What is Logic?

LOGIC I
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Motivations

Reasoning: Logic is the study of formal reasoning.

- By 'formal' we don't mean that it uses mathematical symbols.
- Rather, what follows from what *in virtue of logical form*.
- Abstracting from specific subject-matters, logic describes general patterns of reasoning that apply across the disciplines.

Normativity: Logic is not a *descriptive* science studying how human beings in fact reason across the various disciplines.

- Logic is a *normative* science, describing an especially strong form of reasoning that may serve as an ideal.

Artifical: We will primarily work in artificial languages where we will stipulate how to reason in these languages.

- Regimenting English will expose and remove ambiguities.
- We will provide proof systems for our artificial languages by which to compute what follows from what in a manner that vastly extends our natural cognitive capacities.

Interpretations

Proposition: We will begin with propositional logic where a PROPOSITION is a way for things to be which either obtains or does not.

Declarative Sentence: Given an interpretation of the language, an English sentence is DECLARATIVE just in case it expresses a proposition.

- Interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory sentences are not declarative sentences and typically do not have truth-values.
- We will restrict to declarative sentences throughout.

Truth-Values: A declarative sentence is TRUE in an interpretation if, given that interpretation, it expresses a proposition that obtains and FALSE in that interpretation otherwise.

Interpretations: We will only be concerned with the truth-values of sentences in this course, and so it is enough to take an INTERPRETATION to be an assignment of truth-values to sentences.

- This amounts to taking there to be just two propositions.

Examples

Deductive Argument: A DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT in English is a nonempty sequence of declarative sentences where a single sentence is designated as the CONCLUSION (typically the last line) and all of the other sentences (if any) are the PREMISES.

***Snow**: This argument may be compelling, but it is not certain.*

A1. It's snowing.
A2. John drove to work.

***Red**: This argument provides certainty, but not on all interpretations.*

B1. The ball is crimson.
B2. The ball is red.

***Museum**: This argument's certainty is independent of the interpretation.*

C1. Kate is either at home or at the Museum.
C2. Kate is not at home.
C3. Kate is at the Museum.

Informal Validity

Question 1: What goes wrong if we assume the premises but deny the conclusion in *Snow*, *Red*, and *Museum*?

Snow: Improbable but possible.

Red: Impossible on the intended interpretation.

Museum: Impossible on all interpretations so long as we hold the meanings of logical terms 'not' and 'or' fixed.

Task 1: Clarify what it is to hold the logical terms fixed.

Informal Interpretation: An INFORMAL INTERPRETATION assigns every declarative sentence of English to exactly one TRUTH-VALUE without offending the following informal semantic clauses:

- A *negation* is true just in case the negand is false.
- A *disjunction* is true just in case either disjunct is true.

Informal Validity: An argument in English is INFORMALLY VALID just in case its conclusion is true in every informal interpretation in which all of its premises are true.

Formal Languages

Problem 1: There is no set of all declarative sentences of English, and so no clear notion of an informal interpretation of English.

Suggestion: Could choose some large set of atomic English sentences, but this would be arbitrary and hard to specify precisely.

Solution 1: We will *regiment* English arguments in artificial languages that are both general and easy to specify precisely.

Propositional Language: The SENTENCES of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ are composed of SENTENCE LETTERS $A, B, C, \ldots$ and sentential operators $\neg$ and $\vee$.

Task 2: Regiment *Museum* in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$: $H \vee M, \neg H \vDash M$.

- H = 'Kat is at home'.
- M = 'Kat is at the Museum'.

Task 3: Provide a way to interpret the sentences of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Schematic Variables: Let $\varphi, \psi, \ldots$ be variables with sentences of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ as values, and let $\Gamma, \Sigma, \ldots$ be variables for sets of sentences of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Interpretation: An INTERPRETATION $\mathcal{V}$ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ assigns exactly one truth-value (1 or 0) to all sentences of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ where for any φ and ψ:

- $\mathcal{V}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}(\varphi) = 0$.
- $\mathcal{V}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).

Logical Consequence: $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ just in case $\mathcal{V}(\varphi) = 1$ for any interpretation $\mathcal{V}$ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ where $\mathcal{V}(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$.

Logical Validity: An argument is LOGICALLY VALID just in case its conclusion φ is a logical consequence of its set of premises Γ, i.e. $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

Task 4: Show that *Museum* is logically valid.

Logic

Model Theory: We have characterized logical reasoning as truth-preservation across a space of interpretations for an artificial language.

Proof Theory: Another approach focuses entirely on syntactic rules that specify which inferences in a language are logically valid.

- A system of basic rules for reasoning in an artificial language is referred to as a LOGIC for that language.

- By composing basic rules, we will define what counts as a PROOF in each of the logics that we will study.

Metalogic: Despite their differences, these two strategies will be shown to coincide for the languages that we will study in this book.

Logical Form

Picasso

D1. The painting is either a Picasso or a counterfeit and illegally traded.
D2. The painting is not a Picasso.
D3. The painting is a counterfeit and illegally traded.

Task 5: Regiment *Picasso* in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$: $P \vee (Q \wedge R), \neg P \vDash Q \wedge R$.

- P = 'The painting is a Picasso'.
- Q = 'The painting is a counterfeit'.
- R = 'The painting is illegally traded'.

Question 2: How does this argument relate to *Museum*?

Logical Form: Both arguments are instances of $\varphi \vee \psi, \neg\varphi \vDash \psi$ which is a logically valid argument schema, i.e., all instances are valid.

Question 3: How many logically valid argument schemata are there, and how could we hope to describe this space?

Suggestion: The logical consequence relation $\vDash$ for $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ describes the space of logically valid arguments, where the logically valid argument schemata are patterns in this space.

Problem 2: $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ cannot regiment all logically valid arguments.

Socrates: Every man is mortal, Socrates is a man $\vDash$ Socrates is mortal.

- Our intuitive grasp on logical validity is not exhaustively captured by what we can regiment in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Solution 2: Rather, logical validity in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ provides a partial answer, where we may extend the language to provide a broader description of logical validity, e.g., $\mathcal{L}^{\text{FOL}}$.

- We will consider further extensions to $\mathcal{L}^{\text{FOL}}$ in later chapters.

Syntax for $\mathcal{L}^{\text{LP}}$

LOGIC I
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Object Language and Metalanguage

Object Language: $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ is the OBJECT LANGUAGE under study.

Metalanguage: Mathematical English is the METALANGAUGE with which we will conduct our study.

Quotation: To talk about $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ we will take a quoted expression to be the CANONICAL NAME for the expression quoted.

Use/Mention: We MENTION expressions by putting them in quotes, whereas otherwise they are USED.

- 'Sue' is a nickname for Susanna.
- The complex sentence '$A \to B$' includes the sentence letters 'A' and 'B'.
- 'A' belongs to $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, but " 'A' " and A do not.

The Expressions of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$

Sentential Operators: '$\neg$','$\wedge$','$\vee$','$\to$', and '$\leftrightarrow$'.

- '$\sim$', '&', '.', '|', '$\supset$', and '$\equiv$' are also sometimes used.

Punctuation: '(' and ')'.

Sentence Letter: 'A_0', 'A_1', ..., 'B_0', 'B_1', ..., 'Z_0', 'Z_1', ...

Question: How can we specify all sentence letter explicitly?

- A SENTENCE LETTER is the result of subscripting a capital English letter with a numeral.

Corner Quotes: Let $\ulcorner \varphi_x \urcorner$ refer to the result of concatenating φ with $_x$.

- $\ulcorner \varphi_x \urcorner$ is a SENTENCE LETTER for any capital letter φ and numeral for a natural number x.

Primitive Symbols: The sentential operators, punctuation, and sentence letters are the PRIMITIVE SYMBOLS of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Expressions: The EXPRESSIONS of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ are defined recursively:

- The primitive symbol of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ are expression of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- If φ and ψ are expressions of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, then so is $\ulcorner \varphi\psi \urcorner$.
- Nothing else is an expression of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

The Sentences of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$

Uninterpretable: The expressions '$\neg\neg\neg\neg$', '$B_3 A_0$', '$))\leftrightarrow$', and '$A_4\vee$' cannot be assigned truth-values in a meaningful way.

- Compare 'MIT is in session' and '$A_4 \wedge P_1$'.

Well-Formed Sentences: Letting $\varphi, \psi, \chi, \ldots$ be variables with expressions for values, we may define the WFSS of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ as follows:

- Every sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ is a wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- If the expressions φ and ψ are wfss of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, then:

  1. $\ulcorner \neg\varphi \urcorner$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
  2. $\ulcorner (\varphi \wedge \psi) \urcorner$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
  3. $\ulcorner (\varphi \vee \psi) \urcorner$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
  4. $\ulcorner (\varphi \to \psi) \urcorner$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$; and
  5. $\ulcorner (\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \urcorner$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

- Nothing else is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Sentential Variables: We will often restrict 'φ', 'ψ', 'χ',... to the wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Main Operator: The MAIN OPERATOR is the last operator used in the construction of a sentence.

Arguments: The inputs to a main operator are its ARGUMENTS.

Scope: The main operator has SCOPE over its arguments.

Metalinguistic Conventions

Subscripts: We will suppress the subscript '$_0$' to ease exposition.

Task: Build increasingly complex sentences from just A.

Naming: We will refer to the NEGAND in a NEGATION, the CONJUNCTS in a CONJUNCTION, the DISJUNCTS in a DISJUNCTION, the ANTECEDENT and CONSEQUENT in a MATERIAL CONDITIONAL, and the ARGUMENTS in a MATERIAL BICONDITIONAL.

Quotation: We will sometimes drop quotes and corner quotes when the intended meaning is clear from the context.

- We will only do so when this improves readability.

Punctuation: We will drop outermost parentheses for ease.

- Compare $A \wedge B$, $A \vee B \vee C$, and $A \vee B \wedge C$.

Therefore: We will use '$\because$' for inline arguments.

Metalinguistic: These abbreviations all happen in the metalanguage.

Truth Functionality

Interpretations: Improving on last time, an INTERPRETATION $\mathcal{I}$ is an assignment of truth-values to sentence letters of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Valuation: We may then define a VALUATION function $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}$ which assigns truth-values to every sentence of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ by way of the following semantic clauses:

- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{I}(\varphi)$ if φ is a sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ (i.e., $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$.

Observe: These clauses resemble the composition rules for $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Homophonic Semantics: The clauses for $\neg$, $\wedge$, and $\vee$ use analogous operators in the metalanguage, but not so for $\rightarrow$ and $\leftrightarrow$.

Truth Tables: Use the semantics to fill out the TRUTH TABLES below:

φ	$\neg\varphi$
1	0
0	1

φ	ψ	$\varphi \wedge \psi$	$\varphi \vee \psi$	$\varphi \rightarrow \psi$	$\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	1	1

Truth Functions: The sentential operators express truth-functions, and so are often called TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL OPERATORS.

Question: How many unary/binary truth-functions are there?

Adequacy: Given these limitations, what should we hope to be able to adequately regiment in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$?

Logical Truths: φ is a LOGICAL TRUTH of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\mathcal{I}$.

Regimentation

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From Last Time…

Definitions: Here is slightly different take on the same definitions:

Well-Formed Sentences: The set WFSS of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ is the smallest set to satisfy:

- φ is a wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ if φ is a sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
- $\neg\varphi$ is a wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ if φ is a wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
- $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ if φ and ψ are wfss of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
- $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ if φ and ψ are wfss of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
- $(\varphi \to \psi)$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ if φ and ψ are wfss of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$;
- $(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi)$ is a wff of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ if φ and ψ are wfss of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Semantics: For an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$, a VALUATION function $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}$ is the smallest function to assign truth-values to every sentence of SL that satisfies the semantic clauses:

- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{I}(\varphi)$ if φ is a sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ (i.e., $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \to \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$.

Observe: Observe the symmetry between the above.

Recall: The hierarchy of sentences from before…

Complexity

Complexity: $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi)$ is the smallest function to satisfy all of the following conditions for all wfss φ and ψ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$:

- $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = 0$ if φ is a sentence letter;
- $\texttt{Comp}(\neg\varphi) = \texttt{Comp}(\varphi) + 1$;
- $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \texttt{Comp}(\varphi) + \texttt{Comp}(\psi) + 1$;
- …

Question: Do we need to include corner quotes?

Validity

$\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ Validity: An argument in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ is *valid* iff its conclusion is a logical consequence of its premises.

English Validity: An argument in English is *valid* iff it has a (faithful) regimentation (in some language) that is valid.

- Note the imprecision here; there is no avoiding this.

Soundness: An argument is *sound* iff it is valid and has true premises (on an interpretation we care about, probably the intended interpretation).

Examples

Rain

1. If it is raining on a week day, Sam took his car.
2. Kate borrowed Sam's car only if Sam did not take it.
3. Kate borrowed Sam's car just in case she visited her parents.
4. It is raining and Kate visited her parents.
5. Either it is not a week day or it is not raining.

Task 2: Regiment this argument and construct its truth table.

Observe: This argument can be adequately regimented and evaluate in SL.

Negation

Uninitiated

A1. If Sam attended the gathering, then he has been initiated.
A2. Sam is uninitiated.
A3. Sam did not attend the gathering.

Observe: Being uninitiated is the same as not being initiated.

Uninvited

B1. Arden is not invited.
B2. Arden is uninvited.

Observe: Arden can fail to be invited without being uninvited.

Question: What about the converse?

Disjunction

Party

C1. If Adi or James make it to the party, Isa will be happy.
C2. If Adi and James make it to the party, Isa will be happy.

Observe: This argument suggests an inclusive reading of 'or'.

Race

D1. Sasha won the 100 meter dash.
D2. Josh won the high jump.
D3. Either Sasha won the 100 meter dash or Josh won the high jump

Observe: We could strengthen the conclusion.

Vault

E1. If Kin uses the remote, the trunk will open.
E2. If Yu tries the handle, the trunk will open.
E3. If Kin uses the remote and Yu tries the handle, the trunk won't open.
E4. If Kin uses the remote or Yu tries the handle, the trunk will open.

Observe: We cannot regiment the conclusion with inclusive-'or'.

Question: Can we salvage the validity of this argument?

Conjunction

Exam

F1. Henry failed and Megan passed.
F2. Megan passed and Henry failed.

Observe: Perfectly adequate and valid regimentation.

Gym

G1. Kate took a shower and went to the gym.
G2. Kate went to the gym and took a shower.

Observe: Conjunction in English can track temporal order.

Question: How can we capture the invalidity of this argument in $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$?

Logical Consequence

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From Last Time...

Semantics: For any interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, the VALUATION function $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}$ from the wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ to truth-values is defined:

- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{I}(\varphi)$ if φ is a sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ (i.e., $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$.

Characteristic Truth Tables: As drawn in the textbook...

Complete Truth Tables

Setup: Write the sentence on the top right, add the constituent sentence letters on the left, and use the characteristic truth tables.

Constituents: We define $[\varphi]$ to be the set of sentence letters that occur in φ:

- $[\varphi] = \{\varphi\}$ if φ is a sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- For any wfss φ and ψ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, and $\star \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}$:

  ($\neg$) $[\neg\varphi] = [\varphi]$;
  ($\star$) $[\varphi \star \psi] = [\varphi] \cup [\psi]$;

Rows: Add 2^n rows for n constituent sentence letters.

Examples: $[A \wedge (B \vee A)] \rightarrow A$, $C \leftrightarrow \neg C$, D.

Tautology: Only 1s under its main connective in its complete truth table.

Contradiction: Only 0s under its main connective in its complete truth table.

Logically Contingent: A 1 and a 0 under its main connective in its complete truth table.

Logical Entailment: On any row of a complete truth table, the consequent has a 1 under its main connective whenever the antecedent does.

Logical equivalence: Identical columns under the main connectives for the sentences.

Satisfiable: There is a row where all wfss have a 1 under all main connectives.

Logical Consequence: The conclusion has a 1 under its main connective in every row in which every premise has a 1 under its main connectives.

Decidability

Effective Procedure: A finitely describable and (in principle) usable procedure that always finishes and produces a correct answer to the question asked, requiring only that the instructions be followed accurately.

Question: How to define the main operators and distribute truth-values?

- Recursively, like the formation rules for the wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Question: Is it always possible to construct a complete truth table for a wfs?

- Sentences have a finite number of constituent sentence letters.

Decidable: If there is an effective procedure for determining the answer to a question, that question is *decidable*.

- It is decidable whether a wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ is a tautology, etc.

Question: What about a complete truth table for a set of sentences?

- Could require infinitely many sentence letters.
- We might be able to define an infinite table, but we can't use it.

Question: If one procedure is not effective, couldn't there be another one?

- It turns out that there is no effective procedure…
- There is always an effective procedure for finite sets of sentences.

Validity: So the validity of finite arguments is decidable.

Partial Truth Tables

Worry 1: It is not *that* effective… in practice it is daunting for $n > 4$.

Partial Truth Tables: Sometimes only one or two lines are needed.

- $A \to \neg(A \lor B)$: not a tautology or contradiction, so contingent.
- $B \leftrightarrow \neg(A \lor B)$ is a contradiction, so we need a complete table.
- $C \lor (A \to A)$ is a tautology, so we need a complete table.

Complete: To affirm equivalence, entailment, and logical consequence.

Partial: To affirm that a set is satisfiable.

Worry 2: Still daunting sometimes.

Worry 3: Definitions all refer to complete truth tables.

- Definition of a complete truth table has some minor ambiguities.
- These could be fixed, but the result is cumbersome.

Heuristic: The truth table definitions are best taken to be a heuristic guide for grasping the abstract definitions we may now provide.

Semantic Proofs

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From Before...

Semantics: For any interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, the VALUATION function $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}$ from the wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ to truth-values is defined:

- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{I}(\varphi)$ if φ is a sentence letter of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ (i.e., $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$.
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).
- $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$.

Formal Definitions

Interpretation: $\mathcal{I}$ is an *interpretation* of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ *iff* $\mathcal{I}(\varphi) \in \{1, 0\}$ for every sentence letter φ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$.

Tautology: φ is a *tautology iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\mathcal{I}$.

Contradiction: φ is a *contradiction iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ for all $\mathcal{I}$.

Logically Contingent: φ is *contingent iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{J}}(\varphi)$ for some $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$.

Logical Entailment: φ *entails* ψ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \leq \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$ for all $\mathcal{I}$.

Logical Equivalence: φ is *equivalent* to ψ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$ for all $\mathcal{I}$.

Satisfiable: Γ is *satisfiable iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$ for some $\mathcal{I}$.

Logical Consequence: $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ whenever $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$.

Satisfiability

Which sets of sentences are satisfiable?

Taller

(1) Liza is taller than Sue.

(2) Sue is taller than Paul.

(3) Paul is taller than Liza.

Lost

(4) Kim is either in Somerville or Cambridge.

(5) If Kim is in Somerville, then she is not far from home.

(6) If Kim is not far from home, then she is in Cambridge.

(7) Kim is not in Cambridge.

Validity

Arguments: Sequences of wfss of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$, not sets.

Valid: For any argument, it is valid *iff* its conclusion is a logical consequence of its set of premises.

- Many arguments may have the same set of premises.
- An argument is valid *iff* its conclusion is true in every interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ to satisfy the set of premises.

Tautology: A wfs φ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ is a *tautology* just in case $\vDash \varphi$.

- Every $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ satisfies the empty set.
- Each premise constrains the set of interpretations the conclusion must be true in where the empty set has no constraints.

Weakening: If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \cup \Sigma \vDash \varphi$.

- Each wfs of $\mathcal{L}^{\text{PL}}$ corresponds to a set of all interpretations which make that sentence true: $|\varphi| := \{\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1\}$.
- Is the interpretation set for the conclusion a subset of the intersection of the premise interpretation sets?

Examples

1. Show that $\neg R \to \neg Q,\ P \wedge Q \vDash P \wedge R$.
2. Show that $A \vee B,\ B \to C,\ A \leftrightarrow C \vDash C$.
3. Show that $P,\ P \to Q,\ \neg Q \vDash A$.
4. Show that $(P \to Q) \leftrightarrow (\neg Q \to \neg P)$ is a tautology.
5. Show that $A \leftrightarrow \neg A$ is a contradiction.
6. Show that $\{P,\ P \to Q,\ Q \to \neg P\}$ is unsatisfiable.
7. Show that $\{P \to Q,\ \neg P \vee \neg Q,\ Q \to P\}$ is satisfiable.

Observe: There seem to be patterns.

Question: How could we systematize these proofs?

Methods

Truth Tables:	Mechanical but tedious.
•	Bad if there are lots of sentence letters.
•	Good for counterexamples. $A \leftrightarrow (B \rightarrow C),\ A \wedge \neg B,\ D \vee \neg A \ \vDash C.$
Semantic Arguments:	Good if there are lots of sentence letters. $(A \vee B) \rightarrow (C \wedge D),\ \neg C \wedge \neg E \ \vDash \neg A.$

The Material Conditional

Roses

A1. Sugar is sweet.

A2. The roses are only red if sugar is sweet.

Observe: First paradox of the material conditional.

Vacation

B1. Casey is not on vacation.

B2. If Casey is on vacation, then he is in Paris.

Observe: Second paradox of the material conditional.

Crimson

C1. Mary doesn't like the ball unless it is crimson.

C2. Mary likes the ball.

C3. If the ball is blue, then Mary likes it.

The Biconditional

Rectangle

D1. The room is a square.

D2. The room is a rectangle.

D3. The room is a square if and only if it is a rectangle.

Work

E1. Kin isn't a professor.

E2. Sue isn't a chef.

E3. Kin is a professor just in case Sue is a chef.

Mathematical Induction

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
October 6, 2023

Continuing from Last Time...

Task 1: Let $\mathcal{I}^+(\alpha) = 1$ for every sentence letter α in SL. Show that $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}^+}(\varphi) = 1$ for every SL sentence φ that does not include negation.

Task 2: Every tree has a finite number of branches.

Task 3: Show that for every SL sentence φ, if $\texttt{Simple}(\varphi)$, then there are SL interpretations $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ where $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{J}}(\varphi) = 0$.

Task 4: For any SL sentences φ, ψ, χ and SL sentence letter α, if $\vDash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\vDash \chi_{[\varphi/\alpha]} \equiv \chi_{[\psi/\alpha]}$.

Task 5: Every tree can be completed in a finite number of steps.

Recursive Definitions

Length: For any SL tree X, we define $\texttt{Length}(X)$ to be the number of resolution rules that have been applied.

- $\texttt{Length}(X) = 0$ for any root X.
- For any SL tree X, if $\texttt{Length}(X) = n$ and X' is the result of resolving a sentence in exactly one branch in X, then $\texttt{Length}(X') = n + 1$.

Constituents: We define $[\varphi]$ to be the set of sentence letters that occur in φ.

- If $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = 0$, then $[\varphi] = \{\varphi\}$.
- For any SL sentences φ and ψ, and binary connective $\star \in \{\wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv\}$:

  ($\neg$) $[\neg\varphi] = [\varphi]$; and

  ($\star$) $[\varphi \star \psi] = [\varphi] \cup [\psi]$.

Simplicity: We define $\texttt{Simple}(\varphi)$ to hold just in case the SL sentence φ has at most one occurrence of each sentence letter in SL.

- If $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = 0$, then $\texttt{Simple}(\varphi)$.
- For any SL sentences φ and ψ, and binary connective $\star \in \{\wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv\}$:

  ($\neg$) $\texttt{Simple}(\neg\varphi)$ if $\texttt{Simple}(\varphi)$; and

  ($\star$) $\texttt{Simple}(\varphi \star \psi)$ if $\texttt{Simple}(\varphi)$, $\texttt{Simple}(\psi)$, and $[\varphi] \cap [\psi] = \varnothing$.

Substitution: We define $\varphi_{[\chi/\alpha]}$ to be the result of replacing every occurrence of the sentence letter α in φ with χ.

- If $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = 0$, then $\varphi_{[\chi/\alpha]} = \begin{cases} \chi & \text{if } \varphi = \alpha, \\ \varphi & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$
- For any SL sentences φ and ψ, and binary connective $\star \in \{\wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv\}$:

  ($\neg$) $(\neg\varphi)_{[\chi/\alpha]} = \neg(\varphi_{[\chi/\alpha]})$; and
  ($\star$) $(\varphi \star \psi)_{[\chi/\alpha]} = \varphi_{[\chi/\alpha]} \star \psi_{[\chi/\alpha]}$.

Resolution: We define $\texttt{Res}(\varphi)$ to be the maximum number of times that we may resolve φ and any of its descendants.

- $\texttt{Res}(\varphi) = 0$ if φ is a literal.
- For any SL sentences φ and ψ, and binary connective $\star \in \{\wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv\}$:

  ($\neg$) $\texttt{Res}(\neg\neg\varphi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + 1$; and
  ($\star$) $\texttt{Res}(\varphi \star \psi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\psi) + 1$.
  ($\star$) $\texttt{Res}(\neg(\varphi \star \psi)) = \texttt{Res}(\neg\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + 1$.

Set Binary: We extend the definition of $\texttt{Res}$ to sets of sentences as follows:

$$\texttt{Res}(\Gamma) = \sum_{\varphi \in \Gamma} \texttt{Res}(\varphi).$$

Unresolved: We define $[X]$ to be the set of unresolved sentences in the SL tree X.

- $\varphi \in [X]$ if X is a root and φ occurs in X.
- For any SL tree X' which results from resolving $\varphi \in [X]$ on every open branch in X in which φ occurs:

  ($\neg$) $[X'] = ([X]/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\psi\}$ if $\varphi = \neg\neg\psi$;
  ($+$) $[X'] = ([X]/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\psi, \chi\}$ if $\varphi \in \{\psi \wedge \chi, \psi \vee \chi\}$;
  ($-$) $[X'] = ([X]/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\neg\psi, \neg\chi\}$ if $\varphi \in \{\neg(\psi \wedge \chi), \neg(\psi \vee \chi)\}$;
  ($\supset$) $[X'] = ([X]/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\neg\psi, \chi\}$ if $\varphi = \psi \supset \chi$;
  ($\not\supset$) $[X'] = ([X]/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\psi, \neg\chi\}$ if $\varphi = \neg(\psi \supset \chi)$;
  ($\equiv$) $[X'] = ([X]/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\psi, \chi, \neg\psi, \neg\chi\}$ if $\varphi \in \{\psi \equiv \chi, \neg(\psi \equiv \chi)\}$.

Resolvable: Letting $\mathbb{L}$ be the set of SL literals, we define $X_U = [X]/\mathbb{L}$ to be the set of SL sentences in X that can be resolved.

Task 5

Proof: Given any SL tree X, let X_U be the set of resolvable sentences in X. The proof goes by induction on $\texttt{Res}(X_U)$ for any SL tree X.

Base Case: Let X be an SL tree where $\texttt{Res}(X_U) = 0$. By definition, every branch is complete, and so the tree is complete. Accordingly, X can be completed in a finite number of steps, namely 0.

Hypothesis: Assume that for every SL tree X, if $\texttt{Res}(X_U) \leq n$, then X can be completed in a finite number of steps.

Induction: Let X be an SL tree where $\texttt{Res}(X_U) = n + 1$. Thus there is some $\varphi \in X_U$. Letting X' be the SL tree that results from resolving φ on every open branch in X, we may observe that $\varphi \notin X'_U$. Consider the following cases where $\star \in \{\wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv\}$ is a binary connective:

Case 1: If $\varphi = \neg\neg\psi$ and $\texttt{Res}(\psi) \neq 0$, then $X'_U = (X_U/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\psi\}$. If instead $\texttt{Res}(\psi) = 0$, then $X'_U = X_U/\{\varphi\}$. Since $\texttt{Res}(\psi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) - 1$, it follows either way that $\texttt{Res}(X'_U) \leq \texttt{Res}(X_U) - 1 = n$.

Case 2: If $\varphi = \psi \star \chi$ and $\texttt{Res}(\psi) \neq 0$ and $\texttt{Res}(\chi) \neq 0$, then we know that $X'_U = (X_U/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\psi, \chi\}$. Since $\texttt{Res}(\psi) + \texttt{Res}(\chi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) - 1$, it follows that $\texttt{Res}(X'_U) = \texttt{Res}(X_U) - 1 = n$. If instead $\texttt{Res}(\psi) = 0$ or $\texttt{Res}(\chi) = 0$, then $\texttt{Res}(X'_U)$ will be even smaller, and so $\texttt{Res}(X'_U) \leq n$.

Case 3: If $\varphi = \neg(\psi \star \chi)$ and $\texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) \neq 0$ and $\texttt{Res}(\neg\chi) \neq 0$, then $X'_U = (X_U/\{\varphi\}) \cup \{\neg\psi, \neg\chi\}$. Since $\texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\chi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) - 1$, it follows that $\texttt{Res}(X'_U) = \texttt{Res}(X_U) - 1 = n$. If instead $\texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) = 0$ or $\texttt{Res}(\neg\chi) = 0$, then $\texttt{Res}(X'_U)$ will be even smaller, and so $\texttt{Res}(X'_U) \leq n$.

Since in all cases $\texttt{Res}(X'_U) \leq n$, it follows by hypothesis that X' can be completed in a finite number of steps. We know by **Task 2** that X' is the result of resolving φ in at most a finite number of branches in X. Since the sum of finite numbers is finite, we may conclude that X may be completed in a finite number of steps. Thus it follows by induction that every tree X can be completed in a finite number of steps.

The Soundness of SL Tree Proofs

LOGIC I
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October 5, 2023

Informal Proof

Motive: We want to know which arguments are valid.

Equivalence: $\Sigma \vDash \varphi$ *iff* $\Sigma, \neg\varphi \vDash \bot$.

Soundness: Letting $\Gamma = \Sigma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$, we want to show that $\Gamma \vDash \bot$ if $\Gamma \vdash \bot$.

Informally: We want to show that every closed tree has an unsatisfiable root.

Question 1: Why can't we use our tree method (or similar) to prove soundness?

Definitions

Root: An SL tree whose root contains the sentences in Γ is a tree *with* root Γ.

Branch Satisfaction: An SL interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ *satisfies* a branch $\mathcal{B}$ in an SL tree X just in case $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every φ which occurs in $\mathcal{B}$.

Setting up the Proof

Contrapositive: Every SL tree with a satisfiable root is closed.

Lemma 3: Every SL tree with a satisfiable root has a satisfiable branch.

Question 2: How can we derive soundness from this stronger claim?

Question 3: How can we prove *Lemma 4*?

Supporting Lemmas

Lemma 1: Every satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$ in an SL tree X is open.

Lemma 2: If X is an SL tree with a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$, then any tree X' which is the result of resolving a sentence in $\mathcal{B}$ has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}'$.

- Assume X has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$.
- So there is some $\mathcal{I}$ where $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for all φ in $\mathcal{B}$.
- By *Lemma 1*, $\mathcal{B}$ is open.
- If $\mathcal{B}$ is complete, then the consequent holds vacuously.
- If $\mathcal{B}$ is not complete, then $\mathcal{B}$ has a resolvable sentence φ.
- There are nine cases to check given our nine resolution rules.

Lemma 3

Proof: Every SL tree with a satisfiable root has a satisfiable branch.

Antecedent: Assume $\Gamma \nvDash \bot$.

Base: Let X be an tree with root Γ where $\texttt{Length}(X) = 0$.

Hypothesis: Every tree X with root Γ of $\texttt{Length}(X) = n$ has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$.

Induction: Assume X' is a tree with root Γ of $\texttt{Length}(X') = n + 1$.

1. Let X be any tree with root Γ where X' is the result of resolving a sentence φ in a branch $\mathcal{B}$ of X.
2. So X is a tree with root Γ of $\texttt{Length}(X) = n$.
3. By hypothesis, X has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}^\star$.
4. So either $\mathcal{B}^\star = \mathcal{B}$ or not.

Case 1: Assume $\mathcal{B}^\star = \mathcal{B}$.

   (a) We know that X' is the result of resolving φ in $\mathcal{B}$.
   (b) By the case assumption $\mathcal{B} = \mathcal{B}^\star$.
   (c) Since $\mathcal{B}^\star$ is satisfiable, X' has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}'$ by *Lemma 2*.

Case 2: Assume $\mathcal{B}^\star \neq \mathcal{B}$.

   (a) We know $\mathcal{B}^\star$ is a satisfiable branch of X.
   (b) X' is the result of resolving φ in $\mathcal{B} \neq \mathcal{B}^\star$ of X.
   (c) So $\mathcal{B}^\star$ is also a branch of X'.
   (d) Since $\mathcal{B}^\star$ is satisfiable, X' has a satisfiable branch.

5. Thus X' has a satisfiable branch whether $\mathcal{B}^\star = \mathcal{B}$ or not.
6. Every tree X' with root Γ of $\texttt{Length}(X') = n + 1$ has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$.

Conclusion: By weak induction, QED.

Proving Soundness

Proof: If there is a closed SL tree with root Γ, then Γ is unsatisfiable.

1. Assume Γ is satisfiable.
2. Let X be an SL tree with root Γ.
3. So X has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$ by *Lemma 3*.
4. So $\mathcal{B}$ is open by *Lemma 1*.
5. So X is not closed.
6. More generally, there is no closed SL tree with root Γ.
7. By contraposition, QED.

The Completeness of SL Tree Proofs

LOGIC I
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The Proof

Completeness: Every unsatisfiable root has a closed tree: $\Gamma \vDash \bot \Rightarrow \Gamma \vdash \bot$.

Contrapositive: If there is no closed tree with root Γ, then Γ is satisfiable.

Lemma 6: For any tree X with root Γ, there is a complete tree X' with root Γ.

- Assume there is no closed tree with root Γ.
- Roots are trees, and so Γ has a complete tree X.
- So X is a complete open tree with a complete open branch $\mathcal{B}$.

Note: This result is purely syntactic.

Lemma 7: Every complete open branch in an SL tree is satisfiable.

- So $\mathcal{B}$ is satisfiable, and so Γ is satisfiable.
- By contraposition, if $\Gamma \vDash \bot$, then $\Gamma \vdash \bot$.

Resolution

Let the *resolution* $\texttt{Res}(\varphi)$ provide an upper bound on the number of times that φ and its descendants could be resolved in an SL tree.

1. $\texttt{Res}(\varphi) = 0$ if φ is a literal.
2. For any SL sentences φ and ψ:
   - $\texttt{Res}(\neg\neg\varphi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)) = \texttt{Res}(\neg\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\varphi \vee \psi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\neg(\varphi \vee \psi)) = \texttt{Res}(\neg\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\varphi \supset \psi) = \texttt{Res}(\neg\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\neg(\varphi \supset \psi)) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\varphi \equiv \psi) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\psi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + 1$.
   - $\texttt{Res}(\neg(\varphi \equiv \psi)) = \texttt{Res}(\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\psi) + \texttt{Res}(\neg\varphi) + \texttt{Res}(\psi) + 1$.

Resolution Set: Let $[X]$ be the set of SL sentences that are resolvable in a branch of X.

Tree Resolution: Let $\texttt{Res}(X) = \sum_{\varphi \in [X]} \texttt{Res}(\varphi)$ be an upper bound on resolutions in X.

Supporting Lemmas

Lemma 4: Every SL tree X has a finite number of branches.

Lemma 5: For any SL tree X with root Γ and $\varphi \in [X]$, there is an SL tree Y with root Γ where $\texttt{Res}(Y) < \texttt{Res}(X)$.

- Let X be an SL tree with root Γ where $\varphi \in [X]$.
- By *Lemma 4*, φ is resolvable in finitely many branches of X.
- So there is a tree Y with root Γ that resolves φ throughout X.
- So $\varphi \notin [Y]$ but the children of φ could be in $[Y]$.

Case 1: Assume $\varphi = \neg\neg\psi$ where $\psi \in [Y]$ and $\psi \notin [X]$.

- So $\texttt{Res}(\psi) < \texttt{Res}(\varphi)$, and so $\texttt{Res}(Y) < \texttt{Res}(X)$.

Case n: The other cases are similar.

Lemma 6

Proof: For any Γ-tree X, there is a complete Γ-tree X'.

Base: Assume X is a Γ-tree where $\texttt{Res}(X) = 0$.

- So every $[X]$ is empty, so X is complete.

Hypothesis: Every Γ-tree X where $\texttt{Res}(X) \leq n$ has a complete Γ-tree X'.

Induction: Let X be a Γ-tree where $\texttt{Res}(X) = n + 1$.

- Since $\texttt{Res}(X) > 0$, there is some $\varphi \in [X]$.
- By *Lemma 5*, there is some Γ-tree Y where $\texttt{Res}(Y) < \texttt{Res}(X)$.
- By hypothesis, there is a complete Γ-tree Y'.

Conclusion: By strong induction, QED.

Finite Lemma

Proof: Every branch $\mathcal{B}$ in an SL tree contains finitely many sentences.

Base: Assume $\mathcal{B}$ belongs to an SL tree X where $\texttt{Length}(X) = 0$, so finite.

Hypothesis: Assume that every branch $\mathcal{B}$ of an SL tree X of $\texttt{Length}(X) = n$ has a finite number of sentences.

Induction: Assume that $\mathcal{B}'$ belongs to an SL tree X' of $\texttt{Length}(X) = n + 1$.

- Let X be a tree where X' is the result of resolving a sentence in X.
- So $\texttt{Length}(X) = n$.

- By hypothesis, every branch $\mathcal{B}$ of X has a finite number of branches.
- $\mathcal{B}'$ includes at most two more sentences than any branch $\mathcal{B}$ in X.
- Thus $\mathcal{B}'$ has a finite number of sentences.

Lemma 7

Proof: Every complete open branch in an SL tree is satisfiable.

Assume: Let $\mathcal{B}$ be a complete open branch in an SL tree.

- Let $\mathcal{I}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* φ is a sentence letter in $\mathcal{B}$.
- By the *Finite Lemma*, we may assign sentences in $\mathcal{B}$ a position number where the leaf is 0.

Base: Assume φ has position 0.

- Since $\mathcal{B}$ is complete and open, φ is a literal.

Case 1: If φ is a sentence letter, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{I}(\varphi) = 1$.

Case 2: Assume $\varphi = \neg\psi$ where ψ is a sentence letter.

- Since $\mathcal{B}$ is open, ψ does not occur in $\mathcal{B}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = \mathcal{I}(\psi) = 0$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\psi) = 1$.

Hypothesis: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every φ with position $k \leq n$ in $\mathcal{B}$.

Induction: Assume φ has position $n+1$ in $\mathcal{B}$.

Case 1: φ is a literal, so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ as above.

Case 2: $\varphi = \neg\neg\psi$.

- Since $\mathcal{B}$ is complete, ψ occurs in $\mathcal{B}$ in position $k \leq n$.
- By hypothesis, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\neg\psi) = 1$.

Case 3: $\varphi = \psi \wedge \chi$.

Case 4: $\varphi = \neg(\psi \wedge \chi)$.

- Since $\mathcal{B}$ is complete, $\neg\psi, \neg\chi$ occur in $\mathcal{B}$ in positions $j, k \leq n$.
- By hypothesis, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\psi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\chi) = 1$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\chi) = 0$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi \wedge \chi) = 0$.
- Thus $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg(\psi \wedge \chi)) = 1$.

Case n: $\varphi = \neg(\psi \equiv \chi)$.

- Since $\mathcal{B}$ is complete, ψ and $\neg\chi$ occur in $\mathcal{B}$ in positions $j, k \leq n$, or else $\neg\psi$ and χ occur in $\mathcal{B}$ in positions $j, k \leq n$.
- By hypothesis, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\chi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\psi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\chi) = 1$.
- In either case, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) \neq \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\chi)$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi \equiv \chi) = 0$.
- Thus $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg(\psi \equiv \chi)) = 1$.

Natural Deduction in SL

LOGIC I
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Motivation

Proof Trees: Proof trees provide an efficient way to evaluate validity.

- If an argument is valid, the tree will close.
- If an argument is invalid, the tree will give us an interpretation.

Unnatural: But proof trees do not provide a natural line of reasoning.

- Proof trees go by *reductio* which are not explanatory.
- Rules for proof trees are not entirely unnatural.
- But trees do not resemble natural reasoning.

Natural Deduction: How would we describe the patterns of natural deduction?

- Identify a range of intuitively compelling basic inferences in SL.
- Such inferences hold in virtue of the meanings of the connectives.
- Define a proof to be any composition of basic inferences.

Rules: Our system will include introduction and elimination rules.

- These rules will describe how to reason with the connectives.

Conditional

Elimination: $A,\ A \supset B,\ B \supset C\ \vdash C.$

- Premises justified by ':PR'.
- Easy to derive C.
- What if A was excluded from the premises?

Introduction: $A \supset B,\ B \supset C\ \vdash A \supset C.$

- Need something to work with.
- Want to conclude with a conditional claim.
- Assumption of A justified by ':AS'.

Subproofs: Lines in a closed subproof are dead and all else are live.

- $\supset$E can only cite to live lines.
- $\supset$I can only cite an appropriate subproof.

Reiteration

Example: $A \vdash D \supset [C \supset (B \supset A)]$.

Conjunction

Elimination: $A \supset (B \wedge C),\ B \supset D \vdash A \supset D$.

Introduction: $A \wedge B,\ B \supset C \vdash A \wedge C$.

Disjunction

Introduction: $A \vdash B \vee ((A \vee C) \vee D)$.

Elimination: $A \vee (B \wedge C) \vdash (A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C)$.

Biconditional

Elimination: $A \equiv (B \supset [(A \wedge C) \equiv D]) \vdash (A \wedge B) \supset (D \supset C)$.

Introduction: $A \supset (B \wedge C),\ C \supset (B \wedge A) \vdash A \equiv C$.

Negation

Elimination: $\neg\neg A \vdash A$.

Introduction: $A \supset (B \wedge C),\ C \supset (B \wedge A) \vdash A \equiv C$.

Proof

Proof: A natural deduction PROOF (or DERIVATION) of a conclusion φ from a set of premises Γ in SD is any sequence of lines ending with φ on a live line where every line in the sequence is either:

(1) a premise in Γ;
(2) a discharged assumption; or
(3) follows from previous lines by the rules for SD.

Provable: An SL sentence φ is PROVABLE (or DERIVABLE) from Γ in SD *iff* there is a natural deduction proof (derivation) of φ from Γ in SD, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

Equivalent: Two sentences φ and ψ are PROVABLY EQUIVALENT (or INTERDERIVABLE) if and only if both $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\psi \vdash \varphi$.

Inconsistent: A set of sentences Γ is PROVABLY INCONSISTENT if and only if $\Gamma \vdash \bot$ where $\bot$ is our arbitrarily chosen contradiction, e.g., $A \wedge \neg A$.

Natural Deduction in SL: Part II

LOGIC I
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October 19, 2023

Negation

Elimination Rule: $\neg\neg A \vdash A$. (*Double Negation Elimination*)

1. $A \vee \neg A$. (*Law of Excluded Middle*)
2. $A, \neg A \vdash B$. (*Ex Falso Quodlibet*)

Introduction Rule: $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$. (*Law of Non-Contradiction*)

3. $A \vdash \neg\neg A$. (*Double Negation Introduction*)

Proof

Proof: A natural deduction PROOF (or DERIVATION) of a conclusion φ from a set of premises Γ in SD is any finite sequence of lines ending with φ on a live line where every line in the sequence is either:

(1) A premise in Γ;

(2) A discharged assumption; or

(3) Follows from previous lines by the rules for SD.

Provable: An SL sentence φ is PROVABLE (or DERIVABLE) from Γ in SD *iff* there is a natural deduction proof (derivation) of φ from Γ in SD, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

Theorems: An SL sentence φ is a THEOREM of SD *iff* $\vdash \varphi$.

Equivalent: Sentences φ and ψ are PROVABLY EQUIVALENT (or INTERDERIVABLE) if and only if both $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\psi \vdash \varphi$, i.e., $\varphi \dashv\vdash \psi$.

Inconsistent: A set of sentences Γ is PROVABLY INCONSISTENT *iff* $\Gamma \vdash \bot$ where $\bot$ is the arbitrarily contradiction we chose, i.e., $A \wedge \neg A$.

Soundness and Completeness

Assume: $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ *iff* $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

Tautologies: Coextensive with the theorems.

Validity: The valid SL arguments are derivable in SD, and *vice versa*.

Task 1: Can we ever use SD to determine that an argument is invalid?

Uncertainty: If we haven't found a proof, that doesn't mean one doesn't exist.

Logical Analysis

Task 2: How can we tell if an argument is valid?

- Use a semantic argument: true premises and false conclusion.
- Construct a tree proof.

Pro: Both methods provide a countermodel if there is one.

Con: Neither method derives the conclusion from the premises if valid.

Task 3: How can we tell if a theorem is valid?

Tautology?	If YES, prove $\vdash \varphi$.	If NO, provide a countermodel.
Contradiction?	If YES, prove $\vdash \neg\varphi$.	If NO, provide a model.
Contingent?	If YES, provide a models.	If NO, prove $\vdash \varphi$ or $\vdash \neg\varphi$.
Equivalent?	If YES, prove $\varphi \dashv\vdash \psi$.	If NO, provide a countermodel.

Schemata

Observe: Compare rules of inference in SD to SL proofs in SD.

- Whereas the rules are general, SL proofs are particular.
- But nothing in our SL proofs depend on the particulars.

Task 3: How might we generalise our proofs beyond any instance?

Rule Schemata: Replace sentence letters in SL proofs with metavariables.

- Premises are replaced with the lines cited by that rule.
- New rules require new names if we are to use them.

Task 4: Can we also generalise proofs of theorems?

Axiom Schemata: Amount to lines that can be added without citing lines.

Goal: We want to derive intuitive rule schemata.

Derivable Schemata

Double Negation: $\neg\neg\varphi \dashv\vdash \varphi$.

Ex Falso Quodlibet: $\varphi, \neg\varphi \vdash \psi$.

Law of Excluded Middle: $\vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$.

Law of Non-Contradiction: $\vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi)$.

Hypothetical Syllogism: $\varphi \supset \psi, \psi \supset \chi \vdash \varphi \supset \chi$.

Modus Tollens: $\varphi \supset \psi,\ \neg\psi \vdash \neg\varphi$.
Contraposition: $\varphi \supset \psi \vdash \neg\psi \supset \neg\varphi$.
Dilemma: $\varphi \vee \psi,\ \varphi \supset \chi,\ \psi \supset \chi \vdash \chi$.
Disjunctive Syllogism: $\varphi \vee \psi,\ \neg\varphi \vdash \psi$.
$\vee$*-Commutativity:* $\varphi \vee \psi \vdash \psi \vee \varphi$.
$\wedge$*-Commutativity:* $\varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \psi \wedge \varphi$.
Biconditional MP: $\varphi \equiv \psi,\ \neg\varphi \vdash \neg\psi$.
$\equiv$*-Commutativity:* $\varphi \equiv \psi \vdash \psi \equiv \varphi$.
$\wedge$*-De Morgan's:* $\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \vee \neg\psi$.
$\vee$*-De Morgan's:* $\neg(\varphi \vee \psi) \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \wedge \neg\psi$.
$\vee\wedge$*-Distribution:* $\varphi \vee (\psi \wedge \chi) \dashv\vdash (\varphi \vee \psi) \wedge (\varphi \vee \chi)$.
$\wedge\vee$*-Distribution:* $\varphi \wedge (\psi \vee \chi) \dashv\vdash (\varphi \wedge \psi) \vee (\varphi \wedge \chi)$.
$\vee\wedge$*-Absorption:* $\varphi \vee (\varphi \wedge \psi) \dashv\vdash \varphi$.
$\wedge\vee$*-Absorption:* $\varphi \wedge (\varphi \vee \psi) \dashv\vdash \varphi$.
$\wedge$*-Associativity:* $\varphi \wedge (\psi \wedge \chi) \dashv\vdash (\varphi \wedge \psi) \wedge \chi$.
$\vee$*-Associativity:* $\varphi \vee (\psi \vee \chi) \dashv\vdash (\varphi \vee \psi) \vee \chi$.

Axiom System for SL

Axiom System: Consider the axiom and rule schemata, writing '/' for deduction.

- $\varphi \supset (\psi \supset \varphi)$.
- $(\varphi \supset (\psi \supset \chi)) \supset ((\varphi \supset \psi) \supset (\varphi \supset \chi))$.
- $(\neg\varphi \supset \neg\psi) \supset ((\neg\varphi \supset \psi) \supset \varphi)$.
- $\varphi \supset \psi,\ \varphi\ /\ \psi$.

PL-Proof: $\Gamma \vdash_{PL} \varphi$ *iff* there is a finite sequence of SL sentences where every sentence in the sequence is either: (1) a member of Γ; (2) an axiom schemata; or (3) follows from previous sentences in the sequence by the single rule schemata given above.

Equivalence: Amazingly, it is possible to show that $\Gamma \vdash_{PL} \varphi$ *iff* $\Gamma \vdash_{SD} \varphi$.

Definitions: Given that the axioms and rule schemata only include $\neg$ and $\supset$, we may take these to be the *only* primitive logical connectives, defining all other connectives in their terms.

- This makes for a very compact description of the same logic.
- This logic is much less natural to use, requiring that a lot of derived rules be added to system.
- We don't have this problem, though our system is more complex.

Midterm Review

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
October 24, 2023

Derivable Schemata

Contraposition: $\varphi \supset \psi \vdash \neg\psi \supset \neg\varphi$.
Hypothetical Syllogism: $\varphi \supset \psi,\ \psi \supset \chi \vdash \varphi \supset \chi$.
Disjunctive Syllogism: $\varphi \vee \psi,\ \neg\varphi \vdash \psi$.
$\vee$*-Conditional:* $\varphi \supset \psi \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \vee \psi$.
$\neg$*-Conditional:* $\neg(\varphi \supset \psi) \dashv\vdash \varphi \wedge \neg\psi$.
Conditional Weakening: $\psi \vdash \varphi \supset \psi$.
Double Negation: $\neg\neg\varphi \dashv\vdash \varphi$.
$\wedge$*-De Morgan's:* $\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \vee \neg\psi$.
$\vee$*-De Morgan's:* $\neg(\varphi \vee \psi) \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \wedge \neg\psi$.
Modus Tollens: $\varphi \supset \psi,\ \neg\psi \vdash \neg\varphi$.

Regimentation

Complete the following tasks for arguments (A) and (B):

Task 1: Write a symbolization key and regiment the argument.

Task 2: Determine if the argument is valid.

Task 3: Provide an SD proof if valid, and a countermodel otherwise.

(A) If Dorothy plays the piano in the morning, then Roger wakes up cranky. Dorothy plays piano in the morning unless she is distracted. So if Roger does not wake up cranky, then Dorothy must be distracted.

(B) If Cam remembered to do his chores, then things are clean but not neat. Cam forgot only if things are neat but not clean. Therefore, things are clean just in case they are not neat.

Lemmas

`Lemma 1`: Every satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$ in an SL tree X is open.

`Lemma 2`: If X is an SL tree with a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$, then any tree X' which is the result of resolving a sentence in $\mathcal{B}$ has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}'$.

`Lemma 3`: Every SL tree with a satisfiable root has a satisfiable branch.

`Lemma 4`: Every SL tree X has a finite number of branches.

`Lemma 5`: For any SL tree X with root Γ and $\varphi \in [X]$, there is an SL tree Y with root Γ where $\texttt{Res}(Y) < \texttt{Res}(X)$.

`Lemma 6`: For any tree X with root Γ, there is a complete tree X' with root Γ.

`Lemma 7`: Every complete open branch in an SL tree is satisfiable.

Soundness

1. Assume Γ is satisfiable.
2. Let X be an SL tree with root Γ.
3. So X has a satisfiable branch $\mathcal{B}$ by *Lemma 3*.
4. So $\mathcal{B}$ is open by *Lemma 1*.
5. So X is not closed.
6. More generally, there is no closed SL tree with root Γ.
7. By contraposition, QED.

Completeness

1. Assume there is no closed tree with root Γ.
2. Roots are trees, and so Γ has a complete tree X by `Lemma 6`.
3. So X is a complete open tree with a complete open branch $\mathcal{B}$.
4. By *Lemma 7*, $\mathcal{B}$ is satisfiable, and so Γ is satisfiable.
5. By contraposition, if $\Gamma \vDash \bot$, then $\Gamma \vdash \bot$.

Quantifier Logic

LOGIC I

Benjamin Brast-McKie

October 31, 2023

Expressive Limitations

Socrates: Consider the following argument:

(a) Every human is mortal.
(b) Socrates is human.
(c) ∴ Socrates is mortal.

Mammals: Consider the following argument:

(a) All humans are mammals.
(b) All mammals are multi-celled organisms.
(c) ∴ All humans are multi-celled organisms.

SL Regimentation: Neither argument is valid in SL.

Predicates, Variables, and Quantifiers

Mammals (a): Everything is such that if it is human then it is a mammal.

Mammals (b): Everything is such that if it is a mammal then it is a multi-celled organism.

Mammals (c): Everything is such that if it is human then it is a multi-celled organism.

Predicates: 'is human',
'is a mammal', and
'is a multi-celled organism'.

Properties: Predicates express properties.

Variables: 'it'.

Reference: What does 'it' refer to?

Atomic Formulas: 'it is human',
'it is a mammal', and
'it is a multi-celled organism'.

Complex Formulas: 'if it is human then it is a mammal',
'if it is a mammal then it is a multi-celled organism', and
'if it is human then it is a multi-celled organism'.

Quantifiers: 'Everything is such that'.

Constants

Socrates (a): Everything is such that if it is human then it is mortal.

Socrates (b): Socrates is human.

Socrates (c): Socrates is mortal.

Predicates: 'is human' and 'is mortal'.

Variables: 'it'.

Constants: 'Socrates'.

Reference: Constants refer to objects.

Atomic Formulas: 'it is human', 'it is mortal', 'Socrates is human', and 'Socrates is mortal'.

Complex Formulas: 'if it is human then it is mortal'.

Quantifiers: 'Everything is such that'.

Binary Predicates

Height: Kin is taller than Prema.
$\therefore$ Prema is shorter than Kin.

Task 1: Regiment the argument above.

Predicates: 'is taller than', 'is shorter than', and 'is the same height as'.

Relations: Binary predicates express 2-place properties, i.e., *relations*.

- $Tkp \therefore Spk$.
- $Tkp \therefore \neg Tpk$.
- $Tkp \therefore \neg Tpk \wedge \neg Epk$.

Question 1: Is this argument valid, and if not how can we make it valid?

- $Tkp,\ Tkp \supset Spk \therefore Spk$.
- $Tkp,\ \forall x \forall y (Txy \supset Syx) \therefore Spk$.

Age: Jon is older than Sara.
Sara is older than Ethan.
$\therefore$ Jon is older than Ethan.

Task 2: Regiment the argument above.

Predicates: 'is older than'.

- $Ojs,\ Ose \therefore Oje$.

Question 2: Is this argument valid, and if not how can we make it valid?

- $Ojs,\ Ose,\ (Ojs \wedge Ose) \supset Oje \therefore Oje$.
- $Ojs,\ Ose,\ \forall x \forall y \forall z ((Oxy \wedge Oyz) \supset Oxz) \therefore Oje$.

Polyadic Predicates

Triadic: 'x is between y and z',
'x is more similar to y than to z',
'x is closer to y than to z', ...

Polyadic: We may refer to predicates as n-place or n-adic.

Properties: n-place predicates express n-place properties.

Primitive Symbols of QL

Predicates: n-place predicates $A^n, \ldots, Z^n$ for $n \geq 0$ possibly with subscripts.

Constants: $a, b, c, \ldots$ possibly with subscripts.

Variables: $x, y, z, \ldots$ possibly with subscripts.

Connectives: $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv$.

Quantifiers: $\forall, \exists$.

Parentheses: $(,)$.

Well-Formed Formulas of QL

Singular Terms: Constants and variables are called *singular terms*.

Well-Formed Formulas: We may define the well-formed formulas (wffs) of QL as follows:

1. $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ is a wff if $\mathcal{F}^n$ is an n-place predicate and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ are singular terms.
2. If φ and ψ are wffs and α is a variable, then:
   (a) $\exists\alpha\varphi$ is a wff;
   (b) $\forall\alpha\varphi$ is a wff;
   (c) $\neg\varphi$ is a wff;
   (d) $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is a wff;
   (e) $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is a wff;
   (f) $(\varphi \supset \psi)$ is a wff; and
   (g) $(\varphi \equiv \psi)$ is a wff.
3. Nothing else is a wff.

Atomic Formulas: The wffs defined by (1) are *atomic*.

Arguments: The singular terms in an atomic wff are the *arguments* of the predicate.

Composition Rules: The clauses in (2) are called *composition rules*.

Scope: φ is the *scope* of the quantifier in $\exists\alpha\varphi$ and $\forall\alpha\varphi$.

- Compare the scope of negation.

Question 3: Does the definition above make sense as stated?

Task 3: How can we fix the definition above to respect use/mention?

The Sentences of QL

Free Variables: We define the *free variables* recursively:

1. α is free in $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ if $\alpha = \alpha_i$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ where α is a variable, $\mathcal{F}^n$ is an n-place predicate, and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ are singular terms.
2. If φ and ψ are wffs and α and β are variables, then:
   (a) α is free in $\exists\beta\varphi$ if α is free in φ and $\alpha \neq \beta$;
   (b) α is free in $\forall\beta\varphi$ if α is free in φ and $\alpha \neq \beta$;
   (c) α is free in $\neg\varphi$ if α is free in φ;
   (d) α is free in $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ if α is free in φ or α is free in ψ;
   (e) α is free in $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ if α is free in φ or α is free in ψ;
   (f) α is free in $(\varphi \supset \psi)$ if α is free in φ or α is free in ψ;
   (g) α is free in $(\varphi \equiv \psi)$ if α is free in φ or α is free in ψ;
3. Nothing else is a free variable.

Bound Variables: Every free occurrence of α in φ is *bound* in $\exists\alpha\varphi$ and $\forall\alpha\varphi$.

Binding: The variable α is the *binding variable* in $\exists\alpha\varphi$ and $\forall\alpha\varphi$.

Open Sentences: An *open sentence* of QL is any wff with free variables.

Sentences: A *sentence* of QL is any wff without free variables.

Interpretation: Only the sentences of QL will have truth-values on an interpretation independent of an assignment function.

Regimentation and Relations

Logic I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
November 2, 2023

Restricting Quantifiers

Universals Quantifiers: Regiment the following sentences:

- All dogs go to heaven.
- Jim took every chance he got.
- All the monkeys that Amar loves love him back.
- Everyone who trained hard or got lucky made it to the top or else didn't compete.

Hidden Quantifiers: Regiment the following sentences:

- At least the guests that remained were pleased with the party.
- I haven't met a cat that likes Merra.
- Kiko's only friends are animals.

Existential Quantifiers: Regiment the following sentences:

- Something great is around the corner.
- One of Ken's statues is very old.
- Kate found a job that she loved.

Mixed Quantifiers

1. Nothing is without imperfections.
2. Every dog has its day.
3. Everyone loves someone.
4. Nobody knows everybody.
5. Everybody everybody loves loves somebody.
6. No set is a member of itself.
7. There is a set with no members.

Arguments

Love: Regiment the following argument:

- Cam doesn't love anyone who loves him back.
- May loves everyone who loves themselves.

$\therefore$ If Cam loves himself, he doesn't love May.

Bigger: Regiment the following argument:

- Whenever something is bigger than another, the latter is not bigger than the former.

$\therefore$ Nothing is bigger than itself.

Relations

Domain: Let the *domain* D be any set.

Relation: A *relation* R on D is any subset of D^2.

Reflexive: A relation R is *reflexive* on D *iff* $\langle x, x\rangle \in R$ for all $x \in D$.

Non-Reflexive: A relation R is *non-reflexive* on D *iff* R is not reflexive on D.

Question 1: What is it to be *irreflexive*?

Irreflexive: A relation R is *irreflexive* on D *iff* $\langle x, x\rangle \notin R$ for all $x \in D$.

Symmetric: A relation R is *symmetric iff* $\langle y, x\rangle \in R$ whenever $x, y \in R$.

Question 2: Why don't we need to specify a domain?

Question 3: Why is a relation reflexive or irreflexive with respect to a domain?

Asymmetric: A relation R is *asymmetric iff* $\langle y, x\rangle \notin R$ whenever $\langle x, y\rangle \in R$.

Question 4: What is it to be non-symmetric? How about non-asymmetric?

Task 1: Show that every asymmetric relation is irreflexive.

Transitive: A relation R is *transitive iff* $\langle x, z\rangle \in R$ whenever $\langle x, y\rangle, \langle y, z\rangle \in R$.

Intransitive: A relation R is *intransitive iff* $\langle x, z\rangle \notin R$ whenever $\langle x, y\rangle, \langle y, z\rangle \in R$.

Question 5: Is every symmetric transitive relation reflexive? (No: $R = \varnothing$)

Task 2: Show that every transitive irreflexive relation asymmetric?

Euclidean: A relation R is *euclidean iff* $\langle y, z\rangle \in R$ whenever $\langle x, y\rangle, \langle x, z\rangle \in R$.

Task 3: Show that every transitive symmetric relation is euclidean.

The Semantics for QL

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
November 7, 2023

Examples

Monadic: Casey is dancing.

Dyadic: Al loves Max.

Triadic: Kim is between Boston and New York.

Constants and Referents

Constants: Constants are interpreted as referring to individuals.

Existence: Thus we need to know what things there are.

Domain: A *domain* is any nonempty set $\mathbb{D}$.

Referents: Interpretations assign constants to elements of $\mathbb{D}$.

Question 1: How are we going to interpret predicates?

Predicates and Extensions

Example: 'Al loves Max' is true *iff* Al bears the loves-relation to Max.

Dyadic Predicates: Dyadic predicates are interpreted by sets of *ordered pairs* in $\mathbb{D}^2$.

Question 2: How are we to interpret n-place predicates?

Cartesian Power: $\mathbb{D}^n = \{\langle \mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_n \rangle : \mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_n \in \mathbb{D}\}$.

Extensions: n-place predicates are interpreted by subsets of $\mathbb{D}^n$.

Singletons: 1-place predicates are interpreted by subsets of $\mathbb{D}^1 = \{\langle \mathbf{x} \rangle : \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{D}\}$.

Question 3: How are we to interpret 0-place predicates? What is $\mathbb{D}^0$?

> *n-Tuples:* Let $\langle \mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_n \rangle = \{\langle 1, \mathbf{x}_1 \rangle, \ldots, \langle n, \mathbf{x}_n \rangle\}$.
>
> 0-*Tuple:* $\langle\rangle = \varnothing$.

Truth-Values: 0-place predicates are interpreted by subsets of $\mathbb{D}^0 = \{\varnothing\}$.

Ordinals: Let $1 = \{\varnothing\}$ and $0 = \varnothing$ be the first two von Neumann ordinals.

QL Models

Interpretations: $\mathcal{I}$ is an QL interpretation over $\mathbb{D}$ *iff* both:

- $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) \in \mathbb{D}$ for every constant α in QL.
- $\mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n) \subseteq \mathbb{D}^n$ for every n-place predicate $\mathcal{F}^n$.

Question 4: What happens if $\mathbb{D} = \varnothing$?

Model: $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ is a model of QL *iff* $\mathcal{I}$ is a QL interpretation over $\mathbb{D} \neq \varnothing$.

Task 1: Regiment and interpret the sentences above.

- Dc, Lam, $Bkbn$.
- $\mathbb{D} = \{c, a, m, k, b, n\}$.
- $\mathcal{I}(D) = \{\langle c \rangle\}$.
- $\mathcal{I}(L) = \{\langle a, m \rangle\}$.
- $\mathcal{I}(B) = \{\langle k, b, n \rangle\}$.
- $\mathcal{I}(c) = c,\ \mathcal{I}(a) = a,\ \ldots$

Lagadonian: We often take constants to name themselves.

Question 5: Do models give us truth-values?

Variable Assignments

Assignments: A variable assignment $\hat{a}(\alpha) \in \mathbb{D}$ for every variable α in QL.

Singular Terms: We may define the referent of α in $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ as follows:

$$\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{I}(\alpha) & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is a constant} \\ \hat{a}(\alpha) & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is a variable.} \end{cases}$$

Variants: A $\hat{c}$ is an α-variant of $\hat{a}$ *iff* $\hat{c}(\beta) = \hat{a}(\beta)$ for all $\beta \neq \alpha$.

Example: Let $\mathbb{D} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ where $\hat{a}(x) = 1$, $\hat{a}(y) = 2$, and $\hat{a}(z) = 3$.

Task 2: If $\hat{c}$ is a y-variant of $\hat{a}$, what is $\hat{c}(1)$, $\hat{c}(2)$, and $\hat{c}(3)$?

Example

Universal: Al loves everything, i.e., $\forall x Lax$.

Existential: Someone is dancing, i.e., $\exists x(Px \wedge Dx)$.

Mixed: Everyone loves someone, i.e., $\forall x(Px \supset \exists y Lxy)$.

Complex: Everything everything loves loves something, i.e., $\forall x(\forall y Lyx \supset \exists z Lxz)$.

Semantics for QL

(A) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n) = 1$ *iff* $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_1),\ldots,\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_n)\rangle \in \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n)$.

$(\forall)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.

$(\exists)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.

$(\neg)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$.

$(\vee)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).

$(\wedge)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$.

$(\supset)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \supset \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).

$(\equiv)$ $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \equiv \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$.

Truth and Entailment

Truth: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some $\hat{a}$ where φ is a sentence of QL.

Satisfaction: $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I}\rangle$ satisfies Γ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every $\varphi \in \Gamma$.

Singletons: As before $\mathcal{M}$ satisfies φ *iff* $\mathcal{M}$ satisfies $\{\varphi\}$.

Entailment: $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ just in case every model $\mathcal{M}$ that satisfies Γ also satisfies φ.

Tautology: φ is a tautology *iff* $\vDash \varphi$.

Contradiction: φ is a contradiction *iff* $\vDash \neg\varphi$.

Contingent: φ is contingent *iff* $\vDash$ and $\nvDash \neg\varphi$.

Consistent: Γ is consistent *iff* Γ is satisfiable.

Minimal Models

Task 3: Provide minimal models in which the examples above are true/false.

Regimentation

- Every rose has its thorn.
- At least the guests that remained were pleased with the party.
- I haven't met a cat that likes Merra.
- Kate found a job that she loved.
- Everybody everybody loves loves somebody.
- No set is a member of itself.
- There is a set with no members.

Arguments

Love: Regiment the following argument:

- Cam doesn't love anyone who loves him back.
- May loves everyone who loves themselves.

∴ If Cam loves himself, he doesn't love May.

Bigger: Regiment the following argument:

- Whenever something is bigger than another, the latter is not bigger than the former.

∴ Nothing is bigger than itself.

Relations

Domain: Let the *domain* D be any set.

Relation: A *relation* R on D is any subset of D^2.

Reflexive: A relation R is *reflexive* on D *iff* $\langle x, x\rangle \in R$ for all $x \in D$.

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Task 1: Show that every asymmetric relation is irreflexive.

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Question 5: Is every symmetric transitive relation reflexive? (No: $R = \varnothing$)

Task 2: Show that every transitive irreflexive relation asymmetric?

Euclidean: A relation R is *euclidean iff* $\langle y, z\rangle \in R$ whenever $\langle x, y\rangle, \langle x, z\rangle \in R$.

Task 3: Show that every transitive symmetric relation is euclidean.

Minimal Models and Variable Assignments

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
November 9, 2023

QL Models

Interpretations: $\mathcal{I}$ is an QL interpretation over $\mathbb{D}$ *iff* both:

- $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) \in \mathbb{D}$ for every constant α in QL.
- $\mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n) \subseteq \mathbb{D}^n$ for every n-place predicate $\mathcal{F}^n$.

Model: $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ is a model of QL *iff* $\mathcal{I}$ is a QL interpretation over $\mathbb{D} \neq \varnothing$.

Variable Assignments

Assignments: A variable assignment $\hat{a}(\alpha) \in \mathbb{D}$ for every variable α in QL.

Singular Terms: We may define the referent of α in $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ as follows:

$$\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{I}(\alpha) & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is a constant} \\ \hat{a}(\alpha) & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is a variable.} \end{cases}$$

Variants: A $\hat{c}$ is an α-variant of $\hat{a}$ *iff* $\hat{c}(\beta) = \hat{a}(\beta)$ for all $\beta \neq \alpha$.

Semantics for QL

(A) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = 1$ *iff* $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_1), \ldots, \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_n) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n)$.

($\forall$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.

($\exists$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.

($\neg$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$.

($\vee$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ or $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).

($\wedge$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$.

($\supset$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \supset \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 0$ or $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ (or both).

($\equiv$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi \equiv \psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi)$.

Truth: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some $\hat{a}$ where φ is a sentence of QL.

Assignment Lemmas

Lemma 1: If $\hat{a}(\alpha) = \hat{c}(\alpha)$ for all free variables α in a wff φ, then $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi)$.

- Goes by routine induction on complexity.

Lemma 2: For any sentence φ: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every v.a. $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

LTR: Assume $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$, so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{c}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

- Let $\hat{a}$ be any v.a. over $\mathbb{D}$.
- Since φ has no free variables, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi)$ by *Lemma 1*.
- So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for all v.a. $\hat{c}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

RTL: Assume $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for all v.a. $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

- Since $\mathbb{D}$ is nonempty, there is some v.a. $\hat{a}$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$.

Lemma 3: For any sentence φ: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

Minimal Models

Task 1: Provide minimal models in which the following are true/false.

- Al loves everything, i.e., $\forall x Lax$.

  True: Let $\hat{a}$ be a v.a. over $\mathbb{D} = \{a\}$.
  - Let $\hat{c}$ be any x-variant of $\hat{a}$.
  - So $\hat{c}(x) = a$ and $\mathcal{I}(a) = a$.
  - Since $\mathcal{I}(L) = \{\langle a, a\rangle\}$, we know $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(a), \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(x)\rangle \in \mathcal{I}(L)$.
  - So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(Lax) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall x Lax) = 1$.

  False: Let $\mathbb{D} = \{a\}$ and $\mathcal{I}(L) = \varnothing$.
  - Assume $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall x Lax) = 1$ for contradiction.
  - So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall x Lax) = 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$.
  - So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(Lax) = 1$ since $\hat{a}$ is an x-variant of itself.
  - So $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(a), \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(x)\rangle \in \mathcal{I}(L)$, and so $\mathcal{I}(L) \neq \varnothing$.

- Someone is dancing, i.e., $\exists x(Px \wedge Dx)$.

  True: Let $\hat{a}$ be a v.a. over $\mathbb{D} = \{a\}$ where $a(x) = a$.
  - Since $\mathcal{I}(P) = \mathcal{I}(D) = \{\langle a\rangle\}$, we know $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(x)\rangle \in \mathcal{I}(P) = \mathcal{I}(D)$.
  - So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(Px) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(Dx) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(Px \wedge Dx) = 1$.
  - Since $\hat{a}$ is a x-variant of itself, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\exists x(Px \wedge Dx)) = 1$.
  - Thus $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\exists x(Px \wedge Dx)) = 1$.

False: Let $\mathbb{D} = \{a\}$ and $\mathcal{I}(P) = \varnothing$.

- Assume $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\exists x(Px \wedge Dx)) = 1$ for contradiction.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\exists x(Px \wedge Dx)) = 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(Px \wedge Dx) = 1$ for some x-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(Px) = 1$, and so $\langle \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(x)\rangle \in \mathcal{I}(P)$.
- Thus $\mathcal{I}(P) \neq \varnothing$.

- No set is a member of itself. `[contingent]`
  $\neg\exists x(Sx \wedge x \in x)$
- There is a set with no members. `[contingent]`
  $\exists x(Sx \wedge \forall y(y \notin x))$
- Everyone loves someone. `[contingent]`
  $\forall x(Px \supset \exists yLxy)$.
- The guests that remained were pleased with the party. `[contingent]`
  $\forall x(Rxp \supset Px)$.
- I haven't met a cat that likes Merra. `[contingent]`
  $\neg\exists x(Mbx \wedge Cx \wedge Lmx)$
- Kate found a job that she loved. `[contingent]`
  $\exists x(Fkx \wedge Jx \wedge Lkx)$
- Everything everything loves loves something. `[contingent]`
  $\forall x(\forall yLyx \supset \exists zLxz)$.

Quantifier Exchange

($\neg\forall$) $\neg\forall x\varphi \vDash \exists x\neg\varphi$.

LTR: Let $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I}\rangle$ satisfy $\neg\forall x\varphi$.

- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\neg\forall x\varphi) = 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\forall x\varphi) \neq 1$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ for some x-variants $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ for some x-variants $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\exists x\neg\varphi) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall x\neg\varphi) = 1$.

($\neg\exists$) $\neg\exists x\varphi \vDash \forall x\neg\varphi$.

LTR: Let $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I}\rangle$ satisfy $\neg\exists x\varphi$.

- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\neg\exists x\varphi) = 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\exists x\varphi) \neq 1$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ for all x-variants $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ for all x-variants $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\forall x\neg\varphi) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall x\neg\varphi) = 1$.

Arguments

Bigger: Regiment the following argument:

- Whenever something is bigger than another, the latter is not bigger than the former.
  $\forall x \forall y (Bxy \supset \neg Byx)$.
- $\therefore$ Nothing is bigger than itself.
  $\neg \exists x Bxx$.

Proof: Let $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ be any model which satisfies the premise.

- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\forall x \forall y (Bxy \supset \neg Byx)) = 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$.
- Assume $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg \exists x Bxx) \neq 1$ for contradiction.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\neg \exists x Bxx) \neq 1$ in particular.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\exists x Bxx) = 1$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(Bxx) = 1$ for some x-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- So $\langle \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(x), \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(x) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(B)$, and so $\langle \hat{c}(x), \hat{c}(x) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(B)$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\forall y (Bxy \supset \neg Byx)) = 1$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{e}}(Bxy \supset \neg Byx) = 1$ for y-variant $\hat{e}$ where $\hat{e}(y) = \hat{c}(x)$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{e}}(Bxy) \neq 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{e}}(\neg Byx) = 1$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{e}}(Bxy) \neq 1$ or $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{e}}(Byx) \neq 1$.
- So $\langle \hat{e}(x), \hat{e}(y) \rangle \notin \mathcal{I}(B)$ or $\langle \hat{e}(y), \hat{e}(x) \rangle \notin \mathcal{I}(B)$.
- So $\langle \hat{c}(x), \hat{c}(x) \rangle \notin \mathcal{I}(B)$ or $\langle \hat{c}(x), \hat{c}(x) \rangle \notin \mathcal{I}(B)$ since $\hat{e}(x) = \hat{c}(x)$.
- So $\langle \hat{c}(x), \hat{c}(x) \rangle \notin \mathcal{I}(B)$, contradicting the above.

Love: Regiment the following argument:

- Cam doesn't love anyone who loves him back.
  $\forall x (Lxc \supset \neg Lcx)$.
- May loves everyone who loves themselves.
  $\forall y (Lyy \supset Lmy)$.
- $\therefore$ If Cam loves himself, he doesn't love May.
  $Lcc \supset \neg Lcm$.

Taller: Regiment the following argument:

- If a first is taller than a second who is taller than a third, then the first is taller than the third.
  $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((Txy \wedge Tyz) \supset Txz)$.
- Nothing is taller than itself.
  $\neg \exists x Txx$.
- $\therefore$ If a first is taller than a second, the second isn't taller than the first.
  $\forall x \forall y (Txy \supset \neg Tyx)$.

Quantified Logic with Identity

LOGIC I
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Logical Terms

Extensions: QL extends SL, but we needn't stop there.

Question 1: How far could we go? What terms could we include?

Logicality: The primitive symbols of SL and QL can be divided in three:

`Logical Terms:` $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \supset, \equiv, \forall\alpha, \exists\alpha, x_n, y_n, z_n \ldots$ for $n \geq 0$.
`Non-Logical Terms:` $a_n, b_n, c_n, \ldots$ and $A^n, B^n, \ldots$ for $n \geq 0$.
`Punctuation:` $($, $)$

Extensions: The "meanings" of the non-logical terms are fixed by an interpretation.

Semantics: The "meanings" of the logical terms are fixed by the semantics.

Question 2: How many logical terms are there?

Identity: At least one more, namely identity which we symbolize by '$=$'.

Syntax for QL$^=$

Identity: We include '$=$' in the primitive symbols of the language.

Well-Formed Formulas: We may define the well-formed formulas (wffs) of QL$^=$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ is a wff if $\mathcal{F}^n$ is an n-place predicate and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ are singular terms.
2. $\alpha = \beta$ is a wff if α and β are singular terms.
3. If φ and ψ are wffs and α is a variable, then:
   (a) $\exists\alpha\varphi$ is a wff;
   (b) $\forall\alpha\varphi$ is a wff;
   (c) $\neg\varphi$ is a wff;
   (d) $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is a wff;
   (e) $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is a wff;
   (f) $(\varphi \supset \psi)$ is a wff; and
   (g) $(\varphi \equiv \psi)$ is a wff.
4. Nothing else is a wff.

Atomic Formulas: The wffs defined by (1) and (2) are *atomic*.

Complexity: $\texttt{Comp}(\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \texttt{Comp}(\alpha = \beta) = 0$.
$\texttt{Comp}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = \texttt{Comp}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = \texttt{Comp}(\neg\varphi) = \texttt{Comp}(\varphi) + 1$.
$\texttt{Comp}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \texttt{Comp}(\varphi \vee \psi) = \ldots = \texttt{Comp}(\varphi) + \texttt{Comp}(\psi) + 1$.

Free Variables

Free Variables: We define the *free variables* recursively:

1. α is free in $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ if $\alpha = \alpha_i$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ where α is a variable, $\mathcal{F}^n$ is an n-place predicate, and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ are singular terms.
2. α is free in $\beta = \gamma$ if $\alpha = \beta$ or $\alpha = \gamma$ where α is a variable.
3. If φ and ψ are wffs and α and β are variables, then:
   (a) α is free in $\exists\beta\varphi$ if α is free in φ and $\alpha \neq \beta$;
   (b) α is free in $\forall\beta\varphi$ if α is free in φ and $\alpha \neq \beta$;
   (c) α is free in $\neg\varphi$ if α is free in φ;

   $\vdots$

4. Nothing else is a free variable.

Sentences of QL$^=$

Sentences: A *sentence* of QL$^=$ is any wff without free variables.

Interpretation: Only the sentences of QL$^=$ will have truth-values on an interpretation independent of an assignment function.

QL$^=$ Models

Question 3: What in the semantics will have to change?

Interpretations: $\mathcal{I}$ is an QL$^=$ interpretation over $\mathbb{D}$ *iff* both:

- $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) \in \mathbb{D}$ for every constant α in QL$^=$.
- $\mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n) \subseteq \mathbb{D}^n$ for every n-place predicate $\mathcal{F}^n$.

Model: $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ is a model of QL$^=$ *iff* $\mathcal{I}$ is a QL$^=$ interpretation on $\mathbb{D} \neq \varnothing$.

Variable Assignments

Assignments: A variable assignment $\hat{a}(\alpha) \in \mathbb{D}$ for every variable α in QL$^=$.

Referents: We may define the referent of α in $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ as follows:

$$\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{I}(\alpha) & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is a constant} \\ \hat{a}(\alpha) & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is a variable.} \end{cases}$$

Variants: A $\hat{c}$ is an α-variant of $\hat{a}$ *iff* $\hat{c}(\beta) = \hat{a}(\beta)$ for all $\beta \neq \alpha$.

Semantics for QL$^=$

(A) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n) = 1$ *iff* $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_1),\ldots,\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_n)\rangle \in \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n)$.

($=$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha = \beta) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.

($\forall$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.

($\exists$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.

($\neg$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\neg\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$.

$\vdots$

Truth: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for some $\hat{a}$ where φ is a sentence of QL$^=$.

Example

Task 1: Prove that the following argument is valid.

(1) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(2) Phosphorus is Venus.
$\therefore$ Hesperus is Venus.

Task 2: Prove that $\forall x\forall y\forall z((x = y \wedge y = z) \supset x = z)$ is a tautology.

Logical Predicates

Taller-Than: Suppose we were to take 'taller than' (T) to be logical.

Question 4: Could we provide its semantics?

(T) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(T\alpha\beta) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha)$ is taller than $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.

Theory: The semantics would have to rely on a theory of being taller than.

- Providing such a theory lies outside the subject-matter of logic.
- By contrast, identity is something we already grasp.
- Compare our pre-theoretic grasp of negation, conjunction, and the quantifiers.

Question 5: Could we take set-membership $\in$ to be a logical term?

Question 6: What is it to be a logical term?

Existence: Observe that $\exists x(x = x)$ is a tautology.

Question 7: Could we take a term in sentence position to be logical?

($\bot$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\bot) = 1$ *iff* $1 \neq 1$.

($\top$) $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\top) = 1$ *iff* $1 = 1$.

Assignment Lemmas

Lemma 1: If $\hat{a}(\alpha) = \hat{c}(\alpha)$ for all free variables α in a wff φ, then $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi)$.

Base: Assume $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = 0$, so $\varphi = (\alpha = \beta)$ or $\varphi = \mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$.

$(\alpha = \beta)$: So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\alpha = \beta) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\beta)$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\beta) \ldots$

$(\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$: So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = 1$ *iff* $\langle \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\alpha_1), \ldots, \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\alpha_n) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(F^n) \ldots$

Lemma 2: For any sentence φ: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every v.a. $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

Lemma 3: For any sentence φ: $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ for some v.a. $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

Leibniz's Law

Believes: Regiment the following argument:

(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.
(2) Superman is Clark Kent.
$\therefore$ Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly.

Sees: Regiment the following argument:

(1) Lois Lane sees Superman.
(2) Superman is Clark Kent.
$\therefore$ Lois Lane sees Clark Kent.

Question 8: Are these arguments intuitively valid?

Opacity: Whereas 'sees' admits substitution, 'believes' does not.

Transparency: We may say that 'sees' is transparent and that 'believes' is opaque.

Mathematics: Importantly, mathematics is transparent insofar as it does not include any opaque contexts.

Uniqueness and Quantity

LOGIC I
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Uniqueness

Uniqueness: Ingmar trusts Albert, but no one else.

Only: Regiment the following argument:

(1) Lois Lane only loves Clark Kent.
(2) Only Clark Kent is Superman.
$\therefore$ Lois Lane loves Superman.

Definite Descriptions

Question 1: Regiment the following sentences.

- Socrates is guilty.
- Socrates is not guilty.
- Socrates is guilty or not.

Question 2: Regiment the following sentences.

- The king of France is bald.
- The king of France is not bald.
- The king of France is bald or not.

Question 3: What is the difference between these two cases?

Existence: If the king of France is Bald, then the king of France exists.

Definite Article: 'The king of France' can't be a name.

Regimentation: Russell offered the following analysis:

- $\exists x(Kxf \wedge \forall y(Kyf \supset x = y) \wedge Bx)$.
- $\exists x(\forall y(Kyf \equiv x = y) \wedge Bx)$.

Negation: Negation applies to the predicate, not the sentence.

Task 1: Regiment the following:

1. Superman is keeping something from his lover.
2. The man with the axe is not Jack.
3. The Ace of diamonds is not the man with the axe.
4. One-eyed jacks and the man with the axe are wild.
5. No spy knows the combination to the safe.
6. The one Ingmar trusts is lying.
7. The person who knows the combination to the safe is not a spy.

At Least:

Task 2: Regiment the following claims.

1. There is at least one wild card.
2. There are at least two clubs.
3. There are at least three hearts on the table.

Question 4: How can we define these quantifiers in general?

Substitution

Free For: β is FREE FOR α in φ just in case there is no free occurrence of α in φ in the scope of a quantifier that binds β.

Constants: If β is a constant, then β is free for any α and φ.

Substitution: If β is free for α in φ, then the SUBSTITUTION $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is the result of replacing all free occurrences of α in φ with β.

Examples: Consider the following cases:

(a) z is free for x in $\forall y(Fxy \supset Fyx)$

(b) y is not free for x in $\forall y(Fxy \supset Fyx)$

Inequality Quantifiers Defined

Definition: We may define the following abbreviations recursively:

Base: $\exists_{\geq 1}\alpha\varphi := \exists\alpha\varphi$.

Recursive: $\exists_{\geq n+1}\alpha\varphi := \exists\alpha(\varphi \wedge \exists_{\geq n}\beta(\alpha \neq \beta \wedge \varphi[\beta/\alpha]))$ where β is free for α.

Infinite: $\Gamma_\infty := \{\exists_{\geq n}x(x = x) : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

Question 5: What is the smallest model to satisfy Γ_∞?

At Most: Regiment the following claims.

1. There is at most one wild card.
2. There are at most two one-eyed jacks.
3. There are at most three black jacks.

Definition: $\exists_{\leq n}\alpha\varphi := \neg\exists_{\geq n+1}\alpha\varphi$.

Cardinality Quantifiers

Task 3: Regiment the following.

1. There is one wild card.
2. There are two winning hands.
3. There are three hearts on the table.

Question 6: How can we define the cardinality quantifiers in general?

Base: $\exists_0\alpha\varphi := \forall\alpha\neg\varphi$.

Recursive: $\exists_{n+1}\alpha\varphi := \exists\alpha(\varphi \wedge \exists_n\beta(\alpha \neq \beta \wedge \varphi[\beta/\alpha]))$.

Question 7: How do the cardinality quantifiers relate to the inequality quantifiers?

Between: $\exists_{(n,m)}\alpha\varphi := \exists_{\geq n}\alpha\varphi \wedge \exists_{\leq m}\alpha\varphi$ where $n \leq m$.

Exact: $\exists_n\alpha\varphi := \exists_{(n,n)}\alpha\varphi$.

Examples

1. Show that $\{\neg Raa, \forall x(x{=}a \vee Rxa)\}$ is satisfiable.
2. Show that $\{\neg Raa, \forall x(x{=}a \vee Rxa), \forall x\exists y Rxy\}$ is satisfiable.
3. Show that $\forall x\forall y\ x{=}y \vdash \neg\exists x\ x \neq a$.

Relations

Task 4: Is the following argument valid?

- $\forall x\forall y(Rxy \supset Ryx)$.
- $\forall x\forall y\forall z((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \supset Rxz)$.

$\therefore$ $\forall x Rxx$.

Task 5: Is the following argument valid?

- $\forall x\forall y\forall z((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \supset Rxz)$.
- $\forall x\neg Rxx$.

$\therefore$ $\forall x\forall y(Rxy \supset \neg Ryx)$.

Natural Deduction in $QL^=$

LOGIC I
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Motivation

Entailment: We have defined entailment in $QL^=$.

Completeness: We want a complete natural deduction system for $QL^=$.

Question 1: What rules do we need to derive the following?

-	All humans are mortal.	-	$\forall x(Hx \supset Mx)$
-	Socrates is human.	-	Hs
-	Socrates is mortal.	-	Ms
$\therefore$	Someone is mortal.	$\therefore$	$\exists x Mx$

Substitution

Free For: β is FREE FOR α in φ just in case there is no free occurrence of α in φ in the scope of a quantifier that binds β.

Constants: If β is a constant, then β is free for any α and φ.

Substitution: If β is free for α in φ, then the SUBSTITUTION $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is the result of replacing all free occurrences of α in φ with β.

Instance: $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is a substitution instance of $\forall\alpha\varphi$ and $\exists\alpha\varphi$ if β is a constant.

Universal Elimination and Existential Introduction

($\forall$E) $\forall\alpha\varphi \vdash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ where β is a constant and α is a variable.

($\exists$I) $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \exists\alpha\varphi$ where β is a constant and α is a variable.

Task 1: Derive the argument above.

Universal: Everyone is either great or unfortunate $\forall x(Gx \vee Ux)$.

Existential: Tom is either great or unfortunate ($Gt \vee Ut$).

$\therefore$	$\exists x(Gx \vee Ux)$.	$\therefore$	$\exists y \exists x(Gy \vee Uy)$.
$\therefore$	$\exists x(Gx \vee Ut)$.	$\therefore$	$\exists y \exists x(Gx \vee Uy)$.
$\therefore$	$\exists x(Gt \vee Ut)$.	#	$\exists x \exists x(Gx \vee Ux)$.

Universal Introduction

Generalising: It would seem that we cannot universally generalise from instances.

Invalid: The following argument is invalid and should not be derivable.

- \- Socrates is mortal. (Ms)
- \# Everything is mortal. $(\forall x Mx)$

Valid: Compare the following valid argument which should be derivable:

- \- $\forall x \forall y \forall z((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \supset Rxz)$.
- \- $\forall x \neg Rxx$.
- $\therefore$ $\forall x \forall y(Rxy \supset \neg Ryx)$.

Task 2: Use the rules we have to derive as much as we can.

1.	$\forall x \forall y \forall z((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \supset Rxz)$	
2.	$\underline{\forall x \neg Rxx}$	
3.	$\forall y \forall z((Ray \wedge Ryz) \supset Raz)$	:$\forall$E
4.	$\forall z((Rab \wedge Rbz) \supset Raz)$	:$\forall$E
5.	$(Rab \wedge Rba) \supset Raa$	:$\forall$E
6.	$\neg Raa$	:$\forall$E
7.	$\mid Rab$	:AS for $\supset$I
8.	$\mid \mid Rba$	:AS for $\neg$I
9.	$\mid \mid Rab \wedge Rba$	:$\wedge$I
10.	$\mid \mid Raa$	:$\supset$E
11.	$\mid \neg Rba$	:$\neg$I
12.	$Rab \supset \neg Rba$	:$\supset$I
13.	$\forall y(Ray \supset \neg Rya)$	:$\forall$I
14.	$\forall x \forall y(Rxy \supset \neg Ryx)$	:$\forall$I

Question 2: How are we going to introduce universal quantifiers without making the invalid argument above derivable?

($\forall$I) $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi$ where β is a constant, α is a variable, and β does not occur in $\forall \alpha \varphi$ or in any undischarged assumption.

Arbitrary: The constraints on ($\forall$E) require β to be arbitrary.

Review: Bad inference above is blocked.

In Premise: Anu loves every dog.
$\forall x(Dx \supset Lax) \vdash Da \supset Laa \nvdash \forall x(Dx \supset Lxx)$.

In Conclusion: All dogs love themselves.
$\forall x(Dx \supset Lxx) \vdash Da \supset Laa \nvdash \forall x(Dx \supset Lax)$.

Existential Elimination

Task 3: Compare the following invalid inference.

- Someone is mortal.

\# Zeus is mortal.

Question 3: How are we going to eliminate existential quantifiers without making the argument above derivable?

Example: Consider the following argument:

- Everyone who applied found a position $\forall x(Ax \supset \exists y Fxy)$.
- Someone applied $\exists x Ax$.

$\therefore$ Someone found a position $\exists x \exists y Fxy$.

($\exists$E) If $\exists\alpha\varphi, \varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \psi$ where β is a constant that does not occur in $\exists\alpha\varphi$, ψ, or in any undischarged assumption, then $\exists\alpha\varphi \vdash \psi$.

Derivation: We can derive the example without deriving the invalid inference.

Quantifier Exchange Rules

($\neg\exists$) $\neg\exists\alpha\varphi \vdash \forall\alpha\neg\varphi$.

($\forall\neg$) $\forall\alpha\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\exists\alpha\varphi$.

($\neg\forall$) $\neg\forall\alpha\varphi \vdash \exists\alpha\neg\varphi$.

($\exists\neg$) $\exists\alpha\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\forall\alpha\varphi$.

Task 4: $\forall\alpha\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\exists\alpha\varphi$.

1. $\underline{\forall\alpha\neg\varphi}$
2. | $\underline{\exists\alpha\varphi}$
3. | | $\underline{\varphi[\beta/\alpha]}$
4. | | | $\underline{\exists\alpha\varphi}$
5. | | | $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$
6. | | | $\neg\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$
7. | | $\neg\exists\alpha\varphi$
8. | $\neg\exists\alpha\varphi$
9. $\neg\exists\alpha\varphi$

Task 5: $\exists\alpha\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\forall\alpha\varphi$.

10. $\underline{\exists\alpha\neg\varphi}$
11. | $\underline{\forall\alpha\varphi}$
12. | | $\underline{\neg\varphi[\beta/\alpha]}$
13. | | | $\underline{\forall\alpha\varphi}$
14. | | | $\neg\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$
15. | | | $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$
16. | | $\neg\forall\alpha\varphi$
17. | $\neg\forall\alpha\varphi$
18. $\neg\forall\alpha\varphi$

Task 6: Prove the rules below:

(MCP) If $\varphi \vdash \psi$, then $\neg\psi \vdash \neg\varphi$.

($\forall$DN) $\forall\alpha\neg\neg\varphi \vdash \forall\alpha\varphi$.

($\exists$DN) $\exists\alpha\neg\neg\varphi \vdash \exists\alpha\varphi$.

Task 7: Use the rules above to derive ($\neg\exists$) and ($\neg\forall$).

Natural Deduction in QL$^=$

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
November 30, 2023

Substitution

Free For: β is FREE FOR α in φ just in case there is no free occurrence of α in φ in the scope of a quantifier that binds β.

Substitution: If β is free for α in φ, then the SUBSTITUTION $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is the result of replacing all free occurrences of α in φ with β.

Quantifier Rules

($\forall$E) $\forall\alpha\varphi \vdash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ where β is a constant and α is a variable.

($\exists$I) $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \exists\alpha\varphi$ where β is a constant and α is a variable.

($\forall$I) $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \forall\alpha\varphi$ where β is a constant, α is a variable, and β does not occur in $\forall\alpha\varphi$ or in any undischarged assumption.

($\exists$E) If $\exists\alpha\varphi, \varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \psi$ where β is a constant that does not occur in $\exists\alpha\varphi$, ψ, or in any undischarged assumption, then $\exists\alpha\varphi \vdash \psi$.

Identity Rules

(=I) $\vdash \alpha = \alpha$ for any constant α.

Axiom: This rule is better referred to as an axiom schema.

Note: Easy to use, but not always obvious when to use.

Task 1: Derive the following in QD:

- $\forall x(x = x \supset \exists yFyx) \vdash \exists y(Fyy)$.
- Everything is something.
- Something exists.

(=E) $\varphi[\alpha/\gamma], \alpha = \beta \vdash \varphi[\beta/\gamma]$.

Note: Also easy to use, but not always obvious how to use.

Task 2: Derive the following in QD:

- $m = n \vee n = o,\ An\ \vdash Am \vee Ao$
- Every symmetric antisymmetric relation is lonely.
- Every irreflexive antisymmetric relation is asymmetric.

Relations

Task 4: Regiment and derive the following in QD.

1. Every transitive symmetric relation is left and right euclidean.
2. Every nonempty transitive and symmetric relation is reflexive.
3. Only the empty relation is symmetric and asymmetric.
4. Every intransitive relation is irreflexive.
5. Every intransitive relation is asymmetric.

Further Examples

Task 3: Regiment and derive the following in QD.

1. $\forall x(x = m), Rma \vdash \exists xRxx$
2. $\forall x(x{=}n \equiv Mx), \forall x(Ox \vee \neg Mx) \vdash On$
3. $\exists x(Kx \wedge \forall y(Kyx{=}y) \wedge Bx), Kd \vdash Bd$
4. $\vdash Pa \supset \forall x(Px \vee x{\neq}a)$

Existential Elimination and Soundness

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
November 29, 2023

Substitution

Free For: β is FREE FOR α in φ just in case there is no free occurrence of α in φ in the scope of a quantifier that binds β.

Substitution: If β is free for α in φ, then the SUBSTITUTION $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is the result of replacing all free occurrences of α in φ with β.

QD Rules

($\forall$E) $\forall\alpha\varphi \vdash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ where β is a constant and α is a variable.

($\exists$I) $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \exists\alpha\varphi$ where β is a constant and α is a variable.

($\forall$I) $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \forall\alpha\varphi$ where β is a constant, α is a variable, and β does not occur in $\forall\alpha\varphi$ or in any undischarged assumption.

($\exists$E) If $\exists\alpha\varphi, \varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vdash \psi$ where β is a constant that does not occur in $\exists\alpha\varphi$, ψ, or in any undischarged assumption, then $\exists\alpha\varphi \vdash \psi$.

(=I) $\vdash \alpha = \alpha$ for any constant α.

(=E) $\varphi[\alpha/\gamma], \alpha = \beta \vdash \varphi[\beta/\gamma]$.

Existential Elimination

Task 1: Regiment and derive the following in QD.

1. The elephant would not obey.
   Patrick is an elephant.
   ―――――――――――
   Patrick would not obey.
2. $\forall x(Jx \supset Kx)$
   $\exists x\forall yLxy$
   $\forall xJx$
   ―――――――――――
   $\exists x(Kx \wedge Lxx)$.
3. $\exists x(Px \supset \forall xQx)$
   ―――――――――――
   $\forall xPx \supset \forall xQx$.
4. $\exists xPx \vee \exists xQx$
   ―――――――――――
   $\exists x(Px \vee Qx)$.
5. Every nonempty asymmetric relation is non-symmetric.

Natural to Normative

Soundness: If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

1. Shows that we can trust QD to establish validity.
2. Easier to derive a conclusion that to provide a semantic argument.
3. The natural rules of deduction preserve validity.

Natural: QD describes (approximately) how we in fact reason.

Normative: Soundness explains why we ought to use QD to reason.

Soundness of QD

Assume: $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{QD}} \varphi$, so there is a QD proof X of φ from Γ.

Lines: Let φ_i be the ith line of X.

Dependencies: Let Γ_i be the undischarged assumptions at line i.

Proof: The proof goes by induction on length of X:

Base: $\Gamma_1 \vDash \varphi_i$.

Induction: If $\Gamma_k \vDash \varphi_k$ for all $k \leq n$, then $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$.

Finite: Since X is finite, there is some m where $\Gamma_m = \Gamma$ and $\varphi_m = \varphi$, so $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

Base Case

Proof: Every line in a QD proof is either a premise or follows by the rules.

Assume: φ_1 is either a premise or follows by AS or =I.

Premise: If φ_1 is a premise or assumption, then $\Gamma_1 = \{\varphi_1\}$, and so $\Gamma_1 \vDash \varphi_1$.

Identity: If φ_1 follows by =I, then φ_1 is $\alpha = \alpha$ for some constant α.

- Letting $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ be any model, $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) = \mathcal{I}(\alpha)$.
- Letting a be a variable assignment, $\mathcal{V}^a_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^a_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha)$.
- So $\mathcal{V}^a_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha = \alpha) = 1$, and so $\vDash \alpha = \alpha$.
- Thus $\Gamma_1 \vDash \varphi_1$ since $\Gamma_1 = \varnothing$.

Induction Case

Assume: $\Gamma_k \vDash \varphi_k$ for all $k \leq n$.

Undischarged: If φ_{n+1} is a premise or assumption, then the argument above applies.

Rules: If φ_{n+1} follows from Γ_{n+1} by the QD rules, then $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$.

Cases: There are 12 rules in SD and an additional 6 in QD.

Further Problems: Relations

Task 1: Regiment and derive the following in QD.

1. Every transitive and symmetric relation is quasi-reflexive.
2. Only the empty relation is symmetric and asymmetric.
3. Every intransitive relation is irreflexive.
4. Every intransitive relation is asymmetric.

Soundness: Part II

LOGIC I
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Soundness of QD

Assume: $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{QD}} \varphi$, so there is a QD proof X of φ from Γ.

Lines: Let φ_i be the i^{th} line of X.

Dependencies: Let Γ_i be the undischarged assumptions at line i.

Proof: The proof goes by induction on length of X:

BASE: $\Gamma_1 \vDash \varphi_i$.

HYPOTHESIS: Assume $\Gamma_k \vDash \varphi_k$ for all $k \leq n$.

INDUCTION: If φ_{n+1} follows by the proof rules for QD from sentences in Γ_{n+1}, then $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$.

Finite: Since X is finite, there is some m where $\Gamma_m = \Gamma$ and $\varphi_m = \varphi$, so $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

SD Lemmas

L12.1 If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$, then $\Gamma' \vDash \varphi$.

L12.2 For any QD proof X, if φ_k is live at line n where $k \leq n$, then $\Gamma_k \subseteq \Gamma_n$.

L12.3 If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \vDash \neg\varphi$, then Γ is unsatisfiable.

L12.4 If $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable, then $\Gamma \vDash \neg\varphi$.

L12.5 $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi)$ if $\hat{a}(\alpha) = \hat{c}(\alpha)$ for all free variables α in a wff φ.

L12.6 $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ for every v.a. $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

L12.7 If $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vDash \psi$, then $\Gamma \vDash \varphi \supset \psi$.

SD Rules

(R) $\varphi_k = \varphi_{n+1}$ for live $k \leq n$. Thus $\Gamma_k \vDash \varphi_k$ by hypothesis and $\Gamma_k \subseteq \Gamma_{n+1}$ by **L12.2**. Thus $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_k$ by **L12.1**, and so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$.

($\neg$I)
- There is a proof of ψ at line h and $\neg\psi$ at line j from φ on line i.
- By hypothesis $\Gamma_h \vDash \psi$ and $\Gamma_j \vDash \neg\psi$, where $\Gamma_h, \Gamma_j \subseteq \Gamma_{n+1} \cup \{\varphi_i\}$.
- By **L12.1**, $\Gamma_{n+1} \cup \{\varphi_i\} \vDash \psi$ and $\Gamma_{n+1} \cup \{\varphi_i\} \vDash \neg\psi$.
- So $\Gamma_{n+1} \cup \{\varphi_i\}$ is unsatisfiable by **L12.3**, so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$ by **L12.4**.

($\wedge$E) • $\varphi_{n+1} \wedge \psi$ is live on line $i \leq n$.

- By hypothesis, $\Gamma_i \vDash \varphi_{n+1} \wedge \psi$ where $\Gamma_i \subseteq \Gamma_{n+1}$ by **L12.2**
- Thus $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1} \wedge \psi$ by **L12.1**, and so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$ by semantics.

($\supset$I) • There is a proof of ψ at line j from φ on line i.

- By hypothesis $\Gamma_j \vDash \psi$, where $\Gamma_j \subseteq \Gamma_{n+1} \cup \{\varphi\}$.
- So $\Gamma_{n+1} \cup \{\varphi\} \vDash \psi$, and so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi \supset \psi$ by **L12.7**.

QD Lemmas

L12.8 $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$ if $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$ and β is free for α in φ.

Base: Assume φ is $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ or $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$ where $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.

- Let $\gamma_i = \beta$ if $\alpha_i = \alpha$ and otherwise $\gamma_i = \alpha_i$.
- $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_1), \ldots, \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_n) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n)$ *iff* $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\gamma_1), \ldots, \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\gamma_n) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n)$.
- $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_1) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_n)$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\gamma_1) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\gamma_2)$.

Induction: If $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) \leq n$, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$ whenever $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.

Case 2: Assume $\varphi = \psi \wedge \chi$ where $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$ for all $\hat{a}$.

- So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi \wedge \chi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\chi) = 1$ *iff* ...

Case 6: Assume $\varphi = \forall\gamma\psi$ where $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.

- If $\gamma = \alpha$, then $\varphi = \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$.
- If $\gamma \neq \alpha$, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\forall\gamma\psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = 1$ for all γ-variants $\hat{e}$ of $\hat{a}$ *iff*...
- Let $\hat{e}$ be an arbitrary γ-variant of $\hat{a}$.
- Since $\gamma \neq \alpha$, $\hat{e}(\alpha) = \hat{a}(\alpha)$ if α is a variable, so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha)$.
- Thus $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$ follows from the assumption.
- Since β is free for α in $\forall\gamma\psi$, we know that $\gamma \neq \beta$.
- If β is a variable, then $\hat{e}(\beta) = \hat{a}(\beta)$ since $\hat{e}$ is a γ-variant of $\hat{a}$.
- Thus $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.
- By hypothesis, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi[\beta/\alpha])$, where $\hat{e}$ was arbitrary.
- ...*iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{e}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\psi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for all γ-variants $\hat{e}$ of $\hat{a}$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$.

L12.9 If $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$ and $\mathcal{M}' = \langle \mathbb{D}, \mathcal{I}' \rangle$ where $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{I}'$ agree about every constant α and n-place predicate $\mathcal{F}^n$ that occurs in φ, it follows that $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}'}(\varphi)$ for any variable assignment $\hat{a}$ over $\mathbb{D}$.

Base: $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_1), \ldots, \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_n) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n)$ *iff* $\langle \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}'}(\alpha_1), \ldots, \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}'}(\alpha_n) \rangle \in \mathcal{I}'(\mathcal{F}^n)$.

- $\mathcal{I}(\mathcal{F}^n) = \mathcal{I}'(\mathcal{F}^n)$ is immediate from the assumption.
- $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_i) = \mathcal{I}(\alpha_i) = \mathcal{I}'(\alpha_i) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}'}(\alpha_i)$ if α_i is a constant.
- $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_i) = \hat{a}(\alpha_i) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}'}(\alpha_i)$ if α_i is a variable.

L12.10 For any constant β that does not occur in $\forall\alpha\varphi$ or in any sentence $\psi \in \Gamma$, if $\Gamma \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$, then $\Gamma \vDash \forall\alpha\varphi$.

1. Assume $\Gamma \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ for constant β not in $\forall\alpha\varphi$ or Γ.
2. Assume $\Gamma \nvDash \forall\alpha\varphi$, and so $\mathcal{M}$ satisfies Γ but $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\forall\alpha\varphi) \neq 1$.
3. So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ for some α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
4. Let $\mathcal{M}'$ by like $\mathcal{M}$ but for $\mathcal{I}'(\beta) = \hat{c}(\alpha)$.
5. By **L12.9**, $\mathcal{M}'$ satisfies Γ since β does not occur in Γ.
6. So $\mathcal{M}'$ satisfies $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ since $\Gamma \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$.
7. By **L12.6**, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for all $\hat{c}$, and so for $\hat{c}$ in particular.
8. Since β is not in $\forall\alpha\varphi$, we know β is not in φ.
9. So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) \neq 1$ by **L.12.9** given (3) above.
10. By (4) above, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\beta)$ where β is free for α.
11. By **L12.8**, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$.
12. Thus $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}'}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) \neq 1$, contradicting the above.

L12.11 $\forall\alpha\varphi \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ where α is a variable and $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is a sentence.

- Let $\mathcal{M}$ satisfy $\forall\alpha\varphi$, so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{a}}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = 1$ for some $\hat{a}$.
- So $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) = 1$ where $\hat{c}(\alpha) = \mathcal{I}(\beta)$ for an α-variant $\hat{c}$ of $\hat{a}$.
- By **L12.8**, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\hat{c}}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$.

L12.12 If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ and $\Sigma \cup \{\varphi\} \vDash \psi$, then $\Gamma \cup \Sigma \vDash \psi$.

L12.13 $\varphi[\beta/\alpha] \vDash \exists\alpha\varphi$ where α is a variable and $\varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ is a sentence.

L12.14 For any constant β that does not occur in $\exists\alpha\varphi$, ψ, or in any sentence $\chi \in \Gamma$, if $\Gamma \vDash \exists\alpha\varphi$ and $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi[\beta/\alpha]\} \vDash \psi$, then $\Gamma \vDash \psi$.

L12.15 If α and β are constants, then $\varphi[\alpha/\gamma], \alpha = \beta \vDash \varphi[\beta/\gamma]$.

QD Rules

($\forall$I)
- $\varphi_i = \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ for $i \leq n$ live at $n+1$ where β is not in φ_{n+1} or Γ_{n+1}.
- So $\Gamma_i \vDash \varphi_i$ by hypothesis, and $\Gamma_i \subseteq \Gamma_{n+1}$ by **L12.2**.
- Thus $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_i$ by **L12.1**, so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$.
- So $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \forall\alpha\varphi$ by **L12.10** since β not in $\forall\alpha\varphi$ or Γ_{n+1}.
- Equivalently, $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$.

($\forall$E)
- $\varphi_i = \forall\alpha\varphi$ for $i \leq n$ live at $n+1$ where $\varphi_{n+1} = \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$.
- So $\Gamma_i \vDash \varphi_i$ by hypothesis, and $\Gamma_i \subseteq \Gamma_{n+1}$ by **L12.2**.
- Thus $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_i$ by **L12.1**, so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \forall\alpha\varphi$.
- By **L12.11** $\forall\alpha\varphi \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$, and so $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi[\beta/\alpha]$ by **L12.12**.
- Equivalently, $\Gamma_{n+1} \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$.

Completeness of QD

LOGIC I
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Basic Lemmas

L13.1 If α is a constant and X is a proof in which the constant β does not occur, then $X[\beta/\alpha]$ is also a proof.

L13.3 If $\Lambda \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Lambda \vdash \neg\varphi$.

L13.5 If $\Lambda \vdash \varphi$ and $\Pi \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$, then $\Lambda \cup \Pi \vdash \psi$.

L13.6 If $\Lambda \cup \{\varphi\}$ and $\Lambda \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ are both inconsistent, then Λ is inconsistent.

L13.9 If $\Lambda \vdash \varphi$ and $\Lambda \vdash \neg\varphi$, then Λ is inconsistent.

L13.11 If $\Lambda \vdash \varphi$, then $\Lambda \cup \Pi \vdash \varphi$.

Satisfiability

T13.1 Every consistent set of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}$ sentences Γ is satisfiable.

Completeness: If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

1. Assuming $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, we know $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable.
2. So $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent by **T13.1**.
3. So $\Gamma \vdash \neg\neg\varphi$ by **L13.3**, and so $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ by DN and **L13.5**.

Saturation

Free: Let $\varphi(\alpha)$ be a wff of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}$ with at most one free variable α.

Saturated: A set of sentences Σ is saturated in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ just in case for each wff $\varphi(\alpha)$ of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$, there is a constant β where $(\exists\alpha\varphi \supset \varphi[\beta/\alpha]) \in \Sigma$.

Constants: Let $\mathbb{C}$ be the constants of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ where $\mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{C}$ are new constants.

L13.2 Assuming Γ is consistent in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}$, we know Γ is consistent in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Free Enumeration: Let $\varphi_1(\alpha_1), \varphi_2(\alpha_2), \varphi_3(\alpha_3), \ldots$ enumerate all wffs of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ with one free variable.

Witnesses: $\theta_1 = (\exists\alpha_1\varphi_1 \supset \varphi_1[n_1/\alpha_1])$ where $n_1 \in \mathbb{N}$ is the first constant not in φ_1.

$\theta_{k+1} = (\exists\alpha_{k+1}\varphi_{k+1} \supset \varphi_{k+1}[n_{k+1}/\alpha_{k+1}])$ where $n_{k+1} \in \mathbb{N}$ is the first constant not in θ_j for any $j \leq k$.

Saturation: Let $\Sigma_1 = \Gamma$, $\Sigma_{n+1} = \Sigma_n \cup \{\theta_n\}$, and $\Sigma_\Gamma = \bigcup_{i\in\mathbb{N}} \Sigma_n$.

L13.4 Σ_Γ is consistent and saturated in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

1. If Σ_{m+1} is inconsistent, then $\Sigma_m \vdash \exists\alpha_{m+1}\varphi_{m+1}$ and $\Sigma_m \vdash \neg\varphi_{m+1}[n_{m+1}/\alpha_{m+1}]$.
2. So $\Sigma_m \vdash \forall\alpha_{m+1}\neg\varphi_{m+1}$ by $\forall$I, and so $\Sigma_m \vdash \neg\exists\alpha_{m+1}\varphi_{m+1}$ by $\forall\neg$.
3. If Σ_Γ is inconsistent, then $\Sigma_m \vdash \bot$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$.

Maximization

Maximal: A set of sentences Δ is maximal in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ just in case as either $\psi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\psi \in \Delta$ for every sentence ψ in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Full Enumeration: Let $\psi_0, \psi_1, \psi_2, \ldots$ enumerate all sentences in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Maximization: Let $\Delta_0 = \Sigma$, $\Delta_{n+1} = \begin{cases} \Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\} & \text{if } \Gamma_n \cup \{\psi_n\} \text{ is consistent} \\ \Delta_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$, and $\Delta_\Sigma = \bigcup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \Delta_n$.

L13.7 $\Delta = \Delta_{\Sigma_\Gamma}$ is maximal consistent in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Case 1: $\Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\}$ is consistent, and so $\Delta_{n+1} = \Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\}$ is consistent.

Case 2: $\Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\}$ is not consistent, and so $\Delta_{n+1} = \Delta_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\}$.

1. If $\Delta_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\}$ is inconsistent, then Δ_n is inconsistent by **L13.6**.
2. So Δ_{n+1} is consistent in both cases.
3. If Δ_Σ is inconsistent, then $\Delta_m \vdash \bot$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$.
4. Maximality is immediate.

L13.8 $\Gamma \subseteq \Sigma_\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$ where Δ is saturated.

1. Immediate from the definitions.

L13.10 $\varphi \in \Delta$ whenever $\Delta \vdash \varphi$.

1. Assuming $\Delta \vdash \varphi$, we know $\Delta \nvdash \neg\varphi$ by **L13.9**.
2. So $\neg\varphi \notin \Delta$ since otherwise $\Delta \vdash \neg\varphi$.
3. Thus $\varphi \in \Delta$ by maximality.

Henkin Model

Element: $[\alpha]_\Delta = \{\beta \in \mathbb{C} : \alpha = \beta \in \Delta\}$.

Domain: $\mathbb{D}_\Delta = \{[\alpha]_\Delta : \alpha \in \mathbb{C}\}$.

L13.13 If $\alpha = \beta \in \Delta$, then $[\alpha]_\Delta = [\beta]_\Delta$.

1. Assuming $\alpha = \beta \in \Delta$ where $\Gamma \in [\alpha]_\Delta$, we know $\alpha = \gamma \in \Delta$.
2. So $\alpha = \beta, \alpha = \gamma \vdash \beta = \gamma$ by =E, and so $\Delta \vdash \beta = \gamma$ by **L13.11**.
3. Thus $\beta = \gamma \in \Delta$ by **L13.10**, and so $\gamma \in [\beta]_\Delta$, hence $[\alpha]_\Delta \subseteq [\beta]_\Delta$.

Constants: $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\alpha) = [\alpha]_\Delta$ for all constants $\alpha \in \mathbb{C}$.

Predicates: $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\mathcal{F}^n) = \{\langle [\alpha_1]_\Delta, \ldots, [\alpha_n]_\Delta \rangle \in \mathbb{D}^n_\Delta : \mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \Delta\}$.

L13.14 If $\alpha_i = \beta_i \in \Delta$, then $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \Delta$ *iff* $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n[\beta_i/\alpha_i] \in \Delta$.

1. Assume $\alpha_i = \beta_i \in \Delta$ where $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \Delta$.
2. $\Delta \vdash \mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n[\beta_i/\alpha_i]$ by =E, so $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n[\beta_i/\alpha_i] \in \Delta$ by **L13.10**.
3. Parity of reasoning completes the proof.

Henkin Lemmas

L13.15 $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\psi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for some constant $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$.

1. Letting $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$ for some $\hat{a}$, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = 1$ for some α-variant $\hat{c}$.
2. So $\hat{c}(\alpha) = [\beta]_\Delta$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$, so $\hat{c}(\alpha) = \mathcal{I}_\Delta(\beta)$ since $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\beta) = [\beta]_\Delta$.
3. Thus $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$ by **L12.9**.
4. So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ by **L12.6**.
5. Assume instead that $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$.
6. Let $\hat{c}$ be the α-variant of $\hat{a}$ where $\hat{c}(\alpha) = \mathcal{I}_\Delta(\beta)$, so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.
7. Thus $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$ by **L12.9**, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$.

L13.16 $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for all constants $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$.

1. Similar to **L13.15**.

L13.17 $\mathcal{M}_\Delta$ satisfies φ just in case $\varphi \in \Delta$.

Base: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\alpha_1 = \alpha_2) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\alpha_1) = \mathcal{I}_\Delta(\alpha_2)$ *iff* $[\alpha_1]_\Delta = [\alpha_2]_\Delta$ *iff* $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \in \Delta$.

1. If $[\alpha_1]_\Delta = [\alpha_2]_\Delta$, then $\alpha_2 \in [\alpha_2]_\Delta$ by **L13.12**, and so $\alpha_2 \in [\alpha_1]_\Delta$.
2. Thus $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \in \Delta$ by definition, and the converse holds by **L13.13**.

Induction: Assume $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\varphi \in \Delta$ whenever $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) \leq n$.

1. Let φ be a sentence of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ where $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = n + 1$.

Case 1: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\neg\psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi) \neq 1$ *iff* $\psi \notin \Delta$ *iff* $\neg\psi \in \Delta$.

Case 2: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi \wedge \chi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\chi) = 1$ *iff* $\psi, \chi \in \Delta$ *iff* $\psi \wedge \chi \in \Delta$.

Case 6: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$ by **L13.15**.

1. *iff* $\psi[\beta/\alpha] \in \Delta$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$ by hypothesis.
2. *iff* $\exists\alpha\psi \in \Delta$ by $\exists$I and **L13.10** given saturation.

Conclusion: So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\varphi \in \Delta$, from which the lemma follows.

Restriction

Restriction: $\mathcal{I}'_\Delta(\alpha) = [\alpha]_\Delta$ for every constant α in $\mathrm{QL}^{=}$.

L13.18 For all $\mathrm{QL}^{=}$ sentences φ, $\mathcal{M}'_\Delta$ satisfies φ just in case $\mathcal{M}_\Delta$ satisfies φ.

T13.1 Every consistent set of $\mathrm{QL}^{=}$ sentences Γ is satisfiable.

Compactness

C13.2 If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, then there is a finite subset $\Lambda \subseteq \Gamma$ where $\Lambda \vDash \varphi$.

C13.3 Γ is satisfiable if every finite subset $\Lambda \subseteq \Gamma$ is satisfiable.

Completeness of QD: Part II

LOGIC I
Benjamin Brast-McKie
December 12, 2023

Basic Lemmas

L13.1 If α is a constant and X is a proof in which the constant β does not occur, then $X[\beta/\alpha]$ is also a proof.

L13.3 If $\Lambda \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Lambda \vdash \neg\varphi$.

L13.5 If $\Lambda \vdash \varphi$ and $\Pi \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$, then $\Lambda \cup \Pi \vdash \psi$.

L13.6 If $\Lambda \cup \{\varphi\}$ and $\Lambda \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ are both inconsistent, then Λ is inconsistent.

L13.9 If $\Lambda \vdash \varphi$ and $\Lambda \vdash \neg\varphi$, then Λ is inconsistent.

L13.11 If $\Lambda \vdash \varphi$, then $\Lambda \cup \Pi \vdash \varphi$.

Satisfiability

T13.1 Every consistent set of $\text{QL}^=$ sentences Γ is satisfiable.

Completeness: If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

1. Assuming $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, we know $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable.
2. So $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent by **T13.1**.
3. So $\Gamma \vdash \neg\neg\varphi$ by **L13.3**, and so $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ by DN and **L13.5**.

Saturation

Free: Let $\varphi(\alpha)$ be a wff of $\text{QL}^=$ with at most one free variable α.

Saturated: A set of sentences Σ is saturated in $\text{QL}^=_{\mathbb{N}}$ just in case for each wff $\varphi(\alpha)$ of $\text{QL}^=_{\mathbb{N}}$, there is a constant β where $(\exists\alpha\varphi \supset \varphi[\beta/\alpha]) \in \Sigma$.

Constants: Let $\mathbb{C}$ be the constants of $\text{QL}^=_{\mathbb{N}}$ where $\mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{C}$ are new constants.

L13.2 Assuming Γ is consistent in $\text{QL}^=$, we know Γ is consistent in $\text{QL}^=_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Free Enumeration: Let $\varphi_1(\alpha_1), \varphi_2(\alpha_2), \varphi_3(\alpha_3), \ldots$ enumerate all wffs of $\text{QL}^=_{\mathbb{N}}$ with one free variable.

Witnesses: $\theta_1 = (\exists\alpha_1\varphi_1 \supset \varphi_1[n_1/\alpha_1])$ where $n_1 \in \mathbb{N}$ is the first constant not in φ_1.

$\theta_{k+1} = (\exists\alpha_{k+1}\varphi_{k+1} \supset \varphi_{k+1}[n_{k+1}/\alpha_{k+1}])$ where $n_{k+1} \in \mathbb{N}$ is the first constant not in θ_j for any $j \leqslant k$.

Saturation: Let $\Sigma_1 = \Gamma$, $\Sigma_{n+1} = \Sigma_n \cup \{\theta_n\}$, and $\Sigma_\Gamma = \bigcup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \Sigma_n$.

L13.4 Σ_Γ is consistent and saturated in $\text{QL}^=_{\mathbb{N}}$.

1. If Σ_{m+1} is inconsistent, then $\Sigma_m \vdash \exists\alpha_{m+1}\varphi_{m+1}$ and $\Sigma_m \vdash \neg\varphi_{m+1}[n_{m+1}/\alpha_{m+1}]$.
2. So $\Sigma_m \vdash \forall\alpha_{m+1}\neg\varphi_{m+1}$ by $\forall$I, and so $\Sigma_m \vdash \neg\exists\alpha_{m+1}\varphi_{m+1}$ by $\forall\neg$.
3. If Σ_Γ is inconsistent, then $\Sigma_m \vdash \bot$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$.

Maximization

Maximal: A set of sentences Δ is maximal in $\text{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ just in case as either $\psi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\psi \in \Delta$ for every sentence ψ in $\text{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Full Enumeration: Let $\psi_0, \psi_1, \psi_2, \ldots$ enumerate all sentences in $\text{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Maximization: Let $\Delta_0 = \Sigma$, $\Delta_{n+1} = \begin{cases} \Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\} & \text{if } \Gamma_n \cup \{\psi_n\} \text{ is consistent} \\ \Delta_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$, and $\Delta_\Sigma = \bigcup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \Delta_n$.

L13.7 $\Delta = \Delta_{\Sigma_\Gamma}$ is maximal consistent in $\text{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Case 1: $\Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\}$ is consistent, and so $\Delta_{n+1} = \Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\}$ is consistent.

Case 2: $\Delta_n \cup \{\psi_n\}$ is not consistent, and so $\Delta_{n+1} = \Delta_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\}$.

1. If $\Delta_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\}$ is inconsistent, then Δ_n is inconsistent by **L13.6**.
2. So Δ_{n+1} is consistent in both cases.
3. If Δ_Σ is inconsistent, then $\Delta_m \vdash \bot$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$.
4. Maximality is immediate.

L13.8 $\Gamma \subseteq \Sigma_\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$ where Δ is saturated.

1. Immediate from the definitions.

L13.10 $\varphi \in \Delta$ whenever $\Delta \vdash \varphi$.

1. Assuming $\Delta \vdash \varphi$, we know $\Delta \nvdash \neg\varphi$ by **L13.9**.
2. So $\neg\varphi \notin \Delta$ since otherwise $\Delta \vdash \neg\varphi$.
3. Thus $\varphi \in \Delta$ by maximality.

Henkin Model

Element: $[\alpha]_\Delta = \{\beta \in \mathbb{C} : \alpha = \beta \in \Delta\}$.

Domain: $\mathbb{D}_\Delta = \{[\alpha]_\Delta : \alpha \in \mathbb{C}\}$.

L13.13 If $\alpha = \beta \in \Delta$, then $[\alpha]_\Delta = [\beta]_\Delta$.

1. Assuming $\alpha = \beta \in \Delta$ where $\gamma \in [\alpha]_\Delta$, we know $\alpha = \gamma \in \Delta$.
2. So $\alpha = \beta, \alpha = \gamma \vdash \beta = \gamma$ by =E, and so $\Delta \vdash \beta = \gamma$ by **L13.11**.
3. Thus $\beta = \gamma \in \Delta$ by **L13.10**, and so $\gamma \in [\beta]_\Delta$, hence $[\alpha]_\Delta \subseteq [\beta]_\Delta$.

Constants: $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\alpha) = [\alpha]_\Delta$ for all constants $\alpha \in \mathbb{C}$.

Predicates: $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\mathcal{F}^n) = \{\langle [\alpha_1]_\Delta, \ldots, [\alpha_n]_\Delta \rangle \in \mathbb{D}^n_\Delta : \mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \Delta\}$.

L13.14 If $\alpha_i = \beta_i \in \Delta$, then $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \Delta$ *iff* $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n[\beta_i/\alpha_i] \in \Delta$.

1. Assume $\alpha_i = \beta_i \in \Delta$ where $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \Delta$.
2. $\Delta \vdash \mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n[\beta_i/\alpha_i]$ by =E, so $\mathcal{F}^n\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n[\beta_i/\alpha_i] \in \Delta$ by **L13.10**.
3. Parity of reasoning completes the proof.

Henkin Lemmas

L13.15 $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\psi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for some constant $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$.

1. Letting $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$ for some $\hat{a}$, $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = 1$ for some α-variant $\hat{c}$.
2. So $\hat{c}(\alpha) = [\beta]_\Delta$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$, so $\hat{c}(\alpha) = \mathcal{I}_\Delta(\beta)$ since $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\beta) = [\beta]_\Delta$.
3. Thus $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$ by **L12.8**.
4. So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ by **L12.6**.
5. Assume instead that $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$.
6. Let $\hat{c}$ be the α-variant of $\hat{a}$ where $\hat{c}(\alpha) = \mathcal{I}_\Delta(\beta)$, so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}}(\beta)$.
7. Thus $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{c}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha])$ by **L12.8**, and so $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\varphi) = 1$.

L13.16 $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\forall\alpha\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for all constants $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$.

1. Similar to **L13.15**.

L13.17 $\mathcal{M}_\Delta$ satisfies φ just in case $\varphi \in \Delta$.

Base: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\alpha_1 = \alpha_2) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{I}_\Delta(\alpha_1) = \mathcal{I}_\Delta(\alpha_2)$ *iff* $[\alpha_1]_\Delta = [\alpha_2]_\Delta$ *iff* $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \in \Delta$.

1. If $[\alpha_1]_\Delta = [\alpha_2]_\Delta$, then $\alpha_2 \in [\alpha_2]_\Delta$ by **L13.12**, and so $\alpha_2 \in [\alpha_1]_\Delta$.
2. Thus $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \in \Delta$ by definition, and the converse holds by **L13.13**.

Induction: Assume $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\varphi \in \Delta$ whenever $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) \leqslant n$.

1. Let φ be a sentence of $\text{QL}^{=}_{\mathbb{N}}$ where $\texttt{Comp}(\varphi) = n + 1$.

Case 1: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\neg\psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi) \neq 1$ *iff* $\psi \notin \Delta$ *iff* $\neg\psi \in \Delta$.

Case 2: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi \wedge \chi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi) = \mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\chi) = 1$ *iff* $\psi, \chi \in \Delta$ *iff* $\psi \wedge \chi \in \Delta$.

Case 6: $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\exists\alpha\psi) = 1$ *iff* $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\psi[\beta/\alpha]) = 1$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$ by **L13.15**.

1. *iff* $\psi[\beta/\alpha] \in \Delta$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{C}$ by hypothesis.
2. *iff* $\exists\alpha\psi \in \Delta$ by $\exists$I and **L13.10** given saturation.

Conclusion: So $\mathcal{V}^{\hat{a}}_{\mathcal{I}_\Delta}(\varphi) = 1$ just in case $\varphi \in \Delta$, from which the lemma follows.

Restriction

Restriction: $\mathcal{I}'_\Delta(\alpha) = [\alpha]_\Delta$ for every constant α in $\text{QL}^{=}$.

L13.18 For all $\text{QL}^{=}$ sentences φ, $\mathcal{M}'_\Delta$ satisfies φ just in case $\mathcal{M}_\Delta$ satisfies φ.

T13.1 Every consistent set of $\text{QL}^{=}$ sentences Γ is satisfiable.

Compactness

C13.2 If $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, then there is a finite subset $\Lambda \subseteq \Gamma$ where $\Lambda \vDash \varphi$.

C13.3 Γ is satisfiable if every finite subset $\Lambda \subseteq \Gamma$ is satisfiable.

Final Exam Review

Regimentation: (a) No two individuals are at least as tall as each other. Sanna is at least as tall as the finalist, and the finalist is at least as tall as Sanna. Thus, Sanna is the finalist.

Models: (a) $Qab, Qba \nvDash a = b$.

(b) $\forall x \forall y(Px \supset (Py \supset x \neq y)) \nvDash \exists x \exists y\, x \neq y$.

Equivalence: $\exists x(\forall y(Py \supset x = y) \wedge Px) \dashv\vDash \exists x \forall y(Py \equiv x = y)$.

Relations: (a) R is symmetric and antisymmetric. Therefore R is reflexive.

(b) R is asymmetric. Therefore R is antisymmetric.