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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
3	WESTERN DIVISION	
4	HONORABLE CHRISTINA A. SNYDER	
5	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING	
6	INITED CTATES OF AMEDICA	
7	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) )	
8	PLAINTIFF, ) ) CASE NO.:	
9	VS. ) CR 14-648-CAS )	
10	HARINDER SINGH, )	
11	DEFENDANT. ) )	
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14	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
15	MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2018	
16	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	
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22	LAURA MILLER ELIAS, CSR 10019 FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER	
23	350 WEST 1ST STREET, ROOM 4455 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012	
24	PH: (213)894-0374	
25		

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      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
 3
 4
      ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:
 5
 6
                UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
 7
                BY: CAROL CHEN
 8
                ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
 9
                312 NORTH SPRING STREET
10
                LOS ANGELES, CA 90012
11
12
13
      ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT:
14
15
                PETER JOHNSON, ESQ.
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1 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 2 3 THE CLERK: Calling Calendar Item No. 7. 4 Case No. CR 14-648. 5 United States of America versus Harinder Singh. 6 Counsel, please state your appearances. 7 MS. CHEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Carol Chen on behalf of the United States. Also with the Court's 8 9 permission, if it's possible for IRS Special Agent Donald 10 Classen to be at the table? 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MS. CHEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 MR. JOHNSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Peter 14 Johnson on behalf of Mr. Harinder Singh who is present, 15 prepared for sentencing and assisted by the court's Punjabi 16 interpreter. 17 THE COURT: Very well. Good afternoon. 18 Okay. Let's just review what I'm going to call the 19 preliminaries. It appears that the presentence report in 20 this case was disclosed on March 21, 2018. The Court has 21 reviewed the presentence report, the addendum to the 22 presentence report, the government's position regarding 23 sentencing, the defendant's position regarding sentencing. 24 The supplemental sentencing letters submitted on behalf of 25 the defendant and the letter from Professor Singh which was

1 included in the sentencing papers submitted by defendant. 2 Does that cover everything as best we can tell? MS. CHEN: And Your Honor, I apologize if I missed 3 4 it, but I belive there also a presentence investigation report disclosed August 15, 2018. I'm not sure if there were 5 any specific material differences. 6 7 THE COURT: There was one, and then there was a revised one. Um, well, let's discuss that. I think there 8 9 was a revised sentencing letter. I'm not sure that there was 10 a revised PSR, but I thought there was an addendum. I have 11 an addendum. I have the original letter. The sentencing 12 memorandum from Mr. Singh, the government's sentencing 13 memorandum. I have a revised letter to which there is 14 attached -- okay. There's a second addendum to the 15 presentencing report which is attached to the letter. Is 16 that what you're referring to? 17 MS. CHEN: It is, Your Honor. I think that's 18 Document 1020. There also appears to be a docket entry of 19 1019 which it also says presentence investigation report. On 20 the bottom it says date report prepared March 21st, 2018 and 21 the date report revised was August 15, 2018. 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. JOHNSON: I have in my notes that there weren't 24 changes, but I just want to make sure that I don't skip 25 anything that might be important to the Court. I will

operate from my assumption in my notes that there weren't changes to that. To the extent I am wrong, um, please let me know and I can look at it and go through it.

THE COURT: Well, let's be sure we're talking about the same thing. The second addendum that I have, uh, notes changes based on United States versus Evans which was decided recently which goes to conditions of supervision.

MS. CHEN: And, Your Honor, that's Document 1020, I believe. And I think on that same day in question, it appears there was a presentence investigation report disclosed also August 15, 2018. It's 23 pages, but I believe there are no material differences between that and the March 21st, 2018. It may be just that with the addendum, the Probation Office also essentially refiled their presentence report.

THE COURT: Well, I think you're correct, but Mr. Johnson, if you want to look at everything, I'm prepared to let you do that.

MR. JOHNSON: Um, I don't have the physical copy of that addendum. I'm pretty sure that I went through, uh, the documents that were there at least in my notes that I have that there were no changes to the guideline calculation.

THE COURT: I'm not helpful because I don't have the document number from the file. I do have the actual report and I do have the presentence report. It says report

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      prepared March 21, 2018.
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                MS. CHEN: And, Your Honor, I can show Mr. Johnson
      very briefly, if you want, Document 1019 which is the one at
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      issue?
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                THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you do that.
                MR. JOHNSON: If I may, Your Honor? Thank you.
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                MS. CHEN: And I apologize, Your Honor. I just
      want to make sure the record is clear.
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                THE COURT: I understand.
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                MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I'm fine with the PSR.
                THE COURT: Okay. Just to summarize and I don't
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      want to mischaracterize things, but I think that the most
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      recent second addendum really deals with the -- we get them
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      in almost every case now because of United States versus
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      Evans which changes certain of the conditions of supervision.
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      And I think that's why the second addendum was issued to
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      account for that. Is that your understanding, Ms. Chen?
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                MS. CHEN: Yes, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Do you have that, Mr. Johnson?
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      I just want to be sure that you have the second addendum.
                MR. JOHNSON: I -- I don't have the second
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      addendum, but to the extent that I can look at it?
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                THE COURT: Sure.
                MR. JOHNSON: That's fine, Your Honor. Thank you.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Basically, I think we've covered
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what's been disclosed. I think to summarize Probation found an Offense Level of 34, a Criminal History Category of one yielding an advisory 151 to 188 months. The government responded, uh, well the recommendation from Probation was 151 months. The government agreed with 151 months.

And then for reasons which I will go into a minute, Mr. Johnson, you argue that your client should be placed in custody for no more than 12 months and a day. To begin with you argue that the offense level should be 23 which would yield 46 to 57 month advisory range. Um, and basically, you object to the offense conduct because the statements of Sucha Singh are improperly attributed to your client.

Secondly, you object to the plus 18 in offense level because the amounts were not reasonably foreseeable by your client and even if foreseeable, you argue that the increase should be 16 not 18.

Then you object to the plus six in Paragraph 46 because of insufficient evidence that the -- demonstrating that the money that was transferred was connected to drug trafficking. And then you also object to Paragraph 53 because, uh, there should be a three level decrease for mitigating role for your client.

And so at the end of the day, you say that the offense level of eight should at most be increased by 16 and that the plus two is appropriate, but there should be a minus

three and you end up at 23, and I'll let you elaborate further. But in addition you argue that the 3553A factors compel a downward variance based on your client's religious background and what his expectations were regarding hwala money transfers, uh, and based on his personal history, age and lack of criminal history. And I'm sure you have more to say, but that's a short form summary.

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me say this. Obviously, in light of the sentences that have been given in this case, I think 151 months is extreme and not warranted. I am not persuaded for the reasons I articulated at trial that there is some cultural basis for departing. I'm not convinced with your argument that the loss at issue in this case was not foreseeable by your client. I do think there was substantial evidence that your client knew that the proceeds and the laundered funds were connected to drug proceeds.

I want to hear further from everyone regarding the statements of Sucha Singh and whether they are relevant or not. I don't think Mr. Harinder Singh is entitled to minus three for mitigating role given his participation in the transaction.

So I guess what I'm prepared to say is that I think the offense level of 34 is appropriate, but I do think there are mitigating factors most particularly to avoid disparity

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of sentencing which should apply here. And I searched through the docket sheet and I know that Mr. Sucha Singh was sentenced to 63 months in custody, Harmeet 42 months. think Mr. Wadhwa was 46 months and think right now --MR. JOHNSON: 41. THE COURT: -- they're at the high level in this case. So Ms. Chen, can you tell me if there's someone who is higher that I have missed? MS. CHEN: Yes, Your Honor. So I too went through the docket and from my understanding, Sucha Singh get 63 months. He was facing an advisory range of 108 to 135 months. THE COURT: Right. MS. CHEN: But he got credit for attempted cooperation which is not news to anybody. John Bradley Martin who was a repeat courier got 63 months out of an 87 to 108 months advisory range. Harmeet did get 42 months out of a 70 to 87 months. He did cooperate. Again, it's public knowledge. There were two couriers Montenegro who was facing an advisory range of 46 to 57 months and Baraza who was facing 57 to 71 months and both got 24 months. Sanjev Wadhwa as we all know cooperated. THE COURT: He was initially at 70 months, and then reduced.

MS. CHEN: Yes, Your Honor. And for the record, while the government did submit the recommendation of 151 months, having reviewed all of the sentences given by this court, we do agree that 151 months would create a sentencing disparity and so we're actually prepared to adjust our recommendation today.

THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, why don't you go from there.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I can begin where we left off at the last hearing, I think it was at the end of the August, where the government actually agreed after Mr. Singh's arrest in October of 2012 that he did not continue on delivering. And I begin there because I think it's an important part of examining the -- what was going on in Mr. Singh's mind. It, I think, offers mitigation that once he learned that what was actually going on, once he put the puzzle together that he wasn't going to continue delivering money.

Even when, and he can tell you, when solicited by his uncle Sucha Singh to continue to deliver money after October of 2012, he didn't do so. Um, I think that's important because on that day and thereafter, um, Mr. Singh, Harinder Singh, was, um, met with the government. He was going with some of the agents to various places where he picked up money in an effort to cooperate. That cooperation

didn't work out because there was no plea agreement and no admission related to that the money was connected to drugs.

I think that I'll just as we go along, the objection related to the reasonably foreseeable, I think is right. And it's right because if the Court recalls from trial, the money that was being delivered in the very beginning, um, there was no indication that this was from some illegal source. There was the testimony by the expert that there are legal ways to deliver money that are traditionally practiced within the Punjabi faith and culture.

The indictment described that as white hwala. And those beginning payments that I've listed out on page 4, would be considered in at least Mr. Singh's mind white hwala. There was no evidence at trial that they would be anything other than white hwala. No evidence that he was told that this must be some form of illegal activity or drugs.

That was the early ones that I've -- that I've laid out. That's on page 4 I'm referring to where I say the \$522,000 in March of 2012 and \$600,000 again in March.

Another \$500,000 in April.

THE COURT: Could I ask one question?

Let's assume you're correct. At the beginning he had every belief that they were white hwala payments. Along the way, though, he's asked to transport money and has reason to believe that that money comes from drug sources. Doesn't

that impact the argument that the first four payments were white hwala?

In other words, doesn't it make it more foreseeable for your client to believe that the earlier payments were of the same nature as the later payments?

MR. JOHNSON: No, and I can explain why.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JOHNSON: What I did was that I looked at the trial evidence, the evidence from Mr. Khukaran from Canada and the person, uh, Mr. Wadhwa from India and the expert's testimony, the testimony at trial. The testimony was that at the time of this when Khukaran was involved that Mr. Harinder Singh was operating his own kind of hwala.

Now, we disagree with that, but there would be some basis then in the facts to say, okay, this is different somehow. This was not my uncle telling me that I should deliver this money from one, um, Punjabi Sikh to another Punjabi Sikh. Because those funds weren't delivered to what the evidence said well, it may be somebody outside of the faith. These were internal deliveries of money.

So in, uh, based upon the evidence, there's -there's really no evidence to show that this would have been
somehow illegal in nature because the evidence actually was
that, uh, there are legal payments -- from the expert, there
are legal payments of money in the church, in the Sikh faith

that are transferred and it's in the billions of dollars every year.

As well as from Mr. Taran Singh who said yes, there are legitimate for what he believed to Mr. Singh, Taran Singh said that all of it was illegal. That's different from the government's theory that there is money being collected throughout the church and Punjabi Sikh businesses throughout Los Angeles that are collecting money and then delivering money to various sources.

In addition to that, in the journal there were multiple, and that came out at trial during cross-examination, there were multiple hwalas where Mr. Harinder Singh was picking up money and delivering money. Under those circumstances, there's no indication in and of themselves that this is drug related. I fully understand the evidence.

While I disagree with it, again, I understand the evidence that there is evidence to say if large amounts of money are being delivered in a parking lot to an individual, that is not of the Sikh faith. I think that's where the Court got to say there were some form of illegal activity that characterized the illegal activity, but that didn't exist in the first three portions where Mr. Harinder Singh was involved. And that's why I believe that those should not be considered unreasonable.

Now, in addition to that, if those payments occurred after, not before but after, then I think they would be reasonably foreseeable. But, again, under the circumstances and the government's already conceded this fact, that the last payment of \$310,000 that he had already withdrawn. So that payment should not be included in the, uh, in that calculation.

And I think there's -- actually, we would only be assuming and making -- speculating about what the evidence may be related to, uh, the payments in the early ones and I just don't think it's reasonably foreseeable. There's no evidence to say that it is.

Your Honor, I'll turn next to the drug, uh, the plus six. The plus six is inappropriately applied and this is why. There is absolutely no evidence, no evidence not from any one of the witnesses that testified at trial, um, not from anybody that this money that Mr. Singh, Harinder Singh, knew or believed, that's the standard, knew or believed that the offense involved the distribution of a controlled substance.

If the Court recalls that we -- we debated over the jury instructions. That it was, the standard was that the Court decided what the government had to prove some form of illegal activity. I understand the evidence and many of witnesses, Gurkaran Isshpunani Singh, Mr. Taran Singh,

Mr. Wadhwa they all said oh, yeah, he should have known that it was something unlawful. That he would have, uh, he would known from the context that it was something unlawful.

But they weren't talking about drugs, Your Honor.

And I think in the context of the culture and faith that what

Professor Gill has laid out, that a reasonable person that

was coming into the country, asked to deliver money that is

inside, within the church, asked by his uncle, in the

cultural context, I think, if -- and without ever being

introduced to evidence to say that there were conversations

with drugs, with people that delivered drugs, there's no way

to say that he knew that this, knew or reasonably believe

that this was related to drugs.

Um, you know, and I think they recorded as many phone calls as they could in terms of the, um, the evidence here and nobody -- Mr. Harinder Singh is not talking about drugs. I think in addition to that, pulling it all together that he pulled out in October 16, 2012 before he was indicted, he was indicted in May of 2015, that he really didn't know that, um, this was somehow connected to drugs even if they, uh, this evidence to say there was something unlawful.

Um, I do believe the mitigating role of three level applies, but I know the Court has read the papers and I won't get into that. I think that the more important part and it

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does overlap with what we're here about is the 3553 factors. Does the Court want me to get into that right now? THE COURT: Not yet. MR. JOHNSON: Then I'll end there. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Chen, insofar as Mr. Johnson made his arguments, what do you have to say in response? MS. CHEN: I'll try to be brief, Your Honor. So first off, I think the easier, I hope it's the easiest issue is that I believe Probation, uh, actually did take out the December 2012 seizure, uh, because I don't think the government will concede that he formally withdrew from the conspiracy as in like legally sufficient, but he was certainly arrested in October of 2012. We are fine with not putting the additional December 2012 seizure to the calculations. From what I'm looking at the presentence report, Your Honor, again, it would Document 1019 which is the August 15, 2018 one, it appears that on Paragraph 44, Probation specifically does not take into account the December seizure. Um, I don't think Mr. Johnson talked about it at this time, but in his sentencing position, he had talked about also the double counting. Specifically, I believe it was \$170,000 because there were, um, like \$90,000, \$80,000 amounts that were discussed over the phone I think on October 9th and 10th.

And, again, Probation my understanding is they took out \$170,000. I think that still is equivalent to a plus 18.

There is an argument that the three seizure amounts from March and early April would be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, but I think I also can recognize that there probably likely was an escalating level of knowledge for this defendant with regards to the black hwala versus white hwala. The three amounts discussed are very large amounts, \$560,000 essentially.

So I do think based on the evidence including the testimony of cooperators where they indicated that the large amount itself would be a red flag. The money laundering expert also discussed that. Without waiving the government's right to argue that the plus 18 does apply on appeal, we're literally talking about a difference of two levels, plus 16 versus plus 18.

Um, I do think that 151 months like I stated again, not to waive the government's rights, I do think 151 months normally would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, but given the sentences imposed in this case, I think the government would be fine if we just imposed the plus 16 enhancement to, uh, knock down one level of dispute, but however, I do think plus 18 would be consistent with being reasonably foreseeable.

THE COURT: Well, let's just take that to its

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logical conclusion. If for purposes of discussion and without committing the government to any position it was plus 16, that would take him to 24. If I understand, you still believe that he should have the plus six. MS. CHEN: Yes, Your Honor. So if I may briefly address that? THE COURT: Yeah. I believe that issue was taken care of MS. CHEN: at trial. THE COURT: I do, too. MS. CHEN: The only theory that the government proceeded on at all times in this case including heavy litigation preceding trial and at trial, the evidence was that it was drug trafficking proceeds. I believe the jury in order to convict Mr. Singh on Count 1 had to find that each and every element was proven and that includes that the defendant knew that the money constitutes some proceeds of some unlawful activity. Obviously, we didn't have -- I don't believe the verdict form had them specify which unlawful activity, but, again, that was the only evidence that was introduced at trial so I believe the plus six would apply. With respect to whether or not a mitigating role adjustment does apply, we don't believe so, Your Honor. I'm fully aware that Mr. Sucha Singh has been vilified both in

trial as well as sentencing papers and at sentencing hearings. He got sentenced. He took responsibility. He plead. Basically, who's up for sentencing now is this defendant.

I fully understand that Mr. Sucha Singh got his nephew involved, but I think the evidence also was established at trial that as he got -- he put the puzzle together as Mr. Johnson would say by July, August and became a pretty indispensable individual for Gurkaran Isshpunani, Sanjev Wadhwa.

There's evidence which was referenced in this

Court's order denying the motion for acquittal or for a new

trial. Uh, it referenced the evidence that Mr. -- that this

defendant had contacted Mr. Isshpunani to want to invest his

own money. There's also a call, finally, Your Honor, where

this defendant boasted about his ties for hwala, I believe,

with New York and New Jersey.

So while he may have started as a courier, we certainly think that his role was established as much more as a hwala broker along the lines of Taran Singh, Harmeet Singh and Sucha Singh, and in fact he tried to cut out his uncle.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I addressed each of those, the alleged cutting of the uncle, the relationship with Gurkaran Singh, the issue of behind the curtain on page

7 and 8 of our brief, that's a direct response to what the government has laid out. Just basically that he is not, uh, wasn't elevating at all within the hwala business, was acting as a courier because he was trusted. He was introduced to Gurkaran Singh by Sucha Singh.

Um, Professor Gill who is present in the court today has laid out the interpretation of those calls in his letter. I'm happy to put him on the stand if necessary if the Court needs it, but I've laid out the -- the response to what the government has suggested and talked about him being, uh, the allegations of him being a broker.

I fully understand, you know, how the Court will decide whether he's mitigating or minor role, but I think those are the factual issues that are in dispute as well as the idea, and I understand the Court disagrees with me, regarding evidence related to the plus six. I think we've written that and laid out our argument.

THE COURT: I think we exhausted that and I have to say that I think the jury's finding is persuasive because I think they did find that the proceeds were related to an unlawful activity. And as Ms. Chen said not specifically drugs, but whether drugs or not, that obviously is an issue that you're going to raise on appeal, but for my purposes, I think the plus six is appropriate.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, not to belabor that

1 point, but just to be -- I want to make sure my argument is 2 clear. THE COURT: No, by all means. 3 4 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 5 The standard is different on the guideline and I tried to highlight that out. It says the guideline is 6 7 different where the jury instruction didn't point to actual drugs, but allowed the -- the jury to be more expansive and 8 9 say oh, some form of illegal activity or maybe he knew there 10 was some form of illegal activity when he, um, lied to the 11 police when he was pulled over or it was somehow illegal; 12 right? But not that it was related to drugs. That jury 13 finding didn't have that. 14 And what the guideline says is quote "knew or 15 believed that any of the laundered funds were the proceeds of 16 or intended to promote an offense involving the manufacturing, importation and distribution of controlled 17 18 substances." And that -- it adds six levels to an already --19 THE COURT: I know that, but what do you do about 20 Pindi and some of the other evidence in the case? 21 MR. JOHNSON: Oh, Pindi never spoke to Mr. Singh. 22 THE COURT: No, but he spoke to others. 23 MR. JOHNSON: And the evidence of Gurkaran said oh, 24 I assumed he knew it was illegal, but there is a difference 25 between white hwala and back hwala. Even there was some form of illegal activity, what could it be? Could it be the importation of illegal products? Could it be the actual -- could it be money laundering in some other form? And that's what the plus six adds. Plus six adds another level to the sentence that is related to drugs and it's just not here.

THE COURT: Ms. Chen.

MS. CHEN: Your Honor, if I can briefly address that point. First of all, I want to make clear the government's position. We are not just relying upon what the jury likely found. To the extent the Court can make the finding based on the evidence that it reviewed itself, that it sat through during this trial and at which, frankly, if need be the government is happy to put it back on for purposes of sentencing.

That there is evidence and we believe it's sufficient evidence to show that the defendant knew that the proceeds were some form of unlawful activity. Specifically, drug trafficking. That's the first point.

The second point is the government had previously objected and would renew its objection particularly for the record to the letter that was written by Professor Gill who had we intended to cross-examine Mr. Gill, if that had been the case, I would have asked the witness to step out prior to all of this. But the Court had indicated that it was not going to adopt the cultural basis for departing.

I would point out that the letter, I understand Mr. Johnson's advocacy here and this is in no way means to offend him, but the letter is highly inappropriate. It seeks to overturn the jury's finding. It basically attempts to testify for the defendant and tries to basically insinuate what he was thinking at the time a few years ago when he was actually conducting the behavior for which he was convicted by a jury.

And Mr. Gill with all due respect likely should have been called as a witness. I believe Mr. Johnson had indicated he was going to call him. And now at sentencing has decided to put together a letter which talks about all these cultural bases for departing. And it says that he's of a firm belief that surely this defendant did not know what he was doing was illegal.

I find it highly inappropriate and in particular,
Your Honor, we would object to the entire letter, but
specifically Exhibit B which for the first time transcribes a
call that was not played before this jury. He also talks
about various interpretations.

And the only other thing I would mention,

Your Honor, if this Court will recall at the beginning of

trial, we were going to have a potential issue in the sense

that the interpreter that had translated the calls also

happened to be interpreting for the defendant at various

points in the trial and sat next to him.

And we averted that, if I remember correctly, because Mr. Johnson and the government actually ended up agreeing to the transcripts. So to now come back and, uh, add new color to the interpretation, I believe Professor Gill talks about the government's transcript being woefully inadequate, I'm not even sure he would have been qualified as an expert at trial.

For the record and to keep my Appeals Unit happy, I would object to that letter. He's attempting to essentially speak for the defendant. I'm not sure what evidence he reviewed. He's trying to seek to basically overturn the jury verdict and finally we would object.

I understand, obviously, the Court can consider anything it wants at sentencing, but as this Court had already indicated, it was not going to accept a cultural basis for departing. Unless the Court changes its mind, I would ask, at that point I would want to cross-examine Professor Gill.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, the Court can consider any of the other transcript of calls to the extent that are necessary. The government actually didn't object last time. I think the Court came out and suggested that we bring Professor Gill here for the next hearing and we did.

THE COURT: Well, I think more accurately you sought CJA funds to provide to Professor Gill so he could do an analysis for purposes of sentencing, and I said I was prepared to authorize your requested funds.

MR. JOHNSON: I think the Court, forgive me this is my recollection of what happened last time. The government came in to the court and the Court took the bench and said that you read the position papers and that you were sure that the government probably would want to respond. The government said yes, they would like to respond. I didn't receive anything in writing or anything. I asked for the additional funds because we continued the sentencing hearing.

THE COURT: I think we're speaking at cross-purposes.

MR. JOHNSON: I obviously think that Exhibit B is relevant to the Court's determination. The letter is relevant to the Court's determination. Even if the Court struck the -- the belief that hey, Mr. Singh didn't know and the Court -- Professor Gill was not an expert on what the Court -- what evidence the Court must rule on right now.

That the, uh, if that's his belief, if that's stricken from the letter or just taken from the letter or even ignored, the other parts of the letter are very, very important. About the cultural, um, impact of a person coming into the country, being accepted into the Sikh faith and the

Punjabi culture. The role of Sucha Singh as an individual.

And it's actually interpreting not just that Exhibit B, but other calls as well.

That is entirely correct that we disputed over the transcripts. We agreed. I was allowed to cross-examine as to what the calls meant without the ability to impeach because I wouldn't have Professor Gill's interpretation, but we're in a different stage. We're at the sentencing stage and this is entirely important in terms of mitigation and it's definitely important in terms of the plus six.

And it's important to see who he, uh, Mr. Singh is. The personal history and characteristics are part of 3553A.

It's interwoven with his cultural background. We can't ignore that he was born in Punjabi and raised in the Sikh faith and the -- I think that's entirely relevant and important to the Court.

THE COURT: Well, even if it is relevant and I can consider it, let's assume that for a minute. I don't find it persuasive, that's the real problem. Look, I don't want to cut anyone off, but what we come down to in this case it seems to me is a situation whether we accord a plus 16 or a plus 18, the advisory range is quite high. Because of the other sentences I have imposed in the case, I think that a lower range is appropriate.

The difficulty in this case which is driven by

guidelines, I believe that Sucha Singh is probably a significant force in involving Harinder Singh in this conspiracy. The problem is that Sucha Singh chose the road of pleading guilty and your client went to trial. He was entitled to go to trial. He should not be punished because he did go to trial.

But the guidelines do provide a minus three for those who enter into plea agreements versus people who don't. But even if I were to give your client the minus three, he still would be well above the range of other people in the case. So the question for me is what is a principled basis for departing.

I think the appropriate sentence is somewhere in the range of 60 to 70 months. I know the government disagrees, but I think that's the appropriate range. There is a part of me that thinks it should be higher than Sucha Singh. There's a part of me that thinks it should be no higher than Sucha Singh's sentence because I understand that an elder came to your client and got him involved.

But after that I can't say that anyone transporting those amounts of cash, uh, shouldn't have known that there was some illegal activity notwithstanding the custom of white hwala and all those things. I mean, I don't think there's much evidence, there may be some, that your client engaged in white hwala for parts of this transaction. Uh, this was his

hwala experience.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I think that the -- this is where I believe that the cultural and religious context of -- and the expert's testimony that wasn't our expert that testified that there are many thousands, millions of dollars that are being collected in Sikh temples and distributed back to India or collected from Punjabi and Sikh businesses as laid out by the expert that has described how, you know, culturally this is part of a practice that has a very, very long history. It's in the letter and in our papers.

I think that putting Sucha Singh, Harmeet Singh,
Gurkaran Singh on the same level of Harinder Singh is wrong.

And that is because Sucha Singh as the Court recalls the
evidence was a leader in this, negotiated exchange rates.

Uh, same thing with Mr. Wadhwa. The same thing with Harmeet Singh, all of these individuals and, uh, if I didn't mention Mr. Wadhwa. They were negotiating exchange rates. They're very clearly hwala brokers. And each one of the, uh, there was nothing to say that Harinder Singh was negotiating exchange rates at that level.

In addition to that, Sucha Singh, Gurkaran Singh, actually, I don't want to include Gurkaran Singh because I'm not sure of the evidence, but definitely Sucha Singh, definitely Taran Singh, definitely Mr. Wadhwa were dealing in hwala for years. I mean, I think Sucha Singh the evidence

was it was all the way back in the early 2000s, maybe the 1990s. And Mr. Harinder Singh it was just within the period that he arrived in the United States.

Harmeet Singh, the same thing, very, very long period of time. Taran Singh. These were elders in the community. And I think that should be considered in terms of the evidence to say that his sentence should be, I think it would lead to a sentencing disparity to say that they are on the same level. Uh, that it should be much lower than Sucha or Harmeet or Mr. Wadhwa.

I know the Court cited the guidelines where there's a minus three, but the 3553A factors don't consider that. I mean, the Court has the power to look at that. And it would lead to a sentencing disparity to say that someone who's been involved substantially over the years is now sentenced the same way that what would be someone that was involved a shorter period of time and then stopped on October 16, 2012.

When Mr. Sucha Singh knew that people were getting arrested, but he kept going. Gurkaran Singh kept going. All of them kept going. But Mr. Harinder Singh, I think it's relevant to his personal characteristics, and he stopped and that's undisputed here. It's not disputed that he stopped and didn't keep going.

And I think that should be important for the Court to consider under those factors to say once he learned, once

the lesson was learned, this is crazy. I have two children. When he's putting it all together, that's when he stops. The others are watching him get arrested, talking about him getting arrested on the phone. They don't care. They just kept going.

And I think that's a big distinction what they did before and what they did after that would lead the Court to accept a sentence that would be much lower than anyone else. I think that Harmeet Singh received a sentence of 42 months and Mr. Wadhwa received a sentence of 41 months.

THE COURT: But Mr. Wadhwa cooperated such as he did. I know your client attempted to.

MR. JOHNSON: My client did, but I'm sure that and in fact, he's ready to cooperate to the extent that he needs to now. I mean, he just doesn't have the information. He wasn't involved. He wasn't involved at that level where he could cooperate.

But that shouldn't be -- just because Mr. Wadhwa was intricately involved, and I think he went beyond drugs. There were so many things that were involved in some form of unlawful activity, and he was involved for years. To the extent he would come in and get a 41-month sentence and comparing the two, I understand he cooperated, but he cooperated cause he was so substantially involved.

THE COURT: Well, he started out with a 70-month

sentence and that lead to his decision to cooperate against your client apparently.

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, and I understand that. But to the extent that they're in the same, uh, he had the cooperation. He testified. But to the extent that Mr. Singh had information, he could have testified, too. I mean, I don't want the Court to discount the testimony of cooperators. I understand the cooperators it's different. But I do believe that it shouldn't be oh, that's the exception and not look at the sentencing disparity. I think it's very large to say that he would be around a 60 to 70 month sentence.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CHEN: Your Honor, may I just briefly respond?

So first of all with respect to once he learned his lesson, he stopped and whereas other people didn't. To be clear he was arrested I believe October 16, 2012. The very next day he attempted to cooperate, and by that I mean he actually spoke with Special Agent Lindsay Burns which meant the wiretap, federal, local investigation was the cat out of the bag at that point.

So he knew that we had wiretaps going. He knew that there was a much far-flung investigation. Whereas the other individuals were simply stopped by local law enforcement and they were never told about that.

The second thing is to be clear and Special Agent
Burns did testify at trial, it wasn't just a matter of he had
information to cooperate on and it just never worked out. As
Special Agent Burns testified about, he disassembled, he lied
during that interview so he had the opportunity to cooperate.

Your Honor, I think the main point here is this.

At the end of the day, we all agree 151 months is too much.

Nobody is trying to punish somebody for exercising the

constitutional right to testify -- sorry to go to trial. But

I think the Court hit upon the main point which is there's

got to be a principled way to come up with a sentencing here.

And just looking at it, Your Honor, first of all, each of

these individuals, this Court varied, departed I can never

remember which one it is.

THE COURT: Varied, I think.

MS. CHEN: For each of these individuals, and I think, for example, John Bradley Martin got 63 months. He was a repeat courier. He did not do any of the things that this defendant was convicted of and for which the evidence established he actually became a hwala broker as of July, August.

John Bradley Martin, I believe he actually delivered as a courier. There's no evidence that he actually became a hwala broker, I believe, twice. For that he got 63 months. This Court departed, I believe the low end was

87 months. He did not cooperate. This Court departed
25 months. If you look at the pattern, this Court departed
about roughly 20, 30 months for non-cooperators which I think
is fair.

For Bobbi, for Sanjev Wadhwa, Sucha Singh, Harmeet, to be clear all three of them either cooperated or attempted to cooperate and for that they got credit. Whether or not they testified at trial, they actually provided substantial assistance in the government's mind and they got some sort of credit. For those individuals, Sanjev Wadhwa was supposed to get 97 months, that was the low end. Originally, got 70 and ended up getting 41.

So ultimately, 97 from 41. Each of the cooperators from my very quick calculation, Your Honor, got about 40 to 50 months of credit. I think there is a difference when somebody does not take responsibility, goes to trial. Part of the risk is that this court gets to see the full scope of the evidence. I'm not, again, to be clear, nobody should be punished for going to trial, however, he does not take responsibility.

The other individuals not only took responsibility, but also cooperated. And I think the patterns in the sentences being imposed in this case is that for those who took responsibility and cooperated, and, of course, there's self-interest in cooperating, they got a much bigger

variance. Whereas I think if you say that he should get the same amount as Sucha Singh, for somebody who actually for good or for bad, he got him involved.

And I have to say, Your Honor, to the extent that the Court indicated that an elder came and got him involved, that sounds a little bit like crediting the cultural defense, and I would object to that, Your Honor. I think a lot of these individuals, we can get into 3553A factors and I'm sure we will, but I think a lot of those apply to the same — other defendants as well. They all come from the same culture.

I understand Sucha Singh got him involved.

However, for him to get the same sentence as somebody who took responsibility and cooperated, I think that actually creates a sentencing disparity. And, again, I point to John Martin Bradley who plead guilty prior to trial, was sentenced by this Court for 63 months for being a courier which is a lesser role than this defendant who went to trial, did not take responsibility.

And I would think, Your Honor, looking at it, I think that the government is prepared to say a plus 16 applies as opposed to a plus 18. Therefore, it would take it to a base Offense Level of 32, Criminal History of 1 would be 121 to 151.

I do think given everything, based off of the other

sentences, relative culpability, as well as somewhat of the 3553A factors, although, again, most of it applies to other defendants who have already been sentenced, I do think a 97-to-121-month sentence which is two levels off, even though the Court has already stated he should not get a mitigating role adjustment, I think a 97-month sentence or maybe even a little bit less than that seems to be appropriate for the government.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I just want to respond briefly.

Mr. Martin had drug-related offenses connected to him as well and that's not the same as here with Mr. Singh. He did attempt to cooperate, but I'm talking about Mr. Harinder Singh, but he would not agree because it's not true in his mind that he knew it was related to drugs and that's what the hang-up issue in fact was, um, and at least in the beginning. I think the government did revise the plea agreement to some form of unlawful activity.

I still believe that it should be much lower. I think I would be, you know, beating a dead horse already in terms of the sentence, but those individuals that the government has cited to where Sucha Singh gets 63 months, Harmeet 42 and Bobbi Wadhwa, 41, I think the sentence should be much lower than those sentences.

THE COURT: Well, first of all, I want to hear from Mr. Singh, but let me just make this generalized observation. I know you're all trying to make the very best case, and I don't mean it in a bad way, to place your respective client's position in the best of light. I don't know that any other defendant in the case aside from Harinder Singh has depended so heavily on the, uh, religious, social characteristics as you have.

I could draw two inferences. One, the rest of them didn't think it was very significant or two, you were the person who was careful enough to raise it as basis for departure. But in either event, the fact that the Court did not depart on a cultural basis for the other defendants strikes me as beside the point because I don't think the other defendants really raised the issue in the first place so the Court was probably not confronted with the issue.

As far as relative culpability, uh, I think that the factors are at best unclear as to whether Mr. Harinder Singh is so much more culpable than the other defendants that he should have 97 months in custody. As I said, I think that the right number is somewhere between 60 and 70 months. I realize that's a larger departure for Mr. Singh than it would have been for the other defendants in the case.

I also think that I have to throw into this the age-old charge that I have to find a sentence that is

sufficient, but not overly punitive. And so there are a lot of factors at work here and that's why I always find sentencing so difficult. But I do think that given the history of the case, given that the other defendants Sucha Singh, Harmeet Singh, Mr. Wadhwa all cooperated in some fashion or another, they are not the same as your client.

On the other hand, I think that their involvement in the conspiracy was perhaps greater than your client's because your client was induced to enter it. On the other hand, Ms. Chen is correct your client proceeded to engage in the conduct and ultimately became not just a courier, but became a broker. It makes it a very, very difficult situation.

And I have said 60 to 70 months. I think 70 months is probably where I would end up in the case, but I recognize that everyone disagrees with me at some level or another and maybe that's good.

MR. JOHNSON: I understand where the Court's going and I just want to make, I guess, a few more points. Number one is that the cultural issue is not something that I think should be ignored the way it's being ignored.

THE COURT: Well, I don't I'm ignoring it. I am saying to the extent it is relevant, uh, I am acknowledging it.

MR. JOHNSON: Um, to the extent that the Court has

to consider as well the other 3553 factors, I would ask the Court to consider that he has been out over the six years. He's been in full compliance over the time of the last three on electronic monitoring. Not a risk of flight or a danger to the community. And to the extent that that's a punishment that's no more than necessary, um, I think that so the Court understands where I believe 60 to 70 months is more than necessary to let him know that this is illegal and shouldn't be done when in fact he withdrew on October 12, 2016. And the rest of what we would have to say is in the papers.

THE COURT: I've considered what's in your papers.

If I were to adopt the level 32, criminal history one, it

would yield the range that Ms. Chen referred to which I can
pull out, 129 to something.

MS. CHEN: Your Honor, I believe 121 to 151.

THE COURT: Okay, 121 to 151. If that were the starting point, 70 months is would still be an enormous variance from that level. I've indicated that I disagree with your contention that Mr. Singh is entitled to a three-level decrease for a mitigating role. I disagree with your objection to the plus six because I think there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Singh knew he was connected to drug trafficking.

So what we go to is variances and as I say, your client uniquely offered as a basis for a variance religious

1 and cultural history. Um, I'm not sure I buy it, but I'm 2 giving it some credence, obviously, in reaching 70 months when the level might have been 121 months. 3 4 I'm also considering the other 3553A factors which include the nature and history of our client, whether a 5 sentence of 70 months sends a message to him, if you will, or 6 7 to others similarly situated. I think it does. And I think that it also shows that he did not take 8 9 responsibility for his conduct which would have given him 10 perhaps a lower offense level, and I think that a 70-month 11 sentence fairly accounts for the sentences given to others in 12 the case that we've discussed so it seems to me that's where 13 I should end up. 14 That said if as I assume he will, Mr. Singh wishes 15 to be heard, I am more than pleased to hear from him. 16 MR. JOHNSON: Okay, Your Honor. May I have just a 17 moment? 18 THE COURT: Sure. 19 MS. CHEN: And, Your Honor, before we hear from 20 Mr. Singh, may I just make a couple of things clear just for 21 the record? 22 THE COURT: Sure. 23 And I'll wait for Mr. Johnson. MS. CHEN: 24 THE COURT: Please. 25 If I may put some things on the record? MS. CHEN:

1 THE COURT: That's fine. Let him finish and then 2 you can go ahead. 3 MR. JOHNSON: I didn't hear. 4 THE COURT: I think Ms. Chen wants to place 5 something on the record, but she wanted to do it when you were not communicating with your client. 6 7 MR. JOHNSON: So Mr. Singh does have something to 8 say. 9 Did you want to put something on the record? 10 MS. CHEN: Only just for the record about -- and, 11 Your Honor, I, uh -- the government appreciates the time that 12 this Court has put into this case. I recognize that it is a 13 difficult situation to try to sentence real people relative. 14 I never want to come off strident or cute, frankly, but I 15 would like to put this on the record, again, as my Appeals 16 Unit would want me to. Uh, to the extent that this Court is recognizing 17 18 the religious and cultural aspects and to address the Court's 19 comments that no other defendant had so explicitly put that 20 on the record, I believe that's true. My recollection was 21 faith and family was explicitly raised in front of the jury 22 over the government's objections and over I believe the Court's sustaining of objections. So this defense frankly 23 24 has permeated every aspect of this defendant's case. 25 I will say to the extent this Court has indicated

it is giving some credence to it, I would simply note, and again, Your Honor, this is for the record that at trial it was raised especially in wiretap calls that this individual and, again, not to be cute, but has tattoos and earrings which likely is not consistent with an orthodox faith. So it's unclear if he was practicing in the faith.

And I recognize that that has -- that was a defense and that is now being used as a mitigating factor. But I want to make very clear that the government doesn't believe it should apply. And that even if it did would apply as a mitigating circumstance, it wouldn't apply to this defendant.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just be clear because I think I haven't been clear. The government objected to Mr. Gill's testimony both that he was giving me social and religious testimony and to the substance. I think Mr. Johnson then came back and said the Court has a right to consider that in any event because this is sentencing.

What I think I said was to the extent that I have the right to consider that information, I will do so, but I don't buy into it. I disagree that cultural and religious factors come into play in this case. I indicated the reason for my variance related to lots of factors, uh, and to the extent that, uh, the religious factors were offered, I have considered them.

I was not granting a variance based on them because

as I say, I didn't buy into it. I think I wasn't clear. But that said I indicated that there were a variety of factors that had been put forward in terms of perhaps Mr. Singh wasn't entitled to a minus three for his role in the offense, but it seemed to me that he was less culpable than some of the others.

Some of the others received lesser sentences than I proposed to given in this case because they cooperated, uh, they took responsibility early on and there were other factors that lead to their having lower sentences. But once again I was not saying that Mr. Singh was necessarily as involved at every stage as some of the other people who seemed to me to have had higher roles in the operation including Mr. Wadhwa, Sucha Singh, Harmeet Singh to some extent.

I don't know if I've clarified anything or not, but your comments are certainly noted for the record. And I just wanted to be clear knowing that sometimes I'm not as clear as I would like to be.

MR. JOHNSON: Neither am I. I wanted to make sure that it's clear we are advancing that and would oppose any objection to it. That it's not a cultural departure or variance simply because to say that the individual, I think what the guideline as written say don't depart because of that individual's race or culture.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JOHNSON: That's not what the departure is for. The cultural and religious context goes right and fits right within the 3553A factors. I understand what the Court is saying that even if that is the case, the Court rejects -- is not persuaded by it and I understand that.

What I would like to note is that the government has consistently and in its papers as well and just now talked about the religious context so I think I would like to address it. When the government talks about mirroring in that Mr. Harinder Singh was mirroring the behavior of Sucha Singh, Gurkaran Singh, it is absolutely not the same thing based upon Professor Gill's letter and the context this occurred. That these individuals were much higher in the faith. That Sucha Singh was a leader in the church who prayed over the community. So was Ramesh Singh, another individual. They were all much higher and had authority than Mr. Harinder Singh would have been low on the totem pole.

The government talked about tattoos and earrings.

I think that goes further into showing that the deference he would have for someone who would wear a turban and a beard.

It's because members of a congregation, including myself, when you look up to a leader of a church, it doesn't mean that you're perfect. It means that you might be striving to get to that level, and that's what Mr. Harinder Singh was

doing in our view in this context.

Where he may not have worn the turban or had tattoos or he had earrings, but that doesn't mean he's not striving for the ideal values in the Sikh faith. I think it shows that he would look up further to someone that actually has the discipline to do so.

THE COURT: And I understand your argument and with all due respect, I just disagree.

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you.

Mr. Singh has something short to say.

THE COURT: Yes.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, what I want to say is this case seems different than what it was. The money that I was gathering around 20 people would give money to the San Jose Sikh temple. I would go there for church, and I would deliver to Harmeet Singh. I did this for two, three months. And he told me this is like a Western Union. Even when I wanted to send money and I would ask priest how do I do it? They told me this is the way.

And I know this was not wrong. There were -10,000 people were using the same system to send money. And
then towards the end, Gurkaran told me he is not well.

Harmeet was not right. So Gurkaran asked me that for a while
if you can deliver the money. And he told me you don't have
to say anything to Sucha Singh. It's not a big thing.

And I told him I want to go to India for my sister's wedding, and then after that, I don't want to do this. I want to buy a truck. There are more Sikh people in Southern California than Northern California. They have the book, list of people. You can bring Sucha Singh here and you can ask him most of them are his relatives. The book that they have. All I want to say, Your Honor, I am innocent.

MR. JOHNSON: I know that concludes what he's saying, but I think what, uh, Mr. Singh is trying to articulate is that he felt -- this is why I sincerely believe the cultural and religion impacted him. He sincerely believed as he's going along that he's trusting his uncle. He's believing that the things he's delivering are appropriate, and that's really the context of what he is. And every indication was that his uncle was sending him to these Gudwharas to pick up money from the Gudwhara.

THE COURT: I understand that is his position and your position. And I -- at the risk of being too candid, when I know a case is going to be appealed, I would not expect a defendant to admit responsibility. I understand that he feels that what he did was proper, and that will be decided obviously on another occasion.

That said, I do want to correct one thing that goes to Ms. Chen's point. The recommendation of Probation was -- the range was 151 to 188 months. But I want to note for the

record that their sentencing recommendation was 100 months in custody, not 151 months in custody which suggests that for purposes of determining sentencing disparity and issues of that nature, 70 months is even more reasonable than perhaps I had indicated earlier because this is a departure of approximately 30 months from the recommended sentence based on the higher offense level of 34.

And as we've established, if we assume -- and the government, of course, is not giving up its contentions, but if we assume the offense level is 32, then we're talking 121 to 151 months. And if that were the range, I assume the recommendation from Probation is even less, but that's speculation on my part.

But for the reasons I previously articulated, it does seem to me that 70 months is the appropriate sentence to meet the various issues and sentencing considerations of Section 3553A so for that reason, that's what I'm going to impose.

Does anyone have anything further to say?

Otherwise, I would proceed.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I just want to make sure that the record is complete. If I may just have a minute to speak with -- there was just one other thing I wanted to put on the record. I think what Mr. Harinder Singh was trying to explain was that there are --

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THE INTERPRETER: Correction. Your Honor, Mr. Harinder Singh said there are more Sikh community in Northern California than Southern California. THE COURT: Right. THE INTERPRETER: I wanted to clear that, and I asked him again, and he said yes, and that's what he said. MR. JOHNSON: And that's what he was trying to put in the context to say that those individuals that were in his journal were from Sucha Singh. They were the Sucha Singh contacts that he was using from, uh, to pick up money from the various Sikh temples. Your Honor, just in terms of making sure that the record is complete, is it possible to have Professor Gill make a statement or take the stand? MS. CHEN: Your Honor, the government would object to that. I believe the letter apparently is in the record. I would just object to that. MR. JOHNSON: The Court can consider any evidence related to sentencing. THE COURT: Well, I can, but think about where we are right now. That's fine if you want to do it, but then the government is going to have an opportunity to cross-examine. And I've indicated that I have considered his letter and I just do not accept it as a basis for a variance in this case.

1 MR. JOHNSON: I understand. If I might just have a 2 moment? 3 THE COURT: But if we're going to do that, we've 4 got to take a short recess. MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we understand what the 5 Court's rulings are. The Court has read the letter, and 6 7 we'll leave it at that. THE COURT: Anything further, Ms. Chen? 8 9 MS. CHEN: Your Honor, I think only to the extent 10 that there was no fulsome -- everything was quite fulsome, 11 but to the extent that there was no fulsome discussion about 12 3553A factors, I would just note that the government believes 13 again for the record that a 97-month sentence would be 14 extremely generous. There's nothing in the defendant's 15 personal history especially with regard, I believe 16 Mr. Johnson raised immigration status. Most of the 17 individuals in this case would likely be deported if they 18 weren't already deported so that would be inappropriate. 19 Mr. Johnson also noted that the sentencing 20 guidelines stated a person's culture or race should not be 21 considered and yet then stated that 3553A should be considered a factor. I'm not sure what the fine line between 22 23 those two arguments are. With respect to, and to be very clear, I don't want 24 25 to make any argument, uh, having an argument not addressed.

To the extent that Mr. Johnson made the argument that this defendant has been out on bond and fully complied, one, I'm not really sure about that.

Two, to the extent that an individual who is facing serious federal charges and decides to obey the terms and conditions of bond, I don't believe that is something for him to be rewarded in terms of a lighter sentence. That's simply following the law.

And then finally, in terms of the cultural defense, again, while no other defendant raised this specifically, if we're to apply, it would apply across the board. I understand that, again, to be very clear, Mr. Singh is probably one of the younger individuals in this case, and I understand that he got involved due to familial relationships, but I don't believe -- Gurkaran Isshpunani, Taran Singh, I don't believe they're high level priests in any temple.

So, again, just putting it on the record, to the extent that culture should be considered which I believe it shouldn't be under the guidelines because if it can be considered under 3553A factor, how is it then there is prohibition considering it just in general?

Again, I believe 3553A factors raised by

Mr. Johnson in his papers are not that different from any
other defendant. Every defendant has family and children.

1 In some ways having a wife run out of the house with a baby 2 in one arm and \$388,000 in another hand might actually be an 3 aggravating factor. 4 So I just want to make that clear for the record, 5 Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Well, having -- I will make 6 7 clear I agree with everything you say regarding those 3553A factors, however, I have been concerned with sentencing 8 9 disparity, I have been concerned with the relative role of 10 this defendants versus other defendants in the case. 11 Recognizing that some of the other defendants whose 12 roles may have been more substantial, uh, had lesser 13 sentences because they either cooperated or they plead guilty 14 and all those factors also come into play, but I agree with 15 everything you just said as to those factors. 16 MR. JOHNSON: And I -- and I hate to keep opening 17 up --18 THE COURT: No, go ahead. 19 MR. JOHNSON: But what I think the government is 20 saying is absolutely wrong. 21 THE COURT: I know and that's exactly why I said 22 that to the extent the government felt that I should not hear 23 Mr. Gill's testimony, I was prepared at least provisionally 24 to hear what he had to say. And I made it very clear my 25 personal view is I disagree with him and that's all there is

1 to it.

MR. JOHNSON: I understand.

The -- the -- the 3553A factors that -- that we've outlined in our paper, um, are an addition if you cross out the family and religious background is that his lack of experience and communication, connection with drug traffickers, I think that's absolutely true.

His -- his saying he accepted a job with Mr. Singh, uh, with his uncle, to, uh -- as an alternative to be home with his pregnant wife, that can be considered as well. His role in the beginning and certainly as a courier, considered as well.

His ending on October 16th while others continued is that that should be considered as well the -- the -- under the circumstances of the offense as well as his compliance is absolutely something that the Court can consider at sentencing because it demonstrates that no new arrests or his willingness to get involved again or be connected to criminal activity. Even if it's a small part, it should be considered in the history and characteristics.

The extreme family circumstances of his wife having two children after the initial arrest, his zero criminal history with a low risk of recidivism, those are all factors that the Court can consider under 3553.

THE COURT: I agree those are factors that the

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      court can consider, however, as I've indicated, they're not
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      the factors I'm relying upon in reaching this conclusion.
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                MR. JOHNSON: Understood.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Anything further?
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                           I don't believe so, Your Honor.
                MS. CHEN:
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                I think there was a request for bail pending appeal
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      and the government would oppose that.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. JOHNSON: There is a request for bail pending
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      appeal.
              As the Court is aware that what the defendant must
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      do is bring forth a plausible argument that may be successful
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      on appeal. That he's demonstrated he's not a risk of flight
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      or danger to the community in the very beginning. I think
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     he's demonstrated that and I think bail pending appeal should
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     be granted.
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                THE COURT: All right. I am disinclined to grant
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      bail pending appeal. I will consider a surrender date. I'm
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      not remanding him into custody.
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                MR. JOHNSON: What I would like is that would the
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      Court be inclined with January 31st as a self-surrender date?
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                THE COURT: I know the government probably opposes
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      it, but I would be prepared to do that.
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                MS. CHEN: Your Honor, the government does not
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      oppose it. That's fine.
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                MR. JOHNSON: When the Court said, I want to be
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1 clear for the record, is the Court would be inclined not to 2 grant bail pending appeal? 3 THE COURT: I'll tell you why. 4 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 5 THE COURT: First of all, I think there is a low probability that a new trial will be granted. I think 6 7 there's a low probability that the conviction will be reversed on appeal. And I believe that your client has 8 9 demonstrated at least up until now that he's not a risk of 10 flight although I do think that is a possibility given his 11 ability to travel, but I think that can be mitigated by the 12 existing circumstances or surrender of passport and things 13 along those lines. I just don't think you have met the bar 14 in my mind for me to grant bail on appeal. 15 MR. JOHNSON: In terms of the risk of flight and 16 danger to the community, he's continuously, he has electronic monitoring. 17 18 THE COURT: I'm aware of that. 19 MR. JOHNSON: He has turned in his passport. 20 The standard in Handy 761 Fed.2d. 1279 is that is there a debatable issue that would be raised on appeal that 21 22 would likely result in reversal being successful. I think that, in fact, there are several debatable 23 24 issues that are listed on page 22 of the brief, that there 25 were several issues raised at trial, that, um -- including

1 the statements that the Court has ruled on, the jury 2 instructions -- the, uh, uh, the jury instructions related to the money laundering as well as the offense in the 1960 as 3 4 well as the -- the defense that the entire -- the defendant should have been entitled to cross-examine Sanjev Wadhwa 5 during the trial. And I think these are debatable issues 6 7 that if granted will be, uh -- would actually lead to another 8 trial. 9 It's not determining whether they're great issues, 10 but if they are a debatable issue, and they -- if one of them 11 is granted by the 9th Circuit that that would actually lead 12 to a new trial. 13 So I think the standard is met for bail pending 14 appeal. 15 THE COURT: Well, your arguments are noted for the 16 record and for the reasons I just indicated, I respectfully 17 disagree. 18 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to say anything in 20 response to that, Ms. Chen? 21 MS. CHEN: Only with respect to the bail pending 22 appeal, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MS. CHEN: Only that I believe that none of the 25 eight issues listed on page 22 of Mr. Johnson's sentencing

memorandum would actually satisfy the standard. And in particular with regard to Paragraph 4 with regards to his entitlement to present evidence or discuss faith and family, I believe he did get to do that at trial, perhaps not to extent he wanted to.

I will otherwise submit as the reasons listed by the Court. And I do believe that only other thing I would mention is now having been convicted and sentenced to a lengthy sentence, I do believe that increases incentive for flight. On that I would submit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JOHNSON: Just on the bail pending appeal so the record is clear, the Court didn't conclude that he was a flight risk, those could be mitigated. I don't think the Court addressed danger.

THE COURT: Let me be clear. I think that there are not really debatable issues as to whether a new trial would be granted or the conviction reversed on appeal. To the extent that I have to address risk of flight and danger to the community as part of the motion, and I think it's pretty much mooted by a finding that there's little likelihood of reversal on appeal and little likelihood that a new trial would be granted.

But to the extent I do, it seems to me after I impose a 70-month sentence, there is a greater risk of flight

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and I think that the issue of danger to the community is a neutral issue. In other words, I don't think that Mr. Singh presents a risk of danger to the community that cannot be mitigated, but I do think that there's little likelihood of a reversal or a new trial. MR. JOHNSON: I understand the Court's ruling and I just want to be clear on the Court's ruling related to, uh, is he a risk of flight? THE COURT: What I'm saying is he is to the extent that I am imposing a 70-month sentence. He has greater incentive to flee in those circumstances. I believe that for the short term that we're talking about until the date of his self-surrender, the fact that he is not in possession of his passport and the fact he's on electronic monitoring for that short period of time does something to mitigate that risk, but I do not think it entirely mitigates the risk. As I've experienced in numerous other cases where I have delayed a self-surrender date and have believed that there was not a great risk of flight and people have flown the coup more times than I'd like to count. So I can't tell you there's no risk of flight. Does that answer the question? MR. JOHNSON: I think it does Your Honor. THE COURT: Ms. Chen, anything further?

MS. CHEN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Then it is ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of \$300 which is due immediately. Any unpaid balance shall be due during the period of imprisonment at the rate of not less than \$25 per quarter and pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Pursuant to Guideline Section 5E1.2(a), all fines are waived as the Court finds that the defendant has established that he is unable to pay and not likely to become able to pay any fine.

MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Can the Court slow down?

THE COURT: Absolutely, I'm sorry. Let me start at the beginning.

It is ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of \$300 which is due immediately. Any unpaid balance shall be due during the period of imprisonment at the rate of not less than \$25 per quarter and pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Pursuant to Guideline Section 5E1.2(a), all fines are waived as the Court finds that the defendant has established that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it

is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant Harinder
Singh is hereby committed on Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the
indictment to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term
of 70 months. This term consists of 70 months on each of
Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment to be served
concurrently.

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of three years.

This term consists of three years on each of Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment, all such terms to run concurrently under the following terms and conditions:

- 1. The defendant shall comply with the rules and regulations of the United States Probation Office and General Order 05-02 with the exception of Conditions 5, 6 and 14 of that order.
- 2. The defendant shall not commit any violation of local, state or federal law or ordinance.
- 3. During the period of community supervision, the defendant shall pay the special assessment in accordance with this judgment's orders pertaining to such payment.
- 4. The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant.
- 5. As directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify specific persons and organizations of specific risks and shall permit the probation officer to

confirm the defendant's compliance with such requirement and to make such notifications.

6. The defendant shall comply with the immigration rules and regulations of the United States and if deported from this country either voluntarily or involuntarily not reenter the United States illegally.

The defendant is not required to report to the probation office while residing outside of the United States. However, within 72 hours of release from any custody or any reentry to the United States during the period of court ordered supervision, the defendant shall report for instructions to the United States Probation Office located at the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room 600, Los Angeles, California 90012.

The drug testing condition mandated by statute is suspended based on the Court's determination that defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.

It is further ordered that the defendant shall surrender himself to the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons at or before 12:00 noon on January 31, 2019. In the absence of such designation, the defendant shall report on or before the same date and time to the United States Marshal located at Roybal Federal Building, 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California, 90012.

Okay. Do we have a request?

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                MR. JOHNSON: For location?
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                THE COURT: Yes.
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                MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, we do.
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                THE COURT: And that is?
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                MR. JOHNSON: That he be in Southern California
     close to his family and his children.
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                THE COURT: And the Court will make that
     recommendation that the defendant be placed at a facility in
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 9
      the Southern California area which is hopefully near his
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     family.
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                Um, Mr. Singh, to the extent you have a right to
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     appeal and you do, you must do so within 14 days of today.
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      If you cannot afford to pay for counsel, counsel will be
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     provided for you at no cost. Do you understand that?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
16
                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I have two statements
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     regarding the sentencing.
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                THE COURT: Sure.
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                MR. JOHNSON: I believe the Court has imposed a
      sentence of 70 months for each count that they run
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22
      concurrent. I believe Counts 2 and 3 have a 60-month cap.
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                THE COURT: Thank you for clarifying that.
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                MR. JOHNSON: I would also like to -- to object
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     generally just for the record, generally to the supervised
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release conditions and certainly just for appeal purposes and in particular but including DNA, the requirement that he, uh, be required to submit to DNA testing.


THE COURT: Okay. Let me first of all say that the sentence is to 70 months on Count 1, 60 months on Count 2, 60 months on Count 3, and all such counts shall be served concurrently.

With regard to the objections, uh, to the conditions of supervised release, I believe that while I'm going to note them for the record, the objections are not well taken, and I intend to overrule the objections based on the orders -- general order of this court regarding conditions of supervision.

Um, and to the extent that I need to, uh, deal with the 3553A factors, I think I have already done so in the course of these proceedings, and I have indicated that the key factors in my mind are not only the defendant's history and characteristics excluding what I think -- well, let me put it this way, history and characteristics, namely that he's young, he was brought to this crime by Mr. Sucha Singh, uh, and may have been influenced by elders, the fact of the matter is I think he committed the crime fully knowing, uh, its objects.

And last but not least, I have indicated that the reasons that I have varied his sentence to 70 months is

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     principally to avoid what I believe are unwarranted
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      sentencing disparities in the case. Um, obviously, everyone
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     preserves their objections.
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                Now, the one thing that I do need to clarify,
      everybody, is I intend to find that the criminal history is
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      34, and that the, uh -- uh, I'm sorry. I misspoke. The
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     offense level is 34, and the criminal history category is 1.
     Um, for purposes of the statement of reasons recognizing that
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      that there has been a concession by the government at least
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      for purposes of this hearing without waving anything that the
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     offense level is 32.
12
                Does anyone find a problem in my doing that?
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                MR. JOHNSON: Well, obviously, preserving the
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     objections that the defendant has raised, I -- I don't know
15
     that we would weigh in.
16
                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MS. CHEN: And, Your Honor, I don't find any issues
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     with that as well.
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                THE COURT: Okay. And then should we provide that
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     bond will be exonerated upon surrender?
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                MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
22
                MS. CHEN: Yes, Your Honor.
                THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, everyone.
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                MS. CHEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
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2	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	
4	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
5	) SS.
6	STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
7	
8	I, LAURA ELIAS, OFFICIAL REPORTER, IN AND FOR THE UNITED
9	STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
10	DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I REPORTED, STENOGRAPHICALLY, THE
11	FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS AT THE TIME AND PLACE HEREINBEFORE SET
12	FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS THEREAFTER REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN
13	FORM BY MEANS OF COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION; AND I DO
14	FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION
15	OF MY STENOGRAPHIC NOTES.
16	
17	
18	DATE: <u>JANUARY 24, 2019</u>
19	
20	/s/ LAURA MILLER ELIAS
21	LAURA MILLER ELIAS, CSR 10019
22	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
23	
24	
25	