

Charitable Behavior and Public Intervention: a Survey Experiment*

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Abstract

In this paper, we measure the extent of charitable behavior crowding out public intervention and how this phenomenon affects the welfare of the poor. To achieve this objective, we collect novel survey data on a representative sample of the U.S. adult population. In the survey, respondents are asked to go through several hypothetical scenarios, starting from a simple model of public good contribution to learn about their preferences and expectations regarding donations and taxation. We find that when donations are available, government expenditure on the poor is less in equilibrium. Yet, households in need are better off due to disproportionately higher donations. So, in our setting, private charity crowds out public intervention only to a limited extent, affecting equilibrium-level taxes only slightly. Moreover, as equilibrium tax rates without donations are not high enough to compensate for the lack of private charity, our results suggest that people are less driven by inequity aversion than by the direct utility of donating (warm glow). As an implication, we conclude that the widespread availability of private charity in the United States plays a pivotal role in alleviating poverty, which government intervention cannot substitute for due to the structure of voters' preferences.

Keywords: Altruism, Charity, Donation, Public Good, Anti-Poverty, Welfare

JEL Classification: D1, D8, H3, H4, I3

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1 Introduction

Charitable behavior plays a vital role in nearly all societies. For instance, donations account for more than 2% of the United States GDP ([Andreoni and Payne, 2013](#)), and more than 40% of U.S. households are involved in volunteering activities ([Charities Aid Foundation, 2019](#)). Similarly to taxation, private charity is a form of contribution to the public good. As such, the activity of charitable organizations is, to some extent, a substitute for public intervention. This is particularly true for areas such as poverty reduction, targeted by both charitable organizations and the public sector.¹ Some evidence of substitution between private charity and public intervention emerges from a cross-country comparison: among Western OECD countries, those that are characterized by a larger size of the government tend to show a lower prevalence of charity.²

The existence of some degree of substitution between charitable giving and public intervention has often been investigated in the literature, although most contributions have focused on one direction, that is whether government intervention could affect private donations through tax deductions (see for instance [Schiff 1985](#); [Duncan 1999](#); [Brooks 2000](#); [Simmons and Emanuele 2004](#); [Garrett and Rhine 2010](#); [Bredtmann 2016](#) and [Peloza and Steel \(2005\)](#) for a meta-analysis of the estimates of the price elasticity of individual donations in the literature).

Whether the opposite direction is also relevant, that is whether the supply of private charity affects the extent of public intervention, has received considerably less attention. [Becker and Lindsay \(1994\)](#) and [Sav \(2012\)](#) find evidence for partial crowding out in the funding of US higher education; [Heutel \(2014\)](#) finds no evidence of private donations crowding out government grants to charities (while confirming that government grants crowd in private donations) while [Werfel \(2018\)](#) provides evidence that individuals are less likely to support higher taxation when informed of the size of charitable contributions in society.

While most contributions agree that the crowding out is not one-to-one in either direction,

¹In the U.S., 35% of the donations as of 2017 were directed towards organizations in health, education, and human services, while more than 30% targeted religious organizations, most of which are also involved in poverty relief activities according to the nonprofit organization Charity Navigator <https://www.charitynavigator.org/>, accessed 06/01/2022.

²See for instance [OECD \(2021\)](#), [Charities Aid Foundation \(2019\)](#).

ruling out perfect substitution³, answers concerning the size and even the direction of the relationship between charitable giving and public intervention are still discordant.

In this paper, we set to contribute to this debate by providing a causal estimate of the degree of crowding out in both directions. We resort to a survey experiment to identify and measure the causal impact of an increase in public intervention on private donations, and of its opposite, namely the effect of ‘switching off’ donations on tax preferences.

To build the survey experiment, we rely on a simple framework that enriches the traditional models of public good contribution (Becker, 1974; Bergstrom et al., 1986) with elements that are typical of the more recent literature that investigates the determinants of private charity, such as impure altruism and reputational concerns (Andreoni, 1988, 1990; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Katz and Rosenberg, 2005).

To put the question in context, we first collect and analyze aggregate data on donations, poverty rates, and property taxes at the county level in the United States. Controlling for state fixed effects, population size, real GDP per capita, political preferences, and demographic and religious composition, we find that, on average higher donation rates are associated with lower local property taxes and poverty rates. In contrast, given all other factors, the partial correlation between the level of taxes and poverty rates is not statistically significant. However, the sign and magnitude of these associations depend greatly on which controls we include in the regressions, rendering any conclusions based on such an exercise questionable. Furthermore, since it is highly plausible that taxation, poverty, and private charity are jointly determined, causal effects would be hard to disentangle. We, therefore, resort to a survey experiment to address endogeneity more convincingly.

We present a sample of 380 U.S. respondents⁴ with hypothetical but realistic scenarios in which we vary the availability of donations and the respondents’ gross income to measure the change in their taxation preferences. We also elicit respondents’ donation choices at different taxation levels and their expectations about the average level of donations in society. Based on their answers, we simulate equilibrium outcomes in our public good model setting. The

³Among the possible explanations for the lack of a complete crowding out, Eckel et al. (2005) highlight how individuals do not fully internalize their contribution to the government finances and, therefore, indirectly to the public good through taxation (fiscal illusion).

⁴The sample was selected by the survey company Prolific to be representative of the population of the United States according to gender, age bracket, and ethnicity.

results of this exercise allow us to compare equilibrium tax rates and the welfare of the poor with and without donations available. Additionally, we conduct heterogeneity analyses based on the respondents’ characteristics and elicited preferences, and link them to their in-survey preferred levels of taxes and donations.

We find that government expenditure on the poor is lower when donations are available. However, households in need are still better off due to disproportionately higher donations, corroborating the correlation results of the county-level exercise. It means that, in our setting, private charity crowds out public intervention only to a limited extent; equilibrium tax rates in the no-donations scenario are not high enough to compensate for the lack of private charity. This finding suggests that, in relative terms, people are less driven by inequity aversion than by the direct utility of the act of donating (*warm glow*). Our results indicate that the widespread availability of private charity in the United States plays a pivotal role in alleviating poverty, which government intervention cannot substitute for due to the structure of voters’ preferences.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the county-level descriptive evidence from the United States, Section 3 describes the model and derives some predictions, Section 4 describes the survey and the characteristics of the sample, Section 5 presents our results, while Section 6 concludes.

2 Context: poverty, local taxes, and charity in U.S. counties

In this section, we collect descriptive evidence on the interplay between charity, local taxation, and poverty by building a county-level dataset of the United States. We measure donation rates at the county level as the total charitable contributions reported in tax filings divided by the total adjusted gross income estimated by the Statistics of Income division.⁵ For local taxation, we employ the five-year average (for 2010-2014) of the property taxes per

⁵Available at the Internal Revenue Service website: <https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-county-data-2016>, accessed 18/05/2021.

\$1000 worth of real estate collected by the National Association of Home Builders⁶ due to being one of the more substantial taxes with variance at the county level. Finally, poverty rates are based on the Annual Social and Economic Supplements of the 2016 Current Population Survey (CPS ASEC).⁷ We complement the analysis with additional data on relevant county characteristics such as population size, gross domestic product, demographic composition by religion, age, ethnicity, education, and election results.⁸ Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables. On average, people donate nearly 1.8% of their adjusted gross income, pay approximately 9.7 dollars on a thousand dollars worth of real estate, and the county-level poverty rate is slightly below 16%. In addition, Figure 1 shows the geographical variation in the main variables at the county level.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the key variables

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Donation rate in 2016	3,129	1.816	0.802	0.000	1.275	2.193	8.552
Property taxes 2010-2014	3,129	9.700	4.635	1.085	6.124	12.503	29.001
Poverty rate in 2016	3,129	15.864	6.263	3.400	11.400	19.100	48.600

Note: The table reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables of the analysis dataset, which is collected by the authors from the following sources. Charitable tax deductions of 2016 are accessed via the website of the Internal Revenue Service, maintained by the Statistics of Income division. Data on property taxes from 2010-2014 are collected by the National Association of Home Builders. Poverty rates are calculated based on the CPS ASEC data by the U.S. Census Bureau.


A look at pairwise correlations between the three main variables (available in Figure 2) shows that donations are negatively associated with taxation and positively with the poverty rate, which is negatively related to local property taxes.

⁶Available at: <https://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=250239fromGSA=1>, accessed 27/04/2021.

⁷Available at: <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-259.html>, accessed 10/08/2021.


⁸Real GDP per capita data on the county level are based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis calculations. (Available at: <https://apps.bea.gov/itable/itable.cfm?ReqID=70step=1acrdn=5>, accessed 28/09/2021.)

Figure 1: The geographic variation in the key variables



Note: Figure shows the authors' calculations based on the following publicly available datasets. The donation rate for 2016 is calculated as donations over adjusted gross income. The data are accessed via the website of the Internal Revenue Service, maintained by the Statistics of Income division. Data on property taxes from 2010-2014 are collected by the National Association of Home Builders. Poverty rates are calculated based on the CPS ASEC data by the U.S. Census Bureau. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted from the map but are part of the dataset.

Figure 2: Bivariate relations between the key variables



Note: Figure shows the bivariate relations of the county-level variables of the authors' calculations based on the following publicly available datasets. The donation rate for 2016 is calculated as donations over adjusted gross income. The data are accessed via the website of the Internal Revenue Service, maintained by the Statistics of Income division. Data on property taxes from 2010-2014 are collected by the National Association of Home Builders. Poverty rates are calculated based on the CPS ASEC data by the U.S. Census Bureau.

As mentioned earlier, the causal links behind these correlations are unclear. Hence, as an additional exploratory step, we show regression results intended to provide a basic understanding before examining the question in more depth with our survey analysis. Indeed, regressions might not reveal causal links, as the actual mechanism could be driven by unobservable characteristics of the counties, such as different levels of inequity aversion or moral codes behind altruistic behavior (Enke et al., 2020), or by simultaneity as these variables are equilibrium outcomes.

In our first setup, we regress poverty rates on donation rates, property taxes, county-level characteristics, and state fixed effects. The first column of Table 2 reports the results of the simplest specification, where the poverty rate is regressed only on donation rate and property taxes. We can see that without additional covariates, there seems to be no statistically significant relationship between donations and poverty. At the same time, there is a strong negative partial association between taxes and the poverty rate. Including state fixed effects (column 2) results in a negative partial correlation between the poverty rate and donations and taxes. Columns 3 to 6 include an increasingly comprehensive set of controls, with column 6 controlling for real GDP per capita, population size, and demographic composition according to religion⁹, age group, ethnicity and educational level, and presidential election results. The additional covariates turn the relationship between taxes and poverty insignificant while preserving the sign and significance of the negative correlation with donation rates. Other controls improve the precision of the estimated donation rate coefficient (-0.8). If we were to interpret this estimate as causal, increasing donations by one standard deviation (0.8) would result in a relatively small decrease in the poverty rate of 0.64 percentage points, which is approximately 4% of the mean poverty rate and 10% of its standard deviation.

Table 2: County-level regression associations of poverty rate with property taxes and donation rates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Poverty rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donation rate	0.034 (0.691)	-1.725*** (0.406)	-0.916* (0.508)	-1.048** (0.493)	-0.931*** (0.244)	-0.806*** (0.250)
Property taxes	-0.448*** (0.090)	-0.232*** (0.084)	-0.092 (0.108)	-0.050 (0.096)	-0.023 (0.039)	-0.039 (0.037)
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita, population size	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Religious composition	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age, ethnicity, education composition	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election results	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,129	3,129	3,129	3,129	3,128	3,128
R ²	0.110	0.367	0.400	0.422	0.781	0.786

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.

⁹In Christianity, the role of charity is central, however, due to the different historical institutional evolution Protestants are expected to donate more than Roman Catholics (Pugh, 1980; Hoge and Yang, 1994; Pullan, 2005; van Elk et al., 2017).

In our second setup (whose results are reported in Table 3), we take the local property tax as the outcome variable, and we examine its partial correlations with the two remaining key variables (donation rate and poverty rate). Here, even the coefficients' sign reacts substantially to the set of controls we include in the regressions. In the simplest specification, which does not control for county characteristics nor state fixed effects, higher poverty rates and donation rates are associated with lower property taxes. Including state fixed effects reduces the coefficient on poverty rate by a magnitude and flips the sign on donation rates while accounting for most of the explained variance fraction of 0.78. The inclusion of demographic controls reverts the partial correlation between tax and donations to negative, while the impact of the poverty rate becomes non-significant. If we were to interpret the estimates causally, a standard deviation increase of donation rates would imply a slight decrease in local taxes of around 0.288 per 1000\$ of property value, around 3% of the mean.

Table 3: County-level regression associations of property taxes with poverty and donation rates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Property taxes					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donation rate	−0.960** (0.374)	0.518*** (0.149)	−0.058 (0.116)	−0.101 (0.120)	−0.407*** (0.102)	−0.360*** (0.099)
Poverty rate	−0.238*** (0.051)	−0.045*** (0.015)	−0.016 (0.019)	−0.009 (0.017)	−0.009 (0.015)	−0.016 (0.014)
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita, population size	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Religious composition	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age, ethnicity, education composition	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election results	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,129	3,129	3,129	3,129	3,128	3,128
R ²	0.138	0.778	0.814	0.816	0.837	0.839

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.

The evidence we presented so far suggests that the inter-relatedness of poverty, charity, and taxation is challenging to clarify. According to these preliminary findings, higher donations seem to be associated with lower poverty and local property taxes, while the suggested magnitudes are relatively small. However, the sign and magnitude of these estimates are not robust to the inclusion of different controls, nor can we claim that they capture causal

relationships.

To build a deeper understanding of the issue, we propose a simple household behavior model explaining how donations, taxes, and poverty rates are jointly determined with the mediation of a political election process. Then based on the model setup, we administer a survey to a representative sample of U.S. residents to elicit their preferences concerning donations and taxation in different hypothetical scenarios, which are then employed to retrieve equilibrium outcomes.

3 A simple framework

We now provide an overview of the simple framework which provides the basis for structuring the hypothetical scenarios of our survey. We build a simple public good model where households derive utility from their own consumption, the public good, and their contribution to the public good¹⁰. In our setting, the society is composed of N_p households earning positive income, and N_z households earning zero income, and the public good is defined as the financial support accruing to zero-income households. Positive-income households can contribute to the public good through two channels: taxation and private donations. A neutral government sets the tax rate in accordance with the preferences of the median voter.

3.1 Baseline case: no charity

We first describe a simpler version of our model, where households earning a positive income can contribute to the public good only through taxation. Positive-income households maximize their utility, given by:

$$u(c_i, b) = \log(c_i) + \alpha_i \log(b).$$

where c_i is consumption, α_i is the *generosity* or *pure altruism* parameter, representing the weight of the public good in the utility function, and b is the public good, i.e. the transfer

¹⁰Adapting the frameworks of Andreoni (1988) and Duncan (1999).

accruing to each household-in-need:

$$b = \frac{1}{N_z}(\tau - \underline{\tau})W,$$

where $W = \sum_{i=1}^{N_p} w_i$ is the total wage mass, τ is the tax rate selected by the government to support the households in need, and $\underline{\tau}$ is the fraction of total taxes devoted to the upkeep of the government, which is fixed at 20% of the gross wage.

Positive-income households cannot consume more than their net income w_i , resulting in the following budget constraint:

$$c_i \leq (1 - \tau)w_i$$

. Finally, zero-income households are characterized by the following utility function:

$$u(b) = \log(b)$$

3.1.1 Solving for the preferred tax rate

In the baseline case where no charity is allowed, consumption is always set at the maximum available level $c_i = w_i(1 - \tau)$. We can therefore solve for the preferred tax rate of each positive-income household, τ_i^* , by maximizing the value of the problem,

$$V(\tau, w_i, W) = \log((1 - \tau)w_i) + \alpha_i \log\left(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{U}|}(\tau - \underline{\tau})W\right).$$

This implies the following first-order condition and optimal taxation:

$$\frac{\partial V(\tau, w_i, W)}{\partial \tau} = -\frac{1}{(1 - \tau_i^*)} + \frac{\alpha_i}{(\tau_i^* - \underline{\tau})} = 0 \quad (1)$$

$$\tau_i^* = \frac{\alpha_i + \underline{\tau}}{1 + \alpha_i}. \quad (2)$$

Deriving the preferred tax rate τ_i^* with respect to the degree of inequity aversion α_i , we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial \tau_i^*}{\partial \alpha_i} = \frac{1 - \underline{\tau}}{(1 + \alpha_i)^2} > 0,$$

meaning that the preferred tax rate is increasing in inequity aversion.

Zero-income households instead simply wish to maximize the amount of public good, and therefore prefer the highest possible tax rate (which we assume bounded above by some amount τ^H).

3.2 The government's problem

We close the model by solving the government's problem. The government knows the preferences of each household and sets the tax rate τ to match as closely as possible the preferences of the median voter. It, therefore, minimizes the sum of absolute deviations from each citizen's preferred tax rate:

$$\tau = \arg \min_{\tau' \geq \underline{\tau}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_p+N_z} |\tau_i^* - \tau'|$$

This expression is indeed minimized by choosing the median of the population's preferences, which is equivalent to the preferred tax rate of the median voter¹¹.

3.3 Complete case: reintroducing private charity

We now reintroduce private charity in the picture and present the complete framework. Positive-income households can contribute to the welfare of the households in need both paying taxes and engaging in private charity. Their objective function is now:

$$\begin{aligned} u(c_i, d_i, b) = & \log(c_i) + \gamma_i \log(1 + d_i) + \alpha_i \log(\mathbb{E}[b|\tau]) \\ & + \eta_i \left[\log(1 + (d_i - \mathbb{E}(d_{-i}|\tau))^2) 1[d_i \geq \mathbb{E}(d_{-i}|\tau)] \right. \\ & \left. - \log(1 + (\mathbb{E}(d_{-i}|\tau) - d_i)^2) 1[d_i < \mathbb{E}(d_{-i}|\tau)] \right], \end{aligned}$$

where, in addition to own consumption and the public good, utility depends on the amount of own donations (d_i) and on the deviation of own donations from the prevailing level of

¹¹Using a quadratic loss function would result in selecting the average of the ideal tax rates instead of the median

donations in the society, respectively weighted by γ_i , the *warm glow* parameter, that regulates the importance of one's own contribution to the public good in the utility function, and η_i , that is the weight of reputational concerns, or equivalently the cost of deviating from the social norm¹².

The budget constraint is also modified to include donations:

$$c_i \leq w_i(1 - \tau) - d_i.$$

It is important to highlight that now, differently from the simplified case with no donations, agents have to form expectations over the private charitable contributions of others. Indeed, they get utility (disutility) from both positive (negative) deviations between their own donations and the average societal level of donations, and from the total amount of public good which is composed of taxes, own donations, and the not-yet-determined donations of other positive-income households in the society:

$$\mathbb{E}[b|\tau] = \frac{1}{N_z} \left((\tau - \tau)W + d_i + \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{j \neq i} d_j | \tau \right] \right).$$

We can simplify this expression by allowing individuals to only form beliefs on the average level of donations in the society¹³ conditional on the level of taxes:

$$\mathbb{E}[b|\tau] \approx \frac{1}{N_z} \left((\tau - \tau)W + d_i + (N_p - 1)\mathbb{E}[d_{-i}|\tau] \right),$$

The usual assumption of perfect rationality would require that agents' guesses matched the realized outcome. We choose not to make any assumption on the structure of beliefs and instead use our survey to test whether individuals hold accurate beliefs. For the sake of completeness, we will however present a brief analysis of the benchmark case, characterized by a representative household with rational expectations.

¹²The role of reputational concerns in this context has been emphasized, for instance, by [Bénabou and Tirole \(2006\)](#)

¹³Excluding themselves, which however is of little importance for a big enough number of households

3.3.1 Benchmark case: representative agent with rational expectations (RERA)

In the benchmark case, the representative agent maximizes her utility while knowing that everybody else solves an identical problem. Since, in the benchmark case, all individuals have the same preferences and budget, we can treat expected donations as if they were the solution to the individual optimization problem,

$$V(w_i, W, \tau) = \max_{d_i} \log((1 - \tau)w_i - d_i) + \gamma_i \log(1 + d_i) \\ + \alpha_i \log\left(\frac{1}{N_z} \left((\tau - \underline{\tau})W + N_p d_i\right)\right).$$

Since everybody is the same, the individual level of donation coincides with the average societal level, implying that the reputational concern term does not play any role. However, the individual decision maker still solves for her own level of donations as if her contribution was only infinitesimal for the overall benefit accruing to the unemployed so that the benefit term ($\mathbb{E}[b|\tau]$) is taken as given and does not appear in the first order condition.

The optimal level of donations thus results from maximizing the following first-order condition

$$\text{w.r.t. } d_i : \frac{1}{w_i(1 - \tau) - d_i} = \frac{\gamma_i}{1 + d_i} \quad (3)$$

$$d_i^* = \max \left\{ \frac{\gamma_i w_i (1 - \tau) - 1}{1 + \gamma_i}, 0 \right\}. \quad (4)$$

The preferred level of donations is positive whenever:

$$\gamma_i \geq \frac{1}{w_i(1 - \tau)},$$

meaning that there will be a positive level of donations in society whenever the level of warm glow is above a certain threshold (equal to at least the inverse of the net wage).

From 4, the optimal level of consumption can also be retrieved as:

$$c_i^* = \min \left\{ \frac{w_i(1 - \tau) - 1}{1 + \gamma_i}, w_i(1 - \tau) \right\}.$$

Assuming a high enough level of warm glow, we can plug back the values of the interior solution to obtain the value of the problem in the benchmark case:

$$V(w_i, W, \tau) = \log\left(\frac{w_i(1-\tau)-1}{1+\gamma_i}\right) + \gamma_i \log\left(\frac{\gamma_i w_i(1-\tau)-1}{1+\gamma_i}\right) \\ + \alpha_i \log\left(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{U}|} \left((\tau - \underline{\tau})W + |\mathcal{E}| \frac{\gamma_i w_i(1-\tau)-1}{1+\gamma_i}\right)\right),$$

from which we can compute the preferred tax rate of household i , τ_i^* , by finding the tax rate maximizing the value of her problem. Considering that $W = N_p w_i$, the first order condition with respect to τ ,

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial \tau} = -\frac{w_i}{w_i(1-\tau)-1} - \frac{\gamma_i^2 w_i}{\gamma_i w_i(1-\tau)-1} \\ + \frac{\alpha_i w_i}{(1+\gamma_i)(\tau - \underline{\tau})w_i + \gamma_i w_i(1-\tau)-1} = 0$$


implies that:

$$\frac{1}{w_i(1-\tau)-1} + \frac{\gamma_i^2}{\gamma_i w_i(1-\tau)-1} = \frac{\alpha_i}{(1+\gamma_i)(\tau - \underline{\tau})w_i + \gamma_i w_i(1-\tau)-1},$$

which can be solved numerically for the preferred tax rate, τ^* .

Solving the problem for different values of the preference parameters governing inequity aversion (α) and warm glow (γ), we can infer their effect on preferred taxes, donations, and the level of benefits households-in-need receive. Preferred tax rates increase in inequity aversion but decrease in warm glow. Donation rates increase in warm glow, but as an individual's donations do not contribute to reducing inequity, inequity aversion does not affect optimal donation rates—consequently, total benefits for the poor increase in both dimensions. However, let's compare it with the scenario where donations are not allowed. We can see that for regions with somewhat high inequity aversion and warm glow, total benefits would decrease by allowing donations in society. So depending on the preferences representing social values, allowing donations might or might not benefit those that they are designed to target, even if donation expectations are correct, as a consequence of the equilibrium brought by the taxes set by the politician.

Figure 3: Benefit accruing to each zero-income household with versus without donations in the RERA benchmark for different levels of generosity and warm glow



Notes: authors' calculations based on solving the problem of the representative agent with rational expectations and correct beliefs about the level of average donations in society. Tax rates are constrained from below at $\tau = 0.2$ representing a mandatory minimum level of taxation covering other government expenditures, and household income is set at \$60,000.

3.3.2 General case

We now move away from the representative agent, rational expectations benchmark; that is, we allow for heterogeneous household-level utility parameters and income and household-specific expectations. We treat these as model parameters without imposing any assumption and derive the optimal level of donations again for an employed household i in this general case. Analogously to the RERA case, households maximize their utility with respect to the

donation level d_i :

$$V(w_i, W, \tau) = \max_{d_i} \log((1 - \tau)w_i - d_i) + \gamma_i \log(1 + d_i) \\ + \eta_i(w_i \tau)^2 + \alpha_i \log\left(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{U}|}((\tau - \underline{\tau})W + |\mathcal{E}|\mathbb{E}[d_j|\tau])\right),$$

resulting in the following first-order condition and optimal level of donations:

$$\text{w.r.t. } d_i : \frac{1}{w_i(1 - \tau) - d_i} = \frac{\gamma_i}{1 + d_i} \quad (5)$$

$$d_i^* = \max\left\{\frac{\gamma_i w_i(1 - \tau) - 1}{1 + \gamma_i}, 0\right\}. \quad (6)$$

From this, we can also compute the optimal level of consumption as follows:

$$c_i^* = \min\left\{\frac{w_i(1 - \tau) - 1}{1 + \gamma_i}, w_i(1 - \tau)\right\}.$$

Plugging back the values of the interior solution, we can obtain the value of the problem:

$$V(w_i, W, \tau) = \log\left(\frac{w_i(1 - \tau) - 1}{1 + \gamma_i}\right) + \gamma_i \log\left(\frac{\gamma_i w_i(1 - \tau) - 1}{1 + \gamma_i}\right) + \\ \alpha_i \log\left(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{U}|}((\tau - \underline{\tau})W + |\mathcal{E}|\mathbb{E}[d_j|\tau])\right),$$

from which we can compute the preferred tax rate of household i , τ_i^* by finding the tax rate maximizing the value of her problem. When computing the first-order condition, it is important to consider that expected donations could depend on the level of taxation. Indeed, as additional taxation and donations both contribute to the welfare of the unemployed, a belief that higher taxes would result in lower average donations in society is reasonable. We should then allow for the derivative of expected donations with respect to the tax rate τ to be different from 0, obtaining τ_i^* as the numerical solution to the following expression:

$$\frac{w_i(1 + \gamma_i)}{w_i(1 - \tau_i^*) - 1} + \frac{(1 + \gamma_i)\gamma_i^2 w_i}{\gamma_i w_i(1 - \tau_i^*) - 1} = \frac{\alpha_i W + |\mathcal{E}|\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[d_j|\tau_i^*]}{\partial \tau_i^*}}{(\tau_i^* - \underline{\tau})W + |\mathcal{E}|\mathbb{E}[d_j|\tau_i^*]}.$$

This model setup constitutes the baseline for the hypothetical scenarios we use in our

survey. In the survey, we ask respondents to choose their amount of donations conditional on different levels of income (w_i) and taxes (τ), along with the expected value of donations in society given the level of taxes $\mathbb{E}[d_j|\tau]$. Furthermore, we also elicit respondents' preferred level of taxes for two types of society: one where donations are allowed and one where taxation is the only source of support for the households in need. This approach enables us to predict the effect of donations on the equilibrium level of taxes and the welfare of the households in need.

4 Survey experiment

To investigate the causal relationship between donations, taxation, and poverty, we implement a survey experiment in the spirit of the model detailed earlier. The data are provided by a sample of 380 U.S. adult residents selected through the professional survey company Prolific¹⁴ to represent the population at large in terms of age, gender and ethnicity. The survey requires approximately 40 minutes to complete and asks respondents to go through three main sections. The full text of the questionnaire is available upon request.

The survey's first section replicates the game's structure presented in Section 3. We ask respondents to imagine their preferences on taxation and their expectations and behavior concerning donations in six hypothetical scenarios. In each scenario, respondents are asked to take up the roles of employed, income-earning households and to indicate their preferred contribution to the welfare of zero-income households (described as 'households in need'), which account for 15% of the overall population. In three out of six scenarios, respondents can contribute to the welfare of the households in need through additional taxation collected for that purpose or through private donations (complete scenarios). In addition to their own behavior and preferences, they are also asked to state how much they expect other employed households to donate. In the remaining three scenarios, individuals can only contribute through additional taxation, while donations are not allowed (no-charity scenarios). Within each category (with and without charity), scenarios differ according to the level of income accruing to the respondent's household: low, middle, or high.

¹⁴www.prolific.co.

The last two sections of the survey respectively ask for demographic information such as gender, age, ethnicity, state of birth, education level, occupation, income category and religion, and respondents’ real-life charitable behavior (volunteering experiences and private donations) and elicit political preferences, personal attitudes towards economic redistribution and charity, time- and risk-related preferences.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

Consistently with the 2019 American Community Survey estimates¹⁵, our sample contains slightly more female than male respondents (51%) and is predominantly white (69%). Concerning age, the most represented category is the 58+ constituting 30% of the respondents, while the remaining categories all contain between 16 and 19% of the sample. Moving on to variables not targeted by the representative sample requirements, high-income households (that we defined as reporting a gross income of more than \$90,000, consistently with the hypothetical scenarios of the first section of the survey) are over-represented in the sample, 40% versus 31% in the U.S. population.¹⁶ The fraction of middle-income households (reporting a gross income of between \$50,000 and \$90,000) is slightly under-estimated, representing 27% of our sample but 30% of the overall population. Finally, low-income individuals (reporting a gross income below \$50,000) represent 33% of our sample versus 38% of the U.S. population.

Hence, unsurprisingly, the sample has a low fraction of individuals with less than a high school diploma and high school graduates (0.3% and 7.9% versus 10% and 28% in the overall population). At the same time, more than 30% of respondents hold a master’s or professional degree, versus 10.2% in the population at large. Concerning religion, more than 30% of the sample declared having no religious identity. Among those indicating some religious affiliation, the most prevalent creed is Catholicism (26% of the sample), followed by other Christian denominations (18%) and mainline Protestantism (11%).


Finally, concerning the reported patterns of charitable behavior, slightly less than 30% of the respondents report no experience with volunteering, and less than 15% have never engaged in monetary donations. More than half of the respondents volunteer occasionally

¹⁵Aggregate demographic information is available at: <https://data.census.gov>.

¹⁶Data on income brackets available at: <https://censusreporter.org/topics/income/>.

and report having donated a few times. A sizable fraction (21% of the respondents) reports engaging in regular donations. The following graphs show the distribution of estimated yearly donations by income category. Although respondents from the lowest income category are more likely not to donate, the average donation rate slightly decreases with income.

Figure 4: Estimated in-life donation rate by income category



Note: We estimate donation rates in real life by combining survey responses on the frequency of donations and the average donation size. To compute total donations, we impute the middle value of the donation brackets available in the survey and multiply it by the reported number of yearly donations. To compute yearly income, we impute the middle value of the selected income bracket.

Table 4: Demographic characteristics of the sample

	Category	Count	Fraction
Gender	Female	194	51%
	Male	186	49%
Age category	18-27	72	19%
	28-37	70	18%
	38-47	61	16%
	48-57	64	17%
	58+	113	30%
Ethnicity	White	264	69%
	Black	55	14%
	Other	61	16%
Education level	Less than high school degree	1	0%
	High school graduate	30	8%
	Some college but no degree	74	19%
	Bachelor or associate degree in college	130	37%
	Master’s or professional degree	121	32%
	Doctoral degree	14	4%
Income category	Low income ($< \$50k$)	125	33%
	Middle income ($\$50k$ - $\$90k$)	102	27%
	High income ($> \$90k$)	153	40%
Religion	No religious identity	120	32%
	Roman Catholic	96	26%
	Protestant (mainline)	41	11%
	Evangelical Protestant	21	6%
	Other Christian religion	68	18%
	Other non-Christian religion	34	9%
Frequency of volunteering	Never	105	28%
	Occasionally	202	53%
	At least once per month	46	12%
	At least once per week	27	7%
Frequency of donations	Never	56	15%
	Once	44	12%
	A few times	199	52%
	Regular donations	81	21%

4.2 Preferences and predicted behaviors in hypothetical scenarios

To analyze the effect of charity on economic redistribution, we analyze survey responses to the six hypothetical scenarios in the first section, where respondents are asked to report as truthfully as possible how much they would donate, what their preferred tax rate would be,

and how much they would expect others to donate. The main components of each scenario are summarized in the table below.

Table 5: Scenarios description

Common elements						
Fraction of households-in-need	15%					
Baseline tax rate	20%					
Additional tax rate to support households-in-need	0%, 2.5%, 5%, 7.5%, 10%					
Elements differing across scenarios						
Donations allowed	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Gross income	\$40k	\$60k	\$120k	\$40k	\$60k	\$120k
Tasks for respondents						
Choosing preferred additional tax rate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Selecting own donations	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Declaring expected donation of the typical household	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

As shown in Table 5, respondents perform between one and three tasks in each scenario. First, for scenarios where charity is allowed, respondents are asked to select the dollar amount that they expect the typical middle-income household (where the middle income is set at \$60,000) to donate for each level of additional tax rate.¹⁷ Secondly, in these scenarios, respondents are asked to state how much they would be willing to donate to support households in need, given each of the five levels of additional tax rates.¹⁸ finally, they are asked to assign preference points across these five levels of additional tax rates (the table reports the options between 0% and 10%). Their preferred tax rate is then computed as a weighted average of their preferences. Afterward, they similarly provide taxation preferences for scenarios without donations available.

When facing these questions, respondents are explicitly reminded of the amount of benefits households-in-need would receive and the net income their own household would end up with, conditional on each tax level and their previous answers about donation expectations in society. For instance, we use built-in survey tools to calculate the implication of a tax level choice on total unemployment benefits, given the respondent’s own expectations elicited earlier. This ensures that respondents do not need to engage in complicated calculation

¹⁷In all the described scenarios, respondents are reminded that tax rates are flat and that donations cannot be deducted from their taxable income (i.e., they are subtracted from their net income).

¹⁸Dollar amounts are selected on a slider between a minimum of \$0 and a maximum of \$6,000.

exercises and can express their preferences in a self-consistent manner.

5 Results

This section presents the main results obtained from the survey analysis. We measure the extent of the substitution between taxes and donations in both directions (namely, the effect of taxes on preferred donations and the availability of charity on preferred taxes) and discuss the welfare implications of different combinations of taxes and donations.

5.1 First direction of crowding out: taxes on donations

Our first result is that taxes do crowd out donations in our setting, but to a very limited extent. By regressing donations and donation rates on in-survey income and tax rate, and including individual fixed effects, we obtain that a 1% increase in tax rates results in a 0.058% decrease in donation rates (column 1 of table 6), implying a crowding out the magnitude of less than 6%. This result is very far from the 100% rate implied by the full crowding out hypothesis, suggesting that individuals are not only interested in the total amount of public good (pure altruism) but also in the extent of their own contribution (*warm glow*).

Table 6: In-survey donations, donation rate, and expected donation rate on tax rates and income.

	<i>Donations (in \$ 1000)</i>	<i>Donation rate (%)</i>	<i>Expected donation rate (%)</i>
Intercept	1.657*** (0.067)	4.410*** (0.125)	5.185*** (0.138)
Income (in \$1000)	0.011*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.002)	
Tax rate (%)	-0.048*** (0.011)	-0.058*** (0.018)	-0.076*** (0.028)
Individual F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,700	5,700	1,900
R^2	0.536	0.505	0.498

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The last column of table 6 reports the result of an analogous regression, but with expected

donation rates as the outcome variable (which, differently from own donations, are independent of income). The coefficient of the explanatory variable (in-survey tax rates) is negative and significant, but its magnitude is larger (by almost 2% in absolute terms) than for one's own donation rates.

This discrepancy suggests that respondents' beliefs might be inaccurate, which we will now test more formally.

5.2 Accurate beliefs


We now test whether respondents hold accurate beliefs about the average level of donations in the hypothetical society described in the survey. Since we do not provide information on the income distribution in the society, but only a measure of central tendency¹⁹, we aggregate actual donations by levels of income by using several sets of weights. For the primary analysis, we use the prevalence of low, middle, and high-income households²⁰ in the actual U.S. population, based on the 2019 version of the American Community Survey²¹, but results are robust to using equal income weights, as well as to considering middle-income households only or to excluding middle-income households and considering equal weights for the remaining two categories. Figure ?? shows the distribution of the average difference between expected and realized donations for each level of the additional tax rate (0% to 10%). Standard errors are bootstrapped. Table ?? also reports the p value for the paired t-test for the difference in means, which leads us to reject the null hypothesis of accurate beliefs for all levels of taxes. Despite the difference between expected and actual donations being consistently positive and significant (implying overestimation of others' donations), the magnitude is larger for more extreme tax rates (on average \$420 versus \$310), suggesting that individuals tend to form better predictions in more realistic or preferable situations.

¹⁹Respondents are told that the typical income in society is \$60,000

²⁰Low income is defined as less than \$50,000, middle income as between \$50,000 and \$90,000 and high income as more than \$90,000

²¹Available at: <https://censusreporter.org/topics/income/>.

Tax rate	Donations			
	Expected (in 1000 \$)	Realized (in 1000 \$)	Difference (in 1000 \$)	Paired t-test p-value
0%	2.618	2.191	0.427	0.00
2.5%	2.299	1.987	0.313	0.00
5%	2.173	1.862	0.312	0.00
7.5%	2.070	1.759	0.311	0.00
10%	2.161	1.741	0.421	0.00



Distribution of the bootstrapped difference between expected and realized donations. Income weights are 0.38, 0.30, 0.32

5.3 Second direction of crowding out

We next estimate the effect of the availability of donations on preferred tax rates, representing the second direction of crowding out. Figure 5 shows the distribution of preferred tax rates for the two main scenarios (with versus without charity) and each level of in-survey income.

As expected, respondents tend to prefer higher additional tax rates when donations are not allowed, compared to the case in which they can also contribute to the welfare of the unemployed with private donations. On average, higher in-game income results in higher preferred tax rates.

Figure 5: Ideal tax rate with and without donations




Table 7: Ideal tax rates regressed against in-game income and donation availability

	Estimate	Cluster s.e.	t-value	p-value
Middle income	0.29378	0.09288	3.163	0.00169 **
High income	0.63237	0.10622	5.954	5.99e-09 ***
Donations allowed	-0.73905	0.12930	-5.716	2.22e-08 ***
Middle income X Donations allowed	0.01309	0.12726	0.103	0.91812
High income X Donations allowed	0.17031	0.13485	1.263	0.20738
Multiple R-squared(full model): 0.6719 Adjusted R-squared: 0.6054				
Multiple R-squared(proj. model): 0.08573 Adjusted R-squared: -0.09953				

Notes: The table displays the regression of ideal tax rates on in-game income level interacted with whether donations are allowed, using respondent-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the respondent level. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Despite the usefulness of these individual-level results, which already point to some crowding out of donations on preferred public support for zero-income households, we are ultimately interested in the equilibrium tax rate at the societal level. Therefore, based on our model, we aggregate individual preferences by solving the neutral government's problem, which results in selecting the preferred tax rate of the median voter.

We rely on bootstrapping to simulate our hypothetical society repeatedly, where the bootstrapped preferences of survey respondents account for 85% of the votes (i.e., the proportion of positive-income households in society) while the remaining 15% of the votes are for the highest available additional tax rate(10%) since zero-income households optimize their utility by maximizing public support.

Table 8: Average realizations of the outcomes of interest

Variable	Private charity	Mean	SD
τ_a^{med} (%)	No	5.249	0.160
Benefit (in 1000 \$)	No	21.167	0.646
τ_a^{med} (%)	Yes	4.848	0.110
Benefit (in 1000 \$)	Yes	30.170	\$0.608
Average donation rate (%)	Yes	2.966	0.103
Average donation (in 1000 \$)	Yes	1.874	0.006
Average expected donation (in 1000 \$)	Yes	2.183	0.007

Table 9: Average difference in the outcomes of interest

Difference	Mean	SD
τ_a^{med} (%)	-0.401	0.156
Benefit (in 1000 \$)	9.003	0.747


The resulting distribution of the equilibrium tax rate in the two main cases (with and without charity) is reported in figure 6, alongside the distribution of the difference in the two outcomes of interest (median preferred tax rate and benefit accruing to each zero-income household). The average values and bootstrapped standard deviations are reported in table 8, while table 9 reports the average difference in equilibrium tax rate and benefit. The equilibrium tax rate is 5.25% in the taxation-only case compared to 4.85% when donations are allowed. Private donations (on average \$1,874 per positive-income household) more than compensate for the loss in public support, resulting in a much higher benefit per zero-income

household in the case with charity (\$30,000 versus \$21,000)²².

²²To retrieve the average level of donations in the case with charity available we consider the preferred donation of each respondent for the two discrete levels of tax rate which are closest to the equilibrium level, weighting each by its distance to the equilibrium level.


Figure 6: Equilibrium tax rates and benefits of the simulations

(a) Additional tax rate in equilibrium



(b) Difference in equilibrium outcomes

Difference in outcomes with and without charity available




5.4 Welfare analysis

To conclude this section, we compute the societal welfare for each level of the additional tax rate based on our model for different levels of utility parameters. To compute the aggregate welfare, we first obtain the welfare of each positive-income household for each income level, depending on selected levels of the taste parameters (generosity α , warm glow γ , and reputation weight η). We then aggregate using the actual income weights of the US population. Finally, we add the utility of zero-income households (that only get utility from the public good), weighted by their fraction in the sample (15%).


The results of this exercise for different values of the generosity parameter (α) are reported in Figure 7b. The lines show how average household utility and average utility for positive-income households change for different levels of tax rate and utility parameters. Keeping warm glow and reputation weight fixed at 5%, higher generosity (10% versus 5%) results in a hump-shaped curve maximized by the intermediate tax rate, close to what we find in the data.

Figure 7a shows two separate components of the welfare analysis: the sum of squared differences in individual preferences for tax rates for both the case with (grey) and without (orange) charity; and the benefit accruing to each household in need for each tax rate level. For the first component, excessive tax rates result in higher deviations from individual preferences, but values above 5% (the minimizing rate) are less preferred when charity is present. The second component shows instead how, since the two lines (with and without charity) are nearly parallel, higher taxes imply no sizable trade-off in terms of donations, confirming the idea that a combination of the two channels is better than both corner solutions.

(a) Separate components of the welfare analysis by additional tax rate



(b) Warm glow fixed at 5%, reputational concerns at 5%



6 Background characteristics and in-game behavior

Four key in-game behavioral variables (donation rates, expectations about donation rates, the difference between the two, and preferred tax levels) determine the simulation results, for which we can examine partial correlations with respect to other relevant background characteristics. We average through the values across scenarios for each individual, then regress them on demographic information, attitudes towards inequity and fairness, the preferred size of unemployment benefits, and psychological factors (risk-aversion and patience as in [Falk et al., 2016](#), along with real-life charitable behavior. We construct principal components based on the variable groups of inequity attitudes and unemployment benefits due to their high cross-correlation, and we include those in the regressions.

Table 10 presents the OLS estimates of the regressions described above and displays the means and standard deviations for the outcome variables at the bottom. We can see that, on average, the in-game donation rates are close to the aggregates we observe in county-level data. As we already noted, the expectations of survey participants about the average donation rates do not match the realized average, as people overestimate how much others would donate by around 0.8 percentage points (23%). As a baseline, the positive relationship between real-life and in-game donation rates and the negative relationship between conservatism and preferred tax levels provide evidence of consistency between the survey respondents' in-game behavior and their in-life attributes.

Interestingly, our results point to in-game donation rates being lower for women. Conservative opinions also seem to associate negatively with the propensity to donate and the preferred level of taxes. In contrast, more inequity-averse individuals still prefer lower donations but have higher ideal tax rates. Surprisingly, Protestant self-identification does not seem to correlate strongly with own in-game donations or ideal tax rates; however, it negatively relates to expected donation rates. In addition, living in a predominantly Protestant area negatively correlates with preferred tax rates, showing the importance of majority religion on regional social norms as described by [Pugh \(1980\)](#). Volunteering also negatively correlates with in-game own and expected donations, suggesting that donation and volunteering might be substitutes rather than complements. Finally, being more forward-looking and

risk-averse are also negatively associated with donations, which is consistent with behavior that prioritizes higher savings against present expenditures, in this case, donations.

Table 10: In-survey behavior outcomes and participant background

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Donation rate	Expected donation rate	Preferred taxes	Donation difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tertiary educated	-0.150 (0.237)	0.450* (0.273)	-0.124 (0.261)	-0.519* (0.266)
Female	-0.466** (0.209)	-0.507** (0.241)	-0.366 (0.231)	0.007 (0.235)
Age 28-37	-0.554 (0.357)	-0.887** (0.411)	-0.723* (0.394)	0.044 (0.401)
Age 38-47	0.244 (0.393)	-0.238 (0.452)	-0.216 (0.433)	0.038 (0.441)
Age 48-57	-0.179 (0.390)	0.142 (0.449)	-0.344 (0.430)	-0.675 (0.438)
Age 58+	-0.584 (0.354)	-0.519 (0.408)	-0.494 (0.391)	-0.397 (0.398)
Black	0.277 (0.307)	0.508 (0.353)	-0.492 (0.339)	-0.339 (0.344)
Asian	-0.249 (0.364)	0.837** (0.419)	-0.713* (0.402)	-1.307*** (0.408)
Hispanic	0.441 (0.430)	0.472 (0.495)	0.235 (0.475)	0.018 (0.483)
Other	0.010 (0.343)	-0.671* (0.395)	-0.148 (0.379)	0.693* (0.385)
Majority religion is Protestant	-0.246 (0.234)	0.041 (0.270)	-0.598** (0.258)	-0.350 (0.263)
Own religion is Protestant	-0.038 (0.295)	-0.653* (0.339)	-0.022 (0.325)	0.649* (0.331)
Goes to church at least monthly	0.115 (0.228)	0.249 (0.262)	0.200 (0.251)	-0.128 (0.256)
Conservative scale	-0.126** (0.054)	-0.064 (0.062)	-0.173*** (0.060)	-0.047 (0.061)
log(real life donation rate+0.001)	0.190*** (0.072)	0.089 (0.083)	0.130 (0.079)	0.109 (0.081)
Real life donation rate is 0	0.378 (0.466)	0.547 (0.537)	0.201 (0.514)	-0.387 (0.523)
Real life regular volunteering	-0.411* (0.210)	-0.489** (0.242)	-0.021 (0.232)	-0.074 (0.236)
Inequity aversion princ. comp.	-0.348*** (0.079)	-0.188** (0.091)	0.135 (0.087)	-0.097 (0.089)
Unemployment benefit princ. comp.	0.190*** (0.064)	0.041 (0.074)	0.147** (0.071)	0.196*** (0.072)
Number of right answers	-0.441*** (0.119)	-0.499*** (0.137)	0.032 (0.132)	0.111 (0.134)
Forward-looking preferences	-0.070 (0.049)	-0.038 (0.056)	0.083 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.054)
Risk-loving preferences	-0.096** (0.043)	-0.086* (0.050)	-0.052 (0.048)	0.002 (0.049)
Married or cohabiting	-0.033 (0.250)	-0.532* (0.288)	-0.095 (0.276)	0.612** (0.281)
Number of children	0.128 (0.098)	0.267** (0.113)	0.030 (0.108)	-0.118 (0.110)
Constant	4.673*** (1.547)	4.185** (1.782)	5.618*** (1.706)	0.995 (1.735)
Observations	380	380	380	380
R ²	0.302	0.234	0.148	0.154
Adjusted R ²	0.246	0.173	0.080	0.086
Residual Std. Error (df = 351)	1.790	2.062	1.975	2.009

Notes: The population size of the respondent's area and the log of their estimated real-life income are also included in the regressions. We omitted them from the table to ease visibility as they are not statistically significant at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. Donation difference refers to the difference between the individual's own donation rate vs. their expected donation rate for the aggregate level.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7 Conclusion

Our results corroborate and extend several previous findings in the literature regarding the crowd-out between charity and the state, the drivers of charitable behavior, and individual behavior in public good games. By collecting and analyzing novel survey data, we provide evidence for the less-studied direction of charity crowding out the state in an abstract setting, connecting to the findings of [Sav \(2012\)](#), and [Werfel \(2018\)](#) amongst others. In our survey, we document that the other direction is also present: when taxes are higher, respondents choose to donate less. However, the relationship is not strictly monotonous for individual respondents or, on average. It suggests that even under the stylized and simplified conditions of our hypothetical scenarios, crowd-out might be only partial as people do not internalize the full effect of their choices on the public good provision, in line with the experimental findings of [Eckel et al. \(2005\)](#). We also find survey respondents to systematically overestimate the average donation rate in society compared to their realized average contribution, which might result in a sub-optimal public choice regarding poverty reduction. Our survey results are also in accord with the results of the county-level evidence in terms of signs, suggesting a negative association of donations with poverty and taxes.

In our stylized setting, the higher equilibrium tax rates characterizing the no-donations scenario are not enough to compensate for the loss of private charity in terms of benefits to the poor. This finding suggests that, in relative terms, people in our U.S. sample are less driven by inequity aversion (the weight given to the welfare of the households-in-need in the utility function) than warm glow. It corroborates the findings of [Null \(2011\)](#) that only a few donors are willing to pay to check whether their donations reach their declared target. This indicates that the act of charity itself might be driving individuals' donation behavior rather than the welfare of those that charity is designed to help.

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
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
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Figure 8: Donation rate: own behavior and expectations

(a) Donation rate by additional tax rate and level of income




(b) Expected donation rate by additional taxation level



Appendix

Figure 9: Donation rate: own behavior and expectations

(a) Donation rate by additional tax rate and level of income



(b) Expected donation rate by additional taxation level




Table 11: In-survey donations, donation rate, and expected donation rate on tax rates and income.

	<i>Donations (in \$ 1000)</i>	<i>Donation rate (%)</i>	<i>Expected donation rate (%)</i>
Intercept	1.443*** (0.072)	4.354*** (0.131)	5.055*** (0.146)
Income (in \$1000)	0.011*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.002)	
Tax rate (%)	-0.048*** (0.012)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.076*** (0.029)
Individual F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,420	3,420	1,140
R^2	0.665	0.610	0.759

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01