



Implementing Nine-Year Education for All: Addressing Challenges in Qian County



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Disclaimer

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Honor Statement

On my honor as a student, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment

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Acronyms and Key Terms

Nine-Year Compulsory Education Policy: A national regulation in China that calls for all children to complete six years of primary education and three years of junior high school education.

Qian County: A rural county located in Shaanxi Province of China. It is the central area of focus in this policy.

Hukou System: It classifies residents as “urban” or “rural,” depending on where they were born. Access to public services, such as education, healthcare, and social security, is associated with the place of registration.

CCT (Conditional Cash Transfer): The project provides cash assistance to low-income families if their children attend school. It tries to decrease the dropout rate by offsetting the ceremony issues.

CBI (Community-Based Intervention): A locally operated program that offers tutorials, psychological care, and various extracurricular activities after school to disadvantaged students, like left-behind children.

PPP (Public-Private Partnership): An approach for financing and implementation that combines public sector supervision and private sector investment or management support to improve the delivery of educational services.

Left-Behind Children (LBC): Children whose parents work outside and are confined to rural areas face less educational support and psychosocial challenges.

Dropout Rate: The ratio of students leaving school before completion of the nine-year prescribed compulsory education.

Education Bureau (of Qian County): The local government agency in charge of local implementation or compliance with national educational goals.

I. Executive Summary

In Qian County, Shaanxi Province, China, although the nine-year compulsory education policy has been successful, the national enrollment rate has already reached 95.5% (Ministry of Education Of The People's Republic of China, 2023). In stark contrast, Qian County reported that 2,545 school-age children, accounting for roughly 5% of the total student body, were out of school (Qian County Education Bureau, 2023). A gap indicates a failure at the local level in implementing policy, which has profound implications for development.

The fundamental reasons for educational exclusion in Qian County include deep-rooted economic difficulties, gender norms that belittle girls' education, and the long-term impact of the migration of parents' labor force, resulting in children being cared for by the elderly or overburdened guardians (Zhao et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2020). These challenges have a particularly severe impact on vulnerable groups, especially left-behind children and rural girls, who often lack access to education and emotional support. The consequences go far beyond personal well-being. Research shows that for every 1% increase in the enrollment rate, per capita GDP grows by 0.35-0.59%, indicating that education has a strong multiplier effect. At the family level, the returns on education are equally obvious: among the highest-income group, 56.9% of farmers have completed junior high school or higher education, while among the lowest-income group, this proportion is only 39.3% (Zhang & Minxia, 2006). These data indicate that educational exclusion will widen income inequality and undermine Qian County's prospects for achieving inclusive long-term growth.

This report assessed two evidence-based policy alternatives, alongside a financing model designed to improve implementation capacity and sustainability:

Community-Based Interventions (CBIs): Community-Based Interventions (CBIs) refer to after-school programs run by local organizations that provide academic support, psychological counseling, and supervised recreational activities. Research conducted in Zhejiang Province and Shaanxi Province indicates that a large-scale implementation of CBIs can lead to a decrease in the dropout rate by 7-12% (Zhao et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2020). This means that the dropout rate in Qian County is between 62% and 106%. However, the cost of CBI is relatively high. The five-year discount will cost a total of 10.7 million yuan, with each participant costing 6419 yuan. The price for each dropout varies between 100,943 and 172,580 yuan. Due to high fixed costs and logistical issues in the countryside, this model may not be sustainable or politically feasible despite being strongly supported by the community.

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs): This policy alternative sends checks to poor families on the condition that they attend school regularly. A randomized controlled trial conducted in a similarly impoverished county (Shaanxi Province) found that conditional cash assistance reduced the dropout rate from 13.3% to 5.3% (a 60% decrease) (Mo et al., 2013). Should this be replicated in Qian County, it would prevent about 529 dropouts. In addition, conditional cash aid is highly cost-effective. The discounted cost for each dropout is 3986 yuan, which is highly compatible with China's national poverty alleviation and targeted assistance policies. Conditional structures are also critical in holding families accountable and helping them to meet the direct and opportunity costs of education.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Although they are not meant to be implemented as separate intervention measures, public-private partnerships provide a secondary source of financing that

allows local governments to use private capital for education-related activities. Drawing on Ye County's model, which integrates private capital and reduces public spending on education by 20 to 30%, as a case study, it is anticipated that Qian County will similarly be able to reduce its fiscal burden of conditional cash transfers over five years, from 2.65 million to 1.48 to 1.7 million yuan. Public-private partnerships can improve financial sustainability, enhance the efficiency of the private sector, and improve project implementation. Nonetheless, they will need a solid accountability architecture to avoid fairness issues, such as cream skinning, and ensure that the most disadvantaged receive assistance (Zhao et al., 2019).

This report recommended that the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) project, based on a fund-public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement, should be adopted in Qian County. When financial resources are scarce, the CCT-PPP model is a practical and politically feasible way to expand the educational intervention. It combines the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of conditional cash transfer payments with the fiscal flexibility of public-private partnerships, allowing local governments to maximise their leverage without sacrificing fairness or long-term viability. It is expected to reduce the dropout rates in rural areas by 3.3 percentage points to 1.3 percentage points. In doing so, it will prevent more than 500 people from dropping out of school and reduce the urban-rural gap by over two percentage points.

II. Client Overview

The director of the Qian County Education Bureau is a key figure involved in implementing China's nine-year compulsory education policy. This is the responsibility to ensure that policies are being followed, that barriers to children getting to school are removed, and that there are similar and equal learning opportunities across the country. The Education Bureau has to bring every out-of-school child back to school as this is not only a legal obligation but also a basic responsibility. The Education Bureau does the same for every child in Qian County, following the right to equal education. The growing gap in education between villages and big cities is due to economic problems and social values. As a result, the dropout rate remains high. Without the policy intervention, the gap hinders countries from reducing poverty, achieving social equality, and developing human capital. The role of this bureau is multi-faceted. To fill gaps, we analyze participation levels, work with users at the grassroots level, including village committees and women's federations, and network with NGOs and the business sector. The director can help develop subsidies and other assistance programs targeting low-income families and easing their financial burden. If the Qian County Education Bureau can consciously cooperate and deploy effective responses. In that case, the coverage of compulsory education can help achieve the goals of educational equity and rural revitalization to a large extent.

III. Qian County's Educational Landscape

Qian County reveals the different educational problems that exist in rural China. The education of the students is shaped by spatially dispersed immigration, limited resources, and systemic inequalities. According to the data, students are facing these obstacles. Hence, they offer a basis for targeted, evidence-based intervention.

As of the 2023 school year, the population of primary school students in Qian County is 29,489, and the population of junior high school students is 21,698. There are 29,032 school-age children in Qian County, of whom rural students account for around 56.6%. Although more than 90% of rural students are enrolled in school, the enrollment rate is lower than that of urban students (99%). In rural areas, there are 15,801 boys and 13,168 girls. In urban areas, there are 12,118 boys as compared to 10,100 girls. There are differences in the student-teacher ratio. According to the Ministry of Education (2023), the overall average ratio in Qian County is approximately 1:18. Rural schools have a ratio of around 1:25, which is significantly higher than the manageable ratio of 1:12 for urban schools. The national level has a 1:16 ratio. The funding gap has made this problem worse, as rural schools are unable to hire suitable teachers or maintain their facilities. For example, the national average is 91.71% (Ministry of Education, 2023). Rural primary schools report that only 58.36% of teachers hold a college (bachelor's) degree or above, while the proportion exceeds 80% for urban teachers.

Over the past decade, enrollment in Qian County has declined significantly. Also, population change and social economy have taken place. Student dropout data from rural areas and urban areas should be compared and analysed. The dropout rate, at 3.3%, is much higher than that of urban schools at 0.8%. The gap between urban areas and rural areas reflects systemic challenges, such as insufficient funds for schools, inadequate teaching, and the emotional stress of left-behind children, all of which have contributed to the decline in enrollment rates in Qian County.

The economic development gap between Qian County and other regions, especially neighboring cities Xianyang City, has largely contributed to the trend of population migration. For instance, Xianyang City has an average annual income that is about 15% higher than that of Qian County. In Xianyang, urban residents had an average annual income of 69,290 yuan in 2019; similarly, that of Qian County was 58,411 yuan. The incomes are so high that more and more people are migrating. They often leave their children in the care of older relatives or community members. This model aligns with Liang and Sun's (2020) findings that an economic opportunity may promote parental immigration at the cost of family separation and other challenges.

IV. Introduction

China's nine-year compulsory education policy is one of the most successful social development measures in the country. The national enrollment rate has reached 95.5%, which has contributed to a significant reduction in the illiteracy rate over several generations (Ministry of Education, 2023). However, this impressive national figure masks the persistent regional differences, especially in underdeveloped rural areas. In Qian County, Shaanxi Province, internal government data shows that approximately 2,545 school-age children - accounting for about 5% of the eligible students - are still not enrolled. This huge gap reflects systemic challenges and has the potential to undermine the country's goals in achieving educational equity, reducing poverty, and developing human capital.

The high dropout rate in the relocated counties is a result of the combined effects of structural and cultural factors. Economic difficulties remain a significant cause. Many families let their children drop out of school to help with housework or farm work. The migration of parents has exacerbated this problem, leaving their children in the care of elderly relatives or neighbors who have limited ability to force them to attend school. Furthermore, deeply rooted gender norms often do not attach importance to girls' education, and the fierce competition for the limited number of high school admission places hinders the long-term educational investment of rural families. The research of Zeng et al. (2014) indicates that when families have to make trade-offs in resource allocation, rural girls face a greater risk of educational exclusion. The cumulative effect of these pressures has led to a continuous widening gap between urban and rural areas in terms of educational opportunities, quality, and outcomes, raising urgent concerns about the effectiveness of current county-level education policy implementation.

This report was compiled in collaboration with the Education Bureau of Qian County, which is a local government agency responsible for implementing China's compulsory education tasks. The bureau is mainly led by a director affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party. It not only bears the administrative responsibility of ensuring compliance with national enrollment targets, but also plays a key role in interpreting the central government's strategies in the context of local rural governance and economic development. The Education Bureau is authorized to coordinate inter-agency efforts, participate in community organizations, pilot policy innovations, and advocate for funding from county and provincial authorities. Therefore, it is the central institutional client of this analysis, and the suggestions here have been adjusted explicitly for its functional authority, budget constraints, and political responsibilities.

The overall purpose of this policy analysis is to identify and evaluate targeted intervention measures that can effectively reduce the rural dropout rate in Qian County and improve the educational opportunities and retention rates of the most vulnerable groups in the county. The report particularly strives to determine which intervention measures are effective, feasible to implement, cost-effective, and equitable, especially for left-behind children and rural girls.

Two policy alternatives and one funding mechanism for the implementation process were evaluated:

Community-Based Interventions (CBIs): These institutions provide after-school academic support, supervision and care, and psychological counseling through locally run children's centers. Although CBIs have demonstrated a 7-12% reduction in dropout rates in similar rural projects, they require significant investment in physical infrastructure, staffing, and long-term community engagement.

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs): They provide financial aid to low-income families, but are contingent on school attendance. Evidence from randomized controlled trials in Shaanxi Province indicates that conditional cash transfer can reduce the dropout rate by up to 60%. This method is highly cost-effective and highly consistent with China's targeted poverty alleviation strategy.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Although PPP is not an independent intervention measure, it is regarded here as a supplementary financing model that utilizes private investment to support public education initiatives. Take Ye County as an example. This model is likely to reduce local government expenditure by 20-30%, making large-scale implementation more fiscally sustainable.

To evaluate these strategies, the report applies four core criteria:

Effectiveness: The degree to which each intervention reduces dropout rates and improves attendance.

Cost-effectiveness: The financial cost per dropout prevented, adjusted using an 8% discount rate (PBOC, n.d.).

Equity: Intervention measures support the capacity of vulnerable groups, such as girls, left-behind children, and low-income rural families.

Feasibility: The political, institutional, and administrative practicality of implementation within Qian County.

These standards were selected after consultation with the client and drew on the established framework of public policy analysis. Each intervention measure was both qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated, with support from the **outcome matrix**.

This report recommended implementing a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program as the primary intervention measure after undertaking the assessment process, along with financial support from the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model. A hybrid approach is likely to yield sustainable, fair, and measurable benefits. It is expected that the rural dropout rate will decline from 3.3% to 1.3% with this change, and that more than 500 children will not drop out over the next five years. Beyond financial modeling and project impact forecasting, the report also laid out a detailed implementation roadmap specifying administrative responsibilities, stakeholder engagement strategies, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure accountability and long-term success.

V. Problem Statement

In Qian County, a rural area of Shaanxi Province, 2,545 school-age children dropped out of school. Despite the legal guarantee provided by China's nine-year compulsory education policy, they did not receive compulsory education. This exclusion stems from a series of systemic challenges, including the long-term underfunding of rural schools, the lack of access to qualified teachers, and the deep-rooted socio-cultural norms that place the education of marginalized groups (especially girls and left-behind children) in a secondary position. Economic pressure forces many families to drop their children out of school to increase family income. In contrast, left-behind children, whose parents work outside, are often placed in informal care arrangements, cared for by elderly relatives or neighbors who lack the resources or knowledge to ensure that they always attend school. Gender-based differences further exacerbate these obstacles, as traditional norms and economic constraints tend to favor the education of boys rather than girls, thereby perpetuating the cycle of poverty and inequality (Zeng et al., 2014; UNICEF and the National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Being excluded from education for a long time will cause long-term social and economic costs. It restricts the development of human capital, exacerbates intergenerational poverty, and increases the possibility of social instability in rural areas with insufficient resources. If not addressed, it will undermine the national development goals and widen the urban-rural gap in China's education system.

Exclusion from education has a significant effect on the economy. According to studies, a 1% rise in the enrollment rate will lead to a growth of between 0.35% and 0.59% in per capita GDP. Thus, educational opportunity reinforces economic productivity (Zhou et al., 2020). At the family level, educational attainment and income are closely associated. For example, 56.9% of farmers from the highest income group have completed junior high school or senior high school education. In comparison, this proportion reaches only 39.3% for farmers in the lowest income group. This means that income inequality is increasing because educational inequality is growing. Income inequalities are resulting in reduced opportunities for upward mobility. The high dropout rate and low level of schooling have hindered the development of human capital in Shanxi Province at the social level and restricted the realization of national goals such as poverty alleviation, social equity, and economic growth (Song, 2023). In addition, it deepens gender inequality and social division as uneducated youth are more prone to exploitation and denial of citizenship. On a more systemic level, it also displays the failure to implement the nine-year compulsory education. Even though the policy states universal education, structural gaps like a shortage of funds in rural schools, poor teacher training, and poor execution of gender quality show the mismatch between policy design and the actual state of affairs. The government must create a level playing field for education. This public good serves as the backbone of efforts to achieve national goals, including economic development, social stability, and regional gap narrowing. Tackling these issues needs coordinated intervention measures across sectors. It is not enough to just comply with the law; we need to tackle the real drivers of educational exclusion, like economic pressure, social norms, and institutional discrimination.

The educational disparity in Qian County is part of the widespread rural inequality in China. The differences arise from systematic hurdles such as a lack of resources, socio-cultural norms, and the economy. Having solutions to these problems is important for educational equity and the region's long-term development. The next chapters will focus on these challenges and discuss their causes, impacts, and consequences for rural education.

The educational gap in Qian County is part of the widespread inequality in rural China. These differences stem from systemic challenges, including resource shortages, deeply rooted sociocultural norms, and economic pressures. Solving these problems effectively is vital for ensuring educational equity and supporting the region's long-term development. The following chapters will specifically explore these challenges, emphasizing their potential causes, consequences, and impacts on rural education reform.

5.1. Urban-Rural Disparities at the Historical Level

The education gap between urban and rural areas in China remains one of the most pressing and persistent issues in China's education. The average years of education of urban dwellers across the country is around 13.4 years, while it is only 9.3 years for the rural dwellers. Therefore, the four-year difference in educational attainment is significant (UNICEF, 2022). The gap has widened over time: during 1990–2010, while the national enrollment rate for compulsory education reached 95.5%, the enrollment rates for urban and rural students widened from 23.8% to about 50% (UNICEF, 2022). These averages mask the local crises. For example, in poor rural counties, the dropout rate from grade 7 to grade 8 is as high as 14.2%, much higher than the national average of 2.6% reported by the Ministry of Education (Yi et al., 2012). This gap is primarily due to the unequal distribution of funds, infrastructure, and teacher quality. According to Wen et al. (2017), only 25% of rural primary school teachers held a college degree or higher in 2013. This number was above 58% for urban areas. Parents living in the countryside think education is a waste of time. They feel that schools are too poor and that teachers do not teach very well (Banerjee et al., 2004). Due to a lack of resources and limited access, rural students tend to perform less well academically than their urban counterparts. Given this situation, tackling the issue of school dropouts in Qian County is vital for breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty and ensuring coherence between local achievements and national education and development strategies.

5.2 “Left-behind Children”

The educational gap between urban and rural areas significantly affects vulnerable groups, especially children who are left behind. The increasingly migrating children who are becoming separated from their parents constitute a group of rural students who face significant educational, emotional, and social challenges. It is important to understand their problem to solve the bigger educational gap between urban and rural areas. In 2010, across the country, there were approximately 612.05 million left-behind children. Thus, it was found that 37.7% of the total number of rural children are left-behind children. In comparison to their urban counterparts, these children tend to be less academically accomplished and have a higher dropout rate. In 2015, this number increased to 68.77 million, accounting for around 38% of China's total number of children. Of which, grandparents are caring for about 26.3% of the children. Grandparents may be restricted due to their age and education. (National Bureau of Statistics, and others, 2017).

The migration of parents to nearby cities to take advantage of economic disparities has had a great impact on the welfare of rural communities in China, especially left-behind children. According to Liang and Sun (2020), many rural parents have migrated to the more developed areas of the Pearl

River Delta and Yangtze River Delta in the hope of earning a better income. The regions have a relatively high GDP and employment level that attracts a relatively high number of domestic immigrants. They leave their children in their rural hometowns to be cared for by grandparents/relatives. The findings of this study indicate that the child will suffer from low educational attainment and poor mental health because most parents who live in a limited manner will not be able to provide academic and emotional support. According to Tong et al. (2019), parents often leave their children behind in the destination city due to systemic barriers, such as the household registration system. This hinders their access to affordable housing, public education, and social services.

Economic considerations also play a crucial role. In provinces where it is challenging to carry children around due to the high cost of living and logistics, families mainly prioritize maximizing their income. The distance of migration can aggravate this problem. The left-behind children are significantly associated with inter-provincial migration. Kids who are at home with their parents are exposed to countless challenges. These challenges can be a reduction in parental supervision and emotional support. This increases the risk of psychological distress, learning difficulties, and behavioural problems.

According to a systematic review by Fellmeth et al. (2018), these children are at higher risk of depression, anxiety, and behavioural disorders in comparison to their peers with parents. Children who are left behind are at a higher risk of accidental injury (Ma et al. 2019). A report from the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (2016) notes that around 15% of left-behind children have suffered from violence, which has harmed their mental health and made them even more vulnerable. Students attending rural schools, especially boarding schools, are bullied more and fail academically more than urban students. Rural boarding schools have many left-behind children. The percentage of students bullied is approximately 31.5%, and it is more than that of urban centres (Lu et al., 2017). Because of rising pay for low-skilled jobs, many left-behind children face large opportunity costs in education. The real wage rose by 8 % due to the rise in labor demand in coastal provinces between 2001 and 2005. It further increased by 9.8 % in 2006 (Park, Cai, & Du, 2007; Han, Cui, Fan, 2009). For many children in low-income families, the economic incentives make it appealing for them to enter the labour market early. Left-behind children are a reflection of the systemic flaws in the rural education system, which is not able to provide a necessary support structure for socially and emotionally weak students.

5.3 Gender Inequality in Education

Gender inequality in education is a long-standing problem in rural China, and girls are hindered from accessing equal education there. According to Hannum, Wang, and Adams (2008), girls in rural areas achieve lower educational attainment than similarly aged males. This is primarily due to traditional gender roles and economic factors, which privilege boys' education over girls' education. Studies conducted in rural areas found that approximately 68% of respondents noticed a significant difference in education for girls, while studies in urban areas found that only 36% did (Zeng et al., 2014). The system prevents urban residents from accessing public resources, such as high-quality schools and healthcare services, while rural residents have fewer choices when it comes to education. For rural girls, this means limited access to schools, with poorer quality facilities and teaching standards compared to those in urban areas. Due to these institutional barriers and financial constraints, families often have to make tough choices by prioritizing the education of boys, who are considered more likely to provide financial support. In contrast, girls

are often expected to do housework or take low-paying jobs. Rural girls have limited access to education due to this system (Chan & Buckingham, 2008).

VI. Literature Review

When addressing the educational challenges in Qian County, the selection of evidence-based intervention measures followed a pragmatic approach that considered existing stakeholders, resources, and the socio-economic environment. The effectiveness of each intervention measure in improving educational outcomes and its feasibility within Qian County's ecosystem were evaluated. This includes leveraging the capabilities of local government agencies such as the Qian County Education Bureau and the Finance Bureau, and maintaining consistency with the collaborative roles of schools, families, local enterprises, and village committees. By linking these intervention measures to the actual situation and existing resources of local stakeholders, they aim to determine actionable strategies that are relevant to specific circumstances and operationally feasible.

6.1 Community-Based Interventions

CBIs intend to provide academic aid, psychological care, and social participation to children left behind, mostly in rural areas, due to the migration of their parents. The Women's Federation coordinates the intervention work. It helped the village leaders to know the situation and to set up the children's centre. The local village leaders run these centres with real space supervision. Volunteers mainly consist of local women with experience working with children. A child psychologist trains them to manage the centre and conduct age-appropriate activities. During peak hours like school holidays, student volunteers from nearby colleges and universities will be recruited for the task, utilising their social responsibility requirement.

Jiang et al. (2020) revealed that community interventions, such as children's centres, could enhance the psychosocial health and academic performance of left-behind children in rural China. The quantitative findings demonstrate that the overall difficulties and internalising problems of left-behind children, as well as rural children living with parents, have decreased, while the academic success of left-behind children has improved. Social support scores increased in both groups. The qualitative findings showed that the children in most participating centres were happier and felt safer, while the parents appreciated the academic and safety benefits of the centres. While caregivers of grandparents were delighted with the help they received with their kids' homework, they noticed that there was little help with household chores. Some volunteers leave feeling fulfilled, and others leave discontented with their experiences. The leaders of the Village mentioned being together, but there was a concern about Sustainability and the isolated children. Community ownership and strong local leadership are key success factors, although reliance on volunteers and insufficient funding pose challenges. In the longer term, they state that sustainability or scaling up will require government support or user payments. They also note that interventions work, especially in poorer areas. Zhao et al. (2017) showed that child centers led by communities were effective in rural China. The school enrollment rate of children in villages with after-school centers increased by 7-12% compared to those in the control group, due to the psychological counseling and supervised activities they received. The credit for the centers' success goes to local volunteers. As many as 770 children attended at least 50% of the centres' sessions.

Nevertheless, the research by Zhao et al. (2017) did not cover all aspects of a sustainable and comprehensive implementation. A study by Davis and Buchanan (2022) further highlights the importance of participatory research for program design in community-based approaches. In their projects with rural communities in Montana, when locals are included in the planning and implementation phase, there is greater ownership and more cultural relevance. Fletcher, Hammer, and Hibbert in 2014 discussed how CBPR projects struggle to balance service delivery and research in the long term. They say engaging community members from the outset strengthens the impact of the interventions and makes them adaptable to changing needs throughout the research process. CBPR creates a negotiation between service delivery and research, forming a feedback loop that refines an intervention in real time. When applied to Qian County, the CBPR approach can help ensure that interventions implemented in a community not only come from outside but are also informed by the insights of local stakeholders. This type of involvement can help the emotional and social support systems of left-behind children, mitigate trauma and mental issues brought about by having an absent parent, and even help compensate for a lack of educational resources, which means every child in the community has access to educational resources. Besides, these interventions will be continued with feedback so that they can be suitably adapted to the political and cultural context of the communities.

According to White and Reid's 2008 observation, local awareness training of teachers and community volunteers significantly improved student participation and retention in rural areas. Studies of rural schools in Australia show that Teachers who link their teaching to students' culture were successfully able to link their students more deeply with the school. In rural Qian County, we can train the local volunteers and educators to understand the social and cultural specifics of the place. Children face social neglect as a result of parental migration. Receiving community education support will improve their life chances. Thus, children will be able to enjoy a better future. Also, Hammer, B., Fletcher, F., and Hibbert, A. studied the significance of response measures. When the action, as evaluated, is impractical, it refers to the measures taken. Project managers can use it to collect feedback and experiences on how well their interventions have worked. Participatory observation techniques utilized by Qian County stakeholders ensure community projects remain responsive to the needs of left-behind children. If new feedback loops are being created continuously, activities can be adjusted to meet the academic and emotional needs of the beneficiaries and enhance the overall impact of the intervention. Research from Kenya and Uganda shows parental engagement and local ownership of community projects have increased enrollment rates for disadvantaged children in rural areas. Disadvantaged kids are less likely to drop out of school. Community-Led Children's Education Initiative (CLACE) in Uganda found that local stakeholders' contributions to the design and management of the initiative achieved a 15% increase in retention (Kabunga and Datzberger, 2019). The social and political structures in Qian County suggest that local agents should become globally active.

Obtaining qualified volunteers, long-term funding, and local political factors may inhibit the sustainability of community interventions in Qian County. When the level of community participation and leadership changes, it could lead to sustainability and scaling issues. Effective ways to tackle this issue include embedding CBIs into existing local government structures or partnering with NGOs to fill the resource gaps. Experts have studied community participation and participatory approaches in other countries, but they cannot be copied and pasted into Chinese conditions. The principles developed through these methods, including community ownership and cultural sensitivity training, are better suited to the cultural and social conditions of Qian County. Zhao et al. (2017) study showed that the global best practices and local wisdom of this hybrid

combine international experience with local expertise. Thus, it would cope with China's rural challenges.

6.2 Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs

A Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) is a targeted and conditional financial incentive given to low-income families to induce them to fulfill specific requirements. For example, sending their children to school regularly or taking them for check-ups. The local education bureau designs the policy for a particular group of students. Teachers and schools, as frontline implementers, identify qualified students, assess their needs, and provide subsidies through cash transfer payments to ease the burden. The evaluation was aided by teachers who were incentivized by performance bonuses. Alluding to this sometimes leads to those who do not require subsidies having them allocated rather than the neediest. Additionally, it encourages parents and families to use any extra income for their child's education.

Fiszbein and Schady (2009) were the first to argue that conditional cash transfer payments address current poverty and future investment in education. In Qian County, poverty pressure causes children, especially girls, to drop out of school so they can help the family. Conditional cash assistance can influence decisions related to education. It is essential for those left-behind children to be at a higher risk of dropping out of school due to a lack of economic support and supervision.

Mo et al. (2012) conducted a field study in Northwest China, which includes Shaanxi Province, where Qian County is located. They employed a randomized controlled trial (RCT) design to evaluate the treatment with conditional cash transfer to reduce junior high school dropout rates. In the study, conditional cash transfer treatment reduced the dropout rate by 60%. The control group dropout rate is 13.3%, and the treatment group dropout rate is 5.3%. This initiative effectively reaches disadvantaged groups - girls, lower-grade students, and those with low academic performance. Cash conditional payments effectively treat the rising opportunity cost of remaining in school, reflecting the enhancement in pay of low-skilled jobs. Older students tend to drop out of school to work, especially in areas with high demand for migrant workers, more than younger students. This evidence is relevant to Qian County, where similar social and educational conditions exist. It is likewise mentioned in the study that the academic quality is not only indicated by attendance but also improves students' cognitive outcomes. According to Zhou et al. (2020), a randomized controlled trial showed that conditional cash transfers enhance cognitive outcomes and school retention. The results of the research show that conditional cash assistance increases enrollment by 12 percent (12%), particularly benefiting students from low-income families. This plan focuses on conditional incentives tied to educational milestones that relieve the financial stress, causing many students to leave school prematurely. The results of the research show that conditional cash assistance increased the enrollment rate of students and educational participation in the long run. The success of conditional cash transfers on the Latin American continent demonstrates their effectiveness. Mexico's PROGRESA project is among the most studied conditional cash transfer payment projects in the world. According to Schultz (2004), the enrollment rate for rural children has increased by 6%, and the dropout rate has decreased by 19%. In Brazil, the Bolsa Família programme manages to increase the enrolment rate of poor children by 12% (Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012). These results show that conditional cash transfer payments do a strong job of reducing education inequality, which should be the case in Qian County with little alteration to the original plan.

According to Baird et al. (2013), CCTs (conditional cash transfers) were compared with UCTs (unconditional cash transfers), leading to the conclusion that the conditionality factor of CCTs significantly increased the enrollment rate. Families in a case like Qian County may not be able to afford to pay for their children's education due to economic constraints. The fact that these transfers are conditional guarantees that the financial support will yield educational benefits. Also, Garcia and Saavedra's (2022) study results show that conditional cash assistance might increase enrollment by 10%-15% in a similar rural context, which further strengthens the case for conditional cash assistance in Qian County.

Effective implementation of conditional cash assistance requires the proper positioning and monitoring. Alatas et al. (2016) highlight the importance of self-positioning mechanisms in ensuring welfare for the families that are most likely to benefit. In resource-constrained areas, effective targeting is crucial to ensuring that funds are used to expand dropout prevention efforts in Qian County sustainably. Public-private partnerships can create proper financing and business support solutions. Public-private partnerships are viewed not as a stand-alone option but rather as a complementary mechanism that can improve the financial and administrative implementation of the CBI and CCT social programs.

6.3 Public-Private Partnerships

This report does not treat public-private partnerships (PPPs) as an independent policy option, but rather as a supplementary implementation mechanism to enhance the implementation and sustainability of proposed intervention measures, namely community-based interventions (CBIs) and conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs). In resource-constrained areas like Qian County, fiscal constraints have limited the capacity of local governments. PPP can serve as a strategic financing and operation model. By leveraging the financial resources, technical expertise, and efficiency of the private sector, public-private partnerships can help expand and sustain these intervention measures, reduce the government's upfront financial burden, and maintain accountability and service quality at the same time.

Precedents at home and abroad have verified this method. In the Punjab Province of Pakistan, targeted public-private partnerships have significantly improved accessibility in underserved areas and reduced the dropout rate (Ali et al., 2024). In India, according to the Right to Education Act, the participation of the private sector has helped address the gap in school infrastructure and increase the enrollment rate (Jain & Dholakia, 2010). Similar strategies in Vietnam involve private companies building and managing community schools, which reduces overcrowding and maintains affordability for low-income families (Nguyen et al., 2018). In China, the educational informatization strategy of Yexian County provides a remarkable example of an effective PPP deployment. A private enterprise invested 1.51 billion yuan to build a county-wide digital education system, and the government reimbursed it through a 10-year performance contract (China Education Network, 2019). This initiative demonstrates the potential of private participation in supporting critical infrastructure without requiring significant public spending.

Financially, based on the Ye County model, PPP is expected to reduce the implementation costs of infrastructure investment and conditional cash transfer payments in Qian County by 20-30%. The five-year cost of CBIs was initially estimated at 13.37 million yen and can be reduced to 9.36-10.7 million yuan. For conditional cash transfer payments, it is expected that the cost will decrease from 8.5 million yen to 5.95-6.8 million yen. This cost-sharing model not only enables the government's

payments to be dispersed over the long term but also links them to measurable outcomes, such as reducing the dropout rate, enhancing fiscal sustainability, and strengthening accountability.

However, several risk and fairness issues must be addressed during the implementation of PPP. In the past, educational public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China focused mainly on infrastructure and often neglected core educational services. In models such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), private entities are limited to managing school buildings or safety rather than directly contributing to teaching quality or curriculum design. Furthermore, without proper supervision, PPP runs the risk of exacerbating inequality. Research on financial aid for Chinese students shows that support tends to favor outstanding students while ignoring those who are most likely to drop out (Wang, 2015;) Gong & Li, 2014. This "cream skimming" effect is very dangerous in Qian County because the disadvantaged students here need support the most.

To mitigate these risks, the contract must be carefully designed, based on performance, targeted at demand, and with enhanced government supervision. Xu (2023) emphasizes that strategic regulatory support is crucial for attracting private partners while maintaining public policy goals. The clarity of the contract regarding asset ownership, quality assurance, and operational responsibility is necessary to prevent inconsistency between profit motives and educational outcomes. Furthermore, setting an upper limit on the participation of private institutions in teaching decision-making is conducive to safeguarding the public interest.

VII. Evaluating Alternatives

This report analyzed the two major policy alternatives, Community-Based Interventions (CBIs) and Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), for the education gap in Qian County. Community-Based Initiatives (CBIs) are designed to utilize local resources and promote the self-governance of the local community, encouraging students to participate and improve child retention, especially for left-behind children. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are designed to help low-income families by providing conditional cash assistance for education, which eases the economic stress that leads to dropout. Besides these core alternatives, the memorandum also considers PPPs as a supplementary financing option, rather than an independent policy option. Public-private partnerships can harness the investments and know-how of the private sector to enhance both the implementation and sustainability of infrastructure investment and conditional cash transfers. Each option will be assessed for effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, fairness, and political viability.

Effectiveness is measured based on empirical data or local predictions from relevant field studies through the number of dropouts prevented by each policy alternative.

- For CBIs, the pilot project showed a 7-12% reduction in dropout rate, which indicated their effectiveness. Using the dropout baseline of Qian County 881 as the base Figure, it is expected that the CBIs will prevent 62-106 dropouts.
- For CCTs, the study conducted in Shaanxi Province showed a 60% decrease in the dropout rate (from 13.3% to 5.3%). Expanding it to Qian County will avoid about 529 dropouts over the next five years.

Cost-effectiveness is calculated by dividing the total discounted cost of each intervention by the number of dropouts prevented, yielding a “cost per dropout prevented” metric.

- For CBIs, the lot cost is 10.7 million yen over five years with an 8% discount rate. The cost per dropout is estimated to be 100,943 – 172,580 yuan; 62 – 106 dropouts are likely to be prevented.
- The discounted cost of CCT over 5 years will be 2.11 million yuan and is expected to prevent 529 dropouts. It will generate more favourable cost, that is, the cost of preventing each dropout is therefore equal to 3,986 yuan.


Equity is assessed by examining how well each policy alternative targets and benefits marginalized populations, particularly left-behind children and girls.

- Community-Based Institutions (CBIs) help improve equity. They do this by providing a safe learning space that is also local. It is especially useful for children from less privileged backgrounds whose parents are not there or cannot provide organized family learning support.
- Financial aid given under specific conditions is used to address the monetary barriers to education faced by various individuals, especially low-income students and female students. This alternative encourages families to let girls and left-behind children pursue their studies by linking cash transfers to attendance rates.

Political feasibility is evaluated by analyzing both the level of support and the influence of stakeholders involved in the implementation.

- Local community groups and village committees don't support CBIs much because they worry about their sustainability and the administrative burden CBIs are likely to create.
- The model for CCTs is very consistent with the national poverty reduction model; it has received considerable support from the Education Bureau of Qian County and the county government. This consistency with national priorities boosts administrative will and financial capacity.

Figure 1. Political Feasibility (Qian County Education Bureau, personal communication, March 2025)



Note. **Figure 1** shows the political feasibility assessment of key stakeholders involved in implementing dropout prevention strategies in Qian County. The "power" and "support level" scores (ranging from 1–10) were assigned based on qualitative estimates from personal communication with Qian County Education Bureau officials in March 2025. "Power" reflects each stakeholder's influence over education policy decisions, while "support level" indicates the stakeholder's perceived willingness to back proposed interventions such as CBIs and CCTs. Stakeholders include the local government (the Education Bureau and the County Government), private sector partners, schools, and village committees. Higher scores represent greater power or more substantial support.

Table 1. Evaluation Rubric for Policy Alternatives

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>Effectiveness</i>	Prevents >300 dropouts	Prevents 100–300 dropouts	Prevents <100 dropouts
<i>Cost-Effectiveness</i>	<¥5,000 per dropout	¥5,000–¥30,000	>¥30,000 per dropout
<i>Equity</i>	Reduces rural-urban or gender gap >1.5pp	Reduces rural-urban or gender gap ~1pp	Prevents <100 dropouts or reduces gap <0.5pp
<i>Political Feasibility</i>	Strong support from high-power stakeholders (8–9 power + 7–9 support) and policy alignment	Mixed support or strong support from low-power actors	Weak or divided support from high-power actors

7.1 Community-Based Interventions (CBIs)

Effectiveness: Prevents 62–106 dropouts; reduces dropout rate from 3.3% to 2.7–2.9%

Community-based interventions (CBIs) may offer feasible solutions to mitigate the dropout rate of left-behind children in rural China. According to Zhao et al. (2017), projects like children's centers have reduced dropouts by 7-12% by providing comprehensive services, after-school support, psychological counseling, and supervision activities. According to the research report, about 800 children received treatment at 21 village centers, with each center treating an average of 32 children, and attendance was 75%. Jiang et al. (2020) conducted a community-based intervention (CBI) study on the same scale in 20 villages in Zhejiang Province, targeting left-behind children (LBC) and rural children living with their parents (RC). Then, they administer through the children's centre, where academic assistance, psychological counselling, and activities are organized to enhance mental health and school performance. In total, 920 children participated. The 438 children were from LBC, and 256 children, with an average of 52 per centre. The research used quasi-experiments and analyzed interventions using both numbers and interviews for evaluative purposes. Based on the study's findings, the well-being and educational attainment of left-behind children can be improved effectively. Locally trained volunteers and organized activities to help children feel secure and less isolated are usually offered through children's centres as part of continuous emotional care intervention measures. Homework tutoring services are an academic support service to make up for the insufficient educational assistance from the family. Children who are cared for and raised by the elderly are mostly those who require such services. Consequently, students showed an increase in school engagement and performance. Also, the peer norm of group infrastructure of CBI builds peer relations, raises children's perceived social support, and strengthens belongingness and bonding to the community (Jiang et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2017).

In Qian County, a well-functioning CBI program could lower the total rural dropout rate from 3.3% to about 2.7-2.9%. It is predicted that 881 students will drop out in the education cycle, of which

about 62-106 will drop out. Given the nature of the structures, the effectiveness of CBIs in county relocation may vary. The teacher-pupil ratio is relatively high (1:25 in rural schools, compared to 1:12 in urban areas), and the proportion of qualified teachers is also relatively low, with only 58.36% of teachers holding a degree, compared to over 80% in urban areas. Despite CBI's strong record of 75% participation in earlier studies, the success of CBI at Qian County will depend on local implementation factors in this area, such as the availability of community space, teachers' participation, and sustainable funding for well-trained counselors. The development project is anticipated to be disrupted due to the high rate of migration into and out of Shaanxi Province.

Cost-Effectiveness

Discounted Total Cost: ¥10.70 million; Cost per dropout prevented: ¥100,943–¥172,580

In addition to following the protocols, community interventions must have sufficient physical distance among students. In 2002, all students were required to have at least 5.5 square meters of indoor space, as stipulated in the national standard, to ensure enough space for study activities. To stop between 62 and 106 dropouts, we need to provide service for a larger number. The CBI project aims to serve nearly 1,000 students, with a dropout rate of 7-12% among its participants (Zhao et al., 2017). Consequently, an area of 5,500 square meters is needed for these students (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China, 2002). Choose a leasing model instead of building new facilities for cost efficiencies. The average rent is 24 yuan per square meter per month (as of 2025), and the monthly rent expenditure is 132,000 yuan. Over a planned five-year duration, the total rent for the facilities will be approximately 7.92 million yuan.

The program will have full-time teachers and part-time volunteers as its teaching staff. An intervention will require 40 full-time teachers to support 1,000 students properly, according to Qian County's teacher-student ratio of 1:25. According to the Qian County Education Bureau, the average monthly salary for compulsory education teachers is ¥2,270. Therefore, its total annual salary expenditure is ¥1.09 million, which calculates to about ¥5.45 million over five years.

Over five years, the CBIs cost ¥13.37 million before discounting. Supposing that students take part in the program for an average of 3 years (the total cycle of junior high school), then around 1,667 unique students would benefit from structured after-school programs. This results in an undiscounted average cost of ¥ 8,021 for each student served over the entire participation period.

When a discount rate of 8% is applied to account for the time value of money, the total discounted cost for five years will be approximately ¥10.70 million. The average cost per student declines to ¥6,419, more accurately reflecting the current value of the programme. Although it is estimated that CBIs will prevent between 62 and 106 dropouts at a cost per dropout prevented of ¥100,943 to ¥172,580, there will also be other benefits for all students. That is, there will also be improved attendance, engagement, and learning outcomes.

Equity

Prevents 31–52 dropouts among rural girls; narrows urban-rural dropout gap by 0.3–0.5 points

Implementing community-based interventions in Qian County can help alleviate the unequal access to education for rural students, left-behind children, and girls. It is expected that 881 rural students will drop out, with 521 being boys and 360 being girls. There are more boys than girls dropping out of school, as there are more boys in the school. In the rural area of Qian County, there were 15801 boys and 13168 girls.

The urban-rural gap is still a critical issue. The dropout rate in rural areas (3.3%) is a lot higher than that in urban areas (0.8%). It is leading to a gap of about 2.5 percentage points. According to Zhao et al. (2017), CBI can reduce the dropout rate of rural areas by 7-12%, which is 62-106 students the gap will be shortened. Also, CBI's assistance in lessening gender differentials by increasing the retention rate of rural girls in secondary school. Of the total number of rural students, girls account for 49.3%, and although the dropout rate is 49.4%, it is rural girls who are more vulnerable to staff turnover. Due to expected drop-out rates, boys are expected to stay back 37-63%, while girls are expected to stay back 31-52% to complete their education. Males have dropout rates that are higher than those of females. So, males will benefit slightly more. The CBIs still offer a fair bit of help for female students and may help close the gender gap in education retention. According to Jiang et al (2020), psychosocial health improved with the educational method. According to the scoring of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire, the total difficulty score for LBC left by both parents fell by 9.3%, for LBC left by one parent, it fell by 9.8%, and for RC, it fell by 7.6%. There was a significant improvement in the academic performance of both types of LBC ($p < 0.001$). In addition, there was a substantial increase in the perceived social support score for all groups (LBC, $p < 0.001$; RC, $p = 0.005$), suggesting that CBI brought positive changes to children, especially left-behind children, beyond academic performance.

Feasibility

6–8 power + 5–6 support

According to a report from the National Institute of Education Sciences in China, the high recognition of government and social organization-led care actions for left-behind children has improved the social feasibility of Community-Based Interventions (CBIs). Parents who routinely engage in such initiatives are strongly in favour of them, as they feel that these initiatives have filled the gap in care between the school and the village committee. The services provided were varied. Some of these were academic tutoring (16.51%), psychological counseling (15.59%), holiday day care (14.97%), adjustment of family relationships (12.92%), guardianship advice (10.77%), emotional support (10.15%), behavior intervention (5.13%), and other services. This included giving material assistance for the study and life (9.95%). CBI is widespread assistance that (not only academically and psychologically, but also socially) contributes to closer families and better integration (Wu, 2022). Qian County is increasingly likely to achieve successful implementation and long-term sustainable outcomes thanks to the extensive support from parents for the positive development of community trust measures.

The Chinese government has implemented policies that indicate its commitment to left-behind children (LBCs) in political spheres. In 2016, the State Council issued the Opinions on Strengthening Care and Protection for Left-Behind Children in Rural Areas, which advocates for

multi-departmental collaboration to establish a care and service network (State Council, 2016). In 2019, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and several departments jointly issued the Opinions on Further Improving the Care and Service System for Left-behind and Disadvantaged Children in Rural Areas, clarifying the responsibilities of various parties and strengthening grassroots work. In 2021, the Ministry of Education and other relevant departments issued the “Opinions on Consolidating and Expanding the Achievements of Education Poverty Alleviation” (Ministry of Education et al., 2021), which again supports the education of left-behind children.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for CBI Intervention

Indicator	Value
Estimated Dropouts Prevented	62–106
Dropout Rate Reduction (%)	7–12%
Estimated Program Participants	1,000
Facility Requirement (m ²)	5,500
Monthly Rental Cost (¥)	132,000
5-Year Facility Rental Cost (¥ million)	7.92
Number of Teachers Required	40
Monthly Teacher Salary (¥)	2,270
5-Year Staffing Cost (¥ million)	5.45
Total Discounted Cost (¥ million)	10.70
Cost per Dropout Prevented (¥)	100,943–172,580
Cost per Student Served (¥)	6,419
Dropout Rate Reduction	0.3–0.5 percentage points
Rural Dropout Rate Reduction	3.3% to 2.7–2.9%

7.2 Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs)

Effectiveness: Prevents 529 dropouts; reduces rural dropout rate from 3.3% to 1.3%

Mo et al. (2011) evaluated Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) to reduce school dropouts in a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of junior high school students in a household-nation-identified poor county in Shaanxi Province. The study focused on 300 of the poorest students, identified by teachers and principals, and divided into a treatment group and a control group of 150 each. This study assessed the impact of a school attendance-based financial incentive scheme on dropout rates, involving a total of 10 junior high schools and 1,507 students in the seventh grade. Before implementation, data were collected to ensure the treatment and control groups were statistically balanced. After a year, the results found that people in the control group dropped out of school at 13.3%, while those in the treatment group dropped out at only 5.3%. Thus, a 60% drop in school dropouts. By scaling up Mo et al.'s findings to Qian County, a well-designed CCT program could prevent up to 529 dropouts and lessen the total dropout rate by more than half. In areas like Qian County, the socioeconomic circumstances are similar to those of Mo and his associates. In such situations, the findings evidence that CCTs are a powerful policy instrument and strengthen school retention of at-risk, economically vulnerable students.

Cost-Effectiveness: Discounted Total Cost: ¥2.11 million; Cost per dropout prevented: ¥3,986

Mo et al. researched 300 of the poorest junior high school students. Every student can get ¥500 per semester (¥1,000 per year). The per capita disposable income of rural residents was ¥13,055. However, each student must have at least an 80% attendance rate. To reduce dropout rates, transfers were made directly to the parents to diminish their financial burden. The plan included surprise attendance checks to ensure everything was compliant and had low administrative costs, which enhanced the incentive structure. It would be a great incentive to economically vulnerable households for the State to give an annual transfer worth nearly a month's wage for a migrant worker in coastal factories.

To scale this intervention to Qian County, we project that CCTs will prevent 529 students from dropping out. The yearly costs for scaling up this intervention are almost ¥529,000, totaling ¥2.65 million over the 5 years, undiscounted. This means that it is ¥5,000 for every student who is diverted from dropping out. When we discount that amount back to today, and using an 8% discount rate, the total discount cost over 5 years is about ¥2.11 million. The present-value cost per dropout prevented has decreased to about ¥3,986, making it less expensive.

Equity: Prevents 302 female dropouts; narrows urban-rural dropout gap by 2 percentage points

According to Mo's research, an equity evaluation of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs in Qian County is essential due to differences in impact. The study finds that CCT reduces drop-out rates for girls (11%) more than for boys (7%). According to the projection, 529 dropouts will be prevented in Qian County. Of the 227 students who said they will still go to school because of the cash, 42.9% are male, and 302 students, or 57.1%, are female. Thus, it shows that CCTs can foster gender equity. Girls have a bigger effect than boys, because they are more likely to drop out of school for economic and social reasons. Hence, CCTs are an effective mechanism to boost the education of rural girls.

The higher earning potential of boys in the labour market may imply that financial incentives are not enough to offset the greater opportunity costs of dropouts. Before the CCT intervention, the dropout rate was 3.3% in rural areas and 0.8% in urban areas. This gave the intervention a 2.5 percentage point gap. Once the program is in place, the dropout rate in the rural areas will fall to 1.3%. This would mean only a 0.5 percentage point gap between rural and urban areas. CCTs effectively bridge the gap in education between rural and urban students.

Feasibility: High – strongly supported by national poverty alleviation strategy and existing cash-based systems

Implementing CCTs in Qian County supports China's poverty alleviation strategy and is politically feasible, given the support for this strategy. The Targeted Poverty Alleviation Strategy (2014) and the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Poverty Alleviation (2016) both highlight the importance of providing targeted financial assistance to low-income rural households, which is the basic design of CCT Programs. Also, the Guiding Opinions on the Three-Year Action Plan to Win the Battle Against Poverty (2018) mentions extending public services to rural areas, which refines the national commitment to the financial aid model for educational equity. In summary, the combined policies create a conducive political environment for launching and institutionalizing the CCTs in Qian County.

As a result of different welfare programs, for example, the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (Dibao), which has been offering means-tested cash payments to low-income families since the 1990s, CCTs are already familiar and popular. The public is willing to accept a conditional aid mechanism. Previously conducted CCT experiments have shown effectiveness, such as the one conducted by Mo et al. in 2011 in Shaanxi. Both policymakers and families believe CCTs to be a pragmatic solution that helps at-risk students and is linked to transfer school attendance.

CCTs have gained support from a growing number of stakeholders. As shown in **Figure 1**, both the local education bureau and county government (high-power actors) are well-positioned to be strong supporters of this model. Support creates a crucial basis for a successful implementation. Also, there is moderate to strong support among schools and teachers, who implement and verify attendance conditions. CCTs (Conditional Cash Transfers) are more centralized and have clearer organizational structures. In addition, their alignment with national funding flows and poverty alleviation targets makes them more politically and administratively feasible than Universal Basic Incomes (UBIs). To ensure long-term support, targeting transparency and accountability in fund allocation is critical.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for CCT Intervention

Indicator	Value
Estimated Dropouts Prevented	529
Dropout Rate Reduction (%)	60%
Annual Transfer per Student (¥)	1,000
Total 5-Year Cost (Undiscounted, ¥ million)	2.65
Total Discounted Cost (¥ million)	2.11
Cost per Dropout Prevented (¥)	3,986
Rural Dropout Rate Reduction	3.3% to 1.3%
Urban-Rural Dropout Gap Narrowed	From 2.5% to 0.5%

Table 4. Outcome Matrix: Evaluation of Policy Alternatives

Criterion	CBIs	CCTs
Effectiveness	62–106 dropouts	529 dropouts
Cost-Effectiveness	¥100,943–172,580	¥3,986
Feasibility	(6–8 power + 5–6 support)	(8–9 power + 7–9 support)
Equity	0.5–1.0 percentage points	≥1.5 percentage points

To ensure internal consistency in evaluating policy alternatives, both the projected dropout reductions and cost calculations in this report are measured over a five-year implementation period. This timeframe reflects the realistic duration over which either Community-Based Interventions (CBIs) or Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs would be deployed and scaled in Qian County. All outcome metrics—such as the number of dropouts prevented, changes in dropout rates, and per-student costs—are calculated cumulatively across five years. Aligning the timeframes of costs and effectiveness allows for accurate cost-effectiveness comparisons and more reliable policy recommendations.

VIII. Recommendation

After analyzing the policy alternatives, including Community-Based Interventions and Conditional Cash Transfers, along with Public-Private Partnerships as a funding mechanism, the recommended policy for Qian County is to implement a Conditional Cash Transfer program funded by Public-Private Partnerships. After examining each policy alternative against the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, feasibility, and equity criteria, this is the recommendation. Neither CBIs nor CCTs emerge as dominant across all criteria. Instead, CCTs combined with a PPP configuration are the most balanced choice in terms of benefits and tradeoffs.

CCTs are exceptionally effective in achieving their top policy aim—school dropout rates are indeed reduced. The evidence from Mo et al.'s study showed that offering ¥1,000 per school per year has a remarkably positive impact on the school attendance of poor students. If this intervention is applied to Qian County, it will prevent around 529 student dropouts in the next five years. This impact is significantly greater than the expected impact of CBIs. The CBIs will only prevent 62-106 dropouts in the same period. If dropout prevention is the top priority, then CCTs are the best alternative.

CCTs are also the most cost-effective way of using public resources: their discounted cost is approximately ¥3,986 per dropout averted. When used in conjunction with PPPs, costs become more affordable, allowing government financing that relies on the private sector. To make it easier to understand, using a PPP framework will help decrease government spending for the CCT program by an estimated 20–30%. As a result, the five-year cost of the CCT program, which is ¥2.11 million, will be reduced to approximately ¥1.48–¥1.70 million. By reducing the number of projects downstream, Qian County can lower costs, making the economy more financially sustainable. This allows it to use the funds effectively while ensuring the program's continuity and stability.

The funding-based PPP is feasible because it helps implement CCT and does not complicate it much. A comprehensive PPP model that includes private bodies in managing the education system is likely to face significant practical barriers to implementation in Qian County, due to limited regulatory capacity and monitoring mechanisms in rural contexts. A PPP model that is focused on funding steers clear of these problems. The government reaffirms its oversight and accountability for vital aspects, such as educational quality, equity, and administrative control. The private partner injects funds, which makes the model more feasible and acceptable.

Equity continues to be a hugely important issue, especially seeing the large gaps in education that exist between rural and urban populations as well as among disadvantaged groups. CCTs help reduce this gap directly by offering targeted monetary support to the most economically vulnerable students, helping close the rural-urban education gap and ensuring that marginalized groups, like left-behind kids and girls, receive necessary support. Using PPP funding helps make sure that the flow of money is continuous. Reducing the risk of interruptions is also essential because it can cause disproportionate harm to disadvantaged students and their overall education.

IX. Implementation with Public-Private Partnerships

In Qian County, the solution is to sustainably scale dropout prevention through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which will help with financing and implementation. PPPs should not be considered as a stand-alone alternative. Instead, they can complement the fiscal and administrative delivery of Community-Based Interventions (CBIs) and Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). With this model, local governments may allow private entities to finance the implementation of programs through capital investments, infrastructure services, or co-management regimes, while retaining power over education standards and equity goals. Under the PPP model, the overall estimated government expenditure on the implementation of CBIs and CCTs decreases due to operational efficiencies and sharing of costs. The original estimate for the total five-year discounted cost was approximately ¥10.70 million for the CBIs and ¥2.11 million for the CCTs. By using PPPs, costs are expected to be saved 20-30%, which brings the effective price of CBI to approximately ¥7.49–8.56 million (or about US\$113,000–130,000) and CCT to around ¥1.48–1.70 million (or about US\$22,500–25,700). It makes both interventions more financially viable for Qian County, results in a better allocation of resources, and increased sustainability.

A relevant precedent is Ye County in Henan Province, which launched a comprehensive education informatization strategy through a PPP model. There, a private firm invested ¥1.51 billion to build and maintain a countywide digital education system, with the government repaying costs through a ten-year, performance-based contract(中国教育网络, 2019). Ye County's case demonstrates that a properly designed PPP model can mobilize private resources to meet urgent education development goals, especially when public funding is limited. For Qian County, this experience signals the potential of using PPPs to finance CBIs and CCTs, especially in reducing upfront government expenditures while maintaining service quality.

The PPP model is expected to result in a 20–30% discount in total implementation costs for CBIs and CCTs in Qian County on a financial basis. The five-year cost of CBIs would drop from ¥13.37 million to around ¥9.36-10.70 million, and that of CCTs from ¥8.5 million to ¥5.95-6.80 million. By having government funding paid out over time and linking performance with results (i.e., fewer drop-outs), PPPs can enhance fiscal sustainability while ensuring accountability in service delivery.

However, implementation risks remain. As reviews and policy evaluations show, numerous educational public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China have focused more on infrastructure than on education service delivery. Education quality is unaffected as models like Build-Operate-Transfer restrict private participation to property management or maintenance. In Qian county, a well-designed contract should prevent this setback. At the same time, the private sector should support the logistics of the programme, e.g., digital infrastructure or a cash transfer system, without affecting pedagogy. Moreover, some investors may be deterred by legal restrictions on profit-making in compulsory education and ambiguity in asset ownership structures. Therefore, an effective oversight mechanism from the public sector, along with coordinated policy frameworks and efforts, is crucial.

Equity concerns also require attention. Looking at studies of financial aid programs in China (Wang 2015; Gong and Li 2014), the authors argue that PPP funding can unintentionally favor high-performing students if outcomes like (test) scores are used. There is a risk that students who are most likely to drop out – usually those with poorer grades or socio-emotional problems – get

left behind. Thus, it will be an effective way to ensure that private-sector efficiency does not happen at the expense of the education sector's equity.

9.1 Stakeholder Engagement and Institutional Roles

Qian County Education Bureau: The primary government body that is responsible for program management, monitoring school attendance, and making payments.

Local Government (County and Provincial Authorities): Ensures the dropout prevention and poverty alleviation programme is aligned with the national vision. It also approves of regulatory approvals of the PPP model.

Private Sector Partners: Invest through the public-private partnership (PPP) scheme and ensure the program's efficiency with technical or managerial assistance.

School Administrators & Teachers: The front-line implementers who monitor students' attendance, inform their families about the conditions of the program, and provide academic assistance to participating students.

Parents & Beneficiary Families: Responsible for ensuring that students meet attendance requirements to receive financial incentives.

Community Organizations: Help with public outreach, training for families to increase financial literacy, and advocacy to ensure people believe in the program.

To amplify the influence of strong supporters in implementing the CCT-PPP model, focus your strategic action on increasing their formal authority, access to resources, and visibility. For example, high-level policy decisions should take into account the priorities of stakeholders such as the Qian County Education Bureau and funders in the private sector. Allowing them to increase their power by granting them greater control over budgets and decisions. Also, encourage public recognition, media publicity, and other legitimization strategies to strengthen their role and motivate ongoing investment. Financial incentives and capacity-building training programs for school administrators and teachers can enhance their ability to implement and effectively advocate for the program, further strengthening their capacity.

To garner the stakeholder support needed, local community organizations that might resist because they don't want an increase in work burden, or families that might resist CCT conditions, would need to be addressed. Local fears of mismanagement can be alleviated through clear accountability measures, and local adaptation of policies (for example, gradual phase-in or piloting) can help build trust. Organizations in the community are crucial to policy implementation in China, especially grassroots governance and the delivery of social services. According to Wang and Zhu (2015), as China's social management model transforming further and further from state-centered to participatory and multi-center governance, community governance has gained prominence. Community organizations – including resident committees, NGOs, and volunteer groups – act as the eyes and ears of the government. They play a vital role by relaying information to the residents. Together with communicating policies, these organizations ensure effective implementation at the ground level. When they get involved, it makes communities more social, people more active, and

services more accessible. Furthermore, these organizations foster trust between residents and authorities by addressing local issues, mediating disputes, and engaging the public through governance. With the rising complexity of urban and rural problems, enhancing the development of community organizations is essential for the better implementation of political activities, social stability, and greater modernization of governance in China (Gong, 2018). Involving and transforming community groups (like faith-based organizations) into intermediaries between resistant groups and the government can help initiate dialogue, taking them from opposition to conditional support.

To secure the long-term viability of stakeholder support, it must be aligned with stable funding and ongoing policy support. Incorporating the CCT-PPP model into current poverty reduction and educational reforms will enhance legitimacy and durability. In addition, the program design incorporates flexibility through local implementation, which adapts to political and economic shifts, facilitating continued support and discouraging opposition from stakeholders. (Lomeli, 2008).

9.2 Resource Allocation and Financial Feasibility

A funding-based Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model can lessen the financial strain on the government by having the private sector fund portions of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) scheme. The program's key economic aspect is the conditional cash transfer (CCT) payments that families will receive in exchange for keeping their children in school. The suggested framework would grant each participating student ¥1,000 each year. This design follows that of Mo et al., so the transfer is taking place for ¥500 per semester or ¥1,000 per year. The amount was adequate for poor families to make school choices, similar to the per capita net income for rural people, ¥13,055. The estimates indicate that the program prevents approximately 529 students from dropping out each year. The annual cost of the program, which is ¥529,000, discounting for the first five years, is ¥2.65 million.

The financial sustainability of the CCT-PPP model depends on cost-sharing mechanisms and long-term private sector engagement. Drawing from the Ye County education PPP model, empirical evidence suggests that public-private collaborations can reduce government expenditure by 20–30% (河南省叶县教育局, 2019). Applying a similar framework in Qian County, the effective government expenditure is expected to fall within the range of ¥1.48 to ¥1.70 million, depending on the level of private sector cost-sharing achieved. This reduction ensures that government funds can be allocated more efficiently while maintaining program effectiveness. To maintain financial stability and secure continuous funding, additional supplementary mechanisms will be integrated into the implementation framework based on Ye County's case study:

Multi-year PPP Contracts: Private sector partners will enter into long-term agreements that outline clear financial obligations. The contracts will have financial accountability clauses, which are legally binding. Private partners will adhere to agreed-upon payment schedules.

Performance-Based Funding Agreements: To improve efficiency and accountability, the private sector will only step in when there are agreed-upon outcomes for reducing dropout rates. Annual

performance reviews would determine if the fail-dropout program functions as anticipated and whether the funding would be fully justified.

Emergency Reserve Fund: An emergency fund will be built to cover losses that the private sector cannot stand. That may happen, for example, during a recession. This fund will ensure that CCT payments will continue to be received by students even in times of funding uncertainty.

Public Communication and Social Acceptance

It is critical to implement wide publicity and social acceptance in the Qian County Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program. When families have adequate understanding of the purpose of the scheme, eligibility conditions, and payment disbursement procedures, participation rates and compliance with attendance requirements will be high. Earlier expectations (Zhou, 2016) and research from other developing regions (Khan, Hazra, Kant, & Ali, 2016) suggest that CCT programs are more effective when beneficiaries perceive them to be equitable and transparent, as this reduces skepticism and increases parents' commitment to keeping their children in school. Clear communication is required to avoid misunderstandings that can lead to children failing to enroll in school or the use of funds.

There will be a communication strategy to achieve maximum outreach for the CCT. The plan will target parents, community leaders, and school officials. The communication campaign's overall objective is to raise awareness of the benefits of CCTs (cash transfer programs) and the importance of sending children to school, while countering any misconceptions about eligibility and enforcement.

Community Engagement Campaigns:

Local village halls will host in-person meetings to explain the CCT program's objectives. Parents can ask questions, clarify issues, and understand how the program works by attending these meetings.

The parent workshops, led by the school, will focus on the importance of consistent school attendance and its impact on children's futures. Teachers and school administrators will be part of these discussions to establish the program's long-term educational value.

Public Awareness Materials:

Schools, community centers, and public offices will receive printed brochures and posters. They will explain the CCT eligibility, attendance requirements, and disbursement timelines.

Community workers will organize social media campaigns to improve visibility among young parents, who are expected to use digital platforms more. To showcase the program's success stories, short videos, infographics, and testimonials from the involved families will be shared (Li, 2024).

Addressing Concerns of Misuse:

One of the main challenges of CCT programs is that parents may not allocate the money for schooling, especially in low-income rural areas where financial constraints lead them to spend it on other things (Feng, 2015). To reduce this risk, there will be two particular ways.

Parents will need to attend introductory financial training sessions to learn how to use overhead CCT payments for their children's education. In these workshops, parents will learn budgeting techniques and how to allocate their money effectively towards school costs, such as books, uniforms, and transportation.

The primary tool for ensuring that families comply with the program conditions will be attendance checks. If a student fails to attend school regularly, parents will receive a warning notice and a notice of repeated violation. Attendance violations may lead to the suspension of payments.

9.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

It is essential to have a framework to monitor and evaluate the CCT-PPP model in Qian County, ensuring it meets its dropout prevention goals and is financially accountable and transparent (van Leeuwen, 2023). The KPIs on which the program's success will be assessed include student attendance rates, dropout reduction, financial compliance, and the program's scalability. If there is no adequate policy guidance, the PPP-funded education programmes will end up worsening the inequalities in the M&E framework. If we continue to give financial aid only to academically successful students, the goal of preventing dropout may not be fully achieved. Policymakers must be held accountable to ensure that appropriately designed safeguards are implemented in PPP initiatives that support at-risk students. Such safeguards may include targeted need-based fund allocation and mechanisms that mitigate the impact of academic performance on access based on socio-economic vulnerability. The M&E process will thus involve collecting real-time data and conducting impact assessments.

Real-Time Data Collection and Compliance Monitoring

The foundation of the monitoring process is the systematic tracking of student attendance, as CCT payments are contingent upon maintaining at least an 80% attendance rate. This will be achieved through a school-based attendance verification system, where teachers and administrators report absenteeism on a monthly basis. Attendance records will be digitally stored and cross-checked with payment disbursement schedules to ensure that only eligible students receive financial support.

To strengthen compliance enforcement, a randomized attendance audit system will be introduced. Each quarter, a select number of schools will undergo unannounced attendance verification to ensure data accuracy and prevent fraudulent claims. Additionally, parents will receive automated SMS notifications confirming payment status and reminding them of attendance conditions. Transparent enforcement mechanisms, such as conditional warnings for repeated absences, will be in place to maintain program integrity.

Periodic Impact Assessments

Beyond immediate attendance tracking, a comprehensive evaluation will be conducted at the one-year and three-year marks to measure the program's effectiveness (Shaoyang County Education Bureau, 2023). These evaluations will include:

1. Dropout Rate Reduction Analysis: Comparing annual dropout statistics pre- and post-implementation of the CCT program, using historical education data from Qian County to establish a control baseline.
2. Longitudinal Student Performance Tracking: Assessing the impact of CCT participation on students' academic progress, engagement levels, and school retention over multiple years.
3. Equity Impact Review: What difference is the programme making to ensuring effective gender and rural–urban equality, access to funds, and improved school attendance for everyone.

Conclusion

In rural areas of China, educational exclusion continues to deepen poverty and widen the urban-rural gap. In Qian County, this exclusion stems from a combination of poverty, gender norms, parental out-migration, and the presence of poorly resourced schools. The report assessed the aforementioned structural challenges and analyzed two targeted solutions: Community-Based Interventions (CBIs) and Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). Finally, it also evaluated a funding-based Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model for implementing these options.

Researchers compare the cost-effectiveness and scalability of CBIs (such as Bridge, School of Life, and Sadhana) and traditional drop-out schooling strategies. While these interventions are promising, they are costly to scale. CBIs' variants still provide reasonable cost-effectiveness in the near term. Conditional Cash Transfers are a cheap, fair, and feasible solution compared to other options. CCTs can prevent an estimated 529 dropouts over five years, at a cost of only ¥3,986 per student, as they directly tackle the economic triggers of dropping out. Most of the beneficiaries are rural girls and people from low-income families. A PPP funding mechanism strengthens long-term financial sustainability while maintaining public control.

It is proposed that the CCT program be implemented in phases with PPP funding. This mix of approaches will ensure that immediate impact is matched with fiscal prudence, which aligns with our national goal of reducing poverty. The Qian County Bureau of Education could initiate this approach by engaging with the private sector partners, ensuring targeting, and launching community awareness campaigns to improve uptake and trust.

That said, this report has limitations. The cost estimates are based on scaling assumptions from earlier pilots, although these may differ by community capacity or political will. Infrastructure, local administrative capacity, migration issues, and so on may affect implementation. Pilot tests in the field, with monitoring and evaluation built into the programme, could be done in future work. We also need more research to see how they interact with other improvements in rural places, such as digital infrastructure, early childhood education, and parent engagement.

Considering the limitations mentioned above, this report presents a realistic, evidence-based strategy to reduce the dropout rate and enhance educational equity in Qian County. By blending targeted funding with intersectoral collaborations, Qian County will help ensure that all children, regardless of income, gender, or geography, can complete a basic education.

Appendix

Appendix A - Cost Calculations for Community-Based Interventions (CBIs)

Cost Component	Calculation	Value (¥)	Source
Facility Rental			
Required Space		5,500 m ²	National Education Standard (2002)
Rental Price		¥24 per m ² /month	Qian County Education Bureau
Monthly Rental Cost	$5,500 \text{ m}^2 \times ¥24/\text{m}^2$	¥132,000	Calculated by Author
Total Five-Year Rental Cost	$¥132,000 \times 12 \text{ months} \times 5 \text{ years}$	¥7,920,000	Calculated by Author
Teacher Salaries			
Number of Full-Time Teachers		40	Qian County Education Bureau
Monthly Salary per Teacher		¥2,270	Qian County Education Bureau
Monthly Salary Expenditure	$40 \times ¥2,270$	¥90,800	Calculated by Author
Total Five-Year Salary Cost	$¥90,800 \times 12 \text{ months} \times 5 \text{ years}$	¥5,448,000	Calculated by Author
Total Cost (5 years)	$¥7,920,000 + ¥5,448,000$	¥13,368,000	Calculated by Author
Discounted Total (8% discount)	Present Value Calculation	¥10,700,000	Calculated by Author
Students Served	Assumed each student participates for 3 yrs	1,667 students	Author Assumption
Per-Student Cost (undiscounted)	$¥13,368,000 \div 1,667$	¥8,021	Calculated by Author

Per-Student Cost (discounted)	$\text{¥}10,700,000 \div 1,667$	¥6,419	Calculated by Author
Dropouts Prevented	$881 \text{ students} \times 7\text{--}12\%$	62–106 students	Zhao et al. (2017)
Cost per Dropout Prevented (undiscounted)	$\text{¥}13,368,000 \div 62\text{--}106$	¥126,132–¥215,725	Calculated by Author
Cost per Dropout Prevented (discounted)	$\text{¥}10,700,000 \div 62\text{--}106$	¥100,943–¥172,580	Calculated by Author

Appendix B - Cost Calculations for Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs)

Cost Component	Calculation	Value (¥)	Source
Annual Transfer per Student		¥1,000	Mo et al. (2011)
Students Prevented from Dropping Out Annually	Based on RCT findings	529 students	Mo et al. (2011)
Annual Program Cost	$529 \text{ students} \times \text{¥}1,000$	¥529,000	Calculated by Author
Total Cost (5 years)	$\text{¥}529,000 \times 5 \text{ years}$	¥2,645,000	Calculated by Author
Discounted Total (8% discount)	Present Value Calculation	¥2,110,000	Calculated by Author
Cost per Dropout Prevented (undiscounted)	$\text{¥}2,645,000 \div 529$	¥5,000	Calculated by Author
Cost per Dropout Prevented (discounted)	$\text{¥}2,110,000 \div 529$	¥3,986	Calculated by Author

Appendix C - Dropout Rate Reduction Calculations (CBIs)

Calculation	Formula	Value
Total Rural Students	$51,187 \times 56.6\%$	~29,000 students
Current Rural Dropout Rate		3.3%
Projected Rural Dropouts (original)	$29,000 \times 3.3\%$	957 students
Adjusted Baseline Dropout Population		881 students
Dropouts Prevented by CBIs (low)	$881 \times 7\%$	62 students
Dropouts Prevented by CBIs (high)	$881 \times 12\%$	106 students
New Dropout Count After CBIs (low estimate)	$881 - 62$	819 students
New Rural Dropout Rate (low estimate)	$819 \div 29,000$	~2.82%
New Dropout Count After CBIs (high estimate)	$881 - 106$	775 students
New Rural Dropout Rate (high estimate)	$775 \div 29,000$	~2.67%

Appendix D - Discounted Cost Calculation (8% Discount Rate)

D1 - Discounted Cost for Community-Based Interventions (CBIs)

Year	Annual Cost (¥)	Discount Factor (8%)	Present Value (¥)
1	2,674,000	0.9259	2,475,925.90
2	2,674,000	0.8573	2,292,524.20
3	2,674,000	0.7938	2,122,707.40
4	2,674,000	0.7350	1,965,469.80
5	2,674,000	0.6806	1,819,879.50
Total			10,676,506.80

D2 - Discounted Cost for Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs)

Year	Annual Cost (¥)	Discount Factor (8%)	Present Value (¥)
1	529,000	0.9259	489,814.81
2	529,000	0.8573	453,534.24
3	529,000	0.7938	419,937.26
4	529,000	0.7350	388,830.79
5	529,000	0.6806	360,028.51
Total			2,112,145.61

Appendix E - Key Stakeholders**Government Agencies**

Local government agencies are the primary stakeholders of education in Qian County. The superior administrative department of the Xianyang City Bureau of Education will give the overall policy and direction for the region. This bureau supervises the implementation of education policies in Qian County by the County Education Bureau, including attendance verification and subsidy payments. The Bureau of Finance equally manages the funds for education. This helps in the effective removal of systemic problems, such as improving the teacher-to-student ratio and enhancing the quality of infrastructure.

Schools and Families

At a general operational level, primary and middle schools serve as direct providers of education, which affects the academic performance and socialization. School administrators and teachers implement the curriculum, monitor attendance, maintain discipline, and create a supportive environment. Teachers are also a key source of academic support to students, particularly those in intervention programs. Families and caregivers must ensure that children attend school regularly and participate in the educational process, despite many economic and cultural pressures. Schools and families must work together regularly to ensure education is effective throughout the years.

Women's Federation and Village Committees

The Women's Federation and village committees are vital to overcoming socio-cultural barriers to education, especially for girls and children left behind. They work closely with state schools and agencies to run awareness campaigns, monitor dropouts, and assist economically vulnerable families as needed. Community organizations are intermediaries that advocate for the educational needs of people in the locality and what the government policy must ensure in real terms.

NGOs and Businesses

The NGOs, as well as the private sector companies, complement the education system by providing funds and other resources. Organizations like UNICEF, China Charity Foundation, and private enterprises give money, innovative educational programs, and essential materials to schools for students in Qian County. By bridging funding gaps, they can invest in aids to use the most modern and advanced teaching techniques and organize extracurricular activities for rural schools.

Private Sector Partners (PPP Context)

Actors in the private sector join in carrying out the activities through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement where they provide necessary funding, technical, and managerial support. They are significant in enabling programs to accomplish their objectives more efficiently at a lower cost to towns. The partners enter into structured, performance-based agreements to ensure that their investments lead to improvements in school attendance and dropout prevention.

Community Organizations (PPP Context)

Local community organizations are essential for outreach campaigns, family education, and advocacy. It was College Summit that offered clear transparency and financial literacy training to families on the terms and conditions of education incentives. They helped the public stay on the same page with the program. When the community is involved, the chances of successfully implementing policies increase.

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