

# Reducing Violent Crime in Baltimore, Maryland

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*Photo was taken by the author of this report at the corner of Whitelock St. & Francis St. in Baltimore on 8 March 2019.*

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## Disclaimer

The author conducted this study as part of the program of professional education at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia. This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree. The judgments and conclusions are solely those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Batten School, by the University of Virginia, or by any other agency.

On my Honor as a student at the University of Virginia, I have neither given nor received any unauthorized aid on this assignment.

- Brian J. Kelley

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Brian J. Kelley".

*In honor of my father Kieran Kelley (1957-2015).*

*A graduate of Loyola University Maryland '81 & Johns Hopkins University '90.*

*A lifelong Marylander.*

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## Mission Statement of the Department of Justice

“To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.”

## Key Terms

<b>BPD</b>	Baltimore Police Department
<b>DOJ</b>	Department of Justice
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>USAO</b>	U.S. Attorney's Office – likely referring to USAO, District of Maryland
<b>Violent Crime</b>	Violent crime involves force or threat of force and is categorized as one of four offenses: 1.) murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, 2.) forcible rape, 3.) robbery, and 4.) aggravated assault.
<b>Consent Decree</b>	Mutually binding agreements between DOJ & a Police Department. Employed when the govt. through the DOJ has determined that a police dept. has crossed a line in terms of conduct towards citizens, often in grave, biased, and unconstitutional ways.
<b>Proactive v. Reactive Policing</b>	<b>Proactive</b> policing is the practice of deterring criminal activity by showing police presence and engaging the public to learn their concerns, thereby preventing crime from taking place in the first place. In contrast, <b>reactive</b> policing is responding to a complaint after a crime has been committed.
<b>“Open-Air” Drug Markets</b>	Open-air markets represent the lowest level of the drug distribution network. Low-level markets need to be tackled effectively by police not only because of the risks posed to market participants, but also to reduce the harms that illicit drug use can inflict on the local community. Have proliferated since 2015.
<b>GTTF</b>	Gun Trace Task Force
<b>DAT</b>	District Action Teams
<b>Quality of Life Crime</b>	Loitering, standing in groups outside shops or on street corners

## Executive Summary

The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) is in need of an effective violent crime reduction strategy. Baltimore is a geographically immense city with historic social, economic, and political challenges that have all contributed in part to its high violent crime rate. Leading up to 2015, Baltimore's violent crime rate was comparable to other large cities in the United States, but relatively flat. However, after conducting a synthetic control analysis of Baltimore's violent crime, I found that something in 2015—or more accurately, a number of events—contributed to an irregular spike in violent crime that put Baltimore on a different path than it would have been absent these factors. These events—the death of Freddie Gray from injuries sustained in Baltimore Police (BPD) custody, erosion of trust between BPD and the States Attorney (SAO), the DOJ-Baltimore City consent decree, plainclothes unit corruption, and BPD leadership instability—all seem to have played a role in the violent crime increase. More specifically, they have impacted BPD's ability to combat violent crime effectively as revealed by City Councilman Isaac “Yitzy” Schleifer's survey of BPD officers.

Recently, BPD is undergoing significant reforms in training and community policing in accordance with the DOJ consent decree and new BPD leadership. BPD is transitioning to a new Police Commissioner Michael Harrison, and the city is likely to have a new mayor as a result of Mayor Catherine Pugh's corruption allegations. Further, Governor Larry Hogan has announced a \$13 million state plan to lower violent crime in Baltimore City. Therefore, with significant structural reform already taking place, new leadership imminent, and increased investment, the time is right for BPD to create a specialized unit of 14 officers and one supervisor to implement and lead an effective violent crime reduction strategy with DOJ's help. DOJ can help BPD secure a \$2 million Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) COPS Hiring Program (CHP) grant to create a new elite BPD unit with the resources for personnel, equipment, and programming.

I determined three suitable alternatives that BPD could implement with the CHP grant funding:

- **Plainclothes Unit**
- **EXILE Unit**
- **Community Safety Partnership (CSP) Unit**

I evaluated each alternative against criteria of 1.) effectiveness: in terms of lives saved and money saved; 2.) community-based: in terms of strategic partnerships created and perceived fairness; 3.) officer training: in terms of increasing opportunity for department wide officer training; and 4.) feasibility: in terms of acceptability to local, state, and federal governments and within the BPD. Based upon my analysis of the projected outcomes of these alternatives, **I recommend Alternative 2: creating an EXILE unit to reboot one of Baltimore's most effective and community-based violent crime reduction programs.** At the end of this report, I provide an outline of a potential implementation of this strategy.

## Introduction

### Problem Statement

The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) is in need of an effective violent crime reduction strategy. Baltimore has been experiencing a dramatic and unexpected increase in violent crime since 2015. Simultaneously, the BPD has experienced a slew of internal, structural problems that have adversely impacted the department's ability to deter and prevent criminal activity. The confluence of these factors have exasperated the dramatic increase in violent crime in Baltimore. However, assuming that BPD is successful in achieving meaningful department-wide reform and stability, they will need an effective violent crime reduction strategy to immediately combat crime.

### Violent Crime in Baltimore

In 2017, a violent crime occurred in Baltimore every 42 minutes (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2017). Since 2014, nearly 60% of all violent crimes in Baltimore have involved the use of a firearm (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).<sup>1</sup> Therefore, every 42 minutes, a BPD officer is receiving a dispatch to face a violent criminal who is armed with (at least) a gun 60% of the time. Over the last fifteen years from 2003-2015, violent crime has cost Baltimore a total of \$58.8 billion dollars: or about \$3.89 billion annually. Since 2015, that figure increased to \$4.7 billion annually.<sup>2</sup>

### Background

Violent crime in Baltimore is very much a symptom of larger socioeconomic problems (Weinstein, Personal Communication, February 22, 2019). While this paper does not address solutions to these critical social political, and economic challenges, understanding Baltimore's relevant social history is crucial to understanding the larger story behind the problem. Primarily, depopulation, high costs of living, an underperforming education system, and eroding infrastructure are significant problems the city and state governments must contend with in the long-term to adequately and meaningfully address drivers of violent crime.

### Depopulation

Baltimore is a sprawling city located approximately 40 miles away from the nation's capital, Washington D.C. (Janney, 2018). Population decline might be one of the most troubling problems that Baltimore faces. At its peak in 1950, the city had nearly 950,000 residents (Janney, 2018). By 1990, the population was down to about 736,000, and by 2010, Baltimore had fewer than 620,000 people (Janney, 2018). Since July 2010, 18,500 people (3% of its total population) while neighboring counties such as Howard County and Towson County have seen population gains (Zhang, 2019). From July 2017 to June 2018, all counties in the Baltimore region seen population increases (except Baltimore County, whose population has neither increased or decreased) (Zhang,

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<sup>1</sup> Calculated with STATA and using data sets from publically accessible FBI Uniform Crime Reports from years 2011-2017.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix for costing of violent crime for Baltimore.



2019). The depopulation of Baltimore has meant that the city is filled with abandoned and condemned homes often times located next to or near populated neighborhoods. These abandoned homes provide a unique challenge to law enforcement as they are often used as hideouts by criminals, gangs, and drug addicts.

Existing research has established links between rising crime rates and urban flight (Hill et al, 2012). Cullen and Levitt (1999) analyze the link between rising city crime rates and urban flight. They found that rising city crime rates are causally linked to city depopulation (Cullen, Levitt, 1999, p. 159). They find that every additional reported crime is associated with a roughly one-person decline in city population (Cullen, Levitt, 1999, p. 159). The “goers” who are most responsive to violent crime are highly-educated households and those with children, and they found that households that leave the city because of crime are much more likely to remain within the metropolitan area (i.e. the surrounding suburbs) than those that leave the city for other reasons (Cullen, Levitt, 1999, p. 166).

These findings appear to be realized in Baltimore where neighboring counties have been experiencing an uptick in population since 2010. Yet, while Cullen’s and Levitt’s datasets come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports used later in this report, they do not distinguish crimes between violent crimes and property crimes, but instead they aggregate over all crimes (Cullen, Levitt, 1999, p. 161). Therefore, the effects of violent crime in particular on depopulation remain undetermined.

### ***Economic Deprivation: Poverty & Housing Insecurity***

Baltimore has also been plagued with high rates of poverty. Despite the fact that Maryland’s statewide poverty rate is 9.4 percent, 22.1 percent of Baltimoreans lived in poverty in 2017 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Additionally, in 2014, roughly 84% of Baltimore’s primary and secondary school students qualified for free *summer* lunch (Fesperman, King, 2014) which provides low-income children with nutritious snacks and meals (Food Action Research Center [FRAC], 2018). Furthermore, Baltimore has a high renter than homeowner population. Approximately, 52.5% of Baltimoreans (310,945 people) live in rented properties (Dinsmore, 2018). Further, every year 6,000 to 7,000 (Placher, 2018) renter households are judicially evicted in “Rent Court” for not paying their rent—94% of evictees are African-American despite making up only 65% of Baltimore’s renters (Dinsmore, 2018).

Hsieh and Pugh (1993) find that poverty and economic deprivation can be a driver of violent crime. On balance, they find that resource deprivation and poverty are both underlying cause of violent crime (Hsieh, Pugh, 1993). They find that resource deprivation, as indicated by either poverty or income inequality, appears to be more closely associated with homicide and assault than with robbery or rape (Hsieh, Pugh, 1993). Dollar et al (2019) find that poverty is linked with violent crime, but lack of jobs in an area has a stronger effect on violent crime than poverty itself in severely impoverished areas.

### ***High Single-Parent Household Rate & Poor Education System***

Baltimore has historically experienced a high “single-parent household with children” rate of about 60-63% since 2011 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2018) compared to the national average of about 31% (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2018). Investigation into the cause of this phenomenon in Baltimore has not been explored, but it can most likely be attributed to both out-of-wedlock births and high incarceration rates of mostly men—leading to fatherless households. Shaw (2016) explores the racial implications of the effects of parental incarceration on intergenerational mobility and found that having an incarcerated parent significantly alters a child's life course by limiting their educational success. Shaw (2016) further argues that it reduces the children's opportunities to “delay adulthood” by going to college (for example) and thus, improve their socioeconomic situation.

Unfortunately, Baltimore's education system is ranked among the worst in the nation. In 2017, *Project Baltimore* analyzed state testing scores across all of Baltimore's public schools and found that one-third of high schools in Baltimore had *zero* students proficient in math (Papst, 2017). Furthermore, 27.8% of high school students in Baltimore City did not graduate in 2018 whereas in neighboring Baltimore County the number was only 10.8% (Massie, 2019). Educational attainment as well as college attendance have both significant and substantial impacts on future earnings. Carnevale et al (2015, p. 4) find that lifetime earnings between college graduates make an average of \$1 million more over their lives than non-graduates, and that the income gap between the two is roughly \$17,500. Many Baltimore students will never get that chance.

### ***Drugs***

Baltimore has experienced a sustained heroin epidemic for the last fifty years. Agar and Reisinger (2002) detail Baltimore's long and fraught history with heroin going back to the 1960's. The DEA (2019) has cited research from Mars et al (2016) that reveal that Baltimore's heroin supply is being increasingly mixed with dangerous ingredients such as fentanyl, Xanax, benzos, and morphine in over the last five years. Baltimore's heroin was among the least pure in the nation (on average 10.8% pure) (DEA, 2019), but also had the lowest price per “hit” at \$5-\$10 (DEA 2016). In 2011, Baltimore experienced a record low 76 heroin-related overdose deaths, but in 2016 that number jumped to 454 (DEA, 2019) (MDHMH 2016). Fentanyl-related deaths rose at a striking rate from less than 10 in 2011 to 419 in 2016 (DEA, 2019) (MDHMH 2017a). The main traffickers of heroin and fentanyl are local neighborhood-based gangs.

### ***Gangs***

Gangs are often considered to be one of the greatest drivers of violent crime in major U.S. cities (New York State Police, 2019). Baltimore has experienced high levels of neighborhood-based gang activity since at least the 1990's. While gangs can offer a sense of belonging to wayward, disaffected, or disadvantaged youth, often times a gang's group processes foster violence and destruction (Valasik, 2018, p. 415). Baltimore has been well known for its gang culture, but

historically these gangs have been local, neighborhood-based (Weinstein, Personal Communication, February 22, 2019). In the mid-2000's major national gangs such as the Bloods, Crips, MS-13, Black Guerilla Family, and others established themselves in Baltimore, and many neighborhood gangs became affiliated with the national gangs. However, it is primarily local—"unaffiliated"—crews that operate on turf usually no more than a street block in length. USAO Maryland estimates that there are roughly 200-300 unaffiliated "crews" operating in Baltimore currently (DOJ, personal communication, 3/8/19). Many of these crews have longstanding feuds that go back over a decade and led to numerous retaliation killings over the years (DOJ, personal communication, March 8, 2019). Webster et al (2018) finds that the recent high rate of violent crime in Baltimore can be attributed to the illegal drug economy and the availability of guns for criminal and gang use.

### ***Summary***

Understanding the social, political, and economic context of Baltimore is critical to understanding Baltimore's violent crime history. However, these factors alone do not explain the recent dramatic increase in violent crime starting in 2015. My model and analysis below finds that something dramatic happened starting in 2015 that led to a "positive" and irregular increase in Baltimore's violent crime. In particular, I argue that Baltimore's civil unrest of 2015 had a profound effect on Baltimore's dramatic increase in violent crime. The next section outlines the research and analysis conducted to explore the effects of the "civil unrest of 2015" on Baltimore's violent crime rate and murder rate.

## Research & Analysis



This section outlines my findings related to Baltimore’s dramatic increase in violent crime since 2015. Using FBI’s publically accessible yearly “Crime in the U.S.” data, I employed the synthetic control method which compares real-life Baltimore that was treated with the “civil unrest of 2015” with a synthetic Baltimore which establishes what Baltimore’s violent crime and murder rates would have been absent the “civil unrest of 2015.”

### *Violent Crime Spiked in 2015: Synthetic Control Analysis*

Despite the city’s complex social, political, and economic challenges, Baltimore had not been on a trajectory of rapid decline until relatively recently. In fact, until 2015, it had been quite the opposite. The city’s proximity to Washington, D.C., recent business investments in the Inner Harbor particularly from Under Armour in 2013, and the effects of Johns Hopkins University and Hospital had helped the city enjoy higher levels of wealth and opportunity than other former manufacturing cities in the United States (MacGillis, 2019).

Building on the ideas of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Dimaon, and Hainmuller (2010), I apply a synthetic control to study the effects of Baltimore’s “civil unrest of 2015” on the city’s violent crime rate and murder rate. I demonstrate that, following Baltimore’s tumultuous civil unrest in 2015, violent crime rose markedly relative to a comparable synthetic control Baltimore. I estimate that by the end of year 2017, there were on average, 78 more annual total murders and 3906 more total annual total violent crimes committed than what would have been absent Baltimore’s “civil unrest of 2015.” Using Abadie, Dimaon, and Hainmuller (2010) inferential methods, I demonstrate the significance of my estimates in Figure 1.

**Figure 1.** Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 People, 2011-2017



### *Methodology*

Using publically available data from FBI’s annual “Crime in the U.S.” reports from the years 2011-2017, I generated a synthetic control for Baltimore’s violent crime rate and murder rate. I

downloaded the annual datasets into excel, merged them into one spreadsheet. I subsequently identified abnormalities and typos in the values (i.e. “NEW YORK6” instead of “NEW YORK”), cleaned the variables, and imported them into STATA. Once in STATA, I generated violent crime rates and murder rates by dividing the number of violent crimes by population and multiplying it by 100,000 in order to get the violent crime rate per 100,000 people. From there, I dropped cities with populations under 200,000 because they likely would not be good predictors of Baltimore, anyway, plus if the city had a small population, violent crime rates appeared to be enormously high (100 violent crimes in a city of 1000 equals a violent crime rate of 10,000 violent crimes per 100,000 people). Once I made sure that the cities that I had remaining were balanced along relevant variables, I used the `synth` command in order to generate a synthetic Baltimore violent crime rate and murder rate—balancing on population, and total annual rapes, murders, aggravated assaults, and robberies. Note that this model can be refined over in future analysis in order to improve its balance, and add other factors that will better approximate synthetic Baltimore’s violent crime rate such as demographics, average income, average age, and geographic size of the city. However, it still reveals important information about the Baltimore’s violent crime story.

### ***Discussion***

In essence, synthetic Baltimore is a construction of a weighted combination of “U.S. cities with populations over 200,000 people” used as controls to which a “treated” Baltimore is compared. Abadie, Dimaon, and Hainmuller (2010, p. 495) emphasize the strengths of the synthetic control method and say that they protect against estimating against “extreme counterfactuals,” that is, those “counterfactuals that fall far outside the convex hull of the data.”

Synthetic Baltimore accurately reproduces the violent crime rate of Baltimore prior to the “civil unrest of 2015.” Using the synthetic control technique from Abadie, Dimaon, and Hainmuller (2010), my model suggests that the synthetic Baltimore provides a sensible approximation to the number of violent crimes and murders per 100,000 that would have occurred in Baltimore in 2015-2017 in the absence of the “civil unrest of 2015.” Immediately after the civil unrest began in April, 2015, the two lines begin to diverge noticeably. While the violent crime rate in synthetic Baltimore continued on its relatively flat trend, the real Baltimore experienced a sharp increase in violent crime after the civil unrest. The discrepancy between the two lines suggests a large “positive” effect of civil unrest on the violent crime rate similar to what Abadie, Dimaon, and Hainmuller (2010) experienced in their model.

Pre-2015, Baltimore’s violent crime rate was on a steadily decreasing trend. My model suggests that something dramatic happened in 2015 that changed the course for Baltimore’s violent crime and murder rates. The next section explores potential factors that contributed to Baltimore’s spike in violent crime.



## **What Happened Post-2015?**

This section seeks to explain a number of possible contributing factors that started in 2015, and adversely impacted BPD's ability to fight violent crime. This paper does intend to establish causality between the violent crime increases and any specific instance, however, it does argue that these factors all contributed in some way to Baltimore's violent crime increase.

### ***Death of Freddie Gray***

The pivotal moment that set the city down a path of civil unrest was the death of Freddie Carlos Gray Jr. in April 2015. Gray was a 25 year-old Baltimorean who died from spinal injuries sustained while in police custody following his arrest (Morgan, Pally, 2016).

Gray grew up in West Baltimore's neighborhood of Sandtown-Winchester—a historically African-American area of Baltimore with a rich history of arts, culture, and civil rights activism. It was once called “Harlem of the South” during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but today the neighborhood is plagued with drug activity and violence (The West Baltimore Commission on Police Misconduct and the No Boundaries Coalition, 2018, p. 6). Gray's childhood life was difficult. Gray was raised in a broken home by an illiterate mother who was addicted to heroin. The apartment his family rented was not up to regulation, and he was poisoned by lead as a child experiencing significant brain damage (Rentz, 2015). In 2008, Gray's family won a lawsuit against their landlord which revealed that his blood-lead levels were as high as seven times the reference level by the CDC (Rentz, 2015). Gray dropped out of high school, and by the time he was 25, he had been arrested at least 8 times for drug-related offenses and had spent three years behind bars (Rentz, 2015).

Uniformed officers of the BPD arrested Gray on April 12, 2015 near Baltimore's Gilmor-Homes housing project. Gray ran when the officers pulled up to the curb, and once they detained him, they found a small knife on him—confirmed later to be of legal size. What happened next remains unclear—Gray's family alleges that the officers took him on a “rough ride” (in violation of a BPD new department policy). Essentially, Gray was allegedly placed in the back of the van “shackled and unbuckled” and while the officers drove around the city in an erratic manner (Koven, 2019, p. 123). Upon returning to the police station after the thirty minute ride, Gray was in a coma, with 80% of his spine severed at his neck, three fractured vertebrae, and significant injuries to his voice box (Dance, 2015). He died a week later (MacGillis, 2019).

Subsequent outrage at Gray's death sparked an uprising in Baltimore wherein intense rioting engulfed the city for days. During the protests, approximately 380 businesses were destroyed or damaged across Baltimore—at least 350 of which were owned by African-Americans (Kim, 2015). In African-American neighborhoods in particular, the widespread view was that BPD and the National Guard protected the richer, whiter Inner Harbor during while in essence “leaving black neighborhoods to burn” (The West Baltimore Commission on Police Misconduct and the No

Boundaries Coalition, 2018, p. 11). This further validated the perception that police officers were prejudiced against them.

### ***Erosion of Law Enforcement BPD-Local Government Trust***

A major consequence of this unrest was the erosion of trust between the BPD and local government. In an unexpected move, Baltimore City State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby charged the six officers involved—Lieutenant Brian Rice, Sergeant Alicia White, Officer William Porter, Officer Garrett Miller, Officer Edward Nero, and Officer Caesar Goodson—with homicide on May 1, 2015 (MacGillis, 2019). This announcement immediately had negative impacts on the morale of rank-and-file officers within BPD. Many BPD officers felt like their peers should not have been charged criminally—especially by their partners at the SAO (MacGillis, 2019).

In response to the announcement, the local police union allegedly started an undeclared and unofficial “pullback” of officers (according to BPD officials at the time) (MacGillis, 2019). Under the pullback, officers only responded to 911 calls, but largely refused to undertake any “officer-initiated” action (MacGillis, 2019). In an interview, the head of the police union defended the pullback saying that as a result of Mosby’s actions, “officers may be second-guessing themselves” (MacGillis, 2019).

### ***DOJ Consent Decree***

Further eroding confidence within the BPD was President Obama’s decision to instruct the DOJ Civil Rights Division to investigate BPD. In August 2016, they released their report accusing BPD of “racial discrimination and excessive force” (MacGillis, 2019). The report found that in Baltimore, a city that is 63% black, African-Americans made up 91% of those arrested on discretionary offenses like “failure to obey” or “trespassing,” and 82% of traffic stops (Stolberg, 2016).

As a result of the findings, the Baltimore City Council and the DOJ agreed to a “consent decree” which introduced a wide range of police reforms, including training, new technology, and community oversight and would be enforced by a federal judge (Victor, 2017). The pact was signed on January 12<sup>th</sup>, 2017—eight days before President Obama’s term ended. President Trump’s administration sought a 90-day delay to review all police reform agreements, but Baltimore’s U.S. District Judge James K. Bredar put the agreement into effect.

Until 2019, the BPD staff working on the consent decree has largely focused on rewriting BPD policies (Duncan, 2018). The process of implementing the reforms has just begun and will take years to fully implement. Officials say that will not be able to estimate an end date for the consent decree process until late 2019 (Duncan, 2018).

### ***“Plainclothes” Gun Trace Task Force Corruption Uncovered in 2017***

In November 2017, a shocking scandal within BPD’s elite plain clothes Gun Trace Task Force (GTTF) was revealed further destabilizing the department. Prosecutors found alarming widespread corruption in the GTTF—prosecuting officers for stealing thousands of dollars from citizens during arrests, planting evidence, lying in search warrants, and using excessive force (Smith, 2018). It was discovered that former BPD Sgt. Wayne Jenkins admitted to stealing drugs and selling them back on the street as far back as 2012 (Fenton, 2018). One GTTF officer confessed to selling bags of pills looted from pharmacies during the April 2015 riots and other drugs given to him by Sgt. Jenkins for over \$1 million in total (MacGillis, 2019). As a result, the GTTF was disbanded and the officers uninvolved in the scandal presumably returned to the uniformed police units.

GTTF was useful insofar that it kept criminals constantly guessing, and drastically raised the costs of doing crime. One of the GTTF’s most controversial tactics was the “door pop,” which meant driving an unmarked vehicle quickly toward a group of people, slamming on the brakes, popping open the doors and then chasing anyone who ran (Smith, 2018). This tactic earned the GTTF the nickname “jump out boys,” however, today many view the tactic as inherently racist as it predominately targets African-American males (Smith, 2018). One GTTF detective testified that the unit would conduct up to 50 door pops a night (Smith, 2018).

### ***BPD Commissioner Turnover***

Baltimore has had four different police commissioners since 2018 (Booker, 2019). The average tenure of a police commissioner in a major U.S. city is three to four years (Richman, 2018). In July 2015, Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake fired Commissioner Anthony Batts as crime levels spiked (Duncan, 2019). In January 2018, Mayor Pugh sacked Batts’ successor, Kevin Davis, because crime rates continued to rise (Duncan, 2019). Davis’s successor, Darryl De Sousa, was criminally charged with failing to file federal tax returns after a few months on the job, and interim Baltimore Police Commissioner Gary Tuggle turned down the permanent job (Anderson, 2018).

Yet, the new police commissioner Michael Harrison comes from a successful career as police superintendent in New Orleans which like Baltimore is diverse, has undergone civil rights reforms, and has faced high rates of violent crime (Duncan, 2019). Harrison has experience working undercover to investigate corrupt police which Baltimore recently experienced with its corrupt Gun Trace Task Force (Duncan, 2019).

### ***Attempting to understand these Effects: Councilman Schleifer’s BPD Survey***

These effects in tandem have influenced the culture and institutions within BPD leading into 2019, and therefore, it is near impossible to establish causality between any of these events and their impacts on violent crime and the BPD. However, Baltimore Councilman Isaac “Yitzy” Schleifer conducted an anonymous survey distributed among BPD uniformed officers in order to gauge the

sentiments of BPD's rank and file. While rather unscientific in its approach and methodology, it still offers valuable information on how BPD officers view the current state of the BPD.

He received 362 responses—83% of whom were officers—and found them to be balanced on age, but received more response from those with more years on the force (Schleifer, 2019, p. 3). While unable to account for selection bias, his survey revealed numerous attitudes of BPD. Specific Complaints focused on 1.) increased resources to hire more officers and provide better training; 2.) more trust and support from elected leaders in order to do proactive policing; and 3.) more professionalism among BPD leadership.

On the training side, he found:

- 40% of BPD officers feel inadequately trained
- 74% of BPD officers feel restricted by the Consent Decree
- 44% of BPD officers do not understand the Consent Decree
- 43% of BPD officers of officers don't feel comfortable making self-initiated arrests

On the management and retention side, he found:

- 78% feel BPD has lowered hiring standards
- 85% feel BPD is ineffective communication within the department
- 93% feel that city leadership does not support its law enforcement

A major takeaway from the survey is that BPD is facing significant internal challenges that have led to less confident policing, less proactive policing, and *self-reported* lower quality policing. Arguably, BPD's violent crime fighting capabilities have drastically weakened. These sentiments can be borne out in the fact that Baltimore police has had an astounding attrition rate – losing 10% of the officers every year since 2015, and the fact that as of December 2017, BPD had about 293 vacant patrol officer positions (Baltimore Police Department, 2018). Recently, BPD has been hiring at a replacement rate, but addressing retention and vacancies should be a priority for the department in the long-term.

### ***Decreases in Monthly BPD Arrests, but not Monthly Crimes Reported to BPD***


While it is impossible to establish causality between an event and BPD attitudes, it is a fact that BPD officers made less arrests in the months post Freddie Gray.

Using open source data available from *Open Baltimore* (2019), I analyzed the number of monthly police arrest incidents and the number of crimes reported to BPD fifteen months before and fifteen months after the Freddie Gray incident. Initially, it appeared that post Freddie Gray's Death, the number of BPD Arrests went down from a high of about 3500 nine months before the incident to about 2000 monthly incidents per month afterwards. However, the data suggests that arrests were trending downwards before Freddie Gray anyway. Morgan and Pally (2016) note that declines are

consistent with the widely discussed police “pullback,” however, it remains fundamentally unclear whether the crime spike after April 20, 2015 should be regarded as evidence in support of a Ferguson effect on crime in Baltimore.

In support of that conclusion, I found no statistical difference between the number of victim-based crimes reported to BPD before and after the Freddie Gray’s arrest. Therefore, it can be argued that while crimes reported to police remained relatively constant, the number of BPD arrests went down substantially as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2.




Important to note is that all BPD data on *Open Baltimore* (2019) is preliminary data and subject to change. The time frame of 15 months was chosen primarily because there were gaps in the data beyond 15 months. Yet, there was still value in looking at how both variables were trending in the year before and the year after the incident. It is impossible to say what exactly caused BPD arrests to decrease during this period, however, the fact that they did decrease while there was no substantive change in crimes reported to BPD suggest that officer behavior changed significantly post Freddie Gray.

I decided to look at total annual arrests and arrests per uniformed BPD officer and compare that with Baltimore’s total annual murders between 2004 and 2017. The major takeaway is that total annual arrests and annual arrests per officer have decreased dramatically since the equilibrium point of 2011. It appears that there is an optimal point between total arrests/arrest rates and murders, and that equilibrium point—experienced in 2011—saw 197 murders and approximately 60,000 arrests or 20 arrests per officer. In the last recorded year, BPD officers made on average about 9 arrests per year, and the department in total saw just over 24,000 total arrests, compared to 19 arrests per officer per year, and 64,000 total arrests in 2011 as shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3.



Given the unrest of 2015, and the fundamental internal, structural problems within the BPD, the department has begun a series of internal reforms focusing on recruitment, training, and retention since 2018. After completing these reforms, BPD will need a violent crime reduction strategy that the new and improved BPD can implement with the help of the DOJ. The subsequent section explores the literature on a number of feasible violent crime reduction strategies.

## Exploration of Violent Crime Reduction Strategies

After BPD completes its internal reforms, its next challenge will be to implement a violent crime reduction strategy. Baltimore has tried numerous violent crime reduction strategies over the years. Therefore, this section will revisit the policy history of Baltimore's violent crime reduction strategies, and will serve as a literature review that discusses the effectiveness and main findings of such strategies both in Baltimore, and elsewhere.

### **Definition**

Most violent crime reduction strategies implement both prevention and deterrence elements. Prevention strategies aim to prevent violent criminal offenders from committing crime in the first place. Under this approach, law enforcement targets changes in community infrastructure, culture, or the physical environment in order to reduce crime (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 2019). Tactics include but are not limited to community-based outreach, community policing, urban or physical design, and comprehensive or multi-disciplinary efforts (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 2019). These strategies seek to engage residents, community and faith-based organizations, and local government agencies in addressing the factors that contribute to the community's crime, delinquency, and disorder (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 2019).

On the other hand, deterrence strategies aim to deter violent criminal offenders from committing crime through threats of punishment or coercion. The overall idea of focused deterrence strategies is that police can increase the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment in a number of innovative ways. Deterrence works when offenders alter their behavior for fear that they will be apprehended by the police for wrongdoing (Apel, 2015). Often police directly interact with offenders and communicating clear incentives for compliance and consequences for criminal activity (Apel, 2015).

Baltimore City government and law enforcement have employed elements of both prevention and deterrence tactics in their strategies for addressing violent crime over the years.

### **Baltimore Violent Crime Policy History**

#### ***“Stop, Question, Frisk” (SQF) (1999-2007)***

Starting in late 1999, Baltimore's newly elected mayor, Martin O'Malley, adopted “stop, question & frisk” (SQF) policing strategy based off of New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani's program. In New York City, Mayor Giuliani's SQF policing led to discretionary arrests for quality of life crimes like loitering and disturbing the peace (*Baltimore Sun's* Editorial Board, 2016). Former Commissioner of the NYPD William Bratton lauded the program's perceived effectiveness in New York City stating that what was called the “crime capital of the world” in 1994, had dropped its total crime by 37%, and homicide rate by 50% by 1998 (Bratton et al, 1997, p. 3).

Zero tolerance policing is based on the idea that law enforcement should punish low-level crimes and general disorder which would in turn deter more serious violent crimes in the future (Bratton et al, 1997, p. 3). Bratton et al (1997) argues that it offers police officers an opportunity for low-intensity interaction with the community. A large component of zero tolerance policing is “stop, question & frisk” (SQF). In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled in *Terry v. Ohio* that police officers had the right to stop and detain a person when there was reasonable suspicion that he or she was in the act of committing a crime or about to commit a crime (Weisburd et al, 2015, p. 32).

Weisburd et al (2016) found that SQFs had a significant but modest deterrent effect on reducing crime in New York City (Weisburd, 2015, p. 47). They explored the impact of SQFs on daily and weekly crime incidents in NYC at a microgeographic level, and separates two potential causal mechanisms in their work: 1.) SQFs are a response to crime; 2.) SQFs deter crime (Weisburd et al 2015). Using space–time interaction models, they found that SQFs in a specific area will reduce the level of crime—but only by about 2% total (Weisburd, 2015, p. 47). However, a change in the crime rate in a city as large as New York City, can still have meaningful societal benefits (Weisburd, 2015, p. 50).


Weisburd et al (2015) argue that SQFs have a place in crime prevention when they maximize their deterrent value while minimizing infringement on the rights of citizens (Weisburd, 2015, p. 50). Apel responds to Weisburd, and praises his methodology. However, he argues that until we have the counterfactual of what crime looks like without SQFs, SQFs’ true deterrent effectiveness will remain unanswered (Apel, 2015 p. 64).

SQFs remain highly controversial for a number of other negative externalities—particularly damage to community-police relations. White and Fradella (2016) cite that out of 175,000 stops in New York City in 1999, the New York State Attorney General found that 15% of those stops did not meet the reasonable suspicion threshold and that most of the stops targeted minority communities. Gelman et al (2007, p. 822) analyzed NYPD’s SQF policy and found that persons of African (23% more) and Hispanic (39% more) descent were stopped more frequently than whites, even after controlling for precinct variability and race-specific estimates of crime participation.

The constitutionality of SQFs has also been called into question. Bellin (2014) argues that while SQFs may reduce crime, it is prohibited by the Constitution. Bellin (2014) argues that as a policing strategy, SQF violates the Fourth Amendment because illicit goods like drugs or guns are easily concealable, and to discover them would necessitate an unlawful search. He also argues that SQFs violate the Fourteenth Amendment because of their arbitrariness and reliance on impermissible demographic profiles—mainly race (Bellin, 2014, p. 1500). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that SQFs violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in *Floyd v. City of New York* (2013) (Weisburd et al, 2015, p. 32).

Figure 4.

In Baltimore, the result of O’Malley’s zero tolerance program was a massive increase in the number of arrests with less than noticeable decreases in violent crime. Total annual arrests peaked in 2004 at nearly 100,000 arrests. In fact, 20 percent of the 100,000 people arrested in Baltimore in 2004 were released without charge—in other words, it implies that 1 out of 5 innocent people were arrested simply for being in the presence of police (*Baltimore Sun’s* Editorial Board, 2016). Violent crime largely stayed constant for most of this period. In reality, homicides climbed from 261 in 2000 to 282 in 2008 (Gately, 2017). The figure below suggests that there is an optimal balance between “zero-tolerance” policing as seen in 2004 and the “pullback” experienced post-2015. This point appears to be around 60,000 arrests in 2011 as shown in Figure 4.



An editorial in the *Baltimore Sun* (2016) notes that “zero tolerance” policing led to fractured relations with the community, spillover aggressive police training and practices that have remained in place, and numerous ACLU civil rights violations that are currently being settled by the city. Of the 301,000 pedestrian stops Baltimore police made from 2010-2014, just 3.7 percent uncovered evidence of criminal activity (Gately, 2017). Furthermore, critics argue that SQFs have contributed to Baltimore’s increasing number of single-parent households and unemployment rate as many Baltimore residents now have employment-ending criminal records (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2018). To those who would advocate for a resurrection of SQF, the tactics have not produced substantive results while also simultaneously undermining community trust in law enforcement. Therefore, SQFs will not be considered to be a feasible policy alternative in this report.

### ***EXILE (2006-2012, Peak Effectiveness)***

Baltimore’s EXILE program was a unified and comprehensive strategy to combat gun crime. It combined local, state, and federal law enforcement efforts, community action and revitalization, and public awareness to target the most violent repeat offenders (U.S. Attorney’s Office – MD, 2006). The ultimate message was that criminals will do hard time for gun crime, and that law enforcement must empower law-abiding citizens who want to rid their neighborhoods of violent criminals who spread despair (U.S. Attorney’s Office – MD, 2006).

EXILE has been called the antithesis of “zero-tolerance” because it targeted violent repeat offenders (VRO’s) who are likely drive much of the experienced violence in the city (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). EXILE’s strategic partnership of local, state, and

federal law enforcement successfully employed the targeting strategy of identifying and prosecuting the “worst of the worst”—getting them off the streets as quickly and effectively as possible (U.S. Attorney Office – MD, 2006). EXILE worked in tandem with community activists, educators, and civic and faith-based organizations (U.S. Attorney Office – MD, 2006).

In an interview with Jason Weinstein, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) who headed the Violent Crime Section from 2009-2012 and who oversaw EXILE during its peak effectiveness, Weinstein explained that the multifaceted approach of the program and the dedicated federal, state, and city law enforcement were the main components of its success (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). Weinstein helped coordinate state and federal prosecution of firearms cases (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). The result of this was an increase in “felon in possession (of a firearm) guilty pleas” to 88-95% in state court (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). Prior to this strategy, over 2/3rds of all felon in possession cases tried in state courts ended in acquittals (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). Furthermore, EXILE successfully penetrated Baltimore’s anti-“snitching” culture by offering increased witness protection resources and the chance for a new life for criminals who cooperated (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019).

One of the key factors of EXILE was its “call-ins” of the most at-risk youth who attended the meetings with their mothers, girlfriends, and other family members (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). These meetings often proved foundational in diverting at-risk young men away from lives of violent crime (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). Weinstein, Sheryl Goldstein from the Mayor’s office, and police commissioner Fred Bealefeld (2007-2012) and other members of BPD were usually the ones who explained the real costs of crime and the likely trajectories for these at-risk youth (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019).

The program was cost effective, and only consisted of using a grant to hire an ex-offender to serve as a mentor for program participants. Furthermore, the program established “safe zones” where there was a defacto ceasefire, physical barriers denoting the zone at the end of each street, and positive community programming such as cookouts, repairing broken down homes (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019).

Webster et al (2013) found that the EXILE “call-in” in Northwest Baltimore was linked with a statistically and substantively significant reductions of 44% for non-fatal shootings and 35% for homicides. However, the researchers could not establish statistically significant effects associated with the call-in that occurred in West Baltimore (Webster et al, 2013). However, during the implementation and execution of this program, murders were down 30 percent hitting a three-decade low of 197 in 2011, shootings were down 40 percent, *and* adult arrests were down 43 percent (Weinstein, Personal Communications, February 22, 2019). Unfortunately, since 2012,



EXILE lost many of its key leaders who helped make its success possible including Weinstein, Goldstein, and Bealefeld.

### ***“Safe Streets” (2007)***

*Safe Streets* Baltimore was a public health program instituted by the Baltimore City Health Department (BCHD) that replicated Chicago’s *CeaseFire* program but was distinct from EXILE. Instead of “violence interrupters” in Chicago, Baltimore had street outreach workers that would mediate conflicts as well as work with high-risk youth clients between the age of 15 and 24 years (Webster, 2013). These “credible messengers” were individuals who had renounced previous experiences with gangs or drugs and would serve as positive role models, mentors, and supports for making choices that steer young people away from using violence (Webster, 2018). The programs were implemented in police precinct within the top 25% in the city for number of homicides and non-fatal shootings (Webster, 2018).

Webster et al (2013) analyzed the effect of Safe Streets on homicide and nonfatal shooting incidents per month in four intervention neighborhoods found that the program was associated with the prevention of about 35 nonfatal shootings and at least five homicides across 112 cumulative months of program implementation across the four sites. They reported that these reductions were accomplished in some of Baltimore’s most violent neighborhoods and were evident soon after program implementation. However, Webster et al (2013) found “no effects” of Safe Streets on homicides “when the effects were aggregated across all sites implementing the program since 2007 as homicides rose sharply during Madison Eastend’s 20-month intervention period. A promising finding of the study was that surveys of youth in neighborhoods where Safe Streets operated demonstrated attitudes that were less supportive of using guns to resolve conflicts than was the case in similar comparison neighborhoods (Webster et al, 2013).

### ***Plainclothes Violent Crime Impact Section (2007-2012) & Gun Trace Task Force (2007-2017)***

From 2007-2012, Baltimore employed a plainclothes “hot spot” policing method that targeted high-risk individuals—usually gang leaders or key drug dealers—who were the main drivers of violent crime in local areas. The Violent Crime Impact Section (VCIS) which was comprised of plainclothes BPD detectives was put in place in July 2007 with a focus on “bad guys with guns” and operated until December 2012 (Rector, 2018). Webster et al (2013) found that deployment of BPD’s VCIS was associated with a 16% reduction in homicides.

The aforementioned controversial Gun Trace Task Force (GTTF) was established in 2007 as well with the mission of targeting those who supply guns for criminal use (Webster et al, 2013). GTTF sought to reduce the supply of illegal guns by suppressing gun trafficking—cracking down on illegal sales and uncovering the history of guns transferred illegally (Behn, 2010, p. 443). GTTF focused on gun dealers—particularly problem dealers—conducting integrity tests, using straw purchases and ammunition logs, and then building cases to close down illegal dealers (Behn, 2010,

p. 443). Employing eight police officers from the city, five from the state police, and one from the county, GTTF followed the gun market, identifying illegal guns, how they came to the city, and whether a crime was committed during its multiple transfers (Behn, 2010, p. 443). In 2007, the city seized 4,000 guns (Behn, 2010) and in 2009, the GTTF seized 437 firearms, conducted 83 search warrants, and made 37 arrests (Maryland Department of State Police, 2009).

### ***Group Violence Intervention (GVI) (2014-2015)***

Group Violence Intervention (GVI) is a deterrence strategy that reduces street-group involved violence and homicide through a partnership of law enforcement, community members, and social service providers that directly engages the small and active number of people involved in violent street groups and delivers a credible moral message against violence, prior notice about the consequences of further violence, and a genuine offer of help for those who want it (National Gang Center, 2018).

Criminologist David Kennedy helped Baltimore re-implement a version of the GVI strategy in 2014—before the civil unrest of 2015 began. Under the name “*CeaseFire*,” GVI call-ins began on June 10, 2014, with a total of three call-ins in Baltimore’s Western District through November 12, 2015 (Webster et al, 2013). There were an additional two call-ins in the Eastern District: one on March 31, 2015, and one on August 27, 2015 (Webster et al, 2013). However, an analysis of program’s total efficacy has not been conducted, and the call-ins were likely affected by the dramatic unrest of 2015.

### ***Summary***

For the last decade, city, state, and local law enforcement have worked to implement programs to reduce violent crime in Baltimore. These programs have incorporated both prevention and deterrence strategies that will inevitably be incorporated in any future proposal. However, the literature suggests that harsh deterrence strategies like SQF do not lead to substantive reductions in violent crime. Therefore, SQF proponents should consider other approaches—specifically, ones that target most violent offenders and are community-based.

The next section explores the relationship between the DOJ and BPD. Specifically, it discusses potential funding opportunities for community-based violent crime reduction grants within the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) COPS Hiring Program (CHP). It reveals that BPD has underutilized DOJ funding opportunities while comparable cities have secured grants. CHP especially pertains to BPD as the department reports that it is short 293 patrol officers (Baltimore Police Department, 2018). However, it does not suggest reasons as to why BPD has not secured CHP grants. Future research can determine the likely reason for this anomaly.

## DOJ Grant Context & Costing

This section explores 1.) how BPD and the City of Baltimore have underutilized DOJ grants vis-à-vis other cities; and 2.) how much violent crime has cost the city in the last 15 years. Arguably, the relatively small impacts of the grants could have enormous saving potential for the city if they were to secure and implement one successfully.

### ***Baltimore City & BPD Have Not Secured DOJ Grants Effectively***

Over the last two decades, more than \$14 billion has been invested to advance community policing (McCarthy, 2016). Many of these grants come from the COPS office which provides funding but requires applicants to identify a specific crime or problem area where adding community policing can be used as a law enforcement approach by the local department (McCarthy, 2016). Practically all of BPD's future policing strategy will involve community-policing, therefore, it is recommended that they target one of these COPS grants.

Since 2015, BPD has underutilized the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) COPS Hiring Program (CHP) grants. Out of the \$98.5 million invested into the COPS CHP program in 2017, Baltimore secured a meagre \$125,000 to secure funding for 1 new police officer to build "trust and respect." Below Figure 5. outlines some notable and comparable cities CHP funding successes contrasted with Baltimore's underperformance.

<b>Figure 5. Comparable (and not so comparable) cities had far better success at securing COPS CHP grants than Baltimore in 2017</b>				
Data from COPS Hiring Program (CHP) - 2017 Awards				
City	Population	Amount	Officers	Reason
Chicago	2,706,171	\$3,125,000	25	Gun Violence
Sacramento	499,997	\$1,875,000	15	Gun Violence
Cincinnati	299,116	\$1,875,000	15	Gun Violence
Atlanta	481,343	\$1,875,000	15	Critical Infrastructure Problems
Detroit	670,792	\$1,848,067	15	Human trafficking
Village of Chickaloon, Alaska	272	\$178,882	1	Quality of Life Problem
Park City Sheriff's, Montana	16,353	\$125,000	1	Quality of Life Problem
Baltimore City	613,217	\$125,000	1	Building Trust & Respect

BPD did not receive a CHP grant in 2015 or 2016. However, other Maryland local law enforcement agencies received CHP funding. In 2015, the Cambridge Police Department received \$375,000, Hagerstown Police Department received \$500,000, and the New Carrollton City Police received \$125,000 (U.S. Department of Justice, COPS, 2015). Likewise in Charles County and City of Salisbury in Maryland received \$375,000 and \$250,000, respectively for a total of 5 officer spots between the two departments in 2016 (U.S. Department of Justice, COPS, 2016).

Since 2015, the City of Baltimore which applies on behalf of BPD has only been able to secure \$3,594,176 in total from DOJ-OJP grants whereas neighboring Baltimore County received a

comparable \$3,039,897 despite having *substantial* differences in total violent crime (U.S. Department of Justice, OJP, 2019). These findings are worse when looking specifically at 2017. In 2017, Baltimore City received \$919,616 in total DOJ-OJP grants whereas Baltimore County received \$1,476,471 (U.S. DOJ, OJP, 2019). This is alarming considering that Baltimore City’s violent crime total was 12,430 and Baltimore County’s violent crime total was 5,052 as shown in Figure 6.

<b>Figure 6. Differences in Total Murders and Total Violent Crimes between Baltimore County &amp; Baltimore City 2013-2017</b>							
	<b>Locality</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>
<b>Total Homicide &amp; Non-Negligent Murder:</b>	<i>Baltimore County</i>	20	25	30	35	35	27
	<i>Baltimore City</i>	233	211	344	318	342	309
<b>Total Violent Crime</b>	<i>Baltimore County</i>	4,184	4,024	4,539	4,411	5,052	4,826
	<i>Baltimore City</i>	8,725	8,346	9,542	11,010	12,712	11,512

#### ***How much has Violent Crime cost Baltimore?***

While Baltimore the potential savings associated with grants may never be determined, the costs of crime can be calculated. Using Heaton’s (2010) valuation of violent crime, over the last fifteen years, violent crime has cost Baltimore a total of \$58.8 billion dollars or about \$3.89 billion annually. Since the civil unrest of 2015, violent crime has cost the city about \$4.7 billion annually. If Baltimore had stayed on its pre-2015 trend, the city would have had roughly 215 fewer deaths and saved the city \$4.1 billion dollars over three years from just murders alone. All estimates were adjusted using CPI to achieve costs in 2019 (\$).

<b>Figure 7. Total Cost of Violent Crime in 2019 (\$)</b>	
<b>Violent Crime</b>	<b>2019 (\$)</b>
Murder	\$1.1 million
Rape	\$275,000
Robbery	\$85,000
Assault	\$110,000

Given the costs of violent crime, Governor Hogan recently announced that he is committing nearly \$13 million and introducing two new pieces of legislation to utilize all resources available to create the strongest state enforcement presence ever within Baltimore City by creating the Violent Crime Joint Operations Center. He hopes to bring together federal, state, and local stakeholders to get collective input to go after violent crime, gangs, and criminal enterprises (Governor’s Office of Crime Control & Prevention, 2019). His plan calls for bringing in 200 law enforcement officers in a “strike force” to fight crime and expansion of a program in which defendants are prosecuted in federal court (Broadwater, 2019). Therefore, in tandem with this increase in state and local investment, the DOJ is uniquely poised to help BPD secure a DOJ grant in order to implement an effective long-term crime reduction strategy. The next section of this report will explore criteria for evaluating policy alternatives s to reduce violent crime in Baltimore.

## Criteria & Assumptions

This section explores policy options to reduce violent crime reduction in Baltimore. The first part of this section describes evaluation criteria for each option, and the second describes the assumptions necessary for the evaluation of the policy alternatives.

### *Criteria*

The DOJ should help the BPD secure a \$2 million COPS CHP grant that creates a 15 officer unit to implement a violent crime reduction strategy. Alternatives will be weighed against the following criteria:

- 1.) **Effectiveness:** in terms of lives saved and money saved.
- 2.) **Community-based:** in terms of strategic partnerships created, and perceived fairness.
- 3.) **Officer Training:** in terms of increasing opportunity for department wide officer training
- 4.) **Feasibility:** in terms of acceptability to local, state, and federal governments and within the BPD.

**Effectiveness:** The policy alternatives in this report aim to reduce violent crime across the board. However, because murders are the most costly (Heaton 2010), easily quantifiable, and generally perceived as indicative of a city's overall violent crime health, the number of homicides reduced and its total value will be measured. Reducing the total number of homicides is generally associated with overall reductions in violent crime.

**Officer Training:** A highly-trained, highly-motivated, and highly-effective BPD is the cornerstone of any violent crime reduction strategy. Some of the most troubling findings from Councilman Schleifer's survey was the fact that: 40% of BPD officers feel inadequately trained; 44% of BPD officers do not understand the Consent Decree; 43% of BPD officers of officers don't feel comfortable making self-initiated arrests; and 74% of BPD officers feel restricted by the Consent Decree. Therefore, the DOJ should seek a solution that BPD can implement that provides frequent and plentiful training opportunities for BPD officers—ideally having “spillover” effects into other police officers.

**Community-Based:** The community's faith in BPD has been at an all-time low since the death of Freddie Gray in 2015. The community can be a valuable partner in tackling violent crime as they are the ones who witness crime, lead crime reduction programs, and provide valuable intelligence to law enforcement agencies. Therefore, this criterion seeks an alternative that engage residents, community and faith-based organizations, and local government agencies in addressing the factors that contribute to the community's crime, delinquency, and disorder (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 2017). An important aspect to this criterion is a program's perceived “fairness.” Fairness in large part is tied to how effective the alternative is at targeting criminals while leaving innocent bystanders unmolested.



**Feasibility:** The DOJ needs to help BPD implement a program that is acceptable to both the local and state governments but also acceptable to the BPD. Political feasibility refers to the amount of likely resistance that the program will face from Baltimore City Council or the Maryland House of Delegates. BPD implementation feasibility refers to how the program will be received within the department, and how quickly they can get it up and running as time is of the essence.

## ***Assumptions***

A number of key assumptions must be made before analyzing the alternatives:

- In the absence of a policy alternative, the total average number of murders in Baltimore City will be 328 murders per year over the next three years—or the average annual murder total since 2015.
- The cost of a murder is \$1.1 million (Heaton, 2010).
- BPD is fully qualified to receive maximum funding of \$2 million for COPS CPD grants.
- Programs will replicate the same success rates as outlined in the Policy History section. There will be a Generous and Conservative estimate for effectiveness to account for potential error.
- Programs will experience increased effectiveness each year over the three years.
- For costing's sake, murder reduction is linked with overall violent crime reduction.
- The value of a police officer (salary, benefits included) for three years is \$150,000.
- BPD will be successful in instituting its reforms before the policy intervention takes place.
- Governor Hogan's statewide investment into Baltimore's Project EXILE team does not include funding for an EXILE unit, but instead focuses on hiring federal and state prosecutors.

## Policy Alternatives

### Alternative 1

#### *Plainclothes Unit Expansion*

This option calls for BPD to obtain a DOJ COPS grant to expand and strengthen its District Action Teams (DAT's) with a plainclothes unit. Since DAT's predecessors GTTF and VCIS were disbanded in 2017, gun arrests in the BPD's Operational Intelligence Division (OID) plummeted by nearly 70% from the unit's indictment in March 2017 through the end of the year (Smith, 2018).

The primary difference between DAT and its predecessors is that DAT operates in uniform rather than plainclothes, and in police cruisers instead of unmarked cars. Former commissioner Kevin Davis decided to reinstitute new uniformed specialized units called DAT's in 2018. Like GTTF, these DAT officers are not tied to responding to 911 calls and instead they patrol hotspots and neighborhoods that are blighted with the most violence (Rector, 2017). They work with other intelligence and undercover units to target repeat violent offenders and provide commanders with critical response capabilities beyond the scope of patrol units (Rector, 2017). Currently, there are seven lieutenants, 24 sergeants and 127 officers who were reassigned to the DAT units, and they were selected on basis of character and experience.

Therefore, this alternative calls for DOJ funds to be directed towards the District Action Teams to provide them with the latest resources that include resources such as body cameras, bullet proof vests, and less-lethal technologies to increase police and public safety. Specifically, the grant would request funds for 15 additional plainclothes personnel over three years who are trained in *ethical* undercover tactics, and given superior equipment, training, and supplies. The plainclothes units would target violent crime hotspots, clean up open air drug markets, and approach gangs loitering on corners at night.

#### **Evaluation:**

##### *Effectiveness:*

One of the greatest strengths of plainclothes units is its ability to keep criminals guessing whether or not they are dealing drugs to a cop, or whether or not an unmarked car is going to pull down the street while they are committing a crime. Therefore, plainclothes units drastically raise the costs of doing crime. Anecdotally, criminals report that they were much more cautious in committing crime or being caught with a firearm when plainclothes units were in operation (DOJ, personal communication, 2019). Now, that they know all Baltimore police are in uniform (and that the likelihood of encountering an undercover federal agent on a daily basis is low), they have deemed it the perfect time to commit crime and settle feuds.

Webster et al found that the plainclothes units in Baltimore—specifically VCIS—were associated with a statistically significant 12 to 13 percent reduction in homicides (Rector, 2018). Therefore,

if they implemented plainclothes units and we assume that BPD would replicate these trends over the next three years, the program could have substantive success. Over three years, Baltimore could save anywhere from 123 to 148 lives (or on average between 41 and 52 annually), and between \$135 million and \$163 million. It is also hard to estimate what aggregate deterrent value this policy will have across Baltimore. Therefore, this estimate could be undervalued.

*Community-Based:*

This alternative also scores low on the community level. There is a widespread perception that plainclothes officers are racist and corrupt. Given Baltimore's recent plainclothes GTTF scandal, it is likely that the community would be uneasy about seeing the return of plainclothes officers on the street. Likewise, it is estimated that plainclothes policing across the country have been involved in nearly a third of all fatal shooting incidents recorded since 2000 despite their relatively small numbers (Joseph & Quigley, 2018). Therefore, it is unlikely that communities in Baltimore would support such a move at the present moment. Indeed, it might actually have the reverse effect, furthering the community's perception of BPD as racist, overly brutal, and corrupt. If selected, the new plainclothes unit would need significant oversight from BPD leadership which may not be possible in the short term.

*Officer Training:*

This alternative would also likely score low on the officer training criteria. Given that the training under this program would be going towards the "elite" officers selected under this program, it may already be the case that they are better trained than their peers. Furthermore, since the plainclothes unit would operate outside of the normal BPD patrol officer structure, there would be relatively little spillover gains to newly recruited officers who did not receive the training. The result of this program would further lead to a loss of the "best" uniformed officers from patrol units, thereby weakening their effectiveness.

*Feasibility:*

Given the current attitudes within the Baltimore City Council, compliance with the Consent Decree, and the new reforms being implemented at the police academy, it is likely that a push for plainclothes units would be unfeasible in the immediate term. However, in the next three to five years, if the violent crime rate continues to get worse, or other policies have failed, there may be sufficient calls to reinstate the units. Further, implementation within the BPD would be relatively simple as the units are already in place, but just wearing uniforms, and many within BPD think that they were highly effective.

## **Alternative 2**

### ***EXILE Unit***

This policy option would help BPD establish a 15 person EXILE team made up of officer and law enforcement personnel that would focus entirely on the proactive pursuit of violent gangs and

violent repeat offenders, stop the illegal trafficking of firearms, and conducting community outreach and public awareness. In many ways it would be a revitalization of the EXILE program that was started in 2007, but would have 15 full-time, and fully dedicated personnel to support the mission of the program.

On a monthly basis, BPD would provide the USAO and SAO with a list of some of the most violent individuals in the city – individuals who belong to violent gangs or organizations operating in Baltimore and individuals who have been charged with, or have been suspects in, shootings and murders (U.S. Attorney’s Office – MD, 2006). BPD will also take the lead in organizing “call-ins” for both violent offenders and at-risk youth. These call-ins will serve two purposes: 1.) to deter violent criminals from committing future violent acts by guaranteeing harsh punishment; 2,) to convince at-risk youth to avoid becoming violent offenders themselves.

Further, the BPD unit would be in charge of organizing and protecting “safe-zones” where police presence is sustained for 6 months in some of the most vulnerable neighborhood–detering criminal activity, and establishing a ceasefire. In the “safe zone,” communities and neighborhoods will be given the resources for positive programming like cleaning up abandoned row houses, covering graffiti, having cookouts, and positive events. Finally, this unit would be experts at coordinating with local and federal law enforcement, and would be responsible for training the rest of BPD in community-policing and most-violent offender targeting.

### **Evaluation:**

#### *Effectiveness:*

Project Exile is a rare policy option in that it has a demonstrated proof of concept in the city that is being recommended for. Granted, this paper has argued that the situation in the city has drastically changed since the civil unrest of 2015, a revitalization of Project EXILE could lead to a substantive reduction in violent crime. Webster et al found that Project Exile was associated with a 35% reduction for homicide. Therefore, if BPD were to use the DOJ COPS grant to establish a permanent 15 member Project EXILE unit, it is likely that these results could be replicated if not improved upon over the next three years. Over three years, Baltimore could save anywhere from 246 to 295 lives (or on average between 82 and 98 annually), and between \$271 million and \$325 million.

#### *Community-Based:*

This alternative scores high on the community-based level. Perhaps the greatest success of Project Exile in 2011 was that it had reduced arrests by 45% while also reducing murder by 30% in four years’ time. Furthermore, the police call-ins were anecdotally very popular at bringing at-risk youth and their loved ones together to intervene in their lives before they made the decision to commit violent crime. Giving at-risk youth a better shot at resisting criminal activity by offering them an alternative *and* giving them positive encouragement to do so sends a very powerful and

positive message to neighborhoods in Baltimore. Finally, establishing “safe zones” gives neighborhoods a much needed reprieve from violence, and a chance to start rebuilding.

*Officer Training:*

This alternative would also likely score very high on the officer training criteria. BPD officers who are selected to join the Project EXILE unit would be trained by state and federal partners in the SAO and USAO. Those officers will then hold training sessions for all police officers and supervisors in the BPD, transferring those skills to the rest of the department. These training programs will focus on legal and investigative issues that arise in firearms cases, with the goal of improving the BPD patrol officer’s ability to report and ensure better quality cases that increase the likelihood of successful prosecutions. Furthermore, the Project EXILE officers would receive additional training in community-policing, social psychology, and criminal justice policy.

*Feasibility:*

Reinstituting Project EXILE is highly feasible in the political arena. Governor Hogan announced the launch of a new, state-of-the-art violent crime joint operations center in Baltimore City that will serve as a coordinated operational hub for state, federal, and local law enforcement (Governor’s Office of Crime Control & Prevention, 2019). Governor Hogan has also announced his desire to facilitate the resurrection and expansion of Project EXILE. However, he has announced that he plans to work primarily with U.S. Attorney Robert Hur to provide funding for additional federal prosecutors dedicated to charging Baltimore City repeat violent offenders with federal crimes. Therefore, if BPD were to secure funding to create a new Project EXILE unit, these two reforms would dramatically increase the program’s success. Further, the program would likely be met with support from BPD leadership and officers who desire more training, and better communication.

### **Alternative 3**

#### **Community Safety Partnership (CSP) Unit**

#### **(Replicating the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) COPS Grant)**

This policy option would help BPD establish a 15 person Community Safety Partnership (CSP) team made up of fourteen officers and a supervisor who would deploy in one of Baltimore’s worst neighborhoods to begin building relationships and addressing quality of life issues and concerns. Replicating the success of HACLA’s CSP which used a COPS grant to spur a 55% reduction in homicides in the neighborhoods it was deployed in, Baltimore would implement its own CSP (U.S. Department of Justice, COPS, CHP, HACLA, 2017). BPD’s CSP unit would receive “specialized training was designed to teach the concept of community policing and partnerships; to enhance the ability to work as a team; and to cultivate the ability to plan, establish, and manage multiple scenarios that may arise in public housing developments.”

After a month of training, the CSP unit would be deployed in the Baltimore's most violent neighborhood—Sandtown-Winchester. CSP officers would be directed to avoid making nonessential arrests and to instead focus on innovative ways to create trust and humanize themselves in the community. The primary task of the CSP unit would be to develop deep relationships with residents, develop programs to support the residents with their primary focus on youth, and to address pressing quality-of-life and violent crime issues (U.S. DOJ, COPS, HACLA Grant Success Story, 2017). The CSP unit's prolonged presence in the neighborhood would effectively demand a ceasefire from its residents similar to the safe zones instituted in Project EXILE. The safe zones would give neighborhoods the chance to start rebuilding, cleaning up rundown homes, and instilling confidence in the community.

Finally, CSP would institute a host of programs that would primarily target youth. They would include but not be limited to a football program paired with an tutoring/mentoring program coached by officers; creating networks such as a Girl Scout Troop in the neighborhood for young girls to feel empowered and connected; an aggressive "Safe Passage" program which partners with local organizations to ensure kids in Baltimore get to and from school safely; partnerships with local academic institutions to expand tutoring programs; educational field trips around the city or state.

### **Evaluation:**

#### *Effectiveness:*

The CSP program experienced notable success in the neighborhoods of Los Angeles. HACLA found that its CSP program led to a 55% reduction of homicide of violent crime in certain neighborhoods. CSP would be implemented first in Sandtown-Winchester and its relative effectiveness would be gauged. If it were to experience a 55% reduction in Sandtown-Winchester or a reduction of 20 homicides<sup>3</sup> in total. I assume that this would roughly translate to a 5% reduction of homicides across Baltimore. In the first year of implementation, it would lead to savings of 16-20 lives or roughly \$18-\$20 million. However, if successful and replicated across the most violence plagued neighborhoods of Baltimore, I estimate that over three years, total homicides could be reduced by about 163 to 294 and the city would save roughly \$180 - \$323 million in total. Yet, while total savings could be enormous, the CSP necessitates an expansion of the program in years 2 and 3 in order to provide for multiple units that could deploy to the worst neighborhoods. This becomes challenging as Baltimore's neighborhoods are geographically diverse.

#### *Community-Based:*

This alternative is entirely rooted in community-policing and therefore, scores high in this criterion. CSP trains officers to overcome and challenge the negative stereotypes associated with the uniform. They become active members in the community, and ultimately build partnerships and trust that could lead to higher community reporting of crime and less violence. CSP helps

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<sup>3</sup> Sandtown-Winchester experienced 35 homicides in 2016. Therefore, it reduced homicides by roughly 15.

officers become an active member in the community, and with its youth programming is in an investment in the future of the city. Further, many residents are presently reluctant to engage with or assist law enforcement because they feel that law enforcement agents are not sensitive when interacting with community members. CSP may actually restore Baltimoreans' cooperation with

BPD, and lead to positive downstream effects on crime. HACLA was able to increase witness-reporting substantially in certain neighborhoods.

*Officer Training:*

This alternative would also likely score very high on the officer training criteria. BPD officers who are selected to join the CSP unit would become experts in community policing. These officers would serve at the fore of implementing the DOJ Consent Decree and would serve as the face of BPD rebranding. In a way, they would become the symbol of new leadership and direction for the BPD. They would also serve an important role in training the rest of BPD supervisors and officers in community policing, and would be invaluable eyes and ears within violent neighborhoods.

*Feasibility:*

Implementing CSP would be a highly feasible political move. Much of the energy in city government and within federal officials overseeing the consent decree is in the direction of reform—perhaps, more importantly ensuring the success of the reforms. Therefore, CSP could serve a very important function in bridging the gap between the consent decree, community policing, internal reforms, and coordination with federal and state partners.



## Policy Recommendation

The full results of the policy option comparison are summarized in the following outcomes matrix. Considering the alternatives against the criteria, the DOJ should help BPD implement policy **Alternative 2: use a DOJ COPS grant to create a Project EXILE BPD unit** as shown below.

Outcomes Matrix														
			Option 1: Plainclothes Unit				Option 2: Project EXILE Unit				Option 3: CSP Unit			
Cost (millions) over 3 years			\$2				\$2				\$2			
Number of Officers hired for 3 years			15				15				15			
			Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Total	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Total	Year1	Year2	Year 3	Total
Effectiveness (Homicides Reduced & Savings)	Conservative Estimate	Total Homicides Reduced Over 3 Year	10% 33	12.5% 41	15% 49	123	15% 49	25% 82	35% 115	246	5% 16	15% 49	30% 98	163
		Total Savings (millions)	\$36.3	\$45.1	\$53.9	\$135	\$53.9	\$90.2	\$127	\$156	\$17.6	\$53.9	\$108	\$180
	Generous Estimate	Total Homicides Reduced Over 3 Year	10% 33	15% 49	20% 66	148	20% 66	30% 98	40% 131	295	5% 16	30% 98	55% 180	294
		Total Savings (millions)	\$36.3	\$53.9	\$72.6	\$163	\$72.6	\$108	\$144	\$325	\$17.6	\$108	\$198	\$323
Community-based	Builds community trust in law enforcement Number of Officers hired for 3 years		Low: Community members view plainclothes units as racist, overly brutal, and corrupt				Medium: Initial increased police presence and interactions could lead to friction with the Baltimore community. However, once present, and establishing call-ins and safe zones, relations likely to improve. Targeted most violent offender also likely to be popular				High: BPD challenge and overcome the negative stereotypes associated with the uniform. They become active members in the community, and ultimately build partnerships and trust that could lead to higher community reporting of crime and less violence.			
Officer Training	Targets patrol officers for training		Low: Result would likely be a loss of the “best” uniformed officers from patrol units, thereby weakening their effectiveness				High: Officers in this unit will hold training sessions for all police officers and supervisors in the BPD, transferring those skills to the rest of the department				High: BPD officers who are selected to join the CSP unit would become experts in community policing, and train the rest of BPD supervisors and officers in community policing & consent decree			
Feasibility	Political Feasibility		Low: bolstering plainclothes will likely lead to backlash in political government and community				High: Will launch in tandem with Gov. Hogan reboot of more prosecutors; state and local government in favor of strengthening EXILE				High: City government and DOJ want success of consent decree and community policing reforms. Desperately wants positive new direction for BPD			
	Implementation Feasibility		Medium: BPD already has such units in place, providing them with more resources would likely be easy to implement				High: EXILE has many of the existing documents, and even former implementers to relaunch program				Medium: CSP could be difficult to understand/implement; who gets first deployment; resource & officer intensive			

While each alternative offers a promising strategy for reducing violent crime, choosing to create a BPD Project EXILE unit as outlined in Alternative 2 is demonstrably the most cost effective, and politically feasible. EXILE achieves many desirable political, social, and economic outcomes—it has been proven to reduce violent crime and reduce or at least not contribute to more arrests. However, Baltimore’s arrests are already at historic lows compared to its 2011 EXILE levels (roughly 30,000 fewer arrests per year) and this suggests that there is ample room for BPD to increase arrests under this program. Further, of the three options, EXILE has the highest chance at

consistently and substantially reducing total homicides over the next three years, saving anywhere from 246 to 295 lives (or on average between 82 and 98 annually), and between \$271 million and \$325 million. This fact outperforms both the plainclothes unit in alternative 1 and CSP unit in alternative 3—in both conservative and generous estimates.

CSP certainly scores as higher marks in the community-policing category. However, CSP is *too* targeted and *too* limited in scope for a department that is strapped for both personnel and resources. CSP should be revisited once the city of Baltimore has lowered its violent crime rate, and regained stability in city leadership and within BPD. Perhaps, CSP can be considered for implementation in 5 years' time.

Plainclothes units are interesting because they have a drastic psychological effect on criminals. Further research should be done to determine and quantify their effectiveness in police departments across the country. A cost benefit analysis of 1 plainclothes police officer vis-à-vis 1 uniformed police officer could be a valuable comparison for police departments who are trying to make the best investment possible to reduce violent crime in their jurisdictions.

Governor Hogan's decision to invest money into Project EXILE in 2019 suggests that the time is ripe for the program's reboot. However, Governor Hogan has indicated that he wants to dedicate the money to federal and state prosecutors. BPD can therefore apply for a grant from the DOJ in order to further this mission and ensure the success of the program.

## Implementation

This section briefly outlines the steps the DOJ & BPD should take to successfully implement the EXILE unit alternative.

First and foremost, BPD must apply for this year's COPS CHP grant by May 28, 2019, at 7:59 p.m. EDT. It should apply for near maximum funding at \$2 million. Assuming that the BPD secures the grant, it must immediately begin forming a team of dedicated officers and personnel that are committed to working proactively to identify the most violent offenders in Baltimore City and to devise strategies for getting them off the streets as quickly and effectively as possible.

BPD should immediately focus on known VRO's in Baltimore:

- Update, revise, and assess its Violent Repeat Offender (VRO) program and current VRO lists.
- Compile background materials regarding each VRO, including police reports, search warrants, and parole/probation information.
- Reach out to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies—primarily the USAO and SAO—with this information and share it.
- Maintain easily accessible VRO parole or probation which are typically the quickest way to get those individuals off the streets if they violate them.
- This list should constantly be updated in conjunction with intelligence and further development.

After establishing its VRO lists, and background, it should then focus on federal and state training programs for officers.

- These training programs will focus on legal and investigative issues that arise in firearms cases, with the goal of improving the quality of all such cases and increasing the likelihood of successful prosecutions of such cases, whether in state or federal court.
- In turn, BPD officers in the EXILE unit can hold BPD-wide training across the department.
- Training includes standard procedures after firearm arrests such as “sending the firearm, magazine, and ammunition for fingerprints; taking statements from other occupants of a vehicle or residence where a firearm is recovered; and taking statements from, and fully identifying, all other witnesses present when a firearm is recovered.”

Finally, the EXILE unit should focus on establishing effective internal communication, and external communication with state and federal partners and the community. This information includes but is not limited to:

- Reporting on the status of Baltimore EXILE cases, including legal and other issues that arise and the progress and disposition of these cases.
- Updating and sharing lists of VRO's with state and local law enforcement.
- Planning “call-ins” and “safe-zones” in the neighborhoods most blighted by violence.

**Word Count:** 12,823

## Appendix

### ***Raw Data Citations***

#### ***Violent Crime Data for Synthetic Control accessed from:***

Uniform Crime Report Crime in the United States, 2011. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

<https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/download-printable-files>

Uniform Crime Report Crime in the United States, 2012. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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Uniform Crime Report Crime in the United States, 2016. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

<https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/resource-pages/downloads>

Uniform Crime Report Crime in the United States, 2017. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

<https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/violent-crime>

#### ***Arrest Data for BPD accessed from:***

Baltimore Police Department (2019). *Open Baltimore*.

<https://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/BPD-Arrests/3i3v-ibrt>

#### ***Victim-Based Data for BPD accessed from:***

Baltimore Police Department (2019). *Open Baltimore*.

<https://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/BPD-Part-1-Victim-Based-Crime-Data/wsfq-mvij>

### ***Generalizability of Findings & Proposal***


I have come to realize that the unrest of 2015 the structural policy problem lies within the BPD may not be unique to Baltimore. While my analysis and my recommendation are geared specifically to Baltimore, this study can be applied to other major U.S. cities experiencing increases in violent crime, erosion of community-police trust, and significant problems within their local law enforcement agencies. While the circumstance is unique, violent crime is not exclusive to Baltimore—cities like Detroit, Chicago, and even Cincinnati and St. Louis could use aspects of this study to improve their violent crime reduction strategies.

## ***Assumptions & Limitations***

The FBI UCR data was “messy” and not in a single dataset. Invariably, during the cleaning process, a number of data points could have been dropped accidentally or overlooked. Future reports could build on my data set by adding yearly city demographic data from the Census Bureau to add predictive power to my model. Further research can be done to look into the Baltimore City Government and BPD grant process as well as the COPS CHP grant selection process. Understanding the limitations of both can be crucial as to explaining why BPD has not fully utilized or implemented my recommendation.

## ***Costing of Violent Crime***

I came to these estimates using Paul Heaton from the RAND’s valuation techniques to gauge violent crime. Heaton combines the accounting-based methods of Cohen and Piquero (2009) and French, McCollister, and Reznik (2004) and the contingent valuation method of Cohen, Rust, et al. (2004). Cohen and Piquero’s (2009) accounting-based methods attempts to identify all the individual costs associated with crime that individuals and society bear and place a dollar value on those costs. These mostly come in the form of prevention expenditures (buying personal defense products), property loss to victims, expenditures on medical treatment for injuries and effects on mental health, pain and suffering of victims, and costs for investigating, adjudicating, and incarcerating offenders. Heaton then merges this with the contingent valuation approach of Cohen, Rust, et al. (2004) which attempts to elicit information about individual willingness to pay for crime reduction using survey questions. The major advantage of contingent valuation is that it captures overall willingness to pay for a program and, thus, encompasses both tangible and intangible costs. However, its major weakness is that often respondents do not have well-defined preferences.



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