



**GROUND TRUTH
SOLUTIONS**

INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE

A CASE STUDY IN LEBANON

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Disclaimer

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OVERVIEW

Acronyms and Key Terms

Agency: A synonym for organisation, referring to aid provision groups.

ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance

CHS: Core Humanitarian Standard

Cluster: A group of agencies working on one issue in a crisis, such as nutrition or shelter.

GT: Ground Truth (Ground Truth Solutions)

IOM: International Organisation for Migration

IRC: International Rescue Committee

MMP: Mixed Migration Platform

NFI: Non-food items

(I)NGO: (international) non-governmental organisation

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency

WFP: World Food Programme



Executive Summary

According to reports conducted by Ground Truth Solutions in 2017, accountability to affected people in Lebanon is in need of improvement. Affected people report low scores regarding relevance of services, satisfaction with complaints mechanisms, and feelings of inclusion in decision-making. With this information in mind, aid organisations can choose among several courses of action in order to improve accountability.

Accountability is critical to aid operations for two main reasons. Providing services without inquiring about a community's most urgent needs is likely to lead to ineffective and inefficient aid activities, wasting time and money of aid agencies and donors. Additionally, allowing affected people a "seat at the table" for decision making can bolster feelings of control and agency over their own lives. Lack of agency is a challenge commonly faced by affected people that can lead to depression and hopelessness.

Pursuing accountability in aid is a relatively new concept that lacks comprehensive evidence and evaluative frameworks. However, borrowing from practices in the private sector and improving upon existing accountability mechanisms in aid can provide solid, albeit experimental, approaches to increasing the agency affected people have in the decision-making process.

This report proposes a suite of options that can be adopted at the agency, cluster, or response-level in order to increase accountability to affected people. While it uses Lebanon as a case study, the findings are likely scalable and can be extrapolated to other contexts.

The agency-level solution involves the implementation of crude feedback terminals that collect information on affected people's satisfaction with services using a smiley-face button system. The terminals do not rely on language or written words and may be able to sidestep cultural barriers due to the informality and ease of providing feedback. This approach may serve as a gateway for agencies to take meaningful action towards affected peoples' perceptions that agencies do not listen to them or follow up on complaints.

At the cluster level, agencies can work together to implement the Constituent Voice™ Method. The Constituent Voice™ Method is a measurement and performance management methodology developed by Keystone Accountability, the parent organisation of Ground Truth Solutions, in 2013. This method uses five cyclical steps in order to gather data about organisational performance from beneficiaries and make adjustments to improve outcomes.

Finally, the response-level solution is to implement a common feedback tool. A common feedback tool entails a single strategy and survey method for collecting feedback, which is then used by all organisations response-wide. This method of feedback collection ensures that organisations are using the same information and format while avoiding redundancy and survey fatigue that occurs when different agencies repeatedly ask the same questions.

This report also provides an outcomes matrix for comparison of trade-offs, as well as budget estimates for each option.



CONTEXT AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Problem Definition

Data collected by Ground Truth Solutions reveals weak accountability to affected people in Lebanon via relevance of services, satisfaction with complaints mechanisms, and feelings of inclusion and participation. Little effort has been made thus far to assess the accountability landscape or to identify possible methods of increasing affected people's feelings of inclusion and autonomy.

Organisations hold a high stake in affected peoples' feelings of inclusion and participation. Providing services without inquiring about a community's most urgent needs is likely to lead to ineffective and inefficient aid activities (Davis, 2007). Additionally, allowing affected people a "seat at the table" for decision making can bolster feelings of control and agency over their own lives. Lack of agency is a challenge commonly faced by affected people that can lead to depression and hopelessness (Huen et al., 2017).

The country of Lebanon is one of the primary recipients of Syrian refugees fleeing war, due to its proximity. It is also a common place of settlement for displaced Palestinian refugees. The sheer volume of refugees arriving in the country presents unique challenges to basic aid provision, coordination among agencies, and accountability; in 2017, it was estimated that one in every four people in Lebanon was a refugee (Sherlock, 2017).

This project focuses specifically on the five regions of Lebanon in which Ground Truth Solutions has contracted surveys: North Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, Beqaa, South Lebanon, and Beirut. These regions encompass a variety of environmental circumstances, from urban cities to refugee camps. The organisations involved in aid provision include, but are not limited to: UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, IOM, IRC, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Association Najdeh, Kayany Foundation, and Amel Association. Approaches to accountability will likely vary by context.

Overview of Accountability

The Core Humanitarian Standard Alliance, a group of the major players in humanitarianism, defines accountability as "the process of using power responsibly, taking account of, and being held accountable by, different stakeholders, and primarily those who are affected by the exercise of such power" (CHS, 2014). In different terms, accountability can be described "as a demonstration and measurement of the benefits and contributions of those acting, or the assurance that something is being managed well and outcomes are being achieved effectively and efficiently" (Everett & Friesen, 2010). There are two types of accountability: downward accountability, or accountability to the people served by NGO's; and upward accountability, or accountability to donors (Ebrahim, 2003). This literature review and subsequent project focus mainly on downward accountability.

Accountability is considered the crossroads of the political, ethical, and power dimensions in the field of humanitarian aid; it is a means by which humanitarian actors acknowledge their power within crisis contexts and provide agency for affected people in matters that concern their own livelihoods (Gross Stein, 2008). This initiative is about asking affected people for their input, empowering them while simultaneously making aid efforts more efficient and effective (CHS, 2015).

The late 1990's saw an unprecedented increase in the amount of funding available for humanitarian organisations, and with it, an increased pressure to ensure that aid was delivered in a manner that best met needs. Compounded by highly publicised "aid failures," such as the Rwandan Genocide, the issue of reforming humanitarian operations gained increasing attention at the turn of the century (Davis, 2007). The pressures of funding, media attention, and a changing humanitarian identity launched the field of humanitarian aid into what is often referred to as an "accountability revolution," in which mechanisms were put in place to ensure that humanitarian actors were required to meet obligations set by donors and



to systematically incorporate input from the recipients of aid (Knox-Clarke & Mitchell, 2011).

Since the start of the accountability revolution, aid organisations have created several institutions to coordinate activities and emphasize accountability in practice. One of the most notable organisations is the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) Alliance, a group of 13 international humanitarian actors including the British and American governments. The CHS Alliance is committed to upholding the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, which sets out nine commitments to accountability in humanitarian programming (CHS, 2014). Another is the Sphere Project Group, a coalition of agencies that came together to write and publish a set of standards for humanitarian practice, which are updated every several years (Davis, 2007).

Today, international agencies are governed by professional standards that mandate coordination and reporting to donors and to affected people and governments in crises. These same standards also oblige agencies to meaningfully involve aid recipients in their programming while maintaining transparency in goals and operations (Davis, 2007). In practice, agencies often instate complaints mechanisms such as suggestion boxes or hotlines that affected people can use to provide feedback on the services they receive (Bainbridge, 2011).

What is Feedback?

An understanding of what constitutes feedback is essential to understanding the framework for accountability and the challenges it entails. There are two general types of feedback: unsolicited and systematic (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c).

Unsolicited feedback comes in the form of complaints and suggestions made by affected people without being prompted. These suggestions are normally collected via hotlines, in which affected people call a number provided by organisations to complain, or complaints boxes, where affected people write their feedback on a piece of paper and put it into a box before it is collected by agency staff. While the original intent of these mechanisms was to detect cases of corruption or negligence, organisational evaluations show that affected people tend to use such tools as a means of complaining about operational issues.

Systematic feedback is collected and tracked via the active collection of input from affected people, normally using a survey of predetermined questions. These surveys seek the opinions of affected people and use them as a tool for operational improvements, including the effectiveness, relevance, and fairness of organisational activities. This type of feedback allows organisations to collect specific information on key issues and provides a portal for later follow-up and increased community engagement (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c).

Challenges to Accountability

While the rhetoric of accountability in humanitarian aid has been prevalent for decades, practice “continues to lag behind” because “actors outside the traditional power structures of the humanitarian system have little real influence over humanitarian financing and programming” (ALNAP, 2015). Providing means for affected people to voice their opinions and participate in decision making, while generally considered an ideal outcome, presents considerable challenges for the humanitarian community.

The first is the operational challenge of coordinating feedback collection and accountability programming across agencies at the response level. The current mode of operation typically involves a collective feedback approach, in which organisations collect their own feedback and attempt to share the data amongst each other, normally through an online platform (such as the Humanitarian Data Exchange). While the benefit of this is independence in data collection and the ability to ask the targeted questions most relevant to each organisation’s operations, this approach is lacklustre in terms of data sharing and coordination. Because agencies do not use the same data collection methods, the aggregation of their collected feedback is usually too difficult to parse and meaningless in a response-wide context. There is



also a high risk of duplication and survey fatigue, as affected people are too frequently asked the same questions by multiple organisations (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c).

Though accountability programs are fairly inexpensive compared to other humanitarian activities, they present trade-offs in the form of time, effort, and risk aversion. Too much accountability, particularly in the form of stringent regulations, can be crippling in a high-stakes mission as “organisations become mired in an endless cycle of evaluation and reporting” (Gross Stein, 2008). Thus, it is important that organisations maintain a balance between collecting sufficient input from affected people and having the liberty to make quick decisions under stressful conditions.

Accountability programming can also backfire, complicating relationships between aid providers and affected people when such programs are adopted hastily or cursorily. Bainbridge suggests, “expectations are raised when communities are asked for feedback, as people then feel disappointed or ignored if they perceive that no action is taken in response and lose faith in the feedback system.” Thus, complaints mechanisms could do more harm than good when affected people use them and do not receive a response. Bainbridge also discusses the challenge posed when agency staff implement feedback systems without an understanding of the principles underlying the desire for feedback from affected people (Bainbridge, 2011). Combined, these two elements could lead to consequences in crisis response, as affected communities may begin to feel disempowered and distrustful of aid providers.

Evidence and Lessons Learned

Accountability in Lebanon

Current accountability mechanisms in Lebanon include focus group surveys; “community structures” such as peer groups, community hygiene volunteers, community technical volunteers and women’s groups (Oxfam, 2017); suggestion boxes; and hotlines (di Giovanni, 2013). Conversations with aid workers in Lebanon have revealed that these types of feedback mechanisms are largely successful for small-scale local organisations who have the language skills and cultural knowledge necessary to develop intimate relationships with affected people (El-Khateeb, 2018). However, one anonymous aid worker mentioned that a common problem she faces is incentivizing affected people to come forward with feedback on their own, versus soliciting feedback from them. Her worry was that solicitation has implications for the completeness and quality of the feedback. She also mentioned that current complaints boxes (in which affected people submit written feedback into a box that is later read by staff) are underutilized, likely due to language and literacy barriers along with cultural issues (Anonymous, 2018).

Ground Truth Solutions conducted two rounds of surveys in Lebanon this year, in which they inquired about refugees’ thoughts on several issues, including current complaints mechanisms and accountability measures. In the first round, they found that the majority of refugees know how to lodge complaints, but that nearly 80% say that they do not feel that they have a voice in the decision-making process. They are also uncertain as to whether, if they do complain, they will receive a response (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017a). Three months later, the second round of surveys showed no improvement, where only 1% of refugees indicated they feel as though they are able to participate in agencies decisions about the support they receive (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017b). This suggests that those mechanisms currently in use in Lebanon are inadequate and, as discussed, could be contributing to feelings of distrust and disempowerment.

Accountability in Other Humanitarian and Development Contexts

Ebrahim (2002) discusses social auditing as “a process through which an organisation assesses, reports, and improves upon its social performance and ethical [behaviour], especially through stakeholder dialogue.” Social auditing is typically used by private business organisations to monitor social impact; it is heavily used by Scandinavian businesses, with much success. Proponents argue that such mechanisms can be helpful for NGOs to improve



their public reputation via transparency and can improve analytics and monitoring. Ground Truth's Constituent Voice Method™, discussed later in this report, can be considered a form of social auditing. However, social auditing can be costly and may potentially be overwhelming for small NGOs that lack sufficient staff and resources (Ebrahim, 2002).

In service provision and learning contexts, participant-centred engagement efforts to promote ownership and wellbeing have proven to be successful in a variety of development settings. Friis-Hansen and Duveskog (2012) find empirically that group-based learning initiatives “can lead to empowerment and act as a pathway to increased wellbeing.” These initiatives focus on engaging small groups in participatory learning. Their study found statistically significant improvements in livelihoods following farmer field training programs in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Such an initiative could translate to humanitarian contexts related to service provision; organisations may find it helpful to engage small groups in food distribution and WASH programming, as opposed to large-scale or camp/city-wide allocations. Small group learning and service provision could be especially useful for programs in urban settings, where it is difficult to access refugees (UNHCR, 2009).

A helpful mental and organisational framework for viewing the challenges to accountability is called the ownership approach. This approach “emphasizes participation and ownership. In this approach, quality is a negotiated concept that ideally should be formulated in a bottom-up rather than a top-down fashion.” Viewing crisis response through this lens maintains a focal point on the recipients of aid and provides an impetus for coordinated accountability mechanisms that go beyond suggestion boxes and mandate that agencies listen to affected people and consider their opinions in decision-making (Hilhorst, 2002). This type of approach can help to circumvent the problems of cursory implementation discussed by Bainbridge (2011), though it has yet to be empirically evaluated.

Description of Stakeholders

Affected People

The category of affected people includes refugees fleeing to Lebanon, but also the Lebanese people themselves who are affected by the influx of refugees. While the term “affected people” in Ground Truth reports refers mainly to the former, it is worthwhile to discuss the stake that both affected parties hold in this crisis.

A refugee is someone who “an individual who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence who is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR, 2011). It is estimated that Lebanon hosts nearly 1.5 million refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Those refugees who are not resettled struggle in neighboring under-developed countries without work permits or social support, often sleeping on park benches or sharing dank single rooms with multiple other families (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017d). Others are placed in camps where they must deal with inadequate sanitation, idleness, threats of violence, shortages of supplies and services, and general feelings of hopelessness as few opportunities are presented to them to leave the camps. Taking the views of affected people into account is critical to ensuring their needs are met in the most effective way.

The people of Lebanon are also affected by crisis. As previously discussed, one in four people living in Lebanon is a refugee. This entails significant changes to societal structures for the people of Lebanon, who must accommodate newcomers who, while mostly from a similar culture, may operate under different cultural norms and historic societal precedents. It is important to take their views into account when providing services and programs for refugees in order to prevent disaccord and conflict between refugees and their host community.



Aid Agencies

Agencies are in a difficult position in aid delivery accountability because of their obligations both to donors and affected people, whose goals may not always overlap. Donors historically tend to place considerable pressure on agencies to demonstrate performance and meet outcome targets, even at the expense of inefficiency and waste (Davis, 2007). At the same time, agencies exist to aid affected people, and the humanitarian imperative under which they operate obligates them to serve the needs of affected people to the best of their ability. Accountability initiatives could help aid agencies bridge the gap between donors and affected people by providing demonstrable evidence of what affected people want and by creating a new means of monitoring performance. However, as discussed, many aid workers and the agencies they work for must make an effort to shift their mindset and goals from the “old school” view of affected people as helpless beneficiaries and towards a more collaborative way of operating (Bainbridge, 2011). This may prove quite difficult for some but appears to be increasingly easy for the new generation of aid workers.

Donors

Donors, like some aid workers and agencies, are presented with the considerable challenge of shifting their mindset to welcome accountability initiatives. This is particularly difficult for donor governments, who may use aid to meet political objectives and benefit their own citizens (Seo, 2017). However, accountability initiatives also benefit donors by helping them to target their initiatives to have the highest impact. Providing funding for an initiative that affected people do not want, such as distributing food they do not like to eat or NFI they do not need, is ultimately a waste of money. Allowing affected people a voice in the decision making process helps make donors and their funding more effective.



DATA ANALYSIS

Data Source

The main data source for this paper comes from large-scale surveys of affected people in Lebanon, conducted by independent external enumerators hired by Ground Truth Solutions and paid for by the Mixed Migration Platform initiative. These datasets include affected people's responses to a series of questions about their treatment and conditions, generally reported on a Likert scale of 1-5. The datasets also report basic demographic information of participants. The first round of data collection was conducted with 452 respondents, and the second round with 455.

Methodology

Data Collection

Ground Truth Solutions describes its data collection methodology as follows:

"The affected population was sampled randomly. The objective was to have representative samples in each of Lebanon's five regions, for each of the three refugee groups (Syrian refugees, PRL, PRS) and a 50-50 male-female split, with at least 50 respondents for each demographic subgroup to ensure sufficient representation. In this round of data collection refugees were interviewed in the same locations as the survey in March 2017 in order to compile comparable data sets. There are some differences from the previous sample: the number of people interviewed in Beirut is higher in this round and fewer people were interviewed in collective shelters, hence this category was not included in the breakdown. Refugees were interviewed in public places, on the streets, in social gatherings, informal tented settlements, and official refugee camps.

The confidence intervals for the full sample estimates are 95% with a 5% false alarm rate. In other words, we can be 95% certain that the broader population's attitudes fall within 5% of the responses for the full sample, assuming no sampling or response biases. Missing responses from particular questions are excluded from means-comparisons" (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017b)

Analysis

Data was explored using regression analysis in Stata. Critical analysis was conducted to determine variables relevant to the three outcomes. The reported results reflect opinions across the two rounds. Due to the shortage of data and lack of experimental framework, analysis was conducted using OLS regression. These analyses were extrapolated to provide disaggregation of responses and correlational explanations of trends. All results reported are significant at the 95% confidence level. Caution should be taken in interpreting these results, as no case presents strong enough evidence to conclude causality.


Results

The following subsections report results of regression analysis of Ground Truth Indicators on a variety of factors pertaining to demographics and location of affected people. For more detailed results, regression tables can be found in Appendix A.

Relevance of Services

Q2. Needs met by services

Are your most important needs met by the services you receive?




(values in %)

Trend in mean scores: 2.5 → 2.3



Source: Ground Truth Solutions 2017b

Ground Truth Solutions' second-round MMP survey in Lebanon found affected people living in Beirut to be the most negative regarding relevance of services, followed by those in South Lebanon, Beqaa, North Lebanon, and Mount Lebanon (see right). The larger trend from these results shows that, excluding Beirut itself, governorates that are further from the capital tend to be associated with more negative scores. It could be the case that governorates further from the central hub of service provision are more neglected, though this does not explain why affected people in Beirut report the lowest scores.



Source: Ground Truth Solutions 2017b

In general, there is not a statistical difference in feelings toward service relevance for men and women. Opinions on service relevance also did not vary by type of accommodation or length of stay in the current location.

Unsurprisingly, the number of services an affected person receives is positively associated with his or her opinion on service relevance. For each additional service a person received, he or she reported a Likert scale score that was .3 higher on average. The average number of services received across these two rounds was 3.15.

The final factor associated with service relevance was smartphone usage. Those people who report using their internet-enabled smartphone each day gave scores that were .26 lower on average. It is difficult to determine why this is the case, but it could be due to higher expectations that are related to wealth and information availability.

Satisfaction with Complaints Mechanisms

Follow-up question asked to those who responded "Yes" to the previous question:

Are you satisfied with the available channels to make suggestions or complaints?

1 = Not at all
2 = Not very much
3 = Neutral
4 = Mostly yes
5 = Completely
Do not know
Do not want to answer

(values in %)

Trend in mean scores: 2.5 → 2.9



Source: Ground Truth Solutions 2017b


Similar to results for relevance of services, affected people living in Beirut report the lowest amount of satisfaction with complaints mechanisms (see right). Excluding Beirut, those governorates that are further away from the capital tend to report more negative scores. Gender, age, and type of accommodation do not seem to be associated with satisfaction for this question.

Again, the number of services received is associated with more positive responses regarding complaints mechanisms; for every additional service received, affected people report scores .05 higher on average. Note

that this effect is smaller than it was for relevance of service, likely because of the weaker correlation between services and complaints mechanisms. The correlation here may be due to a general increased feeling of satisfaction and thus a lower probability of making a complaint.

Those who own a smartphone report scores that are .32 higher on average than those who do not. This could be due to their ability to access virtual complaints mechanisms and hotlines, as well as their increased access to information about how to complain. Affected people who have stayed longer in a given location are also more likely to report satisfaction with complaints mechanisms, perhaps due to their knowledge about how to complain as a consequence of the length of their stay.

Finally, Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) are more likely to report higher scores than Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (PRL) or Syrian refugees from Syria (SRS). On average, their satisfaction with complaints mechanisms was .5 higher. It is difficult to determine the cause for this trend, but it could be related to the attention they receive due to their status or their geographic location.



Source: Ground Truth Solutions 2017b

Feelings of Inclusion and Participation

Q11. Participation

Do organisations involve you in decisions about the support they provide?

1 = Not at all
2 = Not very much
3 = Neutral
4 = Mostly yes
5 = Completely
Do not know
Do not want to answer

(values in %)

Trend in mean scores: 1.6 → 1.2



Source: Ground Truth Solutions 2017b

In the case of inclusion and participation, affected people were negative across the board. In this case, distance is not associated with perceptions. Gender, again, is also not associated with perceptions. Using a smartphone was not associated with feelings of inclusion and participation, despite its correlation with satisfaction with complaints mechanisms.

For every additional ten years of age, affected people reported scores that were .06 higher on average. It could be the case that agencies are more likely to engage with older people within a community, or that older people have the perception of being more included due to their age and status.

As with the other two questions examined, number of services received is positively associated with feelings of inclusion and participation. This could be due to an overall increased satisfaction with humanitarian response. Alternatively, it could be that those receiving a high number of services are biased in their response so as not to seem ungrateful or to avoid having services taken away by complaining.

Type of accommodation played a role in the context of inclusion and participation. With all else equal, those living in Palestinian unofficial gatherings reported the lowest scores, followed by Palestinian refugee camps, private accommodation, collective shelters, Syrian settlements, and the streets. It is unclear why those living in the streets reported the highest scores for inclusion. There seems to be a trend of those living in accommodations specifically for Palestinian refugees reporting the most negative scores.

Key Takeaways

- Gender does not factor into perceptions of accountability.
- Having an internet-enabled smartphone is generally positively associated with accountability perceptions. More should be done to engage those who do not have regular access to the internet or to virtual complaints mechanisms.
- The number of services a person receives is positively correlated with accountability perceptions. Providing more services or doing more to engage those who receive fewer services could result in an increase in accountability perceptions.
- More investigation and surveying should be done to determine why type of accommodation is associated with feelings of inclusion, and why PRS are more likely to report greater satisfaction with complaints mechanisms.



EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

Addressing the problem of accountability in Lebanon has major implications for aid agency operations. Increasing feelings of agency and participation for affected people requires the implementation of new policies and structures, as well as a shift in aid workers' goals and strategies during response. The following criteria will be used to evaluate proposed solutions (in the sections titled Discussion of Trade-offs). They will later construct an outcomes matrix that compares all of the potential policy options in a manner that makes trade-offs easily identifiable.

Many potential outcomes of policy alternatives are difficult or impossible to quantify in this context, due to a lack of reliable data or the nature of the outcome itself. This project will quantify outcomes whenever possible but may rely on qualitative description or a relative rating on a scale of high, medium, and low to describe certain results.

Effectiveness of Program at Improving Participation

Does the measure increase the participation of affected people in agencies' decision making?

With the desired outcome to improve feelings of participation and agency of affected people, one of the most important evaluative criteria for any policy alternative is the degree to which it increases their input in aid agencies' decision-making process. The measure ideally increases the amount of feedback collected and is implemented in such a way that is accessible by all members of the affected population.

This criterion can be measured in a variety of ways. The first is through the continual tracking of refugees' perceptions, similarly to the three surveys conducted in Lebanon by Ground Truth Solutions. Improved scores over time for questions about accountability can serve as an indicator of success in increasing participation.

Agencies may also be able to track the number of individuals who submit feedback and determine whether the number increases as a result of the measure. With this method of quantification, it will prove useful to simultaneously track the amount of feedback offered on average in order to establish whether the increase in the number of individuals providing feedback is linked to a change in the length and quality of their comments. Organisations can then adjust accordingly.

Utility of Program for Organisational Staff

Does the measure meaningfully help organisations implement programs with affected people in mind?

However, just because a measure increases affected people's participation does not mean it is useful for aid agencies. It is thus important that any measure aid agencies implement is valuable for informing programming. A successful measure will provide information that is relevant to key programs and may otherwise be unknown to the agency. Such a measure will also collect information from a sample that is both large and representative of the entire population served by the agency.

While it is relatively simple to establish whether a measure collects data from a large and representative sample, it is more difficult to quantify whether the information it collects is useful and relevant. This will largely depend on the way the organisation chooses to implement the measure. For measurement purposes, utility of information can be rated on a scale of low-high.



Administrative Feasibility and Ease

Can organisations implement the measure with relative ease?

As with any policy, the chosen measure must be able to be implemented within the context of an organisation, and with relative ease. Though difficult to quantify, feasibility and ease can be described qualitatively and rated on a low-high scale. This criterion is an aggregate of several factors:

1. Staff ownership

Accountability presents a special challenge to staff ownership and implementation because it necessitates a change in mind-set and a shift from the traditional, one-sided methods of distributing aid. Certain proposed measures require more staff ownership than others.

2. Complexity of the program

Programs that are too complex may never reach the implementation phase, particularly for large organisations with a high degree of regulation. Any proposed measure should be simple enough that agencies can implement it within a reasonable timespan relative to the size of the measure.

3. Size of the Program

Some accountability initiatives require inter-agency cooperation and may take time to coordinate and implement. This can be quantified by the number of agencies needed, as well as the time it takes to implement the measure.

Cost

How much does the measure cost to implement?

In a field with limited funding, it is critical that every measure humanitarian organisations implement can be covered by funding granted by donor entities. The proposed budget for each measure will be explained in the section entitled “Cost Analysis.” While budget estimates are provided in this project, a successful measure will be a feasible financial commitment by the organisation, which must be determined by each organisation itself on a case-by-case basis.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The following are proposed policy alternatives that target the issue of community engagement in Lebanon. These alternatives are suggested specifically in the context of Lebanon because they draw on issues discussed in interviews with aid workers in Beirut, and because these mechanisms do not already exist for this specific response. However, all three of the alternatives proposed here are scalable and can be extrapolated to other humanitarian contexts.

The presentation of alternatives is structured based on the level at which they should be implemented: by the agency, cluster, or entire response. Each section begins with a description of the implementation level and a discussion of the reasons for which each initiative should be implemented at that level.


Due to the innovative nature of the proposed solutions and their lack of precedent in humanitarian aid contexts, the section entitled “Case Studies and Precedent” for each alternative serves as a proxy for projecting outcomes. The purpose of this section is to provide as much constructive evidence as possible for each solution, though the case studies may not always directly project results due to the difference between their original contexts and the somewhat extreme context of a humanitarian response.

Agency-Level Solution

Agency-level solutions are alternatives that organisations can pursue to increase accountability independently of a coordinated response. They are reasonably implemented on a smaller scale and can help organisations tailor their specific activities to the needs of affected people.

Strategic Crude Feedback Analysis

This alternative involves the implementation “crude” feedback system based on a terminal system developed by a Finnish company called HappyOrNot. These terminals collect opinions from people in the form of four smiley face buttons (see below) (HappyOrNot, 2018). Although this type of feedback mechanism provides only minimal information, the terminals’ colourful design entices feedback, and could be used as a trigger for agencies to probe for further issues. For example, if a terminal placed in a doctor’s office begins receiving a high quantity of “frowny face” feedback, this could serve as an indicator that an agency should collect more information from affected people on their opinions related to the doctor’s office.





The concept behind such a feedback system is to overcome issues agencies face with incentivizing affected people to provide feedback without being immediately prompted in person. The HappyOrNot terminal can serve as a replacement for suggestion boxes, which affected people in Lebanon are not inclined to use due to language, literacy, and cultural barriers (El-Khateeb, 2018). The terminals do not rely on language or written words and may be able to sidestep cultural barriers due to the informality and ease of providing feedback. This approach may serve as a gateway for agencies to take meaningful action towards affected peoples' perceptions that agencies do not listen to them or follow up on complaints (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c). The terminals could trigger a positive feedback loop in which, if agencies make clear efforts to respond to the data collected by the terminals, affected people notice the effort and become more likely to provide feedback in the future.

Some redesign is necessary in order to adapt this private-sector feedback tool to humanitarian contexts. A proposed design and strategy for the terminal is available in Appendix B. The terminals must be easy to use, inviting, and accessible to all people regardless of physical ability, education/literacy level, gender, and age. The terminals should be strategically placed such that they are easy to access, and in areas where relevant information can be collected, such as at program sites. To prevent survey fatigue, agencies should avoid installing too many terminals. Other challenges to this approach include training staff to understand and use the technology and data, incentivizing affected people to approach the terminal, and ensuring that agencies follow up on concentrated areas of negative feedback.

Case Studies and Precedent

HappyOrNot terminals have proven useful in a variety of contexts in the private sector. The San Francisco 49ers football team installed the terminals in their stadium in 2013. Five years on, they report that they can much more easily “know where [their] problem areas are, and [they] can focus on those” (Owen, 2018).

Several other case studies of HappyOrNot terminals from the company's website have connections to humanitarian aid contexts. In 2017, the San Francisco-based catering company ZeroCater began using satisfaction terminals in order to monitor and assess satisfaction with the quality of their catered meals. HappyOrNot found that since establishing the terminal system “ZeroCater's customer engagement and feedback was bolstered by 400 percent over their proprietary system. This allows them to connect with people more and make better improvements to each customer experience” (HappyOrNot, 2017). The context of catered meals and food quality could be extrapolated to humanitarian food distribution processes, in which agencies are concerned with the quality of food items distributed to affected people.

HappyOrNot terminals have also been proven to be effective in large-scale service provision monitoring and course correction. In the case of Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) airport's implementation of satisfaction terminals, HappyOrNot found that “with an average of 25,000 passenger feedbacks collected each month (and as high as 45,000 during peak travel months), DFW's ability to reliably track and monitor service performance has been made easier and more impactful” (HappyOrNot, 2014). Similar to how humanitarian organisations would use these terminals, DFW took steps to correct its service following the detection of negative feedback. HappyOrNot explains that “When corrective actions are made, they are able to validate how effective the changes have been by returning to the feedback results to see if an increase in satisfaction (green feedbacks) has been achieved” (HappyOrNot, 2014).

Though the context of humanitarian response in Lebanon varies significantly from the private-sector case studies presented here, it is still fundamentally based on the relationship and level of satisfaction between a service provider (aid agencies) and a service recipient (affected people). Thus, it is reasonable to venture that with some adjustment to physical, economic, and cultural differences, the terminals could see similar success in Lebanon.



Discussion of Trade-offs

This option is appealing due to its administrative ease in comparison to the other options. Installing HappyOrNot-like terminals requires little staff ownership; non-essential staff do not need to be involved with the terminals at all. Those who are involved, however, must make a commitment to following up on negative feedback in order for the terminals to be effective. The terminals are a relatively small program and are not too complex, particularly because they serve as an innovative replacement for existing suggestion boxes.

The downside of strategic crude analysis is that it may not provide significant increases in participation. Existing mechanisms for collecting unsolicited feedback in humanitarian contexts have proven widely unsuccessful. While this terminal is designed to overcome some of the challenges of these traditional mechanisms, affected people may still hesitate to provide feedback without being prompted. The terminals are moderately useful for organisations, as they can provide agencies with an indicator of where problems are located. However, they require that organisations follow up on negative feedback and solicit further detail in order to address issues.

Next Steps for Implementation

The following steps should be taken to begin the implementation of crude feedback collection:


1. Finalize a design for terminals. A proposed design is included in Appendix B.
2. Construct and ship the terminals to the proposed site for data collection.
3. Train staff on the use of the terminals and their associated technology and data collection; arrange for maintenance when necessary.
4. Determine strategic placement of the terminals based on number of refugees, geographic factors, and capacity of the organisation to monitor data.
5. Install terminals.
6. Begin collecting information.

Cluster-Level Solution

Sector or cluster-level solutions are best implemented with cooperation across organisations in a cluster because they are likely more effective when initiated by multiple organisations and can provide strategic benefits to coordination within the cluster. They involve more administrative challenges but are more likely to increase performance on accountability indicators.

The Constituent Voice™ Method

The Constituent Voice™ Method is a measurement and performance management methodology developed in 2013 by Keystone Accountability, the parent organisation of Ground Truth Solutions. This method uses five cyclical steps to gather data about organisational performance from affected people and make adjustments to improve outcomes (Keystone Accountability, 2013). The diagram below outlines the steps to the Constituent Voice™ Method. In humanitarian settings, this method heavily emphasizes the collection of feedback from affected people and making changes to response and aid provision based on their feedback. A more detailed explanation of the steps to the Constituent Voice™ Cycle can be found in Appendix C.



While this method is not a mechanism in itself and requires a design phase in which an organisation must create and implement its own feedback collection mechanisms, it is a helpful framework for situating accountability programs and activities. Its overall emphasis on dialogue and solicitation of feedback from affected people can help to orient aid agencies' goals and provide a structure for attaining increased participation and accountability. For this reason, it is also best administered at the cluster level in order to streamline organisations' programming goals and increase coordination capacity across the cluster. However, this method may also be useful at the agency level.

Case Studies and Precedent

The Constituent Voice™ Method has received widespread praise and attention since its debut. In 2013, the president of Oxfam America, Ray Offenheiser, offered high praise for this methodology, explaining that "At its heart, Constituent Voice methodology promises to shift the very power to define 'success', and to declare when it has been achieved, into the hands of those that development organisations claim to serve. This shift toward greater agency is essential if we are to make development more effective" (Keystone Accountability, 2013). In the same year, the charity rating organisation CharityNavigator revised its rating systems to include an aspect of whether or not a charity engages with Constituent Voice™.



(CharityNavigator, 2013). The methodology also received recognition in the academic sphere as part of an annual forecast in philanthropy and social economy by Stanford University in 2014 (Bernholz, 2014).

One of the most compelling case studies on the Constituent Voice™ Method comes from a poverty alleviation NGO called LIFT. The organisation operates in the United States in Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. and works to eradicate intergenerational poverty. LIFT worked with Keystone Accountability in 2014 to institute the Constituent Voice™ Method in all four of its locations. After each interaction with staff from the organization, LIFT requests that clients complete a three-question survey using an iPad. Over time, LIFT collects data, analyses the results, and course-corrects based on areas of concern. Keystone Accountability found several positive outcomes as a result of the Constituent Voice™ program:

1. LIFT changed its hours to better accommodate its working clients
2. Peer support groups were introduced as a response to those clients who wanted to learn more from others.
3. LIFT began collecting more coherent data in order to make better referrals for its clients to other service providers.
4. Data collection allowed for the observation of trends and identification of positive indicators for success from programs, which allows LIFT to target programs and better prime clients for success (Keystone Accountability, 2014).

Overall, the Constituent Voice Method allowed LIFT to create programs centred around client experiences, track their progress, and make changes to better accommodate needs (Keystone Accountability, 2014). These same features could be immensely helpful in increasing accountability in humanitarian contexts.

Discussion of Trade-offs

The Constituent Voice™ Method holds the most potential within this suite of alternatives for increasing participation and providing utility for an organisation. By systematically incorporating feedback into a cycle of designing and assessing programs, organisations put affected people at the heart of the decision-making process. This method provides a strategic framework for organisations to solicit feedback and course-correct based on the findings, which can be quite useful for organisations trying to increase accountability.

Administrative ease varies with the degree to which this method is adopted, as well as the size of the organisation. The requirement for staff ownership with Constituent Voice™ is high, due to the nature of the program; all staff involved in program design, implementation, and evaluation must adjust their processes and direct more attention towards collecting and analysing feedback from affected people. They also must be willing to change their course of action based on responses. The complexity of the program is moderate because it involves a shift in organisational procedures, but this shift is not extreme nor does it require a complete departure from previous ways of working. The size of the program, of course, will vary by the size of the organisation and the degree to which it wishes to adopt the methodology (for a single department, for example, or for the agency at large).



Next Steps for Implementation

The following steps should be taken to begin the implementation of the Constituent Voice™ Method:

1. Determine whether organisational capacity permits such a cycle of data collection, analysis, and course correction. Hire additional staff if possible and necessary.
2. Take steps to ensure organisational mindset is open to the idea of listening to affected people and course-correcting based on their feedback. The method does not work if staff are not willing to take affected peoples' views into account.
3. Contact Keystone Accountability or Ground Truth Solutions to begin a specialized consult to tailor the methodology to the organisation.

Response-Level Solution

Response-level solutions involve coordination across all agencies responding to a crisis, likely involving the inter-sector coordination group or the humanitarian country team (HCT). While these solutions are complex, they present compelling opportunities for systematically incorporating feedback into response.

Response-Wide Common Feedback Tool

As opposed to a collective feedback tool, in which organisations devise their own accountability systems and attempt to aggregate and share the results, a common feedback tool would entail a single strategy and survey for collecting feedback used by all organisations response-wide. This method of feedback collection ensures that organisations are using the same information in the same format while avoiding redundancy and survey fatigue that occurs when different agencies repeatedly ask the same questions. As it is, organisations struggle to share data from affected people because of formatting issues and/or irrelevance of the data collected by other agencies. A common feedback tool, administered by an independent agency like Ground Truth Solutions, could be a way to overcome these difficulties. Affected communities seem to prefer this type of unsolicited feedback tool, as it is easy to interact with and understand (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c).

The main challenge presented by a common feedback tool is the high degree of coordination and mutual accord it requires across agencies. All organisations present for the response must approve of the techniques, from the questions asked to the methods for feedback collection. This level of coordination proves difficult when organisations are interested in hearing from affected people on a wide array of issues, or when they are operating on different schedules and timeframes.

Case Studies and Precedent

Common feedback tools have seen success in several humanitarian contexts. In Erbil, Iraq, agencies created a joint complaints mechanism as a means of collecting unsolicited feedback using one common tool. This mechanism receives feedback and then passes it on to the relevant cluster, which then refers it to the appropriate agency (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c).

In Nepal, the Inter-Agency Common Feedback Project collects systematic feedback at the response level. This common feedback tool collects meta data on the overall response via a brief but regular questionnaire administered to affected people. This initiative provides reliable data meant to keep the Humanitarian Country Team up-to-date and on the same page. It also offers a point of comparison for agencies who wish to conduct further data collection and triangulate their information (Ground Truth Solutions, 2017c). While a systematic evaluation of the Inter-Agency Common Feedback Project has yet to take place, the program has proven to be useful and is entering its third year of operations (CDAC Network, 2018).

Discussion of Trade-offs

The response-wide common feedback tool's benefits and challenges are the opposite of the strategic crude analysis terminal's; it has great potential for utility and improving participation, but it is a large and complex program. Creating a response-wide tool for feedback collection reduces the difficulty of providing suggestions and complaints by streamlining the process, thereby increasing the likelihood that affected people will provide feedback. It also guarantees that an independent entity will be working on behalf of affected people and their opinions. This common approach is useful for organisations because it takes some onus off of the organisations themselves to collect feedback and sidesteps the challenges of synchronising data and information across organisations.

Despite the low requirement for staff ownership, administrative feasibility is low overall because common feedback tools require a high degree of coordination and are quite



large programs to implement. For this approach to be successful, organisations must come together to agree upon questions and procedures to implement at the response level. While difficult, common feedback tools have been implemented successfully in the past and are thus proven to be within a range of feasible accountability programs.

Next Steps for Implementation

The following steps should be taken to begin the implementation of the response-wide common feedback tool:

1. Determine which agencies will be responsible for the coordination and maintenance of the system, and which will be on the periphery.
2. Coordinate among partner organisations to establish responsibilities, including funding of the tool.
3. Establish baseline questions for platform, ensuring that all partner organisations have signed off to prevent issues later on.
4. Place the physical components of the tool (such as complaints desks, suggestions boxes, or crude feedback tools like the one discussed earlier in this report) if necessary; communicate hotline phone numbers to affected people.
5. Begin collecting information.



OUTCOMES MATRIX

The purpose of this outcomes matrix is to provide a simple, visual comparison of previously discussed trade-offs between alternatives.

	Option 1: Strategic Crude Analysis	Option 2: The Constituent Voice™ Method	Option 3: Response- Wide Common Feedback Tool
Increase in Participation	Low	High	Moderate-High
Utility for Organisation	Moderate	High	Moderate
Administrative Ease			
A. Staff involvement	Low	High	Low
B. Complexity	Low	Moderate	High
C. Program Size	Small	Varies by Organization	Large
Proposed Budget	€ 213,270.00	€ 3,037,584.00	€ 628,200.00
Recommendation	Agency-level	Response-level	Cluster-level or mid-to large agency-level



COST ANALYSIS

Budget estimates for each of the proposed alternatives are provided below. While the budgets include staff contributions, it is unlikely that organisations will be required to hire additional staff to undertake each measure. Staff remuneration is sourced from the United Nations pay scale; other sources are confidential.

Option 1: Strategic Crude Feedback Analysis

Cost Type	Task/Description	Field/Deployment					
		Rate EUR	FTE*	Unit	Qty	Month Total	Year Total
Staff							
Senior Programme Manager	Project Management	€ 7,500.00	10%	Month	2	€ 1,500	€ 18,000.00
Program Analyst	Management support and data analysis	€ 3,250.00	30%	Month	3	€ 2,925	€ 35,100.00
Statistician	Data cleaning and analysis	€ 7,000.00	20%	Month	1	€ 1,400	€ 16,800.00
Programme Officer	Set up and run operations on the ground	€ 6,000.00	15%	Month	3	€ 2,700	€ 32,400.00
Total Staff					9	€ 8,525.00	€ 102,300.00
Supplies							
Terminals	Data collection	€ 80.19		Month	100	€ 8,019	€ 96,228.00
D-cell batteries**	Power to terminals	€ 1.22		Month	200	€ 243	€ 5,832.00
Total supplies						€ 8,262	€ 102,060.00
Other							
Shipping***	Shipping terminals to site	€ 44.55		One-time	200	€ 8,910	€ 8,910.00
Total							€ 213,270.00

*FTE is the percentage of total billable hours staff spends on assignment/project

**Note: Terminal takes two batteries. Batteries last approximately 6 months

***Note: Shipping costs incur only in the first year of the program

Option 2: Constituent Voice™ Method

Cost Type	Task/Description	Rate EUR	Field/Deployment			Month Total	Year Total
			FTE*	Unit	Qty		
Staff							
Director	Project Management	€ 10,500	5%	Month	1	€ 10,500	€ 126,000.00
Senior Programme Manager		€ 7,500.00	10%	Month	10	€ 7,500	€ 90,000.00
Programme Analyst		Management support and data analysis	€ 3,250.00	10%	Month	20	€ 6,500
Statistician	Data cleaning and analysis	€ 7,000.00	10%	Month	5	€ 3,500	€ 42,000.00
Total Staff					36	€ 17,500.00	€ 210,000.00
Data Collection							
Tablets	Quantitative data collection	€ 200.00		Devices	6	€ 1,200	€ 14,400.00
Data collection	Enumerator fees	€ 3,200.00		Rounds	2	€ 6,400	€ 76,800.00
Local researcher	Data collection (quant)	€ 2,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 4,000	€ 48,000.00
Interpreter	Data collection (qual)	€ 1,000.00		Rounds	4	€ 4,000	€ 48,000.00
Travel and Logistics	Data collection	€ 2,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 4,000	€ 48,000.00
Communications	Communicating findings	€ 1,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 2,000	€ 24,000.00
Dissemination	Communications materials	€ 1,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 2,000	€ 120,000.00
Total Data Collection							€ 379,200.00
Supplies							
Laptops	Laptops inc. software	€ 300.00		Devices	6	€ 1,800	€ 21,600.00
General supplies	cell phone, office equipment	€ 200.00		Month		€ 200	€ 2,400.00
Total Supplies							€ 38,400.00
Other							
Training**	Train staff on using CVM	€ 50.00		month	1	€ 50	€ 600.00
Total							€ 628,200.00

*FTE is the percentage of total billable hours staff spends on assignment/project

**Note: Training is based on online modules

Option 3: Response-Wide Common Feedback Tool

Cost Type	Task/Description	Rate EUR	Field/Deployment			Month Total	Year Total
			FTE*	Unit	Qty		
Staff							
Director		€ 10,500	5%	Month	10	€ 105,000	€ 1,260,000.00
Senior Programme Manager	Project Management	€ 7,500.00	10%	Month	70	€ 52,500	€ 630,000.00
Program Analyst	Management support and data analysis	€ 3,250.00	10%	Month	100	€ 32,500	€ 390,000.00
Statistician	Data cleaning and analysis	€ 7,000.00	10%	Month	10	€ 7,000	€ 84,000.00
Total Staff					190	€ 92,000.00	€ 1,104,000.00
Data collection							
Tablets	Quantitative data collection	€ 200.00		Devices	30	€ 6,000	€ 72,000.00
Data collection	Enumerator fees	€ 12,800.00		Rounds	2	€ 25,600	€ 307,200.00
Local researcher	Data collection (quant)	€ 8,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 16,000	€ 192,000.00
Interpreter	Data collection (qual)	€ 4,000.00		Rounds	4	€ 16,000	€ 192,000.00
Travel and Logistics	Data collection and management	€ 8,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 16,000	€ 192,000.00
Communications	Communicating back survey findings	€ 4,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 8,000	€ 96,000.00
Dissemination	Communications materials	€ 4,000.00		Rounds	2	€ 8,000	€ 96,000.00
Total Data Collection							€ 1,147,200.00
Coordination							
Administrative fees	Coordination meetings, staff, files	€ 12,688.00		Month	1	€ 12,688	€ 152,256.00
Meeting expenses	Coordination meetings	€ 1,000.00		Month	1	€ 1,000	€ 12,000.00
Logistical support	Coordination	€ 46,344.00		Month	1	€ 46,344	€ 556,128.00
Total Coordination							€ 720,384.00

**Supplies**

Laptops	Laptops inc. software	€ 300.00	Devices	100	€ 30,000	€ 360,000.00
General supplies	cell phone, office equipment	€ 2,000.00	Month	1	€ 2,000	€ 24,000.00

<i>Total Supplies</i>						€ 60,000.00
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Other

Training**	Train staff on using CVM	€ 500.00	month	1	€ 500	€ 6,000.00
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Total						€ 3,037,584.00
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*FTE is the percentage of total billable hours staff spends on assignment/project

**Note: Training is based on online modules



LIMITATIONS

The scope of the research for this project was limited due to the availability of academic and official literature. This is likely for two reasons:

1. Accountability to affected people is still evolving as an idea and practice. As such, many initiatives lack comprehensive evaluations and limited literature is available on the subject. For this reason, some of the literature used in this review is dated; however, the ideas discussed in these older pieces are still relevant to the discussion today.
2. Humanitarian aid is often considered a practical discipline, rather than one that is academic or research-based. Humanitarian organisations also often lack adequate funding for research and experimentation. As Gross Stein (2008) explains, “a great deal of money is invested on an ongoing basis in project evaluation, but very little to generate the knowledge necessary to inform that evaluation.”

Because of this, many proposed initiatives lack conclusive evidence and some solutions have yet to be discovered. To compensate for the challenge of information availability, this project incorporated input from humanitarian aid workers in Lebanon and was guided by accountability professionals at Ground Truth Solutions. This project does not provide concrete projected outcomes due to a lack of data availability, but case studies and precedents for each option were provided as a means of overcoming this challenge.

Evaluation of Sources

Several of the sources used for this review, such as Gross Stein and Ebrahim, were written more than a decade ago. Though the ideas discussed in these pieces are still valid and relevant, they beg the question: why has nothing been done to act upon these criticisms?

Additionally, pieces written from the perspective of someone within the humanitarian system – an aid worker (such as Bainbridge) or an organisational alliance (such as the CHS or ALNAP) – are likely to present only a partial description of the benefits and challenges associated with accountability to affected people. Organisations, for example, are more likely to downplay failures in an effort to be seen as more desirable by donors. This will continue to present a challenge through the remainder of this project, which I will attempt to overcome by including a variety of sources and personal perspectives.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Regression Results

VARIABLES	Relevance of Services	Satisfied with Complaints Mechanisms	Involved in Decisions
round	-0.143** (0.0715)	0.346*** (0.0811)	-0.361*** (0.0617)
male	-0.0405 (0.0683)	-0.107 (0.0774)	-0.000314 (0.0589)
age	-0.00321 (0.00409)	0.00677 (0.00525)	0.00601* (0.00346)
number of services	0.304*** (0.0225)	0.0570** (0.0273)	0.0549*** (0.0192)
uses smartphone	-0.257*** (0.0954)	0.319*** (0.110)	-0.0539 (0.0822)
length of stay	-0.000822 (0.00429)	0.0167*** (0.00487)	-0.00273 (0.00367)
distance from Beirut	-0.00283** (0.00130)	0.00574*** (0.00150)	0.000823 (0.00112)
Syrian settlement	0.219 (0.394)	0.581 (0.475)	-0.178 (0.341)
private accommodation	0.258 (0.381)	0.254 (0.458)	-0.620* (0.329)
Palestinian unofficial gathering	0.188 (0.412)	-0.284 (0.495)	-0.953*** (0.355)
Palestinian camp	0.337 (0.395)	0.0115 (0.470)	-0.695** (0.341)
collective shelter	-0.0860 (0.398)	-0.182 (0.472)	-0.636* (0.344)
SRS	-0.0905 (0.146)	0.157 (0.163)	-0.214* (0.123)
PRS	-0.172 (0.139)	0.504*** (0.158)	0.00854 (0.117)
Constant	1.936*** (0.472)	0.753 (0.563)	2.340*** (0.406)
Observations	858	688	861
R-squared	0.259	0.129	0.097

Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Appendix B: Accountability Terminal Design

Note: The final version of this design document is still in progress – it is due after this project is due. Below is an interim draft version that will be replaced before it is sent to my client.

Terminal Design


Physical Kiosk

The terminal design can encompass a range of styles, from very simple buttons to highly complex “accountability centers” that use webcam technology and touchscreens to interact with affected people as they complain in real time. Below is a possible design for a terminal.



Technology and Survey Design

Professor Earl Mark, University of Virginia School of Architecture, contributed a pilot program to this project which serves as a baseline for terminal technology. The program is based on survey questions from Ground Truth Solutions and the Mixed Migration Platform. While the kiosk may serve to collect feedback on a single, general question (How satisfied are you with your service today?), it could also be developed into a more comprehensive survey mechanism. The program depicted below presents one possibility for such a complex mechanism.



Spatial Aspects and Placement

One of the most compelling features of a Happy-Or-Not-inspired terminal is that it works in a variety of humanitarian contexts. Here, I explore the possibility of placing the terminals within traditional UNHCR refugee camps and urban settings, using a doctor's office as a case study.

Camp Context


A proposal for terminal placement is outlined below, based on Ajuong Thok Refugee Camp. This schema includes a terminal situated in each block of housing, to ensure access to the terminals by all residents and to avoid long distances. In addition, terminals are included in areas where services are densely located, such as common areas, food distribution centers, and religious spaces. Such a placement encourages more feedback, as residents are able to interact with the terminal immediately after receiving a service. The layout depicted below includes 70 terminals in total.




Urban Case Study: Doctor's Office

Given the nature of the current refugee crisis, it is important to consider the implementation of accountability initiatives in urban settings in addition to traditional camps. This case study proposes two alternatives for placing feedback terminals in a basic doctor's office.

Plan 1



Plan 2





Plan 1 utilizes only one terminal, which is placed in the waiting room, near the door. This plan is ideal for smaller organizations that may not have the funding or expertise to implement a large number of terminals and respond to feedback. It also provides the benefit of collecting feedback as patients leave the office, which captures the overall feeling of satisfaction upon exit. The challenge of this approach is overcoming issues of privacy when the terminal is placed in a public place. Because there is only one terminal, it is likely to also collect less feedback than placing the terminals throughout the office.

In Plan 2, a terminal is placed in each patient's room, as well as the examination room. This plan collects more complete feedback than placing a single terminal in the waiting room. It also helps pinpoint issues more precisely; rather than an issue that arises for the doctor's office as a whole, the feedback is now tied to a geographic location within the office. This approach may risk "survey fatigue" in which the high quantity of terminals causes patients to be less inclined to interact with them. Organizations would also have to navigate challenges of installing terminals within spaces where the doctor and staff themselves may be present to see how patients are responding.



Appendix C: The Constituent Voice™ Method

This appendix describes the five steps of the Constituent Voice™ Method in more detail. It is important to note that the specifics of this method are likely to vary by organisation. The following information all originates from Technical Note 1: Constituent Voice, published by ALNAP and Keystone Accountability in 2013.

1. Design

In order to begin data collection, organisations must design a survey and determine how it will be administered. While the rigour of statistical analysis is classically considered the most important element in survey and accountability mechanism design, the Constituent Voice™ Method emphasizes the balance between the four principles of rigour; sensitivity to process and culture, cost, and utility. The overall idea behind Constituent Voice™ design is that “even imperfect data can save lives.”

2. Collect

Collecting data is more than just asking questions and recording responses; with the Constituent Voice™ Method, it’s about building a relationship with affected people. This relationship-building helps ensure that respondents feel respected and engaged in the survey process and bolsters their sense of inclusion. To that end, surveys should always begin with an explanation of the purpose and process of data collection so that affected people understand how they factor into the process. The Constituent Voice™ Method makes use of continually-conducted micro-surveys and more period and in-depth research.

3. Analyse

Constituent Voice™ analysis relies heavily on descriptive statistics to produce data-centred evidence, which is the focus of reports. Overall responses are disaggregated to determine trends and drivers of results. This method continually seeks to improve reports and quality of analysis by triangulating findings with other datasets that provide measures of outcomes, when available. Benchmarking is another common tool used in Constituent Voice™, in order to compare results in one place over time.

4. Dialogue

Because surveys conducted with Constituent Voice™ are limited to prevent survey fatigue, it is helpful to supplement them with more in-depth focus group discussion to explore perceptions with more detail. The purpose of these discussions is to uncover more information, validate findings, and probe for possible solutions.

5. Course-correct

After conducting surveys and collecting further information via focus groups, it is critical that organisations use the new information to change course and implement solutions when necessary. In order to ensure continual success of the method and bolster feelings of inclusions, organisations should also inform affected people of the steps taken to consider their perspectives in decision making and programming.



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