

Algebraic Geometry Codes

Background on Coding Theory

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sender

m



receiver

$m' = m + e$

where e is some low
Hamming weight noise term

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sender

m



receiver

$m' = m + e$

where e is some low
Hamming weight noise term

we don't want noise

Background on Coding Theory

sender

m

encoder

noisy channel

receiver

decoder

$m' = m$



Background on Coding Theory

sender

m

encoder

c

codeword

noisy channel

$w = c + e$

received word

decoder

receiver

$m' = m$



Background on Coding Theory

sender

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noisy channel

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received word

decoder


receiver

$m' = m$

*** with high probability**



Background on Coding Theory



Linear Codes


Linear Codes

m

\mathbb{F}_q^k

message vector

Linear Codes



$$\mathbb{F}_q^k$$

$$\mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$$

message vector

generator matrix

Linear Codes



\mathbb{F}_q^k

$\mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$

\mathbb{F}_q^n

message vector

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codeword

Linear Codes

**the possible codewords form a
subspace of \mathbb{F}_q^n**

c_0

c_1

c_2

c_3

c_4

c_5

c_6

c_7

c_8

Linear Codes

2 important parameters

$$R = k/n$$

information rate

$$D = d/n$$

minimum distance

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Linear Codes

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Singleton bound

$$d \leq n - k + 1$$

Reed-Solomon Codes

Reed-Solomon Codes

m

```
graph TD; m[m] --> mx["m(x)"]; mx --- fx["F_q[x]"]
```

The diagram illustrates the first step in Reed-Solomon encoding. A message m , represented in a box, is mapped via a red arrow to a polynomial $m(x)$. This polynomial is then associated with the polynomial ring $\mathbb{F}_q[x]$.

$m(x)$

$\mathbb{F}_q[x]$

Reed-Solomon Codes


m




$m(x)$

$\mathbb{F}_q[x]$


elements of \mathbb{F}_q^*




Reed-Solomon Codes



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Reed-Solomon Codes



Reed-Solomon Codes

pros:

MDS code

$$d = n - k + 1$$

cons:

Reed-Solomon Codes

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MDS code

$$d = n - k + 1$$

linear code, easy en/decode

1	g	g^2	g^3	g^4	...
1	g^2	g^4	g^6	g^8	...
1	g^3	g^6	g^9	g^{12}	...
...

Vandermonde matrix

cons:

Reed-Solomon Codes

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$$n \text{ (\#evaluation points)} < q \text{ (\#field elements)}$$

Reed-Solomon Codes

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
cons:

$$n \text{ (#evaluation points)} < q \text{ (#field elements)}$$

no asymptotically good family of codes
as $n \rightarrow \infty$


Algebraic Geometry Codes

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projective curve \mathbb{X} over \mathbb{F}_q

Algebraic Geometry Codes



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Reed-Solomon


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$$\mathbb{F}_q[x] \xrightarrow{\text{ambient function field}} F(\mathbb{X}) \sim \text{Frac}(\mathbb{F}_q[x,y]/(\mathbb{X}))$$

Algebraic Geometry Codes

Reed-Solomon


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Algebraic Geometry Codes

Reed-Solomon


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Algebraic Geometry Codes

Reed-Solomon

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Code-based Public-Key Encryption

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hard problem: decoding a linear code, where G is random

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hard problem: decoding a linear code, where G is random

idea: create a G' that looks random, but we can decode

Code-based Public-Key Encryption

keygen:

1. generate randomly a structured G that we can decode
2. publish the masked $G' := SGP$
3. hope G' looks random to others

Code-based Public-Key Encryption

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encryption:

1. encode the message and add noise: $c = mG' + e$

Code-based Public-Key Encryption

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2. publish the masked $G' := SG$
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encryption:

1. encode the message and add noise: $c = mG' + e$

decryption:

1. permute back: $c' = c * P^{-1} = mSG + eP^{-1}$
2. decode: $dec(c') = mS$
3. multiply by S inverse: $m = mS * S^{-1}$

Code-based Public-Key Encryption

keygen:


1. generate randomly a structured G that we can decode
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only known secure
instantiation uses AG
codes, binary Goppa
codes specifically