Moral Universalism and the Structure of Ideology*

Benjamin Enke Ricardo Rodríguez-Padilla
Florian Zimmermann

September 17, 2021

Abstract

Throughout the Western world, people's policy views are correlated across domains in a strikingly similar fashion. This paper proposes that what partly explains the structure of ideology is *moral universalism*: the extent to which people exhibit the same level of altruism and trust towards strangers as towards in-group members. In new large-scale multinational surveys with 15,000 respondents, we measure universalism in both altruism and trust. In the data, heterogeneity in universalism descriptively explains why the left and right both simultaneously support and oppose different types of government spending. Moreover, the left-right divide on topics such as redistribution or foreign aid strongly depends on whether people evaluate more or less universalist implementations of these policies. Large-scale donation data provide complementary field evidence for the political left's universalism.

JEL classification: D72, D01
Keywords: Moral universalism, ideological constraint, behavioral political economy

*We acknowledge funding from the William F. Milton Fund, the Harvard Asia Center, and a Harvard Inequality in America Grant. Enke: Harvard University and NBER, enke@fas.harvard.edu; Rodríguez-Padilla: Harvard University, rodriguezpadilla@g.harvard.edu; Zimmermann: University of Bonn and Institute on Behavior and Inequality, florian.zimmermann@briq-institute.org.

1 Introduction

A key stylized fact in the study of political economy is the existence of *ideological constraint*: people's policy views are correlated across domains, so that an individual's self-identification as "left" or "right" carries information about an entire vector of policy views. Importantly, the internal structure of these ideological clusters is strikingly similar across Western countries. As we confirm using new large-scale survey data from multiple Western democracies, people in a left cluster generally desire government expenditure on foreign aid, affirmative action, environmental protection, welfare, and universal health care, while people in a right cluster support government spending on the military, police and law enforcement, and border control. As we discuss in detail in Section 2, these clusters appear to have become more pronounced over the last 40 years, but the basic qualitative structure of ideology has been remarkably constant in recent history, across both time and space.

Yet, it is not immediately obvious why these *particular* bundles of policy views would prevail in the first place. A prominent view – which we confirm in our data – is that people differ in their overall preferences for "big government." However, views about the size of government as a whole do not rationalize why, in terms of expenditure shares, demand for redistribution is always correlated with demand for environmental protection rather than support for a strong military. A fortiori, the fact that the left desires a larger government overall does not explain why in some policy domains (such as law enforcement) the left actually demands a lower level of spending than the right. The similarity of ideological clusters across countries may also be surprising in that the relevant Western nations often exhibit considerable differences in electoral systems, party structures, and ethnic composition. Still, the striking similarity of the within-country correlations in issue positions suggests that these bundles are generated by a systematic core rather than coincidence. This paper attempts to identify this core and to partly explain what it ultimately means to be "left" or "right," beyond the mechanical description of policy views that is associated with these labels.

Our central proposition is that what imposes the particular structure on the space of policy views is heterogeneity in *moral universalism*, by which we mean the extent to which people exhibit the same level of altruism and trust towards strangers as towards in-group members.[1] Universalism is not about a person's overall *level* of altruism or trust, but instead about its *slope* as a function of social distance, such that group- or place-based identities are less important to universalists. For decades, philosophers have debated whether universalism or its counterpart – a communitarian, particularist moral-

[1] While his empirical measures differ from ours, Tabellini (2008b,a, 2010) labels this concept "generalized morality."

ity that expresses itself through in-group favoritism – are normatively more appealing (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Sandel et al., 1998; Sandel, 2005). In this paper, we conceptualize the link between universalism and policy views. We then test the resulting predictions in large-scale surveys to provide evidence that heterogeneity in universalism descriptively explains the structure of ideology observed in the Western world, in an almost identical fashion across countries. Using those same surveys, we also document that the canonical left-right divide on policy views substantially attenuates or even reverses once traditionally conservative policy domains are recast as universalist policies, or once traditionally left-wing policies are implemented in non-universalist ways. Finally, we leverage large-scale donation data to provide complementary field evidence for the link between heterogeneity in universalism and political behavior. The entire paper is descriptive in nature and offers a new set of stylized facts.

We hypothesize that a unifying feature of contemporary "left" policies is that they have characteristics that make them appealing to universalists, in terms of both whom they care about (altruism) and whom they trust. Regarding altruism, people with a communitarian morality will generally see little value in government expenditure that primarily allocates resources to socially distant strangers (people from other social groups), as is the case for foreign aid or affirmative action. Likewise, in the U.S. or Western Europe, redistributive programs are implemented in a very universalist fashion, according to which tax money is redistributed to strangers that people have little personal connection to. This, we hypothesize, contributes to the opposition of communitarians to federal welfare and implicitly redistributive programs such as universal health care. Universalists, on the other hand, may not mind the impersonal nature of federal redistribution or foreign aid because their altruism by definition extends to socially distant people. Similar arguments apply to the domain of people's trust beliefs. After all, a communitarian who believes that socially distant strangers are more likely to cheat on the tax system, claim benefits that they are not entitled to, or misappropriate foreign aid, will be less enthusiastic about the aforementioned expenditures than a universalist who believes that faraway strangers are no less trustworthy than one's in-group members.

Yet, while these arguments illustrate why universalists will generally be more supportive of government expenditures that have come to be associated with the "left," similar intuitions also suggest why sometimes communitarians (conservatives) desire higher government spending. For example, regarding the scope of people's altruism, public spending on the military or border control is often designed to erect boundaries between "us" and "them," which presumably at least partly reflects the communitarian moral stance that compatriots (in-group members) deserve higher priority. Similarly, regarding universalism in trust, people who believe that socially distant out-groups cannot be trusted will generally support spending on police and law enforcement, the military,

or border control to ensure that the perceived untrustworthy do not expropriate resources from in-group members.

In all, we hypothesize that communitarian people (defined in both altruism and trust space) sometimes support and sometimes oppose government spending, purely depending on whether they believe it to benefit their in-groups. To complement these informal intuitions, we provide a formal model based on Tabellini (2008b) that also generates our hypotheses. The common thread that runs through our formal and informal analysis is that a person's universalism should be predictive of their support for "left" policies.

We test our hypotheses about the link between universalism and a vector of policy views in pre-registered representative large-scale surveys in five Western democracies: United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. We further include Brazil and South Korea as two non-Western countries in our sample. Non-Western countries typically do not exhibit the particular ideological clusters observed in the West, so that the link between universalism and policy should be weaker or absent in these countries. In total, we survey $N \approx 15,000$ individuals. We measure respondents' universalism in altruism and trust, along with their policy views.

To measure universalism in altruism, we implement structured decision tasks. In each task, a respondent is endowed with the hypothetical sum of $100 and is asked to split the money between two equally rich individuals: (i) a randomly selected member of a specific social (in-) group who lives in their own country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives in their own country of residence. Each respondent makes ten allocation decisions across which the social group (i) varies. The list of groups is based on an ex-ante crowdsourcing exercise and includes the respondent's extended family; neighbors; friends of the family; colleagues; members of the same organization; or people who share the respondent's hobbies; religious beliefs; age; political views; and race. For example, in one question, a U.S. participant is asked to split hypothetical $100 between a member of their extended family and a randomly-selected person from the United States. In addition to these 10 questions that measure "domestic universalism", we also measure "foreign universalism" and "global universalism" through money allocation tasks that involve different types of foreigners. From all of these questions, we construct an individual-level summary statistic of universalism in altruism. While all of our survey questions are hypothetical in nature, they underwent an extensive selection and experimental validation procedure, and have been shown to be correlated with real donation decisions (see Enke et al., 2021).

Using an analogous procedure, we estimate respondents' universalism in trust by asking them to indicate who of the individuals described above they trust more. These questions again deliver measures of domestic, foreign, and global universalism in trust. In our data, universalism in altruism and universalism in trust are highly correlated,

which suggests that they capture the same underlying psychology, which we refer to as "moral universalism." In our data, respondents exhibit large variation in universalism: some participants always split their money or trust equally, while others consistently share more money with, and trust more, members of their own in-groups. In line with prior findings, universalism does not just reflect favorable economic conditions: if anything, individuals with higher income and wealth are less universalist.

We supplement these measurements of universalism with detailed questions on respondents' policy views. To this effect, we solicit quantitative responses about how much money the government should collect on average from each citizen to fund *specific expenditure categories*. Here, a respondent states a per capita dollar amount that they would like to see collected and spent on each of welfare payments; universal health care; affirmative action; military; law enforcement and police; border control; foreign aid; and environmental protection.

Looking at the link between policy views and universalism, we find that desired expenditures are strongly correlated with universalism in the ways we hypothesized and pre-registered. Universalism is *positively* correlated with desired expenditure on welfare payments, environment, affirmative action, foreign aid, and – to a lesser extent – universal health care. Moreover, universalism is *negatively* correlated with desired expenditure on border control, military, and law enforcement and police. In this sense, universalism reproduces the structure of policy views that we attempt to explain in this paper.

These correlations are robust and general in the following three ways. (i) The results are almost identical when we consider either universalism in altruism or universalism in trust. (ii) The relationship between universalism and policy preferences is robust against controlling for rich measures of income, wealth, religiosity, education, urbanicity and beliefs about government efficiency, among others. (iii) The results are strikingly similar across the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. On the other hand, in the two non-Western countries in our sample, Brazil and Korea, where policy views generally cannot be grouped according to the Western left-vs.-right divide, heterogeneity in universalism does not explain much of the variation in policy views.

As has long been known, various sociodemographics, beliefs and preferences are correlated with the left-right divide. To put our results on universalism in perspective, we implement a series of benchmarking exercises with variables such as age, religiosity, education, income and wealth, equity-efficiency preferences and beliefs about the efficiency of government. In our data, these variables are all reasonably strongly correlated with respondents' self-positioning on a left-vs.-right scale, which suggests that we measure them in meaningful ways. We also find that these variables are often correlated with desired expenditures in important and known ways. At the same time, universalism is the only variable in our data that organizes the key pattern we are trying to explain: simul-

taneous support for government spending in the domains of welfare, universal health care, environmental protection, affirmative action, and foreign aid, but opposition to large government spending in the domains of military, police, and border control. While many other variables plausibly affect policy views on single or multiple issues, none of them gets close to (correlationally) producing the characteristic structure of ideology that is our focus here.

A potential alternative view of the formation of ideological clusters is that people identify with a party and then "learn" from elites and party leaders which bundles of policy positions they are supposed to hold (though this account doesn't explain why we observe the *specific* clusters that we do). To disentangle such a supply-side story from our emphasis on the moral priorities of ordinary citizens, we study whether people's policy views can be meaningfully shifted by implementing traditionally left-wing policies in more communitarian ways. The idea is that if it was true that people have "learned" from their party leaders that they are supposed to be against redistribution or foreign aid, then this view should not depend on the specific (non-) universalist implementation of a policy. To take an example, we hypothesize that self-identified conservatives may well be supportive of redistribution once it is implemented in a local, community-based fashion. Similarly, conservatives may be supportive of foreign aid once these funds target perceived friends.

To test these hypotheses, we elicit respondents' desired spending levels for specific policy proposals, where some proposals are more universalist than others. For example, within the broad domain of welfare payments, we separately elicit desired spending on "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide" and "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised." Similarly, we separately elicit support for foreign aid that goes to the most needy and for foreign aid that goes to international allies.

In these exercises, the relationship between respondents' political orientation and policy views predictably attenuates or even reverses, depending on whether the specific policy proposal is more or less universalist. To take a few examples, respondents who identify as right-wing are equally likely to support redistribution or environmental protection as left-wingers once it takes place locally. Similarly, conservatives are almost as supportive of foreign aid as left-wingers once it focuses on international allies. These results further strengthen the empirical case for the idea that what matters for the support of a policy is at least partly whether it is universalist in nature.

In the final part of the paper, we complement our surveys with field evidence to document the ecological validity of our analysis. We estimate the universalism of U.S. Congressional Districts (CDs) using large-scale donation data from DonorsChoose, an American non-profit organization providing an online "crowdfunding" platform for pub-

lic school teachers. On this website, individual donors give money to specific funding requests that are posted by teachers. As a proxy for aggregate universalism, we estimate to which extent a CD's donations decline as a function of the geographic (or friendship) distance to the recipient CD. As in our surveys, we only leverage variation in *towards whom* a given donor CD donates, not how much they donate (or receive) overall.

We find that a CD's universalism is strongly correlated with Democratic vote shares. That is, Republican CD's donate relatively more money locally and less money to faraway places. Thus, as in our surveys, left-wingers tend to treat their local community relatively poorly also in terms of actual donations. This raw correlation is robust against leveraging only within-state variation, and against controlling for variables such as local education expenditure or income.

Linking our work to the literature, much research in political science has been devoted to studying the internal structure of elite opinion (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000), but there is no extant theory that convincingly explains the internal structure of mass opinion. Popular accounts often distinguish between an "economic" and a "cultural" or "social" axis, yet these descriptive classifications do not explain why economic and social views are correlated in systematic ways.

Various literatures in economics, political science, and moral and political psychology have highlighted the role of morality, identity and social preferences for political attitudes, though none of them attempts to empirically explain the internal structure of ideology. Enke (2020) studies the supply of and demand for universalist vs. communal moral values in U.S. presidential elections using a framework of moral values that rests on a psychological questionnaire (Haidt, 2012). We innovate on this work (i) by examining not just voting behavior but the internal structure of specific policy views; (ii) not just in the U.S. but in the Western world more generally; and (iii) by working with direct economic measures of preferences and beliefs rather than psychological questionnaires. Much of our approach is inspired by the model in Tabellini (2008b).

The idea that social groups and identity play an important role in understanding contemporary policy views runs through various recent contributions and reviews (Shayo, 2009; Grossman and Helpman, 2018; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2019; Kranton and Sanders, 2017; Besley and Persson, 2019; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020). Relatedly, large literatures explain variation in demand for redistribution through ethnic divisions and citizenship (Alesina et al., 1999, 2018; Luttmer, 2001; Fong and Luttmer, 2009; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Gilens, 2009).[2] Our central contribution to these literatures is to

[2]The broader concept of social capital has received substantial attention in the political economy literature (Putnam, 2000). For example, Dal Bó et al. (2018) and Algan et al. (2018) document that far-right voters exhibit lower trust. We differ from these contributions in that we emphasize the relevance of universalism (the gradient of social capital, rather than its level) for an entire vector of policy views. Somewhat relatedly, a number of social theorists have argued that what fundamentally distinguishes the

highlight the importance of studying *heterogeneity in how much people care about group- and place-based identities*, as these shape an entire vector of policy views in a strikingly similar fashion across Western democracies.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the internal structure of ideology. Section 3 states our hypotheses. Sections 4–6 describe the design and results of our surveys. Section 7 offers field evidence and Section 8 concludes.

2 The Structure of Western Political Ideology

As we discuss below, the existence of ideological constraint (intracorrelations of policy views) is well-documented. Our contribution is not to show that ideological clusters exist, but to explain their structure. Before doing so, we illustrate the structure of political ideology in rich Western societies using our own survey data, described in detail in Section 4. The data cover the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden, along with the non-Western countries Brazil and South Korea, for a total of approximately 15,000 respondents. We elicited respondents' desired per capita expenditure levels for eight domains: welfare payments; universal health care; affirmative action; environmental protection; foreign aid; military; police and law enforcement; and border control. That is, respondents provided a per capita amount that they would like their national government to collect and spend on each of these domains.

To probe the correlation structure of policy views, we implement principal component analyses (PCA) separately in each country. The first principal component (first eigenvector) is that convex combination of the underlying variables that accounts for as much variation in the data as possible. It hence assigns similar weights to highly correlated variables. The second principal component is that convex combination of the underlying variables that explains as much of the residual variation as possible, conditional on being orthogonal to the first eigenvector.

We find that, in each Western country, the first principal component of (log) desired expenditures across domains exhibits an unsurprising and almost identical structure: it loads positively and with essentially equal weights on desired expenditure levels in the eight categories. This first component captures "big vs. small government" views.

left from the right is that people on the left believe that human nature is fundamentally "good," while people on the right believe that people are "flawed" and need control (e.g., Sowell, 2007; Lakoff, 2010). Similarly, a popular view in political psychology is that right-wing ideology correlates with "negativity bias" (Hibbing et al., 2014) or "threat sensitivity" (Jost et al., 2009). Our argument is different in that we emphasize *towards whom* people are altruistic and trusting, rather than *how much*. In our data, it is not so much that people on the right do not trust other people but that they predominantly trust those that are socially close to them. In line with our argument, Waytz et al. (2019) use a psychological task to show that U.S. liberals express greater moral concern toward friends relative to family, and the world relative to the nation.



Figure 1: Factor loadings of the first principal component of desired expenditure shares. Sign convention: the loading on "Border" is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.

The second principal component, on the other hand, closely corresponds to our object of interest: in each country, it loads negatively on desired expenditure levels for military, police and law enforcement, and border control, and almost always positively on desired expenditure levels for welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, environmental protection, and foreign aid. This second component, by virtue of being orthogonal to the first one, intuitively captures desired expenditure *shares*.

To make this point more explicit, we perform a principal component analysis directly on desired *shares* of overall spending, computed as desired expenditure level in a given domain divided by total desired expenditure on all eight domains. Figure 1 presents the loadings of the first principal component for the Western countries. Border control, military, and police and law enforcement all receive negative weights in each country, while foreign aid, affirmative action, environmental protection, welfare payments, and universal health care almost always receive positive weights.

The structure of this eigenvector is reminiscent of intuitive notions of "left" and "right." To confirm this intuition, we elicited from our respondents how they would position themselves on an 11-point left-vs.-right Likert scale. Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between respondents' self-positioning and their desired expenditure levels. In all Western countries, more pronounced left-wing identification is correlated with *higher* desired expenditure levels for canonical left-wing policies and *lower* desired expenditure levels for canonical conservative policies.

Indeed, Figure 2 informally suggests that when respondents tell us that they are "left" or "right," they appear to refer more to *how* they would like to use a given government budget rather than the *overall size* of government. To make this argument more formal, we compute the pairwise correlations between people's left-vs.-right self-positioning, the



Figure 2: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

first principal component of desired expenditure levels (the "big-vs.-small-government" component), and the first principal component of desired expenditure shares. We find that the correlation between the left-right-scale and the big-vs.-small-government component ranges between $\rho = 0.14$ in the U.S. and $\rho = 0.02$ in France. In contrast, the correlation between the left-right-scale and the expenditure-shares-component ranges between $\rho = 0.49$ in the U.S. and $\rho = 0.30$ in Australia. This suggests that at least a considerable part of people's self-identification as "left" and "right" relates to *how* a given budget is spent, rather than how big the budget is in the first place.

While we make use of our own survey data to exposit the structure of ideological clusters, we note that the existence of ideological constraint is well-documented. While early scholars believed that ideological constraint is relatively weak, Ansolabehere et al. (2008) showed that such inferences are largely driven by measurement error. Once political views are elicited using rich and multiple measures, they tend to be highly intra-correlated. For example, in the 2016 American National Election Survey, standard composite measures of respondents' economic conservatism and their social conservatism (Ansolabehere et al., 2006) exhibit a correlation of $\rho = 0.48$, suggesting strong ideological constraint. Draca and Schwarz (2020) and Wu (2020) also provide evidence for the existence of ideological constraint across multiple Western democracies.

Given the existence of such clusters, an obvious question regards their scope, both over time and across space. First, while some recent research suggests that the magnitude of the intra-correlations between people's policy views has increased over the last 40 years, the basic qualitative structure of ideology is stable over time (e.g., Kozlowski and Murphy, 2019; Wu, 2020).[3]

Second, looking across space, we note that we only attempt to understand the structure of Western, rather than global, ideology. Figure 26 in Appendix C.5 replicate the analyses above for the two non-Western countries in our sample. Similarly to the results found in other survey datasets (Malka et al., 2019), we see that the structure of policy views outside the West is considerably less pronounced, and there is no clear relationship with people's left-vs.-right self-assessment.[4]

3 Hypotheses

Figure 3 illustrates how we think about heterogeneity in universalism, which is a slight modification of the setup in Tabellini (2008b). A person's degree of universalism concerns the slope of their altruism (or trust) as social distance increases, holding fixed the overall level of altruism (or trust). According to this conceptualization (which will be reflected in our empirical measurement), universalists are not "more or less moral," they just allocate a given level of altruism more uniformly, and trust people at varying social distances more uniformly. Intuitively, a universalist might argue that it is appealing to treat everyone equally, while communitarians might point out that the universalist's moral compass is distorted in that she does not treat her friends very well. Indeed, in Enke et al. (2021) we show that universalists have fewer friends and spend less time with them.

In this conceptualization, "social distance" is a stand-in for different types of social identities and group memberships that define perceived social distance, including family, friendship, ethnicity, religious beliefs, values, hobbies, nationality etc. Since our interest is in both domestic and foreign polices, it will be useful to broadly distinguish between domestic in-groups, domestic strangers as well as global in-groups and global strangers. This distinction as well as the fact that social distance clearly comprises many different dimensions will be reflected in our survey design.

The main idea behind this paper is that universalism, as conceptualized in Figure 3, affects the formation of an entire vector of policy views. To articulate why this should be

[3]Appendix B leverages data from the World Values Survey (WVS) longitudinal dataset to establish the existence of these clusters going back to at least the mid-1990s.

[4]We further confirm that very similar results on the difference in ideological clusters between Western and non-Western countries hold in a much larger sample of countries in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, and in the WVS longitudinal dataset, see Appendix B.



Figure 3: Illustration of heterogeneity in universalism. In the empirical analysis, we do not impose that the domestic stranger is socially closer than the global in-group.

the case, we rely on two complementary strategies. First, we here briefly discuss simple intuitions. Second, in Appendix A we provide a formal model based on Tabellini (2008b) that also generates our hypotheses.

Our starting point is the observation that many policy domains concern the welfare and anticipated behavior of people who differ in how socially close they are from the decision-maker. This suggests that the decision-maker's universalism in altruism (who he cares about) and his universalism in trust (who he believes will not misbehave) will matter for how he thinks about policy proposals.

Consider first domestic policies that have a redistributive flavor, such as *welfare payments* or *universal health care*. In Western democracies, these are implemented in a highly impersonal fashion, whereby people's tax money is used to fund payments to others that they have potentially no connection to. This is in stark contrast to the more community-based redistributive systems that have dominated human history for centuries. We argue that the decision-maker's support for such highly impersonal redistributive systems will partly depend on (i) whether he actually cares about people that are socially distant from him and (ii) whether he believes that these socially distant people will "cheat on the system" (e.g., by claiming benefits they are not entitled to, or reducing their supply of labor as a form of moral hazard), which hurts the decision-maker's in-group members. This reasoning suggests that universalism in both altruism and trust should be predictive of support for welfare and universal health care, as long as these policies are implemented in universalist ("non-local") ways.

Very similar arguments apply to *affirmative action* and *foreign aid*: these are – almost

by definition – policies that increase the welfare of people who are socially distant from most decision-makers. Thus, universalist individuals should be more likely to support them, both because they internalize the welfare of socially distant people to a larger degree, and because they are less inclined to believe that these strangers will "cheat" by reducing effort after receiving favorable treatment. Again relatedly, from the perspective of Western citizens, *environmental protection* arguably also largely benefits socially distant strangers, including future generations and people in developing countries whose geographic location or lack of funds makes them especially vulnerable to rising sea levels and other aspects of climate change. This again makes climate change prevention more attractive for universalists than for communitarians.

All of the preceding hypotheses concern policy domains in which universalists are more supportive of government spending than communitarians. Yet, we hypothesize that the opposite holds true for expenditure categories that carry signatures of "us vs. them" and protection from untrustworthy people. First, because universalists by definition internalize the welfare of foreigners more, and believe that they are as trustworthy as compatriots, universalists will be less supportive of strong *border protection* than decision-makers who place little weight on the welfare of foreigners (and potentially believe that they are more likely to commit crimes or to misbehave in other ways). Similarly, universalists who place high weight on the welfare of foreign nations, and who believe that these nations are trustworthy partners rather than potential aggressors, will be less inclined to spend money on a strong *military*, compared to people who believe that foreign nations cannot be trusted.

Finally, regarding *police and law enforcement*, communitarian decision-makers believe that socially distant groups are more likely to cheat on society and commit crimes, which comes at the expense of the communitarian's in-groups. Yet, the communitarian fundamentally dislikes this idea because he primarily cares about his in-group members and hence supports a strong police force.

In all, this discussion highlights that universalists and communitarians both sometimes support and sometimes oppose government spending, depending on whether a policy primarily benefits in-group members, and depending on who needs to be trusted. Our complementary model in Appendix A formalizes these arguments. We summarize this discussion in the following hypotheses.

Hypotheses. *Universalism is positively linked to support for welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, environmental protection and foreign aid, but negatively linked to support for border protection, a strong military and police and law enforcement. This holds for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

4 Survey Design

4.1 Logistics

We implemented internet surveys in Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, the United States, Brazil and South Korea through the infrastructure of the market research panel of *Dynata*. The surveys were implemented between June and August 2019. The original survey was developed in English, translated into other languages by *Dynata*, and then checked by us using native speakers. The median completion time was 20 minutes.

The survey consisted of four components: (i) an introductory screen that elicited demographics and routed respondents into or out of the survey; (ii) decision screens to measure universalism and other social preferences; (iii) screens to measure policy views; and (iv) a questionnaire to elicit additional information and covariates. The order of parts (ii) and (iii) was randomized across respondents. We also randomized the order in which universalism in altruism and universalism in trust were elicited.[5]

We took two measures to ensure quality control. First, every respondent who completed the survey in less than 400 seconds was dropped and replaced by *Dynata*. Second, the survey contained two attention check questions, interspersed throughout the survey. Whenever a respondent answered an attention check incorrectly, they were immediately routed out of the survey and replaced by *Dynata*.

We contracted with *Dynata* for nationally representative samples of $N = 1,700$ citizens aged at least 18 in each country (see details on the pre-registration below). However, because constructing a sample that is nationally representative along the lines of age, gender, ethnicity, income, employment status, and education is logistically difficult, *Dynata* eventually supplied a larger sample to us (total $N = 14,731$), a subset of which makes up the more representative samples that we pre-registered. The physical process was that *Dynata* kept sampling respondents until our pre-specified quotas were satisfied. "Surplus" respondents came free of charge for us. Since we view throwing away data as scientifically questionable, all analyses reported in the main text make use of the full sample. In the Appendix we replicate all analyses using the pre-registered (smaller) representative samples. The results are always extremely similar.

As a final remark on the sample, *Dynata* had considerably more difficulty in constructing representative samples in Brazil and South Korea than in the other countries. The final samples in these countries skew young, rich, and employed. Sample characteristics are summarized in Appendix C.1.

[5] A permanent link for the U.S. version of our survey is: `https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_aftuqgHsyIAShkp`.

4.2 Measurement of Universalism

We rely on a set of structured experimentally-validated survey games to measure an individual's universalism. Our main goals when designing these games were to use survey games that (i) are closely linked to how we conceptualize universalism in Section 3 and Appendix A; (ii) capture a broad set of in-groups; and (iii) can be deployed at scale in online surveys relatively easily. To conserve space and focus, we relegated the development, experimental validation, and testing of these survey measures to a separate paper (Enke et al., 2021). We summarize the key aspects below.

4.2.1 Survey Games

Universalism in altruism. Respondents completed a total of 16 hypothetical money allocation tasks that allow us to construct a summary statistic of universalism in altruism. Analogous to Figure 3 and our formal framework in Appendix A, the construction of the survey games is organized along four different types of groups: domestic in-groups, domestic strangers, global in-groups, and global strangers. From these four types of groups, we construct three universalism components: domestic universalism, foreign universalism, and global universalism.

First, to estimate *domestic* universalism, respondents made ten decisions. In each of them, they were asked to split hypothetical $100 between (i) a randomly-selected person from their country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected member of one of their social groups, who also resides in the respondent's country of residence. We based the selection of in-groups on an ex-ante crowd-sourcing exercise (see Enke et al., 2021, for details). Across the ten questions, the social groups included extended family, friends of family, neighbors, colleagues at work or school, same organization (e.g., club), same age, same ethnic background or race, same political views, same hobbies, and same religious beliefs. For example, in one question, respondents in the U.S. were asked to split $100 between a randomly-selected person who lives in the U.S. and a member of their extended family, such as a cousin. The average allocation to the randomly-selected person across the ten questions then makes up the domestic universalism measure.

Second, to estimate *foreign* universalism, respondents were asked to split $100 between (i) a randomly-selected person from their country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world. Foreign universalism then corresponds to the monetary amount sent to the global stranger.

Third, to estimate *global* universalism, respondents made five decisions, in each of which they were asked to split hypothetical $100 between (i) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and is a member of the respondent's social groups. Across the

five questions, the social groups included same language, same religious beliefs, same ethnic background, same values, and same occupation. The average amount of money sent to the randomly-selected world citizen makes up the global universalism measure.

For the purpose of these tasks, respondents were always asked to assume (i) that both individuals are equally rich (addressing income effects) and (ii) that neither of these individuals would find out who sent them the money (ruling out reciprocity considerations). The order of questions was randomized across respondents. Figure 13 in Appendix C.2 shows an example decision screen.

As discussed in detail in Enke et al. (2021), the separate money allocation decisions, and in particular the domestic, foreign, and global universalism summary components are all highly positively correlated with each other in a representative sample of the U.S. population. This is also true in our multinational dataset. To reduce the dimensionality of the data and minimize measurement error, we hence average the three components into a summary statistic of universalism in altruism. The construction of this summary statistic was pre-registered, see below.

Universalism in trust. Respondents completed a total of 16 tasks from which we estimate an individual's universalism in trust. The procedure was identical to the one described for altruism above, except that in a given game respondents were asked to allocate 100 points (rather than $100) between two individuals, to express whom of the two they trust more. This was explained as indicating "how much you trust that different people will not cheat on you or take advantage of you." This procedure again yields domestic, foreign, and global universalism components, which we average into a summary statistic of universalism in trust. Again, the construction of this summary statistic was pre-registered.

Composite measure of universalism. Universalism in altruism and trust exhibit a correlation of $\rho = 0.62$ after accounting for measurement error using the obviously-related instrumental variables technique of Gillen et al. (2015). To reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, in some analyses below we work with a composite measure of universalism, which consists of the unweighted average of universalism in trust and universalism in altruism. At the same time, we always reference robustness checks that use the altruism and trust measures separately, see Section 5.5.

4.2.2 Construct Validity

We validate the universalism measures along three dimensions. See Enke et al. (2021) for details. (i) *Experimental validation.* We implemented an ex-ante experimental vali-



Figure 4: Distribution of the composite measure of moral universalism, pooled across all Western countries. The amounts reflect allocations to random strangers, so that the measure is decreasing in in-group favoritism. 50 corresponds to an equal split of money or trust points.

dation procedure. Specifically, we show that, over a one-week horizon, our hypothetical measure of universalism in altruism is highly correlated with a financially-incentivized measure of universalism, which consists of the same questions with real incentives. Second, we document that behavior in our trust task is highly correlated with trust beliefs in a structured cheating task that is standard in the experimental economics literature. (ii) *Correlation with real donation decisions.* We also show that our survey measure of moral universalism predicts real donation decisions: while universalists donate less to local community organizations, they donate more to nationwide and international charities. (iii) *Choice of social groups.* We document that an individual's degree of universalism with respect to the set of fifteen domestic and foreign groups that we implement is highly correlated with their universalism with respect to a more comprehensive set of forty social groups.

4.2.3 Descriptives

Figure 4 shows a histogram of the composite universalism measure, pooled across all Western countries. Numbers around 50 imply on average equal allocations of money and trust points to in-groups and strangers. Numbers below 50 indicate a tendency to allocate more money and trust points towards in-groups. Numbers above 50 correspond to the (largely counterfactual) case that someone allocates more money and trust points to socially more distant individuals. Appendix C.3 shows the corresponding his-

tograms in each country separately. Table 1 reports correlations with demographics. The strongest correlations are with age and wealth, both of which correlate negatively with moral universalism. Similarly, men, higher-income individuals, and the religious exhibit lower universalism. These results are consistent with those documented in Enke et al. (2021) for a U.S. sample. Importantly, these correlations highlight that heterogeneity in universalism does not simply pick up variation in income or education – if anything, individuals with higher income and wealth are *less* universalist.

4.3 Measurement of Political Attitudes

Measures of Support for Expenditure Categories. Respondents were instructed to imagine they could decide the average amount of money that their federal or national government collects per year from each citizen to spend on each of eight policy categories. We asked respondents to assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category would be spent only on this particular category, without any waste. In addition, we provided respondents with a reference value: annual per capita spending on education in their country of residence.

Respondents were asked to enter eight monetary amounts to indicate their desired per capita spending levels for each of welfare, universal health care, foreign aid, environmental protection, affirmative action, military and counterintelligence, police and law enforcement, and border control. The order of these categories on the computer screen was randomized. Histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category and country are presented in Appendix C.4.[6]

Figure 16 in Appendix C.2 provides a screenshot. Naturally, because of the free-entry format, responses to these questions are subject to large outliers. To account for these outliers, we winsorize the desired spending levels at $+/-$ 3 standard deviations of the within-country mean, as specified in our pre-registration (discussed below). That is, we replace each dollar amount above (below) the amount that corresponds to 3 SD above (below) the mean with this value. This affects 1.6% of all responses.

Summary statistic of policy views. As specified in our pre-registration, we compute a simple summary statistic of policy views across all policy domains, which is computed from the desired expenditure shares:

$$\text{Sum. stat.} = \frac{\text{For. aid} + \text{Envir.} + \text{Aff. act.} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health}}{5} - \frac{\text{Milit.} + \text{Police} + \text{Border}}{3}$$

[6]The term "affirmative action" was never used in the survey. Instead, this was described as "Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage."

Table 1: Individual-level correlates of universalism: Western countries

	Correlation between composite measure of universalism and:						
	Age	Female (0-1)	Income Index (z-score)	Wealth Index (z-score)	College (0-1)	Religiosity (z-score)	Urbanicity (z-score)
Raw correlation	-0.16^{***}	0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.12^{***}	0.01	-0.10^{***}	0.03^{***}
OLS coeff. (w/ Country FEs)	-0.12^{***}	1.78^{***}	-0.84^{***}	-1.51^{***}	0.21	-1.16^{***}	0.38^{***}
OLS coeff. (multivariate) (w/ Country FEs)	-0.09^{***}	1.12^{***}	-0.47^{***}	-0.82^{***}	1.18^{***}	-1.04^{***}	0.20^{*}

Notes. The first row reports the Pearson raw correlation between individual characteristics and the composite measure of universalism ($N = 11,063$). The second row reports OLS coefficients from individual regressions of the composite measure of universalism on the given characteristic, including country fixed effects; this row thus presents by how many dollars / trust points universalism increases for a one unit change in the demographic variable. The third row reports OLS coefficients from a multivariate regression of the composite measure of universalism on all characteristics at once, including country fixed effects. See Appendix E for details on the construction of the demographic variables. All z-scores are computed separately within each country. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

where each policy denotes share of desired expenditure that goes to a domain. Pooling data across all countries, this summary statistic exhibits a correlation of $\rho = 0.40$ with respondents' self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). We pre-specified the summary statistic in this particular way because it corresponds very closely to the structure of policy views in the Western countries discussed in Section 2.

Complementary Likert scale measures of policy views. While the aforementioned variables have the advantage of being quantitative and relatively well-defined, they may also be cognitively difficult for respondents to answer. Therefore, we additionally elicit complementary, simpler measures, which consist of standard Likert scale questions. Here, respondents indicate their support for each of the eight policies on a 0–10 scale. We use this alternative measure for a robustness check below.

4.4 Covariates

Even though this paper is descriptive in nature, we seek to assess to which extent a potential relationship between universalism and policy views is driven by omitted variables. Our survey hence elicits rich measures of covariates, including: age, gender, ethnicity / race, educational attainment, income (two measures), wealth and asset ownership (three measures), religiosity (three measures), urbanicity, employment status, marital status, migration background, belief about whether the government is efficient or wasteful (on a scale 0–10), beliefs about whether the respondent is likely to personally benefit from government expenditure in a given category, and measures of altruism, generalized trust, and equity-efficiency preferences. All of these covariates and their construction are

described in detail in Appendix E.

To highlight just a few, we compute income, wealth and religiosity indices using principal component analyses. An income index is computed as first principal component of two questions that ask respondents (i) for a continuous estimate of their household income (which we transform into a within-country percentile rank) and (ii) to place themselves into income buckets. The wealth index is the first principal component of the z-scores of (i) respondents' estimates of net worth (as within-country percentile rank), (ii) whether they own a home and (iii) whether they own stocks. The religiosity index is constructed as first principal component of the z-scores of (i) a self-assessment of religiosity (scale 0–10), (ii) frequency of church attendance, and (iii) a binary indicator for whether the respondent considers themselves to be an Atheist.

4.5 Pre-Registration

The survey was pre-registered on EGAP, see `http://egap.org/registration/5792`. The pre-registration contained (i) the desired sample size; (ii) the precise construction of the summary statistics of universalism in altruism and trust; (iii) predictions about how we expected universalism to be correlated with support for each of the eight policy domains, as stated in Section 3; (iv) the construction of the summary statistic of policy views discussed above; (v) the analysis of the specific policy proposals in Section 6; and (vi) an analysis of whether the patterns in Brazil and South Korea are different from those in the Western countries.

5 Survey Results

5.1 Summary Statistic of Policy Views

Table 2 presents the results of a set of OLS regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on each of the separate universalism measures detailed in Section 4.2, pooled across the five Western countris in our sample. The composite universalism measure is constructed as average of universalism in altruism and trust. The universalism measures are all in [0,1], where zero means that all money and trust points are allocated to the in-group member in a given game, 0.5 means that the money and the trust points are split equally, on average, and one corresponds to the (counterfactual) case that someone always allocates all money and trust points to the socially more distant individual.

We find a strong positive relationship between universalism and the summary statistic of policy views. This is true for each individual component of universalism, regardless of whether it is measured in the altruism or trust space. In fact, as we document in Fig-

ure 27 in Appendix C.5.1, this pattern is even more general than what is suggested by the results in Table 2: out of the 32 different allocation decisions respondents made, *all* are significantly correlated with the summary statistic of policy views, such that a higher allocation towards the socially more distant individual is correlated with a "higher" score on the summary statistic of policy views. This provides evidence that our results are not driven by a just a few in-groups but reflect a general psychological tendency.

As we document in column (10), the relationship between universalism and our summary statistic of policy views is robust against controlling for age, gender, income, wealth, college education, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Conditional on country fixed effects, the composite universalism measure exhibits a partial correlation with the summary statistic of policy views of $\rho = 0.25$. This is identical to the partial correlation with respondents' left-right self assessment, conditional on country fixed effects. While we provide more sophisticated benchmarking analyses later, it is perhaps informative that the corresponding correlation for the belief that government is efficient vs. wasteful is $\rho = 0.15$, the one for college degree $\rho = 0.05$, for age $\rho = -0.12$, for the religiosity index $\rho = -0.10$, for the income index $\rho = -0.07$, and for the wealth index $\rho = -0.12$.

5.2 Separate Policy Views

Desired expenditure shares. Figure 5 summarizes the results for the separate policy categories. The underlying OLS regressions relate the desired *share* of overall desired expenditure for each policy (standardized into z-scores) to universalism, separately for each country and all Western countries combined, for a total of 48 regressions. The left panel shows the results of univariate regressions, while the point estimates in the right panel stem from multivariate regressions that control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain.

As hypothesized, in all Western countries, we observe a strong negative relationship between universalism and desired expenditure shares for the three "right-wing" policy domains, while the relationship is generally positive and statistically significant for the five "left-wing" domains. In terms of quantitative magnitude, the estimated regression coefficients suggest that increasing universalism from zero to 1/2 (and hence moving from 100:0 to 50:50 allocation decisions) is associated with a 0.25–1.0 standard deviation change in each of the policy views.[7] Out of the 40 regression coefficients for the

[7]A notable exception occurs in the domain of universal health care, where the relationship is strongly positive in the U.S. but either not statistically significant or even negative in the other countries. This

Table 2: Summary statistic of policy views and different universalism measures, pooled across countries

	Dependent variable: Summary statistic of policy views									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Domestic universalism in altruism	0.90***									
	(0.06)									
Foreign universalism in altruism		0.94***								
		(0.04)								
Global universalism in altruism			1.19***							
			(0.06)							
Composite universalism in altruism				1.57***						
				(0.07)						
Domestic universalism in trust					1.01***					
					(0.08)					
Foreign universalism in trust						0.94***				
						(0.06)				
Global universalism in trust							1.19***			
							(0.08)			
Composite universalism in trust								1.50***		
								(0.09)		
Composite universalism									2.09***	1.64***
									(0.09)	(0.09)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881
R^2	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.11

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are pooled across all five Western countries. The dependent variable is the summary statistic of policy views, constructed as described in Section 4.3 and standardized into a z-score within each country. The construction of each universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. Demographic controls include age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

individual countries reported in the left panel of Figure 5, 37 have the expected (pre-registered) sign. Of these, 33 are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Once our battery of controls is added in the right panel, 38 of these coefficients have the expected sign, out of which 31 are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.

An immediate question is whether these results are only driven by universalism in altruism or universalism in trust alone. Indeed, while we construct Figure 5 based on the composite universalism measure, we highlight that our data allow us to separately consider preferences and trust beliefs. Table 3 summarizes the results of OLS regressions, in which we link a respondent's desired expenditure shares (normalized into z-scores) to their universalism in altruism and trust, controlling for our full set of covariates.

We find that, for all policy domains except for health care, the coefficients of universalism in altruism and universalism in trust are always statistically significant and sizable in magnitude. This suggests that even though universalism in altruism and universalism

pattern might arise because, in contrast to the United States, all of these countries have had versions of universal health care for decades, which may generate less heterogeneity in views on universal health care across the political spectrum. It probably also implies that respondents outside the U.S. interpret survey questions about "universal health care" in a different fashion than Americans.



Figure 5: The left panel plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain (as a fraction of overall desired government spending for the eight policy domains) on composite universalism. The right panel plots the analogous coefficients of multivariate regressions, in which we control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain. See Appendix E for details on the construction of these variables. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores within each country. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

Table 3: Universalism and policy views

	Dependent variable: Desired expenditure shares (Z-scores)							
	Border control	Military	Police	Foreign aid	Aff. action	Environment	Health care	Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Universalism in altruism	-0.84***	-0.55***	-0.57***	0.69***	0.51***	0.46***	0.16*	0.25***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Universalism in trust	-0.59***	-0.28***	-0.36***	0.39***	0.30***	0.25***	0.030	0.35***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Age	0.0013**	0.0035***	0.0024***	-0.0061***	-0.0017**	-0.0036***	0.00082	0.00023
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male	-0.022	0.19***	-0.051**	-0.090***	-0.065***	-0.13***	0.037*	0.096***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religion Index (z-scores)	0.069***	0.086***	0.028***	0.035***	-0.028***	-0.088***	-0.063***	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth Index (z-scores)	0.033***	0.045***	0.059***	-0.021*	-0.067***	-0.0018	0.0063	-0.060***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Index (z-scores)	0.0096	0.044***	0.054***	-0.021**	-0.0017	-0.010	0.021*	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College-educated	-0.17***	-0.039*	-0.13***	0.039*	0.058***	0.13***	0.059***	0.023
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Neighborhood size (0 to 9)	0.0035	-0.00023	0.00022	0.00065	-0.00066	-0.0055	0.00076	0.0017
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Equity (0) vs. Efficiency (50)	-0.00087	-0.00085	-0.0016**	0.00065	-0.0020***	-0.00019	0.0035***	0.00024
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Altruism (0 - 100)	0.00023	0.00092**	-0.0016***	0.0027***	0.00096**	0.00013	-0.0021***	0.00047
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Trust (0 - 100)	-0.0030***	-0.0011***	-0.0021***	0.0017***	0.0014***	0.00100**	0.00055	0.0013***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gov't efficient (0) vs. wasteful (10)	-0.046***	-0.016***	-0.031***	0.051***	0.022***	0.0100**	-0.0020	0.032***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881	10881
R^2	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are desired expenditure shares on each of the eight policy categories, normalized into z-scores within each country. Universalism in altruism and universalism in trust are both in [0,1]. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

in trust are positively correlated, they each capture distinct variation that is relevant for understanding policy views.

Desired expenditure levels. Figure 6 reproduces the left panel of Figure 5, except that now the dependent variables are desired (log) expenditure levels rather than implied shares.[8] Again, we standardize desired spending into z-scores within each country to keep the magnitudes comparable across countries. The results show that universalists desire higher government spending in the canonical left-wing policy domains, yet lower government spending in the canonical conservative domains. Thus, universalists do not always desire higher government spending than non-universalists – just in policy domains that we argue have a universalist orientation. In this sense, universalism directly reproduces the pattern reported in Figure 2 in Section 2 that motivates our paper.

[8]Throughout the paper, we set ln(0) equal to zero.



Figure 6: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on composite universalism. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores within each country. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

5.3 Benchmarking Exercises

An immediate question is whether other individual characteristics could also produce the patterns we are trying to explain. To address this question, Figure 7 summarizes the relationship between desired (log) expenditure levels and eleven individual characteristics. For simplicity, we pool the data across Western countries for this analysis. In terms of demographics, we focus on age, religiosity, income, wealth, completion of a college degree, and urbanicity. In terms of beliefs and preferences, we consider residual measures of altruism and of generalized trust, the respondent's preferences over equity vs. efficiency, strength of belief that the government works efficiently, and strength of the belief that one might personally benefit from government spending on each policy domain.[9] We selected this set of variables for the benchmarking exercise because they are commonly associated with an individual's position on the political spectrum. Indeed, in our data, conditional on country fixed effects, a respondent's self-assessment on an 11-point left-vs.-right scale exhibits correlations of: $\rho = -0.08$ with income, $\rho = -0.13$ with wealth and $\rho = -0.23$ with religiosity. This suggests that we measure these vari-

[9]We employ *residual* measures of altruism and trust because both our dictator game and our elicitation of generalized trust are framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger. Thus, by construction, these raw measures partly include universalism.

ables in meaningful ways.

In Figure 7, the leftmost panels serve as reminder and show the pattern we are trying to explain: we are looking for a variable that is negatively correlated with desired spending levels for military, police and law enforcement and border control, but positively correlated with desired spending on welfare, health care, environmental protection, affirmative action and foreign aid. We find that none of the other eleven variables produces the characteristic pattern that universalism successfully reproduces. In other words, other variables are often significantly correlated with policy views in meaningful and known ways – we are not trying to argue that they are unimportant for understanding policy views. However, our results show that they do not generate the characteristic internal structure of ideology that we are interested in here.[10]

Our survey did not attempt to measure variables that have been shown to predict policy views on specific topics in meaningful ways, but that are typically not associated with broad policy attitudes. For instance, we did not measure beliefs about the role of effort and luck in generating success, which are often implicated in determining views on redistribution and affirmative action, but that seem implausible as determinants of a person's policy views on, e.g., the environment, the military or border control.

5.4 Non-Western Countries

Up to this point, our analyses have focused on the five Western countries in our sample. In this section, we comment briefly on the relationship between policy preferences and universalism in Brazil and South Korea. Figure 30 in Appendix C.5.2 plots the coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure shares on universalism in all countries, including Brazil and Korea. Here, we observe that the relationships between universalism and policy preferences are all weaker in magnitude and sometimes opposite in sign relative to those observed in Western countries.

These patterns might be unsurprising because (as discussed in Section 2 and Appendix C.5) the very clusters of policy views that we attempt to rationalize in this paper are absent in these countries. Put simply, if a baseline pattern is not observed, then it cannot be explained by universalism. The different nature of ideological constraint and its relation to morality outside the West may be unsurprising in light of a large body of work in cultural psychology and anthropology that documents that people in non-Western ("non-WEIRD") societies often exhibit different psychological tendencies and behavioral patterns than people in the West (Henrich et al., 2010; Henrich, 2020). Future research is needed to better understand why the structure of ideology is different

[10]While it may appear puzzling that income and wealth are not correlated with support for welfare payments, this is merely a result of looking at desired expenditure *levels* rather than shares; once we look at shares, support for welfare payments decreases significantly with wealth and income, see Table 3.





Figure 7: Benchmarking analyses. We report the standardized beta coefficients and confidence intervals for regressions of log desired expenditure level in a category on different individual-level characteristics, conditional on country fixed effects. All variables are standardized into z-scores within countries. The top panel considers the preferences and beliefs of respondents; the bottom panel considers demographics. Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. To obtain residual altruism and trust, we respectively computed the residuals of dictator game allocations and generalized trust with respect to universalism.

outside the West and why it appears less affected by heterogeneity in universalism.

5.5 Robustness Checks and Extensions

The Appendix contains five sets of robustness checks. First, some of our main analysis employed the composite measure of universalism. As specified in our pre-registration, Appendix C.5.1 shows that very similar results hold if we work with universalism in altruism or universalism in trust separately.

Second, all of our main analyses rely on survey questions about respondents' desired expenditure levels for different policies. While these questions have the advantage of being quantitative and relatively well-defined, they may be cognitively harder for respondents than more qualitative Likert scale-based questions. Thus, for the purposes of a robustness check, we also elicited respondents' level of support for the eight policy domains above using Likert scale questions. These directly ask participants to indicate whether they strongly support or strongly oppose a given policy, on a scale from zero to ten. As Figure 34 in Appendix C.6.3 shows, the results using these questions are very similar to those reported above.

Third, to tentatively probe the time stability of our results, Appendix C.5.3 documents that the link between universalism and policy views is very similar among young and old survey participants.

Fourth, as we pre-registered, we employ instrumentation strategies from Gillen et al. (2019) to address the effects of measurement error in our elicitations of policy views and universalism. Results using multiple elicitations for both outcome and explanatory variables are very similar, see Appendix D.

Fifth, we contracted with *Dynata* for $N = 1,700$ respondents in each country, stratified to match the population on a number of dimensions. In Appendix C.7, we replicate the analysis using these more representative samples, with very similar results.

6 Specific Policy Proposals

The claim of our paper is not that universalists (left-wingers) or communitarians (right-wingers) approve or disapprove of certain policy domains per sé, but rather that this is the case because each domain is predominantly characterized by universalist or non-universalist features. However, a possible alternative interpretation of our results is that ideological constraint is not driven by the structure of voters' morality, but instead results from a supply-side mechanism, according to which voters identify with a political party and then simply follow the party line on different policy domains (though it is unclear

why such a supply-side story should generate the *particular* clusters that we observe, in an identical fashion across countries).

If our claim was true, then it should be possible to manipulate voters' support for broad policy domains such as redistribution by asking them to consider particularly universalist or communitarian counterfactual implementations of these policies. For example, our account would predict that conservatives become more in favor of redistribution once it is implemented at a more local, community-based level. In contrast, it seems unclear how a pure supply-side story could explain why people's policy views should strongly depend on the specific policy implementation.

To formally investigate this, our survey described in the preceding sections additionally elicited respondents' desired government spending level for specific policy proposals (two for each broad policy domain). The general objective of this exercise was to manipulate the scope and moral content of a policy, such that one was unambiguously more universalist than the other. We then investigate whether self-reported left-wingers become more supportive of canonical conservative policies once they are implemented in a more universalist fashion, and whether right-wingers become more supportive of canonical left-wing policies once they are implemented in a communitarian fashion.

To manipulate the degree of universalism that is implied by a policy, we manipulated the social distance between the respondent and the beneficiaries of a policy. For welfare, environmental protection and health care, we implemented this by manipulating *geographic scope*. To illustrate, consider the example of welfare payments. We elicited desired spending levels separately for (i) "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide" and (ii) "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised."[11] We used similar language to elicit desired spending levels for health care that is funded through local vs. national tax revenues, and for local environmental protection vs. preventing global climate change, see Table 13 in Appendix C.6 for details.

For foreign aid and affirmative action, we likewise manipulated the social distance between respondent and beneficiaries of a policy, except that this was done through other means than geography. For foreign aid, we separately elicit desired spending for (i) "Sending foreign aid to countries that are in most need of help" and (ii) "Sending foreign aid to foreign countries that are our international allies," which manipulates social distance. Similarly, for affirmative action, we separately elicit support for policies that ensure that (i) "no individual is disadvantaged" vs. that "no one of your same background (e.g., gender, ethnicity or ancestry) is disadvantaged." Again, this manipulates the universalist appeal of the policy domain because the latter proposal is directed at

[11]Figure 17 in Appendix C.2 provides a screenshot.

improving the welfare of in-group members.[12] See Table 13 in Appendix C.6 for the full wording of each policy proposal.

Figure 8 illustrates the results by showing binned scatter plots that link desired spending levels for specific policy proposals to respondents' self-reported left-vs.-right orientation (0–10), where higher values mean that the respondent considers himself more left-wing. To conserve space, we show the results for welfare, environmental protection and foreign aid; the results for healthcare and affirmative action look very similar, see Appendix C.6. In each row, the left panel shows the link between left-vs.-right orientation and the more universalist policy implementation (which in these cases is arguably close to the policies that are implemented in practice), while the right panel shows results for the (largely counterfactual) more communitarian implementations.

Unsurprisingly, we see that a left-wing political orientation is strongly correlated with desired spending for national redistribution, global climate change prevention and foreign aid to the most needy. These are essentially the standard correlations that we see in the political discourse. However, much more interestingly, and as we hypothesized, we also see that self-identified conservatives become almost as supportive of redistribution, environmental protection and foreign aid once these policies are implemented in more communitarian ways. For example, conservatives and liberals support redistribution to the same extent once it occurs within local communities. Specifically, the partial correlations (conditional on country fixed effects) between the self-reported left-vs.-right scale and desired spending levels drops from $\rho = 0.16$ for national redistribution to $\rho = -0.01$ for local redistribution, from $\rho = 0.20$ for global climate change prevention to $\rho = 0.07$ for local environmental protection, and from $\rho = 0.16$ for foreign aid to the most needy to $\rho = 0.02$ for foreign aid to international allies.

We interpret these patterns as suggesting that it is not mechanically true that conservatives oppose traditional "left-wing" policies, perhaps because they learned from their party leaders that such opposition is part of being a real conservative. Instead, people's policy views strongly vary depending on whether the policies are aimed at impersonal strangers or people that the respondent has some subjective or objective connection to.

In Appendix C.6, we implement similar exercises for the traditional conservative spending categories of border control, military and police and law enforcement. In line with the results summarized above, we find that self-identified left-wingers become substantially more likely to support these expenditures once they focus on universalist objectives, such as peacekeeping by the military.

[12] As pre-registered, we again winsorize the data at +/− 3 sd. of the within-country mean, which affects 0.1% of all responses. We also standardize these variables into z-scores, separately within each country.



Figure 8: This figure shows binned scatter plots between log desired spending levels for specific policy proposals and respondents' self-identification as left-vs.-right wing. In each row, the left panel shows the more universalist and the right panel the more communitarian implementation. The first row shows results for welfare, the second one for environmental protection and the third one for foreign aid. The data are pooled across Western countries, and all panels are constructed controlling for country fixed effects.

7 Field Evidence

We complement the survey analysis with field evidence. Here, we estimate the aggregate universalism of entire Congressional Districts (CDs) using large-scale donation data and link these to administrative data on local vote shares. The objective is to use donations data to study whether – in line with the analysis above – more universalist regions vote left in higher proportions. This adds ecological validity to our survey results, both because the measure of universalism will be derived from real financial choices and because the outcome variable (vote shares) is not self-reported.

7.1 Data

To estimate a CD's universalism in altruism, we leverage data from DonorsChoose, an American non-profit organization providing an online "crowdfunding" platform for public school teachers.[13] On this platform, teachers can post funding requests for a wide variety of classroom "projects," such as field trips, classroom furniture, and purchases of basic school supplies or technology. Potential donors visit the website and donate to individual projects. Appendix F.4 provides screenshots of the layout and functionality of the platform. Notably, potential donors' ability to search through and filter projects based on location is a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the website. Moreover, across CDs the layout and functionality of the donation platform is identical—projects are sorted by default based on a combination of cost to completion, highest economic need, and fewest days left to expiration, and no type of donor is steered by the website towards relatively closer or further projects geographically.

The geographic scope of the data is broad and comprehensive: DonorsChoose reported in June 2019 that since the platform's inception in 2000, teachers in 82% of public schools in the United States had posted 1.4 million projects, reaching 34 million students and involving nearly 3.8 million donors, who had contributed $838 million. We use publicly available data to match all individual donations made on DonorsChoose between March 2000 and October of 2016 to their recipient projects. These data report the school's location (latitude and longitude) and the first three digits of each donor's ZIP code. We drop all observations for which the donor ZIP code is missing. Appendix F.1 reports summary statistics.

The geographic measures enable us to investigate how a CD's altruism towards another CD changes as a function of distance to the recipient. To perform this analysis, we aggregate individual donation data at the CD level to construct a dyadic dataset, where each observation represents every possible unique donor-recipient CD pair.

[13] We are indebted to Ray Fisman for suggesting this analysis to us.



Figure 9: This figure illustrates regression equation (1) for four CDs. The left panel presents a binned scatter plot of all donations from both a Democratic and a Republican CD (based on 2016 presidential vote shares) in California against geographic distance to the respective recipient CDs. The right panel presents an analogue for New York state. All data are residualized of donor and recipient CD fixed effects.

We work with two different measures of distance. First, the simple geographic distance between the CD's centroids. Second, a measure of friendship distance that was recently constructed from Facebook data by Bailey et al. (2018). This measure gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from two CDs are friends on Facebook. We view this measure of friendship distance as a summary statistic of social distance that aggregates a wide variety of demographic and social dimensions, such as ethnic distance, age distance, ideological distance, income distance, educational distance, etc.

7.2 Empirical Approach: Identifying Universalism in Altruism

To begin, we estimate a CD's universalism in altruism as (the negative of) the extent to which donations from a given donor CD decline as a function of geographic distance. Figure 9 illustrates this approach for four donor CDs from California and New York. For each donor CD, we provide a binned scatter plot of the log donation amount as a function of geographic distance to the recipient. Our interest is then in the *slope* of this function, where – as in Section 3 – we define a CD as being less universalist if it exhibits a steeper slope. In these scatter plots, the donation and distance data are residualized from donor and recipient fixed effects. That is, as explained below, we hold fixed the level of donations from and to a given CD, and only exploit variation in the slope.

Formally, for each donor CD i and recipient CD j, denote the log distance measure by $d_{i,j}$ and the log total dollar amount of donations by $p_{i,j}$. Further denote donor CD FEs as α_i and recipient CD FEs as φ_j. Our estimating equation is then given by:

$$p_{i,j} = \theta_i d_{i,j} + \alpha_i + \varphi_j + \varepsilon_{i,j} \tag{1}$$



Figure 10: Relationship between universalism in altruism and CD-level vote shares. Universalism is the negative of $\hat{\theta}_i$ in equation (1).

The measure of interest is the set of coefficients θ_i, which captures for each CD i the average extent to which donations from i to other CDs j decline as distance increases.

The estimating equation includes donor and recipient fixed effects to control for spatial variation in donation rates due to causes unrelated to universalism. For instance, a given donor CD may have disproportionately many users of DonorsChoose or be rich on average, hence leading to higher overall donation amounts. Similarly, a given recipient CD may post many projects on the DonorsChoose website or be very poor and hence receive many donations. Our specification nets out these level effects and only identifies the responsiveness of donations to distance, holding fixed both the level of donations from the donor and the amount of money a given recipient receives.[14]

7.3 Results: Universalism and Vote Shares

Figure 10 shows the raw correlation between universalism (standardized into a z-score) and the two-party Democratic vote shares in the 2016 Presidential election ($\rho = 0.57$). Table 4 provides a regression analysis. Using the baseline measure of universalism developed above, columns (1)–(4) document that a one-standard-deviation increase in a CD's

[14]To mitigate measurement error in the estimation of CD-level coefficients θ_i, we shrink these coefficients to the sample mean by their signal-to-noise ratio, see Appendix F.2.1. Universalism is measured very precisely at the CD level due to the large underlying sample of donations, so the shrinkage does not meaningfully impact our results – the correlation between the raw and shrunk measures is 0.99.

Table 4: Vote shares and universalism in altruism across Congressional Districts

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance)	10.3***	13.4***	11.2***	9.77***		
	(0.65)	(1.16)	(1.46)	(1.39)		
Universalism in altruism (wrt friendship distance)					8.94***	3.80***
					(0.72)	(1.12)
Log [Total donations]			2.63**	1.75*		2.63**
			(1.10)	(0.99)		(1.20)
Log [Median household income]				-45.4***		-45.2***
				(5.30)		(5.51)
Fraction of population with college degree				79.8***		89.5***
				(12.78)		(13.11)
Latitude				1.10**		0.50
				(0.55)		(0.60)
Log [Distance to coast]				-2.05***		-2.05***
				(0.57)		(0.70)
Racial fractionalization				18.8***		20.3***
				(5.82)		(6.02)
Log [Average distance to all projects]				72.4***		64.4***
				(15.07)		(17.90)
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436
R^2	0.34	0.48	0.49	0.64	0.25	0.61

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Effective Democratic vote shares are given by Demoractic vote share as a fraction of Democratic and Republican vote share in the 2016 Presidential election. We have verified that very similar results hold for vote shares in earlier Presidential elections. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

universalism is associated with a 10 to 13 percent higher Democratic vote share in that CD. Columns (2)–(4) show that the result is robust to including state fixed effects. The regressions also control for the CD's level of donations on DonorsChoose, median household income, the fraction of the population with at least a college degree, geographic controls, and racial fractionalization.

A potential concern is that our results are merely a mechanical result of the differing geographic distributions of Democratic and Republican CDs—Democratic CDs could lie farther from projects available for donations. Column (4) shows that the results are robust to controlling for the average distance from a given CD to all projects.

Finally, we present an extension in which universalism in altruism is computed based on *social* rather than geographic distance. When estimating equation (1), we use as $d_{i,j}$ the probability that two individuals from different CDs are friends on Facebook (Bailey et al., 2018); Appendix F.2.2 describes this measure in greater detail. Columns (5)–(6) of Table 4 show that very similar results hold with this alternative distance measure.

This shows that our results do not merely reflect the fact that Democrats' friends are located further away than Republicans' friends. Instead, *holding fixed a given level of friendship distance*, Democrats give relatively less if friendship distance is small and relatively more if friendship distance is large. That is, Republicans treat close friends "better" than Democrats, but Democrats treat distant strangers "better" than Republicans.

7.4 Robustness Checks

Controlling for local sources of education funding. A limitation of our analysis is that we estimate universalism only from DonorsChoose data, and do not observe giving outside of this platform. This would be problematic if, for example, variation in universalism across CDs was generated only as an artefact of variation in amounts given locally through other means in each CD. A prime candidate in this respect is the public school funding system, e.g., payments through local property taxes. Table 15 in Appendix F.3 shows that controlling for the per capita amount of primary and secondary education spending derived from local revenue sources does not affect the results.

Geographic distributions of CDs by party. Another potential concern pertains to differences in the geographic distribution of red and blue CDs. To address this, we implement two robustness checks. First, we re-estimate universalism after re-coding geographic distance into a binary variable, based on a distance threshold of 50 miles. Thus, this measure of universalism only leverages variation in whether donations are "local" or "distant." Long-distance coast-to-coast donations are hence treated just like other non-local donations. As a second robustness check, we add state-pair fixed-effects to the baseline analysis. That is, our analysis fixes a donor state and a recipient state and only leverages variation in distance within these states, say from Massachusetts to Vermont. The results in these two robustness checks are very similar. See Appendix F.3 and Table 15 for details.

Estimation Method. Our analysis relies on a two-step procedure, where we first estimate a CD's universalism through donation data, and then correlate it with its Democratic vote share. We could instead directly analyze the impact of the Democratic lean of a CD on its donation patterns by regressing CD-to-CD donation amounts on the distance between these CDs and an interaction between said distance and the donor CD's Democratic vote share. As predicted, we find that a higher Democratic vote share *flattens* the gradient of a CD's donations with respect to both geographic and friendship distance. See Appendix F.3 and Table 17 for details.

8 Conclusion

For decades, philosophers have argued about the scope of our moral obligations. Should we be always be impartial? Don't we have some special connection to those that are socially close to us, in a way that makes us trust them more and feel more morally responsible for them? These deep normative questions have direct empirical counterparts because many policies and government expenditure categories that are of central concern to economists implicitly or explicitly concern tradeoffs between impersonal strangers and those that are close to us. Yet, empirically, people exhibit large disagreement over what the morally appropriate way to treat different social groups is. This paper has proposed that this individual-level heterogeneity in universalism accounts for the particular structure of policy views that Western democracies have seen over the last few decades.

As discussed in Section 2, our analysis is conditional on two restrictions. First, we only analyze the structure of ideology as it has prevailed over the last 40-50 years. We do not have much to say about whether or how universalism mattered for policy in more distant history. This being said, there is some evidence that suggests that the relevance of universalism for politics has increased over time. The Democratic "loss of the South" and subsequent polarization were largely tied to ideas related to (non-) universalism (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Furthermore, Enke (2020) documents using text analyses that Republicans and Democrats used universalist vs. communal moral language in roughly equal frequencies until the mid-60's but steadily diverged thereafter, which could be understood as suggesting that heterogeneity in universalism is more relevant politically today than in the past.

Second, our analysis deliberately focused on the Western world. As discussed in Section 5.4, the connection between the structure of ideology and morality might be different outside the West for various reasons. Future research is needed to understand why the political systems of non-"WEIRD" societies (Henrich, 2020) don't give rise to the ideological clusters that dominate the West, and which role morality plays in these contexts.

References

Alesina, Alberto and Edward Glaeser, *Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A world of difference*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

_ , Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva, "Immigration and redistribution," Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.

_ , Reza Baqir, and William Easterly, "Public goods and ethnic divisions," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1999, *114* (4), 1243–1284.

Algan, Yann, Elizabeth Beasley, Daniel Cohen, and Martial Foucault, "The rise of populism and the collapse of the left-right paradigm: lessons from the 2017 French presidential election," 2018.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James M Snyder, "The strength of issues: Using multiple measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting," *American Political Science Review*, 2008, *102* (2), 215–232.

_ , _ , and James M Snyder Jr, "Purple america," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2006, *20* (2), 97–118.

Bailey, Michael, Rachel Cao, Theresa Kuchler, Johannes Stroebel, and Arlene Wong, "Social Connectedness: Measurement, Determinants, and Effects," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2018, *32* (3), 259–280.

Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, "The Rise of Identity Politics," 2019.

Bó, Ernesto Dal, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne, "Economic Losers and political winners: Sweden's radical right," *Working Paper*, 2018.

Chetty, Raj and Nathaniel Hendren, "The impacts of neighborhoods on intergenerational mobility II: County-level estimates," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2018, *133* (3), 1163–1228.

Draca, Mirko and Carlo Schwarz, "How polarised are citizens? Measuring ideology from the ground up," *Working Paper*, 2020.

Enke, Benjamin, "Kinship, cooperation, and the evolution of moral systems," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2019, *134* (2), 953–1019.

_ , "Moral values and voting," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2020, *128* (10), 3679–3729.

_ , Ricardo Rodríguez-Padilla, and Florian Zimmermann, "Moral Universalism: Measurement and Economic Relevance," *Management Science*, 2021.

Fong, Christina M and Erzo FP Luttmer, "What determines giving to Hurricane Katrina victims? Experimental evidence on racial group loyalty," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2009, *1* (2), 64–87.

Gennaioli, Nicola and Guido Tabellini, "Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict," *Working Paper*, 2019.

Gilens, Martin, *Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy*, University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Gillen, Ben, Erik Snowberg, and Leeat Yariv, "Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study," *Working Paper*, 2015.

_ , _ , and _ , "Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2019, *127* (4), 1826–1863.

Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, "Identity Politics and Trade Policy," *Working Paper*, 2018.

Guriev, Sergei and Elias Papaioannou, "The political economy of populism," 2020.

Haidt, Jonathan, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*, Vintage, 2012.

Henrich, Joseph, "The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Propserous," *New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux*, 2020.

_ , Steven J Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, "The weirdest people in the world?," *Behavioral and brain sciences*, 2010, *33* (2-3), 61–83.

Hibbing, John R, Kevin B Smith, and John R Alford, "Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 2014, *37*, 297–350.

Jost, John T, Christopher M Federico, and Jaime L Napier, "Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities," *Annual review of psychology*, 2009, *60*, 307–337.

Kozlowski, Austin and James P Murphy, "Issue Alignment and Partisanship in the American Public: Revisiting the'Partisans without Constraint'Thesis," 2019.

Kranton, Rachel E and Seth G Sanders, "Groupy versus non-groupy social preferences: Personality, region, and political party," *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, 2017, *107* (5), 65–69.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Ebonya Washington, "Why Did the Democrats Lose the South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate," *American Economic Review*, 2018.

Lakoff, George, *Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think*, University of Chicago Press, 2010.

Levine, David K, "Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments," *Review of economic dynamics*, 1998, *1* (3), 593–622.

Luttmer, Erzo FP, "Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution," *Journal of political Economy*, 2001, *109* (3), 500–528.

Malka, Ariel, Yphtach Lelkes, and Christopher J Soto, "Are cultural and economic conservatism positively correlated? A large-scale cross-national test," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2019, *49* (3), 1045–1069.

Poole, Keith T and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting*, Oxford University Press on Demand, 2000.

Putnam, Robert D, *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*, Simon and schuster, 2000.

Rawls, John, "A Theory of Justice," 1971.

Sandel, Michael J, *Public philosophy: Essays on morality in politics*, Harvard University Press, 2005.

_ , T Anne et al., *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Shayo, Moses, "A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution," *American Political science review*, 2009, *103* (2), 147–174.

Sowell, Thomas, *A conflict of visions: Ideological origins of political struggles*, Basic Books, 2007.

Tabellini, Guido, "Institutions and Culture," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2008, *6* (2-3), 255–294.

_ , "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2008, *123* (3), 905–950.

_ , "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2010, *8* (4), 677–716.

Waytz, Adam, Ravi Iyer, Liane Young, Jonathan Haidt, and Jesse Graham, "Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle," *Nature Communications*, 2019, *10* (1), 1–12.

Wu, Alex, "Political polarization," *Undergraduate senior thesis, Harvard University*, 2020.

ONLINE APPENDIX

A Formal Framework

Here we provide a simple model based on Tabellini (2008b) that generates the hypotheses stated in Section 3.

The main ingredients of the model are: (i) individuals live on a rectangle and hence at different (social) distance to different members of humanity, where social distance could capture distance along the lines of family, ethnicity, religion, language, values, geography etc.; (ii) the two policy options differ in the extent to which they enable or rule out free-riding or cheating; (iii) in terms of timeline, individuals first vote on a policy and then decide whether to cheat on society; and (iv) individuals differ in the extent to which their altruism and trust are universalist. Our object of interest is how an individual's universalism affects their choice between the two policies.

A.1 Social Distance and Preferences

Let I be a set consisting of N individuals from two separate countries, where for analytical convenience we assume that $N \to \infty$ and that N is a multiple of four. We formalize countries and social distances by allocating individuals in equal proportion to the vertices of a rectangle of length d_l and width d_w where $d_w < d_l$ and $d_w + d_l = 1$. The social distance between individuals i and j is $d_{i,j}$, where distance is measured along the edges of the rectangle. People in the same country are connected by the short end of the rectangle.

We assume that each vertex of the rectangle corresponds to a social group. People who populate the same vertex are said to belong to the same domestic in-group (say, the same neighborhood or the same set of religious beliefs). Individuals at distance d_w can be thought of as domestic out-group. Likewise, we think of individuals at distance d_l as global in-group (say, people who live in a different country but adhere to the same values) and at distance $d_l + d_w = 1$ as global out-group.

Individuals care about their own consumption and the consumption of others, though to potentially heterogeneous degrees. Our formalization of universalism is similar to Tabellini (2008b); also see Enke (2019) for a recent cultural economics application. Define $J_i = I \setminus \{i\}$ to be the set of $N-1$ people in the population other than i and by D_i the set of $N/2-1$ domestic people other than i. Let x_i denote the consumption of individual

i. The utility function of individual i is given by

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = x_i + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} x_j a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) \tag{2}$$

$$a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) = \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_{i,j} \tag{3}$$

The parameter $\beta_i \in (0, 1]$ scales individual i's *level* of altruism, while $\theta_i \in (0, 1]$ governs the *slope* of altruism as a function of social distance. Figure 3, introduced also in Enke et al. (2021), illustrates. We construct $a_{i,j}$ such that (i) altruism declines linearly as a function of distance; and (ii) the function integrates to a constant (1/2). This clarifies that the universalism parameter θ_i does not scale who is "more or less moral," but only how uniformly an individual distributes a given altruism budget.[15] Intuitively, a full universalist might argue that it is appealing to treat everyone equally, while others might point out that the universalist's moral compass is distorted in that she treats her friends not very well. Indeed, in Enke et al. (2021) we show that universalists have fewer friends and spend less time with them, compared to less universalist people.

A.1.1 Domestic Policy Options

Individuals first vote for one of two policies in a simple majority system, where voting is assumed to be sincere. After each individual casts a vote $v_i \in \{A, B\}$, depending on which policy was selected, individuals potentially take an action $q_i \in \{0, 1\}$ that we will think of as free-riding or cheating. The "safe" policy option A enforces that nobody can cheat on society. However, the enforcement of this policy is costly, and that cost is shared equally among all domestic individuals for a per capita cost c that is deducted from the baseline consumption level that is normalized to zero. The "risky" option B does not impose a per capita cost on each person, yet each individual can free-ride or cheat on society. Cheating by person i delivers an extra rent $s > 0$ for person i but imposes an overall externality of $e > 2s$, which is shared equally among all domestic individuals for a per capita externality of $2e/N$.

Let us emphasize that we only use the terminology "safe" and "risky" policy to point out the scope for cheating that is implied by the policies – it will sometimes be the case that what we call the "safe policy" is riskier in respects other than cheating, but this is immaterial for our purposes.

As explained in Table 5, we argue that these abstract features of the two policies

[15] A potential micro-foundation for such type-dependent altruism is that individuals exhibit greater altruism towards those people that they believe to be "good" types, as in the model of Levine (1998). Then, our utility function corresponds to a reduced-form version of a model in which beliefs about the types of others vary as a function of social distance, as in Section A.1.2 below.

map into some of the structural features of each of the eight policy domains discussed above. For example, in the case of welfare payments, the safe option A corresponds to a system with few welfare payments, so that individuals cannot cheat on society by claiming benefits they are not entitled to. On the other hand, this causes a societal loss because random income shocks cannot be equalized. The risky option B, on the other hand, corresponds to a more expansive welfare state, which opens up the possibility of cheating.

In this model, option A and option B are not defined by the implied level of government spending. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 5, in the domain of welfare, the safe option A corresponds to lower spending, while in the domain of police and law enforcement, the safe policy A corresponds to higher spending.

A.1.2 Beliefs and Equilibrium

In order to calculate valuations of each policy, a decision maker must form beliefs about who would cheat under policy option B. We model decision makers that have rational expectations about the *overall* fraction of individuals who will cheat under option B. However, to allow for an analysis of the role of universalism in trust beliefs, we assume that decision makers may not form correct beliefs about *which* individuals will cheat. For example, casual introspection suggests that people differ dramatically in whether they believe that immigrants are more likely to be criminals than natives. Formally, the subjective probability that individual i assigns to individual j not cheating under policy B is

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma^* + \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \tag{4}$$

where $\delta_i \in (0, 1]$ controls the rate at which the belief that an individual will not cheat falls as a function of social distance. We think of δ_i as the inverse of universalism in trust. Note that beliefs are defined analogously to altruism above, and can be graphically represented analogously to Figure 3. As in the case of altruism, universalists and non-universalists do not differ in their overall level of trust: the belief function in equation (4) integrates to the constant γ^*, which is endogenous and corresponds to the fraction of individuals who do not cheat in equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, individuals have rational expectations about the overall rate of cheating in society but not necessarily about how cheating is correlated with social distance from them. We assume that $(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)$ are positive independent joint uniform.

Table 5: Mapping of policy domains to abstract model policies

Policy domain	**Safe Option A**	**Risky Option B**
Abstract framework	Cheating impossible, but individuals pay fixed per capita cost of c	No fixed cost, but individuals can cheat and hence earn rent s by imposing per capita externality of e
Domestic policies		
Welfare	No welfare state: Individuals cannot cheat by claiming benefits they are not entitled to, yet this imposes a per capita cost c because in the absence of welfare payments, random income shocks cannot be equalized ex post	Expansive welfare state: Individuals can cheat on society by claiming benefits they are not entitled to (and hence reap rent s) or through moral hazard (reducing labor supply); this causes per capita externality e
Universal health care	Same logic as for welfare	
Affirmative Action	No AA: Individuals cannot reduce effort while still getting promoted; yet absence of AA also entails a social cost because disadvantaged groups in society cannot live up to their potential	Extensive AA: Individuals who benefit from AA can cheat by reducing effort because they know that they will get promoted either way; this imposes a cost on other individuals
Police and law enforcement	Strong police: Stealing is impossible; but entails a cost because police needs to be paid for	Weak police: Stealing and fraud possible
Foreign policies		
Effective border control	Strong border control: less immigration, but this entails a per capita cost because border control is expensive, and because some immigrants are truly in need	Weak border control: Increase in number of people who could come into country and free ride on others' efforts
Military	Strong military: Foreigners cannot exploit domestic people; entails per-capita cost because military needs to get paid for	Weak military: Other countries can cheat or exploit
Environmental protection	Weak regulation: Foreign countries cannot exploit domestic regulation; yet this entails cost because environmental degradation might have economic or health impacts on domestic individuals	Strong regulation: Other countries can cheat by de-regulating and hence growing their economy at expense of domestic individuals
Foreign aid	No aid: Foreigners cannot cheat; yet this entails a cost because lack of aid could cause increased migration or wars	Extensive aid: Foreigners can cheat by claiming aid they are not entitled to or by misusing funds

A.1.3 Domestic Policy Views

We solve the game by backward induction. Denote by $E_i[\cdot]$ the subjective "expectations operator" that applies the belief function in equation (4). Further denote by L_{-i} the hypothetical losses that individuals incur due to the cheating of individuals other than i. In the second stage of the game, if the risky policy is implemented, individual i cheats iff

$$E_i[u_i(q_i=1)] = \left(s - \frac{2e}{N} - L_{-i}\right) + \beta_i \sum_{j \in D_i} \left\{[1 - b_{i,j}(\delta_i)] \cdot s - \frac{2e}{N} - L_{-i}\right\} \cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \quad (5)$$

$$> E_i[u_i(q_i=0)] = -L_{-i} + \beta_i \sum_{j \in D_i} \{[1 - b_{i,j}(\delta_i)] \cdot s - L_{-i}\} \cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \quad (6)$$

which delivers the vector q^* of individual cheating decisions $q_i^*(\theta_i)$. The resulting losses (externalities) that each individual incurs are denoted by $L^*(q^*(\theta)) \equiv (1 - \gamma^*(\theta))e$.

In the first stage of the game, an individual votes for the safe policy A iff

$$u_i(A) = -c + \beta_i \sum_{j \in D_i} \{-c\} \cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \quad (7)$$

$$> E_i[u_i(B)]$$

$$= [s \cdot q_i^*(\theta_i) - L^*(q^*(\theta))] + \beta_i \sum_{j \in D_i} \{[1 - b_{i,j}(\delta_i)] \cdot s - L^*(q^*(\theta))\} \cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \quad (8)$$

which delivers the vote $v_i^*(\theta_i, \delta_i)$ as a function of universalism and other parameters.

We impose two sets of assumptions that have straightforward economic intuitions. First, we impose restrictions on model parameters that ensure that the (equilibrium) efficiency losses under the risky policy are larger than the efficiency losses under the safe policy. Formally, define $z \equiv \frac{2\frac{s}{e}\log(2-d_w)}{1-d_w}$. As will be shown in Section A.2.2, z captures the share of cheaters in the domestic policy equilibrium. We state the following assumptions:

$$z(e-s) > c \quad (9)$$

$$ed_w/2 \geq c \quad (10)$$

In addition, we impose two restrictions on parameters to ensure that individuals' beliefs about others' cheating are in $[0,1]$:

$$\min\{2z, 2(1-z)\} \geq d_w \quad (11)$$

$$\gamma_f \in [d_w/2, 1 - d_w/2] \quad (12)$$

We obtain the following predictions:

Predictions. *Individuals with higher universalism exhibit a stronger preference for the risky domestic policy B: welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, and weak police and law enforcement. These predictions hold for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

A.2 Proof

Altruism and trust decline linearly in social distance at rate θ_i and δ_i, respectively. Since distances are discrete, we can define altruism and beliefs about other individuals in the same country as

$$a_0 = \tfrac{1+\theta_i}{2} \qquad a_1 = \tfrac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w$$

$$b_0 = \gamma + \tfrac{d_w}{2}\delta_i \qquad b_1 = \gamma - \tfrac{d_w}{2}\delta_i$$

where throughout these derivations, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, and the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members.

A.2.1 Cheating Decision

We proceed by backward induction. Suppose the risky policy got implemented. We now ask under which conditions an individual cheats.

Suppose that some arbitrary fraction φ_i of the other $\frac{N}{2}-1$ domestic individuals is perceived by person i to be cheating on the policy. For every individual i, per-capita loss caused by all cheating individuals *other* than i totals $\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1\right)\frac{e}{\frac{N}{2}} = \varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e$. Thus:

$$E_i[u_i(q_i=0)] =$$

$$\underbrace{-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e}_{\substack{\text{Person } i\text{'s}\\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\tilde{b}_0\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic}\\ \text{in-group members (other than individual } i\text{)}\\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\tilde{b}_1\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic}\\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}} \tag{13}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-\tilde{b}_0)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members}\\ \text{(other than individual } i\text{) who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-\tilde{b}_1)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group}\\ \text{members who cheat}}}\Bigg]$$

$$E_i[u_i(q_i=1)] =$$

$$\underbrace{-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}+s}_{\substack{\text{Person } i\text{'s}\\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\tilde{b}_0\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic}\\ \text{in-group members (other than individual } i)\\ \text{who do not cheat}}}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\tilde{b}_1\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group}\\ \text{members who do not cheat}}}+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-\tilde{b}_0)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group}\\ \text{members (other than individual } i) \text{ who cheat}}} \tag{14}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-\tilde{b}_1)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic}\\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}}\Bigg]$$

An individual doesn't cheat iff $E_i[u_i(q_i=1)] \leq E_i[u_i(q_i=0)]$, i.e. a person doesn't cheat iff their draw of β and θ satisfies the following no-cheat condition:

$$\frac{Ns}{2e} \leq 1+\beta_i\left[\frac{N}{4}(1+\theta_i(1-d_w))-\frac{1+\theta_i}{2}\right] \tag{15}$$

Under our maintained assumption that $N \to \infty$, this delivers

$$\frac{2s}{e} \leq \underbrace{\beta(1+\theta_i(1-d_w))}_{\equiv\Psi} \tag{16}$$

A.2.2 Equilibrium Fraction of Cheaters

The previous condition defines the equilibrium fraction of individuals that don't cheat γ^*:

$$\gamma^* = \mathbb{P}\left(\Psi \geq \frac{2s}{e}\right) = 1-\mathbb{P}\left(\Psi < \frac{2s}{e}\right) = 1-\iint\limits_{Area} f_{\beta\theta}(\beta,\theta)d\beta d\theta$$

Where $Area = \left\{(\beta,\theta)|\Psi < \frac{2s}{e}\right\}$ and $f_{\beta\theta}(\beta,\theta)$ is the joint probability density function of β and θ. Note that since β and θ are i.i.d. $\mathscr{U}(0,1]$, $f_{\beta\theta}(\beta,\theta) = f_\beta \cdot f_\theta = 1\cdot 1 = 1$ over $\beta \in (0,1], \theta \in (0,1]$.

Under the assumptions stated above (in particular that $2s < e$), we get that:

$Area = A + B$, where:

$$A \equiv \beta \in \left(0, \frac{2\frac{s}{e}}{2-d_w}\right] \times \theta \in (0,1] \tag{17}$$

$$B \equiv \beta \in \left[\frac{2\frac{s}{e}}{2-d_w}, 2\frac{s}{e}\right] \times \theta \in \left(0, \frac{2\frac{s}{e}-\beta}{\beta(1-d_w)}\right] \tag{18}$$

Integrating over $Area$ gives:

$$\gamma^*(e,s,d_w) = 1 - \frac{2\frac{s}{e}\cdot\log(2-d_w)}{1-d_w} \in [0,1] \tag{19}$$

A.2.3 Policy Views

Having derived the cheating decision and the equilibrium fraction of cheating, we now determine voting behavior (relative support for policies A and B). The utility from policy options A and B is given by:

$$\pi_A = \underbrace{-c}_{\substack{\text{Person } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Big[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members} \\ \text{(other than individual } i\text{)}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members}}}\Big] \tag{20}$$

$$\pi_B(q_i^*(\beta,\theta)) =$$

$$\underbrace{-(1-\gamma^*)e + s(q_i^*(\theta_i))}_{\substack{\text{Person } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Big[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0 b_0(-(1-\gamma^*)e)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than individual i)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1 b_1(-(1-\gamma^*)e)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-b_0)(-(1-\gamma^*)e+s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than individual i)} \\ \text{who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-b_1)(-(1-\gamma^*)e+s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}}\Big] \tag{21}$$

Given this, the relative support for policy A over policy B is given by:

$$\Pi_{A,B} \equiv E[u_i(A)] - E[u_i(B)] = (1-\gamma^*)e - s(q_i^*(\theta_i)) - c \tag{22}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_0)s-c\}\right] \tag{23}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_1)s-c\}\right] \tag{24}$$

We now investigate how the relative support for policies A and B depends on universalism in trust (δ_i) and universalism in altruism (θ_i).

A.2.4 Policy Views and Universalism in Trust

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i s \frac{d_w}{4}\left[\theta_i\left(\frac{N d_w}{2}-1\right)-1\right] \tag{25}$$

which is greater than zero as $N \to \infty$.

A.2.5 Policy Views and Universalism in Altruism

Case 1: Individuals that are not on the margin. Consider those individuals that are not on the margin of cheating vs. not cheating ($\Psi \neq \frac{2s}{e}$). In other words, $q_i^*(\theta_i)$ is constant for marginal changes of θ_i, $\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \theta_i} = 0$. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}} =& \beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\frac{1}{2}\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_0)s-c\}\right] &(26)\\ &+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_1)s-c\}\right] &(27)\end{aligned}$$

This simplifies to:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}} =& \beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\frac{1}{2}\left\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)+\delta_i\frac{d_w}{2}s-c\right\}\right] &(28)\\ &+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\left\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-\delta_i\frac{d_w}{2}s-c\right\}\right] &(29)\end{aligned}$$

The coefficient on δ_i in $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}}$ is:

$$\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\cdot\frac{1}{2}\cdot\frac{d_w s}{2} - \frac{N}{4}\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\cdot\frac{d_w s}{2}\right] = \beta_i\frac{d_w s}{4}\left(\frac{N d_w}{2}-1\right)\geq 0$$

This expression is non-negative as $N \to \infty$ and therefore $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}} \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e},\delta=0}$. In other words, for any value of β_i, $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}$ takes its smallest value when $\delta_i = 0$ since the coefficient on δ_i is non-negative.

We can therefore focus on evaluating:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e},\delta_i=0} =& \beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\frac{1}{2}\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c\}\right] &(30)\\ &+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c\}\right] &(31)\\ =&\beta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}\right)((1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c) &(32)\end{aligned}$$

Notice that $(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}) > 0$, and so $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi \neq \frac{2s}{e}, \delta_i = 0} > 0$ (and by extension $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi \neq \frac{2s}{e}} > 0$) if $(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c > 0$. This is ensured by the assumption in equation (36). We hence have that $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi \neq \frac{2s}{e}} \geq 0$, meaning that support for the safe policy A increases in θ_i everywhere except at $\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}$, to which we now turn attention.

Case 2: Individuals on the margin of cheating. Consider those individuals for whom $\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}$, so that a marginal change in θ_i induces the individual to switch from cheating to not cheating (recall from equation (16) that cheating decreases in θ_i).

For a marginal change of θ_i, the utility derived from the safe policy option A does not change. For the risky policy option B, observed actions change from $q_i^* = 1$ to $q_i^* = 0$, yet utility varies smoothly. To see this, define $\Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i) = u_B(q=0) - u_B(q=1)$, the difference between the utility from cheating and not cheating under policy option B. From equation (16):

$$\Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i) = \beta_i \frac{e}{2}(1 + \theta_i(1-d_w)) - s \tag{33}$$

It is obvious that $\Lambda(\beta, \theta)$ is continuous at 0, i.e., at $\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}$. Intuitively, when the individual switches from $q_i^* = 1$ to $q_i^* = 0$, utility changes smoothly because – by assumption – the individual is indifferent at $\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}$, where $u_B(q=0) = u_B(q=1)$.

Therefore, even though $\Pi_{A,B}$ is composed of a piecewise function (q^*), $\Pi_{A,B}$ is continuous because Λ is continuous at 0:

$$\lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^-} u_A - u_B(q^* = 1) = \lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^+} u_A - u_B(q^* = 0) \tag{34}$$

$$\implies \lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^-} \Pi_{A,B} = \lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^+} \Pi_{A,B} = \lim_{\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}} \Pi_{A,B} \tag{35}$$

Since Π is continuous, and strictly increasing in θ_i on either side of the indifference boundary, Π increases in θ_i over all values of θ_i.

A.3 Foreign Policy

Decision makers are again presented with a choice between two policy options. Under the safe policy option A, domestic and foreign individuals receive their baseline consumption x. Domestic individuals additionally pay a per capita cost c.[16] Under the risky policy B, domestic individuals do not have to pay c. However, in this regime foreign individuals can cheat and get s by imposing an overall cost of e on all domestic people,

[16] In some of the foreign policy domains we consider, c is likely to be paid by both domestic and foreign individuals. Our main predictions remain unchanged if we assume that c is paid by both domestic and foreign people.

which is again equally shared. Table 5 explains how this abstract structure maps into the domains of military, border control, foreign aid, and environmental protection. As with the domestic policies above, note that the risky policy B sometimes corresponds to big and sometimes to small government. Again, the key defining characteristic that matters for our analysis is whether a policy introduces or prevents cheating opportunities.

The mechanics of the foreign policy analysis are very similar to the domestic case. We again assume that individuals' beliefs about the overall fraction of cheaters are correct, but that they have heterogeneous beliefs about how cheating is correlated with distance from them. As for the domestic case, we impose restrictions on model parameters that ensure that the (equilibrium) efficiency losses under the risky policy are larger than the efficiency losses under the safe policy. Specifically, we state the following assumptions:

$$z(e-s) > c \tag{36}$$

$$ed_w/2 \geq c \tag{37}$$

In addition, we impose that:

$$\min\{2z, 2(1-z)\} \geq d_w \tag{38}$$

$$\gamma_f \in [d_w/2, 1-d_w/2] \tag{39}$$

We get:

Predictions. *Individuals with higher universalism exhibit a stronger preference for the risky policy B: weak border control, weak military, stringent environmental protection, and expansive foreign aid. These predictions hold for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

A.4 Proof

In the foreign policy context it is much simpler to derive the relationship between universalism and policy views. This is because in the context of foreign policies, only *foreign* people are allowed to cheat on one's own country.

In order to evaluate each policy option, decision-makers must form beliefs about who cheats. As in the domestic case, we will take the stance that the subjective probability of not cheating declines linearly in social distance at a rate δ_i:

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \tag{40}$$

where decision-makers are again correct about the overall fraction of cheaters in the foreign country (γ_f), but may be incorrect in their beliefs about which foreigners cheat.

Levels of altruism and beliefs by distance are given by the below:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} a_0 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} & a_1 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w & a_2 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l & a_3 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i \\ b_0 = 1 & b_1 = 1 & b_2 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l\delta_i & b_3 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i \end{array}$$

where, as above, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members, the 2 subscript to foreign in-group members, and the 3 subscript to foreign out-group members.

We define L_f to be the total per capita cost of cheating imposed by foreigners. That is, $L_f = (1-\gamma_f)e$. For a domestic individual i, the relative value of Option A to Option B in the foreign policy domain is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi \equiv & \underbrace{(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Person } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} + \beta_i \Big[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right) a_0(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than individual } i\text{) under Policy A}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} \Big] \\ & - \underbrace{(-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Person } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} - \beta_i \Big[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right) a_0(-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than individual } i\text{) under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1(-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} \\ & + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_2(1-b_2)s}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign in-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_3(1-b_3)s}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign out-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} \Big] \end{aligned}$$

$$= (L_f - c) + \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4}(a_0 + a_1) - a_0 \right)(L_f - c) - \left(\frac{N}{4} \right)(a_2(1-b_2) + a_3(1-b_3))s \right]$$

$$= (L_f - c) + \beta_i \Bigg[\left(\frac{N}{4}(1 + \theta_i(1-d_w)) - \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \right)(L_f - c)$$

$$- \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left\{ \left(\frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l \right) \left(1 - \left(\gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l\delta_i \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i \right) \left(1 - \left(\gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i \right) \right) \right\} s \Bigg] \tag{41}$$

We first take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A compared to Option B with respect to universalism in trust δ_i:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) s \left(\frac{1-d_l}{2} \right) (\theta_i(1-d_l)) > 0 \tag{42}$$

Next, we take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A relative to Option B with respect to universalism in altrusim θ_i:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \theta_i} = \beta_i \left[(L_f - c)\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w) - \frac{1}{2}\right) + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(d_l - \frac{1}{2}\right)(1-b_2)s + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)(1-b_3)s \right] \tag{43}$$

Note that $(L_f - c) = ((1-\gamma_f)e - c) \geq 0$ by the assumption in equation (37), so that the entire expression is positive. We hence see that the relative support for the "safe" policy option A increases as universalism in trust and universalism in altruism decrease.

B Analysis of Ideological Clusters in the CSES and WVS

B.1 CSES

To assess whether the trends observed in our survey data extend to a broader set of countries, we use data from Module 4 of the CSES. Data collection for this module was conducted between 2011 and 2016 in 39 countries. These post-election surveys are nationally representative.

The variables of interest in our analysis are left-right leaning and support for various policy positions. The CSES survey asks respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale of 0 to 10, which aligns with the measure of left-right placement used in our survey. We quantify support for policy positions using CSES survey questions that ask respondents for their desired level of government spending in four policy domains that overlap with our survey: healthcare, defense, police, and welfare. Specifically, the CSES asks respondents whether public expenditure on each of these four domains should be "more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now," where these responses are ranked on a discrete scale from 1 to 5. We standardize these values within each country to account for broad cross-country differences in desired levels of spending.

We include all observations for which both left-right leaning and at least one of the four policy preferences are non-missing. Dropping the missing observations, our figures draw on 51,535 observations from 37 countries. We partition these into a set of sixteen "Western" countries—the Western European countries, along with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—and a set of twenty-one non-Western countries.

Figure 11 illustrates the correlations between policy views and left-right placement for Western and non-Western countries, respectively. As outlined in Section 2, these figures indicate that the trends we observe for the seven countries in our survey data extend to a broader range of countries: Western countries show a stronger correlation between

political leaning and policy positions than do non-Western countries.

B.2 WVS

To document the persistence of the structure of ideology in the West, we turn to data from Waves 3, 4, and 5 of the World Values Survey (WVS). Data collection for these waves spanned the years 1995 to 2009, across a combined 100 countries.

We identified questionnare items that asked respondents across all three waves about their political attitudes with regards to: immigration policy ("border control")[17], foreign aid[18], the environment[19], and welfare[20]. We partition responses into Western and non-Western countries, and regress standardized responses (with respect to within-wave, within-country means) on respondents' left-right self-assessment (on a scale from 1 to 10) and country fixed effects.

We document that as far back as the mid-1990s, a left-leaning self-assessment is associated in the West with increased support for policy domains like foreign aid, the environment, and welfare. Left-leaning, Western respondents also indicate less support for a restrictive immigration policy. Meanwhile, these patterns are much weaker or non-existent in non-Western countries.[21]

[17]The border control question was: "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?" (Let anyone come who wants to; Let people come as long as there are jobs available; Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here; Prohibit people coming here from other countries).

[18]The foreign aid questions were: "In some economically less developed countries, many people are living in poverty. Do you think that what the other countries of the world are doing to help them is about right, too much or too little?" in Wave 3, "Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries. Do you think that this country should provide more or less economic aid to poorer countries? Would you say we should give ..." (A lot more than we do now; Somewhat more than we do now; Somewhat less than we do now; A lot less than we do now) in Wave 4, and "In 2003, this country's government allocated [a tenth of one percent] of the national income to foreign aid–that is [$U.S. 38.05] per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right?" in Wave 5.

[19]The environment question was: "I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental [damage (Wave 3) / pollution (Waves 4 and 5)]" (Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree)

[20]The welfare question was: "How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between." (1: Incomes should be made more equal; 10: We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort).

[21]Countries categorized as "Western" in this analysis are: Andorra, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.



Figure 11: Correlation between self-reported political leaning and policy preferences, as measured by the standardized (within each country) answer to the CSES survey questions about whether government expenditures in a category should go up or down. The left panel includes the Western countries and the right panel non-Western countries. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "All nonwestern countries" specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 12: Correlation between left-right self-assessment and political attitudes, as measured by the standardized (within each country and wave) response to the WVS question about the given policy domain, and pooled across Western and Nonwestern countries. Horizontal bars indicate the point estimate, while shaded areas the 95% confidence interval using robust standard errors. All regressions included country fixed effects.

C Additional Details and Analyses for Survey

C.1 Sample Characteristics

This section presents sample characteristics for all seven countries included in our survey. For reasons beyond our control and related to Dynata's reach in data collection, several of our samples are relatively too educated in comparison with a representative sample. This is specifically the case for Australia, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden.

C.1.1 Australia

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	49	47.1	48.6
Female	51	52.9	51.4
Age			
18–29	24	14.5	14.9
30–39	17	19.2	19.2
40–49	17	19.3	19.1
50–59	16	19.4	18.3
60–69	13	14.1	14.6
≥ 70	13	13.5	13.9
Income (annual; AUD)			
Below 20,000	7	5.0	5.1
20,000–34,999	13	12.4	12.8
35,000–49,999	12	12.8	13.0
50,000–64,999	12	12.9	12.8
65,000–79,999	10	10.2	10.5
80,000–99,999	10	11.1	11.1
100,000–124,999	10	11.2	11.0
125,000–149,999	8	10.0	8.9
150,000–199,999	9	8.3	8.6
200,000 or more	8	6.0	6.2
Ancestry			
English	26	11.5	11.8
Australian	25	68.5	67.5

Other	49	20.1	20.7
Education			
No high school	28	7.5	7.7
High school	18	26.4	25.4
Vocational training	29	33.2	34.2
Bachelor's degree or higher	25	33.0	32.6
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	55	53.2	55.0
Not employed full-time	45	46.8	45.0

Note: We were advised by Dynata that it is not common practice to ask respondents in Australia about their race or ethnicity. Accordingly, we found data from the Australian census corresponding to ancestry, which we condensed into "Australian", "English", or "Other". Our final sample characteristics correspond closely to guidance from Dynata that 74% of Australian citizens are Australian-born, which leads us to believe respondents interpreted our ancestry question as eliciting their country of birth or nationality, as is more common practice in Australia.

C.1.2 Brazil

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	48	52.1	50.2
Female	52	47.9	49.8
Age			
18–29	30	36.7	36.9
30–39	22	30.3	28.8
40–49	19	18.6	19.3
50–59	14	11.0	11.4
≥60	15	3.5	3.6
Income (annual; Brazilian reals)			
Below 3,000	5	15.8	16.1
3,000–5,999	12	13.0	13.5
6,000–11,999	22	9.7	10.1
12,000–17,999	17	8.6	8.9
18,000–29,999	20	9.9	10.3
30,000–59,999	16	19.2	20.0
≥60,000	8	23.9	21.1
Ancestry			
White	49	61.3	59.8
Multi-racial	41	27.4	28.5
Other	10	11.3	11.8
Education			
No formal education	45	0.3	0.3
Elementary school	17	3.3	3.5
High school	28	48.1	50.0
Bachelor's degree or higher	10	48.3	46.2
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	41	67.8	66.5
Not employed full-time	59	32.2	33.5

Note: Our samples in Brazil are relatively educated, young, wealthy, and employed. We have reason to believe that some subsamples of the Brazilian population are inaccessible to *Dynata*. For example, the Brazilian census likely includes indigenous populations that likely make up a sizable portion of the "No formal education" bucket.

C.1.3 France

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	48	47.9	47.7
Female	52	52.1	52.3
Age			
18–29	18	12.9	17.4
30–39	16	20.7	18.0
40–49	16	23.0	18.0
50–59	17	23.3	19.6
≥60	33	20.0	27.0
Income (annual, EUR)			
Below 10,000	7	9.3	9.5
10,000–14,999	6	7.5	7.3
15,000–19,999	13	11.0	12.4
20,000–24,999	12	13.5	13.1
25,000–29,999	11	11.1	10.6
30,000–34,999	10	10.9	10.2
35,000–39,999	8	8.1	7.2
40,000–49,999	13	13.1	12.1
50,000–64,999	10	8.7	8.6
65,000 or more	10	6.9	9.0
Ancestry			
French or other European	85	96.8	95.6
Other	15	3.2	4.4
Education			
No high school	22	17.9	21.4
High school	43	30.9	41.5
Some college	14	20.8	14.8
Bachelor's degree or higher	21	30.4	22.3
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	56	65.6	56.5
Not employed full-time	44	34.4	43.5

Note: "High school" corresponded to "Baccalauréat", "Some college" to "Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+2 max", and "Bachelor's degree or higher" to "Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+3 et plus".

C.1.4 Germany

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	49	51.0	50.3
Female	51	49.0	49.7
Age			
18–29	21	13.5	13.7
30–39	14	19.4	19.7
40–49	19	21.0	21.3
50–59	17	26.0	25.0
60–69	13	16.0	16.2
≥70	17	4.0	4.1
Income (monthly; EUR)			
Below 1,300	19	15.1	15.3
1,300–2,599	33	33.6	34.0
2,600–3,599	19	22.1	22.4
3,600–5,000	15	21.8	20.7
More than 5,000	14	7.5	7.6
Ancestry			
German	79	96.6	96.6
European (not German)	15	2.3	2.3
Other	6	1.1	1.1
Education			
No vocational training	27	5.6	5.7
Vocational training	57	58.3	59.1
University degree	16	36.1	35.2
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	59	64.3	63.8
Not employed full-time	41	35.7	36.2

Note: The option included in the survey equivalent to vocational training was “Lehre oder Berufsausbildung im dualen System”. For “University degree”, the option provided was “Hochschulabschluss”.

C.1.5 South Korea

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	50	49.3	48.3
Female	50	50.7	51.7
Age			
18–29	19	19.6	23.0
30–39	18	30.8	26.2
40–49	20	27.3	24.7
50–59	20	16.3	19.1
60–69	13	5.5	6.4
≥70	10	0.5	0.6
Income (annual; ten-thousand Won)			
Below 200 ten-thousand Won	19	9.7	11.4
200–350 ten-thousand Won	23	27.4	27.7
350–500 ten-thousand Won	21	26.3	23.4
500–750 ten-thousand Won	17	22.0	20.5
More than 750 ten-thousand Won	20	14.5	17.1
Ancestry			
Korean	96	99.8	99.8
Other	4	0.2	0.2
Education			
No high school	13	1.0	1.2
High school	40	26.9	31.6
Some college	13	7.4	8.6
Bachelor's degree or higher	34	64.8	58.7
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	59	85.3	82.7
Not employed full-time	41	14.7	17.3

Note: Our samples in Korea are relatively too educated, too young, and too employed.

C.1.6 Sweden

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	50	58.1	50.3
Female	50	41.9	49.7
Age			
18–29	24	12.5	17.8
30–39	15	10.5	14.8
40–49	15	13.8	16.7
50–59	15	19.2	16.2
60–69	13	20.0	14.8
≥70	18	24.0	19.8
Income (annual; Swedish kronor)			
Below 100,000 kr	14	6.9	9.8
100,000–200,000 kr	13	16.0	13.9
200,000–299,999 kr	18	20.8	18.3
300,000–399,999 kr	25	22.7	25.7
400,000–499,999 kr	16	16.8	16.1
500,000–599,999 kr	7	7.8	7.2
600,000–749,999 kr	4	4.6	4.8
750,000–999,999 kr	2	2.6	2.7
1,000,000 kr or more	1	1.8	1.6
Ancestry			
Swedish	82	92.8	89.7
Other	18	7.3	10.3
Education			
No high school	40	8.1	11.5
High school	22	32.3	31.8
Some college	15	30.1	24.7
Bachelor's degree or higher	23	29.6	32.0
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	67	63.3	66.9
Not employed full-time	33	36.7	33.1

Note: "High school" corresponded to "Gymnasieexamen", while "Some college" to "Viss universitets-/högskoleutbildning". The option equivalent to a university degree or higher was "Kandidatexamen."

C.1.7 United States

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	49	36.4	48.9
Female	51	63.6	51.1
Age			
18–29	21	12.6	19.1
30–39	16	11.3	14.4
40–49	16	14.1	15.2
50–59	17	24.5	19.4
60–69	14	25.8	15.5
≥70	16	11.6	16.5
Income (annual; USD)			
Below 15,000	11	14.3	13.9
15,000–24,999	9	14.3	9.2
25,000–34,999	9	14.7	9.8
35,000–49,999	12	14.6	11.7
50,000–74,999	17	14.8	17.3
75,000–99,999	13	10.4	13.0
100,000–149,999	15	9.9	14.4
150,000–199,999	7	3.9	6.0
200,000 or more	7	3.1	4.7
Ancestry			
White	63	81.9	69.1
African-American	17	8.1	13.6
Hispanic	12	4.7	7.9
Asian	5	3.3	5.9
Other	3	2.0	3.5
Education			
No high school	11	3.9	6.4
High school	29	41.8	30.2
Some college	29	29.7	30.6
Bachelor's degree or higher	31	24.6	32.8
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	67	37.3	63.4
Not employed full-time	33	62.7	36.6

C.2 Screenshots

C.2.1 Universalism tasks

Domestic universalism in altruism.



Figure 13: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in altruism. Respondents would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all respondents, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in altruism is identical to that of domestic groups.

Foreign universalism in altruism.



Figure 14: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation task meant to elicit foreign universalism in altruism. Across respondents, it was randomized whether the domestic social group appeared on the left or on the right. The layout for the task eliciting foreign universalism in *trust* is identical to this layout, with the exception of necessary changes to the instructions and to graphics, as consistent with the layout for trust tasks presented in Figure 15.

Domestic universalism in trust.

Figure 15: Screenshot of decision screen for tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in trust. Respondents would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all respondents, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in trust is identical to that of domestic groups.

C.2.2 Policy preferences

Desired government spending.

Suppose that you could determine how the United States government spends money on various different categories of the federal budget, such as the military or redistribution.

Specifically, imagine you could decide the **average amount of money that the federal government collects per year from each American to spend on each of the eight categories below**. For the purposes of this question, you should assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category are spent only on this particular category, without any waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the following eight categories of expenditure in the federal budget?

To provide a reference, it is estimated that altogether, all levels of government in the United States spend a combined average amount of $2,750 per American every year for the purposes of education.

	Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on category, per year
Police and law enforcement	$
Foreign aid	$
Universal healthcare	$
Environmental protection	$
Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage	$
Military and counterintelligence	$
Welfare payments	$
Effective border control	$

Figure 16: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting respondents' policy preferences through the means of desired per-capita spending on categories of the federal/national government's budget. Across respondents, the order of categories was randomized.

Support for Specific Policy Implementations.

You just indicated your preferences over several broad categories of expenditure. We will now ask you to indicate how much money you would like to collect and spend on **specific projects or policy proposals**. After all, even within broad categories such as military or redistribution, **you may like some policies and projects more than others. We are now interested in which specific projects or policies you favor.**

Please consider the policy proposals presented in the table below. Note that the table will expand with additional rows as you fill in your answers and until you see **eight** rows in total. Again assume that all money collected for the purposes of a policy are spent only on implementing that particular policy, without waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the **specific projects or policies** presented?

Policy	Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year	Policy	Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year
Sensitivity training for the police to **ensure justice and equal treatment of all**	$	Increasing the capabilities of the police to **prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior**	$

Figure 17: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting respondents' preferences towards particular policy implementations of national government expenditure. Across respondents, the order of categories was randomized, and it was randomized whether all more universalist policies appeared on the left or on the right. Additional policies continued to fill the screen as the respondent filled in desired spending levels for each category of policies.

C.3 Histograms of Composite Universalism



Figure 18: This figure plots a comparative set of distributions of our composite measure of moral universalism. All individual plots are scaled to the same x-axis and y-axis.

C.4 Histograms of Desired Expenditure Amounts



Figure 19: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from Australia.



Figure 20: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from Brazil.



Figure 21: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from France.



Figure 22: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from Germany.



Figure 23: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from Korea.



Figure 24: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from Sweden.



Figure 25: This figure plots histograms of desired expenditure amounts for each policy category by respondents from USA.

C.5 Analysis of Ideological Clusters



Figure 26: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.5.1 Separate Allocation Decisions and Universalism Measures



Figure 27: This figure plots OLS coefficients from regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on each separate allocation decision at a time, for all Western countries and including country-fixed effects. A positive regression coefficient indicates that a higher allocation to the more distant individual (i.e. a more "universalist" allocation) is positively correlated with "left-leaning" policy preferences. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors.



Figure 28: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” and “Non-Western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 29: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” and “Non-Western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.

C.5.2 Results for Non-Western Countries

Baseline results. Figure 30 replicates Figure 5 but additionally shows the results for Brazil and South Korea. The results are visibly different from those in the Western countries, with both the magnitude and the sign of the relationship between universalism and policy views usually different.



Figure 30: This figure plots OLS coefficients from regressions of desired expenditure shares on universalism. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.5.3 Results Across Respondent Age



Figure 31: This figure plots the OLS coefficients from regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy category on universalism, separately for each country, and broken down into respondents that are below (left panel) or at least (right panel) the age of 50. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

C.6 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals

C.6.1 Tables

Table 13: Specific policy proposals

Policy domain	**More universalist**	**Less universalist**
Welfare payments	Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide	Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised
Universal healthcare	Using local tax revenues to fund health insurance across all communities nationwide	Using local tax revenues to fund health insurance only within the local communities they were raised
Environmental protection	Preventing global climate change	Cleaning and conserving forests and rivers in local communities in [the U.S., France, etc.]
Foreign aid	Sending foreign aid to countries that are in most need of help	Sending foreign aid to countries that are our international allies
Affirmative action	Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage	Measures to ensure no one of your same background (e.g., gender, ethnic background or ancestry) is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage
Military and counterintelligence	Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad	Ensuring [American, French, etc.] defense and security
Effective border control	Identifying and admitting into the country only those immigrants with the highest need for help	Identifying and admitting into the country only those immigrants who would be good citizens (e.g., be likely to pay taxes and refrain from engaging in criminal activities)
Police and law enforcement	Sensitivity training for the police to ensure justice and equal treatment of all	Increasing the capabilities of the police to prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior

C.6.2 Binned scatter plots: Specific Policy Proposals



Figure 32: This figure shows binned scatter plots between log desired spending levels for specific policy proposals and respondents' self-identification as left-vs.-right wing. In each row, the left panel shows the more universalist and the right panel the more communitarian implementation. The first row shows results for border control, the second one for military and counterintelligence, and the third one for police and law enforcement. The data are pooled across Western countries, and all panels are constructed controlling for country fixed effects.



Figure 33: This figure shows binned scatter plots between log desired spending levels for specific policy proposals and respondents' self-identification as left-vs.-right wing. In each row, the left panel shows the more universalist and the right panel the more communitarian implementation. The first row shows results for healthcare, and the second one for affirmative action. The data are pooled across Western countries, and all panels are constructed controlling for country fixed effects.

C.6.3 Results Using Likert-Scale Questions



Figure 34: The left panel plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of respondents' support for each policy domain (on a 0–10 Likert scale) on composite universalism. The right panel plots the analogous coefficients of multivariate regressions, in which we control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain. See Appendix E for details on the construction of these variables. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores within each country. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.7 Representative Sample



Figure 35: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on composite universalism, without and with controls, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.



Figure 36: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 37: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

D Measurement Error and ORIV Analyses

Measurement error is ubiquitous in lab and survey settings. To ensure that the estimates presented in this paper are neither artefacts of nor attenuated by the presence of measurement error in our elicitations of outcome and explanatory variables, we make use of the instrumentation strategies laid out in Gillen et al. (2019).

That is, we employ the obviously-related instrumental variables (ORIV) technique by eliciting quasi-duplicate measurements of: (i) the set of specific policy views, (ii) the corresponding summary statistic, and (iii) our measures of universalism. This analysis was pre-registered and detailed the formulation of instruments for our variables of interest as follows.

Choice of instruments. In Section 4.3, we document how we elicited support for our eight broad policy categories (affirmative action, border control, environment, foreign aid, health, military, police, and welfare) with two complementary strategies. The first elicited respondents' desired, per capita annual spending by their national government on each of these categories. The second strategy elicited respondents' support for government spending in each of these categories on an 11-point Likert scale. These two elicitations were separated by a series of tasks, including elicitations of support for specific, framed policies, and a sociodemographic questionnaire. From these two proxies for each one of the respondents' policy views on the eight broad categories, we also constructed a summary statistic as described in Section 4.3. This leaves us with duplicate measurements (in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), Y^a and Y^b) of both support for the eight individual policies and of a summary statistic for respondents' ideology.

For the set of predictors (our measures of universalism), we leverage the fact that the order of social groups presented in our survey is randomized within the domestic and global categories. As such, the first measure of universalism (in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), X^a) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear first and the three global groups that (randomly) appear first in the survey for each respondent. We do not include the foreign decision as there was only *one* of these elicitations.

Analogously, the second measure of universalism (X^b) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear last and the two global groups that (randomly) appear last in the survey. We construct these two proxies for both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust separately, and for the composite measure of universalism that averages the two.



Figure 38: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of the summary statistic of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our measures of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Results. With this set of instruments in hand, we replicated our analysis of the relationships between universalism and the structure of ideology with the stacked ORIV regressions described in Gillen et al. (2019). We were interested in ensuring that measurement error neither attenuates nor artifically produces the relationship between views regarding each of our eight individual policies and universalism, and between the summary statistic of these policy views and universalism. We thus examine nine different outcome variables. Moreover, in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), we examine the relationship between these nine Y^*'s and our three X^*'s individually, i.e. the measures of universalism in the choice domains of altruism and trust, and the corresponding composite measure.

We follow the recommendations in Gillen et al. (2019) and use standardized versions of both our universalism measures and policy views. Moreover, since each respondent appears twice when implementing ORIV, standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. In all cases the results with the ORIV estimator are very similar to those presented in the main text with OLS.



Figure 39: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our summary measure of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

E Definition of Main Survey Variables

Left vs. right. Respondent's self-positioning on the left-right political spectrum in response to the following prompt: "Oftentimes, people speak of relatively left-wing and relatively right-wing political views. On a scale from 0 (very left-wing) to 10 (very right-wing), where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Summary statistic of policy views. Summary statistic of policy views, given by

$$\text{Left vs. right summary statistic} = \frac{\text{Foreign aid} + \text{Environment} + \text{Aff. action} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health care}}{5} - \frac{\text{Military} + \text{Police} + \text{Border control}}{3} \tag{44}$$

Each policy denotes the desire expenditure share for the given policy, defined also in this section. The summary statistic generally increases with attitudes towards left-wing views, and correlates with self-positioning on a 0 to 10 scale. This summary statistic is standardized into z-scores within countries.

Domestic universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical $100, between a domestic member of one's in-groups relative to a domestic stranger. The measure averages the ten corresponding money allocation decisions.

Foreign universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through a bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical $100 between a domestic stranger and a global stranger.

Global universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical $100, between a global member of one's in-groups relative to a global stranger. The measure averages the five corresponding money allocation decisions.

Summary measure of universalism in altruism. Unweighted average of domestic universalism in altruism, foreign universalism in altruism, and global universalism in altruism. Because these three individual components correlate highly with each other, the summary measure reduces the dimensionality of the data and describes a respondent's broad universalism in altruism as a general type.

Domestic universalism in trust. Trust analogue of domestic universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Foreign universalism in trust. Trust analogue of foreign universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Global universalism in trust. Trust analogue of global universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Summary measure of universalism in trust. Trust analogue of the summary measure of universalism in altruism. That is, unweighted average of domestic universalism in trust, foreign universalism in trust, and global universalism in trust.

Composite measure of universalism. Unweighted average of (i) summary measure of universalism in altruism and (ii) summary measure of universalism in trust. Reduces the dimensionality of the data.

Revealed altruism. Altruism as elicited through a standard dictator game over $100 between the self and a domestic stranger.

Residual altruism. Residuals from within-country regressiosn of dictator game behavior (revealed altruism) on the summary statistic of universalism in altruism. Because the dictator game is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of altruism partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of revealed altruism that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

Revealed generalized trust. Generalized trust in others as elicited through an allocation of trust points on a scale from 0 to 100. Respondents were prompted to consider their trust in a domestic stranger, where 0 meant that they believe they "cannot trust a randomly-selected person very much", and 100 meant they believe "a randomly-selected person can in general be trusted a great deal."

Residual trust. Residuals from within-country regressions of revealed generalized trust on the summary statistic of universalism in trust. Because generalized trust is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of trust partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of generalized trust that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

Equity-efficiency preferences. Elicitation of preferences for efficiency over equity, as given by a bystander dictator game between two "randomly-selected people" who live in the respondent's country, in which the most unequal split of money maximizes total payoffs. The measure captures how much a respondent deviates from an equal, 50:50 split of the money.

Desired government spending on policy categories. Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Respondents were prompted to respond in free-form text entry with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of the eight domains. They were provided a reference value of the annual per capita spending amount on education by their national level of government.

These dollar amounts were then translated into desired shares, out of a total amount of per capita spending by the national government. Both desired expenditure shares and expenditure levels were standardized into z-scores within-country.

Support for policy categories. Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Respondents were prompted to respond on a 0 (strongly oppose) to 10 (strongly support) Likert scale with their level of support for national government spending on each of the eight domains.

Desired government spending on individual policies. Measure of support for sixteen distinct policies, two per each of the eight broad policy domains. Per each of these policy domains, one specific policy had a less universalist implementation, while the other a more universalist one. See Table 13.

Respondents were prompted to respond with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of these sixteen policies. Both ensuing desired expenditure shares and expenditure levels were standardized into z-scores within-country.

Religiosity. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) self-described religiosity on a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious); (ii) church attendance on a scale from 0 to 5; and an indicator for atheism, agnosticism, or no religion.

Income Index. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) percentile rank of income (from free-form text entry), and (ii) income on a scale from 0 to 4 (roughly corresponding to income quintiles in each country).

Wealth Index. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) an indicator for stock ownership, (ii) an indicator for home ownership, and (iii) percentile rank of net worth (from free-form text entry).

Urbanicity. Respondent's neighborhood size on a 10-step variable: > 1 million, 200k-1m, 50k-200k, 20k-50k and close to metro, 20k-50k and not close to metro, 3k-20k and close to metro, 3k-20k and not close to metro, 500-300k and close to metro, 500-3k and not close to metro, <500.

Educational attainment. Respondent's educational attainment. Across all countries but Brazil and Germany, the four educational categories were the local equivalents of: (i) no high school, (ii) high school, (iii) some college or vocational training, (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Brazil, the four educational categories were: (i) no formal education, (ii) elementary school, (iii) high school, and (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Germany, the three educational categories were: (i) no vocational training, (ii) vocational training, and (iii) university degree.

Beliefs in the efficiency of government. Respondent's rating on a scale from 0 (the government is wasteful) to 10 (the government is generally efficient) on the efficiency of the government in implementing policies and providing for public services.

Belief in personal benefit from government expenditure on policy categories. Respondent's report on the probability (0%-100%) that they would personally benefit over the twelve months following the survey from the corresponding services of the eight broad policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

F Additional Details and Analyses for Field Evidence

F.1 Summary Statistics for DonorsChoose Data

Category	Statistic
Number of donations (overall)	4,050,872
Number of donors (overall)	1,265,592
Number of projects (overall)	896,294
Average donation amount (overall)	$76.25
Median donation amount (overall)	$25.00
Average number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	20.82
Median number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	3.83
Max number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	9,918
Min number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	0
Average donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	$1,602.55
Median donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	$146.70
Max donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	$909,664.20
Min donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	$0
Average total number of donations by a CD	9,080
Median total number of donations by a CD	6,003
Max total number of donations by a CD	192,473
Min total number of donations by a CD	1,350
Average total donation amount by a CD	$698,709.80
Median total donation amount by a CD	$332,959.40
Max total donation amount by a CD	$18,782,564.00
Min total donation amount by a CD	$59,579.35

F.2 Additional Notes on Methodology

Data Cleaning. Our raw data consists of 6,211,940 individual donations made between March 2000 and October 2016. Beginning in 2007, donations are made to projects in all states in the United States plus the District of Columbia.

In addition to dropping observations with missing geographic or donation data, we exclude donations either (i) made by donors, or (ii) directed to schools that are located outside of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.

Aggregation to Congressional District level. Projects were mapped to Congressional Districts through the exact coordinates of their schools, as provided by DonorsChoose. ZIP codes provided in the DonorsChoose data were used to map donors to their respective Congressional Districts.

Note that for reasons of anonymity, donor ZIP codes were truncated at the first three digits, which added a layer of uncertainty to CD mappings beyond the fuzziness of ZIP-to-CD mappings. Thus, through data provided by the United States Census Bureau, every donation was first mapped to all possible *full* ZIP codes corresponding to the truncated ZIP code from DonorsChoose, and then in turn, to a given CD based on all possible Congressional Districts that each one of these possible full ZIP codes could map to. Because this mapping is not 1:1, when aggregating donations to relevant source CDs, all observations were weighted by the degree of a fuzzy match to relevant CDs. For example, if based on the provided ZIP code a donation could have originated from either MA-5 or MA-7, this donation would appear twice in our merged data once all donations were mapped to donor Congressional Districts. In turn, each of these two observations would then be weighted by one-half when aggregating donation statistics by pairs of donor and recipient CDs.

F.2.1 Bayesian Shrinkage

Our raw regression coefficients θ_i form unbiased but imprecise estimates of universalism. To reduce measurement error and generate more precise estimates of this parameter, we "shrink" our estimates toward the mean $\overline{\theta}$ of the average across CDs, producing a shrunk coefficient θ_i^s that is a weighted average of θ_i and $\overline{\theta}$:

$$\theta_i^s = w_i\theta_i + (1-w_i)\overline{\theta}. \tag{45}$$

As in Chetty and Hendren (2018) and Enke (2020), the weights w_i are selected to minimize the mean-squared prediction error, so that

$$w_i = \frac{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2]}{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2] + se_i^2}.$$

$Var(\theta_i)$ represents the variance of the raw coefficients across CDs and se_i the standard error of the coefficient for CD i. See Chetty and Hendren (2018) for a derivation.

F.2.2 Social Distance Data

Data on the social connectedness and the "relative probability of friendship" between pairs of counties in the United States was obtained from Facebook. The construction of this data is covered in Bailey et al. (2018). The Social Connectedness Index (SCI) reflects the aggregate number of Facebook friendship links within or between counties. The "relative probability of friendship" normalizes for county populations by dividing the SCI by the product of the number of Facebook users in each of the two counties.

We aggregate this "relative probability of friendship" data to the Congressional District level by taking the average of the relative probabilities of all possible county-to-county pairings between two given Congressional Districts. Since mappings from county to Congressional District are not 1:1, the aggregation from county to this geographic level accounts for the potential of a fuzzy match, by weighting observations by the number of different possible Congressional Districts every given county could map to.

This aggregation from county-pair SCIs and relative probabilities of friendship forms our measure of "friendship distance". Specifically, we define the social distance between a donor in geographic entity i and a recipient in a geographic entity j of the same level as $-\ln(1 + \text{rel. prob. of friendship}_{i,j})$.

F.3 Robustness Checks

Differing geographic distributions of CDs by party. Democratic CDs are more likely than Republican CDs to be found along the coasts, producing disparities in the distributions of distances to other CDs from a typical Democratic and a typical Republican CD. Though our baseline analysis already takes measures to address this concern, we also re-run the analysis using a binary geographic distance measure. We set distance equal to 0 for "local" CD-to-CD pairs i and j for which $d_{i,j} < 50$ miles and 1 otherwise, repeating the analysis for cutoffs of 10 and 100 miles. We also repeat our baseline analysis with an additional control for state-pair fixed-effects, which accounts for broad locational differences between the two political parties. As we report in Table 15, the strong positive

relationship between universalism in altruism and Democratic vote share persists.

Estimation Method. In the main text, we implement a two-step procedure that first (i) estimates a CD's universalism with data on each CD's donations across geographic and friendship distance, and then (ii) correlates the estimated universalism parameters with Democratic vote shares. An alternative approach that bypasses estimating a universalism parameter directly regresses the log donation amounts between each pair of CDs on (i) the log geographic or friendship distance between each CD pair, and (ii) an interaction between the log distance variable and the donor CD's Democratic vote share. In Table 17, we thus estimate the following equation:

$$p_{i,j} = \alpha d_{i,j} + \beta \left[d_{i,j} \times v_i \right] + \omega_i + \varphi_j + \varepsilon_{i,j} \tag{46}$$

where $p_{i,j}$ denotes the log donation amount sent by donor CD i to recipient CD j, $d_{i,j}$ denotes the distance measure between CDs i and j, and v_i denotes the donor CD's Democratic vote share. ω_i and φ_j capture donor and recipient CD fixed effects, respectively. Table 17 shows the results. As predicted, we estimate a negative coefficient α on distance, but a positive and significant coefficient β, indicating that the more Democratic a CD, on average the less sensitive to geographic or friendship distance its donation amounts to other CDs. In columns (2) and (4), we also allow each state to have its own slope of log donation amounts with respect to log distance, showing that even within states that themselves might lean overall Democratic, on average the donations of relatively *more* Democratic CDs are less sensitive to distance.

F.4 Visual layout and functionality of the DonorsChoose platform

We ensure our results are not artefacts of the layout or functionality of the DonorsChoose website when a potential donor accesses the platform. To do so, we examined all available screenshots of the platform's layout and functionality since its inception.

Throughout the relevant time period, it is not the case that projects are sorted by closest proximity to each donor on the website. Instead, for a significant portion of the time period, the default sort for projects on the platform was by urgency, which DonorsChoose defines as a combination of the lowest cost to complete, highest economic need, and fewest days left to expiration of the project.

It is also not the case that the website's layout varies across space. That is, to the best of our knowledge, at any given time all donors observe the same platform layout regardless of location, and given the default sort, the same exact projects when they first arrive at the platform. As such, it is not the case that donors in Republican CDs are

Table 15: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable:									
	Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations)	14.2***	7.72***								
	(1.47)	(1.38)								
Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance)			10.4***	6.44***						
			(1.01)	(1.35)						
Universalism in altruism (controlling for state-pair fixed effects)					9.46***	6.58***				
					(0.87)	(1.07)				
Universalism in altruism (wrt binarized distance variable)							9.79***	10.0***		
							(0.96)	(1.23)		
Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance)									10.2***	5.20***
									(1.60)	(1.36)
Log [Total donations]		4.13***		1.74		2.02**		-0.18		2.83***
		(1.02)		(1.16)		(1.02)		(1.02)		(1.01)
Log [Median household income]		-42.5***		-45.3***		-46.1***		-52.0***		-48.5***
		(5.47)		(5.44)		(5.36)		(5.21)		(5.13)
Fraction of population with college degree		79.1***		86.8***		82.7***		91.5***		74.5***
		(13.10)		(13.02)		(12.90)		(12.38)		(12.11)
Latitude		0.55		0.86		1.21**		0.83		1.79***
		(0.53)		(0.58)		(0.55)		(0.52)		(0.53)
Log [Distance to coast]		-1.84***		-1.97***		-2.10***		-0.67		-2.22***
		(0.65)		(0.64)		(0.58)		(0.57)		(0.58)
Racial fractionalization		20.0***		19.7***		18.5***		19.4***		18.6***
		(5.78)		(5.96)		(5.90)		(5.53)		(5.49)
Log [Average distance to all projects]		67.6***		69.3***		70.7***		93.9***		77.7***
		(15.82)		(16.63)		(15.88)		(15.75)		(15.79)
Log [Education spending per capita]									3.52***	4.96***
									(0.85)	(0.62)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	430	430
R^2	0.46	0.62	0.46	0.62	0.47	0.63	0.47	0.66	0.51	0.70

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations) in columns (1)–(2) corresponds to our estimate of θ_i for each Congressional District, as per equation 1, based on geographic distance and *number* of donations as opposed to donation amounts. Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance) in columns (3)–(4) refers to a composite measure formed from a principal component analysis of geographic and friendship distances between CD pairs. In columns (5)–(6), we residualize both donation amounts and distances of state-pair fixed effects, and in columns (7)–(8), we estimate universalism in altruism based on a binarized rather than continuous geographic distance measure. In columns (9)–(10), we return to our baseline specification in Table 4, but introduce the log per capita spending on primary and secondary education from *local* sources of funding as controls, as covered in Section 7.4.

Table 16: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism in altruism (excluding same states)	8.95***	6.98***	5.67***	9.16***	6.36***	4.95***
	(0.76)	(0.66)	(0.72)	(1.27)	(1.20)	(1.12)
Log [Total donations]		6.66***	4.26***		6.10***	4.45***
		(0.88)	(0.98)		(0.95)	(1.00)
Log [Median household income]			-36.8***			-47.1***
			(4.89)			(5.49)
Fraction of population with college degree			81.3***			88.6***
			(12.18)			(13.08)
Latitude			0.42***			0.64
			(0.14)			(0.57)
Log [Distance to coast]			-1.77***			-2.51***
			(0.42)			(0.66)
Racial fractionalization			20.2***			18.4***
			(4.82)			(6.15)
Log [Average distance to all projects]			13.2***			61.3***
			(3.58)			(16.73)
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436
R^2	0.26	0.35	0.50	0.39	0.45	0.61

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In each regression specification, we exclude all CD-to-CD pairs in which the donor state equals the recipient state; that is, we exclude all within-state donations, in order to estimate the gradient parameter of interest only when it comes to states other than a donor's own.

systematically nudged towards donating locally more often or in larger amounts through the website's layout or functionality. Below, we present a screenshot of the DonorsChoose platform as accessible in June 2019.

Throughout our time period of interest, we can confirm that the options available to each donor with which to filter and sort projects were constant. Most importantly, the ability to search through and filter projects based on location was and continues to be a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the screen. This makes a donor's selection of a project based on geography particularly straightforward, and potentially enhances the case for our claim that geographic distance is a relevant metric employed by donors in selecting projects.

Table 17: CD-to-CD donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Log [Total Donation Amounts]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log [Geographic Distance b/w CDs]	-1.38***			
	(0.05)			
Log [Friendship Distance b/w CDs]			-1.13***	
			(0.03)	
Log [Geographic distance] x (Effective Dem. vote share, 2016)	0.0099***	0.0057***		
	(0.00)	(0.00)		
Log [Friendship distance] x (Effective Dem. vote share, 2016)			0.0062***	0.0051***
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Donor CD FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Recipient CD FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(Donor State FE) x Log [Distance]	No	Yes	No	No
(Donor State FE) x Log [Distance]	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	190096	190096	190096	190096
R^2	0.70	0.71	0.72	0.73

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. This table presents the impact of the Democratic lean of a CD on the slope of its donations with respect to geographic and friendship distance. That is, rather than first estimating the universalism of all CDs and correlating that vector with Democratic vote shares (our two-step procedure in the main text), here we directly regress the donation amounts between each CD-to-CD pair on our two definitions of distance, and an interaction between CD-to-CD distance and the Democratic vote share of the donor CD. Each observation is one CD-to-CD pair. Each regression includes donor and recipient CD fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include interactions between donor CD fixed effects and the corresponding distance variable, which omits the coefficient on the distance variable as each state will have its own slope. Standard errors are clustered twoway for donor and school CDs.



Figure 40: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the ability to search for projects near any given geographical location at the top of the page, the default sort based on "most urgent" projects, and the options available to the donor with which to filter projects. Additional options available with which to filter projects included the project's target age group, request type (e.g., art supplies, books, classroom basics, etc.), project type (classroom projects, or professional development), and buckets for amount needed ($50 and under, $100 and under, etc.).