

# Addressing the Challenges Posed by the Sino-Russian Partnership

Addressing the Challenges Posed by the Sino-Russian Partnership in Europe

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**Honor Pledge:** On my honor as a student at the University of Virginia, I have neither given nor received aid on this assignment.

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A handwritten signature in dark ink that reads "Daniel Durgavich". The script is cursive and fluid, with the first name "Daniel" and last name "Durgavich" clearly legible.

Daniel Durgavich, 7 WR

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**Executive Summary**

The Sino-Russian partnership poses many challenges to the United States and its security interests abroad. This is particularly salient in Europe, given the close proximity of the Russian Federation, and the economic interests of the People's Republic of China. The European challenge is a pressing concern because of the impact it would have on the United States' broader international efforts to promote its interests and expand its influence abroad.

The Sino-Russian partnership is an act of resistance to the present international system developed by the United States and its allies following World War II. This partnership seeks to undermine present international structures, develop alternative systems to gain greater authority, and support the two participating countries' growth. While at present the partners operate independently in Europe, the Sino-Russian partnership is one that could pose a much larger threat to the United States and its European allies in the future should it continue to grow in strength. As such, the United States should deter further action from the Sino-Russian partnership, both as a unit and as individual nations, and secure its partnerships in Europe.

In order to achieve these goals this, the Joint Chiefs should use the military presence and diplomatic tools available to encourage a strengthening of military alliances and retrenchment on the continent. This solution can be enacted domestically through interagency cooperation and advising of the President and their administration, and internationally through the Military Representative to NATO and the Commander of United States European Command. This solution is one which does the least to aggravate the Sino-Russian partnership, but still moves to counter activities through which the partnership weakens United States security and strength.

## Problem

The increased relations between the Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as Russia) and the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as the PRC) form a key security threat for the United States and its allies in Europe (Oudenaren, 2019). While the historical relationship between these two nations has been tense, current political, military and economic realities have allowed them to develop closer ties. Specifically, the partnership poses a strategic threat to the United States military and diplomatic partnerships in Europe, as expressed in organizations such as NATO (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).

## Background

The threat posed by the Sino-Russian alliance operations in Europe is the most significant challenge posed to the continent since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To properly frame this problem, there must be an examination of the United States presence in Europe, the Sino-Russian partnership that is emergent, and present activity of the Sino-Russian partnership in Europe.

**United States-European Partnership:** The partnership between the various states in Europe and the United States is a significant source of support for United States security abroad, and has been since the end of the Cold War (*National Security Strategy*, 2017). The direct investment of aid through the Marshall Plan and the individual military alliances that remained following World War II laid a foundation for future cooperation, especially with the looming threat of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Iron Curtain (*National Security Strategy*, 2017). This foundation was further cemented through the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. This alliance, founded in 1949, united the political and military interests of the Western European powers and the United States, and has since been a primary channel through which joint action has been taken (*National Security Strategy*, 2017). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this alliance

expanded to include members of the former Eastern Bloc, and even sought to form cooperative measures with the Russian Federation. While the latter did not succeed, the former led to increased cooperation leading into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with a renewal of focus and commitment to mutual defense (Micko & Plichta, 2019).

In the past decade, there has been increased tension as the interests of Europe and the United States have begun to diverge. This divergence has occurred on both sides of the Atlantic, with national officials expressing their concern at the structures of the more traditional forms of cooperation, including NATO, and discussing what future these institutions should have (Carpenter, 2019). While this has not led to any major dissolutions or overtures to that end, it is worth noting that at present, the United States is currently working to ensure that the political and military interests remain aligned.

**Sino-Russian Partnership:** Although the depth and durability of the partnership is debated (see Appendix A for further analysis of the strength of the partnership), present United States analysis place both the Russia and the PRC as key competitors to the United States. Their partnership has existed since the 1990s, but overt communications between the two powers has been increased during the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Bolt, 2014). This partnership was a renewal of relations which had broken down during the Sino-Soviet split in 1963. During the intervening time, the United States pursued a policy of cooperation with the PRC and, prior to its collapse, a policy of strategic competition with the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the latter in 1991, the United States established itself as a unipolar power, willing to work in the global commons, but focused heavily on the systems and structures it created (Bolt, 2014). During that time, the PRC and Russia reopened bi-lateral communication and diplomatic actions; however, in the past two decades, this partnership has taken on elements akin to formal military cooperation (Korolev, 2019). The impetus for this renewed relationship appears to be a mutual displeasure with certain elements of American



international activity and structure, and a desire to provide an alternative structure to oppose that system (Bolt, 2014). This alignment has come in many forms, from the Russian Federation increasing Chinese access to the Arctic to the Chinese purchasing Russian military equipment to modernize its military (Korolev, 2019).

In addition to bi-lateral cooperation, other organizations have been created by the two states which indicate the significance of this partnership. The most concerning of these is that of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This group is significant because of the way in which it mirrors NATO, bringing together Russia, the PRC, the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic Pakistan, and several Central Asian states in a political-military cooperative (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2020). A partnership of such depth and magnitude strongly suggests a desire for further cooperation in the international sphere, and that this cooperation will come through alternative organizations if necessary (Bhadrakumar, 2007). It is also important because it limits areas of further United States involvement, and extends joint Sino-Russian influence instead. While Central Asia has largely been considered a region dominated by Sino-Russian influence, the expansion into South Asia demonstrates the desires for this partnership to establish greater control over the entire Asia continent (Bhadrakumar, 2007). The influence of the Sino-Russian partnership is further expressed in the mission statement of the SCO, centered on increasing neighborly relations and establishing a new international system (SCO, 2020). Both of these goals severely limit and oppose United States interests. The SCO should serve as evidence that the Sino-Russian partnership exists for the purposes of developing strategy for addressing challenges counter to their joint desires and propose an alternative vision that other states may participate in.

**Present Action of the Sino-Russian Partnership in Europe:** At present, the extent of cooperation between Russia and the PRC in Europe appears to be minimal; however, both states are taking independent actions that are growing in audacity. If not addressed, they will provide a

foundation for further joint endeavors. In order to achieve their ends, the PRC is attempting to leverage soft power to increase influence across the continent, while Russia is using hard power to intimidate neighboring states.

The PRC uses soft power, primarily economic means, to increase its diplomatic influence in Europe (for a more detailed summary of Chinese Policy, see Appendix B). These economic means include the creation of the Cooperation between the PRC and Central and Eastern European Countries (17+1), which sought to promote the increase of economic activity and cooperation in Eastern Europe, and the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), which would directly link the PRC to Europe through a series of roads and trade routes (Gerstl, 2018). There is also indirect economic pressure through business such as Huawei, whose 5G network is fully allowed throughout Europe despite United State objection (Friedman, 2020). Huawei poses a security threat through potential leaks to the Chinese government, due to lax data privacy laws in the PRC.

It should be noted that in addition to these soft power efforts, the PRC has sought to begin expanding its military presence in Europe. Most notably, there were joint exercises with the German military to practice for a medical crisis. This are an underdeveloped avenue, posing less of a present threat to American security interests (Pickrell, 2019).

Conversely, Russia has sought to pursue hard power measures to intimidate the continent and reduce interference in Russian goals (for more detailed summary, see Appendix C). Through both covert and overt action, Russia relies on its military power to enact its will. The clearest example of the covert action can be found in the use of what are commonly called “Little Green Men” stationed both in the Donboss area and the border of the Baltic States (Radin, 2017). These troops, who have no official flag, still achieve the same end of reminding the bordering states in Eastern Europe of the dominance of Russian military power (Radin, 2017). The overt action of particular note was the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This highly forceful use of the Russian

military altered the calculus for all future Russian action in the region (Radin, 2017). While it is still unlikely that Russia would directly attack a formal NATO member, it is clear that Russia is willing to use military force to directly achieve its ends. This conventional military power is supported by new technologies, especially in the cyber area. Russia has used its cyber capabilities to not only on continues military operations but also directly interfere with the political actions of both European partners and the United States homeland (Stelzenmüller, 2017).

Together, these two states are working to increase their influence over European states in order to diminish the primacy of the United States-European relation, especially in the form of NATO. They are doing so in a moment when there are openings for greater economic and military presence, both of which allow for future joint action to occur on the continent. While this may not occur for several years, the United States has an opportunity now to work to deter further engagement and involvement between the two states and from both states in Europe more broadly.

**Desired End: The United States should seek to deter further action from the Sino-Russian partnership, both as a unit and as individual nations, and secure its partnerships in Europe.**

**Tools Available**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have several tools which can be used to form both the ways and means to achieve the objective of American security. First is the tool of the military of the United States. This tool is powerful, direct, and has worked deter competitor states in the past; however, given the multinational nature of this problem, it is also one which requires assent from partner states to be properly used. This means that any advice in favor of military power should also take into account where those forces will be stationed, and at what point they may act (Joint History Office, 2016).

Secondly, there is the diplomatic abilities of the JCS, both among the different agencies of the federal government and among international partners. These diplomatic means often partner military resources with cooperative strategy to focus on partners rather than competitors. The Chairman of the JCS has an outsized amount of influence domestically due to the large budget for the Department of Defense and their role as the principal military advisor to the President of the United States (POTUS) (Joint History Office, 2016; Gould, 2019). This can allow the JCS to recommend political-military options that occur through interagency cooperation, strengthening all aspects of United States foreign policy. Internationally, JCS can partners with the Combatant Commanders to use joint exercises with European militaries, as well as officer training programs, to achieve similar diplomatic ends and increase deterrence. (Joint History Office, 2016).

A final tool is that of innovation, through the research and development arms of the military. The JCS are able to advise the direction of resources towards the development of new technologies to protect these alliances and structures in the future, without taking action that may be perceived as aggressive in the present (Joint History Office, 2016). This also allows the United States to monitor the situation while still being active, so that it is not caught unprepared in the event that there is an escalation which occurs.

**Potential Actionable Strategies**

The following are several paths which the JCS can recommend to attempt to reduce the threat posed by the Sino-Russian partnership. These take into account all of the tools raised above, with several options working with multiple tools to achieve the desired end.

**Maintenance of the Status Quo:** Given the present status of the Sino-Russian partnership in Europe, one course of action is to simply observe and allow for the situation to progress. The present actions that are being taken by the PRC and Russia, while troubling, are not coordinated in ways that have been seen in other theaters. Additionally, the United States alliance structure in Europe is still present, which may serve as deterrent factor in the near future (Micko & Plichta, 2019). The concern with this option is that the United States is not taking steps to address the present diplomatic and military threats posed by either state. Moreover, the full extent of their disruption if they were to increase joint efforts in Europe may be missed by this strategy. The diplomatic threat comes particularly through the creation of bodies such as the 17+1, which grants the PRC a larger amount of leverage than it has had previously in Europe (Gerstl, 2019). Militarily, both states are developing new technologies and advancing new methods of fighting wars (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017; DIA, 2019). The United States must develop countermeasures for these technologies and continue to design new strategies of its own. This would also involve maintaining current military involvement and partnership present levels, with little change being done alter present plans for United States involvement in Europe. The latter of these are to deter the much more militarily active Russia, whose demonstration of military presence in Ukraine continues to be worthy of observation (Trenin, 2014).

**Cooperation with Russia:** A possibility for breaking up this partnership is to expand cooperation with one of the partner states. Partnering with Russia has been discussed in the past; in 1990s the United States worked to encourage cooperation between Russia and NATO through programs such as the Project for Peace (NATO, 2020). Russia also partnered with the United States in part to fight the War on Terror in the early 2000s (Hill, 2001). These partnerships did not last due to lack of trust between the two states and a divergence of interests in many key areas of national security. However, history does not have to repeat itself here. Military drills, treaties, and cooperation with the Russian Federation is possible; still, this would require concessions in other international realms and would take many years to establish (Burns, 2019). This partnership would also have to be placed in the context of both the Crimean annexation and the interference in foreign elections, especially the 2016 United States Presidential election. These are significant barriers to cooperation, but not insurmountable ones. If a good faith agreement could be established, Russia could be swayed with partnership, due to their traditional focus on Europe to establish security and present need for economic support (Hill, 2001).

**Cooperation with the PRC:** The other potential partner to draw away from the developing Sino-Russian relationship is the PRC. Throughout the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the PRC worked with the United States to develop economically and diplomatically, in order to find a place in the world order and to use mutual interest to create solutions. A key example of this partnership is the PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, which expanded the PRC's economic capability and gave them an increased presence in global leadership (Weissmann, 2016). In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this relationship has cooled as the PRC has regained its economic strength and begun to advance in technological power. Additionally, Chinese aims have changed: they are seeking a rejuvenation of international authority and military strength that brings them into conflict with the United States and its treaty allies (Jinping, 2019). Several elements of this rejuvenation that have

created incited this conflict include the expansion of artificial islands in the South China Sea and the creation of the Belt and Road Initiative (Jinping, 2019). As such, while historic norms make the potential for cooperation are much stronger, the current trajectory of Chinese development and expansion hinder United States influence.

**Precise Intervention at a Key Linkage:** If there is no opportunity to form better relations with either partner, there are possibilities to address the partnership as it presently stands. Predicated on the idea that the relationship between Russia and the PRC is primarily founded on searching for areas to counter United States' influence, this alternative strives to find areas of competitive interest between the two states and apply additional pressure to create discord. This can come through either an intervention at a key time or in a key place. For the former, this would mean the United States putting pressure on the long-term goals of the PRC and Russia, which differ significantly, in order to have the two cease their relationship now (Rapoza, 2019). For the latter, it would mean taking a location outside of Europe, such as Central Asia or the Arctic, and intervening to demonstrate the tension that should exist currently (Sahai, 2019). Both of these options tend to lean slightly more diplomatic than militaristic, but could be buttressed by United States military exercises and cooperation with other states in the region. The risk is in creating a situation that partner states would not enter and in doing so, add to the strain within NATO. There is also a strong possibility that an action like this could lead to greater cooperation between the two states rather than driving them apart (Korolev, 2019). The effect on the problem is variable and uncontrollable due to the more increased deniability needed for this alternative to function.

**Strengthen Military Alliances:** The final option is to strengthen existing military alliances. This can be done both through joint efforts to develop partner military forces and through investment in domestic partners to aid in the mission. This allows the United States to pursue greater diplomatic options to reassure European partners and deter the Sino-Russian partnership.

This reassurance can be achieved both bilaterally and through NATO (Geiger, 2009). This would give the United States greater strength to advance other forms of deterrence, such as sanctions and new treaties. The partnerships are also crucial for proper positioning of deployed forces, making the political-military option one which allows for greater flexibility on necessitous deployments in the future. This option has strong historical precedent, especially through the joint exercises and joint strategies made on the ground through cooperation between the leadership of United States European Command (EUCOM) and partner states (EUCOM, 2020). It would be advisable that any action taken to advance this alternative is done with interagency support, to augment military efforts to increase cooperation with those done by the State Department. It also should take into consideration informational and economic components as well, to strengthen the deterrent effort. This allows for a cohesive strategy to be developed which can be articulated to partner states, that addresses both military and diplomatic concerns rising from those partners.



### Criteria for Evaluation of the Potential Strategies

In order to determine the potential success of the alternative ways listed above, they will be evaluated on a series of three criteria, which take into account the different documents and strategies that make up the United States strategy, as well as the desired ends to be achieved.

#### Effectiveness

The primary goal of any proposal made to the government must be its effectiveness. This is extremely important in the realm of national security, where action in one area can affect many others. While other programs lacking effectiveness may result in the need for a new solution, an ineffective security solution could lead to the deaths of many, if not the destabilization of the nation. Although this particular analysis may not deal explicitly with war, it does deal with preventing rising security threats. In order to measure the effectiveness of the policies proposed, there are two distinct aspects that can be examined to determine the effectiveness of the solutions created: the National Security Strategy and the De-Escalation of the Sino-Russian Partnership.

**National Security Strategy:** The first of these is that addresses the goals laid out by the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS lays out four key pillars of United States Security which serve to direct planning done to determine the goals of any solution made to address United States action abroad: Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life; Promote American Prosperity; Preserve Peace Through Strength; and Advance American Influence (*National Security Strategy*, 2017). These four pillars will be used in the evaluation of the alternatives as metrics of effectiveness.

**De-escalation of the Sino-Russian Partnership:** Additionally, each alternative will take into account the impact on the development of a stronger partnership in the region between Russia and the PRC. The goal of these options is to address this issue, and so each option should be

working to either deter the current spread or work to reduce the partnership between the two states. The best way to measure this would be to see what element of the short- and long-term strategy of both adversarial states is being addressed, and determine how likely it is that the United States interference will cause significant stress on it.

### **Impact on Allied States**

Military solutions are not necessarily dedicated towards encouraging parity with adversarial states; however, they are dedicated towards protecting all members of our security system equitably. While inherent in the above criteria is the protection of all citizens and residents of the United States, there are other groups who must be considered in order to ensure that the solution is not aiding the United States at the expense of our allies (*National Security Strategy*, 2017). Attempting to oppose action of other foreign states will incur costs on allied states, especially those involved in NATO or other multinational organizations. To measure this, the projected impact should be considered, to evaluate if the cost of the option on those states would pose a more serious threat to the wider United States alliance system than this particular action would gain. Similar to the above, the values and goals of allied states would be compared against the potential gain from a particular intervention, to ensure that the solution is not harming allied aims needlessly. Progress of any solution accepted can be viewed through the lens of trust increasing, both in the United States and in organizations such as NATO. In order to examine this criterion, the different potentials for cooperation between the states, due to the security strategies of the United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, and France will be factored into consideration along with the United States NSS (for a brief analysis of each individual state, see Appendix D). The greater the potential for cooperation amongst these partners, the more highly rated the option will be.

**Monetary Cost of the Strategy**

The United States military benefits from a large budget; however, a large budget does not mandate excessive spending. The goal of any solution in this analysis would be to utilize already existing resources effectively, and work to ensure that new resources that must be acquired or mobilized cost as little as possible. This would be measured by proportional change in cost, as compared to current figures on expenditure in particular field. These costs would include several potential changes that would need to be made to address the solutions: new research, new bases, new technology, movement of troops (Joint History Office, 2016). These costs can be extrapolated with greater ease than a single base increase in specific dollar values. In many cases, the potential to reallocate monetary costs will also be noted. While there are other types of costs to measure, these monetary costs are the most relevant. The lenient budget of the Department of the Defense, and of the JCS is due to a high degree of support politically, a trend which may be beginning to change (Gallup, 2020). This budget may also change if a significant change in the economy of the United States happened as well. If there were to be a change in the political support for the military and its protection of the United States, there may need to be evaluation of the political and social costs of expanding or redeploying troops once more, especially considering the cost of the previous conflicts of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Evaluation of the Alternatives:**

The alternate ways that the JCS can recommend the United States respond to the present threat of the Sino-Russian partnership will now be evaluated against the criteria of maintaining the security strategy, deescalating adversarial states, budgetary cost, and preserving our alliance networks. The impact of each strategy on each criterion is recorded below.

**The Status Quo:** Given the American domestic situation, as well as rising engagement from the Europeans with the Chinese, there is a good argument to uphold status quo. To do so would have several benefits. Budgetary costs would remain constant, as no new expenditures to Europe would be expected. Indeed, given present trends, there may be more funds released to aid other aspects of the military's goal, such as research and development. Furthermore, if other nations within NATO achieve the goal of 2% defense spending by 2024, there could even be a decrease in the cost paid by the United States (Mandelbaum, 2017). This alternative also allows the United States to work towards three parts of the Security Strategy: Defense of the American Way of Life, Preserve American Prosperity, and Peace through Strength. The last of these is seen especially through the military operations that occurred in March of 2020, DEFENDER Europe-20 (EUCOM, 2020). These efforts would be strengthened through the reallocation of resources that could occur; however, they come at a cost to the last pillar of the strategy.

This option does not address the lingering concerns coming from European states about the commitment of the United States. The increase in their contribution may be based on the idea that the United States is not willing to further monetarily invest in the security of the continent against the Sino-Russian partnership (Chazen & Peel, 2020). This could further reduce the power of American influence abroad and damage trust with allies. Allied leaders, such as French president Emmanuel Macron, have already stated their perception that the United States is no longer invested in Europe (Macron, 2019). Other states, such as the United Kingdom, have demonstrated this

concern through their actions. The clearest case for this is the expansion of 5G across Europe through the end of 2019 into the beginning of 2020 (Friedman, 2020). With companies such as Huawei, which have connections to the PRC, expanding rapidly into the region with little opposition from partner states, the ability of the United States to exert its soft power in cooperation with its physical presence appears to be diminishing in terms of the status quo. This path forward also does little to mitigate the partnership, taking the tactic instead that the threat posed by the partnership will not actually reach the level of concern where the United States should fear in Europe; however, it still ranks low on de-escalation and fails to actively address the threat in question.

**Cooperation with Russia:** Before evaluating this option, there are two key assumption that must be addressed. The first is that the Russian state can be trusted in this scenario to cooperate with the United States and its goals. The second is that popular support, at home and in allied states, also moves towards seeing a partnership increase. If these assumptions hold, the alternative does provide benefits to the United States. This alternative provides several opportunities for cost reduction, as the United States may not feel the need to expend resources to counter Russia in the theater, and resources dedicated to that purposed can be reallocated or written out of the budget (Pifer, 2012). The alternative also provides security for partner states, through increasing cooperation between all actors in the region. If NATO and Russia were to form better security partnerships, as was proposed in the 1990s, then the cooperative could do more to protect both European interests and the broader international system (NATO, 2019). When considering the National Security Strategy of the United States, this option achieves several of its ends. Cooperating with Russia helps to secure not only the mainland presence of the United States in Europe, but also adjacent regions of significance. The most important of these is the Arctic, a space shared by Russia, Europe and the United States. Partnering with Russia could lead to a more cooperative expansion into this region, calming both European and American concerns that Russian expansion is as aggressive as it appears

(Rempfer, 2019). It also would lay the groundwork for new economic connection to preserve American prosperity, and expand American influence abroad. A NATO-Russian partnership certainly works to promote peace through strength, given the combined power of both blocks together (NATO, 2019).

Even with these benefits, this option has several drawbacks. This option may deescalate one half of the partnership, but the full impact on the PRC is uncertain. While a more united Europe may be able to resist the PRC, the preeminence of the PRC in the partnership should not be understated. The PRC is expanding its influence because it is economically powerful, and the security implications may be ignored if the proper incentives are given (Gerstl, 2017). Even though there is potential for decreased costs at this moment, long run trends of opposing the PRC may cause the earlier savings to be undone. The largest drawback comes from the assumptions stated earlier. The current perception and attitude of Russia does not lend this option credibility even if there were to be potential gains. Domestically, 47 percent of Americans view Russia as a security threat according to recent Pew research polls (Huang & Cha, 2020). This also applies to many of the most important American allies, including the United Kingdom and Poland, who feel this threat more tangibly (*National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 2019). These states have already reacted negatively to moves by the present administration to increase cooperation with Russia, and this could only increase if a partnership is pushed for unilaterally. While ideally NATO would participate, the scope of this partnership is not guaranteed. The impact on the alliance system makes it an option worth considering, but also one with great social capital costs.

**Cooperation with the PRC:** Instead of working with Russia, the United States could partner with the PRC. This option similarly has a singular assumption implied within: that the United States can fully trust the Chinese on issues of national security. As with the prior two alternatives, this action would have budgetary cost reductions that could be reallocated. Even if the

goal is to at least maintain parity against larger Chinese resources, this investment could be used to develop new technologies, such as cyber or space capabilities. These budgetary savings could be more expansive, as the United States may work with the Chinese in more than one theater. The reserved funds could be put towards other efforts in the region to ensure a fair partnership. A Sino-American partnership would also be the most successful option in terms of de-escalation. It would pull the PRC away from cooperation with Russia, in addition to deterring Russia from military escalation. Russia needs Chinese support far more than the PRC needs Russian support; therefore, by addressing the more powerful partner, the United States has addressed the entire partnership (Weitz, 2012). In terms of the United States Security Strategy, this works well in three of the major categories. It is strongest in preserving American prosperity, given the significant economic ties between the two states. It also works to protect the homeland, as decreasing security threats in Europe speak to trends globally as well. Finally, it does promote peace through strength, through its commitment to bringing together the two largest militaries in the world for security aims.

Despite these strong components, there are some areas where this alternative is lacking. Culturally, the PRC and the United States may clash regarding how the PRC chooses to expand. Current plans for the expansion of the BRI make this even more stark. Rather than using local labor in nations where the BRI is expanded, Chinese labor is nearly exclusively relied upon (Chandran, 2018). The impact on cooperation with allies is mixed. Economically, there is a current movement among NATO partners to consider working closer with the PRC; militarily there is still distrust (Stewart & Emmot, 2019). While many allies have resisted using newer technologies in their security systems, conventional arms trading and technology sharing are prevalent. This was on display at the recent military exercises run between Germany and the PRC, the first of their kind on the European continent (Pickrell, 2019). Following allied states in this course of action could make them feel encouraged; however, as with previous caveats, this can only come if trust can be reestablished with

the PRC. Moreover, there has been a decline in the past few years of trust in the PRC, both domestically and abroad, leading to increased tensions globally (Silver, Devlin & Huang, 2019). There is also the potential that this expansion could reduce the United States network of allies and further send the world into a multi-polar system, rather than one dedicated solely to American ideals. American influence has a more significant chance of being moderated or reduced under this particular option.

**Precise Intervention at a Key Linkage:** This option is weakest among those attempting to address the challenges faced in Europe. While this option does have many potential benefits, whose impact would be felt throughout Europe, it would be likely be implemented in Central Asia, or otherwise outside of Europe (Kim and Indeo, 2013). This option, if successful, would do the most to deescalate the two states, with the added hope that an intervention would ensure that there was an actual break between the two states. If this occurred, this option would solve the Sino-Russia partnership not only in Europe, but in other global theaters as well. It would also strengthen United States influence abroad, even if this strengthening is less overt than other methods. This option also takes into account the need to include allies, both European and otherwise, in the broader attempt at defense against the threat posed by a Sino-Russian partnership, especially in Europe.

Despite these potential benefits, the detriments cannot be overlooked. This option would incur greater financial cost, as the choice to invest heavily in a particular state would require a reallocation of funds to that project. It would also only work tangentially with the Security Strategy. As this option is primarily focused on breaking up the Sino-Russian, it does not focus on American prosperity or peace through strength in strong terms. The most it does is work to defend the homeland; however, historical precedent indicates that intervening in foreign conflicts to deescalate or destabilize other nations can have unintended results. The de-escalation efforts are also mixed, as the breaking of the partnership does not immediately lead to infighting. As there are already some



doubts as to the strength of the present partnership between Russia and the PRC, a splitting in the partnership may not achieve the goal of de-escalation as fully as other options could (Bolt, 2014). The last aspect of this particular strategy that could be more mixed than positive is the alliance network. While this may break up the Sino-Russian partnership, its focus does not incorporate the different European partners interests in Europe. This may leave European partners feeling that they are not as vital, or that they are not particularly necessary. Given current trends in the NATO alliance, while a decreased presence from the two strategic competitors may allow for a restructuring or growth of the alliance, there is also the potential that this lends greater credence to the idea that NATO does not need to exist with American aid (Mandelbaum, 20). As such, this option could harm the alliance network.

**Reinforce Military Alliances:** The final option is a retrenchment into areas where the United States has alliances. This differs from the status quo, as it operates under the assumption that the present cooling of relations with Europe is a result of a perceived lack of care from the United States. This belief on the part of American allies can be reversed through demonstration of investment in key partnerships, such as NATO. Looking at this option from the lens of the American security strategy, this option succeeds on all aspects. It defends the homeland through these increased partnerships, especially with NATO as a formal entity. It also bolsters American prosperity, by protecting trans-Atlantic trade and deepening our ties to these nations. Peace through strength is achieved by making the military alliance the center-piece of the strategy. This alliance has sustained the United States security, especially in recent military conflicts, and is a key part of what has spurred great power politics in the present (McCracken & Downman, 2019). As near peer competitors rise, it is important to maintain these alliances to ensure that they do not join other competitors. Strengthening these alliances also works to further United States influence abroad. In this present era, where there is a lack of stability in American influence, strengthening the alliances

may be the first and most sustainable way to strengthen the rest of the diplomatic efforts (Fix & Giegerich, 2019).

The primary drawback of this option is its indirect focus on the Sino-Russian partnership. This option does not address means by which the partnership can be broken, nor does it propose methods stop the escalatory nature of the two competitor powers. Rather, this option seeks to provide structure against a threatening force which cannot necessarily be conventionally fought. The United States would return to overarching structures to ensure that the global system, built on the American way of life, is safeguarded from competitive influence by deterring greater expansion. This would rely on many partners, rather than solely through United States. It also has fewer opportunities to reduce costs, but does not necessitate increased expenditures either.

### Outcomes Matrix

The matrix below provides a tabulated summary of the above analysis. In this matrix, low, medium and high are used to show how effective the option is at achieving the goals of security, de-escalation and forming new areas of cooperation with our allies Under monetary cost, standing, increase, and decrease indicate whether the cost of the option will maintain current operating costs, raise them, or lower them respectively. There are some boxes marked as unclear; in these cases, the research did not have conclusive results in what the outcome would be for the proposed change.

	Security	De-escalation	Alliances	Cost
Status Quo	Medium	Low	Medium	Standing
Russia Partnership	High	Medium	Low	Standing
PRC Partnership	Medium	High	Low	Reduce
Key Linkage	Low	Unclear	Medium	Increase
<b>Reinforce Alliances</b>	High	Unclear	High	Standing

**Recommendation: Reinforce Military Alliances**

The recommended option from this analysis is to reinforce existing military alliances to oppose Sino-Russian expansion into Europe. In recent years, the diplomatic strength of the NATO alliance has been tested, but not found fully wanting, and has even begun to operate in the great power conflict globally (Stewart & Emmot, 2019). This alliance succeeds best at goals of the NSS, which is the guiding objective of the JCS. While there may additional expenditures initially, these costs are mitigated in the long run through successfully renegotiating how to best jointly fund alliances, such as NATO, between all partners (Maccias & Rattner, 2019). A retrenchment here will allow for greater stability through diplomatic strength, informational security, and military preparedness. Resting these three pillars, the strategy would take the rough outline of the formation of a unified domestic strategy, backed through proper investment in necessary interagency partners, such as the State Department, and collaboration with international partners to phase in alternatives to present technological challenges and achieve stronger military power for all states involved.

It should be noted again that this option does not specifically speak to fracturing the Sino-Russian partnership. This was determined to be an unachievable goal, due to the limited options that would not risk an escalated conflict or decrease United States security. Rather, the JCS can advise that the military be used jointly with diplomatic efforts to bolster American influence against the expansion of these partners. This allows for underlying tensions in the Sino-Russian to exacerbate themselves, while working to address tensions in the United-States-European partnership that could be exploited by foreign actors. This alternative also creates a solution that is meant to last regardless of the persistence of the Sino-Russian partnership's presence. This will hopefully result in more numerous options for the United States to pursue its own security and the security of its allies moving forward, even as threats decline.

## Implementation Strategy

In order to carry out a reinvestment in European military allies that coordinates with all other strategies, the JCS can use their diplomatic tools to create change domestically and internationally. Domestically, the JCS, especially the Chairman, can work towards advancing an interagency strategy. As the principal military advisor to POTUS, the Chairman of the JCS can advise presidential administrations towards cooperation and reinvestment in the NATO alliance and other key European partnerships. Statements made about the funding of NATO in the past decade, though effective at articulating changes that must occur in order to increase the sustainability of the alliance, also led to increased mistrust between European partners and the United States (Gehrke, 2020). The Chairman can advise Presidential administrations of the concerns of potentially losing these alliances, and the benefits that come from them. The goal of this is to gain presidential approval of any further action, especially interagency cooperation.

Once presidential support is secured, the JCS can be instrumental in securing funding for other executive partners, especially the State Department. Budgetary cuts in recent continuing resolutions have reduced the State Department's ability to engage in the negotiations necessary to develop these relationships again, while adding more overhead spending to the defense budget (Mattis, 2018). The Joint Staff could advocate for a reversal of these funding changes, to better achieve the goals of reinvigorating the alliance network. This would follow efforts put forward by former Secretary Mattis to ensure that the military cooperation is not the sole means of linkage from a security standpoint (Mattis, 2018). Since his appointment, Secretary Esper has still spoken in favor of the diplomatic solution, but has not made the same direct pleas to Congress that former Secretary Mattis had. As the relationship between the PRC and Europe remains primarily economic at this present moment, as seen through the 17+1 and companies such as Huawei, these diplomatic linkages will be more effective than a direct military solution at limiting influence. It also decreases

the potential of antagonizing the Chinese or the Russians, which could occur through a troop surge in Europe.

The JCS should also seek to counter the influence of new technologies, especially informational technologies, through the development of American alternatives. These alternatives serve two distinct purposes. Firstly, they offer American allies alternatives to those offered by the PRC, through companies such as Huawei. This gives the United States leverage in negotiations with these partners to push back against allowing these potentially insecure networks onto their soil. Secondly, this strategy increases American security, by providing equal access to the most advanced internet capabilities, while not having to rely on foreign networks to provide. This is critical for intelligence and diplomatic efforts abroad, where these networks may soon become commonplace, with no real alternative except legacy systems. This will also allow United States military forces to have this technology for their own, protecting the most vital assets from cyber interference. As such, JCS should seek further investment in the development of these technologies as part of the domestic effort.

Internationally, the JCS can work with American military leaders stationed in Europe to bolster active cooperation between the United States and European armed forces. These leaders can be found on both the organizational and the tactical level. Organizationally, the leader to work with is the United States Military Representative (US MILREP) to NATO (NATO, 2020). The US MILREP has the leverage to push for greater areas of military cooperation, and the ability to learn to where the different partners want the United States to be. Eastern European states, such as Poland, seem the most likely to welcome aid and assistance, and their presence on the front with Russia gives more credence for their strategic plans (Goure, 2020). The largest obstacle to the US MILREP's attempts to form new strategies would come from states, such as Germany and France, with more developed militaries who have also expressed their doubts in the partnership and

proposed alternative forms of cooperation (German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2014; French Ministry of Armed Forces, 2016). This can be addressed through tailoring solutions to mutual goals, such as collective security, and minimizing issues, such as a joint European army, that may cause division. NATO is strongest when all states reinvest in the partnership and working through the US MILREP to strengthen this partnership on an organizational level achieves this end.

Tactically, the JCS can coordinate with the United States European Command (USEUCOM) leadership. While this relationship is one that can at times be tense, the USEUCOM leadership will have the greatest ability to maneuver and redirect placement of armed forces. Additionally, they can cooperate with states on an individual basis, rather than strictly with the alliance (EUCOM, 2020). The current commander goals are already focused on opposing Russia and strengthening partnerships, so placing further emphasis on these goals only boosts the commander's ability to succeed in these goals (EUCOM, 2020). While these stated goals may have been in place for many years, directly communicating a goal of retrenchment to USEUCOM may alter plans taken to achieve those goals, in the form of more specific actions such as renewed joint military exercises across a variety of states. One specific example would be to focus on countering grey space interference in the Baltics, working jointly with allied militaries to develop new tactics and tools to address this rising military threat. Moreover, by pivoting from a military buildup to a reinforcing of partnerships, the JCS can make this approach more cooperative on a tactical level. It also gives future commanders of USEUCOM more avenues to reach new solutions and avenues through which to move United States assets.

If pursued as suggested above, a reinvestment in the European alliance structure would hopefully achieve the ends set out of deterrence and fulfil the security goals of the United States. There are however, two unintended consequences that could emerge, even if the recommended solution is implemented properly. The first of these is that European continues to move away from

the United States, despite United States efforts to the contrary. This possibility derives mostly from nations with substantive international militaries, such as France, making overtures against international partnerships (Macron, 2019). This potential outcome is worrisome as it would demonstrate a deeper fracturing than may have been predicted. If this occurs, the JCS should reconsider to what extent engagement should occur in the future. These are untested waters in the post-war balance, and would require greater study.

The second negative possibility is that working to strengthen American-European relations increases joint action by the Sino-Russian partnership instead of deterring it. In this event, the JCS may need to consider more militaristic options. An expansion of the Sino-Russian partnership does give the United States greater cause to push for more aggressive collective action against the partnership, especially in Eastern Europe; however, if the first negative outcome has also occurred, these options may instead be limited. These economic and diplomatic inroads made by the PRC, as noted before, are the key threat to the security partnership in Europe and could be used to neutralize the impact of soft power tools of the United States, such as financial aid. Moreover, a distrustful Europe may not want to see conflict on its own soil and may instead decide to negotiate terms. It is for this reason that a reinvestment is crucial, to prevent the United States from having reduced paths to address a more aggressive Sino-Russian partnership.

## Conclusions

There are several key conclusions to draw from this research, regardless of the option taken in response to this challenge. The first of these is the strength of the present challenge posed by Sino-Russian partnership. While there is an argument to the contrary, present evidence indicates that this partnership is based primarily on the desire to oppose United States influences and primacy (Bolt, 2014). So long as the United States continues to pursue principles and practices which would advance that end, this partnership will continue to grow. This partnership is also, at present, mutually beneficial, and any potential action against it would be viewed as an excessive hostility (Korolev, 2018). As such, any action taken to reduce the relative challenge posed by either state should focus on areas where the partnership is weakest, to avoid increasing the potential strength of the partnership.

The second key conclusion is that of the challenges posed by the potential weakening of the United States-European partnership. While only partially related to the threat posed by the Sino-Russian partnership, it is a limiting element to the solutions available to the JCS, and the United States military more broadly, moving forward. If these partnerships, especially the formal partnership of NATO, were to end in this present moment, it would greatly detract from the ability of the United States to properly address the challenge of a rising Sino-Russian partnership, especially in Europe (Waltz, 2000). NATO has begun to consider the PRC a nation of interest as it pertains to the partnership and to lose that support would affect other theaters as well. The importance of these partnerships should not be undervalued, for both their regional and global significance, and the hope that they can endure should be taken into account.

Lastly, there are strategies to be gained for addressing nebulous relationships, such as the Sino-Russian partnership, on the international scene. While this research focuses on Europe, similar analysis can be done to other areas of Sino-Russian cooperation, such as in the Indo-Pacific theater.



Primarily, it is clear that while the partnership is strong, the use of the partnership to achieve joint-ends is presently limited (Anderson, 2013). Keeping solutions focused on methods by which the two states can be dealt with individually reduces the threat posed by either state and delegitimizes the effects of the partnership by mitigating its effects on a disparate set of issues. While this may not work for every interaction, it is a principle which should guide decision making in order to ensure that the United States maintains as much strength as it can on the world stage.

**Appendix A: Evaluation of the Sino-Russian Partnership**

The Sino-Russian partnership is among the most significant challenges faced by the United States since the fall of the Soviet Union. It is significant both states are historically significant, and have often stood as independent great powers in their own right; however, the true test of the threat comes from its strength and longevity. These aspects of the Sino-Russian partnership are contested, and the true nature of this partnership greatly impacts the response to it. If it is a passing partnership that is unsustainable or poorly established, then the threat is reduced a paper tiger. If it is well-established and strong, then this threat deserves greater attention, as well as a restructuring of focus in Europe, and abroad.

Both those who believe the partnership is weak and those who believe it is stronger acknowledge that present United States global influence and action have fostered this partnership. This affects any calculation by framing it in terms of internal durability, rather than a partnership with an end goal. Current United States policy is undertaken for the defense and security of the United States and its citizens, and should not change to assuage the concerns of states which in the have antagonized the United States. It does mean that the United States should evaluate any potential longevity of the partnership as being derived from American policy, and that international sentiment towards that policy could be a predictor for a growth in Sino-Russian influence.

The evidence for a weak partnership comes from historic precedent between the two countries. Both states are deeply committed to their historical standing, which has more often than not resulted in competition between them (Anderson, 2013). This competition was most important in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the Sino-Soviet split being a key example of the damage that this rivalry could bring (Anderson, 2013). These historic wounds, which have not fully faded, could still play a major role in weakening the relationship between the two states. One key example of this is Central Asia, where relations remain cooler than in other regions (Sahai, 2019). This is due to the historic

competition that has occurred between Russia and the PRC for dominance across the centuries, and which continues to this day. Additionally, both Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have used rhetoric of returning to former glory to underpin their personalist regimes. This historically focused rhetoric could be used to raise tensions in the future.

This potential for the relationship deteriorating is even more likely if Russia recovers from its present economic condition, which currently requires it to remain the weaker and more directable of the two partners. In addition to these concerns over the future stability, some of the present action of the two states appears to be primarily focused on more superficial development (Bolt, 2014). The trade of arms and the sale of energy is mutually beneficial at this present moment, and the exchange is primarily to circumvent the presently dominant American system (Bolt, 2014). As such, it is an arrangement of convenience rather than proper integration. This is also seen by the lack of joint efforts properly undertaken. Most joint exercises are a means to global relevance, instead of support in the partnership. Europe is a good example of this distant cooperation, as the evidence demonstrates that the two states are largely operating separately in the sphere. This argument concludes with the idea that both states are primarily independent, rather than moving towards formal cooperation.

Conversely, there are others who argue that the partnership is continuing to deepen and gain strength. This depth is demonstrated in the manner in which these two states have sought to form these linkages, which has primarily been through the signing of treaties and agreements (Korolev, 2019). According to this argument, these signal a strong bi-lateral partnership built on developed infrastructure, rather than a partnership that is purely of convenience. Moreover, this argument points to the number of treaties as a sign that the relationship can presently be defined as nearing a full alliance (Korolev, 2019). These treaties not only concern bilateral issues, but also advance mutual standing in a variety of international theaters. One such example is the recognition of the PRC as an

Arctic power by Russia, despite the former lacking an Arctic border (Martime Executive, 2019). This form of treaty is particularly worrisome, given the expansive scope of the cooperation, which threatens the balance of power in the Arctic. While this does not provide a clear answer to the historic rivalry question, it does indicate a depth that may have been previously overlooked.

In addition to the bi-lateral treaties, the formation of international institutions is another sign of an increasingly strong partnership. Similar to how the formation of NATO bound Europe and the United States together, the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an event which bound Russia and the PRC together. This organization's goal is the "the establishment of a democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order" (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2020). This goal is forthright with its intention of reshaping the global order and the partnership that underpins it must be dedicated to that new order. A partnership in this position would need to be able to withstand challenges to the new order, both within and without. It is worthwhile to acknowledge that this new order may simply be the removal of the American system; however, the expansion of the SCO to include other nations of import, especially the Republic of India and other South Asian states, adds to the integrity of the Sino-Russian partnership (Bhadrakumar, 2007). It also demonstrates the potency of such a partnership, as it can draw other states into concert with it.

Both cases have evidence to support their particular interpretation of the Sino-Russian partnership; however, in light of the need to respond to this partnership, the arguments for strong internal validity have much greater weight. The present state of the Sino-Russian partnership globally is strengthening, rather than stagnating. It is apparent that it is acting strategically, to leverage its power as effectively as it can to achieve broader aims, while reducing the United States' ability to respond to it. As such, the United States should act assuming that this threat will persist and increase

in the next decade. It should also prepare for the partnership to begin more joint efforts, where the two states do not simply tacitly support one another, but rather move together to achieve their goals.

**Appendix B: Chinese Doctrine and Strategy**

Much of the Chinese strategy for expansion relies on economic and diplomatic efforts. As reports from United States demonstrate, the goal of initiatives such as the BRI are meant to increase international influence and develop economic strength (DIA, 2019). These are the most important elements in Europe, where new organizations such as the 17+1 help to keep Chinese interest present and active (Gerstl, 2019). While the Chinese military is among the strongest in the world, it is not often the primary means used to advance Chinese interests, especially in Europe. This increase is of note as it could destabilizing in the future. While this may be the primary strategy in Europe, an analysis of their present military strategy is also necessary for more complete tactical planning.

The Chinese National Defense strategy, released in 2019, reveals that the Chinese are more concerned with using their conventional military forces for regional stability than power projection globally (State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019). Despite this, there is a global emphasis that reflects the desire to see continued Chinese power develop. The current goals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are to develop capabilities to make them a peer competitor in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2019). As with many other militaries, this includes heavy investment in technology and reorganization to ensure streamlined operation.

The foremost challenge of the PLA in the near term for the European theater is informational technology. Given the privacy laws of the PRC, the spread of Huawei represents a spread of potential access to European citizen data for the PLA. Moreover, with these new technological capabilities, the PLA is looking to space to develop new means to counter United States influence (DIA, 2019). Given the lack of involvement of the PRC in the early years of space exploration, the policy of the PRC presently is much less cooperative than some of their partners,

namely Russia. This is unusually rogue and of great concern to the United States as it seeks to expand into this new theater.

In addition to this technological development, there is also significant conventional development underway, especially in the naval and missile realms (State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2019). While these are less oriented toward the European theater, they are still of note, given the developing committed global focus of NATO (State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2019). Moreover, for the United States, these developments hamper security efforts in the Indo-Pacific theater, requiring more resources that otherwise could be dedicated to the European theater. In Europe, these new conventional developments have already been seen through the Joint Exercises done in Europe with Germany (Pickrell, 2019). These exercises are of critical importance because while limited in scope, they were between a competitor state and an allied one.

The PLA is also being reorganized to centralize its efforts moving forward. This centralization mimics the global command structure of other states. It also mirrors the general centralization of other aspects of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PRC leadership and governance (State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2019). The concern here is that the military will become even further tied to the state, in a manner that makes addressing the challenge of one element without addressing the rest more difficult. This reorganization also links key arms of the military, such as the aerospace and outer space forces, together, as many other nations have done (State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2019). This modernization should be taken as a caution for both NATO and American forces, who will have to face a much more developed PLA in the future. This PLA could then be used at such a time more offensively, to move away from the traditional structure of increasing power through influence and economy.

## **Appendix C: Russian Doctrine and Strategy**

The Russian Federation is currently pursuing a military strategy to both foster socio-economic growth and maintain military readiness. This strategy has been in effect since 2014, with a new strategy to be released in 2020. As such, the relevant conclusions and insights drawn from the strategy and power should take this into account.

The focus of the Russia military power is on development of defensive capabilities and of new technologies to address regional and global concerns. These regional concerns are primarily the Arctic and Eastern Europe, where the buildup of NATO is cited as a threat to Russian security (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2014). The Arctic is of note due to the specific plans that Russia has to develop the Arctic, including the development of energy capture technologies and military bases, which would conflict with the traditionally shared nature of the region (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2014). This is further augmented with an emphasis on the regional organizations that Russia is a member of, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2014). It also specifically mentions the two independent republics created from Georgia in 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by name and with distinct direction (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2014). This demonstrates that military gains are to be preserved, not matter how small or indirect. It also speaks to the Russian commitment to using hybrid warfare to achieve its own ends, through the creation of these new republics. The emphasis placed on regional security is important as it grounds other elements of Russian strategy, which are focused on reestablishing the sphere of influence and on preserving the gains it has made

The military doctrine of Russia provides strategies for the development of key infrastructure for all of its conventional forces. However, it also gives direction for developments in outer space



and cyber space. These two areas have been key to modern Russian military development and should be monitored closely for their impact on the security interests in Europe. The former is a point of Russian pride, and one where the Russian Federation continues to invest resources (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2014). Recent reorganization of the Russian military linked the outer space forces with their missile program, which could impact how these two threats are used. This is of particular importance for Europe and the United States, who are highly dependent to the satellite system that is in place presently, these developments are of deep concerns. Additionally, they are preparing for active engagement in the space area. This is of note given the recent establishment of the United States Space Force (USSF), whose job it will be to protect against threats in space (USSF, 2020). The USSF should begin to work closely with European partners to address this potential concern.

In cyber space, Russia has opened a new theater of warfare as part of the hybrid style that it uses in Eastern Europe. This element is of note for similar reasons as outer space, where Russia power could be used to harm United States and Europeans security efforts due to attacks on technological systems. These systems have also been used to interfere in the domestic stability of multiple states, including Germany and the United States (Stelzenmüller, 2017). As such, the United States should be prepared to see these developments used in future to counter United States and European conventional military capabilities. These are elements that have been noted by American intelligence as growth areas for the Russian Federation, and which should continue to be monitored in the near term

These elements of Russian military doctrine help to shape an understanding of where the United States must prioritize its own development. The creation of USSF has the potential to give an edge against Russian development in the region, and United States Cyber Command can continue to work to create new system that are more resilient. The United States should consider, given

Russia's conventional and missile dominance in Europe, these avenues as the primary means of aggression in the near term. It also should anticipate expansion in the Arctic, given the connection to the homeland and the recent treaties signed with the PRC.

**Appendix D: NATO and European Allies Military Doctrine**

There are many key states in Europe that are military allies of the United States. For this appendix, the general doctrine of NATO and four major United States military policies will briefly be discussed to gain insight on their current orientation.

**NATO:** NATO has recently released a new strategic concept, focused on adapting the alliance to a new security paradigm (North Atlantic Council, 2010). This is to adjust for radical changes to the international system that have occurred since 2001. The proposed system is focused on completing objectives abroad, preventing new threats from emerging, and engaging with states such as Russia to maintain peace (NAC, 2010). This new paradigm is a perfect opportunity for the United States to help reshape the commitment to the alliance, and make an alliance that builds up the power of all states involved. Of note are the focus on cyber, which mirrors United States goals, and the lack of focus on space, which is an important emerging theater of importance for the United States (NAC, 2010). These are areas where the United States can form partnerships. Most importantly is the reaffirmation of common defense, which is necessary to ensure that the deterrent threat of United States military power can influence the actions of the Sino-Russian partnership as other states continue to develop.

**The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:** Current British strategy, developed in 2019, is focused primarily on the threats of terrorism and technological weaknesses. These threats have greatly affected the United Kingdom in the past decade and will likely continue to do so. Of particular notes were the interference from Russia in recent elections, and the chemical weapons attack in Salisbury (HM Government, Ministry of Defence, 2019). The United Kingdom is also wary of the rise of interstate tension, which it notes is a continued threat to collective action on a variety of problems (HM Government, Ministry of Defence, 2019). Despite leaving the European

Union, the United Kingdom is intent on maintaining its European presence and partnerships, and its global influence. These continue to make the United Kingdom a key ally in the European security interests for the United States, especially given the historically strong partnership in the North Atlantic naval theater and on matters of intelligence (HM Government, Ministry of Defence, 2019).

**French Republic:** The French strategy, released in 2013, is focused in reinvigorating the global influence of France (French Ministry of Armed Forces, 2013). While there is strategy for Europe, there is also a nation-specific strategy that could split shared European interest. In the context of Europe, France is pursuing a highly independent strategy, focused on increasing French direction in the alliance (French Ministry of Armed Forces, 2013). While France is still a committed partner, the goal of present French intentions is to find areas of development that can be used to advance this influence. This means that the military development of France is not purely focused on Europe, but also on North Africa and several Central African nations (French Ministry of Armed Forces, 2013). From a United States perspective, this means that France should receive specific bilateral cooperation in order to garner more aid than other members of the alliance, who may seek more collaboration between states.

**Federal Republic of Germany:** The German Republic's focus is on the European project and its stability. Unlike France, Germany is actively in favor of an integrated, multinational European force (German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016). This force would ideally be headed by the Bundeswehr. It would advance the centralization of Europe, a move that is a source of concern for Russia. In addition, Germany is focused on maintaining the rules-based order, and is distressed by Russian aggression on the edges of the European Union (German Federal Ministry of Defence,

2016). These concerns are leading Germany to focus internally on Europe.<sup>1</sup> This also takes into account the rise of terrorism and the migrant crisis, both of which have affected Germany significantly, and require a unified front to address (German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016). The United States should focus on directing German efforts towards coordination on NATO and regional partnerships, to encourage the cooperative desires in a general manner.

**Republic of Poland:** The Republic of Poland has quickly grown in importance for NATO and the United States. An examination of their security strategy is most useful for understanding the Eastern European perspective. This perspective is focused on preparing to address the imminent threat from Russia, and looking to secure alliances within Europe to do so (Polish Ministry of National Defence, 2014). This means that Poland is chiefly concerned with conventional preparations and maintaining armed forces for deployment on the home front, and with the strength of its alliances such as NATO (Polish Ministry of National Defence, 2014). While there is mention of the United Nations, more imminent concerns have Poland focused on the regional level. As such, it also remains committed and active in the European bi-lateral alliances (Polish Ministry of National Defence, 2014). Polish dedication to its allies and active development of its military should serve as a model for other allies and the United States should urge other European states to follow Poland's lead.

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<sup>1</sup> A note of importance is that as of the writing of this paper, the sitting President of the European Commission, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, is the former German Defense Minister who published the German Military Strategy in 2016.

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