
INCREASING THE REPRESENTATION RATE OF WOMEN IN GUATEMALA'S NATIONAL CONGRESS



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DISCLAIMER

The author conducted this study as part of the program of professional education at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia. This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree. The judgments and conclusions are solely those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Batten School, by the University of Virginia, or by any other entity.

HONOR STATEMENT

On my honor as a University of Virginia student, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.



Source of Image on Cover Page: ("Congreso de la República de Guatemala: Concluye Restauración de los Muros del Salón del Pueblo," 2014)

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ACRONYMS

DEMI	Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena/Women's Indigenous Ombudsperson
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
LEPP	Law on Elections and Political Parties
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental organization
SEPREM	Secretaría Presidencial de la Mujer/Women's Secretary of the Presidency
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNF	United Nations Foundation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNW	United Nations Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 12, 2019, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, the President of the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly, stated the following at a UN conference titled “Women In Power”:

“In the field of political participation, the figures speak for themselves: 90% of Heads of State and Government are men, as are 76% of members of parliament. The vast majority of countries have never been governed by a woman: this is the same in all regions of the world.”

“If this trend continues, reaching parity would take 107 years: in other words, more than a century. But what makes the situation even more serious is that, only 4 years ago, in 2015, the projection was that this gap would be closed in 30 years. We are clearly facing a regression...we must move from rhetoric to action, from acknowledgment to transformation” (Garcés, 2019).

The time to increase female representation in political bodies around the world is now, and it is clear that gender parity will not occur without intervention. In Guatemala, women have been systematically and culturally excluded in political bodies since the inception of their democracy in 1985. In 2019, only 13.92% of seats in the Guatemala National Congress are held by women. This report will provide a thorough evaluation of this problem and provide solutions for Girl Up to consider implementing to solve it.

First, this report defines the problem and contextualizes it by explaining the background of women’s political participation in the Guatemala government to date. Next, literature on cultural barriers, the benefits of having women serve in office, and methods of increasing representation are analyzed to uncover best practices of intervention. Then, this report presents a set of criteria that analyze the effectiveness, sustainability, feasibility, and cost of implementation of the following four alternatives: 1) Fund Expansion of UN Women, NDI, and USAID Programming; 2) Public Political Finance Sanctions for Political Parties That Do Not Nominate Women or Systematically Exclude Them; 3) Advocate for a Mandatory 30% Legislative Candidate Quota; 4) Advocate for Rotating Reserved Seats in 30% of Seats in all 22 Departments. Ultimately, this report recommends that Girl Up allocate funding and resources towards an advocacy campaign that lobbies the Guatemala government to adopt mandatory 30% legislative candidate quotas.

PROBLEM DEFINITION

Currently, only 13.92% of seats in the Guatemala National Congress are held by women, despite that women are 51.2% of the total Guatemalan population. From the first free election in the newly democratic Guatemala in 1985 to the most recent election in 2015, female representation in the Congress has had a net increase of only 7 percentage points. A patriarchal society, traditional gender roles, and institutional barriers have led to the exclusion, and subsequent low percentage, of women in the Guatemala Congress.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The following background section and literature review will contextualize the problem defined above, as well as provide empirical research on best practices for increasing women's participation in national legislatures. Specifically, this section will provide background on political representation as a human right, Guatemala's political landscape, existing gender institutions and programs in Guatemala, and cultural barriers to representation. Additionally, it will provide literature on the benefits of having women in office and different methods employed to increase female representation rates.

Political Representation as a Human Right

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states that “everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his, or her, country” (“Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 2015). Despite this universal commitment to equality in governance, nations around the globe continuously have egregious underrepresentation of women in their National Parliaments. In the last 20 years, the UN has focused on addressing the problem of female underrepresentation through resolutions, initiatives, and partnerships. Despite resolutions that implore member states to increase female representation in national parliaments to 30% in 1995 and 50% in 1990, women in most member states remain largely marginalized due to cultural and structural elements (United Nations General Assembly, 2013).

Guatemala's Political Landscape

In 1985, after three decades of military-authoritarian governments, Guatemala made the transition to become a liberal democracy. Per Guatemala's Constitution of the Republic and the Electoral and Political Parties Law (LEPP Decree 1-85), the President, Vice President, Members of the Congress, Deputies, and Mayors must be elected democratically and freely (Congreso de la República, 2007; Santa Cruz, 2016). Fair, open, and representative elections became one of

the core principles of the country. However, the past 25 years of democratization have revealed significant gaps in representation for women, minorities, and indigenous populations.

Guatemala has a unicameral National Congress with 158 members from 22 districts. Every four years, all 158 seats are open for contest in a national election. Guatemala has a proportional representation democracy with closed candidate lists meaning that the number of seats given to each political party are assigned based on the number of votes casted for that party (“Guatemala - Political and electoral system,” n.d.). The orders of the candidate lists are integral given that seats are awarded to candidates based on the order they appear on the list.

After the most recent election in 2015, only 22 women were elected to the Congress. Despite this 13.92% representation rate, women make up 51.2% of the population in Guatemala (“Guatemala,” 2014). Guatemala has one of the lowest rates of female participation in national congresses in Latin America and the Caribbean. The next election in Guatemala is in September 2019 and all 158 seats are open. As of now, 17 parties will nominate candidates to fill these seats. The only candidate requirements in Guatemala are that one must be nominated by a legally registered party and you cannot be a civil servant, member of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal—the main electoral governing body in Guatemala—or Audit office, or a government contractor (“IPU PARLINE database: GUATEMALA (Congreso de la República), General information,” 2018).

Gender Equality Institutions

The main institutions for ensuring and promoting gender equality in the country are the Presidential Secretariat for Women (SEPREM), the Women’s Specific Cabinet in the Executive, and the Women’s Indigenous Ombudsperson (DEMI). However, the institutional integrity and power of these institutions decreased significantly from 2012-2015 because of corruption scandals within the national government. As a result of this crisis, SEPREM is now elected by the president instead of the women’s groups and the Women’s Specific Cabinet was eliminated. This creates a significant gap in communication, agenda setting, and policy implementation between the government and the women’s movement (USAID, 2018).

Guatemala instated the National Policy for the Promotion and Integral Development of Women and Equal Opportunity Plan 2008-2023. This plan includes a specific section on the Socio-Political Participation of Women (Santa Cruz, 2016). Additionally, there is a permanent Committee on Women in the National Congress that legislates and advocates for gender equality in the country and in the congress. There are currently 12 members on this committee, 4 men and 8 women, and it is chaired by Ms. Ana Regina del Rosario Guzman Sanchez (“IPU PARLINE database: GUATEMALA (Congreso de la República), General information,” 2018).

However, despite the above efforts, a 2018 USAID Report stated that “Guatemalan women’s organizations have experienced little success, despite their efforts over the last 25 years to introduce affirmative actions and provisions to ensure increased women’s political participation (such as quotas and parity)” (USAID, 2018). This is largely due to the fact that ineffective institutions prevent progress on gender equality and masculine cultural norms remain ingrained in Guatemalan society.

Cultural Norms and Barriers to Female Representation


Guatemala is a traditionally patriarchal society which adversely affects female agency to participate politically. In a 2008-2009 National Child and Maternal Health study, interviewers asked Guatemalan men what aspects of daily life his wife needed to ask permission for. In total, 81.6% of men required asking permission to leave the house, 67% required asking for managing money, and 77.8% required asking for working or studying outside of the house (USAID, 2018). This creates a culture where women are subservient to men. The 2018 USAID Gender Analysis report confirmed the above cultural norms and added that in Guatemala, society does not look favorably upon women voicing their opinions due to their expected role in the household. Women are expected to be responsible for child care in the family—without childcare support, women cannot leave their families and run for office (Pande & Ford, 2011). Overall, multiple sources confirm that traditional practices limit the political participation of women (US State Department, 2016).

In addition to oppressive cultural norms, women in Guatemala also face barriers to participating politically such as illiteracy, gender-based violence (GBV), lack of role models, and societal taste discrimination in favor of men. Guatemala has the third highest rate of GBV with a femicide rate of 2.5 per 100,000 women. Approximately 19.2% of women aged 15-49 report that they have experienced some sort of physical GBV (USAID, 2018). Women who participate in political campaigns may be more likely to face episodes of GBV thereby discouraging them from running. Additionally, 48% of indigenous women and 19% of non-indigenous women are illiterate which impact their abilities to create campaign materials and craft legislation (“Guatemala,” 2014). Third, the role model effect found that because women have a lack of female predecessors in Guatemala, they are less likely to have the aspiration to run for office (Pande & Ford, 2011). Finally, Kelley and McAllister (1984), and Beaman et al. (2009) both found that taste discrimination in predominately patriarchal societies prevents societies from voting women into office. Simply put, Guatemalan citizens prefer men in office more so than women (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009; Kelly & Mcallister, 1984). Overall, the main factors contributing to the underrepresentation of women in Guatemala include lack of financial resources, lack of inclusive political environment, gender roles, and patriarchal political parties ((Santa Cruz, 2016; Vasquez, Nuñez, Monzon, & Silvia, 2013)

In the 35 years that Guatemala has been a liberal democracy, there have been no significant changes in the number of women serving in the National Congress. Between 1985 and 2015, female representation had a net increase of only 7 percentage points—the number of women serving has never exceeded 22. See Figure One for the total number of men and women in the Guatemala National Congress from 1985-2015.

Figure One

Total Number of Men and Women in the Guatemala National Congress 1985-2015



(Santa Cruz, 2016)

Previously Implemented Programs in Guatemala

First, Guatemala does not have any constitutional or electoral laws, or other measures to mandate the political participation of women. To counter this fact, many international organizations partner with Guatemalan locals to implement programming and increase the political representation of women during election cycles. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) ran election observations in the 2015 elections to ensure that there was no misuse, mistreatment, or

discrimination (National Democratic Institute (NDI), 2016). Additionally, they, alongside UN Women, published 101 Tips for Female Candidates and their Campaign Teams (UN Women, 2011). The government of Spain financed the Instituto Autonomo para la Formacion Politica de Las Mujeres Indigenas Training Program which worked with indigenous women to build political strategy, increase communication skills, and record TV spots for their campaigns (UN Women, 2011). UN Women launched the “Free and Informed Participation” program which sponsored radio spots in 5 of the indigenous Guatemalan languages to make women aware of their right to vote and their right to political participation (UN Women, 2011). USAID implemented democracy strengthening programs and preventative gender-based violence programs to ensure the viability of elections and expand the opportunity for women to participate (“Citizen Security | Guatemala | U.S. Agency for International Development,” 2018). These programs, while effective in the short term during election cycles, do not contribute to the long term increase of female representation because they do not target cultural norms or institutional barriers.

General Benefits of Increasing Female Representation

There are a multitude of studies that confirm various benefits of female representation in parliaments. Overall, these studies conclude that female representation is effective, efficient, and increases the presence of policies relating to women and families. Asiedu, Branstette, Gaekwad-Babulal, and Malokele found robust results that a higher share of women in developing countries’ parliaments are more likely to pass comprehensive laws on sexual harassment, rape, divorce and domestic violence (Asiedu, Branstette, Gaekwad-Babulal, & Malokele, 2016). A case study in Norway regarding the increase of women in municipal councils found that there was a direct causal relationship between the presence of women and an increased childcare coverage (UN Women, 2013). Wolbrecht & Campbell (2017) concluded that women aged 18-29 became significantly more likely to discuss politics in the U.S. with the presence of a viable female candidate (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2017). Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) also found that there is a significant positive relationship between having visible female politicians in office and inspiring adolescent girls to engage politically (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006). This proves that a role model effect fosters a future generation of female leaders. Finally, a case study in India found that female-led panchayats (local councils) had 62% more drinking water projects than similar male-led panchayats (UN Women, 2013). Women are both empirically and anecdotally proven to make legislating a more representative process.

Methods for Increasing Representation

The following section will outline three common methods for increasing women’s political representation in national legislatures: quotas, programming, and political finance sanctions.

Quotas

Worldwide, quotas are the most commonly implemented method to increase the representation rate of women. More than half of the countries in the world have implemented either volunteer party quotas (parties choose a percentage of women nominated), legislative candidate quotas (required by law), or reserved seats quotas (seats where only women can run). A study that looked at data from 126 countries concluded that candidate quotas and reserved seats have a significant positive effect on increasing female representation (Pande & Ford, 2011). However, Guatemala is one of three Central and South American countries that does not have mandatory candidate quotas for its national legislature (See Appendix A).

The United Nations General Assembly concluded that “30% women in parliament [is] the critical mass that countries needed for women to have a visible impact on the style and content of politics and policy” (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). Paxton and Hughes (2015) also find that as the quota threshold is increased by 10%, there is a 4.4% increase in women with a reserved seat quota and a 2.7% increase in women with a legislative candidate quota. Additionally, countries with proportional representation electoral systems, such as Guatemala, are proven to have a more successful outcome with implementing quotas (McAllister & Studlar, 2002).

A randomized natural study regarding quotas in India highlighted some of the benefits of quotas. Not only did the authors find that female leadership and influence over policies increased, but they also found that quotas reduced gender discrimination in the long term (Pande & Ford, 2011). Additionally, Bhavnani (2009) found that when reserved seats were implemented in India inherently reducing male-female competition, the number of women running increased 10-fold. When that reserved seat rotated in the next election cycle and anyone was free to run for the seat, not just women, there was a 7.4% increase in women candidates from the previous cycle (Bhavnani, 2009).

Quotas increase representation in the short term, and also create sustainable change in equality in the long term. One of the largest criticisms of quotas, however, is that they may crowd out other minority or excluded groups whom do not have the same quotas (Pande & Ford, 2011). Additionally, more research is needed to understand the implications that implementing quotas would have on Guatemalans. Guatemala has unsuccessfully attempted to pass quotas on a few different occasions since 1985 including 1997, 1998, and 2012. While there is not an exact reason as to why Guatemala has not implemented quotas yet, most attribute it to a lack of stability in government institutions during the attempted adoptions, the persistent cultural perceptions of women, and that quotas were not as common in Latin America as they are today when the adoption attempts occurred.

Successful Programs

One of UN Women's core missions is increasing women's political and citizen participation worldwide. They implement supplemental programming during election cycles to ensure that women have equal opportunity to political representation. The following are case studies where UN Women programming was effective at increasing female representation (UN Women, 2013):

- Kenya: In the 2013 elections, UN Women trained women and ran multiple campaigns to advocate for women in leadership. The number of female legislators increased to 20% which is more than double the previous election.
- Zimbabwe: In the 2013 elections, UN Women sponsored a constitutional gender equality lobbying group of activists, politicians, and scholars to advocate for women. In this election, women filled 35% of seats.
- Rwanda: In the 2018 elections, Rwanda became the top country for female representation with 61% of the seats held by women. UN Women advocated for the 30% candidate quota, and implemented leadership and public speaking training programs for women.

Additionally, directly recruiting women is proven to increase political ambition among women, ultimately encouraging them to run for public office (Karpowitz, Monson, & Preece, 2017; Lawless & Fox, 2010). Programs run by UN Women and the National Democratic Institute focus on increasing the confidence, ability, and ambition of women in Guatemala to engage in national politics and run for the National Congress.

The National Democratic Institute's main mission is to establish fair, free, and representative elections in countries around the world. In Guatemala, they implemented a program in 2015 in coordination with the UN that trained 25 women candidates and newly elected women. This program eventually became the basis for the Multiparty Forum of Women Parliamentarians in the Congress. The 21 forum members helped to establish similar forums in Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay by meeting with women representatives from these countries with NDI support ("Multiparty Forum of Women Members of Congress Strengthens Women's Political Participation in Guatemala," 2017).

Political Finance Reforms

In the UNGA report assessing the progress on Resolution 66/130, (member states must increase female representation) political finance reforms were increasingly popular. Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Ireland, and Mexico all linked public political funding to the promotion of increasing female representation (United Nations General Assembly, 2013). In 2019, around 30 countries have implemented some form of provision for gender equality tied to public political financing (Ohman, 2018). There are many different forms of public political finance provisions such as conditional financing (if parties nominate a certain percent of women, they receive funds in

proportion to that percent) or sanction financing (if parties do not nominate women, they have a portion of their public funds withheld) (Cigane & Ohman, 2014). While these policies on the surface seem promising, more empirical research is needed to assess its strength and validity. Due to the small number of countries implementing these financing stipulations and the lack of long-term data on these countries, results have been inconclusive (Cigane & Ohman, 2014).

METHODOLOGY

As presented in the above background and literature review, women are underrepresented in the Guatemala National Congress due to a variety of institutional and cultural barriers. The remainder of this report will present four possible alternatives for Girl Up to consider implementing to solve this problem. Each alternative is evaluated using a set of criteria that analyze the effectiveness, sustainability, feasibility, and cost of implementation. After evaluating each alternative and weighing the tradeoffs, a recommendation and implementation plan is provided.

EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

The following evaluative criteria will be used to assess the tradeoffs between the proposed alternatives:

1. Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected
2. Sustainability
3. Feasibility of Implementation
4. Cost

Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected

Given that improving the representation for women in Guatemala is one of Girl Up's core principles, this report will measure the number of women that have the potential to be elected with each alternative. An ideal alternative will maximize the number of women and girls reached and be able to increase their likelihood of participating politically. Additionally, it will target women all across Guatemala, including those in indigenous and rural areas. In order to make accurate predictions, this report will use effectiveness rates, measures from empirical studies, and historical precedents from programming that has already been implemented. After assessing the outcomes, each alternative will receive a "highly effective (5), moderately effective (3), or less effective (1)" label in order to compare the tradeoffs between each option. Because this criterion is important to Girl Up, effectiveness will comprise 30% of each alternative's total score.

Sustainability

It is important for Girl Up to invest in an alternative that will continue to support, inspire, and increase female representatives in Guatemala outside of election years. Currently, the main programs being implemented are temporary and only occur during election cycles. While these programs can be effective in the short term, an ideal policy will function in the long term to maximize investments, continue to shape women and girls of the future, and withstand any future political environment changes. After assessing the outcomes, each alternative will receive a “short term (1)” or “long term (5)” label as to whether it will be sustainable. Because investing in a long-term solution is important to Guatemala, sustainability will comprise 30% of each alternative’s total score.

Feasibility of Implementation

Feasibility of implementation will consider political feasibility, cultural feasibility, and public opinion. Because these alternatives are attempting to target deeply ingrained cultural norms and legal institutions, it is important to assess if it is possible for each alternative to be implemented into Guatemalan society. Girl Up should not invest in an option that will not be feasible as to avoid wasting limited resources and funds. While assessing the outcomes, each alternative will receive a “high (5), moderate (3), or low (1)” for feasibility of implementation. Because investing resources in an alternative that will actually be implemented is important to Girl Up, feasibility of implementation will comprise 30% of each alternative’s total score.

Cost

Cost is defined as the amount of money that Girl Up would need to invest into the alternative to fund or advocate for the implementation of it. Since fundraising for the implementation of policies is Girl Up’s core purpose, an ideal policy will minimize the cost of advocating for and funding the alternative. In order to make cost predictions, this report will use pricing from similar programs implemented in Guatemala or other countries, as well as consider the scale of the implementation of the alternative. While assessing the outcomes, each alternative will receive a “high (1), moderate (3), or low cost (5)” label in order to compare the tradeoffs between each option. Because Girl Up has a set budget for Guatemala programming, however, the cost of advocacy is less important to consider in this evaluation. Girl Up has the flexibility to fund as much or as little as its budget allows. Additionally, other UN agencies, USAID, and NDI, which have larger budgets, will be able to partner with Girl Up to help implement these alternatives regardless of cost. Due to these reasons, cost will comprise 10% of each alternative’s total score.

ALTERNATIVES

Girl Up should consider the following policy alternatives given the current and historical context of female representation in the Guatemala National Congress:

1. Fund Expansion of UN Women, NDI, and USAID Programming
2. Advocate for Public Political Finance Sanctions for Political Parties That Do Not Nominate Women or Systematically Exclude Them
3. Advocate for a Mandatory 30% Legislative Candidate Quota
4. Advocate for Rotating Reserved Seats in 30% of Seats in all 22 Departments

Alternative One: Fund Expansion of UN Women, NDI, and USAID Programming

This alternative proposes to increase funding and advocacy for an expansion of current UN Women, NDI, and USAID programming in Guatemala. These programs have proven to be effective at increasing women's engagement with national politics in Guatemala so far, so expanding these programs in Guatemala would likely be an effective option. Currently, the UN, NDI, and USAID all sponsor election programs that target underrepresented female populations in indigenous and rural areas. These programs train women to have the skills to run for election, provide them with tips to run a strong campaign, and monitor elections to ensure legitimacy and fairness in the process.

Each of these actors have a very strong relationship with the Guatemala government and are respected in the country for their current programs. The most effective and popular programming are Más Mujeres Mejor Política (More Women, Better Policy), Instituto Autonomo para la Formacion Politica de Las Mujeres Indigenas Training Program, and election monitoring efforts to ensure fair and free elections. This alternative would propose to increase funding to these important initiatives and expand them to target more women throughout the country.

Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected

Girl Up is supporting the UN, NDI, and USAID by providing funds towards programs that are currently being implemented in Guatemala. These programs have a variety of purposes such as election monitoring, training indigenous women to have the skills to run for office, and advocating the government to make changes to the electoral system. While these programs are highly effective at providing stability to the election process, the work they do to help women have the skills and opportunity to run for Congress currently only targets a small population of women in rural and indigenous communities. The total number of women who are reached by these programs is not widely available, however based on evaluation reports from a few programs, we can assume that the majority of the programs are only reaching about 40-60 women each. Expanding funding would help to reach more women in rural and indigenous communities, but would not reach women country-wide.

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **moderately effective.**

Sustainability

While there are a couple of programs that work with the government to create long-term change, the majority of programs are only implemented when there is an upcoming election. The existing programs largely focus on providing women with the skills to run for an election and monitoring the electoral process. While important for the short-term, these programs do not create lasting, long term change. It is important for Girl Up to invest in an alternative that will create long term change because it cannot sustain continuously funding short-term programs.

Because expanding funding for this would only expand short-term programming that appears during the election cycle, this alternative is labeled **short term sustainability.**

Feasibility of Implementation

Because this alternative is already being implemented on a lesser funding scale, the feasibility of implementing an increase in funding towards successful UN Women, NDI, and USAID programming is likely to be high. However, given that Girl Up has a limited budget to allocate towards programming, it could require funding to be cut from other programs. This reallocation of funds could be difficult to implement depending on the stakeholders involved, the programs receiving the cut in funding, and the priorities of Girl Up.

Given the status quo nature of this alternative and the reallocation of funding, this alternative is labeled **moderate feasibility of implementation.**

Cost

In 2013, UN Women's Program Expenditures totaled \$264 million. About 9.4% of this was invested directly into the Latin American and Caribbean region (Geut, 2015). Based on tax forms from 2017, the UN Foundation (of which Girl Up is a campaign) invested a total of \$186,783 into Women and Population programming in Central America and the Caribbean (*UN Foundation Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax*, 2017). Specific costs for Guatemala programming were not readily available. The UN Foundation is just one funding source for programming in Guatemala. When considering the amount invested by UN Women, UN Foundation, UNICEF, NDI, USAID, and more in election programming, it is projected that the cost of this option will near \$500,000-\$1,000,000. Since 2010, Girl Up has only raised \$5,600,000 for UN programming in Liberia, Guatemala, Ethiopia, and Malawi for education, health, safety, representation, and leadership ("Financials," 2019). This option is projected to be outside of the scope of

Girl Up's funding capacity because it has to invest its limited budget in several different countries for several different focuses.

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **high cost**.

Alternative Two: Advocate for Public Political Finance Sanctions for Political Parties That Do Not Nominate Women or Systematically Exclude Them

This alternative proposes to advocate for the government to place funding sanctions on political parties that either do not nominate women to their candidate lists in general, or place female candidates at the bottom of the nomination lists making their chances of being elected small. The Guatemala political party system is viewed as one of the most unstable in Latin America due to their "high electoral volatility, low degree of institutionalization and high levels of fragmentation" (Santa Cruz, 2016). They rarely are representative of the population as a whole and are traditionally very patriarchal (Loaiza, Ochaeta, & Sociales (Guatemala), 2008; Vasquez et al., 2013). Additionally, parties do not have mandatory gender quotas, although a couple have implemented voluntary quotas. Women remain underrepresented in political parties therefore making the "supply" of women into national politics scarce. This alternative would propose denying access to public financing for political parties that do not nominate female candidates. This option does not impose a mandatory quota, but incentivizes political parties to implement voluntary quotas in order to receive their public campaign funds.

Additionally, in Guatemala, a small number of people within the political parties have the sole power of determining the physical order of who is on their nomination lists. Women, if the parties nominate them at all, are typically placed at the bottom of these lists making their chances of being elected smaller than if they were placed at the top. This alternative suggests reprimanding parties who participate in such behavior by placing limits on the funds they receive from public political financing. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Italy, and Ireland all have similar sanctions in place to motivate political parties to increase the nomination of female candidates (Cigane & Ohman, 2014).

Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected

As of 2018, around 30 countries have public political party financing tied to gender equity. A report from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance stated that there are three main determinants for the effectiveness of public political financing sanctions on gender equity: 1) party dependency on public funding 2) strength of connection between public funding and gender equality, and 3) party perception of societal views on gender equality (Ohman, 2018). In Guatemala, political parties receive money from the government at a rate of 2 quetzals per vote (\$0.26 USD) to finance items such as postal and telecommunications services for either campaign or ordinary operation purposes (Lopez-Pintor & Fischer, 2005). Despite this public financing, most parties in

Guatemala rely heavily on private financing which decreases the effectiveness of withholding public money to improve gender rates. Additionally, because Guatemalan culture does not encourage women to run as candidates, most parties do not perceive gender equality as a priority. Given these reasons, Guatemala fails to satisfy the three main determinants of effectiveness.

Additionally, in the 30 countries that have implemented public financing stipulations on political parties for gender equality, the results have been inconclusive due to lack of patterns and data (Cigane & Ohman, 2014). However, when the French government mandated that all political parties must have 50% of their candidates be women or face political sanctions, the following election they raised their representation rate to 47.5% women (Cigane & Ohman, 2014).

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **less effective.**

Sustainability

Because this option would create an incentive for political parties to change their current behavior and add women to their candidate lists for every election, this alternative is likely to be long-term. Additionally, Congress would have to pass a law to implement political finance reform therefore making it harder to undo if passed.

Given these reasons, this alternative is labeled as **long-term sustainability.**

Feasibility of Implementation

Guatemala just recently passed in 2016 a reform to the Law on Elections and Political Parties (LEPP) that governs the way elections, campaigns, and political financing are run in the country. It took the Congress three attempts over the course of twenty years to finally pass this legislation (“Historic Reform Is A Big Step Forward for Guatemalan Democracy,” 2016). This alternative would require an alteration to the LEPP, which is unlikely to occur given the widespread debate and arduous process that it took to pass the 2016 version. Therefore, implementing this law would prove incredibly difficult.

Given the recent passage of the LEPP and the lack of consensus among politicians on political financing and gender equity, this alternative is labeled **low feasibility of implementation.**

Cost

Given that this alternative proposes an advocacy campaign, its costs will be generally very low. Girl Up will serve as a leader in rallying organizations to support this alternative, but they will not be responsible for much of the costs associated with

advocacy. Girl Up will have to provide funds for non-volunteer personnel, education materials, and marketing. These costs are typical to their existing advocacy campaigns and were not concluded during analysis to be outside of the scope of Girl Up's capabilities. Because this is an advocacy campaign, Girl Up has the freedom to choose the amount that they invest.

For the above reasons, this alternative is labeled *low cost*.

Alternative Three: Advocate for a Mandatory 30% Legislative Candidate Quota

This alternative proposes for Girl Up to advocate and lobby for the Guatemalan government to implement a mandatory 30% legislative candidate quota for political parties. This means that each political party's candidate list must be filled with at least 30% women in order to increase the likelihood of getting elected. Because Guatemala is a closed-list, proportional representation democracy, each party receives a certain number of seats based on the number of votes they receive. If women are more represented on these lists, the representation rate will increase.

The first gender quotas were implemented in the Nordic countries in the 1970s to increase descriptive representation of women in elected offices and were largely viewed as a success. Countries in Latin America began implementing quota systems in the 1990s. Currently, every country in Central and South America have implemented legislative candidate quotas except for Guatemala, Belize, and Suriname as can be seen in Appendix A ("Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA," 2019). While two political parties have implemented voluntary quotas that require a certain percentage of women to be included on the nomination lists—National Unity of Hope Party: 40% in the lists; Unidad Revolucionaria Guatemalteca: 30% in the lists (Santa Cruz, 2016), most political parties do not nominate a representative number of women.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) reports that in 2015, 58 countries held parliamentary elections. Of these 58 countries, 28 had some form of electoral gender quota and 30 did not have any form of gender quota. In the 28 countries that had quotas, women, on average, held 28.3% of seats whereas in the countries without quotas, women held, on average, 13.5% of seats (Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2016). Historically and empirically, quotas are a proven mechanism at increasing gender parity (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). Currently, Guatemala lags behind the rest of the Latin American countries by not having any sort of legal quota.

Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected

Because this option would make it mandatory for parties to fill at least 30% of their candidate lists with women candidates, this option makes it more plausible that a woman is elected. While it is not ensuring with certainty that the seat will go to a woman as reserved seats do, it is ensuring that the pipeline is expanded to include 30% women. In a study that analyzed the growth of women's political representation at the national level in

145 countries from 1990 to 2010, it was found that quotas in general are highly effective at changing the gender composition of national legislatures (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). Specifically, although mandatory candidate quotas were not as effective when first implemented, by 2010, countries with candidate quotas had, on average, 8.5% more women serving in politics than countries without quotas (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). While there is a delay in effectiveness upon implementation due to cultural and party adjustments, candidate quotas are deemed effective.

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled *moderately effective*.

Sustainability

This alternative would require the Congress to pass a law mandating the 30% legislative candidate quota. Because this law would make a permanent adjustment to the political process of electing women, it is likely that it would be sustainable in the long term in the event of government instability. Additionally, this alternative, while proven to be less effective in the short term, operates quite successfully in the long term (Paxton & Hughes, 2015).

Given the permanent nature of a 30% legislative candidate quota, this alternative is labeled *long term sustainability*.

Feasibility of Implementation

As can be seen in Appendix A, Guatemala is one of the only countries in Latin America that has not implemented a 30% Legislative Candidate Quota. Because of this, they are facing pressure from the international community, from other Latin American countries, and from citizens in Guatemala to implement this quota. A study analyzed the public opinion of Guatemalans regarding the implementation of quotas in 2012. The study added the following question to the Latin American Public Opinion Project survey, which is conducted in 24 Latin American countries including Guatemala: “The state should require political parties to reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men.” The respondents were to rank their answers on a scale of 1 to 7 (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). In Guatemala, approximately 80% of respondents answered 4 or more with the average answer being 4.56 (Barnes & Córdova, 2016). Based on this measure of public opinion, implementing a legislative candidate gender quota would be received as a positive step towards gender equity. Since, the “popular mobilization” of women has been proven a necessity for implementing the adoption of quotas (Baldez, 2004), the feasibility of this alternative from a public opinion perspective is high.

From a political feasibility perspective, this alternative is moderately feasible given that it would require Congress to pass a law. The Guatemalan Congress has made multiple attempts from 1995 to most recently in 2016 to implement legislative candidate quotas. In 2016, an initial draft of a law passed by Congress included a gender quota, however it was taken out in the final draft (“Historic Reform Is A Big Step Forward for Guatemalan Democracy,” 2016). However, given that Guatemala is now one of the only countries in Latin America without a quota, we can assume that this law would garner more public and legislative support in 2019.

Given the positive public opinion and moderate political feasibility, this alternative is labeled **high feasibility of implementation.**

Cost

Because this alternative is proposing an advocacy campaign to lobby the Guatemala government, it is projected to have relatively low costs. Similar to options two and four, this alternative would require Girl Up to invest funding in non-volunteer personnel, education materials, and marketing, but would be able to rely heavily on unpaid volunteers already working in Guatemala. Girl Up would have the freedom to choose the amount it would like to invest in this advocacy campaign.


Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **low cost.**

Alternative Four: Rotating Reserved Seats in 30% of Seats in all 22 Departments

This alternative proposes an advocacy campaign to lobby the government to adopt rotating reserved seats. This means that in every election, 30% of seats in all 22 of the departments will be reserved for women candidates. Similar to the India model, these seats would rotate between departments every election in order to reach women in all parts of Guatemala. Currently, there is a wide disparity between the number of women elected from each department. Thirty-three women have been elected as a part of the national list, however the departments that have elected the most women are Central, Guatemala, and Huehuetenango as viewed in Figure Two.

Figure Two

Total Number of Women Elected to the National Congress By Department from 1985-2015



(Santa Cruz, 2016)

Implementing rotating reserved seats would equalize the disparity across districts and include women in Congress from all over Guatemala. Additionally, this would increase the number of female representatives by mandate. Jordan, Uganda, Rwanda, and India all use a similar model to elect their representatives (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2009).

Haiti is the only country in Latin America that has implemented reserved seats. While this form of quota is not as common in Latin America, it is very effective in Asia and Africa where approximately 20 countries have reserved seats implemented (“Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA,” 2019).

Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected

Reserved and rotating seats would require that 30% of seats in all 22 departments are allocated to women. Due to the mandatory nature of this alternative, this option is the most effective at increasing the representation rate of women. Unlike legislative candidate quotas, reserved seats ensure that women are elected by excluding men from running for the seat. In the study listed above that analyzed the growth of women representation rates in national legislatures in 145 countries from 1995-2010, the most effective quota method at reaching representation rate goals is reserved seats. The authors state that “reserved seats are always effective at increasing women’s numbers, in any

time period” (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). Further, they find that a country that has reserved seats, on average, has 9% more women politicians than countries without a quota. Unlike candidate quotas, there is no implementation lag. Countries that implement reserved seats have immediate and effective outcomes.

Additionally, by adding the rotating component of this alternative, it ensures that women from all of the 22 departments will have an opportunity to be elected. In a study about rotating reserved seats in India, there was a 7.4% increase in women candidates from the previous cycle in seats that had been previously reserved for women, but were now open to all (Pande & Ford, 2011).

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **highly effective**.

Sustainability

Reserved and rotating congressional seats would offer a permanent solution to the underrepresentation of women in the Congress. Due to the proven effects of increasing the number of women candidates who run for seats in an election cycle after that seat was reserved, this is a sustainable alternative. Additionally, because this alternative would require Congress to pass a law to implement it, the reserved and rotating seats would be a permanent component of election cycles regardless of the stability of the government at the time.

Because of the permanence in increasing the rate of women representatives, this alternative is labeled **long term sustainability**.

Feasibility of Implementation

While reserved seats are very popular in Africa and Asia, the only country in Latin America that has reserved seats is Haiti (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2019). Given the uncommon adoption of reserved seats in Latin America, it is assumed that this alternative may not have the same widespread support that legislative candidate quotas do. A smaller portion of the public will likely see this as the most preferable solution.

For political feasibility, this alternative would require Congress to pass a law mandating the 30% reserved and rotating seats. This may prove difficult for the Congress and create more debate because this is a more direct and intrusive solution to the gender norms and inequity in the Congress. Given the historical difficulty of passing legislative candidate quotas, it is assumed that reserved seats will face more opposition because they are mandating specific seats and not just candidate lists.

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **low feasibility of implementation.**

Cost

Similar to alternatives two and three, since this alternative proposes that Girl Up launch an advocacy campaign, it is relatively low cost. Girl Up has a strong presence of unpaid volunteer advocates in Guatemala that it can rely on for this advocacy campaign. These volunteers will be able to conduct conversations with government officials and disseminate materials about rotating and reserved seats. Girl Up will have to provide funds for non-volunteer personnel, education materials, and marketing, however they have the freedom to choose how much they would like to invest in this campaign.

Given the reasons above, this alternative is labeled **low cost.**

OUTCOMES MATRIX

	Effectiveness: Number of Women Potentially Elected	Sustainability	Feasibility of Implementation	Cost	Total
	30%	30%	30%	10%	
Alternative One: Expand Funding For UN Women, NDI, USAID Programming	Moderately Effective $3 * .3 = .9$	Short Term Sustainability $1 * .3 = .3$	Moderate Feasibility $3 * .3 = .9$	High $1 * .1 = .1$	2.2
Alternative Two: Public Political Funding Sanctions	Less Effective $1 * .3 = .3$	Long Term Sustainability $5 * .3 = 1.5$	Low Feasibility $1 * .3 = .3$	Low $5 * .1 = .5$	2.6
Alternative Three: 30% Legislative Candidate Quota	Moderately Effective $3 * .3 = .9$	Long Term Sustainability $5 * .3 = 1.5$	High Feasibility $5 * .3 = 1.5$	Low $5 * .1 = .5$	4.4
Alternative Four: 30% Rotating and Reserved Seats	Highly Effective $5 * .3 = 1.5$	Long Term Sustainability $5 * .3 = 1.5$	Low Feasibility $1 * .3 = .3$	Low $5 * .1 = .5$	3.8

RECOMMENDATION

Given the four alternatives above and the evaluation of tradeoffs, it is recommended that you implement Alternative Three: Advocate for a Mandatory 30% Legislative Candidate Quota. Legislative candidate quotas are proven to be effective at increasing the representation rates of women in national legislatures, are highly feasible to implement, and have long-term benefits for gender equity in Guatemala. Therefore, Girl Up should advocate and fund efforts for the government to pass legislation that institutes this 30% legislative candidate quota.

Although increasing funding for existing UN Women, NDI, and USAID programs is moderately feasible and moderately effective considering these programs have been deemed a success, this option was ultimately ruled out due to its short-term nature and high costs. Girl Up should invest in an option that is going to be effective not just in the short-term, but also have ensured lasting effects in the long-term. Additionally, because this programming is already being implemented with copious funding from other governments, the U.S. government, and NGOs, it is recommended that Girl Up focus its advocacy efforts and funding on lobbying the government to adopt 30% candidate quotas. Girl Up has a smaller budget, so having to sustain funding for these programs every election cycle would require reallocation of funds away from other important programming.

Public political funding sanctions have low cost and long term sustainability due to the permanent change in political party guidelines, however this alternative was ultimately ruled out because it is less effective and has low feasibility of implementation. Due to the inconclusive results in other countries that have implemented public financing sanctions on political parties, it is recommended that funds are allocated elsewhere. Additionally, it is important for Girl Up to invest in an alternative that will be feasible to implement. Given the recent passage of the LEPP in 2016 and the reliance of political parties on private funders, this option is not the best use of Girl Up advocacy and funding resources.

Reserved and rotating seats scored the second highest when evaluating the alternatives using the criteria. While reserved and rotating seats in all 22 departments is the most effective option, has long term sustainability, and is of low costs, it was ultimately not recommended because of its low feasibility. If reserved and rotating seats were more common in Guatemala and if cultural barriers to women were not as severe, then this alternative would be the best to advocate for. However, because legislative candidate quotas are perceived as the most common quota in Latin America for gender equity and Haiti is the only country with reserved seats, legislative candidate quotas were chosen for Girl Up to implement over reserved seats. In the future, given fewer cultural barriers, Girl Up might consider advocating for reserved seats because they are a proven method of improving representation rates of women.

Girl Up should invest funding and advocacy resources towards lobbying the Guatemala government to implement 30% legislative candidate quotas because of its proven effectiveness, high feasibility, long-term sustainability, and low costs. The low representation rate of women in the Congress is a solvable problem that other countries in Latin America have addressed through legislative candidate quotas. This option will be successful because it expands the pipeline of female candidates with the opportunity of being elected. Additionally, Guatemala has been facing increasing pressure from international organizations, like the UN, and other Latin American countries to implement this quota. Finally, given the upcoming elections in Guatemala in September 2019, the time to invest funds and resources into advocacy initiatives is now. While this quota will not be implemented in time for the 2019 elections, conversations regarding methods of increasing the female representation rates are happening within the country. Depending on the outcomes of the election, it could be the perfect time for Girl Up to launch an initiative for the newly elected Congress to pass legislation instituting a 30% legislative candidate quota.

IMPLEMENTATION

In order to implement the chosen alternative, Girl Up will need to launch an advocacy campaign with the goal of lobbying the Guatemala National Congress to adopt 30% legislative candidate quotas. This campaign will require funding, personnel, education materials to distribute, and marketing. In past programming implemented in Girl Up's focus countries, partnerships with UN agencies such as UNICEF, UN Women, UNESCO, and WHO have been absolutely crucial in achieving success ("Our Approach," 2019). Girl Up will lead this advocacy campaign, but also encourage these UN agencies to support the campaign.

In 2017, Girl Up successfully lobbied the Guatemalan Congress to adopt legislation that raised the legal age of marriage from 14 years old to 18 years old due to Guatemala's high rates of child marriage ("Our Success," 2019). Because this legislation was adopted recently, Girl Up still has access to the members of Congress and the advocates on the ground in Guatemala that helped this success to occur. When implementing this alternative, Girl Up should rely on these preexisting relationships and launch a very similar lobbying effort. There is a strong network of girls and women in Guatemala who volunteer to advocate for Girl Up, so they will be able to assist in launching this implementation strategy.

Finally, when specifying to the Guatemala Congress what this legislative candidate quota should entail, Girl Up should ensure that placement mandates are adopted alongside the 30% quota. Placement mandates are used in proportional representation countries with legislative candidate quotas to avoid parties simply placing women at the bottom of the list where they will never be elected. Examples of placement quotas are "women must be placed on at least every fifth place on candidate lists," such as in Paraguay, or a zipper system where "lists are required to alternate between men and women," such as in Tunisia (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). A placement mandate

should absolutely be included in the quota legislation because they are proven to help increase the success rate of the quota (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). When Costa Rica implemented their 40% legislative candidate quota in 1996, they did so without placement mandates. During the following election cycle, the quota only produced a 19% representation rate. However, once they implemented a placement mandate, the representation rate for women increased to 35% (Paxton & Hughes, 2015). Placement mandates are an effective way of ensuring that the implementation of quotas by political parties is not left open to interpretation by each party. In order to have the best chance at increasing the representation rate of women in the Congress, Guatemala should pass the 30% legislative candidate quota with a placement mandate.

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Gender Quotas in Latin America: 2019



Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). (2009).
Gender Quotas | International IDEA.

Quota Data By Country

Country	Is There a Gender Quota?	Quota Type
Antigua and Barbuda	No	
Argentina	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Bahamas	No	
Barbados	No	
Belize	No	
Bolivia	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Brazil	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Chile	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Colombia	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Costa Rica	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Cuba	No	
Dominica	No	
Dominican Republic	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Ecuador	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
El Salvador	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Grenada	No	
Guatemala	No	
Guyana	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Haiti	Yes	Reserved seats
Honduras	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Jamaica	No	
Mexico	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Nicaragua	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Panama	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Paraguay	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Peru	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Saint Kitts and Nevis	No	
Saint Lucia	No	
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines	No	
Suriname	No	
Trinidad and Tobago	No	
Uruguay	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas
Venezuela	Yes	Legislative Candidate Quotas

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). (2009).
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