer or solicitation would be illegal. It does not constitute a personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual clients. Clients should consider whether any advice or recommendation in this research is suitable for their particular circumstances and, if appropriate, seek professional advice, including tax advice. The price and value of investments referred to in this research and the income from them may fluctuate. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a loss of original capital may occur. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived from, certain investments.

Certain transactions, including those involving futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Investors should review current options disclosure documents which are available from Goldman Sachs sales representatives or at <http://www.theocc.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp>. Transaction costs may be significant in option strategies calling for multiple purchase and sales of options such as spreads. Supporting documentation will be supplied upon request.

All research reports are disseminated and available to all clients simultaneously through electronic publication to our internal client websites. Not all research content is redistributed to our clients or available to third-party aggregators, nor is Goldman Sachs responsible for the redistribution of our research by third party aggregators. For research, models or other data available on a particular security, please contact your sales representative or go to <http://360.gs.com>.

Disclosure information is also available at <http://www.gs.com/research/hedge.html> or from Research Compliance, 200 West Street, New York, NY 10282.

© 2015 Goldman Sachs.

No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied or duplicated in any form by any means or (ii) redistributed without the prior written consent of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.