
# PROPAGANDA

Parallel ROP Attack Generator and Non-Direct Assembler

**Chris Lee and Ben Spinelli** 

A <u>return-oriented programming (ROP) attack</u> takes advantage of buffer overflow vulnerabilities in executables to gain control of the program.



Because programs are just sequences of bytes, you could directly input byte code in old school attacks.

**BUT**, people fixed this, so now we use GADGETS!

<u>Gadgets</u> are sequences of bytes within the vulnerable executable that are terminated by 0xc3 (return).

After returning, the program goes to the next return address and continues executing.

 402e74:
 41
 5f
 pop %r15

 402e76:
 c3
 retq

5f c3 performs pop %rdi (register used for first argument).

### So, we just have to create a string like this:

```
/* pop %rdi */
75 2e 40 00 00 00 00

/* stack constant $0xffff */

ff ff 00 00 00 00 00

/* address of withdraw_money */
23 1e 60 00 00 00 00 00
```

# We created a parallel ROP attack generator.

We perform parallel search based on a sequence of desired effects (target) and equivalence rules. Both are provided by the user.

Equivalence 
$$S \rightarrow t$$
  $t \rightarrow D$   $t \not\in D$   $S \rightarrow D$   $S \rightarrow D$ 

We grow a tree by applying the given rules and creating variables (t).

#### A node can be:

- matched with a gadget: becomes a solved leaf.
- matched with a rule: creates more nodes and solves them.

We do this until every endpoint is a solved leaf.

### This is the result of a completed search.

### **Target:**

%rsp +  $$0x1337 \rightarrow %$ rdi

### **Gadgets:**

%rsp → %rax	(0x401c4f)
%rcx → %rsi	(0x401c2f)
%rax → %rdx	(0x401c0f)
%rdx → %rcx	(0x401c08)
%rcx → %rdx	(0x401bb8)
%rdi + %rsi → %rax	(0x401b98)
pop %rax	(0x401b98)
%rax → %rdi	(0x401b6c)

### **Attack String:**

```
/* Pad with buffer size */
                                       /* Mov %rdx, %rax */
                                        0f 1c 40 00 00 00 00 00
                                       /* Mov %rcx, %rdx */
                                        08 1c 40 00 00 00 00 00
 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       /* Mov %rsi, %rcx */
                                        2f 1c 40 00 00 00 00 00
/* Mov %rax, %rsp */
4f 1c 40 00 00 00 00 00
                                       /* Arith %rax, %rdi+%rsi */
                                        98 1b 40 00 00 00 00 00
/* Mov %rdi, %rax */
6c 1b 40 00 00 00 00 00
                                       /* Call target function */
                                       01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef
/* Load %rax, $0x1337 */
8d 1b 40 00 00 00 00 00
/* Stack constant 0x1337 */ 37 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

### **Complete Tree (grows upwards):**



# Our algorithm was difficult to implement because of domain-imposed constraints:

### 1. Preventing Infinite looping

How do we prevent a cycle of applied rules?

### 2. Synchronizing Variables


- When a variable gets a value, how do we update that value across all branches that have it?
- And then back track if that value fails?

### 3. Serializing gadgets

- All instructions share a small number of registers.
- How do we prevent them from clobbering each other's resources?

We solved these problems. Check our writeup for details. :D


# We parallelized our algorithm by distributing work before the search occurs.



**Cost of synchronization > Benefit of fine-grained work distribution** 

## Speedup is limited by attack target size.

Typical targets aren't heavily imbalanced, so our work distribution is OK.



### Workload imbalance is the main barrier to parallelism.


We have to assign nodes to threads before knowing how much each node will need.

Run on 6-core GHC Machine [GHC38]



### Short-circuiting on failure can result in super-linear speedup.

Note: In this case, we get a 50x speedup, but this just depends on the disparity of the branch sizes.



# LIVE DEMO!!!!