

# Program Vulnerability Analysis Using DBI

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# Outline

- What is DBI ?
- Before that
- How ?
- A simple example
- Demo !



# What is DBI ?

- Instrumentation

Keyword : To gather information, insert code

- Dynamic Binary Instrumentation

Keyword : **Running program**, special purpose, insert code

Arbitrary Code




# Static Analysis

- Summary

- Without running
- Considering all execution paths in a program
- Tools : Sonar, cppcheck, Prevent, KlockWork



# Static Analysis



# Dynamic Analysis

- Summary
  - Running
  - Considering single execution path
  - Input dependency



# Winner

- Dynamic Analysis

More precise



Because > works with **real values** in the **run-time**

- if ( you think Ollydbg & IDA Disassembler )

Easy to understand

# Source Analysis

- Source Analysis
  - Language dependency
  - Access high-level information
  - Tools : Source insight





# Binary Analysis

- Binary Analysis
  - Platform dependency
  - Access low-level information ex) register
  - Complexity, Lack of Higher-level semantics, Code Obfuscation



# DRAW

- Binary Analysis

Original source code is not needed

- Source Analysis

Just you look at source

영어 -> 한국어 번역

그냥 소스 좀 봐

듣기 소리나는 대로 읽기

geunyang soseu jom bwa

**New!** 대체 번역을 보려면 위 단어를 클릭합니다. 무시

# SBI

- Static Binary Instrumentation
  - Before the program is run
  - Rewrites object code or executable code
  - Disassemble -> instrumentation

# DBI

- Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
  - Run-time
  - By external process, grafted onto the client process

# Winner

- DBI

1. Client program doesn't require to be prepared
2. Naturally covers all client code



# Usefulness of DBI

- Do not need Recompiling and Relinking
- Find the specific code during execution
- Handle dynamically generated code
- Analyzing running process



# Use

- Trace procedure generating
- Fault tolerance studies
- Emulating new instructions
- Code coverage  $\rightarrow t / \text{all} * 100$
- Memory-leak detection
- Thread profiling
- And so on ...

# Before that

- Taint Analysis


Kind of information flow

To see the flow from the external input effect






# Taint propagation



# Taint propagation



# Use

- Detecting flaws

if ( tracking user data == available )

I see where untrusted code swimming

- Data Lifetime Analysis

# How ?

- **Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tools**

Pin : Win & Linux & MAC, Intermediate Language

DynamoRIO : Win & Linux & MAC

TEMU : Win & Linux, QEMU based

Valgrind : Linux



# How ?

- Use PIN Tool

Windows, Linux, MAC OSX

Custom Code ( C or C++ )

Attach the running file

Extensive API

Pinheads

# Pin ?


- <http://pintool.org>

One of JIT ( Just In Time ) compiler

Not input bytecode, but a regular executable

Intercept instruction and generates more code and execute

# Pin ?




Pin : Instrumentation Engine

Pintool : Instrumentation Tool


Application : Target Program or Process

# Pin ?







# Pin ?




# Pin ?



# Pin ?



# Pin ?




# Install

- if ( Install window )  
you need to visual c++
- else if ( install linux )  
you need to gcc-c++
- else if ( install mac 64bit )  
not available

# A Simple Example

- Inscout & Itrace & Pinatrace
- Step by modify code



# Inscount

- count the total number of instructions executed

```
#include <iostream>
#include <fstream>
#include "pin.H"

static UINT64 icount = 0;

VOID docount() { icount++; }

VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v)
{
    INS_InsertCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)docount, IARG_END);
}

KNOB<string> KnobOutputFile(KNOB_MODE_WRITEONCE, "pintool",
    "o", "inscount.out", "specify output file name");

VOID Fini(INT32 code, VOID *v)
{
    ofstream OutFile;
    OutFile.open(KnobOutputFile.Value().c_str());
    OutFile.setf(ios::showbase);
    OutFile << "Count " << icount << endl;
    OutFile.close();
}

int main(int argc, char * argv[])
{
    IF (PIN_Init(argc, argv)) return Usage();
    INS_AddInstrumentFunction(Instruction, 0);
    PIN_AddFiniFunction(Fini, 0);

    PIN_StartProgram();

    return 0;
}
```

# Modify Inscount

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include "pin.H"

FILE * trace;

VOID printip(VOID *ip) { fprintf(trace, "%p\n", ip); }

VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v)
{
    INS_InsertCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)printip, IARG_INST_PTR, IARG_END);
}

VOID Fini(INT32 code, VOID *v)
{
    fprintf(trace, "#eof\n");
    fclose(trace);
}

int main(int argc, char * argv[])
{
    trace = fopen("itrace.out", "w");

    if (PIN_Init(argc, argv)) return Usage();
    INS_AddInstrumentFunction(Instruction, 0);
    PIN_AddFiniFunction(Fini, 0);

    PIN_StartProgram();

    return 0;
}
```



# ltrace

- ltrace

Instruction Address Trace

How to pass arguments

Useful understanding the control flow of a program for debugging

# Itrace

```
c:\WIN_Utility\win>pin.bat -t .\source\tools\ManualExamples\obj-ia32\itrace.dll --  
c:\Users\Deok9\Desktop\123.exe  
CodeEngn!  
c:\WIN_Utility\win>
```



```
770B89D8  
770B89DA  
770B89DB  
770B89DC  
770B89DD  
770B89DE  
770C5C41  
770C5C44  
770C5C47  
770C5C70  
770C5C73  
770B3063
```

# Modify Itrace

```
FILE * trace;

VOID RecordMemRead(VOID * ip, VOID * addr)
{
    fprintf(trace, "Xp: R Xp\n", ip, addr);
}

VOID RecordMemWrite(VOID * ip, VOID * addr)
{
    fprintf(trace, "Xp: W Xp\n", ip, addr);
}

VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v)
{
    UINT32 memOperands = INS_MemoryOperandCount(ins);

    for (UINT32 memOp = 0; memOp < memOperands; memOp++)
    {
        if (INS_MemoryOperandIsRead(ins, memOp))
        {
            INS_InsertPredicatedCall(
                ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)RecordMemRead,
                IARG_INST_PTR,
                IARG_MEMORYOP_EA, memOp,
                IARG_END);
        }
        if (INS_MemoryOperandIsWritten(ins, memOp))
        {
            INS_InsertPredicatedCall(
                ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)RecordMemWrite,
                IARG_INST_PTR,
                IARG_MEMORYOP_EA, memOp,
                IARG_END);
        }
    }
}
```

# insertPredicatedCall ?

```
if (INS_MemoryOperandIsRead( ins, memOp))
{
    INS_InsertPredicatedCall(
        ins, IPUNIT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)RecordMemRead,
        IARG_INST_PTR,
        IARG_MEMORYOP_EA, memOp,
        IARG_END);
}
if (INS_MemoryOperandIsWritten( ins, memOp))
{
    INS_InsertPredicatedCall(
        ins, IPUNIT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)RecordMemWrite,
        IARG_INST_PTR,
        IARG_MEMORYOP_EA, memOp,
        IARG_END);
}
```

- ☉ To avoid generating references to instructions that are predicated when the predicate is false
- ☉ Predication is a general architectural feature of the IA-64

# Pinatrace

- Pinatrace

Memory Reference Trace

Useful debugging and for simulating a data cache in processor

# Pinatrace

```
c:\WH_Utility\pin>pin.bat -t .\source\tools\SimpleExamples\obj-ia32\pinatrace.dll
-- c:\Users\Deok9\Desktop\123.exe
CodeEngn!
c:\WH_Utility\pin>
```

```
#
# Memory Access Trace Generated By Pin
#
770B89DA: R    0023F434  4      0x1
770B89DB: R    0023F438  4    0x23f4f0
770B89DC: R    0023F43C  4    0x331f50
770B89DD: R    0023F440  4    0x23f534
770B89DE: R    0023F444  4 0x770c5c41
770C5C41: W    0023F51B  1      0x1
770C5C44: W    0023F530  4      0x1
770C5C47: W    0023F454  4 0x770c5c4c
770C5C73: W    0023F450  4 0x770c5c78
```

770B89DA : Instrumentation Points

R/W : Access Type

0023F434 : &Address

4 : R/W Size

0x01 : \*Address

# Vera

- Use vera !

Shmoocon 2011 Danny Quist

Visualizing Executables for Reversing & Analysis

Better OEP detection & IDA Pro Plugin



# Demo !

- if ( Use DBI with Vera )

you will see the memory flow ( easily )

- And

you will see the pattern of vulnerable program and patched program



# Demo !



# Zero-day !

## 1. Hook Vulnerability Function

strcpy, strcat, sprintf, scanf, fscanf, strstr, strchr

## 2. And

monitoring ESI


## 3. Olleh!

It's possible to modify the parameters

# Zero-day !

[illegible]

# Zero-day !



# reference

- <http://translate.google.co.kr/?hl=ko&tab=wT>
- <http://www.pintool.org/>
- <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nlWbDdxKjw>

# Q & A

# Quiz

OR, XOR 연산에서

A 가 Taint 된 값( 1 ) 이라고 가정했을 때  
B 의 값이 무엇일 때 “Taint 되었다”

라고 할까요 ??

답과 간단한 이유를 말해주세요용

hint ) AND 연산일때 B 가 1 일때 Taint 되었다.