



# A JAPANESE STRATEGY FOR THE ABDUCTION ISSUE

Suguru Amano

Franck Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

University of Virginia

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The author conducted this study as part of the program of professional education at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia. This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree. The judgments and conclusions are solely those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Batten School, by the University of Virginia, or by any other entity.

## **HONOR STATEMENT**

*On my honor as a student, I have neither given nor received aid on this assignment.*

Suguru Amano

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There are 17 Japanese citizens that the Japanese government officially has certified as abductees of North Korea, and 12 of whom still remain in North Korea (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). Abduction by North Korea is a universal issue as a violation of the fundamental human rights; therefore, North Korea must reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees and provide sufficient explanations to Japan. However, North Korea currently faces a number of disputes with the U.S. and other countries in East Asia over the nuclear and missile problem. The Japanese government has put a high priority on the abduction issue; however, North Korea views this bilateral abduction issue as being less important than other multilateral and bilateral problems. Because North Korea does not have an incentive to solve the problem, the Japanese government cannot make progress on the abduction issue.

This report endeavors to provide recommendations of effective policy for the Japanese government that makes North Korea reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees. Three policy alternatives are presented to solve the abduction issue, including:

- (1) Providing economic assistance to North Korea
- (2) Using Japanese economic sanctions as leverage
- (3) Cooperating with South Korea for the return of Japanese and South Korean abductees

These alternatives were evaluated on the basis of three criteria: (1) Political feasibility, (2) Consistency of the Japanese stance, and (3) Acceptability from allies.

The recommendation to make North Korea reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees depends on the progress of denuclearization. **If North Korea maintains nuclear weapons and missiles, this analysis recommends taking advantage of Japan's own economic sanctions as leverage.** On the contrary, **if North Korea abandons nuclear weapons and missiles, this report recommends providing economic assistance to North Korea based on the Pyongyang Declaration.**

## **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

There are 17 Japanese citizens that the Japanese government has officially certified as abductees of North Korea, 12 of whom still remain in North Korea (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). This report endeavors to provide recommendations of effective policy for the Japanese government that makes North Korea reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees and return them.

## **BACKGROUND**

During the 1970s and 1980s, many Japanese citizens disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Based on investigations by Japanese agencies and the testimonies of North Korean agents, the Japanese government suspects that these disappearances were abductions carried out by North Korea (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) has recognized 883 missing persons who could potentially have been abducted by North Korea (NPA, 2019). At the moment, the Japanese government has certified 17 Japanese citizens as abductees of North Korea, of whom five were returned to Japan in October 2002. As for the remaining abductees, North Korea has yet to provide a satisfactory explanation to the Japanese government (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2017).

Abduction by North Korea is a universal issue as a violation of the fundamental human rights, therefore, North Korea must reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees and provide sufficient explanations to Japan; however, North Korea currently faces a number of disputes with the U.S. and other countries in East Asia over denuclearization and a missile problem. The Japanese government has put a high priority on the abduction issue; however, North Korea views this bilateral abduction issue as being less important than other multilateral and bilateral problems. Because North Korea does not have an incentive to solve the problem, the Japanese government cannot make progress on the abduction issue.

This section introduces the causes of North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens and the Japanese negotiation history of solving this problem. As for the Japanese negotiation history, this section focuses on the agreements that the Japanese government succeeded in making with North Korea.

### **The Objective of the Abduction**

North Korea's motives for abducting Japanese citizens remain unknown. Many researchers believe that North Korea forced the Japanese abductees to teach Japanese language and culture to North Korean spies in order to train North Korean spies to act like Japanese people (Edelman, 2018). For example, in November 1987, a North Korean agent pretending to be Japanese blew up the Korean Air Flight 858 from Seoul to Baghdad. In subsequent investigations, Japan confirmed its suspicion that the woman who had taught Japanese to the North Korean agent was, in fact, Yaeko Taguchi, a victim of North Korean abduction who was kidnapped in 1978 (Rich, 2017).



### ***Does only Japan have an abduction issue with North Korea?***

Abduction by North Korea is not only a Japanese issue but also a problem faced by the international community. Returned Japanese abductees have testified that there are people from Thailand, Romania, and Lebanon who may have been abducted by North Korea (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). In addition, North Korea has also kidnapped many South Korean people (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). Also, according to the testimony from South Korean abductees returned from North Korea, North Korea has also abducted Chinese citizens (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). Finally, a US citizen who disappeared in China in 2004 could potentially have been abducted by North Korea (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

### **The Diplomatic Relationship between Japan and North Korea**

The Japanese government has held several bilateral meetings with North Korea. The first bilateral summit meeting between Japan and North Korea took place in Pyongyang, 2002. North Korea revealed the whereabouts of 14 people, including 11 victims of eight abduction cases in which “eight people died, five people survived, one person had no facts of entering North Korea (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017).” Kim Jong-Il, the leader of North Korea, apologized to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the summit meeting and explained that some of the “special institutions” consist of agents acting out of patriotism and heroism in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017). The two leaders signed the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, by which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong-Il agreed as follows:

- (1) that Japan and North Korea begin negotiations for normalization of diplomatic relations
- (2) that Japan would express "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" for colonial rule
- (3) that Japan would provide economic aid to North Korea, including grant aids and long-term loans with low interest rates
- (4) that Japan and North Korea would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before the end of World War II
- (5) that North Korea would take appropriate measures in order not to have these regrettable incidents happen in the future
- (6) that Japan and North Korea would cooperate in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia


- (7) that Japan and North Korea would comply with all related international agreements for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula
- (8) that North Korea would further maintain not to launch a missile in and after 2003 (MOFA, 2002a).

Considering the background of the first bilateral summit, North Korea was working on improving foreign relations in the early 2000s. North Korea began diplomatic relations with Italy, Australia, and the United Kingdom in 2000, and with the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain, and Germany in 2001 (Wertz, 2016). In June 2000, North Korea also held a summit with South Korea. North Korea has tried to gain cooperation to advance economic reform (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017). Considering this trend of expanding economic partnerships, North Korea appeared to be expecting funds from Japan. However, North Korea's report on the safety of the abductees was suspect. North Korea officials explained that the causes of death of eight Japanese were gas poisoning, traffic accidents, drowning, and suicide. Additionally, North Korea claimed that the remains of seven out of eight Japanese individuals were washed away by floods (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017). The Japanese government did not accept North Korea's explanations and demanded reinvestigation. However, North Korea repeated that abduction issues had already been resolved. As a result, relations between Japan and North Korea deteriorated further (Kim, 2017).

After Japan and North Korea reached a deadlock, Kim Jong-Un became the leader in North Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed a strong desire to resolve the abduction issue during his term, and in May 2014, working-level negotiations reached an agreement in Stockholm, Sweden (MOFA, 2014). North Korea agreed to start a comprehensive investigation into the case of Japanese abductees in addition to the Japanese soldiers who died in North Korea at the end of World War II. In exchange, Japan agreed to lift some of the economic sanctions that it had imposed independently in response to North Korea's conducting of nuclear and missile experiments. Japan had expected to receive a report of the investigation from North Korea in a few months, but North Korea claimed that it needed a year to investigate (Blomquist and Wertz, 2015). However, in July 2015, after that year ended, North Korea delayed their response again. North Korea conducted a fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and a practical long-range ballistic missile launch in February 2016. In response, the Japanese government announced that it would reimpose the previously-lifted economic sanctions as well as imposing new, stronger sanctions. North Korea announced that it would be stopping the investigation of abductees (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017). Since then, Japan and North Korea have had no official bilateral engagement.

## Growing Attention of Japanese Citizens

Intergovernmental negotiations have raised interest in the abduction issue among the Japanese citizens. The Japanese Cabinet Office conducts an annual public opinion survey on diplomacy. According to the 2018 survey, in the category of North Korea, the percentage of those interested in the “Japanese abduction issue” was the highest at 81.4%, followed by the “nuclear issue” (66.7%) and the “missile problem” (59.9%) (CAO, 2018). The reason why the missile problem is the highest (83.0%) in 2017 is that North Korea launched many missiles towards the Sea of Japan in that year.



### ***A story of a 13-year-old girl, Megumi Yokota***

North Korea abducted Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the abduction issue was not well-known in Japan due to a lack of evidence. After a journalist indicated in 1996 that Miss Megumi Yokota might have been abducted North Korea, the abduction issue became to draw the attention of the Japanese citizens (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017).

Miss Megumi Yokota, a 13-year-old girl at the time, suddenly disappeared at Niigata Prefecture, which faces on the Sea of Japan, on November 15, 1977. At the time of her disappearance, it was believed that she was coming home after a badminton practice at her junior high school. The police investigated her disappearance but could not find any evidence at all (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). According to testimony provided long after the time of her abduction, “during that time when Megumi’s father and mother were desperately searching to find her, she had been kidnapped by North Korean agents and was confined in the pitch-dark and cold hold of a boat heading to North Korea. She cried out “Mom! Mom!” and scratched everywhere on the door and walls so desperately that when she arrived in North Korea it was said that her finger nails had almost come off and were covered with blood” (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

In January 1997, 20 years after her abduction, Megumi’s family finally received the news that their daughter was alive in Pyongyang. The news was broadcasted by Japanese media (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

When the first bilateral summit meeting between Japan and North Korea took place in Pyongyang, 2002, Megumi’s family expected that their daughter would come back to Japan, but North Korea revealed that Miss Megumi Yokota had died (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). However, because North Korea’s explanation was unconvincing, the Japanese government demanded a reinvestigation into abductees who North Korea revealed had died, including Miss Megumi Yokota. In November 2004, North Korea provided Megumi’s remains to Japan; however, a forensic analysis confirmed that the remains are not Megumi (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). Megumi’s family is still waiting for her return.

## **CURRENT JAPANESE STANCE AND ACTIONS**

The Japanese government reveals its stance to address the abduction issue. In addition to the Japanese government's efforts to negotiate with North Korea as detailed above, the Japanese government continues to pressure North Korea by imposing its own economic sanctions and gaining support and cooperation from other countries regarding the importance of resolving the abduction issue.

### **Comprehensive Resolution**

The Japanese government's stance to the North Korean problems is consistent. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe published the statement that "as set down in the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, we wish to reach a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, including the abduction issue and North Korea's nuclear development and missile programs" (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2010). The three issues must be solved together in order for Japan to solve the abduction issue. If North Korea solves the abduction issue before solving the nuclear and missile problems, the Japanese government cannot lift the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or give North Korea money, as these actions contradict the policy to apply pressure in cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea regarding the nuclear and missile problems. On the other hand, if nuclear and missile problems are solved before resolving the abduction issue, North Korea may lose an incentive to negotiate with Japan because they will get money by solving the nuclear and missile problems as pressure from other countries also decreases.

### **Japanese Economic Sanctions Against North Korea**

The Japanese government has imposed its own sanctions in addition to the sanction measures set out in the UNSC resolutions during the 11 years from July 5, 2006, to December 2017 (details are on Appendix B). These Japanese sanctions have been imposed not only because of the abduction issue but also in response to North Korea's conducting of nuclear experiments and launching of missiles. These sanctions include banning the entry of North Korean nationals into Japan, restrictions on travel to North Korea, prohibiting the entry into Japanese ports of all vessels which had stopped at a port in North Korea, prohibiting export and import with North Korea, setting the minimum amount of money requiring notification of the export of means of payment, and freezing the assets of related organizations and individuals (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

## Efforts in the International Community

The Japanese government raises the abductions issue at every diplomatic opportunity in hopes of gaining support and cooperation from other countries. In the United Nation, as of October 2018, Japan and the European Union have co-tabled the Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in North Korea at the Human Rights Council 11 times for 11 consecutive years and at the General Assembly 13 times for 13 consecutive years (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

In addition, the Japanese government has raised the abduction issue in multilateral frameworks, including the G7 summit and the ASEAN-related summit meetings, and has gained the understanding and support of other states. For example, in June 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe asked the G7 leaders for understanding and cooperation toward an immediate resolution of the abduction issue and obtained support at the G7 Charlevoix Summit (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). Also, in September 2018, Prime Minister Abe requested for the understanding and cooperation in the return of all abductees at the United Nations General Assembly (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

At last, the Japanese government also has addressed the abduction issue at bilateral summit talks and foreign ministerial meetings with countries including the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia. When President Donald Trump visited Japan in November 2017, he met with family members of the abductees. Moreover, on a request from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, President Trump raised the abduction issue with Chairman Kim Jong-Un at the Singapore Summit in June 2018 (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019) and the Hanoi Summit in February 2019 (Kyodo, 2019). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated his strong desire to meet Kim Jong-Un to discuss the abduction issue after talking with President Trump about the Hanoi Summit (The New York Times, 2019).

## **NORTH KOREAN AMBITIONS AND PRIORITY**

To consider the strategy to make North Korea reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees and provide sufficient explanations to Japan, it is important to consider North Korean intentions and policy priority.

### **Maintaining the Kim Regime**

North Korea possesses nuclear and missile technology to ensure that the current Kim regime remains in power. North Korea has not conducted any nuclear-capable missile or nuclear tests in over a year and Kim Jong-Un mentioned in the Singapore Summit that “he sought the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (DNI, 2019). However, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assesses that “North Korea is unlikely to give up all of its nuclear weapons and production capabilities, even as it seeks to negotiate partial denuclearization steps to obtain key US and international concession” (DNI, 2019). On January 29, 2019, DNI Dan Coats mentioned to the Senate Intelligence Committee that “its leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime survival” (Kerry, 2019).

One possible solution to assure the Kim regime would be to end the Korean War. This means the withdrawal of the United Nations Command from South Korea and Japan. Consequently, by significantly decreasing the military costs, North Korea would be able to concentrate on economic policies.

### **Inferior Economic Condition**

Kim Jong-Un revealed North Korea’s main policy at the 7th Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2016. North Korea declared not only continuing to engage in nuclear and missile development but also boosting economic growth (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017). Although Kim Jong-Un decided to set a five-year plan to boost North Korea’s struggling economy, the North Korean economic situation is still poor (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017).

Sanctions imposed by the UNSC, the U.S., and Japan appear to be effective in pressuring the North Korean regime. North Korean export revenue has decreased significantly in 2018 compared with 2017 (DNI, 2019). As a result, North Korea is trying to mitigate the effects of the pressure. For example, Kim Jong-Un has repeatedly demanded sanctions relief, including during the Hanoi Summit in February 2019 (Lee & Shin, 2019). Also, he has sought economic cooperation with South Korea; he has met with South Korean President Moon Jae-In with whom he made agreements of economic

cooperation, such as reconnecting roads and rail lines and facilitating cultural exchanges (DNI, 2019).

Also, to generate revenue, North Korea gathers foreign currency by sending North Korean labors to other countries and making them work. In addition, North Korea conducts cyber-theft operations and illicit commercial exports (DNI, 2019). In addition, North Korea conducts ship-to-ship transfers to circumvent UN sanctions (details of UN sanctions are on Appendix C).

***Is North Korea interested in having bilateral talks with Japan?***

At the time of the Pyongyang Declaration in 2002, Japanese economic presence in East Asia was dominant, which may have in turn strengthened North Korean expectations for getting money. Now that the economic power of China far exceeds that of Japan, the bargaining power of Japan has been relatively weakened. However, at the same time, we should consider North Korea's expectation for compensation from World War II. The Pyongyang Declaration stipulates that Japan would provide economic assistance to North Korea after the normalization of diplomatic relations (MOFA, 2002). In light of the past, in which Japanese dominance of the Korean Peninsula, as part of the normalization of Japan-South Korea diplomatic relations in June 1965, Japan provided a total of \$ 500 million USD of economic assistance to South Korea. It may be a common recognition between Japan and North Korea that Japan will provide similar funding to North Korea if diplomatic relations are normalized (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017). Therefore, North Korea is still interested in engaging in talks with Japan. South Korean President Moon Jae-In told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on September 25, 2018 that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, at the April 2018 inter-Korean summit, said that he is ready to "have a dialogue with Japan at an appropriate time to seek an improvement in relations" (Jibiki and Onchi, 2018). This indicates that North Korea is interested in engaging in talks with Japan to expect money from Japan.



## STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR INTERESTS

The United States, South Korea, China, Russia, and the United Nations are key stakeholders in solving nuclear, missile and abduction issues. Whereas the United States and South Korea are important allies for Japan, North Korea has good relationships with China and Russia. However, each country has its own interests in North Korea, but, basically, as for the abduction issue, the Japanese government gets the understanding from each of the other countries.

### The United States

The United States is strengthening pressures on North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile technology. In November 2017, the United States once again listed North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (Whitehouse, 2017) and strengthened its own sanctions against North Korea several times. Although President Trump makes efforts to solve the nuclear and missile issues by holding bilateral talks with Kim Jong-Un in Singapore and Hanoi, “North Korea is unlikely to give up all of its nuclear weapons and production capabilities.” (DNI, 2019).

Also, North Korea and the U.S. have disputes about human rights. Otto Warmbier, a student at the University of Virginia, was imprisoned in North Korea in 2016. Upon his release from North Korea, Warmbier was in a coma and died shortly after in June 2017. He was suspected of having been tortured (Ponniiah & Spender, 2017). After his death, President Donald Trump officially announced re-listing North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (Whitehouse, 2017). In addition, the U.S. may have an abduction issue with North Korea. David Sneddon, who disappeared in China in 2004, may also have been abducted by North Korea. “Expressing concern over the disappearance of David Sneddon,” a resolution directing the U.S. government to investigate him was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in September 2016 and in the U.S. Senate in November 2018 (H.R. Res. 891, 2016; S. Res. 92, 2018).

As for the Japanese abduction issue, the Japanese government obtains understanding and support from the U.S. When the U.S. President Donald Trump visited Japan in November 2017, he met with the family members of the abductees and shared in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s view that Japan and the United States will continue to work together towards the resolution of the abductions issue (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). In addition, President Donald Trump raised the abductions issue with Kim Jong-Un at the Singapore Summit in June 2018 (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019) and the Hanoi Summit in February 2019 (Kyodo, 2019).

## South Korea

South Korea has implemented appeasement of North Korea, which represents the most recent expression of Seoul's long-standing desire to achieve reunification on the Korean Peninsula. South Korean President Moon Jae-In is probably eager to achieve this reunification during his tenure as a president and this desire makes him eager to appease North Korea.

One South Korean appeasement approach is to appeal to other countries with a close relationship with North Korea in hopes of lifting sanctions. During the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics, President Moon Jae-In successfully demonstrated a close relationship with North Korea to the world by inviting Kim Yong-Jong, a sister of Kim Jong-Un, to the opening ceremony (Snyder, 2018). In addition, President Moon Jae-In asked particular countries to lift sanctions and attempted to rally European support for loosening sanctions on North Korea in October 2018 (Norman & Yoon, 2018).

Another appeasement approach is the providing of economic support to North Korea. During a bilateral talk with Kim Jong-Un in September 2018, President Moon Jae-In brought a host of business leaders from South Korean firms such as Samsung and proposed economic cooperation with North Korea (Pham, 2018). In addition, South Korea might violate the UN sanctions against North Korea. South Korea might not notify the Security Council of its deliveries of petroleum products for use at a joint liaison office set up in September 2018 in Kaesong, just inside the North Korean border (Lee, 2019).

South Korea is implementing these appeasements without pursuing denuclearization. This contradicts the policy that the U.S., Japan, and South Korea continue with sanctions and pressure on North Korea until achieving denuclearization in North Korea.

As for the Japanese abduction issue, the Japanese government has addressed its concerns at bilateral summit talks and foreign ministerial meeting with South Korea. South Korea has been raising the abduction issue with North Korea on successive occasions, including the Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018 (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019). For its part, South Korea also has an abduction issue with North Korea. Nearly 500 South Koreans have been abducted since the Korean War; however, the South Korean government has done very little to publicize this issue, and thus the people of South Korea have low interest in both Japanese and South Korean abduction issues (Evans, 2015).

## China

China would likely intervene in North Korea for both security and economic reasons. Geographically, North Korea is a buffer state for China, acting to reduce the

threats of the U.S.' presence in South Korea and Japan. Therefore, the worst scenario for China would be the unification of the Korean peninsula under South Korea's leadership. In addition, China has 2 million ethnic Korean citizens living in China near the border with North Korea (Denny and Green, 2016). Therefore, significant instability in North Korea could ignite instability among those ethnic Korean living in China. For these security reasons, China would like North Korea to be stable.

In general, China and North Korea have maintained a good relationship since the Korean War. In particular, North Korea has relied too much on China economically. According to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency in South Korea, bilateral trade increased ten times between 2000 and 2015, peaking at \$6.86 billion USD in 2014 (Albert, 2018). However, despite the traditional relationship, China has changed its tone towards North Korea. When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, China agreed to impose the UNSC's economic sanctions. Also, China expressed "grave concern and opposition" to North Korea following a North Korean missile launch in November 2017 (Albert, 2018). Considering these points, while China may have an intention to control North Korea, it does not have enough capability for complete control.

Also, China would likely lead the denuclearization discussion to get advantages from trade negotiations with the U.S. China will approach North Korea as the denuclearization and the U.S.-China trade negotiations make progress.

As for the abduction issue, at the Japan-China summit meeting in September 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe obtained the complete support of Chinese President Xi Jinping for Japan's position (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

## Russia

Much like China, Russia has an intent in maintaining the Kim regime as a minimizing the threat from the U.S. in South Korea or Japan.

Russia continues its attempts at strengthening its economic bond with North Korea. Russia has increased the number of North Korean laborers in its country, having accepted an estimated total of at least 30,000 labors from North Korea (Higgins, 2017). Also, in the long term, Russia would like to see energy and railway links to connect the Korean peninsula in order to more easily transport energy and gas (Taylor, 2018). Russia is expanding economic ties with North Korea even though international sanctions are strengthening.

As for the abduction issue, at the Japan-Russia summit meeting in September 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe obtained the understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin (Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019).

## **The United Nations**

The UNSC has adopted ten sanction resolutions since North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006 (details are on Appendix C). In the latest sanctions resolution adopted on December 22, 2017, the 15-member Security Council capped refined petroleum product exports to North Korea at 500,000 barrels per year (UNSC, 2017a). Also, the sanction first stated that the Security Council would take measures to further restrict oil supplies to North Korea when North Korea conducts nuclear tests or launches long-range ballistic missiles in the future (UNSC, 2017a).

These sanctions appear to be effective. While North Korea reiterates its request that the UN sanctions be lifted, it continues to conduct illicit ship-to-ship transfers. In 2018, the United States pointed out that 89 North Korean tankers had brought in refined petroleum products illicitly obtained in the ship-to-ship transfer, as of May 30 (Nichols, 2018).

## POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Repeatedly, abduction by North Korea is a universal issue as a violation of the fundamental human rights. Therefore, the Japanese government needs to make North Korea reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees and provide sufficient explanations to Japan. There are three policy alternatives that the Japanese government could pursue in order to solve the abduction issue.

**Alternative 1: Providing Economic Assistance to North Korea**  
**Alternative 2: Using of Japanese Economic Sanctions as Leverage**  
**Alternative 3: Cooperating with South Korea for the Return of Japanese and South Korean Abductees**

The presented options are not mutually exclusive and should be considered in tandem to let North Korea have an incentive to return the abductees. Also, the Japanese government is expected to maintain its effort in the international communities to get cooperation and understanding of the abduction issue from other countries.

### Alternative 1: Providing Economic Assistance to North Korea

Under this option, the Japanese government provides money and Japanese proprietary technology as a form of “economic assistance” to North Korea based on the Pyongyang Declaration. This economic assistance includes compensation from World War II, much like the compensates that Japan provided to South Korea in June 1965 after the normalization of Japan-South Korea diplomatic relations. To implement this option, the Japanese government needs to fulfill one important condition: Japan and North Korea must normalize their diplomatic relationship. In order to achieve this goal, North Korea needs to solve all issues including nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

In light of the past, in which Japanese dominance of the Korean Peninsula, as part of the normalization of Japan-South Korea diplomatic relations in June 1965, Japan provided a total of \$ 500 million USD of economic assistance to South Korea. This amount was twice greater than South Korean national annual budgets at that time. Given this context, North Korea seemed to expect about \$10 billion USD as the economic assistance considering the inflation rate of that amount (Isozaki and Sawada, 2017).

While this option seems simple, there are several concerns. First, the Japanese government cannot solve the abduction issue without first achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Although the Japanese government’s current stance is the comprehensive resolution, completing denuclearization is extremely hard because possessing nuclear weapons has been the only way for the Kim regime to survive.

Second, if the denuclearization makes progress, Japan may be expected to provide economic assistance in exchange for denuclearization. Under this scenario, the Japanese government may encounter significant challenges in convincing North Korea and its allies to include the resolution on the abduction issue.

### **Alternative 2: Using Japanese Economic Sanctions as Leverage**

This option seeks to resolve the abduction issue before achieving denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. Because the Japanese government cannot take a measure, such as providing money, that weakens the pressure based on international cooperation to force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, the Japanese government needs to seek a solution by imposing new own economic sanctions or lifting their current economic sanctions. Currently, the Japanese government has primarily restricted the movement of persons, items, and money (details are on Appendix B).

This option can solve the abduction issue before achieving denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula; however, to conduct this option, the Japanese government must recognize two important assumptions. First, Japan should gather information through both diplomatic and intelligence channels in order to better understand North Korea's intention, the overall effectiveness of current Japanese sanctions, as well as to identify the most effective form of sanctions that Japan could impose in the future. It is important to bet an appropriate bargaining chip to withdraw a solution from North Korea.

The second important assumption is that North Korean would accept the high-level bilateral meeting. Given that North Korea's decision-making process depends too much on Kim Jong-Un, the Japanese leader should hold bilateral talks with the North Korean leader and make an agreement in exchange for the return of abductees: either to lift existing sanctions or not to impose any new, additional sanction.

### **Alternative 3: Cooperating with South Korea for the Return of Japanese and South Korean Abductees**

This alternative focuses on the countries which have abduction issues with North Korea. South Korea has the highest number of citizens abducted by North Korea, with more than 486 abductions confirmed by the Unification Ministry of South Korea (H.R. Con. Res. 168, 2005). Under this option, Japan would cooperate with South Korea in order to increase the pressure on North Korea for the return of abductees from each of the two countries.

This option makes the pressure on North Korea even greater; however, it has several concerns. First, the amount of effort required for North Korea to resolve the abduction issue will significantly increase. Whereas North Korea would only be required

to release an estimated 12 abductees if it were exclusively resolving the Japanese abduction issue, the number of released abductees would increase to roughly 500 if the North Korean government were to resolve both the Japanese and South Korean abduction issues. Second, the negotiation process would be much more complicated. Under the current Japanese policy, in exchange for the return of the 12 Japanese abductees, Japan would either provide economic assistance, including compensation from World War II or lift its own economic sanctions. However, under this option, South Korea would also need bargaining power in order to negotiate the return of 500 abductees. Because the cost of revealing the whereabouts of the remaining South Korean abductees is much higher than those of Japanese abductees, South Korea needs to prepare great options to incentive North Korea to resolve the issues. Third, and most importantly, because the South Korean government continues to seek reunification of the Korean Peninsula (through appeasement efforts), South Korea may avoid provoking the North and, consequently, may not be interested in this option. In fact, despite a large number of abductees, South Korea has never brought their own abduction issue to North Korea officially.

## EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

Each of the alternatives above will be evaluated using the following criteria, which will serve as evaluative measures to assess the advantages and disadvantages of each option in its ability to resolve the abduction issue. Each alternative is targeted at the way of approaching North Korea, so considerations on political feasibility are important to consider. In addition, because the Japanese government appeals the abduction issue both domestically and internationally, the consistency of the Japan's stance will contribute to maintaining the credibility of the Japanese government. Finally, the cooperation of allies is important for the Japanese government, as allies can press North Korea to confront the abduction issue. I have defined three criteria that take into account the needs of these policy issues, which list as follows; all criteria will be measured using a subjective rating scale of low to high.

**Criterion 1: Political Feasibility**

**Criterion 2: Consistency of the Japanese Stance**

**Criterion 3: Acceptability from Allies**

### Criterion 1: Political Feasibility

Political feasibility is critical to the success of any of the aforementioned options. This criterion ultimately aims to reflect the possibility of solving the abduction issue. Therefore, this criterion discusses not only whether the Japanese government can implement options in terms of legal oversight, the timing of implementation, logistic complexities, skills and capabilities required, and risk and uncertainties; but also the willingness of North Korea to accept the Japanese policy. If an alternative is easy for the Japanese government to implement but is unacceptable for North Korea, the political feasibility will be low. If an alternative is easy for the Japanese government to implement and is acceptable for North Korea, the political feasibility will be high.

### Criterion 2: Consistency of the Japanese Stance

The consistency of the Japanese stance is important to assure its credibility to the people and Japan's allies. If the Japanese government changes its policy readily, it may need an additional budget and as a result, lose the trust of people. Also, because the Japanese government has sought support from many countries on the abduction issue, changing the basic stance could lead to distrust. Therefore, when the Japanese government makes a decision, it should be consistent with the current Japanese stance, any decisions made by the Japanese government, as well as any previous agreements signed with North Korea. This criterion will measure the consistency of the Japanese stance mainly based on the Pyongyang Declaration and the framework of the



comprehensive resolution. If an alternative completely contradicts the contents of the Pyongyang Declaration, the consistency will be low. If an alternative is not completely consistent with the current Japanese stance based on the Pyongyang Declaration, but the alternative does not contradict it, the consistency will be medium. If an alternative completely accords to the contents of the Pyongyang Declaration, the consistency will be high.

### **Criterion 3: Acceptability from Allies**

The last criterion is the Japanese allies' approval. Because the abduction issue is highly related to other issues, such as nuclear and missile issues, the Japanese government cannot make progress on the abduction issue without ignoring these other issues. This means that the Japanese government cannot solve the abduction issue without cooperation from its allies. This criterion will measure the acceptability of the two important allies, the United States and South Korea. If an alternative requires the cooperation of allies that it would not likely get, the acceptability will be low. If an alternative does not need allies' cooperation to conduct, but it is not completely favorable for allies, the acceptability will be medium. If an alternative is favorable for allies, the acceptability will be high.

#### ***What about costs?***

Evaluating costs is important for a policymaker to make a decision; however, it is not appropriate to address costs as a criterion to evaluate these alternatives for several reasons. First, evaluating the costs of each alternative is extremely difficult because of uncertainties. The decision as to whether or not to provide money, or how much the Japanese government provides money requires highly political judgment. Second, this paper focuses exclusively on solving the abduction issue; however, the Japanese government's stance is the comprehensive resolution, meaning that the Japanese government is considering costs of solving all nuclear, missile and abduction issues as a package. Third, and most importantly, the Japanese government has a strong resolve to solve the abduction issue. In order to increase the probability of resolving the abduction issue, the Japanese government may not care about the cost difference, provided that it is not significant.

## POTENTIAL FUTURES

For the Japanese government, the most important aspect of solving the abduction issue is North Korean denuclearization progress. There are two different futures for North Korea.

**Future 1: North Korea Maintains Nuclear Weapons and Missiles.**  
**Future 2: North Korea Abandons Nuclear Weapons and Missiles.**

The Japanese government needs to prepare for solving the abduction issue in both scenarios. Therefore, the alternatives above should be evaluated based on these futures.

### Future 1: North Korea Maintains Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

Under this scenario, the U.S. and other countries in East Asia would struggle to denuclearize North Korea, as Japan also struggles to resolve the abduction issue. The UN, the U.S., and Japan would continue to pressure North Korea through sanctions.

North Korea would still suffer from severe sanctions and its economic condition would continue to deteriorate. Therefore, North Korea would seek to lift sanctions in order to survive. North Korea may become more aggressive as its economic condition deteriorates. North Korea may resume launching missiles and conducting nuclear tests as a way to convincing other nations to recognize it as a nuclear state, as well as to bargain lifting sanctions.

### Future 2: North Korea Abandons Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

Under this scenario, the U.S. and other countries in East Asia succeed to denuclearize North Korea while Japan would still address the abduction issue. Because of denuclearization, the Korean War would finally and officially end. The United Nations would lift their severe sanctions and the international community might shift to cooperate with North Korea from to take severe attitudes.

In response to denuclearization, the international community would make a commitment to not attack North Korea because of achieving the denuclearization; however, this would not be enough for the Kim regime to survive. The biggest concern for him would be rebellions. In order to stabilize international security, North Korea would try to eliminate public dissatisfaction by enriching its citizens, meaning that economic development would become an urgent issue. Therefore, North Korea would need as much money as they could gather.

South Korea would definitely try to place pressure on North Korea in order to reunify the Korean Peninsula. However, if Kim Jong-Un tries to maintain its regime, he may not want to do so. Because North Korea cannot accept reunifying under the South Korean regime, and South Korea cannot accept reunifying under the North Korean regime, two regimes divided between North and South would remain in the Korean Peninsula even if the Korean Peninsula were reunified. Under this scenario, reunifying the Korean Peninsula would mean that North Korean people would be exposed to South Korean democratic culture. This may trigger democratization in North Korea which may, in turn, end the Kim regime.

## ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION

This section includes an analysis of each alternative by three criteria based on two potential futures and concludes with a matrix summarizing the overall merits of each.

### Future 1: North Korea Maintains Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

#### Alternative 1: Providing Economic Assistance to North Korea

*Political Feasibility: High*

Under this scenario, gathering money is an urgent issue for North Korea because of its inferior economic condition and severe sanctions imposed by the UNSC, the U.S., and Japan. Therefore, North Korea might appreciate Japanese economic assistance and this incentive to receive economic assistance would make North Korea try to reveal the whereabouts of the remaining abductees.

*Consistency of the Japanese Stance: Low*

Because Japan would provide economic assistance to North Korea without solving the nuclear and missile issues, this alternative clearly contradicts to the current Japanese stance based on the Pyongyang Declarations and comprehensive resolution. The stance means that Japan would provide economic assistance to North Korea after the normalization of diplomatic relations due to solving all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

*Acceptability from Allies: Low*

Under this scenario, providing economic assistance to North Korea would weaken the effect of sanctions imposed by the UNSC and the U.S. to make North Korea abandon nuclear weapons. Therefore, Japanese allies and international communities would never accept this policy.

#### Alternative 2: Using Japanese Economic Sanctions as Leverage

*Political Feasibility: Medium*

In order to operate this option, the Japanese government must offer North Korea an incentive to settle the abduction issue by imposing new own economic sanctions or lifting their current economic sanctions. Therefore, the Japanese government needs to

sufficiently demonstrate its negotiation capability. However, under this scenario, North Korea's economic condition would keep deteriorating because of its inferior economic condition and severe sanctions imposed by the UNSC, the U.S., and Japan. Thus, North Korea would seek to lift Japanese economic sanctions to survive and may have an incentive to negotiate with Japan.

*Consistency of the Japanese Stance: Medium*

Lifting Japanese own economic sanctions or not adding a new Japanese sanction is not stipulated in the Pyongyang Declaration, but they do not contradict the current Japanese stance based on the comprehensive resolution to seek to solve all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

*Acceptability from Allies: Medium*

This alternative may weaken the total amount of pressure on North Korea to make North Korea give up maintaining nuclear weapons. However, this alternative uses Japanese own economic sanctions to negotiate with North Korea. Therefore, Japanese allies would likely not completely disagree with this alternative.

**Alternative 3: Cooperating with South Korea for the Return of Japanese and South Korean Abductees**

*Political Feasibility: Low*

Under this option, North Korea's amount of effort to solve the abduction issue significantly increases. Whereas North Korea would only be required to release an estimated 12 abductees if it were exclusively resolving the Japanese abduction issue, the number of released abductees would increase to roughly 500 if the North Korean government were to resolve both the Japanese and South Korean abduction issues. Therefore, even if South Korea accept to cooperate with Japan, North Korea may not have an incentive to solve the abduction issue.

*Consistency of the Japanese Stance: Medium*

The Japanese government has never tried to implement this option, but it does not contradict the current Japanese stance based on the comprehensive resolution to seek to solve all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

### *Acceptability from Allies: Medium*

Regarding the U.S., if South Korea cooperates with Japan and begins to address the South Korean abduction issue with North Korea, the pressure of denuclearization on North Korea may relatively weaken. However, the U.S. worries about the deteriorating relationship between Japan and South Korea particularly following events. First, in October 2018, the Supreme Court in South Korea ordered to make Japanese companies compensate for South Korean citizens who were forced to work during World War II (Sang-Hun, 2018). In addition, in December of the same year, South Korean warship locked radar on a Japanese patrol plane (Kajimoto & Shin, 2018). Therefore, the U.S. will agree with this option because the U.S. can expect to improve Japan-South Korean relationship.

As for South Korea, considering the current South Korean policy to appease North Korea, South Korea does not want to provoke North Korea by raising its own abduction issue. Therefore, South Korea may not accept this option.

### **Outcome Matrix**

	Political Feasibility	Consistency of the Japanese Stance	Acceptability from Allies
Alternative 1: <i>Providing economic assistance</i>	High	Low	Low
Alternative 2: <i>Using Japanese economic sanctions</i>	Medium	Medium	Medium
Alternative 3: <i>Cooperating with South Korea</i>	Low	Medium	Medium

## **Future 2: North Korea Abandons Nuclear Weapons and Missiles**

### **Alternative 1: Providing Economic Assistance to North Korea**

#### *Political Feasibility: Medium*

After the denuclearization, North Korea would develop economic power to stabilize its domestic security. Therefore, North Korea is interested in getting economic assistance

from Japan. However, under this scenario, Japan may be expected to provide economic assistance as an exchange for denuclearization. Thus, the Japanese government may have tough negotiations with North Korea to include solving the abduction issue into the agreement or to provide additional money to North Korea.

*Consistency of the Japanese Stance: High*

This option is precisely consistent with the comprehensive resolution, the current Japanese stance based on the Pyongyang Declarations and comprehensive resolution. The stance means that Japan would provide economic assistance to North Korea after the normalization of diplomatic relations due to solving all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

*Acceptability from Allies: High*

There is no demerit for Japanese allies to operate this option. After the denuclearization, the U.S. and countries in East Asia would start securing North Korea and providing economic assistance. Under this scenario, allies will completely agree with implementing this alternative.

**Alternative 2: Using Japanese Economic Sanctions as Leverage**

*Political Feasibility: Low*

After the denuclearization, North Korea would receive much economic assistance from many countries and the UNSC and the U.S. would lift sanctions. Under this scenario, the effect of Japan's own sanctions would become relatively weak. Therefore, the Japanese bargaining power might be too weak to make North Korea face the abduction issue.

*Consistency of the Japanese Stance: Medium*

Lifting Japanese own economic sanctions or not adding a new Japanese sanction is not stipulated in the Pyongyang Declaration, but they do not contradict the current Japanese stance based on the comprehensive resolution to seek to solve all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues. As a reference, in order to be consistent with the current Japanese stance, the Japanese government needs to provide economic assistance to North Korea based on the Pyongyang Declaration after it solves the abduction issue because North Korea would resolve all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

*Acceptability from Allies: Low*

After the denuclearization, the U.S. and countries in East Asia would start securing North Korea and providing economic assistance. Under this scenario, allies may want the Japanese government not to add new own economic sanctions but to lift the current economic sanctions regardless of the progress of solving the abduction issue. Therefore, they may not accept this policy.

**Alternative 3: Cooperating with South Korea for the Return of Japanese and South Korean Abductees**

*Political Feasibility: Low*

Under this option, North Korea's amount of effort to solve the abduction issue significantly increases. Whereas North Korea would only be required to release an estimated 12 abductees if it were exclusively resolving the Japanese abduction issue, the number of released abductees would increase to roughly 500 if the North Korean government were to resolve both the Japanese and South Korean abduction issues. Therefore, even if South Korea accept to cooperate with Japan, North Korea may not have an incentive to solve the abduction issue.

*Consistency of the Japanese Stance: Medium*

The Japanese government has never tried to implement this option, but it does not contradict the current Japanese stance based on the comprehensive resolution to seek to solve all nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.

*Acceptability from Allies: Medium*

Regarding the U.S., if South Korea cooperates with Japan and begins to address the South Korean abduction issue with North Korea, the pressure of denuclearization on North Korea may relatively weaken. However, the U.S. worries about the deteriorating relationship between Japan and South Korea particularly following events. First, in October 2018, the Supreme Court in South Korea ordered to make Japanese companies compensate for South Korean citizens who were forced to work during World War II (Sang-Hun, 2018). In addition, in December of the same year, South Korean worship locked radar on a Japanese patrol plane (Kajimoto & Shin, 2018). Therefore, the U.S. will



agree with this option because the U.S. can expect to improve Japan-South Korean relationship.

As for South Korea, considering the current South Korean policy to appease North Korea, South Korea does not want to provoke North Korea by raising its own abduction issue. Therefore, South Korea may not accept this option.

### Outcome Matrix

	Political Feasibility	Consistency of the Japanese Stance	Acceptability from Allies
Alternative 1: <i>Providing economic assistance</i>	Medium	High	High
Alternative 2: <i>Using Japanese economic sanctions</i>	Low	Medium	Low
Alternative 3: <i>Cooperating with South Korea</i>	Low	Medium	Medium

## RECOMMENDATION AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Recommendations are different based on the situation. **If North Korea maintains nuclear weapons and missiles, this analysis recommends Alternative 2: using Japanese economic sanctions as leverage.** Under this condition, this option provides the highest likelihood in solving the abduction issue.

One of the biggest challenges associated with implementing this option is having a bilateral talk with North Korea, meaning that the Japanese government must give North Korea an incentive to talk with Japan and to lift Japanese own sanctions. Therefore, because North Korea needs to suffer significantly from its inferior economic condition, it is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the UNSC sanctions. One important action to ensure the effectiveness of the UNSC sanctions is patrolling the North Korean illicit ship-to-ship transfers. At this point, Japan, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France are cooperating to patrol them (MOFA, 2018). The Japanese government should continue to cooperate with these countries to ensure the effectiveness of the UNSC sanctions.

Another implementing challenge for the Japanese government is negotiations. When the Japanese government made the Stockholm Agreement with North Korea in May 2014, North Korea succeeded in having Japan lift its economic sanctions for more than a year without dealing with the Japanese requests in the agreement. In addition, before the Singapore Summit was held, the U.S. government insisted that the sanction would be lifted after North Korea achieved complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID). However, there is no “CVID” in the joint statement in the Singapore Summit (Whitehouse, 2018). There are trade-offs between the feasibility of having a talk with North Korea and the feasibility of solving problems. Considering the North Korean behaviors including the Stockholm Agreement and the post-Singapore Summit, North Korea tried to get concessions, time, and money without solving any of the underlying problems. Therefore, it is important for Japan to balance the trade-offs when the Japanese government will get a chance to talk with North Korea. Also, when the Japanese government will make an agreement with North Korea in the future, it would be better not to pay for the North Korean unverifiable actions but to pay for the result of the North Korean actions.

On the Contrary, **if North Korea abandons nuclear weapons and missiles, this report recommends Alternative 1: providing economic assistance to North Korea.** Under this condition, this alternative best provides a combination of three criteria: political feasibility, consistency of the Japanese stance, and acceptability of allies.

One challenge of implementing this alternative is also negotiation. Repeatedly, under this scenario, Japan may be expected to provide economic assistance as a barter of progressing denuclearization. Therefore, the total cost must be huge if the Japanese

government provides economic assistance to North Korea twice: one is the economic assistance for progressing denuclearization, and the other is the economic assistance based on the Pyongyang Declaration which stipulates the democratic normalizations after solving the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues. Thus, the Japanese government needs to have tough negotiations with North Korea or Japanese allies that the economic assistance should be as a barter based on the Pyongyang Declaration, meaning that the Japanese government will not provide economic assistance until North Korea solves the abduction issue. In order to make the possible negotiation easier, the Japanese government should contribute to the denuclearization process and get understanding and support from the Japanese allies, mainly the U.S., about the negotiation stance. One possible way for the Japanese government to engage in denuclearization might be in the use of advanced technology. For example, the Japanese government should consider dealing plutonium occurred in the process of dismantling of North Korean nuclear weapons.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: Pyongyang Declaration

#### **Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration**

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.

Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations, and decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002.

Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the normalization.

2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.

Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the normalization talks.

Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks.



Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan and the issue of cultural property.

3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.

4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia.

Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized.

Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned.

The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.

Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security.

Prime Minister of Japan  
Junichiro Koizumi

Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission  
Kim Jong-Il

September 17, 2002  
Pyongyang

Source: MOFA, 2002 (Retrieved from [https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n\\_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html))

## APPENDIX B: Japan's Own Sanctions Against North Korea

	North Korean Actions	Japanese Counteractions
July 2006 – February 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Launched seven ballistic missiles (July 2006)</li> <li>• Launched ballistic missiles (April 2009, April 2012, December 2012)</li> <li>• Carried out nuclear tests (October 2006, May 2009, February 2013)</li> <li>• Launched a torpedo attack on a South Korean naval vessel (March 2010)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Banning the entry of North Korean nationals into Japan and of North Korean flagged ships into Japanese ports.</li> <li>• Prohibiting export and import with North Korea.</li> </ul>
May 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Made the Stockholm Agreement with Japan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lifting restrictions on visits of persons</li> <li>• Lifting measures of restriction on North Korea regarding the amount of money requiring notification of the export of means of payments and report on the money transfer</li> <li>• Lifting the embargo on the entry of North Korea flagged ships with humanitarian purpose into Japanese ports.</li> </ul>
January 2016 – February 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carried out nuclear tests (January 2016)</li> <li>• Launched ballistic missiles (February 2016)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementing restrictions on visits of persons.</li> <li>• Lowering the minimum amount of money requiring notification of the export of means of payment.</li> <li>• Prohibiting in principle the payment of money to North Korea.</li> <li>• Prohibiting the entry of North Korean flagged ships as well as ships carrying the flag of a third country which stopped at a port in North Korea, including those with humanitarian purposes, into Japanese ports</li> <li>• Expanding the list of related organizations and individuals subject to asset freezing.</li> </ul>

2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carried out nuclear tests (September 2016)</li> <li>• Launched 20 ballistic missiles in 2016</li> <li>• Did not make progress on the Abduction issue</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Upgrading restrictions on travel to North Korea.</li> <li>• Prohibiting the entry into Japanese ports of all vessels which had stopped at a port in North Korea.</li> <li>• Expanding the list of related organizations and individuals subject to asset freezing.</li> </ul>
2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carried out nuclear tests (September 2017)</li> <li>• Launched 17 ballistic missiles in 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanding the list of related organizations and individuals subject to asset freezing.</li> </ul>

Source: Headquarters for Abduction Issue, 2019

## APPENDIX C: The UNSC Sanctions Against North Korea

Date	Resolution Number	Main Contents
December 22, 2017	2397	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prohibiting the supply, sale or transfer to North Korea of all refined petroleum products, including diesel and kerosene, in the aggregate amount of up to 500,000 barrels per year</li> <li>• Not supplying, selling or transferring food and agricultural products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including magnesite and magnesite, wood, and vessels</li> <li>• Seizing, inspecting, and freezing any vessel in their ports, and any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters if the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities prohibited by resolutions</li> <li>• Applying travel ban and asset freeze to 16 North Korean individuals and 1 entities</li> </ul>
September 11, 2017	2375	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prohibiting the supply, sale or transfer to North Korea of all refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 2,000,000 barrels per year</li> <li>• Not supplying, selling or transferring textiles</li> <li>• Not providing work authorizations for North Korean nationals in their jurisdictions</li> </ul>
August 5, 2017	2371	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not supplying, selling or transferring coal, iron, and iron ore</li> </ul>
June 2, 2017	2356	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Applying travel ban and asset freeze to 14 North Korean individuals and 4 entities</li> </ul>
November 30, 2016	2321	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulating total exports to all Member States of coal originating in North Korea that in the aggregate do not exceed 400,870,018 US dollars or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever is lower</li> <li>• Not supplying, selling or transferring copper, nickel, silver, and zinc</li> <li>• Applying travel ban and asset freeze to 11 North Korean individuals and 5 entities</li> </ul>
March 2, 2016	2270	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preventing the sale or supply of aviation fuel, including aviation gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel to North Korea</li> </ul>
March 7, 2013	2094	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspecting all cargo that has originated in North Korea, or that is destined for North Korea if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items which are prohibited by resolutions</li> </ul>

January 22, 2013	2087	• Applying travel ban and asset freeze to 4 North Korean individuals and 6 entities
June 12, 2009	1874	• Calling upon all States to inspect all cargo to and from North Korea if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items which are prohibited by resolutions
October 14, 2006	1718	• Freezing the funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities that are engaged in or providing support for North Korean nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programme.

Source: UNSC, 2017a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, 2013a, b, 2009, 2006

