

#### Please don't sue me

- This is general advice and your environment will be different and I don't know how it works – so think before making any changes
- The information presented today has not been obtained from any single one of my previous employers and my views do not represent them
- Please don't sue me
- Please don't



#### /whois

- Graduated Bachelor Engineering (Telecommunications) First Class Honours at QUT in 2009
- Worked as a telecommunications engineer for 7 years
- Did some other stuff went back to Uni and studied a Master of Business in Applied Finance and I am now interested in Asset Management (engineering not the finance type)
- Currently an Operational Technology Cyber Security Specialist
- Treasurer of the Brisbane Branch of the International Society of Automation (ISA)



# This evening's agenda

- Overview of the 62443 Standard Framework
- Review of:
  - 62443-1-1 Terminology, concepts and models
  - 62443-2-1 Establishing an IACS security program
  - 62443-3-2 Security Risk Assessment for system design
  - 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security levels
- Additional resources
- ° Q&A




#### What is the ISA 62443


- ISA/IEC 62443 is a Framework of Cyber Security Standards for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS)
- ISA 99 is the Working group and the standards were originally published with ANSI as ISA 99 but are now published in partnership with the IEC and are designated ISA/IEC 62443
- You might see ISA 95 Enterprise-Control System Integration it is based on the Purdue Model but it is separate to ISA 62443
- ISA62443 is referenced by the NIST Cyber Security Framework but only 2 of the 14 standards referenced (2-1 and 3-3)
- Is referred to in NIST 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
  Security



#### ISA 62443 Framework




# ISA 62443 Framework (cont.)







### 62443-1-1 Concepts & Models

- Definitions (What is an asset!!!)
- Defines an asset model taxonomy
- Zones and Conduits
- Defines Security Levels (Target, Achieve, Capability)
- Defines Policies and Procedures Requirements
- and more ...









Referenced from ISA 62243-1-1

#### 62443-1-1 Concepts & Models (cont.)



# 62443-1-1 Concepts & Models (cont.)





# 2-1 Establishing an IACS Security Program

 $\,{}^{_{\circ}}\,$  To be completed ...



#### 3-2 Security risk assessments for system design

- Formally Zones and Conduits but now Security risk assessments for system design
- Is still in Draft (was finalised in 2020)
- From the quick start guide it lists the risk management process
- From the Quick Start Guide:
  - "A Zone is defined as a grouping of logical or physical assets based upon risk or other criteria such as criticality of assets, operational function, physical or logical location, required access, or responsible organization"
  - "A Conduit is defined as a logical grouping of communication channels that share common security requirements connecting two or more zones."




Figure 3: Risk Assessment Process



From ISAGCA Quick Start Guide: An Overview of the ISA/IEC 62443 Standard

# 3-3 System security requirements and security levels

#### Foundational Requirements

- FR 1 Identification and Authentication Control (IAC)
- FR 2 Use Control (UC)
- FR 3 System Integrity (SI)
- FR 4 Data Confidentiality (DC)
- FR 5 Restricted Data Flow (RDF)
- FR 6 Timely Response to Events (TRE)
- FR 7 Resource Availability (RA)
- Also has the concept of a Requirement Enhancement

The associated four SLs are defined as:

- SL 1 Prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information via eavesdropping or casual exposure.
- SL 2 Prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information to an entity actively searching for it using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation.
- SL 3 Prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information to an entity actively searching for it using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills and moderate motivation.
- SL 4 Prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information to an entity actively searching for it using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills and high motivation.



#### 3-3 System security requirements and security levels (cont.)

SRs and REs		SL 1	SL 2	SL 3	SL 4	
FR 5 - Restricted data flow '	9.3 SR 5.1 – Networ	rk segmentatio	on.			
SR 5.1 - Network segmentation	9.3.1 Requirement					
RE (1) Physical network :	The control system shall provide the capability to logically segment control system networks from non-control system networks and to logically segment critical control system networks from other control system networks.					
RE (2) Independence from networks	9.3.2 Rationale and Network segmentation	supplementa		or a variety of	nurnoses includ	dina cyber
RE (3) Logical and physic networks	security. The main reasons for segmenting networks are to reduce the exposure, or ingress, of network traffic into a control system and reduce the spread, or egress, of network traffic from a control system. This improves overall system response and reliability as well as provides a measure of cyber security protection. It also allows different network segments within the control system, including critical control systems and safety-related systems, to be segmented from					
SR 5.2 – Zone boundary prote						
RE (1) Deny by default, a	other systems for an ac Access from the contr			Web should be	a clearly justified	hased on
RE (2) Island mode	control system operation			uirement enha		based on
	Network segmentation		(1) Physical n	etwork segme	ntation	
RE (3) Fail close	overall network archited within their control syst some measure of prote	ems. Logicaĺ	from non-	control system	provide the cap networks and to	o physically

compromised. Physically segmenting that single-point-of-failure case, bu

These trade-offs will need to be

In response to an incident, it may

network segments. In that event, the

ISA-62443-2-1 (99.02.01)).

provide the capability to physically segment control system networks networks and to physically segment critical control system networks from non-critical control system networks.

(2) Independence from non-control system networks

The control system shall have the capability to provide network services to control system networks, critical or otherwise, without a connection to non-control system networks.

(3) Logical and physical isolation of critical networks

The control system shall provide the capability to logically and physically isolate critical control system networks from non-critical control system networks.

#### Certification

 Security Development Lifecycle Assurance (SDLA) which certifies that the Security Development Lifecycle of a Product Supplier meets the requirements in Part 4-1.



 System Security Assurance (SSA) which certifies that Control System products have the capability to meet the requirements in Part 3-3 and have been developed in accordance with an SDLA program.



 Component Security Assurance (CSA) which certifies that Component products have the capability to meet the requirements in Part 4-2 and have been developed in accordance with an SDLA program. Certified Component products can be: Embedded Devices, Host Devices, Network Devices, and Software Applications





Would you like to know more?





#### Additional Resources

- The ISA Global Cyber Security Alliance Quick Start Guide to ISA 62443 https://gca.isa.org/isagca-quick-start-guide-62443-standards
- Read the Standards! Read the standards for free with your Membership benefit
  <a href="https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/member-access-to-standards/">https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/member-access-to-standards/</a>
- Follow @ISA99Chair on Twitter
- Consider ISA training <a href="https://www.isa.org/training-and-certification/">https://www.isa.org/training-and-certification/</a>



The Brisbane Section are considering future training delivery options as well!



# Thank you

Q&A

