

Benjamin Hemingway

CONTACT INFORMATION	Totoriu g. 4 CEFER, Bank of Lithuania LT-01121 Vilnius Lithuania	Tel: +370 699 38 140 Email: bhemingway@lb.lt Website: benhemingway.github.io
CURRENT POSITION	Senior Economist <i>Research Center (CEFER), Bank of Lithuania</i>	2018–
	Research Fellow <i>Vilnius University</i>	2018–
EDUCATION	PhD <i>Department of Economics, University College London</i> Advisors: Professor Morten Ravn (primary) and Dr Vincent Sterk Examiners: Professor Xavier Mateos-Planas and Dr Frédéric Malherbe	2012–2018
	MRes, Economics <i>University College London</i>	2011–2012
	MSc, Economics <i>University College London</i>	2009–2010
	BA, Philosophy, Politics and Economics <i>University of Oxford</i>	2006–2009
RESEARCH FIELDS	Macroeconomics, Digital Currency, Banking, and Corporate Finance.	
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Lecturer <i>Vilnius University</i>	
	PhD Advanced Macroeconomics	Spring 2021, 2022
	Quantitative Economics, Economic Theory II	Spring 2020, 2021, 2022
	Quantitative Economics, Economic Principles II	Spring 2019, 2020
	PhD Research Methods, Introduction to MATLAB	Nov 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021
	Teaching Assistant <i>University College London</i>	
	ECONG105 <i>MRes Macroeconomics</i>	Spring 2015, 2016 & 2017
	ECON3029 <i>Advanced Macroeconomics</i>	Spring 2015
	ECON7002 <i>Economics of Finance</i>	Autumn 2013, 2014, & 2015
	ECON3003 <i>Econometrics for Macroeconomics and Finance</i>	Spring 2014
	ECON1001 <i>Economics</i>	Spring 2013
WORK EXPERIENCE	Research Analyst <i>FTI Consulting</i>	Oct 2010–Sep 2011

PUBLICATIONS **Banking regulation and collateral screening in a model of information asymmetry**
Journal of Financial Services Research **61**, 367-405 (2022)

This paper explores the impact of banking regulation on a competitive credit market with ex-ante asymmetric information and aggregate uncertainty. I construct a model where the government imposes a regulatory constraint that limits the losses banks make in the event of their default. I show that the addition of banking regulation results in three deviations from the standard theory. First, collateral is demanded of both high and low risk firms, even in the absence of asymmetric information. Second, if banking regulation is sufficiently strict, there may not exist an adverse selection problem. Third, a pooling Nash equilibrium can exist.

WORKING PAPERS **Macroeconomic implications of insolvency regimes**
Bank of Lithuania Working Paper No. 77

The impacts of creditor and debtor rights following firm insolvency are studied in a firm dynamics model where defaulting firms choose between restructuring or exit. The model accounts for differing effects of productivity shocks across economies that differ in the credit/debtor rights. Following a negative shock labour productivity falls sharply in a creditor-friendly regime such as the UK while in a debtor-friendly regime such as the US, there is a larger employment response. This paper suggests a possible explanation for the different employment and labour productivity response in the UK and US since the financial crisis.

The Impact of CBDC on Bank Deposits and the Interbank Market

This paper investigates how the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) impacts the banking sector. The deposit market is modeled as a Salop circle and deposits are subject to liquidity shocks. Absent a CBDC the interbank market can redistribute liquidity between banks. However, the central bank does not take part in the interbank market and CBDC leads to greater reliance of the banking sector on central bank standing facilities. The model shows adjusting the remuneration rate of CBDC has little pass-through to the deposit rate set by banks and may have implications for transmission of monetary policy.

The Impact of Bank Competition on Loan Applications

How does competition in the loan market affect firm loan applications? I model competition in a loan market where firms choose between applying to a bank, an uninformed lender or neither. Banks have an informational advantage over lenders in the form of a costly creditworthiness test. The choice of lender depends on the ex ante riskiness of the borrower. Low risk borrowers apply to the uninformed lender, high risk firms do not apply for loans while intermediate risk borrowers apply for banks. The model predicts that increased bank concentration benefits higher risk borrowers at the cost of lower risk borrowers.

WORKS IN PROGRESS	The effect of the financial crisis on bank lending to SMEs <i>joint with Alan Crawford</i>	
	<p>In this paper we develop a model of bank lending to small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). Combining a bi-annual survey of European SME financing decisions with a contemporaneous EU-wide banking conditions survey, we empirically evaluate the determinants of successful loan applications during the financial crisis.</p>	
CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS	2022: Baltic Economic Conference, CEBRA Annual Meeting, MMF Annual Conference, Warsaw MMF 2021: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Microeconomics Seminar, Baltic Economic Conference (Virtual) 2020: 22nd INFER Annual Conference, Bank of Lithuania Non-Technical Research Seminar 2019: 16th Corporate Finance Day, MMF 50th Anniversary Conference, Belgrade Young Economists Conference 2019, Economic Challenges in Enlarged Europe 2019	
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	Affiliations: Member of ECB's MPC Expert Group on CBDC Refereeing: Journal of Financial Services Research, Macroeconomic Dynamics	
SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS	ESRC Studentship: 1+3 Award UCL Economics: Outstanding Teaching Award (ECONG105) UCL Economics: Outstanding Teaching Award (Best Overall) UCL Economics: Outstanding Teaching Award (ECON7002)	2011-2015 2016-2017 2014-2015 2013-2014
REFERENCES	Available upon request	