TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF GOVERNANCE:

The 2022 Berggruen Governance Index

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Berggruen Institute

THE PROJECT

THE BERGGRUEN GOVERNANCE INDEX PROJECT (BGI) analyzes the relationship between democratic accountability, state capacity and the provision of public goods. It builds upon prior work that examined the impact of governance and democracy on the quality of life. It is a collaborative project between the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs and the Berggruen Institute.

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More information about the project and the 2022 BGI:

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HKA, May 2022

FOREWORD

THE UCLA LUSKIN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS likes to say that it advances the cause of human well-being through its research and training. Our goals are better functioning people, families, communities and polities. Alas, there is no shortage of challenges and issues that threaten the lives, safety, prosperity and happiness of people and communities near and far.

Partnering with the Berggruen Institute on the Berggruen Governance Index was an obvious step toward our larger goals. The effectiveness and responsiveness of a government to the needs of its citizens vary widely across the globe and, indeed, across the United States. Citizens face wildly different political opportunity structures for shaping and reforming the institutions designed to serve their needs. And it is fair to say, I think, that levels of democratic responsiveness to citizen desires is in global retreat, to our peril and to the particular disadvantage of the peripheral and the powerless.

What makes for responsible and responsive governance? Which societal factors facilitate governments that work and distinguish them from governments that fail, that oppress or worse? Our attention, investigation and vigilance are necessary as we observe how these metrics have changed in light of international trends in authoritarian leadership, global climate degradation and its downstream consequences, advanced economic globalization in the absence of globalized norms for worker rights, migration, and environmental protection. Our sincere hope is that the Berggruen Governance Index advances that cause.

Gary Segura
Dean and Professor
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FOREWORD

IN THE 21ST CENTURY, the threats to democracy arise more from within than without. It is the incapacity of governments to produce the conditions for a thriving society and the incumbent collapse of confidence in the institutions that follows, that is the true threat. These conditions provide fertile ground for autocrats to seduce angry publics to electoral victory only to dismantle institutions of democracy once in power.

But what capacities are most important in producing the conditions for a thriving society? Where are countries falling short and what investments should they make to improve?

In a world awash with indices, the Berggruen Governance Index is uniquely insightful. Most indices measure the performance of countries and their governments in one area of performance — say the quality of their democracy or their ability to grow their economy. The BGI disaggregates the components of governance, enabling analysis of the interactions between them. By disaggregating the Quality of Democracy (democratic accountability), the Quality of Government (state capacity) and the Quality of Life (public goods provision), the BGI provides not only a ranking of countries but the ability to unveil the interactions between these capacities over time.

Containing data for over 134 countries over 20 years, the BGI is a powerful tool for policymakers, researchers and the public at large to analyze and improve government effectiveness. We look forward to learning the stories and conclusions their explorations uncover.

Dawn Nakagawa
Executive Vice President
Berggruen Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIGURES

TABLES

1. INTRODUCING THE BERGGRUEN GOVERNANCE INDEX

PUBLIC HEALTH FAILURES, nations' unwillingness to adequately address climate change, and widespread political instability represent the core governance challenges of the 21st century. All around the world, we witness states struggle to provide public goods like education, health, and infrastructure to their populace in times of crisis. In many facets, it appears that governments' ability to efficiently deliver what the populace needs has diminished, often to critically low levels.

However, the true state of governance in the 21st century is not as dire as news headlines of pandemic, war, and economic crisis would indicate. For example, vaccines against COVID-19 were developed in record time, the production of renewable energies has increased rapidly, and millions were lifted from poverty in recent decades. Indeed, many countries have made significant progress in recent decades, and especially in the Global South. But these gains have not been spread evenly. In the Global North, gains, too, have been uneven, with many countries progressing moderately. Some, like the United States, have even slid backward on core measures of governance performance.[1]

> Governance is at the heart of how well countries manage a wide array of public problems.

We argue that governance is at the heart of how well countries manage a wide array of public problems. In doing so, we propose to reposition the actual delivery of goods, rather than just procedural state efficiency, at the core of research agendas and policy debates. However, the "new" governance debate we wish to advance should

[1] At the onset, we should clarify what we mean by governance performance, as we make the analytic distinction between the three dimensions of democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision. In the broadest sense, governance performance indicates the extent to which any of the three dimensions is being realized. In a narrower sense, it refers to the ability of a country to achieve advances in any two or all three dimensions over time. By implication, governance performance can also stagnate or decline.

overcome the limitations of the "old" one by viewing state capacity as a tool to be used rather than a problem to be contained; by treating state capacity as a means to an end, not an end in itself, meaning that its discharge has to be judged by actual performance; and by understanding that discharge of state capacity has to reflect voice, priority setting, and accountability processes. In essence, we seek to avoid both the "neoliberal" and the "technocratic" trap. That is, we reject a "neoliberal" view that overemphasizes the capacity of nonstate actors to solve public problems and downplays state capacity, and at the same time, we avoid the "technocratic" trap of policymaking informed by statist orientations that assume governments know best and can do it alone.

1.1 Why a New Governance Index?

New approaches demand new measures. Although countries across the globe may face similar challenges —from pandemics to rising inequality to carbon emissions—they handle them differently, sometimes strikingly so. They do so with neither equal efficiency nor effectiveness, even after taking level of economic development or the type of political system into account. Such differences have long been revealed, especially since the 2000s, and under the leadership of the World Bank,[2] when systematic efforts were made to understand the governance record of countries with the help of performance indicators. These looked at country performance beyond conventional measures such as GDP or the Human Development Index, and included dimensions such as accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulation, the rule of law, and control of corruption.

Whilst this first generation of governance indicators proved to be a valuable source and contributed to our understanding of governance, it nonetheless left unopened the "black box" of how differences

The Berggruen Governance Index examines interactions among the underlying governance outcomes, rather than focusing on a composite performance measure.

in governance performance come about. By this we mean the relationship between the various components that contribute to performance, namely, the mechanisms of accountability, the state's capacity to generate resources and enlist other actors, and, in the final analysis, its ability to provide public goods. This is where the Berggruen Governance Index (BGI) comes in: rather than focusing on a composite performance measure, we examine the interactions among the factors underlying governance outcomes. What leads to certain outcomes may be as relevant for scholars and policymakers as the final outcomes themselves, if not more so.

We ask: why do some countries perform badly in delivering healthcare, providing a clean environment and social security, or delivering some other public good to their populations even when they have the resources to do so, while others seemingly fare better? Does the capacity of states to provide the basics for societies to thrive depend on democratic accountability that represents different interests, or are systems under technocratic control that impose solutions and disregard, even suppress, many voices better? Can we necessarily assume that democratic accountability makes for better

[2] Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130

governance performance, or is it state capacity alone that makes the difference? Does a seemingly "apolitical" technocratic approach to governance lead to better outcomes than a system of contestation and democratic decision-making? Questions such as these are at the core of what the BGI is about and the new understanding of governance that underlies it.

The BGI focuses on public governance, or how the state uses its power to execute tasks, ensure compliance, and provide public goods. As Fukuyama[3] describes it, public governance is "government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not… [G]overnance is about execution, or what has traditionally fallen within the domain of public administration, as opposed to politics or public policy." Yet what then is the role of forms of accountability and popular decision-making in setting priorities?

We argue that employing state capacity necessitates information about prevailing needs and the ability to set priorities. In other words, systems of voice and accountability connect state capacity to public goods provision. We combine these three dimensions in our understanding of governance: public goods provision is a function of state capacity and accountability. Thus, the BGI reports on variations in public goods provision across countries and over time based on variations in state capacity and forms of accountability. As we will show further below, the relationship is referred to as the Governance Triangle.

1.2 Why Governance?

Why do we re-focus on governance as a concept? The term rose to prominence partly to reject earlier state-centric approaches that guided conventional development policies during the Bretton Woods era. It became more widely accepted only in the late 20th century after institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and OECD embraced it as did the European Commission.[4] Reasons for the "explosion" of how the term was used around this time include increased economic globalization and massive growth in international financial flows and trade,

Our understanding of governance: Public goods provision is a function of state capacity and accountability.

as well as a rise in corruption and state failures, leading to a general critique of development policies of the 1980s.[5] Its popularity as a concept grew apace throughout the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. As Brown[6] observes, "'governance' has ascended in scholarly circles as well as those of politics, business, public agencies and non-governmental organizations."

In the context of the World Bank's widely used Doing Business Index[7] and other similar

[3] Fukuyama, F. (2013). "What is Governance?" Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 26(3), 347–368, p. 350.

[4] World Bank (1991). Managing Development: The Governance Dimension. Discussion Paper 34899, Washington, DC: The World Bank.

[5] Arndt, C. and Oman, C. (2006). *Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators.* OECD Development Centre; Bevir, M. (2012). On Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[6] Brown, W. (2016). "Sacrificial citizenship: Neoliberalism, human capital, and austerity politics," Constellations, 23, 3–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12166, p. 5.

[7] https://databank.worldbank.org/source/doing-business

approaches, scholars like Fukuyama[8] point out that governance analysis often focuses too much on limiting the state, rather than empowering it to provide for citizens. He argues that many governance studies err in having a "relative emphasis on checking institutions rather than power deploying institutions."[9] He goes on to suggest that more emphasis should be placed on how "Weberian" (merit-based) a given system of government is and how state capacity is wielded.

However, others take issue with the term in general, pointing to the "neoliberal" character of some conceptualizations of governance.[10] In her critique, Brown[11] argues that governance "transforms the state itself into a firm, produces everyday norms of identity and conduct that configure the subject as human capital, and configures every kind of human activity in terms of rational self-investment or entrepreneurship." Others yet have lamented the technocratic vision the concept advances, ignoring politics and the normative bases of legitimacy.[12]

The BGI seeks to avoid such distortions and elisions by looking beyond mechanistic views of how states offer public goods and by bringing politics back in. With a focus on accountability and state capacity, we combine governance concerns of both the "first order" (i.e., more politically-oriented aspects of how decisions are made) and the "second order" (i.e., more policy-oriented aspects of how decisions are implemented).[13]

Common pitfalls in the study of governance:

1. **Narrow statist orientation that ignores the role of business and civil society**
2. **Denial of the role of the state as provider of public goods**
3. **View of state capacity as an end itself, rather than a means to an end**
4. **"Neoliberal" approach that overemphasizes the role of markets**
5. **"Technocratic" approach that excludes politically oriented decision-making and voice processes**

In summary, the BGI avoids five common pitfalls in the study of governance. First, we reject the narrow "statist" orientations of earlier approaches and instead incorporate the role of business and civil society into the analysis. Next, we accept the role of the state as the primary provider of public goods, even when working with nonstate actors, viewing its capacities as a tool to be used rather than a problem to be contained. At the same time, however, we view state capacity as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Furthermore, in line with Brown,[14] we reject a "neoliberal" approach to governance, focusing on public goods that the average person needs and not over-emphasizing

[8] Fukuyama (2013). "What is Governance?"

[9] Fukuyama (2013). "What is Governance?", p. 348.

[10] Pyysiäinen, J., Halpin, D., and Guilfoyle, A. (2017). "Neoliberal governance and 'responsibilization' of agents: reassessing the mechanisms of responsibility-shift in neoliberal discursive environments," Distinction: Journal of Social Theory, 18(2), 215–235, DOI: 10.1080/1600910X.2017.1331858; Ives, A. (2015). "Neoliberalism and the concept of governance: Renewing with an older liberal tradition to legitimate the power of capital," Mémoire(s), identité(s), marginalité(s) dans le monde occidental contemporain, 14, https://doi.org/10.4000/mimmoc.2263

[11] Brown (2016). "Sacrificial Citizenship," p. 5.

[12] Kelly, J., and Simmons, B. (2019). "Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators," International Organization 73, 491–510, doi:10.1017/S0020818319000146.

[13] Kooiman, J., and Jentoft, S. (2009). "Meta-governance: Values, norms and principles, and the making of hard choices," Public Administration, 87(4), 818-836; Anheier, H. K. and List, R. (2013). "Governance: Issues and frameworks," in: Governance Challenges & Innovations. Financial and Fiscal Governance. Oxford University Press, pp. 3-21.

[14] Brown (2016). "Sacrificial Citizenship."

the role of markets especially. Finally, we reject "technocratic" and overly narrow formulations, using a broad array of measures and criteria and incorporating aspects of "first order" decision-making and voice processes.

However, we do not wish to promote the BGI as the panacea for solving the world's governance problems. Nor do we intend to over-state the depths of insights that can be gleaned from country-level analysis given the complexity of the factors and developments involved and the importance of subnational as well as international aspects. While we emphasize the relationships among factors adding to, or subtracting from, governance performance, and while we present descriptions of country patterns and developments, we agree with Hirschman[15] and exercise great caution when looking for necessary and sufficient conditions of change. Indeed, we follow his advice and are "on the lookout for unusual historical developments, rare constellations of favorable events, narrow paths, partial advances that may conceivably be followed by others."

The BGI is meant to point us toward these developments as well as toward general tendencies across countries—a line of thinking that resonates well with the approach taken by Acemoglu and Robinson[16] who argue that neither is societal progress an inevitable outcome nor does it proceed along a simple mechanistic path of cause and effect. It is a contingent phenomenon and depends on how institutions such as the rule of law evolve and organizational capacities develop, in particular the balance between state power and social self-governance, as well as on economic and political opportunities that present themselves in the course of history. Countries can advance but also backslide in their governance performance; they can go through periods of stability showing remarkable resilience to internal or external shocks; and they can also be trapped in a faux stability of low performance.

1.3 The 2022 BGI

As mentioned, we are not the first to propose an indicator system to measure governance performance.[17] Indeed, observers have noted that the "market" for such indicators is crowded, and it takes a unique approach to stand out and become visible to policymakers and the public at large.[18] We therefore strive to create an index that first and foremost rests on an improved conceptualization of governance which sees public goods provision resulting from the interplay of democratic accountability and state capacity. We see state capacity as the crucial link mediating between democratic accountability and public goods provision. Whereas state capacity is about the state administration's ability to generate revenue, to organize collective action, and to achieve stated goals, democratic accountability refers to the process by which governments are selected, monitored, held accountable, and replaced.

The overall framework of our approach can be depicted as the Governance Triangle (see Figure 1.1). Once fully operationalized, measured, and statistically analyzed, it can help assess the different pathways by which democratic accountability and state capacity influence public goods provision. We can then demonstrate

[15] Hirschman, A. O. (1986). "On democracy in Latin America," The New York Review of Books, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1986/04/10/on-democracy-in-latin-america/?printpage=true

[16] Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2019). Narrow Paths: The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin.

[17] Gisselquist, R. (2013). Evaluating Governance Indexes: Critical and Less Critical Questions," WIDER Working Paper, No. 2013/068; Anheier, H. K., Haber, M., and Kayser, M. (eds.) (2018). Governance Indicators: Approaches, Progress, Promise. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

[18] Kelly and Simmons (2019). "Introduction."

FIGURE 1.1: The Governance Triangle



whether and how state capacity mediates effects of democratic accountability on public goods provision. In other words, we can capture the direct, indirect, and total effect of democratic accountability as well as the direct effect of state capacity on public goods provision. The model can be analyzed over time and cross-nationally as well as for specific regions, regime types, level of economic development, or the experience of crisis episodes of different kinds (civil and inter-state wars, natural disasters, severe recessions, colonialism, etc.). What is more, the BGI can be used to help explain variations in economic growth, levels of inequality, political and social stability, and the trustworthiness of governments.

1.4 The 2022 Report at a Glance

Following up on the themes set in this introduction and elaborating on the Governance Triangle, the next chapter describes in more detail the dimensions and subdimensions of the BGI, how they interact with each other, and how we operationalize and measure them. The framework includes: public goods provision, which is broken down into social, economic, and environmental public goods; state capacity and the key subdimensions of fiscal, coordination, and delivery capacity; and democratic accountability and the sub-elements of institutional, electoral, and societal accountability. We also briefly explain our methodological approach, describe data sources and coverage, including how we approach data gaps, and outline the estimation procedure. More details are included in appendices.

In Chapter 3, we present an overview of the main results. These include the overall governance performance of countries over time across world regions and a look at those that improved most and declined most. We then review the governance performance of the United States relative to Brazil, China, major EU countries, India, Russia and other select countries. We use comparisons to explore the versatility of the Index for addressing key conceptual issues such as the twin fallacies of governance: the "democratic fallacy," which assumes that democracy is sufficient for better public goods provision, and

the “autocratic fallacy,” which assumes that state capacity alone matters for the delivery of public goods.

Chapter 4 examines implications of these findings for our understanding of governance as well as takeaways for policymakers. We discuss what the findings suggest for the proposed relationship depicted in the Governance Triangle as well as relationships between governance performance and trust in government, and level of economic development, among others. We point to conceptual areas that are ripe for developing testable hypotheses linking the new understanding of governance to concerns about, for example, the future of the liberal order. We then present key recommendations for policymakers at both national and supranational levels.

The Governance Triangle, the BGI’s underlying framework, can help assess the different pathways by which democratic accountability and state capacity influence public goods provision.

Chapter 5 concludes the report, summarizing the key arguments and offering concluding thoughts on the future of our understanding of governance and how the BGI can and could contribute to it.

2. THE DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND THEIR MEASUREMENT

2.1 Dimensions of Governance

FOLLOWING FROM THE GOVERNANCE TRIANGLE, the 2022 BGI consists of three main dimensions: democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision (see Figure 2.1). Mindful of the "narrow paths" and complex interactions that Hirschman[1] discusses and the "narrow corridor" toward liberty and prosperity that Acemoglu and Robinson[2] identify in their analysis of how societies develop, we analytically separate democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision when operationalizing the Triangle. This separation allows us to examine empirically how each dimension relates to the other, exploring key questions such as how forms of accountability relate to public goods provision. It also allows us to address, among other questions, whether and under what conditions autocratic regimes might perform better than democracies and vice versa.

Each dimension is broken down into subdimensions, which are constructed with the help of individual indicators. Here we describe how we operationalize each of the dimensions and subdimensions. Appendix 1 offers a full list and description of all respective indices, subindices, and indicators used to construct the BGI.

2.1.1 Public Goods Provision

Our primary goal in developing the Berggruen Governance Index is to gain a better understanding of the provision of public goods and quasi-public goods. We use the term "public goods" to mean goods from which the population of a country cannot be excluded, and over which they do not have to compete, i.e., "pure" public goods such as clean air, as well as those for which there is partial exclusion and competition, i.e., quasi-public goods such as basic medical care or education. To determine a minimal set of public goods, we rely on the conceptual specification of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[3] While the SDGs are partly the result of political compromises, they have arguably been thoroughly vetted, and hence become accepted, by the international community. They therefore make a suitable basis for analysis of public goods provision across countries.

[1] Hirschman (1986). "On Democracy in Latin America."
[2] Acemoglu and Robinson (2019). Narrow Paths.
[3] United Nations. "The 17 Goals." https://sdgs.un.org/goals.

FIGURE 2.1: The Berggruen Governance Index

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY	STATE CAPACITY	PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION
Institutional Accountability	**Fiscal Capacity**	**Social Public Goods**
• Judicial oversight	• Tax revenue	• Basic medical care
• Other bodies question executive officials	• Tax administration	• Education
Electoral Accountability	• Central bank reserves	• Gender equality
• Electoral infrastructure resilience	• Interest payments	**Economic Public Goods**
• Suffrage	**Coordination Capacity**	• Food security
• Elected head of executive	• Elite cohesion	• Productive knowledge
• Political parties	• Bureaucratic remuneration	• Employment
Societal Accountability	• Appointment criteria	• Health care
• Media freedom	• Rigorous administration	• Inequality reduction
• Freedom of expression	• State-society relations	**Environmental Public Goods**
• Engaged society	**Delivery Capacity**	• Clean air and clean household fuels
• Civil society organizations	• Resource allocation	• Affordable and sustainable energy
	• Absence of public sector theft	• Ecosystem protection
	• Territorial authority	
	• Predictable enforcement	

The assumption we make in relying on the SDGs is that countries which come closer to attaining public-goods-oriented SDGs also make progress in providing other public goods such as more advanced healthcare provision, knowledge generation, or ecosystem protection. Based on this assumption we distinguish between three sets of public goods:

1. **Social Public Goods**
2. **Economic Public Goods**
3. **Environmental Public Goods**

Figure 2.1 shows what SDGs or public goods we associate with each of these three sets. For example, within social public goods, a country can provide basic medical care (SDG 3), education (SDG 4), as well as gender equality (SDG 5) as public goods to its populace. But the same country might also decide to focus on economic public goods by putting more resources into food security (SDG 2), by reducing inequality (SDG 10) including access to healthcare, or by boosting decent work (SDG8). Countries may also concentrate on environmental public goods, by providing affordable and sustainable energy (SDG 7), or protecting ecosystems (SDG 15).

> Because they have been thoroughly vetted and accepted, the UN Sustainable Development Goals make a suitable basis for analysis of public goods provision across countries.

To some extent, the choice of these three sets of public goods to construct subindices reflects

common development paths of countries with already high public goods provision capabilities. Yet it also leaves room for alternative development paths by allowing for indirect trade-offs between different sets of SDG-aligned public goods.

To create an index of public goods provision, we rely mainly on indicators that are included in the UN's SDG indicator framework[4] and are frequently used in national well-being frameworks.[5] All these frameworks have the important advantage that they were assembled by a large number of country and domain experts. What is further helpful for our purposes is that these experts have classified the 231 unique indicators in the UN framework into three different tiers. A tier 1 indicator, for instance, is "conceptually clear, has an internationally established methodology and standards are available, and data are regularly produced by countries for at least 50 per cent of countries and of the population in every region where the indicator is relevant."[6]

For the BGI we use only tier 1 indicators given that tier 2 indicators "are not regularly produced by countries" and tier 3 indicators are only "being (…) developed or tested." When tier 1 indicators are too sparsely covered to be useful for the operationalization of one of our public goods subindices, we instead draw on data sources from the Growth Lab at Harvard University, the Notre Dame Global Adaption Initiative, and other providers, which fulfill tier 1 and higher requirements (see Appendix 1).

2.1.2 State Capacity

While we operationalize public goods provision in reference to the SDGs, we conceptualize state capacity following Berwick and Fotini7 who distinguish between three primary activities for which countries develop competence or power:

- **Extraction: the state's ability to secure resources through mechanisms such as taxation;**
- **Coordination: the state's capacity to solve collective action problems via, e.g., a functioning public administration system;**
- **Compliance: the state's ability to implement set priorities and enforce regulations.**

We call the capacity associated with the extraction or generation of resources fiscal capacity, the capacity associated with the ability to organize collective action coordination capacity, and the capacity associated with implementation and achieving compliance by legitimacy or force delivery capacity.

As Figure 2.1 indicates, a given country can be said to have fiscal capacity if it generates tax revenue now, but also has the tools to sustain it in the future (tax administration). Other fiscal capacity subdimensions include central bank reserves and interest payments. These subdimensions are helpful to capture to what extent governments will be able to withstand (external) economic and geopolitical shocks.[8] Similarly, a country can be said to have coordination capacity if it is able to

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[4] United Nations Statistics Division (2022). SDG Indicators: Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/

[5] Brandt, N., Exton, C., and Fleischer, L. (2022). "Well-being at the heart of policy: lessons from national initiatives around the OECD," Forum New Economy, Basic Papers No. 1, https://newforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/FNE-BP01-2022.pdf

[6] United Nations Statistics Division (2022). IAEG-SDGs: Tier Classification for Global SDG Indicators, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/tier-classification/

[7] Berwick, E. and Fotini, C. (2018). "State capacity redux: Integrating classical and experimental contributions to an enduring debate," Annual Review of Political Science 21, 71–91.

[8] Chițu, L., Gomes, J., and Pauli, R. (2019). "Trends in central banks' foreign currency reserves and the case of the ECB," ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2019/html/ecb.ebart201907_01~c2ae75e217.en.html

maintain a merit-based "Weberian" bureaucracy[9] (bureaucratic remuneration, appointment criteria, and rigorous administration) and if elite cohesion can be maintained. Yet coordination capacity also means that state expenditures favor public goods that benefit society in general over particularistic interests (state-society relations). Finally, having delivery capacity implies that a country can allocate sufficient resources and has the territorial authority to do so. Furthermore, a country with high delivery capacity can ensure that its law enforcement is predictable and stable (predictable enforcement) and that corruption does not cripple the ability to produce public goods (absence of public sector theft).

To construct the State Capacity Index, we use both objective indicators like tax revenue and government expenditure, and subjective, expert-coded indicators like V-DEM indicators "concerning the state." [10] These indicators have proven to be highly correlated with state capacity measures available for specific countries and years, as well as with widely used commercial government quality indices.[11] The main reason we use both objective and subjective indicators is that a combination of the two types helps us to ensure that increases in objective indicators actually enhance capacity. Take, for example, an increase in government expenditure: it can increase the capacity to build hospitals and schools, but it can also merely fill the pockets of politicians, bureaucrats, or businesspeople. By combining objective measures like government expenditure and subjective measures like "public sector theft,"[12] we are able to take into account capacity-enhancing effects of government spending without having to make the assumption that all government spending is necessarily capacity enhancing. In other words, we use different types of indicators to be able to distinguish countries that managed to "only" increase taxation and spending from countries that were able to also increase coordination and delivery capacity.

2.1.3 Democratic Accountability

Whether countries acquire state capacity—and the ability to provide public goods to citizens—depends, according to numerous studies, on the ways and means by which governments set priorities relative to needs. Even though it is conceivable that countries provide public goods to the populace in the absence of elections, institutional checks, and civil society activism, it may be less sustainable in the long run. While the complexity of the relationship between democratic accountability and regime performance is a central theme in the political science literature,[13] it has received less attention from a governance perspective, and it is not quite clear through which causal pathways low or high democratic accountability influences public goods provision.

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[9] A Weberian bureaucracy is a hierarchically structured, professional, rule-bound, impersonal, meritocratic, and disciplined body of public servants who possess a specific set of competences and who operate outside the sphere of politics. See: Sager, F. and Rosser, C. (2021). "Weberian Bureaucracy," Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.166.

[10] Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Alizada, N., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, M. S., Gastaldi, L., Gjerløw, H., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Hindle, G., Ilchenko, N., Krusell, J., Lührmann, A., Maerz, S. F., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., Medzihorsky, J., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Pernes, J., von Römer, J., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S.-E., Staton, J., Sundström, A., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y., T., Wig, T., Wilson, S., and Ziblatt, D. (2021). V-Dem Dataset v11.1, https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds21

[11] Hanson, J. K. and Sigman, R. (2021). "Leviathan's latent dimensions: measuring state capacity for comparative political research," The Journal of Politics, 83(4), https://doi.org/10.1086/715066

[12] The higher a country scores on the V-DEM indicator "public sector theft," the less public sector theft there is in this country. To avoid confusion, we refer to the "absence of public sector theft" throughout this report.

[13] See, among others, Linz, J. J., and Stepan, A. (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; North, D., Wallis, J. J., and Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and Social Order. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile; Acemoglu and Robinson (2019). Narrow Paths.

High democratic accountability could influence public goods provision directly, as is sometimes assumed,[14] or it could influence public goods provision in a mediated fashion, through state capacity. By the same token, low democratic accountability could allow some countries to grow faster, rendering the provision of public goods, at least temporarily, more instead of less likely.[15] The prime example for this causal pathway could, of course, be China. By including democratic accountability, we hope to be able to study such pathways in more detail.

In conceptualizing democratic accountability, we closely follow Lührmann and her colleagues.[16] They distinguish between horizontal accountability (the extent to which state institutions hold the executive branch of the government accountable), which we call institutional accountability; vertical accountability (the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections and political parties), which we call electoral accountability; and diagonal accountability (the extent to which actors outside of formal political institutions hold a government accountable), which we call societal accountability.

Figure 2.1 indicates that we assume a given country to be more institutionally accountable if there is, for instance, judicial oversight, if the executive respects the constitution, and if a legislature exists and state bodies investigate and question government action in practice. In a similar vein, we assume a country to be electorally accountable if there is resilient election infrastructure, broad suffrage, and an elected executive. The presence of competing political parties is also an indicator of electoral accountability. Last but not least, we perceive a country as societally accountable if media freedom and freedom of expression are not unduly restricted and limited and if there are civil society organizations and an engaged society.

As the measure of accountability, we use already estimated and validated democratic accountability indices that V-DEM team members released in 2021.[17] These indices are constructed through the aggregation of selected accountability and democracy-related variables in the V-DEM dataset.[18] They are uniquely helpful to validate our own, newly estimated state capacity and public goods provision indices. While it would, of course, be possible to construct our own indices by extending V-DEM's, we see limited benefits in constructing new indices in the absence of new accountability datasets. It seems, by contrast, more useful to concentrate on aligning a broader set of indices that can be used to better understand the relationships between democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision.

2.2 Index Coverage

Certainly, many other indicators could be and have been considered for capturing these three dimensions of governance. However, we have been careful to only select indicators that are regularly updated and available over long periods of time. This is arguably more difficult in the case of state capacity and public goods indicators than in the case of democratic accountability indicators. While it is possible for the V-DEM project to promptly update its indicators, there is typically a multiyear lag in the availability of tax revenue,

[14] See Tarverdi, Y., Saha, S., and Campbell, N. (2019). "Governance, democracy and development," Economic Analysis and Policy, 63, 220–233, for a detailed discussion of the role of democracy on governance.

[15] See Gerring, J., Gjerløw, H., and Knutsen, C. H. (2020). Regimes and Industrialization. V-Dem Working Paper 2020: 99, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3586482

[16] Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., and Mechkova, V. (2020). "Constraining governments: New indices of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability," American Political Science Review, 114(3), 811–820.

[17] Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020). "Constraining Governments"; Coppedge, et al.. (2021). V-Dem Dataset v11.1.

[18] Coppedge, et al. (2021). V-Dem Dataset v11.1.

FIGURE 2.2: Countries covered in BGI 2022 dataset



health, and education data.[19] Moreover, public goods indicators on productive capacity and environmental protection are often only available since the late 1990s.[20]

It is for these reasons that we limit our overall dataset to the 2000–2019 period and to 134 countries for which reliable index scores for all three dimensions and their subdimensions can be estimated. Figure 2.2 shows for which countries our indices have been calculated. A full list of countries is presented in Appendix 3.

2.3 Aggregation

For the aggregation of subindices and indices, we use Bayesian latent variable models.[21] A latent

[19] IMF (2022). World Economic Outlook Database (WEO), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) (2019). Global Burden of Disease Study 2019 (GBD 2019) Covariates 1980-2019, https://doi.org/10.6069/CFCY-WA51; UNESCO (2021). Sustainable Development Goals (full dataset), http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx? DataSetCode=SDG_DS.

[20] The Growth Lab at Harvard University (2019). Growth Projections and Complexity Rankings, V2 [Data set], https://doi.org/10.7910/dvn/xtaqmc; IUCN (2022). Red List Index (RLI), https://www.iucnredlist.org/assessment/red-list-index.

[21] Arel-Bundock, V. and Mebane, W. (2011). "Measurement Error, Missing Values and Latent Structure in Governance Indicators." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899725; Hanson and Sigman (2021). "Leviathan's Latent Dimensions"; Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020). "Constraining Governments."

FIGURE 2.3: A graphical example of a latent variable model



variable is essentially a variable that cannot be directly observed, such as the fiscal capacity of a state, yet can be estimated with the help of observed variables like tax revenue, reserves, interest payments, and so on. Figure 2.3 illustrates the core idea, namely that a latent variable can be inferred based on a set of observed variables x1, x2, and x3. Somewhat counterintuitively, the arrows point from the latent variable to the three observed variables because, to put it simply, we model the latent variable as the underlying factor that generates x1, x2, and x3. This means in the fiscal capacity example that we model fiscal capacity as an underlying factor that generates a certain amount of tax revenues, reserves, and so on.

In constructing the state capacity and public goods indices, we follow two basic steps: first, we estimate subindices like fiscal capacity relying on the indicators mentioned in Section 2.1. Second, following extensive validity checks, we use the subindices estimated in step 1 to estimate higher level indices. Fig 2.4 illustrates how we infer state capacity, a higher-level latent variable, with the help of three newly estimated subindices: 1) Fiscal Capacity, 2) Coordination Capacity, and 3) Delivery Capacity. For the subindex Coordination Capacity, Figure 2.4 also presents the sub-subindicator level. Likewise, we repeat the first step to construct three lower-level public goods indices, which are then aggregated into the higher-level Public Goods Index in the second step.

Our overall aggregation approach closely resembles the strategy that the V-DEM project team uses to construct its higher-level accountability index based on three lower-level accountability indices.[22] These lower accountability indices are estimated with the help of objective and subjective indicators related to accountability and democracy drawn from the much larger V-DEM dataset. The models used by both the V-DEM project and our project to construct higher-level indices based on lower-level indices can also be described as “hierarchical models.”

We use Bayesian latent variables models to analyze the data (Appendix 2 offers a fuller description). Using a Bayesian approach means that the models themselves assign weights to individual indicators and subindices, not we researchers. This has the advantage that we avoid inconsistencies and arbitrariness in the aggregation process associated with the manual assignment of prior weights. It also enables us to take into account that, for instance, increases in coordination capacity and delivery capacity likely depend on earlier increases in fiscal capacity. To put it simply: our models allow us to construct higher-level indices that are more than the sum of

[22] Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020). “Constraining Governments.”

FIGURE 2.4: An example of a latent variable model of state capacity



their parts. While this clearly improves the higher-level indices we make available, it also asks for caution in the use and interpretation of lower-level indices: they are not a substitute for higher-level indices, but are mainly helpful for identifying weaknesses in accountability mechanisms, capacity generation or overall public goods provision. A given country might, for instance, have difficulties in attaining high overall public goods provision because of critical weaknesses in the provision of social public goods, i.e. health, education and gender equality.

One specific advantage of Bayesian latent variable models is that the reliance on Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to identify underlying factors makes them more robust to missing data than traditional factor analysis models.[23] Yet given the variety of countries we seek to cover, it is clear that missing data can still be a problem in estimating index scores for certain countries. To address this problem, we rely on data augmentation methods[24] rather than multiple imputation methods,[25] as data augmentation produced fewer biased results for countries with higher proportions of missing values. In addition to the use of data augmentation, we only include countries that are covered by key indicators at the subindex level for all years in the dataset. This means that higher level index estimates are always based on multiple, key indicators.

[23] Hanson and Sigman (2021). "Leviathan's Latent Dimensions."
[24] We use data augmentation techniques implemented in the R packages BLAVAAN/JAGS.
[25] Merke, E. C. (2011). "A comparison of imputation methods for Bayesian factor analysis models," Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 36(2), https://doi.org/10.3102/1076998610375833.

3. THE 2022 BERGGRUEN GOVERNANCE INDEX: A FIRST LOOK

THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS AN OVERVIEW of some of the main findings from our analysis of the BGI. Given the scale and scope of the Index, it will not be possible to review all countries, indicators, and subindicators. Instead, we will first look at overall governance performance across world regions, single out general trends, and identify top and bottom performers. We then review the case of the United States relative to other major world powers like Brazil, China, the EU, India, and Russia. We use this comparison also to explore the versatility of the Index to address key conceptual issues. Prominent among them is a look at the twin fallacies of governance: the "democratic fallacy," which assumes that democracy is sufficient for improved governance performance, and the "autocratic fallacy," which assumes that state capacity alone matters for the delivery of public goods.

The purpose of this chapter, however, is mainly descriptive, and rather than generating hypotheses we will point to critical questions as they emerge and prepare the ground for the conceptual implications that are the topic of Chapter 4. Appendix 3 lists the results of each country (in alphabetical order) on each index for 2000, 2010, and 2019, and then in descending order according to the sum of the three index scores for 2019.

3.1 Governance Performance by Dimension

3.1.1 Public Goods Provision

Not surprisingly, whether governments can provide high levels of public goods varies both between and within regions. Figure 3.1 shows that while public goods scores in Europe, the Americas, and East Asia are generally higher than in other regions, there are nonetheless substantial variations within each region as well. For example, Western European countries like Germany (95), France (91), or the Netherlands (92) along with Scandinavia (ranging between 91 and 94) provide higher levels of public goods than Eastern European countries like Bulgaria (72), Romania (75), or Hungary (82). Similarly, within the Americas, Canada (93) delivers public goods better than the United States (86), and the latter better than Mexico (76). In Latin America, Chile (83) and Uruguay (83) offer higher public goods levels than Brazil (69) and Colombia (73). Taking a closer look at Asia, China (74) outperforms India (64) in public goods provision, and Japan (100) and South Korea (92) perform even better than China. Finally, countries in Northern and Southern Africa, e.g., Algeria (75), Morocco (65), South Africa (63),

FIGURE 3.1: Public Goods Index by country, 2019



and Botswana (52), supply public goods more extensively than most countries in Central Africa, e.g., Mali (38) and Mozambique (29).

While a 2019 snapshot of world regions is helpful to develop a sense of overall cross-country variations in public goods provision, a look at regional averages over time offers additional insights. Most striking about the trends revealed in Figure 3.2 is that public goods provision in Africa has clearly improved since the early 2000s, from a 2000 average of 30 to 48 in 2019. Often seen as the world´s most deprived continent in terms of poverty, political instability, lagging economic and institutional development, low life expectancy, and poor health, Africa has nonetheless made substantial progress—albeit frequently from a rather low level of public goods provision.

Public goods provision has improved across all regions since the early 2000s, but no region has advanced as remarkably as Africa — albeit from a relatively low starting point.

For example, Angola's level of public goods provision increased from 24 in 2000 to 42 by 2019, Burkina Faso's from a low of 8 to 35, and Ghana's from 35 to 57 in the same period. Only few countries in the region show moderate increases (Botswana from 47 to 52), and importantly there is virtually no backsliding among the sub-Saharan African countries included in the Index. The substantial improvement of public goods provision in Africa—before the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic—is remarkable. Since the Public Goods Index documents a longer-term trend toward improved levels of provision in most African countries, that achievement could come under threat due to vaccine nationalism, a slowing world economy, looming debt crises and the impact of Russia's war on Ukraine on world food supplies.

As Figure 3.2 shows, all regions are in fact better off, but have not improved to the same extent as Africa. On average, Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania have only slightly raised the supply of public goods between 2000 and 2019, all improving in the single digits.[1] Latin America, after the "lost decades" of the late 20th century, when the region was plagued by financial and political instability,[2] seems to have gained ground, moving from 63 to 70. Chile (from 74 in 2000 to 83 in 2019), Ecuador (64 to 79), and Peru (63 to 80) showed the largest gains in Latin America, while all other countries in the region showed mostly smaller improvements.

Stating that all world regions progressed does not mean that all countries did so at the same rate or even moved forward at all. By looking at regional averages, we naturally tend to miss specific country successes and failures as they are essentially "averaged out." In Africa, Nigeria, the continent's economically most powerful country,

FIGURE 3.2: Changes in Public Goods Index by region, 2000–2019



[1] This relative stagnation could even become backsliding, according to the United Nations. The 2021 SDG progress report finds that "COVID-19 has wiped out 20 years of education gains" and that "the pandemic has halted or reversed progress in health." See https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/overview/.

[2] Sims, J. and Romero, J. (2013). "Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s," Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/latin-american-debt-crisis.

FIGURE 3.3: Countries with most improvement in public goods provision, 2000–2019



is a case in point. Even though its Public Goods Index increased from 23 in 2000 to 43 in 2019, its performance remains close to the sub-Saharan averages (26 to 45). Likewise, Brazil's score improved only slightly from 65 to 69 over the same period and is similar to the Latin American average, and in Asia, Malaysia remained largely stable (74 to 78) as well. Disproportionate improvement in performance was not among the regional powerhouses, but more in smaller and mid-sized countries, with Madagascar as a case in point in Africa (see below), Chile in Latin America, and South Korea in Asia.

Overall, however, Africa deserves special mention because the improvements are not just visible in regional averages, but also if we look at the ten worst and best performing countries in the entire Public Goods Index in terms of 2000–2019 changes. Figure 3.3 illustrates that the 10 most improved countries on the Public Goods Index are, in fact, all located in Africa. Even though very low starting levels doubtlessly matter for this outcome, the score improvements in countries like Kenya (from 25 to 53) and Ethiopia (from 11 to 52) are nonetheless noteworthy. We will explore below to what extent these increases coincided with increases in state capacity and democratic accountability. For now, we simply note that the Public Goods Index captures a significant upward trend in public goods provision in Africa and a more moderate upward trend in other world regions.

A similar look at the ten least improved countries in Figure 3.4 essentially confirms that public

FIGURE 3.4: Countries with least improvement or decline in public goods provision, 2000–2019



goods provision has generally improved in most countries. There appear to be no countries where public goods declined significantly. Even war-torn countries like Libya (a 6-point drop) and Syria (a 1-point drop)[3] have apparently not seen quantitatively substantial worsening of public goods provision, although the data likely cover only parts of the country, and their resilience could be attributable to international relief efforts and humanitarian assistance. In Libya, for example, economic and environmental public goods have suffered more heavily than social public goods. It is important to stress, however, that this does not mean that the quantitatively small public goods losses that countries like Libya and Syria have seen are not experienced as catastrophic by local populations. If a country is generally only able to provide a limited amount of medical care, education, or environmental quality to some part of its population, then any further worsening of public goods provision can imply a fundamental decline in well-being for all.

By contrast, similar decreases in public goods provision in countries with already high levels of public goods provision do not imply similarly fundamental declines in well-being. Finland, for instance, lost productive knowledge after its IT

[3] Syria has experienced civil war since 2011 and Libya's second civil war took place from 2014–2020. The UNFPA finds "dire" consequences in both countries, with access to health, housing, and education negatively affected by a large population displacement as a result of the wars. See https://www.unfpa.org/data/emergencies/libya-humanitarian-emergency [accessed May 5, 2022].

FIGURE 3.5: State Capacity Index by country, 2019



industry started to decline in the 2010s; yet it seems rather problematic to compare Finland's decline (from 93 in 2000 to 91 in 2019) or Belgium's (from 93 to 92) in public goods provision to Libya's and Syria's decline. Likewise, among European countries, the Netherlands and Spain are the only ones showing stagnation between 2000 and 2019 at a high score of 92 for the former and 90 for the latter. Honduras, too, has stagnated over the same period at 52. Such declines and stagnation set in at rather different levels. For Honduras, stagnation may imply misery for large parts of the population, whereas it would hardly be noticeable to Dutch or Spanish citizens.[4] We will return to this issue below, when we relate increases and decreases in public goods provision to increases and decreases in state capacity and democratic accountability.

3.1.2 State Capacity

While public goods provision generally increased across world regions and for many countries, the development of state capacity is more varied. The BGI shows that state capacity tends to be highest on average in Western Europe (81), North America (62), and East Asia (60) (Figure 3.5). Yet Figure 3.5 also reveals that there are high-capacity countries in regions with generally limited state capacity.

[4] In 2019, the Netherlands had a Human Development Index score of .94 and Spain was at .90, while Honduras substantially trails both at only .63. https://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506.

FIGURE 3.6: Changes in State Capacity Index by region, 2000–2019



Botswana (65) and Namibia (58) are examples of countries with high state capacity scores in Africa (average is 38), compared to Nigeria (27) or Somalia (16). Similarly positive examples can be found in other regions as well, as the examples of Uruguay (75), Chile (68), and Costa Rica (66) in Latin America (average 41) demonstrate. They stand out against other countries like Brazil and Colombia (both 49) or Bolivia (43).

On average, state capacity increased only in Africa and Asia, however, rising from 34 to 38 and 43 to 45, respectively (see Figure 3.6). The Americas, by contrast, were on a downward trajectory well before the COVID-19 pandemic. In North America, only Canada showed a slight improvement (from 80 in 2000 to 82 in 2019) whereas both the U.S. and Mexico reveal substantial losses: from 79 to 65 for the U.S. and from 49 to 40 for Mexico during the same period. In Latin America, most state capacity scores range from a low of 38 for Paraguay (up from 29 in 2000) to a high of 75 for Uruguay (up from 72 in 2000). However, most countries are in the 40s to 50s range, except for Chile with 68, down from 74 in 2000. Indeed, Brazil too suffered a slight decline (from 52 to 49), as did Suriname (down 4 points), with all others showing slight to modest improvements.

Europe and Oceania achieved the highest average scores on the State Capacity Index, but have not improved much during the last decades.[5] For example, German, French, and Italian state capacities remained more or less stable, as did Australia's and New Zealand's.

Asia shows a more varied picture. Myanmar had the largest increase in state capacity, starting from a low score of 21 in 2000 and reaching the 50-point mark by 2019. China had a modest improvement in state capacity, from 38 to 44 over the period in question, as did India (48 to 51), Indonesia (40 to 43), and Vietnam (37 to 40), whereas Japan and South Korea remained stable at much higher capacity levels in the lower- to mid-70s. Several countries in the region, however, suffered a substantial loss in state capacity, for example, Thailand (from 43 in 2000 to 33 in 2019).

[5] Europe's average state capacity stayed constant around 69 while Oceania stagnated around 71 between 2000 and 2019.

FIGURE 3.7: Countries with the most improvement in state capacity, 2000–2019



Figure 3.7 shows that there is no European, Oceanian, or American country among the most improved on the State Capacity Index; only African and Asian countries have seen significant jumps in state capacity between 2000 and 2019.

What is worth noting, however, is that the countries with the largest increases in state capacity in Africa (Tunisia, from 32 in 2000 to 61 in 2019) and Asia (Myanmar, from 21 to 50) have recently experienced "soft" (Tunisia) and "hard" (Myanmar) coups.[6] These dramatic reversals in both countries' governance underline Hirschman's[7] concern about the narrow path toward better and sustainable governance. It might be that large increases in state capacity (and democratic accountability) can be particularly difficult to sustain if either externally or internally induced crises and upheavals render it difficult to achieve public goods increases.

Yet even at higher levels of public goods provision, the loss of state capacity can be worrisome as it might foreshadow future declines in public goods provision. Figure 3.8 suggests that the United States was, in fact, among the ten countries that have suffered a significant deterioration in state capacity over the last decades: from 79 in 2000 to 65 in 2019, with a drop of 14 points occurring in the 2010s. This decline may have left the United States surprisingly ill-prepared to contain, for

[6] Yee, V. (2021, December 13). "Tunisia's president promises vote on constitution and sets election date," New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/13/world/middleeast/tunisia-saied-constitution-election.html

[7] Hirschman (1986). "On Democracy in Latin America."

FIGURE 3.8: Countries with highest decline in state capacity, 2000–2019



example, the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, U.S. state capacity in 2019 was substantially below that of Canada (82) and most Western European countries like the United Kingdom (84), France (81), and Germany (88). We will take a closer look at the U.S. case further below.

3.1.3 Democratic Accountability

Democratic accountability varies widely between and within regions. In other words, except Oceania, all regions have countries with comparably low and high levels of accountability. In fact, within-region variations for accountability are more pronounced than those for the other two main dimensions of governance. Figure 3.9 shows that there are countries on democratic and autocratic paths in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Syria with a score of 5, Saudi Arabia (9), Qatar (11), and China (14) show the lowest level of democratic accountability, with none having improved between 2000 and 2019. By contrast, Denmark (97), Germany, Norway and Sweden (at 95 each), and Costa Rica and Estonia (93 each) reveal the highest scores.

A look at regional averages in Figure 3.10 suggests an overall increase in accountability in Africa since the 2010s, rising from 55 to 58 over that decade, up from 51 in 2000. Several countries in the region made significant headway: Gambia (from 36 in 2000 to 65 in 2019), Liberia (from 51 to 69), Sierra Leone (50 to 69) as well as Sudan (20 to 43) stand out. Other countries, however, fell back, among them Botswana (from 78 to 68), Cameroon (45 to 39), Uganda (54 to 48), and especially Egypt, from an already low score of 34 in 2000 to 26 by 2019.

FIGURE 3.9: Democratic Accountability Index by country, 2019



Nigeria remained stable in terms of democratic accountability, which means that the country can look back at the longest period of being a democracy since becoming independent in 1960.

As in terms of improvement in public goods provision, the African case offers significantly more good news than bad. In other world regions, however, accountability seems to have generally declined over the same time period. Neither Oceania nor Europe experienced a democratic renewal, although accountability remains at a high level in most countries in those regions. For example, among EU member states, only four rank below 80 (Hungary with 57; Poland 69; Bulgaria 73, and Romania 74). Hungary and Poland suffered

Democratic accountability rose only in Africa as a whole; in the Americas and Asia it is on a downward trajectory.

significant losses in democratic accountability, down from 83 and 90 in 2000, respectively. Other EU countries are more or less stable, as are the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland.

In the Americas and Asia, accountability is clearly

FIGURE 3.10: Changes in Democratic Accountability Index by region, 2000–2019



on a downward trajectory. Indeed, countries showing declining democratic accountability between 2000 and 2019 are mainly located in the Americas and Asia. In North America, both Canada (86) and Mexico (71) remained stable, while the U.S. experienced a decline from 90 in 2000 to 83 in 2019. In Latin America, some countries like Bolivia (from 77 to 53) and Brazil (87 to 72) suffered major losses, while Argentina (83 to 79) and Ecuador (72 to 68) experienced a more modest decline, with Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay remaining stable. Only Colombia (from 67 to 72) and Peru (53 to 81) stand out with an increase in democratic accountability.

The picture from Central America and the Caribbean is mixed at best. Cuba continues to rank lowest on democratic accountability in the region, even though it improved its score from 11 in 2000 to 19 in 2019. Costa Rica has by far the highest score (93) followed by Jamaica (81) and Trinidad (80). However, several counties show declining scores: the Dominican Republic (from 66 to 60), Honduras (60 to 53), and especially Nicaragua, with a significant drop to 24, down from 66 in 2019, and Venezuela (from 59 to 28).

Asia offers a bleaker picture. Only few countries show gains over the period in question (Myanmar from 9 to 59; Pakistan from 49 to 53; Sri Lanka from 57 to 68), and while some democracies like Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia remain stable at 85, 87, and 72, respectively, and Singapore (47) and Vietnam (34) likewise though at much lower levels, it is the decline in democratic accountability in major countries that stands out: Bangladesh (from 56 to 36), China (21 to 14), Hong Kong (70 to 57), India (80 to 59), Indonesia (76 to 72), and Thailand (67 to 42) are cases in point.

Given the increase in average accountability in Africa, it should not come as a surprise that some of the most improved countries on the Democratic Accountability Index can be found in Africa (Figure 3.11). This is consistent with the results of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which also detected a steady rise in governance

FIGURE 3.11: Countries with the most improvement in democratic accountability, 2000–2019



performance in Africa from 2010 to 2018, with only a small drop in 2019. In fact, the IIAG argues that "in 2019, 61.2% of Africa's population lives in a country where Overall Governance is better than in 2010."[8] In our index, the performance of Tunisia (from 21 to 83) and Gambia (36 to 65) stood out, achieving much higher values in 2019 than in 2000. But there are also accountability success stories in other regions: in the Americas, Peru (from 53 to 81) has gained substantially in accountability; in Asia, Armenia (from 51 to 71) and, as mentioned, Myanmar have at least intermittently received higher accountability scores.

By contrast, those countries whose scores worsened most on the Democratic Accountability Index are mostly located in the Americas and Asia (Figure 3.12). As we have seen, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia saw significant deterioration in accountability, as did Bangladesh, India, and Thailand in Asia. Turkey, too, shows a major drop in democratic accountability from 67 to 35 over the period, as did Yemen, a country torn by bitter conflict, from 41 to 25. Finally, two EU member states, Poland and Hungary, have been on a steady downward trajectory in this regard.

3.2 First Analytic Steps

So far, we have looked at the BGI mainly from a descriptive perspective and explored some

[8] Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2020). 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Index Report. https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/2020-key-findings

FIGURE 3.12: Countries with the highest declines in democratic accountability, 2000–2019



of the main findings for each of its dimensions separately. We now address an initial selection of four topics to show the versatility of the Index to shed light on substantive issues and help generate hypotheses. The first is about the relationship between democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision. Our primary question is one of the most important of our age: are democracies or autocracies more effective at providing public goods for their people. Second, we look at the United States and its performance record across all three dimensions, exploring instances of stagnation and even decline. Next, we take a comparative point of view and examine the major global players relative to each other. Finally, given current geopolitical tensions, we take a closer look at selected countries in the post-Soviet space and their governance performance over the last 20 years.

3.2.1 What Makes for Good Governance?

In this section we show how the BGI can be used to identify countries that have simultaneously managed to advance public goods provision, state capacity, and accountability—or conversely experienced declines across all three. By focusing on countries that have either experienced across-the-board increases or decreases, we examine the most extreme cases that reveal the most about what makes for good and bad governance. The ability to identify advances and failures by countries at similar or different starting levels is critical because it can provide important lessons that "may conceivably be followed by others," as Hirschman (1986) suggests. This question

FIGURE 3.13: Accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision by selected most improved countries, 2010–2019



also addresses the twin fallacies of governance: the "democratic fallacy," which assumes that democracy is sufficient for superior governance performance, and the "autocratic fallacy," which assumes that state capacity alone matters for the delivery of public goods.

Figure 3.13 illustrates how countries with significant improvements on the Democratic Accountability Index have more recently (since 2010) performed on the state capacity and public goods indices. Madagascar, at the bottom of Figure 3.13, for instance, has during that period seen a remarkable increase in accountability (from 44 to 60), and a slightly more moderate increase in state capacity (from 39 to 52). Therefore, the country moved from the lower left of the graph closer to the center. We can also see that public goods provision substantially increased given that a barely visible gray dot in 2010 with a score of 19, became a clearly visible blue dot in 2019 with a score of 33. These increases came after a political crisis between 2009 and 2013 from which Madagascar seems to have partially recovered.[9] It is, however, only at the beginning of a path toward better and more sustainable governance. Similar to World

[9] Other studies also find Madagascar to be a recent success story. The BTI Transformation Index finds that economic reforms "since 2014 enabled the country to experience continuous economic growth until 2019. Madagascar's economy grew by 4.4% in 2019." Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022). BTI 2022 Country Report—Madagascar. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 3. Engstrom also finds that post-2014 reforms have had a positive impact after a "costly period of institutional decay" from 2009 to 2013. See Engstrom, L. (2022). "Madagascar: Institution-Building in a Fragile State," in Newiak, M., Wane, A. A., and Segura-Ubiergo, A. (eds.), Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities and Lessons. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Countries that achieve a virtuous relationship between the three dimensions of governance, though at relatively low levels, may not have the resilience to withstand jolts.

Bank[10] and IMF[11] country assessments, as well as the BTI Transformation Index,[12] our indices suggest that improvements are still at a very low level.

For the same period, we can detect trajectories like Madagascar's in the cases of Ethiopia and Sudan. In contrast to Sudan and Madagascar, however, Ethiopia saw a substantial increase in accountability (from 30 to 45) but not in state capacity, which increased only marginally (from 34 to 38) before the country's accountability deteriorated during COVID-19, and a brutal civil war created a full-blown humanitarian crisis.[13] Ethiopia is a particularly interesting case to explore the relevance of state capacity and public goods provision in more detail, as we know from existing research that the country struggled with the poor employment performance of large companies and the poor productivity performance of smaller companies.[14] Sudan's overall performance is similar to Ethiopia's: an increase in accountability (from 32 to 43) coincides with an improvement of state capacity (from 24 to 35) and a slightly better public goods provision (from 40 to 45). As is the case in Ethiopia, gains were soon reversed as political instability and repeated military coups destroyed the emerging yet fragile virtuous cycle that had led to improved governance conditions.[15]

A focus on all three indices and their inter-relations is useful for pinpointing major strengths and weaknesses, especially in the context of political and economic developments that lie outside the BGI itself, such as domestic and international armed conflicts or economic recessions. Countries like Madagascar, Ethiopia, or Sudan that manage to develop a virtuous relationship between the three dimensions of governance while still relatively underdeveloped in overall performance may not have the resilience to withstand internal and external jolts. They are vulnerable to shocks while negotiating the narrow corridors toward a more resilient level of development, and backsliding is likely.

Figure 3.13 also shows that increases in accountability and state capacity in Malaysia (accountability increased 12 points and state capacity 13) and Armenia (22- and 21-point increases) are similar to those of Madagascar. Yet these improvements no longer seem sufficient to produce equally large increases in public goods provision. For Malaysia, public goods provision remained basically stable (from 76 to 78) as it did for Armenia (from 79 to 80). This finding might indicate decreasing public

[10] World Bank (2021, February 17). Madagascar Country Program Evaluation. Approach Paper. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_madagascarcpe.pdf

[11] IMF (2020). Republic of Madagascar: Special Issues. IMF Country Report No. 20/61. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2020/English/1MDGEA2020002.ashx

[12] Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020). Madagascar.

[13] The Tigray region of Ethiopia in particular is facing severe crisis, with conflict and famine resulting in food insecurity for about 7 million people, with almost a million displaced. UN (2021). „Ethiopia: Humanitarian aid needed as situation deteriorates in Tigray," https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1106522 [accessed May 5, 2022].

[14] Diao, X., Ellis, M., McMillan, M., and Rodrik, D. (2021). Africa's Manufacturing Puzzle: Evidence from Tanzanian and Ethiopian Firms, NBER Working Paper Working Paper 28344, doi 10.3386/w28344.

[15] Sudan is also in a state of crisis, with conflict and climate events resulting in about two-thirds of its population (roughly 9 million people) being in need of humanitarian assistance. UN OCHA (2022). South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022.

FIGURE 3.14: Accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision by selected least improved countries, 2010–2019



goods returns from accountability and state capacity gains at higher levels of public goods provision. But it is also possible that shorter-term events have an important role to play.[16] In such cases,the BGI is helpful in identifying countries with similar trajectories even if the countries are geographically and culturally distinct.

The BGI governance dimensions can also help identify and explore cases of democratic backsliding. Figure 3.14 shows that Hungary and Poland saw substantial declines in both state capacity and accountability between 2010 and 2019. For Poland that decline in accountability was from a high score of 91 (identical to the Netherlands' and higher than France's with 89) to 69, which is lower than the scores for Bulgaria (73) and Romania (74). Poland's state capacity dropped to 58, down from 68 in 2010, among the lowest in the EU. For Hungary, the accountability scores declined from 78 in 2010 to 57 in 2019, and state capacity from 63 to 57. Yet neither country saw corresponding declines in public goods provision. Indeed, scores improved from 78 to 82 for Hungary and from 80 to 89 for Poland. Most likely, the relatively high levels of EU transfers both countries receive are part of the reason why they

[16] Both countries were hit hard by the global financial crisis. In addition, the 2020 Russia-Georgia war spilled over to Armenia. Malaysia has been in crisis for several years now, with the original corruption scandal from 2015 resulting in the first shift of party in power since independence, and then spiraling out of control during COVID. (2020) "Malaysia's political crisis," (2020). Strategic Comments, 26(2), vii-ix, doi: 10.1080/13567888.2020.1756352.

managed to achieve considerable levels of public goods provision.[17] In future research, we could explore whether Hungary's and Poland's position in global value chains might also play a role, especially the deep integration of their economies with large export economies like Germany's. More generally, the loss of accountability accompanying partial developmental successes— a phenomenon referred to as the Hirschman tunnel effect[18]—has been observed in other cases as well. The effect suggests that a population, at least for a while, will accept greater levels of inequality and autocratic tendencies if a popular sentiment of general improvement prevails.

Whereas Hungary and Poland appear to have weathered declines in democratic accountability and state capacity at least for the time being, Turkey and Thailand fared relatively less well. Turkey´s accountability score declined from 63 in 2010 to 35 in 2019 and its state capacity from 43 to 26, more fitting the profile of an autocracy in the developing world. For Thailand, the scores were 59 to 42 and 40 to 33, respectively. Yet even in these cases, public goods provision seems generally unlikely to decline in spectacular fashion, particularly not if gains in basic medical care, health, productive knowledge, or environmental quality have already been achieved. Even though such public goods appear to be extremely difficult to provide for countries with low state capacity scores, their provision appears to become easier once respective administrative systems and processes are in place.[19]

This dynamic could help explain why countries with weak accountability that manage to increase state capacity and even economic growth up to a certain threshold tend to be able to achieve a relatively high level of public goods provision. More accountable countries, by contrast, appear to be on a narrower path if they seek to increase accountability, state capacity, and public good provision all at the same time. In doing so, they may achieve what Fukuyama describes as the "sweet spot" of a high capacity and relatively autonomous bureaucracy,[20] which enables countries to efficiently provide public goods.

At below-average state capacity levels, it can be difficult for more accountable countries to reach the same public goods scores as less accountable countries.

To explore this argument further Figure 3.15 relates state capacity to public goods provision while factoring in levels of accountability in a single year (2019) rather than over time. The pattern revealed in Figure 3.15 suggests that at below-average state capacity levels, it can be difficult for more accountable countries (blue dots) to reach public goods scores similar to those of less accountable countries (red dots). Ghana, India, and Brazil, for instance, have not managed to reach public goods scores as high as Turkey, Thailand, or China despite comparable state capacity levels.

However, at above-average state capacity levels, the public goods advantages of less accountable countries apparently cease to be important. While

[17] Hungary received a net of 5 billion euros from the European Union in 2018, while Poland received 11.6 billion net. https://www.statista.com/chart/18794/net-contributors-to-eu-budget/ [accessed May 5, 2022].

[18] Hirschman, A. O., and Rothschild, M. (1973). "The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(4), 544–566, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882024

[19] Turkey had a 2019 HDI score of .82 while Thailand was at a similar level with .78. https://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506.

[20] Fukuyama (2013). "What is Governance?" p. 362.

FIGURE 3.15: State capacity, public good provision, and accountability by country, 2019



there are historically important examples for countries with low accountability and high state capacity and public goods scores, such as Imperial Germany in the early 20th century or Singapore[21] today (with an accountability score of 47, state capacity at 86, and public goods provision at 94), countries with high state capacity and public goods provision tend to also have high accountability scores.

These findings are important because we have deliberately not "democratized" our Public Goods Index: it reflects basic development achievements that are likely as important to countries like Turkey, Thailand, and China, as they are to Ghana, India, and Brazil. This is similar to what Fukuyama has in mind when he stresses that it is important to develop "measures that will work for both authoritarian and democratic regimes."[22] However,

At above-average state capacity levels, the public goods advantages of less accountable countries apparently cease to be important.

our findings do shed light on the dual fallacies mentioned above. Nigeria is a case in point for the "democratic fallacy," which assumes that democracy is sufficient for improved governance performance but fails to take into account that a sufficient and resilient state capacity is needed for improved public goods production. The fact that

[21] Singapore's ability to generate effective governance and high state capacity in the absence of full democracy has become legendary since its independence in 1965. As Menon writes, "its governing system has become widely known for efficiency and competence, especially in terms of its role in generating an "economic miracle"' (p. 1). Menon, S. (2007). Governance, Leadership and Economic Growth in Singapore, MPRA Paper No. 4741, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4741/.

[22] Fukuyama (2013). "What is Governance?", p. 351.

FIGURE 3.16: State capacity and accountability in the United States and elsewhere, 2019



there is no other case like Singapore is evidence of the "autocratic fallacy," which assumes that state capacity alone matters for the delivery of public goods but disregards the need for democratic accountability in setting priorities for state capacity to deliver public goods at higher levels.

Taken together, all three dimension-level indices allow users to explore constellations in which some countries were able to achieve better governance outcomes, but others continued to struggle or even backslide. In future publications we will explore how some of the implicit hypotheses generated here can be tested with both current tools for causal identification and historical case studies that allow for the consideration of contextual factors.

3.2.2 A Closer Look at the United States

Despite some notable recent governance challenges, it would seem intuitive that the U.S. is a strong performer in state capacity, democratic accountability, and public goods provision. In a sense this is true: it ranks above the average in all three categories. Yet merely being better than most countries is a surprisingly humble result for the world's main superpower. Indeed, if we explore the development of democratic accountability and state capacity indices over time, we see that the United States has been on a decidedly downward trajectory. As Figure 3.16 indicates, it currently fails to reach the highest tier populated by other advanced countries in either state capacity or democratic accountability.

In state capacity in particular, the results are dramatic. As Figure 3.17 shows, a decline has occurred in all three main fields of state capacity from 2000 to 2019: fiscal capacity (50 to 43), coordination capacity (84 to 70), and delivery capacity (82 to 66). The drop since

FIGURE 3.17: Subdimensions of state capacity in the United States, 2000–2019



2015 is particularly notable in coordination capacity and delivery capacity.[23] These failures became especially apparent during the Trump administration's initial chaotic response to the COVID-19 pandemic, during which the American state's ability to respond to public health crises was called into question.[24]

But the deficiencies are not only in state capacity. In fact, the United States has also seen a decline

[23] It is difficult to ascribe the drop to a single event, but we could count among them post-financial crisis reductions in federal employment and the Trump administration's vow to pursue the "deconstruction of the administrative state." See Lindsey, B. (2021). State Capacity: What Is It, How We Lost It, And How to Get It Back, Washington, DC: Niskanen Center; Weiss, L. and Thurbon, E. (2018). "Power paradox: how the extension of U.S. infrastructural power abroad diminishes state capacity at home," Review of International Political Economy, 25(6), 779–810, doi: 10.1080/09692290.2018.1486875; Rucker, P. and Costa, R. (2017, February 23). "Bannon vows a daily fight for 'deconstruction of the administrative state,'" The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html).

[24] Nakagawa, D., Root, A. S., Knudsen, E., Anheier, H. K., Kononykhina, O., and Lang, M. (2021). COVID-19 Response: Case Studies of Four Countries. Los Angeles: Berggruen Institute, https://www.berggruen.org/work/the-planetary/the-2019-berggruen-governance-index/covid-19-response-case-studies-of-four-countries/

FIGURE 3.18: Change in accountability and state capacity in the United States, 2010–2019



in democratic accountability: it moved closer to the global average in both fields, as Figure 3.18 shows. And although public goods provision has improved slightly, it does so from a lower baseline than similarly wealthy countries, likely due to the fact that it has higher inequality and a much smaller welfare state than European countries.[25] In the field of healthcare in particular, it must spend a much larger share of national income to achieve lower levels of coverage and worse health outcomes than other advanced economies.[26]

3.2.3 Comparative Perspectives

How did governance in the United States compare to other major countries? First, the U.S. is the only world power where both accountability and state capacity declined significantly between 2000 and 2019: accountability dropped from 90 to 83, and state capacity from 79 to 65. While China (21 to 14) and Russia (53 to 37) became more autocratic and while India (80 to 59) and Brazil (87 to 72) experienced democratic back-sliding, only Brazil showed a slight drop in state capacity (52 to 49), whereas the others experienced a slight increase in state capacity. Thus, it is the dual decline that makes the U.S. stand out.

By contrast, the EU5 (the European Union's 5 largest economies, consisting of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) is the other outlier: accountability (with an average score of 91 in 2000 and 2019) and state capacity (80 versus 79) remained stable and well above the global average as well as above the U.S., and well ahead of China, Russia, India, and Brazil. Indeed, in terms of accountability, the gap between the EU5 and

[25] Alesina, A., Glaeser, E., and Sacerdote, B. (2001). "Why doesn't the United States have a European-style welfare state?" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 187–277, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2001/06/2001b_bpea_alesina.pdf.

[26] Cohen, J. (2020, November 1). "Dismal U.S. life expectancy trend reflects disconnect between dollars spent on healthcare and value produced," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2020/11/01/dismal-us-life-expectancy-trend-reflects-disconnect-between-dollars-spent-on-healthcare-and-value-produced/

FIGURE 3.19: Public goods provision in Russia, 2000–2019



the other powers widened. The gap grew in the case of state capacity as well, except for China and Russia (albeit marginally).

In terms of public goods provision the U.S., the EU5, and Brazil saw smaller improvements, with bigger jumps in Russia (from 63 in 2000 to 81 in 2019), India (from 42 to 64) and China (63 to 74). As Figure 3.19 shows, in the case of Russia, improvements in public goods provision were mostly in the field of social public goods, i.e., social security and related services which are largely subsidized by Russia's energy export earnings. This can be a familiar tactic to shore up support for autocratic regimes: citizens are less likely to rebel against the state if social goods provision remains high.[27] We will see a dramatic example of this approach to governance in section 3.2.4 with the case of Belarus.

Figure 3.20 shows two clusters: a highly developed cluster with the U.S. and EU5 more toward the right and what could be called an emerging economy cluster with Brazil, China,

[27] Taydas, Z. and Peksen, D. (2012). "Can states buy peace? Social welfare spending and civil conflicts," Journal of Peace Research, 49(2), 273–287; Justinoa, P. and Martorano, B. (2018). "Welfare spending and political conflict in Latin America, 1970–2010," World Development, 107(July), 98–110.

FIGURE 3.20: State capacity, public goods provision, and democratic accountability by major global powers, 2000–2019



India, and Russia, toward the left. Whereas the developed cluster clearly positions the EU5 at the top and shows the U.S. drifting away from it, the emerging cluster moves closer together in terms of delivery of public goods and autocratic tendencies. At the same time, we can observe three trajectories. First, the EU5 are more or less stable and more of an outlier in 2019 than they were in 2000. Then the U.S. and Brazil share a decline in accountability and a drop in state capacity with a modest increase in public goods provision. Both countries move slightly toward the upper-left in Figure 3.20. Then, we have a third trajectory, shared by China, India, and Russia. These countries, all with declining accountability, slightly improved state capacities, and a disproportionate jump in public goods provision, show an upward trajectory.

For the EU5, the challenge becomes sustaining the virtuous cycle among the three dimensions, as discussed above, whereas for the U.S. and Brazil the questions are how to reverse the dual drop in accountability and state capacity, and how and for how long levels of public goods provision could be maintained otherwise. For the "upward" cluster, the key issue becomes how higher levels of public goods provision can be maintained given low and lower accountability and more or less stagnating state capacity. How will priorities be set, and where do the resources come from?

3.2.4 A Closer Look at Eastern Europe

How does Russia compare to other countries in the eastern European region, almost all of which were part of former Soviet Union? Figure 3.21 shows two clear clusters: in the upper right-hand corner are

FIGURE 3.21: State capacity, public goods provision, and democratic accountability by selected Eastern European countries, 2000–2019



the three Baltic countries and Poland, and on the left are the remaining countries. Let's take a look first at the upper-right cluster: the Baltic countries are clearly a success when it comes to reaching an upward trajectory in terms of public goods provision while improving in terms of both state capacity and accountability. For the three Baltic countries, accountability scores range between 82 and 90 in 2000, and between 85 and 93 in 2019. Likewise, their state capacity scores range from 61 to 67 in 2000 and 64 to 78 some two decades later.

Poland diverges from this pattern, as we have seen, and is on a different trajectory, with accountability and state capacity declining substantially, even though public goods provision increased. Poland is an outlier in this respect, and its trajectory is more like that of Brazil and the United States (see Figure 3.20). As in these cases, we can speculate how long this trajectory can be maintained, especially as the European Union threatens Poland with reduced funding given the country's accountability record, which is in violation of EU law.

Moldova seems like a country at the doorstep of what could become a virtuous cycle of governance, and similar to some of the African countries we reviewed previously. With accountability stable, though not very high at 66 and a slightly improving state capacity (from 40 to 43), it managed to achieve a high public goods provision level of 82, up from 67 in 2000. However, this pattern is typically neither resilient nor self-sustaining and can be fragile. Especially if Moldova should be drawn further into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, much of the progress the country has achieved

over the last decades could be in jeopardy.

This brings us to Ukraine. Until the conflict with Russia, the country seemed to be on a solid course to improve accountability (from 54 in 2000 to 63 in 2019) and state capacity (from 30 to 40). Even though these scores are well below the European average, and much lower than those for the Baltic countries, they suggest that Ukraine has left behind an era of corruption and that the Maidan revolution of 2014 was showing significant trends toward more democracy and better functioning public administrative systems. Its record in terms of public goods provision remained basically stable in the mid-70s range, and by 2019 was the lowest among the countries depicted.

Finally, Belarus, which shows accountability scores persistently well below the European average, has a pattern similar to Russia's, with mid-level state capacity scores and disproportionate levels of public goods provision.[28] However, the source of each country's wealth differs: Russia relies largely on natural resources, while Belarus retains much of the state-centric industrial economy

While the Baltic countries have succeeded in finding a virtuous balance at a high level, Poland is backsliding and progress in the Ukraine and Moldova has been stymied.

from the Soviet era. Still, both countries display the characteristics of autocracies and face the same long-run dilemma of how to maintain such high levels of public goods provision with little accountability and state capacity. The Baltic countries likely face no such problem: they are well on their way to navigating the narrow corridor toward good governance. Poland is backsliding on this path, whereas the Ukraine and Moldova could likely have progressed more if it were not for external constraints.

[28] Belarus has been criticized for its lack of post-communist democratic reforms, yet has retained a strong social welfare state compared to many other post-Soviet countries. Indeed, strong social protections like "nearly full employment, no large-scale privatisation, and high levels of security provision" (Yarashevich, p. 1704) likely exist primarily to shore up President Lukashenko's grip on power. Reasonably strong economic growth has facilitated this. As Yarashevich (2014, p. 1703) finds, "in purely statistical terms Belarus fared no worse and often much better than many other post-communist countries." Yarashevich, V. (2014). "Political economy of modern Belarus: Going against mainstream?" Europe-Asia Studies, 66(10), 1703–1734.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY

IN THIS CHAPTER, WE ADDRESS two types of implications: conceptual implications as they relate to an improved understanding of governance and its contributions to the social sciences at large; and policy implications based on insights that can be gained with the help of the BGI. We will deal with each in turn but will begin with a more general observation about indicators.

What makes some indicators more useful than others? Beyond their basic methodological, measurement and statistical qualities such as validity, reliability and robustness, the utility of any indicator or index such as the BGI is determined largely by how it is used. In governance studies, it is often difficult to both select and acquire the necessary quantitative indicators, as Fukuyama points out.[1] Long ago, one of the founders of comparative social research, Karl Deutsch,[2] suggested that combinatorial richness and organizing power are two criteria of effective indicators. An indicator has combinatorial richness if it surfaces a wide range of interesting relationships, patterns, and contrasts, and does so across different disciplines and thematic foci. It is the degree of an indicator´s fruitfulness. Institutional trust, which we look at in relation to the BGI below, is such an indicator.

The other quality criterion, organizing power, depicts the ability of the indicator to fit a broad range of circumstances, which is especially important in international comparative work. An indicator with great organizing power is the one that can most comfortably encompass the circumstances of a large number of different countries, regimes, economic systems, or geopolitical settings. It is the degree of versatility. An example is the Human Development Index.

When it comes to organizing power, the previous chapter demonstrates the utility of the BGI for comparative purposes, both cross-national as well as longitudinal. Opening the black box of governance to explore the Governance Triangle—with the varying relationships between the three dimensions of democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision in a wide range and many types of countries, regimes, and circumstances—allowed us to obtain relevant results and gain important insights about, for

[1] Fukuyama (2013). “What is Governance?”, p. 363.
[2] Deutsch, K. W. (1063). The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. New York: The Free Press.

example, the performance of the Global South, of autocracies, and of specific countries like the United States or Madagascar.

Based on these results and insights, we also point to possible hypotheses that could be generated with the help of the BGI. These relate to a variety of disciplines and substantive problems like the dual (democratic and autocratic) fallacies or the notion of "narrow paths."[3] Such aspects are part of the quality criteria that Deutsch called combinatorial richness. We want to follow up on this point and explore the relationships in the Governance Triangle further, and again, with an interest in proposing rather than testing hypotheses for now. Specifically, we look at the relationship between governance performance (as measured by the BGI) and trust in government and between such performance and GDP. We point to conceptual areas that are ripe for developing testable hypotheses linking the new understanding of governance to concern about the future of the liberal order, among other hypotheses.

4.1 Trust in Government and Public Goods Provision

Let's look at trust first. Trust in government, as a general indicator of political legitimacy extended by the governed to those in power, has long been seen as an essential component of political stability. For example, the seminal comparative analysis on the breakdown of democratic regimes by Linz and Stepan[4] used a conceptual framework linking the performance of a governance system to three crucial aspects and their interrelationships: legitimacy (are trusted actors playing by the rules, and is the system as a whole to be trusted?), efficacy (do these actors know what they are doing in addressing public problems?), and effectiveness (do they achieve acceptable results with reasonable means?).

Because no clear pattern exists in how public goods provision relates to trust in government, puzzling questions arise.

The legitimacy of the governance system in place becomes a positive and negative reinforcer that magnifies the effects of efficacy and effectiveness on performance and vice versa. This is not unlike the balancing of the Governance Triangle described above, and the question becomes whether there is a relationship between trust in government and public goods provision. Note that when posing this question, we are relating the BGI to a phenomenon, trust in government, that is "outside" the Index proper.[5] Depending on the theoretical question and the hypothesis at hand, the BGI could either become a dependent (public goods provision is a function of trust in government) or independent (trust in government is a function of public goods provision) variable.

In any case, as Figure 4.1 shows, the relationship between the two is far from clear. In fact, because Figure 4.1 reveals no clear pattern in how public goods provision relates to trust, puzzling questions arise. Why is it that Brazil has a much lower trust in government than Nigeria or Pakistan, even though its Public Goods Index is much higher? Italy, too, has lower trust levels than Nigeria and Pakistan, while its public goods provision is higher

[3] Hirschman (1986). "On Democracy in Latin America," p. 2.

[4] Linz and Stepan (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.

[5] The measure we use is based on responses to the World Values Survey (WVS) question: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: The Government." Data drawn from Haerpfer, C., et al. (2021). World Values Survey Time-Series (1981-2020) Cross-National Data-Set: Data File Version 2.0.0. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.15.

FIGURE 4.1: Trust in government and BGI Public Goods Index, 2018



still. What is more, why do citizens of autocratic countries like China and Turkey have more trust in government than those in Germany? It seems that either the relationship between the two indicators is less clear than Linz and Stepan assumed, or that advances in public goods provision from a low base have supported and maintained the legitimacy of autocratic governments. Finally, it is likely that "political control" partially explains the perplexingly high level of trust observed in China.[6] Even in China, however, trust in government has declined in recent decades following rising public criticism of income inequality.[7]

Focusing on public goods provision as dependent variable, it would be a mistake to assume that a high level of economic effectiveness as measured by GDP per capita can be quasi-automatically converted into a high level of public goods provision. Figure 4.2 indicates that, for instance, the United States provides noticeably fewer public goods to its citizens than New Zealand. Note that this is the case although the GDP per capita of New Zealand is considerably lower than that of the United States. While countries like New Zealand and Costa Rica are evidently not as economically effective as the United States, they nonetheless show higher efficacy and effectiveness in the provision of public goods. To simplify somewhat, we could say that countries located above the curve in Figure 4.2 provide more public goods than we would expect given their GDP per capita, whereas countries located below the curve provide fewer public goods than we would expect.

Of course, this does not imply that there is no relationship between economic effectiveness and public goods provision. On the contrary, Figure 4.2 suggests the presence of a strong relationship between these two variables. This is why we are interested in GDP per capita both as a control variable that can help us to evaluate whether

[6] Wu, C. and Wilkes, R. (2018). "Local-national political trust patterns: Why China is an exception," International Political Science Review, 39(4), 436–454.

[7] Zhong, P. and Zhan, J. V., (2021). "Authoritarian critical citizens and declining political trust in China," The China Review, 21(2), 117–151.

FIGURE 4.2: Public Goods Index and GDP per capita (PPP), 2019



state capacity has an independent effect on public goods provision, and as a mediating variable through which state capacity could influence public goods provision more indirectly. In making GDP per capita, and a number of other economic variables, part of our future modeling efforts, we address the often-heard criticism that governance indices fail to capture more than the overall economic success of countries. Already a first look at our indices illustrates that high GDP per capita values do not guarantee high public goods provision scores, and that alternative measures of efficacy and effectiveness might be helpful to understand more precisely how legitimacy is created and lost.

4.2 The Governance Triangle, Narrow Paths, and Corridors

We have already referred to a line of reasoning in comparative political economy that takes a longer-term view in trying to understand how societies develop or fail to do so: Hirschman's notion of the narrow path,[8] North et al.'s concept of the doorstep conditions,[9] and most recently Acemoglu and Robinson's work on the narrow corridor that countries must negotiate to advance.[10] In essence, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the key toward advancement is for society and the state to advance more or less simultaneously. Borrowing from the Red Queen analysis in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass, they suggest that both state and society must "keep running" just to maintain their position,[11] let alone avoid falling behind. The self-organizing power and resilience of society must match the state's power to dominate and provide order. Out of this balancing act, a domestic set of liberal institutions can emerge over time.

While Acemoglu and Robinson's concern is primarily about liberty, we suggest that the

[8] Hirschman (1986). "On Democracy in Latin America."
[9] North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009). Violence and Social Order.
[10] Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), Narrow Paths.
[11] Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), Narrow Paths, pp. 40–42.

FIGURE 4.3: The Governance Triangle and the four Leviathans



Governance Triangle can benefit from an institutional political economy perspective, and vice versa. For the BGI, we substitute their concept of state with state capacity and society with democratic accountability. This means that in our framework negotiating the narrow corridor begins with better public goods provision over time, an output-oriented approach. Figure 4.3 presents the stylized relationship between accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision, and the corridor that often leads to good governance. In an idealized case, this would require the development of a "shackled Leviathan," i.e., a state that exists in a cage of rules and regulations and respects society, and a citizenry with strong institutions and voice that demands as much and complains if the state becomes too dominant.[12] State and society both enable and constrict each other in terms of accountability and state capacity.

While we take Fukuyama's point that "an authoritarian regime can be well governed, just as a democracy can be maladministered,"[13] scenarios when countries veer off the narrow path can pose a threat in the long run. One is the "despotic Leviathan," when the state is dominant and applies

[12] Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), Narrow Paths, pp. 26–27.
[13] Fukuyama (2013). "What is Governance?" p. 351.

FIGURE 4.4: The Governance Triangle and the path trajectories



its capacity as it sees fit and without much input from society. The state-dominant mode of public goods provision is very much a weak society syndrome (at least from a Western perspective). That is, it is unable or unwilling to allow for appropriate accountability roles and capacities of self-organization outside the state. Such societies see the state making all major decisions and implementing them. In an extreme version of this scenario, there is the "paper Leviathan": a despotic state with little or no accountability that is unresponsive to actual needs ultimately fails in its ability to deliver public goods, while having no scruples about repressing its citizens. Argentina in the early 1980s is one example, and many Latin American and sub-Saharan African countries have in the past fallen into this category. China represents an interesting exception to these examples: while retaining a strong and centralized state, it has so far succeeded in improving public goods provision. Whether its accountability deficits later lead it down the road of the "paper Leviathan" remains to be seen. Finally, there is the "absent Leviathan," when a country has no sustainable form of government or public administration system. Both the state and society are unable to deliver public goods. Today's failed states are examples of this pattern.

How does the institutional political economy approach to the Governance Triangle reflect some the main findings of the 2022 BGI? Figure 4.4 illustrates how select countries or regions have moved across the "triangle space." Some regions like the Baltic countries and the EU5 are clearly well advanced and secure in progressing further along the corridor. As we have seen, the data for all three dimensions clearly indicate this trajectory. The United States, by contrast, is in danger of falling off the narrow path and seems to be developing a trajectory in the opposite direction, even though its public goods provision is holding

up for now. However, unless the country manages to rebalance and improve both democratic accountability and state capacity, declining public goods provision seems likely, accelerating the downward trend. Indeed, for the longer-term performance of a country, declines in the Public Goods Index are more consequential than declines in GDP.

In contrast to the U.S., China and Russia (which are both well outside the "corridor") are moving more to the upper left-hand corner. That is, they are still able to deliver public goods but entering challenging terrain: to what extent can higher levels of public goods provision be achieved without greater democratic accountability, especially considering large levels of social inequality and regional disparities? Latin America, at a much lower level of public goods provision, could be on a trajectory toward entering the corridor rather than moving away from it. Finally, African countries, while still far from achieving a virtuous balance inside the corridor, were until recently on an upward trend. The continent had fewer despotic and absent Leviathans thanks to improvement on institutional and electoral accountability as well as improved state capacity.

4.3 Cross Fertilization

In addition to relating to conceptual debates like the ones featured above, there is another way in which the BGI can show its combinatorial richness and organizing power: this is the potential of linking the BGI to other indicator projects that track similar or different aspects of country characteristics and performance. For one, this potential exists because the BGI incorporates measures of other indicator projects, for example from Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM). Yet there are also other projects that are relevant such as UNDP's system to track progress toward meeting the SDG targets or the Human Development Index. Here is an initial list of other indicator projects that are of relevance to the BGI and vice versa:

» OECD Better Life Index

BGI components can be used to understand changes in the different dimensions of the OECD Better Life Index. This index provides measures that cannot be included in the BGI Public Goods Index for wealthy countries.

https://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org

» National Well-Being Frameworks

There are a number of national well-being frameworks that could rely on BGI components to understand shifts in specific indicators. These national well-being frameworks are, in turn, a useful source for country-specific public goods indicators that are not included in the BGI. A few examples include :

New Zealand Living Standards Framework Dashboard (Treasury)
https://www.treasury.govt.nz/information-and-services/nz-economy/higher-living-standards/measuring-wellbeing-lsf-dashboard

United Kingdom Measures of National Well-Being (The UK Office for National Statistics)
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/suresofnationalwell beingdashboard/2018-04-25

Israel Indicators of Well-Being, Sustainability and Resilience (Central Bureau of Statistics)
https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/subjects/Pages/Indicators-of-well-being-sustainability-and-resilience.aspx

Sweden New Measures of Well-Being (Ministry of Finance)
https://www.government.se/articles/2017/08/new-measures-of-wellbeing/

Well-Being in Germany (Federal Chancellery)
https://www.gut-leben-in-deutschland.de/en/

» Sustainable Development Report

The BGI and the Sustainable Development Report both seek to capture where countries stand with regard to achieving the SDGs. While

the BGI state capacity component could be used to make sense of progress on various SDG indicators included in the Sustainable Development Report, the latter could be used to understand specific aspects of public goods provision in more detail.
https://www.sdgindex.org/

» **Social Progress Imperative (SPI)**
The BGI and SPI are both interested in developing public goods/well-being measures that go beyond GDP. More specifically, the BGI could be helpful to make sense of changes in SPI dimensions. The SPI, in turn, provides dimensions with a different focus than the BGI public goods subdimensions.
https://www.socialprogress.org/

» **Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)**
The IIAG provides substantially more detailed output/public goods measures than the BGI. The BGI, in turn, could be useful for analyzing changes in the output measures included in the IIAG.
https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag

» **Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM)**
The BGI provides state capacity indices that make use of and complement the V-DEM dataset.
https://v-dem.net/

» **The Quality of Government (QoG) Institute**
The BGI and the QoG Institute share a similar interest in developing better state capacity measures
https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government

4.4 Policy Implications

Given the complexity of the BGI and the many differences across countries and regions, concrete policy implications and the recommendations that follow from them are best based on detailed case studies in a comparative perspective. We will add these cases studies in the future and limit ourselves to more general observations here.

Perhaps the most important policy implication is that the concept of governance as the interplay between democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision matters. Achieving the right balance in the Governance Triangle is a longer-term endeavor, and countries will take time to reach levels of sustainability and resilience. Many African countries have been on a positive track for several years but often lack the resilience to turn intermittent successes in public goods provision into more lasting achievements. The U.S. and Brazilian cases, among others, point to the possibility of countries backsliding even if public goods provision holds up for longer periods.

Policymakers should be mindful of the fact that public goods provision is a slow-moving and lagging indicator of governance performance. Accountability is the most volatile dimension: it can change radically by means of a military coup or with the rise of an autocratic leader. It can erode more slowly under illiberalism or build up after gradual democratic reforms. Much depends on the resilience of the institutional checks and balances in place. These tend to be less developed in the countries of the Global South than in the OECD countries, which is one reason why democratic backsliding has more immediate effects on public goods provision in the Global South. By contrast, while democratic accountability in the U.S. dropped during the Trump administration, its public goods provision increased slightly.

In terms of volatility, state capacity lies in between the other two, but in tendency also is rather inert in the medium term. In other words, some policy levers available to governments carry a longer-term time frame, which in democracies may well be outside conventional election cycles, but more feasible in autocracies. It is therefore important to identify what policy measures governments with improving democratic accountability scores can take to show quicker results in terms of overall advancement, maintaining stability, or building

Achieving the right balance in the Governance Triangle is a longer-term endeavor; countries will take time to reach levels of sustainability and resilience.

resilience, and which ones are likely to become effective in the medium or longer term and require things like cross-party coalitions. Conversely, we can identify what subindicator levels are responsible for backsliding and have the potential to knock the Governance Triangle out of balance more than others, especially considering the respective timelines by which any such measures would show results.

Specifically, we encourage policymakers to take a closer look at the specific patterns of improvement. By looking at African countries (even given the lingering high poverty rates and low living standards on the continent), we can ask: are there more potential regional success stories out there? Policymakers can also do the same for countries suffering decline or backsliding and ask: could what has befallen the United States in recent decades also happen in other countries? Moreover: what countries are moving into the critical areas where lack of accountability becomes a hindrance to further advancement in public goods provision and reach the fork between continued autocracy or a democratic opening? Conversely, how resilient are countries in the early stages of a virtuous balance and what could make them slide back, and what measures can be taken to prevent this from happening? With the democratic fallacy in mind, some measures must clearly involve strengthening state capacity quickly.

Finally, policymakers in non-democratic regimes and illiberal democracies should be aware of the autocracy fallacy and the dangers of having a dominant Leviathan setting priorities and making decisions for societies that have little voice and shrinking degrees of self-organization. With some exceptions like Belarus and Singapore (see Chapter 3) despotic Leviathans often reach their limits in public goods provision, even if they are supported from the outside or benefit from exporting natural resources through state-controlled enterprises to generate revenue. By contrast, policymakers in liberal democracies should avoid the democratic fallacy and assume that without adequate state capacity and a functioning public administration system, society can benefit from an adequate supply of public goods. Democratic accountability and state capacity must move forward in unison to avoid falling behind, to borrow the Red Queen analogy once more.



5. CONCLUSION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT was to introduce the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index, its objectives, conceptual background, and methodology as well as present a selection of initial findings and their implications. Opening the black box of governance, we introduced the three dimensions of democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision. With the Governance Triangle we were able to show that some countries realized the key to good governance: achieving a balance among the three dimensions on an upward and sustainable trajectory. To operationalize these dimensions, we developed three main indices and nine subindices, and collected data from a variety of sources for 134 countries spanning the period from 2000 to 2019. We aggregated the data using Bayesian factor analysis and presented a first look at the new indices. Among the initial findings are:

»Public Goods Provision

- There is significant variation between and within regions as well as over time.
- On average, all world regions are providing a higher level of public goods in 2019 than they were in 2000.
- The African continent has shown the greatest improvement since 2000.
- The ten most improved countries are all African.
- There are no countries showing major declines.

»State Capacity

- As with public goods provision, there is significant variation between and within regions, and over time.
- Most improvements have taken place in Africa and Asia; in fact, only African and Asian countries have shown large gains.
- In North America, both the U.S. and Mexico lost state capacity, whereas Canada gained ground.
- Europe remained largely stable.

»Democratic Accountability

- There is an increase in many African countries.
- Europe, again, stays mostly stable except for Hungary and Poland, which experienced major declines.
- The U.S., the world's most powerful democracy, shows significant backsliding.
- The Americas and Asia experienced a downward trend.

In summary, the 2022 BGI reveals that in the first two decades of the 21st century, countries have, on average, improved in terms of public goods provision, but less and unevenly in terms of state capacity and democratic accountability. While Africa shows the best improvement record across all three main indices, and Europe, with a few notable exceptions, remains basically stable at a

high level, the Americas and Asia reveal troubling trends in declining state capacity and democratic accountability.

We then explored analytical issues and found that a focus on all three indices and their inter-relations is useful to pinpoint major strengths and weaknesses of a country's governance, also in the context of political and economic developments such as domestic strife, international armed conflicts, or economic recessions. Specifically:

One of the most important findings, and one with considerable currency in the current geopolitical context, is what could be called the liability of democracy: at below-average state capacity levels, it can be difficult for countries with higher levels of democratic accountability to reach public goods scores similar to those of less accountable countries. However, at above-average state capacity levels, public goods advantages of less accountable countries apparently begin to fade and higher democratic accountability begins to matter more and turns into what could be named the liability of autocracy.

Countries in the Global South, even while developing a virtuous governance balance, may not have the resilience to withstand internal and external jolts. They are vulnerable and backsliding is likely.

The "democratic fallacy," which assumes that democracy is sufficient for improved governance performance, fails to take into account that a sufficient and resilient state capacity is needed for improved and sustainable levels of public goods production.

The "autocratic fallacy," which assumes that state capacity alone matters for the delivery of public goods, disregards the need for democratic accountability in setting priorities for state capacity to deliver public goods at higher levels.

When we then looked at the United States, we found that it is the only world power where both accountability and state capacity declined significantly between 2010 and 2019. This dual decline makes the U.S. stand out and gives cause for concern. Finally, we looked at Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space in particular and found that the countries in the region are drifting apart, particularly with regard to democratic accountability.

In terms of implications, and to demonstrate the BGI's combinatorial richness and organizing power, we explored how our approach could be useful for institutional political economy perspectives. We also emphasized potential links that could be forged with other indicator projects and suggested initial takeaways for policy, while acknowledging that any concrete policy recommendations would require in-depth case studies.

The key to good governance is achieving a balance among the three dimensions on an upward and sustainable trajectory.

Throughout, our intention in the presentation of results was to suggest—and to encourage—the formulation of research questions and hypotheses. Understanding governance at the country level as the interplay between democratic accountability, state capacity, and public goods provision opens many avenues for research. It moves governance research out of some technocratic corner, and close to major theoretical and methodological concerns in the social sciences. We invite researchers to explore countries by conducting in-depth case studies, examine cross-national

patterns and longitudinal trends in greater detail than we could do here, and take up substantive issues such as the doorstep conditions needed to move from a fragile to a resilient governance triangle, the nonlinear effects of state capacity on public goods provision given varying levels of democratic accountability, or the tensions between the liability of democracy and the liability of autocracy.

Likewise, we invite policy analysts to examine specific patterns of improvement, stability, and decline within and across countries. What do these patterns tell us about how to encourage states to move in one direction or another or prevent them from doing so? What options are available to countries for finding and maintaining a virtuous balance among the three dimensions of governance? Do other countries offer lessons?

Understanding governance as the interplay between democratic accountability, state capacity and public goods provision opens many avenues for research.

We will explore these and other questions in the months and years to come, and hope that others will join us in this endeavor before the next full BGI update will be released in 2024.



APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Dimensions, Subdimensions, Indicators, Variables and Sources

Dimension:
Public Goods Provision

Question: To what extent does this state provide public goods?

Clarification: Public goods are goods and services from which citizens of a state cannot be excluded and for which citizens do not have to compete with other citizens. We include also quasi-public goods, i.e., those such as basic medical care or education for which there is partial exclusion and competition We distinguish between three types of public goods: social public goods, economic public goods and environmental public goods.

Aggregation: To create an aggregate measure of public goods provision, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three subindices of public goods provision: social public goods, economic public goods and environmental public goods.

Subdimension:
Social Public Goods

Question: To what extent does this state provide social public goods?

Clarification: Social public goods are public goods that enable the population to live a healthy life and to acquire a basic education. Gender equality is a key condition for the widespread availability of medical care and education, among other public goods.

Aggregation: We model social public goods provision as a function of three nodes: basic medical care, basic education and gender equality. The basic medical care node incorporates life expectancy at birth. The second node captures the availability of basic education through the net primary school enrollment rate and the lower secondary completion rate. We also include the expert-coded variable educational equality to account for the presence of low equality education that likely prevents children from exercising their basic rights as adult citizens. Finally, we operationalize gender equality with the help of the women's political empowerment index.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Basic medical care	Life expectancy at birth	Years	Gapminder (2022)
Education	Net primary enrollment rate	Percentage of the total children of the official school age population	UNESCO (2021)
	Lower secondary completion rate	Number of new entrants in the last grade of lower secondary education, regardless of age, divided by the population at the entrance age for the last grade of lower secondary education	UNESCO [SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS](sourced from World Bank 2021)
Education	Educational equality	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.	V-DEM [v2peedueq] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Gender equality	Women's political empowerment index	Index formed by taking the average of country experts' aggregated evaluation of V-DEM subindices related to women's civil liberties, women's civil society participation, and women's political participation. Interval scale from 0 (low empowerment) to 1 (high empowerment).	V-DEM [v2x_gender] (Sundström, et al. 2017; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Subdimension:
Economic Public Goods

Question: To what extent does this state provide economic public goods?

Clarification: Economic public goods are public goods that facilitate economic growth, such as food security and productive knowledge. They also ensure resilience in times of economic crisis, i.e. access to care and inequality reduction.

Aggregation: Economic public goods provision consists of six main concepts: food security, productive knowledge, vulnerable employment, unemployment, healthcare and inequality. We operationalize food security with the help of the food vulnerability component of the ND-Gaincountry index. Next, we capture a country's productive knowledge by relying on the economic complexity index, which allows us to assess a country's productive knowledge by measuring the relative complexity of the goods and services it exports. To determine the employment situation in a particular country, we rely on measures for vulnerable employment and unemployment. We measure access to healthcare with the help of the universal health coverage index. Inequality is incorporated via a reverse coded Gini-index (post-tax, post-transfer).

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Food security	Food vulnerability index	Index that captures a country's vulnerability to climate change in terms of food production, food demand, nutrition and rural population. Indicators include: projected change of cereal yields, projected population growth, food import dependency, rural population, agriculture capacity, and child malnutrition. The more vulnerable, the lower the score.	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (2021)
Productive knowledge	Economic complexity index (ECI)	A ranking of countries based on how diversified and complex their export basket is. Countries that are home to a great diversity of productive know-how, particularly complex specialized know-how, are able to produce a great diversity of sophisticated products and receive a higher score.	The Growth Lab (2019)
Decent work	Unemployment	Percentage of total labor force (modeled ILO estimate).	International Labour Organization (ILO) [SL. UEM.TOTL.ZS](sourced from World Bank 2021)
Healthcare	Universal health coverage index (UHC)	Index that measures the coverage of 9 tracer interventions and risk-standardized death rates from 32 causes amenable to personal healthcare, including vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g., diphtheria, tetanus, measles), respiratory infections, cancer (breast, cervical, uterine, testicular), heart diseases, diabetes, kidney disease, and the adverse effects of medical treatment. The higher the score, the better the coverage.	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) (2019)
Inequality reduction	Inequality in disposable income	Standardized Gini Index of Disposable Income (Post-Tax, Post-Transfer). Reversed so that lower Gini index produces higher score.	Solt (2020)(based on Luxembourg Income Study, OECD, World Bank, Eurostat etc.)

Subdimension
Environmental Public Goods

Question: To what extent does this state provide environmental public goods?

Clarification: Environmental public goods are public goods that are only continually available if states are able to conserve ecosystems and make sustainable water systems and energy sources affordable.

Aggregation: This index is formed by combining variables indicating clean air and household fuels (2 variables), affordable and sustainable energy (3 variables), and ecosystem protection (1 variable).

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Clean air and clean household fuels	PM2.5 air pollution	Percent of population exposed to ambient concentrations of PM2.5 that exceed the WHO guideline. A higher percentage yields a lower score.	IHME (sourced from World Bank 2021)
	Access to clean fuels and technology for cooking	Proportion of total population primarily using clean cooking fuels and technologies for cooking. Under WHO guidelines, kerosene is excluded from clean cooking fuels.	World Bank (2021) [EG.CFT.ACCS.ZS]
Affordable and sustainable energy	Access to electricity	Percentage of population with access to electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national surveys and international sources.	World Bank (2021)[EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS]
	Energy intensity	Energy is more affordable and sustainable in the case of a percentage decrease in the ratio of energy supply per unit of gross domestic product (GDP).	International Energy Agency (IEA) (2022)
	Shares of renewables	Modern renewable share in total final energy consumption (hydro, wind, solar etc.).	International Energy Agency (IEA) (2022)
Ecosystem protection	Red List Index	Index that shows trends in overall extinction risk for species. To be more precise, it "shows trends in the status of groups of species based only on genuine improvements or deteriorations in status of sufficient magnitude to quality species for listing in more threatened or less threatened Red List Categories." A higher value means lower extinction risk and thus better ecosystem protection.	IUCN (2022)

Dimension:
State Capacity

Question: To what extent is this state able to reach primary state goals?

Clarification: State capacity is defined as the ability of state institutions to reach three primary goals: the generation of revenue (fiscal capacity), the organization of collective action (coordination capacity), and the delivery of policies (delivery capacity).

Aggregation: To create an aggregate measure of state index, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three subindices of state capacity: fiscal, coordination and delivery capacity.

Subdimension
Fiscal Capacity

Question: To what extent is this state able to generate resources?

Clarification: Fiscal capacity is the capacity to generate resources via taxes or other means. To this end, states define who and what is taxed. In other words, they create tax structures. Fiscal capacity further depends on accumulated central bank reserves and interest payments.

Aggregation: We operationalize fiscal capacity with variables relating to 4 concepts: 1) actual tax revenue (1 variable); 2) tax administration (3 variables); 3) central bank reserves (population-adjusted); and 4) the percent of government expenses required for interest payments.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Tax revenue	Tax revenue	Percentage of GDP	IMF (2022b)
Tax administration	Trade tax revenue	Percentage of GDP (Assumption in the literature: trade taxes are easier to collect which is why less sophisticated tax administrations tend to generate more trade tax revenue.)	IMF (2022b)
	Income tax revenue	Percentage of GDP(Assumption in the literature: income taxes are more difficult to collect which is why more sophisticated tax administrations tend to generate more income tax revenue.)	IMF (2022b)
	State fiscal source of revenue	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself. 1: The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities. 2: The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities. 3: The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties). 4: The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital. A higher score reflects higher fiscal capacity.	V-DEM [v2stfisccap] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Central bank reserves	Total reserves	Population-adjusted total reserves (comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities). More reserves means more fiscal capacity.	IMF [FI.RES.TOTL.CD] (sourced from World Bank 2021)
Interest payments	Interest payments	Population-adjust interest payments (include interest payments on government debt--including long-term bonds, long-term loans, and other debt instruments--to domestic and foreign residents). Higher interest payments reflect lower fiscal capacity.	IMF [GC.XPN.INTP.ZS] (sourced from World Bank 2021)

Subdimension
Coordination Capacity

Question: To what extent is this state able to organize collective action?

Clarification: Coordination capacity concerns the ability of state institutions to organize collective action. This includes elite cohesion in relation to shared policy goals, under which bureaucratic coordination is possible. Organizing collective action is also assumed to require a "Weberian" bureaucracy characterized by salaried staff selected based on meritocratic criteria who respect law and administer it impartially and rigorously. The coordination capacity of a given state further requires the buildup of strong state-society relations that favor public goods expenditures over particularistic interests.

Aggregation: We operationalize coordination capacity with five variables: 1) government cohesion; 2) bureaucratic remuneration; 3) appointment decisions; 4) rigorous and impartial public administration; and 5) state-society relations.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Elite cohesion	Government cohesion	Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the "extent to which the executive/cabinet is coalesced around the government's general policy goals" measured on a scale of 0 (low cohesion to 4 (high cohesion).	The PRS Group (2022)
Bureaucratic renumeration	Bureaucratic remuneration	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: None or almost none are salaried state employees. 1: A small share is salaried state employees. 2. About half are salaried state employees. 3: A substantial number are salaried state employees. 4: All or almost all are salaried state employees. A higher score indicates higher coordination capacity.	V-DEM [v2strenadm] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Appointment criteria	Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit. 1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit. 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit. 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit. 4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit. A higher score indicates more coordination capacity.	V-DEM [v2stcritrecadm] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Rigorous administration	Rigorous and impartial public administration	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant. 1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread. 2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate. 3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited. 4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.	V-DEM [v2clrspct] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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State-society relations	Particularistic or public goods	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how 'particularistic' or 'public goods' are most expenditures?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic. 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods. 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public- goods programs. 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic. 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic. A stronger public goods orientation would indicate more coordination capacity.	V-DEM [v2dlencmps] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Subdimension
Delivery Capacity

Question: To what extent is this state able to deliver policies?

Clarification: Delivery capacity is the ability of government and public administration to deliver policies. In essence, this concerns conditions that enable "street-level bureaucrats", including police officers, social workers, teachers and nurses, to implement state goals on the ground. The delivery of policies is ensured through allocation of adequate resources, the absence of public sector theft (and corruption), territorial authority and predictable enforcement.

Aggregation: We model delivery capacity as a function of four components: resource allocation, absence of public sector theft, territorial authority and predictable enforcement. To operationalize resource allocation, we rely on the IMF's measure of general government total expenditure (as % of GDP). To assure that delivery capacity is not equated with exploitative government spending we add VDEM's measure for public sector theft. Finally, we add a variable that captures the share of territory over which the government has actual authority (and so can deliver the goods and services) and a variable that assesses overall enforcement quality.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Resource allocation	General government total expenditure	Percentage of GDP	IMF (2022a)
Absence of public sector theft	Public sector theft	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property. 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.	VDEM [v2exthftps] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Territorial authority	State authority over territory	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question,** "Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?"	VDEM [v2svstterr] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Predictable enforcement	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion. 1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion. 2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country. 3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion. 4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.	VDEM [v2cltrnslw] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Dimension
Democratic Accountability

Question: To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Lührmann et al. (2020) define government accountability "as constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions." The Accountability Index is based on three subtypes: institutional (horizontal) accountability which concerns checks and balances between institutions; electoral (vertical) accountability which refers to the ability of citizens to hold the state accountable through elections; and finally, societal (diagonal) accountability which measures the extent to which civil society organizations and media outlets have the capacity to constrain the use of political power.

Scale: The V-DEM dataset contains a version of the accountability index that is the normalized output from a hierarchical latent variable analysis. To ensure comparability with the BGI indices constructed in our project, we scale V-DEM's normalized output between 1 (low accountability) and 100 (high accountability).

Aggregation: This aggregate measure of accountability was created via a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three subindices of accountability: institutional accountability, electoral accountability, and societal accountability.

Subdimension
Institutional Accountability

Question: To what extent is the ideal of institutional (horizontal) government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Institutional (horizontal) accountability concerns the ability of state institutions to control the government by requesting information, questioning public officials and punishing wrong behavior. The relevant state institutions are the legislature, the judiciary, and more specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Judicial oversight	Compliance with high court	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.	V-DEM [v2juhccomp] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Compliance with judiciary	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.	V-DEM [v2jucomp] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Judicial oversight	Lower court independence	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**When judges not on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 4: Never.	V-DEM [v2juncind] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Higher court independence	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 4: Never.	V-DEM [v2juhcind] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Other bodies question executive officials	Executive oversight	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Extremely unlikely. 1: Unlikely. 2: Very uncertain. 3: Likely. 4: Certain or nearly certain.	V-DEM [v2lgotovst] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Executive respects constitution	Executive respects constitution	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences. 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions. 2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences. 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges. 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.	V-DEM [v2exrescon] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Legislature exists	Legislature bicameral	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**How many chambers does the legislature contain?" measured on a scale of 0 to 2. 0: 0 chambers. 1: 1 chamber. 2: 2 or more chambers.	V-DEM [v2lgbicam] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Legislature investigates in practice	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Extremely unlikely. 1: Unlikely. 2: As likely as not. 3: Likely. 4: Certain or nearly certain.	V-DEM [v2lginvstp] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Legislature questions officials in practice	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?" 0: No — never or very rarely. 1: Yes — routinely.	V-DEM [v2lgqstexp] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Subdimension
Electoral Accountability

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral (vertical) government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Electoral (vertical) accountability refers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens can use to hold governments accountable. This includes organization in political parties and participation in free and fair elections.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Electoral infrastructure resilience	Electoral regime index	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?" 0: No. 1: Yes.	V-DEM [v2x_elecreg] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	EMB autonomy	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body. 1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body. 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election. 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections. 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.	V-DEM [v2elembaut] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	EMB capacity	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory. 1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country. 2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB. 3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread. 4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.	V-DEM [v2elembcap] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Election voter registry	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used. 1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation). 2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes. 3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly. 4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.	V-DEM [v2elrgstry] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Electoral infrastructure resilience	Election other voting irregularities	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities. 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country. 2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups. 3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation. 4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.	V-DEM [v2elirreg] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Election government intimidation	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.	V-DEM [v2elintim] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Elections multiparty	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Was this national election multiparty?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party). 1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency. 2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally. 3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory. 4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/ left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).	V-DEM [v2elmulpar] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Electoral infrastructure resilience	Election free and fair	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.	V-DEM [v2elfrfair] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Suffrage	Share of population with suffrage	**Index that** reflects "de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population." Interval, from low to high (0-1).	V-DEM [v2x_suffr] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	HOS appointment in practice	Variable coded by V-DEM Project Managers and Research Assistants based on extant, objective sources. Question: "How did the head of state reach office?" 0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion. 1: Appointed by a foreign power. 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system). 3: Appointed by a royal council. 4: Through hereditary succession. 5: Appointed by the military. 6: Appointed by the legislature. 7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage). 8: Other.	V-DEM [v2expathhs] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	HOS appointed by legislature	Index partly based on "HOS appointment in practice". Question: "Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?" 0: No. 1: Yes.	V-DEM [v2ex_ legconhos] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	HOG appointment in practice	Variable coded by V-DEM Project Managers and Research Assistants based on extant, objective sources. Question: "How did the head of government gain access to office?" 0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion. 1: Appointed by a foreign power. 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system). 3: Appointed by a royal council. 4: Through hereditary succession. 5: Appointed by the military. 6: Appointed by the head of state. 7: Appointed by the legislature. 8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage). 9: Other.	V-DEM [v2expathhg] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	HOG selection by legislature in practice	Variable coded by V-DEM Project Managers and Research Assistants based on extant, objective sources. Question: "Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?" 0: No. 1: Yes.	V-DEM [v2exaphogp] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Elected head of executive	Relative power of the HOS	Variable coded by V-DEM Project Managers and Research Assistants based on extant, objective sources. Question: "Does the head of state HOS have more relative power than the head of government HOG over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?" 0: No. 0.25: See notes. 0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power. 1: Yes.	V-DEM [v2ex_hosw] (Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Political parties	Party ban	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Are any parties banned?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties. 2: Yes. Many parties are banned. 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned. 4: No. No parties are officially banned.	V-DEM [v2psparban] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Barriers to parties	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Parties are not allowed. 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally). 2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities). 3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities). 4: There are no substantial barriers.	V-DEM [v2psbars] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Opposition parties autonomy	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Opposition parties are not allowed. 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime. 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.	V-DEM [v2psoppaut] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Subdimension
Societal Accountability

Question: To what extent is the ideal of societal (diagonal) government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Societal (diagonal) accountability captures the extent to which civil society organizations and the media are able to hold the government accountable. The assumption is that informal mechanisms such as street-level mobilization and investigative journalism can increase institutional and electoral accountability.

Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Media freedom	Media self-censorship	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?" measured on a scale of 0 to 3. 0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough. 1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete. 2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues. 3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.	V-DEM [v2meslfcen] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Harassment of journalists	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Are individual journalists harassed — i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur. 1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop. 2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time. 3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished. 4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.	v-DEM [v2meharjrn] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Media bias	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover. 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage. 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. 3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates. 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.	V-DEM [v2mebias] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Print/ broadcast media critical	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?" measured on a scale of 0 to 3. 0: None. 1: Only a few marginal outlets. 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do. 3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.	V-DEM [v2mecrit] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Media freedom	Government censorship effort - Media	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine. 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.	V-DEM [v2mecenefm] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Freedom of expression	Internet censorship effort	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?" measured on a scale of 0 to 3. 0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content. 1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls. 2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues. 3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.	V-DEM [v2mecenefi] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Freedom of discussion for men	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion. 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements. 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.	V-DEM [v2cldiscm] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
	Freedom of discussion for women	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion. 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements. 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.	V-DEM [v2cldiscw] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Freedom of expression	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government. 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression. 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression. 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft. 4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.	V-DEM [v2clacfree] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Engaged society	Engaged society	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?" measured on a scale of 0 to 5. 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas. 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas. 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.	V-DEM [v2dlengage] (Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)
Civil society organizations	CSO participatory environment	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?" measured on a scale of 0 to 3. 0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.	V-DEM [v2csprtcpt] (Bernhard, et al. 2015; Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Civil society organizations	CSO entry and exit	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience. 3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.	V-DEM [v2cseeorgs] (Bernhard, et al. 2015; Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

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Label	Indicator	Measurement	Source
Civil society organizations	CSO repression	**Country experts' aggregated evaluation of the question, "**Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?" measured on a scale of 0 to 4. 0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic. 2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain. 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia. 4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.	V-DEM [v2csreprss] (Bernhard, et al. 2015; Pemstein, et al. 2021; Coppedge, et al. 2021)

Appendix 2: Methodology

In order to construct indices that operationalize state capacity and public goods provision we use Bayesian latent variable models. We begin by estimating sub-indices like fiscal capacity and coordination capacity which we then aggregate into higher-level indices such as state capacity. We construct the individual sub-indices using the indicators listed in Appendix 1.

Public Goods Index and Subindices

Social Public Goods Subindex

Our measure of social public goods provision is a function of three nodes: basic medical care (life expectancy), education, and gender equality (women's political empowerment index). We model both basic medical care and gender equality as directly influencing social public goods provision. Education, by contrast, is a nested latent variable.

We use a standard latent variable model to parameterize the indicators that directly load into social goods provision (life expectancy and women's political empowerment): $y_{ij} \sim N(\mu_{ij}, \tau_j)$, where $\mu_{ij} = \alpha_{j1} + \alpha_{j2}\xi_i^{social}$. In this equation, ξ^{social} represents "social public goods provision" in country-year i, whereas τ and α are loading and precision parameters for $j = 2$ manifest variables.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in the R package BLAVAAN/JAGS.[1] By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

We model education as nested latent variable $\eta_i^{education} \sim N(\xi_i^{social}, o)$, with its variable following a standard latent variable form: $y_{ij} \sim N(\xi_{ij}, \sigma_j)$, where $\xi_{ij} = \beta_{j1} + \beta_{j2}\eta_i^{education}$. This approach implies that basic education has a cumulative impact on social public goods provision. The model, however, weights specific education variables with respect to the overall social public goods measure. For identification, we rely again on default BLAVAAN/JAGS priors.

Figure A2.1 shows a path diagram for social public goods provision and Table A2.1 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that the correlation between the education sub-subindex and the social public goods subindex is particularly strong.

FIGURE A2.1: Social Public Goods Path Diagram



[1] Merkle, E. C. and Rosseel, Y. (2018). blavaan: Bayesian structural equation models via parameter expansion, Journal of Statistical Software, 85(4), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v085.i04

TABLE A2.1: Social Public Goods Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Life expectancy at birth	(-0.038, 0.035)		(0.189, 0.252)	0.910
Education		(0.816, 0.919)	(0.030, 0.066)	0.994
Primary enrollment rate	(-0.141, -0.055)		(0.384, 0.452)	0.819
Secondary completion rate	(-0.095, -0.010)	(1.103, 1.228)	(0.180, 0.234)	0.941
Educational equality	(-0.038, 0.036)	(0.875, 0.984)	(0.423, 0.481)	0.786
Gender equality	(-0.038, 0.036)	(0.498, 0.586)	(0.730, 0.815)	0.491

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5,000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Economic Public Goods Subindex

We conceptualize economic public goods provision with five main concepts: 1) food security (measured using a food vulnerability index); 2) productive knowledge (measured via an economic complexity index); 3) employment; 4) (access to) healthcare; and 5) inequality reduction.

To estimate economic public goods provision, we rely on a standard latent variable model: $y_{ij} \sim N(\mu_{ij}, \tau_j)$, where $\mu_{ij} = \gamma_{j1} + \gamma_{j2}\xi_i^{economic}$. Here $\xi^{economic}$ represents "economic public goods provision" in country-year i. The parameters τ and γ are loading and precision parameters for $j = 5$ manifest variables.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.2 shows a path diagram for economic public goods provision and Table A2.2 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that the food vulnerability index (food security), healthcare coverage, and the economic complexity index (productive knowledge) are most strongly related to the economic public goods subindex.

FIGURE A2.2: Economic Public Goods Path Diagram



TABLE A2.2: Economic Public Goods Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Food vulnerability	(-0.038, 0.037)		(0.119, 0.174)	0.974
Economic complexity	(-0.094, -0.016)	(0.865, 0.946)	(0.327, 0.387)	0.840
Unemployment	(-0.038, 0.036)	(-0.028, 0.058)	(0.947, 1.049)	-0.015
Health coverage	(-0.055, 0.043)	(0.920, 1.015)	(0.174, 0.236)	0.931
Income inequality	(-0.097, -0.018)	(0.623, 0.707)	(0.578, 0.657)	0.647

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5,000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Environmental Public Goods Subindex

For the measurement of environmental public goods provision we take into account the prevalence of 1) clean air and household fuels (2 indicators); 2) affordable and sustainable energy (3 indicators); and 3) ecosystem protection (1 indicator).

We estimate a standard latent variable model: $y_{ij} \sim N(\mu_{ij}, \tau_j)$, where $\mu_{ij} = \delta_{j1} + \delta_{j2}\xi_i^{environmental}$. In this model, $\xi^{environmental}$ represents "environmental public goods provision" in country-year . The parameters τ and δ are loading and precision parameters for $j = 6$ manifest variables.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.3 shows a path diagram for environmental public goods provision and Table A2.3 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that variables related to clean household fuels, as well as affordable and sustainable energy, are much more strongly correlated with the environmental public goods subindex than ecosystem protection.

FIGURE A2.3: Environmental Public Goods Path Diagram



TABLE A2.3: Environmental Public Goods Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
PM2.5 air pollution	(-0.054, 0.050)	(0.237, 0.353)	(0.860, 1.000)	0.290
Clean fuels for cooking	(-0.017, 0.055)		(0.104, 0.155)	0.951
Access to electricity	(-0.050, 0.024)	(1.023, 1.095)	(0.038, 0.092)	0.990
Energy intensity	(-0.039, 0.037)	(0.347, 0.430)	(0.824, 0.919)	0.478
Share of renewables	(-0.038, 0.037)	(0.026, 0.109)	(0.944, 1.050)	0.090
Ecosystem protection	(-0.036, 0.036)	(-0.004, 0.087)	(0.947, 1.051)	0.080

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Aggregated Public Goods Index

To create an aggregate measure of public goods provision, we treat the subindices of public goods provision as manifest variables $(j = social, economic, environmental)$. We then use a standard latent variable model to estimate public goods provision.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.4 shows a path diagram for public goods provision and Table A2.4 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that all three subindices contribute strongly to the overall model. None is significantly more important than the other.

FIGURE A2.4: Public Goods Path Diagram



TABLE A2.4: Public Goods Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Social Public Goods	(-0.035, 0.037)		(0.049, 0.070)	0.992
Economic Public Goods	(-0.034, 0.037)	(0.909, 0.950)	(0.174, 0.200)	0.933
Environmental Public Goods	(-0.036, 0.036)	(0.895, 0.938)	(0.196, 0.224)	0.921

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5,000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

State Capacity Index and Subindices

Fiscal Capacity Subindex

Our measure of fiscal capacity incorporates indicators related to 4 concepts: 1) actual tax revenue (1 indicator); 2) tax administration (3 indicators); 3) central bank reserves (1 indicator); and 4) interest payments (1 indicator).

We use a standard latent variable model to parameterize the indicators: $y_{ij} \sim N(\mu_{ij}, \tau_j)$, where $\mu_{ij} = \epsilon_{j1} + \epsilon_{j2}\xi^{fiscal}$. In this equation, ξ^{fiscal} represents "fiscal capacity" in country-year i, whereas τ and ϵ are loading and precision parameters for $j = 6$ manifest variables.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.5 shows a path diagram for fiscal capacity and Table A2.5 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that the variables associated with tax revenue and tax administration have the highest correlation with the fiscal capacity subindex.

FIGURE A2.5: Fiscal Capacity Path Diagram



TABLE A2.5: Fiscal Capacity Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Tax revenue	(-0.059, 0.016)		(0.188, 0.237)	0.941
Trade tax revenue	(-0.074, 0.010)	(0.174, 0.275)	(0.907, 1.021)	0.221
Income tax revenue	(-0.208, -0.127)	(1.084, 1.169)	(0.079, 0.134)	0.987
State fiscal source of revenue	(-0.040, 0.033)	(0.624, 0.702)	(0.609, 0.685)	0.616
Total reserves	(-0.050, 0.027)	(0.104, 0.199)	(0.928, 1.035)	0.134
Interest payments	(-0.113, -0.016)	(0.183, 0.294)	(0.897, 1.026)	0.223

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5,000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Coordination Capacity Subindex

We conceptualize coordination capacity as a function of five processes: 1) elite/government cohesion; 2) bureaucratic remuneration; 3) appointment decisions; 4) rigorous and impartial public administration; and 5) state-society relations (particularistic vs. public goods).

To estimate coordination capacity, we rely on a standard latent variable model: $y_{ij} \sim N(\mu_{ij}, \tau_j)$, where $\mu_{ij} = \eta_{j1} + \eta_{j2}\xi^{coordination}$. Here $\xi^{coordination}$ represents "coordination capacity" in country-year i. The parameters τ and η are loading and precision parameters for $j = 5$ manifest variables.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.6 shows a path diagram for coordination capacity and Table A2.6 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that "Weberian" variables, such as (meritocratic) appointment criteria and rigorous administration, show the highest correlations with the coordination capacity subindex.

FIGURE A2.6: Coordination Capacity Path Diagram



TABLE A2.6: Coordination Capacity Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Government cohesion	(-0.039, 0.037)		(0.963, 1.071)	0.056
Bureaucratic remuneration	(-0.038, 0.035)	(2.931, 3.967)	(0.730, 0.812)	0.473
Appointment criteria	(-0.038, 0.036)	(5.157, 6.747)	(0.296, 0.341)	0.846
Rigorous administration	(-0.036, 0.037)	(5.967, 7.786)	(0.076, 0.113)	0.985
State-society relations	(-0.038, 0.035)	(4.813, 6.309)	(0.386, 0.436)	0.774

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Delivery Capacity Subindex

We conceptualize delivery capacity as a function of four components: 1) resource allocation; 2) absence of public sector theft; 3) territorial authority; and 4) predictable enforcement.

We estimate delivery capacity with a standard latent variable model: $y_{ij} \sim N(\mu_{ij}, \tau_j)$, where $\mu_{ij} = \pi_{j1} + \pi_{j2}\xi^{delivery}$. Here $\xi^{delivery}$ represents "delivery capacity" in country-year i. The parameters τ and π are loading and precision parameters for $j = 4$ manifest variables.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.7 shows a path diagram for delivery capacity and Table A2.7 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that the manifest variables "absence of public sector theft" and "predictable enforcement" have the highest correlations with the delivery capacity subindex.

FIGURE A2.7: Delivery Capacity Path Diagram



TABLE A2.7: Delivery Capacity Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Government total expenditure	(-0.058, 0.015)		(0.703, 0.781)	0.556
Public sector theft	(-0.036, 0.035)	(1.791, 2.039)	(0.024, 0.049)	0.998
Territorial authority	(-0.035, 0.037)	(0.813, 0.986)	(0.745, 0.830)	0.454
Predictable enforcement	(-0.037, 0.035)	(1.532, 1.758)	(0.267, 0.303)	0.852

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Aggregated State Capacity Index

To create an aggregate measure of state capacity, we treat the subindices of state capacity as manifest variables $(j = fiscal, coordination, delivery)$. We then use a standard latent variable model to estimate state capacity.

For identification purposes, we rely on the uninformative default priors prespecified in BLAVAAN/JAGS. By default the mean of the slope parameters is 0, with a standard deviation of 10 (precision of $.01$). These priors are flat and allow probability mass across the entire parameter space.

Figure A2.8 shows a path diagram for state capacity and Table A2.8 relevant statistics for free parameters. Note that the relative contribution of the delivery capacity and coordination capacity subindices to the state capacity model is greater than that of fiscal capacity.

FIGURE A2.8: State Capacity Path Diagram



TABLE A2.8: State Capacity Statistics

Parameter	Intercept	Slope	Variance	p
Fiscal capacity	(-0.036, 0.035)		(0.462, 0.515)	0.742
Coordination capacity	(-0.037, 0.036)	(1.285, 1.392)	(0.072, 0.099)	0.975
Delivery capacity	(-0.036, 0.036)	(1.298, 1.407)	(0.053, 0.080)	0.986

p represents the correlation coefficient between the manifest variable and the point estimate of social goods provision. Loadings and uniqueness values represent 95 percent HPD intervals across eight MCMC chains, each with 5000 draws from 100,000 iterations (10,000 iteration).

Accountability Index and Subindices

We rely on the accountability index and subindices constructed by the V-DEM team.[2] The data and methodology used to estimate the respective indices is described in online supplementary material that accompanies the *American Political Science Review* (APSR) article in which the indices were first introduced.[3]

[2] Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020). "Constraining Governments."

[3] https://static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:article:S0003055420000222/resource/name/S0003055420000222sup001.pdf

Appendix 3: Dimension-level Indices, by Country, 2000, 2010, and 2019, and BGI Indices, by Country in rank order, 2019

Public Goods Index, 2000, 2010, and 2019

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Albania	Europe	69	74.7	78.8
Algeria	Africa	60.6	67.6	74.8
Angola	Africa	23.7	33.7	42.5
Argentina	Americas	76.1	77.3	80
Armenia	Asia	74.4	79.4	79.5
Australia	Oceania	85.5	88.3	88.7
Austria	Europe	83.3	86.9	91.2
Azerbaijan	Asia	49.3	64.1	60.9
Bangladesh	Asia	39	47.3	57.2
Belarus	Europe	79.3	82	83.7
Belgium	Europe	93.1	90.8	91.8
Bolivia	Americas	61.7	65.8	68
Botswana	Africa	46.9	45.2	52.1
Brazil	Americas	64.7	69.1	68.8
Bulgaria	Europe	73.1	76	71.9
Burkina Faso	Africa	7.9	20.4	34.8
Cameroon	Africa	33.9	41.1	49.5
Canada	Americas	90	91.7	92.8
Chile	Americas	74.2	79	83
China	Asia	62.5	76.3	73.8
Colombia	Americas	68	75.9	73.4
Congo - Brazzaville	Africa	24.1	38.1	44
Congo - Kinshasa	Africa	21.3	29.7	38.8
Costa Rica	Americas	67.3	72.3	79.3
Côte d'Ivoire	Africa	20.9	33.4	45.4
Croatia	Europe	77.4	80.9	85.2
Cuba	Americas	78.4	81.4	80.7
Cyprus	Asia	81.9	87.7	89.3
Czechia	Europe	85.7	84.3	88.8
Denmark	Europe	90.6	90.9	94.3
Dominican Republic	Americas	58.8	68.8	69.5
Ecuador	Americas	64	74.3	78.6
Egypt	Africa	54.6	61.7	67.2
El Salvador	Americas	60.8	69.2	67
Estonia	Europe	80.6	87.1	90.5

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Ethiopia	Africa	11.1	33	51.7
Finland	Europe	92.7	92.5	91.1
France	Europe	88.2	89.7	90.8
Gabon	Africa	45.8	53.6	57.6
Gambia	Africa	30	36.1	48.4
Germany	Europe	85.6	88.5	94.9
Ghana	Africa	35	43.5	57
Greece	Europe	85.6	87.4	87.7
Guatemala	Americas	43.5	57.8	58.1
Guinea	Africa	10.8	27.1	34.6
Guinea-Bissau	Africa	12.1	26	36.2
Guyana	Americas	61.3	64.3	62.8
Haiti	Americas	26	1	37.6
Honduras	Americas	51.8	55.5	51.9
Hong Kong	Asia	84.5	86	88.7
Hungary	Europe	74.2	78.2	81.7
Iceland	Europe	89.9	92.5	95.9
India	Asia	42.2	53.3	63.7
Indonesia	Asia	51.2	64.3	62.3
Iran	Asia	64.3	73.5	74.2
Iraq	Asia	47	60.8	64.4
Ireland	Europe	87.2	90.7	93.5
Israel	Asia	84.8	88.5	90.9
Italy	Europe	87.8	90	90.4
Jamaica	Americas	72.2	78.4	75.4
Japan	Asia	94.9	98	99.9
Jordan	Asia	69.3	71.5	70.3
Kazakhstan	Asia	69.2	74.4	81.7
Kenya	Africa	25.1	41.8	53.2
Kuwait	Asia	76.7	82.3	83
Latvia	Europe	76.5	82	84.5
Lebanon	Asia	68.2	72.8	73.2
Liberia	Africa	26.2	37.5	42.6
Libya	Africa	66.3	66	63.2
Lithuania	Europe	76.8	80.9	85.4
Luxembourg	Europe	90.7	92.4	100
Madagascar	Africa	19.2	27.3	32.8
Malawi	Africa	15	23.5	41.3
Malaysia	Asia	74.3	76.1	78.1

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Mali	Africa	22.7	27.9	38.3
Mexico	Americas	68.1	74.3	76.1
Moldova	Europe	67.4	68.6	82.2
Mongolia	Asia	55.6	72.6	73.3
Morocco	Africa	45.6	62.1	64.7
Mozambique	Africa	12.9	27.9	29.4
Myanmar	Asia	31.9	42.5	53.8
Namibia	Africa	38.9	48.3	50.6
Netherlands	Europe	91.5	94	92.2
New Zealand	Oceania	88.3	92.8	94
Nicaragua	Americas	50.6	62.3	64.8
Niger	Africa	1.8	16.8	24.7
Nigeria	Africa	22.8	33.5	43.2
Norway	Europe	90.8	92.7	94.1
Oman	Asia	63.9	65.5	78.6
Pakistan	Asia	34.6	35.7	44.4
Panama	Americas	74.5	72.4	78.6
Papua New Guinea	Oceania	31.9	32.6	38.4
Paraguay	Americas	62.8	62.4	63.8
Peru	Americas	63.2	72.6	80.1
Philippines	Asia	54.6	57.6	65.5
Poland	Europe	83.1	86	89.3
Portugal	Europe	83.8	88.8	88.3
Qatar	Asia	75.4	73.4	81.5
Romania	Europe	69.2	76.1	75
Russia	Europe	62.9	68.3	81.1
Saudi Arabia	Asia	65.9	75.5	81
Senegal	Africa	25.3	38.9	45.9
Serbia	Europe	69	77.8	80.4
Sierra Leone	Africa	19.1	31.6	43.9
Singapore	Asia	86.4	92.6	93.6
Slovakia	Europe	74.9	75.8	79.3
Slovenia	Europe	85.7	90.5	91.7
Somalia	Africa	12.1	16.7	27.8
South Africa	Africa	50.1	45.1	63
South Korea	Asia	87.9	93.3	91.9
Spain	Europe	90.1	85.3	89.6
Sri Lanka	Asia	56	69.6	74.8
Sudan	Africa	30.7	39.6	45.3

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Suriname	Americas	63.1	59.4	62.7
Sweden	Europe	92.7	90.8	94.1
Switzerland	Europe	93	92.4	95.2
Syria	Asia	58	64	57.1
Tanzania	Africa	19.2	43.2	42.1
Thailand	Asia	62.6	74.3	75.4
Togo	Africa	30.2	38.9	47
Trinidad & Tobago	Americas	69.3	75.8	79.8
Tunisia	Africa	71.1	73.7	77.6
Turkey	Asia	72	80.7	77.6
Uganda	Africa	17.5	33.6	45.1
Ukraine	Europe	75.4	82	75.6
United Arab Emirates	Asia	65.1	74.9	82.4
United Kingdom	Europe	89.3	90.8	91.3
United States	Americas	81.3	82.8	86.5
Uruguay	Americas	77.8	77.6	83.1
Venezuela	Americas	61	69.4	64.2
Vietnam	Asia	64.2	73.4	73.7
Yemen	Asia	34.9	41.8	40.5
Zambia	Africa	18.5	39.9	42.2
Zimbabwe	Africa	37.3	38.1	49.2

State Capacity Index, 2000, 2010, and 2019

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Albania	Europe	43.3	44.5	43.5
Algeria	Africa	36.8	36.9	34.2
Angola	Africa	29.1	27	37.2
Argentina	Americas	51.9	55.5	55.2
Armenia	Asia	33.1	35.9	56.9
Australia	Oceania	89.1	87.9	86
Austria	Europe	74.4	74.5	69.3
Azerbaijan	Asia	15.8	15.5	20.5
Bangladesh	Asia	23.4	23.3	21.2
Belarus	Europe	43.7	48.3	48.5
Belgium	Europe	83.8	83.5	83.5
Bolivia	Americas	40.5	42.7	42.6
Botswana	Africa	68.1	66.4	65.2
Brazil	Americas	51.9	53.7	49.4
Bulgaria	Europe	52.5	50.4	45.7

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Burkina Faso	Africa	43	42.9	50.6
Cameroon	Africa	24.6	23.8	14.6
Canada	Americas	80	83.9	81.8
Chile	Americas	74.4	74.3	68.1
China	Asia	38.3	41.3	44.4
Colombia	Americas	44.1	48.6	48.9
Congo - Brazzaville	Africa	27.3	28.8	25.6
Congo - Kinshasa	Africa	12.1	14.6	21.9
Costa Rica	Americas	67.3	64.9	66.4
Côte d'Ivoire	Africa	39.1	38.8	47.8
Croatia	Europe	56.8	58.1	52.9
Cuba	Americas	29	28.9	24.6
Cyprus	Asia	56.5	60.4	59.6
Czechia	Europe	57.3	60.2	59.9
Denmark	Europe	99.5	99.5	99.6
Dominican Republic	Americas	33.7	32.3	20
Ecuador	Americas	43.9	49.9	49.3
Egypt	Africa	21.2	21.5	27
El Salvador	Americas	41	39.3	37.1
Estonia	Europe	67.1	77.1	77.9
Ethiopia	Africa	32.4	33.8	38.1
Finland	Europe	87.9	87	84
France	Europe	82.9	82.4	81.4
Gabon	Africa	41.5	43.1	43.8
Gambia	Africa	32	32.2	48.1
Germany	Europe	93.1	92.9	88.1
Ghana	Africa	36.9	37.3	35.5
Greece	Europe	61.6	63.3	60.5
Guatemala	Americas	24.5	31.9	31.1
Guinea	Africa	21.6	29.7	28.2
Guinea-Bissau	Africa	15.8	22	20.4
Guyana	Americas	40.9	40.8	46.2
Haiti	Americas	34.8	25.5	21.3
Honduras	Americas	29.6	28.8	26.5
Hong Kong	Asia	69.7	67.2	56.4
Hungary	Europe	72.4	63.1	56.8
Iceland	Europe	79.4	80.1	84.1
India	Asia	48.2	50.6	51.1
Indonesia	Asia	40.1	41.8	43.1
Iran	Asia	48	39.1	38.1

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Iraq	Asia	21	22.8	19.8
Ireland	Europe	78	78	80.4
Israel	Asia	69	66.3	64.1
Italy	Europe	60.9	60.6	63.1
Jamaica	Americas	59.2	59.3	61.4
Japan	Asia	74.4	74.7	73.9
Jordan	Asia	45.1	46.2	45.8
Kazakhstan	Asia	34.9	34.7	35.6
Kenya	Africa	30.8	41.8	45.9
Kuwait	Asia	45.5	42.2	43.6
Latvia	Europe	61.4	68.7	63.7
Lebanon	Asia	31.8	34.4	34
Liberia	Africa	13	36.1	37.6
Libya	Africa	22.7	23.6	14.3
Lithuania	Europe	61.7	65	67.6
Luxembourg	Europe	86.5	86.8	86.3
Madagascar	Africa	30.4	22.2	31.2
Malawi	Africa	40.7	37.7	37.8
Malaysia	Asia	34.6	39.2	52.2
Mali	Africa	34.3	29.7	31.1
Mexico	Americas	49.3	41.8	39.6
Moldova	Europe	40.2	47.6	43.2
Mongolia	Asia	50.8	53.7	47.6
Morocco	Africa	32.6	38.1	42.5
Mozambique	Africa	35	35.9	35.6
Myanmar	Asia	21.4	26.9	50
Namibia	Africa	58.6	59.2	58.1
Netherlands	Europe	82.7	82.2	81.5
New Zealand	Oceania	88.5	88.6	88.7
Nicaragua	Americas	30	31.8	24.9
Niger	Africa	39.4	44.2	41.6
Nigeria	Africa	19.5	20.1	27.2
Norway	Europe	89.5	90.3	88.7
Oman	Asia	47	47.3	49
Pakistan	Asia	28.1	23.2	24.9
Panama	Americas	47.4	47.9	47.4
Papua New Guinea	Oceania	34.5	37.3	35.9
Paraguay	Americas	29.1	39.5	38.3
Peru	Americas	41	51.6	51.2
Philippines	Asia	45.6	45.8	39.8

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Poland	Europe	65.4	67.9	58.2
Portugal	Europe	74.5	70.1	70.3
Qatar	Asia	39.9	43	44.2
Romania	Europe	35.5	38.6	39.8
Russia	Europe	32.1	33.4	34.4
Saudi Arabia	Asia	37.9	38.2	36.8
Senegal	Africa	51.3	51.3	52.7
Serbia	Europe	33.5	41	39.5
Sierra Leone	Africa	31.7	43	45.2
Singapore	Asia	85.8	85.4	85.9
Slovakia	Europe	59.4	59.3	55.9
Slovenia	Europe	69.4	66.4	69.2
Somalia	Africa	1.5	9.8	16.3
South Africa	Africa	53.1	51.1	42.7
South Korea	Asia	73.5	70.7	72.7
Spain	Europe	80.9	81	82.9
Sri Lanka	Asia	45.6	40.2	45.8
Sudan	Africa	17.8	23.8	34.6
Suriname	Americas	46.3	46.3	42.3
Sweden	Europe	93.2	91.1	86.2
Switzerland	Europe	80.9	80.9	85.3
Syria	Asia	25	24.5	16.8
Tanzania	Africa	46.5	47.4	54.9
Thailand	Asia	43.2	40.2	32.6
Togo	Africa	29.4	31.8	33.9
Trinidad & Tobago	Americas	59.2	58.9	61.2
Tunisia	Africa	31.8	34.1	61.1
Turkey	Asia	49.1	43.3	25.8
Uganda	Africa	42.5	36.6	37.3
Ukraine	Europe	30.4	33.1	40.2
United Arab Emirates	Asia	59.5	62.7	60.3
United Kingdom	Europe	85.9	85.8	84.4
United States	Americas	79.2	79	64.8
Uruguay	Americas	72.1	73.8	75.1
Venezuela	Americas	28.3	22.4	5.6
Vietnam	Asia	36.7	37.3	39.6
Yemen	Asia	20.5	23.5	12.3
Zambia	Africa	49.1	48.6	45.1
Zimbabwe	Africa	36.5	36.3	26.9

Democratic Accountability Index, 2000, 2010, and 2019

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Albania	Europe	61.6	70.1	64.3
Algeria	Africa	42.6	42.9	39.4
Angola	Africa	32.3	38.3	45.7
Argentina	Americas	83.3	77.4	78.6
Armenia	Asia	51.1	48.7	71.4
Australia	Oceania	93.7	95.6	88
Austria	Europe	86.7	88	86.1
Azerbaijan	Asia	27.4	23.3	18.4
Bangladesh	Asia	56.1	51.1	36
Belarus	Europe	26.4	22.1	28.4
Belgium	Europe	88	89.7	90.5
Bolivia	Americas	76.6	68	52.6
Botswana	Africa	77.8	77.8	68.5
Brazil	Americas	86.9	91.1	71.6
Bulgaria	Europe	78.8	76.2	73
Burkina Faso	Africa	65.2	68.3	72
Cameroon	Africa	44.7	45.8	38.7
Canada	Americas	86.2	85.6	86.1
Chile	Americas	89.4	94	88.4
China	Asia	20.7	21.9	13.8
Colombia	Americas	66.8	71.4	71.9
Congo - Brazzaville	Africa	32.8	34.3	33
Congo - Kinshasa	Africa	31.8	48.8	46.2
Costa Rica	Americas	95	95.9	93.4
Côte d'Ivoire	Africa	57	58.7	63.1
Croatia	Europe	76.1	83.1	76.7
Cuba	Americas	14.3	14.2	19.4
Cyprus	Asia	79.7	84.5	83.1
Czechia	Europe	87	89.4	81
Denmark	Europe	97.1	98	97.3
Dominican Republic	Americas	66	65	60.1
Ecuador	Americas	72.2	58.4	68.4
Egypt	Africa	34.2	32.5	25.9
El Salvador	Americas	61	68.8	70.1
Estonia	Europe	89.8	91.6	92.9
Ethiopia	Africa	32.4	29.8	44.9
Finland	Europe	94.4	95.2	92.6
France	Europe	87.5	89	88.3

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Gabon	Africa	46.4	51.5	47.5
Gambia	Africa	35.9	34.9	65.2
Germany	Europe	99	100	94.8
Ghana	Africa	80.5	83	76.6
Greece	Europe	88.8	92.8	88.4
Guatemala	Americas	65.6	67	65.7
Guinea	Africa	35.7	51.3	48.9
Guinea-Bissau	Africa	52.8	56.4	60.8
Guyana	Americas	62.3	64.3	69.8
Haiti	Americas	57.9	59.5	57.3
Honduras	Americas	59.8	52.1	53.2
Hong Kong	Asia	70	70.2	57.3
Hungary	Europe	82.8	77.9	57.5
Iceland	Europe	86.8	87.7	85.9
India	Asia	80.2	78.5	59.2
Indonesia	Asia	75.8	78	72.3
Iran	Asia	47.9	34.2	38.7
Iraq	Asia	8.7	60.4	56.6
Ireland	Europe	88.3	89.4	89.7
Israel	Asia	82.9	80.8	75.7
Italy	Europe	88.5	89.7	90.6
Jamaica	Americas	75	81	84.8
Japan	Asia	85.5	86.6	85
Jordan	Asia	44.6	51.9	56.6
Kazakhstan	Asia	37.5	34.5	34.4
Kenya	Africa	56	67.2	63.7
Kuwait	Asia	57.8	57.5	57.1
Latvia	Europe	82	83.2	85.3
Lebanon	Asia	49.7	61	58.2
Liberia	Africa	51.2	74.5	69.3
Libya	Africa	7.4	7.6	52.1
Lithuania	Europe	85	87.9	85
Luxembourg	Europe	89	89.2	89.5
Madagascar	Africa	57.1	43.5	60
Malawi	Africa	62.3	65.2	65.6
Malaysia	Asia	38.1	43.6	56
Mali	Africa	65.4	70.5	62.7
Mexico	Americas	70.9	70.4	70.8
Moldova	Europe	65.7	72.9	65.7

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Mongolia	Asia	73.9	76.1	72.4
Morocco	Africa	50.9	58.5	58.4
Mozambique	Africa	57.6	57	53.6
Myanmar	Asia	8.9	26.1	59.3
Namibia	Africa	71.7	71.9	67.9
Netherlands	Europe	89.4	91.1	92.4
New Zealand	Oceania	91	93.2	92.7
Nicaragua	Americas	65.9	50.7	23.7
Niger	Africa	64.4	62	65.1
Nigeria	Africa	64.7	63.7	65.7
Norway	Europe	94.8	95.5	95
Oman	Asia	28.8	31	36.3
Pakistan	Asia	49	59.7	53.4
Panama	Americas	76.3	77.4	76.9
Papua New Guinea	Oceania	66	62.2	60.8
Paraguay	Americas	64.1	71.7	65.9
Peru	Americas	52.7	80.8	81.2
Philippines	Asia	73.2	70.8	60.6
Poland	Europe	89.7	91.1	69.3
Portugal	Europe	88	92.1	90
Qatar	Asia	11.2	12	10.9
Romania	Europe	70.3	74	73.5
Russia	Europe	52.9	41.9	37.5
Saudi Arabia	Asia	9.4	11	7.9
Senegal	Africa	73.3	74.9	77.9
Serbia	Europe	60.4	71.5	53.6
Sierra Leone	Africa	50.3	63.2	68.7
Singapore	Asia	48.7	49.1	47.2
Slovakia	Europe	83.3	84.5	84.9
Slovenia	Europe	84.5	88	84
Somalia	Africa	37	49.5	42.9
South Africa	Africa	81.6	82.1	76.4
South Korea	Asia	87	80.3	87.5
Spain	Europe	90.7	92.7	88.9
Sri Lanka	Asia	56.6	49.9	68.5
Sudan	Africa	19.6	31.8	42.8
Suriname	Americas	82.7	79.9	76.7
Sweden	Europe	95.1	96	95.4
Switzerland	Europe	91.2	92.9	93.1

Country	Region	2000	2010	2019
Syria	Asia	12.4	8.4	4.7
Tanzania	Africa	67.3	69.7	60.7
Thailand	Asia	67.3	59.4	42.2
Togo	Africa	40.4	54.9	46.4
Trinidad & Tobago	Americas	79.2	80.9	79.8
Tunisia	Africa	22.9	23	81.1
Turkey	Asia	66.6	63.1	34.9
Uganda	Africa	54.4	53.2	46
Ukraine	Europe	54.2	60.6	63.2
United Arab Emirates	Asia	19.8	24	26.6
United Kingdom	Europe	88.9	89.6	89.1
United States	Americas	89.7	94.4	83
Uruguay	Americas	90.1	93.9	89.6
Venezuela	Americas	58.6	41.9	27.5
Vietnam	Asia	33.1	34.5	33.8
Yemen	Asia	40.5	43.2	24.6
Zambia	Africa	64.4	67.6	55.2
Zimbabwe	Africa	37.4	41.9	44.6

BGI Indices, 2019

Country	Region	Accountability	State Capacity	Public Goods
Denmark	Europe	97.3	99.6	94.3
Germany	Europe	94.8	88.1	94.9
Norway	Europe	95	88.7	94.1
Sweden	Europe	95.4	86.2	94.1
Luxembourg	Europe	89.5	86.3	100
New Zealand	Oceania	92.7	88.7	94
Switzerland	Europe	93.1	85.3	95.2
Finland	Europe	92.6	84	91.1
Netherlands	Europe	92.4	81.5	92.2
Iceland	Europe	85.9	84.1	95.9
Belgium	Europe	90.5	83.5	91.8
United Kingdom	Europe	89.1	84.4	91.3
Ireland	Europe	89.7	80.4	93.5
Australia	Oceania	88	86	88.7
Spain	Europe	88.9	82.9	89.6
Estonia	Europe	92.9	77.9	90.5
Canada	Americas	86.1	81.8	92.8
France	Europe	88.3	81.4	90.8

Country	Region	Accountability	State Capacity	Public Goods
Japan	Asia	85	73.9	99.9
South Korea	Asia	87.5	72.7	91.9
Portugal	Europe	90	70.3	88.3
Uruguay	Americas	89.6	75.1	83.1
Austria	Europe	86.1	69.3	91.2
Slovenia	Europe	84	69.2	91.7
Italy	Europe	90.6	63.1	90.4
Chile	Americas	88.4	68.1	83
Costa Rica	Americas	93.4	66.4	79.3
Lithuania	Europe	85	67.6	85.4
Greece	Europe	88.4	60.5	87.7
United States	Americas	83	64.8	86.5
Latvia	Europe	85.3	63.7	84.5
Cyprus	Asia	83.1	59.6	89.3
Israel	Asia	75.7	64.1	90.9
Czechia	Europe	81	59.9	88.8
Singapore	Asia	47.2	85.9	93.6
Jamaica	Americas	84.8	61.4	75.4
Trinidad & Tobago	Americas	79.8	61.2	79.8
Slovakia	Europe	84.9	55.9	79.3
Tunisia	Africa	81.1	61.1	77.6
Poland	Europe	69.3	58.2	89.3
Croatia	Europe	76.7	52.9	85.2
Argentina	Americas	78.6	55.2	80
Peru	Americas	81.2	51.2	80.1
Armenia	Asia	71.4	56.9	79.5
Panama	Americas	76.9	47.4	78.6
Hong Kong	Asia	57.3	56.4	88.7
Ecuador	Americas	68.4	49.3	78.6
Hungary	Europe	57.5	56.8	81.7
Colombia	Americas	71.9	48.9	73.4
Mongolia	Asia	72.4	47.6	73.3
Moldova	Europe	65.7	43.2	82.2
Bulgaria	Europe	73	45.7	71.9
Brazil	Americas	71.6	49.4	68.8
Sri Lanka	Asia	68.5	45.8	74.8
Romania	Europe	73.5	39.8	75
Albania	Europe	64.3	43.5	78.8
Mexico	Americas	70.8	39.6	76.1
Malaysia	Asia	56	52.2	78.1

Country	Region	Accountability	State Capacity	Public Goods
Botswana	Africa	68.5	65.2	52.1
Kuwait	Asia	57.1	43.6	83
South Africa	Africa	76.4	42.7	63
Suriname	Americas	76.7	42.3	62.7
Ukraine	Europe	63.2	40.2	75.6
Guyana	Americas	69.8	46.2	62.8
Indonesia	Asia	72.3	43.1	62.3
Namibia	Africa	67.9	58.1	50.6
Senegal	Africa	77.9	52.7	45.9
El Salvador	Americas	70.1	37.1	67
India	Asia	59.2	51.1	63.7
Serbia	Europe	53.6	39.5	80.4
Jordan	Asia	56.6	45.8	70.3
United Arab Emirates	Asia	26.6	60.3	82.4
Ghana	Africa	76.6	35.5	57
Paraguay	Americas	65.9	38.3	63.8
Philippines	Asia	60.6	39.8	65.5
Morocco	Africa	58.4	42.5	64.7
Lebanon	Asia	58.2	34	73.2
Oman	Asia	36.3	49	78.6
Bolivia	Americas	52.6	42.6	68
Myanmar	Asia	59.3	50	53.8
Kenya	Africa	63.7	45.9	53.2
Gambia	Africa	65.2	48.1	48.4
Belarus	Europe	28.4	48.5	83.7
Sierra Leone	Africa	68.7	45.2	43.9
Tanzania	Africa	60.7	54.9	42.1
Burkina Faso	Africa	72	50.6	34.8
Côte d'Ivoire	Africa	63.1	47.8	45.4
Guatemala	Americas	65.7	31.1	58.1
Russia	Europe	37.5	34.4	81.1
Kazakhstan	Asia	34.4	35.6	81.7
Iran	Asia	38.7	38.1	74.2
Thailand	Asia	42.2	32.6	75.4
Dominican Republic	Americas	60.1	20	69.5
Liberia	Africa	69.3	37.6	42.6
Gabon	Africa	47.5	43.8	57.6
Algeria	Africa	39.4	34.2	74.8
Vietnam	Asia	33.8	39.6	73.7
Malawi	Africa	65.6	37.8	41.3

Country	Region	Accountability	State Capacity	Public Goods
Zambia	Africa	55.2	45.1	42.2
Iraq	Asia	56.6	19.8	64.4
Turkey	Asia	34.9	25.8	77.6
Qatar	Asia	10.9	44.2	81.5
Nigeria	Africa	65.7	27.2	43.2
Papua New Guinea	Oceania	60.8	35.9	38.4
Ethiopia	Africa	44.9	38.1	51.7
Mali	Africa	62.7	31.1	38.3
China	Asia	13.8	44.4	73.8
Honduras	Americas	53.2	26.5	51.9
Niger	Africa	65.1	41.6	24.7
Libya	Africa	52.1	14.3	63.2
Uganda	Africa	46	37.3	45.1
Togo	Africa	46.4	33.9	47
Saudi Arabia	Asia	7.9	36.8	81
Angola	Africa	45.7	37.2	42.5
Cuba	Americas	19.4	24.6	80.7
Madagascar	Africa	60	31.2	32.8
Sudan	Africa	42.8	34.6	45.3
Pakistan	Asia	53.4	24.9	44.4
Zimbabwe	Africa	44.6	26.9	49.2
Egypt	Africa	25.9	27	67.2
Mozambique	Africa	53.6	35.6	29.4
Guinea-Bissau	Africa	60.8	20.4	36.2
Haiti	Americas	57.3	21.3	37.6
Bangladesh	Asia	36	21.2	57.2
Nicaragua	Americas	23.7	24.9	64.8
Guinea	Africa	48.9	28.2	34.6
Congo - Kinshasa	Africa	46.2	21.9	38.8
Cameroon	Africa	38.7	14.6	49.5
Congo - Brazzaville	Africa	33	25.6	44
Azerbaijan	Asia	18.4	20.5	60.9
Venezuela	Americas	27.5	5.6	64.2
Somalia	Africa	42.9	16.3	27.8
Syria	Asia	4.7	16.8	57.1
Yemen	Asia	24.6	12.3	40.5



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