STATE-NATIONALISMS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, GREECE AND TURKEY

Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945

Edited by Benjamin C. Fortna, Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis and Paraskevas Konortas

ROUTLEDGE

State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830–1945

Tracing the emergence of minorities and their institutions from the early nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War, this book provides a comparative study of government policies and ideologies of two states toward minority populations living within their borders.

This volume transcends the tendency to compare the Greek Orthodox in Turkey and the Muslims in Greece in binary terms. A comparison of the policies of the host states and the operation of political, religious and social institutions of the minorities highlights common patterns and discrepancies between the two states.

A collaboration between Greek and Turkish scholars, this book makes extensive use of new archival material. The broad-ranging research interests and international perspective of the authors ensure that this book benefits from a balanced viewpoint and as such is an indispensable aid to students and scholars alike.

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Note on transliteration

The authors have tried to transliterate Greek names and terms so that their reading would approximate their pronunciation in Greek as much as possible. Ottoman Turkish words have been rendered in modern Turkish, using the Redhouse dictionary as a standard. For the transliteration of the Bulgarian alphabet the following system has been followed: Ж (zh), ч (ch), ш (sh), щ (sht), ц (ts), х (h), й (y), ю (yu), я (ya), ь (y), у (u).

1 The Ottoman Empire and after

From a state of "nations" to "nation-states"

Benjamin C. Fortna

Introduction

For the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century with its still wide swathes of territory stretching from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf and its seemingly endless procession of confessional, ethnic and linguistic groups, the innovation of states based on national identity represented a mortal threat, as indeed, it did to other imperial structures of similarly diverse composition. None of the major empires, the Romanov, the Hapsburg and the Ottoman, would survive the early decades of the twentieth century. What set the Ottoman case apart from the others was the direct involvement of the Western powers in the process of imperial dismemberment. When even its erstwhile allies began to help themselves to portions of Ottoman territory whose integrity they had recently promised to protect—the French seized Tunisia in 1881 and the British helped themselves to Egypt the following year—it was clear that the external environment was turning increasingly hostile to the empire's existence.

On the internal front, itself increasingly complicated by the changing international situation, national identification and organization presented formidable challenges to the Ottoman system of communal relations. The new national impetus not only disturbed the lived reality of late Ottoman existence but also, in ways both subtle and brutal, inevitably affected the way we view the transition from empire to post-empire. In other words, it shaped—and continues to shape—both the history and the historiography of that period.

This introduction is intended to offer an overview of the minorities question in the late Ottoman and post-Ottoman context in order to set the stage for the more substantive chapters that appear in the following pages. I begin with a brief discussion of the main subject of this volume, namely the parallel (but far from identical) trajectories of the "Greek minority" in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, on the one hand, and the "Muslim minority" in Greece on the other. I then reflect briefly on the term "minority" in its Ottoman context, before turning to a cursory attempt to situate the Ottoman state's approach to its varied population. I conclude by highlighting the problematic nature of rigid categories and definitions that hamper our ability to see the fluidity of linguistic, cultural and even religious identities in the imperial context on the eve of the nation-state era.

The relationship between the "Greek minority" in Turkey and the "Muslim minority" in Greece is normally considered in binary terms. This is natural enough given the more or less reciprocal way in which the relevant governments considered the groups in question, most visible, for example, in the case of the population exchanges, and in the subsequent histories of these groups.[1] We have come to think of them as prime examples of the processes of "othering" on which nation states increasingly depended as they tried to forge coherent polities out of the remnants of multi-national, multi-confessional, multi-ethnic and multilingual empires.

From the point of view of the nation states that eventually—but perhaps not inevitably—emerged as a consequence of the demise of empire, the persistence of these groups in the recently constituted national midst became a "minority problem." Out of the multifaceted imperial dynamic of communal relations, there developed what came to be seen as a largely symmetrical, reciprocal relationship between what had recently become the normative national "majority" and its newly fashioned, othered "minorities." This binary depended—and for many still depends—on the constructing of some rather rigid boundaries of identification. But one of the main points I hope to make here is that the creation, construction and invention of these boundaries—and their embedding in mental, social, political and legal frameworks—required varying degrees of elision, simplification, distortion and even amnesia in order to succeed.

It is important to see that the interrelated processes of self-definition and othering took place against a much more varied, complicated and by no means predetermined backdrop of intercommunal and proto-national interaction. In this volume we focus on only one of the many parallel sets of relationships that existed in the Ottoman context, namely, that between and among "Greeks" and "Turks" as the empire gave way to the nation state. The superimposition of this nationally defined structure over the Ottoman system is one of many legacies of late Ottoman Empire. Legacy is a subject that has been much discussed in the Ottoman context.[2] It is a crucially important but also rather slippery construct, given the many ways in which the past is subject to reinterpretation in light of subsequent developments. Here we come to a central problem facing all who would take up the crucial but difficult task of crossing the formidable barriers of periodization between the imperial and the post-imperial. Such traversing is crucial for reasons that should be clear to all of us and yet equally difficult given the silences, obfuscations and sometimes willful misappropriations associated with nationalist historiography of almost every stripe. It pervades many facets of our investigations: terminological, thematic and chronological.

Terms

For example, we are here concerned with the question of "minorities" but such a label was itself a creation of the national era. In the pre-modern Ottoman

context the term itself did not exist, only coming into use very late in the empire's lifespan. Instead, communal differences within the pluralistic Ottoman concatenation of peoples were expressed in terms of religious confession and to a much lesser extent regional and ethno-linguistic identification. The subject of the non-Muslim communities (*millet* or *cemaat*) has been much discussed and debated;[3] what is clear is that the notion of a clearly articulated bilateral majority–minority relationship did not exist as we now know it.

The subject of "minorities" only really became a major issue with the almost universal proliferation—and success—of nationally organized states in the modern period. The category of "minority" in the sense we use it today is, naturally enough, determined by our own political and historical context. In other words, during the pre-modern era, the lack of automatic association between a particular people and "their" state made it much less important to be concerned about the status of particular groups of the population, "national" or otherwise (e.g., defined by religion, ethnicity or language or some other categories such as class or status).

A look at some dictionaries helps us to see when this term and presumably therefore the concept began to appear. The term that eventually emerges in Ottoman Turkish to represent "minority" in the sense we understand it generally and in particular in the context of this volume is "akalliyet" (or its variants "ekalliyet" and "aqalliyet"). Now there were other, different ways in which Ottoman Turkish referred to what we have come to think of as minorities; "cemaat" being the more usual term. But they generally refer to any one of the various groups that constituted the empire's population, usually the non-Muslim communities. Minority as an established group that stands in contrast to the preponderance of the population and distinguished from them by the existence or more usually the absence of the same legal status and rights did not yet exist. The term akalliyet is relatively late to appear in Turkish-language lexicons. It does not occur in Meninski's dictionary of the late seventeenth century, Naci's of the 1880s, James Redhouse's (1890) or again in the 1911 version, Şemsettin Sami's *Kamus–i Türki* (1899–1900), Ali Nazima's lexicon of 1901 or Şemsettin Sami's *Dictionnaire Turc–Français* of 1911. None of these dictionaries contains the term "ekalliyet." By contrast, dictionaries designed to provide Ottoman Turkish equivalents of European languages offered the Turkish equivalent somewhat earlier. Thus Şemsettin Sami's *Dictionnaire Français–Turc* of 1905 lists "akalliyet" as the last of several definitions for "minorité." Shortly following the foundation of the republic, Commander A. Vahid Bey from the Turkish Navy published *A Condensed Dictionary: English–Turkish* (Constantinople, 1924). There the term "minority" generates the Ottoman–Turkish equivalents "sabavet" (childhood), "sugar-i sinn" (minor age), and, finally, "aqalliyet." In this entry Vahid Bey goes even further and explains "rights of minorities" as "aqalliyyetlerin houqouqou."[4] Dictionaries cannot adequately reflect linguistic practice or social understanding, but they provide a clear indication that the concept of minority in its current sense was only beginning to come into use in the early years of the twentieth century.

The state

Another factor complicating a simplistic view of the "minority question" is that the Ottoman state's approach was itself changing over the course of the nineteenth century and especially in the first decades of the twentieth century. For example, after the Constitutional or "Young Turk" Revolution of 1908, the new government quickly busied itself with trying to rationalize and homogenize the imperial administration by effacing many of the regional differences and breaking down the various barriers ("national" or otherwise) that had accrued over time. This was essentially an attempt to remove what has been referred to as "empire of difference"[5] with a linguistically, politically and in many cases ethnically homogeneous bureaucratic structure that would cement loyalty to the empire *qua* nation state led by a core group who were animated by Muslim (and later Turkish) nationalism. In the event this attempt was firmly rebuffed by many of the groups that it had hoped to attach more firmly to the center. The rejection of the Albanians and many of the Arabs was particularly damaging, given their shared religious identity with the Turkish nationalists but pointed up the difficulties in eliminating distinctions made on religious, ethnic or linguistic grounds during what would later be seen as this period of imperial to national transition. In the process, many of the realities of the period would be rather starkly exposed, including the contrast between the expanding nationalist rhetoric and its diminishing geographical horizons, between the weakness of the state's ability to maintain a far-flung empire and its strength in dictating a range of social, cultural and economic policies, and between the relatively small size of the public sphere and its relative domination, in rhetorical terms at least, by the state.

Peoples

It is important to underscore the remarkably complicated and diverse nature of the Ottoman population. The situation in Macedonia was without doubt the most difficult demographic and, with the advent of nationalism, political problem facing the late Ottoman state. Certainly it was the best known, becoming something of a byword for the complex conglomeration of peoples, languages and faiths in the empire. The competition in and over Macedonia, whether relatively peaceful in the form of linguistic and educational jostling or much more violent in the form of increasingly politicized gang violence (*çetecilik*), came to symbolize the difficulties inherent in maintaining the authority of the supranational Ottoman state. The inherently incompatible nationalist aspirations created an increasingly intractable problem for the multinational empire. But even in parts of the empire far removed from the Balkans, the demographic situation was far from simple. On the other side of the empire, in the Ottoman provinces that would become Iraq, for example, the diversity of the population was remarkable. An Ottoman official sent into internal exile there in the 1890s counted eight ethnic, twenty confessional and five linguistic groups

among its population.[6] Interestingly for our consideration of the minority question, the report he sent to Istanbul states that those attached to the state in terms of language and religious rite are "in the minority while those opposed are in the majority." Neither ethnic nor national identity figures in his calculation of what was for him the prime issue, namely, affiliation with the state which he regards as being based firmly on communitarian and linguistic factors, a point which further suggests that we need to approach the issue of majority–minority with caution.

There are further reminders that the eventual "solution" to the demographic and political problems of late imperial rule was far from inevitable, even relatively late in the day. It bears emphasizing that the centralizing, nationalist, secular state was far from a foregone conclusion. In other words, what later came to be seen as a clear trajectory towards the eventual appearance of the modern Turkish state actually emerged out of a far more nuanced late Ottoman context than is generally acknowledged. For example, the trend towards centralization, strong though it undoubtedly appeared, was neither predetermined nor universally supported. In fact, one of the important factions active in the opposition movement that grew up during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) called itself the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization; the idea that the empire could be saved by recourse to regional autonomy was supported by a number of factions, not least the Armenian revolutionary organizations.[7] Even after the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were in power after the revolution of 1908, their centralizing agenda was not unopposed. The formation of the Liberal Entente in 1911 and their emerging political success led to the CUP's strong-handed tactics during the "Big Stick" elections of 1912. It is interesting to speculate as to what would have transpired in the aftermath of a counterfactual victory for the Liberals that may well have produced an attempt at a decentralized empire that could have afforded a degree of regional autonomy for the main ethno-national groups in the empire, such as the Rum (i.e., the "Greeks") and the Armenians.[8]

If we were to explore other supposed certainties of the transition from empire to republic we would see that a much more blurred, nuanced picture emerges. Such notions as secular thought, ethno-linguistic definitions or even the very notion of what constituted the "nation" in the context of the late Ottoman Empire all prove problematic when we examine them in any detail. During the Turkish "War of National Liberation" exactly how the nation was defined was unclear. In fact, the nationalists seemed to take advantage of this very ambiguity. The battle was being waged on behalf of the "millet" in the sense of a community defined on the basis of common religion which included not only Turks but also such Muslim groups as Kurds, Albanians and Circassians whose efforts were crucial to the eventual victory. It was only after the war was over and the Turkish Republic established that the term "millet" underwent a semantic metamorphosis so as to become coterminous with the "nation" as ethnically, linguistically and culturally understood.

By pointing out the complications of the late Ottoman period I would like to emphasize that I am not interested in conjuring up a nostalgic and in many respects equally problematic vision of an overly idealized Ottoman pluralistic past. Nor do I wish to celebrate the comparatively simpler picture created by national imagination on all sides. What is important to stress is the extent to which the boundaries, definitions and categories that eventually proved so crucial to the national state's self-image were far from clear-cut. In what follows I provide a few examples of the blurred lines of demarcation between and among categories that are later presumed to have been absolute in constituting the "nation" (millet), such as language, religion and culture. The point here is not to claim that these examples are representative of broader trends—far from it—but rather to unsettle the more facile assumptions concerning linguistic, religious and cultural boundaries.

Language, religion and culture

While language is often referred to as the "badge of nationalism," it is nevertheless clear that linguistic and ethno-national boundaries are hardly coterminous. Bilingualism should make this abundantly clear. In the case of Ottoman/Turkish Rums and Greek Turks, one of the many problematic aspects of the population exchanges effected between Greece and Turkey was the fact that substantial numbers of each group arrived in "their" new countries with a substantial disadvantage: they did not speak the national language. The persistence of large numbers of people in each country whose mother tongue differs from the national language has represented a direct challenge to state efforts at imposing uniformity and, more broadly, to the projected one-to-one correlation between language and nation.

The many instances of religious syncretism, conversion and what Mark Mazower has referred to as "slippage" between religions in the Ottoman Empire suggest that religion itself cannot be taken for granted as a hard-and-fast marker of identity.[9] Such cases are usually associated with the peasantry where a textual, scholastic approach to faith would have been unusual. But there are other cases that demonstrate the religious identities were discarded and taken up even by men and women of individual historical significance. Consider the case of Panaretos, who has been referred to as the "Greek Janissary." Although some of the details of this case remain murky, what is clear is that at the time of his death in 1878 he was serving as the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Heraklia, following a lengthy career in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. His Janissary and therefore his Muslim origins were revealed by his tattoos when his body was being prepared for burial. It seems likely that Panaretos had jumped from that traditional bulwark of the Ottoman military to the Rum clergy well before the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826, as he had been appointed Metropolitan of Philadelphia in 1824.[10]

Both in the center and in the provinces the changes of the nineteenth century frequently served to undermine the traditional patterns of communal

identification. By encouraging reform of the millet organization, the Ottoman government inadvertently exacerbated tensions within the communities and undermined the traditional hierarchy that was generally seen as being closer to the state. On the local level, as Ayşe Ozil's recent work on Rum communities in northwestern Anatolia has shown, there were forces that both reinforced and undermined the sense of community in the provinces.[11] Rivalries over land, church buildings and legal cases could cause local communities to turn towards the government and against the ecclesiastical structures, thereby revealing further instances that the boundaries between and among confessional categories were far from clear-cut.

With linguistic and confessional categories far from airtight, it should be no surprise that in cultural terms the population of the Ottoman Empire could not be easily defined. A "Turk" did not necessarily share characteristics with his or her fellow Turkish-speaking Muslims. Much of late Ottoman satirical literature turned on the existence of what Şerif Mardin has referred to as "super westernized" Ottoman cultural actors who were pilloried for their extravagant aping of Western dress, language and behavior.[12] So also did the non-Muslim population fail to conform to any set of preordained practices and affinities. A good reminder of this can be seen in the case of Constantine Musurus (1807–91), or Musurus Pasha as he was known by the Ottoman officialdom to which he unquestionably belonged. In particular the years he served as Ottoman ambassador to Athens in the middle of the nineteenth century provide a challenge to the question of "millet" affinity.

A Rum of the aristocratic Phanariote stripe, Musurus was a dedicated and loyal servant of the Ottoman state (one of that group who, as Richard Clogg put it, "saw no conflict between their ethnic identity and their acting as loyal servants of the Ottoman Porte"), a native-Greek speaker who, despite his long and important career as an Ottoman diplomat, curiously never gained full command of Ottoman Turkish.[13]

As ambassador to Athens during the period 1840–8, Musurus was placed in a position that might have challenged his overlapping Ottoman and Rum loyalties. Among other tricky diplomatic tasks, he had to request extradition to Ottoman lands of those accused of brigandage or other hostile nationalist acts—Musurus himself was the object of an attack towards the end of his mission—and to try to limit the emigration, or as a Member of Parliament put it, the flight, of Ottoman Christian subjects towards the Greek state.

But, as Olivier Bouquet has shown, this was not the case. Musurus clearly disassociated himself from the Greek kingdom and the cultural life of Athens that he felt to be vastly inferior to life in Istanbul. He wanted nothing to do with the locals, looked down his nose at their press and found the poetry produced on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the uprising "nauseating." As Bouquet puts it, in Musurus's view "nothing could be said, thought or written in Athens that couldn't be said, thought or written better in Greek circles in Istanbul."[14] Athens was for him nothing more than "a big village of fishermen," a place of parvenus and brigands. His "Rum" allegiances were centered firmly

on Istanbul. A similar case is that of Alexandros Karatheodoris (Karatodori) Paşa who negotiated the loss of Thessaly to the Greek state on behalf of the Ottoman government in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Once again a member of the Rum Phanariot community was given the responsibility for pursuing Ottoman interests against the Greek state. And, once again, he seized the chance and performed his Ottoman responsibilities with distinction.

The assumption that all Rums were by definition proto-citizens of Greece or that late-Ottoman Muslims would happily take up the post-war Turkish identity is clearly problematic. In the realms of high culture and low, the variation of historically defined characteristics—linguistic, religious, economic, social and cultural—meant that much had to be altered, effaced or forgotten for the drive towards national monoculture to succeed. In my own recent work on reading and literacy in the Ottoman/Turkish context I have observed that the clear invocation of national difference only entered the world of children after the first decade of the twentieth century and then only sporadically and in response to specific events, such as the Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya or the Greek invasion of Anatolia. It is only with the establishment of the Turkish Republic that a clearly national agenda can be observed.[15] In this altered political atmosphere there was a clear need to identify the "enemies of the nation" so as to shore up the novel boundaries of national self-definition. Previously children's reading materials had shown little need to identify—or even mention—different ethnic groups which would have been tantamount to shattering the carefully preserved illusion that the empire was a seamless quilt of undifferentiated people(s) who had its preservation close to heart.

Conclusion and chapter overview

We have seen how a number of structures and systems that evolved to function in an imperial system both could and could not make the transition to the post-imperial or national period. In the case of "Greek"–"Turkish" relations this was obviously complicated by such crucial factors as Greek independence, the changes and tensions affecting the Christian Orthodox patriarchate (in particular the emergence of autocephalous Christian Orthodox churches which inevitably undermined the ecumenical appeal of the Patriarchate in Constantinople) and the fragmentation of Muslim solidarity towards the Ottoman state, increasingly if imperfectly seen as a "Turkish" enterprise. Organizations that straddled ethno-linguistic difference—indeed whose dominant position depended on their suppression—such as the Ottoman Empire itself, its religious structures and mentalities in particular, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate whose existence after 1453 had depended on a symbiosis with the Ottoman cause, were brutally affected by imperial demise.

A final thought: In attempting to understand the complex and changing sets of communitarian relations and interactions that constituted the transition from Ottoman to post-Ottoman periods, we need to be aware of unintended as much as intended consequences. A good example of this would be the

Ottoman reform decree of 1856 (Islahat fermanı, or Hatt-i hümayunu). From the perspective of the Ottoman government, this decree was intended to perform several feats: to shore up the still somewhat inchoate sense of Ottomanism (i.e., the collective allegiance of all subjects, regardless of religion, language or ethnicity to Istanbul) by emphasizing the overarching imperial identity at the expense of "millet" or national sub-identities; to emphasize the reassertion of central authority after a period of considerable consolidation in the first half of the nineteenth century; and, somewhat overplayed in the literature but still important, to assuage the growing insistence of the Great Powers for "reforms" that would in practice improve the condition of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. This was a tricky balancing act, if not an internally contradictory one, and one that, perhaps inevitably, failed to satisfy everyone. For our purposes, it is important to note the unintended consequence: ironically this leveling decree in the spirit of pan-Ottoman identification frequently had the effect of reinforcing the very particular national ("millet") identifications that it had set out to soften and to weaken the imperial institutions such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate on which it depended. Provoking moreover widespread Muslim anger and frustration at the clear perception of a loss of privilege and prestige (which in many cases had already been accepted in unspoken acknowledgement through daily practice) and in many cases, especially in the Arab provinces, communal violence, the edict provoked a heightened awareness of the very communitarian boundaries that it had sought to blur.

We come, therefore, back again to the persistent issue of identity definition and the creation of boundaries. As with the blurred categories we touched on above, it seems clear that given the combination of potential identities and the tendency for these to overlap, it was inevitable that any effort to rearrange the lines of demarcation would, like turning a kaleidoscope, result in new patterns of identification and belonging.

The chapters define in much clearer terms than I have been able to achieve in these introductory remarks the ways in which the Muslims in Greece and the "Greeks" in Turkey have come to their heavily linked if not fully reciprocal historical embrace. Dimitris Kamouzis's leads off by explaining the ways in which the Rum elites reacted to the increasingly politicized milieu of late Ottoman politics. Proceeding in comparative fashion, Kamouzis demonstrates that the processes at work among the "Greeks" had much in common with the other non-Muslim groups in the empire. We can see a clear trend in which the laity, emboldened by newfound wealth, modern educational institutions and ideas about society, challenged the dominance of the ecclesiastical authority. The resulting politicization of the *millet* had profound consequences for the era of nation states. Stefanos Katsikas in Chapter 3 traces the legacies of the Ottoman *millet* in the national context of independent Greece. Maintaining the focus on the relationship between communities and elites, this chapter demonstrates what happened when a newly formed nation state attempts to administer and control communities and institutions that were constituted in a pre-national environment. The principal

feature to emerge from this confrontation was the incongruity between religiously and ethnically defined conceptions of belonging and identification.

Chapter 4 provides an example of how the larger transformations of the period played out at the local level. Examining the region defined by the Ottoman district (kaza) of Gümülcine in Western Thrace, Paraskevas Konortas offers us a fascinating case study of the ways in which national identification came to replace pre-national understandings of belonging. This chapter delineates the tension between the emerging strands of separate national consciousness ("Greek," Bulgarian, etc.) and the ecumenically defined religio-cultural identity common to the Rum (Orthodox) population of Gümülcine. The adherence of many to the pre-national identification cautions us against assumptions about the inevitability of the national project. Staying at the local level, Dimitris Kamouzis turns our attention to Istanbul. In Chapter 5 he shows how the Rum community, now seen as a "minority," organized educational and administrative life in the former Ottoman capital during the early years of the Turkish Republic. Here, again, we see the problems and tensions associated with adapting pre-national patterns to newly created national realities.

In Chapter 6 Elçin Macar examines the ways in which the early Turkish Republic approached the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the most important institution for both the Greeks and the Rum. The combination of the radical secular nationalism of the young Turkish Republic and the difficulties of the preceding period, including the Greek invasion and the Greco-Turkish war, made for a decidedly tense relationship between the Patriarchate and the Ankara government. As Macar demonstrates, the Republic eventually backed away from the hostility of its earlier stance. While the Patriarchate managed to survive, its ability to function as it had in the past was severely curtailed. Stefanos Katsikas's second contribution to this volume (Chapter 7) turns our attention to the fate of the Muslims who remained in Greece after the creation of the Turkish Republic and the Population Exchange. This chapter explains the impact of the terms of the Lausanne Treaty on the heterogeneous Muslim population, the persistence of Ottoman-era administrative practices, the complicated problems involved in settling questions of property, the educational situation and the politicization of the Muslim communities in Greece. Given the staunchly nationalist climate in Greece and Turkey, the Muslim communities in Greece, not unlike their Orthodox counterparts in Turkey, were veritable hostages to their new state. The sufferings of the recent past, the varied nature of the population that stayed "behind" and the persistence of maximalist nationalist tendencies in both countries meant that creating a new "golden era" for Muslim–Christian relations in both countries was never going to be easy.

Samim Akgönül in Chapter 8 analyzes the ways that the normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey after 1930 affected the Muslim minority in Greece and the Rum minority in Turkey. Tracing the ways in which the different ethnic communities both did and did not coexist peacefully, Akgönül explains that while the political rapprochement between Ankara and Athens mitigated some of the obstacles to coexistence, the establishment of the

principles of state "protection" of the minorities and that of reciprocity sowed the seeds for tension and discord in the years to come. In Chapter 9 Ayhan Aktar focuses on one of the most alarming episodes in the history of Greco-Turkish relations, namely, the "Wealth Tax" of the early 1940s, an important reminder of the depth of the problems facing the minority populations in an era of sometimes virulent ethno-nationalism. Aktar shows us how difficult economic times, the early Republic's demonization of Istanbul and the promulgation of ethnically specific state economic policies combined to create the severity of the Wealth Tax legislation, a staunchly anti-minority instrument with brutal consequences for individuals and communities alike. Finally, in Chapter 10, Paraskevas Konortas offers an epilogue that highlights several key themes that run throughout the present. Especially notable are the importance of comparative scholarship to covering such a long and complicated piece of history and the importance of the Ottoman legacy in the period of nation states despite the often strident rhetoric condemning or denying the relevance of the empire.

Taken together, this volume is impressive for a number of reasons. First of all, it is crucial to recognize that this book represents an important collaboration between Greek and Turkish scholars who see the importance of working together for a common intellectual purpose, namely, to understand the complexities of the historical development of these interrelated communities despite rather formidable obstacles that have been erected over time. Second, the articles here draw on an impressive combination of primary and secondary literature—particularly important here are the use of Greek, Ottoman and Turkish state archives and ecclesiastical and other communal repositories—reflecting the energy and intellectual rigor of their authors. Third, as a result of this collaborative research, this volume breaks new empirical and theoretical ground and helps us to see the complicated and interrelated—but hardly parallel—cases of change from communities to nations in the modern sense of the term.

Notes

1 Samim Akgönül, ed., *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities: Law, Religion and Politics* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008).
2 See, for example, L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).
3 Benjamin Braude, "The Strange History of the Millet System," in Kemal Çiçek (ed.), *The Great Ottoman–Turkish Civilisation*, vol. 2, Economy and Society (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), pp. 409–17.
4 I am extremely grateful to my colleague Akşin Somel for his kind help in providing this information.
5 Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA). Yıldız Esas Evrakı (YEE) 14/1188 9 Ramazan 1309 (April 7, 1892). For further details of late Ottoman Iraq, see Gökhan

Çetinsaya, *The Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908*, SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

7 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 146–7.

8 Çağlar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire," in Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire*, p. 39.

9 Mark Mazower, *The Balkans* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000), p. 68; Selim Deringil, "'There Is No Compulsion in Religion': On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839–1856," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42 (2000), pp. 547–75.

10 I am extremely grateful to Dimitris Stamatopoulos for kindly informing me about this case. For more detail, see Manouil Gedeon, *Istoria ton tou Xristou Peniton, 1453–1913* [History of Jesus Christ's Indigents, 1453–1913] (Athens, 1939), pp. 261–2, and D. Stamatopoulos, *Μεταρρύθμιση και εκκοσμίκευση: Προς μια αν ασύνθεση της ιστορίας του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου τον 19ο αιώνα* (Athens: Αλεξ άνδρεια, 2003)

11 Ayşe Özil, "The Structure of Community: Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire in North-Western Asia Minor, *c.*1860–1910" (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2009).

12 Şerif Mardin, "Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter Century of the Nineteenth Century," in Peter Benedict et al. (eds.), *Turkey: Geographical and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 403–46.

13 As cited in Olivier Bouquet, "Un *Rum* aux pays des Hellènes. Constantin Musurus, premier représentant permanent de la Sublime Porte à Athènes (1840–8)," paper presented at the conference Society and Politics in Southeastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century, October 2009, Corfu. I thank Dr. Bouquet for generously allowing me to cite this article.

14 Ibid., p. 11.

15 Benjamin C. Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).