




SCONE


*Secure CONtainer Environment
Christof Fetzer, TU Dresden, Germany*



MOTIVATION



OBJECTIVE: PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY & INTEGRITY



Prevent unauthorized access


ONLY ACADEMIC ISSUE?

.....

2017 hacking contest

bug in Windows 10

*bug in VMware
Workstation*






GENERAL APPROACH


- „Firewall“ around the application
- application-oriented security
- Cloud-Native Applications
- set of microservices

APPROACH: APPLICATION-ORIENTED SECURITY



- Protect application
 - integrity
 - confidentiality

DEFENDER'S DILEMMA




► **Attackers:**

- success by exploiting a single vulnerability

► **Defender:**


- must protect against every vulnerability
- not only in application
- millions of lines of source code

CLOUD SOFTWARE STACK



- Applications run on top of software stack
- millions of lines of code
- Cloud stack consists of
 - VM/container engine
 - operating system
 - hypervisor
 - node management service


Linux: > 20 millions line



VULNERABILITIES


- **Coverity reports:**
 - 1 defect per 1700 lines of code
- **Kernel self protection project:**
 - 500 security bugs fixed in Linux during the last 5 years
 - each bug stayed about 5 years inside kernel
- **Coverity:**
 - quality of closed source software is not better than open source software

APPLICATION-ORIENTED SECURITY



APPLICATION PROTECTION


.....



- Intel SGX protects application's
 - confidentiality
 - integrity
- by preventing accesses to
 - application state
 - encrypting main memory

SGX protects application from accesses from outside


SGX PERFORMANCE



SAME PROBLEM: BUGS!

.....

same address space




➤ SGX:


- prevent accesses via privileged / other software
- Smart adversary:
 - will exploit bugs inside application code

USE OF MICROSERVICES


same address space




separate address spaces




PROTECTING MICROSERVICE APIs



SCONE-BASED CLOUD-NATIVE APPLICATIONS



HYBRID APPLICATIONS






CONTAINER WORKFLOW

- ease of use! -

CONTAINER WORKFLOW

service provider

*extended
Dockerfile*



build


custom
microservice
image

*secure container
image*

CONTAINER WORKFLOW

service provider

*extended
Dockerfile*



custom
microservice
image

*secure container
image*

build


uses

SCONE cross
compiler
image

- SCONE cross compilers:
 - C, C++
 - Rust
 - GO
 - (Fortran)
- Docker
 - to build, ship and deploy images


CONTAINER WORKFLOW

service provider



build

image curator







build

DOCKER HUB

NGINX	nginx official	5.7K STARS	10M+ PULLS	DETAILS
redis	redis official	3.6K STARS	10M+ PULLS	DETAILS
MySQL	mysql official	4.1K STARS	10M+ PULLS	DETAILS
mongo	mongo official	3.1K STARS	10M+ PULLS	DETAILS
...				


SCONE CURATED IMAGES (WORK IN PROGRESS)

 nginx official		<i>nginx SCONE image</i>	5.7K STARS	10M+ PULLS	 DETAILS
 redis official		<i>redis SCONE image</i>	3.6K STARS	10M+ PULLS	 DETAILS
 mysql official		<i>mysql SCONE image</i>	4.1K STARS	10M+ PULLS	 DETAILS
 mongo official		<i>mongo SCONE image</i>	3.1K STARS	10M+ PULLS	 DETAILS

...


SCONE images are shielded and tuned for SGX

CONTAINER WORKFLOW



SERVICE PROVIDER VS CLOUD PROVIDER

.....





COMPOSE EXAMPLE



HOW TO DISTRIBUTE SECRETS?

.....

```
mysql-master:  
  
  environment:  
    MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass  
    MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger  
    MYSQL_USER: messenger  
    MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger  
  tty: true  
  
  tty-key: mysecret  
  
  image: mysql  
  
  MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494  
  
  FSPFKEY: topsecret  
  
  stdin_open: true
```


- State of the art:
 - put passwords in stack / compose file
- Problem:
 - Docker engine is not trusted

Bad practice to put secrets in compose file!

EXAMPLE: MYSQL

```
mysql-master:  
  
environment:  
  
  MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass  
  
  MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger  
  
  MYSQL_USER: messenger  
  
  MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger  
  
  tty: true  
  
  tty-key: mysecret  
  
  image: mysql  
  
  MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494  
  
  FSPFKEY: topsecret  
  
  stdin_open: true
```

split



secrets

```
mysql-master:  
  
environment:  
  
  MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass  
  
  MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger  
  
  MYSQL_USER: messenger  
  
  MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger  
  
  tty-key: mysecret  
  
  MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494  
  
  FSPFKEY: topsecret
```


SCONE

no-secrets

```
mysql-master:  
  
environment:  
  
  APPID: 012345  
  
  tty: true  
  
  image: mysql  
  
  stdin_open: true
```

DOCKER

SCONE: SPLIT STACK / COMPOSE FILE



```
mysql-master:
```

```
environment:
```

```
  MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass
```

```
  MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger
```

```
  MYSQL_USER: messenger
```

```
  MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger
```

```
  tty: true
```

```
  tty-key: mysecret
```

```
  image: mysql
```

```
  MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494
```

```
  FSPFKEY: topsecret
```

```
  stdin_open: true
```

PROBLEMS?

- Stack file

- secrets are in the clear

- Problems:


- service administrators
might leave company

- access to secrets by root

- Approach:

- delegate keys to key store
like vault

APPROACH: RETRIEVE SECRETS FROM VAULT



```
mysql-master:
```

no secrets

```
environment:
```

```
  MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: $mysql_root_pw
```

```
  MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger
```

```
  MYSQL_USER: messenger
```

```
  MYSQL_PASSWORD: $messenger_pw
```

```
tty: true
```

```
tty-key: $tty_key
```

```
image: mysql
```

```
MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494
```

```
FSPFKEY: $fspfkey
```

```
secrets:
```

```
  mysql_root_pw:
```

```
    vault: ascii
```

```
  messenger_pw:
```

```
    vault: ascii
```

```
  tty_key:
```

```
    vault: AES256
```

```
  fspfkey:
```

```
    vault: AES256
```

extended stack file

EXAMPLE: INTEGRATION WITH VAULT

```
environment:
```

config file

```
  MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: xU0932hd...
```

```
  MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger
```

```
  MYSQL_USER: messenger
```


```
  MYSQL_PASSWORD: 9S3jDh1...
```

```
tty-key: 0AF1B...
```

```
MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494
```

```
FSPFKEY: 3HDJejh...
```

secrets



split

```
mysql-master:
```

no secrets

```
environment:
```

no-secrets

```
mysql-master:
```

```
environment:
```

```
  APPID: 012345
```

```
  tty: true
```

```
  image: mysql
```

DOCKER




PERFORMANCE

SGX impact

SCONE


- Performance optimisations:
 - asynchronous interface: minimise enclave exits
 - syscalls executed by external threads
 - TLS extensions (new)
 - support pre-encrypted memory blocks
 - Autotuner (new)
 - find „optimal“ values for tuning parameters

Memcached Throughput




TLS API

Memcached CPU



Redis Throughput



TLS API

Performance Overview

Application	Throughput w.r.t. native async (%)	sync (%)
Memcached	120	113
Apache	80	70
NGINX	80	36
Redis	60	20

inline encryption
has less overhead

inline encryption
hurts performance
with single thread

Performance Improvement

Application	Throughput w.r.t. native async (%)	sync (%)
-------------	---------------------------------------	----------

Memcached	120	113
Apache	80	70
NGINX	80	36
Redis	>80?	20



current work:
TLS offloading


SCONE SUMMARY

- **ease of use:**
 - look and feel like Docker
- **security:**
 - based on Intel SGX
 - compiler extensions (bounds checker, limit accesses)
- **performance reasonable** (as long as microservice fits in EPC)
 - combine with horizontal scaling if needed
- **practical approach**
 - note: Intel SGX EPC will increase next year...

ADVERTISEMENT

- If you want to evaluate SCONE: ➤ christof.fetzer@gmail.com
 - now: SCONE cross compilers
 - June: extended Docker compose
- I'm looking
 - for PhD students and PostDocs
 - for developers who want to join a SCONE startup
- Check out the SCONE documentation

```
docker pull sconecuratedimages/sconedocu
docker run -d -p 8080:80 sconecuratedimages/sconedocu
open http://127.0.0.1:8080
```



```
docker pull sconecuratedimages/sconedocu  
docker run -d -p 8080:80 sconecuratedimages/sconedocu  
open http://127.0.0.1:8080
```