

MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGY^{*}

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Abstract

Throughout the Western world, people's policy preferences are correlated across domains in a strikingly similar fashion. Based on a simple model, we propose that what partly explains the particular internal structure of political ideology is heterogeneity in *moral universalism*: the extent to which people's altruism and their trust in others remain constant as social distance increases. In representative surveys with 15,000 respondents, we measure universalism in both altruism and trust. In the data, heterogeneity in universalism descriptively explains a substantial share of desired government spending levels for welfare, affirmative action, environmental protection, foreign aid, health care, military, border control, and law enforcement. Moreover, the canonical left-right divide on issues such as the military or redistribution reverses depending on whether participants evaluate more or less universalist versions of these policies. These patterns hold in the U.S., Australia, Germany, France, and Sweden, but not outside the West. We confirm the idea of higher universalism among the Western political left by estimating the universalism of U.S. regions using large-scale donation data and linking this measure to local vote shares.

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“To be from the left means to know that the Third World’s issues are closer to us than our neighborhood’s issues.”
Gilles Deleuze, Left-wing French philosopher, 1988

1 Introduction

It is a stylized fact that Americans’ policy views are correlated across domains: knowing a person’s view on one policy issue (such as redistribution) allows an observer to back out with reasonable confidence the person’s views on many other policy issues such as support for the military, environmental protection or foreign aid. Political scientists refer to this well-known fact as *ideological constraint*. What is perhaps slightly more surprising is that the internal structure of the resulting ideological clusters is strikingly similar throughout the Western world. We confirm this motivating observation using new large-scale survey data from the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. In each of these countries, principal component analyses reveal the existence of two clusters that all “Western” readers – irrespective of their nationality – will probably intuitively associate with “left” and “right.” In the left cluster, people desire high government expenditure on foreign aid, affirmative action, environmental protection, welfare, and universal health care, while people in a right cluster support government spending on the military, police and law enforcement, and border control.

Yet, it is arguably not immediately obvious why this *particular* structure of policy views prevails. For example, it is well-known that people’s overall preferences for “big government” (captured by beliefs about the efficiency of government or the distortionary effects of taxes) are an important determinant of left-wing political attitudes. Yet such views about the size of government as a whole do not rationalize why in some policy domains the left actually demands a lower level of government expenditure than the right. Still, the striking similarity of ideological clusters across countries that exhibit vast differences in electoral systems and party structures, suggests the existence of a systematic ideological core that does not merely reflect country-specific peculiarities. This paper is devoted to identifying the utility function and belief system that underlie this core. To take a crisp example, why is it that everywhere in the Western world identification as left-wing is positively correlated with support for strong government in the domain of welfare, yet negatively with support for strong government in the domain of police and law enforcement?

The central proposition of this paper is that what imposes this particular structure on the space of policy views is heterogeneity in *moral universalism*: the extent to which people’s altruism and their trust in others remain constant as social distance increases. Universalism is about “us vs. them” rather than “me vs. you”: it determines *towards*

whom one is altruistic and trusting, rather than *how much*. Universalists allocate a given altruism or trust budget more uniformly, where full universalism corresponds to the extreme case that one's neighbor, friend or cousin are treated in the same way (and trusted by the same amount) as a random stranger. Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals exhibit large heterogeneity in their degree of universalism, and many do not agree with the moral priorities implied by Deleuze's statement above.

We make four contributions. First, we present a simple model that articulates why and how universalism in altruism and trust should be linked to a vector of policy views. Second, we test and confirm these predictions in large-scale nationally representative surveys in five Western countries. Third, using those same surveys, we document that the left-right divide on policy views substantially attenuates or even reverses once traditionally conservative policy domains are recast as universalist policies, or once traditionally left-wing policies are implemented in non-universalist ways. Fourth, we leverage large-scale donation data to provide complementary field evidence for the idea that the Western political left is more universalist in monetary tradeoffs. The paper is descriptive in nature and offers a new set of stylized facts by presenting different types of conditional correlations.

To transparently spell out how we think about the link between universalism and an entire vector of policy views, we present a simple model that builds on [Tabellini \(2008\)](#). In the model, the key primitives are two parameters that govern an agent's universalism in altruism and trust. First, universalism in altruism governs the welfare weights that each agent assigns to other agents, as a function of social distance. Second, a universalism in trust parameter determines the extent to which trust in others declines as a function of social distance. Both universalist and non-universalist agents have rational expectations about the overall rate of cheating in society, yet they differ in their beliefs about who the cheaters are, where a full universalist believes that cheating is uncorrelated with social distance from him.

Agents evaluate two potential policies, where Policy A is “risky” in that it introduces a scope for cheating by individual members of society. Policy B is “safe” in that it reduces the scope for cheating but is associated with other societal costs. For example, in the domain of welfare, Policy A corresponds to a system with more extensive welfare payments, which introduces scope for cheating (claiming benefits one is not entitled to). Policy B, on the other hand, corresponds to a smaller redistributive system with less scope for cheating, yet this introduces the social cost that random income shocks cannot be equalized ex post. In this setup, less universalist agents oppose welfare because they are more likely to believe that the socially distant are likely to cheat on society, and hence on the agent's in-groups. Thus, in the model, universalism in altruism and trust both lead to a stronger demand for welfare.

To further illustrate the logic of the model, consider the domain of police and law enforcement. Here, the risky Policy A corresponds to a system with less police presence, which introduces scope for stealing. The safe Policy B, meanwhile, corresponds to more police presence, which eliminates the scope for cheating but introduces the societal cost of paying for a law enforcement system. Here, less universalist agents again support the safe Policy B because they worry that their highly valued in-group members get cheated on by socially distant agents. The key takeaway is hence that, in our framework, less universalist agents (defined in both altruism and trust space) sometimes support and sometimes oppose government spending, depending on whether it introduces or prevents cheating opportunities.

While our formal model emphasizes the role of cheating, we also discuss informally how universalism in altruism could explain variation in policy preferences absent opportunities for cheating. For example, non-universalists may intrinsically dislike the idea that their own tax money goes to socially distant people in the form of welfare. Similarly, non-universalists may disapprove of foreign aid simply because they value the welfare of the domestic poor higher. The common thread that runs through our formal and informal applications is that a person's universalism should be predictive of their support for contemporary "left" policies. To empirically assess these predictions, we leverage evidence from both large-scale surveys and field data.

In the main part of the paper, we present evidence from structured large-scale pre-registered internet surveys on representative samples in the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. We further include Brazil and South Korea as two non-Western countries in our sample. Non-Western countries typically do not exhibit the particular ideological clusters observed in the West, so that the link between universalism and policy views might be different in these countries. In total, we survey $N \approx 15,000$ individuals. In these surveys, we measure respondents' universalism in altruism and trust, along with their policy views. Our empirical analysis consists of two steps. (a) We show that measures of universalism in altruism and trust correlate with policy views in a way that reproduces the particular clusters of policy views observed in the Western world. (b) We show that we can predictably manipulate the policy views of left- and right-wingers by proposing specific (non-) universalist implementations of traditionally left- or right-leaning policies.

To measure universalism in altruism, we implement tightly structured decision tasks. All of our survey questions are hypothetical in nature, yet they underwent an extensive selection, pre-testing, and experimental validation procedure (see [Enke et al., 2019](#)). In each task, a respondent is endowed with the hypothetical sum of \$100 and is asked to split the money between (i) a randomly-selected person who lives in their own country of residence and (ii) a randomly selected member of a specific social (in-) group. Each

respondent makes ten allocation decisions across which the social group (ii) varies. The list of groups is based on an ex-ante crowdsourcing exercise and includes the respondent's extended family; neighbors; friends of the family; colleagues; members of the same organization; or people who share the respondent's hobbies; religious beliefs; age; political views; and race. In addition to these 10 questions that measure "domestic universalism", we also measure "foreign universalism" and "global universalism" through money allocation tasks that involve different types of foreigners. From all of these questions, we construct an individual-level summary statistic of universalism in altruism.

Using an analogous procedure, we estimate respondents' universalism in trust by asking them to allocate 100 trust points between the individuals outlined above, to indicate whom the respondent trusts more. These questions again deliver measures of domestic, foreign, and global universalism in trust. In our data, universalism in altruism and universalism in trust are highly correlated, which suggests that they capture the same underlying psychology, which we refer to as "moral universalism."

We supplement these measurements of respondents' universalism with detailed questions on their policy views. We rely not only on qualitative Likert-scale questions to elicit policy views, but additionally solicit quantitative responses about how much money the government should collect on average from each citizen to fund *specific expenditure categories*. Hence, a respondent states a per capita dollar amount that they would like to see collected and spent on each of welfare payments; universal health care; affirmative action; military; law enforcement and police; border control; foreign aid; and environmental protection.

Our results show that universalism is strongly correlated with policy views in the ways predicted by the model and our pre-registration. Universalism is *positively* correlated with desired expenditure levels on welfare payments, environmental protection, affirmative action, foreign aid, and – to a lesser extent – universal health care. Moreover, as predicted, universalism is *negatively* correlated with desired expenditure levels on border control, military, and law enforcement and police. Thus, universalism successfully reproduces the internal structure of policy views observed in the Western world.

These correlations are robust and general in the following three ways. (i) The results are almost identical when we consider either universalism in altruism or universalism in trust, as predicted by our model. (ii) The results are strikingly similar across the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. In the two non-Western countries in our sample, Brazil and Korea, where policy views cannot be grouped according to the Western left vs. right divide, universalism explains very little of the variation in policy views. (iii) The relationship between universalism and policy preferences is robust against controlling for a large set of covariates.

A series of benchmarking analyses reveals that heterogeneity in universalism is more

predictive of the structure of policy views than variables such as age, educational attainment, population density, rich measures of religiosity, income, and wealth, or standard measures of altruism and generalized trust. In line with prior work, we find that beliefs about the efficiency of government and equity-efficiency preferences are strongly correlated with desired expenditure levels: people who believe that government is relatively efficient, or people who favor equity over efficiency, support higher government expenditure in *all* expenditure categories. Thus, universalism is the only variable in our data that organizes the key pattern we are trying to explain: simultaneous support for government spending in the domains of welfare, universal health care, environmental protection, affirmative action, and foreign aid, but opposition to large government spending in the domains of military, police, and border control.

The key idea behind our paper is that universalism is linked to policy views purely depending on whether the policy in question is largely universalist or not. Taking this argument a step further, it should be possible to manipulate people's support for broad policy domains by highlighting or proposing specific (non-) universalist implementations of these policies. After all, to take an example, while we argue that universalists disapprove of the military in a broad sense, they may well be in favor of specific universalist policies within the general domain of the military. We make the link between moral universalism and policy attitudes more direct by eliciting respondents' desired spending levels for more specific policy proposals, where some proposals are more universalist than others. For example, within the domain of the military, we separately elicit desired spending levels on "Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad" and "Ensuring American defense and security." Likewise, within the broad domain of welfare payments, we separately elicit desired spending levels on "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide" and "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised." Or, within the domain of environmental protection, we separately elicit support for "Preventing global climate change." and "Cleaning and conserving forests and rivers in local communities in [the U.S.]". To take a final example, we separately elicit desired spending levels for "Sending foreign aid to countries that are in most need of help." and "Sending foreign aid to countries that are our international allies."

In these exercises, the relationship between universalism and policy views substantially attenuates, and often even *reverses* depending on whether the specific policy proposal is more or less universalist. To take a few examples, universalists (left-wingers) are suddenly more supportive of military expenditure than non-universalists (right-wingers) once the military is said to focus on humanitarian missions. Similarly, conservative non-universalists are equally likely to support redistribution or environmental protection as liberals once it takes place locally. We find very similar results on all of the eight policy

domains that we study in this paper. These results further tighten the empirical case for the idea that what matters for the desired level of government spending is at least partly whether or not it is universalist in nature. We are not aware of alternative theories that would predict such patterns.

Our survey data have the advantage that (i) we can measure universalism in a controlled decision environment; (ii) regarding both altruism and trust; (iii) in representative samples; along with (iv) detailed information on specific policy views; (v) in multiple countries. At the same time, these analyses all rely on non-incentivized (though experimentally-validated) measures of universalism and self-reports of policy views.

In the final part of the paper, we complement the survey analysis with field evidence. Here, we show that, in the United States, spatial variation in universalism is strongly correlated with local vote shares. To estimate the universalism of U.S. Congressional Districts (CDs), we make use of large-scale donation data from DonorsChoose, an American non-profit organization providing an online “crowdfunding” platform for public school teachers. On this website, individual donors give money to specific funding requests that are posted by teachers. Because DonorsChoose records the location of the donor and the recipient school, we can estimate the extent to which a CD’s donations decline as a function of geographic or friendship distance between the donor CD and the recipient CD. This estimate of a slope parameter delivers a CD-specific measure of how sensitive altruism is with respect to distance. We only exploit variation in *towards whom* a given donor CD donates, not how much they donate (or receive) overall.

We find that a CD’s universalism is strongly correlated with Democratic vote shares: Republican CD’s donate relatively more money locally and less money to faraway places. This raw correlation is robust against leveraging only within-state variation, and against controlling for variables such as local education expenditure or income. This provides additional, financially incentivized evidence for our claim that the Western political left is characterized by higher universalism in monetary tradeoffs.

In summary, the paper’s key takeaway is that heterogeneity in moral universalism rationalizes the particular structure of policy views that we observe in the West today, in a perhaps surprisingly consistent way across countries with different electoral systems and party structures. This view of universalism as a “psychological core” provides a complementary perspective to the markets-vs.-government debate that often dominates the discourse. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the seminal work of the moral and political philosopher Rawls (1971) sparked two intense academic debates: the traditional one between libertarians and egalitarians (which largely captures the markets-vs.-government discussion), but also the more recent one between communitarians and universalists (e.g., Rawls, 2005; Sandel, 2005).¹ We are not aware of previous papers

¹Universalism is also the subject of much psychological and evolutionary research (Haidt, 2012; Gra-

that have linked individual-level heterogeneity in universalism (or in-group bias) to an entire vector of policy views.

Perhaps most closely related to the present paper is work by [Enke \(2018\)](#) who studies the supply of and demand for moral values in recent U.S. presidential elections using a psychological (non-utilitarian) framework of moral values that partly rests on concepts related to group loyalty, but also includes notions such as the moral relevance of respect or individual rights ([Haidt, 2012](#)). We innovate on this work (i) by examining not just voting behavior but the internal structure of specific policy views; (ii) not just in the U.S. but in the Western world more generally; and (iii) by operating with a utilitarian framework of morality and corresponding experimental measurements.

The idea that group identity plays an important role in politics runs through various literatures and contributions ([Shayo, 2009](#); [Grossman and Helpman, 2018](#); [Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2019](#); [Kranton and Sanders, 2017](#)). For example, the model in [Gennaioli and Tabellini \(2019\)](#) rests on the assumption that policy views are intracorrelated in particular ways, and our paper could be viewed as providing a micro-foundation for this assumption. Attitudes towards redistribution in the U.S. have been linked to group loyalty and ethnic divisions ([Alesina et al., 1999](#); [Luttmer, 2001](#); [Alesina and Glaeser, 2004](#); [Gilens, 2009](#); [Alesina et al., 2018](#)), but thus far this idea has not been leveraged to explain the structure of ideology more generally. [Dal Bó et al. \(2018\)](#) document that in Sweden far-right voters and politicians exhibit lower generalized trust, which is consistent with our results.

In political science, much research has been devoted to studying the internal structure of elite opinion ([Poole and Rosenthal, 2000](#)), but to the best of our knowledge there is no extant theory that convincingly explains the internal structure of mass opinion. A popular view in political psychology is that political affiliation in the U.S. correlates with “negativity bias” ([Hibbing et al., 2014](#)) or “threat sensitivity” ([Jost et al., 2009](#)). A psychology paper that is close to ours is contemporaneous work by [Waytz et al. \(2019\)](#) who show that in the U.S. self-reported liberals are more universalist in that they express greater moral concern toward friends relative to family, and the world relative to the nation. We view our results as broadly consistent with this body of work and believe that our notion of universalism in altruism and trust may partly capture many of the more fine-grained psychological concepts that have received attention in this literature.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 exposit the internal structure of contemporary political ideology. Section 3 offers a formal framework that develops hypotheses on the link between universalism and policy views. Sections 4 and 5 describe the design and results of our nationally representative surveys. Section 6 studies the link between universalism and vote shares in the field and Section 7 concludes.

ham et al., 2009; [Greene, 2014](#); [Henrich et al., 2010](#); [Tabellini, 2008](#); [Enke, 2019](#)).

2 The Structure of Ideology

To confirm our motivating observation on the structure of political ideology, we work with our own survey data (described in detail in Section 4). The data cover the Western countries United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden, along with the non-Western countries Brazil and South Korea, for a total of approximately 15,000 respondents. We elicited respondents' desired per capita expenditure levels for eight domains: welfare payments; universal health care; affirmative action; environmental protection; foreign aid; military; police and law enforcement; and border control. That is, respondents provided a dollar amount that they would like their national government to collect and spend on each of these domains.

Western countries. To probe the correlation structure of policy views, we implement principal component analyses (PCA) separately in each country. PCA aims at reducing the dimensionality of the data while preserving most of the information. The first principal component (first eigenvector) is that convex combination of the underlying variables that accounts for as much variation in the data as possible. It hence assigns similar weights to highly correlated variables. The second principal component is that convex combination of the underlying variables that explains as much of the residual variation as possible, conditional on being orthogonal to the first eigenvector.

We find that, in each Western country, the first principal component of (log) desired expenditures across domains exhibits an unsurprising and almost identical structure: it loads positively and with essentially equal weights on desired expenditure levels in the eight categories. See Figure 21 in Appendix C.4 for a visualization. Thus, the first component directly captures “big vs. small government” preferences.

The second principal component, on the other hand, reveals a perhaps more surprising pattern: in each country, it loads negatively on desired expenditure levels for military, police and law enforcement, and border control, and almost always positively on desired expenditure levels for welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, environmental protection, and foreign aid.² This second component, by virtue of being orthogonal to the first one, intuitively captures desired expenditure *shares*.

To make this point more explicit, we perform the principal component analysis directly on desired *shares* of overall spending, computed as desired expenditure level in a given domain divided by total desired expenditure on all eight domains. Figure 1 presents the loadings of the corresponding first principal component for the Western countries. Again, border control, military, and police and law enforcement all receive negative weights in each country, while foreign aid, affirmative action, environmental

²Figure 22 in Appendix C.4 visualizes this structure.




Figure 1: Factor loadings of the first principal component of desired expenditure shares, Western countries only. Sign convention: the loading on “Border” is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.

protection, welfare payments, and universal health care almost always receive positive weights in each country.

The structure of this eigenvector is reminiscent of intuitive notions of “left” and “right.” To confirm this intuition, we elicited from our respondents a standard self-assessment about where they would position themselves on an 11-point left-vs.-right Likert scale. The correlation between the first eigenvector of expenditure shares and people’s own left-vs.-right assessment is always in the ballpark of $\rho = 0.4$ across the five countries. To sharpen this point, Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between respondents’ self-positioning on the left-right scale and their desired expenditure levels. We see that, in all Western countries, more pronounced left-wing identification is correlated with *higher* desired expenditure levels for canonical liberal policies and *lower* desired expenditure levels for canonical conservative policies.

The objective of this paper is to understand this pattern in greater detail: why do policy views exhibit the correlation structure shown in Figures 1 and 2, in a strikingly similar fashion across Western countries?

Non-Western countries. The structure of policy views in the two non-Western countries in our sample – Brazil and South Korea – is less pronounced. Figure 23 in Appendix C.4 replicates Figure 1 for all seven countries. Although Figure 23 suggests that there is some consistency in the structure across policy domains in Korea and Brazil, we observe from Figure 24 that this structure is much less strongly related to respondents’ left-right placement than in the Western countries. While not the focus of this paper, we offer a tentative discussion of the differences in ideological clusters between Western




Figure 2: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

and non-Western countries in Section 7.

The limited number of countries in our sample raises the concern that the differences between Western and non-Western countries represents a mere coincidence. To address this limitation, Appendix B replicates our analysis using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, which covers 37 countries ($N \approx 49,000$). These data cover fewer policy domains and only contain Likert scale questions to elicit support for specific policies. Still, as we show in Figure 13 in Appendix B, we find almost identical patterns in the CSES data as in our own survey, regarding both Western and non-Western countries.

3 Theoretical Framework

This section develops a simple framework that clarifies how we think about the relationship between policy preferences and universalism in both altruism and trust. Our setup builds on [Tabellini \(2008\)](#). In the model, agents choose between two policy options, yet we will argue that the structure of these two policies captures an essential feature of all eight policy domains discussed in the previous section. The key features of the model are:

(i) agents live on a rectangle and hence at different (social) distance to different members of humanity, where social distance could be thought of as capturing distance along the lines of family, ethnic, religious, linguistic, values etc.; (ii) the two policy options differ in the extent to which they enable or rule out cheating by individual members of society; (iii) in terms of timeline, agents first vote on a policy and then decide whether they would like to cheat on society; and (iv) agents differ in the extent to which their altruism and trust are universalist. Universalism in altruism governs the welfare weights that an agent assigns to other agents, where for a full universalist these welfare weights are the same for everyone. Universalism in trust, on the other hand, governs the extent to which agents' trust in others decreases as a function of social distance. The question of interest is then how an agent's universalism affects their preferences between the two policies. We sketch the model here and relegate technical derivations to Appendix A.

3.1 Social Distance and Preferences

Let I be a finite set consisting of $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$ agents from two separate countries. Throughout, we assume that the world population is “large,” with $N > \bar{N}$, with \bar{N} defined in Appendix A. We formalize countries and social distances by allocating agents in equal proportion to the vertices of a rectangle of length d_l and width d_w where $d_w < d_l$ by convention and $d_w + d_l$ is normalized to one. The social distance from agent i to agent j is $d_{i,j}$, where distance is measured along the edges of the rectangle. Agents in the same country are connected by the short end of the rectangle. That is, for any agent the distance to another agent in the same country is either 0 or d_w and the distance to another agent in the foreign country is either d_l or 1. See Figure 3 for an illustration.

We assume that each vertex of the rectangle corresponds to a social group. Agents who populate the same vertex are said to belong to the same domestic in-group (say, the same neighborhood or the same set of religious beliefs). Agents at distance d_w can be thought of as domestic out-group. Likewise, we think of agents at distance d_l as global in-group (say, people who live in a different country but adhere to the same values) and at distance $d_l + d_w$ as global out-group.

Agents care about their own consumption and the consumption of others, though to potentially heterogeneous degrees. Our formalization of universalism builds on the seminal contribution of [Tabellini \(2008\)](#); also see [Enke \(2019\)](#) for a recent application.³ Define $J_i = I \setminus \{i\}$ to be the finite set of $N - 1$ people in the population other than i . Let x_i denote the consumption of agent i and the vector x_{-i} be the consumption of all

³A difference between these earlier contributions and our work is that we formalize universalism as being *only* about the slope of the altruism function in Figure 4, while in [Tabellini \(2008\)](#) variation in universalism also affects the overall level of altruism of an agent towards all other agents in society.

Agents in Same Country




Figure 3: Illustration of distances between agents. One quarter of the agents are allocated to each vertex. A country is illustrated by an oval.

agents other than i . The utility function of an agent i is given by

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = x_i + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} x_j a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) \quad (1)$$

$$a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) = \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_{i,j} \quad (2)$$

The parameter $\beta_i \in [0, 1]$ scales agent i 's overall level of altruism, i.e., it determines the relative value assigned to own consumption versus the consumption of all others, regardless of the identity of these “others”. Agents differ in *towards whom* they feel altruism, where $a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i)$ represents group-specific altruism – how much weight they place on others' consumption relative to their baseline level of altruism β_i .

Universalism in altruism is defined as the extent to which altruism remains constant as social distance increases. For simplicity, we assume agent i 's relative altruism $a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i)$ declines with social distance at a constant rate $\theta_i \in [0, 1]$, so that this parameter captures the inverse of universalism. Figure 4 represents heterogeneity in universalism in altruism (θ_i) graphically. Here, the *slope* of each function is given by θ_i , while β_i scales the area under the curves (the overall level of altruism), which integrates to $\frac{\beta_i}{2}$. This clarifies that the universalism parameter θ_i does not scale who is “more or less moral”, but only how uniformly an agent distributes a given altruism budget. Thus, θ_i governs only “us vs. them” but not “me vs. you” tradeoffs.⁴

The timeline of the model is that agents first vote for one of two policies in a simple majority system, where voting is assumed to be sincere. That is, each agent casts a vote $v_i \in \{A, B\}$. Then, depending on which policy was selected, agents potentially take an action $q_i \in \{0, 1\}$ that we will think of as cheating on society.

⁴A potential micro-foundation for such type-dependent altruism is that agents exhibit greater altruism towards those agents that they believe to be “good” types, as in the model of Levine (1998). Then, our utility function corresponds to a reduced-form version of a model in which beliefs about the types of others vary as a function of social distance, as in Section 3.2 below.




Figure 4: Illustration of heterogeneity in universalism.

3.2 Domestic Policy

3.2.1 Domestic Policy Options

Decision makers in this model are presented with a choice between two policy options. The “safe” option A enforces that nobody can cheat on society, so that all domestic agents receive their baseline consumption level x . However, the enforcement of this policy is costly, and that cost is shared equally among all domestic agents for a per capita cost c . The “risky” option B does not impose a per capita cost on each agent, yet under this policy regime each agent can cheat on society. Cheating delivers an extra rent s for the cheating agent and imposes a per-capita externality e on all other domestic agents. As will become clear, we only use the terminology “safe” and “risky” to point out the scope for cheating that is implied by the policies – it will sometimes be the case that what we call the safe policy is riskier in other respects, but this is immaterial for our purposes.

We argue that these abstract features of the two policies map into some of the structural features of each of the eight policy domains discussed above, see the upper and middle panel of Table 1. For example, in the case of welfare payments, the safe option A corresponds to a system with few welfare payments, so that agents cannot cheat on society by claiming benefits they are not entitled to. On the other hand, this causes a societal loss because random income shocks cannot be equalized. The risky option B, on the other hand, corresponds to a more expansive welfare state, which however opens up the possibility of cheating on society.

It is worth pointing out that, in our model, Option A and Option B are not defined

Table 1: Mapping of policy domains to abstract model policies

Policy domain	Risky Option B	Safe Option A
Abstract framework	No fixed cost, but agents can cheat and hence earn rent s by imposing per capita externality of e	Cheating impossible, but agents pay fixed per capita cost of c
Welfare	Expansive welfare state: Agents can cheat on society by claiming benefits they are not entitled to or by not trying to find a job (and hence reap rent s); this causes per capita externality e	No welfare state: Agents cannot cheat by claiming benefits they are not entitled to, yet this imposes a per capita cost c because in the absence of welfare payments, random income shocks cannot be equalized ex post
Universal health care	Same logic as for welfare	
Affirmative Action	Extensive AA: Agents who benefit from AA can cheat by reducing effort because they know that they will get promoted either way; this imposes a per capita cost on other agents	No AA: Agents cannot reduce effort while still getting promoted; yet absence of AA also entails a social cost because disadvantaged groups in society cannot live up to their potential
Police and law enforcement	Weak police: Stealing and fraud possible	Strong police: Stealing is impossible; but entails a per capita cost because the police needs to be paid for
Effective border control	Weak border control: Increase in number of people who could come into country and free ride on others' efforts	Strong border control: less immigration, but this entails a per capita cost because border control is expensive, and because some immigrants are truly in need
Military	Weak military: Other countries can cheat or exploit	Strong military: Foreigners cannot exploit domestic people; entails per-capita cost because military needs to get paid for
Environmental protection	Strong regulation: Other countries can cheat by de-regulating and hence growing their economy at expense of domestic agents	Weak regulation: Foreign countries cannot exploit domestic regulation; yet this entails cost because environmental degradation might have economic or health impacts on domestic agents
Foreign aid	Extensive aid: Foreigners can cheat by claiming aid money they are not entitled to or by misusing funds	No aid: Foreigners cannot cheat; yet this entails a cost because lack of aid could cause increased migration or wars

by the implied level of government spending. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1, in the domain of welfare, the safe option A corresponds to lower spending, while in the domain of police and law enforcement, the safe policy A corresponds to higher spending. Instead, our framework emphasizes the presence of cheating opportunities, as they are prevented or introduced by the introduction of government spending.

3.2.2 Beliefs and Equilibrium

In order to calculate valuations of each policy, a decision maker must form beliefs about who would cheat under Policy Option B. A crucial assumption of our model is that a specific aspect of these beliefs is not necessarily correct in equilibrium. We assume that decision makers have rational expectations about the *overall level* of cheating under Option B – that is, they are correct about the overall fraction of agents who will cheat. However, decision makers may not form correct beliefs about *which* agents will cheat. As we will see in Section 5, the assumption that agents differ in their beliefs about who cheats is strongly reflected in the data. For example, casual introspection suggests that people differ dramatically in whether they believe that immigrants are more likely to be criminals than natives. Formally, the subjective probability that agent i assigns to agent j not cheating under policy B is

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \quad (3)$$

where δ_i controls the rate at which the belief that an agent will not cheat under Option B falls as a function of social distance.⁵ That is, beliefs are defined analogously to altruism above, and can be graphically represented in the same way that relative altruism is represented in Figure 4. As in the case of altruism, the universalists and non-universalists do not differ in their overall level of trust: the belief function in equation (3) integrates to the same constant γ , which in turn corresponds to rational expectations about the average fraction of cheaters in equilibrium.

We assume that $(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)$ are positive independent joint uniform and that β_i is orthogonal to both θ_i and δ_i . It is straightforward to derive the equilibrium number of cheaters in this framework. See Appendix A.3 for details.

In equilibrium, we define $L_{i, \text{no cheat}}$ and $L_{i, \text{cheat}}$ to be the equilibrium total losses that a non-cheating and a cheating agent i sustains, respectively, as a result of cheating behavior of other agents. Formally, $L_{i, \text{no cheat}} = (1 - \gamma) \frac{N}{2} e$, and $L_{i, \text{cheat}} = ((1 - \gamma) \frac{N}{2} - 1) e$.

3.2.3 Domestic Policy Preferences

We will analyze the model in the domestic context under the following assumption:

Assumption 1. $L_{i, \text{no cheat}} - c \geq (1 - b_0)(e + s)$

where b_0 denotes the belief of a non-cheating agent that fellow domestic in-group

⁵Technically, equation (3) represents beliefs absent agents' knowledge about their own cheating. While we present this version for notational simplicity, in Appendix A we are accurate about scaling beliefs in order to reflect an agent knowing whether or not they form part of the equilibrium fraction of cheaters.

members do not cheat. This assumption says that we restrict attention to scenarios in which the safe Policy A is not strictly dominated by the risky Policy B.

We solve the game by backward induction. If the risky policy is implemented, agent i cheats iff

$$E_i[u_i(q_i = 1)] = (x + s - L_i) + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} \{x + [1 - b_{i,j}(\delta_i)]s - e\} \cdot a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) \quad (4)$$

$$> E_i[u_i(q_i = 0)] = (x - L_i) + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} \{x + [1 - b_{i,j}(\delta_i)]s\} \cdot a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) \quad (5)$$

which delivers the cheating decision $q_i^*(\theta_i, \delta_i)$. Here, $E_i[\cdot]$ denotes the subjective “expectations operator” that applies the belief function in equation (3). In the first stage, an agent votes for the safe policy A iff

$$u_i(v_i = A) = (x - c) + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} \{x - c\} \cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \quad (6)$$

$$> E_i[u_i(v_i = B)] = (x + sq_i^*(\theta_i, \delta_i) - L_i) + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} \{x + [1 - b_{i,j}(\delta_i)]s - L_j\} \cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \quad (7)$$

which delivers the vote $v_i^*(q_i^*(\theta_i, \delta_i), \theta_i, \delta_i) = v_i^*(\theta_i, \delta_i)$ as a function of universalism parameters. We obtain the following prediction:

Prediction 1. *Individuals with higher universalism exhibit a stronger preference for the risky policy B: welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, and weak police and law enforcement. These predictions hold for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

See Appendix A.3 for a proof. The intuition behind this prediction is straightforward. All else equal, a decision maker who is less universalist will believe that out-group agents are more likely to cheat on society. This, in turn, implies a redistribution of resources away from the agent’s would-be “honest” in-group members to the out-group. However, the non-universalist dislikes this idea because his altruistic concerns are largely limited to the in-group, which as a consequence makes him dislike Option B.

3.3 Foreign Policy

Decision makers are again presented with a choice between two policy options. Under the safe policy option A, domestic and foreign agents receive their baseline consumption x . Domestic agents additionally pay a per capita cost c . Under the risky policy B, domestic agents do not have to pay c . However, in this regime foreign agents can cheat and get s by imposing a per-capita cost e on domestic people.

Table 1 explains how this abstract structure maps into the domains of military, border control, foreign aid, and environmental protection. As with the domestic policies above,

note that the risky policy B sometimes corresponds to big and sometimes to small government. Again, the key defining characteristic that matters for our analysis is whether a policy introduces or prevents cheating opportunities.

As before, decision makers must form beliefs about who cheats in order to evaluate each policy option. Decision makers are again correct about the fraction of cheaters in the foreign country, but may be incorrect in their beliefs about which foreigners cheat. For simplicity, we assume that the subjective probability of not cheating declines linearly in social distance at a rate δ_i :

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma_f + \frac{1 + d_l}{2} \delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \quad (8)$$

where γ_f is the true fraction of foreigners who do not cheat.⁶ It is again straightforward to derive the number of cheaters in this framework. Define L_f to be the total loss that each agent i sustains as a result of cheating behavior of foreign agents. See Appendix A.4 for details. To solve the model, we again impose a regularity condition:

Assumption 2. $L_f - c \geq 0$

That is, we assume that the consumption of domestic agents is lower under Option B than Option A. If this were not the case, then both foreign and domestic agents would consume more under Policy Option B than Policy Option A.

Prediction 2. *Individuals with higher universalism exhibit a stronger preference for the risky policy B: weak border control, weak military, stringent environmental protection, and expansive foreign aid. These predictions hold for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

See Appendix A.4 for a proof. The intuition is very similar to the domestic case discussed above. In summary, the model yields the prediction that higher universalism in both altruism and trust leads to more pronounced support for contemporary “liberal” policies as these are policies that open up the possibility that agents cheat on society.

3.4 Informal Discussion

Our formal model highlights the role of cheating opportunities. We adopt this perspective because it allows us to tie together different types of policy preferences in a simple formal framework, in a way that accommodates both altruism and trust. At the same time, universalism in altruism as such can also plausibly explain heterogeneity in policy preferences absent cheating opportunities. For instance, non-universalists may intrinsically dislike the idea that their own tax money goes to people that they are socially

⁶See Appendix A.4 for conditions under which beliefs are well-defined.

distant from (for welfare or universal health care). Similarly, non-universalists may support tight border control even in the absence of cheating opportunities for immigrants, if they intrinsically dislike interacting with socially distant people. To take a final example, non-universalists might dislike the concept of foreign aid simply because they value the welfare of the domestic poor higher than that of the foreign poor. These examples illustrate that our general idea – that “left” policies are appealing to universalists – does not appear to hinge on our specific cheating framework but comfortably accommodates other intuitions as well.

4 Survey Design

4.1 Logistics

We implemented internet surveys in Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, the United States, Brazil, and South Korea through the infrastructure of the market research panel of *Dynata*.⁷ The survey was implemented between June and August 2019. The original survey was developed in English, translated into other languages by *Dynata*, and then checked by us using native speakers. The median completion time was 20 minutes.

The survey consisted of four components: (i) an introductory screen that elicited demographics and routed respondents into or out of the survey, depending on whether they matched the desired sample characteristics; (ii) decision screens to measure universalism and other social preferences; (iii) screens to measure policy views; and (iv) a questionnaire to elicit additional information and covariates. The order of parts (ii) and (iii) was randomized across respondents, while part (iv) always appeared in the end. Moreover, at the respondent level the following was also randomized: (a) the order in which universalism in altruism and universalism in trust were elicited; (b) within all altruism (trust) tasks whether the subject first completed those games meant to elicit universalism or a standard dictator game (generalized trust question); and (c) the ordering of social groups on the visual interfaces that elicited universalism and other social preferences.⁸

We took two measures to ensure quality control. First, every respondent who completed the survey in less than 400 seconds was dropped and replaced by *Dynata*. Second, the survey contained two attention check questions, interspersed throughout the survey.

⁷For the former five countries in this list, we were interested in selecting countries where we were confident the ideological structure of interest exists, and with an eye to ensuring cultural diversity conditional on being traditionally considered as “Western”. South Korea and Brazil were selected as countries outside the traditional “West” with comparable levels of development to the former five countries.

⁸A permanent link for the U.S. version of our survey is: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_aftuqgHsyIAShkp.

Whenever a respondent answered an attention check incorrectly, they were immediately routed out of the survey and replaced by *Dynata*.

We contracted with *Dynata* for nationally representative samples of $N = 1,700$ citizens aged at least 18 in each country (see details on the pre-registration below). However, because constructing a sample that is nationally representative along the lines of age, gender, ethnicity, income, employment status, and education is logically difficult, *Dynata* eventually supplied a larger sample to us (total $N = 14,769$), a subset of which makes up the more representative samples that we pre-registered. The physical process was that *Dynata* kept sampling respondents until our pre-specified quotas were satisfied. “Surplus” respondents came free of charge for us. Since we view throwing away data as scientifically questionable, all analyses reported in the main text make use of the full sample. In the Appendix we replicate all analyses using the pre-registered (smaller) representative samples. The results are always extremely similar.

As a final remark on the sample, *Dynata* had considerably more difficulty in constructing representative samples in Brazil and South Korea than in the other countries, which we did not anticipate when we initially contracted with them. Thus, the final samples sent to us skew young, rich, and employed in Brazil and Korea. The sample characteristics are summarized in Appendix C.1.⁹

4.2 Measurement of Universalism

We rely on a new set of structured experimentally-validated survey games to measure an individual’s universalism in both altruism and trust. Our design goal was to measure trade-offs between “us vs. them”, making sure that “me vs. you” type of considerations do not confound the measurement. Thus, we devised “bystander” allocation games in which respondents were asked to allocate money or trust points between two other individuals. To conserve space and focus, we relegated the development, experimental validation, and testing of these survey measures to a separate note ([Enke et al., 2019](#)). We summarize the key aspects below.

4.2.1 Survey Games

Universalism in altruism. Respondents completed a total of 16 hypothetical money allocation tasks that allow us to construct a summary statistic of universalism in altruism. The construction of the survey games is closely tied to the theoretical framework in Section 3 in that it makes use of four different types of groups: domestic in-groups, domestic strangers, global in-groups, and global strangers. From these four types of

⁹We have confirmed that reweighting our samples to be representative of the respective population distributions in Brazil and South Korea does not affect our results.

groups, we construct three universalism components: domestic universalism, foreign universalism, and global universalism.

First, to estimate *domestic* universalism, respondents made ten decisions. In each of them, they were asked to split hypothetical \$100 between (i) a randomly-selected person from their country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected member of one of their social groups, who also resides in the respondent's country of residence. Ideally one would of course like to measure universalism with respect to all possible social groups. Since this is infeasible in practice, we based the selection of in-groups on an ex-ante crowd-sourcing exercise (see [Enke et al., 2019](#), for details). Across the ten questions, the social groups included extended family, friends of family, neighbors, colleagues at work or school, same organization (e.g., club), same age, same ethnic background or race, same political views, same hobbies, and same religious beliefs. For example, in one question, respondents in the U.S. were asked to split \$100 between a randomly-selected person who lives in the U.S. and a member of their extended family, such as a cousin. The average allocation to the randomly-selected person across the ten questions then makes up the domestic universalism measure.

Second, to estimate *foreign* universalism, respondents were asked to split \$100 between (i) a randomly-selected person from their country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world. Foreign universalism then corresponds to the monetary amount sent to the global stranger.

Third, to estimate *global* universalism, respondents made five decisions, in each of which they were asked to split hypothetical \$100 between (i) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and is a member of the respondent's social groups. Across the five questions, the social groups included same language, same religious beliefs, same ethnic background, same values, and same occupation. The average amount of money sent to the randomly-selected world citizen makes up the global universalism measure.

For the purpose of these tasks, respondents were asked to assume (i) that both individuals are equally rich (addressing income effects) and (ii) that neither of these individuals would find out who sent them the money (ruling out reciprocity considerations). The order of questions was randomized across respondents. Figure 14 in Appendix C.2 shows an example decision screen.

As discussed in detail in [Enke et al. \(2019\)](#), the separate money allocation decisions, and in particular the domestic, foreign, and global universalism summary components are all highly positively correlated with each other in a representative sample of the U.S. population. This is also true in our multinational dataset. To reduce the dimensionality of the data and minimize measurement error, we hence average the three components into a summary statistic of universalism in altruism. The construction of this summary

statistic was pre-registered, see below. To document the validity of this procedure, some of the analyses below will also work with the separate universalism components.

Universalism in trust. Respondents completed a total of 16 tasks from which we estimate an individual’s universalism in trust. The procedure was identical to the one described for altruism above, except that in a given game respondents were asked to allocate 100 “trust points” (rather than \$100) between two individuals, to express whom they trust more. This again yields domestic, foreign, and global universalism components, which we average into a summary statistic of universalism in trust. Again, the construction of this summary statistic was pre-registered.

Composite measure of universalism. Universalism in altruism and trust exhibit a correlation of $\rho = 0.45$. To reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, in most analyses below we work with a composite measure of universalism, which consists of the unweighted average of universalism in trust and universalism in altruism. At the same time, throughout the paper we reference robustness checks that use the altruism and trust measures separately, see in particular the discussion of robustness checks in Section 5.6.

4.2.2 Construct Validity

We validate our measurement tool along two dimensions. (i) *Experimental validation*. We implemented an ex-ante experimental validation procedure, see [Enke et al. \(2019\)](#) for details. Specifically, we show that, over a one-week horizon, our hypothetical measure of universalism in altruism is highly correlated with a financially-incentivized measure of universalism, which consists of the same questions with real incentives. Second, we document that behavior in our trust point allocation game is highly correlated with trust beliefs in a structured cheating task that is standard in the experimental economics literature. (ii) *Choice of social groups*. We document that an individual’s degree of universalism with respect to the set of fifteen domestic and foreign groups that we implement is highly correlated with their universalism with respect to a more comprehensive set of forty social groups. Intuitively, this is the case because universalism appears to be a trait that is relatively stable across different types of in-groups: if an individual is universalist with respect to their neighbors, then on average they are also universalist with respect to, say, people who share their religious beliefs. See [Enke et al. \(2019\)](#) for details.

4.2.3 Descriptives

Appendix C.3 shows histograms of the composite universalism measure in each country. Table 2 reports correlation coefficients with demographics. The strongest correlations

Table 2: Individual-level correlates of universalism

	Correlation between composite measure of universalism and:						
	Age	Female	Income	Wealth	College	Religiosity	Urbanicity
<i>Raw corr.</i>	-0.15***	0.06***	-0.09***	-0.11***	0.01*	-0.07***	0.02***
<i>Partial corr. (Country FE)</i>	-0.13***	0.07***	-0.07***	-0.11***	0.01	-0.09***	0.02***

Notes. The first row reports the Pearson raw correlation between individual characteristics and the composite measure of universalism ($N = 14,769$). The second row reports partial correlations conditional on country fixed effects. See Appendix C.8 for details on the construction of the demographic variables.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

are with age and wealth, both of which correlate negatively with moral universalism. Similarly, men, higher-income individuals, and the religious exhibit less universalist preferences and beliefs. This set of results is consistent with those documented in [Enke et al. \(2019\)](#) for a U.S. sample.

4.3 Measurement of Political Attitudes

4.3.1 Measures of Support for Policy Domains

To measure respondents' policy views, we pursue two complementary strategies, with an eye towards reducing measurement error and ensuring participant comprehension.

Desired government spending. In our main measure, respondents were instructed to imagine they could decide the average amount of money that their federal or national government collects per year from each citizen to spend on each of eight policy categories. We asked respondents to assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category would be spent only on this particular category, without any waste. In addition, we provided respondents with a reference value: annual per capita spending on education in their country of residence.

Respondents were asked to enter eight monetary amounts to indicate their desired per capita spending levels for each of welfare, universal health care, foreign aid, environmental protection, affirmative action, military, police and law enforcement, and border control. The order of these categories on the computer screen was randomized at the respondent-level.

Figure 17 in Appendix C.2 provides a screenshot. Naturally, because of the free-entry format, responses to these questions are subject to large outliers. To account for these outliers, we winsorize the desired spending levels at $+/- 3$ standard deviations of the within-country mean, as specified in our pre-registration (discussed below). That is, we replace each dollar amount above (below) the amount that corresponds to 3 SD above

(below) the mean with this value. This affects 1.6% of all responses.

As specified in our pre-registration, we compute a simple summary statistic of policy views across all policy domains, which is computed from the desired expenditure shares:

$$\text{Summary statistic of policy views} = \frac{\text{Foreign aid} + \text{Environment} + \text{Aff. action} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health care}}{5} - \frac{\text{Military} + \text{Police} + \text{Border control}}{3} \quad (9)$$

where each policy denotes share of desired expenditure that goes to a domain. Pooling data across all countries, this summary statistic exhibits a correlation of $\rho = 0.44$ with respondents' self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). We pre-specified the summary statistic in this particular way because it corresponds very closely to the structure of policy views in the Western countries discussed in Section 2. Consistent with our discussion in that section regarding the existence of such a structure in the West versus the non-West, in the former group of countries the correlation between the summary statistic and respondents' self-positioning is $\rho = 0.51$, while in Korea and Brazil the correlation is only $\rho = 0.24$. Throughout the results in this paper, we standardize into z-scores both the summary statistic of policy views and its individual components.

Qualitative support for policies. As a second, and complementary measure, we elicit respondents' level of support for the eight policy domains above using Likert scale questions. These directly ask participants to indicate whether they strongly support or strongly oppose a given policy, on a scale from zero to ten. The order of policy domains on participants' computer screens was randomized across respondents. See Figure 19 in Appendix C.2 for a screenshot.

As specified in a pre-registration (see below), we use these qualitative measures as instruments for the quantitative ones to be able to conduct “Obviously-Related Instrumental Variables” analyses (Gillen et al., 2019) and account for measurement error. The quantitative and qualitative measures are reasonably highly correlated: the correlations range from $\rho = 0.28$ for the case of police and law enforcement to $\rho = 0.42$ for the case of the military. However, there is a significant drop in these correlations (presumably due to an increase in measurement error) when focusing only on Korea and Brazil, where the correlations range from only $\rho = 0.09$ for the case of health care to $\rho = 0.28$ for the military.

4.3.2 Measure of Support for Specific Policy Proposals

The measures reported in the previous subsections aim at capturing a respondent's support for broad policy domains. In addition, we measured respondents' preferences over more specific policy proposals, two for each broad policy domain. Specifically, after respondents had indicated their desired spending levels for the eight broad policy domains, we asked them how much money they would like to see collected and spent on two specific projects or policy proposals. We constructed these proposals such that one was more universalist than the other, yet both focused on the same policy domain. We present the policy proposals in Table 3. To take the example of welfare payments, we elicited desired spending levels for (i) "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide" and (ii) "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised." In the case of the military, the policy proposals were given by (i) "Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad" and (ii) "Ensuring [American, French, etc.] defense and security." Figure 18 in Appendix C.2 provides a screenshot.

Similarly to above, these data contain a few large outliers because of the free-form entry. We hence again winsorize the data at $+/- 3$ standard deviations of the within-country mean, which affects 0.1% of all responses. Throughout this paper, we also standardize these variables into z-scores when presenting results.

4.4 Covariates

Even though this paper is descriptive in nature, we seek to assess to which extent a potential relationship between universalism and policy views is driven by omitted variables. Our survey hence elicits rich measures of covariates, including: age, gender, ethnicity / race, educational attainment, income (two measures), wealth and asset ownership (three measures), religiosity (three measures), urbanicity, employment status, marital status, migration background, belief about whether the government is efficient or wasteful (on a scale 0–10), beliefs about whether the respondent is likely to personally benefit from government expenditure in a given category, and measures of altruism, generalized trust, and equity-efficiency preferences. All of these covariates and their construction are described in detail in Appendix C.8.

To highlight just a few, an income index is computed as average of the z-scores of two questions, which ask respondents for (i) a continuous estimate of their household income and (ii) to place themselves into income buckets. The wealth index is the average of the z-scores of (i) respondents' estimates of net worth, (ii) whether they owned a home and (iii) whether they own stocks. The religiosity index is constructed as average of the z-scores of (i) a self-assessment of religiosity (scale 0–10), (ii) frequency of church

Table 3: Specific policy proposals

Policy domain	More universalist	Less universalist
Military and counterintelligence	Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad	Ensuring [American, French, etc.] defense and security
Welfare payments	Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide	Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised
Effective border control	Identifying and admitting into the country only those immigrants with the highest need for help	Identifying and admitting into the country only those immigrants who would be good citizens (e.g., be likely to pay taxes and refrain from engaging in criminal activities)
Environmental protection	Preventing global climate change	Cleaning and conserving forests and rivers in local communities in [the U.S., France, etc.]
Universal healthcare	Using local tax revenues to fund health insurance across all communities nationwide	Using local tax revenues to fund health insurance only within the local communities they were raised
Police and law enforcement	Sensitivity training for the police to ensure justice and equal treatment of all	Increasing the capabilities of the police to prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior
Foreign aid	Sending foreign aid to countries that are in most need of help	Sending foreign aid to countries that are our international allies
Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage	Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage	Measures to ensure no one of your same background (e.g., gender, ethnic background or ancestry) is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage

attendance, and (iii) a binary indicator for whether the respondent considers themselves to be an Atheist.

The measures of altruism, generalized trust, and equity-efficiency preferences are derived using the same methodology as for universalism. That is, for example, altruism is measured using a hypothetical dictator game in which the respondent splits \$100 between himself and a randomly-selected person in their country of residence. Equity-efficiency preferences ([Fisman et al., 2017](#)) are measured using a bystander game in which the respondent was asked to allocate money between two randomly-selected people from their country of residence; here, the most equal allocation was 50:50 and for every \$1 that the allocation became more advantageous for one recipient, only \$0.50 were deducted from the other recipient, so that the game represents a tradeoff between equity and efficiency.

4.5 Pre-Registration

The survey was pre-registered on EGAP, see <http://egap.org/registration/5792>. The pre-registration in particular contained (i) the desired sample size and sample characteristics; (ii) the precise construction of the summary statistics of universalism in altruism and trust; (iii) predictions about how we expected universalism to be correlated with support for each of the eight policy domains, based on the model in Section 3; (iv) the construction of the summary statistic of policy views discussed above; (v) the prediction that universalism would be more positively correlated with the more universalist, specific implementations of policy domains than their less universalist counterparts; and (vi) an analysis of whether the patterns in Brazil and South Korea are different from those in the Western countries.

Two remarks regarding the relationship between the pre-registration and the analyses in this paper are in order. First, as discussed above, our sample turned out to be larger than anticipated, for reasons beyond our control. We report robustness checks using the smaller representative sample in the Appendix.

Second, we pre-specified that we expect all of our hypotheses to be true for both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust. To conserve space and reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, we mostly work with a composite measure of universalism that averages universalism in altruism and trust. We replicate these analyses with the separate universalism measures in the Appendix. The results are always very similar.

5 Survey Results

5.1 Summary Statistic of Policy Views

To evaluate a potential correlation between universalism and policy views, we begin by considering the summary statistic of policy views described in Section 4.3.1, where higher values indicate higher desired expenditure shares for the canonical left-wing policies. We first pool the data across Western countries and then disaggregate the results in a second step.

Table 4 presents the results of a set of OLS regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on each of the separate universalism measures detailed in Section 4.2. Columns (1)–(3) focus on the domestic, foreign, and global universalism in altruism components, while column (4) uses the composite universalism in altruism measure. Analogously, columns (5)–(7) focus on the domestic, foreign, and global universalism in trust components, while column (8) uses the composite universalism in trust measure. Finally, columns (9) makes use of the composite universalism measure, which is constructed as

average of universalism in altruism and trust. The different universalism measures are all in $[0,1]$, where zero means that all money and trust points are allocated to the respective in-group member in a given game, 0.5 means that the money and the trust points are always split equally, and one corresponds to the (counterfactual) case that someone always allocates all money and trust points to the socially more distant individual.

We observe a strong positive relationship between universalism and policy views. This is true for each individual component of universalism, regardless of whether it is measured in the altruism or trust space. In fact, as we document in Figure 28 in Appendix C.5.3, this pattern is even more general than what is suggested by the results in Table 4: out of the 32 different allocation decisions in our survey from which we estimate universalism in altruism and trust, *all* are significantly correlated with the summary statistic of policy views, such that a higher allocation towards the socially more distant individual is correlated with a higher left-vs.-right score. This provides evidence that our results are not driven by just a few in-groups but reflect a general psychological tendency. Across Western countries, the raw correlation between composite universalism and the summary statistic of policy views is $\rho = 0.33$. Given the similarity of results across different universalism components, to average out measurement error, and to reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, we focus on the composite measure of universalism in what follows. We report robustness checks below.

Next, we disaggregate this result by looking at each Western country separately. To this effect, Figure 5 visualizes the OLS coefficients of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on the composite measure of universalism in each country, with and without covariates. The controls include age, gender, an income index, a wealth index, college, urbanicity, a religiosity index, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Table 13 in Appendix C.5 reports a full regression table. In every Western country, the relationship between higher desired expenditure shares for canonical left-wing policies and universalism is positive and statistically significant in both specifications. To interpret the coefficient magnitudes, recall that universalism is in $[0,1]$ and the summary statistic represents a z-score. The coefficients hence indicate that a respondent who always splits the \$100 and the 100 trust points equally between the two recipients in a given game, is about one standard deviation more left-leaning than someone who always allocates all of the money and trust points to the socially closer individual.

5.2 Separate Policy Views

Ultimately, our theoretical framework predicts not only that universalism is correlated with aggregated left-vs.-right views but that it is correlated with support for each policy

Table 4: Summary statistic of policy views and different universalism measures, pooled across countries

	Dependent variable: Summary statistic of policy views								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Domestic universalism in altruism	1.19*** (0.06)								
Foreign universalism in altruism		1.25*** (0.04)							
Global universalism in altruism			1.54*** (0.06)						
Composite universalism in altruism				2.07*** (0.07)					
Domestic universalism in trust					1.26*** (0.07)				
Foreign universalism in trust						1.23*** (0.06)			
Global universalism in trust							1.48*** (0.07)		
Composite universalism in trust								1.91*** (0.08)	
Composite universalism									2.72*** (0.09)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902
R ²	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.11

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are pooled across all five Western countries. The dependent variable is the summary statistic of policy views, constructed as described in Section 4.3.1 and standardized into a z-score. The construction of each universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

domain in a particular way: negatively with police and law enforcement, military, and border control, and positively with foreign aid, environmental protection, affirmative action, welfare, and universal health care.

Figure 6 summarizes the corresponding results. The underlying OLS regressions relate the desired *share* of overall desired expenditure for each policy (standardized into z-scores) to universalism, separately for each country and all Western countries combined, for a total of 48 regressions. The left panel shows the results of univariate regressions, while the point estimates in the right panel stem from multivariate regressions that control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain.

As hypothesized, in all Western countries, we observe a strong negative relationship between universalism and desired expenditure shares for the three “conservative” policy domains, while the relationship is generally positive and statistically significant for the five “left-wing” domains. That is, viewed through the lens of the theoretical framework in Section 3, lower universalism is associated with decreased support for “risky” policies that introduce cheating opportunities. In terms of quantitative magnitude, the estimated




Figure 5: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on composite universalism, without and with controls. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.

regression coefficients suggest that increasing universalism from zero to 1/2 (and hence moving from 100:0 to 50:50 allocation decisions) is associated with a 0.25–1.0 standard deviation change in each of the policy views. Tables 14–19 in Appendix C.5 present the regression results that underlie the construction of Figure 5.

A notable exception occurs in the domain of universal health care, where the relationship is strongly positive in the US but either not statistically significant or even negative in the other countries. This pattern might arise because, in contrast to the United States, all of these countries have had versions of universal health care for decades. The fact that universal health care is long-established in these countries may generate less heterogeneity in views on universal health care across the political spectrum, as is already visible in Figure 2. It probably also implies that respondents outside the U.S. interpret survey questions about “universal health care” in a different fashion than Americans.

Either way, overall, universalism is consistently correlated with policy views in the ways we hypothesized. Out of the 40 regression coefficients for the individual countries reported in Figure 6, 38 have the expected sign and 36 are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.




Figure 6: The left panel plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain (as a fraction of overall desired government spending for the eight policy domains) on composite universalism. The right panel plots the analogous coefficients of multivariate regressions, in which we control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain. The regressions can be found in Tables 14–19 in Appendix C.5. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.




Figure 7: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on composite universalism. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

The preceding discussion provides evidence that universalism is consistently related to desired expenditure *shares*. We proceed by looking at desired expenditure levels. To this effect, Figure 7 reproduces the left panel of Figure 6, except that now the dependent variables are desired (log) expenditure *levels*. The results show that universalists desire higher government spending in the canonical left-wing policy domains, yet lower government spending in the canonical conservative domains. Thus, universalism directly reproduces the pattern reported in Figure 2 in Section 2 that motivates our paper.

5.3 Benchmarking Exercises

An immediate question is whether other individual characteristics could also produce the patterns reported in the previous section. To address this question, Figure 8 summarizes the relationship between desired (log) expenditure levels and eleven additional characteristics that are either commonly associated with an individual’s position on the political spectrum or might be predictive of policy views. For simplicity, we pool the data across countries for this analysis. In terms of demographics, we focus on age, religiosity, income, wealth, completion of a college degree, and urbanicity. In terms of beliefs and preferences, we consider residual measures of altruism and of generalized trust, the

respondent's preferences over equity vs. efficiency, strength of belief that the government works efficiently, and strength of the belief that one might personally benefit from government spending on each policy domain.¹⁰

We find that none of the other eleven variables produces the characteristic pattern of a positive correlation with desired size of government in the canonical left-wing domains and a negative correlation with desired government expenditure levels in the canonical right-wing domains. For example, we find that beliefs in the efficiency of government and equity-efficiency preferences are both correlated with desired expenditure levels in very sensible ways: people who believe that government is relatively efficient and those who favor equity over efficiency demand more government in all expenditure domains. This is intuitive and in line with prior findings, but it also highlights that these variables do not capture the pattern we are trying to rationalize in this paper.¹¹ Thus, again, these variables cannot generate the pattern that we seek to explain here.¹²

5.4 Specific Policy Proposals

The claim of our paper, in particular viewed through the lens of the formal framework in Section 3, is not that universalists approve or disapprove of certain policy domains per sé, but that this is the case because these policy domains are predominantly (non-) universalist. If this was true, then it should be possible to manipulate people's support for broad policy domains such as the military or welfare by having them consider particularly universalist or non-universalist implementations of these policies. For this purpose, as described in Section 4.3.2, we asked respondents to indicate their desired government spending level for 16 specific policy proposals (two for each of the eight broad policy domains), where one proposal was more universalist than the other. See Section 4.3.2 for the precise text used to describe the policy proposals.

To analyze whether this affects people's stated policy preferences, Figure 9 plots the OLS regression coefficients of universalism for each of the specific policy proposals. Here, the left panel reports the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel

¹⁰We employ *residual* measures of altruism and trust because it is important to recall that both our dictator game and our elicitation of generalized trust are framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger. Thus, by construction, these raw measures partly include universalism.

¹¹While it appears puzzling that income and wealth are not correlated with support for welfare payments, this is merely a result of analyzing the data in *levels* rather than shares; once we look at desired expenditure shares, support for welfare payments decreases significantly with wealth and income.

¹²In Appendix C.5.4, we additionally present the R^2 of each of these alternative predictors in a regression of our summary statistic of policy views, documenting that universalism dominates each of the other variables in explanatory power for the structure of ideology. Because most of the alternative characteristics rely on a smaller number of survey items than our main universalism measure, a potential concern is that the difference in explanatory power merely reflects differences in measurement error. To document that this is not the case, in Figure 34 in Appendix C.5.4, we present the top panel of this figure using a bootstrapped one-item version to measure universalism.





Figure 8: Comparison of relationships between policy views and respondent characteristics. The top panel considers the preferences and beliefs of respondents; the bottom panel considers demographics. Coefficients and confidence intervals are from regressions of individual-level log desired expenditure levels (in z-scores) on other standardized characteristics with country fixed effects. To obtain residual altruism and trust, we respectively computed the residuals of dictator game allocations and generalized trust with respect to universalism in the corresponding domain. See Figure 8 in Appendix C.5.4 for a version of this figure where coefficients come from a multivariate regression that includes all alternative predictors at once, and a common set of controls.




Figure 9: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

those for the less universalist policies.

Focusing first on the left panel, we find strong and positive relationships between desired expenditure levels for each of the eight policy domains and universalism. For example, in contrast to the baseline analysis above, universalists are now *more* likely to endorse a strong military than non-universalists once the military is said to focus on humanitarian missions and peacekeeping abroad. Looking at the right panel, we find that the relationship between universalism and policy views is substantially shifted downwards, relative to the more universalist proposals. That is, the correlations are substantially attenuated and in many cases even reverse. For example, less universalist people are substantially more likely to support welfare once the specific proposal is that money be redistributed only within the local communities in which it was raised, than if redistribution occurs across all communities in the country. There is only one instance in which the coefficient on universalism is lower in the left panel than in the right panel (affirmative action in France). Otherwise, the OLS coefficient of universalism is between 0.16 and 2.29 units of a standard deviation larger in the left panel than in the right panel. Table 22 and Figure 39 in Appendix C.5 show that this difference in coefficient magnitudes is statistically significant in almost all cases.

Figure 9 shows that the link between policy views and *universalism* can be manipulated in predictable ways. A related question is whether we can predictably manipulate the link between policy views and *generic self-reported political orientation*. To address this question, Figure 41 in Appendix C.5 reproduces Figure 9, except that it plots the relationship between policy preferences and people's self-positioning on an 11-point left-right scale. Here, very similar patterns hold. For example, self-identified left-wingers more strongly endorse the military than self-identified right-wingers once the military focuses on humanitarian missions and peacekeeping.

In summary, this analysis documents that we can manipulate the relationship between universalism and policy views in predictable ways by having subjects consider more or less universalist implementations of each expenditure category. These results suggest that the (moral) conflict between the left and the right is not over abstract notions of the military or redistribution as such. Instead, it is at least partly about how these particular policy domains are conceived and which specific form they take in implementation.

5.5 Non-Western Countries

Up to this point, our analyses have focused on the five Western countries in our sample. In this section, we comment briefly on the relationship between policy preferences and universalism in the two non-Western countries in our sample, Brazil and South Korea.




Figure 10: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired log expenditure levels on universalism. The regressions can be found in Tables 14–21 in Appendix C.5. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

Figure 10 plots the coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure levels on universalism in all countries, including Brazil and Korea.¹³ Here, we observe that the relationships between universalism and policy preferences observed in Brazil and Korea are all weaker in magnitude and sometimes opposite in sign relative to those observed in Western countries.

Furthermore, Figures 39 and 40 in Appendix C.5 show that policy preferences in Brazil and Korea are not observably affected by whether these policy domains are implemented in a more or less universalist way through specific policy proposals, as we did in Section 5.4. This further corroborates the conclusion that heterogeneity in universalism does not shape policy preferences in these countries in a meaningful way.

These patterns might be unsurprising because (as discussed in Section 2 and Appendix C.4) the very clusters of policy views that we attempt to rationalize in this paper are absent in these countries. Put simply, if a baseline pattern is not observed, then it cannot be explained by universalism. We discuss potential reasons for the difference between Western and non-Western countries in Section 7.

¹³Tables 20 and 21 in Appendix C.5 present regression tables for Brazil and Korea.

5.6 Robustness Checks

Universalism in altruism and trust separately. Our main analysis employed the composite measure of universalism. As specified in our pre-registration, Figures 29–31 in Appendix C.5.3 and Figures 42–44 in Appendix C.6.3 show that very similar results hold if we work with universalism in altruism or universalism in trust instead.

Obviously-related instrumental variables (ORIV) analyses. As pre-registered, we employ instrumentation strategies from [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#) to address the effects of measurement error in our elicitations of policy views and universalism. Results using multiple elicitations for both outcome and explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C.5.5, which documents very similar results using the ORIV estimator to those presented in our main analysis.

Representative sub-samples. We contracted with *Dynata* for samples of $N = 1,700$ respondents in each country, stratified to match the population on a number of dimensions. Figures 45–49 in Appendix C.7 replicate the analysis using these more representative samples, with very similar results.

6 Field Evidence

Our survey data have the advantage that (i) we can measure an individual’s universalism in a controlled decision environment; (ii) regarding both altruism and trust; (iii) in representative samples; along with (iv) detailed information on specific policy views; (v) in multiple countries. At the same time, these analyses all rely on non-incentivized (though experimentally-validated) survey measures of universalism and self-reported policy views. Thus, we complement the survey analysis with field evidence. Here, we estimate the aggregate universalism of entire Congressional Districts (CDs) using large-scale donation data and link these to administrative data on local vote shares. The objective is to confirm the result that more universalist regions vote left in higher proportions.

6.1 Data

To estimate a CD’s universalism in altruism, we leverage data from *DonorsChoose*, an American non-profit organization providing an online “crowdfunding” platform for public school teachers.¹⁴ On this platform, teachers can post funding requests for a wide variety of classroom “projects,” such as field trips, classroom furniture, and purchases

¹⁴We are indebted to Ray Fisman for suggesting this analysis to us.

of basic school supplies or technology. Potential donors visit the website and donate to individual projects. Appendix D.5 provides screenshots of the layout and functionality of the platform. Notably, potential donors' ability to search through and filter projects based on location is a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the website. This makes a donor's selection of a project based on geography particularly straightforward, a feature we leverage in this section to estimate CD's aggregate universalism.

The geographic scope of the data is broad and comprehensive: DonorsChoose reported in June 2019 that since the platform's inception in 2000, teachers in 82% of public schools in the United States had posted 1.4 million projects, reaching 34 million students and involving nearly 3.8 million donors, who had contributed \$838 million.

We use publicly available data to match all individual donations made on DonorsChoose between March 2000 and October of 2016 to their recipient projects. These data report the school's location (latitude and longitude) and the first three digits of each donor's ZIP code. We drop all observations for which the donor ZIP code is missing. All 50 states and all 435 CDs plus the District of Columbia (henceforth counted as a CD) are represented as donors and recipients in the data. Appendix D.1 reports summary statistics.

The geographic measures enable us to investigate how a CD's altruism towards another CD changes as a function of distance to the recipient. For this purpose, we estimate a reduced-form version of the utility function in Section 3. To perform this analysis, we aggregate individual donation data at the CD level to construct a dyadic dataset, where each observation represents every possible unique donor-recipient CD pair, including same-CD pairs. Here, the "direction of flow" from donor to recipient matters, i.e. the pair NY-15 to CA-2 is different from the pair CA-2 to NY-15. For each pair, we compute the total dollar amount and number of donations from the donor CD to the recipient CD. In effect, we hence treat the aggregated CD-level data as if generated by a representative agent at the CD-level.

The empirical analysis to be presented below will quantify the extent to which a CD's donations decline as a function of distance between itself and the recipient CD. For this purpose, we work with two different measures of distance. First, the simple geographic distance between the CD's centroids. Second, we work with a measure of friendship distance that was recently constructed from Facebook data by [Bailey et al. \(2018\)](#). This measure gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from two CDs are friends on Facebook.¹⁵ We view this measure of friendship distance as a summary statistic of social distance that aggregates a wide variety of demographic and social dimensions, such as ethnic distance, age distance, ideological distance, income distance, educational distance, etc. The voting data at the CD level stem from David

¹⁵The underlying raw data are at the county-level. We implement a fuzzy match to aggregate them to CDs.




Figure 11: This figure illustrates regression equation (10) for four CDs. The left panel presents a binned scatter plot of all donations from both a Democratic and a Republican CD (based on 2016 presidential vote shares) in California against geographic distance to the respective recipient CDs. Each observation in the underlying data is an individual donation from a donor in the given CDs to a school in a recipient CD. The binned scatter plot averages within each distance bin the log amount of donations from each of the California CDs to the CDs of recipient schools. The right panel presents the analogue for New York state. All data are residualized of donor and recipient CD fixed effects, so that the figure presents only differences in the *gradient* of prosociality and not in absolute *levels* of altruism between the given CDs. Figure 50 in Appendix D.4 replicates the figure with friendship distance.

Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

6.2 Empirical Approach: Identifying Universalism in Altruism

To begin, we estimate a CD's universalism in altruism as (the negative of) the extent to which donations from a given donor CD decline as a function of geographic distance. Figure 11 illustrates this approach for four donor CDs from California and New York. For each donor CD, we provide a binned scatter plot of the log donation amount as a function of geographic distance to the recipient. Our interest is then in the *slope* of this gradient, where we define a CD as being less universalist if it exhibits a steeper slope. In these scatter plots, the donation and distance data are residualized from donor and recipient fixed effects. That is, as explained in detail below, we hold fixed the *level* of donations from and to a given CD, and only exploit variation in the slope with respect to distance.

Formally, for each donor CD i and recipient CD j , denote the log distance measure by $d_{i,j}$ and the log total dollar amount of donations by $p_{i,j}$. Further denote by $S_i \in \{0, 1\}$ an indicator variable for each donor CD i and by $R_j \in \{0, 1\}$ an indicator variable for each recipient CD j . Our estimating equation is then given by:

$$p_{i,j} = \sum_i \theta_i [d_{i,j} \times S_i] + \sum_i \alpha_i S_i + \sum_j \varphi_j R_j + \varepsilon_{i,j} \quad (10)$$

The primary measure of interest is the vector of θ_i , which captures the extent to which donations from i to j decline as distance increases. In our baseline specifications, $d_{i,j}$ represents the geographic distance between the geographic centers of the CDs.

As indicated above, the estimating equation includes donor and recipient fixed effects to control for spatial variation in donation rates due to causes unrelated to universalism in altruism. For instance, a given donor CD may have disproportionately many users of DonorsChoose or be rich on average, hence leading to higher overall donation amounts. Similarly, a given recipient CD may post many projects on the DonorsChoose website or be very poor and hence receive many donations. Our specification nets out these level effects and only identifies the responsiveness of donations to distance, holding fixed both the level of donations from the donor and the amount of money a given recipient receives.

To mitigate measurement error in the estimation of CD-level coefficients θ_i , we shrink these coefficients to the sample mean by their signal-to-noise ratio (following e.g. [Chetty and Hendren, 2018](#); [Enke, 2018](#)), see Appendix D.2.1. Universalism is measured fairly precisely at the CD level due to the large underlying sample of donations, so the shrinkage does not meaningfully impact our results—the correlation between the raw and shrunk measures is 0.99. We denote the shrunk and standardized value by θ_i^s . We standardize the shrunk universalism values into z-scores for ease of interpretation. Figure 51 in Appendix D.4 maps these standardized estimates, documenting significant heterogeneity across space. Figure 52 replicates the map for universalism in altruism with respect to friendship distance.

6.3 Results: Universalism and Vote Shares

We proceed to document the relationship between this measure and vote shares for the Democratic Party. Formally, we are interested in the coefficient ω in the following regression specification:

$$V_i = \omega \theta_i^s + \sum_k \mu_k T_k + X_i' \psi + u_i \quad (11)$$

where V_i is the 2016 Democratic presidential vote share in CD i , θ_i^s is our shrunk and standardized estimate of CD i 's universalism in altruism based on equation (10), and X_i is a vector of controls. State fixed-effects are captured by T_k .

Figure 12 presents our main finding: more universal CDs tend to vote Democratic in larger proportions.¹⁶ The raw correlation coefficient for this relationship is $\rho = 0.57$.

¹⁶We have verified that almost identical results hold when we (a) don't consider 2016 vote shares but rather averages of 2008–2016 vote shares, and (b) estimate universalism using only donation data from 2000–2014, i.e. before Donald Trump launched his 2016 presidential campaign; both robustness checks




Figure 12: Relationship between universalism in altruism and CD-level vote shares. Each point represents one CD, which is colored based on US Census Divisions. Our results indicate that a large estimate of universalism (on the x-axis, θ_i^s as estimated w.r.t. geographic distance) correlates strongly with the Democratic vote share in a given CD in the 2016 presidential election ($\rho = 0.57$). Figure 53 in Appendix D.4 replicates the figure for universalism in altruism w.r.t. friendship distance, while Figure 55 replicates with friendship distance and also controls for state fixed effects.

Figure 54 in Appendix D.4 presents an added variable plot that controls for state fixed effects.

Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating equation (11). Using the baseline measure of universalism developed above, columns (1)–(4) document that a one-standard-deviation increase in a CD’s universalism is associated with a 10 to 13 percent higher Democratic vote share in that CD.

Columns (2)–(4) show that the result is robust to including state fixed effects. The regressions also control for a number of potential confounding factors, including the CD’s level of donations on DonorsChoose (i.e. a measure of the *level* of altruism of a CD), per capita income, the fraction of the population with at least a college degree, geographic controls, and racial fractionalization.

A potential concern is that our results are merely a mechanical result of the differing geographic distributions of Democratic and Republican CDs—Democratic CDs could lie farther from projects available for donations. While the inclusion of state fixed effects alleviates such concerns, column (4) shows that the results are robust to controlling for the average distance from a given CD to all projects.

document that our results are not driven merely by a “Trump effect.”

Table 5: Vote shares and universalism in altruism across Congressional Districts

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance)	10.3*** (0.66)	13.5*** (1.18)	11.1*** (1.47)	10.7*** (1.61)		
Universalism in altruism (wrt friendship distance)					8.83*** (0.72)	5.19*** (1.22)
Log [1 + Total donations]			2.81** (1.09)	2.07* (1.14)		2.18 (1.36)
Log [GDP p/c]				0.18 (1.17)		0.32 (1.40)
Fraction of population with college degree				-0.28 (7.93)		10.9 (8.02)
Latitude				0.54 (0.57)		0.017 (0.59)
Log [Distance to coast]					-1.56** (0.64)	-1.50** (0.70)
Racial fractionalization				21.0*** (6.32)		22.7*** (6.55)
Log [Average distance to all projects]					66.6*** (16.76)	56.6*** (19.04)
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436
R^2	0.33	0.48	0.49	0.54	0.25	0.51

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the Democratic vote share in 2016. Universalism in altruism corresponds to our estimate of θ_i^s for each Congressional District, as per equation (10), based on geographic distance and dollar amount of donations. Effective Democratic vote shares are given by Demoractic vote share as a fraction of Democratic and Republican vote share. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Finally, we present an extension in which universalism in altruism is computed based on *social* rather than geographic distance. When estimating equation (10), we use as $d_{i,j}$ the probability that two individuals from different CDs are friends on Facebook ([Bailey et al., 2018](#)); Appendix D.2.2 describes this measure in greater detail. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 document that universalism computed with respect to friendship distance is strongly correlated with Democratic vote shares ($\rho = 0.49$).

The extension with friendship distance data show that our results do not merely reflect the fact that Democrats' friends are located further away than Republicans' friends. Instead, *holding fixed a given level of friendship distance*, Democrats give relatively less if friendship distance is small and relatively more if friendship distance is large. That is, conditional on a certain level of altruism, Republicans treat close friends "better" than Democrats, but Democrats treat distant strangers "better" than Republicans.

6.4 Robustness Checks

Controlling for local sources of education funding. An obvious limitation of our analysis is that we estimate universalism only from DonorsChoose data, and thus do not observe giving outside of this platform. This would be problematic if, for example, variation in universalism across CDs was generated only as an artefact of variation in amounts given locally through other means in each CD. In that case, relatively high “universalism” in a given CD would capture only the relatively diminished incentives of donors in that CD to donate to local schools.

A prime candidate in this respect is the public school funding system, e.g., payments through local property taxes. As such, we verify that our results are not driven by variation in local educational funding sources by using data from the Annual Survey of School System Finances. Table 26 in Appendix D.3 shows that controlling for the per capita amount of primary and secondary education spending derived from *local* revenue sources in equation (11) does not affect the results. More broadly, in an additional robustness check we conceptually bypass *all* sources of local education funding (whether it be through the tax system or DonorsChoose) and limit ourselves to variation only *outside* of (i) one’s own CD or (ii) one’s own state. As reported in Tables 28 and 29, the relationship between Democratic vote shares and universalism in altruism holds when we remove own-CD and own-state donations, hence suggesting that the responsiveness of giving to distance does not only reflect differing concern for the very local community or idiosyncrasies of local tax collection and educational funding sources.

Differing geographic distributions of CDs by party. Another potential concern pertains to differences in the geographic distribution of red and blue CDs, such as that many blue CDs are located along the coasts. To address this, we implement two robustness checks. First, we re-estimate universalism after re-coding geographic distance into a binary variable, based on a distance threshold of 50 miles. Thus, this measure of universalism only leverages variation in whether donations are “local” or “distant.” Long-distance coast-to-coast donations are hence treated just like other non-local donations. As a second robustness check, we add state-pair fixed-effects to the baseline analysis. That is, our analysis fixes a donor state and a recipient state and only leverages variation in distance within these states, say from Massachusetts to Vermont. The results in these two robustness checks are very similar. See Appendix D.3 and Table 26 for details.

Accounting for corporate donations. We replicate the analysis excluding donors with high levels of lifetime donations (using cutoffs of \$250, \$500, \$1,000, and \$2,700, the

federal limit on individual contributions to a single candidate committee or PAC in a given election). As detailed in Table 27, results are not impacted excluding these donors. Our results also hold when we use the total *number* of donations rather than the total dollar amount of donations to estimate equation (10). See Table 26.

7 Conclusion

Based on a simple model and a utilitarian definition of universalism, this paper has provided an analysis of the link between moral universalism and the structure of ideology. We have seen that policy views in the Western world cluster together in highly consistent ways across countries. This suggests that there is some deeper principle that generates this particular correlation structure. We have proposed that individual-level heterogeneity in universalism in both altruism and trust accounts for this structure: certain policies and types of big government are very universalist, while others are not. To take just two examples, sending money to starving children in the developing world, or redistributing one's own tax money to people one has never met, are very universalist ideas. Yet, this universalism does not comply with everyone's moral intuitions and beliefs.

To argue our case, we have provided three different types of evidence: (i) consistent correlations between universalism and policy views in each of five Western countries; (ii) evidence that the canonical left-right differences change depending on whether people consider more or less universalist specific policy proposals within a broad policy domain; and (iii) field evidence from large-scale donations data that shows a link between local vote shares and U.S. regions' universalism as estimated from donations data.

The results in our paper raise two further and potentially interrelated questions. First, why is the internal structure of policy views outside the West so different from that in the West, and why doesn't universalism explain any of the variation in these countries? Second, would we have found similar correlations in the Western world 40, 50 or 100 years ago?

We can only speculate in response to these questions. However, there is evidence to support the idea that in the Western world the structure of political conflict used to be defined more along the lines of income and the redistributive conflict 30-50 years ago than it is today ([Piketty, 2018](#)). In fact, as [Enke \(2018\)](#) documents using text analysis of speeches in the U.S. Congress, Republicans and Democrats used universalist vs. communal moral language in roughly equal frequencies until the mid 60's and slowly but steadily diverged thereafter: the language of members of both parties become substantially more universalist over time, yet this trend was much more pronounced for Democrats. This pattern could be understood as suggesting that heterogeneity in uni-

versalism is more relevant politically today than it used to be in the past. Moreover, an even more speculative conjecture is that societies outside the West have not undergone this transformation in the structure of political conflict yet, but might do so in the future. Indeed, a huge body of work in cultural psychology and sociology argues that over the past 50 years Western societies have increasingly moved towards “post-material” values, and that this transition has not taken place outside the West in a comparable fashion ([Inglehart, 1997](#)). Based on the results in this paper, our prediction is that if and when societies outside the West undergo a similar transformation, correlations between universalism and an internally consistent cluster of policy views will emerge. It is also worth pointing out that the differences in patterns between Western and non-Western countries tie into a large literature in political science that has repeatedly documented that “common wisdoms” from Western political systems often do not translate into the newer democracies outside the West (e.g., [Moser and Scheiner, 2009](#); [Gallego et al., 2012](#)).

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ONLINE APPENDIX

A Model Derivations

A.1 Setup

Let I be a discrete set of $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$ agents randomly allocated in equal proportion to the vertices of a rectangle of length d_l and width d_w where $d_w < d_l$ and $d_w + d_l = 1$. Let the distance from agent i to agent j be $d_{i,j}$, where distance is measured along the edge of the rectangle (i.e., the distance between agents diagonal to each other is one).

Agents are divided into two separate countries, where agents connected by the short end of the rectangle are in the same country. Formally, we define a national border $z = d_w$ such that for all agents, any other agent at distance $d_{i,j} \leq z$ are in the same country and all other agents are in a different country.

Define J_i to be the set of people in the population other than i , $J_i = I \setminus \{i\}$. Let vector x_{-i} be the consumption of all agents other than i . The utility function of an agent i is given by

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = x_i + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) x_j$$

$$a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) = \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_{i,j}$$

A.2 Overview

For each policy domain, agents make a decision to support one of two different policy alternatives. We maintain the convention introduced in the main text that policy option A corresponds to the “safe” option that is costly but does not allow for cheating, while policy option B to the “risky” option that does not impose a per capita cost but introduces scope for cheating by individual agents on the rest of society.

We are concerned with making predictions about the following object, which we define to be an agent i ’s *relative support for policy option A over policy option B*, and which accordingly dictates which one of the two policy alternatives each agent i prefers:

$$\Omega_{A,B,i} = P(\Lambda_i(\theta_i, \delta_i), \theta_i, \delta_i) \quad (12)$$

$\Lambda_i(\theta_i, \delta_i)$ captures an agent’s own decision to *not* cheat on the given policy domain,

given their universalism in preferences and beliefs. That is, agents' decisions to support either a safe or risky policy will derive not only from their social preferences – how allowing or not allowing for cheating would impact the utility of others – but also whether they *themselves* would be likely to cheat on the policy given that opportunity (a greater likelihood of which, everything else equal, should push them towards supporting the risky policy).

Our main prediction will specifically revolve around $\frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \theta_i}$ and $\frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \delta_i}$, the degrees to which an agent i 's relative support for the safe option vis-à-vis the risky option evolves independently as a function of both their degree of universalism in altruism and universalism in trust, respectively captured by θ_i and δ_i . In particular, we will claim:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \theta_i} &= \frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i} \frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \theta_i} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial \theta_i} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \delta_i} &= \frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i} \frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \delta_i} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i} > 0\end{aligned}\tag{13}$$

That is, both “selfish” and social forces combined, less universalist agents will be more likely to support the safe policy. To make these claims concrete, we will show that in our framework, $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i}$, $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \theta_i}$, $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \theta_i}$, and $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i}$ are all positive. Meanwhile, $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \delta_i} = 0$.

These derivatives are to be interpreted as follows:

1. $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \delta_i} = 0$: Agents are less likely to cheat on a policy if they are less universalist (more “groupy”) in altruism. Universalism in trust does not affect an agent's decision to cheat on a given policy. See Lemma 1.
2. $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i} > 0$: An agent i is more likely to support the safe policy if they would be less likely to cheat on a risky policy themselves. That is, given a lower likelihood of personally benefitting from cheating, an agent i is more likely to support a policy that eliminates that opportunity in the first place for everybody else, as doing so eliminates the possibility of all others imposing per capita losses on agent i , and those agent i cares about. See Lemma 2.
3. $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i} > 0$: Independent of any *personal* cheating opportunities, “groupy” people are more likely to support the safe policy in both domestic and foreign contexts. Because groupy people think their in-groups (those they care about the most) are also less likely to cheat, they will be more likely to support removing the opportunity to cheat on a policy in the first place from all members of society (predominantly, from the out-group members they simultaneously don't care as much about and believe are more likely to cheat). See Lemmas 3 and 4.

All three derivatives above imply that both personal and prosocial incentives combined unambiguously push less universalist agents to support the safer policy option in

each policy domain over the risky policy option. In the following subsections, we prove each of the relevant lemmas in turn, for both domestic and foreign policy domains.

A.3 Domestic Policy

We first focus on domestic policy options, defined as policies that only affect the decision-maker and others in the DM's country. We will consider two policy options:

1. Option A: Domestic agents all get a benefit x and pay a cost c .
2. Option B: Domestic agents all get a benefit x but domestic agents are allowed to cheat. An agent that cheats gets an extra rent s and imposes a per-capita externality e on all other domestic agents.

We will denote the equilibrium fraction of the population in the DM's country that does not cheat by γ . Define L_i to be the total loss in equilibrium that agent i sustains as a result of cheating behavior of other agents within the country. Because there is a discrete number of agents, this total equilibrium loss will differ depending on whether or not agent i forms part of the fraction γ of non-cheaters. Formally, $L_{i,\text{no cheat}} = (1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e$ for all agents who do not cheat, and $L_{i,\text{cheat}} = \left((1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)-1\right)e$ for all agents who do cheat.

Define $b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i)$ to be agent i 's subjective probability that agent j is not a cheater. We will assume that agents are correct about the fraction of people that cheat, but may be incorrect in their beliefs about who the cheaters are. Let agent i 's subjective beliefs about the probability that agent j is not a cheater if j is in the same country be given by:

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma + \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \quad (14)$$

Since in the model distances are discrete, we can define altruism and beliefs about other agents in the same country as

$$a_0 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \quad a_1 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w$$

$$b_0 = \gamma + \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i \quad b_1 = \gamma - \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i$$

where throughout these derivations, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, and the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members.

Assume that (θ_i, δ_i) are positive independent joint uniform and drawn i.i.d. in the population. For the altruism weight to be weakly positive we assume $\theta_i \leq 1$. We need $\delta_i \leq \frac{2\gamma}{d_w}$ for beliefs to be non-negative and we need $\delta_i \leq (1-\gamma)\frac{2}{d_w}$ for beliefs to be weakly

less than one. Note that, because all agents are correct about the fraction of cheaters, average beliefs do not depend on δ_i .

A.3.1 No-Cheat Condition

In an environment in which cheating on a domestic policy is possible, an agent i must decide whether or not to cheat. In evaluating whether or not to cheat, suppose some arbitrary fraction φ_i of the other $\frac{N}{2} - 1$ domestic agents is perceived by agent i to already be cheating on the policy. In doing so, agent i perceives each of these cheating agents as causing a per-capita loss e on all other agents in the domestic country, including i . For every agent i , this per-capita loss caused by all cheating agents *other* than i totals $\varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) e$. Let \tilde{b}_0 and \tilde{b}_1 be respectively agent i 's beliefs about the fraction of domestic in-group members and domestic strangers who do *not* cheat, centered around the arbitrary fraction φ_i of cheaters among the other agents in the country, as perceived by agent i .

If an agent i does *not* cheat on a domestic policy, they derive utility from own consumption, and in addition, utility from the vector of all other domestic agents' consumption, which is partitioned into those who cheat and do not cheat:

$$\begin{aligned}
u_{i, \text{no cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i}) = & \\
& \underbrace{x - \varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) e}_{\text{Agent } i\text{'s consumption utility}} + \beta_i \left[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 \tilde{b}_0 \left(x - \varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) e \right)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who do not cheat}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 \tilde{b}_1 \left(x - \varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) e \right)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who do not cheat}} \right. \\
& + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 (1 - \tilde{b}_0) \left(x - \varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \right) e + s \right)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}} + \left. \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 (1 - \tilde{b}_1) \left(x - \varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \right) e + s \right)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who cheat}} \right] \tag{15}
\end{aligned}$$

Agent i 's cheating, on the other hand, would deliver utility:

$$\begin{aligned}
u_{i,\text{cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i}) = & \\
& \underbrace{x - \varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) e + s}_{\text{Agent } i\text{'s consumption utility}} + \underbrace{\beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 \tilde{b}_0 \left(x - \left(\varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) + 1 \right) e \right) \right]}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} \\
& + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 \tilde{b}_1 \left(x - \left(\varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 \right) + 1 \right) e \right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 (1 - \tilde{b}_0) \left(x - \left(\varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \right) + 1 \right) e + s \right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}}} \\
& + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 (1 - \tilde{b}_1) \left(x - \left(\varphi_i \left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \right) + 1 \right) e + s \right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who cheat}}}
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

An agent i does *not* cheat on a domestic policy iff $u_{i, \text{no cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i}) \geq u_{i, \text{cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i})$, i.e. iff eq. (15) \geq eq. (16).

$$\iff s \leq \beta_i e \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) [1 + \theta_i(1 - d_w)] - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} \right] \quad (17)$$

Equation (17) defines the equilibrium level of γ . That is, γ is equal to the fraction of agents in each domestic country for which the inequality in equation 17 is true, given an arbitrary and constant s , e , N , d_w , and each agent's draw of θ_i and β_i . We assume this fraction γ exists and is achieved as an equilibrium fraction between 0 and 1, not inclusive.

For any particular individual, their decision is made by calculating the quantity

$$\Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i) \equiv \beta_i e^{\left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - \frac{1}{2} \right) + \theta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} (1 - d_w) - \frac{1}{2} \right) \right]} - s \quad (18)$$

and comparing to zero, i.e. if $\Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i) \geq 0$, agent i does not cheat on a domestic policy.

Lemma 1. Agents displaying low universalism in altruism (relatively large values of θ_i) are less likely to cheat on domestic policies. Likelihood of cheating is independent of universalism in trust.

Pf: For universalism in altruism,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} &= \beta_i e \left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w) - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\ &> 0 \iff \frac{N}{4}(1-d_w) - \frac{1}{2} > 0 \\ &> 0 \iff 1-d_w > \frac{2}{N}\end{aligned}$$

With $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} &> 0 \iff 1-d_w > \frac{1}{2} \\ &> 0 \iff d_w < \frac{1}{2}\end{aligned}$$

Given $d_w + d_l = 1$ and $0 < d_w < d_l < 1$, we know:

$$d_w < \frac{1}{2} \implies \frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$$

For universalism in trust,

$$\frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \delta_i} = 0$$

□

A.3.2 Policy Preferences

Recall that policy Option A gives $x - c$ to everyone but does not allow cheating, while Option B gives x to everyone but allows cheating.

The value of policy option A to an agent i would thus be

$$\pi_A = \underbrace{x - c}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i \left[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0(x - c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members} \\ (\text{other than agent } i)}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1(x - c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members}}} \right] \quad (19)$$

The value of policy option B to an agent i for whom in equilibrium *not* cheating is ex-ante

optimal is:

$$\pi_{B, \text{no cheat}} =$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \underbrace{x - L_{\text{no cheat}}}_{\text{Agent } i\text{'s consumption utility}} + \beta_i \left[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 b_0 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who do not cheat}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 b_1 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who do not cheat}} \right. \\
& \quad \left. + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 (1 - b_0) (x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 (1 - b_1) (x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who cheat}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

while the value of policy option B to an agent i for whom in equilibrium cheating is ex-ante optimal is:

$$\pi_{B, \text{cheat}} =$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \underbrace{x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s}_{\text{Agent } i\text{'s consumption utility}} + \beta_i \left[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 b_0 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who do not cheat}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 b_1 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who do not cheat}} \right. \\
& \quad \left. + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 (1 - b_0) (x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members (other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 (1 - b_1) (x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group members who cheat}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

In turn, the value of policy A relative to policy B for an agent i who does not cheat is

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_{\text{no cheat}} &\equiv (L_{\text{no cheat}} - c) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 \{L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_0)(e + s)\} + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 \{L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_1)(e + s)\} \right] \\
&= \left((1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c \right) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2}) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(\frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2}) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right] \tag{22}
\end{aligned}$$

while the value of policy A relative to policy B to agent i who *does* cheat is

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_{\text{cheat}} &\equiv (L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - e - s) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 \{L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_0)(e + s)\} + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 \{L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_1)(e + s)\} \right] \\
&= \left((1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - e - s \right) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2})}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(\frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2})}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right] \tag{23}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\implies \Pi_{\text{cheat}} \equiv \Pi_{\text{no cheat}} + (e + s) \left[\left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) \beta_i \left\{ \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) (1 + (1 - d_w) \theta_i) - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} \right\} - 1 \right] \tag{24}$$

Note that in equations (22) and (23), b_0 and b_1 are scaled to reflect that, in equilibrium, whether or not an agent i forms part of the fraction of cheaters in the country necessarily distorts their beliefs about the fraction of domestic in-group and out-group

members who are cheaters and non-cheaters (in that knowing you yourself are not a cheater means you must scale up the fraction of *other* agents in the country who must be cheating, in order for the fraction γ of non-cheaters to be true for the entire country; viceversa for knowing you *are* a cheater, which means you adjust downwards your beliefs about the fraction of *other* agents who are also cheating, given an equilibrium, constant fraction γ).

Lemma 2. *Everything else equal, agent i 's relative support for the “safe” policy option A increases with the likelihood of agent i not cheating on the given policy domain.*

Pf: Lemma 2 is true if the value derived from Policy A is greater relative to that derived from Policy B for an agent who would not cheat given the opportunity to do so, compared to one who *would* cheat. That is, if $\Pi_{\text{no cheat}} > \Pi_{\text{cheat}}$. From equation (24), we see that this condition is true if:

$$\left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}\right)\beta_i \left\{ \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(1 + (1 - d_w)\theta_i) - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} \right\} < 1$$

We can confirm the above condition is itself true for *any* values $\beta_i \leq 1$, $d_w \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, $N \geq 4$, and $\theta_i \in [0, 1]$. Because by assumption all of the relevant parameters take on values *only* in those prescribed ranges, the condition is true.

Analogously, because Π 's define the *relative* support for Policy A over Policy B, a would-be cheating agent i values Policy B relatively more than Policy A, compared to a non-cheater.

$$\therefore \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \Lambda_i} > 0$$

□

Now let's consider how the relative valuation of Policy A over Policy B changes as universalism in trust δ_i varies.

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i \left(\frac{d_w}{2} \right) (e + s) \left[\theta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} d_w - \frac{1}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right] \quad (25)$$

For the case of universalism in altruism, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} &= \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} - d_w \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right] \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} &= \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2})}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} - d_w \right) \left\{ (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2})}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s) \right\} \right] \quad (27) \\
&= \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} + \left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) (e + s) \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) (1 - d_w)
\end{aligned}$$

In what follows, we define $\omega \equiv [(1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c] - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2}) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s)$. We additionally make the assumption that $\omega \geq 0$, which corresponds to the intuition that Policy B does *not* strictly dominate Policy A. For clarity, consider the counterfactual assumption, i.e. $\omega < 0$. In that case, we'd have $(1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{N}{2} \right) e - c < \left(1 - \frac{\gamma(\frac{N}{2}) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e + s)$. The left-hand-side of this inequality can be reexpressed as $L_{\text{no cheat}} - c$ and thus corresponds to the per-capita change in consumption utility for all *non-cheating* agents moving from the “safe” Policy A to the “risky” Policy B; such agents would no longer have to pay the per-capita cost c associated with the safe policy, but would now suffer from the total losses imposed on them by the cheating of others. The right-hand-side of the inequality, on the other hand, can be reexpressed as $(1 - b_0)(e + s)$, and thus corresponds conceptually to the expected, per-capita gain for all other domestic in-group members obtained from the equilibrium fraction of those who now get to cheat under the switch from Policy A to Policy B (as given by the no-cheat condition; each of those who ex ante would find cheating optimal would each gain $e + s$ relative to a non-cheater in an environment in which cheating was allowed).

As such, if $\omega < 0$, it would be the case that even for a *non-cheater*, a switch from Policy A to Policy B would be optimal; the per capita change in consumption utility for them and all other domestic non-cheaters would be more than compensated for by the expected, per capita gain of domestic in-group members cheaters under such a regime switch (produced by those who cheat), let alone without including the gains reaped by domestic *out-group* cheaters. As such, $\omega \geq 0$ captures the reasonable assumption that the risky policy B does not strictly dominate the safe policy A for a non-cheater.

With the above assumption, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} &= \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \omega + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} - d_w \right) (\omega + d_w \delta_i) (e + s) \right] \quad (28) \\
\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} &= \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} + \left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) (e + s) \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) (1 - d_w)
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 3. *For N sufficiently large, support for the “safe” policy option A increases as universalism in trust decreases. For any $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, under assumption $\omega \geq 0$, support for the “safe” policy option A increases as universalism in altruism decreases.*

Pf: For universalism in trust,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} > 0 &\iff \theta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} d_w - \frac{1}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} > 0 \\ &\iff \theta_i > \frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} d_w - 1}\end{aligned}$$

As $N \rightarrow \infty$, the condition for support for policy option A to decrease with universalism in trust converges to $\theta_i > 0$, which with θ_i drawn uniformly from the continuum $[0, 1]$, encompasses all values of θ_i in the population almost surely.

Formally, for the case of a finite N , we define some very small fraction $\varepsilon > 0$ of the world population whose draw of θ_i does *not* satisfy the condition above, but with which in turn a sufficiently large fraction $1 - \varepsilon$ of the world's population N *would* satisfy the condition required for relative support for the safe policy to decline with universalism in trust (i.e., increase with δ_i). Given that $\theta_i \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} U[0, 1]$, the minimum world population \bar{N} required for a fraction $(1 - \varepsilon) \approx 1$ of the population to have drawn a value of θ_i that satisfies the condition above is given by:

$$\bar{N} \equiv \left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon} + 1 \right) \frac{2}{d_w}$$

For universalism in altruism, remember that we assume $\omega \geq 0$. Moreover, also notice that with $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $\frac{N}{4} - 1 \geq 0$, and that with $d_w + d_l = 1$ and $d_l > d_w$, $d_w < \frac{1}{2}$. As such,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$$

Moreover, notice that:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} + \left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) (e + s) \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) (1 - d_w)$$

That is, with $\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$, if it is also the case that $\left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) (e + s) \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) (1 - d_w) \geq 0$, then $\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$ as well.

Because $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $0 < d_w < \frac{1}{2}$, $\beta_i \in [0, 1]$, $e > 0$, and $s > 0$, it is indeed the case that:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$$

Thus relative support for the safe policy option A vis-à-vis the risky policy option B increases with the agent's "groupishness" (i.e., decreases with moral universalism).

□

Comments on stability. Note that, in equilibrium, since $L_{\text{cheat}} = L_{\text{no cheat}} - e$, in a world in which Option B is already the incumbent policy, would-be cheaters are better off than non-cheaters by a magnitude of $\pi_{B, \text{cheat}} - \pi_{B, \text{no cheat}} > 0$, by virtue of forming part of the equilibrium fraction $1 - \gamma$ of cheaters (which means they face a lower total cost from all others' cheating, and the additional rent s).

Critically, this does *not* also imply that in equilibrium, those who start off as non-cheaters want to switch to cheating on the policy. This is because, as laid out in Appendix A.3.1, the no-cheat condition assumes some arbitrary fraction φ of agents is known to already be cheating on the policy when each agent decides whether or not to cheat. Under a choice of arbitrary φ equal to $1 - \gamma$, a decision to switch to cheating from non-cheating by an agent who considered cheating to be *ex-ante* suboptimal would make them worse off. Due to the discreteness of the model, each agent would consider their switch to cheating as if changing the equilibrium fraction of cheaters in the world, and as such adding an *additional* per capita cost to others (not as if merely replacing a cheater to maintain γ constant), which would make them ultimately worse off. Thus, non-cheating decisions are stable, as are the equilibrium fraction γ of non-cheaters, the total equilibrium losses L_{cheat} and $L_{\text{no cheat}}$, and in turn policy preferences.

We can envision the formation and stability of this equilibrium as if all agents originally construe $\varphi = 0$. That is, before any information is revealed (say policy option B is not yet enacted), all agents decide whether or not they *would* like to cheat if the environment was conducive to do so (i.e. once policy option B was enacted) and as if no one else in the country was cheating. As given by this no-cheat condition with the arbitrary choice of $\varphi = 0$, some fraction of agents would decide to cheat while the remainder would not, as dictated by equation (17). By the linearity of the utility function and the discreteness of the model, even upon learning of the actual fraction of agents $\varphi (= 1 - \gamma)$ that *is* cheating, *ex-ante* non-cheaters would, by the same no-cheat condition, *still* not find it optimal to switch to cheating. So even though *ex-post* cheaters are better off under policy option B than non-cheaters, the equilibrium is stable.

A.4 Foreign Policy

In the foreign policy context, we will again assume that only two policy options exist. They are

1. Option A: Domestic and foreign agents both receive a benefit x , but domestic agents also pay a cost c while foreign agents pay no cost.
2. Option B: All agents, domestic and foreign, get the same benefit x but foreign agents are allowed to cheat and get s by imposing a per-capita cost e on domestic

people.

Note that in this context it is much simpler to derive the relationship between universalism and policy preferences. This is because in the context of foreign policies, only *foreign* agents are allowed to cheat, and as such there are no “selfish” components of a domestic agent i ’s utility function to consider when examining their policy preferences. A no-cheat condition is not needed, and we do not need to examine cases based on a domestic agent i ’s own decision to cheat or not.

However, we need to redefine beliefs in this framework. We will take the stance that beliefs about the probability of not cheating follow the form

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2} \delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \quad (29)$$

where γ_f is the true fraction of foreigners who cheat. Note that the average belief across all foreigners is γ_f , and thus is correct and independent of δ_i . In order for beliefs to lie on the unit interval, we assume $\delta_i \in [0, \min\left(0, \min\left(\frac{2\gamma}{1-d_l}, (1-\gamma_f)\frac{2}{1-d_l}\right)\right)]$. Levels of altruism and beliefs by distance are given by the below:

$$\begin{array}{llll} a_0 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} & a_1 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w & a_2 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l & a_3 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i \\ b_0 = 1 & b_1 = 1 & b_2 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2} \delta_i - d_l \delta_i & b_3 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2} \delta_i - \delta_i \end{array}$$

where, as above, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members, the 2 subscript to foreign in-group members, and the 3 subscript to foreign out-group members.

We define L_f to be the total cost of cheating imposed by foreigners. That is, $L_f = (1 - \gamma_f) \left(\frac{N}{2}\right) e$. For a domestic agent i , the relative value of Option A to Option B in the

foreign policy domain is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi \equiv & \underbrace{(x - c)}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} + \beta_i \left[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right)a_0(x - c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than agent } i) \text{ under Policy A}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(x - c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(a_2 + a_3)x}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign agents under Policy A}}} \right] \\
& - \underbrace{(x - L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} - \beta_i \left[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right)a_0(x - L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than agent } i) \text{ under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(x - L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_2 b_2 x}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign in-group members who} \\ \text{do not cheat under Policy B}}} \right. \\
& \left. + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_3 b_3 x}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign out-group members} \\ \text{who do not cheat under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_2(1 - b_2)(x + s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign in-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_3(1 - b_3)(x + s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign out-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} \right] \\
= & (L_f - c) + \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4}(a_0 + a_1) - a_0\right)(L_f - c) - \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(a_2(1 - b_2) + a_3(1 - b_3))s \right] \\
= & (L_f - c) + \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4}(1 + \theta_i(1 - d_w)) - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2}\right)(L_f - c) \right. \\
& \left. - \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left\{\left(\frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l\right)\left(1 - \left(\gamma_f + \frac{1 + d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l\delta_i\right)\right) + \left(\frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i\right)\left(1 - \left(\gamma_f + \frac{1 + d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i\right)\right)\right\}s \right] \tag{30}
\end{aligned}$$

We first take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A compared to Option B with respect to universalism in trust δ_i :

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \theta_i \left[d_l \left(\frac{d_l - 2}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \right] \tag{31}$$

Next, we take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A relative to Option B with respect to universalism in altruism θ_i :

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \theta_i} = \beta_i \left[(L_f - c) \left(\frac{N}{4}(1 - d_w) - \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(d_l - \frac{1}{2} \right) (1 - b_2)s + \left(\frac{N}{4} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) (1 - b_3)s \right] \tag{32}$$

Lemma 4. *Relative support for the “safe” policy option A increases as universalism in trust decreases. With the condition $c \leq L_f$, relative support for the “safe” policy option A increases as universalism in altruism decreases.*

Pf: For universalism in trust,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} > 0 \iff d_l \left(\frac{d_l - 2}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} > 0$$

The above is true for $d_l \neq 1$. Because $d_w + d_l = 1$ and $d_l > d_w$, we have that $\frac{1}{2} < d_l < 1$. Therefore, $\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} > 0$.

For universalism in altruism,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \theta_i} > 0 \iff L_f \geq c, \frac{N}{4}(1 - d_w) - \frac{1}{2} > 0, d_l > \frac{1}{2}$$

With $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $d_w + d_l = 1$, and $d_w < d_l$, we know $d_w < \frac{1}{2}$, $d_l > \frac{1}{2}$, and $\frac{N}{4}(1 - d_w) > \frac{1}{2}$.

Restricting attention by assumption to cases in which $c \leq L_f$, this comparative static is always non-negative, meaning that more groupy agents are more likely to prefer Option A. This condition is quite weak, in that it restricts us to look at cases in which Option B does not dominate. If $c > L_f$, both domestic agents and foreigners would be weakly better off under Option B. We can thus conclude that under reasonable circumstances agents that are more groupish are more likely to prefer Option A.

□

B Analysis of Ideological Clusters in the CSES

To assess whether the trends observed in our survey data extend to a broader set of countries, we use data from Module 4 of the CSES. Data collection for this module was conducted between 2011 and 2016 in 39 countries. These post-election surveys are nationally representative.

The variables of interest in our analysis are left-right leaning and support for various policy positions. The CSES survey asks respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale of 0 to 10, which aligns with the measure of left-right placement used in our survey. We quantify support for policy positions using CSES survey questions that ask respondents for their desired level of government spending in four policy domains that overlap with our survey: healthcare, defense, police, and welfare. Specifically, the CSES asks respondents whether public expenditure on each of these four domains should be “more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now,” where these responses are ranked on a discrete scale from 1 to 5. We standardize these values within each country to account for broad cross-country differences in desired levels of spending.

We include all observations for which both left-right leaning and at least one of the four policy preferences are non-missing. Dropping the missing observations, our figures draw on 51,535 observations from 37 countries. We partition these into a set of sixteen “Western” countries—the Western European countries, along with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—and a set of twenty-one non-Western countries.

Figure 13 illustrates the correlations between policy views and left-right placement for Western and non-Western countries, respectively. As outlined in Section 2, these figures indicate that the trends we observe for the seven countries in our survey data extend to a broader range of countries: Western countries show a stronger correlation between political leaning and policy positions than do non-Western countries.

In Western countries, the regression coefficients of defense spending on left-right leaning average -0.10 (min: -0.19, max: -0.0039), whereas the average in non-Western countries is -0.033 (min: -0.17, max: 0.035). For police spending, these coefficients are respectively an average of -0.058 (min: -0.12, max: -0.014), and -0.0091 (min: -0.083, max: 0.040). In the domain of health care, the regression coefficients in Western countries average 0.056 (min: -0.028, max: 0.12), whereas the average coefficient in non-Western countries is 0.013 (min: -0.048, max: 0.075). Finally, in the domain of welfare, the regression coefficients average 0.099 (min: -0.0096, max: 0.20), and 0.015 (min: -0.029, max: 0.095), respectively.

On average, in these four domains the coefficients are greater in magnitude in Western countries, with the expected signs. This is consistent with the findings in our survey.




Figure 13: Correlation between self-reported political leaning and policy preferences, as measured by the standardized (within each country) answer to the CSES survey questions about whether government expenditures in a category should go up or down. The left panel includes the Western countries and the right panel non-Western countries. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.

C Additional Details and Analyses for Survey

C.1 Sample Characteristics

This section presents sample characteristics for all seven countries included in our survey. For reasons beyond our control and related to Dynata's reach in data collection, several of our samples are relatively too educated in comparison with a representative sample. This is specifically the case for Australia, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden.

C.1.1 Australia

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	49	47.1	48.6
Female	51	52.9	51.4
Age			
18–29	24	14.5	14.9
30–39	17	19.2	19.2
40–49	17	19.3	19.1
50–59	16	19.4	18.3
60–69	13	14.1	14.6
≥ 70	13	13.5	13.9
Income (annual; AUD)			
Below 20,000	7	5.0	5.1
20,000–34,999	13	12.4	12.8
35,000–49,999	12	12.8	13.0
50,000–64,999	12	12.9	12.8
65,000–79,999	10	10.2	10.5
80,000–99,999	10	11.1	11.1
100,000–124,999	10	11.2	11.0
125,000–149,999	8	10.0	8.9
150,000–199,999	9	8.3	8.6
200,000 or more	8	6.0	6.2
Ancestry			
English	26	11.5	11.8
Australian	25	68.5	67.5

Other	49	20.1	20.7
Education			
No high school	28	7.5	7.7
High school	18	26.4	25.4
Vocational training	29	33.2	34.2
Bachelor's degree or higher	25	33.0	32.6
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	55	53.2	55.0
Not employed full-time	45	46.8	45.0

Note: We were advised by Dynata that it is not common practice to ask respondents in Australia about their race or ethnicity. Accordingly, we found data from the Australian census corresponding to ancestry, which we condensed into “Australian”, “English”, or “Other”. Our final sample characteristics correspond closely to guidance from Dynata that 74% of Australian citizens are Australian-born, which leads us to believe respondents interpreted our ancestry question as eliciting their country of birth or nationality, as is more common practice in Australia.

C.1.2 Brazil

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	48	52.1	50.2
Female	52	47.9	49.8
Age			
18–29	30	36.7	36.9
30–39	22	30.3	28.8
40–49	19	18.6	19.3
50–59	14	11.0	11.4
≥60	15	3.5	3.6
Income (annual; Brazilian reals)			
Below 3,000	5	15.8	16.1
3,000–5,999	12	13.0	13.5
6,000–11,999	22	9.7	10.1
12,000–17,999	17	8.6	8.9
18,000–29,999	20	9.9	10.3
30,000–59,999	16	19.2	20.0
≥60,000	8	23.9	21.1
Ancestry			
White	49	61.3	59.8
Multi-racial	41	27.4	28.5
Other	10	11.3	11.8
Education			
No formal education	45	0.3	0.3
Elementary school	17	3.3	3.5
High school	28	48.1	50.0
Bachelor's degree or higher	10	48.3	46.2
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	41	67.8	66.5
Not employed full-time	59	32.2	33.5

Note: Our samples in Brazil are relatively educated, young, wealthy, and employed. We have reason to believe that some subsamples of the Brazilian population are inaccessible to *Dynata*. For example, the Brazilian census likely includes indigenous populations that likely make up a sizable portion of the “No formal education” bucket.

C.1.3 France

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	48	47.9	47.7
Female	52	52.1	52.3
Age			
18–29	18	12.9	17.4
30–39	16	20.7	18.0
40–49	16	23.0	18.0
50–59	17	23.3	19.6
≥60	33	20.0	27.0
Income (annual, EUR)			
Below 10,000	7	9.3	9.5
10,000–14,999	6	7.5	7.3
15,000–19,999	13	11.0	12.4
20,000–24,999	12	13.5	13.1
25,000–29,999	11	11.1	10.6
30,000–34,999	10	10.9	10.2
35,000–39,999	8	8.1	7.2
40,000–49,999	13	13.1	12.1
50,000–64,999	10	8.7	8.6
65,000 or more	10	6.9	9.0
Ancestry			
French or other European	85	96.8	95.6
Other	15	3.2	4.4
Education			
No high school	22	17.9	21.4
High school	43	30.9	41.5
Some college	14	20.8	14.8
Bachelor's degree or higher	21	30.4	22.3
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	56	65.6	56.5
Not employed full-time	44	34.4	43.5

Note: “High school” corresponded to “Baccalauréat”, “Some college” to “Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+2 max”, and “Bachelor’s degree or higher” to “Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+3 et plus”.

C.1.4 Germany

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	49	51.0	50.3
Female	51	49.0	49.7
Age			
18–29	21	13.5	13.7
30–39	14	19.4	19.7
40–49	19	21.0	21.3
50–59	17	26.0	25.0
60–69	13	16.0	16.2
≥70	17	4.0	4.1
Income (monthly; EUR)			
Below 1,300	19	15.1	15.3
1,300–2,599	33	33.6	34.0
2,600–3,599	19	22.1	22.4
3,600–5,000	15	21.8	20.7
More than 5,000	14	7.5	7.6
Ancestry			
German	79	96.6	96.6
European (not German)	15	2.3	2.3
Other	6	1.1	1.1
Education			
No vocational training	27	5.6	5.7
Vocational training	57	58.3	59.1
University degree	16	36.1	35.2
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	59	64.3	63.8
Not employed full-time	41	35.7	36.2

Note: The option included in the survey equivalent to vocational training was “Lehre oder Berufsausbildung im dualen System”. For “University degree”, the option provided was “Hochschulabschluss”.

C.1.5 South Korea

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	50	49.3	48.3
Female	50	50.7	51.7
Age			
18–29	19	19.6	23.0
30–39	18	30.8	26.2
40–49	20	27.3	24.7
50–59	20	16.3	19.1
60–69	13	5.5	6.4
≥70	10	0.5	0.6
Income (annual; ten-thousand Won)			
Below 200 ten-thousand Won	19	9.7	11.4
200–350 ten-thousand Won	23	27.4	27.7
350–500 ten-thousand Won	21	26.3	23.4
500–750 ten-thousand Won	17	22.0	20.5
More than 750 ten-thousand Won	20	14.5	17.1
Ancestry			
Korean	96	99.8	99.8
Other	4	0.2	0.2
Education			
No high school	13	1.0	1.2
High school	40	26.9	31.6
Some college	13	7.4	8.6
Bachelor's degree or higher	34	64.8	58.7
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	59	85.3	82.7
Not employed full-time	41	14.7	17.3

Note: Our samples in Korea are relatively too educated, too young, and too employed.

C.1.6 Sweden

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	50	58.1	50.3
Female	50	41.9	49.7
Age			
18–29	24	12.5	17.8
30–39	15	10.5	14.8
40–49	15	13.8	16.7
50–59	15	19.2	16.2
60–69	13	20.0	14.8
≥70	18	24.0	19.8
Income (annual; Swedish kronor)			
Below 100,000 kr	14	6.9	9.8
100,000–200,000 kr	13	16.0	13.9
200,000–299,999 kr	18	20.8	18.3
300,000–399,999 kr	25	22.7	25.7
400,000–499,999 kr	16	16.8	16.1
500,000–599,999 kr	7	7.8	7.2
600,000–749,999 kr	4	4.6	4.8
750,000–999,999 kr	2	2.6	2.7
1,000,000 kr or more	1	1.8	1.6
Ancestry			
Swedish	82	92.8	89.7
Other	18	7.3	10.3
Education			
No high school	40	8.1	11.5
High school	22	32.3	31.8
Some college	15	30.1	24.7
Bachelor's degree or higher	23	29.6	32.0
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	67	63.3	66.9
Not employed full-time	33	36.7	33.1

Note: “High school” corresponded to “Gymnasieexamen”, while “Some college” to “Viss universitets-/högskoleutbildning”. The option equivalent to a university degree or higher was “Kandidatexamen.”

C.1.7 United States

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	Representative
Gender			
Male	49	36.4	48.9
Female	51	63.6	51.1
Age			
18–29	21	12.6	19.1
30–39	16	11.3	14.4
40–49	16	14.1	15.2
50–59	17	24.5	19.4
60–69	14	25.8	15.5
≥70	16	11.6	16.5
Income (annual; USD)			
Below 15,000	11	14.3	13.9
15,000–24,999	9	14.3	9.2
25,000–34,999	9	14.7	9.8
35,000–49,999	12	14.6	11.7
50,000–74,999	17	14.8	17.3
75,000–99,999	13	10.4	13.0
100,000–149,999	15	9.9	14.4
150,000–199,999	7	3.9	6.0
200,000 or more	7	3.1	4.7
Ancestry			
White	63	81.9	69.1
African-American	17	8.1	13.6
Hispanic	12	4.7	7.9
Asian	5	3.3	5.9
Other	3	2.0	3.5
Education			
No high school	11	3.9	6.4
High school	29	41.8	30.2
Some college	29	29.7	30.6
Bachelor's degree or higher	31	24.6	32.8
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	67	37.3	63.4
Not employed full-time	33	62.7	36.6

C.2 Screenshots

C.2.1 Universalism tasks

Domestic universalism in altruism.

In each row below, how would you split \$100 between a randomly-selected person who lives in the United States and the individual displayed on the right (who is part of a particular social group)?

The closer you drag the slider to one individual, the more money you allocate to that individual. Please assume all individuals below have the same income, **all live in the United States**, and would not find out that it was you who sent them the money.




Figure 14: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in altruism. Subjects would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all subjects, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in altruism is identical to that of domestic groups.

Foreign universalism in altruism.

How would you split \$100 between a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and a randomly-selected person who lives in the United States?

The closer you drag the slider to one individual, the more money you allocate to that individual. Please assume both individuals below have the same income, and would not find out that it was you who sent them the money.




Figure 15: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation task meant to elicit foreign universalism in altruism. Across subjects, it was randomized whether the domestic social group appeared on the left or on the right. The layout for the task eliciting foreign universalism in *trust* is identical to this layout, with the exception of necessary changes to the instructions and to graphics, as consistent with the layout for trust tasks presented in Figure 16.

Domestic universalism in trust.

In each row below, how would you split 100 “trust points” between a randomly-selected person who lives in the United States, and the individual displayed on the right (who is part of a particular social group)?

The closer you drag the slider to one individual, the more you trust that individual, relative to the other individual. Please assume all of the individuals below live in the United States.




Figure 16: Screenshot of decision screen for tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in trust. Subjects would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all subjects, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in trust is identical to that of domestic groups.

C.2.2 Policy preferences

Desired government spending.

Suppose that you could determine how the United States government spends money on various different categories of the federal budget, such as the military or redistribution.

Specifically, imagine you could decide the **average amount of money that the federal government collects per year from each American to spend on each of the eight categories below**. For the purposes of this question, you should assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category are spent only on this particular category, without any waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the following eight categories of expenditure in the federal budget?

To provide a reference, it is estimated that altogether, all levels of government in the United States spend a combined average amount of \$2,750 per American every year for the purposes of education.

Amount of money (\$) collected on average from each American to spend on category, per year	
Police and law enforcement	\$ <input type="text"/>
Foreign aid	\$ <input type="text"/>
Universal healthcare	\$ <input type="text"/>
Environmental protection	\$ <input type="text"/>
Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage	\$ <input type="text"/>
Military and counterintelligence	\$ <input type="text"/>
Welfare payments	\$ <input type="text"/>
Effective border control	\$ <input type="text"/>

Figure 17: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting subjects' policy preferences through the means of desired per-capita spending on categories of the federal/national government's budget. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized.

Support for Specific Policy Implementations.

You just indicated your preferences over several broad categories of expenditure. We will now ask you to indicate how much money you would like to collect and spend on **specific projects or policy proposals**. After all, even within broad categories such as military or redistribution, **you may like some policies and projects more than others. We are now interested in which specific projects or policies you favor.**

Please consider the policy proposals presented in the table below. Note that the table will expand with additional rows as you fill in your answers and until you see **eight** rows in total. Again assume that all money collected for the purposes of a policy are spent only on implementing that particular policy, without waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the **specific projects or policies** presented?

Policy	Amount of money (\$) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year	Policy	Amount of money (\$) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year
Sensitivity training for the police to ensure justice and equal treatment of all	\$ <input type="text"/>	Increasing the capabilities of the police to prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior	\$ <input type="text"/>

Figure 18: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting subjects' preferences towards particular policy implementations of national government expenditure. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized, and it was randomized whether all more universalist policies appeared on the left or on the right. Additional policies continued to fill the screen as the subject filled in desired spending levels for each category of policies.

Qualitative support for policies.

On a scale from 0 (strongly oppose) to 10 (strongly support), how much do you support government spending in each of the following categories?




Figure 19: Screenshot of questionnaire items capturing support for our eight main categories of national government expenditure on a 0–10 Likert scale. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized. The value selected for each policy would appear visibly on the screen as the subject made decisions.

C.3 Histograms of Composite Universalism




Figure 20: This figure plots a comparative set of distributions of our composite measure of moral universalism. All individual plots are scaled to the same x-axis and y-axis.




Figure 21: Factor loadings of the first principal component, Western countries only. Principal component analysis is performed within each country on support for eight policy domains, as measured by log desired expenditure in each domain. Sign convention: the loading on “Border” is always non-negative, and the other signs are determined accordingly.

C.4 Analysis of Ideological Clusters

This section extends Section 2’s analyses of the correlation structure of policy views to the non-Western countries Brazil and South Korea. As in Section 2, we focus on survey respondents’ self-positioning on a left-right spectrum and their policy preferences in eight domains: universal health care; affirmative action; environmental protection; foreign aid; military; police and law enforcement; and border control. The data collection procedure and the precise way in which we elicited policy views are described in detail in Section 4.

As described in Section 2, we perform a principal component analysis of individuals’ log desired expenditure levels in the eight policy domains within each country; Figures 21 and 22 illustrate the loadings of the first and second principal components, respectively. In the West, the first principal component explains on average 67.8% of the variance in the data (as high as 73.9% of the variance in Germany, and a low of 60.6% of the variance in the United States), while the second principal component an average of an additional 10.9% (as high as 15.1% of the variance in the United States, and a low of 8.6% of the variance in Germany). In Korea and Brazil, these first two principal components respectively explain 76.8% and 6.1% of the variance in the data on average.

Figure 23 visualizes the correlation structure of policy views in all policy domains. As in Section 2, we perform a principal component analysis of individuals’ support for the eight policy domains within each country; this figure illustrates the loadings of the first principal component. The signs of the factor loadings are consistent across the Western countries and correspond as expected to the left-right divide, but they display less




Figure 22: Factor loadings of the second principal component, Western countries only. Principal component analysis is performed within each country on support for eight policy domains, as measured by log desired expenditure in each domain. Sign convention: the loading on “Border” is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.

consistency across the non-Western countries. In non-Western countries, greater support for a single policy domain tends to correspond to greater support for all policy domains, aligning more with “big vs. small government” views than with the typical left-right dichotomy.




Figure 23: Factor loadings of the first principal component of desired expenditure shares, all countries. Sign convention: the loading on “Border” is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.

Figure 25 illustrates these correlations separately for all countries in our sample, with each line corresponding to an OLS fit within a given country. The signs and magnitudes of the correlations observed in non-Western countries tend to diverge from the patterns observed in Western countries, which follow a consistent pattern.




Figure 24: Correlation of principal components with self-reported political leaning, including Korea and Brazil. The big-vs.-small-government component is the first principal component of desired log expenditure levels. The policy component is the first principal component of desired expenditure as a share of overall desired spending.




Figure 25: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

C.5 Relationship between Universalism and Policy Views

C.5.1 Tables

Table 13: Separate countries, summary statistic of policy views

	Dependent variable: Summary statistic of policy views																				
	USA			Australia			Germany			France			Sweden			Korea			Brazil		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)							
Composite universalism	2.45*** (0.16)	1.87*** (0.17)	1.97*** (0.24)	1.60*** (0.25)	1.96*** (0.22)	1.55*** (0.25)	1.68*** (0.22)	1.23*** (0.22)	2.50*** (0.17)	1.69*** (0.16)	0.17 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.27)	0.17 (0.27)	0.078 (0.18)							
Age	-0.0083*** (0.00)	-0.0019 (0.00)	-0.00061 (0.00)	-0.0045*** (0.00)	-0.0015 (0.00)	-0.0015 (0.00)	-0.00063 (0.00)														
Male	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.013 (0.05)	-0.013 (0.05)	-0.051 (0.05)	-0.051 (0.04)	-0.051 (0.04)	-0.051 (0.04)	-0.051 (0.04)	-0.051 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.27*** (0.05)							
Religiosity index	-0.094*** (0.01)	-0.072*** (0.02)	-0.072*** (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.080*** (0.02)	-0.024 (0.02)	-0.024 (0.02)	-0.024 (0.02)	-0.0080 (0.02)	-0.0080 (0.02)						
Wealth index	-0.077*** (0.02)	-0.090*** (0.02)	-0.090*** (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.055*** (0.02)	-0.045*** (0.02)	-0.045*** (0.02)	-0.045*** (0.02)	-0.0090 (0.02)	-0.0090 (0.02)	-0.0090 (0.02)	-0.0090 (0.02)	-0.0090 (0.02)			
Income index	-0.020 (0.02)	0.0017 (0.03)	0.0017 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.046* (0.02)	-0.028 (0.02)	-0.028 (0.02)	-0.028 (0.02)	-0.053* (0.03)	-0.053* (0.03)	-0.053* (0.03)	-0.053* (0.03)	-0.053* (0.03)			
College-educated	0.22*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.0052 (0.05)	0.0052 (0.05)	0.0052 (0.05)	0.0052 (0.05)	0.0052 (0.05)			
Neighborhood size	0.0057 (0.01)	0.018* (0.01)	0.018* (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.0026 (0.01)	-0.0026 (0.01)	-0.0026 (0.01)	-0.0026 (0.01)	-0.012* (0.01)	-0.0017 (0.01)	-0.0017 (0.01)	-0.0017 (0.01)	0.0046 (0.01)	0.0046 (0.01)	0.0046 (0.01)	0.0046 (0.01)	0.0046 (0.01)			
Efficiency vs. equity	0.0038** (0.00)	-0.0012 (0.00)	-0.0012 (0.00)	0.00032 (0.00)	0.00032 (0.00)	-0.00031 (0.00)	-0.00031 (0.00)	-0.00031 (0.00)	-0.00031 (0.00)	0.0039*** (0.00)	0.0039*** (0.00)	0.0039*** (0.00)	0.0039*** (0.00)	-0.0056** (0.00)	-0.0056** (0.00)	-0.0056** (0.00)	-0.0056** (0.00)	-0.0056** (0.00)			
Altruism	0.00042 (0.00)	0.00050 (0.00)	0.00050 (0.00)	0.0015 (0.00)	0.0015 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)	0.00033 (0.00)	0.00033 (0.00)	0.00033 (0.00)	0.00033 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)			
Trust	0.00092 (0.01)	0.0045*** (0.01)	0.0045*** (0.01)	0.0032*** (0.01)	0.0032*** (0.01)	0.0038*** (0.01)	0.0038*** (0.01)	0.0038*** (0.01)	0.0038*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.00097 (0.01)	0.00097 (0.01)	0.00097 (0.01)	0.00097 (0.01)	0.00097 (0.01)			
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	0.033*** (0.01)	-0.0099 (0.01)	-0.0099 (0.01)	0.044*** (0.01)	0.044*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	-0.054*** (0.01)	-0.054*** (0.01)	-0.054*** (0.01)	-0.054*** (0.01)	-0.054*** (0.01)			
Observations	2873	2873	1732	1732	1654	1654	2255	2255	2388	2388	1913	1913	1750	1750							
R ²	0.09	0.16	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.08	0.10	0.25	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.05							

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the summary statistic of policy views, constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: All Western countries pooled, separate policies

	Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																			
	Border control				Military				Police		Foreign aid		Aff. action		Environment		Health care		Welfare	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)				
Composite universalism	-1.71*** (0.09)	-0.94*** (0.09)	-1.13*** (0.09)	-0.61 *** (0.09)	-1.28*** (0.09)	-0.76*** (0.09)	1.53*** (0.08)	0.99*** (0.08)	1.11*** (0.08)	0.80*** (0.09)	0.97*** (0.08)	0.58*** (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.20*** (0.09)	0.78*** (0.08)	0.53*** (0.09)				
Age	0.0012** (0.00)	0.0032*** (0.00)	0.0018*** (0.00)	-0.0039*** (0.00)	0.00042 (0.00)	-0.0018*** (0.00)							0.0012** (0.00)			0.0021*** (0.00)				
Male	-0.0222 (0.02)		0.21 *** (0.02)		-0.035* (0.02)		-0.085*** (0.02)		-0.063*** (0.02)		-0.10*** (0.02)		0.035* (0.02)		0.035* (0.02)	0.077*** (0.02)				
Religiosity index	0.016** (0.01)	0.031*** (0.01)	0.0064 (0.01)	0.0088 (0.01)	0.029*** (0.01)		-0.029*** (0.01)		-0.063*** (0.01)		-0.063*** (0.01)		-0.039*** (0.01)		-0.016** (0.01)					
Wealth index	0.014* (0.01)	0.019** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.019** (0.01)	0.019** (0.01)		-0.047*** (0.01)		-0.047*** (0.01)		-0.00041 (0.01)		0.0058 (0.01)		-0.043*** (0.01)					
Income index	0.016 (0.01)	0.044*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)	0.0053 (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)		0.015 (0.01)		0.0072 (0.01)		0.0072 (0.01)		0.044*** (0.01)		-0.045*** (0.01)					
College-educated	-0.10*** (0.02)	0.0099 (0.02)	-0.092*** (0.02)	0.046** (0.02)	0.068*** (0.02)		0.068*** (0.02)		0.10*** (0.02)		0.063*** (0.02)		0.063*** (0.02)		0.020 (0.02)					
Neighborhood size	0.0012 (0.00)	-0.0032 (0.00)	-0.0020 (0.00)	0.00014 (0.00)	0.00014 (0.00)		-0.0017 (0.00)		-0.0017 (0.00)		-0.0054 (0.00)		-0.0021 (0.00)		0.0012 (0.00)					
Efficiency vs. equity	-0.00072 (0.00)	-0.00063 (0.00)	-0.0016* (0.00)	0.00084 (0.00)	0.00084 (0.00)		-0.0018** (0.00)		-0.0018** (0.00)		0.00035 (0.00)		0.0038*** (0.00)		0.00046 (0.00)					
Altruism	-0.00082** (0.00)	0.000069 (0.00)	-0.0019*** (0.00)	0.0015*** (0.00)	0.00027 (0.00)		0.00027 (0.00)		-0.00034 (0.00)		-0.00034 (0.00)		-0.0020*** (0.00)		-0.000039 (0.00)					
Trust	-0.0025*** (0.00)	-0.0012*** (0.00)	0.0014*** (0.00)	0.0012*** (0.00)	0.00052 (0.00)		0.00052 (0.00)		0.00052 (0.00)		0.00052 (0.00)		0.00030 (0.00)		0.0011** (0.00)					
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.056*** (0.00)	-0.030*** (0.00)	-0.039*** (0.00)	0.036*** (0.00)	0.013*** (0.00)		-0.0100** (0.00)		-0.0100** (0.00)		-0.0100** (0.00)		-0.018*** (0.00)		0.021*** (0.00)					
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0100*** (0.00)	0.0080*** (0.00)	0.0053*** (0.00)	0.0075*** (0.00)	0.0049*** (0.00)		0.0049*** (0.00)		0.0079*** (0.00)		0.0079*** (0.00)		0.0059*** (0.00)		0.0055*** (0.00)					
Country FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No		
Observations	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902	10902		
R ²	0.04	0.17	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.11	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.06		

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are pooled across all five Western countries: the United States, Australia, Germany, France, and Sweden. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: USA, separate policies

Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share												
	Border control			Military			Police			Foreign aid		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Composite universalism	-2.00*** (0.18)	-1.07*** (0.18)	-1.42*** (0.16)	-0.59*** (0.17)	-1.25*** (0.17)	-0.82*** (0.16)	0.73*** (0.17)	1.29*** (0.17)	0.90*** (0.18)	1.12*** (0.16)	0.58*** (0.18)	
Age	0.0030*** (0.00)	0.0061*** (0.00)	0.0061*** (0.00)	0.0022 (0.00)	-0.0071*** (0.00)	-0.0022 (0.00)	-0.0051 (0.00)	-0.00051 (0.00)	-0.0035** (0.00)	0.87*** (0.17)	0.53*** (0.17)	
Male	-0.035 (0.03)	0.27*** (0.04)	-0.058 (0.04)	-0.074** (0.04)	-0.035 (0.04)	-0.035 (0.04)	-0.035 (0.04)	-0.035 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.080** (0.04)	0.0016 (0.00)	
Religiosity index	0.0087 (0.01)	0.060*** (0.01)	0.034** (0.01)	0.029** (0.01)	0.027** (0.01)	0.027** (0.01)	0.027** (0.01)	0.027** (0.01)	-0.083*** (0.01)	-0.056*** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.01)	
Wealth index	0.043*** (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)	-0.065*** (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.038* (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.038* (0.02)	-0.038* (0.02)	0.0097 (0.02)	0.0097 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)	
Income index	0.020 (0.02)	0.071*** (0.02)	-0.017 (0.03)	0.010 (0.02)	0.050*** (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)	0.050*** (0.02)	0.050*** (0.02)	0.0097 (0.02)	0.039* (0.02)	-0.045*** (0.02)	
College-educated	-0.20*** (0.04)	0.030 (0.05)	-0.095** (0.05)	0.12*** (0.04)	-0.0047 (0.04)	-0.0047 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.0041** (0.05)	0.0041** (0.05)	0.034 (0.04)	
Neighborhood size	0.00014 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	0.0051 (0.01)	0.0039 (0.01)	0.0072 (0.01)	0.0072 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0026 (0.01)	-0.0026 (0.01)	0.0045 (0.01)	
Efficiency vs. equity	-0.00052 (0.00)	-0.0012 (0.00)	-0.0041*** (0.00)	-0.00053 (0.00)	-0.0044*** (0.00)	-0.0044*** (0.00)	0.0052** (0.00)	0.0052** (0.00)	0.0041** (0.00)	0.0041** (0.00)	0.00064 (0.00)	
Altruism	-0.00094 (0.00)	-0.00055 (0.00)	-0.00047 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)	-0.00083 (0.00)	-0.00083 (0.00)	-0.00061 (0.00)	-0.00061 (0.00)	-0.0022*** (0.00)	-0.0022*** (0.00)	0.00077 (0.00)	
Trust	-0.00090 (0.00)	0.00079 (0.00)	-0.00067 (0.00)	0.00045 (0.00)	0.00066 (0.00)	0.00066 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	-0.0014 (0.00)	-0.0014 (0.00)	-0.00035 (0.00)	
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.036*** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.01)	0.024*** (0.01)	0.024*** (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.015** (0.01)	-0.015** (0.01)	0.0087 (0.01)	
Belief in short-term benefit	0.011*** (0.00)	0.0079*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0083*** (0.00)	0.0068*** (0.00)	0.0085*** (0.00)	0.0085*** (0.00)	0.0085*** (0.00)	0.0094*** (0.00)	0.0094*** (0.00)	0.0072*** (0.00)	
Observations	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	2873	
R ²	0.06	0.22	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.08	0.11	0.02	0.08	0.13	0.14	

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1.
Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 16: Australia, separate policies

	Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																							
	Border control			Military			Police			Foreign aid			Aff. action			Environment			Health care			Welfare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)								
Composite universalism	-1.53*** (0.26)	-1.09*** (0.28)	-1.37*** (0.24)	-0.98*** (0.23)	-0.80*** (0.28)	-0.41 (0.30)	1.75*** (0.20)	1.12*** (0.19)	1.05*** (0.21)	0.71*** (0.22)	0.92*** (0.21)	0.21 (0.22)	-0.12 (0.23)	0.0047 (0.23)	0.22 (0.21)	0.30 (0.23)								
Age	-0.0016 (0.00)	0.0030* (0.00)	0.0030* (0.05)	0.00081 (0.00)	-0.0043** (0.00)	-0.0016 (0.00)	-0.0016 (0.05)	-0.0016 (0.05)	-0.0016 (0.05)	-0.0030* (0.00)	-0.0030* (0.00)	-0.0030* (0.00)	-0.00066 (0.00)	-0.00066 (0.00)	0.0081*** (0.00)									
Male	-0.018 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	-0.078 (0.05)	-0.078 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.070 (0.05)	-0.070 (0.05)	-0.070 (0.05)	-0.070 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)									
Religiosity index	0.059*** (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	-0.0032 (0.02)	-0.0053 (0.02)	-0.048*** (0.02)	-0.048*** (0.02)	-0.048*** (0.02)	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.014 (0.02)													
Wealth index	0.057*** (0.02)	0.0092 (0.02)	0.0092 (0.02)	-0.044* (0.02)	-0.044* (0.02)	-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.034 (0.02)	-0.034 (0.02)	-0.034 (0.02)	-0.058** (0.02)	-0.058** (0.02)	-0.058** (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)						
Income index	-0.042 (0.03)	0.053** (0.02)	0.011 (0.02)	0.032 (0.03)	0.040* (0.02)	0.040* (0.02)	0.040* (0.02)	0.040* (0.02)	0.040* (0.02)	0.020 (0.02)	0.020 (0.02)	0.020 (0.02)	0.038 (0.03)	0.038 (0.03)	0.038 (0.03)	0.011 (0.03)	0.011 (0.03)	0.011 (0.03)						
College-educated	-0.080 (0.05)	-0.053 (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	0.076* (0.05)	0.122** (0.06)	0.111** (0.05)	0.111** (0.05)	0.111** (0.05)	0.111** (0.05)	0.084* (0.05)	0.084* (0.05)	0.084* (0.05)	0.029 (0.05)	0.029 (0.05)	0.029 (0.05)									
Neighborhood size	-0.0093 (0.01)	-0.023** (0.01)	-0.0059 (0.01)	-0.0096 (0.01)	-0.020** (0.01)	-0.020** (0.01)	-0.020** (0.01)	-0.020** (0.01)	-0.020** (0.01)	0.00660 (0.01)	0.00660 (0.01)	0.00660 (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)	0.017* (0.01)	0.017* (0.01)	0.017* (0.01)						
Efficiency vs. equity	0.0023 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.00032 (0.00)	0.0012 (0.00)	0.00029 (0.00)	0.00020 (0.00)	-0.00017 (0.00)	-0.00017 (0.00)	-0.00017 (0.00)	0.0026 (0.00)	0.0026 (0.00)	0.0026 (0.00)												
Altruism	-0.000657 (0.00)	0.00020 (0.00)	-0.0013 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	-0.000118 (0.00)	-0.000118 (0.00)	-0.000118 (0.00)	-0.000118 (0.00)	-0.000118 (0.00)	0.00093 (0.00)	0.00093 (0.00)	0.00093 (0.00)	-0.0021** (0.00)	-0.0021** (0.00)	-0.0021** (0.00)	-0.000077 (0.00)	-0.000077 (0.00)	-0.000077 (0.00)						
Trust	-0.0027** (0.00)	-0.0010 (0.00)	-0.0043*** (0.00)	0.0021** (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0021** (0.00)	0.0021** (0.00)	0.0021** (0.00)	0.0021** (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)						
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.015 (0.01)	-0.0030 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	-0.0025 (0.01)	-0.041*** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.01)	-0.0067 (0.01)	-0.0067 (0.01)	-0.0067 (0.01)												
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0085*** (0.00)	0.0074*** (0.00)	0.0038*** (0.00)	0.0089*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0063*** (0.00)	0.0063*** (0.00)	0.0063*** (0.00)	0.0066*** (0.00)	0.0066*** (0.00)	0.0066*** (0.00)									
Observations	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732		
R ²	0.03	0.12	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.12	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.13	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.08								

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 17: Germany, separate policies

Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																				
	Border control			Military			Police			Foreign aid			Aff. action		Environment		Health care		Welfare	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)				
Composite universalism	-1.59*** (0.28)	-0.83*** (0.28)	-0.71*** (0.22)	-0.62** (0.25)	-1.28*** (0.23)	-0.62*** (0.24)	2.17*** (0.19)	1.56*** (0.20)	0.77*** (0.22)	0.55** (0.23)	1.18*** (0.21)	1.06*** (0.23)	-0.86*** (0.23)	-0.72*** (0.23)	0.31 (0.21)	-0.020 (0.23)				
Age	0.00085 (0.00)	0.00075 (0.00)	0.00075 (0.00)	0.0034** (0.00)	0.0034** (0.00)	0.0034** (0.00)	-0.0033* (0.00)	0.00017 (0.00)	0.00017 (0.00)	0.0049*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.037 (0.05)	-0.037 (0.05)	0.036 (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)					
Male	-0.000076 (0.05)	0.082 (0.05)	-0.021 (0.05)	-0.090* (0.05)	-0.090* (0.05)	-0.090* (0.05)	-0.037 (0.05)	-0.037 (0.05)	-0.037 (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.036 (0.05)	-0.036 (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	0.0029* (0.05)					
Religiosity index	0.017 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)	-0.050*** (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.0021 (0.02)	0.0021 (0.02)	-0.040** (0.02)	-0.040** (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.02)					
Wealth index	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.03)	0.034 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.016 (0.03)	-0.016 (0.03)	0.0073 (0.03)	0.0073 (0.03)	0.042 (0.03)	-0.055** (0.02)					
Income index	0.073*** (0.02)	0.045* (0.03)	0.070*** (0.03)	0.070*** (0.03)	0.046 (0.03)	0.046 (0.03)	-0.046 (0.03)	-0.046 (0.03)	-0.046 (0.03)	0.0096 (0.03)	0.0096 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)	-0.056** (0.03)	-0.056** (0.03)					
College-educated	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.083* (0.05)	-0.064 (0.05)	-0.064 (0.05)	-0.0035 (0.05)	-0.0035 (0.05)	-0.0035 (0.05)	0.087 (0.05)	0.087 (0.05)	0.031 (0.05)	0.031 (0.05)	-0.016 (0.05)	-0.016 (0.05)	0.066 (0.05)	0.066 (0.05)					
Neighborhood size	0.019** (0.01)	0.0034 (0.01)	-0.0021 (0.01)	-0.00031 (0.01)	-0.00031 (0.01)	-0.00031 (0.01)	0.0052 (0.01)	0.0052 (0.01)	0.0052 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)	0.0062 (0.01)	0.0062 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)					
Efficiency vs. equity	-0.00081 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	-0.00076 (0.00)	0.00023 (0.00)	0.00023 (0.00)	0.00023 (0.00)	-0.0027 (0.00)	-0.0027 (0.00)	-0.0027 (0.00)	-0.00021 (0.00)	-0.00021 (0.00)	0.0027 (0.00)	0.0027 (0.00)	-0.000070 (0.00)	-0.000070 (0.00)					
Altruism	0.000031 (0.00)	-0.00039 (0.00)	-0.0034*** (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.0020* (0.00)	0.00088 (0.00)	0.00088 (0.00)	0.00088 (0.00)	0.000015 (0.00)	0.000015 (0.00)	-0.0028** (0.00)	-0.0028** (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)					
Trust	-0.0034*** (0.00)	0.00013 (0.00)	-0.0024** (0.00)	0.0015 (0.00)	0.0015 (0.00)	0.0015 (0.00)	-0.00100 (0.00)	-0.00100 (0.00)	-0.00100 (0.00)	-0.00068 (0.00)	-0.00068 (0.00)	0.0020 (0.00)	0.0020 (0.00)	0.0023* (0.00)	0.0023* (0.00)					
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.071*** (0.01)	-0.0093 (0.01)	-0.028*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)	-0.028*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)	-0.0023 (0.01)	-0.0023 (0.01)	-0.0023 (0.01)	-0.021** (0.01)	-0.021** (0.01)	-0.0060 (0.01)	-0.0060 (0.01)	0.019* (0.01)	0.019* (0.01)					
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0111** (0.00)	0.0094*** (0.00)	0.0077*** (0.00)	0.0059*** (0.00)	0.0059*** (0.00)	0.0059*** (0.00)	0.0050*** (0.00)	0.0050*** (0.00)	0.0050*** (0.00)	0.0064*** (0.00)	0.0064*** (0.00)	0.0018** (0.00)	0.0018** (0.00)	0.0039*** (0.00)	0.0039*** (0.00)					
Observations	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654	1654					
R ²	0.03	0.20	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.14	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.04					

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 18: France, separate policies

Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Border control																	
Composite universalism	-1.08*** (0.21)	-0.47** (0.21)	-0.80*** (0.21)	-0.38* (0.21)	-1.45*** (0.20)	-0.92*** (0.20)	1.42*** (0.17)	0.95*** (0.17)	0.64*** (0.19)	0.40** (0.19)	0.32 (0.21)	0.27 (0.22)	0.013 (0.24)	0.19 (0.25)	0.74*** (0.16)	0.57*** (0.17)	
Age	-0.00076 (0.00)	0.0036** (0.04)	0.0036** (0.04)	0.0036** (0.04)	0.0033** (0.00)	-0.0051*** (0.00)	0.0021 (0.00)	-0.0040** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.00080 (0.00)	0.00080 (0.00)	0.00080 (0.00)		
Male	-0.042 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	-0.057 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.046 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.064 (0.04)	0.064 (0.04)	0.064 (0.04)		
Religiosity index	0.036** (0.02)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)	-0.0093 (0.02)	-0.052*** (0.02)	-0.052*** (0.02)	-0.071*** (0.02)	-0.071*** (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)		
Wealth index	0.025 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.021 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	0.0083 (0.02)	0.0083 (0.02)	0.0083 (0.02)	0.0083 (0.02)	0.0083 (0.02)		
Income index	0.045** (0.02)	0.0079 (0.02)	0.081*** (0.02)	0.081*** (0.02)	-0.044* (0.03)	-0.044* (0.03)	-0.0040 (0.03)	-0.0040 (0.03)	-0.0015 (0.03)	-0.0015 (0.03)	0.084*** (0.03)	0.084*** (0.03)	0.084*** (0.03)	0.084*** (0.03)	0.084*** (0.03)		
College-educated	-0.12*** (0.04)	0.0065 (0.05)	-0.039 (0.05)	-0.039 (0.05)	-0.00012 (0.05)	0.0093* (0.05)	0.015*** (0.05)	0.015*** (0.05)	0.015*** (0.05)	0.015*** (0.05)	0.064 (0.05)	0.064 (0.05)	0.064 (0.05)	0.064 (0.05)	0.064 (0.05)		
Neighborhood size	-0.000023 (0.01)	0.0051 (0.01)	-0.013* (0.01)	-0.013* (0.01)	0.0047 (0.01)	0.0034 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)		
Efficiency vs. equity	0.00012 (0.00)	-0.00099 (0.00)	-0.00099 (0.00)	-0.00099 (0.00)	-0.000078 (0.00)	0.00056 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	0.00018 (0.00)	0.00018 (0.00)	0.00018 (0.00)	0.00018 (0.00)	0.00018 (0.00)		
Altruism	-0.0024*** (0.00)	0.00013 (0.00)	-0.0025*** (0.00)	-0.0025*** (0.00)	-0.0025*** (0.00)	0.0022*** (0.00)	0.00049 (0.00)	-0.00020*** (0.00)	-0.00020*** (0.00)	-0.00020*** (0.00)	0.00072 (0.00)	0.00072 (0.00)	0.00072 (0.00)	0.00072 (0.00)	0.00072 (0.00)		
Trust	-0.0025*** (0.00)	-0.0029*** (0.01)	-0.0029*** (0.01)	-0.0029*** (0.01)	-0.0025*** (0.00)	0.0022*** (0.00)	0.0017* (0.00)	0.0017* (0.00)	0.0017* (0.00)	0.0017* (0.00)	-0.0011 (0.00)	-0.0011 (0.00)	-0.0011 (0.00)	-0.0011 (0.00)	-0.0011 (0.00)		
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.069*** (0.01)	-0.018* (0.01)	-0.023** (0.01)	-0.023** (0.01)	0.017* (0.01)	0.0080 (0.01)	-0.026*** (0.01)	-0.026*** (0.01)	-0.026*** (0.01)	-0.026*** (0.01)	0.0094 (0.01)	0.0094 (0.01)	0.0094 (0.01)	0.0094 (0.01)	0.0094 (0.01)		
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0083*** (0.00)	0.0075*** (0.00)	0.0075*** (0.00)	0.0057*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0030*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0055*** (0.00)	0.0051*** (0.00)	0.0051*** (0.00)	0.0051*** (0.00)	0.0051*** (0.00)	0.0051*** (0.00)		
Observations	2255 0.02	2255 0.12	2255 0.01	2255 0.08	2255 0.03	2255 0.08	2255 0.03	2255 0.09	2255 0.01	2255 0.03	2255 0.05	2255 0.05	2255 0.05	2255 0.05	2255 0.05		
R ²																	

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1.
Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 19: Sweden, separate policies

	Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																	
	Border control			Military			Police			Foreign aid			Aff. action		Environment		Health care	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)		
Composite universalism	-2.07*** (0.17)	-1.08*** (0.17)	-1.20*** (0.16)	-0.48*** (0.16)	-1.47*** (0.18)	-0.75*** (0.19)	1.45*** (0.16)	0.78*** (0.15)	1.50*** (0.16)	0.97*** (0.17)	1.23*** (0.15)	0.63*** (0.14)	0.0042 (0.17)	0.23 (0.18)	0.98*** (0.17)	0.61*** (0.18)		
Age	0.0030*** (0.00)	0.0030*** (0.00)	0.0030** (0.00)	0.0022* (0.00)	-0.0023* (0.00)	-0.0014 (0.00)	0.0014 (0.00)	-0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0014 (0.00)	-0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0019 (0.00)	0.0019 (0.00)	0.0019 (0.00)	0.0019 (0.00)	0.0019 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)		
Male	-0.052 (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	-0.053 (0.04)	-0.0091 (0.04)	-0.053 (0.04)	-0.053 (0.04)	-0.087** (0.04)	-0.087** (0.04)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.045 (0.04)	-0.045 (0.04)	-0.045 (0.04)	-0.045 (0.04)		
Religiosity index	-0.0091 (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	-0.045*** (0.02)	-0.045*** (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	0.026 (0.02)		
Wealth index	-0.015 (0.02)	0.050*** (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.052*** (0.02)	-0.052*** (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	0.0038 (0.02)	-0.038** (0.02)		
Income index	0.0052 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	0.043** (0.02)	-0.010 (0.02)	-0.010 (0.02)	-0.010 (0.02)	-0.026 (0.02)	-0.026 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.040** (0.02)		
College-educated	-0.091** (0.04)	0.036 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.062 (0.04)	-0.062 (0.04)	-0.062 (0.04)	0.064 (0.05)	0.064 (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.086* (0.05)	0.091** (0.05)		
Neighborhood size	0.00091 (0.01)	0.0065 (0.01)	0.0071 (0.01)	-0.0034 (0.01)	-0.0034 (0.01)	-0.0034 (0.01)	-0.0061 (0.01)	-0.0061 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.0044 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)		
Efficiency vs. equity	-0.0026** (0.00)	-0.0019 (0.00)	-0.0024* (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.0010 (0.00)	0.00043 (0.00)	0.00043 (0.00)	0.00046 (0.00)	0.00046 (0.00)	0.00046 (0.00)	0.00046 (0.00)	0.00046 (0.00)	0.00046 (0.00)	0.0084*** (0.00)	-0.0012 (0.00)		
Altruism	0.00078 (0.00)	0.0015* (0.00)	-0.0034*** (0.00)	0.0019* (0.00)	0.0019* (0.00)	0.0019* (0.00)	0.0014 (0.00)	0.0014 (0.00)	0.00053 (0.00)	0.00053 (0.00)	0.00053 (0.00)	0.00053 (0.00)	0.00053 (0.00)	0.00053 (0.00)	-0.0038*** (0.00)	-0.00066 (0.00)		
Trust	-0.0022** (0.00)	-0.0017** (0.00)	-0.0014* (0.00)	0.00079 (0.00)	0.00079 (0.00)	0.00079 (0.00)	0.0022** (0.00)	0.0022** (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	-0.00038 (0.00)	0.0015* (0.00)	0.0017** (0.00)		
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.089*** (0.01)	-0.058*** (0.01)	-0.077*** (0.01)	0.063*** (0.01)	0.063*** (0.01)	0.063*** (0.01)	0.057*** (0.01)	0.057*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)	0.040*** (0.01)	0.040*** (0.01)		
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0091*** (0.00)	0.0096*** (0.00)	0.0038*** (0.00)	0.0098*** (0.00)	0.0098*** (0.00)	0.0043*** (0.00)	0.0043*** (0.00)	0.0093*** (0.00)	0.0093*** (0.00)	0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0040*** (0.00)	0.0056*** (0.00)	0.0056*** (0.00)		
Observations	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388	2388		
R ²	0.07	0.25	0.02	0.18	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.14	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.16	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.07		

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 20: Korea, separate policies

Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																				
	Border control				Military				Police				Foreign aid		Aff. action		Environment		Health care	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)				
Composite universalism	0.60*** (0.22)	0.48** (0.24)	-0.48* (0.26)	-0.0078 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.22)	0.12 (0.24)	0.99*** (0.20)	0.41** (0.21)	0.13 (0.29)	0.14 (0.32)	0.28 (0.20)	0.29 (0.25)	-0.34* (0.20)	-0.29 (0.22)	-0.42* (0.22)	-0.43* (0.23)				
Age	-0.0013 (0.00)	0.0082*** (0.00)			-0.0025 (0.00)		-0.0027 (0.00)		-0.0046* (0.00)		0.0026 (0.00)		-0.0045** (0.00)		0.0092** (0.00)					
Male	-0.040 (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)		0.071 (0.05)		-0.098** (0.05)		0.027 (0.05)		-0.17*** (0.05)		-0.077 (0.05)		-0.14*** (0.05)						
Religiosity index	0.011 (0.02)	0.024* (0.01)		-0.0048 (0.01)		0.017 (0.01)		-0.018 (0.01)		-0.0025 (0.01)		-0.0025 (0.01)		-0.014 (0.02)		-0.024* (0.01)				
Wealth index	-0.060* (0.03)	0.016 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.024 (0.03)	-0.040 (0.03)	-0.040 (0.03)	-0.040 (0.03)	-0.040 (0.03)	-0.040 (0.03)	-0.040 (0.03)	-0.012 (0.02)				
Income index	0.014 (0.03)	0.017 (0.03)	0.059** (0.03)	0.045 (0.03)	-0.045 (0.03)	-0.045 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.03)	-0.0030 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.017 (0.03)				
College-educated	-0.066 (0.05)	-0.011 (0.05)	0.029 (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.019 (0.05)	0.019 (0.05)	-0.020 (0.05)	-0.020 (0.05)	-0.0021 (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)						-0.0021 (0.05)				
Neighborhood size	0.013 (0.01)	-0.00092 (0.01)	-0.0070 (0.01)	0.0065 (0.02)	0.000044 (0.02)	0.00072 (0.02)	0.00072 (0.02)	0.00072 (0.02)	0.000093 (0.02)	0.017 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	-0.023 (0.02)				
Efficiency vs. equity	0.0030 (0.00)	0.0020 (0.00)	0.0040* (0.00)	-0.0016 (0.00)	-0.0014 (0.00)	-0.0050*** (0.00)										-0.0015 (0.00)				
Altruism	0.0014 (0.00)	-0.0012 (0.00)	-0.0019 (0.00)	0.0037*** (0.00)	-0.0021 (0.00)	0.00023 (0.00)	-0.00023 (0.00)	-0.00023 (0.00)	-0.000093 (0.00)							-0.00040 (0.00)				
Trust	-0.000011 (0.00)	-0.0023** (0.00)	-0.0013 (0.00)	0.0026* (0.00)	0.00100 (0.00)	-0.00027 (0.00)	-0.00027 (0.00)	-0.00027 (0.00)	-0.00018 (0.00)	-0.00018 (0.00)	-0.00018 (0.00)	-0.00018 (0.00)	-0.00018 (0.00)	-0.00018 (0.00)	-0.00087 (0.00)					
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	-0.035*** (0.01)	-0.068*** (0.01)	-0.035*** (0.01)	-0.0034 (0.01)	0.0015 (0.01)	-0.026* (0.01)	0.0015 (0.01)	0.0015 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)					
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0082*** (0.00)	0.0077*** (0.00)	0.0062*** (0.00)	0.0046*** (0.00)	0.0056*** (0.00)	0.0065*** (0.00)	0.0065*** (0.00)	0.0065*** (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0064 (0.00)	0.0030*** (0.00)				
Observations	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913				
R ²	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03				

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy,” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1.

Table 21: Brazil, separate policies

Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share																
	Border control		Military		Police		Foreign aid		Aff. action		Environment		Health care		Welfare	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Composite universalism	0.13 (0.17)	0.13 (0.17)	-0.0094 (0.16)	0.084 (0.20)	-0.32 (0.21)	-0.17 (0.15)	0.63*** (0.15)	0.40*** (0.15)	0.12 (0.20)	0.17 (0.17)	0.25 (0.18)	0.12 (0.19)	-0.45** (0.19)	-0.34* (0.19)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.022 (0.16)
Age	-0.000099 (0.00)		-0.0019 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)		-0.0019 (0.00)		-0.0019 (0.00)	-0.0027 (0.00)		-0.0065*** (0.00)		0.00061 (0.00)	0.011*** (0.00)		
Male	0.070 (0.05)		0.12** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)		0.20*** (0.05)		-0.073 (0.05)	-0.058 (0.05)		-0.19*** (0.05)		-0.089* (0.05)	-0.0077 (0.05)		
Religiosity index	0.00014 (0.02)		0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)		0.017 (0.02)		0.041*** (0.02)	-0.042** (0.02)		-0.038** (0.02)		-0.0074 (0.02)	0.021 (0.02)		
Wealth index	-0.019 (0.02)		-0.0084 (0.02)	0.018 (0.03)		-0.054* (0.03)		0.015 (0.03)	0.015 (0.03)		0.021 (0.03)		-0.018 (0.02)	0.0074 (0.02)		
Income index	-0.022 (0.02)		-0.036* (0.02)	0.011 (0.02)		-0.054* (0.02)		0.0076 (0.02)	0.0076 (0.02)		-0.00075 (0.02)		0.082*** (0.02)	0.0075 (0.02)		
College-educated	-0.097* (0.05)		-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.023 (0.05)		-0.023 (0.05)		-0.015 (0.05)	-0.0052 (0.05)		-0.067 (0.05)		0.11** (0.05)	0.092* (0.05)		
Neighborhood size	0.015 (0.01)		-0.023* (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)		-0.011 (0.01)		-0.029* (0.02)	0.0074 (0.02)		0.024* (0.01)		-0.0067 (0.01)	0.0047 (0.02)		
Efficiency vs. equity	0.0013 (0.00)		0.0040** (0.00)	0.0038** (0.00)		0.0038** (0.00)		0.0062*** (0.00)	-0.0020 (0.00)		0.0025 (0.00)		-0.0026 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)		
Altruism	0.0027** (0.00)		-0.00091 (0.00)	-0.00068 (0.00)		0.00068 (0.00)		0.0035*** (0.00)	-0.0021* (0.00)		0.0022** (0.00)		-0.0031*** (0.00)	-0.0013 (0.00)		
Trust	-0.0023** (0.00)		0.00042 (0.00)	-0.0013 (0.00)		-0.0013 (0.00)		-0.0018 (0.00)	0.00083 (0.00)		0.00083 (0.00)		-0.00088 (0.00)	0.00054 (0.00)		
Gov't efficient vs. wasteful	0.020* (0.01)		0.026*** (0.01)	-0.00073 (0.01)		0.00073 (0.01)		0.0083 (0.01)	-0.042*** (0.01)		-0.042*** (0.01)		-0.046*** (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)		
Belief in short-term benefit	0.0061** (0.00)		0.0050*** (0.00)	0.0046*** (0.00)		0.0046*** (0.00)		0.0059*** (0.00)	0.0042*** (0.00)		0.0046*** (0.00)		0.0011 (0.00)	0.0015* (0.00)		
Observations	1750 0.00	1749 0.06	1750 0.00	1749 0.07	1750 0.00	1749 0.04	1750 0.01	1749 0.10	1750 0.00	1749 0.04	1750 0.00	1749 0.05	1750 0.05	1749 0.00	1750 0.03	
R ²																

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the “composite measure of support for a policy” constructed as described in Section 4.3.1.
Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5.2 Including Controls




Figure 26: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of desired expenditure shares on composite universalism, with controls. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain. Tables 14–21 report the full results of the regression. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.




Figure 27: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of log desired expenditure levels on composite universalism, with controls. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.

C.5.3 Separate Allocation Decisions and Universalism Measures




Figure 28: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on all separate allocation decisions. A positive regression coefficient indicates that a higher allocation to the more distant individual (i.e. a more “universalist” allocation) is positively correlated with “left-leaning” policy preferences. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors.




Figure 29: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust), without and with controls. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.




Figure 30: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0, 1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.




Figure 31: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.

C.5.4 Benchmarking exercises




Figure 32: This figure presents the R^2 for individual regressions of our summary statistic of policy views on each alternative predictor, and country fixed effects. As such, the figure displays that universalism dominates all other alternative predictors in explanatory power of a subject's ideology in our selection of Western countries.





Figure 33: Replication of Figure 8, where we plot relationships between policy views and respondents' preferences and beliefs. Coefficients and confidence intervals are from a *multivariate* regression of individual-level log desired expenditure levels (in z-scores) that includes all of the standardized beliefs and all of the standardized sociodemographic predictors at once, with country fixed effects.




Figure 34: Replication of the top panel of Figure 8, where we plot relationships between policy views and respondents' preferences and beliefs. With the exception of universalism, coefficients and confidence intervals are from regressions of individual-level log desired expenditure levels (in z-scores) on standardized characteristics with country fixed effects. To obtain residual altruism and trust, we respectively regressed dictator game allocations and generalized trust on the summary statistic of universalism in the corresponding choice domain, and took the residuals as the portion of revealed altruism and generalized trust that cannot be explained by universalism. Because most of the alternative characteristics rely on a smaller number of questionnaire items or elicitations than our main universalism measure, here we use a bootstrapped version of the coefficients for universalism, where we randomly select one of every subject's 32 universalism decisions. We use only the set of those randomly-selected, individual decisions as the vector of measurements of universalism, and regress policy views on that vector. We iterate this process 2,000 times, generating the coefficients and confidence intervals for universalism presented above.

C.5.5 Measurement Error and ORIV Analyses

Measurement error is ubiquitous in lab and survey settings. To ensure that the estimates presented in this paper are neither artefacts of nor attenuated by the presence of measurement error in our elicitations of outcome and explanatory variables, we make use of the instrumentation strategies laid out in [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#).

That is, we employ the obviously-related instrumental variables (ORIV) technique by eliciting quasi-duplicate measurements of: (i) the set of specific policy views, (ii) the corresponding summary statistic, and (iii) our measures of universalism. This analysis was pre-registered and detailed the formulation of instruments for our variables of interest as follows.

Choice of instruments. In Section 4.3, we document how we elicited support for our eight broad policy categories (affirmative action, border control, environment, foreign aid, health, military, police, and welfare) with two complementary strategies. The first elicited respondents' desired, per capita annual spending by their national government on each of these categories. The second strategy elicited respondents' support for government spending in each of these categories on an 11-point Likert scale. These two elicitations were separated by a series of tasks, including elicitations of support for specific, framed policies, and a sociodemographic questionnaire. From these two proxies for each one of the respondents' policy views on the eight broad categories, we also constructed a summary statistic as described in Section 4.3.1. This leaves us with duplicate measurements (in the notation of [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#), Y^a and Y^b) of both support for the eight individual policies and of a summary statistic for respondents' ideology.

For the set of predictors (our measures of universalism), we leverage the fact that the order of social groups presented in our survey is randomized within the domestic and global categories. As such, the first measure of universalism (in the notation of [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#), X^a) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear first and the three global groups that (randomly) appear first in the survey for each subject. We do not include the foreign decision as there was only *one* of these elicitations, and thus including this decision in both X^a and X^b would likely contribute to violating the assumption of independence between the errors $\nu_X^a = X^a - X^*$ and $\nu_X^b = X^b - X^*$ in both elicitations.

Analogously, the second measure of universalism (X^b) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear last and the two global groups that (randomly) appear last in the survey. We construct these two proxies for both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust separately, and for the composite measure of universalism that

averages the two.

Results. With this set of instruments in hand, we replicated our analysis of the relationships between universalism and the structure of ideology with the stacked ORIV regressions described in [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#). We were interested in ensuring that measurement error neither attenuates nor artificially produces the relationship between views regarding each of our eight individual policies and universalism, and between the summary statistic of these policy views and universalism. We thus examine nine different outcome variables. Moreover, in the notation of [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#), we examine the relationship between these nine Y^* 's and our three X^* 's individually, i.e. the measures of universalism in the choice domains of altruism and trust, and the corresponding composite measure.

We follow the recommendations in [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#) and use standardized versions of both our universalism measures and policy views. Moreover, since each subject appears twice when implementing ORIV, standard errors are clustered at the subject level.

We plot the ORIV coefficients and standard errors by individual country for each of our relationships of interest in Figures 35 – 38. In all cases the results with the ORIV estimator are very similar to those presented in the main text with OLS. Specifically, with the exception of healthcare (the specific case of which was also covered in Section 5.2), universalism predicts greater support for the canonical left-wing domains, and less support for the canonical right-wing domains of political ideology. Moreover, it does so *only* in our set of Western countries.

With this analysis we conclude that measurement error does not artificially lead us to identify a relationship between moral universalism and the structure of Western political ideology.




Figure 35: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of the summary statistic of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our measures of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.




Figure 36: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our summary measure of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.




Figure 37: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our measure of moral universalism in altruism. As recommended by [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.




Figure 38: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our measure of moral universalism in trust. As recommended by [Gillen et al. \(2019\)](#), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

C.6 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals

C.6.1 Tables

Table 22: All western countries, specific policy questions

	Dependent variable: Difference in desired log expenditure levels More - Less Universalist Policy Proposal							
	Border control	Military	Police	Foreign aid	Aff. action	Environment	Health care	Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Composite universalism	1.87*** (0.09)	1.87*** (0.10)	1.92*** (0.09)	1.29*** (0.09)	0.79*** (0.08)	1.37*** (0.09)	0.94*** (0.10)	1.02*** (0.08)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11086	11086	11086	11086	11086	11086	11086	11086
R ²	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Prior to taking the difference and log, desired spending on each policy proposal is winsorized at 3 standard deviations and standardized within-country. The framed policy proposals are detailed in Section 4.3.2. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.6.2 All Countries




Figure 39: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two specific policy proposals is estimated by universalism. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 40: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0, 1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 41: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10), separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

C.6.3 Separate Measures of Universalism




Figure 42: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two framed policy proposals is estimated by the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 43: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on self-positioning on universalism in altruism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 44: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism in trust, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

C.7 Representative Sample




Figure 45: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on composite universalism, without and with controls, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 46: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 47: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

C.7.1 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals




Figure 48: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two framed policy proposals is estimated by universalism, using only the representative subsample described in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.




Figure 49: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of support for specific policy proposals on universalism, using only the representative subsample described in Section 4.1. The left panel shows the results for the universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

C.8 Definition of Main Survey Variables

Left vs. right. Respondent's self-positioning on the left-right political spectrum in response to the following prompt: "Oftentimes, people speak of relatively left-wing and relatively right-wing political views. On a scale from 0 (very left-wing) to 10 (very right-wing), where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Summary statistic of policy views. Summary statistic of policy views, given by

$$\text{Left vs. right summary statistic} = \frac{\text{Foreign aid} + \text{Environment} + \text{Aff. action} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health care}}{\frac{5}{\text{Military} + \text{Police} + \text{Border control}}} - \frac{3}{3} \quad (33)$$

Each policy denotes the composite measure of support for the given policy, defined also in this section. The summary statistic generally increases with attitudes towards left-wing views, and correlates with self-positioning on a 0 to 10 scale.

Domestic universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical \$100, between a domestic member of one's in-groups relative to a domestic stranger. The measure averages the ten corresponding money allocation decisions.

Foreign universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through a bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical \$100 between a domestic stranger and a global stranger.

Global universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical \$100, between a global member of one's in-groups relative to a global stranger. The measure averages the five corresponding money allocation decisions.

Summary measure of universalism in altruism. Unweighted average of domestic universalism in altruism, foreign universalism in altruism, and global universalism in altruism. Because these three individual components correlate highly with each other, the summary measure reduces the dimensionality of the data and describes a respondent's broad universalism in altruism as a general type.

Domestic universalism in trust. Trust analogue of domestic universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Foreign universalism in trust. Trust analogue of foreign universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Global universalism in trust. Trust analogue of global universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Summary measure of universalism in trust. Trust analogue of the summary measure of universalism in altruism. That is, unweighted average of domestic universalism in trust, foreign universalism in trust, and global universalism in trust.

Composite measure of universalism. Unweighted average of (i) summary measure of universalism in altruism and (ii) summary measure of universalism in trust. Reduces the dimensionality of the data.

Revealed altruism. Altruism as elicited through a standard dictator game over \$100 between the self and a domestic stranger.

Residual altruism. Residuals from a regression of dictator game behavior (revealed altruism) on the summary statistic of universalism in altruism. Because the dictator game is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of altruism partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of revealed altruism that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

Revealed generalized trust. Generalized trust in others as elicited through an allocation of trust points on a scale from 0 to 100. Respondents were prompted to consider their trust in a domestic stranger, where 0 meant that they believe they “cannot trust a randomly-selected person very much”, and 100 meant they believe “a randomly-selected person can in general be trusted a great deal.”

Residual trust. Residuals from a regression of revealed generalized trust on the summary statistic of universalism in trust. Because generalized trust is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of trust partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of generalized trust that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

Equity-efficiency preferences. Elicitation of preferences for efficiency over equity, as given by a bystander dictator game between two “randomly-selected people” who live in the subject’s country, in which the most unequal split of money maximizes total payoffs. The measure captures how much a subject deviates from an equal, 50:50 split of the money.

Desired government spending on policy categories. Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Subjects were prompted to respond in free-form text entry with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of the eight domains. They were provided a reference value of the annual per capita spending amount on education by their national level of government.

These dollar amounts were then translated into desired shares, out of a total amount of per capita spending by the national government.

Support for policy categories. Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Subjects were prompted to respond on a 0 (strongly oppose) to 10 (strongly support) Likert scale with their level of support for national government spending on each of the eight domains.

Desired government spending on individual policies. Measure of support for sixteen distinct policies, two per each of the eight broad policy domains. Per each of these policy domains, one specific policy had a less universalist implementation, while the other a more universalist one. See Table 3.

Subjects were prompted to respond with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of these sixteen policies.

Religiosity. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) self-described religiosity on a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious); (ii) church attendance on a scale from 0 to 5; and an indicator for atheism, agnosticism, or no religion.

Income. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) log income (from free-form text entry), and (ii) income on a scale from 0 to 4 (roughly corresponding to income quintiles in each country).

Wealth. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) an indicator for stock ownership, (ii) an indicator for home ownership, and (iii) log net worth (from free-form text entry).

Urbanicity. Respondent's neighborhood size on a 10-step variable: > 1 million, 200k-1m, 50k-200k, 20k-50k and close to metro, 20k-50k and not close to metro, 3k-20k and close to metro, 3k-20k and not close to metro, 500-300k and close to metro, 500-3k and not close to metro, <500.

Educational attainment. Respondent's educational attainment. Across all countries but Brazil and Germany, the four educational categories were the local equivalents of: (i) no high school, (ii) high school, (iii) some college or vocational training, (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Brazil, the four educational categories were: (i) no formal education, (ii) elementary school, (iii) high school, and (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Germany, the three educational categories were: (i) no vocational training, (ii) vocational training, and (iii) university degree.

Migration background. Indicators for whether respondent is a first-generation or second-generation migrant in their country, given by questions eliciting: (i) their country of birth, (ii) their mother's country of birth, and (iii) their father's country of birth. A respondent was classified as a first-generation migrant if their country of birth was different from the local country the survey was being conducted in (where in order to complete the survey, all respondents needed to be citizens of the local country). Meanwhile, a respondent was classified as a second-generation migrant if either one of their parents was born in a country different from the local country the survey was being conducted in (and of the respondent's citizenship).

Beliefs in the efficiency of government. Respondent's rating on a scale from 0 (the government is wasteful) to 10 (the government is generally efficient) on the efficiency of the government in implementing policies and providing for public services.

Belief in personal benefit from government expenditure on policy categories. Respondent's report on the probability (0%-100%) that they would personally benefit over the twelve months following the survey from the corresponding services of the eight broad policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

D Additional Details and Analyses for Field Evidence

D.1 Summary Statistics for DonorsChoose Data

D.1.1 Aggregate Statistics

Category	Statistic
Number of donations (overall)	4,050,872
Number of donors (overall)	1,265,592
Number of projects (overall)	896,294
Average donation amount (overall)	\$76.25
Median donation amount (overall)	\$25.00
Average number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	20.82
Median number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	3.83
Max number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	9,918
Min number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	0
Average donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$1,602.55
Median donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$146.70
Max donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$909,664.20
Min donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$0
Average total number of donations by a CD	9,080
Median total number of donations by a CD	6,003
Max total number of donations by a CD	192,473
Min total number of donations by a CD	1,350
Average total donation amount by a CD	\$698,709.80
Median total donation amount by a CD	\$332,959.40
Max total donation amount by a CD	\$18,782,564.00
Min total donation amount by a CD	\$59,579.35

D.1.2 Statistics by Year: Donations

Year	# of donations	Amt. of donations	Avg. donation amount
2000	1	\$100	\$100
2001	133	\$66,071	\$496.77
2002	354	\$125,945	\$355.78
2003	2,369	\$722,848	\$305.13
2004	4,685	\$1,267,504	\$270.55
2005	7,746	\$2,003,395	\$258.64
2006	24,288	\$4,176,259	\$171.95
2007	64,495	\$7,594,973	\$117.76
2008	91,183	\$8,921,355	\$97.84
2009	120,622	\$13,767,233	\$114.14
2010	189,038	\$18,061,066	\$95.54
2011	249,631	\$18,591,558	\$74.48
2012	250,000	\$20,547,611	\$82.19
2013	467,064	\$27,362,186	\$58.58
2014	827,338	\$48,612,736	\$58.76
2015	911,852	\$72,266,122	\$79.25
2016 (until October)	840,073	\$64,772,648	\$77.10

D.1.3 Large Donors

Amount	Number (%) of donors with lifetime donation amounts in excess of given amount
\$50	506,929 (40.05%)
\$100	262,757 (20.76%)
\$250	107,575 (8.50%)
\$500	49,319 (3.90%)
\$1,000	22,984 (1.82%)
\$2,000	11,229 (0.89%)
\$5,000	4,549 (0.36%)
\$10,000	2,193 (0.17%)
\$100,000	254 (0.02%)
\$1 million	20 (0.00%)

D.2 Additional Notes on Methodology

Data Cleaning. Our raw data consists of 6,211,940 individual donations made during the time period between March 2000 and October 2016. Beginning with the year 2007, donations are made to projects in all states in the United States plus the District of Columbia.

In addition to dropping observations with missing data, we exclude donations made by donors outside of the 50 states and the District of Columbia; that is, we exclude donations made by donors from the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as any donation made by donors providing military overseas addresses. No projects associated to all but one of these locations are included in the raw data. Only 79 donations are recorded in the data as directed to schools in Puerto Rico, which we drop given sparsity.

Aggregation to Congressional District level. Projects were mapped to Congressional Districts through the exact coordinates of their schools, as provided by DonorsChoose. ZIP codes provided in the DonorsChoose data were used to map donors to their respective Congressional Districts.

Note that for reasons of anonymity, donor ZIP codes were truncated at the first three digits, which added a layer of uncertainty to CD mappings beyond the fuzziness of ZIP-to-CD mappings. Thus, through data provided by the United States Census Bureau, every donation was first mapped to all possible *full* ZIP codes corresponding to the truncated ZIP code from DonorsChoose, and then in turn, to a given CD based on all possible Congressional Districts that each one of these possible full ZIP codes could map to. Because this mapping is not 1:1, when aggregating donations to relevant source CDs, all observations were weighted by the degree of a fuzzy match to relevant CDs. For example, if based on the provided ZIP code a donation could have originated from either MA-5 or MA-7, this donation would appear twice in our merged data once all donations were mapped to donor Congressional Districts. In turn, each of these two observations would then be weighted by one-half when aggregating donation statistics by pairs of donor and recipient CDs.

Distances. CD-to-CD distances are given by the distance between the population-weighted, average geographic centers of each Congressional District, based on the counties constituting each Congressional District.¹⁷

¹⁷Because we have exact school coordinates and three-digit ZIP codes for each donor, we also ran a version of the analysis where first, for every individual donation in the data, we calculated the distance between the exact location of the school and the average set of coordinates of the donor's three-digit ZIP (as given by location data from the U.S. Census Bureau for all the possible *full* ZIP codes that make up

Covariates. Whenever available, data for covariates was obtained at the level (state or CD) relevant to the analysis. Specifically for the CD-level analysis, when granular data was not available for this level of entities, estimates were either aggregated or constructed from available *county*-level data. This was done by performing mappings of ZIP codes to counties, and then to CDs, in operations similar to those described above for donations, and also accounting through appropriate weights for layers of uncertainty in mappings from (3-digit or full) ZIP code to county, and then in turn to Congressional District. In particular, note this exercise was conducted for the aggregation of SCIs and relative probabilities of friendship (social distances).

Note specifically that for CD-level GDP estimates, since no GDP data per U.S. county is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we took the share of total U.S. household income made up by each county, and used those shares to form a rough estimate of GDP by county that could be aggregated as explained above to the level of Congressional Districts.

D.2.1 Bayesian Shrinkage

Our raw regression coefficients θ_i form unbiased but imprecise estimates of universalism. To reduce measurement error and generate more precise estimates of this parameter, we “shrink” our estimates toward the mean $\bar{\theta}$ of the average across CDs, producing a shrunk coefficient θ_i^s that is a weighted average of θ_i and $\bar{\theta}$:

$$\theta_i^s = w_i \theta_i + (1 - w_i) \bar{\theta}. \quad (34)$$

As in [Chetty and Hendren \(2018\)](#) and [Enke \(2018\)](#), the weights w_i are selected to minimize the mean-squared prediction error, so that

$$w_i = \frac{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2]}{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2] + se_i^2}.$$

$Var(\theta_i)$ represents the variance of the raw coefficients across CDs and se_i the standard error of the coefficient for CD i . See [Chetty and Hendren \(2018\)](#) for a derivation.

The shrinkage procedure most strongly affects those CDs with imprecisely estimated θ_i . However, we find in general that universalism is fairly precisely estimated—due to the large underlying sample of donations—and that the shrinkage does not substantially alter the universalism measure. In all specifications (i.e. all baseline specifications and

each three-digit ZIP). Then, for each CD-to-CD pair, the distances between the “expected” locations of all donors in the source CD to all the corresponding recipients in the other CD were averaged to arrive at the corresponding CD-to-CD distance. The correlation between the log of the distance measure used in our analyses and the log of this more “granular” version of distances is $\rho = 0.98$, so all results hold using this alternative version of distance.

robustness checks reported in this paper) but one, the correlation between the raw estimates and the shrunk values is at least 0.98. The specification including state-pair fixed effects yields a correlation of 0.75 between the raw and shrunk coefficients.

D.2.2 Social Distance Data

Data on the social connectedness between pairs of counties in the United States, as well as on the social connectedness of these counties with foreign countries, was obtained from Facebook. This Social Connectedness Index (SCI), developed by [Bailey et al. \(2018\)](#), maps all Facebook users active during a 30-day period in early 2016 to their respective U.S. county or country locations. It then takes the aggregate number of friendship links within or between these entities as their respective degree of social connectedness, normalized to a maximum value of 1 million for Los Angeles County (i.e. the normalized number of Facebook friends that people living in Los Angeles County and active on the platform during the snapshot period have who are also living in the same county and active during the same period). Finally, to account for level effects (in that counties with larger populations will seem relatively more socially-connected than other counties merely because they have larger populations), [Bailey et al. \(2018\)](#) then construct a measure they call the “relative probability of friendship” between two counties, which simply divides the SCI for a pair of counties by the product of the number of Facebook users in each of the two counties.

We aggregate this “relative probability of friendship” data to the state and Congressional District levels by matching counties to these corresponding geographies, and taking the average of the relative probabilities of all possible county-to-county pairings between two given states or Congressional Districts. That is, the friendship distance between a state i made up of counties A , B , and C and a state j made up of counties D and E is given by the average of the relative probabilities of friendship between A and D , A and E , B and D , B and E , and so on. Since mappings from county to Congressional District are not 1:1, the aggregation from county to this geographic level accounts for the potential of a fuzzy match, by weighting observations by the number of different possible Congressional Districts every given county could map to.

This aggregation from county-pair SCIs and relative probabilities of friendship forms our measure of “friendship distance”. Specifically, we define the social distance between a donor in geographic entity i and a recipient in a geographic entity j of the same level as $-\ln(1 + \text{rel. prob. of friendship}_{i,j})$.

D.3 Robustness Checks

Differing geographic distributions of CDs by party. Democratic CDs are more likely than Republican CDs to be found along the coasts, producing disparities in the distributions of distances to other CDs from a typical Democratic and a typical Republican CD. Though our baseline analysis already takes measures to address this concern, we also re-run the analysis using a binary geographic distance measure. We set distance equal to 0 for “local” CD-to-CD pairs i and j for which $d_{i,j} < 50$ miles and 1 otherwise, repeating the analysis for cutoffs of 10 and 100 miles. We also repeat our baseline analysis with an additional control for state-pair fixed-effects, which accounts for broad locational differences between the two political parties. As we report in Table 26, the strong positive relationship between universalism in altruism and Democratic vote share persists.

Controlling for poverty and inequality confounds. If donors in all CDs were merely concerned with directing donations towards projects in the lowest-income schools, and it was also the case that donors in Republican CDs were systematically closer than Democratic CDs to projects in these low-income schools, then such a set of facts would mechanically generate the patterns of behavior in our results even if donors in all CDs had identical moral preferences. As such, we perform a set of replications controlling in equation (10) for: (i) the recipients’ poverty level in each CD-to-CD pair as given by the fraction of families living under the federal poverty line, and (ii) the GINI coefficient of the recipient CD. In both robustness checks, results hold. See Table 30.

Controlling for promotions. About 25% of projects on the DonorsChoose platform are eventually assigned a “Double Your Impact” or “Almost Home” promotion, in which a corporate sponsor of the platform agrees either to match every donation dollar-for-dollar (“Double Your Impact”) or to donate enough money to bring the total donations to within \$100 of the goal amount (“Almost Home”). We have verified that there is no significant difference between the projects assigned these promotional offers in Democratic and in Republican CDs. To control for the possibility that donors from CDs of opposite political leanings are differentially motivated to donate to these projects, or that geographic clustering of these promotions impacts our results, we include a control for the proportion of projects in the recipient CD assigned either of these promotions. This does not affect our results. See Table 30.

Table 26: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations)	12.8*** (1.52)	9.67*** (1.46)								
Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance)		10.5*** (1.02)	7.59*** (1.47)							
Universalism in altruism (controlling for state-pair fixed effects)				9.50*** (0.89)	7.11*** (1.20)					
Universalism in altruism (wrt binarized distance variable)						9.81*** (0.96)	8.11*** (1.45)			
Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance)								10.5*** (1.51)	7.00*** (1.65)	
Log [1 + Total donations]	5.32*** (1.09)	1.69 (1.32)		2.40** (1.17)		1.49 (1.21)		3.16*** (1.21)		
Log [GDP p/c]	0.31 (1.27)	0.38 (1.35)		0.12 (1.20)		0.74 (1.16)		-0.17 (0.94)		
Fraction of population with college degree	3.78 (7.77)	7.34 (7.96)		1.65 (8.01)		2.15 (8.03)		-5.20 (7.84)		
Latitude	0.12 (0.56)	0.35 (0.59)		0.64 (0.58)		-0.058 (0.54)		1.12* (0.60)		
Log [Distance to coast]	-1.21* (0.64)	-1.45** (0.66)		-1.60** (0.65)		-0.46 (0.65)		-1.30** (0.62)		
Racial fractionalization	22.0*** (6.30)	22.0*** (6.48)		20.7*** (6.44)		22.1*** (6.34)		21.9*** (6.03)		
Log [Average distance to all projects]	63.0*** (16.14)	63.2*** (17.87)		64.7*** (17.78)		81.8*** (18.55)		74.4*** (17.77)		
Log[1 + Education spending per capita]							4.01*** (0.98)	4.77*** (0.91)		
State FFE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	430	430
R ²	0.42	0.53	0.46	0.52	0.47	0.53	0.47	0.52	0.51	0.58

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations) in columns (1)–(2) corresponds to our estimate of θ_i for each Congressional District, as per equation 10, based on geographic distance and number of donations as opposed to donation amounts. Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance) in columns (3)–(4) refers to a composite measure formed from a principal component analysis of geographic and friendship distances between CD pairs. In columns (5)–(6), we residualize both donation amounts and distances of state-pair fixed effects, and in columns (7)–(8), we estimate universalism in altruism based on a binarized rather than continuous geographic distance measure. In columns (9)–(10), we return to our baseline specification in Table 5, but introduce the log per capita spending on primary and secondary education from local sources of funding as controls, as covered in Section 6.4.

Table 27: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Universalism in altruism (only donors w/ <\$250 lifetime donations)	17.8*** (1.30)	16.0** (1.68)						
Universalism in altruism (only donors w/ <\$500 lifetime donations)			17.8*** (1.30)	16.0*** (1.67)				
Universalism in altruism (only donors w/ <\$1,000 lifetime donations)					17.7*** (1.34)	16.0*** (1.68)		
Universalism in altruism (only donors w/ <\$2,700 lifetime donations)							17.9*** (1.33)	16.2*** (1.72)
Log [1 + Total donations]	2.00** (0.96)		1.92** (0.96)		1.94** (0.96)		1.84* (0.98)	
Log [GDP p/c]	-0.00047 (0.79)		0.0049 (0.81)		-0.088 (0.84)		-0.15 (0.82)	
Fraction of population with college degree	-11.5 (7.32)		-11.6 (7.30)		-11.7 (7.34)		-12.6* (7.37)	
Latitude	0.20 (0.52)		0.22 (0.52)		0.12 (0.52)		0.19 (0.52)	
Log [Distance to coast]	-0.95 (0.60)		-1.08* (0.61)		-1.10* (0.61)		-1.08* (0.63)	
Racial fractionalization	19.4*** (5.78)		18.9*** (5.83)		18.2*** (5.84)		18.2*** (5.83)	
Log [Average distance to all projects]	63.5*** (16.77)		63.6*** (16.56)		64.1*** (16.64)		62.9*** (16.69)	
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
R ²	0.55	0.60	0.55	0.60	0.55	0.60	0.55	0.60

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In each regression specification, we exclude donors who donate lifetime donation amounts in excess of the specified dollar amounts. That is, in columns (1)–(2) we drop all donations made by donors who, throughout our entire data, donated more than \$250. Columns (3)–(4) do the same for those donors with lifetime donations in excess of \$500, while columns (5)–(6) for amounts in excess of \$1,000, and columns (7)–(8) in excess of \$2,700.

Table 28: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism in altruism (excluding same CDs)	9.64*** (0.71)	7.44*** (0.73)	5.11*** (0.85)	13.0*** (1.30)	9.98*** (1.45)	9.46*** (1.55)
Log [1 + Total donations]		5.30*** (0.92)	3.68*** (1.02)		4.05*** (1.02)	3.32*** (1.09)
Log [GDP p/c]			1.41 (1.83)			0.050 (1.18)
Fraction of population with college degree			13.3* (7.73)			-0.56 (8.05)
Latitude			0.072 (0.15)			0.29 (0.57)
Log [Distance to coast]			-1.30*** (0.46)			-1.59** (0.65)
Racial fractionalization			19.5*** (5.13)			20.8*** (6.42)
Log [Average distance to all projects]			5.29 (3.38)			67.7*** (16.93)
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436
R ²	0.30	0.35	0.41	0.46	0.48	0.53

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In each regression specification, we exclude all CD-to-CD pairs in which the donor CD equals the recipient CD; that is, we exclude all within-CD donations, in order to estimate the gradient parameter of interest only when it comes to CDs other than a donor's own.

Table 29: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism in altruism (excluding same states)	8.87*** (0.76)	6.92*** (0.66)	4.68*** (0.74)	9.00*** (1.30)	6.29*** (1.20)	5.09*** (1.28)
Log [1 + Total donations]			6.76*** (0.88)	4.42*** (1.03)		6.19*** (0.95)
Log [GDP p/c]				1.21 (1.76)		0.16 (1.38)
Fraction of population with college degree				14.6* (7.71)		6.23 (8.19)
Latitude			0.22 (0.15)		-0.017 (0.59)	
Log [Distance to coast]				-1.64*** (0.46)		-2.05*** (0.70)
Racial fractionalization				18.2*** (5.21)		20.7*** (6.71)
Log [Average distance to all projects]				4.65 (3.40)		54.6*** (17.90)
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436
R^2	0.25	0.35	0.41	0.39	0.45	0.50

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In each regression specification, we exclude all CD-to-CD pairs in which the donor state equals the recipient state; that is, we exclude all within-state donations, in order to estimate the gradient parameter of interest only when it comes to states other than a donor's own.

Table 30: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable: Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Universalism in altruism (controlling for recipient poverty level)	13.5*** (1.19)	10.7*** (1.62)						
Universalism in altruism (controlling for GINI of recipient CD)			13.6*** (1.20)	10.7*** (1.63)				
Universalism in altruism (controlling for Double Your Impact promotions)					13.5*** (1.17)	10.7*** (1.60)		
Universalism in altruism (controlling for Almost Home promotions)							13.5*** (1.18)	10.7*** (1.61)
Log [1 + Total donations]	2.01* (1.14)	2.13* (1.14)			1.98* (1.14)		2.12* (1.14)	
Log [GDP p/c]	0.19 (1.17)	0.17 (1.15)			0.18 (1.17)		0.18 (1.16)	
Fraction of population with college degree	-0.31 (7.92)	-0.48 (7.95)			-0.40 (7.92)		-0.47 (7.92)	
Latitude	0.50 (0.57)	0.55 (0.57)			0.51 (0.57)		0.55 (0.57)	
Log [Distance to coast]	-1.58** (0.64)	-1.56** (0.64)			-1.51** (0.64)		-1.52** (0.64)	
Racial fractionalization	21.1*** (6.33)	21.0*** (6.32)			21.1*** (6.32)		21.1*** (6.31)	
Log [Average distance to all projects]	67.3*** (16.64)	66.6*** (16.72)			66.4*** (16.75)		66.3*** (16.80)	
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
R ²	0.48	0.54	0.48	0.54	0.48	0.54	0.48	0.54

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In columns (1)–(2), we control for the recipient's poverty level when we estimate each CD's θ_i , and in columns (3)–(4), we control for the GINI coefficient in the recipient CD when we estimate θ_i . In columns (5)–(6), we control for the fraction of all projects in the recipient CD eligible for “Double Your Impact” matching, and in columns (7)–(8), for the fraction of all projects in the recipient CD eligible for “Almost Home” matching.

D.4 Figures




Figure 50: This figure replicates Figure 11 with friendship distance. The left panel presents a binned scatter plot of all donations from both a Democratic and a Republican CD (based on 2016 presidential vote shares) in California against friendship distance to the respective recipient CDs. Each observation in the underlying data is an individual donation from a donor in the given CDs to a school in a recipient CD. The binned scatter plot averages within each distance bin the log amount of donations from each of the California CDs to the CDs of recipient schools. The right panel presents the analogue for New York state. All data are residualized of donor and recipient CD fixed effects, so that the figure presents only differences in the *gradient* of prosociality and not in absolute *levels* of altruism between the given CDs.




Figure 51: Universalism in altruism w.r.t. geographic distance at Congressional District level




Figure 52: Universalism in altruism w.r.t. friendship distance at Congressional District level




Figure 53: Relationship between universalism in altruism w.r.t. friendship distance and CD-level vote shares. Each point represents one CD, which is colored based on US Census Divisions.

CD-level vote shares and universalism in altruism
(conditional on state fixed effects)




Figure 54: CD-level vote shares and universalism w.r.t. geographic distance, conditional on state fixed effects.

CD-level vote shares and universalism in altruism
(conditional on state fixed effects)




Figure 55: CD-level vote shares and universalism w.r.t. friendship distance, conditional on state fixed effects.

D.5 Visual layout and functionality of the DonorsChoose platform

We take care to ensure our results are not artefacts of the layout or functionality of the DonorsChoose website when a potential donor accesses the platform. To do so, we examined all available screenshots of the platform's layout and functionality since its inception.

We can confirm that throughout the relevant time period, it is *not* the case that projects are sorted by closest proximity to each donor on the website. Instead, it appears that as of June 2019 and for a significant portion of the time period, the default sort for projects on the platform was by urgency, which DonorsChoose defines as a combination of the lowest cost to complete, highest economic need, and fewest days left to expiration of the project.

It is also *not* the case that the website's layout varies across space. That is, to the best of our knowledge, at any given time all donors observe the same platform layout regardless of location, and given the default sort, the same exact projects when they first arrive at the platform. As such, it is not the case that donors in Republican CDs are systematically nudged towards donating locally more often or in larger amounts through the website's layout or functionality. Below, we present screenshots of the DonorsChoose platform as accessible in June 2019.

Notable in each screenshot is that throughout our time period of interest, we can confirm that the options available to each donor with which to filter and sort projects were constant. These included the subject/ topic of each project (e.g., literacy, special needs, health & sports), the cost of the project, the urgency or poverty level associated to each project, grade level of the students to be reached by each project, etc.

Most importantly, the ability to search through and filter projects based on location was and continues to be a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the screen. This makes a donor's selection of a project based on geography particularly straightforward, and potentially enhances the case for our claim that geographic distance is a relevant metric employed by donors in selecting projects. That is, given the position of the location filter on each page throughout the years, it is reasonable to imagine that some portion of our results is supported by deliberate donor choices that explicitly involve geographic distance and, in turn, implicitly their degree of universalism.

DonorsChoose.org Find a classroom to support About us | Help Sign in

Search topics, teachers & schools near city, state, or zip Search

53,184 projects sorted by most urgent ▾

SUBJECT

- Applied Learning
- Health & Sports
- History & Civics
- Literacy & Language
- Math & Science
- Music & The Arts
- Special Needs
- Warmth, Care & Hunger

A Cozy, Comfortable, Reading Corner



"Help me give my students a warm and cozy classroom reading corner where they can go to sit comfortably and read quietly."

Mrs. Holcomb
Loma Rica Elementary School • Marysville, CA

13 DONORS SO FAR
\$125 STILL NEEDED
\$63 FOR NOW

2X Donations to this project are currently matched, thanks to Google.org.

SHOW ONLY

- Match offers
- Never before funded teachers
- Projects with no donations
- More than half of students from low-income households
- Fully funded projects
- Rural schools

Let's Get It Started: Back to School Tools



"Help me give my students a stocked classroom with necessary tools to enhance learning."

Mrs. McDaniel
Saks Elementary School • Anniston, AL

13 DONORS SO FAR
\$82 STILL NEEDED

Figure 56: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the ability to search for projects near any given geographical location at the top of the page, the options available to the donor with which to filter projects, and the “Double Your Impact” promotion applied to the topmost project presented.

AGE GROUP

- Grades PreK-2
- Grades 3-5
- Grades 6-8
- Grades 9-12

REQUESTS FOR

- Art Supplies
- Books
- Classroom Basics
- Computers & Tablets
- Educational Kits & Games
- Flexible Seating
- Food, Clothing & Hygiene
- Instructional Technology
- Lab Equipment
- Musical Instruments
- Reading Nooks, Desks & Storage
- Sports & Exercise Equipment
- Trips
- Visitors

PROJECT TYPE

- Classroom projects
- Professional development



Help us Be More Organized
"Help me give my students a way to organize their materials as we move away from desks and to tables in our classroom!"
Mr. Consaul
Nathaniel Hawthorne School 25 • Rochester, NY

8 DONORS SO FAR

\$73 STILL NEEDED



I See Me and I See You!
"Help me give my students a variety of mirror books (reflection of their own identity & culture) and window books (allows students to see other cultures) for our classroom library!"
Ms. Brown
Moulton Elementary Shool • Des Moines, IA

11 DONORS SO FAR

\$28 STILL NEEDED

\$14 FOR NOW



Seating for All!
"Help me give my students a colorful, organized meeting area and bouncy bands to help them focus!"
Mrs. Correa
LEAD Elementary School • San Mateo, CA

13 DONORS SO FAR

\$80 STILL NEEDED



Hands-On Learning!
"Help me give my students more manipulatives (table toys) to help then practice a wide variety of skills!"
Mrs. Kirker
North Adams Elementary School • Seaman, OH

11 DONORS SO FAR

Figure 57: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the options available to the donor with which to filter projects.

AMOUNT NEEDED

- \$50 and under
- \$100 and under
- \$250 and under
- \$500 and under
- \$1,000 and under
- Over \$1,000

Show teacher & school type

Pick a project for me

Show give box

2X *Donations to this project are currently matched, thanks to Google.org.*



Being Better Prepared for Emergencies
"Help me give my students a stronger sense of safety with radios to keep communication with all areas of our campus at all times as well as fanny packs to carry radios, nurse passes and a first aid kit."
Mrs. Garcia
Rowell Elementary School • Fresno, CA

7 DONORS SO FAR

\$142 STILL NEEDED

\$71 FOR NOW



Incorporate Core With Common Core.
"Help me give my students the option to sit on a stability ball."
Mrs. D'Iorio
Torrington Middle School • Torrington, CT

12 DONORS SO FAR

\$51 STILL NEEDED



Materials for Arts Integration
"Help me give my students watercolors, watercolor paper, colored pencils, play dough, and air dry clay to allow for arts integration in second grade."
Mrs. K.
Cochran Elementary School • Coopersburg, PA

9 DONORS SO FAR

\$36 STILL NEEDED

Figure 58: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the options available to the donor with which to filter projects.




Figure 59: Screenshot of sorting feature as available at the top of the DonorsChoose platform as of June 2019. The default sort appears to be “most urgent”. Note it does not appear to be possible to sort projects by geographic location, though the ability to *search* through projects by geographic location is available, as presented in Figure 56.