



GD32 SBSFU User Guide

Version1.0

◆ Introduction

Secure Boot and Secure Firmware Update ensure the integrity and authenticity of the device during the boot process, while ensuring that only trusted firmware can be loaded and executed. This document describes the implementation of secure boot and secure firmware update functions based on the GD32 MCU, as well as the methods of use.

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1 Terminology and Abbreviations

The professional terms and abbreviations used in this document are as shown in [Table 1-1. Common Acronym Comparison Table](#).

Table 1-1. Common Acronym Comparison Table

| Acronyms | Full Name | Chinese Terms |
|----------|---|---------------|
| API | Application programming interface | 应用程序接口 |
| IBL | Immutable bootloader | 不可变的引导加载程序 |
| IDE | Integrated Development Environment | 集成开发环境 |
| ISP | In system programming | 在系统可编程 |
| MBL | Main bootloader | 主要的引导加载程序 |
| OTP | One time programmable | 一次性可编程器件 |
| ROTPK | Root of trust public key | 信任根公钥 |
| SBSFU | Secure boot and secure firmware updates | 安全启动与安全固件更新 |

2 SBSFU Introduction

2.1 Introduction

The complexity and variability of the current device operating environment are continuously increasing, which makes it particularly important to prevent and avoid attacks and damage to the equipment. In view of this, the design and implementation of device security are indispensable. Among them, secure boot and secure firmware updates are key components of the device's secure operation, jointly ensuring the integrity, authenticity, and stability of the device during the boot process.

2.2 Features

- Fixed and unchangeable startup entry (the only startup entry);
- Only allow the execution of software code that has passed digital signature verification for integrity and authenticity;
- The safety boot code should be as simple, reliable, and universal as possible;
- Controlled code updates (methods and content of updates);
- Firmware updates are only allowed only when the updates firmware have passed integrity and authenticity checks.

2.3 Secure Boot

Secure Boot is a security mechanism implemented during the device boot process, designed to ensure that the device can only boot software that has been verified for integrity and authenticity through digital signatures:

- SPC or EFUSE ensures a unique boot entry point;
- Use SHA256 and asymmetric encryption to verify integrity and authenticity (currently using ECDSA-Secp256r1-SHA256);
- Random startup time;
- Support for FWDG, tamper detection, etc;
- Inspect the next phase of the code version;
- Delivery of status information;
- Support for the Mbed TLS encryption and decryption library;
- Export API;
- Support for hardware acceleration engines (HAU, CAU, PKCAU, and TRNG);
- SPC or EFUSE prohibits debugging and boot code from SRAM.

2.4 Secure firmware update

The secure firmware update refers to allowing updates only for firmware that has passed integrity and authenticity checks. The characteristics of secure firmware updates are as follows:

- Provide code updates for Ymodem protocol with serial port support;
- Check the integrity and authenticity of the update content, and only the firmware that passes the check can be updated;
- Support for anti-rollback and rollback.

3 SBSFU Project Introduction

3.1 Introduction


SBSFU is supported by three parts of code: IBL (fixed boot code), MBL (main boot code), and APP (user code). After the device is reset, the IBL code runs first, then the IBL verifies and starts the MBL, and finally, the MBL verifies and starts the user code, completing the boot process.

3.2 Project Structure

The SBSFU project directory structure can refer to [Figure 3-1. SBFU Project Directory Structure](#). The main parts and their functions are as follows:

- Configuration directory: Contains global configuration header files, which will be used in program compilation and script programs;
- Export directory: Contains export library files for IBL and MBL, IBL library files can be called in MBL and APP, MBL export library files can be used in APP;
- Platform directory: contains source files related to the MCU platform;
- Project directory: It contains the project files, currently only supports project management using KEIL IDE;
- Scripts directory: mainly includes the script programs used in the project;
- Source directory: It contains the main implementation code and test code files;
- Utilities directory: The directory where third-party source code is stored, such as mbedtls, shell, and MCUBOOT source code.

Figure 3-1. SBSFU Project Directory Structure




3.3 Software Framework

The software framework of the SBSFU project, as shown in [Figure 3-2. Software Framework](#), is mainly composed of three parts:

- IBL: Includes the standard C library, encryption and decryption library, IBL's API, Ymodem update code through serial port, and verifies MBL and if verify passed then executes MBL;
- MBL: Contains the main boot-up functions, verified and executed by IBL, MBL also verifies the APP image, and after passing the verification, it executes the APP;
- APP: User code, verified and executed by MBL.

Figure 3-2. Software Framework




3.4 FLASH Layout

The FLASH layout of the SBSFU project, as shown in [Figure 3-3. FLASH Layout](#).

- IBL can be executed on the chip in the FLASH or OTP1 area (such as GD32F5xx, which supports loading IBL to the OTP1 area for execution), and it is stored in FLASH by default; ROTPK is also stored in FLASH by default, but on GD32F5xx, it supports setting it to the OTP2 area.


Figure 3-3. FLASH Layout



3.5 Trust Chain and Implementation of the Trust Chain


The trust chain of the SBSFU project is shown in [Figure 3-4. Trust chain](#). As indicated in the trust chain, after the system starts up, the IBL code will run first. Then, the IBL will verify the MBL code, and after passing the verification, it will execute the MBL code. The MBL code will verify the APP code, and after passing the verification, it will execute the APP code.

Figure 3-4. Trust chain



The implementation of the trust chain in the SBSFU project is shown in [Figure 3-5. Implementation of the Trust Chain](#). Taking IBL as an example, asymmetric SECP256R1 is used for signature and verification. The public key is stored in FLASH or OTP2. The SHA256 hash value of the public key is appended to the end of the MBL image, along with the SHA256 hash value of the MBL and the signature value of the MBL image signed with the private key. IBL will verify the validity of the public key by checking the hash of the public key, determine the validity of the image through the image's hash, and finally complete the verification of the integrity and authenticity of the image through the signature information. The process of MBL verifying the APP is similar to the verification process of IBL, and currently, the same public key is used for IBL and MBL verification.


Figure 3-5. Implementation of the Trust Chain



3.6 Implementation of Firmware Update

The SBSFU project supports firmware updates using the serial port YMODEM protocol, and the implementation of firmware updates is shown in [Figure 3-6. Firmware Update](#).

Figure 3-6. Firmware Update



After the system starts up, the IBL (Initial Boot Loader) code will run first. If there is a need to update, the IBL code can update the MBL (Main Boot Loader) firmware area code through the serial port. The APP's firmware is divided into two areas, "Firmware0" and "Firmware1". The "Firmware0" area is the execution area, and the "Firmware1" area is the firmware update area. If there is a need for APP firmware update, MBL can update the APP firmware to the update area through the serial port, and the APP also supports updating the APP firmware to the APP firmware update area. After each firmware update is completed, the system will be reset by software and restarted.

4 IBL Project

The IBL project is one of the trust anchors of the SBSFU project. After the system starts, the IBL project should be executed first, followed by the execution of software code that has passed integrity and authenticity checks by the IBL, to complete the system's boot process. The IBL also integrates basic security code such as the mbedTLS encryption and decryption library, chip drivers, and firmware updates. Its main functions and features are as follows:


After the reset, the code that is to be executed should start first;

- Support for the mbedTLS encryption and decryption library, and the export of the encryption and decryption library;
- Firmware update implementation of Ymodem protocol over serial port;
- Directly obtain ROTPK;
- Support the verification of the integrity and authenticity of MBL before executing it;
- Support for the management of the MBL version;
- Implement device-level security feature configuration and detection;
- Delivery of exported IBL API and IBL initialization status information.

4.1 IBL Project Code File Structure

The file structure of the IBL project is shown in [Figure 4-1. IBL Project Code File Structure](#). It mainly includes the chip's low-level driver library, the mbedTLS encryption and decryption library, the standard C library, the API code, the image signature verification, MBL image update and jump to execute MBL code.


Figure 4-1. IBL Project Code File Structure



4.2 Image Authentication

The firmware signature verification process is shown in [Figure 4-2. Signature Verification Process](#). The verification process begins by verifying the correctness of the image header, checking the Magic word and version number respectively. Then, TLV verification is performed, checking the Magic word, Total Size, hash/signature/public key length, and public key. Based on the offset value set by the system, it is determined whether each part has been verified. Once completed, the information is saved and the next step is proceeded with.

Figure 4-2. Signature Verification Process



4.3 IBL Updates MBL


In IBL, a YMODEM protocol implemented through a serial port is provided to update the firmware of MBL, and its implementation process is shown in [Figure 4-3. IBL Updates MBL](#).

1. First, it will determine whether the error handling status in the system status is "ERR_PROCESS_ENTER_ISP". If so, it indicates that updating the MBL firmware through the serial port is allowed;
2. In wait_second, check if there is any data input from the serial port; if there is, proceed with the YMODEM protocol firmware upgrade; if not, move on to the step of verifying the image;
3. If the firmware update is successful, the system will restart; if the update fails, the system will enter an error handling state.

Note:

The error handling status can be set and retrieved through the IBL APL: `ibl_API ibl_sys_status_set` and `ibl_sys_status_get`.


Figure 4-3. IBL Updates MBL



4.4 The Boot Process of IBL

The boot process of IBL, as shown in [Figure 4-4. IBL Boot Process](#), configures the corresponding peripherals after system reset for the subsequent signature authentication process. Then it determines whether firmware update is needed. If an update is required, it completes the firmware update and restarts. After a period of delay, it starts to verify the firmware. If the verification passes, it jumps to MBL; otherwise, it enters an infinite loop and waits for the next reset.

Figure 4-4. IBL Boot Process



4.5 Exported Libraries and API Interfaces of IBL

In order to improve the usage rate of code, IBL will export the adapted mbedtls encryption and decryption library and some API interfaces, so that these exported functional libraries can be used in the MBL and APP projects. The exported library of IBL is mainly divided into two parts: the encryption and decryption library of mbedtls and the API interface. The exported library of mbedtls mainly includes common encryption and decryption interfaces, which are not described in detail here. The API interfaces exported by IBL can refer to [Table 4-1. API Interface](#).

Table 4-1. API Interface

| Function Name | Description |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|
| ibl_log_uart_init | serial port initialization |
| ibl_printf | formatted serial port printing |
| ibl_uart_putc | serial port character printing |
| ibl_trace_ex | serial port trace printing |
| ibl_rand | random number acquisition |
| ibl_set_mutex_func | mutex addition |

| Function Name | Description |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| ibl_memset | string assignment |
| ibl_memcmp | string copy |
| ibl_strlen | string length calculation |
| ibl_strncmp | string comparison |
| ibl_uart_rx_to | serial port reception handling |
| ibl_strtoul | string to decimal conversion |
| ibl_cal_checksum | checksum calculation |
| ibl_img_verify_sign | signature verification |
| ibl_img_verify_hash | hash value verification |
| ibl_img_verify_hdr | image header verification |
| ibl_img_verify_pkhsh | public key hash verification |
| ibl_img_validate | image verification |
| ibl_sys_setting_get | get system configuration |
| ibl_sys_status_set | set system status |
| ibl_sys_status_get | set system status |
| ibl_sys_set_trace_level | set system trace level |
| ibl_sys_set_err_process | set system error handling |
| ibl_sys_set_img_flag | set image flag (not enabled) |
| ibl_sys_reset_img_flag | reset image flag (not enabled) |
| ibl_sys_set_running_img | set running image (not enabled) |
| ibl_sys_set_fw_ver | set firmware version (not enabled) |
| ibl_sys_set_pk_ver | set public key version |
| ibl_sys_set_trng_seed | set random number seed |
| ibl_jump_to_img | jump to execute image |
| ibl_ymodem_download_check | Ymodem update check |
| ibl_is_valid_flash_offset | FLASH offset legitimacy judgment |
| ibl_is_valid_flash_addr | FLASH address legitimacy judgment |
| ibl_flash_total_size | get total size of FLASH |
| ibl_flash_erase_size | get erase size of FLASH |
| ibl_flash_init | FLASH Initialization |
| ibl_flash_read | read FLASH |
| ibl_flash_write | write FLASH |
| ibl_flash_write_fast | fast Write FLASH (not enabled) |
| ibl_flash_erase | erase FLASH |
| ibl_fmc_unlock | unlock FLASH |
| ibl_fmc_lock | lock FLASH |
| ibl_fmc_flag_clear | clear FLASH flags |
| ibl_fmc_page_erase | erase FLASH page |

| Function Name | Description |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| ibl_fmc_mass_erase | erase entire FLASH |
| ibl_fmc_word_program | flash word programming |
| ibl_fwdg_reload | FWDG feed dog |

4.6 IBL Status information

Before IBL completes the boot process and jumps to MBL, some status information is handed over to MBL through SRAM. This status information is called the initial boot status. In MBL, the initial boot status information can be used to obtain the required boot information, such as the MBL public key. [Table 4-2. Initial Boot State Information](#) shows the content of the initial boot status information.

Table 4-2. Initial Boot State Information

| Information Name | Description |
|------------------|-------------------------------|
| reset_flag | reset flag |
| boot_status | boot status |
| ibl_ver | IBL version |
| ibl_opt | IBL configuration information |
| impl_id | implemented ID (not enabled) |
| mbl_pk | MBL public key |
| mbl_info | MBL information (not enabled) |

5 MBL Project


The MBL project is the boot code for the second phase of the SBSFU project. The MBL itself is verified and loaded by the IBL. Its main function is to complete the boot and loading of the application code. To meet the boot and loading functions of the application code, MCUBOOT is adapted in MBL, and the currently supported and verified features are as follows:

- Currently, MBL supports single-image dual-slot APP image management, where slot 0 (primary slot) is the execution area for APP code, and slot 1 (secondary slot, second slot, or scratch slot) is the update area for the APP;
- Support YMODEM protocol via serial port to update the APP code to the update area;
- Support verification of the integrity and authenticity of the APP code before updating and executing the APP code;
- Support the exchange and rollback function of the dual-slot app code, and support power-off recovery during the exchange period;
- Support version management of app code.

5.1 MBL Project File Structure

The file structure of the MBL engineering code is shown in [Figure 5-1. MBL Engineering Code File Structure](#). It mainly includes the MCUBOOT code, IBL API, and the exported library of IBL mbedtls to achieve the management of updating, verification, and execution of the APP firmware.

Figure 5-1. MBL Engineering Code File Structure



5.2 APP Image Exchange Type


Before MBL exchanges the APP firmware, it first determines the type of firmware exchange based on the trailer information in the APP slot. The content of the trailer information can refer to the layout of the FLASH.

Table 5-1. trailer information and exchange type

| Information Name | Value | Description |
|------------------|-----------------------|---|
| swap type | BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_NONE | attempt to boot slot0 content |
| | BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_TEST | switch to the slot1, if not confirmed, restore on next boot. |
| | BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_PERM | permanently switch to the slot1 |
| | BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_REVERT | switch back to the slot1 after confirmation, change this status to none switch failed |
| | BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_FAIL | switch failed |
| | BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_PANIC | encountered an unrecoverable error during switch |
| copy done | BOOT_FLAG_SET | flag is set |
| | BOOT_FLAG_BAD | flag is illegal |
| | BOOT_FLAG_UNSET | flag is not set |
| | BOOT_FLAG_ANY | flag is irrelevant (used only for control) |
| image ok | BOOT_FLAG_SET | flag is set |
| | BOOT_FLAG_BAD | flag is illegal |
| | BOOT_FLAG_UNSET | flag is not set |
| | BOOT_FLAG_ANY | flag is irrelevant (used only for control) |
| magic | BOOT_MAGIC_GOOD | magic is good |
| | BOOT_MAGIC_BAD | magic is illegal |
| | BOOT_MAGIC_UNSET | magic is not set |
| | BOOT_MAGIC_ANY | magic is irrelevant (used only for control) |
| | BOOT_MAGIC_NOTGOOD | magic is abnormal (used only for control) |

The trailer information and the values descriptions of the exchange types can refer to [Table 5-1. trailer information and exchange type](#). The trailer information and exchange types. [Figure 5-2. Confirmation of Exchange Types](#) shows the process of confirming the exchange type. Among them, the "BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_TEST" exchange type, if the exchange is completed without confirmation (setting the image OK information after the exchange to BOOT_FLAG_SET), after the next restart, a "BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_REVERT" exchange will be performed, swapping back to the firmware in the secondary slot.

Figure 5-2. Confirmation of Exchange Types



5.3 Change of Trailer Information

Different types of swaps will lead to different changes in the trailer information of the slot. The basic types of swaps and the changes in trailer information can refer to [Figure 5-3. Modification of trailer information](#). The "BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_NONE" swap will not cause any changes in the trailer information. After the "BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_TEST" swap, the image ok can be manually set, so that the next reset will not produce a "BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_REVERT" swap. The "BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_PERM" swap is permanent and will not undergo a rollback swap.

Figure 5-3. Modification of trailer information



5.4 MBL Boot Process

The overall startup process of MBL is shown in [Initially, after the system](#) boots up, since the internal oscillator is no longer utilized, the system clock and certain peripherals (such as the serial port) will be reinitialized;


1. Subsequently, the status information of the IBL is obtained, and the ROTPK for firmware signature verification is extracted from the IBL's status information;
2. Then, stack space is allocated for mbedTLS, and once this is done, the mbedTLS library exported by the IBL can be utilized within the MBL project;
3. Following this, it is determined whether a firmware update is necessary. If an update is required, the firmware is updated and the system is rebooted. The firmware update process is similar to how the IBL updates the MBL, but the difference lies in the fact that the MBL updates the APP firmware and places it into the slot1;

4. Next, the type of image swap is retrieved and assessed from the tail information of both the slot0 and slot1;
5. If the swap type indicates that an image swap is necessary, proceed to step 7; otherwise, go to step 9;
6. Verify the slot1 and check the version information; if the verification fails, proceed to step 9;
7. The slot1 is valid, the images of the slot0 and slot1 are swapped, and the valid flag for the image in the slot 0 is set;
8. Verify the image in the primary slot; if the verification is successful, attempt to execute the primary slot. If the verification fails, enter a loop and wait for the system to reboot.

Figure 5-4. MBL Boot Process.

9. Initially, after the system boots up, since the internal oscillator is no longer utilized, the system clock and certain peripherals (such as the serial port) will be reinitialized;
10. Subsequently, the status information of the IBL is obtained, and the ROTPK for firmware signature verification is extracted from the IBL's status information;
11. Then, stack space is allocated for mbedTLS, and once this is done, the mbedTLS library exported by the IBL can be utilized within the MBL project;
12. Following this, it is determined whether a firmware update is necessary. If an update is required, the firmware is updated and the system is rebooted. The firmware update process is similar to how the IBL updates the MBL, but the difference lies in the fact that the MBL updates the APP firmware and places it into the slot1;
13. Next, the type of image swap is retrieved and assessed from the tail information of both the slot0 and slot1;
14. If the swap type indicates that an image swap is necessary, proceed to step 7; otherwise, go to step 9;
15. Verify the slot1 and check the version information; if the verification fails, proceed to step 9;
16. The slot1 is valid, the images of the slot0 and slot1 are swapped, and the valid flag for the image in the slot 0 is set;
17. Verify the image in the primary slot; if the verification is successful, attempt to execute the primary slot. If the verification fails, enter a loop and wait for the system to reboot.

Figure 5-4. MBL Boot Process



5.5 Exported Library of MBL

As previously mentioned, after completing the exchange and firmware update, the APP code will set the magic number of the tail information and the image validity flag. For this reason, MBL will export some interface functions for the APP to call. The exported library interface of MBL can be referred to [Table 5-2. MBL Export Library Interface](#).

Table 5-2. MBL Export Library Interface

| Function Name | Description |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| flash_area_open | open FLASH area |
| boot_write_magic | write magic number |
| boot_write_image_ok | write image validity |

6 APP Project


The APP project is the final code in the SBSFU project that completes the boot and execution after passing integrity and authenticity verification, which can be considered as trusted firmware. Currently, the implementation of APP is relatively simple, mainly realizing the following functions:

- Integrated with letter-shell as a serial port interrupt tool;
- Supports updating the firmware to the slot 1 via the APP in slot 0;
- Support API for IBL export and export the mbedTLS library;
- Support partial testing features.

6.1 APP Project Code File Structure

The file structure of the APP project code is shown in [Figure 6-1. APP project code file structure](#). It mainly includes the letter-shell code, test code, IBL API, and the exported library of IBL mbedtls to achieve the firmware update of the APP.

Figure 6-1. APP project code file structure



6.2 APP shell Commands

In the serial terminal, you can list the currently supported commands through the help command. [Figure 6-2. APP shell command](#) shows all the currently supported commands.

Figure 6-2. APP shell command

```

COMMAND LIST:

help          --command help
cls           --clear command line
reboot       --reboot system
ymodem_update --ymodem update image
app_test     --run app testsuit

#>>
  
```

For an introduction to shell commands, please refer to [Table 6-1. Shell Commands and Descriptions](#).

Table 6-1. Shell Commands and Descriptions


| Command Name | Description |
|---------------|---|
| help | help command, capable of listing all supported commands |
| cls | clear screen command, clears the terminal screen |
| reboot | software reset and reboot |
| ymodem_update | Ymodem protocol to download APP firmware to the auxiliary slot |
| app_test | Run test code (currently only used for verifying IBL's mbed TLS exported libraries) |

7 Implementation of SBSFU Project on GD32F5XX

7.1 Project Compilation

The SBSFU project for GD32F5xx is managed by the Keil IDE and can be opened by the SBSFU project group through "Project/GD32F5xx/MDK-ARM/SBSFU.uvmpw". As shown in [Figure 7.1. SBSFU Project Group](#), the SBSFU project group contains three independent projects: IBL, MBL, and APP. By using the "Batch Build" button shown in the figure, all projects can be compiled at once. After the compilation is completed, images that can be downloaded to the chip will be generated in the "scripts/images" directory.

Figure 7.1. SBSFU Project Group



The generated image can refer to [Table 7-1. Generated Image](#). The generated image. Where mbl-sys.hex will be copied to "MBL/mbl/Objects/mbl.hex", and then can be directly downloaded using the MBL project. The app-sign.hex and app-sign1.hex files will be copied

to "APP/app/Objects/app.hex" and "APP/app/Objects/app1.hex" respectively, and then the file can be downloaded using the APP project.

Note:

"mbl-sys.hex" is the file that contains system configuration information, and it must be downloaded with the configuration information included during the initial download.

Table 7-1. Generated Image

| Image Name | Description | Usage |
|---------------|---|---------------------------------|
| ibl.bin | IBL image in bin format | directly usable for downloading |
| ibl.hex | IBL image in hex format | directly usable for downloading |
| mbl.bin | MBL image in bin format with image header and signature information added | temporary file |
| mbl-sign.bin | MBL image in bin format with image header and signature information added | for MBL update |
| mbl-sys.bin | MBL image in bin format with image header, signature information, and system design information | for the initial download file |
| mbl-sys.hex | MBL image in hex format with image header, signature information, and system design information added | for the initial download file |
| app.bin | original APP Image in bin format | temporary file |
| app-sign.bin | APP image in bin format with image header and signature information added | for App update |
| app-sign.hex | APP image in hex format with image header and signature information added 1 | directly usable for downloading |
| app-sign1.hex | APP image in hex format with image header and signature information added 2 | directly usable for downloading |

7.2 Project Download and Verification

■ Download the IBL project

The IBL code is the first code to be executed, so there is no need for special treatment, so it can be downloaded and debugged just like a regular project.


■ Download the MBL project

After the MBL project is compiled, a tool program will add the firmware header, firmware signature, and system setting information to the MBL executable code, and then generate "mbl-sys.hex" in the "scripts/images" directory. Subsequently, "mbl-sys.hex" is used to replace the original "mbl.hex" in the project. Both of these files can be downloaded. Here, you can directly use Keil to download the "mbl.hex" file to the chip. For reference, see [Figure 7-1. MBL project download](#) for MBL project downloading, the modified executable file name is changed to "mbl.hex". You don't need to compile the project directly, just download it.

Notes:

- When downloading the code as described above, if you wish to recompile, you need to first modify the executable file name to “mbl”;
- The “mbl-sys.hex” image can be used of the initial download, while the updated firmware should use “mbl-sign.bin”

Figure 7-1. MBL project download



■ Download The APP Project

The download of the APP project can refer to the MBL project, where the app.hex can download the image to the main slot, and the app1.hex can download the image to the auxiliary slot.

■ SBSFU Project Verification

After all projects are correctly downloaded, If the serial port output is as shown in [Figure 7-2. SBSFU Project Serial Project Output](#), it indicates that the project is running correctly.

Note:

The secure boot project defaults to using USART0 with a baud rate of 115200

Figure 7-2. SBSFU Project Serial Project Output

```

ALW: GIGA DEVICE
INF: Get ROTPK form flash.
ALW: IBL version 1.1
ALW: Reset by pin.
INF: Sys status checked OK.
ALW: IBL wait for ymodem download OS
INF: MBL version: 1.0.0, Local: 1.0.0
ALW: Validate MBL Image OK.
INF: local version: 1.0.0
ALW: Update MBL version to 1.0.0
ALW: Jump to MBL.
ALW: MBL version is 1.0.0
ALW: MBL wait for ymodem download OS
INF: Primary image: magic=good, swap_type=0x2, copy_done=0x1, image_ok=0x1
INF: Scratch: magic=unset, swap_type=0x1, copy_done=0x3, image_ok=0x3
INF: Boot source: none
INF: Image index: 0, Swap type: none
INF: validate primary solt succeed.
ALW: Jump to APP
ALW: APP image version is 1.0.0
DBG: writing image_ok; fa_id=0 off=0xx (0xx)

+=====+
|               Letter shell v2.0.8               |
|               SBSFU for GD32MCU                 |
|               Build: Jun  6 2024 17:40:13         |
+=====+

#>>

```


7.3 Firmware Update

The implementation of firmware updates can refer to the implementation of firmware updates. This section will mainly introduce how to update the MBL and APP firmware, and the terminal software uses SecureCRT 7.3.3.

7.4 APP Firmware Update


The firmware update of the APP can follow these steps, as shown in [Figure 7-3. Terminal sends update command](#). To send an update command, enter the "ymodem_update" command in the terminal. After that, the device will wait for the update confirmation (the user can input any character in the terminal, such as pressing the space key to confirm the update). Before the countdown ends, if the device confirms the need for an update, it will keep outputting 'C' to wait for the update.

Figure 7-3. Terminal sends update command



After the device enters the waiting for update state, refer to [Figure 7-4. Terminal sends firmware update](#). The terminal sends the firmware update from the terminal to the device. After the update is successful, the device will be reset and restarted by the software.

Figure 7-4. Terminal sends firmware update



The update process and the log printing after the device restart can be referred to as [Figure 7-5. Terminal Update Log Printing](#). From the log, it can be found that after the restart, the MBL program will perform a test exchange, swapping the image in the secondary slot to the primary slot, completing the update of the APP firmware.

Figure 7-5. Terminal Update Log Printing

```
Starting ymodem transfer. Press Ctrl+C to cancel.
Transferring app-sign.bin...
 100%    11 KB    11 KB/sec    00:00:01    0 Errors

DBG: writing magic; fa_id=1 off=0xx (0xx)
ALW: Ymodem update success, system reboot.
ALW: GIGA DEVICE
INF: Get ROTPK form flash.
ALW: IBL version 1.1
ALW: Reset by sw.
INF: Sys status checked OK.
ALW: IBL wait for ymodem download OS
INF: MBL version: 1.0.0, Local: 1.0.0
ALW: Validate MBL Image OK.
INF: local version: 1.0.0
ALW: Update MBL version to 1.0.0
ALW: Jump to MBL.
ALW: MBL version is 1.0.0
ALW: MBL wait for ymodem download OS
INF: Primary image: magic=good, swap_type=0x2, copy_done=0x1, image_ok=0x1
INF: Scratch: magic=unset, swap_type=0x1, copy_done=0x3, image_ok=0x3
INF: Boot source: none
INF: Image index: 0, Swap type: test
INF: Starting swap using scratch algorithm.
DBG: erasing scratch area
DBG: initializing status; fa_id=2
DBG: writing swap_info; fa_id=2 off=0xx (0xx), swap_type=0x1fd8 image_num=0x83fd8
DBG: writing swap_size; fa_id=2 off=0xx (0xx)
DBG: writing magic; fa_id=2 off=0xx (0xx)
DBG: erasing trailer; fa_id=0
DBG: initializing status; fa_id=0
DBG: writing swap_info; fa_id=0 off=0xx (0xx), swap_type=0xfffd8 image_num=0x19ffd8
DBG: writing swap_size; fa_id=0 off=0xx (0xx)
DBG: writing magic; fa_id=0 off=0xx (0xx)
DBG: erasing trailer; fa_id=1
DBG: erasing scratch area
DBG: writing copy_done; fa_id=0 off=0xx (0xx)
INF: validate primary solt succeed.
ALW: Jump to APP
ALW: APP image version is 1.0.0
DBG: writing image_ok; fa_id=0 off=0xx (0xx)

+=====+
|               Letter shell v2.0.8               |
|               SBSFU for GD32MCU                  |
|               Build: Jun  7 2024 14:45:22         |
+=====+

#>>
```

7.5 MBL Firmware Update

The MBL firmware can be updated through IBL. As shown in the first countdown of the SBSFU project startup in [Figure 7-6. MBL Update](#), the MBL update can be confirmed (the confirmation process is similar to the APP update). After that, the updated firmware can be sent to the device through terminal software to complete the firmware update. After a successful update, the device will also reset and restart.

Figure 7-6. MBL Update

```

ALW: GIGA_DEVICE
INF: Get ROTPK form flash.
ALW: IBL version 1.1
ALW: Reset by pin.
INF: Sys status checked OK.
ALW: IBL wait for ymodem download 2S
  
```

7.5.1 MBL Updates the APP

APP firmware can also be updated through MBL, and the update confirmation (similar to the APP update process) can be made during the second countdown when the SBSFU project is launched, and the firmware update can be completed.

7.6 Implementation of Flash layout

The overall FLASH layout of the SBSFU project can refer to [Figure 3-3. FLASH Layout](#) where the FLASH layouts of IBL, MBL, and APP can be configured through the files "Platform/IBL/ibl_region.h", "Platform/MBL/mb1_region.h", and "Platform/APP/app_region.h" respectively. The main configuration macros used can be referred to in [Table 7-2. FLASH Layout Configuration Macros](#).

Table 7-2. FLASH Layout Configuration Macros


| Command Name | Description | Default Value |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| IBL | | |
| FLASH_BASE_IBL | base address of IBL | 0x08000000 |
| IBL_CODE_START | starting address of IBL Code | 0x08000000 |
| IBL_CODE_SIZE | size of IBL code | 0x4000 |
| FLASH_BASE_LIB | base address of IBL library | 0x08004000 |
| FLASH_LIB_START | starting address of IBL library | 0x08004000 |
| FLASH_LIB_SIZE | size of IBL library | 0x50000 |
| FLASH_OFFSET_SYS_SETTING | offset address of system setting data | 0x60000 |
| MBL | | |
| MBL_BASE_ADDRESS | base address of MBL | 0x08061200 |
| MBL_CODE_START | starting address of MBL code | 0x08061200 |
| MBL_CODE_SIZE | size of MBL code | 0x1E00 |
| APP | | |
| APP_CODE_START | starting address of APP code | 0x080A0200 |
| APP_CODE_SIZE | size of APP code | 0xFFE00 |

7.7 SBSFU Project Asymmetric Key Configuration

7.7.1 Generation of New Keys

Currently, the SBSFU project uses SECP256R1 for signature and verification. In the "scripts/certs" directory, there is a "gen-secp256r1_key.bat" script provided, which can be used to generate a SECP256R1 key pair. By double-clicking the BAT script, a SECP256R1 key pair will be generated as shown in [Figure 7-7. Generate a SECP256R1 Key Pair](#).

Figure 7-7. Generate a SECP256R1 Key Pair



The files and functions in the "scripts/certs" directory can refer to [Table 7-3. Description of Key and Certificate Files](#).

Table 7-3. Description of Key and Certificate Files

| Command Name | Description |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| ec_secp256r1_prikey.pem | default secp256r1 private key, the script for generating the APP and MBL images will use this file. |
| pub_key.bin | file saved in bin format of the default secp256r1 public key. |
| gen-secp256r1_key.bat | script for generating secp256r1 keys, running it will generate the following three files. |
| mcuboot_secp256r1_public_key.bin | the public key stored in hexadecimal format generated by gen-secp256r1_key.bat, which can be used for downloading to the OTP2 area |
| mcuboot_secp256r1.pem | the PEM format private key generated by gen -secp256r1_key.bat, which can be used to replace ec_secp256r1_prikey.pem. |
| mcuboot_secp256r1_private_key.txt | the private key stored in hexadecimal format generate by gen-secp256r1_key.bat, which can be used for signing |
| mcuboot_secp256r1_public_key.txt | the private key stored in hexadecimal format generate by gen-secp256r1_key.bat, which can be used for verification. |

7.7.2 Adaptation of New Keys

If you need to adapt to a new key, you need to make modifications in the following two places:

- Private key adaptation for MBL and APP image generation script.

Generate the private key adaptation for the image generation script, taking MBL as an example, it needs to adapt to the position shown in [Figure 7-8. Adapt Private Key](#). The private key adaptation for the APP image generation script is similar to that of MBL.

Figure 7-8. Adapt Private Key

```

afterbuild.py X
Project > afterbuild.py > sysset_gen
19 from scripts.scripts_mcuboot.gentool import Assembly
20 from scripts.scripts_mcuboot.hextool import convert_to_hex
21 from scripts.scripts_mcuboot.imgtool.main import sign
22
23 ROTPK = ROOT + "/scripts/certs/ec_secp256r1_prikey.pem"
24 CONFIG_FILE = ROOT + "/config/config_gdm32.h"
25 IMGTOOL = ROOT + "/scripts/scripts_mcuboot/imgtool.py"
26 SREC_CAT = ROOT + "/scripts/scripts_mcuboot/srec_cat.exe"
27
  
```

- Public Key Adaptation in IBL Engineering

When adapting a public key, if you are using a public key stored in FLASH (which is the default storage location), you need to write the hexadecimal data of the public key to the location shown in [Figure 7-9. Adapting public key](#) for public key adaptation.

Figure 7-9. Adapting public key

```

C ibl_key.c 2 X
Source > IBL_Source > C ibl_key.c > ...
22 };
23 #elif SIGN_ALGO_SET == IMG_SIG_ECDSA256
24 static const uint8_t flash_rotpk[IMG_PK_LEN] = {
25     0xce, 0x43, 0xb2, 0xfc, 0x3a, 0x04, 0x15, 0x20,
26     0x82, 0xe7, 0xc5, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x3d, 0x93, 0xb2,
27     0x82, 0x55, 0xc2, 0x19, 0x97, 0x13, 0x32, 0x05,
28     0x5a, 0x01, 0x6f, 0x07, 0x72, 0x47, 0x46, 0xbd,
29     0x77, 0xb7, 0x66, 0xda, 0x7c, 0xe4, 0x07, 0x2d,
30     0xec, 0xa0, 0x23, 0x8e, 0x88, 0x49, 0x35, 0x37,
31     0xc4, 0x62, 0xe7, 0x7b, 0x32, 0x2c, 0xfe, 0x04,
32     0xe7, 0xb2, 0x4c, 0x54, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0x80
33 };
34 #endif /* SIGN_ALGO_SET */
35 #endif /* GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTpk */
36
  
```


7.8 Adapt the public key to the OTP2 area

The OTP2 area of the GD32F5xx supports read and write locking configurations, making it very suitable for storing public keys with higher security requirements. To write the public key into the OTP2 area and use it normally, the following operations and modifications need to be made:

- Write the public key into the OTP2 area and set appropriate read and write locking.

Write the public key into the OTP2 area, you can use the "GD32AllInOneProgrammer.exe" software, and refer to [Figure 7-10. Write the public key into the OTP2 area](#).

Figure 7-10. Write the public key into the OTP2 area




Notes:

- The GD32AllInOneProgrammer.exe Software requires launching from the Bootloader area;
- The current code defaults to using the first 64 bytes of the OTP2 area to store the public key;
- The OTP area only supports one-time programming, and the lock block bytes can only be programmed once from 0xFF to 0x00.

- Public key adaptation in the IBL project

In the IBL project, the macro "GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTTPK" is enabled as shown in [Figure 7-11. IBL project uses OTP2 to store public keys](#). The OTP2 area will be set to read-locked by the code after the IBL reads the key, so that the subsequent code can no longer read the OTP2 area, and MBL can only obtain the public key through the status information of IBL.

Figure 7-11. IBL project uses OTP2 to store public keys



```
C ibl_def.h x
Source > IBL_Source > C ibl_def.h > LOG_UART
46  ... if defined INNER_ROTTPK_EFUSE need to be set 0
47  */
48  // #define GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTTPK
49
50  #if defined GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTTPK
51  #define GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTTPK_ADDR ... (0xFF20000)
52  #endif /* GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTTPK */
53
54  #endif /* PLATFORM_GD32F5XX */
55
56  /* support platform console */
57  #define LOG_UART USART0
```


7.9 Adapt IBL to the OTP1 Area

The default placement of the IBL project in SBSFU is in the FLASH. However, on the GD32F5xx chip, there is a 128KB OTP1 area that supports read and write lock configurations, which is suitable for running the IBL project. The SBSFU project also supports configuring the IBL to run in the OTP1 area. The following modifications are needed when using it:

- Modify the IBL project.

In the IBL project, it is necessary to enable the macro "GD32F5XX_OTP1_USED", and there are two places that need to be modified, which can be referred to [Figure 7-12. IBL is adapted to the OTP1 region](#).


Figure 7-12. IBL is adapted to the OTP1 region



- In the MBL and APP projects, the enable macro "GD32F5XX_OPT1_USED" is also required. For modifications in the MBL, you can refer to [Figure 7-13. MBL modification](#) (modifications

for the APP project can refer to the MBL project).

Figure 7-13. MBL modification




- Modify the "config/config_gdm32.h" configuration file, and change the macro RE_FLASH_BASE to 0x08000000.

- Use the GD32AllInOneProgrammer.exe adapter to IBL into the OTP1 area.

After correctly modifying the project and compiling it successfully, an ibl.bin file will be generated in the "scripts/mages" directory. The ibl.bin file is the final executable file for IBL. You can use the GD32AllInOneProgrammer.exe software to download the code and configure OTP1 to be write-locked. For specific steps, you can refer to [Figure 7-14. Download IBL to the OTP1](#).

Figure 7-14. Download IBL to the OTP1




Note:

- Since the OTP1 area is only 128KB, some functions of the IBL may be missing;
- The read lock for OTP1 has not yet been implemented;
- To boot the chip from the OTP1 area, the BTFOSEL bit needs to be set, which is located in the EFUSE, and once enabled, it cannot be undone.

7.10 Locking for Boot Entry

For secure boot, it is necessary to ensure a unique entry point, and after reset, the code of IBL should be run first instead of other code. For the GD32F5xx, it is recommended to configure the chip for high-level security protection and EFUSE settings to achieve this purpose. It is recommended to use the GD32AllInOneProgrammer.exe software for configuration. For the specific steps of configuring the chip for high-level security protection, you can refer to [Figure 7-15. Configuring high-level security protection](#).

Figure 7-15. Configuring high-level security protection



Note:

- Once configured to a high security protection level, it cannot be undone, and debugging with a debugger will not be possible;
- After being set to a high security protection level; the option bytes cannot be modified;
- After being set to a high security protection level; it will not be possible to start from RAM and the Bootloader


7.11 Dual-bank Switching Feature

The GD32F5xx series of chips supports a dual-bank flash memory structure for some series, and can support the exchange of BANK0 and BANK1 areas, which can be used to achieve the update of the APP image. For more detailed content about dual-bank, please refer to the "GD32F5xx User Manual". The GD32 SBSFU project has been adapted for dual-bank switching on GD32F5xx devices to achieve the update of the APP image (currently only supports 7.5M on-chip flash memory chips).

7.11.1 Enabling Dual-bank

In the SBSFU project, the "config/config_gdm32_otp_bankswp.h" configuration file is provided. When the dual-bank function is needed, the content in the "config/config_gdm32_otp_bankswp.h" file can be used to replace the content in the "config/config_gdm32.h" configuration file. After that, the "GD32F5XX_BANKS_SWP_USED" macro can be added to the IBL, MBL, and APP projects to enable the dual-bank function. Enabling the dual-bank function in the IBL project can refer to [Figure 7-16. IBL Project enables dual-bank functionality](#). The enabling method for MBL and APP is similar to that of IBL.

Figure 7-16. IBL Project enables dual-bank functionality



Note:

- The macro "GD32F5XX_BANKS_SWP_USED", once enabled, requires the simultaneous enabling of "GD32F5XX_BANKS_SWP_USED".


7.11.2 Image Distribution After Enabling Dual-bank

The mirror distribution can be referred to as shown in [Figure 7-17. Mirror distribution after enabling dual-bank](#):

- IBL will run in the OTP1 region;
- System configuration information, system status information, MBL, and the swap area are stored in the extended area of bank1 (the swap area is no longer valid);

- The running firmware (Firmware 0) and the updated firmware (Firmware 1) are stored in Bank 0 and Bank 1, respectively.

Figure 7-17. Mirror distribution after enabling dual-bank



7.12 Update encrypted firmware

The encrypted firmware header marks APP IMG as ENCRYPTED (0x04). The firmware is encrypted using AES. When a new IMG is created, the key is randomly generated by imgtool. This key should not be reused and is not checked for this, but using TRNG to randomly generate 16-byte blocks makes repetition extremely unlikely. The AES key is asymmetrically encrypted and stored in the TLVs of IMG, and the asymmetrically encrypted private key is stored in the MCU (where the public key is used to encrypt the firmware). Firmware headers and TLVs are still sent as plaintext data. The functionality of hashing and signing is also the same as before, applied to unencrypted data.

The encryption firmware is updated as it is decrypted, as shown in [Figure 3-3. FLASH Layout](#).

The IMG currently running is stored in plain text at Firmware0. The encryption firmware is downloaded to Firmware1 through ymodem. Before firmware update, the encrypted AES key in TLVs is decrypted asymmetrically. After firmware encryption is enabled, the updated firmware is stored in plaintext in Firmware0, and the updated firmware is encrypted in Firmware1 by AES.

- As shown in [Figure 7-18. Enable firmware encryption upgrade](#), The related define in mcuboot_config.h in MBL are enabled.

Figure 7-18. Enable firmware encryption upgrade

```
#if defined(MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES)
#define MCUBOOT_ENCRYPT_RSA
#endif
```

- As shown in [Figure 7-19. Generate encrypted firmware](#). To update the APP firmware through Ymodem, check Run#2. For the firmware that directly loads, select Run#1.

Figure 7-19. Generate encrypted firmware

| Command Items | User Command | ... | Stop on Exi... | S... |
|---|---|-----|----------------|--------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Before Compile C/C++ File | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Run #1 | | | Not Specified | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Run #2 | | | Not Specified | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Before Build/Rebuild | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Run #1 | | | Not Specified | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Run #2 | | | Not Specified | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> After Build/Rebuild | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Run #1 | python ../../\..\afterbuild.py project_deal -enc FI... | | Not Specified | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Run #2 | python ../../\..\afterbuild.py project_deal -enc True -pn APP -op SL -on @L -ic | | | |

- As shown in [Figure 7-20. RSA key](#), in the case of RSA, the keys are stored in the keys.c file.

Figure 7-20. RSA key

```

210
211 unsigned char enc_priv_key[] = {
212 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xA3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x08, 0x1A,
213 0x18, 0x44, 0x2C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0xFB, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0xA3, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x5E, 0xF9,
214 0xAA, 0xD2, 0x4B, 0x18, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x80, 0x19, 0xF9, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x1B,
215 0xCB, 0xF3, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xDB, 0x42, 0xE7, 0x8C, 0x7F, 0x10, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x43, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0x57,
216 0x2C, 0x44, 0xD1, 0x67, 0x08, 0x0F, 0x0D, 0xBB, 0x5C, 0xEE, 0xEC, 0xB3, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xE0, 0x4D,
217 0x84, 0x0B, 0xAA, 0x77, 0x41, 0x60, 0xED, 0x15, 0x28, 0x49, 0xA7, 0x01, 0xB4, 0x3C, 0x10, 0xE6,
218 0x69, 0x9C, 0x2F, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x5E, 0x5C, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF2, 0xF8, 0xCF, 0x3D, 0x1E,
219 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0xB4, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x88, 0x7E, 0x47, 0x3C, 0x94, 0xC3, 0x77, 0x67, 0x54,
220 0xB8, 0xAA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0x35, 0xCA, 0x62, 0x61, 0x7E, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x15, 0xDB, 0x77, 0x73, 0xD4,
221 0xBE, 0x7B, 0x72, 0x21, 0x89, 0x69, 0x24, 0xFB, 0xF8, 0x65, 0xEE, 0x64, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0xD7,
222 0x85, 0xD5, 0x5C, 0x4A, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xF3, 0x13, 0x39, 0x83, 0x3F,
223 0xA3, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x0F, 0xA7, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0xF9, 0xFE, 0xB8, 0xCE, 0xFA, 0x2A, 0xBE, 0xAF, 0xB8,
224 0xE0, 0xFA, 0x82, 0x37, 0x54, 0xF4, 0x3E, 0xE1, 0x2B, 0xD0, 0xD3, 0x08, 0x58, 0x18, 0xF6, 0x5E,
225 0x4C, 0xC8, 0x88, 0x81, 0x31, 0xAD, 0x5F, 0xB0, 0x82, 0x17, 0xF2, 0x8A, 0x69, 0x27, 0x23, 0xF3,
226 0xAB, 0x87, 0x3E, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xFE, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x1A, 0x24, 0x66, 0x59, 0xF8, 0x1C, 0xAB,
227 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x68, 0x1B, 0x66, 0x64, 0x35, 0xEC, 0xFA, 0x0D, 0x11, 0x9D, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0x3A, 0xA7,
228 0xD1, 0x67, 0x08, 0x47, 0xEF, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x2C, 0x62, 0xE1, 0xD1, 0xC9, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00,
229 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00, 0x46, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xFF, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xD3,
230 0x79, 0x24, 0x99, 0x97, 0x45, 0xF0, 0xD9, 0x2B, 0xE5, 0x05, 0xD4, 0x2C, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xB0,
231 0xE3, 0x95, 0x50, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xD0, 0x76, 0x67, 0x22, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x88, 0x42,
232 0xF7, 0x9D, 0x83, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x97, 0x7E, 0xF3, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x6B, 0x5E, 0x5A, 0xC3, 0x05, 0x5B,
233 0x2D, 0x81, 0x74, 0x96, 0x75, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB9, 0x6D, 0x57, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0x26, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0xA8,
234 0x94, 0xEA, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xCD, 0x66, 0x24, 0x85, 0x6B, 0xC2, 0x22, 0x40, 0xF1, 0x7C,
235 0x09, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xE2, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0xE9, 0xEE, 0x32, 0x77, 0xBF, 0x4E, 0x53,
236 0x9D, 0x93, 0x95, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0x83, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0xFB, 0x21, 0x66, 0xE9, 0xFE, 0x2E,
237 0x0A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xB5, 0x7F, 0x87, 0x26, 0xB8, 0xFF, 0x42, 0xF6, 0x8A,
238 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x9A, 0xF2, 0x96, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x62, 0x68, 0x86, 0x46, 0x23, 0x42, 0x51,
239 0x3E, 0xB2, 0x49, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x26, 0x60, 0x9A, 0x91, 0x70, 0xC8, 0x0A, 0x4F, 0x21, 0xCF, 0xE0,
240 0xBF, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x0E, 0x26, 0xA0, 0xC2, 0x6B, 0xEB, 0x36, 0xDF, 0x6D, 0x6C, 0x71, 0x6F, 0x94,
241 0xC2, 0xEC, 0xA5, 0x59, 0x49, 0x0F, 0x54, 0x29, 0x96, 0x7E, 0x64, 0xBB, 0xB2, 0xFE, 0x99, 0x14,
242 0x41, 0xEE, 0x06, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x84, 0xD2, 0xBF, 0x91, 0xF6, 0xEE, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0F, 0x3B, 0x23,
243 0x5B, 0xE0, 0x1E, 0x19, 0xFC, 0x58, 0x94, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x7D, 0x36, 0xEC, 0xE5, 0x54, 0xAB, 0x91,
244 0xDF, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x44, 0x01, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0x31, 0xA6, 0x1E, 0x55, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x9B,
245 0xA2, 0x73, 0x71, 0x77, 0xC5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xFF, 0x7D, 0x8F, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0x70, 0x45,
246 0xC7, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xC8, 0xFE, 0x41, 0x59, 0x31, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x7A, 0xC6, 0x45, 0xF2, 0xEE, 0x64,

```

- As shown in [Figure 7-21. Keys configuration in the afterbuild.py](#), ROTPK corresponds to the asymmetric key pair signed in the firmware, and ENCK corresponds to the asymmetric key pair given to the encrypted AES key.

Figure 7-21. Keys configuration in the afterbuild.py

```

# ROTPK = ROOT + "/scripts/certs/ec_secp256r1_prikey.pem"
ROTPK = ROOT + "/scripts/certs/ec_rsa2048_prikey.pem"
ENCK = ROOT + "/scripts/certs/root-rsa-2048.pem"
CONFIG_FILE = ROOT + "/config/config_gdm32.h"
IMGTOOL = ROOT + "/scripts/scripts_mcuboot/imgtool.py"
SREC_CAT = ROOT + "/scripts/scripts_mcuboot/srec_cat.exe"

```

8 Implementation of SBSFU Project on GD32H7xx

The implementation of SBSFU project on GD32H7xx follows a similar architecture and usage process to that on GD32F5xx. The differences that need attention are:

- The project group for GD32H7xx is located in "Project/GD32H7xx/MDK-ARM/SBSFU.uvmpw";
- If compiling the IBL project with the O2 optimization level, the macro "MEM_CMP_NOT_INV_ICACHE" needs to be enabled.

9 Implementation of SBSFU Project on GD32G5x3

The implementation of SBSFU project on GD32G5x3 follows a similar architecture and usage process to that on GD32F5xx. The differences that need attention are:

- The project group for GD32G5x3 is located in "Project/GD32G553/MDK-ARM/SBSFU.uvmpw"; The Project group whose bank exchange is enabled is located in "Project/GD32G553_bankswap/MDK-ARM/SBSFU.uvmpw";
- Because the APP code cannot get the exact address of the IBL interface function after dual bank switching is enabled, G5X3 APP does not have the function of updating firmware.

10 Appendix A: Description of Functional Macros

Table 10-1. Functional Macro Description

| Name | Description | Value |
|----------------------|---|---|
| LOG_UART | define the used serial port | USART0: PA9、PA10 |
| | | USART1: PB15、PA8 |
| | | USART2: PB10、PB11 |
| PLATFORM_GD32F5XX | use the GD32F5XX series chip | |
| INNER_ROTPK_EFUSE | whether POTPK is stored in EFUSE | 0: not stored in EFUSE |
| | | 1: stored in EFUSE |
| INNER_HUK_EFUSE | whether HUK is stored in EFUSE | 0: not stored in EFUSE |
| | | 1: stored in EFUSE |
| GD32F5XX_OTP2_ROTPK | whether GD32F5XX OTPK is stored in OTP2 | / |
| IMG_VERIFY_OPT | verify the type of image | IBL_VERIFY_CERT_IMG: verify certificate (not implemented) |
| | | IBL_VERIFY_IMG_ONLY: verify image only |
| | | IBL_VERIFY_NONE: no verification, jump directly |
| SPC_PROTECT_ENABLE | enable security protection | / |
| FWDG_PROTECT_ENABLE | enable watchdog protection | / |
| IBL_TEST_SUIT | enable IBL testing | / |
| SYS_STATUS_ENCRPTED | encrypt storage of system state | 0: not encrypted (not verified) |
| | | 1: encrypted |
| SIGN_ALGO_SET | signature verification algorithm | IMG_SIG_ED25519: ED25519 |
| | | IMG_SIG_ECDSA256: ECDSA256 |
| GD32F5XX_OPT1_USED | GD32F5XX series stores IBL in OPT1 | / |
| RE_FLASH_BASE | starting address of IBL shared data | / |
| RE_SRAM_BASE | referenced RAM starting address | / |
| RE_SHARED_DATA_START | starting data area starting address | If you want to use the IBL's encryption library, the subsequent code RAM address needs to be utilized, the space following the starting address of the shared data. |
| RE_MBL_DATA_START | MBL data area starting address | |
| RE_APP_DATA_START | APP data area starting | |

| Name | Description | Value |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| | address | |
| RE_VTOR_ALIGNMENT | alignment address of interrupt vectors | default is 0x200 |
| RE_SYS_SET_OFFSET | the offset address of the system configuration data, relative to the offset from RE_FLASH_BASE | default is 0 |
| RE_MBL_OFFSET | offset address of system configuration data, offset relative to RE_FLASH_BASE | default is 0x1000 (system configuration data is 4KB, the smallest page unit) |
| RE_SYS_STATUS_OFFSET | offset address of system state | default is 0x20000 |
| RE_IMG_0_APP_OFFSET | offset address of APP0 | |
| RE_IMG_1_APP_OFFSET | offset address of APP1 | |
| RE_MBL_VERSION | version of MBL | currently does not support automatic version generation, manual addition is required when calling the script |
| RE_APP_VERSION | version of APP | currently does not support automatic version generation, manual addition is required when calling the script |
| FLASH_BASE_IBL | base address of IBL code segment | |
| IBL_CODE_START | starting address of IBL code segment | default is FLASH_BASE_IBL |
| IBL_CODE_SIZE | size of IBL code segment | |
| FLASH_BASE_LIB | base address of IBL library | |
| FLASH_LIB_START | starting address of IBL library | |
| FLASH_LIB_SIZE | size of IBL library | |
| FLASH_OFFSET_SYS_SETTING | offset address of system configuration data, offset relative to the base address of Flash | |
| FLASH_API_ARRAY_BASE | starting address information of Flash API | default is FLASH_LIB_START |
| FLASH_API_ARRAY_RSVD | size information of Flash API | default is 0x800 |
| IBL_DATA_START | starting address of IBL data segment | |
| IBL_DATA_SIZE | size of IBL data segment | |
| IBL_HEAP_SIZE | size of IBL HEAP segment | |

| Name | Description | Value |
|---|---|--|
| IBL_MSP_STACK_SIZE | size of IBL STACK segment | |
| IBL_SHARED_DATA_START | starting address of IBL shared data | |
| IBL_SHARED_DATA_SIZE | size of IBL shared data | |
| MBL_BASE_ADDRESS | base address of MBL code segment | |
| MBL_CODE_START | starting address of MBL code segment | |
| MBL_CODE_SIZE | size of MBL code segment | |
| MBL_SHARED_DATA_START | starting address of MBL shared data | |
| MBL_SHARED_DATA_SIZE | size of MBL shared data | |
| MBL_DATA_START | starting address of MBL data | |
| MBL_BUF_SIZE | size of data allocated to mbedtls by MBL | |
| MBL_MSP_STACK_SIZE | size of MBL stack | |
| BOOTUTIL_HW_DOWNGRADE_PREVENTION | prevent firmware downgrade | |
| MCUBOOT_DOWNGRADE_PREVENTION_SECURITY_COUNTER | use secure counter | 1: use a security counter (not implemented) 0: use version number for comparison (verified) |
| MCUBOOT_USE_MBED_TLS | select the encryption library as mbedtls | |
| MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER | number of supported images | currently, only the case where the image is 1 has been implemented |
| MCUBOOT_HAVE_LOGGING | enable log | |
| MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL | Log print level | MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_OFF (0) |
| | | MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_ERROR (1) |
| | | MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING (2) |
| | | MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_INFO (3) |
| | | MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG (4) |
| | | MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_SIM (5) |
| MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC256 | the signature verification algorithm used in ESDSA256 | |
| MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT | verify the main slot at each startup | |
| MCUBOOT_USE_IBL_VERIFY_SIG | use IBL's API for signature | |

| Name | Description | Value |
|-------------------------|---|-------|
| N | verification | |
| GD32F5XX_BANKS_SWP_USED | enable the dual-bank switching function of GD32F5XX | |

GigaDevice

11 Version History

| Version Number | Description | Date |
|----------------|--|-----------|
| 1.0 | 1. initial Release Version | June 2024 |
| 1.0 | 1. add description of GD32F5xx dual-bank switching | July 2024 |

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