

# UNPROTECTED

AMERICAN ROLE IN ENDING SEXUAL  
EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY UNITED  
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES

A REPORT PREPARED ON THE BEHALF OF  
THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE – POLICY,  
STABILITY AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,  
PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH  
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING  
OPERATIONS



FRANK BATTEN SCHOOL  
of LEADERSHIP and PUBLIC POLICY

AN APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY PROJECT BY:  
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## Client

This report has been prepared for the Department of Defense

## Disclaimer

The author conducted this study as part of the program of professional education at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia. This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree. The judgments and conclusions are solely those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Batten School, by the University of Virginia, or by any other agency

## Honor Pledge

On my honor as a student, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Elisabeth Scully". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop under the first name and a smaller loop under the last name. The signature is written over a horizontal line.

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## Acronyms

**APP:** Applied Policy Project

**DoD:** Department of Defense

**OSD-P:** Undersecretary of Defense- Policy

**PKSO:** Peacekeeping and Stability Operations

**SEA:** Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

**SHA:** Stability and Humanitarian Affairs

**SHARP:** Sexual Harassment Assault Response Prevention

**SOFA:** Status of Force Agreements

**TCC:** Troop Contributing Country

**UN:** United Nations

**UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNPKO:** United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

## Executive Summary

Peacekeepers deployed across the world have continually been involved in sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) scandals. SEA by peacekeepers further dehumanizes an already vulnerable population that peacekeepers were sent to protect. It is unacceptable in a peacekeeping environment as it normalizes a culture of violence. This paper will dive into why the Department of Defense (DoD) should hold the United Nations (UN) accountable for SEA accusations, the history of UN SEA, and how the DoD should hold the UN accountable for these abuses.

This analysis will assess four options for reducing the occurrence of sexual assault and abuse scandals within the United Nations. These options include increase women-only forces, implementing a zero-tolerance policy for fraternization, increase in-troop resources, and bolster the partnership approach.

After assessing the impact each of these alternatives has on reducing SEA, their political and program feasibility, I recommend both implementing a zero-tolerance policy for fraternization and increasing in-troop resources. Together, these options will have the largest impact while being feasible on both scales. This paper concludes with advice on implementation and how confrontational the DoD should be.

## Problem Statement

The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces have a history of sexual exploitation and abuse, with over 2,000 formal cases over the past 20 years. Although the United Nations and its partner states have made credible change to hold abusers accountable, there is a great need for preventative policy. Since implementing the zero-tolerance policy, only one out of fourteen missions has prevented SEA. SEA damages the credibility of the institution which the United States relies on for conflict stabilization. As America, the largest funder of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) budget, moves away from policing missions, the United States must continue to work with the UN to create the most effective SEA policy.

# Background

## Client Overview

The United States has a complicated and unsuccessful history with nation-building. Nation-building is one of the most difficult tasks for the American military. The missions are complex, costly, and time-consuming (Pei & Kasper, n.d.). Three characteristics that constituents, thus Congressmen, oppose allocating federal funds to. Further, humanitarian missions through the military are dangerous and politically unrewarding (*Doing It Right: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, n.d.). When the military aids in delivering humanitarian assistance, the local forces are able to view the assistance as a component of American warfare, thus legitimizing the targeting of aid workers (*Afghanistan*, n.d.).

*Table 1: United States-led Nation Building Efforts since 1900*  
(Pei & Kasper, n.d.) (Dobbins et al., n.d.)

Target country	Period	Duration (years)	Population	Multilateral or unilateral	Type of interim administration	Democracy after 10 years?
Afghanistan	2001–present	19	26.8 million	Multilateral	U.N. administration	No
Bosnia	1995– present	25	3.8 million	Multilateral	Multilateral administrati..	No
Cambodia	1970–1973	3	7 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Cuba	1898–1902	3	1.6 million	Unilateral	U.S. direct administration	No
	1906–1909	3	2 million	Unilateral	U.S. direct administration	No
	1917–1922	5	2.8 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Dominican Republic	1916–1924	8	895,000	Unilateral	U.S. direct administration	No
	1965–1966	1	3.8 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Grenada	1983	< 1	92,000	Unilateral	Local administration	Yes
Haiti	1915–1934	19	2 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
	1994–1996	2	7 million	Multilateral	Local administration	No
Iraq	2003–present	17	25.6 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Japan	1945–1952	7	72 million	Multi-unilateral	U.S. direct administration	Yes
Kosovo	1999– present	21	1.8 million	Multilateral	Multilateral administrati..	No
Nicaragua	1909–1933	18	620,000	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Panama	1903–1936	33	450,000	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
	1989	< 1	2.3 million	Unilateral	Local administration	Yes
Somalia	1992–1994	2	7.3 million	Multilateral	Local administration	No
South vietnam	1964–1973	9	19 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
West Germany	1945–1949	4	46 million	Multilateral	Multilateral administrati..	Yes

Funding of these missions is only deemed worthwhile to American policymakers if the country transitions into a democracy. Unfortunately, the data shows that American forces are unprepared to lead these tasks. American military forces have led approximately 20 nation-building missions since 1900 (Pei & Kasper, n.d.) (Dobbins et al., n.d.). Only four of these missions have been successful in transitioning the country to democracy within 10 years. No American surrogate regime has made a successful transition to democracy. With a 20% total success rate, American policymakers in the Pentagon want to distance the forces from humanitarian and policing missions.

*Graphic A: United States-led Nation Building Efforts since 1900 Map*  
(Pei & Kasper, n.d.) (Dobbins et al., n.d.)

#### US-led Nation Building Efforts since 1900 Map



There have been many proposed solutions and replacements for American-led humanitarian missions. Many academics advocate to let the country transition on its own (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). If American policymakers were to follow this advice, they would leave behind a power vacuum in many vulnerable regions. This would cause problems for the Department of Defense in the long-term, as unstable nations can be a breeding ground for terrorism and cause a refugee crisis or market disruptions (Jones, 2015).

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations can fill this role and maintain stability, at a lower price for the American public. As outlined by the United States Government Accountability Office, a United States operation in the Central African Republic costs around \$5.7 billion while the United States contribution to MINUSCA costs only \$700 million (U. S. Government Accountability, 2018). That means five billion tax payer's dollars saved.

### The Problem

Before the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces can fully replace the American military in stabilization operations, the United Nations must eradicate its problem of sexual exploitation and abuse. SEA damages the credibility and effectiveness of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. It creates a culture of disorder that not only normalizes sexual violence among warring factions but may encourage groups to return to fighting (Olsson et al., 2020). Further, it causes the local population and international community to distrust its operations.

In 1992, allegations revealed the United Nation's sexual exploitation and abuse problem. These allegations were initially dismissed and not taken seriously ("Sexual Abuse in UN Peacekeeping,"




2020). This allowed the problem to fester. In 2001, the SEA problem reached its culminating point with the sex-for-food scandal in West African Refugee Camps. This scandal involved workers from over 40 organizations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), sexually exploiting children (Eustachewich, 2018). These workers would withhold essential items, such as food and shelter, until they received sexual gratification. There were allegations against 67 UNHCR workers and zero were prosecuted (Eustachewich, 2018).

At this time, the UN standardized the umbrella term sexual exploitation and abuse. Sexual exploitation is defined as “any actual or attempted abuse of position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. This includes acts such as transactional sex, solicitation of transactional sex, and exploitative relationships” (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, n.d.). In the unstable environments in which peacekeepers are sent, the civilians are often poor with no economic prospects. Thus, these civilians are forced into similar situations as the exploitative sex-for-food scandal because they do not have any other prospect to fulfill their basic needs (*Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse*, n.d.). Sexual abuse is defined as “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. All sexual activity with a minor (a person under the age of 18) is considered as sexual abuse” (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, n.d.). A contributing factor to sexual assault is power dynamics. Peacekeepers feel superior towards the local community and think they are immune to retribution.

In response to media and stakeholder outrage, the UN implemented new policies to counter SEA. This includes, but is not limited to, Resolution 1325 and the zero-tolerance policy. Resolution 1325 implemented gender training for peacekeeping troops, began the movement to increase female representation within peacekeeping forces and required the Secretary-General to report to the UN Security Council on women, peace, and security (*Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse*, n.d.). the zero-tolerance was implemented in 2003, outlawing any exploitative or forceful sexual activity (*STANDARDS OF CONDUCT*, n.d.). The zero-tolerance policy states that the United Nations will not condone any form of SEA. With strong support from the United States, the UN has also built up its investigative capabilities, increased training and vetting of troops, implemented greater community outreach to increase awareness about sexual abuse, instituted penalties for offenders,

and improved victims' assistance (Corker et al., n.d.). While this initial push has increased accountability for the forces, there is still a need for more preventative policy.

*Graphic B: United Nation Peacekeeping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations since 2006*  
(*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, n.d.)




These policies have made a significant impact on decreasing sexual exploitation and abuse allegations, there is still more work to be done in this policy arena. There are significant legal barriers that prohibit SEA from being completely solved. The UN has an agreement with troop-contributing countries (TCCs) called the Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs). SOFAs guarantee the troop-deploying nation has complete legal authority over their troops, meaning only the nation can prosecute soldiers (*Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse*, n.d.). This allows many SEA perpetrators to avoid trial as many host nations will not prosecute due to the extraterritorial nature of the case or due to lack of political desire (*Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse*, n.d.). To abide by the SOFA, the United Nations relies on communication between itself and the TCC to track the progress of the cases. Currently, the United Nations publishes the number of communications sent to TCCs and the number of communications received from TCCs. On average, only 62% of communications given have a response (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, 2017). All communication involves a request for action for either the investigation, administrative, or disciplinary proceedings. Follow-ups to the initial request are not included in the graphic. Communication received includes any formal communication providing information on action taken. The data can be filtered by neither the category of personnel nor the nationality of the personnel/TCC. Outside of this communication field, there are no legal ways to increase UN involvement within holding TCCs accountable for processing the cases.

### COMMUNICATIONS WITH MEMBER STATES

Note: This graph provides total numbers and is not affected by applied filters

This graph provides information on the number of communications sent to Member States, requesting action, and responses received from Member States, providing information on action taken in relation to investigations, or administrative or disciplinary proceedings. Communications sent and received by the Secretariat are only recorded by year, and cannot be filtered by category or nationality of personnel involved or by the mission in which the misconduct referred to in the communication occurred.



Graphic C: United Nations Communications with Member States  
(Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, n.d.)

## Consequences of Problem

If this problem is not addressed, sexual exploitation and abuse will continue to occur. Sexual assault can have negative effects on health, education, employment, and crime (*Consequences | Sexual Assault | INSPQ*, n.d.). It can place an extra financial burden on individuals and their families due to increased “healthcare costs, criminal justice costs, child welfare costs, special education costs, and productivity losses” (*The Impact of Child Sexual Abuse - Darkness to Light*, n.d.). The costs of an American survivor of child sexual abuse averages \$210,012 (Fang et al., 2012). Sexual assault is also a public health problem that will result in a financial cost to society. Survivors of child sexual abuse are more likely to become addicted to drugs and become involved in crime (*The Impact of Child Sexual Abuse - Darkness to Light*, n.d.).

The UN does not directly compensate victims for the lost money from SEA. The UN establishes that reparations are the responsibility of the perpetrator, not the organization (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015). The prosecution of the SEA perpetrator occurs in their home country. Thus, if a victim wants financial compensation, they need to pursue the financial claim in the troop-contributing country (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015). This creates many barriers to justice because the victim would need an understanding of the troop-contributing country’s legal system, be able to travel to the country to file the claim, and employ a lawyer (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015). Consequentially, a victim cannot receive direct financial compensation for their suffering.

The UN established a Trust Fund to sponsor programs for the economic empowerment of SEA victims. In 2019, the UN paid \$959,917 for projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Liberia (*2019 Annual Report: Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation And Abuse*, 2020). In 2020, the expenses are anticipated to rise by \$591,013, an increase of 61% (*2019 Annual Report: Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation And Abuse*, 2020).

## Literature Review


There are many limits to evaluating SEA policies as it is unethical to manipulate the independent variable (policies preventing SEA) and researchers have no control over confounding variables. This can create bias or debatable causality of the experiment. Nonetheless, there is significant research available on implementation. Findings need to be significantly questioned to determine their rigor.

### Representation does not fix the problem

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force is dominated by male personnel. On average, only 9.5% of the total troop personnel are female with a median of only 6.45%. While this is a drastic gender disparity and requires attention, there has been a push to combine the problem of gender disparity and SEA. Many policymakers began to push for increased female representation to solve the SEA problems.

Mission	Female Troop Contributions	Overall Personnel	Percentage
MINURSO	58	249	23
MINUSCA	594	11,468	5
MINUSMA	641	13,424	5
MONUSCO	641	12,955	5
UNAMA	0	1	0
UNAMI	15	244	6
UNAMID	255	3,956	6
UNDOF	63	1,108	6
UNFICYP	81	799	10
UNIFIL	603	10,335	6
UNISFA	421	3,835	11
UNMHA	0	4	0
UNMIK	1	7	14
UNMISS	799	14,686	5
UNMOGIP	10	44	23
UNOWAS	0	2	0
UNSMIL	18	232	8
UNSOM	51	629	8
UNSOS	1	14	7
UNTSO	18	153	12
UNVMC	19	48	40

*Table 2: Female Representation in Peacekeeping Missions*  
(Gender | United Nations Peacekeeping, *n.d.*)



Research shows an increased female presence could increase the effectiveness of peacekeeper operations. Researchers discovered that female police officers use less force and are better communicators than their male colleagues (Mazurana, n.d.). This data matches the results of Akashinga, the female anti-poaching rangers in Africa. The rangers were able to drive down poaching in Phundundu Wildlife Park by 80% (*Akashinga | The Brave Ones | International Anti-Poaching Foundation*, n.d.). Academics hypothesize this occurred for two reasons. First, women are better at de-escalating situations (Society, 2020). Second, they were more successful at garnering community buy-in through communication and partnering with the local community, which allowed them to get more intelligence (Society, 2020). Both environments of policing and anti-poaching rangers are similar to the environment in which peacekeepers work in, thus these results would likely be replicable in peacekeeping forces.

While there is definite data on the positive effects of female representation on the effectiveness of the overall mission, there is only weak documentation on whether the presence of women can decrease SEA. Karim and Beardsley (2016) found diminishing returns on female representation towards decreasing SEA. They admit an unclear causal relationship because female peacekeepers might join forces that already have better records of gender equality and treatment (Karim & Beardsley, 2016). Additionally, there was only a one percentage point increase in female participation in peacekeeping military forces over the past seven years. (Dharmapuri, n.d.) (*Women in Peacekeeping |*

*United Nations Peacekeeping*, n.d.). With very minimal growth, it is impossible to causally link a change in female representation to a decrease in sexual assault cases. The decrease in cases could have been a result of any policy implemented around the same period.

Instead, most policymakers rely on data from the general population, that only 5% of sexual offenders are women. (*The Proportion of Sexual Offenders Who Are Female Is Higher Than Thought: A Meta-Analysis* - Franca Cortoni, Kelly M. Babchishin, Clémence Rat, 2017, n.d.). Although there is no definite research that women's presence will decrease SEA, policymakers assume that increasing a faction that historically does not engage in SEA will bring down total SEA. Further research proves that this assumption is not valid.

In 2007, researchers conducted 49 interviews and 12 focus groups with Peacekeepers in Haiti and Liberia. They found no difference in willingness to report SEA based on gender (Jennings, 2008). Policymakers that propose female representation in peacekeeping forces to stop sexual assault are assuming that the ties of gender will prevail over their own force's cohesion, loyalty, and the shared military socialization process. In reality, women peacekeepers and the women civilians whom they are protecting may be vastly different; in terms of religion, nationality, ethnicity, linguistically, culturally, and socioeconomically (Anania et al., n.d.). The power dynamic between female peacekeepers and the local population still exists.

Most importantly, the policy of increasing women in peacekeeping is not finding the solution to the real problem. "Diverting responsibility to women does not address the problem of sexual violence in PKOs, or help eradicate its causes" (Simić, 2010). It requires women to take on an additional duty of preventing their male counterparts' SEA while dealing with their own gender discrimination and harassment within the forces. This policy allows male action to continue as if it was inevitable while women need to deal with the consequences (Anania et al., n.d.). Male predators are responsible for their actions and the duty of subduing men's undesirable urges cannot be placed on women. Without finding policies that address the real problem, SEA will continue. It is necessary to prevent, not mitigate SEA.

## Lack of quality training

The United Nations mandates SEA training. Current practices emphasize the positive and negative impacts of peacekeepers along with basic gender analysis training, including how conflicts change relationships and gender roles (Lyytikäinen, n.d.). This is an important first step as peacekeepers come from 125 different countries, therefore common values need to be established (Westendorf & Searle, 2017). Contributor states are largely responsible for the training of their own peacekeepers. Countries with the least developed training typically send the most amount of troops. The effects of home-country training have a high correlation to behavior in the UN PKO (Olsson et al., 2020).

Research shows that the most effective prevention measure is improved quality and quantity of training (Stern, n.d.). Current training is taught by people without experience or significant training in gender studies (*Gender Training for Police Peacekeepers: Approaching Two Decades of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* | SIPRI, n.d.). Many missions are not equipped with a gender unit to lead training (Lyytikäinen, n.d.). Missions that do not have a gender unit are further impaired as there is less pressure for gender mainstreaming and no continual teaching against sexual misconduct (Nduka-Agwu, 2009). The UN has put additional pressure on commanders to take responsibility for the sexual misconduct of their unit, but there is no additional training on how to create an environment that condemns SEA (Nduka-Agwu, 2009).

The UN moved sexual awareness training online which standardizes training across countries through an accessible platform. At face value, this appears to a wise move. Academics note this move signals a shift in attitude towards the training as an administrative requirement that runs through legally required disclosure of rules than an engaging conversation (Westendorf & Searle, 2017). It is necessary to engage UN personnel in mission-specific local, international, normative, systematic, and structural factors that lead to occurrences of SEA (Westendorf & Searle, 2017). Sexual exploitation and abuse can be incorporated into every training. Most military forces encourage toxic masculinity by encouraging “physical toughness and/or muscular development, aggression, violence, emotional control” (Hinojosa, 2010). This mindset inadvertently encourages sexual violence (Westendorf & Searle, 2017). Many of these qualities deemed superior for soldiers can still be encouraged, but it needs to be done within context-dependency training.



## Outreach is essential

Four key deterrents to sexual violence in crisis are “increasing the risk to offenders of being detected; building community engagement; ensuring community members are aware of available help for and responses to sexual violence; and safe and anonymous systems for reporting and seeking help” (Spangaro et al., 2015). Each of these deterrents requires community outreach. Many civilians do not know what rules peacekeepers must abide by, thus decreasing reporting and accountability (Ho & Pavlish, 2011).

In 2008, soon after the implementation of the zero-tolerance policy, Kathleen Jennings conducted a study in Haiti, Liberia, Kenya, Namibia, and Thailand (Jennings, 2008). During her research period, only Liberia had successful SEA prevention mechanisms, in which they utilized an outreach program that informed the community on reporting mechanisms and guaranteed the safety of SEA survivors.

Further, many communities already have mechanisms to address SEA (Spangaro et al., 2015). New policies and programs must incorporate existing community traditions and cultures to ensure their success. For example, gender training modules can be improved by cooperating with local women’s organizations. This was done in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and allowed for mission-specific conversations which engaged soldiers in real-world situations (Lyytikäinen, n.d.) (Nduka-Agwu, 2009).

## Alternatives


### All women forces

This alternative recommends the DoD advise policymakers to create all-women forces. More specifically, that the UN should further expand its efforts to increase female representation in peacekeeping forces. In 2018, The UN created a program called the ‘Global Effort’ to reduce gender disparity in their personnel. They aim to have 15% of military contingents be women by 2028 (*Women in Peacekeeping*, n.d.). This recommendation will be taking this a step further and recommending 5% of all peacekeeping forces are female-only by 2028. I reached this number for two reasons. First, this is a third of the projected total female representation in the forces by 2028. This allows there to be both all-female forces and some female representation on mixed forces. It would be counter-productive to have 15% of all military forces be female-only forces because 85% of forces would be male-only forces. Second, if mixed-gender forces have an average female representation of 10%, that is still increased (although minimal increase) representation from the current population. Doing so would require little monetary cost aside from what is already allocated through the Global Effort.

### Increase in-troop resources

This alternative recommends that the DoD advise UN policymakers to require one in-troop gender unit for every 200 peacekeepers by 2027. This unit conducts gender awareness training, monitor/evaluates programs throughout the mission, and connects with the local population to both raise awareness of policies and to determine what additional measures will best help the local population. In-troop units will ensure productive and comprehensive education and will demonstrate the mission’s norms. I am recommending one unit per 200 peacekeepers as this is a policy that the DoD currently has in our forces. In the American military, there is at least one Sexual Harassment Assault Response Prevention (SHARP) representative at each company level (which ranges from 80-250 soldiers). Each UN Peacekeeping Mission houses 20 through 14,169 contingent troops, with an average of 6,468 contingent troops (*Troop and Police Contributors*, n.d.). Currently, only 66% of missions have at least one in-troop gender unit, thus this program will require a lot of time and money.

*Graphic E: Sum of Contingent Troops Deployed in each Current Peacekeeping Mission (as of January 31 2021)  
(Troop and Police Contributors, n.d.)*



## Zero Tolerance for Fraternization

This alternative recommends the DoD advise the United Nations to bolster their current zero-tolerance policy. This policy option would ban all sexual relations with the local population in all of the mission areas by 2023. Currently, the UN has a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse. There is an inherent power dynamic between UN personnel and civilians, in a warring zone, that cannot be overcome.

## Partnership Approach

This alternative recommends that the DoD advise the United Nations to bolster their current partnership approach. More specifically, it recommends that the United Nations release the nationality of the member state/personnel involved in the partnership communications efforts. Currently, the United Nations publishes the number of formal communications sent to TCCs “requesting action to be taken by the Member State in relation to [SEA] investigations, or administrative or disciplinary proceedings” and the communications received regarding action taken. This information can be filtered by neither the nationality of the Member State/personnel involved or the mission in which the misconduct occurred. This policy option strengthens this approach through increasing information sharing. The published information could be filtered by nationality of personnel involved and by which peacekeeping mission in which the violation occurred. This will increase accountability towards which countries are abiding by the legal framework and which countries are abusing it by not holding their citizens accountable for SEA.

## Criteria

**Effectiveness:** capability of reducing sexual exploitation and abuse charges

1. Not effective. Will likely not reduce any sexual exploitation and abuse charges
2. Medium Effectiveness. Will slightly reduce sexual exploitation and abuse charges
3. Very effective. Will have moderate to high impact reducing sexual exploitation and abuse charges.

**Political Feasibility:** the likelihood of suggested policy being accepted by US policymakers

1. Not feasible. Unlikely to pass due to political constraints
2. Medium feasibility. Unknown whether it will pass due to political constraints. It will be difficult, but it is possible.
3. High feasibility. Will pass without significant political pushback.

**Program Effectiveness:** the likelihood of suggested policy being accepted by policymakers from both the UN and troop-contributor nations.

1. Not feasible. Unlikely to pass due to political constraints
2. Medium feasibility. Unknown whether it will pass due to political constraints. It will be difficult, but it is possible.
3. High feasibility. Will pass without significant political pushback.

## Findings

### Increase Women Forces

**Effectiveness:** This program ranks as a 1 for effectiveness. The policy of increasing women in peacekeeping is not finding the solution to the real problem. It requires women to take on an additional duty of preventing their male counterparts' SEA while dealing with their own gender discrimination and harassment within the forces. It is important to recognize that women can and have engaged in SEA. Research shows that sexual exploitation occurs more often due to a power disparity than due to gender. This program may have an additional unintended effect on the overall effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission. Many of the areas in which peacekeeping forces are sent to do not have strong protection for women. This creates two problems. Firstly, their authority may be undermined by the civilian population. Secondly, they may face more danger in the area.

**Political Feasibility:** This program ranks 1 for political feasibility. The United States military does not have any gender-restricted women-only troops. US policymakers are unlikely to support a policy that they have not implemented domestically. Further, our military faces a similar problem of female recruitment and retention. Recommending a policy that we have not yet solved, is very politically unfeasible.

**Program Feasibility:** This program ranks as a 1 for program feasibility. The United Nations relies on Troop-Contributing Countries for gender-equal personnel. In 2009, the UN pushed for female representation of 20% within peacekeeping forces by 2014 (*United Nations in Global Effort to Increase Number of Female Police in Peacekeeping Operations | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*, n.d.). This goal was not reached. In 2018, the UN reimplemented this program by decreased the goal to 15% by 2028. The UN has very limited control over the implementation of gender equality programs. This becomes an even more difficult task when many TCCs either do not allow or do not encourage women to serve in the military. This means that the burden of this gender responsibility will be shifted to Western nations, which are already facing the problem of low female military recruitment. Further, with the Global Effort, there will not be a significant enough increase in female representation for the all-women troops to be either numerous or impactful.

## Zero Tolerance for Fraternization

**Effectiveness:** This program ranks as a 3 for effectiveness. The United Nations needs more accountability measures to stop SEA. I determined this would have moderate to high effectiveness based on research done with other zero-tolerance programs. While there is minimal research on the effectiveness of zero-tolerance policies on SEA, due to researchers having no control over confounding variables and morally questionable procedure, zero-tolerance policies are used in other situations as well. The United States military has a zero-tolerance policy for drug use. Researchers found this policy to be “highly effective” at deterring drug use (*Employee Drug Testing Is Effective*, n.d.). While the findings from this program will not be 100% replicable for the zero-tolerance policy on SEA, it is likely to have similar results because a similar population is being studied (military personnel) and the policy is very similar.

This policy would likely have high effectiveness due to its legal nature. If all sexual interaction with the local population is considered illegal, there is no room for legal disputes whether an interaction was consensual or not. This negates a lot of gray space currently surrounding this area and the debate whether any sexual interaction is consensual or not when there are power dynamics involved.

**Political Feasibility:** This program ranks as a 2 for political feasibility. This has medium political feasibility because the United States military does not have this overall policy, but it is typically mandated within General Orders for deployed forces in combat zones. For example, CENTCOM prohibited “sexual contact of any kind with Iraqi nationals or third-party nationals who are not members of coalition forces” in 2009 (*General Order No. 1 - Prohibited Activities for Soldiers*, n.d., p. 1). Thus, it has medium feasibility because we do not have an overarching policy but it is implemented in most if not all combat zones.

**Program Effectiveness:** This program ranks as a 2. This will be difficult to implement. The United Nations typically expresses that there is no inherent power dynamic between UN employees and locals of the Host Nation. Implementing this policy would mean creating a new norm, within a large institution, that many people may oppose.

In the initial push for policies to stop SEA, the UN relied heavily on the Zeid Report.

This report was requested by the UN and written by Jordanian Diplomat Zeid Raad Al Hussein. It says that a zero-tolerance policy “could be seen as an additional protective measure to protect the reputation and credibility of the mission and its ability to effectively and, in the eyes of the local population, impartially implement its mandate and to protect a local population that is highly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse” (*Report of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, on a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations [A/59/710]*, n.d.). Most recommendations became policy within a few years. In the report, Zeid Raad Al Hussein recommends creating stricter standards for some nations by banning all sexual relations with the local population. If the DoD draws on the fact that it was first recommended by Zeid Raad Al Hussein, the UN may be more amenable to implementing it.

Due to many legal barriers presented by SOFA, this is one of the closest programs to accountability that can be implemented with any possibility of program effectiveness.

## Increase In-Troop Resources

**Effectiveness:** This program ranks as a 2 for effectiveness. This unit will ensure constant improvement of educational material and will share between missions. Current training is taught by people without experience or significant training in gender studies, such as military commanders (*Gender Training for Police Peacekeepers: Approaching Two Decades of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* | SIPRI, n.d.)(Nduka-Agwu, 2009). This unit will consist of individuals trained in this subject area and will conduct gender awareness training, monitor/evaluates programs throughout the mission, and connects with the local population to both raise awareness of policies and determine what additional measures will best help the local population. Increased resources can stop SEA before it happens. Research shows that adding a gender unit to missions helps with creating norms such as gender mainstreaming (Nduka-Agwu, 2009). Stakeholder analysis calls the extent of effectiveness into question because some people cheat the system by using the training.

**Political feasibility:** This program ranks as a 3 for political feasibility. This solution is aligned with American current practices and ideals. The American military already has this policy within our troops, where there is a SHARP (Sexual Harassment Assault Response Prevention) representative within each company level. Each company within the US military has around 50-250 people. Having one unit per 200 people matches our standards.

**Program feasibility:** This program ranks as a 3 for program feasibility. This implementation could be difficult because it would be one of the more expensive options as significantly more personnel need to be hired. The United Nations has a difficult time recruiting people for peacekeeping missions. Adding a position for only those with significant training or education in gender studies would be hard to fill. It is unlikely there would be significant pushback from neither the United Nations nor the Troop-Contributing Countries.



## Partnership Approach

This alternative recommends that the DoD advise the United Nations to bolster their current partnership approach. More specifically, it recommends that the United Nations release the nationality of the member state/personnel involved in the partnership communications efforts. Currently, the United Nations publishes the number of formal communications sent to TCCs “requesting action to be taken by the Member State in relation to [SEA] investigations, or administrative or disciplinary proceedings” and the communications received regarding action taken. This information can be filtered by neither the nationality of the Member State/personnel involved or the mission in which the misconduct occurred. This policy option strengthens this approach through increasing information sharing. The published information could be filtered by nationality of personnel involved and by which peacekeeping mission in which the violation occurred. This will increase accountability towards which countries are abiding by the legal framework and which countries are abusing it by not holding their citizens accountable for SEA.

**Effectiveness:** This program ranks as a 2 for effectiveness. Similar to the zero-tolerance policy, this program is trying to increase accountability. If the UN releases which TCCs are not participating in the SEA judiciary process, it is possible that other countries would ‘shame’ the non-participants through soft powers to cooperate. Unfortunately, the UN does not have the power to press the TCCs to prosecute their peacekeepers for abuses. It is possible that after tracking the country’s abuses, the UN determines that there are a few countries that consistently do not prosecute their citizens and the other countries do not pressure them into cooperating. This could have an unintended effect if countries do not ‘shame’ the non-participants, so other countries see the lack of consequence and stop prosecuting their peacekeepers.

**Political Feasibility:** This program ranks as a 3 for political feasibility. There is likely to be minimal push back from the United States. As of January 21 2021, the United States has no personnel in the peacekeeping forces (*Troop and Police Contributors*, n.d.). Additionally, we have a judicial process set up to try military personnel for SEA crimes. This policy option will neither change US protocol nor greatly affect us; thus, I expect to see no pushback.

**Program Feasibility:** This program ranks as a 1 for program feasibility. There will be significant pushback from all TCCs that do not prosecute their peacekeepers. There is currently no data on how many and which countries do not prosecute their peacekeepers, so it is difficult to estimate how large of a pushback will occur. Further, many of these countries may stop contributing troops. The UN Peacekeeping Unit already has a difficult time with recruitment, thus it is unlikely they will implement a program that may cause decreased recruitment.

## Program Evaluation

	<b>Effectiveness (.5)</b>	<b>Political Feasibility (.25)</b>	<b>Program Feasibility (.25)</b>	<b>Total (Max: 3)</b>
<b>All Women Forces</b>	1	1	1	1
<b>Zero-Tolerance</b>	3	2	2	2.5
<b>In-Troop Resources</b>	2	3	3	2.5
<b>Partnership Approach</b>	2	3	1	2

Effectiveness was given the largest weight (50%) because if a program is not effective, then the Department of Defense does not want to advocate for it. Political feasibility and program feasibility were given equal weight (25%) because it is equally important that American and UN policymakers will support the program.

## Recommendation

My final recommendation is to implement both the zero-tolerance policy and increase in-troop resources. The zero-tolerance policy addresses the outcome of SEA charges and ensures no peacekeepers who have perpetrated abuses in the past are allowed to serve again. Additionally, it dissuades others from future action. This matches well with increasing in-troop resources because it mitigates SEA from occurring. Implementing both measures shows the United Nation's commitment to preventing SEA.

## Implementation

To successfully advocate for the United Nations to adopt these options, I have created an advocacy plan for the Department of Defense to follow. Although the Department of Defense does not typically advocate for institutions to introduce new policies; as demonstrated in my memo, it has become essential for our national security. We need to spearhead this project as it will not be in the UN's short-term interest, thus we need to convince them it is worthwhile.

The goal of the advocacy campaign is for the United Nations to implement a zero-tolerance Policy for Fraternization by 2023 and to have an in-troop gender unit for every 200 peacekeepers by 2027. It will take around two years for the United Nations to implement a zero-tolerance Policy for Fraternization for two reasons. First, it will take around one year for the DoD to authorize and reassign resources to this project. Second, it is estimated that the UN will take about a year to implement it. This is based on the timeframe that the UN took to implement the recommendations from the 2005 Zeid Report (*Report of the Secretary-General's Special Advisor, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, on a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* [A/59/710], n.d.) (STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, n.d.). The policy increasing in-troops gender units will take more time because it requires more funding and hiring of personnel. Finishing this project by 2027 will be impactful because it is the 20th anniversary of the Haiti sex abuse scandal breaking.

It is important to have allies when advocating. Within the executive branch, two important allies are Samantha Power, Secretary Antony Blinken, and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield. Samantha

Power is the former Ambassador to the UN. During her tenure she was the lead advocate for the #FreeThe20 campaign, advocating for the release of 20 women political prisoners from around the world. During which she relied on allies in the UN and writing op-eds. This year, President Biden nominated Samantha Power to be the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Aid (USAID). Samantha Power and Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, will be essential in creating international allies. They can use their soft powers to encourage other countries to get on board our mission. Lastly, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield is the current Ambassador of the United Nations. Without her support, this initiative will die.

Within the United Nations, you should look for allies within the Security Council and the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. There are five permanent members on the Security Council: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and ourselves. Only China will likely push back on these policies because China is a large troop-contributing country. To convince China, we need to discover their underlying values for not wanting the policy so that we can compromise. The ten current non-permanent members are Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines, Tunisia, and Vietnam (*Current Members | United Nations Security Council*, n.d.). We need to use our established alliances with Administrator Power and Secretary Blinken to win the countries over by using our soft power. We already have an in for the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nation's Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Her name is Ms. Jane Holl Lute and she is an American. If we can convince the people working on the United Nation's sexual exploitation and abuse problem, then we have a better chance at convincing countries to approve the initiative.

There are three different levels of confrontation for advocacy campaigns. I recommend the DoD stays less confrontative because we do not want to damage any formal diplomatic relations in the process. This form of advocacy campaign uses the media. I recommend someone writes an op-ed for an internationally recognized media source, such as The New York Times. It does not need to get political. It only asserts why the United States is championing this project. Samantha Power worked with Refinery29 on her #FreeThe20 campaign. A second op-ed can be written by a victim of UN peacekeeping sexual assault. This makes the project more personal. Influential narratives typically engage more people, thus are more successful. If the DoD decides to become more confrontative, then I recommend tying in funding. Currently, the US is the largest funder of

UNPKO. We have the power and the ability to threaten withholding funds if the United Nations refuses to take further steps to eradicate sexual exploitation and assault by their Peacekeeping Forces.

## Appendix

Table 1 United States-led Nation Building Efforts since 1900

Target country	Period	Duration (years)	Population	Multilateral or unilateral	Type of interim administration	Democracy after 10 years?
Afghanistan	2001–present	19	26.8 million	Multilateral	U.N. administration	No
Bosnia	1995– present	25	3.8 million	Multilateral	Multilateral administrati..	No
Cambodia	1970–1973	3	7 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Cuba	1898–1902	3	1.6 million	Unilateral	U.S. direct administration	No
	1906–1909	3	2 million	Unilateral	U.S. direct administration	No
	1917–1922	5	2.8 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Dominican Republic	1916–1924	8	895,000	Unilateral	U.S. direct administration	No
	1965–1966	1	3.8 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Grenada	1983	< 1	92,000	Unilateral	Local administration	Yes
Haiti	1915–1934	19	2 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
	1994–1996	2	7 million	Multilateral	Local adminstration	No
Iraq	2003-present	17	25.6 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Japan	1945–1952	7	72 million	Multi-unilateral	U.S. direct administration	Yes
Kosovo	1999– present	21	1.8 million	Multilateral	Multilateral administrati..	No
Nicaragua	1909–1933	18	620,000	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
Panama	1903–1936	33	450,000	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
	1989	< 1	2.3 million	Unilateral	Local administration	Yes
Somalia	1992–1994	2	7.3 million	Multilateral	Local administration	No
South vietnam	1964–1973	9	19 million	Unilateral	U.S. surrogate regime	No
West Germany	1945–1949	4	46 million	Multilateral	Multilateral administrati..	Yes


Table 2 Female Representation in Peacekeeping Missions

Mission	Female Troop Contributions	Overall Personnel	Percentage
MINURSO	58	249	23
MINUSCA	594	11,468	5
MINUSMA	641	13,424	5
MONUSCO	641	12,955	5
UNAMA	0	1	0
UNAMI	15	244	6
UNAMID	255	3,956	6
UNDOF	63	1,108	6
UNFICYP	81	799	10
UNIFIL	603	10,335	6
UNISFA	421	3,835	11
UNMHA	0	4	0
UNMIK	1	7	14
UNMISS	799	14,686	5
UNMOGIP	10	44	23
UNOWAS	0	2	0
UNSMIL	18	232	8
UNSOM	51	629	8
UNSOS	1	14	7
UNTSO	18	153	12
UNVMC	19	48	40



Graphic A: United States-led Nation Building Efforts since 1900 Map

## US-led Nation Building Efforts since 1900 Map




Democracy after 10 years?

■ No

■ Yes

## Graphic B: United Nation Peacekeeping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations since 2006

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations since 2006




## Graphic C: United Nations Communications with Member States

### COMMUNICATIONS WITH MEMBER STATES


Note: This graph provides total numbers and is not affected by applied filters

This graph provides information on the number of communications sent to Member States, requesting action, and responses received from Member States, providing information on action taken in relation to investigations, or administrative or disciplinary proceedings. Communications sent and received by the Secretariat are only recorded by year, and cannot be filtered by category or nationality of personnel involved or by the mission in which the misconduct referred to in the communication occurred.



Graphic D: Female Representation in Peacekeeping Missions


Female Representation in Peacekeeping Missions




Female Troop Contributions and Overall Personnel for each Mission. Color shows details about Female Troop Contributions and Overall Personnel.

- Measure Names
- Female Troop Contributions
  - Overall Personnel

**Graphic E: Sum of Contingent Troops Deployed in each Current Peacekeeping Mission (as of January 31 2021)**



## All Alternatives Examined



### Policies targeted at the Soldiers

#### *Soldiers do not care*

##### **Norm Setting**

122 countries contribute personnel to the peacekeeping operations (*Troop and Police Contributors*, n.d.). Each country has different values and culture. Some countries may not blame males for sexual abuse. The conversation on how to prevent SEA must begin with establishing norms. Norm Setting is currently being used through mandatory training. The UN moved sexual awareness training online which standardizes training across countries through an accessible platform. Through this format, all soldiers are exposed to the values of the United Nations. This format is a good beginning, but the UN must expand upon it. Right now, the training is more similar to an administrative requirement that runs through legally required disclosure of rules, rather than an engaging conversation (Westendorf & Searle, 2017). Soldiers must talk about tricky situations in order to build on their

skills. Some attitudes that can be worked against in this program include rape-myth acceptance, hostility toward women, belief in traditional gender roles, and hypermasculinity (Greathouse et al., 2015).

### **All women forces**

This alternative recommends the DoD advise policymakers to create all-women forces. More specifically, that the UN should further expand its efforts to increase female representation in peacekeeping forces. In 2018, The UN created a program called the 'Global Effort' to reduce gender disparity in their personnel. They aim to have 15% of military contingents be women by 2028 (*Women in Peacekeeping*, n.d.). This recommendation will be taking this a step further and recommending 5% of all peacekeeping forces are female-only by 2028. I reached this number for two reasons. First, this is a third of the projected total female representation in the forces by 2028. This allows there to be both all-female forces and some female representation on mixed forces. It would be counter-productive to have 15% of all military forces be female-only forces because 85% of forces would be male-only forces. Second, if mixed-gender forces have an average female representation of 10%, that is still increased (although minimal increase) representation from the current population. Doing so would require little monetary cost aside from what is already allocated through the Global Effort.

### **Personality Test**

Currently, the United States Military is running a test pilot-program for a non-cognitive personality test, called the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS). The test is mostly designed to test soldier's motivation (*What Is the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS) – Boot Camp & Military Fitness Institute*, n.d.) (*Army Adds New Test for Incoming Soldiers*, 2020). RAND published a report for the director of Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR), the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff (AF/CVS), and the commander of Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS/CC) on psychological factors associated with sexual predators. They found that sexual assault predators are a very heterogeneous group and it is nearly impossible to correctly predict who might commit sexual assault (Greathouse et al., 2015). Research does find strong correlation between past SEA perpetration to committing SEA in the future. This means that the test is most likely to only be effective if it can encourage a soldier to self-report former incidences.

### **Zero-Tolerance for Fraternization**

This alternative recommends the DoD advise the United Nations to bolster their current zero-tolerance policy. This policy option would ban all sexual relations with the local population in all of the mission areas by 2023. Currently, the UN has a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse. There is an inherent power dynamic between UN personnel and civilians, in a warring zone, that cannot be overcome.

### **Create alternative hangouts**

A Rand report identified alcohol to have high correlation to sexual assault (Greathouse et al., 2015). The United States Air Force has attempted to create social activities and facilities that are alternatives to bars (*Ban on Off-Base Bars during Pandemic Breathes New Life into Officers, Enlisted Clubs*, n.d.). This both keeps soldiers from fraternizing with local civilians, but also keeps the soldiers under surveillance by leadership.

### ***Soldiers do not know***

#### **Increase in-troop resources**

This alternative recommends that the DoD advise UN policymakers to require one in-troop gender unit for every 200 peacekeepers by 2027. This unit conducts gender awareness training, monitor/evaluates programs throughout the mission, and connects with the local population to both raise awareness of policies and to determine what additional measures will best help the local population. In-troop units will ensure productive and comprehensive education and will demonstrate the mission's norms. I am recommending one unit per 200 peacekeepers as this is a policy that the DoD currently has in our forces. In the American military, there is at least one Sexual Harassment Assault Response Prevention (SHARP) representative at each company level (which ranges from 80-250 soldiers). Each UN Peacekeeping Mission houses 20 through 14,169 contingent troops, with an average of 6,468 contingent troops (*Troop and Police Contributors*, n.d.). Currently, only 66% of missions have at least one in-troop gender unit, thus this program will require a lot of time and money.

#### **Increase education**

The United Nations mandates SEA training. Current practices emphasize the positive and negative impacts of peacekeepers along with basic gender analysis training, including how conflicts change



relationships and gender roles (Lyytikäinen, n.d.). As previously mentioned, Contributor states are largely responsible for training of their own peacekeepers. Unfortunately, countries with the least developed training typically send the most amount of troops. The effects of home-country training have a high correlation to behavior in the UN PKO (Olsson et al., 2020). It is necessary to engage UN personnel in mission-specific local, international, normative, systematic, and structural factors that lead to occurrences of SEA (Westendorf & Searle, 2017). Sexual exploitation and abuse can be incorporated into every training.

### **Policies targeted at the Situation**

#### ***There is a lack of accountability***

##### **Bystander intervention**

The US military promotes a bystander intervention program (*Be an Active Bystander in Preventing Sexual Assault*, n.d.). This program includes steps to take in case you are a bystander to a possible SEA occurrence. This program can easily be fit into an educational program. This program on its own is unlikely to be very effective as it does not get to the root of the problem.

##### **Partnership Approach**

This alternative recommends that the DoD advise the United Nations to bolster their current partnership approach. More specifically, it recommends that the United Nations release the nationality of the member state/personnel involved in the partnership communications efforts. Currently, the United Nations publishes the number of formal communications sent to TCCs “requesting action to be taken by the Member State in relation to [SEA] investigations, or administrative or disciplinary proceedings” and the communications received regarding action taken. This information can be filtered by neither the nationality of the Member State/personnel involved or the mission in which the misconduct occurred. This policy option strengthens this approach through increasing information sharing. The published information could be filtered by nationality of personnel involved and by which peacekeeping mission in which the violation occurred. This will increase accountability towards which countries are abiding by the legal framework and which countries are abusing it by not holding their citizens accountable for SEA.

### ***The victims do not know***

#### **Provide increased support for survivors**

The UN does not directly compensate victims for the lost money from SEA. The UN establishes that reparations are the responsibility of the perpetrator, not the organization (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015). The prosecution of the SEA perpetrator occurs in their home country. Thus, if a victim wants financial compensation, they need to pursue the financial claim in the troop-contributing country (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015). This creates many barriers to justice because the victim would need an understanding of the troop-contributing country's legal system, be able to travel to the country to file the claim, and employ a lawyer (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015). Consequentially, it is essentially impossible for a victim to receive direct financial compensation for their suffering.

#### **Outreach Programs**

In 2008, soon after the implementation of the UN zero-tolerance policy, Kathleen Jennings conducted a study in Haiti, Liberia, Kenya, Namibia, and Thailand (Jennings, 2008). During her research period, only Liberia had successful SEA prevention mechanisms, in which they utilized an outreach program which informed the community on reporting mechanisms and guaranteed the safety of SEA survivors. Continue community awareness-raising efforts to combat the perception that sexual exploitation and abuse is acceptable and educate the public about available reporting mechanisms

#### **Partner with local organizations**

Many communities already have mechanisms to address SEA (Spangaro et al., 2015). New policies and program must incorporate existing community traditions and cultures to ensure their success. For example, gender training modules can be improved by cooperating with local women's organizations. This was done in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and allowed for mission-specific conversations which engaged soldiers in real-world situations (Lyytikäinen, n.d.) (Nduka-Agwu, 2009).

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