

Android Reverse engineering

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
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
The Android Architecture



Dalvik Virtual Machine (VM)


- **Novel** Java Virtual Machine implementation (not using the Oracle JVM)
- **Open License** (Oracle JVM is not open!)
- **Optimized** for memory-constrained devices
- **Faster** than Oracle JVM

APK Build process



Code Protection in Android-Patrick Schulz

Dalvik Java Virtual Machine (JVM)




Dex File Structure

- B. Bytecodes
 - classes.dex 파일은 Bytecode 형태

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	
00000000	64	65	78	0A	30	33	35	00	81	77	D2	5E	74	7D	9B	86	dex.035..wÔ^t} >†
00000010	DE	C7	23	5A	94	3F	3D	91	4D	92	E2	76	6B	B1	B7	98	ÈÇ#Z"?'='M' âvk±·~
00000020	B8	C1	07	00	70	00	00	00	78	56	34	12	00	00	00	00	,.Á..p...xV4.....
00000030	00	00	00	00	E8	C0	07	00	86	15	00	00	70	00	00	00èÀ..†...p...
00000040	FC	02	00	00	88	56	00	00	F8	03	00	00	78	62	00	00	ü...^V...ø...xb..
00000050	AC	04	00	00	18	92	00	00	EE	12	00	00	78	B7	00	00	¬.....'...î...x...
00000060	CA	01	00	00	E8	4E	01	00	90	39	06	00	28	88	01	00	Ê...èN...9..(^...
00000070	8C	A3	05	00	24	D3	04	00	B7	D0	04	00	0C	D3	04	00	Œ£...\$Ó...·Ð...Ó...
00000080	AE	D3	04	00	95	2B	05	00	45	2C	05	00	D9	25	05	00	©Ó...*+...E,...Û%...
00000090	8A	2C	05	00	BC	6D	05	00	8F	6D	05	00	5E	6D	05	00	Š,...¼m...m...^m...
000000A0	38	27	05	00	78	27	05	00	D6	27	05	00	AD	2C	05	00	8'...x'...Ö'....,..
000000B0	18	D3	04	00	AC	2B	05	00	19	2C	05	00	6D	2C	05	00	.Ó...¬+....,..m,..
000000C0	FD	25	05	00	56	28	05	00	65	28	05	00	2B	29	05	00	ý%...V(..e(..+)..
000000D0	FE	27	05	00	F4	07	05	00	8A	08	05	00	02	08	05	00	p'...ô...Š.....
000000E0	1D	08	05	00	8F	26	05	00	48	08	05	00	60	08	05	00&...H...`...
000000F0	11	08	05	00	56	25	05	00	66	D7	04	00	B9	0C	05	00V%...f×...²...
00000100	99	31	05	00	6D	10	05	00	53	29	05	00	3B	28	06	00	™1...m...S)..;(...
00000110	8C	2E	06	00	7F	2E	06	00	9C	2E	06	00	4A	F8	04	00	Œ.....œ...Jø...
00000120	77	45	06	00	C0	45	06	00	97	D9	04	00	5D	45	06	00	wE...ÀE...-Û...]E...

Dex File Structure



Dalvik Executable

The Instruction Set of Dalvik VM Bytecode

- <https://source.android.com/devices/tech/dalvik/dalvik-bytecode.html>

Op & Format	Mnemonic / Syntax	Arguments	Description
32..37 22t	if-test vA, vB, +CCCC 32: if-eq 33: if-ne 34: if-lt 35: if-ge 36: if-gt 37: if-le	A: first register to test (4 bits) B: second register to test (4 bits) C: signed branch offset (16 bits)	Branch to the given destination if the given two registers' values compare as specified. Note: The branch offset must not be 0. (A spin loop may be legally constructed either by branching around a backward <code>goto</code> or by including a <code>nop</code> as a target before the branch.)
38..3d 21t	if-testz vAA, +BBBB 38: if-eqz 39: if-nez 3a: if-ltz 3b: if-gez 3c: if-gtz 3d: if-lez	A: register to test (8 bits) B: signed branch offset (16 bits)	Branch to the given destination if the given register's value compares with 0 as specified. Note: The branch offset must not be 0. (A spin loop may be legally constructed either by branching around a backward <code>goto</code> or by including a <code>nop</code> as a target before the branch.)

Mnemonic Example

Java source code	Mnemonics
<pre>public static void hello() { System.out.println("hello koha"); }</pre>	<pre>sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/System;- >out:Ljava/io/PrintStream; const-string v1, "hello koha" invoke-virtual v0, v1 , Ljava/io/PrintStream;- >println(Ljava/lang/String;)V return-void</pre>

Smali Example

```
1 MainActivity.smali
2
3 .method public SerialCheck(Ljava/lang/String;)Z
4     .locals 1
5     .param p1, "inputText"    # Ljava/lang/String;
6
7     .prologue
8     .line 41
9     const-string v0, "최고준업 모든 u77i77i"
10
11     invoke-virtual {p1, v0}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
12
13     move-result v0
14
15     if-eqz v0, :cond_0
16
17     .line 42
18     const/4 v0, 0x1
19
20     .line 43
21     :goto_0
22     return v0
23
24     :cond_0
25     const/4 v0, 0x0
26
27     goto :goto_0
28 .end method
```

...



Phishing cam

사회 · 사건 · 사고 [주말뉴스 토] '몸캠 주의보' 몸캠 피해 사례 속출

이태형 TV조선 기자 ▼

기사 100자평(12)

입력 : 2014.08.16 20:55 | 수정 : 2014.08.16 21:23



알몸 채팅을 하자고 유인한 뒤 이를 녹화한 영상을 미끼로 협박하는 '몸캠' 사기의 피해자가 늘고 있다.


'몸캠' 사기는 중국 보이스 피싱 조직이 스마트폰 채팅으로 음란 행위를 유도한 뒤 연락처를 해킹하는 수법이다. 이들은 확보한 연락처를 바탕으로 지인들에게 유포하겠다고 협박하며 거액을 요구한다.

최근 SNS 상에 피해 사례가 속속 올라오는가 하면 피해자 모임 카페엔 한 달 만에 200여명이 가입했다.


치명적인 유혹 '몸캠 피싱' 사기 주의보... 남성 200여명 30억원 뜯겨

입력: 2015.02.11 00:10 트위터 카카오스토리 페이스북



Like 0 + 확대 - 축소 인쇄



Phishing Cam victims (2/3)



Phishing Cam victims (3/3)



Phishing Cam Application



Phishing Cam Server

TorBrowser

phpinfo()

www.melo123.net/c29/phpinfo.php




PHP Version 5.2.6

System	Windows NT SN4Q86KJHYBW 5.2 build 3790
Build Date	May 2 2008 18:01:20
Configure Command	cscript /nologo configure.js "--enable-snapshot-build" "--with-gd=shared" "--with-extra- includes=C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SDK\Include;C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\VC98\ATL\INCLUDE;C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\VC98\INCLUDE;C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\VC98\MFC\INCLUDE" "--with-extra-libs=C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SDK\lib;C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\VC98\LIB;C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\VC98\MFC\LIB"
Server API	Apache 2.0 Handler
Virtual Directory Support	enabled
Configuration File (php.ini) Path	C:\WINDOWS
Loaded Configuration File	D:\APMServ5.2.6\PHP\php.ini
PHP API	20041225
PHP Extension	20060613
Zend Extension	220060519
Debug Build	no
Thread Safety	enabled
Zend Memory Manager	enabled
IPv6 Support	enabled
Registered PHP Streams	php, file, data, http, ftp, compress.zlib, https, ftps, zip
Registered Stream Socket Transports	tcp, udp, ssl, sslv3, sslv2, tls
Registered Stream Filters	convert.iconv.*, string.rot13, string.toupper, string.tolower, string.strip_tags, convert.*, consumed, zlib.*, mcrypt.*, mdecrypt.*

Apache Environment

Variable	Value
HTTP_HOST	www.melo123.net
HTTP_USER_AGENT	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
HTTP_ACCEPT	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE	en-us,en;q=0.5
HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING	gzip, deflate
HTTP_COOKIE	PHPSESSID=bc26278a09964fafe4c6c98f21a37674
HTTP_CONNECTION	keep-alive
PATH	C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem
SystemRoot	C:\WINDOWS
COMSPEC	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
PATHEXT	.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH
WINDIR	C:\WINDOWS
SERVER_SIGNATURE	<address>Apache/2.2.9 (APMServ) PHP/5.2.6 Server at www.melo123.net Port 80</address>
SERVER_SOFTWARE	Apache/2.2.9 (APMServ) PHP/5.2.6
SERVER_NAME	www.melo123.net
SERVER_ADDR	122.10.49.147
SERVER_PORT	80
REMOTE_ADDR	176.10.100.227
DOCUMENT_ROOT	D:\APMServ5.2.6\www\htdocs
SERVER_ADMIN	webmaster@localhost
SCRIPT_FILENAME	D:\APMServ5.2.6\www\htdocs\c29\phpinfo.php
REMOTE_PORT	57860
GATEWAY_INTERFACE	CGI/1.1
SERVER_PROTOCOL	HTTP/1.1
REQUEST_METHOD	GET
QUERY_STRING	no value
REQUEST_URI	/c29/phpinfo.php
SCRIPT_NAME	/c29/phpinfo.php

Phishing Cam Server



Android Obfuscation

Obfuscation Code

- What is Obfuscation Code?

- 코드의 실행 특성은 유지하면서, 역공학을 어렵게 변형시키는 기법

- 난독화의 효과

- 분석 도구를 방해
- 분석가의 일을 늘려 분석시간 지연 (역공학 무력화)
- 행위 숨기기

- 난독화의 한계

- 암호화 만큼 충분히 강한 난독화가 불가능
 - Barak, et al., 2001. On the (im) possibility of obfuscating programs - CRYPTO 2001
- 사용된 난독화 기법을 알면 분석 가능
 - Appel, A., 2002. Deobfuscation is in NP.




The International Obfuscated C Code Contest

- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Obfuscated_C_Code_Contest
- <http://www.ioccc.org/winners.html>


표 1 난독화 기술 분류 표

```
#include <math.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <X11/keysym.h>
double L, o, P
, _dt, T, Z, D=1, d,
a[999], E, h= 8, l,
J, K, w[999], M, m, O
, n[999], j=35e-3, i=
1E3, r, t, u, v, W, S=
74.5, l=221, x=7.26,
a, B, A=32, o, F, H;
int N, q, C, y, p, U;
Window z; char f[52];
: GC k; main(){ Display=
XOpenDisplay( 0); z=RootWindow(e, 0); for (XSetForeground(e, k=XCreateGC( e, z, 0, 0), BlackPixel(e, 0))
; softmax( "%f%f%f", y +n, w, y, a)+1; y ++); XSelectInput(e, z= XCreateSimpleWindow(e, z, 0, 0, 400, 400,
0, 0, WhitePixel(e, 0)), KeyPressMask); for(XMapWindow(e, z); ; T=sin(O)){ struct timeval G={ 0, dt*1e6}
; K= cos(j); N=1e4; M= H; Z=D*K; F=-P; r=E+D*B*W; j=d*_D*_AF+E; P=W+E
AT+B, E=d/K +B*W/B*(K/F+D); p; y; } { T[p[a]]+; E=p[w]; D=n[p]-L; K=D+m-B*
T; } O/K < fabs(W*T+r-l+E +D*P) { fabs(D+t +D*Z +T-a +E) K)N=1e4; else{ q=W/K
+D; N=1E433 XDrawLine(e, z, K, N, U, q, 0); Nq; U=q; } +p; } L+=A (X+t +P*H
XDrawString(e, z, k, 20, 880, f, 17); D+=1/15; H=(B +l-M*r -xZ); for(;; X
XEvent z; XNextEvent(e, &z);
++((N-XLookupKeysym
(&z, &key, 0))-IT?
N-LT? UP-N*E+8
J+8 u: 0h); --(
DN -N? N-DT ?N=
RT*8u: 8 W, 0h, 0J
); } m=154/F/1;
o=(l+m/ 1, 14H
+M+M+X); H
=A+r+v-X-F+H(
E= H*4.9/1, t
=T+m/52-147/24
)/8; K=F*M*H(
h= 1e4/1-(T+
E+5+T+E)/5e2
)/8-X*d-B*A;
a=2.68 /1+d;
X+=(- d+1-T/8
A, 19-E +a
+ .04+J/ 1e3
)-M+ v +A*
Z); A, 1 =
K +, W=d;
sprintf(f,
"%5s %d",
"%7d", p =1
/1.7, (O-9E8+
O*57.3)/X0550, (int)1); dH=T*(.45-14/1+
x-a+180-J+ 1d)+/125e2+P+v; P=T*(47
+1-m+ 52+E+94 +D+4+.38+u+.21+E)/1e2+H*
179-v)/2812; select(p=0, 0, 0, 0, 0); v=(
W*F-v)/(.65-m+1+.059+m+E+19-D*25-11+u
)/107e2); D=cos(o); E=sin(o); }
```




유형	세부 분류	설명
Layout		변수 이름 등을 난독화
Data	storage	인코딩 및 암호화
	aggregation	여러 배열로 분할 저장
	ordering	데이터 정렬
Control	aggregation	명령 구문 그룹화 변경
	ordering	명령 순서 변경
	computation	불필요한 연산 추가
Preventive	Targeted	난독화 해제를 어렵게
	Inherent	난독화 해제 도구의 버그나 취약점 이용

Obfuscation : Class & Variable name



- Normally use

Obfuscation : invalid function



Obfuscation : String

- **The goal of Obfuscate String**

- C&C Server IP
- En-/decryption Key
- ETC.

- **How to**

- Used Base64
- Used DES, AES

Android Obfuscation Tools


■ 개발 단계 난독화

- Proguard
- Dexguard




■ 개발 이후 난독화

- DexProtector
- Medusa
- APK Protect



Using ZIP Format Header Trick

Using ZIP Format Header Trick



The structure of a PKzip File

	0x0	0x1	0x2	0x3	0x4	0x5	0x6	0x7	0x8	0x9	0xa	0xb	0xc	0xd	0xe	0xf
0x0000	Signature				Version		Flags		Compression		Mod:time		Mode date		Crc-32	
0x0010	Crc-32		Compressed size				Uncompressed size				File name len		Extra field len			
0x0020	File name (variable size)															
0x0030	Extra field (variable size)															

Signature

The signature of the local file header. This is always 'x50x4b'x03'x04'.

Version

PKZip version needed to extract

Flags

General purpose bit flag:

Bit 00: encrypted file

Bit 01: compression option

Bit 02: compression option

Bit 03: data descriptor

Bit 04: enhanced deflation

Bit 05: compressed patched data

Bit 06: strong encryption

Bit 07-10: unused

Bit 11: language encoding

Bit 12: reserved

Bit 13: mask header values

Bit 14-15: reserved

The structure of a PKzip File

- \x09\x08 -> 00001001 00001000 -> 10001000 00010000

aaa.apk

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF

0000h: 50 4B 03 04 14 00 09 08 08 00 5C 03 3E 43 00 00 PK....\>C..

0010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 04 00 4D 45ME

0020h: 54 41 2D 49 4E 46 2F 4D 41 4E 49 46 45 53 54 2E TA-INF/MANIFEST.

0030h: 4D 46 FE CA 00 00 8D 92 51 6F A2 40 14 85 DF 4D MFpÊ...'Qoc@...BM

0040h: FC 0F 3E EE C6 28 D8 52 AB 26 7D 40 44 CB 8A 08 ũ.>iE(ØR«&)@DEŠ.

0050h: 22 58 7C 31 C3 30 E0 E8 30 E0 0C 53 C1 5F BF EE "X|1Ã0æè0à.SÁ_¿i

0060h: 6E 93 ED 92 1A F7 F5 26 E7 3B E7 9E 9C 05 A0 38 n"i'.÷ð&ç;çžæ. 8

0070h: 46 BC E8 F8 88 71 9C D1 51 AB D7 95 9B 0D 8D 21 F4èø"qœÑQ«*»>..!

0080h: 50 A0 A8 33 AE 7E 1F 5A DF 54 1A B1 0C 47 2D 17 P`3@~.Z&T.±.G-.

0090h: 27 54 CD 8F DF 9B 8D 66 C3 02 29 1A B5 18 E2 52 'TÍ.â>.fÃ.)..µ.âR

00A0h: C4 C0 19 84 04 75 CA 7D 94 63 09 C3 1D 01 82 C2 ÅÅ...uÊ)"c.Ã...Â

00B0h: 3D 62 DD 9C 26 CD 86 FB AA F6 3A 13 9C 5C 8D 46 =bÝæ&Îtû*ð:œ\F


Template Results - ZIPTemplateAdv.bt

Name	Value
struct ZIPFILERECOND record[0]	META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
enum SignatureTYPE frSignature	S_ZIPFILERECOND (4034B50h)
struct VERECORD frVersion	Ver 2.0, OS_FAT
enum FLAGTYPE frFlags	12057: FLAG_Encrypted, FLAG_DescriptorUsedMask, FLAG_Uu#8
enum COMPTYPE frCompression	COMP_DEFLATE (8)
DOSTIME frFileTime	00:26:56
DOSDATE frFileDate	09/30/2013
uint frCrc	0h
uint frCompressedSize	0
uint frUncompressedSize	0
ushort frFileNameLength	20
ushort frExtraFieldLength	4
char frFileName[20]	META-INF/MANIFEST.MF


Signature	Wx50Wx4bWx03Wx04		
Version	PKZip version needed to extract		
Flags	num	name	bit
	0	encrypted file	1
	1	compression option	0
	2	compression option	0
	3	data descriptor	1
	4	enhanced deflation	0
	5	compressed patched data	0
	6	strong encryption	0
	7	unused	0
	8	unused	0
	9	unused	0
	10	unused	0
	11	language encoding	1
	12	reserved	0
	13	mask header values	0
	14	reserved	0
	15	reserved	0

Using the Java Native Interface

Using the Java Native Interface



libEgslv1.so - ReadDAT



String obfuscation

```
DCD aRaineqbqbvkia ; DATA XREF: .text:0001269Eto
; .text:off_129D8to
; "RAINEQBQBQkKiAwEs9VWP0DaejQh3TFn1jpcS9z" ..
DCD aEoazsdcfejpfxi ; "EOAZSDCFEJPfXixidWibTZZhRr2S93AU7Yp3QNs" ..
DCD aLrezsdytkju25r ; "LREZSDYTKJU25RUXuaGaYxFh2KEKKK56QrHZmY5" ..
DCD a0aipahudej0vxh ; "0AIPAHUDEJ0vxHNFSU8c2JRz4eUzh1YAQ1bnq8J" ..
DCD aHxiporyfqrquae ; "HXIPORYFQRQuAesYG1S6EEFrYdn6aNiRBA1IHGg" ..
DCD aNsypqdudsdtmsg ; "NSYPQDUDSDTSmgLN1wAzssS1671hAbT5DimAHhH" ..
DCD a0pebmdupsxaspk ; "OPEBMDUPSXAspKQck9szNWNQFNMTbM1mzWTvvp7" ..
DCD aTaovslsxsvgns ; "TAOVSLXSUGnsP8nXvrxfh5v0UHS07LtkAP1KV0" ..
DCD aBsmtqhcrrpxany ; "BSMTQHCRQPxanYLQfufuvGUNDv4FatWs0x5WAL1" ..
DCD aAsklelijgfh2hv ; "ASKLELIJGFH2hUPH4Z30g4bxxFNoSQeNDvaGZag" ..
DCD aMbhgfabmtgozpx ; "MBHGFABMTGozpXfPpWzm1gdQBjuGoDCve5MSFH9" ..
DCD aGoazmnolsqnxz ; "GOZAZMNOLSQnxZiJ5NLQmQ46mGbJZjwIORoKy62" ..
DCD aHlhadwzkbmzlix ; "HLHADWZKBMZLiXm1RvbljIGPwhH8MugKzVxE1Ue" ..
DCD aXm1slgzmlsjq6r ; "XMLS1GZMLSjQ6rUtct4zB2L2pduxajx64YgU0ZH" ..
DCD aYrradoxolorpn1 ; "YRRADOXOLORPn117W4R7x1TzgZeP54RNQd5qvRU" ..
DCD aCdtgvsxudsZRhu ; "CDTGVSXUDSZRhuNH0o9JH1HIMm2dh0d89mxMM1n" ..
DCD aUbfmvqzmledbwn ; "UBFMVQZMLEDBWNKvBDPv8NEbarx0mryt7oq7JTX" ..
DCD aBapynonkhke7co ; "BAPYNONKHKE7Co6zFGHY8v0xtJM9iga6KQtrMDj" ..
DCD aRvfcvaxwxewqac ; "RVFCVAXWXEWQAc0Va4Mt5pC1v6E4I4AHIGkr08e" ..
DCD aQvpghglope9huz ; "QVPGHGLOPE9HUz2cdW0iAu6ZcMP9DiKfKiss2Ev" ..
DCD aSetjnienv ; DATA XREF: JNI_OnLoad+6Eto
D:\sampleWandroid>decrypt.py
com.avira.android_____
com.antivirusDDDDDDDDDDDD
com.kmsXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
com.wsandroid.suite000000
com.qihoo360.mobilesafeC
com.ijinshan.dubaCCCCCCC
com.tencent.qqpimsecureD
com.anguanjia.safeXXXXXX
com.lbe.security0000000000
com.netqin.mobileguardII
com.avast.android.mobilesecurityXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
com.estsoft.alyacJJJJJJJ
com.lookout00000000000000
com.zoner.android.antivirusGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
com.symantec.mobilesecurityFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
com.drweb.proBBBBBBBBBBBB
com.drwebSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
com.drweb.pro.marketLLLL
com.symantec.mobilesecurityMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
com.symantec.monitor_____
```

Decrypt algorithm

- ex) RAINEBQBQVvkKiAwEs9VWPODaejQh3TFn1jpcS9ztCX

- R** A INEBQBQV *kKiAwEs9VWPODaejQh3TFn1jpcS9ztCX*

- XOR key** key *CipherText*

- com.avira.android**


```

00017B26 E9 49      LDR    R1, =(a0x1mhmXghoba48pjWuyhvzkeomab0ju - 0x17B30)
00017B28 61 AD      ADD    R5, SP, #0x218+var_94
00017B2A 28 1C      MOVS   R0, R5
00017B2C 79 44      ADD    R1, PC          ; "0xLMHMXGH0ba48pJWUYhVZKEomAB0JUnc2tpdBN".
00017B2E 76 AA      ADD    R2, SP, #0x218+var_40
00017B30 73 F0 0A ED BLX    String_Alloc
00017B34 60 AE      ADD    R6, SP, #0x218+var_98
00017B36 30 1C      MOVS   R0, R6
00017B38 29 1C      MOVS   R1, R5
00017B3A F6 F7 A5 FE BL     Decryption_String
00017B3E 6B 46      MOV    R3, SP
00017B40 89 33      ADDS   R3, #0x89
00017B42 FF 33      ADDS   R3, #0xFF

0000EB3C 00 21      MOVS   R1, #0          ; c
0000EB3E 04 9A      LDR    R2, [SP,#0xD8+n] ; n
0000EB40 03 98      LDR    R0, [SP,#0xD8+ptr] ; s
0000EB42 FF F7 58 E9 BLX    j_memset_ptr
0000EB46 0A 99      LDR    R1, [SP,#0xD8+var_B0] ; src
0000EB48 03 98      LDR    R0, [SP,#0xD8+ptr] ; dest
0000EB4A 0B 1C      MOVS   R3, R1
0000EB4C 0C 3B      SUBS   R3, #0xC
0000EB4E 1A 68      LDR    R2, [R3]        ; n
0000EB50 FE F7 28 EF BLX    memcpy
0000EB54 0A 9B      LDR    R3, [SP,#0xD8+var_B0]
0000EB56 03 98      LDR    R0, [SP,#0xD8+ptr]
0000EB58 07 9A      LDR    R2, [SP,#0xD8+var_BC]
0000EB5A 0C 3B      SUBS   R3, #0xC
0000EB5C 19 68      LDR    R1, [R3]
0000EB5E FF F7 E3 FA BL     xor encryption

```

Android application build process



Code Protection in Android-Patrick Schulz

Using the Dynamic code loading

Using the Dynamic code loading

■ Main Activity

- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.Papplication`
- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.MainActivity`
- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.BKMain`




■ Receiver

- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.receiver.SystemReceiver`
- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.receiver.LockReceiver`

■ Service

- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.ContactsService`
- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.ProcessRemoteCmdService`
- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.ClientService`
- `com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.CallService`



Encrypt File

The image shows a file explorer window on the left and a hex editor window on the right. The file explorer shows a ZIP file named 'CC35CD55F22CD0F9010C55' with a folder structure: META-INF, assets, and res. The 'assets' folder is selected. The hex editor window shows the file 'dex_encrypt.db' with a size of 318,200 bytes. A red arrow points from the file name in the file explorer to the file name in the hex editor. The hex editor displays the file's content in hexadecimal and ASCII format.

파일명	압축크기	원본크기
..		
dex_encrypt.db	318,200	318,200

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	
00000000	11	A4	34	B9	2A	C8	65	BE	2E	E0	92	D9	00	19	13	24	[.x4²*Èe%.à'Ù...\$
00000010	7F	44	8E	7C	B8	06	B4	2C	46	03	4A	18	02	5A	F3	54	.DŽ ,.,',F.J..ZóT
00000020	FE	9D	63	D4	16	8E	4F	4A	3B	DF	1F	A4	DB	F9	B6	3A	p.cÔ.ŽOJ;S.xÙùq:
00000030	05	79	A0	FF	EC	92	81	27	10	FF	6F	27	BD	3C	9F	24	.y ÿì'.'.ÿo'%'<Ÿ\$
00000040	98	FE	AF	A0	0A	5A	3E	93	C3	BC	AE	53	66	C5	56	D6	~p~.Z>"Å~SfÅVÖ
00000050	80	BA	B3	47	A2	64	5A	1E	92	36	73	6C	B5	44	3E	BE	€°³GcdZ.'6s1pD>%
00000060	8A	9D	54	04	69	AE	45	A3	37	3B	A1	30	C3	D8	BE	FB	Š.T.i@E£7; ;0ÅØ%û
00000070	33	B9	35	0F	67	E0	DB	72	47	D9	D8	F3	E8	E1	F7	4F	3²5.gàÛrGÜØóéá÷O
00000080	86	3C	09	01	F1	76	EB	C8	9B	63	9B	91	0C	DA	71	42	t<..ñvèÈ>c>''.ÚqB
00000090	62	33	FD	93	6C	EA	74	B4	0D	58	4B	9B	61	B2	9A	EE	b3ý"lê't'.XK>a²šî
000000A0	47	0E	B6	E2	67	BE	9F	32	67	B1	52	9F	2C	90	CD	99	G.Ÿäg%Ÿ2g±RŸ,.Í™
000000B0	4A	4F	DA	4F	28	B5	B9	92	E3	BC	3C	DF	22	B6	7F	E9	JOÚO(µ²'ä%<S"Ÿ.é
000000C0	06	5E	30	F7	FD	00	83	8D	93	24	72	97	77	03	CD	D3	.^0÷ý.f."\$r-w.ÍÓ
000000D0	B5	E5	E5	B4	D2	7F	38	06	F8	8C	DC	F0	6A	BB	4C	0A	µãã'Ò.8.øEÜ8j»L.
000000E0	7D	0D	E4	7A	44	46	EB	43	8A	CA	08	0A	ED	4C	90	E4	} .äzDFèCŠÊ..îL.ä
000000F0	22	98	0E	24	B8	11	78	1B	4D	E4	E8	FB	9C	FD	4D	87	"~.\$. .x.MäèûœýM+

DES Encryption

```
Application.class x DesUtils.class x

private void loadClass(Context par
{
    String str1 = "/data/data/" + pa
    String str2 = str1 + "x.zip";
    String str3 = str1 + "x";
    for (;;)
    {
        DexFile localDexFile;
        Enumeration localEnumeration;
        try
        {
            InputStream localInputStream = getAssets().open("dex_encrypt.db");
            int i = localInputStream.available();
            byte[] arrayOfByte1 = new byte[i];
            localInputStream.read(arrayOfByte1, 0, i);
            byte[] arrayOfByte2 = new DesUtils("gjaoun").decrypt(arrayOfByte1);
            FileOutputStream localFileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(str2);
            localFileOutputStream.write(arrayOfByte2);
            localFileOutputStream.close();
        }
    }
}

private Key getKey(byte[] paramArrayOfByte)
    throws Exception
{
    byte[] arrayOfByte = new byte[8];
    for (int i = 0;; i++)
    {
        if ((i >= paramArrayOfByte.length) || (i >= arrayOfByte.length)) {
            return new SecretKeySpec(arrayOfByte, "DES");
        }
        arrayOfByte[i] = paramArrayOfByte[i];
    }
}
```



Decryption flow

```
from Crypto.Cipher import DES

def encrypt_file(in_filename, out_filename, chunk_size, key):
    des = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_ECB)

    with open(in_filename, 'rb') as in_file:
        with open(out_filename, 'wb') as out_file:
            while True:
                chunk = in_file.read(chunk_size)
                if len(chunk) == 0:
                    break
                elif len(chunk) % 16 != 0:
                    chunk += ' ' * (16 - len(chunk) % 16)
                out_file.write(des.encrypt(chunk))

def decrypt_file(in_filename, out_filename, chunk_size, key):
    des = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_ECB)

    with open(in_filename, 'rb') as in_file:
        with open(out_filename, 'wb') as out_file:
            while True:
                chunk = in_file.read(chunk_size)
                if len(chunk) == 0:
                    break
                out_file.write(des.decrypt(chunk))

key = "\x67\x6A\x61\x6F\x75\x6E\x00\x00"

in_filename = "dex_encrypt.db"
out_filename = "dex_Decrypt.db"
chunk_size = 64
decrypt_file(in_filename, out_filename, chunk_size, key)
```

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	
00000000	11	A4	34	B9	2A	C8	65	BE	2E	E0	92	D9	00	19	13	24	.x4' *Èe%.à'Û...\$
00000010	7F	44	8E	7C	B8	06	B4	2C	46	03	4A	18	02	5A	F3	54	.DŽ ,.,',F.J..ZóT
00000020	FE	9D	63	D4	16	8E	4F	4A	3B	DF	1F	A4	DB	F9	B6	3A	p.c.ô.ŽôJ;B.xÛùq:
00000030	05	79	A0	FF	EC	92	81	27	10	FF	6F	27	BD	3C	9F	24	.y ýì'.'.ÿo'<ÿ\$
00000040	98	FE	AF	A0	0A	5A	3E	93	C3	BC	AE	53	66	C5	56	D6	"p-.Z>"Ä-sfÅVÖ



Encrypt

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	
00000000	50	4B	03	04	14	00	00	00	08	00	CD	56	AB	44	26	0D	PK.....íV«D&.
00000010	B3	82	55	DA	04	00	F0	4C	11	00	0B	00	00	00	63	6C	°,Uú...8L.....cl
00000020	61	73	73	65	73	2E	64	65	78	5C	DD	05	74	54	C7	DB	asses.dex\Ý.tTÇÛ
00000030	C7	F1	D9	BD	0B	85	24	58	80	24	40	08	EE	EE	EE	14	ÇñÜ%...\$Xe\$@.iii.
00000040	2F	EE	4E	D1	16	DA	E2	EE	EE	EE	1A	DC	5D	8A	7B	91	/iNÑ.Úáiii.Ü]Š{'




Decrypt

E:\Data\연구\2014-05-27안드로이드악코\CC35CD55F22CD0F9010C557A38E08E7B - ...						
파일(F) 편집(E) 보기(V) 즐겨찾기(A) 도구(T) 도움말(H)						
+	-	✓	⇄	➡	✗	i
추가	압축 풀기	테스트	복사	이동	삭제	정보
E:\Data\연구\2014-05-27안드로이드악코\CC35CD55F22CD0F9010C557A38E08E7B - 복사본.apk\wa						
이름	크기	압축된 크기	수정한 날짜	만든 날짜	액세스한 날짜	
classes.dex	1 133 808	318 037	2014-05-11 11:54	2014-05-11 11:55	2014-05-11 11:55	

Classes.dex

■ Main Activity

- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.**Papplication**
- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.**MainActivity**
- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.**BKMain**




■ Receiver


- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.receiver.**SystemReceiver**
- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.receiver.**LockReceiver**

■ Service

- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.**ContactsService**
- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.**ProcessRemoteCmdService**
- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.**ClientService**
- com.google.android.ebk.hana.kakao.service.**CallService**



Using the Dynamic code loading



Code Protection in Android-Patrick chulz

Using the ApkProtect Lite

Using the ApkProtect

[진도 여객선 침몰] 세월호 사고사청 스미싱 문자 출현

입력시간 | 2014.04.17 14:44 | 김현아 기자 chaos@


기자의 다른 기사보기

+ - | | | | |



[화제] 피부과 의사도 깜짝 놀란 효과 주름,기미,잡티 없앤 이것!! [AD]

[이데일리 김현아 기자] 미래창조과학부(장관 최문기)와 한국인터넷진흥원(KISA)이 17일 오전 세월호 침몰사고를 사칭한 스미싱 문자가 발송되고 있다며 주의를 당부했다.



세월호 사칭 스미싱 문자



비극적인 세월호 침몰사고와 관련 수백 명의 가족과 국민들이 비통함을 감추지 못하고 밤새 구조 작업을 안타깝게 지켜보고 있는 가운데, 사고 발생 하루 만인 17일 오전 세월호 침몰사고 구조현황 동영상을 가장한 스미싱 사기가 발생했다.

해당 문자에는 '여객선(세월호) 침몰사고 구조현황 동영상'이라는 문구가 적혀있으며, 해당 메시지에는 인터넷주소를 포함하고 있다.

세월호 침몰사고 사칭 스미싱 문자에 포함된 인터넷주소(URL)를 클릭하면 스마트폰에 악성앱(구조현황.apk)이 다운로드 되고, 설치된 악성앱을 통해 기기정보, 문자, 통화기록 등을 탈취하는 것으로 확인됐다.



How to Check Apkprotect

이름	크기	압축된 크기	수정한 날짜
apkprotect.com	1 063	1 063	2013-12-05 19:08
assets	80 962	26 882	
lib	70 120	31 721	
META-INF	23 633	9 004	
res	294 596	261 811	
AndroidManif...	4 548	1 338	2013-12-06 02:57
classes.dex	373 472	171 684	2013-12-05 19:08
resources.arsc	33 588	33 588	2013-12-06 02:57

구조현황.zip - 압집

파일(F) 편집(E) 도구(A) 보기(V) 설정(O) 도움말(H)


압축풀기 새로압축 압축열기 파일추가 파일삭제 보기

폴더	필터	검색	파일명	압축크기	원본크기	압축률	종류	수정한 날짜
구조현황.zip			assets				로컬 디스크	
			META-INF				로컬 디스크	
			res				로컬 디스크	
			AndroidManifest.xml	2,050	8,916	77%	XML 문서	2014-04-16 PM 05:50:10
			classes.dex	176,668	404,828	56%	DEX 파일	2014-04-16 PM 05:50:10
			resources.arsc	739	2,504	70%	ARSC 파일	2014-04-17 AM 02:36:04

APK Protect


Function	APK Protect Lite	APK Protect Professional	APK Protect Enterprise
Anti-debugging	Yes	Yes	Yes
Anti-decompilation	Yes	Yes	Yes
Java Code Protection Quantity	/	10	20
C++ Code Protection	No	No	Yes
Any package name	Yes	Yes	No
ARM v5/v7	Yes	Yes	Yes
Intel X86	/	/	Yes
Long Password	No	Yes	Yes

APK Protect process



Code Protection in Android-Patrick Schulz

APK Protect Lite



Dalvik File Format

header
string_ids
type_ids
proto_ids
field_ids
method_ids
class_defs
data

Name	
⊕ struct header_item dex_header	
⊕ struct string_id_list dex_string_ids	6467 strings
⊕ struct type_id_list dex_type_ids	948 types
⊕ struct proto_id_list dex_proto_ids	1152 prototypes
⊕ struct field_id_list dex_field_ids	1478 fields
⊕ struct method_id_list dex_method_ids	5635 methods
⊕ struct method_id_item method_id[0]	void android,a,<init>()
└─ ushort class_idx	(0x6) android,a
└─ ushort proto_idx	(0x236) void ()
└─ uint name_idx	(0x114) "<init>"
⊕ struct method_id_item method_id[1]	java,lang,String android,a,a()
└─ ushort class_idx	(0xb) android,a
└─ ushort proto_idx	(0x1F2) java,lang,String ()
└─ uint name_idx	(0xA49) "a"

Error Code Injection

```
public java.lang.String
android.a.a()

UNUSED
shl-long/2addr          v15:v16, this:v2
add-double              v240:v241, v0:this, v0:this
Method End
move/from16             v0, v1
nop
nop
and-long/2addr          v14:v15, v2:v3
move-object/from16      v0, v3
nop
```

```
# virtual methods
.method public a()Ljava/lang/String;
    .registers 2

    .prologue
    .line 12
    rsub-int p0, p5, 0x5ba9

    #disallowed odex opcode
    #execute-inline/range {p1 .. p217}, inline@0
    nop
.end method
```

```
E:\koha\dex2jar-0.0.9.15\out\android 디렉터리
2014-12-01 오전 10:20 <DIR> .
2014-12-01 오전 10:20 <DIR>
2014-12-01 오전 10:20 656 a.smali
2014-12-01 오전 10:17 <DIR> support
1개 파일 656 바이트
3개 디렉터리 72,563,957,760 바이트 남음

E:\koha\dex2jar-0.0.9.15\out\android>cd support
E:\koha\dex2jar-0.0.9.15\out\android\support>dir
E 드라이브의 볼륨: 새 볼륨
볼륨 일련 번호: 5CB3-9D27

E:\koha\dex2jar-0.0.9.15\out\android\support 디렉터리
2014-12-01 오전 10:17 <DIR> .
2014-12-01 오전 10:17 <DIR>
2014-12-01 오전 10:20 599 a.smali
2014-12-01 오전 10:17 <DIR> v4
1개 파일 599 바이트
3개 디렉터리 72,563,957,760 바이트 남음

E:\koha\dex2jar-0.0.9.15\out\android\support>
```


Solution

```
C:\Users\koha>e:
```

```
E:\test\temp>anti_apkprotect.exe 구조현황.apk
```

```
#####
```

```
# Anti Apkprot
```

```
#
```

```
# hacked by
```

```
#####
```

```
Processing...
```

```
Okidoki
```

```
E:\test\temp>_
```

File Name	Date	Type	Size
lib	2014-08-20 오후 ...	파일 폴더	
AndroidManifest_de.xml	2014-08-20 오후 ...	XML 문서	6KB
anti_apkprotect.exe	2014-04-25 오후 ...	응용 프로그램	6,654KB
classes_unpack.dex	2014-08-20 오후 ...	DEX 파일	392KB
classes_unpack_dex2jar.jar	2014-08-20 오후 ...	ALZip JAR File	342KB
구조현황.apk	2014-04-17 오후 ...	APK 파일	235KB

Java Decompiler - MainActivity.class

File Edit Navigate Search Help

classes_unpack_dex2jar.jar x

- android.support.v4
- com
 - android.internal.telephony
 - mixywiqrt5.dd
 - App
 - BootBroadcastReceiver
 - BuildConfig
 - Common
 - Config
 - Connect
 - Contact
 - CoreService
 - Download
 - FileUtils
 - HttpDownloader
 - LockReceiver
 - MainActivity
 - PhoneListener
 - R
 - SMS
 - SMSReceiver

MainActivity.class x

```
package com.mixywiqrt5.dd;

import android.app.Activity;

public class MainActivity
    extends Activity
{
    public static MainActivity context;
    private ComponentName componentName;
    public RelativeLayout mmain;
    private DevicePolicyManager policyManager;

    private void HideIcon()
    {
        getPackageManager().setComponentEnabledSetting(getComponentName(), 2, 1);
    }








    private void activeManager()
    {
        Intent localIntent = new Intent("android.app.action.ADD_DEVICE_ADMIN");
        localIntent.putExtra("android.app.extra.DEVICE_ADMIN", this.componentName);
        localIntent.putExtra("android.app.extra.ADD_EXPLANATION", "개인정보보호");
    }
}
```

Using the ApkProtect Pro

APK Protect Pro

E:\koha\smample\apkprotect_pro.apk\lib\armeabi\

파일(F) 편집(E) 보기(V) 즐겨찾기(A) 도구(T) 도움말(H)

 추가
  압축 풀기
  테스트
  복사
  이동
  삭제
  정보

E:\koha\smample\apkprotect_pro.apk\lib\armeabi\

이름	크기	압축된 크기	수정한 날짜
libAPKProtect.so	23 496	11 276	2014-05-01 22:12

classes_dex2jar.jar x

- com.ns.smart.scourt
 - receiver
 - service
 - util
 - AppContext
 - BuildConfig
 - InstallActivity
 - MainActivity
 - R

MainActivity.class AppContext.class x

```


package com.ns.smart.scourt;

import android.app.Application;

public class AppContext
    extends Application
{
    public static final String BASEDIR = En
    public static final String FILENAME = "
    public static final String InstallPacka

    static
    {
        System.loadLibrary("APKProtect");
    }
    
```

APK Protect Pro



Java Decompiler - AppContext.class

File Edit Navigate Search Help

classes_dex2jar.jar

com.ns.smart.scourt

- receiver
- service
- util
- AppContext
- BuildConfig
- InstallActivity
- MainActivity
- R


AppContext.class

```
public void onCreate()
{
    for (;;)
    {
        try
        {
            File localFile = new File(BASEDIR);
            if (!localFile.exists()) {
                localFile.mkdir();
            }
            InputStream localInputStream = getApplicationContext().getResources().openRawResource(2130968576);
            localFileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(new File(BASEDIR + "/" + _100172c("40KAw5vegIKPhIGInYGYnsOMnYY1M8xtI2jo")));
            arrayOfByte = new byte[1024];
            i = 0;
            j = localInputStream.read(arrayOfByte);
            if (j != -1) {
                continue;
            }
            localFileOutputStream.flush();
            localFileOutputStream.close();
            localInputStream.close();
        }
    }
}
```

APK Protect Pro


```
public void run()
{
    String str = Config.get(CoreService.mContext, run("==HhpqDj+NBDMgGEPCciNA/P"),
```

```
private static String run(String paramAnonymousString)
{
    byte[] arrayOfByte1 = { 122, 117, 127, 105, 116, 114
    String str1 = paramAnonymousString.substring(0, 2);
    String str2 = paramAnonymousString.substring(-2 + pa
    int i = 0;
    for (;;)
    {
        String str3;
        String str5;
        if (i >= 19)
        {
            str3 = new String(arrayOfByte1);
            String str4 = str3.substring(2, 3) + str3.substr
            str5 = new StringBuilder(String.valueOf(new Stri
        }
        try
        {
            Class localClass = Class.forName(str3);
            Class[] arrayOfClass = new Class[2];
            arrayOfClass[0] = String.class;
            arrayOfClass[1] = Integer.TYPE;
            Method localMethod = localClass.getDeclaredMetho
            Object[] arrayOfObject = new Object[2];
            arrayOfObject[0] = str2;
            arrayOfObject[1] = Integer.valueOf(0);
            arrayOfByte2 = (byte[])localMethod.invoke(localC
            int i = arrayOfByte2.length;
```



APK Protect Pro

- <http://kkoha.tistory.com/entry/AntiAPKProtecten>



Thank you for listening



kkoha@msn.com