



PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

COUNTERING SWEDISH GANG VIOLENCE

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Client Overview

In 2022, the Center on Policing merged with the Miller Center on Community Protection and Resilience at Rutgers University–New Brunswick to form a new joint organization: the Miller Center on Policing and Community Resilience. The organization seeks to enhance the safety and standing of vulnerable communities worldwide through initiatives that help improve their relationships with law enforcement, government agencies, and other marginalized communities. Initiatives under the Miller Center integrate researched and evidence-based best practices, including but not limited to community policing, violence reduction efforts, and training workshops. As noted by Director John J. Farmer, Jr.:

The Miller Center mission recognizes the world of vulnerable communities we now inhabit and the resurgence of hate that threatens them. Stated simply, the role of the center is to help break down barriers and instead to build bridges between vulnerable communities and law enforcement, vulnerable and majority communities and among the communities themselves. (Miller Center on Policing and Community Resilience, 2023)

With this framework, I approach the problem statement to provide the best deliverable possible for my client.

Honor Statement

On my honor as a student I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.



Disclaimer

The author conducted this study as part of the program of professional education at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia. This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree. The

judgments and conclusions are solely those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Batten School, by the University of Virginia, or by any other agency.

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Lastly and most importantly, I thank God for the opportunity and the strength to complete this project and for all I have been given thus far in my pursuit of academic excellence.

Executive Summary

“We are talking about system-threatening crime with a large capital of violence that silences witnesses, threatens social workers, infiltrates authorities and political parties, that handles drugs, deceives the elderly and our welfare systems.”

Those are the words of Swedish Minister of Justice Gunnar Strömmer in his assessment of the criminal environment within Sweden at this time (Sørensen, 2024). The crux of this problem lies with entrenched networks of organized gang criminality that have strained the criminal justice system, including law enforcement, and Swedish society as a whole. These criminal groups have exploited not only various illicit markets, including those concerning weapons, drugs, and fraud, but also vulnerable communities and youth, which has led to a complex web of crime hot spots that also intersect with poverty and marginalization.

A thorough review of scholarly literature and interviews provides three policy alternatives Swedish stakeholders can pursue:

1. Public–Private Partnerships
2. Focused Deterrence (Group Violence Intervention)
3. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act Model

In this report, each policy option is analyzed through the following criteria:

1. Cost-Effectiveness (per 1% reduction in violent crime)
2. Administrative Feasibility
3. Political Feasibility
4. Equity

Based on these criteria calculations and evaluations, I recommend Swedish stakeholders pursue a national-level public–private partnership between law enforcement and private enterprises to mitigate gang criminality.

Introduction

Sweden is at a critical turning point in its public safety landscape today. The country currently stands amid a historic surge in gun and explosives violence as criminal enterprises, mainly in the form of gangs, break new ground in markets, both legal and illegal, and in operational capacity. Given this context, the Swedish government started a relationship with the Miller Center on Policing and Community Resilience, which has yielded many collaborations of mutual benefit and innovative policy recommendations for Sweden’s law enforcement agencies and public officials. Sweden's cordial reception of the Miller Center and other American partners showcases a commendable amount of openness and forward-thinking concerning tackling crime and the

networks behind it, representing a foundation for many successful missions between both sides that this report builds on.

Problem Statement

Sweden has experienced an influx of gun violence and bombings that have tested current information sharing processes and community resilience strategies. Building on a collaboration of mutual benefit between Swedish and American partners, an examination of new policy alternatives is needed to solidify further Sweden's development of best practices in public safety.

Background

The Typology and Trends of Swedish Crime

Although Swedish criminal street gangs have been present since the 1990s (Rostami, 2017, p. 366), they have become increasingly prevalent amid a growing number of open drug markets (Gerell et al., 2021). The most substantial forms of violence perpetrated by these gangs consist of shootings, related homicides by firearms, and bombings, the latter encompassing many by hand grenades (Sturup et al., 2019, pp. 367–368). The link between these two forms of violence cannot be understated, with Swedish scholars estimating that each detonated hand grenade in an area is associated with 1.7 more shooting incidents (Gerell et al., 2021, p. 226). What's more, this increase in gun violence is concentrated in males aged 15 to 29 years old (Sturup et al., 2019). In terms of general numbers, Sweden saw its highest amount of homicides by firearms ever in 2022, standing at 62 (Statista, 2022a), and has a gun-homicide rate 2.5 times greater than the European average (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2021a). In 2023, Sweden had the second deadliest year ever for gun homicides, at 53, and the worst year recorded for bombings, at 149 (Polismyndigheten, 2023). The latter represents 16 more detonations than the previous record year, 2019 (The Local Sweden, 2023). The former, although under the 62 noted earlier, houses the second deadliest month on record for the nation: September 2023 saw 11 people murdered with firearms in Sweden, one less than December 2019, which saw 12 people shot and killed (Fleck, 2023). In 2023, Minister of Justice Strömmer noted that an estimated 30,000 people are involved in criminal networks in the country (Euronews, 2023). However, after a long-awaited report released this year, authorities now estimate that the number of people involved in these networks is double the previous figure, at 62,000 (Sørensen, 2024).

Concerning the geographical and spatial elements of Sweden's gang violence, Swedish scholars have identified these trends as most concentrated in disadvantaged communities, also known as "vulnerable" communities in contemporary Swedish discourse. These communities are overwhelmingly composed of immigrant populations with lower socioeconomic status. These neighborhoods are also overrepresented in markers of social unrest and extremism (Sturup et al., 2019, pp. 373–374). The Swedish Police officially define a vulnerable area as "a geographically defined area characterized by a low socio-economic status where criminals have an impact on the local community . . ." in which "impact is linked to the social context in the area rather than a wish to take power and control the community" (The Local Sweden, 2017).

It is also important to note that these developments in Sweden do not show an aggregate increase in all crime, but an increase in certain types of crimes and the lethality of those crimes. This is best summarized by Mondani and Rostami (2023) in their paper:

If we were to summarize the Swedish crime development, it can be simplified as a paradox . . . As described earlier, the overall level of violence in Swedish society has not increased or become more severe since the early 1990s. However, violence related to firearms and knives has increased significantly, and an extensive criminal economy has developed, sustained through fraud against individuals, businesses, and the state. For example, there are fewer young people committing crimes, but those who do commit crimes are committing more serious offenses. There is, therefore, a significant skewing of violent crime, with a very small proportion of young men accounting for the majority of prosecuted violent crimes, and the age of onset for serious violent crimes is decreasing . . . The development in this regard can be simplified as having fewer but more serious offenders, less but more severe criminality. (pp. 29–30)

With these raw numbers and scholarly insights, it becomes clear that Sweden’s current crime surge is intimately connected to the types of weapons used: that is, there is a certain lethality to what criminals, especially gang members, are using that is unmatched in Swedish history. However, to only pin such carnage on these weapons would ignore other factors that have dovetailed to produce the current criminal milieu that the country is seeing today. At the heart of Sweden’s struggle with crime is a complex web of communities, criminal enterprises, illegal markets, and means of violence that must be considered to cultivate appropriate, efficacious policy alternatives. With this said, we turn to each of these factors and flesh out the causal mechanisms that intersect to create the criminal environment we see today in Sweden.

Illegal Weapons Trafficking in Sweden

Before looking at the deeper structures that create the current criminal context seen in Sweden, it is best to talk about the relative deadliness of attacks happening across the country compared to years past and how the use of certain weapons empowers it. Under the violence lies a plethora of weapons that street gangs use, which constitute illegal arms and explosives smuggled into Sweden from the Balkans, particularly the Western Balkans. These weapons mainly originate from former Yugoslavia due to the shadow of the Balkans Wars of the 1990s, with significant weapon reserves utilized by traffickers for financial gain. Although many different types of weapons are trafficked into Sweden illegally, the most common weapons are handguns, grenades, and automatic weapons, the latter of which has grown in use and hence cognized as “the currency of power” among criminal groups. Among the former, the Serb-produced Zastava handgun stands out, along with converted blank pistols, such as Ekols and Zorakis, and the Glock handgun; Kalashnikov-type rifles (most notably the Zastava M70) are most prevalent after these types of guns (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, pp. 8–19). The reuse of these firearms in several shootings is a phenomenon that has become increasingly prevalent in the criminal milieu: a 2020 police report notes that 40% of the shootings that occurred in Stockholm were carried out with weapons that had been used in previous shootings, although it also says that this is much less the case in other parts of Sweden (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 40). Like the firearms trafficked into Sweden, most grenades that enter the country also stem from the Balkans. The M75 hand grenade is most common in the criminal arsenal, along with bangers/firecrackers, and improvised devices, which are crafted through Thermos devices (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 11).

This brings us to the *modus operandi* of firearm and explosives trafficking, or put more accurately, the multiple *modi operandi*. The dominant form of such trafficking is known as “ant-type” trafficking, which, according to experts, consists of “low quantities of firearms being smuggled at a time in transportation, most commonly in the flow of cars or buses” (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 12). This occurs most commonly through the border between Sweden and Denmark, specifically, the Öresund Bridge connecting Malmö to Copenhagen. However, traffickers can also smuggle weapons from Germany, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Czechia. A second *modus operandi* exploits mail and courier flows, with a given package usually sending parts of a weapon or a few weapons at a time. It is this choice of trafficking that is specifically connected with converted weapons, which are initially sold as blank-firing arms and do not have to be registered (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, pp. 13–14).

These trends are surprising because of the lack of such networks and weapons in neighboring nations. One example is Denmark: experts point to a puzzling lack of (a) weapons trafficked into Denmark from the Balkans (although traffickers will bring weapons into Sweden through Denmark) and (b) automatic weapons in Denmark (though there are commonalities when it comes to other types of weapons). Grenade trafficking is also a uniquely Swedish phenomenon, with rusting hand grenades usually included for free with the purchase of automatic weapons due to an eagerness of sellers to move them after decades in storage (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, pp. 12–13). Although there are many theories as to why this is the case, a common train of thought is that Sweden has this supply chain as a result of “the unique familial, cultural, lingual and social connections between criminals in Sweden” (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 54); put another way, a result of “the large diaspora from the various Balkan states in Sweden and their connections which enable the trafficking of firearms from this area into Sweden” (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 12).

Illegal Drug Trade in Sweden

We know that gangs perpetuating the violence we see in Sweden usually operate in an environment of competition under the illicit drug trade, where turf wars have emerged (Rasmussen, 2023). This makes sense, given an array of scholarly literature that points to the drug trade and violence being correlated with one another in Swedish society. As referenced before, Gerell et al. (2021) found that gun violence in the Swedish cities of Stockholm and Malmö is strongly concentrated in open drug markets, a trend even more pronounced in vulnerable communities (p. 236). These specific vulnerable-based open drug markets also exhibit an increased likelihood of an additional shooting following an initial one, compared to the rest of the areas in these cities; as explicated by the authors:

... open drug markets in vulnerable neighbourhoods are not just exhibiting spatial concentrations of gun violence, but also strong spatio-temporal concentrations. We note that there is a relatively high risk of a follow-up shooting taking place after an initial shooting, nearby and within a short time period. This risk is at least two times as high if the first shooting took place at an open drug scene in a vulnerable neighbourhood compared to if the first event took place elsewhere in the two cities. Gun violence is clustered in both time and space, and the highest risk identified for gun violence is identified at open drug scenes in vulnerable neighbourhoods in the weeks following an initial shooting event. This is in line with findings that crime prediction works best when

combining geographical risk factors with crime data, rather than just using one of the two . . . (Gerell et al., 2021, p. 237)

Magnusson (2023) finds similar results; after analyzing open drug scenes (ODSs), gun violence data, vector grid data for sociodemographic variables, and crime from Stockholm between 2017 and 2020, she finds that the total ODS data represent 37% of gun incidents, but only 0.6% of the considered land area (p. 18). Further, she finds that micro places (the unit of analysis) that have both ODSs and gun violence “suffer from the worst sociodemographic conditions” and have “the worst levels of most of the violent crimes examined[,]” not only including “public assault, robberies and explosions but also thefts, narcotic offences and vandalism” (p. 18).

The connection between illicit drug networks and Sweden’s swell of violence, then, is clear-cut. So what does this market actually look like? Cannabis has a huge turnover, especially in the face of its illegality throughout Sweden, but the market also sees large movements of cocaine, amphetamines, and narcotics-classified pharmaceuticals (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2021b, p. 6). The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2021b) has identified three substantial changes in the illegal drug market within the past decade that should illuminate mitigation efforts, in their own words:

1. . . . [C]ontacts between Swedish criminal networks and actors in other countries have, in recent years, been facilitated by new organisational patterns. Smuggling has been streamlined due to the relocation of Swedish organisers in key transit countries. The drug supply chain has been shortened, and the opportunity to import narcotics is open to a broader range of criminal networks than before. Larger consignments are being imported—mainly with the help of legal companies working in the freight industry.
2. [There is] an increasing ambition among criminal networks to control local street markets in certain suburban areas. Previously, such territorial claims were regarded as unusual. Today, however, they have both a practical and symbolic significance. The competition for “ownership” of certain streets and locations entails a greater level of conflict, and networks in major towns expanding and dispersing their activities to other locations in Sweden.
3. The final change concerns the accessibility for buyers. New online sales platforms have been established (on Darknet and open internet sites), while social media and encrypted apps have simplified customer recruitment and marketing for street dealers. Certain delivery methods have become more common in recent years, such as home delivery and postal delivery. These delivery methods and sales forms enable people—without prior contacts with dealers—to buy illegal drugs without being detected by the judicial system. (pp. 1–2)

These dynamics, unsurprisingly, mimic many of the observations noted earlier concerning illegal weapons trafficking. Additionally, this conveys clear economic structures behind Sweden’s violence. The Swedish Police have all but confirmed that this trade is lucrative and provides a monetary basis for criminal activities: according to a 2021 report, the turnover for this illicit drug market sits between 10-15 billion Swedish krona (Polismyndigheten, 2021, p. 26). However, what serves as a source of funding for organized crime groups can also pull people into a scenario they feel they cannot escape. This is why the Swedish National Council for Crime


Prevention (2021b) goes on to say that “an absence of alternatives and the continual cycle of debts and payments are considered to be significant factors in locking people in the market” (p. 11). If tackling Sweden’s violence is a goal, then this market, like that of illegal weapons, must be considered when crafting policy alternatives.

Fraud as a Source of Criminal Income

Like most criminal economies, complex networks emerge that make it hard to disentangle more violent and well-known acts (e.g., gun and explosives violence, the illegal drug trade) from more subtle ones, which brings us to fraud, a critical part of organized and systematic economic crime in Sweden. As discussed earlier, it is well-established that the illegal narcotics trade in Sweden is remunerative and helps to fund various criminal activities. What most would be surprised to learn, however, is that fraud proves just as lucrative, and even has some benefits to Swedish organized crime groups over the drug market when it comes to the attainment of criminal income. As articulated by Rostami (2021):

Compared to the illicit drug market, fraud activities do not require the same operational and logistics cost in the form of production, intermediaries, transport routes and stockholding. For each part of the process there is also a probability one’s activities may indeed be revealed by law enforcement authorities. Intriguingly, regardless of extensive profits from drug manufacturing and distribution, it remains an onerous market in the traditional sense. Engaging in fraudulent activities, on the other hand, is much like new digital markets. Technology-oriented, network-based companies with relatively low operational and logistics cost, which generate large profits and are difficult to detect. Thus, the question is not what the profit margin of the 18 billion Swedish kronor from benefit crime is, but rather how much of that amount goes directly to organised crime. And it is not far-fetched to assume that some of the observed criminal conflicts could be linked to profits from this type of crimes, and not only linked to the illicit drug market and to interpersonal rivalries and disputes. (p. 7)

In fact, according to Sweden’s Finance Minister Elisabeth Svantesson, many gangs in vulnerable neighborhoods who run drugs are now graduating to several forms of fraud that nestle into legitimate businesses and public services, which now make up the biggest source of income for organized crime (Rolander, 2023). This is the case because the revenue streams of these economic crimes could be lower than that of the drug trade, but the profits are much higher; that is, the returns are greater, given that 80% of revenue from the illegal drug trade must be reinvested in infrastructure to maintain that market. This is why Swedish Police estimate that the illegal drug trade has a total profit margin of about 1.8-2.8 billion Swedish kronor (Rostami, 2021, p. 7). This pales compared to Sweden’s greatest fraud threat, welfare fraud, which is currently estimated to net 6 billion Swedish kronor. According to Sweden’s Economic Crimes Authority, welfare is not the only state-sponsored activity that is being targeted by gangs: healthcare clinics, vaccination centers, family home operations, and even operations for the care of unaccompanied migrant minors are all areas of concerns, although this is not an exhaustive list (Semonsen, 2023). A new report from November 2023, done by the Swedish-based Center for Business and Policy Studies and spearheaded by political scientist Carina Gunnarsson, argues that there is a startling lack of research on how organized crime swindles the public sector, especially in municipalities. It is believed that an absence of this information prevents authorities from detecting blind spots and vulnerabilities in these economic systems (Sivberg, 2023).



Source: Rostami (2021)¹


Vulnerable Communities and the Exploitation of Youth

With the inclusion of vulnerable communities in many previous sections, it is abundantly clear that socioeconomic and sociodemographic circumstances play a role in the continuation of record-breaking violence Sweden is experiencing. According to Felipe Estrada Dörner, a professor of criminology at Stockholm University who researches juvenile delinquency and segregation, the former is a far stronger risk factor than the latter (Sunnemark, 2023). However, this does not mean that the latter is absent, given that (1) there is a strong correlation between lower socioeconomic status and immigrant background in Sweden (Rostila & Fritzell, 2014 p. 686), and (2) immigrant status, through discrimination (particularly in housing), ostracization, and other factors, is correlated with an increased risk of committing crime in Sweden; that is, a causal effect separate from correlated socioeconomic status can be ascertained (Beckley et al., 2017). If there are any doubts as to the general proclivity of Sweden's violence to plague vulnerable communities, one can look to the statistics that have stood out in the past decade: in 2015, shootings were five times more likely to happen in vulnerable areas compared to the rest of Sweden, but as of 2020, this increased to eight times as likely (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 28).

Although the exact mechanisms under the phenomenon of violence seen in these vulnerable communities are blurry and not certain without more study, a failure of assimilation for these marginalized citizens, particularly of those that are or descend from immigrants, is a point of consensus between both sides of the political spectrum in Sweden (Milne, 2023). Martin Lazar, the head of a regional community policing effort under the Swedish Police, and an immigrant himself, agrees that this is a substantial factor as to why gangs prey especially on these neighborhoods, noting that gang activity stems from “alienation, distrust of authority, poor

¹ Rostami (2021) cites “Brå” (shorthand for the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention) and “Sturup et al.”; see his bibliography for details on these sources. “Benefit crimes” specifically represent welfare fraud, and are considered separate from other types of fraud in the criminal code after the Benefit Crimes Act was implemented in January 2008.

education, crippling poverty and displacement from [an immigrant's] places of birth" (Gips & Goldenberg, 2023).



Source: Sunnemark (2023)²


But perhaps the most significant casualties for vulnerable communities on the frontline of gun and explosives violence, other than the carnage itself, is the recruitment of youth into gangs and their criminal activity. This trend has only grown over the past decade, with both sticks and carrots used to lure young people into a life of crime under the banner of a gang. In terms of sticks, there have been reports that gangs will threaten potential recruits or their families with harm (Sveriges Radio, 2023a), or will try to extort them, sometimes with fabricated debts. Regarding carrots, gangs can provide socialization and status attractive to potential recruits, many of whom have struggled to gain educational and job security (Hillier & Lewis, 2022, p. 35). The susceptibility of such youth even has psychological underpinnings, with a recent report by Sveriges Radio stating that many young criminals sentenced for explosives violence in the past five years suffer from neurodevelopmental disorders (Ridderstedt & Pohjanen, 2023).

This has translated to worrying numbers when it comes to youth involvement in gang criminality. In one of the most comprehensive articles yet on Sweden's struggle with gangs, Sunnemark (2023), using data from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, reports

² Sunnemark (2023) uses a Guardian graphic to display what are labeled "deprivation levels" compared to Sweden in general. Data from SCB, Sweden's statistics agency, is utilized.

that in 2012, 15- to 20-year-olds made up 16.9% of all suspects for crimes connected to gangs (e.g., murder, assault, manslaughter). So what about the number now? It stands at 29.7%, as of 2022. This coincides with a recidivism rate that is less than encouraging: research company Acta Publica found that nine out of ten young gang criminals fall back into crimes after going through institutional youth care (Sveriges Radio, 2023b). But why would gangs specifically target children, seeing them as a suitable, if not essential cog in gang operations? Although there are many theories, most observers and scholars point to (1) lower risks and costs for gangs, since youth receive lighter sentences, evade detection and policing strategies, and can be paid less than adults (Barry, 2023), and (2) an easily exploitable population that can serve as a strong and continuous supply of recruits for gangs, to the point where exploiting these children and young adults is considered a “business model” (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2023, p. 90).

An example of this is the phenomenon of gangs using children as hitmen; last year, police stopped a 14-year-old girl who was carrying an automatic weapon, ready to kill her assigned target (Sørensen, 2024). In these networks, there is usually a dynamic of older youth mentoring younger youth, a process labeled by officials as a “hierarchical age strata.” This is almost exclusively a male domain, given that girls are not usually a part of this network and, if involved, are typically exploited for tasks such as transportation and storage of drugs and weapons (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2023, pp. 88–89)




Source: Sunnemark (2023)³

³ Like the previous note, the author uses a created graphic mapping data from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention and Swedish Police.

A Culture of Deadly Reprisals

Even with all the factors examined thus far concerning Sweden's gang criminality, there is still a unique deadliness of passion and intent that seems to permeate. Unlike past years, there is something new about the ferocity of gang feuds; it has even culminated in the family members of gang members, who are not involved in such networks, being targeted. Once this level is reached, not only are these targeted family members hurt or killed, but also other innocent people who happen to be in the crossfire or are mistakenly targeted. There are more anecdotes than can be counted showing this: a 13-year-old boy executed by a gang and thrown into the woods (Olsen, 2023); a 25-year-old woman killed in a bombing targeting the wrong house (Duxbury, 2023b). What's more, many scholars in Sweden point to deliberate efforts on the part of gang hitmen to inflict lethal trauma, rather than wound their enemy as a message (Nezirevic, 2022). Günther et al. (2021) report a substantial increase in gunshot wounds and stab wounds targeting the head, neck, and face in the past decade in Sweden and note that this same period has seen a sizable increase in violent deaths, according to corresponding data calculated by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. These attacks only serve to instigate other attacks, becoming a cycle of revenge, which stifles confidence in public safety and convinces people to carry weapons for self-protection and take matters into their own hands (Duxbury, 2023a).



Source: Günther et al. (2021)⁴

Economic Costs to Swedish Society

As shown above, the greatest cost of gang violence in Sweden is the loss of human life and injury that has jeopardized public safety and community well-being. However, a conversation on the toll of Swedish gang violence would not be complete without addressing how these critical issues trickle down to affect the economic and entrepreneurial vitality of Sweden's biggest hubs. Although it is difficult to assess the toll that gangs and other criminal organizations inflict on Sweden's economy and business environment, especially when looking at specific types of crimes, some studies and reports are available to paint a picture. In 2018, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise estimated that the cost of crime in general to the Swedish economy is 1.2% of the country's GDP; or, about 55 billion Swedish krona per year (Lallerstedt, 2018). However, this figure is a conservative estimate given that it only accounts for direct costs. Furthermore, increases in crime have become highly visible for Swedish businesses: over half of them see crime, unemployment, and gang presence as a problem (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023). This is especially acute in the Stockholm area, where an international perception of gang-related violence has resulted in difficulties attracting talent and investments (Gips & Goldenberg, 2023). A recent survey shows that 80% of businesses specific to Stockholm and Uppsala are worried that gang conflict will disallow the "best and brightest" from coming to work for them. Andreas Hatzigeorgu, CEO of Stockholm's Chamber of Commerce, reports that 1 in 5 business leaders surveyed by the Chamber report that their operations have already been disrupted by crime. Nonetheless, Hatzigeorgu also expressed confidence in the ability of the metropolitan area to recover through collaboration with other stakeholders (Walsh, 2023). But what does the empirical literature say amid such worries? Several studies show that these concerns are substantiated: increased crime rates are negatively correlated with firm entry (Barbieri & Rizzo, 2023; Mahofa et al., 2016).

Evidence on Potential Solutions

Information Sharing, Clearance Rates, and Relevant Stakeholders

A clear picture can be distinguished then: vulnerable communities, reaching for opportunities within illegal markets, amplified by the presence of lethal weaponry and intense acrimony between rival gangs. However, research and commentary by experts reveal that some causal mechanisms are more crucial to address in the near term than others. According to Swedish criminologist Dr. Amir Rostami, public-private information sharing should rank highly as a priority due to collaboration and resource-sharing among gangs in Sweden; to put it in his own words: "We need to do the same . . . We need to bring public and private together" (Gips & Goldenberg, 2023). This lack of resource-sharing and collaboration between the police and businesses in Sweden is perhaps most embodied in clearance rates for crimes of interest,

⁴ Günther et al. (2021) cite data from the Swedish Trauma Registry (SweTrau) and the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. Interestingly, the authors note that there was no increase in 30-day mortality for gunshot wounds or stab wounds. In the paper, it is speculated that this could be due to increased lethality on the streets, effective healthcare, or a combination.

although previous missions between the Miller Center and Swedish officials have explored other policy changes to address this.⁵

Typically, clearance rates are defined as the rate of prosecutions for a given category of crime over the total number of those considered crimes. However, regarding how homicides are studied in Sweden, clearance rates represent convictions instead of mere prosecutions (the latter which could, hypothetically, result in acquittals) (Sturup et al., 2019, p. 367). However, even with glaring asymmetries between various definitions of what a “clearance rate” is in criminological literature, clearance rates are a sufficient gauge for the number of crimes solved among registered cases.

Unfortunately, clearance rates have been falling in many categories of violent crime in Sweden, including all homicides, firearm homicides, and bombings. Specifically, 2022 saw a clearance rate of just 17% for all murders in Sweden (Statista, 2022b). When isolating these homicides to those committed with firearms, Granath and Sturup (2018) observe that the clearance rate has decreased from about 95% in the early 1990s to around 50% in the early 2010s (p. 104). Moreover, the clearance rate for bombings has been relatively low in the past, with less than 10% of bombings resulting in prosecutions as of 2019 (Haglund, 2020).

With this context in mind, interaction between the public and private sectors is important when looking at Sweden’s surge in crime. It is the creation of “force multipliers”—where knowledge, experience, and expertise are shared between law enforcement and other stakeholders in a community—in which differences can be made (Gainer, 2014). What’s more, considered stakeholders do not have to extend to just businesses, but others as well, such as schools, religious communities, and civil society organizations. In Stockholm, which Sweden’s crime surge has hit the hardest, many initiatives are being implemented that have these various stakeholders in mind, with youth counseling centers, social services, and schooling/extracurriculars serving as examples (City of Stockholm, 2023).

Intelligence-Led Policing

Since the turn of the twentieth century, there hasn’t been a more monumental shift in policing than the emergence of the intelligence-led policing (ILP) model. Originating in the United Kingdom and sweeping through the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is now practiced throughout many departments, such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the New Jersey State Police (NJSP). The most cited scholar on the subject, Jerry Ratcliffe (2016), provides a simple definition that can be broken down:

Intelligence-led policing emphasises analysis and intelligence as pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that prioritises crime hot spots, repeat victims, prolific offenders and criminal groups. It facilitates crime and harm reduction, disruption and prevention through strategic and tactical management, deployment, and enforcement. (p. 66)

There are many moving parts here, but it is best to start with a few definitions and a conceptual basis for what “intelligence” even means in the law enforcement sphere. The Organization for

⁵ See Appendix C.

Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (2017), which has produced the definitive international guide on the subject, provides the following:

Data are raw and uninterpreted observations and measurements. Examples include features of criminal activity that are easily quantified, such as crime reports and other crime statistics, databases of offenders and police tasks.

Information is data put in context and empowered with meaning, which gives it greater relevance and purpose.

Knowledge is information that has been given an interpretation and understanding. When a person has added his/her wisdom to information, it becomes knowledge.


Intelligence is data, information and knowledge that have been evaluated, analysed and presented in a decision-making format for action-oriented purposes. (p. 16).

Let's further break this down with a corresponding model and example from Ratcliffe (2016), which is simplified and rephrased by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017) :

At a local police station, residential burglary incidents are inserted in the police database. These computer records are **data**. When a crime analyst accesses and maps the data, and recognizes an emerging pattern of new burglaries in an area, this becomes **information**. In essence, raw data have been enhanced with sufficient meaning to recognize a pattern. If the analyst subsequently discusses and shares this information with a detective, their understanding and insights become **knowledge**. After collecting further data and information, and analysing them, the detective and the analyst are able to build a picture in their minds, one that undoubtedly has gaps but that also has enough substance to support hypotheses and contain implications. The crime analyst and the detective draft an Operational Analysis Report and brief a senior officer. He/she decides to investigate and launch a surveillance operation to target burglars based on the **intelligence** from the analyst and the detective. (p. 17)⁶

This is based on Ratcliffe's (2016) DIKI (Data-Information-Knowledge-Intelligence) continuum model:

⁶ These page numbers refer to those referenced in the OSCE source; in Ratcliffe (2016), this example can be found on pp. 73–74.




Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017, p. 17)

Ultimately, this encompasses Ratcliffe's (2016) claim that:

[Intelligence-led policing] comes into its own when used for strategic planning and resource allocation, so that investigative actions target the right offenders and emerging areas of criminality. In an intelligence-led policing model, crime intelligence drives operations rather than operations dictating intelligence-led gathering priorities (p. 6).

This represents a proactive approach where analysis drives investigations, not the other way around. This allows for a business-like model that contextualizes threats and risks, and prioritizes them accordingly, instead of relying on individual and laborious investigations that fail to counter criminal networks (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 6). However, this prompts the question of what it means to target the "right offenders." This is, arguably, the other crucial half of intelligence-led policing, where this process explained above focuses on prolific offenders who are usually concentrated in geographical hot spots. At the end of the day, research shows not only that an extremely small percentage of addresses account for the majority of crime in a given city, but also that a relatively small percentage of offenders account for a significant percentage of the crime, usually producing not only repeat victims, but also repeat offending in a short span of time within these hot spots and near these hot spots (known as "near repeat" patterns of crime) (Ratcliffe, 2016, pp. 5–6, 37–48).

With this definition explicated, the key actors of intelligence-led policing can be explained, shown through arguably the most important conceptual model in the entire field, the 4-i model, created by Ratcliffe (2016):



Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017, p. 20)

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017) goes on to discuss how each actor contributes to this framework:

The decision-makers (managers) task, direct, advise and guide the criminal intelligence analysts. First, the decision-makers have to ensure that their *intentions* are explained and understood. Second, the analysts *interpret* the criminal environment, and third, *influence* the decision-makers with the analysis findings. Based on these findings, the decision-makers (fourth) *impacts* on the criminal environment through strategic management, action plans, investigations and operations. (p. 20)

This process reflects how intelligence analysis serves as the basis for strategic, operational, and tactical decisions; however, it also shows that decision-makers' intentions can produce a sizable impact on how analysts cognize a given criminal environment.

The most important question left to answer is whether intelligence-led policing helps to achieve public safety goals: is it effective? Although the field is far from definitive evaluations, some successful implementations of intelligence-led policing, drawn from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (2012) report titled *Reducing Crime Through Intelligence-Led Policing*, are noted by Fritsvold (2019) (to quote him verbatim):

- In Texas, the Austin Police Department reported a reduction in violent crime as well as burglaries and other repetitive offenses, including a 15 percent reduction in burglary of vehicles. Their overall goal was to “develop a method to identify the 20 percent of the population that causes 80 percent of the crime problems.”
- In Medford, Oregon, an increased focus on intelligence-led policing strategies including “cooperation between the police and their constituents rarely seen in contemporary

society” were instrumental in achieving an “astounding” clearance rates for all crimes in excess of 80 percent.

- The San Diego Police Department put in place a strategy that involved “a combination of criminal intelligence, problem solving, proactive enforcement, situational crime prevention and technology.” By increasing the number of informants providing information on gang activity from four to 60, the SDPD was able to determine that 16% of gang members were responsible for 47% of the crime. They were then able to dramatically reduce gang-related violence and crime by focusing more attention on “hot people, times, locations and property.”

This new paradigm in law enforcement will serve as the basis for the three policy alternatives considered. Before turning to that, however, a more profound question must be briefly addressed.

The Role of Arrests and Prosecutions

A final element to consider before looking at appropriate policy alternatives is whether putting people through the criminal justice process yields public safety gains, particularly for communities with hot spots and the serial offenders accompanying them. Intelligence-led policing, after all, does not need to necessarily be applied solely for the arrest and prosecution of criminals; decision-makers can take other routes with the intelligence they receive. So, do arrests and prosecutions actually help mitigate criminal environments? The evidence shows that when the police act on knowledge concerning highly concentrated crime in these areas, primarily through arrests, it helps reduce crime. Ratcliffe (2016) points to the following examples:

- In Australia, the New South Wales Police Commissioner focused on crime “hot spots” and “hot times,” where police commanders increased searches for illegal weapons and targeting of recidivist offenders. Research showed that significant reductions in crime that followed were due to an increased arrest rate, with a burglary prevented for every two arrests, a vehicle theft prevented for every five arrests, and a robbery prevented for every thirty arrests (p. 139).
- In the United Kingdom, police in the Killingbeck area of Leeds started a “focused detection and incapacitation strategy” that targeted prolific burglars. The intelligence-led strategy encompassed a consolidation phase, which consisted of crime prevention activities such as “target hardening, educating elderly people about the potential risks of burglary by deception, and youth outreach programs.” This resulted in residential burglaries falling by 60% with indicators of diffusion benefits to areas surrounding those targeted (p. 139–140).

Earlier, it was implied that crime occurrences can lead to an increased risk of other crimes occurring nearby, for a short time, which is known as “near repeat” patterns. In one study of the Dallas Police Department, Wheeler et al. (2021) found that “arrests resulted in 20%–40% reductions in a near repeat follow-up crime” (p. 236).

Policy Alternatives

In the last section, the utility of intelligence-led policing was covered. With this foundation, three policy alternatives can be examined, all of which rely on an ILP model for optimized execution: public–private partnerships, focused deterrence (specifically in the form of group violence intervention), and racketeering legislation.⁷

Public–Private Partnerships

Public–private partnerships (known as “PPPs” or “P3s”) are defined by the Defense Business Board (2012) as encompassing “a voluntary interaction between public and private sector entities through which both parties leverage the expertise, resources, and incentives of the other in order to address an issue or opportunity with greater speed, effectiveness, efficiency, or residual impact.” Similarly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2021) defines a public–private partnership as “any type of mutually beneficial cooperative arrangement, informal or formal, between two or more organizations of private industry and the public sector to enhance the life safety, economic security and resilience of jurisdictions” (p. 1). This policy alternative has become popular in the United States due to the acknowledgment of a threat environment that increasingly necessitates horizontal, as opposed to vertical, public safety networks: more than ever before, technological innovation, individual empowerment, and locally directed action animate criminal organizations and terrorists (Business Executives for National Security, 2016, p. 6). That such a model is generalizable, and possible in Sweden, is of no doubt when one looks at the nature of given criminal networks across the pond: not only are such networks localized (Rostami, 2017) and exploiting technological advances (Åkerman, 2022), but also empowering serial offenders (Gips & Goldenberg, 2023).

However, it would be a mistake to think that public–private partnerships are simply an extension of information sharing between these sectors. P3s not only seek to relay information and prevent “silos,” but also contextualize information to create greater “knowledge creation,” where data is filtered through first-hand personal interaction and individual histories. Among open-source data, certain types of information must be prioritized. With this knowledge creation scaled, it can then be fed back into a public safety network to support decision-makers in communities (Business Executives for National Security, 2016, pp. 7, 11–13). Further, P3s serve to enhance other elements of the public safety landscape that promote threat mitigation and community resilience, including but not limited to the sharing of training methods, technology, community policing, and response planning. (Law Enforcement–Private Security Consortium, 2009, pp. 1–2).

What is most challenging about public–private partnerships is the lack of impact evaluations that accompany their formations, especially regarding crime reduction and other markers of public safety. This is likely due to the inherent nature of information sharing. In the United States, information sharing is most visible in fusion centers, which are “state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal and private sector partners” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2022). However, this entails a situation where you are measuring the prevention of events that may not happen. As noted by Business Executives for National Security (2016):

⁷ As to how ILP can help enable P3s, see Ratcliffe (2016, pp. 112–114). Concerning how ILP can help focused deterrence strategies, see Ratcliffe (2016, p. 140). For an example of ILP aiding a racketeering investigation, see Bureau of Justice Assistance (2012, pp. 21–23).

Unless a fusion center can make a direct correlation between their functions and a criminal and/or terrorist event not occurring, it can be difficult to articulate a value proposition that quantifies progress against established objectives and demonstrates a tangible contribution to public safety. No one gets rewarded for solving a problem that didn't manifest. As one high-level intelligence leader observed, "How do you measure that? It's the dog that didn't bark." (p. 22)

Due to this, traditional cost-benefit analysis can only partially capture the extent to which public-private partnerships enhance public safety. This means that case studies are usually the best mechanisms to succinctly capture the effectiveness of P3s, at least in terms of monumental events, since they showcase how a given situation could have been worse. One example of this is the Nebraska Preparedness Partnership (NPP), a 501(c)(3) created in 2014 to address response and recovery from floods throughout the state. With over 100 stakeholders receiving information from NPP on topics ranging from training opportunities to situational awareness and preparedness updates, the organization proved crucial during historic floods in 2019: because of NPP, a critical convoy of supplies was able to reach the people of Fremont in dire need of essential commodities (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2021, pp. 43–47).

That said, impact evaluations and studies of P3s are not impossible and can point to promising results. This is the case for Safe City, a public-private partnership that started in 2003 and included Target, the police, and other neighboring retailers looking to deter crime in four jurisdictions, which spread throughout Ohio, California, Maryland, and Arizona. A three-year evaluation of the partnership by the Urban Institute, with federal funding, found that the partnership increased safety perception in all four communities with cost-effective reductions in crime for two of them (La Vigne et al., 2009). This is in line with the scholarly consensus on how P3s can help law enforcement agencies fight crime, with Ratcliffe (2016) noting that increased arrests and reduced crime rates are "expected benefits and indications of success[.]" in reference to Tilley (2003).

Focused Deterrence (Group Violence Intervention)

Focused deterrence, also called "pulling levers," is a strategy that attempts to deter specific criminal behavior through fear of specific sanctions (hence the term "levers") along with the anticipation of benefits for not engaging in such criminal behavior. Representatives of a community, in conjunction with the police, will engage with those at high risk for the crime of interest and highlight both incentives for avoiding the considered crime and deterrents through consequential penalties (RAND Corporation, 2018). Put another way, the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (2020) defines focused deterrence strategies as embodying the idea that:

... police can increase the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment in a number of innovative ways, often by directly interacting with offenders and communicating clear incentives for compliance and consequences for criminal activity. These approaches all focus on high rate offenders, often gang members or drug sellers.

The model, which originated in the "Operation Ceasefire" intervention implemented by the city of Boston in the late 1990s to address gang homicides, has been observed to work better targeting groups rather than individuals (RAND Corporation, 2018). This is where a specific type of focused deterrence, Group Violence Intervention (GVI), comes into play. GVI consists of

direct communication with violent groups, where the police, social service providers, and community figures present a unified antiviolence message that articulates community norms, with an emphasis on (1) violence bringing law enforcement attention to entire groups and (2) a way out through services and alternatives to group members. It is this emphasis on groups (the unit) that commit violence (the type of crime) that distinguishes other forms of focused deterrence that will focus solely on drug markets (a different type of crime) or high-risk individuals (a different unit) (National Network for Safe Communities, 2015, p. 3).

In their most recent meta-analysis of quasi-experimental studies implementing focused deterrence strategies, Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018) found a statistically significant overall mean size, showing moderate crime reduction effects on targeted crimes. Moreover, they found that the most far-reaching effects resided with focused deterrence strategies centered on group violence (pp. 232–241).

As to the generalizability of focused deterrence, a GVI pilot was implemented in the Swedish city of Malmö in October 2018, called “Sluta Skjut” (“Stop Shooting” in Swedish). An impact evaluation of this pilot program by Malmö University (2021) showed that there was a decrease in the average number of shootings per month of about 25% (from 4.4 to 3.3) after the implementation of the program, but with a twist: the results were not statistically significant. Accordingly, the report notes that the program was implemented during a time when the number of shootings per month was already on a downward trajectory (pp. 8–11). Hence, whether GVI definitively works in a Swedish context remains to be seen.

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act Model

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (referred to simply as “RICO”) was passed into law in 1970 to target organized crime. Peluso et al. (2023) cite language from the Act and relevant case law to establish what the legislation fundamentally entails:

RICO enhanced sanctions, constructed new legal tools for prosecutors to use in the evidence-gathering process, and created new remedies to tackle the unlawful activities of criminal syndicates. RICO brings the “highly diversified acts of a single organized crime enterprise under [one] umbrella” in an attempt to “curb the infiltration of legitimate business organizations by racketeers.” (p. 1198)

Although initially devised as a way to confront mobsters of that time period, Congress purposefully designed the statute to be broad (or perhaps “vague” to its critics) for the law to reach “even legitimate businesses and organizations without a profit motive”; this line of reasoning has largely been accepted by the courts (Peluso et al., 2023, p. 1198). These “enhanced sanctions,” “new legal tools,” and “new remedies” consist of not only new criminal sanctions with the patterned commission of other state and federal offenses that encompass “racketeering” (known as “predicate offenses”), but also the ability of any person injured in their business or property to bring a civil action to state or federal court against a RICO offender. These criminal consequences, according to the Congressional Research Service (2021), consist of:

(a) the forfeiture of any property acquired through a RICO violation and of any property interest in the enterprise involved in the violation, (b) imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or for life if one of the predicate offenses carries such a penalty, and/or (c) a fine of

not more than the greater of twice the amount of gain or loss associated with the offense or \$250,000 for individuals (\$500,000 for organizations). (p. i)

Notice in particular how powerful part (a) is; this is in addition to forfeiture provisions that allow a prosecutor to seek pre-indictment restraining orders and forfeitures of property transferred to third parties (Peluso et al., 2023, p. 1224).

As referenced before, to fall under RICO, a pattern of “racketeering activity” must be present, encompassed in two predicate acts occurring within ten years of each other that are “continuous and interrelated” (Peluso et al., 2023, pp. 1201–1202). The list of federal and state crimes considered to be predicate offenses is extensive and includes murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, bribery, gambling, arson, and many others. In addition, it is only required of predicate offenses that these crimes are committed; convictions are not necessary, and along with acquittals, do not serve to preclude subsequent RICO prosecutions (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p. 9–13). The establishment of racketeering activity, as one could guess, rests on other elements: namely, that there is a criminal enterprise to begin with, that given persons are tied to this enterprise, and that this enterprise somehow affects interstate commerce.⁸ The Congressional Research Service (2021, p. i) summarizes this accordingly:

In simple terms, RICO condemns

- (1) any person
 - (2) who
 - (a) uses for or invests in, or
 - (b) acquires or maintains an interest in, or
 - (c) conducts or participates in the affairs of, or
 - (d) conspires to invest in, acquire, or conduct the affairs of
- (3) an enterprise
- (4) which
 - (a) engages in, or
 - (b) whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce
- (5) through
 - (a) the collection of an unlawful debt, or
 - (b) the patterned commission of various state and federal crimes.

Hence, RICO can not only subject many more interconnected criminals within an organization to extensive sentences and fines (an environment where no one is safe), but can also cripple criminal organizations through the permanent taking of property and civil liability. This is the

⁸ RICO can also be implemented on a state level, with all these same elements, except that the enterprise affects trade/commerce within the state, or “intrastate” commerce. For an example of this, see Appendix B, which features commentary on state RICO proceedings in New Jersey.

purpose: to completely bury a criminal enterprise, and its members, to the fullest extent of the law.

So why bring RICO to Sweden? This is a possible policy alternative due to a lack of anti-racketeering laws in the country, particularly at a time when organized crime is a growing problem, although there are anti-bribery and corruption laws on the books (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023; CMS, 2024). This is why Rostami (2021), one of Sweden's most distinguished criminologists referenced earlier, suggests that "more consideration should be given to investigating the introduction of proper anti-racketeering legislation to specifically target organised crime instead of [a] general increase in punitive and covert coercive measures" (p. 10).

Evaluative Criteria

The criteria that will be used to evaluate these policy alternatives are described below. A corresponding evaluative rubric, which details the scale of the last three criteria, and all calculations, can be viewed in Appendices A and B, respectively.

Evaluative Criteria Descriptions

Cost-Effectiveness: This criterion will consist of the estimated costs (in 2024 U.S. dollars) of a given policy alternative, calculated through a case study, divided by the percent reduction of violent crime in that case study. Hence, the metric represents the cost per 1% reduction in violent crime.

Administrative Feasibility: This criterion measures relevant institutions' organizational capacity to administer a given policy alternative. Although many factors can affect this, with some particular to certain institutions, the essential elements to consider are the resources an institution has, how sustainable those resources are, and whether an institution is designed to use these resources well. This is represented by a three-way scale of low, medium, or high.

Political Feasibility: This criterion measures the degree of support for a given policy alternative in the current and near-term political climate. The most important stakeholders in this regard are public officials (e.g., politicians, lead administrators) who can set and control the agenda, the political cultures of relevant institutions, and the sentiment of the public at large. This is also represented by a three-way scale of low, medium, or high.

Equity: This criterion measures the degree to which a given policy alternative helps (or at the very least, does not harm) vulnerable communities that, unfortunately, usually sit at the frontlines of violent crime and corresponding public safety strategies. Like administrative and political feasibility, this will be ranked on a low-medium-high scale.

Outcomes Matrix

Evaluation Criteria	Policy Alternatives		
	Public–Private Partnerships	Focused Deterrence (Group Violence Intervention)	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act Model
Cost-Effectiveness (per 1% reduction in violent crime)	\$17,082.15	\$49,088.75	\$725,163.99
Administrative Feasibility	Medium	Medium	Medium
Political Feasibility	Medium	High	Low
Equity	Medium	High	Medium

Recommendation

With a comprehensive outcomes matrix, it is clear that each policy alternative encompasses a diverse set of criteria scores that speak to strengths and weaknesses. However, this matrix shows that public–private partnerships and focused deterrence consistently outrank a RICO Act model. Ultimately, I recommend that Swedish partners pursue a public–private partnership between the Swedish National Police and relevant private partners (i.e., those in areas with high crime concentration). The reason that I am recommending public–private partnerships is (1) because it can by far be the most cost-effective alternative with the right stakeholders and implementation plan and (2) although focused deterrence ranks higher on the criteria of political feasibility and equity, this alternative has already been implemented in several Swedish localities, while P3s are a relatively new and innovative approach that has huge potential.

Implementation

The implementation of this alternative needs to be carefully tailored to the Swedish context and stakeholders it presupposes while also drawing from best practices in the United States. The most important stakeholders, potential challenges to the implementation process, and the best steps to mitigate these challenges will be briefly discussed.

Stakeholder Analysis

Management Groups (Swedish Police Intelligence)

The Swedish Police divide their intelligence hierarchy into three primary levels: national, regional, and local. Each level is split into management groups focusing on strategic or operational priorities. This allows for a uniform and coordinated information sharing environment through a top-down command and control structure, with personnel ranging from the National Police Commissioner to local investigators (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, pp. 74–76). Given their expansive reach and ability to sift through open-source intelligence while producing unique reports, these management groups are pivotal stakeholders for any public–private partnership regarding public safety and homeland security matters. This is particularly important when it comes to tackling organized crime, which can prove more sophisticated than other investigations and which will continue to grow more complex as criminal groups graduate from the drug trade to forms of fraud and business infiltration. This makes these groups a primary stakeholder in developing and maintaining public–private partnerships.

Other Government Agencies

Joint intelligence and operational efforts centered on organized crime in Sweden not only involve the Swedish National Police, but also eleven other government authorities who are critical stakeholders, including the National Employment Office, the Economic Crime Authority, and the Social Insurance Agency (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, p. 77). Given the multi-faceted nature of many organized crime groups, the inclusion of many agencies, and the cooperation and information sharing between these agencies, is critical to any public–private partnership, making them essential stakeholders. The relationships between these agencies are fostered by joint intelligence centres, with one in each region and the National Intelligence Centre. These aid in the sharing of data, tools, and finished intelligence products between these authorities. Other agencies besides the twelve that sit on councils also participate in this process, providing multidisciplinary resources to operational action groups on the ground. Under this categorization, it is also important to mention the Secretariat, which facilitates meetings among the collaborating and operational councils and helps coordinate communications (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, pp. 77–79).

Private Sector Partners

The leadership of premier Swedish businesses is familiar with the conversations on public safety between Swedish and American partners. One of the most substantial partners thus far has been the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, which arguably represents the heart of the Swedish economy, from small businesses to world-class corporations (globalEDGE, 2024). The Chamber has been instrumental in diagnosing the current anxiety of these businesses over Swedish crime trends. Many business leaders see this insecurity as a foundation for recruitment and investment woes, allowing for new conversations in public safety strategies (Savage, 2023). For obvious reasons, this means that Swedish private sector partners will be crucial stakeholders in developing public–private partnerships to counter the criminal milieu and must serve as trusted collaborators in any implementation processes. Although a national P3 model would be unprecedented in gang countermeasures, a collaboration between the Swedish Police and the private sector is not unheard of, given the Swedish Anti-Money Laundering Intelligence Task Force (SAMLIT)—a partnership between Swedish Police Intelligence and commercial banks to

support “the detection, investigation and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing” (European Commission, 2022, p. 10).

Potential Challenges

Both the Law Enforcement-Private Security Consortium (2009) and Morabito and Greenberg (2005) inform on the following challenges that could potentially arise when forming and implementing a public safety P3:

- Barriers to information sharing and relevant deliverables: information sharing can be suppressed by a desire of corporations to safeguard insights that could become publicly available and make them vulnerable to competition, while law enforcement agencies may be suspect of divulging information that could be leaked or subject to adversarial influence. A lack of meaningful meetings, trainings, and other activities can dampen the resolve and retention of P3 membership.
- Lack of trust: a lack of trust between the public and private sectors is possible due to a divergence of goals; even with the same goals, different ways of achieving them can also produce tension. Ultimately, this can create a sense that problems aren’t being addressed jointly.
- Misinformation and misunderstanding: the inherent differences between the public and private sectors mean that each may not fully comprehend what the other does or what they can potentially do.
- Lack of guidance on leadership turnover and overall structure: when there is inevitable turnover or structural deficiencies that aren’t anticipated, this can eventually stifle the ability of a P3 to achieve its mission.
- Lack of resources: although self-explanatory, resources that are especially essential to this process are personnel and technologies.


If these challenges are not actively anticipated and accounted for in forming and implementing a P3, the chances of long-term success are severely diminished.

P3 Formation Steps

The following steps are crucial to prevent and mitigate these challenges. Again, these insights are taken from two imperative voices in this sphere, the Law Enforcement-Private Security Consortium (2009) and the Morabito and Greenberg (2005), along with a P3 guide from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (2018). Each step falls under a stage of formation that is noted in parentheses and expanded on in the visual aid that follows:

1. Solidify a mission and shared values (**Aspiration**): without a shared vision, which manifests itself through a joint mission statement and shared values, a P3 cannot be sustained. At the heart of a P3 is a passion for solving a problem that brings public and private together.


2. Develop an informed P3 model (**Formulation**): stakeholders that have solidified a mission should then do a deep-dive into P3 models, existing partnerships, publications, conferences, and other resources that academics and institutions have to offer. A review of past experiences and insights, informed by stakeholder capabilities, helps to build a strong foundation for a successful P3.
3. Develop a detailed plan of action (**Delineation**): with a chosen model, the next step is to detail a plan of action, where day-to-day operations and timetables are fleshed out. This should also cover funding mechanisms and a communication structure that fosters information sharing and sound working relationships between each side.
4. Prepare a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other coordination agreement (**Formalization**): formalizing the partnership is essential not only because it shows that the partnership is a priority but also because it solidifies expectations and institutionalizes coordination efforts, in addition to promoting sound execution and longevity. Some partnerships may require more formalization, while others may need less. Still, it is a vital element of P3 formation that can be achieved through various legal tools, whether MOUs or incorporation.
5. Execute plan of action and assess (**Actualization**): with a partnership formalized, the last step is to execute a plan of action, followed by continual reporting and eventual assessments of strengths and weaknesses. Experts recommend starting with small, manageable projects and then scaling up. Not only should outcomes be measured for success, but they should also be documented with periodic public reports.



Source: Rampolla (2024)

As to *where* a public–private partnership could exist in Sweden’s current intelligence-led policing model, a promising option is the joint intelligence and operational efforts framework to

tackle organized crime. To illustrate, I have edited the organizational chart for this apparatus (Organization for Security and Co-operation, 2017), referenced in Appendix B, to include private sector partners:



Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017, p. 78) (Edited)

Although this is only one option for P3 formation, it shows the possibilities within Sweden's intelligence sharing network.

Conclusion

Implementing any P3, let alone one that promotes public safety and homeland security, is a vast undertaking that requires thorough study and coordination between stakeholders around a shared mission. However, with a rich literature and a series of successful past missions between American and Swedish partners, the possibility of a public–private partnership between law enforcement and the private sector in Sweden has never been more opportune. Whatever policy alternatives Sweden pursues, including many not covered by this report, future courses of action should continue to build on the nation's robust ILP model and give law enforcement the tools necessary to fulfill their public safety mission.

Appendix A: Evaluative Criteria Rubric

	Low	Medium	High
Administrative Feasibility	<p>Relevant institutions lack the resources necessary for administrative competency.</p> <p>Resources are scarce and/or unsustainable.</p> <p>Relevant institutions are not designed to achieve key administrative tasks.</p>	<p>Relevant institutions have the resources necessary for proper administration, but not to an optimized extent.</p> <p>Resources are attainable but subject to scarcity and threats of unsustainability.</p> <p>Relevant institutions are designed to achieve key administrative tasks, but also have embedded flaws that need to be addressed.</p>	<p>Relevant institutions have a totality of necessary resources that allow for fully optimized administration.</p> <p>Resources are not only attainable, but abundant, stable, and sustainable.</p> <p>Relevant institutions are designed with minimal flaws that allow for the optimization of key administrative tasks.</p>
Political Feasibility	<p>The political climate does not allow for a given policy alternative to be put on the agenda and successfully executed.</p> <p>Key political stakeholders are resistant to the given policy alternative and represent a lack of a political will.</p>	<p>The political climate allows for the given policy alternative to be put on the agenda, but does not approach the wide consensus and/or unanimity necessary for execution.</p> <p>Some key political stakeholders endorse the given policy alternative, while others do not, representing a conflicted political will.</p>	<p>The political climate not only allows the given policy alternative to be put on the agenda, but also commands wide consensus and/or unanimity that makes its execution likely.</p> <p>Many key political stakeholders endorse the policy and represent a clearly favorable political will.</p>
Equity	<p>A given policy alternative represents little or no opportunity to help</p>	<p>A given policy alternative represents an opportunity to improve not only the</p>	<p>A given policy alternative represents a clear and extensive opportunity to</p>

	<p>vulnerable communities, though it may help other communities.</p> <p>A given policy alternative, as a tool, could worsen outcomes for marginalized populations.</p>	<p>public safety of society at large, but also vulnerable communities.</p> <p>A given policy alternative, as a tool, is unlikely to worsen outcomes for marginalized populations but still requires strict standards.</p>	<p>improve the public safety for all, including vulnerable communities.</p> <p>A given policy alternative, as a tool, is extremely unlikely to worsen outcomes for marginalized populations and does not need strict standards.</p>
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Appendix B: Evaluative Criteria Calculations

Public–Private Partnerships

Cost-Effectiveness

Given the vast array of ways a public–private partnership can be initiated and maintained between law enforcement agencies and private sector entities, it is difficult to reach an average cost of a given program definitively. This diversity of initiatives also prevents a universal definition of an effectiveness metric; numbers of arrests, clearance rates, crime rates, and many other figures can be used. However, given the confidentiality they usually entail, what little information is available on these partnerships still provides some data that can be put together to offer a cost-effective stat.

We will specifically look at the Safe City Initiative implemented in Cincinnati, Ohio, known as the Western Corridor Safe City Project. This program consisted of collaboration between local law enforcement, local retailers spearheaded by Target, and other community stakeholders, with this project specifically located in “a relatively large geographic swath along the western side of the city spanning approximately five miles along mostly commercial areas interspersed with the Price Hill, Westwood, and Western Hills neighborhoods and ending at the city/county line” (La Vigne et al., 2009, pp. 1, 41). The practices under this initiative included fourteen all-partner meetings, business trainings in loss prevention, robbery prevention, and personal safety, enrollment of all businesses in the Citizen Observer Alert Network (which would email bi-monthly crime alerts), increased surveillance and theft prevention measures, and increased foot patrols (La Vigne et al., 2009, pp. 46–47). Using this as a model for cost-effectiveness, we first need to put the program cost in 2024 dollars. With a cost of \$221,093 at that time (La Vigne et al., 2009, p. 69), and using the midpoint of the program, May 2008, as a basis, Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculations using January 2024 as our standard brings the cost to \$314,768.08 in today’s dollars.⁹ We now need a denominator that can prove helpful; the best figure in this regard would be the statistically significant reduction in violent crime. For the sake of a uniform unit of effectiveness, this can be presented as a percent reduction; so, given that there was a statistically significant reduction in the average number of violent crimes reported from 9.28 to 7.57 (La Vigne et al., 2009, p. 65), this leaves us with, rounded, a percent reduction of 18.43%. Without rounding the denominator, this allows a final calculation of \$17,082.15 per 1% reduction in violent crime.

\$314,768.08 (cost of P3 in 2024 dollars)

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
18.43% (% reduction in violent crime) =

\$17,082.15 per 1% reduction in violent crime

⁹ Calculation made with the CPI Inflation Calculator on the official website of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).

Administrative Feasibility

Sweden has embraced ILP, which could make the administrative implementation of a P3 easier. In 2015, the Swedish Police undertook major reform, with not only 21 independent agencies being merged into a single National Police Authority (divided into seven regions), but also a “top-down command and control structure” for an ILP model. This consists of a national strategic level, a national operational level, a regional strategic level, a regional operational level, and a local operational level, with management groups meeting for each. A representative from the next level down will also attend each meeting to foster coordination and information sharing between these levels (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, p. 74). This is best displayed in the *OSCE Guidebook: Intelligence-Led Policing*:



Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017, p. 75)


National management groups meet every second week virtually, with an additional traditional meeting every month, while regional management groups solely meet every second week virtually. Local management groups solely meet once a week. Although they encompass many tasks, their primary responsibilities consist of:

- National Operational Management Group (NOLG): prioritization of “national actions, operations and investigations, based on intelligence reports from the National Criminal Intelligence Unit located within the National Operations Department of the Swedish National Police Authority.”
- Regional Strategic Management Groups (RSLGs): discussion and decision-making “on regional strategic directions and plans,” and decision-making “on long-term priority areas including resource allocation, based on national decisions by NOLG, strategic reports and assessments.”
- Regional Operational Management Groups (ROLGs): prioritization of “regional actions, operations and investigations, based on available information and intelligence reports from the regional intelligence units . . . The ROLG can make a decision to direct proposed actions to the local level and can request operational and intelligence support from the national level (NOLG).”
- Operational Local Groups (POLGs): decision-making “on local actions, operations and investigations based on reports from the local Intelligence Unit . . . POLG can request operational and intelligence support from the regional level (ROLG)” (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, p. 76).

Within this framework, a P3 is theoretically feasible due to an intelligence apparatus among the police that can support information sharing with private partners if they are brought into the fold. However, a question arises: how would this administrative capacity look specifically when tackling organized crime, i.e., gangs? Here too, Sweden has an apparatus, embedded in its ILP model, that would help in a given collaboration with the private sector. In 2009, a national initiative was launched by nine public authorities to foster joint intelligence and operational efforts to counter organized crime (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, p. 77). The initiative now stands at twelve agencies consisting of:

- Swedish National Police
- National Employment Office
- Economic Crime Authority
- Social Insurance Agency
- Prison and Probation Service
- Enforcement Authority
- The Migration Board
- The Swedish Coast Guard
- Tax Agency
- Security Services
- Customs
- Prosecution Authority

Similar to the organizational and decision-making structures of the Swedish ILP model, the structures for this initiative can be laid out and then explained:



Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017, p. 78)

The purpose of these distinct entities is:

- **Collaboration Council:** chaired by the Swedish National Police Commissioner, this council consists of the heads of each collaborating agency. It is tasked with developing and deciding on a joint strategy to mitigate organized crime. The group meets twice a year.
- **Operational Council:** chaired by the head of the National Operations Department in the National Police Authority, this council consists of the operational heads of the twelve

agencies. It is tasked with directing the use of Operational Action Groups and other resources in joint investigative or operational tasks. The council also serves as a rapporteur for the Collaboration Council. The group meets every month.

- Secretariat: this role supports the processes of collaboration and operational councils, along with action groups, by planning, preparing, and submitting proposals for decisions, taking minutes, and other tasks.
- Regional Collaboration Councils: with one for each of the seven police regions in Sweden, these councils set up joint actions at the local and regional levels and meet monthly. They report back to the Operational Council through the Secretariat.
- Joint Intelligence Centres: these multi-agency intelligence centres inform joint efforts through information sharing, including analytical services and intelligence products. A National Intelligence Centre in the National Operations Department also serves joint efforts on organized crime.
- Operation Action Groups: with 200 law enforcement staff divided into sections of 20–30 each, these units implement decisions from the Operational Council. Spread throughout the seven police regions and the National Operations Department, every unit consists of a group leader, investigators, analysts, and administrators. (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, p. 79)

It's clear from these structures that an information sharing environment is implemented at all levels, as explained by the *OSCE Guidebook*:

According to law from 2016, all these agencies/ authorities are not only allowed, but obliged to share each other's data, information and intelligence on intelligence tasks, conducted within the forum, when addressing criminal activity of serious nature, conducted in an organized manner and systematically by a group of individuals. (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, p. 79)

This means that including the private sector is possible and administratively feasible. However, given the contrasting organizational makeup and tools of the private sector, a lack of statutes and policies that govern their integration into this intelligence apparatus, and uncertainty over the presence, allocation, and sustainability of resources necessary for this integration, the administrative feasibility criterion score for this alternative is medium.

Political Feasibility

Although the Swedish partners engaging with my client have grown increasingly curious about public–private partnerships and how they can aid a public safety environment, it is safe to say that a healthy amount of skepticism remains among many political stakeholders in the country. It is difficult to pin down the exact mechanisms behind this skepticism. Still, conversations I have had with my client and Swedish officials reveal that a culture of collaboration is not a norm and lacks historical precedence in Sweden, save for a few examples. This is clear from many analyses of the P3 model by teams both in and outside the Swedish government. One analysis of P3s by the Swedish National Debt Office (2021) notes that these partnerships aren't ideal

because “public finances have been strong and continue to be so,” (p. 2) and in their summary go into further reasoning:

Our assessment is that the possible socio-economic benefits of PPP are uncertain and difficult to justify in relation to the disadvantages of this project delivery method. The disadvantages mainly consist of clearly higher financing costs and a worsening in government budgetary discipline and transparency. We therefore conclude that the central government should refrain from using [public–private partnerships]. (p. 1)

Another analysis, this one under the Stockholm Environment Institute, also showcases how fragile political support for these types of programs can be; Requena et al. (2021) highlight how P3s can lead to “[l]ack of assurance over the democratic mandate,” “political perceptions that private interest is above public interest[,]” and “[p]olitical deception, leading to lock-in of costs, which can be expensive for the public sector in the long run” (p. 2). Given, as said before, the robust tradition of public financing that Sweden has maintained for decades, it isn’t surprising that these sentiments ring throughout society. However, as shown by the many missions the Miller Center has hosted and participated in (with both parties crossing the pond for discussions and briefings), there has been an expanding interest in P3s as a policy alternative.

In January 2024, a group of Swedish officials, representing police leadership, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and executives from some of Sweden’s largest businesses discussed the concept and practice of P3s with those who are leading them in America today, such as the DC Police Foundation, Business Executives for National Security (BENS), and the NYPD Lower Manhattan Initiative.¹⁰ This mission was so successful that it prompted another visit the following month, this time consisting of Swedish Members of Parliament who received exclusive presentations and briefings on New Jersey’s police strategies, with one of them given on P3s by Paul Goldenberg of the Miller Center (Miller Center on Policing and Community Resilience, 2024). In addition, Sweden has some precedent for these types of partnerships, with some businesses and public authorities collaborating at the local level. A growing amount of political feasibility, if not absolute, is evident through the words of Fredrik Erfelt, who was part of the January 2024 mission: “The business sector desires and needs these types of initiatives to confront our challenges” (Gips & Goldenberg, 2023). Hence, by our evaluative criteria rubric, this alternative ranks as medium.

Equity

Given how powerful P3s can be in initiating information sharing, technological prowess, and enhanced surveillance, concerns over how these collaborations impact equity are warranted. Specifically, we can look at the Safe City Initiative and Target as a case study of how these partnerships can impact historically underserved groups and the marginalized today. After the murder of George Floyd, Target’s past practices in the criminal justice sphere were put under a microscope. In particular, a program similar to those under the Safe City Initiative, named the Minneapolis SafeZone Collaborative, received a \$300,000 donation from Target that helped fund new surveillance cameras, a new radio system for use between police and businesses, private security guards, and social service workers. This was done in tandem with the development of geographic restriction orders under the City Attorney’s Office and with the cooperation of

¹⁰ Unfortunately I could not find a press release detailing this.

Target, which barred offenders from entering specified areas of downtown (Waldman & Etter, 2021); the authors go into detail on how this impacted specific populations:

In 2009 the Minneapolis Police Department made nearly 9,000 arrests in the SafeZone, a 60% increase since the beginning of the program in 2004, according to the city's arrest data. More than 80% of the arrests were for misdemeanors, and 7 out of 10 offenders were Black. Roughly 20% of Minneapolis is Black. Between 2009 and 2021 at least 214 people were subject to geographic restriction orders, 74% of them Black and 10% American Indian. There were likely more such orders—some records are missing, including those for orders issued before 2009.

As shown above, increased surveillance can inequitably target groups and contribute to harmful stigmas. However, given that the research on public–private partnerships and their equity impact is far from definitive, and a lack of knowledge on how generalizable this experience would be in a Swedish context, it is appropriate that this policy alternative is scored as medium for this criterion scale based on the formulated rubric.

Focused Deterrence (Group Violence Intervention)

Cost-Effectiveness

Although focused deterrence, in the form of GVI, has been implemented in Sweden (Sluta Skjut), the program's total cost cannot be found at this time. Costs for these types of programs in the United States are also difficult to come by. However, one important data point is a Glasgow, Scotland report on the impact of the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), a gang intervention program modeled after GVI. This initiative stayed especially true to the model, reaching over 400 gang members through ten sessions spanning from October 2008 to February 2011, broken down into three main components: (1) enforcement, (2) services and programs, and (3) the moral voice of the community (Violence Reduction Unit, 2020). Similar to our first policy alternative above, we can first take a budget, this one standing at £1.4 million (Youth Endowment Fund, 2024), and after putting it into dollars, choose a month and year for CPI calculations; using the midpoint of the program, June 2010 is our choice. This budget in dollars is \$1,764,882, and with a January 2024 standard, it can be converted to a final cost of \$2,552,614.95 in today's dollars. In terms of the denominator, the program led to a 52% decrease in violent crime (Williams et al., 2014).¹¹ So, dividing gives us a cost-effectiveness metric of \$49,088.75 per 1% reduction in violent crime.

\$2,552,614.95 (cost of GVI in 2024 dollars)

÷

52% (% reduction in violent crime) =

\$49,088.75 per 1% reduction in violent crime

¹¹ When compared to non-CIRV gang members, there was only a 29% reduction in violent crimes in the treatment. However, when this is broken down by specific violent crimes, some of these comparisons are statistically significant, while others aren't. See Williams et al. (2014) for details.

Administrative Feasibility

Given the number of stakeholders, coordination, and resources needed for GVI, administrative challenges are present, but manageable given a detailed strategic plan. In reference to the implementation guide for GVI published by the National Network for Safe Communities, a follow-up study by Swedish scholars on Sluta Skjut notes that resources are supposed to be pulled from sources already present among stakeholders rather than obtained from new ones. However, they also note that this is not present yet in Malmö, explaining that “there is still a need for specially designated people with allocated time and knowledge to carry out the work with the strategy” (Ivert & Mellgren, 2023, p. 46) as showcased by several interviews of those involved. For context, the administration of the program consisted of the following:

Overall, the work within Stop shooting is organized with a steering group with representatives of the Probation Service in Malmö, the city of Malmö, the Malmö Police District and the National Operational Department. The steering group is responsible for the overall cooperation and that there are resources within the cooperating authorities. The work in Stop shooting is led by a project manager from the Police and a deputy project manager from the city of Malmö. The respective actor also has a number of coordinators who are responsible for driving and coordinating the operational work. These are key people for the implementation of the strategy. At the Police, there is a coordinator with responsibility for intelligence and analysis, one with responsibility for criminal investigation and two coordinators from the Malmö police area with a focus on crime prevention work and cooperation. The social service has a coordinator and within the Correctional Service there are three coordinators. (Ivert & Mellgren, 2023, p. 30).

Although resources are present, as shown above, this can especially be difficult on police, who have other responsibilities:

The police's coordinators emphasize that it is important that even within the police there are specially allocated resources to work with Stop Shooting and to establish a new way of working. Having the work with Stop Shooting as a concurrent task is described as "not optimal" and that it is periodically difficult to complete all the tasks. Even though it works as it is structured today and Stop Shooting is in many ways part of the regular work and also benefits other parts of the business, working with the strategy takes time away from other tasks. One of the coordinators also believes that if more resources were allocated to work with GVI and Stop shooting, it would benefit the entire organization. Having clearly dedicated assignments within the police to work with Stop Shooting would, based on what emerges in the interviews, also increase interest in the assignment as coordinator among the employees. (Ivert & Mellgren, 2023, p. 47)

Given these challenges, which nonetheless operate in an environment of administrative competency, this alternative scores as medium for this criterion.

Political Feasibility

Focused deterrence, specifically implemented as a GVI model, has spread across many Swedish jurisdictions and has blossomed as a method of countering violence among many municipalities.

As said before, Malmö served as the pilot municipality for this model, implementing the Sluta Skjut program from 2018 to 2020. This put GVI on the agenda throughout Swedish society and spread to many other locations nationwide, including Gothenburg, Uppsala, and Örebro. According to the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2022), the Swedish government has tasked their organization, the Swedish Police Authority, and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service “to jointly spread the GVI strategy to more locations” and reports that “authorities have built up a national support team to be able to provide methodological support to the municipalities that choose to implement the strategy.”

Hence, it is evident that there is a strong political will disseminated throughout Sweden for the GVI model, with key stakeholders, from local governments to the national government, embracing it. By the evaluative criteria rubric, this policy alternative is ranked as high for the political feasibility criterion.

Equity

One of GVI’s greatest strengths compared to the other policy alternatives considered is its ability to empower community stakeholders, particularly through the messages that can be delivered to targeted offenders and the resources they can provide them. Participants in Sweden’s GVI programs have reported how powerful a unified, moral message can be from the community, all while humanizing those who sometimes turn to crime when they do not think they have any other options (The Crime Report, 2021). It also provides a level of outreach and building of trust between public authorities and vulnerable communities that is not nearly as present in other alternatives. This in turn can help the community convince youth not to join gangs in the first place or defect (Gips & Goldenberg, 2023).

In their *Group Violence Intervention Issue Brief*, the National Network for Safe Communities (2020) postulates that the scars of historical harms, such as over-enforcement, demand a strategy that can “build communities’ capacity to prevent violence, use enforcement narrowly and strategically, help the most vulnerable people, and improve the legitimacy of police in the eyes of the community.” They also point, correctly, to another critical element of the GVI approach that helps promote equity: “Most people in those communities [with serious violence] are not at high risk for either victimization or offending. A very small number of identifiable street groups drive the violence, and the people in them face extraordinary risk and trauma” (National Network for Safe Communities, 2020).

With these considerations, it’s clear that focused deterrence, and GVI in particular, can uplift marginalized groups and give them a stake in the criminal justice process to an unparalleled extent compared to most strategies. All the while, vulnerable communities’ public safety and outcomes are not jeopardized. Accordingly, this policy alternative is scored as high for the equity criterion.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act Model

Cost-Effectiveness

Given the scarcity of information on how much anti-racketeering operations and proceedings cost the federal government, it is difficult to ascertain precisely how cost-effective RICO is as a

strategy against gang violence. However, an estimation of cost-effectiveness relative to our other alternatives is possible given the precise documentation of a RICO case study in the Bronx, New York:

Nestled outside the Parkchester complex and community in the Bronx, within the confines of the NYPD's 43rd Precinct, a small neighborhood became a warzone for its residents. Shootings, stabbings, homicides, and all kinds of violent crimes plagued this neighborhood for over a decade. The disproportionate number of crimes committed in less than one square mile—and across the precinct—raised alarm bells among community members and the leadership at 1 Police Plaza. Community Board Chairman William Rivera met with precinct officials several times to voice his concerns about this violent area, attributing the problem to the “recidivism of violent criminals.” The NYPD deemed the area so violent that it became part of an “impact zone,” where droves of officers flooded the area on foot posts every night to deter crime. (Ryerson, 2019, p. 27)

It was this environment that prompted a federal racketeering investigation by the Bronx Violent Crimes Squad of the New York Police Department (NYPD), with federal counterparts in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Investigators discovered that the majority of this violence was due to disputes over drugs and territory between two gangs: the Taylor Avenue Crew and the Leland Avenue Crew. The sale of crack cocaine and the carrying of illegal firearms were prevalent in both criminal enterprises. This led to two indictments in racketeering and narcotics offenses for members and associates of both gangs (nine of the Taylor Avenue crew and eight of the Leland Avenue crew) (Ryerson, 2019, pp. 27–31). Information on these proceedings is not easily summarizable and hence not practical. However, for our purposes, we can approach the cost (or at least show how much bigger it is compared to the other alternatives) with some math that is based on the indictment documents concerning the Taylor Avenue Crew and Leland Avenue Crew (United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, 2015)¹² and construct a hypothetical concerning the charges and amount of years that stick.¹³

First, we can approximate the cost of the investigation. RAND has an interactive tool that can estimate both law enforcement and court costs in 2010 dollars, both by state averages and national averages.¹⁴ Unfortunately, this does not allow for federal court estimates. Still, it can prove useful given that the investigation in the case study took place in New York and was partially operated by a law enforcement team within that state (Bronx Violent Crimes Squad). The indictment encompasses two murders of rival gang members, which, according to RAND, would cost about \$452,676; we'll be generous in having all other law enforcement operations fall under that price. This comes out to \$640,394.17 in 2024 dollars, translating the cost from July 2010 to January 2024. Now we turn to the court costs. One member of each gang committed

¹² See corresponding reference entry for all indictment documents and details.

¹³ As noted before, there are some limited sources on the outcomes of these indictments, but they only allow glimpses into the sentencing that came about. Additionally, many elements are sealed and these sources don't account for all the possible appeals and changes in sentences that have most likely occurred for many of the offenders.

¹⁴ See RAND webpage titled “Costs of Responding to Crime: Police, Court, and Legal Services” (<https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TLA517-1/tool.html>).

murder against the other gang, resulting in multiple murder charges for each perpetrator. There are also nuances as to what all the others were charged with, but to keep things simple, we can proceed with these two murder charges and narcotics conspiracy charges for all seventeen defendants. The costs to the court (using New York estimates rather than federal estimates) come out to \$82,352. Using the same standards as before, this comes out to \$116,502.18 in 2024 dollars. Finally, we turn to projected incarceration costs in our hypothetical sentencing. All guilty charges for narcotics conspiracy would result in a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison each; add that to, let's say, forty years served for each murder charge, and that brings us to 250 total years of incarceration. Suppose we assume that these are not served concurrently for a given offender with multiple charges and use the latest average annual cost of incarceration fee for a federal inmate (Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee, 2023). This brings the total incarceration cost to \$10,668,000 ($\$42,672 \times 10$). Since this is based on Fiscal Year 2022 data, we can use a midpoint of April 1, 2023 and translate that to January 2024 dollars, arriving at \$10,845,727.5. Now let's add all these costs together:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \$640,394.17 \text{ (cost of investigation in 2024 dollars)} \\
 & + \$116,502.18 \text{ (cost of court proceedings in 2024 dollars)} \\
 & + \$10,845,727.5 \text{ (cost of incarceration in 2024 dollars)} = \\
 & \hline
 & \$11,602,623.8 \text{ in total costs}
 \end{aligned}$$

In his case study of Taylor Avenue Crew/Leland Avenue Crew indictments, Ryerson (2019) reports “[f]ollowing the initiation of the racketeering case, almost all violent crime in this small neighborhood plunged at a rate far greater than experienced in both the borough of the Bronx and city of New York, as a whole” (p. 30). He bases this off crime numbers for the three years preceding the execution of the arrest warrants in the investigation compared to those encompassing the three years proceeding the execution of the search warrants,¹⁵ finding:

- A 50% reduction in homicides, compared to 1% in the borough and 7% in the city
- A 70% reduction in shootings, compared to 8% in the borough and 24% in the city
- A 26% reduction in robberies, compared to 10% in the borough and 18% in the city
- A 23% reduction in felony assaults, compared to a 9% *increase* in the borough and a 2% in the city
- A 16% combined reduction in the FBI “seven major crimes” (murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny, and grand larceny auto), compared to 1% in the borough, and 8% in the city

¹⁵ Unfortunately, this is far from any statistical confirmation that this drop was induced by the RICO charges. However, given the relatively small area of this neighborhood, and how much these gangs disrupted it, I am making a plausible assumption that dismantling these gangs led to these numbers post execution of the search warrants.

To generalize these reductions with those used for the cost-effectiveness calculations of the other two policy alternatives, this last percent reduction in the seven major crimes will be our denominator. The division of our total costs by this statistic gives us a cost-effectiveness metric of a whopping \$725,163.99 per 1% reduction in violent crime for this policy alternative.

\$11,602,623.8 (cost of RICO investigation in 2024 dollars)

÷

16% (% reduction in violent crime) =

\$725,163.99 per 1% reduction in violent crime

Administrative Feasibility

As mentioned earlier, a delegation of Swedish Parliamentarians visited New Jersey in February 2024 to deepen their understanding of potential crime-fighting strategies that could be brought back to Europe. One of the highlights of this mission was a presentation by attorney Jill S. Mayer, of Parker McCay P.A. Within a 26-year career in the office of the New Jersey Attorney General, Mayer spent 18 years as a Deputy Attorney General in the Gangs and Organized Crime and Racketeering Bureau. She has prosecuted hundreds of cases involving the illegal use of firearms, distribution of narcotics and narcotics trafficking, and robbery. She has also prosecuted over a dozen racketeering cases under New Jersey law (Miller Center on Policing and Community Resilience, 2024). Her presentation provided critical insights into the administrative challenges of the RICO model, explicitly noting that it is a prosecutorial tool underutilized due to the complexity of these statutes, its cost, the length of prosecutions, and the need for cooperating witnesses.

This leads to a critical question: in the face of these implementation challenges in the U.S., how generalizable is RICO when looking at Sweden? Several asymmetries between both nations immediately stand out. One of these is the fact that Sweden does not have the harsh sentencing that RICO-like statutes demand (Schartmueller, 2015). Another is that Sweden does not have plea bargains in their justice system (Hedström, 2018, p. 61–62), which some scholars see as an essential part of RICO prosecutions (Leblang, 1990). Swedish Parliamentarians brought up plea bargains during Mayer’s presentation, with a consensus that this could be a roadblock to adopting racketeering statutes. This means that, almost certainly, Sweden would have to create new judicial tools and types of proceedings to accommodate racketeering charges modeled on RICO. However, some parts of Sweden’s legal code would dovetail nicely with this reform, and represent resources that would not need to be sought after in the first place. One example of this is a new wiretapping law that was passed in October 2023, which now allows Swedish Police to secretly intercept communication of private individuals without concrete suspicion of a crime (Sveriges Radio, 2024). In her presentation, Mayer noted that wiretaps are not only the most powerful tool for prosecutors besides racketeering charges, but also that the two go hand in hand in these cases, making adopting a RICO model in Sweden easier. All considered, this alternative is hence ranked as medium for this criterion.

Political Feasibility

The current political environment in Sweden suggests that it would be difficult for RICO-like legislation to be put on the agenda, let alone become law. In a discussion with one Swedish Parliamentarian, he noted that there have been past legislative proposals that mirror RICO, but could never make it across the finish line. So how is this different from the political feasibility of public–private partnerships, which also have yet to be implemented at the national level? Although several factors make public–private partnerships more politically feasible (in my estimation), two stand out: (1) there is already precedent for this policy alternative at the local level, unlike racketeering statutes, and (2) the political cultures of relevant institutions do not seem to approach the level of buy-in for racketeering statutes that they do for public–private partnerships (as discussed earlier).

The lack of a stable political will is best shown by the study of the “law and order” issue in Cattermole’s (2023) analysis of party competition between the Social Democrats, the Swedish Democrats, and the Moderates between 2014–2022. In the 2022 elections, 50% of Swedish voters put “law and order” as a top ten issue. However, when we look at the 2022 election manifestos from these three parties, differing takes on the issue are apparent, albeit with a few strands of commonality. Cattermole (2023) highlights three “aspects” of the law and order issue that each election manifesto addresses in some capacity: (1) “increased support and resources for the police,” (2) “tougher attitudes in courts,” (3) “the importance of internal security” (p. 11). The following table shows where each party stands on these three aspects, via the considered election manifestos from 2022:

Source: Cattermole (2023)	Sweden Democrats	Social Democrats	Moderates
Increased Support and Resources	“It is stated that they need to be given the right tools to do their job and be supported by society through a strong judiciary. Simplified rules regarding confidentiality are highlighted as facilitating the cooperation between police and other authorities” (p. 17).	“[They emphasize] . . . increased powers . . . [such as] possibilities to listen in and house search, as well as removing obstacles related to confidentiality between authorities” (p. 19).	“ . . . making the police profession more attractive is mentioned under the fourth heading in the chapter concerning crime, with higher salaries and harsher punishments for crimes committed against police . . . In addition to this, increased capacities are highlighted by removing obstacles related to confidentiality, as well as rolling out visitation zones” (p. 21).
Tougher Attitudes	. . . criminal policy	“ . . . the preventive	“Harsher punishments

	[should] be fundamentally reformed, with new judicial tools and harsher punishments . . . [such as] Removing the reduction of sentences and premature releases as well as lowering the age for criminal responsibility is raised” (p. 17).	side is underlined linked to combatting segregation and improving integration, while also highlighting harsher measures to combat crime . . . Segregation is stated as being a driving force in the development of crime, where the integration has failed to meet high immigration, leading to economic inequalities” (p. 19).	concern for example gang crime, sexual offences, crimes against police, weapons offences, and crimes against the elderly” (p. 21).
Internal Security	“[It’s argued there should be] more police, security guards, camera surveillance and lighting . . . Internal security is raised in relation to foreign criminals” (p. 18).	“. . . serious crimes are described as undermining Swedish security and interpersonal trust . . . Powerful measures are stated as important to combat crime and increase security” (p. 19).	“. . . imprisonment of criminals and reforming the justice policy are mentioned to reestablish security” (p. 22).

With these differences considered, and despite a few similarities, this policy alternative is scored as low for this criterion.

Equity

A substantial amount of the scholarship focused on RICO has been negative and primarily focuses on how RICO intersects with marginalized populations, civil rights, and civil liberties. This should not be taken lightly, given the in-depth analysis that Swedish criminologists have devoted to the intersection of marginalization and gang violence. Woods (2011), conducting an empirical study of publicly released RICO prosecutions of criminal street and prison gangs, finds that 86% of these cases involve at least one racial minority group. Additionally, he finds that the five gangs in the sample subjected to more than three prosecutions under RICO all were Latino- and Black-Affiliated gangs, labeled as "more prominent" gangs by the Department of Justice (pp. 328–335). Although he doesn’t statistically prove it, he argues that this could be due to systematic racial biases, grounded in stereotypes and gang conceptualization. He explains that this would not only hurt disadvantaged groups in the criminal justice process but also advantaged communities:

Conflating racial minorities with criminal activity enables the government to rely upon denigrating racial stereotypes in order to engage in invidious practices of racial profiling and to conduct sweeping arrests of racial minorities under RICO. This conflation also shields groups of nonimmigrant White criminal offenders from being conceptualized as gangs and shields nonimmigrant White neighborhoods from the stigma of having gang problems. In practice, this may harm communities that have White gang problems by preventing the government from executing gang-specific interventions within those communities. (Woods, 2011, p. 303).

However, a few other points should be emphasized when looking at RICO-like legislation for Sweden. First, it could be that this speaks more to American society than RICO itself, because as a tool, RICO will fall victim to the biases of prosecutors. Put another way, the merits of the tool should not be conflated with the merits of those who use it. In fact, this is what Woods (2011) reflects on at the end of his paper:

Clear and enforceable standards must be put into place in order to inhibit the government from using gang prevention as a pretext to engage in invidious practices of racial profiling that erroneously label innocent racial minorities, and racial minority criminal offenders without gang ties, as gang members. Given the harsh consequences of RICO convictions, these new strategies are essential to prevent RICO from operating as a state instrument of racial subordination. (p. 352)

Interestingly, some authors have even discussed how instrumental RICO could be in countering white supremacist organizations and other threats of domestic extremism. Deogracias (2020) makes this argument, specifically referencing two RICO cases against white supremacist groups in *United States v. Yarbrough* (targeting the “Bruders Schweigen,” or “Silent Brothers”) and *United States v. Loadholt et. al.* (targeting the “New Aryan Empire”) (pp. 335–337). With the conclusion that “[t]he United States’ statutory scheme fails to encompass the current nature and threat of domestic extremism[,]” Romano (2023) asserts that RICO can serve as a model for the creation of “a domestic extremism statute that would allow the government to present a pattern of aggregated hate crime activity, link it to a related domestic enterprise, and use this enterprise’s pattern of criminal activity to designate domestic extremist organizations” (pp. 1011–1012).

Given these points, it is clear that RICO could hurt vulnerable communities, but it can also be a force for good if the proper procedures and standards are in place. Hence, this alternative is scored as medium for the equity criterion.

Appendix C: Past Policy Recommendations from the Miller Center

As mentioned before, the Miller Center on Policing and Community Resilience, in tandem with past missions, has previously highlighted and recommended policies to mitigate Sweden's struggle with gang violence and improve public safety. Although this encompasses many areas of expertise, the most substantial and relevant to this report consisted of guidance on improving the expedition and flow of information between different partners in a given investigation. Specifically, the Miller Center, along with the New Jersey State Police, the Newark Police Department, and other partners, highlighted the following insights concerning Swedish investigations (which is not an exhaustive list):

1. There should be equal attention to non-lethal shooting assaults (including “hits” and no-hits”) by police teams, including the Crime Scene Unit (CSU), Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU), and Intelligence Unit (IU) (Rostami & Fuentes, 2021).
2. To quote Rostami and Fuentes (2021) directly: “. . . responses to shooting incidents required more staffing and better coordination on the part of forensics units. Following notification by the first responding patrol, an immediate response was conducted by the CSU. Further responses by the [CIU] and the [IU] followed. The response of the latter two units was often delayed and uncoordinated. Although members of the CIU were responsible for the investigation of the incident, too little guidance and direction was provided to the CSU.”
 - “. . . it could not be determined if post-scene examinations were carried out. . . there was no indication that shell casings recovered at the scene, or gathered from test-fired, recovered weapons, had been entered into the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS), a ballistics tracking database located at the National Forensic Center (NFC) in Linkoping.”
3. To quote Rostami and Fuentes (2021) again: “A critical finding by the U.S. law enforcement delegation was the untimeliness of providing lead value ballistics information to investigators in the field once recovered weapons or ballistics had been turned over to the NFC in Linkoping This shortfall is largely due to administrative reasons and the nature of the forensic examination process . . . a similar problem had arisen with the NJSP in that information connecting ballistics or guns to serial crime took up to 10 months to reach the investigator. During that period, suspects were giving ample time to cover their tracks, witnesses chose not to testify, and additional incidents occurred from serial shooters.”
4. There should be increased criminal information sharing between different regions of the Swedish National Police through a CompStat process, given how organized crime and gang activity connections span the entire country (Rostami & Fuentes, 2021).

These insights are pertinent to this report due to a desire to look at policy alternatives that dovetail effectively with past policy recommendations from the Miller Center.

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