Supplementary Appendix for "Secular Party Rule and Religious Violence in Pakistan"

Additional Prefatory Data

Figure A1: Democratization in Muslim-majority Countries, 1980–2014 (Unweighted)

Figure A2: Frequency of Religious Violence Events by Election Cycle

Data Sources

Violence Data

Data on violence incidents are from the *BFRS Political Violence in Pakistan Dataset*, available at: https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/bfrs-political-violence-pakistan-dataset. Further details on how we parse the data are described in the text, and in the various robustness checks.

Election Data

Fully digitized, constituency-level election data were generously provided to us by Ali Cheema and Farooq Naseer at the Institute of Development & Economic Alternatives.

Public Opinion Data

To identify the sectarian affiliation of supporters of Pakistan's political parties, we analyzed nationally representative survey data gathered by Blair et al. (2013). The survey was conducted among 6000 Pakistanis in four provinces of the country. The data are available at: https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/pakistan-fms09-survey-data.

Police Stations Data

Data on the number of police stations in each district were collected from the *Pakistan Statistical Year Book* (various years), published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Specifically, we take data from the section of the reports titled: "Number of Police Stations/Posts by Division/District." We use data for the number of police stations that existed in each of our six election years (1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008). The number of police stations are summed by joined districts (as defined in the main paper). We are missing data for several observations—these were instances where the *Yearbook* had blank entries for districts we know existed at that time. In one case—Karachi 2008—we used the 2007 data due to anomalous missingness in the 2008 entries for the 5 Karachi districts.

Note that our analysis uses the variable police stations per registered voter. The number of registered voters in each joined district is generated using the election data just described.

Agricultural Yields Data

Data on agricultural yields—used in the balance tests—are extracted from the following publication: *Crops Area and Production (by Districts), (1981–82 to 2008–09), Volume 1, Food and Cash Crops.* This is published by the Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic Wing). It is available from this website: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/crops-area-and-production-districts-1981-82-2008-09. As usual, the data were summed by joined district.

Global Terrorism Database

In one robustness test we employ an alternative measure of the dependent variable from data provided by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD includes information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2015. It is available from this website: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. We are thankful to Imran Khan for providing us the data for Pakistan coded at the district level.

Data on Candidate Characteristics

Data on cabinet positions were collected and kindly shared with us by Mariam Mufti, University of Waterloo.

To determine the sectarian affiliation of candidates, we consulted with four Pakistani journalists and country experts. If at least two of these individuals agreed that a particular candidate was Shia, we coded the candidate as such. Determining whether an individual is Shia or Sunni in Pakistan is far from straightforward as this information is not officially collected. While one's name can provide some indication as to one's sectarian beliefs, it is not by itself a sufficient guide to determine sect.

Data on party switching was coded using the constituency-level election data provided by the Institute of Development & Economic Alternatives.

Data on Party Positions

To support our categorization of political parties as secular, we used data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project survey. It is available from this website: `https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/data/`. The text of each survey question used in our analysis is reproduced below.

- Majoritarian (value label between 1 and 10; dichotomized into "no" [values 1–5] and "yes" [values 6–10]):

    1 Party advocates toleration and social and political equality for minority ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial groups and opposes state policies that require the assimilation of such groups to the majority national culture.

    10 Party believes that the defense and promotion of the majority national identity and culture at the expense of minority representation are important goals.

- Religious Organizations Link ("no" or "yes"):

    – Political parties often have more or less routine and explicit linkages to civil society organizations such as unions, business or professional organizations, and cultural organizations based on religion, language, or ethnicity. The linkages might include leadership and membership overlap, mutual financial support, reserved positions for representatives of these organizations at National Conventions, etc. Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organizations?

- Left-Right Scale (value label between 1 and 10; dichotomized into "left" [values 1–5] and "right" [values 6–10]):

    1 Party is best located at the left of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.

    10 Party is best located at the right of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.

- Forcibly Combat Militancy (value label between 1 and 10; dichotomized into "no" [values 1–5] and "yes" [values 6–10]):

  1 Party advocates negotiations and dialogue rather than the use of force against militants in Pakistan as a way to solving the current crisis of militancy.

  10 Party advocates a comprehensive military offensive against militancy, including the right of pre-emptive strikes against militant targets.

Census Data

Data on population size, housing quality, electrification, gas connections, piped water, literacy, and schooling were taken from the district handbooks of the Census of Pakistan 1981 and 1998. These data were newly digitized and cleaned by the authors. We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Rinchan Mirza from Oxford University, who generously shared the schooling data for three provinces. The data are averaged by joined district. Note that in cases where a joined district at time t encompasses more than one census district (covariates for which are measured at time $t-1$) we take a simple unweighted average of measures for the constituent census districts.

Princely States

We created a dichotomous variable that takes 1 when any part of a joined district fell within the boundaries of a "princely state" (i.e. indirectly ruled territory) during the British colonial era (pre-1947). The information needed to construct this variable was taken from maps provided in the 1909 Imperial Gazetteer of British India. These maps have been digitized and have been posted online by the University of Chicago (https://goo.gl/Mvsqnt, last accessed 5/6/2017). We are grateful to Dann Naseemullah at King's College, University of London, who sent us a similar variable coded using the same source, which we used to cross-check our own coding.

Crime

Data on crime—murder and motor vehicle theft—were obtained from various editions of the provincial *Development Statistics* reports (e.g. *Punjab Development Statistics 2009*. We aggregated the raw district-level counts of crime incidents to our joined-district areas. Unfortunately, annual district-level data were only available for certain provinces and for certain time periods. (Most reports, especially prior to 2002, only report crime at the provincial level.) Exact data availability was as follows:

- Punjab: 2002 onwards (not available for 2003)

- Sindh: 2004 onwards

- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 2010 onwards

- Balochistan: none available

Linkages Between Sectarian and Islamist Violence in Pakistan

In this article, we conceptualize religious conflict in Pakistan as combining two types of violence: sectarian violence and Islamist/Jihadist violence. Sectarian violence refers largely to Sunni-on-Shia conflict as well as Shia-on-Sunni conflict—although, given the numerical and apparent resource dominance of Sunnis, Sunni-on Shia violence predominates. Sectarian violence also covers attacks by certain sub-sects of Sunni Islam (notably, Deobandi Islam) on other sub-sects (notably, those adhering to a Barelvi interpretation of Islam). Meanwhile, Islamist violence refers to a type of violence carried out in the name of a totalizing ideology focused on social transformation—sometimes called social "Talibanization"—and the introduction of various elements of Sharia law into the Pakistani state and society. To the extent that politicians fail to implement the tenets of Sharia, Islamist violence is anti-statist.

Numerous organizations, each with their own independent hierarchy and mandate, fall within these categories. Most prominent among the Jihadist militant groups is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The primary sectarian militant groups are those groups related to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), renamed the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) in the early 2000s.

While it is generally possible to code whether a militant group was, at its inception, primarily conceived to pursue Islamist or sectarian goals, separating these groups, and the types of violence they orchestrate, following their establishment is much harder. Linkages between the two sets of militant groups run very deep. We summarize six key areas of overlap highlighted in the specialist literature.

First, sectarian and jihadist groups have strong ideological commonalities. In particular, both sets of organizations propagate a Deobandi ideology. Deobandis, an orthodox school of Islamic Sunni thought, follow the Hanafi School of fiqh (jurisprudence). The Deobandi school preaches "an austere, scripturalist version of Sunni Islam and [is] opposed to most manifestations of 'folk Islam,' which they associate with syncretist Hindu influences" (Rieck 2016, 87). Those groups promoting an extremist interpretation of Deobandi Islam share a common political project: purifying the Islamic state by ridding it of groups they consider heretical, either because they are Shia or because they are Sunnis that venerate saints and tombs.

Second, Jihadist and sectarian actors draw from similar recruitment pools. Many members of the Taliban and the SSP were recruited from one of many *madaris* in Pakistan. Jaffrelot (2015, 557–8) writes, for instance: "The Binori town madrassah and other such breeding grounds for Islamists who would later wind up in sectarian or jihadist organisations provided a common foundation for groups that hence continue to have considerable affinities." SPP and Taliban members have trained together in various camps in Pakistan as well as in neighboring Afghanistan.

Third, these groups share personnel. Fair (2015, 1139) argues that "sectarian groups ... share overlapping membership with other Deobandi militant groups including the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and the so-called 'Kashmiri tanzeems' that focus upon Kashmir and the rest of India, most notably the Jaish-e-Mohammad."

Fourth, organizations share numerous policy goals. For example, both sectarian and

Jihadist groups in Pakistan support the Afghan insurgency. Yusuf (2014, 19) writes, "Even though the anti-Shia agenda of Punjab-based Sunni sectarian groups is seemingly irrelevant to the TTP's call for the imposition of Sharia in FATA, the ideological affinity and desire of both groups to support the Afghan insurgency allows them to converge, offering militants useful opportunities for reinforcement." Similarly, Jihadist groups support sectarian violence in part because it "makes strategic sense ... its fallout plays into a larger mayhem the militants have planned to unleash on Pakistan" (Abou Zahab 2011, 382).

Fifth, the groups possess important institutional and financial linkages. For example, LeJ leader Riaz Basra had "direct links with Arab financiers and the [Afghan] Taliban helped him establish his base camp in Afghanistan" (Abbas 2004, 208). Similarly, the TTP has claimed that the Afghan Taliban are financially supporting them and providing them sanctuary in Afghanistan.[54]

Sixth and finally, there is much evidence to suggest that the groups have also cooperated in carrying out specific tasks and attacks. For example, when U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein was kidnapped by Al Qaeda, reports suggest that militants belonging to the sectarian LeJ helped abduct him from his home in Lahore, in Punjab province.[55] Similarly, in the violent metropolis of Karachi, "the suicide-attacks carried out since 2006, particularly against Shi'as, are attributed to the LeJ working in tandem with the TTP" (Abou Zahab 2011, 381). More recently, a bombing in a vegetable market in the predominantly Shia city of Parachinar (Kurram tribal agency), which killed 25 and injured 49, was believed to have been a joint operation by the LeJ and a splinter group of the TTP.[56]

What do we conclude from this bank of evidence? The depth and breadth of overlap between Jihadist and Islamist violence in Pakistan makes separating these two strains of militancy a fraught empirical task, and one without a clear conceptual foundation. As Abou Zahab (2011, 369–70) concludes, "Different strains of militancy have overlapped to the point where it might not seem relevant to treat sectarian violence as separate from al-Qaeda attacks or militancy in Punjab as different from that in FATA."

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[54] "Afghan Taliban financing militants in Pakistan: TTP," *Dawn*, 10/7/2013, https://goo.gl/pON6YF, last accessed 5/6/2017.

[55] "Pakistani terrorist killed in staged shootout, say police sources," *Guardian*, 11/26/2015 https://goo.gl/xKudb7, last accessed 5/6/2017.

[56] "'Terrorists will fail in their attempt to regain lost relevance,' army chief says," *Dawn*, 1/22/2017, https://goo.gl/RYVQt2, last accessed 5/6/2017.

Tests of Threshold Bunching

Figure A3: Global Histogram of Secular Party Margin of Victory/Loss

Figure A4: McCrary Density Test

Discontinuity Estimate = -0.007, Standard Error = 0.131

This shows the formal McCrary test for whether or not the density of secular margin of victory/loss is discontinuous around the winning threshold.

First-Stage Regression

Table A1: First-Stage Regression for Benchmark Specification

Dependent variable:	Prop. secular win
Prop. secularist close win	0.903***
	[0.123]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.098
	[0.103]
F-stat. on Prop. secularist close win	53.91
Province FEs	Y
N	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Identification Checks

Table A2: Balance Check—Lagged Joined-District Characteristics Measured in Census of Pakistan 1981 and 1998

Dependent variable:	Area	Pacca (Prop. HHs)	Electricity (Prop. HHs)	Gas (Prop. HHs)	Total literacy (Prop.)	Female literacy (Prop.)	Primary schools (Per capita)
Prop. secularist win	0.104	0.070	-0.073	-0.002	-0.044	-0.045	0.000
	[0.519]	[0.122]	[0.167]	[0.028]	[0.053]	[0.044]	[0.000]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.319	-0.125	-0.080	-0.021	-0.047	-0.024	-0.000*
	[0.367]	[0.083]	[0.125]	[0.027]	[0.039]	[0.036]	[0.000]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	435	421	421	417	425	425	419

Notes: Electoral outcomes for 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 are used to predict (as a falsification test) census outcomes measured in 1981; electoral outcomes for 2002 and 2008 are used to predict census outcomes measured in 1998. Sample sizes vary somewhat across models due to missingness in some census data. Missingness is minimal and appears to be unsystematic. Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Balance Check—Lagged Agricultural Outcomes

Dependent variable:	Rice area	Rice yield	Wheat area	Wheat yield
Prop. secularist win	70.355	223.851	-93.866	-178.719
	[74.040]	[159.986]	[223.091]	[454.305]
Prop. secularist close race	-25.959	-93.441	134.249	138.116
	[46.662]	[81.794]	[137.333]	[288.917]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437

Notes: The unit for area is thousands of hectares; the unit for yield is thousands of tonnes. Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A4: Balance Check—Additional Characteristics

Dependent variable:	Total registered voters (000s)	Police stations per 100,000	Princely state pre-1947
Prop. secularist win	-323.303	-0.577	-0.139
	[281.355]	[1.012]	[0.293]
Prop. secularist close race	354.285	0.865	0.120
	[241.786]	[0.740]	[0.142]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y
N	435	423	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5: Placebo Check—Can Secular Victory in Close Elections at Time t Predict Characteristics of Prior Elections $(t-1)$?

Dependent variable:	% Secular-held	% Secular-held (excl. 1977)	Secular-party voteshare	Turnout	Margin of victory
Prop. secularist win	0.062	0.064	0.029	-0.100**	-0.035
	[0.212]	[0.175]	[0.094]	[0.048]	[0.058]
Prop. secularist close race	0.023	-0.080	0.073	0.055*	-0.022
	[0.093]	[0.068]	[0.052]	[0.031]	[0.046]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	388	346	346	346	346

Notes: All dependent variables pertain to outcomes in the previous election cycle. Note that the three right-hand columns do exclude observations for 1988—lagged electoral data are unavailable owing to the military dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq (1978–88). The left-hand column does attempt to fill in the 1988 data by using electoral outcomes from 1977, for which we have data on winning candidates only. We lack observations for some joined districts because it is sometimes impossible to match constituencies at $t-1$—specifically constituencies that cross district boundaries—onto our joined-district units, which are designed to cleanly encompass constituencies from time t. Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Summary Statistics

Table A6: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Dependent Variables					
Any event (0/1)	0.91	0.28	0.00	1.00	437
Event count	39.31	140.37	0.00	2084.00	437
Any killed (0/1)	0.85	0.36	0.00	1.00	437
Number killed	41.66	142.23	0.00	1977.00	437
Number of days	39.41	141.20	0.00	2103.00	437
Capacity Mechanisms					
Police stations per 100,000 registered voters	2.57	1.32	0.63	7.81	423
Lagged Independent Variables					
Prop. secularist wins ($t - 1$)	0.36	0.42	0.00	1.00	388
Secularist party vote share ($t - 1$)	0.33	0.22	0.00	0.95	346
Av. margin of victory ($t - 1$)	0.18	0.14	0.01	0.80	346
Turnout, $t - 1$	0.39	0.10	0.12	0.61	346
Census Variables					
Pacca house	0.25	0.27	0.00	0.96	421
Electricity in house	0.40	0.27	0.00	0.96	421
Gas used for cooking	0.06	0.11	0.00	0.81	417
Primary schools per capita	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	419
Total literacy rate	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.70	425
Female literacy rate	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.63	425
Agricultural Variables					
Rice cultivated area (000s hectares, $t - 1$)	108.11	217.88	0.00	1423.70	437
Rice yield (000s tonned, $t - 1$)	197.99	452.00	0.00	4117.70	437
Wheat cultivated area (000s hectares, $t - 1$)	377.64	411.66	0.00	2811.00	437
Wheat yield (000s tonned, $t - 1$)	789.27	961.52	0.00	5537.90	437
Other Characteristics					
No. registered voters	794386.30	714742.82	116400.00	6653915.00	435
Joined-district area (GIS measure)	0.97	1.16	0.09	6.86	435
Princely state pre-1947	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00	437
Non-Religious Dependent Variables					
Non-religious event count (ethnic)	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00	437
Any non-religious event (ethnic)	3.04	11.59	0.00	189.00	437
Non-religious event count (public services)	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00	437
Any non-religious event (public services)	0.94	2.50	0.00	21.00	437
Murder count	670.17	583.23	39.00	3193.00	118
Vehicle theft count	1219.65	3579.85	3.00	31782.00	117
Right-Hand-Side Variables (Alternative Bandwidths)					
Prop. secularist win	0.34	0.40	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close race (2 percent)	0.04	0.14	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close win (2 percent)	0.02	0.10	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close race (2.5 percent)	0.05	0.16	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close win (2.5 percent)	0.03	0.12	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close race (3 percent)	0.06	0.18	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close win (3 percent)	0.04	0.13	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close race (3.5 percent)	0.07	0.18	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close win (3.5 percent)	0.04	0.15	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close race (4 percent)	0.08	0.19	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. secularist close win (4 percent)	0.05	0.16	0.00	1.00	437
Alignment Analysis Variables					
Prop. aligned win (3 percent)	0.39	0.41	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. aligned close race (3 percent)	0.08	0.19	0.00	1.00	437
Prop. aligned close win (3 percent)	0.04	0.13	0.00	1.00	437

Robustness and Sensitivity Checks

Bandwidth Sensitivity

Table A7: Bandwidth Sensitivity (2 percent)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.571**	-3.166*	-0.360	-1.686	-3.174*
	[0.227]	[1.773]	[0.290]	[2.196]	[1.782]
Prop. secularist close race (2 percent)	0.015	0.261	-0.057	-0.470	0.353
	[0.102]	[0.847]	[0.194]	[1.395]	[0.848]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A8: Bandwidth Sensitivity (2.5 percent)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.697***	-4.504**	-0.508*	-3.049	-4.542**
	[0.222]	[1.758]	[0.279]	[2.158]	[1.784]
Prop. secularist close race (2.5 percent)	0.021	0.558	-0.010	0.006	0.666
	[0.088]	[0.815]	[0.161]	[1.218]	[0.824]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A9: Bandwidth Sensitivity (3.5 percent)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.318**	-2.177*	-0.182	-1.256	-2.158*
	[0.144]	[1.145]	[0.155]	[1.250]	[1.170]
Prop. secularist close race (3.5 percent)	-0.108	-0.278	-0.103	-0.628	-0.195
	[0.088]	[0.709]	[0.115]	[0.880]	[0.721]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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Table A10: Bandwidth Sensitivity (4 percent)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.247*	-1.297	-0.123	-0.547	-1.274
	[0.132]	[1.122]	[0.139]	[1.222]	[1.139]
Prop. secularist close race (4 percent)	-0.130	-0.529	-0.112	-0.753	-0.445
	[0.089]	[0.726]	[0.109]	[0.877]	[0.734]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dropping Certain Sets of Observations

Table A11: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting 1988 Election)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.442*	-2.992	-0.219	-1.399	-3.069
	[0.261]	[2.109]	[0.290]	[2.369]	[2.142]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.050	0.256	-0.122	-0.537	0.386
	[0.091]	[0.894]	[0.159]	[1.272]	[0.909]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	371	371	371	371	371

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A12: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting 1990 Election)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.471	-3.205	-0.237	-1.318	-3.182
	[0.298]	[2.499]	[0.379]	[3.045]	[2.510]
Prop. secularist close race	0.079	1.261	-0.016	0.280	1.371
	[0.112]	[1.143]	[0.226]	[1.800]	[1.152]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	369	369	369	369	369

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A13: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting 1993 Election)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.812***	-6.152***	-0.844***	-5.877***	-6.250***
	[0.247]	[1.929]	[0.264]	[2.017]	[1.954]
Prop. secularist close race	0.039	0.898	0.179	1.113	1.055
	[0.115]	[0.997]	[0.132]	[1.067]	[1.007]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	372	372	372	372	372

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A14: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting 1997 Election)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.648***	-4.414***	-0.464*	-3.073	-4.415***
	[0.200]	[1.576]	[0.252]	[1.956]	[1.576]
Prop. secularist close race	0.002	0.390	-0.032	-0.143	0.389
	[0.087]	[0.816]	[0.149]	[1.172]	[0.817]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	370	370	370	370	370

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A15: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting 2002 Election)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.714***	-5.012***	-0.530*	-3.723*	-5.071***
	[0.207]	[1.671]	[0.273]	[2.121]	[1.701]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.001	0.745	-0.007	0.314	0.876
	[0.084]	[0.817]	[0.158]	[1.236]	[0.831]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	351	351	351	351	351

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A16: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting 2008 Election)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.802***	-5.569***	-0.518*	-3.608	-5.619***
	[0.214]	[1.871]	[0.312]	[2.386]	[1.897]
Prop. secularist close race	0.158	1.859	0.062	0.983	1.988
	[0.118]	[1.278]	[0.216]	[1.698]	[1.288]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	352	352	352	352	352

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A17: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting Karachi and Balochistan)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.602**	-4.420*	-0.330	-2.522	-4.437*
	[0.280]	[2.282]	[0.362]	[2.894]	[2.301]
Prop. secularist close race	0.038	1.029	-0.052	0.089	1.097
	[0.130]	[1.264]	[0.229]	[1.874]	[1.269]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	362	362	362	362	362

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A18: Instrumental Variables Results (Omitting Punjab)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-1.075***	-7.241***	-0.808***	-5.756**	-7.304***
	[0.189]	[1.488]	[0.311]	[2.261]	[1.519]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.062	-0.290	-0.116	-0.781	-0.190
	[0.098]	[0.858]	[0.181]	[1.346]	[0.882]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	263	263	263	263	263

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Using Count and Logit/Probit Models

Table A19: Reduced-Form Results (Probit and Negative Binomial)

Dependent variable: *Model:*	Any event (Probit)	Event count (NegBin)	Any killed (Probit)	Number killed (NegBin)	Number days (NegBin)
Prop. secularist close win	-2.425**	-2.359	-1.406*	-1.665	-2.368
	[1.150]	[1.758]	[0.854]	[1.717]	[1.763]
Prop. secularist close race	0.634	1.287	0.218	0.829	1.296
	[1.058]	[1.258]	[0.719]	[1.234]	[1.261]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	431	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A20: Reduced-Form Results (Logit and Poisson)

Dependent variable: *Model:*	Any event (Logit)	Event count (Poisson)	Any killed (Logit)	Number killed (Poisson)	Number days (Poisson)
Prop. secularist close win	-4.795*	-1.233*	-2.500	-1.130	-1.239*
	[2.573]	[0.724]	[1.561]	[0.765]	[0.726]
Prop. secularist close race	1.528	1.057	0.352	0.814	1.064
	[2.467]	[0.756]	[1.394]	[0.796]	[0.758]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	431	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Including and Excluding Various Fixed Effects

Table A21: Instrumental Variables Results (Excluding Province Fixed Effects)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.628***	-4.451**	-0.452	-3.043	-4.463**
	[0.211]	[1.805]	[0.288]	[2.256]	[1.827]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.041	0.309	-0.039	0.010	0.424
	[0.087]	[0.854]	[0.149]	[1.180]	[0.862]
Province FEs	N	N	N	N	N
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A22: Instrumental Variables Results (Including Year Fixed Effects)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.576***	-3.742***	-0.386	-2.272	-3.752***
	[0.181]	[1.411]	[0.242]	[1.841]	[1.412]
Prop. secularist close race	0.005	0.739	-0.007	0.323	0.736
	[0.089]	[0.827]	[0.149]	[1.181]	[0.828]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election-year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A23: Instrumental Variables Results (Including Cluster-District Fixed Effects)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.659***	-4.687***	-0.540**	-3.943**	-4.639***
	[0.210]	[1.620]	[0.231]	[1.780]	[1.655]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.011	0.357	-0.006	0.007	0.506
	[0.085]	[0.748]	[0.120]	[0.938]	[0.756]
Cluster-district FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Including Linear Time Trend

Table A24: Instrumental Variables Results (Including Linear Time Trend)

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.617***	-3.966**	-0.411	-2.422	-4.012**
	[0.202]	[1.621]	[0.261]	[2.000]	[1.638]
Prop. secularist close race	0.050	1.139	0.033	0.652	1.249
	[0.089]	[0.867]	[0.157]	[1.236]	[0.870]
Linear time trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Controlling for Additional Margins

In this section, we follow the modeling approach taken by Clots-Figueras (2012). In her application, which explores the effect of narrow victory by female legislators on district-level education, "[p]olynomials of the margin of victory in each one of the elections between women and men in the district are also added in the regressions as controls" (Clots-Figueras 2012, p. 213). We employ the equivalent strategy here by calculating the margin of victory or loss for the highest-performing secular-party candidate in each race.

Table A25: Main Instrumental Variables Results with Linear Controls for the Secular-Party Margin of Victory/Loss in Each Seat in Joined-District

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.664***	-4.705***	-0.474*	-3.287*	-4.746***
	[0.182]	[1.407]	[0.245]	[1.895]	[1.420]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.079	-0.160	-0.094	-0.538	-0.079
	[0.065]	[0.599]	[0.121]	[0.966]	[0.600]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Secular margins controls	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A26: Main Instrumental Variables Results with Second-Order Polynomial Controls for the Secular-Party Margin of Victory/Loss in Each Seat in Joined-District

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.677***	-4.666***	-0.478*	-3.198*	-4.705***
	[0.185]	[1.414]	[0.251]	[1.928]	[1.430]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.085	-0.155	-0.086	-0.430	-0.055
	[0.070]	[0.576]	[0.120]	[0.938]	[0.581]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Secular margins controls	Square	Square	Square	Square	Square
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A27: Main Instrumental Variables Results with Third-Order Polynomial Controls for the Secular-Party Margin of Victory/Loss in Each Seat in Joined-District

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.710***	-4.790***	-0.501*	-3.280*	-4.840***
	[0.188]	[1.405]	[0.258]	[1.954]	[1.420]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.083	-0.208	-0.084	-0.462	-0.107
	[0.070]	[0.547]	[0.121]	[0.920]	[0.551]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Secular margins controls	Cubic	Cubic	Cubic	Cubic	Cubic
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Pruning BFRS Data in Different Ways

Table A28: BFRS Pruning

Dependent variable:	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Any event	Count (ln)	Any event	Count (ln)	Any event	Count (ln)	Any event	Count (ln)	Any event	Count (ln)	Any event	Count (ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.268	-1.901	-0.695***	-4.375**	-0.634**	-4.148**	-0.666***	-4.576***	-0.695***	-4.375**	-0.395*	-2.551*
	[0.218]	[1.467]	[0.266]	[1.773]	[0.278]	[1.854]	[0.221]	[1.719]	[0.266]	[1.773]	[0.230]	[1.523]
Prop. secularist close race	-0.191	-0.685	0.008	0.145	0.031	0.460	0.106	1.129	0.008	0.145	-0.155	-0.503
	[0.151]	[0.996]	[0.186]	[1.224]	[0.183]	[1.243]	[0.091]	[0.883]	[0.186]	[1.224]	[0.155]	[1.021]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.
These criteria for inclusion and exclusion of events—represented by Stata code—is as follows. Please note that the numbered list corresponds to the numbered columns in the table. We never include events that did not occur (in code terms: drop if eventoccured != "yes").

(1) keep if partyresponsible=="informal group (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="religiousparty" | eventtype=="islamist" | eventtype=="sectarian"

(2) keep if partyresponsible=="informal group (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="informal group(other)" | partyresponsible=="militants (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="militants (other)" | partyresponsible=="religious party" | eventtype=="sectarian" | reportedcause=="desecration of a religious site/symbol" | reportedcause=="public rituals/festivities (moharram)" | reportedcause=="previous violence (sectarian)"

(3) keep if partyresponsible=="informal group (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="militants (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="islamist" | eventtype=="sectarian" | partyresponsible=="militants (other)" & event=="terrorism" | partyresponsible=="militants (other)" & event=="assasination" | partyresponsible=="militants (other)" & event=="riot" | partyresponsible=="militants (other)" & event=="violent political demonstration" | partyresponsible=="informal group (other)" & event=="terrorism" | partyresponsible=="informal group (other)" & event=="assasination" | partyresponsible=="informal group (other)" & event=="riot" | partyresponsible=="informal group (other)" & event=="violent political demonstration"

(4) drop if partyresponsible=="foreign party (afghanistan)" | partyresponsible=="foreign party (india)" | partyresponsible=="foreign party (multilateral)" | partyresponsible=="foreign party (united states)" — eventtype=="ethnic" | eventtype=="food/water" | eventtype=="fuel supply/price" | eventtype=="politico-economic" | eventtype=="public services" | eventtype=="tribal" — partyresponsible=="informal group (ethnic)" | partyresponsible=="intelligence agency" | partyresponsible=="militants (ethnic)" | partyresponsible=="military/paramilitary" | partyresponsible=="police" | partyresponsible=="tribal group" | eventoccured=="no" — event=="assassination (drone attack)" | event=="attack on state" | event=="conventional attack on military/paramilitary/police/intelligence" | event=="military/paramilitary/police attack on non-state combatants" | event=="military/paramilitary/police selective violence" | reportedcause=="economic interests (land)" | reportedcause=="previous violence (ethnic)" | reportedcause=="quarrels over women" | reportedcause=="violent exchanges across the loc" | reportedcause=="economic interests (other)" | reportedcause=="construction/attempted construction (public sector)" | reportedcause=="construction/attempted construction (private sector)" | reportedcause=="legal demolition / attempted legal demolition (private sector)" | reportedcause=="allegations of unpatriotic acts" | reportedcause=="private quarrel between 2 political actors" | reportedcause=="legal demolition / attempted legal demolition (public sector)"

(5) keep if partyresponsible=="informal group (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="militants (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="religious party" | eventtype=="islamist" | eventtype=="sectarian" | reportedcause=="desecration of a religious site/symbol" | reportedcause=="public rituals/festivities (moharram)" | reportedcause=="previous violence (sectarian)"

(6) keep if partyresponsible=="informal group (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="informal group(other)" | partyresponsible=="militants (islamist/sectarian)" | partyresponsible=="religious party" | eventtype=="islamist" | eventtype=="sectarian" | reportedcause=="desecration of a religious site/symbol" | reportedcause=="public rituals/festivities (moharram)" | reportedcause=="previous violence (sectarian)"

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Alternative Measure of Dependent Variable: Global Terrorism Database

Table A29: Global Terrorism Database Outcomes

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)
Model:	2SLS				Probit RF	NegBin RF	Probit RF	NegBin RF
Prop. secularist win	-0.426	-2.907	-0.449	-3.132*				
	[0.316]	[1.930]	[0.293]	[1.749]				
Prop. secularist close race	0.064	0.396	0.029	0.062	0.276	0.798	0.329	1.256
	[0.214]	[1.354]	[0.186]	[1.169]	[0.606]	[1.504]	[0.587]	[2.984]
Prop. secularist close win					-1.041	-3.667*	-1.140	-6.614*
					[0.741]	[2.160]	[0.740]	[3.651]
Province FEs	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
N	437	437	437	437	431	437	437	437

Notes: "RF" denotes reduced form analyses. For the probit and negative binomial regressions, the coefficient of interest, therefore, is "Prop. secularist close win." Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Number of Close Elections Fought Between Secular and Non-Secular Party Candidates, by Bandwidth

Table A30: Number of Closely Fought Elections by Bandwidth

	Count
2.0 percent	67
2.5 percent	84
3.0 percent	104
3.5 percent	115
4.0 percent	129

Potential Long-Run Effects of Secular Incumbency on Violence

Table A31: Instrumental Variables Results for Violence in Subsequent Election Cycle

Dependent variable:	Any event T+1 (Binary)	Event count T+1 (Ln)	Any killed T+1 (Binary)	Number killed T+1 (Ln)	Number days T+1 (Ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.175	-1.854	-0.182	-1.757	-1.853
	[0.126]	[1.339]	[0.126]	[1.246]	[1.338]
Prop. secularist close race	0.164***	0.734	0.264***	1.449	0.731
	[0.054]	[0.983]	[0.070]	[0.954]	[0.982]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	352	352	352	352	352

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Secular Party Incumbency and Non-Religious Violence

Table A32: Instrumental Variables Results for Non-Religious Violence and Crime

Dependent variable:	Ethnic (Binary)	Ethnic (Ln count)	Pub. Services (Binary)	Pub. Services (Ln count)	Murder (Ln count)	Vehicle Theft (Ln count)
Prop. secularist win	-0.355	-1.260	-0.132	-1.029	0.141	-0.347
	[0.217]	[1.169]	[0.199]	[1.116]	[1.124]	[2.064]
Prop. secularist close race	0.182	0.528	0.071	0.683	0.716	1.375
	[0.134]	[0.676]	[0.136]	[0.806]	[0.930]	[1.167]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	118	117

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Alignment Analysis

Table A33: Effect of MNA Alignment with the Party of the Prime Minister on Religious Violence

Dependent variable:	Any event (Binary)	Event count (Ln)	Any killed (Binary)	Number killed (Ln)	Number days (Ln)
Prop. aligned win (3 percent)	0.222	1.552	0.328	2.329	1.526
	[0.221]	[1.552]	[0.215]	[1.614]	[1.543]
Prop. aligned close race (3 percent)	-0.175	-1.037	-0.118	-0.854	-1.004
	[0.133]	[0.934]	[0.126]	[0.967]	[0.938]
Province FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Global OLS Results

Table A34: Conditional Correlation between Proportion of Joined-District Seats Held by Secularist Parties and Religious Violence

Dependent variable:	Any event (binary)	Event count (ln)	Any event (binary)	Event count (ln)
Prop. secularist win	-0.077*	0.006	-0.057	0.170
	[0.045]	[0.281]	[0.051]	[0.313]
Cluster FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province-Year FEs	N	N	Y	Y
N	437	437	437	437

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by cluster-district area, in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.