

RELIGION AND GLOBAL POLITICS

Islam and Nationalism in Modern Greece 1821–1940



STEFANOS KATSIKAS

Islam and Nationalism in Modern Greece,
1821–1940

Islam and Nationalism in Modern Greece, 1821–1940

STEFANOS KATSIKAS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS



Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2021

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0–19–065200–5

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190652005.001.0001

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America

To the voices unheard and the stories untold

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xix
<i>Names and Dates</i>	xxiii
<i>Transliteration</i>	xxvii
1. Islam in Southeastern Europe	1
2. The Greek War of Independence (1821–1832)	19
3. Greek Nationalism and Islam	30
4. Muslims in the Kingdom of Hellas (1832–1880)	47
5. The Annexation of Thessaly	72
6. Muslims in the New Lands (1912–1923)	95
7. The Interwar Years (1923–1940)	172
Conclusion	214
<i>References</i>	231
<i>Index</i>	253

Preface

This book began as a BA thesis more than two decades ago while I was an undergraduate at the Ionian University in Corfu, Greece. What struck me then, and to a great extent continues to amaze me, was how underresearched the history of the Muslims in Greece was and how little this history had been researched in relation to the intricate paths of Greek nationalism since the creation of modern Greece in 1832. Even today, when more and more scholars are elucidating the political, economic, and social life of Muslims, and a number of academic studies of these subjects have been published, the discussion rarely moves beyond the post-1923 Muslims of Western Thrace, the “leftovers” of an erstwhile robust Muslim population of Greece that was nearly eliminated by wars, mass emigration, and the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange. Little attention has been paid to the history of the Muslims in Greece prior to 1923, who largely remain at the margins of modern Greek history. A number of factors explain this lack of attention: unavailability of archival material; the failure to confront long-held ideas in Greek historiography; and Islamophobia, or an obsession with viewing the Muslims of Greece primarily as a kin minority group of Turkey. In the latter case, researchers’ interest has been limited to helping scholars understand how Muslims were embroiled in, influenced, or affected by Greco-Turkish relations and has not extended to Muslims as a minority group whose history and culture are an inextricable part of modern Greece’s history and culture on their own merits. Some scholars may wish to avoid risking their popularity among a conservative Greek public, who often view the Muslims of Western Thrace as Turkey’s Trojan Horse in Greece. This is not the case in other nations’ modern histories. It would be unthinkable today to write of U.S. history without considering Native Americans or African Americans. Historians cannot write of British imperialism without any mention of the slaughter of Africans in the Congo or of Chinese in the Opium Wars. Without exploring the development of the relationship between modern Greece and its Muslims, scholars fail to capture the nuances of state attitudes, policies, and perception in Greece with regard to its minority populations.

The purpose of this book is to consider the interactions between modern Greece and its Muslim populations from the Greek War of Independence in 1821 to the entrance of Greece into World War II in October 1940, and to explain modern Greece's shifting policies. The book aims to shed light on the complicated history of Greek nationalism and addresses questions of identity, especially with regard to the modern Greek elites who formulated state policies. Greece was the first country to become an independent state in the Balkans, and its ruling framework and policy measures toward its Muslims were to serve as a template for other Orthodox Christian Balkan states with Muslim minorities (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Cyprus). I chose the period covered in this book because it encompasses the full span of what can truly be considered the "post-Ottoman period." The rupture caused by World War II was such that afterward, long-standing institutions that had persisted in Greece as a sort of Ottoman legacy, despite the absence of the Ottoman Empire, ultimately disappeared. The Dodecanese insular complex, which was ceded to Greece in September 1947, and therefore the small Muslim population of the Dodecanese (mainly in Rhodes and Kos), is not discussed here. Eastern Thrace and the district of Izmir were controlled by Greece only for a short time, from the conclusion of the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), between the Allied Powers of World War I and the Ottoman Empire, to the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), following Greece's defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. Therefore, the book does not delve into issues concerning the Muslims in those areas.

Chapter 1 sets the stage by exploring Islam's historical presence in Southeastern Europe after the seventh century CE, and by looking at the status of Muslims within the state administration in Ottoman times. Emphasis is given to Muslims in areas that were later to become part of modern Greece. Chapter 2 discusses the start of the Greek War of Independence (1821–1832) and its impact on the Muslim populations of the war-affected areas. Chapter 3 explores the conditions leading to the emergence of Greek nationalism and the effects of the latter on the Muslims of the war-affected areas. The chapter also analyzes the reasons leading several Muslims in the rebellious areas to support the Greek War of Independence. Chapter 4 discusses the life of Muslims in the newly established Kingdom of Hellas up to the end of the 1870s. The cession of Thessaly to Greece in 1881 was a landmark in the history of the Muslims of Greece. Athens was forced to recognize the country's Muslims as legal entities, to introduce a charter defining the state's administration of Muslim communities, and to accept aspects of sharia as

governing Muslim family and property affairs. Chapter 5 looks at the Greek state administration and the Muslims of Thessaly and explores the reasons for the mass exodus of Muslims from Thessaly. Chapter 6 discusses how the Balkan War and World War I affected Muslims in Greek-controlled areas and the impact of these wars on Turkish nationalism. Chapter 7 explores the implications of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922 in Asia Minor for the Muslims of Greece, with emphasis on the forced Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923. Chapter 7 looks at the status and life of Muslims who were exempt from the exchange during the interwar years. Finally, a conclusion draws on the chapters' discussions to address some theoretical questions about nation-state formation and communal diversity in modern Greece.

Ideas of nation and nationalism stand at the core of this book, but the discussion in the book avoids complicating the already complex historical circumstances with theoretical approaches to the questions of nationalism. Instead, the rest of this preface offers a concise overview of the main arguments about nationalism, which may prove helpful to the reader in the remaining chapters.

Most theorists, preoccupied with the development of various nationalist movements, agree on the modern nature of nationalism, and have stressed its relation to modernity, which may be relevant in some cases but inapplicable to others. Theorists often fail to adequately explain Greek and other national movements in the Balkans. Ernest Gellner, for example, distinguishes between traditional and modern societies, and defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” and as the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population.¹ In other words, nationalism is the establishment of an anonymous impersonal society, with mutually sustainable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of the previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by these microgroups themselves. The imposition of this high culture is conducted through the general diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication.² Gellner viewed nationalism in a historical perspective and

¹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.

² Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 57.

as a key element of changes in the political and economic system of Europe and beyond that arose in the wake of the Renaissance and referred to the transition from agrarian to industrial society, commonly known as modernity. Nationalism is closely related to the political and cultural aspects of that transition: that is, the popularization of education, the unifying and culturally homogenizing roles of a standardized national language, a national educational system, national labor markets, and improved communication and mobility in the context of urbanization. As these changes spread around the world slowly and at different paces in numerous places, cultural elites were often able to resist cultural assimilation and defend their own culture and language. Premodern traditional societies had no incentive to impose homogeneity on their peoples because diversity often benefited the ruling elites. Modern industrial societies aim at the exact opposite. Nationalism is seen as the product of industrial revolution and the social organization of industrial societies, in which the migration of labor and bureaucratic employment is important for forging a national society.³ Industrialization served the purpose of filling the ideological void left by the disappearance of the prior agrarian society's culture and of the political and economic system of feudalism.

It is hard to apply Gellner's model in the case of the Balkans, since the region lacked industrial development until the turn of the twentieth century, whereas Greece and other Balkan states nevertheless deployed a highly influential, centralized bureaucracy and pioneered efforts toward mass education.⁴ Gellner also fails to explain the passions generated by nationalism and why one should fight and die for a country. He has not also taken into account the role of war and the military in fostering both cultural homogenization and nationalism, or the relationship between militarism and compulsory education.⁵ In addition, scholars, such as Philip Gorski, have questioned the claim of modernization theorists, including Gellner, that nationalism is a product of modernity. Instead these scholars have argued that nationalism existed prior to modernity, and even has medieval roots.⁶

John Breuilly associates nationalism with modernization, which is primarily understood as an economic process that changed societies as well as the

³ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 47, 55, 61; Damian Tambini, "Explaining Monoculturalism."

⁴ Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*.

⁵ Daniele Conversi, "Homogenization."

⁶ Philip Gorski, "The Mosaic Moment."

nature of state and state power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁷ Breuilly views the nation as a body of citizens who share the same political rights with many ethnic, religious, and other social groups. Scholars who pursued Breuilly's thoughts further, for example Paul Bass, have viewed the standardization of language, literacy, schooling, media, and mass communication as necessary to promote interclass communication.⁸ But, Breuilly himself admits, the case of Greek nationalism does not conform to his theory, since modern Greece lacked the economic structures, literacy, or even standardization of Greek language to justify the emergence and development of Greek nationalism that his theory requires.⁹

For Eric Hobsbawm, nations and nationalism are the outcome of a social process in which invented traditions play a pivotal role in crafting the necessary continuity with the past. He argues that the period from 1870 to 1914 was the peak for invented traditions, and witnessed the emergence of mass politics.¹⁰ Hobsbawm identifies two phases of European nationalism: (1) from 1830 to 1870, a nationalism infused with ideals of the French Revolution and the democratic nationalism of the “great nations,” and (2) from the 1870s onward, the so-called small nations’ reactionary nationalism, directed mostly against the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian empires.¹¹ Greece, though a small nation, emerged fully independent in 1832, almost forty years before the time that is supposed to mark the start of the reactionary nationalism of small nations. Nor does Greek nationalism fit comfortably within Hobsbawm’s description of the democratic nationalism of “great nations.”

For Benedict Anderson, the nation is an “imagined political community” similar to other social groupings (e.g., religion, kinship). Its constituents do not know the overwhelming majority of their fellow citizens, yet they live the image of their commonality.¹² Anderson views nationalism as a cultural artifact that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century due to a decline of the older forms of imagined communities (e.g., empires), the exploration of the world by Europeans, the decline of Latin as the sacred language, and commercial publishing. The latter created fields of communication in fixed vernacular languages, which helped the development of an image of antiquity

⁷ John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism,” 163–164.

⁸ Paul Bass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 63–64.

⁹ Brendan O’Leary, “Ernest Gellner’s Diagnoses,” 73.

¹⁰ Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions.”

¹¹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 14–45.

¹² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 4–7.

crucial to the idea of the nation and spread different languages of power and authority. All led to the creation of national consciousness. Greek nationalism involved a different sacral language than Latin, but instead of creating a fixed spoken vernacular language, linguistic diversification emerged in the country. This was further intensified by a dispute about whether the language of the Greek people (demotic Greek) or a cultivated imitation of ancient Greek (katharevousa) should be the official language of the Greek nation, which was finally resolved in 1976 when demotic Greek became the official language. In addition, Orthodox Christianity played a more significant role in the formulation of Greek national consciousness than the Greek language.¹³

Miroslav Hroch associates nation-building with the process of social transformation related to capitalism. He claims that classical national movements are distinguished by (1) the development of a national culture based on the local language, to be used in education, administration, and economic transactions; (2) the creation of their own social structure, with educated elites and economic classes; and (3) equal civil rights with some degree of political autonomy.¹⁴ Hroch defined three chronological stages in the creation of a nation. First, activists strive to lay the foundation of a national identity. They research the cultural, linguistic, social, and sometimes historical attributes of a nondominant group in order to raise awareness of its common traits, but they do this “without pressing specifically national demands to remedy deficits.” Second, a new range of activists emerge who seek to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to project of creating a future nation. Third, the majority of the population forms a mass social movement that branches into conservative-clerical, liberal, and democratic wings, each with its own program. Hroch identifies the Balkan national movements as mass movements already established under the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ He views the nation as the product of a long and complicated process of historical development in Europe, and defines it as a large social group integrated by a combination of different types of bonds—economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious—and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. Many of these ties can be mutually substituted, with three standing out as irreplaceable: (1) a memory of some common past, treated as the “destiny” of the group, or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density

¹³ James Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, 48.

¹⁴ Miroslav Hroch, “National Self-Determination,” 66–67.

¹⁵ Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, 25–30.

of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the groups than beyond it; and (3) a conception of the equality of all the members of the group. The construction of national identities, however, is not as predetermined as Hroch may have thought. There have been national movements that have succeeded in convincing certain ethnic and religious groups with little linguistic and cultural ties to the nation that their natural place lies in the nation. For example, the Greek national movement succeeded in persuading, with remarkable success, many Albanian-speaking, Slavic-speaking and Vlach-speaking Orthodox Christians that they were Greeks.

Anthony Smith argues that to understand modern nations one needs to consider the preexisting ethnic components (*ethnies*) without which nation-building is problematic.¹⁶ Nationalism draws on the preexisting past of the “group,” aiming to fashion a sense of common identity and shared history, which need not necessarily be valid or cogent. Many nationalisms are based on historically flawed interpretations of past events. Nationalistic interpretations of the past are often fabricated to justify modern political and ethnic positions. Smith identifies two types of nationalism: (1) “ethnic nationalism,” which bases nation membership on descent or heredity, expressed through common blood or kinship, and not on political membership, and (2) “civic nationalism” (a Western type of nationalism), which defines nationality or citizenship by birth within the nation state. In this classification system, Greek nationalism is viewed as “ethnic nationalism,” and Smith explains its emergence as due to the failure of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church to respond to the rising aspirations of the middle classes, who then turned to secular discourses to achieve their goals.¹⁷ Smith’s theory is criticized for viewing history as a mission evolving through well-defined stages (evolutionary historicism); from that perspective *ethnies* must become nations.¹⁸

Michael Billig’s concept of banal nationalism looks at everyday representations of the nation that develop a shared feeling of national belonging, a sense of tribalism through national identity. Nationalism continues after the establishment of the political entity it demanded, and national identity is constantly reinforced in nation-states, with politicians and newspapers playing a significant role in its reproduction.¹⁹ Roger Brubaker

¹⁶ Anthony Smith, *Myths and Memories*, 29–56.

¹⁷ Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, 35–36.

¹⁸ Sinisa Malesevic, *Identity as Ideology*, 131.

¹⁹ Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 93–94, 96, 119.

asserts that scholars should treat “nations” as “categories of practice” and nationhood as the product of cultural and political institutionalization, and encourages scholars to refrain from using these categories to define substantial, enduring collectives.²⁰

Nationalism is a “cultural construct” that invents traditions and is primarily political, but in the Balkans and the nation-states that emerged from the domains of the former Ottoman Empire, most of the nationalist ideologies were in essence religious nationalisms, because they were inextricably linked to a particular religious belief, dogma, or affiliation.²¹ Religion does not diminish with the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, but nationalism is rather defined by religion, which often dominated all elements of the Balkan nationalist movements. The nineteenth-century Balkan wars of independence from Ottoman rule were simultaneously wars of religion.²² In the words of Mark Mazower, “religion became a marker of national identity in ways not known in the past, and therefore more sharply marked off from neighbouring religions.”²³ For example, nineteenth-century Greek nationalism was closely connected with Greek Orthodoxy and was affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople and later—that is, after 1833—to the autocephalous (i.e., self-governed) Church of Greece as well as to the patriarchate.²⁴ Greek Orthodoxy was seen to be the common bond unifying the members of the Greek nation and was therefore regarded as the major cultural element that defined Greek national identity, along with the Greek language. Greek Orthodox ideas often inspired political activism and action: for example, laws were often passed to foster stricter religious adherence. During the Greek War of Independence, Greek Orthodoxy was seen by Greek insurgents as a mobilizing factor that instigated interest, enthusiasm, and support among Greek- and non-Greek-speaking Orthodox for an otherwise dangerous political project.

Nation-building has been at the forefront of academic debates at least since 1976, with the publication of Eugen Weber’s *Peasants into Frenchmen*. The book’s convincing argument for a much-delayed success at nation-building

²⁰ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 7–8, 21, 37.

²¹ Paschalios Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*; Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*; Katherine Fleming, “Orientalism”; Madhu Kishwar, *Religion*. The term “religious nationalism” was coined by Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*.

²² Fikret Adanır, “The Formation,” 303.

²³ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans*, 76.

²⁴ Paschalios Kitromilides, “Orthodox Culture”; Paschalios Kitromilides, “Imagined Communities”; Paschalios Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution*; Victor Roudometof, “Invented Traditions”; Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet.”

in the most iconic European nation-state, France, challenged past widely held views on the effectiveness of the nation-building projects of the first half of the nineteenth century.²⁵ Although Greece emerges as a nation-state remarkably early (in 1832) and builds all the institutions of a modern state, historiography paid scant attention to the relationship of the state with its ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups until the twentieth century, when Greek territorial expansion transformed Greece. In part, this is due to an implicit assumption that the early Greek state was a homogenous entity that lacked minorities until after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913).²⁶

But is it possible to discuss nationalism without exploring, or even addressing “the other,” those groups who do not belong to the nation or are perceived as enemies and threats to the national project? The idea that minorities, or nationalities as they were called in the nineteenth century, could be a threat to the state was not new, as was evidenced by the wars of religion in early modern Europe and the persecution of threatening minority groups, for example, the Moors of Spain, the Roman Catholics in post-Reformation England, and the Huguenots in France. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries exacerbated these fears, as more and more nationalities demanded the right to maintain their differences, if not outright autonomy, challenging the assimilationist efforts of the new nation-states. The objective of this book is to take a step toward integrating the history of Islam and its followers into the history of modern Greece as an integral component of the evolution of the modern Greek state, by examining ideas about the nation and about national policies from the nineteenth century to the end of the interwar period.

²⁵ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.

²⁶ Evdoxios Doxiadis, *State, Nationalism*, xiii–xiv.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge those whose support, advice, and assistance made this book possible. First I wish to thank Paraskevas (Paris) Konortas (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), who, as my professor at the Department of History at the Ionian University (Corfu, Greece) more than twenty years ago, stimulated my interest in this research topic and supervised my BA thesis on the legal status of the Muslims of Thessaly from 1881 (Thessaly's annexation to Greece) to 1912 (the start of the Balkan Wars). As a postgraduate student at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) at the University College London, I wrote my MA thesis on the legal status of the Muslims of Greece from 1912 to 1923. I wish to thank the Lilian Voudouris Foundation (Athens) for sponsoring my MA studies, as well as my two MA thesis supervisors, Peter Siani-Davies and Ger Duijzings, for their guidance and support. I also wish to thank the SSEES Library, King's College (London) Library, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Library, the (University of London) Senate House Library, the British Library, and the British National Archives, where I spent endless hours researching and writing my MA thesis. Much of the research I conducted contributed to this book.

I wish to thank the John S. Latsis Public Benefit Foundation (Athens), which generously funded a two-year postdoctoral research project through the Department of History and Archaeology at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Many thanks also to Dimitris Kamouzis (Center for Asia Minor Studies, Athens), my research partner in this project, and Paris Konortas for supervising the project. Thanks also to Kostas Gavroglou, academic advisor of the project, Robert Holland (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London), and Olga Katsiardi-Hering (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens) for their support and guidance.

My deepest gratitude goes to John Louis Esposito (Georgetown University) and Jonathan A. C. Brown (Georgetown University) for their tremendous support in the publication of this book. I cannot thank William (Bill) Cope and Mary Kalantzis (both at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign [UIUC]) enough for their precious advice and unreserved assistance. I am

most grateful to Oxford University Press and the anonymous reviewers for their pertinent comments. Cynthia Read, chief editor, and the entire staff of the Religion and Politics series at Oxford University Press deserve special thanks for their patience and precious assistance. I also wish to thank Julie Goodman for editing my manuscript, Daniel Eichler for assisting with the book's tables, and Irini Urania Politi for assisting with the book cover image and for her friendship.

Many thanks to my research assistants Sakis Dimitriadis, Anna Krinaki, Angeliki Lioka, Thanasis Papadimitriou, Giorgos Papaioanou, Christina Koleva, Özlem Yıldız, and Jessica Nicholas. Thanks also to Zsuzsanna Fagyal of the Department of French and Italian at UIUC for her support. As director of the Program in Modern Greek Studies at UIUC (2012–2018) I benefited from the invaluable support of a number of graduate assistants who assisted with teaching and some administrative duties, including Charalambos Ntantanis, Ilias Bolaris, Anna Tsiola, Venetta Ivanova, Anastasia-Olga Tzirides, and Maria Kontari. I am also deeply grateful to the Onassis Foundation, the John S. Latsis Public Benefit Foundation, and the Houston Family Foundation, especially Dennis and Cathy Houston, for their generous support to the Program in Modern Greek Studies at UIUC during my time as program director.

A number of colleagues have helped me during the writing of this book through their friendship, encouragement, and academic and other support for my research. I cannot thank Maria Todorova (UIUC) enough, a great mentor and a true friend and a person from whom I have frequently sought advice over the years. I am also deeply grateful to Benjamin C. Fortna (University of Arizona), Konstantinos Tsitselikis (University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki), Anastasia (Sia) Anagnostopoulou (Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences), Samim Akgönül (Université de Strasbourg), Ayhan Aktar (Bilgi University, Istanbul), Elçin Macar (Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul), Nadine Akhund (Sorbonne-IRICE Institute, Paris), Vemund Aarbakke (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), Anastasios (Tasos) Anastasiadis (McGill University), Lambros Baltsiotis (Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences), Alain Bresson (University of Chicago), Nathalie Clayer (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique), Dejan Djokic (Goldsmiths, University of London), Spyros Economides (LSE), Kevin Featherstone (LSE), Katherine Fleming (New York University), Thomas Gallant (University of California, San Diego), Katerina Gardika (National and Kapodistrian University of

Athens), Anastasia Giannakidou (University of Chicago), Sakis Gekas (York University, Canada), Yannis Glavinas (General State Archives of Greece, Athens), Molly Greene (Princeton University), Jonathan Hall (University of Chicago), Ariel Hessayon (Goldsmiths, University of London), Renee Hirschon (Oxford University), Valerie Hoffman (UIUC), Wolfgang Hoepken (University of Leipzig), Nicole Immig (Boğaziçi University), Stathis Kalyvas (Oxford University), Vangelis Karamanolakis (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), Kostas Kostis (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), Alexandros Kazamias (Coventry University), Paschalis Kitromilides (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), Christina Koulouri (Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences), Andreas Lymberatos (Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences), Eleftheria Manta (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), Giorgos Mavrogordatos (National and Kapodistria University of Athens), Mark Mazower (Columbia University), Jason Merchant (University of Chicago), Vassilis Monastiriotis (LSE), David Nirenberg (University of Chicago), David Norris (University of Nottingham) Dimitris Papadimitriou (University of Manchester), Evangelos Prontzas (Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences), Dimitris Stamatopoulos (University of Macedonia), Maria Stassinopoulou (University of Vienna), Anastasia Stouraiti (Goldsmiths, University of London), Marina Terkourafi (Leiden University), Sofia Torallas-Tovar (University of Chicago), Konstantinos Travlos (Özyegin University, Istanbul), and Thanos Veremis (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens).

Thanks are also due to the General State Archives of Greece, the Service of the Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliamentary Archives and the Library of the Hellenic Parliament, the National Library of Greece, the Historical Archives of the Benaki Museum, the Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives, the Gennadius Library at the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, and the Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı in Istanbul for allowing me to use their invaluable materials.

I wish to thank for their friendship and support my good friend Kathryn Anthony, who provided terrific company, delicious meals and illuminating travel experiences, and lots of laughs and memorable moments. Many thanks for their friendship and support should also go to Eleni Lykou, George Kydonakis, Dimitris Fyntanidis, Ercan Balcı, Miltiades Bolaris and his family, Asimina Giannoula, John Gouleras, Dimitris Kourkouvis, Spyros Kypraios, Maria Pappas, George Papadantonakis, Kiki Dara, Robert Leucht,

Mithilesh Mishra, Kristina Riedel, Eman Saadah, Abdelaadim Bidaoui, Aazam Feiz, Angelos Vlazakis, Endy Zemenides, and George Zervas. I'd also like to thank my friends at the Greek Orthodox parish of the Three Hierarchs, including Fr. Michael and his family. Finally, I'd like to make special mention of Evangelos Dioletis, a good friend of mine, postdoctoral researcher of molecular biology at Yale University, who passed away suddenly and prematurely on 1 April 2019. I'll miss him. Many thanks to the students I have been fortunate to teach in the United Kingdom and the United States and the great, constructive, and happy moments we have shared.

I am most grateful to my family, my biggest fans in good and in bad times: my mother, Chrysoula Katsika, my father, Georgios Katsikas, and my siblings, Manolis and Marina, and their families.

In this book, I aim to provide insights on an underresearched topic of the history of modern Greece and Southeastern Europe. I wish to dedicate this book to the voices unheard and the stories untold that have, for various reasons, remained in the shadows of history and deserve to have more light shed on them to allow us to see their roles in history.

Names and Dates

For dates of bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as treaties, conventions, and protocols, I have used the Gregorian calendar. For dates before 16 February 1923, when Greece adopted the Gregorian calendar, I have used the Julian calendar, and after this date the Gregorian calendar.

The use of names and terms presented one of the greatest challenges in writing this book. The very name “Greeks” is in itself highly problematic. Modern Greeks do not call themselves Greeks but use the name “Hellenes,” which was used in antiquity to describe people of Hellenic culture and today is used to associate modern with ancient Greeks. In fact, as a self-identifying name “Greeks” is an exonym that has been accepted by modern “Hellenes”, just like the Deutsch accept being called Germans, and the Magyars Hungarians, and in fact refer to themselves as such in foreign languages and official translations. Until the fifteenth century CE (and beyond), “Hellenes”—because most Christians of the Eastern Roman Empire (i.e., Byzantium) associated this name with ancient Greeks and with paganism—was considered inappropriate to use, except by less respected scholars, for example Georgios Plethon Gemistos. His own contemporaries, including Gennadius Scholarios, who served as the first Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople after the Ottoman conquest in May 1453, rejected “Hellene” in favor of the generic “Christian.” The Ottomans chose to identify Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic background, with the name Rûm (“Romios” in Greek), meaning “Roman.”

Medieval Europeans used “Greeks” to denote followers of the Orthodox Christian Patriarchate of Constantinople regardless of their mother language, because the ecclesiastical language of the patriarchate was Koine Greek, a supraregional form of spoken and written Greek that served as the lingua franca of much of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East in Hellenistic, Roman, and Ottoman times. For this reason, in this book, I call the patriarchate the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, Orthodox Christian Patriarchate of Constantinople, or Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople that is the official name. A few Greeks did appropriate “Greeks” (Graikoi) to denote Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians. In this book I avoid using

“Greek” prior to discussion of the establishment of the modern Greek state and when I do the term means a Grecophone person or describes something relating to a Greek speaker or Greek speakers. The term does not imply that the Greek-speaking person to whom the term refers was someone who had necessarily a shared sense of Greek national identity and a shared understanding that he belonged to a people group (i.e., a Greek national community) with whom the Greek-speaking person shared a common ethnic, linguistic and cultural background. For this reason, composite terms, such as “Greek-speaking,” “Grecophone,” and others, instead of “Greek”, are often used because they are seen as less confusing. Depending on the context, “Greek Orthodox” and “Greek Orthodox Christians” refer to the faithful of the Orthodox Christian Patriarchate of Constantinople or of the Autocephalous Church of Greece, founded in 1833.

“Turks” often refers to “Muslims” in historical sources, almost until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. There are often disagreements on the use of “Albanian,” “Bulgarian,” “Vlach,” “Arvanite,” “Pomak,” and the like. Historical sources often use names on which they bestow a blurred identity: for example, “Alvanophonoi” (Albanian speakers or Albanian nationally minded), “Voulgarophonoi” (Bulgarian speakers or Bulgarian nationally minded), “Tourkophonoi” (Turkish speakers or Turkish nationally minded), “Roumanizontes” (Romanian nationally minded), and combinations of these. The meanings of such names often obey political calculations and thus shift over time: for example, a Voulgarophone could simply become a Slavophone (Slavic speaker). In this book, I avoid using “Albanian,” “Bulgarian,” and “Turk” when discussing events prior to the establishment of those groups’ respective nation-states and when I do these terms mean an Albanian speaker, a Bulgarian speaker, a Turkish speaker or describes something relating to these people. Like with the use of the term “Greek”, the use of the term “Albanian”, “Bulgarian” and “Turk” prior to the establishment of those groups’ respective nation states do not imply that the people to whom they refer had necessarily a sense of national identity and a shared understanding that they belonged to a people group with whom these Albanian, Bulgarian or Turkish speakers shared a common ethnic, linguistic and cultural background. Again, composite terms—for example, “Albanian-speaking,” “Bulgarian-speaking,” and “Turkish-speaking”—are often, but not always preferred, and often describe minorities in Greece whose mother language is Albanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish, respectively. In this book, “Pomaks” refers to all Slavic-speaking Muslims, “Çams” refers to

Albanian-speaking Muslims originating predominantly from the region of Thesprotia, “Arvanites” refers to Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians, “Vlachs” refers to Eastern Romance (Aromanian)-speaking natives of the Balkans. “Roma” and “Gypsies” refer to members of an Indo-Aryan ethnic group, traditionally itinerant, whose mother language is Romani or a mixture of Romani and other languages. “Bulgarian Orthodox” and “Bulgarian Orthodox Christians” refer to those who are faithful to or supporters of the establishment of a Bulgarian Orthodox church. This church was unilaterally established with an Ottoman imperial decree (firman) by Sultan Abdülaziz on 23 May 1872 and became known as the Bulgarian Exarchate (Bûlgarka Ekzarihiya in Bulgarian). Its offices were in Istanbul until early 1913, when Exarch Joseph I transferred the offices from Istanbul to Sofia. The ecclesiastical languages of the exarchate were Bulgarian and Old Slavonic.

The meaning of the term “nation” saw significant changes over time, and several Greek terms have been used to refer to the Greek nation, from the older *genos* to the modern *ethnos*. *Ethnos* is often seen in Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical documents, where it denotes the faithful of the Orthodox Christian Patriarchate of Constantinople. The more problematic *phyle* is also used to mean “race.” There are often subtleties of meaning when authors choose to use one term over another that can be lost in translation. The term *genos* can have many meanings (race, species, gender, breed, family, ilk) and, along with its derivatives *omogenos* (same-*genos*) and *allogenos* (other-*genos*), is frequently used with significance regarding minorities.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Balkans, places often changed names due to policies of hegemonic cultural imposition, and this may confuse the reader. There is hardly a city that retained its name from Byzantine to Ottoman times, and then when it ended up in one or another Balkan nation-state; in several cases, speakers or authors, based on their own ethnicities, may use different names. For Greeks, Istanbul is Konstantinopolis (Constantinople), Izmir is Smyrni, and Edirne is Adrianoupoli(s) (Adrianople). The choice of name often betrays the speaker’s or author’s political preference. In this book I generally use the names that were officially or commonly used at the time. On some occasions, I provide older names, or names in other languages, for a city or village in parentheses. Although “Konstantiniyye” was used as the most formal official name throughout most of the Ottoman period up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, I use the modern Turkish name “Istanbul,” attested in a range of variants since the 10th century, at first in Armenian and Arabic and

then in Ottoman sources and deriving from the Greek phrase “eis tin Polin” (to the city) and based on the common usage of referring to Constantinople as *The City*. I do not use “Istanbul” in titles that contain “Constantinople” (e.g., the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople); I use Edirne for Adrianople, Salonica, or Selânik for Thessaloniki before 1913; and I use Gümülcine for Komotini before 1920. That may not always be accurate, as sources often refer to cities and areas in different ways. Where I fear confusion, I add in parentheses a second name and, in some cases, a third.

Transliteration

Greek names and terms are transliterated so as to approximate their pronunciation in Greek. Ottoman Turkish words have been rendered in modern Turkish, using the Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English dictionary as a standard. Throughout the book the Ottoman word for governor is transliterated as pasha, and not as paşa. For transliterating the Bulgarian alphabet, the following system is followed: Ж (zh), Ч (ch), Щ (sh), Щ (sht), Щ (ts), Х (h), Й (i) a љ (yu), Я (ya), Ѓ (ü), Ъ (y), and Ў (u).

1

Islam in Southeastern Europe

The Byzantine Era

Islam's long presence in Southeastern Europe dates back to the Byzantine era, shortly after the religion's inception. Muslim forays into continental Europe by Arabs and Berbers of the Maghreb, known as Moors, gained a foothold after the conquest in 711 of Al-Andalus (comprising most of today's Portugal and Spain). With the Maghreb and Al-Andalus as their home base, the Moors succeeded in establishing various emirates—states ruled by Arabic or Berber dynastic families. The Emirate of Crete (the largest island of Greece) was notable, lasting from the late 820s CE to the Byzantine reconquest of the island in 961.¹ Meanwhile, Islamic missionaries appear from the mid-ninth century onward in the lands of today's Bulgaria. Islamic influences on Bulgarian art are seen during the empire of the Bulgarian tsar Simeon I (893–927). Later, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, nomadic Turkic tribes from the Eurasian Steppe and Central Asia, such as the Cumans and the Pechenegs, entered Bulgaria and engaged with the Byzantine Empire.²

Byzantium, which controlled much of Southeastern Europe, was at war with the Arabs from the seventh to the tenth centuries. After the eleventh century, Byzantium fought the Seljuk Turks, who advanced in the tenth century from the Eurasian Steppe and Central Asia, their original home, into southwestern Asia. They converted to Sunni Islam, and eventually founded an empire (the Seljuk Empire) that included Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and most of Iran.³ In 1071, the Seljuks defeated the Byzantines in a decisive battle at Manzikert (today Malazgirt, Turkey) that allowed the Seljuks to advance westward in Asia Minor. After the eleventh century, Turkic people of Islamic faith from areas controlled by Seljuks and later by Ottomans were

¹ Vassilios Christides, "The Raids."

² Harry T. Norris, *Islam*, 21–27.

³ Andrew Peacock, *Early Seljuk History*.

serving as mercenaries in the Byzantine army, and some of them settled in regions like Dobrudzha in Southeastern Europe. Surrounded by Byzantines on the west and by the Crusader states on the east, the Seljuks organized their Anatolian domain as the Sultanate of Rûm, an Islamic state founded on the lands conquered from the Byzantines.⁴

The Ottoman Conquest

The establishment of the Ottoman Empire facilitated a strong Muslim presence in Southeastern Europe, through mass settlements of Muslims from Asia Minor and other parts of the empire and the conversion to Islam of a large number of non-Muslim subjects. The Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm declined during the thirteen century, and Asia Minor was divided into Anatolian beyliks (independent Turkic principalities). One of these beyliks, near the town of Söğüt in northwestern Anatolia, led by Osman I, a Turkish tribal leader of obscure origins (from whose name “Ottoman” derives), founded the Ottoman Empire by conquering Byzantine towns along the Sakarya River and extending control of his principality over its neighbors. After 1354, the Ottomans crossed into Europe and took control of the Gallipoli peninsula, including its Byzantine fortress. From there, what once was an Anatolian beylik gradually transformed into a vast, transcontinental, multiethnic and multireligious empire that overtook the Byzantine Empire, which ended with the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed II, the Conqueror. Constantinople was the empire’s capital, now formally known as Konstantiniyye and, much later, Istanbul, a name that was used alongside the formal Konstantiniyye. In control of lands surrounding the eastern Mediterranean basin, the Ottoman Empire was at the center of interactions among Africa, Asia, and Europe for the next six centuries. Between 1354 and 1526, when the empire was at the height of its power under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1494–1566), it controlled Southeastern Europe, parts of Central Europe, Western Asia, parts of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, although the

⁴ Rûm in Arabic means Romans. The term was used at different times in the Muslim world to describe the Byzantine Empire, known then as the Roman Empire. The term denotes that the sultanate comprised former Byzantine territories and a great number of non-Muslims (Orthodox Christians, Armenians, and members of other Christian churches in the Middle East), whom the Seljuks often dubbed “Romans.” Nadia Maria El-Cheikh, “Rûm,” 601; Nadia Maria El-Cheikh, *Byzantium*, 24.

Ottoman dynasty was of Turkic origin, it became thoroughly Persianized in its language, literature, culture, and habits.

Pax Ottomana

The unification of Southeastern Europe with the territories of Anatolia, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus joined under the same political authority facilitated human mobility, including the movement of a great number of Muslims from Anatolia and other parts of the empire. These Muslims often settled in Southeastern Europe in search of employment or for other reasons. For example, as the Ottoman territorial expansion continued, the Ottoman military, state officials, and subordinates, all Muslims, settled in the newly conquered areas to facilitate the Ottoman state's consolidation of its power in the newly conquered lands.

Muslim Colonization

During the expansion at the height of the Ottoman Empire, the mobility of Muslim populations often took the form of deliberate mass settlement, by which the Ottoman authorities aimed to ensure the loyalty of the conquered territories against a potential enemy invasion (by, e.g., the Republic of Venice or the Habsburg Empire). For example, within a month after the Ottomans seized Gallipoli in 1354, they fortified the damaged fortress and populated the area with Muslim Turkic settlers from Asia Minor. The Ottomans often pursued deliberate colonization of underpopulated areas, particularly plains, valleys, and plateaus suitable for farming, by Turkic populations of Islamic faith from Asia Minor, such as the Yörüks (a Turkic nomadic group in Anatolia) and the Konyars (residents of the plateau around the town of Konya in Asia Minor). Arable land was an important element of the *timar* system, the backbone of the Ottoman economy for most of its life.⁵ As increased farming would augment Ottoman revenues through taxation,

⁵ In the *timar* system the projected revenue of a conquered territory was distributed in the form of temporary land grants among the *Sipahi* (cavalrymen) and other members of the military class, including the Janissaries—infantry units that formed the Ottoman sultan's household troops, his bodyguards, and the first modern standing army in Europe—and other *kül* (slaves) of the sultan. These temporary land grants were given as compensation for annual military service, for which no monetary payment was made. Halil Inalcik, *An Economic and Social History*.

Ottoman law imposed fines on farmers who left their fields uncultivated due to negligence, under an imperial decree (*kânûnnâme*) of Sultan Ahmed I (1590–1617). Even after the abolition of the *timar* system in 1844, many of its provisions concerning uncultivated lands were incorporated into the Ottoman land code of 1858.⁶

Muhacir

At times of military defeats and territorial losses, Muslim populations often moved to territories under Ottoman control in order to avoid death, atrocities, and assault by conquering non-Ottoman armies and local non-Muslims. These populations were known as *muhacir* (Muslim refugees). Their number increased drastically at times of war with the Habsburg and the Russian empires, as well as during the rise of nationalism in Southeastern Europe, when Muslim fears of massacres and other atrocities drove Muslims from their homelands. A large number of *muhacir* of various ethnicities moved from Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus areas to Ottoman-controlled lands from the start of the Greek War of Independence in March 1821 until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1923.⁷

Conversions to Islam

As the faith of the Ottoman dynasty and the ruling class, Islam was under the protection of the Ottoman state. Muslims were seen as first-class subjects in the Ottoman Empire and enjoyed economic and social privileges that were denied to followers of other faiths (*dhimmī*). For example, *dhimmī* paid more in taxes through the *jizya* (*kharaj* or poll tax), a per capita annual tax levied on adult, free, and sane *dhimmī* males in exchange for their exemption from military service and in order to help the state fund public expenditures.⁸

⁶ Georgios Nakos, *To Nomiko Kathestos*, 62, 78.

⁷ Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 338–340.

⁸ Women, children, elders, the handicapped, ill, the insane, monks, hermits, slaves, those who could not afford to pay, and *musta'min* (non-Muslim foreigners who only temporarily resided in Muslim lands) did not pay the *jizya*. *Dhimmī* who chose to join military service were also exempted from the *jizya*. Between 1839 and 1876, under the reigns of the sultans Abdülmecid I (1839–1861) and Abdülaziz (1861–1876), a series of reforms promulgated in the Ottoman Empire, known as Tanzimat reforms, were intended to effectuate a fundamental change of the empire from the old system based on theocratic principles to that of a modern state. In

Dhimmī were also discriminated against by the Ottoman court system, which distinguished between Islamic and non-Islamic courts, and did not allow *dhimmī* to appear in Islamic courts. This often resulted in *dhimmī* losing legal disputes against Muslims. Muslims also enjoyed greater prospects for employment and possibilities of advancement in the Ottoman government bureaucracy and the military.⁹

As a rule, the Ottomans did not require *dhimmī* to become Muslims. In fact, they often discouraged conversion, because *dhimmī* paid higher taxes and supplied the Ottoman state with soldiers and administrators through *devşirme*, a policy of imposed separation of *dhimmī* (Christian) male children aged eight to eighteen from their families to be raised to serve the Ottoman state. However, the Muslims' elevated social status and access to privileges often led *dhimmī* to convert to Islam. *Devşirme* involved conversion to Islam as part of the education and training of the recruited *dhimmī* males before they became Janissaries. This too was responsible for the gradual Islamization of a great number of *dhimmī* in Southeastern Europe from the fourteenth century, when *devşirme* started under Murad I (1362–1389), until the mid-seventeenth century, when it was abolished.¹⁰

An indeterminable number of *dhimmī* converted to Islam in order to avoid acts of discrimination, retaliation, violence, and torture inflicted by Ottomans in positions of power or by ordinary Muslims. To protect their assets from encroachment or seizure in chaotic times, some *dhimmī* registered their assets (*evkaf*, that is, mortmain properties) with religious or charitable Islamic institutions protected by Ottoman law. In those circumstances, the *dhimmī* retained their assets in exchange for an annual compensation they were to pay in perpetuity to the Islamic institution(s) to which the *evkaf* were registered.¹¹ An indefinite number of *dhimmī* who converted to Islam for self-protection observed Islamic rituals and dressed and behaved like Muslims in public but in private practiced their prior

1856, with the Tanzimat reforms, the *jizya* was replaced by the *bedl-i askeri*, a tax that was only payable by non-Muslims who would have been liable for conscription, until 1909, when the Ottoman constitution introduced compulsory conscription and abolished the *bedl-i askeri*. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 100; Ceasar Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism*, 531.

⁹ Speros Vryonis, *The Decline*; Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City*, vol. 1, 85–87.

¹⁰ David Nicolle, *The Janissaries*.

¹¹ Dimitrios K. Tsopotos, *Gi kai Georgoi*, 58–59.

religion, or that of their ancestors, in the case of descendants of converts to Islam. The converts, known as crypto-Christians or crypto-Jews, often passed their religious dualism on to their descendants, who perpetuated the dual faiths.¹²

A large number of peasant *dhimmī* converted to Islam via Islamic mysticism, or Sufism. Islamic congregations formed around grand masters who viewed and practiced Islam differently from the mainstream Islam of the ulama, the traditional Islamic law and theology according to Muslim scholars recognized as authorities. Islamic mysticism began very early in Islamic history and was widespread in rural areas of the Ottoman Empire through several Sufi orders, both Sunnis, for example the Nakşibendi and Halveti orders, and Shias, for example the Bektaşı and Kızılbaş orders. Sufi ministrants preached Islam in syncretic forms, integrating beliefs and practices of other religions, including Orthodox Christianity. Thus, they made Islam familiar and approachable among peasant *dhimmī* with little or no education.¹³

A significant, though indeterminable, number of the Muslim population of Asia Minor in the mid-fifteenth century consisted of converts to Islam or descendants of converts who had been Islamized after the establishment of the Seljuk and, later, the Ottoman states in the region. In Southeastern Europe Islamic conversions began slowly in the fourteenth century and reached their peak in the seventeenth century.¹⁴ The earliest converts came from the ranks of the Balkan nobility and military elites who helped the Ottomans administer their native provinces. Prominent Ottoman statesmen, intellectuals, and artists were of *dhimmī*, and many of Greek, origin. For example, Misac Palaeologos Pasha, the Ottoman commander during the Ottomans' first siege of Rhodes, in 1480, was a member of the Byzantine Palaeologos dynasty. Ahmed Resmi, an Ottoman statesman and historian from Resmo, present-day Rethymno, in Crete, and the Ottoman poet Agehi Mansur from Yenice-i Vardar, present-day Yannitsa, were of Greek origin.

¹² Michel Balivet, "Aux Origines"; Alexander Lopasic, "Islamisation"; Maria Kalicin, Asparuh Velkov, and Evgeni Radushev, *Osmansi Izvori*.

¹³ Frederick Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam*, vol. 1, 31, and vol. 2, 565; Speros Vryonis, "Religious Changes," 173; Natalie Clayer, *Mystiques, État*, 252, 378, 564; Irène Melikoff, "Recherches."

¹⁴ Speros Vryonis, "Religious Changes"; Speros Vryonis, *The Decline*; Tijana Krstic, *Contested Conversions*; Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory*; Anton Minkov, *Conversion to Islam*; Alexander Lopasic, "Islamisation"; Maria Kalicin, Asparuh Velkov, and Evgeni Radushev, *Osmansi Izvori*.

The Multiformity of Islam

Human mobility, conversions to Islam, and ethnolinguistic and other interactions within the empire produced a multicultural environment that affected the outlook of the Muslim communities and the way they experienced and practiced their Islamic faith. For Ottoman law, all that mattered was one's Muslim faith. Ethnonyms did not disappear: a Sultan's firman of 1680 lists Balkan ethnolinguistic groups—Greek speakers (Rûm); Albanian speakers (Arnaut); Serbian speakers (Sirf); Vlach speakers (Eflak), and Bulgarian speakers (Bulgar).¹⁵ Ethnicity, language, and other cultural characteristics were, however, of minor importance. All Muslims enjoyed the same rights and privileges as members of the Islamic faith, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, or other cultural background. The ethnolinguistic matrix of Muslims in the empire was rich, indeed, but at the same time not easy to map, because Ottoman censuses registered the subjects of the empire according to their religious faith only.

The inhabitants of areas that later became part of the modern Greek state included the following groups.

1. Turkish-speaking Muslims in the Peloponnese, Rumeli (the part of the Greek mainland across from the Peloponnese), Thessaly, Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace, and the Aegean islands). These Muslims were often given names that denoted their origin: for example, Konyaroi (Konyars) or Konyarotourkoi (Konyar Turks) in Thessaly and Macedonia, believed to be descendants of settlers from Konya in Asia Minor, or Yörüks (Macedonia), a Turkic tribal ethnic group in Asia Minor.¹⁶
2. Albanian-speaking Muslims (Peloponnese, Rumeli, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus, e.g., Çams).¹⁷ The Albanian-speaking Muslims, most of them Bektaşı Sufis, were in decline after 1826 due to persecutions of Bektasism in the Ottoman Empire.
3. Greek-speaking Muslims, most of them descendants of Islamized Greek-speaking Christian populations (Crete, Ioannina, Preveza) in

¹⁵ Georgi Bakalov, *Istoriya na Bûlgarite*, 23.

¹⁶ Paraskevas Konortas, "Les Musulmans," 51–52; Alexandre Tourmakine, *Les Migrations*, 13.

¹⁷ Approximately 12,800 Albanian-speaking Muslims lived in Macedonian territories ceded to Greece in 1913. Dimitris Lithoxou, *Meionotika Zitimata*. The Çams numbered approximately 25,000 people after the 1923 compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange: Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 17–23.

the Louros region in Epirus and in western Macedonia—known there as Valaades).¹⁸ Like other Islamized natives of Southeastern Europe, such as the Bosniaks (mainly between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries), most Greek-speaking Muslims communicated in their mother language, Greek, which they wrote in Ottoman characters. These scripts are known as *aljamiado* or *aljamia* and, in the case of Bosniaks, Arebica or Arabica.¹⁹

4. Pomaks, most of them descendants of Islamized indigenous Slav-speaking Christian populations (in Kastoria, Flornia, Pella, and Drama),²⁰ and in Thrace (Xanthi, the Rhodope Mountains).²¹
5. Small communities of Tatars, Turkish-speaking Muslims from Tatarstan and other parts of the Russian Empire who had left during the Crimean War and the various Russo-Ottoman wars (e.g., 125 Tatar families lived in Thessaly prior to its annexation to Greece in 1881).
6. Circassians: Muslims from northwestern Caucasus who, like the Tatars, had migrated in periods of crises in Russo-Ottoman relations (e.g., the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878). They lived in small communities in Thessaly (in the towns of Almyros, Loxades, and Velestino) and in Western Thrace.²²
7. Islamized Vlachs (e.g., in Ventista, present-day Amarantos, in Thessaly; in Karadjova, present-day Almopia, in Macedonia).²³
8. Roma.²⁴
9. Africans (mostly Arabs and Ethiopians), for example, in Crete, most of them having migrated from Benghazi.²⁵
10. Crypto-Sabbateans (Dönme) in Thessaloniki and Izmir. They practiced Islam in public, but many had retained their beliefs in the

¹⁸ Approximately 3,200 Greek-speaking Muslims lived in Ioannina (Epirus) in 1913 and 11,600 Valaades in western Macedonia during the same year. Descendants of Valaades live today in the outskirts of Istanbul and the region of Konya in Asia Minor: Apostolos Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tis Makedonias*, 319–327; Athanasia-Marina Tseltlaka, “Les Musulmans Hellénophones.”

¹⁹ Iskender Özsoy, *Iki Vatan Yorgunlari*, 54–87.

²⁰ Approximately 40,921 Pomaks lived in areas of Macedonia ceded to Greece in 1913 (i.e., 3.5 percent of the entire population and 10 percent of the entire Muslim population). Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 138.

²¹ Approximately 12,000 Pomaks lived in Western Thrace—mostly in the Rhodope area of Xanthi—after the 1923 compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange.

²² Efstratios Zeginis, “O Bektasimios,” 110.

²³ Evangelia Gouglaki-Ziozia, “Oi Othomanoi”; Thede Kahl, “The Islamization.”

²⁴ Approximately 10,000 Muslim Roma lived in Macedonia and Epirus in 1913 and 2,000 in Western Thrace—mostly in Alexandroupoli and Didymoteicho—after the 1923 compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange.

²⁵ Konstantinos Fournarakis, *Tourkokrites*, 18.

teachings of Sabbatai Zevi, a Jewish Kabbalist who proclaimed himself the Jewish Messiah in 1666, but eventually converted to Islam under threat of death by Sultan Mehmed IV.²⁶

Regardless of their mother languages, many Muslims were bilingual or multilingual in practice.

The Islamic Creed

The Muslims of Southeastern Europe were largely Sunni Muslims, followed the Maturidi school of Islamic theology and the Hanafi *madhab* (school of Islamic jurisprudence). However, the Ash'ari creed was more prevalent in the *madrasas* (Islamic schools). Both the Maturidi and Ash'ari schools of Islamic theology used the *ilm al-kalm* (science of discourse; often also called Islamic scholastic theology), to interpret the Qur'an and the Hadith (a collection of reported sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammad) in order to apply Islamic principles to Islamic rulings, or fatwas. This is in contrast to other schools of Islamic theology, such as the Athari School, which takes the Qur'an and the Hadith literally. Next to the Ottoman establishment, the most educated upper- and middle-class Muslims, who followed the teachings and the Islamic practice of the ulama, there were many adherents of various Sufi orders. Sufism, mostly Bektaşı and Mevlevi, was popular among non-Turkish-speaking Muslims, as is evidenced by scattered Bektaşı and Mevlevi *tekkes* (sanctuaries) in Greece and elsewhere in Southeastern Europe.²⁷ Bektaşı Sufism, in particular, was popular among the Janissaries, non-Turkish-speaking Muslims who had converted through *devşirme*.

Most of the Sufi orders were popular among people with little or no education, who were fascinated by the Sufis' more inclusive and approachable

²⁶ François Georgeon, "Selanik," 115–118.

²⁷ For example, the Bektaşı *tekke* of Hasan Baba in the Vale of Tempe (Thessaly, Greece) and that of the Mevlevi that later became the Bektaşı *tekke* of (den) Ntourbali Sultan (Farsala, Greece). The latter appears to have been active until 1973, when the last *baba* (abbot) of the *tekke* died. Several Albanian political opponents to the Albanian King Zogu I who were offered political asylum in Greece found shelter in the *tekke*, which in the mid-1930s was served by six dervishes under the leadership of *baba* Kiamim. At the time of writing, the *tekke* is deserted and in ruins but is listed as a historical monument by the Greek authorities. David Margoliouth reports the existence of a *tekke*, in the village Tatar, near Velestino, Farsala, and Karditsa, that belonged to Mevlevi but without any reference to the date, whether it existed, and, if so, whether it was active at the time of his writing ("Mawlawiya," 480). Frederick Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam*, vol. 1, 31, and vol. 2, 565; Apostolos Vakalopoulos, *Ta Kastrá; Andreas Karkavitas, O Tekes*.

way of teaching and practicing Islam and were not attracted to the often incomprehensible teachings and rulings of the ulama, whom many saw as part of the Ottoman establishment, another world from their own, with different communication codes, views, and needs. Sufi dervishes were mendicant ascetics who had taken a vow of poverty and, unlike the ulama, practiced Islam through individual experiences rather than through scholarship. These believers collected alms for the poor and used worship practices, such as whirling and lucky charms, that satisfied the views and needs of less educated Muslims who were attracted by magical practices. For this reason, Sufi *tekkes* were often attacked by the Ottoman authorities as shrines where, allegedly, polytheism and impure versions of Islam were practiced, including celebrations of the birthdays of Sufi saints and *dhikr* (ritual prayers or litanies) for the commemoration of Allah. The interaction of Sufism with other faiths in rural areas gave rise to a religious syncretism. In Western Thrace, for example, Bektaşı celebrated the Orthodox Christian feasts of Saint George, Saint Mary and other saints, whom they identified as Islamic martyrs.²⁸ Bektaşı from areas that today form Albania made annual pilgrimages to the Christian church of Saint Spyridon on Corfu for the feast day of Saint Spyridon.²⁹ Moreover, Orthodox Christians often visited Sufi *tekkes* in search of spiritual guidance, advice, and the acclaimed therapeutic skills of the Sufi dervishes.³⁰ Orthodox Christians in mixed areas, for example in Crete and Macedonia, often cocelebrated Islamic feasts, such as Ramadan and Bayram, with their Muslim neighbors.³¹

According to some historical accounts, mixed marriages between Muslims and members of other faiths often took place in Ottoman times in mixed areas of Macedonia and elsewhere. The Balkan wars estranged Orthodox Christians from Muslims, and helped to reduce the number of mixed marriages in these areas during and after the wars. Such marriages usually necessitated the wife's conversion to the husband's religion, and religious conversions were not easily accepted by family members and local societies in the atmosphere of suspicion and hatred of the wartime and later. With Islam enjoying higher status than other faiths in the Ottoman Empire, and with the conversion of Muslims to other faiths being regarded as religious

²⁸ Efstratios Zeginis, "O Bektasimos," 231–239.

²⁹ Harry Norris, *Islam*, 98.

³⁰ Frederick Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam*, vol. 2, 528–530; Margaret Hardie-Hasluck, "Christian Survivals."

³¹ Iskender Özsoy, *Iki Vatan Yorgunlari*, 25, 55; Maria Tsirimoniaki, *Aftoi pou Efygan*, 76.

apostasy and punishable by death under Ottoman law, mixed marriages were usually of non-Muslim females to Muslim males. The spouses' common language often facilitated such marriages between Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian women and Valaades men in western Macedonia and between Vlach Orthodox Christian women and Vlach-speaking Muslims of central Macedonia.³²

Muslims in Ottoman Times

The highest form of political entity in Islam is the caliphate, an Islamic state under the leadership of the caliph, who is considered to be the political and religious successor to Prophet Muhammad and the righteous leader of the entire ummah, or community of Muslims. All Ottoman sultans, beginning with Murad I (1362–1389), called themselves caliphs. The seat of the Ottoman caliphate moved from Edirne (1363–1453), and, after Mehmet the Conqueror's conquest of Constantinople in 1453, to Constantinople, where it remained until the abolition of the caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on 3 March 1924.³³ The annexation of the Mamluk sultanate of Cairo by Sultan Selim I in 1517 and the extension of Ottoman power to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina strengthened Ottoman claims to the caliphate. After the annexation, Ottomans gradually came to be viewed as the de facto leaders of the Islamic world. As caliph, the Ottoman sultan was the highest Islamic authority in the empire. He had the right to decree and enforce the Ottoman Kanun (secular law) and sharia with its local customary laws.³⁴ The Ottoman *kanun-name* (literally: “book of law”) was a legal system based on sharia that covered issues sharia did not address sufficiently, such as taxation, administration, and penal law. The *kanun-name* also overcame problems posed by the ulama’s different interpretations of sharia.³⁵ The ulama advised on sharia and had tremendous influence on the Ottoman government during the legislative process. The ulama, however, with its hierarchy that placed its leader, the *sheikh-ul Islam*, second

³² Margaret Hardie-Hasluck, “Christian Survivals,” 227–228; Thede Kahl, “The Islamization,” 79.

³³ Before Edirne, Bursa (1335–1363), İznik (Nicaea) (1331–1335) and Söğüt (c1299–1331) were the Ottoman capitals.

³⁴ Sharia is the Islamic religious law consisting of the Qur'an and Hadith. Wael Hallaq, *An Introduction*.

³⁵ Dora Nadolski, “Ottoman and Secular Civil Law.”

in authority only to the caliph, rarely broke with the *kanun-name*, thus allowing the sultan and his government freedom to legislate.

The *Millet* System

Under Ottoman authority, religious groups were allowed to rule themselves under their own religious laws (e.g., sharia, Canon law, and Halakha) and customs and enjoyed self-government in their community affairs. Although Ottoman rule for Muslims and *dhimmī* was neither uniform nor structured prior to the nineteenth century, varying across regions and groups, some common patterns emerged.³⁶ Religious communities set their own laws and collected and distributed their own taxes. Courts, schools, and welfare systems were in the hands of religious officials. All the Ottomans required was loyalty to the sultan's authority. When a member of a religious community committed a crime against a member of another, the law of the injured party applied, but any dispute involving a Muslim fell under sharia. This system of governance is often referred to as the “*millet* system.”

The idea of highly structured religious groups at the state level with certain ethnolinguistic characteristics (e.g., the Bulgar *millet*—Orthodox Christian affiliates of the Bulgarian Exarchate; the Rûm *millet*—Orthodox Christian affiliates of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople) emerged after the promulgation of the Tanzimat reforms in 1839. To the Ottomans, the *millet* system was in line with Prophet Muhammad's rule of tolerance toward *dhimmī* (Christians and Jews) and offered the practical advantage of “divide and rule.”

Following the decline of the Assyrian Church of the East in the fourteenth century, the principal non-Muslim religious communities in the Ottoman Empire were the Orthodox Christians, the Armenians, and the Jews. Orthodox Christians formed the *millet-i Rûm* (Rûm *millet*, i.e., Roman nation), which included subjects of various ethnolinguistic backgrounds, including Greek, Slavonic, Albanian, Georgian, Arabic, and Vlach speakers. The ecumenical patriarch, the Orthodox Christian archbishop of Constantinople (or New Rome) was the highest religious and political authority (*millet-bashi*, or ethnarch) of the *millet-i Rûm*. The Serbian

³⁶ Paraskevas Konortas, “From Taife”; Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths.”

Patriarchate of Peć and the Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ohrid, both autonomous Christian Orthodox institutions under the tutelage of the Orthodox archbishop of Constantinople, were taken over by the Greek Phanariots in 1766 and 1767, respectively.³⁷ Until the nineteenth century, there was a single Armenian *millet* (*millet-i Ermeniyân*), which included members of non-Chalcedonian churches—Christian churches that did not accept the Confession of the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451. The Jewish *millet*, the *Yehudi millet-i*, included all Jews of the empire. The Hahambaşı, or chief rabbi, of Istanbul was the *millet-bashi* of the Jewish *millet* and often attended meetings of the Ottoman *divan*, or cabinet. The *Yehudi millet-i* increased in numbers significantly after the influx of Sephardic Jews to the Ottoman Empire following their expulsion from Spain in 1492. Ottoman Salonica flourished economically, and by the eighteenth century Sephardic Jews were the majority religious group in the city and the Sephardic dialect Ladino the most widely spoken language; the city was often called the “Jerusalem of the Balkans.”

Under Ottoman law, Muslims were first-class citizens, a fact manifested in various aspects of public life. For example, *dhimmî* were barred from testifying as witnesses against Muslims in Islamic courts, which often led them to settle conflicts with Muslims out of court. In the early Ottoman years, the state decreed that members of religious groups had to distinguish themselves by wearing turbans and shoes of specific colors. Prior to the Tanzimat reforms of 1839, special restrictions applied to the construction and renovation of Christian churches and to the size of church bell towers, which by rule had to be shorter than the tallest minaret in the city. Many Orthodox Christian churches were destroyed or converted to mosques over time, including Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Holy Savior in Istanbul and Hagios Demetrios in Salonica. Most of the converted Christian churches lost their relics, icons, mosaics, frescos, and bells because of the prohibition of depictions of sentient beings in Islamic art, due to fears of idolatry and the belief that creating living forms is Allah’s prerogative.

³⁷ The Phanariots emerged as a class of moneyed Greek merchants after the mid-sixteenth century and were named after the Phanar, the chief Greek quarter of Istanbul and the headquarters (after 1600) of the Orthodox archbishop of Constantinople. Despite their cosmopolitanism and often European education, the Panariots were aware of their Hellenism. In the words of the Phanariot Nikolaos Mavrocordatos, “We are a race completely Hellenic”; Marc-Philippe Zallony, *Essai*, 239–240.

While *dhimmī* legally enjoyed an inferior status to Muslims, in most respects this status was much better than the position of non-Christians and heretical Christians in medieval Europe. For example, *dhimmī* rarely faced martyrdom or exile, or were forced to convert, and, with certain exceptions, they were free in their choice or residence and profession. In addition, it would be far from reality to assume that the Muslims of the empire prospered to the disadvantage of *dhimmī*. In terms of economic and social status, the line between Muslims and *dhimmī* is vague, particularly after the seventeenth century. From the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 to the March 1821 outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, Phanariots enjoyed high positions in the conduct of Ottoman foreign policy: Panagiotis Nikousios, the first grand dragoman (*terdjümân bashı*), the most senior interpreter of the empire and de facto deputy foreign minister, was a Phanariot and was succeeded by another, Alexander Mavrokordatos.³⁸ Phanariots also acted as interpreters of the admiral (*kapudan pasha*) of the Ottoman fleet, making them de facto governors of the Aegean Sea. The most important offices held by Phanariots were those of the princes (*hospodars*) of the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, where they ruled as viceroys to the sultan.³⁹

The Tanzimât Reforms

Until the eighteenth century, the Ottoman state was as powerful as the Habsburg and the Russian empires, but after the mid-1750s, it could no longer compete with them militarily. The Ottoman army, once invincible, was repeatedly defeated, the empire lost territory, and its very survival was threatened. There was a widely held view among the Ottoman ruling class that the Ottoman state needed extensive reforms in order to survive. As a result, a series of educational, military, political, and economic reforms were carried out between 1839 and 1876, known as the Tanzimât reforms, aiming at modernizing the Ottoman state, economy, society, and army.⁴⁰ The process of modernization, initiated at the insistence of European powers, involved the adoption of models and practices tested in industrialized European countries that would enable the empire to protect itself from further territorial

³⁸ Dimitris Livanios, “Pride, Prudence.”

³⁹ Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History*, 56.

⁴⁰ Musa Cadirci, *Tanzimat Döneminde; Bilâl Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde*.

losses, decline, and potential dissolution. Following the end of the Greek War of Independence in 1832, nationalism was on the rise in Southeastern Europe, and European states such as Britain, France, and Russia, felt it was their humanitarian duty to intervene on behalf of the empire's Christians and Jews, whom they saw as unfairly treated.⁴¹ Some of the reforms aimed to improve the status of *dhimmī*, who for the first time were granted equal status with Muslims before the law. Influenced by French and other European nationalisms, an Ottoman civic nationalism, known as Ottomanism, was cultivated among all the subjects of the empire, Muslim or *dhimmī*. The reforms sought to secure the *dhimmīs'* allegiance to the Ottoman state to counter the disintegrating influences of the rising national movements. New *millets* were recognized, including the Chaldean (Catholic Nestorian) *millet* in 1846, the Melkite Catholic *millet* in 1848, the Bulgar *millet* in 1870, and the Vlach *millet* in 1905. All *millets* became legal entities ruled by statutes that governed their political institutions and their authority, as well as the election of *millet-bashi*.⁴² No longer selected by the sultan, as in the past, the *millet-bashi* was now elected via a conclave of high religious officials and representatives of the laity. The powers of *millet-bashi* and religious officials in dioceses across the empire were checked by community councils that included representatives of the laity.

The atmosphere of liberalization and devolution of the Tanzimat period also affected the Muslim communities. The role of Muslim religious officers, the muftis and imams, was not only to lead the Muslim prayers in mosques. They also became increasingly involved in the administration of their communities in matters of education, community property, and more. Meanwhile, Muslim community councils of laity (*Cemaat-i İslamiye Encümenleri*) were elected in each community with the task of managing Muslim community properties, including *evkaf*, and other issues, along with the local religious officers. The Muslim community council was normally chaired by the highest local religious officer. These administrative structures were later preserved and formalized through state legislation by Orthodox Christian Balkan nation-states, including Greece, governing Muslims in their territories. The main difference for Muslims in the Tanzimat era was that Muslim religious officers, unlike non-Muslim *millet* leaders, did not hold judicial powers and were not considered to be

⁴¹ Roderic Davison, *Reform*.

⁴² Dimitris Stamatopoulos, "I Ekklisia."

the highest authority on issues pertaining to the Islamic faith. Since the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state, the actual Muslim *millet-bashi* was the caliph, who was also the head of state. This was not the case for Muslims in the post-Ottoman Orthodox Christian Balkan states, where the head of the state was Orthodox Christian. There, the ultimate Muslim religious authorities were the Muslim muftis and chief muftis, who held judicial powers and issued judgments on issues relating to family, inheritance, and property law, according to sharia.

The Tanzimat reforms also aimed at the state education system, which was religious in character and dominated by the ulama. A network of secular schools and universities was created, based on the educational systems of industrialist European nations. Some of their graduates were to become major statesmen in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa, including Mustafa Kemal Attatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.⁴³ School and university curricula emphasized science and new technologies, and were designed to allow students to develop skills that would enable them to modernize the state economy and administration later in their lives. The state economy was liberalized to generate sufficient capital to do business and compete with other European nations: guilds were abolished, and free trade, the right to private property, and a new business-friendly tax system that encouraged investment were introduced. New banks were established, despite the ulama's objection to lending at interest as *riba*, usury, which was forbidden by the Qur'an.

The reform of the Ottoman legal system introduced European concepts to Ottoman legal thought. These concepts included constitutionality; the rule of law; fair and public trials for all accused of crimes regardless of their religion; the creation of a system of separate competences, religious and civil; and the validity of non-Muslims' testimony in Islamic courts. These concepts began to overtake sharia in commercial, procedural, penal, and family laws through the enactment of a new land code in 1858, a new criminal code in 1859, and a new civil code from 1869 to 1876. Inheritance, marriage, divorce, and child custody were reformed in line with the practices of industrialist European states such as Britain and France. The reforms also aimed at restricting the powers of the sultan and ensuring the rule of law throughout the state. There were even attempts to introduce a multiparty political system.

⁴³ Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.

The Impact of the Tanzimât Reforms

Despite the scale and significance of the changes introduced by the Tanzimât reforms, their impact was not felt by most of the people. While banks were established and economic reforms introduced, very few people reaped their benefits. Technically, individual rights were improved, but in reality the sultan still exercised almost unlimited power over his subjects. Following the Crimean War of 1853–1856 between Russia and an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain, and Sardinia, the Ottoman reforms were undermined, in part by the great European powers.⁴⁴ Under the Islâhat Fermâni, or the Ottoman Reform Decree of 1856, the great powers demanded a much stronger sovereignty for non-Muslim communities within the Ottoman Empire from the Ottomans, through reforms of the *millet* system. The Islâhat Fermâni served to strengthen the Christian middle classes and increase their economic and political power. It ultimately strengthened nationalism, which undermined the empire's territorial integrity. Each *millet* became increasingly independent, with the establishment of its own schools, churches, hospitals, and other facilities, helping to move the Christian populations outside the framework of the Ottoman political system. Loyalty to the House of Osman and Ottomanism began to decline with the increasing identification of religious creed with ethnic nationalism. It was impossible to hold the system together or prevent ethnoreligious conflicts. In the words of the Armenian patriarch, Nerses Varjabedyan, to the British minister of foreign affairs, Lord Salisbury, on 13 April 1878: "it is no longer possible for the Armenians and the Turks to live together. Only a Christian administration can provide equality, justice and freedom of conscience. A Christian administration should replace the Muslim administration."⁴⁵

Besides nationalism, the system of capitulations—bilateral contracts between the Ottoman Empire and the European states—also helped to undermine Ottoman authority within its dominion. Capitulations conferred rights and privileges on citizens of European states residing in the empire and on Ottoman subjects under the political protection of the contracted European states. These privileges could consist of exemption from prosecution, taxation, conscription, and other obligations. Under this system Russia often aimed to protect Orthodox Christians, France did the same for Roman

⁴⁴ David Watzel, *The Crimean War*; Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War*.

⁴⁵ Bilâl Şimsir, *British Documents*, 173, no. 69.

Catholics, and Britain for Jews and other minorities. Usually these protections were not devoid of ulterior motives, as in the case of the “candlestick wars” of 1847, which led to the Crimean War (1853–1856). Capitulations began systematically in the sixteenth century. In 1500, France, under the rule of Louis XII, signed a treaty of concessions with the Mamluk sultanate of Cairo to France, French subjects, and Mamluk subjects protected by France. After the Ottomans conquered Egypt in the Ottoman-Mamluk War of 1516–1517, they upheld the capitulations to the French and in 1535 applied them to the entire empire. In 1914, the empire abolished the capitulations, a measure confirmed by the Turkish government of Mustafa Kemal Attatürk in article 28 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

The Tanzimat reforms brought about a fundamental change in the status of *dhimmi*, from a subjugated population to equal subjects, that caused a backlash among Muslims with the rise of the Muslim nationalist movements, such as the Turkish and the Albanian ones, and atrocities committed against non-Muslims, such as the Hamidian massacres of 1894–1896. In the words of Turkish historian Zeynep Çelik: “from 1838 to 1908 the Ottoman Empire staged its final but doomed struggle for survival. To recover from the economic crisis and technological underdevelopment, it attempted to enact a series of social and institutional reforms based on Western models. These reforms, not well adapted to Ottoman society, failed ‘to save’ the empire. They introduced Western concepts and institutions that conflicted with the century-old values and traditions.”⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking*, 37.

2

The Greek War of Independence (1821–1832)

The Outbreak of Revolt

In the winter of 1820–1821 Sultan Mahmud II sought to destroy Ali Pasha of Tepelena, the Muslim warlord who controlled much of present-day Albania and mainland Greece.¹ This was part of Mahmud's efforts to restore the depleted authority of the Ottoman central government, which was challenged by various warlords who operated in the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Middle East.² The military operations against Ali Pasha engaged substantial armed forces and focused the Ottomans' attention on the Balkans and the areas adjacent to Ali Pasha's territory, thus leaving uncovered other rebellion-prone places. This opportunity was not missed by the Filiki Etaireia, Society of Friends. This secret nineteenth-century organization, founded in 1814 in Odessa, recruited widely among the inhabitants of the Greek- and non-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian world with the aim of purging the Ottoman rulers from the "Motherland" through an armed revolt.³ In March 1821, Alexander Ypsilantis, a prominent Phanariot and leader of the Filiki Etaireia, launched his small army across the river Pruth, which marked the border between Russian Bessarabia and Moldavia. Ypsilantis hoped to take advantage of the concurrent uprising of the Aromanian-speaking inhabitants of the Ottoman principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia against the native aristocratic *boyars*, led by Tudor Vladimirescu, who had been in contact with the Filiki Etaireia. But the Aromanian-speaking inhabitants showed no enthusiasm for making common cause with the Greeks, whom they associated with the oppressive rule of the Phanariot *hospodars* of the region. Following the defeat of his ragged army in the battle of Dragatsani in Wallachia in June

¹ Katherine Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte*; Dennis Skiotis, "From Bandit."

² Frederick Anscombe, "Continuities"; Frederick Anscombe, *State, Faith*, 46–89.

³ Vasilis Panagiotopoulos, "Oi Tektones"; Tasos Vournas, *Filiki Etaireia*; David Brewer, *The Greek War*, 26–35.

1821, Ypsilantis was forced to flee into Habsburg territory, and the invasion petered out.⁴

The revolution in the Danubian Principalities helped inspire the uprising in Morea (Peloponnese), where the Greek War of Independence began. The region was suffering from pillaging by gangs in much of the Balkans after 1770, with the Ottoman authorities unable to stop them.⁵ Sporadic outbursts of violence in March 1821 soon assumed the form of an all-out revolt with a successful outcome. The Ottoman garrisons withdrew to their coastal fortresses after vicious fighting marked by atrocities on both sides. In the heated atmosphere of lingering Muslim-Christian tensions in the Balkans caused by incidents such as the 1804 Christian uprising of Belgrade against the depredations of the Janissaries, the Greek revolt soon took on a strong religious dimension. The Ottoman Porte (synecdoche for the Ottoman central government) launched a jihad against the rebels, and the dividing line of the conflict was between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.⁶ Large-scale violence on both sides, often surpassing that of Morea, became the norm.

Orthodox Christian clergy were arrested, notables publicly humiliated, property plundered, and individuals killed or executed in many places around the Ottoman Empire. In one incident well-publicized in Christian Europe, Ottoman troops killed or enslaved the residents of much of the island of Chios in 1822.⁷ In another, Grigorios V, the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople, was brutally hanged at the main gate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the Phanar district in Istanbul on 10 April 1821, although he had strongly opposed the revolt and pronounced an anathema on the rebels.⁸ Most accounts portray the execution of Patriarch Grigorios as a punishment, because in Ottoman eyes he had failed to observe the implicit contract whereby the patriarch was expected to act as the guarantor of the loyalty of the Rûm *millet*. His execution made him an *ethnomartyras* (national martyr) and outraged the Greek rebels and Christian Europe. Along with the

⁴ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle*, 41–57; Apostolos Vakalopoulos, “Symvoli stin Istoria”; Tasos Vournas, *Filiiki Etaireia*.

⁵ Frederick Anscombe, “Albanians.”

⁶ Frederick Anscombe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age.”

⁷ Richard Clogg, “Aspects,” 23.

⁸ The gate has remained closed from that day to the present. After three days, Patriarch Grigorios’s corpse was handed to a Jewish mob, for there had long been animosity between Greeks and Jews in Istanbul, and the mob dragged it to the Golden Horn. The corpse was picked up by the Greek crew of a Russian ship and taken to Odessa. In 1871, it was transferred to Greece, and on the centennial anniversary of his martyrdom in 1921, Patriarch Grigorios V was formally proclaimed a saint of the Greek Orthodox Church. Richard Clogg, *A Concise History*, 36–37; William St. Clair, *That Greece*; Christopher Woodhouse, *The Philhellenes*.

1822 massacre on Chios, it contributed to a powerful upsurge of sympathy for the insurgent Greeks that grew in liberal circles of Europe and led to the development of philhellenism, a nineteenth-century world movement that supported the Greek War of Independence and the establishment of an independent Greek state. The Orthodox Christians of Istanbul also were subject to purges, especially the Phanariot elite, who lost the privileged place in the Ottoman administration they had enjoyed until then.⁹

Atrocities against Muslims

The 1821 Greek revolt in Morea began with the murders of Ottoman government officials, especially tax collectors, but soon became a widespread attack by Greek guerillas and peasants against the Muslim population of the region. It is estimated that more than 20,000 Muslims, most of them Turkish-speaking men, women, and children, were killed by rebels in just a few weeks.¹⁰ Bishops and priests exhorted their parishioners to exterminate the infidel Muslims; Germanos, the metropolitan bishop of Patras, proclaimed, “Peace to the Christians! Respect to the Consuls! Death to the Turks!”¹¹ while official revolutionary documents often encouraged religious cleansing in rebellious regions. The Politikon Syntagma tis Ellados, the third provisional constitution adopted in Troezen in 1827 by representatives of the insurgents, for example, declares: “Hellenes! . . . tens of thousands of Ottomans perished from the face of the fatherland, thousands of them we are able to destroy, when we love each other, are united and have the same wish.”¹²

News of the Ottoman authorities’ retaliatory measures against Orthodox Christians in Istanbul and elsewhere, including the execution of Patriarch Grigorios V, inflamed massacres of Muslim civilians.¹³ Most Muslims sought refuge with their families in the few strongholds of the rebellious areas, such as the Acropolis of Athens, held by garrison troops. There they were besieged and ultimately killed by rebels or, in rare cases, rescued by Ottoman forces. On 9 June 1822, after a siege of several months, the Ottoman garrison of the Acropolis, driven by lack of water, agreed to capitulation, by virtue of which

⁹ Christine Philiou, *Biography*, 67–74; Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong*, 44–45.

¹⁰ Alison Phillips, *The War*, 48.

¹¹ Thomas Gordon, *History*, vol. 1, 149.

¹² Politikon Syntagma tis Ellados, 1827, <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn09.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2021, 4–5.

¹³ Harris Booras, *Hellenic Independence*, 24.

they were to lay down their arms, retain half of the valuables in their possession, and be transferred to Asia Minor in neutral ships. The Orthodox Christian bishop of Athens asked Greek rebels to conform to the terms of the capitulation by swearing oaths to God. About 1,150 Muslims, 180 of whom were capable of bearing arms, surrendered on these terms and were lodged within the ruins of the Stoa of Hadrian, pending the completion of arrangements for their removal. In the meantime, news reached the town that the army of Mahmud Dramali Pasha had crossed the Straits of Thermopylae and was heading toward Athens. The rebels, joined by a Christian mob, slaughtered the defenseless prisoners.¹⁴

The horror of the Acropolis massacre had too many parallels during the course of the Greek War of Independence. Monemvasia and Navarino or Neokastro (present-day Pylos) in Morea were two other towns with citadels whose Muslim and non-Muslim residents faced the rampant ferocity of the insurgents. After months of a difficult siege by sea and land, and weakened by famine, Monemvasia opened the gates of the citadel and capitulated to the Greek rebels on 23 July 1821. Muslims, mostly Turkish-speaking, surrendered their arms. They were promised that they were to be transferred to Asia Minor in the three brigs that maintained the sea blockade after a sum fixed for their passage was paid to the rebels. However, some insurgents from Mani in the southern Peloponnese opposed the terms of the capitulation and murdered several Muslims who had chosen to stay in town or were embarking on the brigs and plundered their property. The Muslims on the ships were stripped of their clothes, beaten, and left on a desolate rock in the Aegean. Only a few were saved by a French merchant.¹⁵ The surrender of the citadel of Navarino followed a few days later on 5 August 1821, accompanied by even greater atrocities. Prior to the surrender, many Muslim families, mostly Turkish-speaking, had been compelled by hunger to escape the citadel and had thrown themselves on the mercy of Greek insurgents from the surrounding areas, with whom they had once been connected with bonds of mutual kindness. These Muslims were allowed to retain only their clothes and household furniture and were promised that they were to be transported to Egypt or Tunisia.¹⁶ A ship from the blockade anchored in the harbor, and the money and valuable property of the Muslims were carried on board.

¹⁴ Alison Phillips, *The War*, 100–101.

¹⁵ George Finlay, *History*, 261–262; Apostolos Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tou Neou Ellinismou*, vol. 5, 1980, 393–394.

¹⁶ Thomas Gordon, *History*, vol. 1, 231.

While this was happening, a general massacre began, and in the space of an hour almost all of the Muslims who had not embarked on the ship were murdered.¹⁷ Only a few survivors were transported, not to Egypt or Tunisia, but to Izmir. There, incensed by what they had experienced in Navarino, some sought vengeance. On 10 October 1821 they killed 400 Orthodox Christians and a month later joined a Muslim mob who slaughtered another 500 Orthodox Christians as they were coming out of the church of Saint Fotini after the church service.¹⁸

One of the worst atrocities, in terms of ferocity and number of victims, took place after the fall of Tripolitsa in September 1821. In the words of Alison Phillips: “the other atrocities of the Greeks paled before the awful scenes which followed the storming of Tripolitsa.”¹⁹ In the heart of Morea, home to the Ottoman pasha (governor) of the region, Tripolitsa was estimated to have a population of 15,000 people before the Greek revolution that included 7,000 Muslims and 1,000 Greek-speaking (Romaniote) Jews.²⁰ With the start of the revolution most of the Orthodox Christians fled the town, and the Muslims of the surrounding regions of Mistras, Bardounia, Leondari and Fanari, along with 9,000 Muslim troops, sought protection inside the walls of the citadel. It is estimated that approximately 25,000 souls were inside the citadel in the summer of 1821. Famine, disease, and fighting had thinned the population, yet it is believed that approximately 8,000 Muslims of every age and sex, but mostly women and children, perished when the Greeks sacked the citadel.²¹ Many young women and girls were carried off as slaves. A few high-ranking Ottoman officers and the women of Khurshid Pasha’s harem were spared in expectation of high ransoms.²² The murderous massacre of Tripolitsa was vicious: “For three days the miserable inhabitants were given over to the lust and cruelty of the mob of savages. . . . Women and children were tortured before being put to death.”²³ Theodoros Kolokotronis, an eminent army officer who in 1825 became commander-in-chief of Morea’s Greek forces, took part in the siege of Tripolitsa, and recalled that “from the gate to the citadel, my horse’s hoofs never touched the ground”

¹⁷ George Finlay, *History*, 262–263; Alison Phillips, *The War*, 58–59.

¹⁸ Amvrosios Phrantzes, *Epitomi*, vol. 1, 355–412, 417–430; C. T. Striebeck, *Mittheilungen*, 39–42.

¹⁹ Alison Phillips, *The War*, 59.

²⁰ Charles Knight, *Geography*, 897; Thomas Gordon, *History*, vol. 1, 234.

²¹ Maxime Raybaud, *Mémoires*, vol. 1, 463, 480–483; Nikolaos Spiliadis, *Apomnimonemata*, vol. 1, 246.

²² Spyridon Trikoupis, *Istoria*, vol. 2, 128.

²³ Alison Phillips, *The War*, 61.

because the entire path was carpeted with corpses.²⁴ On learning about the atrocities in Tripolitsa, Thomas Gordon, the first English philhellene to join the Greek revolution, left Greek service in disgust.²⁵

The ferocity of the 1821 Greek revolution is well encapsulated by Amvrosios Phrantzes, a Greek Orthodox monk at the monastery of Great Cave in Kalavryta who in 1819 joined the Filiki Etaireia and, along with Germanos, the metropolitan bishop of Patras, is regarded as a pioneer of the revolution. In his *Summary of the History of Reborn Greece*, Phrantzes records the atrocities of his countrymen, many of which he witnessed, with shame and indignation:

Such tragic slaughter and murder have never occurred in the history of any centuries. . . . Women, wounded with musket-balls and sabre-cuts, rushed to the sea, seeking to escape, and were deliberately shot. Mothers robbed of their clothes with infants in their arms plunged into the water to conceal themselves from shame, and they were then made a mark for inhuman riflemen. Greeks seized infants from their mothers' breasts and dashed them against the rocks. Children, three and four years old, were hurled living into the sea and left to drown. When the massacre was ended, the dead bodies washed ashore, or piled on the beach, threatened to cause a pestilence.²⁶

It is difficult to estimate Muslim mortality during the Greek War of Independence because some of the censuses and historical accounts are sympathetic to the cause of the revolution and none are reliable.²⁷ Prior to the war, approximately 60,000–91,000 Muslims (9.1–11.9 percent of the population) lived in the territories that later formed the Kingdom of Hellas, including the Peloponnese, Rumeli, and a number of islands such as Euboea, the Cyclades, and the Sporades, close to the mainland. (See Maps 2.1 and 2.2).²⁸ Muslims numbered 70 percent of the population of Kyparissia, 15 percent in Euboea, and 10 percent of Attica, where approximately one-half to

²⁴ Theodoros Kolokotronis, *Diigisis Symvanton*, 80.

²⁵ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle*, 66–67.

²⁶ Amvrosios Phrantzes, *Epitomi*, vol. 1, 399–401.

²⁷ Eduard Blaqui  re, *The Greek Revolution*; Alfred Lemaitre, *Musulmans et Chr  tiens*.

²⁸ Emile Kolodny, *La Population*, vol. 1, 191–192; Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 109; Paraskevas Konortas, "Les Musulmans," 74; Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 20; Georgios Nikolaou, "Islamizations," 232; Alexandros Despotopoulos, "Teliki Rythmisi," 577.




Map 2.1 Territorial expansion of Greece, 1832–1947

three-quarters of the entire arable land belonged to rich Muslim landlords living in cities or in *konaks*, fortified mansions.²⁹ The vast majority of Muslims in these areas were killed or died of famine and disease. A number fled to territories controlled by the Ottomans, and others converted to Orthodox Christianity to preserve their lives and properties or secure higher status in the new environment.³⁰

The Greek War of Independence was the first of the Balkan national movements to commit murders, atrocities, and expulsions of Muslims on

²⁹ Effi Allamani, “Gegonota,” 70–100; Ioanna Diamantourou, “Explosi,” 110.

³⁰ Georgios Nikolaou, “Islamisations,” 332.



Map 2.2 Lands owned by Muslim individuals and the Ottoman state in Rumeli (according to the Greco-Ottoman treaties of 1837 and 1844). Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique* (Berlin, 1986)

such a large scale. In 1804 the Christian uprising in Belgrade was primarily aimed at the misrule of the Janissaries, who killed and pillaged Muslims and Christians indiscriminately, leading Sultan Selim III's commander in Belgrade to order Christians to arm themselves for protection. But neither the 1804 uprising nor the events that followed saw massacres, atrocities, and expulsions of Muslims on the scale of those of the Greek revolution of 1821,³¹ which set a pattern for future Balkan national uprisings and conflicts with the Ottomans. These included the Eastern Crisis conflicts of 1875–1878, the Balkan wars of 1912–1913, the First World War of 1914–1918, and the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1923. All aimed to create unified nations by destroying ethnic and

³¹ Frederick Anscombe, "The Balkan Revolutionary Age"; Roger Paxton, "Nationalism and Revolution."

religious groups who stood in the way, like the Muslims, whose loyalty was assumed to be with the Ottomans, not with the non-Muslim nations. The attacks against Muslims in the Balkans are often seen as an outpouring of hatred following a long period of unjust Ottoman harm and oppression—not as calculated opportunistic acts that often exploited the chaotic atmosphere to kill and pillage for the perpetrators' profit and economic status.³²

Muslims were not the only religious group who suffered atrocities and massacres by Greek rebels. Jews were often victims, too, although the Jewish population was not the main target of the insurgents. Approximately 5,000 Jews were killed in the Peloponnese alone during the Greek War of Independence, including almost the entire Jewish population of Tripolitsa (1,000 souls). A similar fate befell the 200 Jews of Vrachori, today Agrinio, in Rumeli when the town fell in June 1821. Before being murdered, the Jews of Vrachori were forced to surrender all of their money and jewelry.³³ Some of the massacres of Jews, such as those in Tripolitsa, were due to virulent disputes between Jews and Orthodox Christians during Ottoman times, if not earlier, and derived fresh hostility following the mistreatment of the corpse of Grigorios V by a Jewish mob in Istanbul following his execution by the Ottomans in April 1821.³⁴ Apart from the Jews, many Orthodox Christians who did not support the Greek War of Independence, or had collaborated with the Ottoman authorities, were tortured or murdered.

The Outcome of the War of Independence

In January 1822, the Greek insurgents declared the “independence of Hellas” in lands they controlled. The Ottomans attempted to restore Ottoman control in areas under Greek revolt three times between 1822 and 1824 with no success. The rebels’ initial successes soon became a stalemate: internal rivalries prevented them from consolidating their position in the Peloponnese and extending their control in Rumeli. In the autumn of 1823 a civil war broke out between the provisional government of Georgios Kountouriotis, formed in January 1822 but was forced to flee to the island of Hydra in December 1822, and supporters of the Filiki Etaireia, led by general

³² Hercules Millas, “History Textbooks,” 21–33; Umut Özkiprimli and Spyros Sofos, *Tormented by History*, 91–97; Büşra Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire.”

³³ George Finlay, *History*, 202–203.

³⁴ Thomas Gordon, *History*, vol. 1, 245.

Theodoros Kolokotronis. The civil war ended in June 1824 with the victory of the provisional government. It was soon followed by a second civil war that began in October 1824 between insurgents from Rumeli and the islands, led by Georgios Kountouriotis and Ioannis Kolettis, and insurgents from the Peloponnese, led by Theodoros Kolokotronis, Andreas Londos, and Kanellos Deligiannis. This war ended in February 1825 under the pressure of Egyptian forces, led by Ibrahim Pasha, the eldest son of Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt and Sudan, who landed in the Peloponnese to quell the Greek War of Independence and restore Ottoman control, in return for a large share of the spoils. On 4 April 1826 Britain and Russia signed a diplomatic protocol in St. Petersburg that gave them diplomatic authority for settling the “Greek Question,” as the Greek War of Independence was described in diplomatic circles in Europe. Britain and Russia offered to mediate between the insurgents and the Ottoman government to reach an agreement that would leave the lands controlled by Greek insurgents under Ottoman suzerainty, but with a measure of autonomy.

While negotiations by Britain and Russia with the Ottoman government were in progress, Ibrahim Pasha captured the Peloponnese and Mesolonghi in April 1826, Athens in August 1826, and the Acropolis of Athens in June 1827. In light of his successes, the Ottomans refused to grant autonomy to the lands under Greek control. Britain, France, and Russia stationed naval squadrons near the bay of Navarino in the southern Peloponnese, where the Ottoman and Egyptian armada was based, in an attempt to increase their diplomatic pressure on the Ottomans to accept their plan for an autonomous Greek state under Ottoman suzerainty. An accident on 8 October 1827 led to a naval battle between the British, French, and Russian naval squadrons and the Ottoman and Egyptian armada that destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet. Despite the crippling of the Ottoman-Egyptian navy, Ibrahim Pasha continued military operations. Negotiations followed between the Greek provisional government of Ioannis Kapodistrias and the three European powers that ended in the March 1829 London Protocol, which proposed the establishment of an autonomous Greek state, under minimal Ottoman suzerainty, whose northern frontier would extend from the Ambracian Gulf in the Ionian Sea to the Pagasetic Gulf in Thessaly.³⁵ The Ottoman government rebuffed this proposal and continued to do so up to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829. In April 1828, Russian forces crossed the Danube, and they

³⁵ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle*, 260.

reached the surroundings of Istanbul in August 1829. The diplomatic negotiations that followed concluded with the 3 February 1830 London Protocol, which proclaimed Hellas (Greece) an independent state but reduced its size by contracting the northern border to the line connecting the Malian Gulf in the western Aegean to the Spercheios and Aspropotamos rivers in Rumeli. As part of the September 1829 Treaty of Edirne, the Ottomans were forced to subscribe completely to the terms of the London Protocol.

After lengthy negotiations, a final settlement of the “Greek issue” was reached with the 21 July 1832 Treaty of Kalender Köşk (or Treaty of Constantinople) between Britain, France, and Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Greece’s northern border shifted to the line connecting the Ambracian and Pagasetic gulfs. The newly formed Kingdom of Hellas was to pay a one-off indemnity of £1,600,000 to the Ottoman government, an amount equivalent to the revenues the Ottoman sultan would forfeit by the cession of the additional territories of eastern Rumeli, the island of Euboea, and the Sporades islands. Ibrahim Pasha’s forces had withdrawn from the Peloponnese and Rumeli in October 1828, a year after the battle of Navarino, and Greek forces regained control in the subsequent months.

3

Greek Nationalism and Islam

The Rise of Greek Nationalism

Like other incidents in human history, the start of the Greek War of Independence was an unexpected event with an unpredictable conclusion. When it broke out nothing boded well for its outcome. There were occasions when the war risked having a fate similar to the unsuccessful February 1821 uprising of Alexander Ypsilantis in Wallachia and Moldavia. The motives of the participants in the Greek War of Independence were unclear and not the same for all. For many insurgents, the March 1821 Greek revolution was a spontaneous reaction against the Ottoman establishment, which was associated with lawlessness, economic misery, and an arbitrary administration. After the 1770s, Albanian-speaking gangs continued raids in many areas in the Peloponnese and Rumeli, despite the Ottoman government's repeated attempts to restrict them. The conflict between Sultan Mahmud II and Ali Pasha of Tepelena in the first quarter of the nineteenth century aggravated the situation, as it engaged military units that could have been used for law enforcement.¹

The Greek revolution of 1821 was the culmination of Greek nationalism, a political movement that emerged in the eighteenth century with the aim to promote the interests of Greek Orthodox Christians, who were often called Hellenes and defined unclearly on the basis of a common Greek language, Orthodox Christianity, history, and culture. Greek nationalism eventually aspired to achieve sovereignty for Orthodox Christians from Ottoman rule. It was the first national movement to emerge in the Ottoman Empire and was given impetus by the Modern Greek, or Neo-Hellenic, Enlightenment. The Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment was the Greek expression of the European Enlightenment, an intellectual and philosophical movement that dominated the world of ideas in Europe

¹ Dennis Skiotis, "From Bandit," 231–238.

during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, advancing ideals such as liberty, progress, toleration, fraternity, and constitutional government.

Separation of church and state, which was a political goal in the European Enlightenment, was not an objective of the Modern Greek Enlightenment. Many of its leading members, such as Eugenios Voulgaris, Neophytos Doukas, Theophilos Kairis, Theoklitos Farmakidis, and others were members of the Christian Orthodox clergy and received an Orthodox Christian education.² Alongside them were several other conservative members of the Christian Orthodox clergy who resisted the ideas of the Enlightenment and distained the admiration for ancient Greek philosophy, literature, and culture like members of the European and Modern Greek Enlightenments did. The conservative members formed the Kollyvades movement and began their operation in the second half of the eighteenth century, around the same time as the emergence of Modern Greek Enlightenment, among the monastic community of Mount Athos. The Kollyvades were alarmed at the way all too many of their fellow Greek Orthodox Christians were falling under the influence of the European Enlightenment and were convinced that a regeneration of Greek *genos* (nation) would come, not through embracing the secular ideas of the Enlightenment, fashionable in non-Ottoman and non-Christian Orthodox Europe, but through a return to the true roots of Orthodox Christianity, that is, via the rediscovery of Patristic theology and Orthodox liturgical life. In his *Antifonisis (Response)*, published in 1802 in Trieste under the pseudonym Nathanael Neocaesareus, Athanasios Parios (1712–1813), a Greek Orthodox hieromonk and member of Kollyvades, argued that ancient Greek philosophers were unworthy of admiration because they had not succeeded in eradicating polytheism from the world nor brought eudaemonia and harmony to human society, since many of the ancient Greek city-states were involved in endless civil wars and had to bend to the power of the Macedonians to achieve peace.³

Both Greek nationalism and the Modern Greek Enlightenment were driven by Greek predominance in trade and education in the Ottoman Empire, which occurred for several reasons. After the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire was in military decline, as it had failed to adapt to advances in military technology and had become vulnerable to external

² Paschal Kitromilides, “Orthodox Culture”; Paschal Kitromilides, “Imagined Communities”; Paschal Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution*; Victor Roudometof, “Invented Traditions”; Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet.”

³ Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, 99–100; Ioannis Zelepos, “Metemorfosi Gar kai Eginen.”

challenges from the Habsburg Empire, Persia, and Russia. Challenges from Russia, the sole Orthodox Christian power in the world, had a special resonance among Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman domain.

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 reinvigorated the Orthodox Christian popular beliefs that identified Russians with the “fair-haired nation” that were to conquer the Ishmaelites, that is, the Ottoman Muslims, and retake Constantinople, the City of the Seven Hills, and its dominions 320 years after its capture.⁴ Russian agents were active in Ottoman lands and attempted to inflame uprisings among Orthodox Christian subjects in an effort to help the Russians achieve their goals. One such uprising was the so-called Orlov revolt of 1770 in the Peloponnese and later Crete, which, despite its support from Russia, was easily suppressed by the Ottomans and resulted in punitive measures against Orthodox Christians in the rebellious areas.⁵ The 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, the present Kaynardzha in Bulgaria, gave the Russians the right to claim a protectorate over all the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. This and other external challenges from Christian Europe strengthened the ties between Ottoman Christian subjects and Christian European states, increasing their confidence and encouraging a sense of superiority, supported by an extensive network of European missionary schools operating in the Ottoman Empire. Many Ottoman Christian subjects studied at those schools, became accustomed to the technological and other advances of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European educational systems, and gained access to the economic and political networks and markets of Christian Europe.

Within this context of Ottoman military decline and opportunity for Orthodox Christians, a small but influential group of Phanariots ascended to positions of power at the highest reaches of the Ottoman state. The empire needed skilled diplomats to rescue what they could from its decline. Since Ottomans traditionally ignored European languages and cultures, the Ottoman government assigned these tasks to Phanariots, who had a long mercantile and educational tradition and the necessary skills. From the end of the seventeenth century until the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, Phanariots monopolized the office of the *terdjümân bashı*, the principal interpreter and de facto deputy foreign minister, acted as interpreters of the *kapudan pasha*, the grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet,

⁴ Cyril Mango, “The Legend,” 85–86.

⁵ Thomas Gallant, *The Edinburgh History*, 6–10; Tasos Gritsopoulos, *Ta Orlofika*; Nikos Rotzokos, *Etnafignisi*.

and were the de facto governors of the Aegean Sea. They became the sultan's *hospodars* in Wallachia and Moldavia. The Phanariots' rule as *hospodars* was much resented by locals, but a number of *hospodars* became enlightened patrons of Greek letters and culture, and their courts functioned as channels via which European ideas reached Orthodox Christians of the empire.⁶

Of greater significance was the emergence of an entrepreneurial, prosperous, and widespread Greek Orthodox mercantile class, whose activities were based both within and beyond the empire. Merchants of Greek origin or culture came to dominate Ottoman trade, exporting raw materials and importing European manufactured goods and colonial wares. *Paroikies*, Greek mercantile communities, were established throughout the Mediterranean, the Balkans, central Europe, South Russia, and even India, and Greek became the lingua franca of commerce. The development of this mercantile class was assisted by the fact that non-Muslims were exempt from summons to military service, unlike the Muslim subjects in the empire.⁷ The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji also allowed Russian merchant vessels to sail the Black Sea unimpeded, and over the next several decades Greek merchant ships under Russian flags conducted business in the Ottoman seas and beyond.⁸ Greek merchants also benefited from protective policies and financial incentives offered by Christian European leaders. For example, a series of Patents of Toleration issued by the Habsburg emperor Joseph II in 1781 granted freedom of worship to Greek Orthodox Christians and removed restrictions on buying property, joining guilds, and attending universities in Habsburg lands.⁹ Success in commerce provided many Greek merchants with the confidence to abandon their common fatalistic outlook on life, such as the belief that God had sent the Ottomans to punish Orthodox Christians for their sins and protect the Orthodox religion from the Roman Catholics.

Some wealthy Greek merchants offered material and other support to the Greek War of Independence, whereas others were not prepared to risk their newly acquired prosperity in what they viewed as a precarious enterprise. But the most significant contribution of this newly emerging mercantile class was to sustain the material base for the development of a Greek national movement, particularly the intellectual revival (Modern Greek Enlightenment) of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that gave

⁶ Alex Drace-Francis, *The Making*, 15–94; Athanasios Karathanassis, "Le Rôle," 253–256.

⁷ Traian Stoianovich, "The Conquering"; Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City*, 58, 193, 198.

⁸ Charles King, *The Black Sea*, 140–141; 147.

⁹ Vaso Seirinidou, *Ellines sti Vienni*.

rise to a Greek national consciousness. Some of the merchants sponsored a large number of young Greek Orthodox students to study in universities in Italy, the Habsburg Empire, and elsewhere in non-Ottoman Europe. Their education exposed them to the ideas of the European Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and romantic nationalism. These young students also became aware of the extraordinary hold of the language and civilization of ancient Greece on the minds of their educated European contemporaries. During the Ottoman period, knowledge of the ancient Greek world had all but died out, but under the influence of European classical scholarship, a rising Greek intelligentsia realized that they were the heirs to a heritage that was universally respected and admired throughout the civilized world. European travelers from Britain, France, and elsewhere who had visited the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century in search of Greek classical antiquities also contributed to this awareness.¹⁰ Such was the admiration for the ancient Greek world among educated European contemporaries that after the start of the Greek War of Independence a global movement of philhellenism developed. Philhellenes, for example the British Lord Byron, Captain Jonathan Miller of Vermont, and the Boston physician Samuel Gridley Howe, took part in the military operations on the side of the Greek insurgents. Lord Byron died for the Greek cause in Mesolonghi in April 1824.

Other merchants endowed schools and libraries and financed the publication, principally outside the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, of a growing and increasingly secular body of literature aimed specifically at a Greek audience. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, seven times as many such books were published as during the first.¹¹ On the eve of the Greek War of Independence, major centers of Greek commerce, such as Yanya, present-day Ioannina; Izmir; and Sakiz, present-day Chios, were also important centers of Greek education and home to Greek schools. In the course of the nineteenth century, a small but growing number of educated Greek Orthodox Christians articulated an ever more explicit Greek national consciousness and became increasingly resentful of Ottoman rule. Their efforts were often opposed by the Phanariots, the higher Orthodox Christian clergy, and the *kodjabashi*, Orthodox Christian notables, who were too comfortable with the Ottoman status quo to identify with the growing Greek national movement. Educated members of the Greek Orthodox diaspora,

¹⁰ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle*, 22.

¹¹ Konstantinos Dimaras, *La Grèce*, 30, 104, 122.

dazzled by the advanced material and technological progress of industrialized Europe, aspired to overthrow Ottoman rule and replace it with a new state that would model its political institutions and practices after those of industrialized Europe, chiefly France. Their aspirations did not always resonate with the insurgents and peasants of the Peloponnese and Rumeli, who had learned to give primacy to family and local institutions. Many of them exploited the turmoil and anarchy of the Greek War of Independence simply in order to advance their personal, family, or other agendas, to plunder and expand their possessions, or to punish and kill fellow countrymen to their advantage. Old rivalries among clans and cliques for position, wealth, and the Ottomans' favor were among the primary motives of many insurgents for taking part in the Greek War of Independence, and they often maneuvered and hedged their commitments during the war. Many educated members of the Greek diaspora (i.e., Greek Orthodox living in non-Ottoman Europe), however, insisted on embracing new concepts, such as national loyalty and citizenship, and a different mindset inspired by their "higher motives" to achieve their goals, such as sovereignty from Ottoman rule, and gain indispensable support from industrialized Europe. These motives were not always comprehended or shared by many insurgents.

Power Rearrangements within the Rûm Millet

But whatever the motives of the 1821 Greek revolution supporters, the Orthodox Christian religion played an important role as a mobilizing force for rallying the support of the many ethnically and linguistically diverse Orthodox Christian communities of the rebellious areas. Orthodox Christianity fed the insurgents' uncompromising intensity and clarity of purpose. Enemies of the revolution stood not only against the rebels' aspirations but also against God. Religion also allowed an easier identification of the opponent: Muslims could be seen as enemy religious "infidels" by each of the ethnically and linguistically different Orthodox Christian communities. Muslims and non-Muslims loyal to the Ottoman state were not to be tolerated in the new status quo the rebels aspired to create. For centuries religious faith had been a strong element of identity in the Ottoman Balkans that surpassed other forms of identity, such as ethnicity and language. When nationalism emerged in the Ottoman Empire after the eighteenth century, its manifestations were more tied to the Ottoman *millet* system

than to ethnic nationalism as seen in other parts of Europe.¹² Under this system, Orthodox Christians lived in an anational ecumene that reached across the entire Ottoman Empire. There were no standardized national languages as there were after the establishment of the Balkan nation-states, and few of the multiple linguistic divisions across the Balkans were sharply defined or unbridgeable. The clearest linguistic divisions among Orthodox Christians lay perhaps among the Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, Turkish, and Vlach/Aromanian families of dialects, but large commonalities of everyday vocabulary helped overcome those barriers. So did the similarities of grammar, syntax, vocabulary, and phonology in what linguists term “the Balkan sprachbund” (language federation) or Balkan linguistic convergence.¹³

The languages that helped create this Orthodox Christian ecumene were Koine (liturgical) Greek and Slavonic, which, similar to Latin among the Roman Catholic faithful, although spoken and written by the educated, were not the mother tongues of any. Koine Greek was historically the ecclesiastical language of the Orthodox Christian Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Phanariot elites who controlled it. The three other senior Orthodox patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem also traced their history to the Byzantine era, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople was primus inter pares. Its seat was in the capital of both the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. It was believed to have been founded by Saint Andrew, who together with St. John were the first disciples to follow Jesus. This provided the theological justification for its spiritual primacy and its title—the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Its location in the capital provided opportunities for political influence on the Ottoman government, which, in the long run, helped turn the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s primacy into dominance. While the patriarch of Antioch resided in Damascus, after the eighteenth century the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Alexandria resided in Istanbul, along with the patriarch of Constantinople, and thus were under the influence of the Phanariots. In 1766–1767 the Phanariots persuaded the Ottoman government to abolish the autocephaly, the status of self-governance, of the Slavonic ecclesiastical dioceses of the Patriarchate of Peć in northwestern Kosovo and of the Archbishopric of Ohrid in the Republic of North Macedonia and put them under the authority

¹² Paschalis Kitromilides, “Orthodox Culture”; Paschalis Kitromilides, “Imagined Communities”; Paschalis Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution*; Victor Roudometof, “Invented Traditions”; Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet”; Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 179.

¹³ Olga Mišeska Tomić, *Balkan Sprachbund*; Victor Freedman, “The Balkan Languages.”

of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.¹⁴ By the end of the eighteenth century, these developments had made the Patriarchate of Constantinople the unchallenged ruler of some 13 million Orthodox Christians in the empire.

The increased influence of the Phanariots and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, along with the rise of the Greek-speaking mercantile class, increased the prestige of the Greek language and led to a Greek cultural hegemony within the Rûm *millet* that remained unchallenged until the middle of the nineteenth century.¹⁵ The education of many Orthodox non-Greek speakers was conducted almost entirely in Greek, and a number of scholars and intellectuals of the Rûm *millet* and its diaspora in non-Ottoman territories believed that members of the *millet* had to be Hellenized. They were to write and speak Greek, communicate in Koine Greek, and, for some, marginalize any forms of vernacular Greek, which was seen as a shameful reminder of the Ottoman rule, since the vocabulary and syntax of vernacular Greek had been influenced by other languages. Moreover, the splitting of vernacular Greek into diverse dialects was seen as a threat to the *millet's* unity. In 1759 the monk Kosmas the Aetolian (1714–1779) toured areas in present western Greece and Albania urging Albanian- and Aromanian-speaking Orthodox Christians to abandon their mother language and become speakers of Koine Greek because “our Church is Hellenic.” In 1802 Daniil (1754–1825), a Greek-speaking Vlach priest and scholar from Moscopole, present-day Voskopojë in Albania, wrote: “Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, speakers of other languages, rejoice and prepare to become Romaioi [i.e., Romans, speakers of Koine Greek].”¹⁶

Although it is difficult to measure the grassroots effects among non-Greek speaking Orthodox of these efforts for Hellenization of the *millet-i Rûm*, the Greek cultural hegemony did not remain unopposed. Three years after Kosmas the Aetolian’s tour in southwestern Balkans, in 1762, Paisiy Hilendarski (later St. Paisiy Hilendarski), a Bulgarian clergyman from Samokov in today’s southwestern Bulgaria who established himself as a hieromonk and deputy-abbot of Hilandar monastery on Mount Athos and a key figure of Bulgarian nationalism, published in Zografski Monastery (Mount Athos) his *Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya*, which is a history of Bulgaria that aims to awaken and strengthen Bulgarian national consciousness among

¹⁴ Paraskevas Konortas, *Othomanikis Theoriseis*, 217–227.

¹⁵ Victor Roudometof, “From Rum Millet,” 20.

¹⁶ Peter Mackridge, *Language*, 58.

the Bulgarian speakers. There, Paisiy Hilendarski writes to his Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox fellows:

Oh, you unwise moron! Why are you ashamed to call yourself a Bulgarian and why don't you read and speak in your native language? Weren't Bulgarians powerful and glorious once? Didn't they take taxes from strong Romans and wise Greeks? Out of all the Slavic nations they were the bravest one. Our rulers were the first ones to call themselves kings, the first ones to have patriarchs, the first ones to baptize their people. . . Why are you ashamed of your great history and your great language and why do you leave it to turn yourselves into Greeks? Why do you think they are any better than you? Well, here you are right because did you see a Greek leave his country and ancestry like you do?¹⁷

Rûm versus Hellenic/Greek Identification

The names “Graikoi” (Greeks) and “Ellines” (Hellenes), which, prior to the eighteenth century, were used as identification terms by a few educated Greek-speaking and Hellenized Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire,¹⁸ were used more frequently after the mid-eighteenth century under the influence of Greek-speaking and Hellenized Orthodox of the diaspora. During this period, Hellenes and Hellenism were connected—hesitantly at the beginning and more confidently as one approached the start of the Greek War of Independence—to Christian Orthodoxy. The names (Graikoi and Ellines) were often used interchangeably, and the name Romioí (Romans), singular Romios, members of the Orthodox Christian Rûm community, the preferred term for Orthodox Christian scholars of the Ottoman Empire. For an Orthodox Christian of the empire, Ellin (Hellene) often meant pagan. Writing in the 1780s, Dimitrios Katartzis, a Phanariot scholar, insisted that the correct term to describe his own identity was Romios Christianos (Roman Christian) and argued that it was unworthy of a Romios Christianos to call himself Hellene because Hellenes were pagans.¹⁹ On many occasions, however, terms such as Graikos and Ellin often had religious, not ethnic or linguistic, meanings and were used as synonymous with the name

¹⁷ Ivan Tibor Benend, *History Derailed*, 76; Rumen Daskalov, *The Making of a Nation*, 152–155.

¹⁸ Ioannis Chasiotis, “Anazitontas Esoterikes kai Exoterikes.”

¹⁹ Dimitrios Katartzis, *Ta Evriskomena*, 43–44, 50, 105.

Romios.²⁰ By the same token, the name Tourkos, Turk, in this period often denotes Muslim. Thus, in a pamphlet published in 1811, Neofytos Doukas (c. 1760–1845), a cleric and scholar from Zagori in Epirus, Greece, claimed that “Hellenes” inhabited the area that covered present-day Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and parts of the former Yugoslavia, as well as parts of Egypt, a concept that includes members of the Rûm *millet*, and not only those whose mother language was Greek.²¹

Despite inconsistencies in the meanings of these terms, Ellin more often tended to refer to Grecophones and Hellenized Orthodox Christians. After the start of the 1821 revolution, the term was especially used to describe the Orthodox Christians of the areas in revolt, conveying the assumption they were descendants of the ancient Greeks. They were inhabitants of the same region, Ellas (Hellas), where ancient Greek civilization had been born and flourished, many of them spoke a version of the same language, and all of them in the church worshiped in Koine Greek. Many of the Greek Orthodox of the time tended to view the world in ethnic terms.²² In addition, under the influence of the European Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the rise of European nationalist movements, a number of Greek Orthodox nationalists aspired to restore a relationship between Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians and ancient Greeks. This aspiration reached almost obsessive proportions during the first decade of the nineteenth century, when, to the dismay of church authorities, Greek Orthodox nationalists began to name their children and their ships after the luminaries of ancient Greece rather than after Christian saints. The restored relationship provided a way to legitimize political emancipation from Ottoman rule, and appealed to the international admiration for the Greek classical world, an admiration the Greeks thought they needed if they were to obtain international help to establish a Greek nation-state. Semantic inconsistencies and confusion often occurred with concepts such as *genos* and *ethnos*, which were often used interchangeably to denote either a religious community (*millet*) or an ethnolinguistic group; although, after the eighteenth century, *ethnos* increasingly tended to describe an ethnolinguistic group and, as such, could be translated as the contemporary European term “nation.”²³ Thus, writing

²⁰ Konstantinos Dimaras, *Neoellinikos Diafotismos*, 82–86; Maria Mantouvalou, “Romaios-Romios”; Dimitris Livanios, “The Quest,” 55.

²¹ Peter Mackridge, *Language*, 46.

²² Paschal Kitromilides, *Neoellinikos Diafotismos*, 224.

²³ Peter Mackridge, *Language*, 52.

in 1771, Eugenios Voulgaris, the Orthodox bishop of Kherson in present-day Ukraine, argued that the Greek and other *ethni* form the Orthodox Christian *genos*, the Rûm *millet*.²⁴

Muslims and the Greek National Identity

A number of major figures in the 1821 Greek uprising, for example Captain Markos Botsaris, Captain Kitsos Tzavelas, and female naval commander Laskarina Bouboulina, were Arvanites whose mother tongues were dialects of Albanian, not Greek. In addition, numerous Slav-speaking Orthodox Christians sympathized with the cause of their Rûm *millet* fellows and came from the northern Balkans to assist the Greek War of Independence. Vaso Brajović from Mojdež in Montenegro, known as Vasos Mavrovouniotis or Vasos the Montenegrin, and Kristo Dagović of Belgrade, known as Hatzichristos Voulgaris or Hristo the Bulgarian, are two examples of Orthodox Christian chieftains of Slavic ethnic origin with no Greek background who assisted the war effort, each with one contingent of Slavic-speaking militias.²⁵

In this sense, the 1821 uprising was not Greek because it was organized and conducted by ethnic Greeks with a clear aim to create an ethnically and linguistically homogenous Greek state. It was Greek because it was orchestrated and executed by members of the Rûm *millet* who aspired to overthrow Ottoman rule and establish a Christian state whose language would be Greek, the language of the *millet's* leading institution, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. In addition, after the establishment of the Kingdom of Hellas and under the influence of German and Italian nationalisms, Greek and other Balkan nationalisms assumed more ethnolinguistic characteristics. Greek nationality did not describe any subject of the kingdom but mainly referred to Greek Orthodox individuals and secondarily Greek speakers. Writing in 1842, Sophocles Evangelinos Apostolides, a native of Tsangarada in Mount Pelion and the first tenured professor of Modern Greek language in the Western world, at Harvard University, claimed that most of the Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire identified themselves by religion as Romaioi (Romans). The term Ellines (Hellenes), he said, was used

²⁴ Stephen Batalden, *Catherine II's Greek Prelate*, 18–19.

²⁵ Elpida Vogli, *Ellines to Genos*, 86, note 70; Stefanos Papageorgiou, "Vasos Mavrovouniotis"; Veselin Beshevliev et al., *Izsledvaniia*.

mainly by the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hellas. He derogatorily called it “Bavarian Greece” because of its Bavarian rulers: Greece’s first king, Otto (Wittelsbach), was the second son of the Bavarian king Ludwig I, and his multitudinous entourage came with him from Bavaria.²⁶

From the very start of the Greek War of Independence, there were Muslims who served in it as soldiers, physicians, surgeons, and translators of Ottoman documents. Their number was significantly smaller than those of the Slav-speaking Orthodox Christians, but these Muslim philhellenes were often respected by the Christian members of their communities. Some of them even sought to capitalize on their support of Greek insurgents by demanding pensions and family properties lost during the war from Greek authorities. In one such case the Muslim Mustafa Gekas from Livadia in Rumeli left the comfort of his affluent life to fight on the side of the Greek insurgents in 1821 “motivated by pity and sympathy for the tyranny and the inhumanity inflicted on his fellow Muslims, suffering with the Greek people.”²⁷ Derviș Mehmet, a Muslim translator from Tripolitsa, in 1828 said the reason he wished to serve in the Greek War of Independence was that he wanted to die in his homeland. However, he argued, he joined the war because he felt he was “a genuine Hellene,” and, as a zealot of freedom, he did not view his decision as a betrayal of his fellow Muslims.²⁸ An anonymous Muslim from Kalavryta claimed in a letter to the Greek authorities in 1829 that he refused to follow his family who had left his hometown during the war because he wanted to live together with his Orthodox Christian fellows. He considered his nationality to be a higher priority than his religious differences with the Orthodox Christians: “that [he and his family] are Turks [Muslims] it is true; you can be assured however that our conscience is not Turkish, but was, and still is, purely Hellenic, and more so than any other Hellene.”²⁹

By the end of the Greek War of Independence, some Muslim supporters of the war were able to articulate a Greek Muslim identity. Prior to 1821 the influence of Greek nationalism on the Muslim populations in the war-torn areas was nonexistent. The perception of being part of an imagined national Greek community was a product of their experiences during the war. In 1856

²⁶ Sophocles Evangelinos Apostolides, *A Romaic Grammar*, iv.

²⁷ General State Archives (henceforth GSA), Athens, Vlachogiannis Collection (henceforth VO), 83, “Mustafa Gekas to the Parliament, 5 October 1827.”

²⁸ Spyros Loucatos, “Les Arabes,” 252–256.

²⁹ Spyros Loucatos, “Les Arabes,” 269–270.

the Greek parliament debated whether to offer state compensation to Youpis Dritsakos, a Muslim from the village of Kostantina in the Peloponnese, who had remained in Kostantina during the war and offered his services as a physician to the Greek insurgents but had lost much of his family property. Alexandros Kontostavlos, the Greek minister of finance, argued that Muslims who had sided with Greek rebels during the war had “a well-founded right to claim that they are Hellenes in consciousness.”³⁰

However, the view of Muslims as Greek nationals was not part of the political and intellectual heritage of the Greek War of Independence. Constitutions and other official documents adopted by the Greek revolutionary authorities provided religious tolerance to all citizens living in the territories controlled by Greek insurgents but at the same time reserved the status of Greek national (*Hellene*) to indigenous Christians only, and stripped all political rights from Muslim and Jewish residents. All the revolutionary constitutions acknowledged Orthodox Christianity as the dominant religion in the country, and it became the main criterion for assigning Greek nationality, echoing the Ottoman *millet* system. For example, the first provisional constitution of independent Greece, the *Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados* (Provisional Regime of Greece), adopted in 1822 in Epidaurus by representatives of the insurgents, referred to the rebellious areas as Ellas (*Hellas*) and to the insurgents who took up arms against the Ottomans and demanded independence from the Ottoman state as Ellines (*Hellenes*). The latter would form the backbone of the citizenry of Hellas and would enjoy full political rights and privileges as the new dominant ethnic group in the newly created status quo. In the words of the preamble of the *Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados*: “The Hellenic nation, being unable to bear the direful Ottoman dynasty as well as [Ottoman dynasty’s] unbearable and unprecedented tyranny, which [the Hellenic Nation] disclaimed with great sacrifices, declares today through its representatives convened in a National Assembly, before God and humanity, ‘its political existence and independence’ in Epidaurus on 1 January 1822 and the first [year] of independence.”³¹ Ellines were defined as “all those who believe in Christ and were born within the insurgents’ domains.”³² The second provisional constitution of 1823, the *Nomos tis*

³⁰ Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament (henceforth Minutes HP), 4:3 (1855–56), vol. 2, 27.

³¹ *Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados*, 1822, preamble, <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn06.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2021.

³² *Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados*, 1822, sec. 2, para. β', <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn06.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2021.

Epidavrou (Law of Epidaurus), adopted in Astros, added the criterion of language, stating: “[Ellines] are those who speak Greek as their mother language and believe in Christ.”³³

Although the Nomos tis Epidavrou introduced the Greek language as a defining element of Hellenic nationality, the Christian religion was widely regarded as the most significant criterion of Greek nationality, and therefore it was often given prominence over the Greek language by the overwhelming majority of Hellenes at the time and later in the Kingdom of Hellas as well as abroad. This view is reflected in a newspaper article of 19 November 1824, authored by Theodoros Negris, a Greek politician who had served in the provisional administration of the rebellious areas during the war and was a member of the First and Second National Assemblies. Entitled “Concerning Religion,” the article expressed Negris’ views on the provisions of the Nomos tis Epidavrou regarding religion as a defining element of Greek nationality. Negris argued that the Nomos tis Epidavrou was incomplete because “the Greek language should not be a criterion for one’s civil rights... the citizen of Caesarea [i.e., Karaman and Cappadocia] speak Turkish,³⁴ Bulgarians [speak] Bulgarian, but nevertheless both the Cesarean and the Bulgarian in reality have the same [civil] rights as [Hellenes] from the islands of Rhodes and Cyprus.”³⁵ Furthermore, the newspaper *Filos tou Nomou* (*Friend of the Law*) argued, in an editorial of 17 September 1826, that the Christian Orthodox “religion is the strongest bond in society... it preserved the most important and unlimited treasure of the mother language and, through the Greek language, the memory of ancient glory. [Religion] did not allow the Hellenic nation to be assimilated into the barbarians who had seized [Hellenic] territory, as had its earlier masters, the Roman emperors, for whom, the Hellenes sacrificed their national name Hellenes for the sake of their own [Christian] religion, being renamed Romioi (Romans).”³⁶ In addition, the third revolutionary national assembly convened in 1827 in Troezen, another town in the Peloponnese, and the constitution it approved, the Politikon Syntagma tis Ellados, omits the reference to the Greek language and claims that Hellenes are simply those born in the country who “believe in Christ” and either came

³³ Nomos tis Epidavrou, 1823, chap. 2, sec. β', <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn07.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2021.

³⁴ The Karamanides or Karamanlılar in Turkish, were Turkish-speaking Christian Orthodox who used the Greek alphabet for writing their form of Turkish.

³⁵ *Efimeris ton Athinon*, 26 November 1824.

³⁶ *Filos tou Nomou*, 17 September 1826

to fight with the insurgents or to live in Hellas.³⁷ Subsequent revolutionary and postrevolutionary constitutions defined Greek nationality on the basis of religion (Christianity in general, without restricting it to Christian Orthodoxy) and Greek language, with Christian religion always holding primacy over Greek language.

As part of an attempt to integrate the Roman Catholic populations of the Aegean Islands into the emerging Greek nation-state, on 9 June 1823 the archimandrite priest Grigorios Dikaios, also known as Papaflessas—the minister of the interior and a fighter in the war—sent a circular to the Roman Catholic “Hellenes of the Western Church” that disassociated religious affiliation from Greek nationality: “both the natural and the human-based laws do not ever allow in any nation divisions alongside religious differences exclusively; for nationality is not founded on religious basis but on so many material and moral interests, common throughout the nation. . . . If we throw an eye on the enlightened world, we see many nations, each of which consists of adherents of different denominations, who nevertheless are tied together in one nation . . . the German nation, the Dutch, the French. . . . Only barbarous nations identify religion with nationality.”³⁸

Although they shared the same language and culture with their Greek Orthodox neighbors, the Roman Catholics in the Aegean were not part of the Rûm *millet*, nor were they always supportive of the Greek War of Independence. They refused to take up arms in support of the 1821 uprising, to pay taxes to the provisional Greek revolutionary government, or to recognize the authorities it appointed, demonstrating a clear preference for Ottoman rule and the status quo ante bellum. However, these Roman Catholics enjoyed a privileged status, because the Greek revolutionaries had succumbed to pressures from France and other European powers to treat Christians who were not Orthodox in their domain well. In addition, the restrictions on Hellenic nationality and citizenship to Christian Orthodox only would not be received well by Philhellenes, comrades in arms, and others who admired ancient Greece and were themselves Roman Catholics or Protestants or came from majority Roman Catholic or Protestant countries.

In his circular, however, Dikaios clarified that overcoming religious differences in the Greek nation concerned only dogmatic variations

³⁷ Politikon Syntagma tis Ellados, article 6, <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn06.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2021.

³⁸ Konstantinos Manikas, “Scheseis Orthodoxias,” 103–104, note 191.

within Christianity and not the dichotomy between Christians and non-Christians:

The Hellenic nation took up arms to liberate itself from the horrible tyranny of the [Ottoman] Turks, and to live as an independent and free nation. This nation will be ruled by laws that impose isonomy and view all those born in Hellas as Hellenes, both members of the Eastern Church and of the Western Church, and in general all those who believe in Christ. This is shown by our respectable National Assembly [of March 1823, in Astros], which follows natural laws and does not exclude any Christian from the nation, but rather invites all those who believe in Christ and whose mother language is Hellenic to partake in the holy struggle for the faith and the homeland . . . And those of you, the Christians of the Western Church, born in Hellas, you are inseparable from our nation. If you have been indoctrinated by priests of the Western Church, you have not stopped being members of the same nation as those indoctrinated by priests of Eastern Church [i.e. Christian Orthodoxy]. You are Hellenes too, and you are subject to the same national obligations and have the same rights as the Eastern Christians [i.e., Christian Orthodox].³⁹

Theodoros Negris also supported Dikaios's view and claimed in an article in *Efimeris ton Athinon* on 19 November 1824 that

Eastern Orthodoxy is the religion of the Hellenic nation. The other religions, without any exceptions, are acceptable and their rituals are not impeded . . . the Lutherans, the Pope's faithful, the Armenians and others are allowed to reside in Hellas and build churches. And the Jews are allowed to reside in Hellas and build synagogues, and pagans can erect their own temples as well, without any obstacles. This permission was given by the law because my homeland also needs foreign [citizens] to bring us the arts and sciences and teach us to farm; we need to perfect our ploughs and do good ironwork and profit by mining ores from our land.⁴⁰

In other words, believers of faiths different from the Christian Orthodox were allowed to reside in Hellas and free to practice their faith and erect

³⁹ *Filos tou Nomou*, 6 June 1823, 3-4.

⁴⁰ *Efimeris ton Athinon*, 19 November 1824, 3-4.

temples where they could worship according to their religions. They were not, however, viewed as equals to Orthodox Christians.

The only dissonance came from few liberal scholars living in Europe, such as Adamantios Koraes and Jeremy Bentham, who, influenced by the spirit of the European Enlightenment, often raised the issue of discrimination in Greek constitutional documents against Muslims and Jews.⁴¹ With reference to the fate of Muslims and Jews in a liberated Hellas, in his *Peri ton Ellinikon Symferonton* (*Regarding the Hellenic Interests*) in 1825, seven years prior to the establishment of the Kingdom of Hellas, Adamantios Koraes argued against expelling Muslim and Jewish populations who had been living in the rebel areas for a long time and whose only difference from the Hellenes was religion: “Not only is exile [of Muslims and Jews] unjust, but it is not in favor of our interests at all . . . Trust me, friend, we should judge them as brothers who obey the same laws . . . we have to educate in justice all those we view as unjust, sharing with them the same goods . . . Jews should have synagogues and Turks [i.e., Muslims] mosques . . . and if for your voyage you must choose between two ships, and the captain of the first is Christian but totally inexperienced in sailing and of the second is an experienced Turk or Jew, to whom would you trust your life and belongings? This is how such distinctions matter in politics.”⁴²

⁴¹ Georgios Filaretos and Adamantios Koraes, *Simeioseis*, 8–20; Fred Rosen, “Bentham’s Constitutional Theory,” 38–43.

⁴² Adamantios Koraes, *Peri ton Ellinikon*, 88–97.

4

Muslims in the Kingdom of Hellas (1832–1880)

We should provide to all Muslims who would prefer to live in our Kingdom, every protection, which all citizens of whatever religious faith should enjoy, and we should bestow on them the most perfect freedom of their religious beliefs.

—Royal Act by the Greek Regency
on behalf of King Otto (February 1833)

It is estimated that 750,000 people lived in the Kingdom of Hellas in 1832, 2,500 of whom were Muslims. Most of the Muslims lived in Euboea, with 1,500 residing in Chalkida (Chalcis), Euboea's capital.¹ The Muslims of Euboea were the only substantial Muslim population in the kingdom. A small number of Muslims were scattered around the country, remnants of erstwhile thriving Muslim communities. One such example was Ibrahim Arnautoğlu, the former Ottoman district governor of Vostitsa, today Aigio, and an esteemed member of Vostitsa's Muslim community. Arnautoğlu was captured by Greek insurgents during the Greek War of Independence and was exchanged for Greek captives held by the Ottoman authorities.² In 1838, he returned to Tripolitsa to live the rest of his life in his homeland. In March 1845 he sought permission from the Greek parliament to exchange the lands he owned in Mantinea with fields of equal size in Chalkida, where he and his family had moved.³ In addition, a number of Albanian-speaking Muslims, originating from different parts of the kingdom or from neighboring Ottoman areas, served as noncommissioned officers in the Greek

¹ Lambros Baltsiotis, *O Exthros*, 217; the epigraph is from the *Official Governmental Gazette* (henceforth OGG), no. 2, 22 February 1833, 8–9.

² George Finlay and Henry Fanshawe Tozer, *A History of Greece*, vol. 7, 147–148; Spyridon Trikoupis, *Istoria*, vol. 1, 59.

³ GSA, Athens, VC, 83; Minutes HP, 1:1, vol. 2, 726–727; *Nea Efimeris*, 17 July 1882.

army.⁴ One such was Ahmet Tefik, a Muslim lieutenant from Thessaly who lived in Chalkida. Tefik joined the Greek army in 1881, and he and his family were granted Greek citizenship because of his service in the Greek army, despite the fact that they were Muslims of the Ottoman Empire.⁵

The Legal Status of Muslims

Like the provisional constitutions of the period of the Greek War of Independence, postwar constitutional documents granted a privileged status to Orthodox Christianity and its faithful. In their preambles, they invoked the name of the “Holy, one-in-essence and indivisible Trinity,” as had provisional constitutions, and recognized Orthodox Christianity as the dominant religion in the country. They forbade other religions to proselytize Orthodox Christians or to interfere with the internal affairs of the dominant religion, but they allowed Orthodox Christians to proselytize and interfere with the affairs of other faiths. The Greek king and his heirs had to be Orthodox Christians and defenders of the Orthodox faith. The king, the members of the Hellenic Parliament, and the civil servants had to take an Orthodox Christian oath when they were sworn in to office, although post-1864 Greek constitutions provided for oaths of parliamentarians and civil servants of other faiths.⁶

Greek authorities had to accept the fact that their newly founded kingdom was inhabited by non-Orthodox as well as Orthodox Christians. For example, the London Protocol of 3 February 1830 provided for an “act of amnesty . . . in favor of all Muslims or Christians who have taken sides against the cause [i.e., the Greek War of Independence]. . . . Moslems, who wish to continue to inhabit in the territories and islands assigned to Greece, will retain their property there, and will invariably enjoy with their families, a perfect security.”⁷ The Treaty of Kalender Köşk offered a period of eighteen months after the demarcation of the Greco-Ottoman borderline during which Muslims could sell their estates and move to the Ottoman Empire if

⁴ OGG, no. 44, 20 May 1881; OGG, no. 93, 20 October 1881; OGG, no. 13, 9 December 1881; OGG, no. 347, 23 December 1887.

⁵ Lambros Baltsiotis, *O Exthros*, 268–269.

⁶ Articles 43, 47, 64 of 1864 and 1911 constitutions: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn13.pdf>, and <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn14.pdf>, both accessed 15 April 2021.

⁷ General Gazette of Greece (henceforth GGG), 10 May 1830, 145.

they wished. The Muslims who were to remain in the kingdom would not be regarded as Greek nationals (Hellenes). The first citizenship law of May 1835 was modeled after citizenship laws in the United States, Britain, and France and applied birthright citizenship (*jus soli*), by which all individuals who were born in the kingdom were Ellines (Hellenes), and their fathers had the right to become Greek nationals at the time of their births.⁸ However, since Greek constitutions restricted the right of Greek nationality to Christians, most Muslims were excluded from Greek citizenship unless they or their parents had converted to Christianity or had been granted Greek nationality.⁹ Thus, when a Muslim from Karystos in Euboea applied for Greek citizenship in 1852, the Greek authorities claimed that “Article 6 of the provisional Troezen constitution of 1827 regards Greek nationals as only those who believe in Christ and reside in Greece. . . . His [the applicant’s] father did not believe in Christ.”¹⁰ Being deprived of Greek citizenship meant fewer rights for Muslims. For example, according to the constitutions of 1844 and 1864, only Greek citizens were accepted into the civil service, leaving the impression that Muslims were regarded as second-class citizens.¹¹

When the term Ellin (Hellene) was used in state documents, it did not include Muslims. They were called Mousoulmanoi (Muslims), Moamethanoi (Mohammedans), Tourkoi (Turks), and Othomanoi (Ottomans). “Othomanoi” was also used for Ottoman citizens or Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. For example, a law passed on 15 May 1835 regarding state compensation to neophytes, that is, Muslim converts to Orthodox Christianity, defined neophytes as “baptized Ottomans and their descendants,” despite that most neophytes were born and raised in rebellious areas that were later to form the Kingdom of Hellas.¹² Similarly, a royal decree of 18 December 1882 regulating the foundation of Muslim schools in Larissa in Thessaly, then Greek territory, was titled “Royal Decree for the Foundation of an Ottoman School in Larissa.”¹³

Post-Ottoman Greeks could not easily disengage from the Ottoman *millet* worldview that emphasized the role of religion in individuals’ identities and

⁸ OGG, no. 20, 16 May 1835.

⁹ Elpida Vogli, *Ellines to Genos*, 197.

¹⁰ Charalambos Christopoulos, Stefanos Euclides, and Theodoros Deligiannis, *Efimeris*, vol. 1, 104–105.

¹¹ Article 3 of 1844 and 1864 constitutions: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn12.pdf>, and <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn13.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2020.

¹² OGG, no. 20, 10 May 1836.

¹³ OGG, no. 197, 18 December 188

was present elsewhere in the Balkans, too: for example, the 1835 constitution of the Principality of Serbia did not treat Muslims, Jews, and Orthodox Christians of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople as Serbs.¹⁴ Nevertheless, some Muslims succeeded in gaining Greek citizenship due to their proven records of supporting the War of Independence, or because their applications were supported by powerful members of Greek society. One such case was Ibrahim Arnautoğlu, who was given Greek citizenship by King Otto soon after his arrival in Greece in 1838. Since Ibrahim was a Greek citizen, his son, Halil, and his children were automatically granted Greek citizenship.¹⁵ The citizenship law of October 1856 that replaced that of May 1835 applied the right of blood (*jus sanguinis*) as a major principle of the citizenship law, influenced by the concept of “objective nationality” conceived by scholars such as Johan Fichte. According to *jus sanguinis*, children like Halil and Halil’s sons were automatically granted Greek citizenship at birth.¹⁶ A number of Muslims from Euboea became Greek citizens in the 1860s. By that time the Muslim population of Euboea had been significantly reduced, and they were not seen as being as great a threat to national security as they had been in the first two decades after the Greek War of Independence, when their numbers were higher and memories of the war were fresh.

During this period, no special legal framework existed that regulated the administration of Muslim religious, educational, and cultural institutions, such as procedures for appointing Muslim religious clergy, the operation of Muslim schools, and the content of school curricula. This lack of a legal framework left the Muslim population unprotected from state discriminatory policies but meant that Muslims were not treated as a special group. The general, and often ambiguous, clauses of international treaties and state legal documents were meant to protect Muslims’ cultural autonomy and civil rights. For example, Greek constitutions (those of 1864 and 1911) recognized the right of non-Orthodox Christians to believe and practice their religious faiths in freedom as long as they did not proselytize Orthodox Christians.¹⁷ These constitutions declared that “personal freedom is inviolable and no

¹⁴ Lambros Baltsiotis, *O Exthros*, 183 (note 15).

¹⁵ Diplomatic and Historical Archives Service of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth DHAGMFA), 40:2–25 (1865), “Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1865”; 20:2–25 (1865), “Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1865.”

¹⁶ Women’s nationality was determined by that of their husbands. Greek women married to foreigners, in cases where they became widows and wished to reside in Greece, had the right to reclaim their Greek nationality, if they wished (article 12). See Act 391 (Civil Code of 1856), OGG, no. 75, 15 November 1856.

¹⁷ Elias Kyriakopoulos, *Ta Syntagmata*, 183, 221.

one can be persecuted” and that “in Greece no individual can be sold or bought; slave of any origin or religion is free while the individual sets foot on Hellenic soil.” The absence of a specific legal framework for Muslims can be partly explained by the fact that international treaties, for example the 1830 London Protocol or the 1832 Treaty of Kalender Köşk, did not force Greece to adopt such legal frameworks. International treaties of the time made specific mention of Jewish and nonconformist Christian communities but not of Muslims. For example, the 1814 Congress of Vienna, which aimed to reestablish peace and order in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, was mostly concerned with the protection of the rights of Jews in Bavaria and Württemberg or of Poles in Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. The 1856 Congress of Paris that followed the Crimean War paid special attention to the status of Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire, but not Muslims. There was no experience of integrating Muslim populations acquired through territorial readjustment into the body politic of a country whose religious majorities were Christian. In this respect, the Kingdom of Hellas was a litmus test of such an experience in Europe, beginning with Southeastern Europe. In addition, there were no international mechanisms to force a sovereign national state like the Kingdom of Hellas to protect the religious or any other rights of its subjects or minority groups.¹⁸

The Great Powers of Europe were also biased against Islam and the Ottoman Empire, often viewing the Islamic faith as a religion that did not allow Ottoman society to conform to the political, social, and economic advancements of Europe. The Ottoman Empire, once an international rival, was now viewed as a weak state, the “sick man of Europe,” as it was frequently called in European diplomatic circles. Thus, after the Crimean War, the European powers pressed the Ottoman regime to strip Islam from state law through the Tanzimat reforms but applied no similar pressure to Ottoman Christians or, indeed, to the Kingdom of Hellas.¹⁹ This also explains why the European powers were not as concerned with the status and the rights of the Muslims in Greece as they were with those of the Christians. The 1 July 1830 London Protocol agreed on by Britain, France, and Russia, which elaborated the terms of the 3 February 1830 London Protocol, specified that “the intentions and solicitude of the three Courts [Britain, France, and Russia] . . . with respect to the equality of civil and political rights [in

¹⁸ Jennifer Jackson, *National Minorities*, 61.

¹⁹ Richard Horowitz, “International Law,” 462–465.

Greece], referred especially to members of the Christian church.”²⁰ In a letter of 15 August 1830 to Ioannis Kapodistrias, the governor of Greece, the deputy ambassadors of Britain, France, and Russia clarified that “the full equality of civil and political rights has been specifically stipulated in favor of Christian cults.”²¹

Apart from the international context, the Greek authorities also were often indifferent to the well-being of the Muslims in the kingdom. Due to their small number, which was shrinking further due to emigration to the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims lacked the leverage that could force Greek authorities to pay more attention to their needs: in 1861 approximately 400 Muslims lived on Euboea, while in 1869 there were only 150.²² With memories of the Greek War of Independence still fresh, the Muslims were often seen as national enemies because they shared the same faith as the Ottoman dynasty and ruling class. An atmosphere of diplomatic antagonism against the Ottoman Empire prevailed with the promulgation of the Megali Idea (Great Idea). The Megali Idea, which emerged in 1844 as a visionary nationalist aspiration to expand the territorial borders of the Greek state to include the large Orthodox Christian populations remaining under Ottoman rule after the end of the Greek War of Independence, dominated Greece’s foreign policy until 1923.

The Muslims of Euboea

No statistics exist to offer an accurate picture of the ethnic groups and religious sects of the Muslims of Euboea. Scrappy historical accounts show that most of the island’s Muslims were Turkish speakers, but there were a significant number of Greek-speaking (Karystos) and Albanian-speaking Muslims, Roma, and Muslims from North Africa, whom historical sources often indiscriminately call “Arabs.” But regardless of mother language, it was not uncommon for Muslims living in linguistically mixed areas like Euboea to communicate in two or three different languages, including Greek. In terms of Islamic sects, there were Sunni Muslims, mostly upper- and middle-class and educated, and a number of Sufi Muslims—Naqshbandi, Halveti, Bektaşı,

²⁰ *Protocols of Conferences held in London Relative to the Affairs of Greece*, Paper no. 33, 112.

²¹ Alexandros Soutsos, *Syllogi ton eis to Exoterikon*, 245.

²² Emile Kolodny, *La Population*, vol. 1, 226; Ioannis Petropoulos and Aikaterini Koumarianou, “I Periodos Vasileias tou Othonos,” vol. 13, 15–16; Lambros Baltsiotis, *O Exthros*, 223.

Kızılbaş—especially in rural areas: there were twelve *tekkes* in Chalkida in 1832, five of them active.²³

After it became clear that Euboea would become Greek territory, many Muslims started to leave for the Ottoman Empire. By the beginning of the 1840s almost all affluent Muslims of the island had left, and the remaining Muslim population consisted mainly of low-income people, such as craftspeople, grocers, silk manufacturers, beggars, blacksmiths, shoe cleaners, and household staff, some of them former slaves who had gained their freedom as soon as Greek sovereignty extended to the island. Other Muslims tried to leave but could not because they were enmeshed in legal disputes regarding their properties. As soon as they succeeded in selling their assets or settling their legal disputes, they, too, left the island. Eager to escape Greece, Muslims often sold their properties at low prices and sometimes fled, leaving their assets behind unsold, to the benefit of their former neighbors. Ingenious local and foreign fortune hunters often spread fictional rumors about imminent acts of revenge against Muslims by Greeks in an attempt to spread panic, forcing the Muslims to leave haphazardly and sell their properties at the lowest possible price. In the early 1830s, Muslims in Athens trying to sell their properties often fell victim to intentional legal delays and other machinations by potential buyers (Greek and foreign), who, aware that Athens was to become Greece's new capital in September 1834, wished to acquire as much property as they could at the lowest possible cost.²⁴ It is estimated that approximately 20 percent of property sales in Chalkida between 1835 and 1851 involved Muslims leaving the city for the Ottoman Empire.²⁵

This is not to claim that the Euboean Muslims were in a state of emigration panic in the first years after the change of sovereignty. The Ottoman garrison commander remained in Chalkida until the middle of 1836, and historical accounts show that many Muslims continued to lease their properties and make loans to Christians and Jews under long-term contracts of a year or longer. At the end of 1832, after a large wave of Muslim emigration from Karystos to Çeşme and Sivrihisar in Anatolia, many of the emigrants returned to Karystos a year later, disappointed with the conditions they had found in Anatolia and the treatment they had received from locals and the

²³ Karl Baedeker, *Greece*, 201; Theodoros Skouras, "To Proto Cheirografo," 29.

²⁴ Giannis Kairofylas, *I Athina*, vol. 1, 13; Kostas Biris, *Ta Prota Schedia*, 6–7.

²⁵ Lampros Baltsiotis, *O Exthros*, 45, note 40.

Ottoman authorities. Their stories led many of their fellow Muslims who were ready to emigrate to postpone their plans.²⁶

The fact that most of Euboean Muslims lived in Chalkida, a fairly urbanized environment, exposed them to non-Islamic cultural influences. Some Muslim families preferred to send their children to Greek schools, despite the existence of a *mektep* (Muslim elementary school) in Chalkida.²⁷ A number of Muslim students pursued their academic studies at the University of Athens rather than emigrating to the Ottoman Empire.²⁸ Muslims' social life was changing due to their increasing exposure to non-Islamic lifestyles. By the end of the 1870s the only item of dress that distinguished Muslim men from the rest of the population was the fez. Muslim women's dress code was more traditional, but European influences were discernible in their dress as well. They often adopted the French chignon hairstyle and wore thin yashmaks, transparent veils that partly revealed their faces, which they wore in the presence of unknown men and removed when among women.²⁹ Some Muslims also consumed alcohol.³⁰

The Muslim Exodus

The exodus of Euboean Muslims was facilitated through maritime transport from the island's major ports of Chalkida and Karystos to Istanbul, Selânik (Thessaloniki), Izmir, and Quluz (Volos). Most of the Muslim migrants left for Izmir and Selânik, fewer moved to Thessaly or Macedonia via Quluz, and a few affluent Muslims migrated to Istanbul. The destination was often determined by the location of networks of family, friends, and acquaintances who could help the migrants resettle and find work in the new environment. Whenever there was a surge of Muslim migration from Euboea, the Ottoman authorities sent passenger ships to transport the migrants. The Ottoman state also induced them to settle in underpopulated rural areas, like Thessaly, by offering each Muslim migrant family eighty *stremmata* (19.8 acres) of arable land for settling and farming.

²⁶ T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı (BA), f: HH, g: 47727; f: F, g: 47759; f: C, g: 47682; Evangelia Balta, "I Othomaniki Martyria," 198–199.

²⁷ *Evoia*, 11 March 1876, 2.

²⁸ *Evripo*, 13 June 1879, 2.

²⁹ *Evoia*, 12 February 1876, 4.

³⁰ *Evripo*, 1 April 1889, 2–3.

The Greek authorities had no organized plan to drive Euboean Muslims from the island. The Kingdom of Hellas was too young and vulnerable a state to adopt measures that would upset the Muslim population, complicate diplomatic relations with Istanbul, and risk retaliatory measures against Orthodox Christians in Ottoman lands. In a confidential letter sent to King Otto in April 1838, Konstantinos Zografos, the royal secretary of foreign affairs, advised the king to take action in response to unpleasant incidents against Euboean Muslims, lest these incidents threaten “the interests of Hellenes in Turkey.”³¹ When Otto had been selected as king, Britain, France, and Russia had extracted a pledge from Otto’s father, King Ludwig I of Bavaria, that King Otto would refrain from hostilities against the Ottoman Empire, insisting that Otto’s formal title be “King of Hellas” and not “King of Hellenes,” which would have laid claim to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. George Ludwig von Maurer, one of the three members of the Regency Council, which advised the underage King Otto until he reached his adulthood in 1835,³² claimed that “it was our impartiality in religious affairs that encouraged some hundreds of Muslims to remain in Greece.”³³

The kingdom, however, lacked a history and culture of state administration. Its state structures were in formation, and officials were often unfamiliar with their role and duties. It was not always easy for the Greek government to fully control local administrations, which often misinterpreted or disobeyed government instructions. In this context, Muslims’ civil rights were often violated, Muslims’ properties were frequently encroached on, and the local authorities turned a blind eye to and sometimes even protected the perpetrators, who were neither punished nor forced to compensate their Muslim victims. This led Gregory Perdicaris, the Greek-American U.S. consul to Athens, to remark: “[the Muslims of Chalkida], failing to sell their estates are forced to remain in the land of their ancestors and to become witnesses of humiliating insults towards . . . their religion.”³⁴ In March 1834, Muslims from Chalkida complained to the local authorities about a *frangoforemenos*—the derogatory term for a Greek of high social status who embraced European, or “French,” dress codes and did not wear the national costume of the *fustanella*, a stiff white kilt. This person had toured Muslim

³¹ DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1838), “C. Zographos à S. Me. Le Roi, Rapport Confidential Tauchant les affaires Turques en Grèce, Athènes, 6 April 1838.”

³² The other two were Count Josef Ludwig von Armansperg, who acted as chair of the Regency Council, and Karl von Abel, both from Bavaria.

³³ George Ludwig von Maurer, *Das Griechische Volk*, 189.

³⁴ Gregory Perdicaris, *The Greece of Greeks*, vol. 1, 108–109.

and mixed villages in Karystos, encouraging Greek Orthodox Christian farmers working on Muslim farms to stop paying their leases or any other revenue to their Muslim landowners. The prefect of Euboea sought advice from the secretary of foreign affairs, who in his response accused the prefect of “pretending ignorance” on the matter and the general situation in Euboea.³⁵

The Muslims of Euboea also did not find it easy to adjust to the new cultural environment of the kingdom, which increased their feelings of insecurity and led them to emigrate to the more familiar Ottoman Empire. Religious holidays and feasts had changed to emphasize Orthodox Christianity. There was no limit to the size of Christian churches in the kingdom, and churches were allowed to display crosses and call the faithful to prayer with loud bell-ringing, while the *adhan*, the muezzin’s call to prayer from the minaret of the one operating mosque in Chalkida, was forbidden.³⁶ To ensure that the dead were actually dead, the Greek authorities ordered that all cadavers were to remain unburied for a period of thirty-six to forty-eight hours.³⁷ Many Muslims saw this order as disrespectful of their customs, which required the burial of the dead within twenty-four hours.³⁸ Dress codes, social etiquette, customs, and tastes changed, including the freedom to consume the formerly prohibited pork and alcohol. Urban space was often redesigned, and Islamic buildings such as mosques, *tekkes*, and cemeteries were demolished or converted to different uses from the original: one of the mosques in Chalkida became the Orthodox Christian church of Saint Nicholas.³⁹ The destruction of Muslim graves in the churchyard of Saint Paraskevi’s Orthodox Christian church, a former mosque, led Gregory Perdicaris to complain to the Greek government of “destruction of historical monuments” that made the “Greeks look worse than the Turks.”⁴⁰

To a certain extent, Muslim emigration was self-propelling. As the Muslim population was shrinking, Muslim community life was affected, causing feelings of frustration, unhappiness, and misery for the Muslims who remained behind. Some young Muslim males were emigrating to the Ottoman

³⁵ DHAGMFA, *Ottoman Lands in Greece*, 1834, “Ottoman Landowners in Chalkida to the Prefecture of Euboea, Chalkida, 29 March 1834”; “[Prefect of Euboea] to the Royal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Chalkida, 6 April 1834”; “[Royal Secretary of Foreign Affairs] to the Prefect of Euboea, Nafplion, 13 April 1834.”

³⁶ Alexander Bouchon, *Voyage dans l’Eubée*, 26; Carl Bronzetti, *Erinnerung*, 124.

³⁷ OGG, no. 16, 5 May 1834.

³⁸ DHAGMFA, 68:1A (1835), “Complaints from Chalkida Ottomans, Athens, 22 March 1835.”

³⁹ Iakovos Ragavis, *Ta Ellinika*, vol. 3, 28.

⁴⁰ Gregory Perdicaris, *The Greece of Greeks*, vol. 1, 111.

Empire for education or work and were not returning. As the Muslim male population diminished, many conservative Muslim families married their women to Muslim grooms from the empire, which often led entire families to emigrate. In October 1877, Mustafa Idrizis, an esteemed Muslim from Chalkida, married his daughter to a Muslim schoolteacher living near Quluz, and after the wedding the entire family moved to Thessaly.⁴¹

Muslim emigration increased during times of disputes between Muslims and Orthodox Christians. One such dispute occurred in 1834–1835, when many Orthodox Christians from the island of Samos fled to the Kingdom of Hellas and settled near Chalkida, because they refused to accept that their island had not become part of the kingdom. They had taken an active part in the Greek War of Independence, and a provisional government with its own constitution had been set up to rule the island. The London Protocol of 1830 excluded Samos from the Kingdom of Hellas. The island was declared an autonomous tributary principality under Ottoman suzerainty, paying to the Ottoman government the annual sum of £2,700. Thus it remained until November 1913, when the Ottomans ceded Samos to Greece under the Peace Convention of Athens.⁴² As numbers of Samian refugees arrived in Euboea, they needed immediate accommodation. Many Muslims were forced by the island's authorities to take families of Samian refugees into their homes, for an agreed rent to be paid by the refugees.⁴³ At the same time, a number of Muslim families were asked to share their homes for rent by soldiers and army officers of a battalion from neighboring Fthiotida, brought to the island to maintain order due to an increase in criminal incidents and sporadic clashes between Muslims and refugees. This contravened Islamic customs, since Muslim females were not even allowed to be seen by males other than their spouses and children, let alone to live under the same roof with non-Muslim male foreigners. Many of the refugees and soldiers were accommodated in empty houses of Muslims who had emigrated to the Ottoman Empire, and others were settled in mosques and Islamic public buildings.⁴⁴

Despite agreements, the rent was not always paid, and Muslim landlords often accommodated Samian refugees and Greek military personnel in their own homes at their own expense. Tenants often forced Muslim landlords and their families out of their houses, or damaged property with neither

⁴¹ *Evoia*, 27 October 1877, 4.

⁴² Alexis Sevastakis, *Samiaki Politeia*; Georgios Moutafis, “To Zitima tis Samou.”

⁴³ Georgios Fousaras, “I Metepanastatiki Chalkida,” 138.

⁴⁴ DHAGMFA, 68:1A (1836), “Regarding Ottoman Houses in Chalkida, Athens, 3 October 1836.”

compensation nor apologies. On many occasions, these “tenants” attacked Muslims physically or verbally and were not punished for their actions.⁴⁵ These conflicts caused further unrest among Muslims, many of whom reacted by selling their properties and leaving for the Ottoman Empire. Britain, France, and Russia, the guarantors of Greece’s independence, intervened and complained about the violations of the London Protocol of 1830 and the 1832 Treaty of Kalender Köşk, which had been meant to ensure the protection of Muslims’ civil rights and religious freedom in the Kingdom of Hellas.⁴⁶ The Greek government sent Ioannis Pittaris, a special government commissioner, to find out why the Euboean authorities seemed to act unfairly toward local Muslims. In his January 1835 report to the government, Pittaris claimed that the disturbances against Muslims were due to “the unskillful and wild-mannered ways of those who execute the orders of the Greek government.”⁴⁷ He recommended the establishment of a three-member committee, to include one Euboean Muslim, to investigate all cases of Muslim house sharing, especially the problematic ones, and recommend satisfactory solutions for all interested parties. A few months after Pittaris’s recommendation, such a committee was in operation and included two Muslims.⁴⁸

In addition, the Greek regency issued royal decrees for the release of three Muslims, Osman Efendi, Keli Ibrahim, and Ismail Ibrahim, who had been imprisoned because they had refused to lease their properties to Samian refugees and Greek military personnel.⁴⁹ The regency also forced Georgios Psyllas, prefect of Euboea and Attica, to resign from his position because he had “dared to abuse the power he was entrusted with.” He was replaced by Georgios Ainian, who had served as prefect before Psyllas; he was forced out of office in May 1834 because it was alleged that his policies favored Muslims at the expense of Orthodox Christians.⁵⁰ The regency’s measures brought peace, but the Samian refugees and military personnel hosted by

⁴⁵ DHAGMFA, 68:1A (1835), “About the Euboean Ottoman Ibrahim Efendi, Athens, 29 April 1835.”

⁴⁶ DHAGMFA, 7:1A–ΣΤ (1836), “Secretariat of Justice to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 2 March 1836.”

⁴⁷ DHAGMFA, 68:1A (1835), “Pittaris to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Chalkida, 22 January 1835.”

⁴⁸ DHAGMFA, 68:1A (1835), “Pittaris to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Chalkida, 22 January 1835”; “Touchant les Turcs demeurant à Chalcis, Athens, 25 February 1835”; 68:1B (1835), “G. Ainian to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 19 November 1835.”

⁴⁹ DHAGMFA, 68:1A (1835), “Otto . . . Im Namen des Königs, Athens, 9 May 1835”; “Otto . . . Im Namen des Königs, Athens, 11 May 1835”; 7 (1835), “Pittaris to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Chalkida, 22 April 1835.”

⁵⁰ OGG, no. 19, 26 May 1834; Charalambos Farantos, “O Nomarchis Evoias,” 102–110.

Muslims never fully paid the rent they owed: by the end of the 1830s only 11,109 drachmas, 10 percent of the amount owed, had been paid to Muslim landlords.⁵¹

Muslim emigration also surged around the time of the Crimean War. The Greek government saw the war as an opportunity to expand their young country to Ottoman areas inhabited by Orthodox Christians. Under severe diplomatic pressures from Britain and France, whose forces occupied Piraeus, Greece's main port, and effectively neutralized the Greek army, the Greek government refrained from declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. In 1854, however, Athens, betting on a Russian victory and with a large section of its political class and the public expecting their fellow Orthodox Christians in Russia to help Greece fulfill its national aspirations, encouraged a large-scale revolt in Epirus and uprisings in Crete.⁵² These rebellions were easily crushed by the Ottoman army, frustrating the Greek political class, who blamed King Otto for not declaring war on the Ottomans. Greece's backstairs involvement in the Crimean War disturbed Greco-Ottoman relations and inflamed hatred among Orthodox Christians in Euboea, who often attacked Muslims and violated Muslim properties. Such incidents led French novelist and journalist Edmond François Valentin About to remark: "the Greeks tolerated [Euboean Muslims], as they tolerated [Euboean] Jews: I know nothing more intolerant than their tolerance."⁵³ In this atmosphere of hostility, an unspecified number of Muslims left Euboea with the assistance of the Ottoman government, which dispatched ships to facilitate a quick and safe transfer of Euboean Muslims to the empire.⁵⁴

Ottoman Patronage

Unlike Greece's Jews who had no kin state, the Ottoman state assumed the role of political patron for Greece's Muslims. In 1849 the Ottoman government established consulates in Chalkida and Karystos that operated until the turn of the twentieth century. A number of the consuls were not subjects of the Ottoman Empire but were trusted, educated Euboean Muslims with good

⁵¹ DHAGMFA, 68:1B (1835), "About Turkish Houses in Euboea, Athens, 12 November 1835"; "Rent Payment from Samian Refugees, 19 December 1835."

⁵² George Finlay and Henry Fanshawe Tozer, *A History of Greece*, vol. 7, 224.

⁵³ Edmond About, *La Grèce Contemporaine*, 74–75.

⁵⁴ BA, f. İ.HR., g: 5281, d: 107, 07 Recep 1270 [05.04.1854]; DHAGMFA, 76:1 (1868), "Ismail Muhtar Premetis to Ioannis Fotiadis, Athens, 23 March 1868."

command of Greek and Ottoman Turkish. The Ottoman consulates functioned as channels of political and cultural contact between the Ottoman Empire and the Euboean Muslims: they updated the Ottoman authorities on the Muslims' political, economic, and social life on Euboea and reported to the Greek authorities any issues that required Ottoman diplomatic intervention. For example, worried about the poor condition of the only operating mosque in Chalkida and the safety of those praying in it, in 1888–1889 the Ottoman authorities decided to fully finance the mosque's repair.⁵⁵ They also considered building a new mosque in another area or rebuilding the existing mosque from scratch, surrounding it with a covered walkway of shops. However, these ideas remained on paper, despite the fact that the Hazine-i Celile, the Ottoman treasury, disbursed the necessary funds, which seem to have disappeared in the labyrinthine dark alleys of Ottoman and Greek state bureaucracies.⁵⁶

In many instances, the Ottoman government interfered with the Greek authorities on behalf of the Muslims of Euboea, and sometimes issues concerning the Euboean Muslims complicated Greco-Ottoman relations. In 1835, the Ottoman authorities intervened on behalf of the Muslims of Chalkida, who had complained that Chalkida's municipal authorities were not allowing Muslims to sell or repair any Muslim-owned properties or Islamic buildings in the city's castle area until the execution of Chalkida's new urban plan was complete. This reduced real estate prices at a time when many Muslims were planning to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. Yielding to Ottoman diplomatic pressures, King Otto issued a royal decree on 9 November 1839 that exempted all old and new Muslim properties from the jurisdiction of the new urban plan of Chalkida.⁵⁷ In July 1852, Muslims visiting a mosque in Chalkida were subjected to verbal and physical attacks by local Orthodox Christians. The incident created a major diplomatic crisis: the Ottoman Empire threatened to recall its ambassador from Athens and declare war on the Kingdom of Hellas. The diplomatic tension calmed down after the intervention of Britain and France, who forced the Greek authorities to apologize to the Ottoman government.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ BA, f: HR.TO., g: 122, d: 12, 14.1888, g: 92, d: 342, 16.1889, g: 14, d: 343, 02.1899, g: 44, d: 13, 03.1889, g: 14, d: 244, 02.1889; BA, f: Y.A.RES, g: 8, d: 50, 18 Rabiulahir 1307.

⁵⁶ BA, f: Y.A.RES, g: 8, d: 50, 18 Rabiulahir 1307; f: HR.TO., g: 78, d: 12, 13.1888.

⁵⁷ DHAGMFA, 68:1 (1843), "Mufti Zade Serif to Deputy [Ottoman] Ambassador K. Mousouron, Chalkida, 14 January 1843"; "Secretariat of Interior to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 25 March 1843."

⁵⁸ DHAGMFA, 20:1–14 (1852), "Greek Ambassador in Istanbul to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pera, 9 August 1852."

Ottoman patronage established a special relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Euboean Muslims that helped channel the Muslim exodus to Ottoman territories. The last Muslims of Karystos left in the 1870s, thus limiting Muslim presence on the island mostly to Chalkida.⁵⁹ Even the Muslim community of Chalkida was reported to number less than 100 people in August 1877: only five students studied in the only Muslim elementary school, and the last imam died in May 1889.⁶⁰ By the turn of the twentieth century, fewer than ten Muslim families lived in Chalkida, and in 1920, three years prior to the compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange of the 1923 Convention, only four Muslims lived in the city: an educated, Greek-speaking Muslim woman, two uneducated Muslim women (one Albanian-speaking and one Turkish-speaking), and an uneducated Turkish-speaking Muslim man. After 1923, the only evidences of the erstwhile thriving Muslim community of Chalkida were the crumbling remnants of Ottoman monuments and the Muslim cemetery, which had a guardian hired by the Turkish embassy in Athens until 1926.⁶¹

The Megali Idea

The Megali Idea was a visionary irredentist concept of Greek nationalism that expressed the goal of establishing a Greek state that would encompass all ethnic Greek-inhabited areas, including the Greek Orthodox populations still under Ottoman rule and all the regions that had traditionally belonged to Greeks in ancient times, such as the southern Balkans, Anatolia, and Cyprus.⁶² This state would have Constantinople (Istanbul) as its capital. The Megali Idea was first articulated by the Greek prime minister Ioannis Kolettis, during his political debates with King Otto preceding the promulgation of the 1844 constitution: “the Kingdom of Hellas is not Hellas; it is merely a part: the smallest, poorest part of Hellas. The Hellene is not only he who inhabits the Kingdom, but also he who lives in Ioannina, Salonica or Serres . . . or Constantinople . . . or any other region belonging to Hellenic history or the Hellenic race. . . . There are two great centers of Hellenism.

⁵⁹ Alexander Bouchon, *Voyage dans l’Eubée*, 27.

⁶⁰ *Times* (London), 31 August 1877, 9; *Ervípos*, May 6, 1889, 1.

⁶¹ BA, f: HR.İM, g: 58, d: 179, 15 March 1926.

⁶² Anastasia Stouraiti and Alexander Kazamias, “The Imaginary Topographies”; Elli Skopetea, *To ‘Prototypo Vasileio’*; Vasilis Kremmydas, *I Megali Idea*.

Athens is the capital of the kingdom. Constantinople is the great capital, the dream and hope of all Hellenes.”⁶³

Although first articulated in 1844, the Megali Idea had long roots in the Greek psyche going back to Ottoman times, as witnessed by popular sayings such as “Once more, as years, and time go by, once more they [i.e., these lands] shall be ours!” The Megali Idea was to dominate Greece’s foreign and domestic politics until 1923. The Megali Idea identified the Ottoman Empire as Greece’s main rival and, given the empire’s Islamic character as well as its patronage of Greece’s Muslims, regarded Muslims as the empire’s Trojan Horse in the Greek national polity. The Megali Idea, along with the fact that Muslims were not adherents of Christianity, the religion that Greek constitutions and legal documents regarded as an indispensable element of Greek national identity, was also the reason that Muslims did not serve in the Greek army.

After the mid-1870s, when the bulk of Euboean Muslims had left for the Ottoman Empire, a series of articles that appeared in the local Euboean Greek press commended the peaceful harmony in which Orthodox Christian and Muslims were living in Euboea. Some of the Greek local newspapers showed a keen interest in the life and well-being of the Muslim community and criticized the Greek authorities for any failures or wrongdoings in relation to Euboean Muslims. On 4 August 1877 the Greek newspaper *Evoia* stated: “[Muslims and Jews] are not different from us, and no difference would be noticeable, were it not for the fez which Muslim men wear and the ‘special dress’ of Muslim women.”⁶⁴ On 12 August 1876, an article in *Evoia* entitled “Cohabitation of Christians and Ottomans” reads: “the testimonies of all Ottomans [i.e., Muslims] in Chalkida are that they enjoy the same rights as their Christian fellows without exception, and Christians and Muslims love each other like brothers. . . . In no other city is this truth more apparent than in Chalkida. . . . [This is something] that [British prime minister William] Gladstone admitted in the House of Commons. Christians, Ottomans and Jews live in brotherly love under the Christian government [i.e., the Greek government].”⁶⁵ On 31 August 1877, an editorial in the *Times* of London, republished by the Greek newspapers *Evripo*s in Euboea and *Nea Imera* in Trieste, concluded: “the Greeks do not wish to turn the Ottomans out of Greece, but to keep them as faithful subjects of a just government.”⁶⁶

⁶³ Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision*, 2.

⁶⁴ *Evoia*, 4 August 1877, 1–2.

⁶⁵ *Evoia*, 12 August 1876, 3.

⁶⁶ *Times* (London), 31 August 1877, 9; *Evripo*s, 3 September 1877, 1–2.

These articles should be seen in the context of the Great Eastern Crisis of the late 1870s. In 1875 Hercegovina rebelled against Ottoman rule. The rebellion encouraged Slavic populations in the northeastern Balkans, Serbia, and Montenegro to take up arms against the Ottomans. A widely held view in Athens and other European capitals was that territorial borders would soon be redrawn in the Balkans, opening an opportunity for Greece to fulfil the goals of the Megali Idea. Athens coveted Ottoman territories with sizeable Greek Orthodox Christian populations in Thessaly, Macedonia, Epirus, and elsewhere, but other ethnic and religious groups also lived there. If Greece wished to make qualifying claims on these territories, it had to show a record of fair rule of its populations who were not Greek Orthodox Christians, and especially of Muslims, in whom Istanbul would have particular interest before relinquishing its sovereignty in these territories. Newspapers aimed to influence public opinion and create a positive impression in diplomatic circles that could be capitalized on during future diplomatic negotiations. Articles in newspapers with global readership, such as the *Times* of London, could have a real impact, and should be viewed in the context of British foreign policy aims at the time. The British government was concerned about the decline of the Ottoman Empire because it had stemmed Russia's influence in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. After the end of the Crimean War, as Athens was distancing itself from Russia and increasingly coming under British influence, the British had an interest in seeing any lost Ottoman territories come under Greek control rather than under the influence of Russia through Slavic proxy states in the region.

Muslim Properties

The Kingdom of Hellas's aim was to sweep away the entire Ottoman Islamic legal and social order. This was in line with the general spirit of the Greek War of Independence, which regarded this legal and social order as abhorrent to Greeks (Hellenes) and to most subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Sharia was *prima facie* repugnant in independent Greece and had to be officially extirpated. In reality, however, it was impossible to ignore Ottoman legal precedents in certain areas, especially in land use and taxation. Greek authorities had to refer to these precedents regarding landholding, where legal continuity was essential if they wanted the rights enjoyed by Christians under

Ottoman rule to be honored.⁶⁷ This was true in property transactions, particularly in eastern Rumeli and Euboea. During the diplomatic negotiations for Greece's independence, eastern Rumeli and Euboea had been occupied by the Ottoman army. The Ottoman authorities had agreed that these areas were to come under Greek rule, providing that the Muslims who lived there would retain the rights to their private properties and would be allowed to sell these rights, should they wish to, within a stipulated time. The Greek authorities had adopted the *Hexabiblos* (*Promptuarium* in Latin; *Sheshtiknizhia* in Russian), a law book in six volumes written in 1344–1345 by Konstantinos Armenopoulos, a senior judge of Salonica. It was first used as the interim civil code in 1828 in the territories under Greek control and, in 1835, became the official civil code of the kingdom, remaining valid until 1946. First printed in 1540 in Paris, the *Hexabiblos* compiles a range of Byzantine legal sources. It was the chief book of law for Christians in Ottoman times and, along with local customary laws, served as the legal basis for the resolution of civil disputes.⁶⁸

It was not always easy to translate legal rights from Ottoman law to those of the *Hexabiblos* because they represented two different legal systems that embodied differing philosophies. For example, even after the introduction of the Ottoman land code of 1858, which aimed to rationalize the chaos of Ottoman land affairs, Ottoman land law was still complex and inconsistent.⁶⁹ It recognized a system of shared rights in property that led to great complexity in matters of land tenure. A single property might have a sovereign or residual owner, probably the state or a religious institution; a usufructuary holding the right in perpetuity or for as long as there were no heirs to claim it; a tax farmer holding a lease to manage the property and collect its revenues; and peasant tenants who might hold occupancy rights in perpetuity. Greek authorities often translated the right of *tassaruf*, that is, the right for usufruct of a public land, to full ownership. This right might have been perpetual and hereditary in Ottoman times, but it did not de jure correspond to full ownership. Only *mülk* lands (lands held in complete ownership) corresponded to full proprietorship by contemporary European standards. Extensive pieces of land and a great number of buildings owned by Muslims and non-Muslims

⁶⁷ Georgios Nakos, *To Nomiko Kathestos*, 180–213.

⁶⁸ OGG, no. 7, 7 March 1835.

⁶⁹ François Belin, *Étude sur la Propriété*; Vera Mutafčieva and Strashimir Dimitrov, *Sur l' État*; Kemal Karpat, "The Land Regime."

were *evkaf* properties, inalienable charitable endowments under sharia for Islamic religious or charitable purposes with no option for reclaiming these assets. There were many different types of *evkaf*, and the legal status of each was determined by the will of its donor. This already complex picture was complicated further in cases of property sales, exchange, rental, or sublease of these different rights in a number of ways.

This complexity was challenging enough in Ottoman times but became almost chaotic during the Greek War of Independence due to the prolonged period of turmoil and lawlessness. There were families who continued to work farms where their forebears had held various rights; landless families who had settled on state lands and remained undisturbed, paying the usufruct tax; still others who claimed their farms as fully private property on the basis of alleged legal acquisition prior to the Greek War of Independence. Very few were able to present property titles in support of their claims, and disputes and litigation were endless.⁷⁰ Thus, in December 1832 the Greek committee responsible for the sale of Muslim properties in Attica and Euboea warned potential buyers of Muslim properties to beware of fake property titles.⁷¹ Greek authorities often operated under a system of political patronage, where state actors were not always keen to observe the rule of law. Legal arrangements and documents were seen as of little importance or were interpreted as these officials saw fit at the time. At one time, the Ottomans had maintained an elaborate system of land and tax records, but the decline of Ottoman administration after the seventeenth century had also affected these records, which became filled with inconsistencies and irregularities.⁷² Imperfect as they were, Ottoman records were denied to the Greek provisional governments during the Greek War of Independence, while local Ottoman records in areas under rebellion were destroyed or removed by departing Ottoman officials. A government committee that was appointed to gather information concerning land, population, and taxation in eastern Rumeli in 1828 reported that archival records were unreliable prior to the revolution due to the disorder that had prevailed under Ottoman rule. During the war, “everything was destroyed, not a register nor any other public document was saved” that could shed light on those matters.

⁷⁰ McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, 208.

⁷¹ OGG, no. 15, 27 April 1838, 70.

⁷² McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, 29; George Ludwig Von Maurer, *Das Griechische Volk*, vol. 1, 123.

The Ottoman governor of İzzedin, present-day Lamia, removed the region's tax and property records to Yenişehir, present-day Larissa.⁷³

The expulsion of a large number of Muslims from territories controlled by Greek insurgents during the Greek War of Independence freed vast real estate holdings of both Muslim individuals and the Ottoman state, which were seized by Greek insurgents exploiting the turmoil of war. Most of the properties, however, between 1,482,600 and 2,471,000 million acres, came under public control and became known as *ethnikes gaies*, national estates.⁷⁴ In a region with very few forms of wealth other than agriculture, the *ethnikes gaies* were viewed as public assets that might help place the new state's finances on a sound footing. The provisional governments in power between 1821 and 1832 sold off some of the *ethnikes gaies* and pledged others in mortgage schemes. In 1871 the Greek government introduced a program that distributed most of the arable land of the *ethnikes gaies* to landless peasants, and legalized the arbitrary planting of vines and trees on the national estates. The program was intended to fulfill at last the repeated promise of the Hellenic Parliament to grant the lands liberated from Ottoman control to Greek nationals, who would be able to cultivate them as full independent proprietors.⁷⁵

The July 1832 Treaty of Kalender Köşk distinguished between Muslim properties as: (1) those in regions under Greek control in 1832, where Muslim proprietors would have no further claims, and (2) those in eastern Rumeli and Euboea, held by Ottoman forces and ceded to Greece by the terms of the Treaty of Kalender Köşk, whereby Muslims retained rights to private property, including individual interests in *evkaf* properties where individuals held interests as tenants or as hereditary trustees and which would be treated as private properties, eligible for sale within eighteen months after the demarcation of the Greco-Ottoman border. These *evkaf* properties are known as *evkaf adi*.⁷⁶

Soon after the news of the signing of the 1830 London Protocol for the establishment of a sovereign Greek state became known, Muslim holders of large estates in eastern Rumeli and Euboea began to sell their properties and

⁷³ Foreign Office Archives at the British National Archives, London (henceforth FO), 32:23, no. 66, "Dawkins to Palmerston, 18 December 1831"; DHAGMFA, 27 (1828), "Christodoulos Ainian and Spyridon Kalogeropoulos to the Panhellenic, 18 September 1828."

⁷⁴ Georgios Nakos, "Ai 'Megalai Dýnameis,'" 488–491.

⁷⁵ William McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, 207–214.

⁷⁶ FO, 421/4, 6:47, Protocol of the Conference of London of 26 September 1831; William McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, 51.

move to the Ottoman Empire. Although these areas were held at the time by the Ottoman army, these Muslim landholders became aware through diplomatic connections in Istanbul that the future territorial status of eastern Rumeli and Euboea was uncertain. In August 1830 the Examining Committee of Ottoman Land Properties was formed. The committee consisted only of Greeks appointed by the Greek provisional government of Ioannis Kapodistrias who were tasked to check the authenticity of Ottoman property titles, to oversee the fairness of property transactions of Greek citizens in eastern Rumeli and Euboea, and to ratify property sales. This committee appears under various names in official documents, for example, the Ratification Committee on Property Sale Contracts, the Examining Committee of Ottoman Land Properties in Attica and Euboea, the Examining Committee for Divestments and Sales of Ottoman Properties in Attica and Euboea, and others. The committee operated until the end of 1849, when it was formally dissolved.⁷⁷ Afterward, the Ottoman government would send to Greece a sharia court judge or an Ottoman law expert who checked property titles for those interested in selling their properties or issued new titles where property titles were missing and then certified the validity of the sale transaction. The certificate was submitted to the Examining Committee for ratification, which then had to be confirmed by Greek state authorities before it was submitted to a local Greek court for validation of the property transaction. The Greek authorities and Greek courts accepted Ottoman property titles translated into Greek if they were certified to be authentic.⁷⁸

The main role of the Greco-Ottoman Committee, formed in 1836, was to adjudicate property sale transactions between Greeks and the Ottoman citizens who sold their properties in eastern Rumeli and Euboea under the Treaty of Kalender Köşk and moved to the Ottoman Empire. It oversaw the sale of Muslims' assets, checked their title deeds, and worked out compromises between interested parties in cases of property disputes, before reaching a final decision. In cases of split votes or objections, property disputes were rejudged by the deputy chair of the Council of State (*Symvoulion tis Epikrateias*), the supreme administrative council of the kingdom, which was founded in 1835. This procedure remained despite the fact that the Ottoman government disputed the prerogative of the Greek state to make final decisions about

⁷⁷ OGG, no. 45, 14 December 1849.

⁷⁸ DHAGMFA, 7:1A–B (1832), “Detailed Memo from the Examining Committee to the Greek Government Regarding Divestment, Athens, 21 July 1832.”

contested property transactions rather than Britain, France, and Russia, the three guarantors of Greece's independence.⁷⁹ After 1839, the rejudgment of property disputes was conducted by ad hoc arbitrators, high-ranking state administrators or judges appointed by the Greek government.⁸⁰ The main rationale for establishing the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee was to accelerate the ratification of property sales in the kingdom by Muslims who wished to move to the Ottoman Empire within eighteen months of the demarcation of the Greco-Ottoman border, in line with the Treaty of Kalender Köşk. However, the committee's scope also included the adjudication of property sales where Muslim proprietors had already moved to the Ottoman Empire or were not Ottoman citizens.

The 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee consisted of four members, two appointed by the Greek government and the other two by the Ottoman Porte. A number of Ottoman appointees in the committee, such as G. Konemenos and I. Adamantidis, in 1859, were Orthodox Christian Ottoman citizens.⁸¹ The idea of a mixed judicial committee with half of its members Ottoman citizens to adjudicate property transactions in sovereign Greece was not always well received by the Greek political class and the public. A letter of 5 January 1837 from the secretary of justice to the secretary of foreign affairs reads: "what an unpleasant impression has caused to the public the view of Ottoman [officials] meeting in Hellas to irreversibly adjudicate Hellenes."⁸² After the adoption of the 1844 constitution, which abolished King Otto's absolute rule and established constitutional monarchy in Greece, the local authorities in eastern Rumeli and Euboea proposed a number of initiatives to abolish the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee on the basis that the new constitution forbade the establishment of any judicial commissions or emergency courts under any name. All these initiatives were dismissed by the Greek government, however, on the basis that the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee did not run counter to the 1844 constitution because it was founded on the basis of international treaties, such as the Treaty of Kalender Köşk, that had founded the kingdom.⁸³

⁷⁹ DHAGMFA, 7:1A–B (1841), "C. Musurus [à] Monsieur le Secrétaire d' État J. Rizos, Athènes, 23 Octobre 1841."

⁸⁰ OGG, no. 21, 10 October 1839.

⁸¹ OGG, no. 30, 2 August 1852; OGG, no. 27, 24 July 1861.

⁸² DHAGMFA, 7:1A–B (1837), "Secretary of Justice to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 5 January 1837."

⁸³ DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1845), "The Minister of Justice to the Governor of Euboea, Athens, 24 January 1845."

The scope of Greek courts and that of the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee overlapped, however, often causing confusion on which cases of property dispute were within the purview of Greek courts and which should be decided by the 1836 Greco-Ottoman committee. Thus, in June 1836, the Greek government gave to the Areios Pagos, the supreme court of the kingdom, the right to decide which property disputes fell in the purview of the Greek courts and which in the purview of the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee.⁸⁴ Three months earlier, in April 1836, the Greek government had ordered that citizens who had legal disputes with Muslims had to take these disputes to Greek courts or even seek Muslims' detention if necessary, until July 1836. After that date no legal differences should prevent Muslims who wished to move to the Ottoman Empire from leaving the country because "[the government] wished to facilitate the migration of Ottoman residents to their own state, which is sometimes prevented by judicial impediments around the time of their departure."⁸⁵ To accelerate legal procedures to the benefit of Muslims who wished to move to the Ottoman Empire, a bill was passed in November 1836 that ordered Greek courts to prioritize pending trials on property sales of Muslims who wished to emigrate.⁸⁶ Besides accelerating legal procedures, these measures also revealed the Greek government's anxiety to show that its sovereignty had been not diminished by the establishment of the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee. An intragovernmental memo of 7 September 1836 stated that "it was against the nature of independent states to be subject to a foreign court where trivial cases of foreign citizens are judged" and, therefore, the government had decided to reduce the role of the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee to that of an advisory organ to Greek courts, which henceforth should be the only institutions to decide legal disputes about Muslims' properties.⁸⁷

The Greco-Ottoman Committee completed any pending cases under examination by the end of January 1862, when it legally ceased to be.⁸⁸ All legal disputes on property issues after that date were settled in Greek courts. Though it is difficult to estimate the exact volume and value of Muslims'

⁸⁴ OGG, no. 57, 16 October 1836.

⁸⁵ OGG, no. 14, 14 April 1836.

⁸⁶ OGG, no. 65, 14 November 1836, "Royal Decree Regarding the Migration of Ottomans, Athens, 10 November 1836."

⁸⁷ It was common in the nineteenth century, however, for consular courts with a limited scope of responsibilities to operate in a country's territory. For instance, Greek consular courts operated in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.

⁸⁸ OGG, no. 28, 15 July 1859; DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1862), "The Mixed Committee, Athens, 30 January 1862."

property sales due to the lack of credible sources, it is believed that around two-thirds of the arable lands in the territories that formed the Kingdom of Hellas had belonged to Muslims, and were either confiscated or encroached upon by Greeks or sold by Muslim owners to residents of the kingdom, mostly Greeks.⁸⁹ In Attica alone, approximately 180,000 Muslim assets and 20,000 *stremmata* (4,942 acres) of Muslim land, worth 1,981,407 Ottoman *kuruş* (£17,851 or \$89,253), changed hands between 1833 and 1839 (see Map 2.2 in Chapter 2, this book). In the district of Thivais the total value of Muslim land sold during the same period is estimated at 1,703,500 Ottoman *kuruş* (£15,347 or \$76,734). Available sources show that fewer than 20 percent of Muslim property transactions were examined by the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee, which was particularly busy during the first few years after its establishment. In 1849, the committee handled only eleven cases.⁹⁰ The rest were overseen by Greek courts, the 1830 Examining Committee on Ottoman Land Properties, and a few specialized committees. One such specialist committee was the Greco-Ottoman Committee on Disputed Forests, whose main task was to determine the future status of forests in eastern Rumeli and Euboea. There were also Greek committees with limited geographic scope, such as the Committee of the Ottoman Estates in the district of Fthiotida.⁹¹ Throughout this period there was ongoing, direct discussion between the Ottoman and Greek governments. Two diplomatic representatives, one appointed by the Greek government and one by the Ottoman Porte, met frequently to evaluate the progress of all the property committees' work and to resolve any problems that might have arisen. Despite genuine intentions to divide the labor and accelerate the process of the transition from the Ottoman property tenure system to the law of the Kingdom of Hellas, the proliferation of committees caused overlaps in their work, which was both confusing and counterproductive.

A number of disputed Muslim property issues were also settled through Greco-Ottoman bilateral agreements: in February 1844 the kingdom signed a convention with the Ottoman Empire by which Athens agreed to pay the total sum of 549,000 *kuruş* (*grosia*, or piastres, in Greek), including 8 percent interest, to buy all the rights on *şerif-i evlad* properties from the

⁸⁹ Paraskevas Konortas, "Les Musulmans"; Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 110; Effi Allamani, "Gegenota," 70–100; Ioanna Diamantourou, "Explosi," 110; Apostolos Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tou Neou Ellinismou*, vol. 5, 311; vols. 6 and 7.

⁹⁰ DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1849), "Mixed Committee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 16 November 1849."

⁹¹ DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1857).

Ottoman Empire held by the Ottoman state or Ottoman subjects, including Muslims in eastern Rumeli and Euboea.⁹² Through similar Greco-Ottoman agreements, in September 1837 the kingdom had bought all property rights from the Ottoman state and subjects in the district of Thivais in eastern Rumeli and in March 1838 in the districts of Euboea and Attica.⁹³ These property settlements were conducted in a rush, under pressure by Britain, France, and Russia for the Ottoman Empire to settle any ongoing issues with the kingdom.

The Greek authorities had little choice but to accept in principle the validity of Ottoman law, including sharia, and incorporate it de facto in the country's domestic legal framework. Their purpose was to avoid injustices, correct abuses of property rights, and provide legal continuity to the residents of the new state—not to establish a legal dualism, as was the case after 1881.⁹⁴ Thus, a state document of 1846 regarding the operations of the 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee instructs the committee members that “the litigation of [property] differences produced by Ottoman law [should be conducted] with whatever [law] is valid in Hellas, with Ottoman law, and the prevailing customs of the Ottoman state.”⁹⁵ The 1836 Greco-Ottoman Committee and the other committees involved in property transactions, as well as the Greek courts, often consulted with the Ottoman authorities and sharia courts that operated in Athens, Chalkida, Nafplio, and other towns during the first three decades of the kingdom, seeking their aid in issuing property titles and confirming their authenticity and seeking their advice on property disputes that required expertise on Ottoman law and sharia.⁹⁶

⁹² OGG, no. 12, 25 April 1844. *Serif-i evlad* was a kind of family trust whereby a donor placed his property under *vakif* legal status—he donated it to a Muslim holy or charitable institution—and his heirs enjoyed part of the trust's income in perpetuity. Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*; Randi Deguilhem, *Les Waqf*; Dilek Kurban and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *A Tale of Reciprocity*.

⁹³ OGG, no. 10, 22 March 1838.

⁹⁴ Georgios Nakos, *To Nomiko Kathestos*, 180–213.

⁹⁵ DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1846).

⁹⁶ *Chronos* (Nafplion), 11 June 1833, 50–51; Stefanos Papageorgiou, *Archeio*, vol. 2, 112, 121; Nikolaos Ioannidis, *Evretirion*.

5

The Annexation of Thessaly

The Great Eastern Crisis

The 1875 uprising in Hercegovina and the series of rebellions it triggered among Slavic populations in Serbia, Montenegro, and the north-eastern Balkans were precipitated by the harsh treatment of peasants, mostly non-Muslims, by Ottoman provincial rulers and led to ruthless military reactions by the regular Ottoman army and Ottoman militias (*başibozuk*). These inflamed anti-Ottoman sentiments in Europe and drew the Ottoman state into wars with the autonomous principalities of Serbia and Montenegro in 1876–1878, as well as with Russia in 1877–1878.¹ The Russo-Ottoman War ended in March 1878 with the Treaty of San Stefano, which provided for the creation of the Principality of Bulgaria, self-governed by a Christian government and with the right to field an army. Though de jure vassal to the Ottoman state, the principality was meant to function de facto as an independent nation. Its territory would include the plain between the Danube and the Balkan mountain range, the regions of Sofia, Pirot, and Vranje in the Morava valley, northern Thrace, and nearly the entire region of Macedonia. Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania would also increase their territories and become independent states. The *vilayet* (Ottoman administrative district) of Bosnia-Hercegovina would become an autonomous province, and Crete, Epirus, and Thessaly were to receive limited forms of local self-government.²

Austria-Hungary and Great Britain were displeased with the Treaty of San Stefano, since it increased Russia's influence in Southeastern Europe. Serbia feared that the establishment of a big Bulgarian state would harm its interests in the former and remaining Ottoman territories. As a result, representatives of Russia, Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, the Ottoman

¹ William Ewart Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*; Richard Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*.

² Lucien Frary and Mara Kozelsky, *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands*; Alexander Lyon Macfie, *The Eastern Question*; Miroslav Šedivý, *Crisis among the Great Powers*.

Empire, Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro met at the Congress of Berlin on 13 June 1878 to revise the Treaty of San Stefano and determine the future territories of the Balkan states. The Congress ended with the signing on 13 July 1878 of the Treaty of Berlin, which recognized the independence of the de facto sovereign principalities of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, which proclaimed themselves kingdoms. Serbia was not permitted to appropriate Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, or the district of Novi Pazar. Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Britain acquired Cyprus, in order to balance the presumed Russian influence in the newly autonomous Bulgaria. The large Bulgarian state of San Stefano was divided into three parts: (1) the Principality of Bulgaria, a de facto independent political entity but de jure vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, squeezed between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains, with access to the Black Sea but not to the Aegean; (2) the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, encompassing the territory between the Balkan Mountains, the Rhodope Mountains, and Strandzha, remaining under the political and military jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire; and (3) the wider region of Macedonia, returned to Ottoman rule. Romania ceded to Russia the province of Bessarabia, a major grain-producing region populated by Romanian speakers that commanded the Danube delta, in exchange for the much poorer region of northern Dobrudzha, populated mostly by Turkish-speaking Muslims and Tatars. The Treaty of Berlin called vaguely for a border rectification between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, which was decided, after protracted negotiations, with the 2 July 1881 Convention of Istanbul.³ Thessaly, except for the district of Elassona, plus the district of Arta in Epirus, was ceded to Greece (see Map 2.1 in Chapter 2, this book).

The Treaty of Berlin ended the Great Eastern Crisis of the 1870s. However, although its intention was to offer partial satisfaction of Balkan national aspirations in the region, to control the expansion of Russia's influence in Southeastern Europe, and to mitigate the territorial decimation of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty failed to curb rising regional nationalism and laid the foundations for new frictions in the future. The Greeks had hoped to gain Crete and the remaining Aegean islands and continued to dream of the fulfilment of the Megali Idea.⁴ The Albanian-speaking populations in the

³ Act 973, OGG, no. 14, 13 March 1882.

⁴ Roderic Davison, "The Ottoman-Greek Frontier," 190.

western Balkans did not gain much, and they initiated their own national movement, fearing the future partition of their lands by the intervention of the Great Powers.⁵ The Treaty of Berlin set in motion forces that shaped Balkan politics well after World War I.⁶

The Muslims of Thessaly

Thessaly's annexation to Greece was a landmark for the Muslims of the kingdom. It was the first time after 1832 that the Muslim population in Greece increased significantly. When the Ionian Islands, under British protection by then, had been ceded to Greece on 2 May 1864, the number of Muslims in the country had not changed much: the Ionian Islands had never come under Ottoman sovereignty, which mostly explains the absence of sizeable Muslim populations. Greece's 1907 national census shows that seventy-two Muslims lived on Corfu and another two on Paxoi. During the compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange in 1923, approximately 100 Muslims, from Lefkada, who seem to have settled in the islands after 1864, moved to Asia Minor.⁷ Approximately 40,000 Muslims lived in Thessaly prior to its annexation to Greece, about 11 percent of the region's population (see Map 5.1, Tables 5.1 and 5.2).⁸ The Muslims of Thessaly comprised Turkish-speaking Koniaroi or Koniarotourkoi;⁹ Albanian-speakers; 125 families of Tatars, Turkish-speaking Muslims of Tatarstan in Russia, who had moved to Thessaly after the Crimean War; Circassians from the northwestern Caucasus, who had moved to Thessaly during the Great Eastern Crisis and settled in Almyros and Velestino in eastern Thessaly and Loxades in western Thessaly; Islamized Greek-speakers and Vlach-speakers in northwestern Thessaly,¹⁰ and Roma, who lived as nomads and were spread throughout the region. Regardless of mother tongue, many Muslims were bilingual or multilingual. Most Muslims were Sunnis, but there were an indeterminate number of Bektaşı

⁵ Basil Kondis, "The Albanian Nationalist Movement"; Arben Puto, "Le Congrès de Berlin."


⁶ Mark Biondich, *The Balkans*, 46–49.

⁷ Alexander Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 116; OGG, no. 192, 18 July 1908.

⁸ Effi Allamani, "I Zoi," 396; Michel Sivignon, *La Thessalie*, 97.

⁹ Dimitrios Tsopotos, *Gi kai Georgoi*, 38–43; Machiel Kiel, "Das Türkische Thessalien."

¹⁰ Evangelia Gouglaki-Ziozia, "Oi Othomanoi."



Map 5.1 Concentration of Muslims in Ottoman Thessaly until 1881. Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique* (Berlin, 1986)

and Mevlevi Sufis, mainly Albanian-speaking Muslims who lived predominantly in rural areas.

Most Muslims lived in towns such as Yenisehir, present-day Larissa; Velestino, present-day Velestino; Alasonya, present-day Elassona. Prior to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, approximately 10,800 Muslims lived in Yenisehir, representing 54 percent of the town's population, and owned 75 percent of the town's real estate, and there were twenty-seven mosques. Approximately 3,000 Muslims, 10 percent of the population, lived in the town of Tirhala, present-day Trikala, with fourteen mosques; 2,385 Muslims, 48 percent of the population, lived in Karditsa; and 1,500 Muslims, 31 percent of the population, in Volos. During the same time, almost all the 264 *çiftlik*s, large estates under hereditary land management, in the region were owned by Muslims, some of whom lived in towns and others in *konaks*, fortified mansions in the countryside. Most Muslims were *çiftlik* serfs, a very few owned and cultivated

Table 5.1 Religious composition of the population in Epirus (1880)

District	Greeks (i.e., Greek Orthodox)	Ottomans (i.e., Muslims)	Israelis (i.e., Jews)
Ioannina	96,560	5,056	2,800
Paramythia	13,332	4,350	
Metsovo	11,000		
Preveza	13,600	1,500	
Arta	44,580	1,050	
Margariti	5,600	14,100	
Parga	6,816	1,063	
Total	191,488	27,119	2,800

Table 5.2 Religious composition of the population in Thessaly (1880)

District	Greeks (i.e., Greek Orthodox)	Ottomans (i.e., Muslims)	Israelis (i.e., Jews)
Larissa	66,750	18,500	3,700
Volos-Velestino	68,750	2,680	350
Farsala-Domokos	50,065	3,500	
Karditsa-Agrafa	65,540	4,300	
Trikala	14,350	3,100	300
Almyros	75,000	1,350	
Elassona	5,850	3,700	
Total	346,305	37,130	4,350

their own land, and some were self-employed in low-paying occupations such as basket-makers, shoemakers, and smiths.

The Legal Status of Muslims

During negotiations at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the Greek authorities offered assurances to the Great Powers of Europe and the Ottoman government that the Muslims of Thessaly would feel “neither fear nor apprehension with regard to their future and status, which would be both respected and preserved by the new [Greek] authorities” after

Thessaly's annexation to Greece.¹¹ The 1881 Greco-Ottoman Convention of Istanbul provided that the lives, honor, properties, religious, and cultural autonomy of Thessaly's Muslims would be respected; allowed the operation of sharia courts in the region; and involved the sheikh-ul Islam of Istanbul, the most senior Muslim religious official in the Ottoman Empire after the sultan, in the appointment of Muslim religious officials and the adjudication of religious festivals and prayer times for Thessalian Muslims. The jurisdiction of Thessaly's sharia courts would be solely confined to religious, family, and property inheritance issues under sharia. Thus, the convention *de jure* introduced a parallel legal system to the civil code of the *Hexabiblos*, which applied to Muslims for all issues, except for those of religion, family, and property inheritance. The Convention declared that Thessalian Muslims would enjoy the same civil and political rights as *ek genetis Ellines polites*, "Hellene citizens by birth." These Muslims were given three years to choose between Greek and Ottoman citizenship. If they chose to become Ottoman citizens, they had to leave Greece. A number of Muslims who did not want to become Greek citizens or leave Greece acquired Austrian or other European citizenship and remained in Thessaly.¹²

The provisions of the Greco-Ottoman Convention of Istanbul were also confirmed by the Greco-Ottoman Treaty of Istanbul of 4 December 1897, which terminated the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897.¹³ Based on the provisions of the Convention of Istanbul, Greece introduced a corpus of special laws for the administration of Thessaly's Muslims that regulated Muslims' relations with the Greek state, determined the jurisdiction of Muslim institutions, and defined the civil and political rights of Muslims, to protect them from assimilationist or arbitrary policies.¹⁴ Islamic customs like polygamy were respected by Greek courts and were not regarded as punishable crimes, as they were for non-Muslims.¹⁵ Greek law did not force Muslim women to attend court hearings, unless they concerned serious crimes like murder. If a Muslim woman did not wish to testify in court hearings, her testimony was taken in writing by investigating

¹¹ FO, 32:530, "Letter from Ford to Granville, 19 June 1881"; *Paliggenesia*, 18 August 1881, 1.

¹² The three-year period was later extended until 1889. Alexandros Vamvetsos, *Mikrai Nomikai Meletai*, 50.

¹³ Ioannis Pikros, "O Ellinotourtikos Polemos"; Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, "The Origins."

¹⁴ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 35.

¹⁵ *Thessalia*, 10 August 1885, 1 and 14 August 1885, 1.

magistrates or public prosecutors at her home or at the local mufti's residence.¹⁶ Thessalian Muslim males were exempted from military service through a series of acts reciprocating the exemption of non-Muslim subjects from Ottoman military service after paying a *bedl-i askeri* (military service tax).¹⁷

The legal status of Muslims in Thessaly was similar to the legal status provided to Muslim populations in other independent Balkan states with Christian religious majorities, such as Bulgaria and Serbia, following the Great Eastern Crisis. The issue of the protection of minority rights was becoming more relevant in an often politically and militarily troubled Europe. Thanks to new technologies, such as the steamship and the electric telegraph, people were aware of the horrors reported from the battlefields of major conflicts such as the Crimean War and the Ottoman atrocities against Bulgarian insurgents during the Great Eastern Crisis. This put additional pressure on international meetings to address the protection of minority rights. The 1856 Congress of Paris following the Crimean War had been preoccupied with the status of Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire and resulted in the introduction of the Islahât Fermâni, the Ottoman Reform Decree of 1856.

The 1878 Congress of Berlin was also preoccupied with minority rights in the Balkans. However, prior to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I, no international legal framework existed to ensure that a specific group considered to be vulnerable, disadvantaged, or marginalized would achieve equality and be protected from discrimination and persecution. The status of minority groups depended largely on the goodwill of the host state, as well as on the political leverage of third states in international meetings, to secure their protection and status. The Ottoman state was keen to protect Muslims in former Ottoman territories. The conditions in Thessaly had emerged from lengthy negotiations, not from an uprising or a Greco-Ottoman war. During the negotiations, the Ottoman government secured special legal status for the Muslims in Ottoman territories that had been lost during the Great Eastern Crisis, including Thessaly, in exchange for the Tanzimât reforms it had introduced for its non-Muslim populations.

¹⁶ Act 956, OGG, no. 36, 18 May 1882.

¹⁷ Act 969, OGG, no. 39, 26 May 1882; Act 1677, OGG, no. 328, 24 December 1888; Act 2250, OGG, no. 23, 15 December 1894; Act 2672, OGG, no. 9, 12 January 1900; Act 3361, OGG, no. 102, 8 May 1909.

Muslim Institutions in Thessaly

Muslim institutions in Thessaly, the most important of which were the muftis' offices and the Muslim community councils, had a special legal status. Both institutions were established in Ottoman times and assumed increased powers in the post-Ottoman era. This development, as in other Balkan states with Muslim minorities and Christian majorities such as Bulgaria and Serbia, in many ways replicated the power structure and functions of non-Muslim institutions in the Tanzimat era. The status of Thessalian Muslims was similar to that of Muslim *millet*s in a Greek Orthodox national space.¹⁸

Muftis

In the Ottoman Empire, muftis, legal experts who could rule on Islamic matters, were nominated and dismissed by the sheikh-ul Islam of Istanbul, and their responsibilities were confined to religious affairs, such as conducting religious services, preaching, and interpreting sharia.¹⁹ In the post-Ottoman period, their powers increased, and their relationship with the sheikh-ul Islam of Istanbul was mainly spiritual. While the sheikh-ul Islam still technically gave his consent to the appointment of Greek muftis, it was the Greek government that now appointed and dismissed muftis after they were elected by the adult Muslim males of their *muftiabs*, or dioceses.

In 1882, the Greek government passed Act 1038, which recognized Muslim dioceses in four Thessalian districts—Larissa, Trikala, Volos, and Farsala.²⁰ The law also officially reappointed the already serving muftis in three of the four *muftiabs*: Mehmet Ismail Effendi in Larissa, Hamni Ismail Effendi in Volos, and Mustafa Mehmet in Farsala. In Trikala the *muftiab* was vacant until Hadji Mehmet Effendi was appointed on 11 March 1883.²¹ The mufti of Larissa ranked above the other muftis, earning a higher salary of 250 drachmas per month while other muftis were paid 150 drachmas per month. His status was also reflected in that he had the privilege of determining the dates of Muslim feasts and the start of the Hajj, the annual

¹⁸ Stefanos Katsikas, "Milletts in Nation States," 54–56; Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "The Pending Modernization."

¹⁹ Georgios Bekiaris, *Oi Mouftides*, 886.

²⁰ OGG., no. 59, 1 July 1882.

²¹ OGG, no. 93, 14 March 1883; Stamatis Georgoulis, *O Thesmos tou Moufti*.

Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, under sharia. Act 1038 provided for the future establishment of new *muftiāhs* by Greek authorities in areas where more than 40,000 Muslims resided. This provision was inactive in Greece prior to the annexation of Epirus, Macedonia, and the Aegean islands in 1913, because no other Muslim population of that size existed in the country prior to that date.

Act 1038 recognized muftis as civil servants in the same manner that non-Muslim religious prelates were recognized by the Ottoman state. They were appointed and paid by the state, which had the right to dismiss them at any time. Their responsibilities were not confined to religious matters but extended to issues such as Muslim education; overseeing the management of *evkaf* properties, mosques, *tekkes*, and other Islamic public properties; and confirming the appointments or dismissals of the managers and trustees of the properties. Muftis also represented their *muftiāhs* to the state, and gained extensive judicial powers relating to marriage, divorce, alimony, and patriarchal power within the Muslim family, which they had lacked in the past. The 1881 Convention of Istanbul provided for the maintenance of sharia courts with jurisdiction over these issues in Thessaly. The 1864 constitution, however, had forbidden the existence of extraordinary courts of any type in Greece and required all judges to be appointed by the king. Thus, the Greek authorities never appointed *hakim* or *kadi*, special judges, to these courts, passing on judicial responsibilities for sharia courts to muftis.²²

Muslim Community Councils

In almost every settlement where *evkaf* existed, Muslim *Cemaat-i İslamiye Encümenleri*, or community councils, were established to assume the responsibilities of the Evkaf Nazareti, the Ottoman Ministry of Imperial Religious Foundations, founded in the Tanzimat period of 1839–1875 to manage the *evkaf* estates of the empire.²³ The Muslim community councils included the mayor of the village, town, or city where the *evkaf* or any other Muslim community property was located, the mufti of the *muftiāh*, and a number of elected Muslim males. Community council service was unpaid. The Muslim

²² Nikolaos Eleftheriadis, *Oi Mousoulmanoi en Elladi*, 22. After the Great Eastern Crisis, muftis assumed similar duties, including judicial responsibilities, in Bulgaria and Serbia. Bilâl Şimşir, *The Turks of Bulgaria*, 45; Dietmar Müller, *Staatbürger auf Widerruf*.

²³ Nikolaos Eleftheriadis, *Oi Mousoulmanoi en Elladi*, 24.

community councils oversaw the management of *evkaf*, had the power to dispose of any movable or immovable assets belonging to the Muslim communities, for example, to rent them and use the income generated as they saw fit. They could also borrow money in the name of the communities and receive donations for mosques and schools. They were responsible for the upkeep of mosques and schools, as well as for inspecting their personnel.²⁴ The powers of the Muslim community councils were restricted; the Greek authorities had the right to remove any council member from office, and to have state auditors review the annual budgets drafted by the councils. Auditors could reject the budgets or send them back to the councils for modification.

Political and Social Life

Despite mass emigrations, Muslims were actively involved in the political and social life of their communities and the country. In Larissa after 1886 three Muslims were actively engaged in public affairs as members of the city council.²⁵ Three Muslims also served on the board of Thessaly's education commission. Muslims were also engaged in the activities of societies and political organizations, such as the Association of Farmers, a nonprofit organization that promoted the interests of those engaged in agriculture.²⁶ Muslims also participated in national elections, despite incidents of electoral fraud aimed at reducing the impact of the Muslim vote. In the general elections of 28 December 1881, Greek police often prevented Muslim voters from reaching the polling stations; those who managed to reach polling stations did not find their names in the voting lists.²⁷ Some areas established separate polling stations for Muslims.²⁸ One cause of these incidents of fraud was confusion on the part of local authorities about electoral law in Thessaly. It was not always clear, for instance, whether the Muslims of Thessaly had to obtain Greek citizenship in order to be eligible to vote.²⁹ Although the Greek government had clarified that citizenship was not a prerequisite for voting in the December 1881 general elections, Ottoman consular authorities often

²⁴ OGG, no. 163, 30 April 1884; OGG, no. 12, 12 February 1885; OGG, no. 44, 17 February 1889.

²⁵ Nicole Immig, "The 'New' Muslim," 518, 522.

²⁶ Nicole Immig, *Zwischen Partizipation*, 261.

²⁷ Gazette of Parliamentary Debates (henceforth GPD), IA, 10 June 1885, 49; *Paliggenesia*, 1 January 1882, 2.

²⁸ Gunnar Hering, *Die Politische Parteien*, vol. 1, 494–499.

²⁹ *Paliggenesia*, 1 January 1882, 2.

signaled that Muslims running for office in Greece would lose their Ottoman citizenship.³⁰ In the 1881 elections, Thessalian Muslims elected two Muslim MPs to the Hellenic parliament, who pledged loyalty to the Greek king and were sworn into office on a copy of the Qur'an, an act that was not received well by some of the Greek press.³¹ Disheartened by the Muslim mass exodus from Thessaly, however, the Muslim MPs seemed to have lost interest in the parliamentary process. They did not participate actively in parliamentary debates, even on issues of interest to their constituents, such as reforming Ottoman land tenure and farm labor relations in Thessaly.³²

Education

A royal decree of 2 October 1882, Act 1013, recognized existing Muslim and Jewish schools in Thessaly.³³ It is not easy to estimate the exact number of operating Muslim schools in Thessaly after the annexation: relevant archival records of that period are missing, and the numbers of Muslims were in constant decline. It appears that in 1883 there were three male and two female primary schools and one male secondary school in Larissa.³⁴ A great many Muslim parents did not send their children to Muslim schools. At a time when school was not compulsory, many Muslim as well as non-Muslim parents in rural areas sacrificed their children's education because they lacked the financial means to afford it or needed their children's labor on their farms and at home. Some Muslims sent their children to Greek schools,³⁵ but the majority of Muslim parents sent their children to Muslim schools, where the teachers' salaries were paid by the Greek state and the cost of maintaining and running the schools was covered by student tuition and the annual income of Muslim *evkaf* properties. When tuition and the income of Muslim *evkaf* properties were not enough, the local municipality, the state, or joint municipal and state funds paid the difference. The school curriculum and teaching methods were similar to those of the Ottoman Tanzimat era, as were the different levels of education—*mekâtib-i sibyan* and *mekâtibi iptidâiye*, primary; *mekâtib-i rüşdiye*, secondary; and *mekâtib-i idadiye*, higher—although no

³⁰ *Aion*, 26 December 1881, 3.

³¹ *Efimeris ton Syzitiseon tis Voulis*, vol. A', 18 January 1882.

³² Dimitrios K. Tsopotos, *Gi kai Georgoi*; Lazaros Arseniou, *I Thessalia stin Tourkokratia*.

³³ OGG, no. 53, 23 June 1882.

³⁴ OGG, 9 December 1882; *Paligenesia*, 10 December 1882, 2.

³⁵ *Thessalia*, 6 July 1885, 2.

mekâtib-i idadiye existed in Thessaly.³⁶ Muslim schools closed on Fridays and could determine their own schedule of school holidays, which had to include national holidays.

The nature of education in these schools was mostly religious, with emphasis on the teaching of Ottoman Turkish, the Qur'an, and elements of the Islamic faith. Courses on Greek language, history, geography, and mathematics were also offered that would help Muslim students integrate and advance professionally in Greek society. Teachers of Turkish and the Islamic faith were recruited by the Greek state from qualified Thessalian Muslims after consulting local muftis. When no qualified candidates were found, the Greek authorities, with the help of local muftis and the Ottoman diplomatic missions in Greece, employed teachers from the Ottoman Empire. In Muslim schools, the Greek authorities allowed the use of textbooks that had been vetted by a governmental educational committee, according to the procedures defined by Act 1042 of July 1882.³⁷ The vetting process for all textbooks was repeated every four years.

Muslim Properties

The 1881 Greco-Ottoman Convention of Istanbul stipulated that the Greek state had to recognize all land property rights under Ottoman title deeds or Ottoman laws in Thessaly at the time of the annexation.³⁸ The Convention also obliged Greek authorities to recognize the title deeds of *evkaf* estates, as well as the Ottoman sultan's property rights in the region. The 1897 Greco-Ottoman Treaty of Istanbul retained these provisions. Thessaly had the potential to be a significantly productive asset for Greece. It produced much-needed agricultural and export goods for a state that was just emerging from decades of crushing debt and defaults. Given that a sizeable number of Muslims lived in the region and controlled most of Thessaly's fertile land, the Greek authorities accepted the retention of the existing Ottoman system of land tenure. Legal provisions such as the 1881 Greco-Ottoman Convention aimed to assure Muslims that their property rights would be respected, and thus to convince Muslim landowners to remain in the region and provide

³⁶ Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.

³⁷ OGG, no. 61, 6 July 1882.

³⁸ OGG, no. 14, 13 March 1882.

the expertise needed to make the incorporation of Thessaly into the Greek economy a success.³⁹

By the end of the first year after Thessaly's annexation to Greece almost all *çiftlik* owners had moved to the Ottoman Empire, selling their *çiftliks* and other assets. Others would sell their properties at a later stage. Prior to Thessaly's annexation to Greece, 3 percent of the population possessed 49 percent of the region's farming lands, 62 percent in the district of Larissa and 40 percent in the district of Trikala.⁴⁰ Whereas almost all of the 264 *çiftliks* of Thessaly were owned by Muslims prior to the region's annexation to Greece, only 54 of them had Muslim proprietors in 1907 and 43 in 1910.⁴¹ While the 1881 Greco-Ottoman Convention had retained Ottoman land tenure in Thessaly and prevented the Greek state from shaping it along the lines of the Greek Civil Code, the change in ownership of the *çiftliks* after the 1878 Congress of Berlin changed the nature of land tenure and labor relations and created a *sui generis* land tenure system that did not serve the purpose of retaining Ottoman land tenure provided by the Convention.⁴² Many of the new Greek *çiftlik* owners, for example, Christakis Zografos and Kostantinos Karapanos, had little relation to the region or to agriculture, as they lived in Istanbul or Athens and were investors and businessmen who were also involved in politics. They bought their *çiftliks* at bargain prices and delegated the management of their land and other assets in Thessaly to local proxy managers and superintendents.

Living conditions for the *koligoi*, the serfs, deteriorated along with land ownership. The *tsiflikades*, *çiftlik* owners, continued to receive part of the agricultural output as they had in Ottoman times but frequently evicted serfs from their lands. They raised land and property rents, as well as income taxes, for the serfs to as much as one-half or one-third of the annual agricultural production and used armed bands to impose their will. The *koligoi* lived in slums, received no education, had no medical care, and often died from illnesses such as malaria. They were subject to harassment and humiliations, such as verbal insults and whipping, by the *çiftlik* owners' superintendents and saw no improvement in their living conditions from Ottoman times. The social inequities this system generated under Greek rule were quite unlike agricultural labor relations in the rest of Greece.

³⁹ Ilias Bantekas, "Land Rights," 388.

⁴⁰ Evangelos Prontzas, *Oikonomia kai Gaioktisia*, 110.

⁴¹ Franchet d' Espérey, "Les Musulmans," 91.

⁴² Theano Tsiovaridou, "I Allagi"; Ilias Bantekas, "Land Rights," 388.

Thessaly became a hotbed of social unrest and conflicts between landless serfs and the local superintendents of the wealthy *tsiflikades* and led to demands for agrarian and land reform. These demands culminated in March 1910 when serfs in the village of Kileler protested against the privileges of the *tsiflikades*. The protest was brutally suppressed by armed bands, resulting in the deaths of four protesters and many more wounded. Despite pressures to abolish the *çiftlik* system and end the Ottoman land tenure system in Thessaly, it was only in November 1917 that Eleftherios Venizelos's government partially expropriated *çiftliks*, due to the need to recruit farmers to fight in World War I and the Asia Minor campaign of 1919–1922. The Greek government also needed farmland for the thousands of Orthodox Christian refugees from the Balkans and Asia Minor.⁴³ After the Greek defeat in the Asia Minor campaign and the arrival of approximately 1.2 million Orthodox Christian refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, the expropriation of *çiftliks* continued without prior compensation for the *tsiflikades*, which, although unconstitutional, was justified by the urgent situation.⁴⁴

The Mosque in Athens

In the early 1890s, the Greek authorities wished to construct a new mosque in Athens. The two old mosques in the Greek capital were being used for other purposes and were located where archaeological excavations were to be undertaken. For example, the seventeenth-century Fethiye mosque, north of the Roman agora near the Tower of the Winds, had been used since 1834 successively as a barracks, a military prison, and finally a military bakery. The press questioned the need for the new mosque, as there was no sizeable Muslim community in Athens. Its construction, however, would improve Greece's international image as a religiously tolerant country and counteract the negative impressions left by sporadic incidents of religious discrimination that had been covered in national and international newspapers. The new mosque could also serve the purposes of the Megali Idea, as the 1893–1908 “Macedonian Struggle”—a series of ethnic antagonisms and armed

⁴³ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 209; François Gos, *L’Agriculture en Thessalie*; Georgios Christaki Zografos, *To Agrotiko Zitima*.

⁴⁴ Dimosthenis Stefanidis, *Eisagogi*, 97.

conflicts between Greeks and Bulgarians in Ottoman Macedonia—was under way. With an eye to the potential redrawing of borders in the Balkans, Athens could more easily lay claim to ethnically mixed Ottoman territories in Macedonia if it had a record of demonstrated religious tolerance. The Ottoman Porte was willing to pay the cost of the mosque's construction and, in exchange, offer land to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople free of charge for the erection of Greek Orthodox churches in the Ottoman Empire. The Greek authorities provided land for the mosque and for the new Muslim cemetery in the Vavoula district of Piraeus.⁴⁵ In the end, the mosque was never built; the funds provided by the Porte were misused, and the Greek bankruptcy of 1893 swept the issue from the public eye.⁴⁶

The Muslim Exodus

As soon as the news of the 1878 Congress of Berlin reached Thessaly, a number of Muslim landowners, including *ciftlik* owners, began to sell their properties and leave the region for other Ottoman areas, due to their sense of insecurity regarding the future and fears of a sudden Greek military takeover.⁴⁷ Greece was to expand northward, and it was not yet clear which Ottoman areas would be ceded to it. Some Muslim landowners left the region but retained their properties, which they managed from afar through Muslim relatives, friends, proxy managers, and superintendents.⁴⁸ For these landowners, the move to Ottoman territories was temporary until they made their final decisions; a small number of them returned to Thessaly under Greek sovereignty.⁴⁹ As the date of Thessaly's annexation to Greece approached, the number of Muslims fleeing the region increased, and approximately one-third of the Thessalian Muslims had left by September 1881.⁵⁰ Most Muslim landowners, however, remained in Thessaly until the mid-1880s. Reports of Muslim migration are often contradictory, but it appears that the bulk of Muslims left Thessaly between 1881 and 1886. By June 1884, 35,000 Muslims had left the region, most of them for Aydin in Asia Minor.⁵¹ On the eve of the

⁴⁵ Act 1851, OGG, no. 126, 1 June 1890.

⁴⁶ Thomas Gallant, *The Edinburgh History*, 182.

⁴⁷ Effi Allamani, "I Thessalia," 87.

⁴⁸ Evangelos Prontzas, "I Trapeziki Politiki."

⁴⁹ *Aion*, 27 August 1881, 1; *Paliggenesia*, 15 March 1882, 1.

⁵⁰ *Aion*, 24 September 1881, 1.

⁵¹ *Thessalia*, 23 May 1884, 4.

Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, only 4,000 Muslims lived in the entire region, and their numbers dwindled to 3,515 in 1907 and 2,795 in 1911, representing 7.8 and 6.8 percent, respectively, of the Muslim population of 1881. Of them, 638 resided in Larissa and 186 in Tyrnavos, most of them old people who lacked the means to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire.⁵² But these numbers are not indicative of the exact size of Thessaly's permanent Muslim residents because they often included the approximately 1,060 Muslim Roma, who led a nomadic life and moved throughout the region and across the Greco-Ottoman border, as well as some 200–500 Valaades and Vlach-speaking Muslims from rural areas of Ottoman Macedonia who moved to Thessaly for part of the year to work as seasonal workers in farms around Larissa, Farsala, and Karditsa.

Most Muslim migrants left via the port of Volos, where at the start of the 1880s steamships were traveling to Istanbul and Izmir. When the Muslim exodus intensified in the early 1880s, affluent Muslims from Thessaly and members of the city councils of potential Ottoman host cities chartered ships to help Muslim migrants due to religious solidarity. The host cities were also in need of additional labor to boost their economies. Muslim delegations from Thessaly were often sent to potential host regions in the Ottoman Empire in order to assess the climate and living conditions and obtain assurances from the local authorities that Muslims from Thessaly would not face discrimination on the part of local authorities and residents. Chartered ships transferred Muslim emigrants from Thessaly to cities in Asia Minor like Antalya and Adana, as well as to Istanbul and Izmir.⁵³ Despite assurances by host Ottoman cities, Muslim migrants from Thessaly were occasionally disappointed by the conditions they found after they arrived. In September 1883, immigrant Thessalian Muslims were on the verge of rioting in Antalya due to alleged overtaxation by the local authorities and frequent clashes with the natives. The Greek government authorized the creation of a relief fund that would finance the repatriation of 200 Thessalian Muslims from Antalya, but in the end, only 43 of them returned to Thessaly; 102 moved to Istanbul and 55 to Izmir.⁵⁴

The Muslim exodus from Thessaly has often been viewed as a forced population movement brought about by discriminatory and oppressive measures

⁵² Nikolaos Georgiadis, *Thessalia*, 97, 101; Franchet d' Espérey, "Les Musulmans," 87.

⁵³ *Paliggenesia*, 11 October 1882, 1; *Ethnikon Pnevma*, 22 April 1882, 4.

⁵⁴ DHAGMFA, A5 (1884), "Greek Consul of Attaleia to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Attaleia, 12 September 1883"; FO, 286:349 (1882), "Longworth to Dufferin, Volos, 3 December 1881."

by Greek authorities aiming for religious and ethnic homogeneity, continuing the pattern set off by the Greek War of Independence of persecution of Muslims with violence, repression, and expulsion.⁵⁵ It has also been suggested that the exodus should be seen in the context of a general Muslim mass emigration movement in Southeastern Europe in the aftermath of the Great Eastern Crisis, particularly from newly independent Christian states after the 1878 Congress of Berlin.⁵⁶ Greece did not, however, participate in the military operations of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1876–1877, and the cession of Thessaly took place after prolonged diplomatic negotiations. This was unlike the case in the territories of Bulgaria and Serbia that became fields of military conflict; most of the Muslims in those areas were left at the mercy of the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Montenegrin armed forces after the retreat of the Ottoman army.⁵⁷ There is no evidence of a Greek state policy aiming at the expulsion or massive reduction of Muslims in the region. After the 1881 Convention of Istanbul, the Greek authorities set out a plan for a smooth transfer of sovereignty in Thessaly. King George I of the Hellenes, the official title of Greece's monarch after 1863, and Prime Minister Alexandros Koumoundouros toured Thessaly soon after the region's annexation to Greece and received a warm welcome from the Muslim population. During the tour, King George awarded medals to Muslims for assisting their fellow Muslims to integrate into the new state environment and for promoting friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims in their communities.⁵⁸ The muftis and the Muslim mayors in the cities of Larissa, Trikala, and Volos were kept in office after the change of sovereignty. A month later, when the fast of Ramadan began, the Greek army in Thessaly announced it with cannon fire.⁵⁹

The Greek authorities were aware of the economic consequences of the severe labor shortage that would be caused by a mass exodus of Muslims from Thessaly. Following the departure of many Muslims, farming ceased on many *ciftlik*s and farms, and agricultural production was in decline.⁶⁰ The situation was so dire that the Greek government considered offering economic incentives to interested farmers from the Ottoman Empire and other Balkan countries to migrate to Thessaly and work on lands owned by the Greek

⁵⁵ Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 12; Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914*.

⁵⁶ Wolfgang Höpken, "Flucht Vor dem Kreuz?", 6.

⁵⁷ Evangelos Kofos, "I Eisvoli," 331; Nicole Immig, "The 'New' Muslim," 512.

⁵⁸ *Thessalia*, 24 October 1881, 2.

⁵⁹ *Aion*, 18 August 1881, 3.

⁶⁰ *Paligenesia*, 30 November 1881, 2.

state.⁶¹ In the end, the Greek authorities abandoned such plans, realizing that the state-owned farms in Thessaly were not large enough to remedy the labor problem, nor could Greece afford ambitious settlement plans that might also complicate Greco-Ottoman relations.⁶² Therefore, the Greek authorities encouraged individuals who were interested in settling and working as farmers in Thessaly to buy farms from emigrating Muslims without any facilitation by the Greek state.

After the signing of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, a number of Ottoman emissaries, mostly conservative religious scholars who believed that Islam was not compatible with life under non-Muslim rule, toured Bosnia-Hercegovina, Thessaly, and other Ottoman areas that were to become Greek and encouraged the Muslims who lived in these areas to emigrate to Ottoman territories.⁶³ To achieve their goals, these emissaries often spread falsehoods and superstitious beliefs that influenced the majority of Muslims who were socially conservative and lacked nonreligious education. For example, they told Thessalian Muslims that they would lose their properties and political and civil rights within three years of the annexation—or that Muslims dying under a non-Muslim ruler would go to hell.⁶⁴

Despite Greek assurances of respect for the civil and religious freedoms of Muslims in Thessaly, frequent open or concealed discriminatory actions targeted the Muslim population. Muslims were often insulted or mocked for their clothing, manners, habits, or accents and, when female, for being veiled in public spaces. Muslims often became targets of discrimination by Greek civil servants who originated from areas in the 1832 Kingdom of Hellas, Palaia Ellada, “Old Greece.” They regarded their assignments in Thessaly as a temporary exile and therefore showed little sensitivity for local problems. Many of these civil servants had no experience of living with Muslims and had grown up with negative stereotypes of Islam and the belief that Muslims and the Ottoman Empire were Greece’s primary foreign enemies. The Ottoman Embassy in Athens and the Ottoman

⁶¹ DHAGMFA, A12:1 (1884), “Greek Consul of Panormos to the Greek Ambassador in Constantinople, Panormos, 16 March 1884”; “Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Minister of Internal Affairs, Athens, 29 March 1884”; “Greek Minister of Internal Affairs to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 7 May 1884”; “Greek Minister of Internal Affairs to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 7 May 1884.”

⁶² FO 32:556 (1884), “Nicolson to Granville, Athens, 25 October 1884”; “Nicolson to Granville, Athens, 21 November 1884.”

⁶³ Fikret Adanır, “The Formation,” 272.

⁶⁴ FO 286:349 (1882), “Lonworth to Dufferin, Volos, 3 December 1881”; *Aion*, 7 September 1881, 2; *Arta*, 27 November 1882, 2; *Thessalia*, 1 September 1884, 4.

consuls in Thessaly often complained to the Greek government about these officials' discriminatory actions. During a parliamentary debate in 1890, MP Georgios Filaretos of the National Party argued that the mass exodus of Muslims from Thessaly was the result of discriminatory policies on the part of the Greek local authorities, especially the courts. He quoted a number of Muslims who had claimed to him that the justice system of the Ottoman Empire was much better than that of the kingdom: "the Ottomans departed due to the lack of an appropriate [system] of justice and the harassment they were subject to by lower agents of state justice. . . . As a result Thessaly today suffers from a labor shortage. I regret to inform you that I heard Muslims say that the justice [system] worked better during the Turkish occupation. At least it was faster."⁶⁵

In April 1884, the Greek government passed Act 1183 for the management of *evkaf* in Thessaly, according to which Muslims who planned to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire and wished to sell or donate as *evkaf* part or the entirety of their properties in Thessaly needed consent of the Greek authorities for every property sale or donation prior to their departure. Without this measure, local city councils could claim full possession of Muslim properties, changing their ownership status without consent of the Greek government.⁶⁶ The intent of the Greek parliament in passing Act 1183 was to prevent Muslims from emigrating to the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the measure would allegedly force the Muslim communities of Thessaly to disclose to the local city councils their *evkaf* properties under threat of imprisonment, which would in turn help the Greek authorities get a full picture of the size of *evkaf* in Thessaly, oversee property sales, and prevent trespassing and illegal sales. The Muslims of Thessaly protested the Act, and the Ottoman government supported Muslims' protests, complaining to European governments and to the Greek government that its provisions went against provisions of the July 1881 Convention of Istanbul, which protected the religious freedom, autonomy, and special character of the Muslims in Thessaly.⁶⁷ In light of these protests, the Greek authorities did not implement Act 1183. Although technically in force, in reality it remained null and void during the government of Charilaos Trikoupis (15 March 1882–1 May 1885). Act 1183 was reactivated, however, by the government of Theodoros Deligiannis

⁶⁵ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, "Oi Ethnikes Meionotites," 29.

⁶⁶ OGG, no. 163, 30 April 1884; OGG, no. 12, 12 February 1885.

⁶⁷ DHAGMFA, 7:1 (1885), "Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 8 May 1885 and 27 June 1885."

(9 April 1885–30 April 1886), but it was again not implemented due to protests by the Ottoman authorities and European governments.⁶⁸

Several Greco-Ottoman treaties were signed that aimed to establish collaboration in fighting cross-border organized crime but did little to improve people's everyday lives, as cross-border criminal gangs continued to ravage Thessaly and Ottoman Macedonia.⁶⁹ The gangs' activities were conducted for profit, with no religious, ethnic, or nationalist motives. On many occasions, wealthy Muslims were targeted for abduction for ransom. In February 1882 Hussein Ağa Sampan, a wealthy landowner from Larissa, was murdered by a criminal group who had attacked to rob him.⁷⁰ The Greek police arrested the murderers in December 1888, and the authorities wrote to the Ottoman consul of Larissa asking the consulate to spread the good news among Thessalian Muslims of the murderers' arrest.⁷¹ Lawlessness in Thessaly was so bad that in February 1881 a delegation of Muslims from Larissa had visited Prime Minister Alexandros Koumoundouros in Athens to request that the Greek government take urgent measures to impose law and order.⁷² Some local Greeks supported the criminal gangs. When in 1893 Haireddin Bey Osman Ağa, one of Trikala's wealthiest Muslim land-owners, was kidnapped for several months by the criminal gang of a ferocious bandit nicknamed Tsanakas, King of the Mountains, he was released only after a ransom of 600 Ottoman gold liras was paid to Tsanakas. After Haireddin Bey's release, both he and a member of Tsanakas's gang who had been arrested told the police and the authorities that local Greeks had collaborated with the Tsanakas gang in return for a share of the ransom.⁷³ These included the politically influential Takis family, who had connections to the Greek royal court, and the priest of the Orthodox church in Liousteri in the Kalabaka district.

The urban environment of Thessalian cities had begun to change as early as, in Ottoman times, after the 1830s, with the introduction of new architectural forms and city plans. A number of Islamic buildings and other sites, such as mosques, cemeteries, and schools, were demolished, sometimes even

⁶⁸ FO 32:563 (1885), Rumbold to Granville, Athens, 6 June 1885; Nicole Immig, *Zwischen Partizipation*, 268–271.

⁶⁹ John Koliopoulos, *Brigands without a Cause*.

⁷⁰ *Paliggenesia*, 16 February 1882.

⁷¹ *Paliggenesia*, 19 February 1882; DHAGMFA, A8 (1889), "General Sophianos to the Ottoman Consul in Larissa, Larissa, 31 December 1888," and "General Sophianos to the Greek Ministry of Justice, Larissa, 4 January 1889."

⁷² *Paliggenesia*, 16 February 1882.

⁷³ Maroula Kliafa, *Trikala*, vol. 1, 134; *Akropolis* in April and May 1894.

for aesthetic reasons, or expropriated for public or other use. Representatives of Muslim communities were often complicit in these changes, even proposing some of the reconstruction projects to the Greek authorities. They were also involved in assessing the compensation due for these demolitions and expropriations. In March 1889, the city council of Trikala decided to tear down the Pazar mosque, despite protests by the Ottoman consul of the city, local Muslims, and the Greek government. Of the twenty-seven mosques in Larissa in 1881, only five remained in 1892; of the seven mosques in Trikala in 1873, only two were left in 1899.⁷⁴ Names of places, buildings, and streets were Hellenized in an effort to demonstrate a firm assimilation of Thessaly into the Greek nation. The Hellenization process was gradual and was not formalized until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. In June 1909, upon the recommendation of Nikolaos Levidis, then minister of the interior, King George I formed a national committee, headed by Levidis, to review all the names of places, streets, and buildings in the kingdom and suggest the Hellenization of existing names or their replacement with new Greek names.⁷⁵ Levidis justified the need for such a committee as follows: “foreign elements infiltrated Hellas’s place names during the country’s long history and displaced older Hellenic names. . . . The [foreign] elements are often ‘vestigial’ memorials of national tragedies and humiliations, which undermine the patriotic feelings of ‘educated’ Hellenes. The latter favored the elimination of traces of national hardships. After the establishment of the kingdom, Hellenic governments attempted to replace old place names with new ones. On many occasions, ‘Turkish’ names still remain, and any name changes remain only on paper.”⁷⁶ Based on the Levidis committee’s report, 60 percent of non-Greek place names in Thessaly were Hellenized or replaced with new Greek names by the early 1940s.⁷⁷

In the first ten years after annexation, Thessaly faced extreme weather conditions and experienced long-lasting droughts, heavy rainfalls, and hard winters.⁷⁸ The weather’s damaging impact on agricultural production led many Muslim farmers to despair and was another reason for some of the emigration. There are reports of heavy floods of the Peneus River and other wetlands in 1883, 1885, and 1886, as well as of severe droughts in the

⁷⁴ Maroula Kliafa, *Trikala*, vol. 1, 88.

⁷⁵ OGG, no. 125, 8 June 1909.

⁷⁶ OGG, no. 125, 8 June 1909.

⁷⁷ Dikaios Vagiakakos, “I Dimografiki.”

⁷⁸ *Paliggenesia*, 17 August 1881; *Aion*, 5 August 1882; *Paliggenesia*, 31 March 1882; FO 286:342 (1881), “Longworth to Dufferin, Volos, 3 December 1881.”

summers of 1881 and 1890.⁷⁹ An epidemic of mad cow disease in Attica and Thessaly in January 1882 killed many farm animals, and many people perished in a typhus epidemic in the region around Farsala in the summer of 1882. Heat waves in the summers of 1881 and 1882 caused fires in Larissa and Karditsa that damaged many homes and businesses.⁸⁰

The Greco-Ottoman War of 1897

In the 1880s, Orthodox Christian insurgencies in Crete often put Greco-Ottoman relations at risk. Greece implemented a series of expensive infrastructure projects and pursued an aggressive program of military preparedness following regional military developments such as the 1885 forced annexation of Eastern Rumelia by the Principality of Bulgaria, which Greece and Serbia viewed as subverting the post-1878 territorial status quo in the Balkans. These events, along with the drop in the price of currants, Greece's main cash crop and export product, and the formidable burden and expense of organizing the world's first modern Olympic Games in 1896, led the country to bankruptcy in 1893. Greece had to deal with foreign creditors and displeased its citizens by imposing heavy taxes and other austerity measures. This atmosphere favored government instability and political populism: ten consecutive cabinets succeeded one another between 1887 and 1897. Political parties and the Greek press searched for scapegoats and favored military operations against the Ottoman Empire. Nationalist organizations—such as the National Society (*Ethniki Etaireia*), established in 1894 by low-ranking Greek military officers and financed by diaspora Greeks—and paramilitary groups operated unchecked in Macedonia and Crete, their aim being to undermine Ottoman authority there and promote their future annexation to Greece.⁸¹ They often attacked the fewer than 4,000 Muslims living in Thessaly.⁸²

Under fierce criticism by the Greek press and opposition parties and under pressure from a series of public demonstrations in Athens, in 1897 the Greek government of Theodoros Deligiannis sent a navy squadron to Crete under the command of Prince George, the second son of King George

⁷⁹ Evangelos Prontzas, *Oikonomia kai Gaioktisia*, 58–59.

⁸⁰ *Aion*, 24 August 1881.

⁸¹ Effi Gazi, "Symvolikos Logos," 108; Giannis Gianoulopoulos, "I Evgenis Mas Tyflosis," 33–42, 47–58, 179; Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, "The Origins," 38–39.

⁸² BA, Hariciyye Nezâreti Mârûzâti, Y.PRK.HR., 23:49.

I, to support Orthodox insurgents who had rebelled against the Ottoman authorities of the island. This act launched a Greco-Ottoman war that lasted around a month (18 April–20 May 1897) and led Greece, which was militarily unprepared, to a humiliating defeat, often referred to as the “ignominious defeat” or the “unfortunate war” of the “dark ’97.”⁸³ The Ottoman army occupied Thessaly and advanced as far as Thermopylae. Following an intervention by European powers, Greece was forced to cede minor border areas in Thessaly and pay a high indemnity of 4 million Ottoman liras to the Ottoman Empire. In order to pay the indemnity, Athens was obliged to adopt strict austerity for many years, overseen by the Athens-based International Financial Commission, consisting of representatives of the six European “mediating powers”: Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Despite the Ottoman victory in the field, an autonomous Cretan state was established in 1898, under Ottoman suzerainty, with Prince George of Greece as its first high commissioner.⁸⁴

A number of Muslims had supported the Ottoman troops and greeted the advance of the Ottoman army in Thessaly with enthusiasm during the 1897 war. A few Muslim landowners, such as Omer Husni Bey from Mega Palamas in Karditsa, took advantage of the opportunity to loot their Christian neighbors: they stole herds, harvests, farm implements, and household tools. Some Muslims offered their services to the Ottoman occupying forces.⁸⁵ However, these were fairly isolated incidents. The majority of Muslims in Thessaly realized that the Ottoman occupation would not last long and feared that collaboration with the Ottoman troops might invite acts of revenge by the Greek authorities and the public after the withdrawal of the Ottoman army.⁸⁶ In addition, the Ottoman army advanced in a disciplined manner, with its commanders tolerating no atrocities against the civilian population. Nevertheless, after the withdrawal of the Ottoman army from Thessaly, acts of revenge against the Muslims and Jews did occur, as many Greeks accused Muslims and Jews of collaboration with the Ottoman occupying forces. These acts of revenge led a number of Muslims to follow the withdrawing Ottoman army and leave Thessaly.⁸⁷

⁸³ Stefanos Katsikas and Anna Krinaki, “Reflections.”

⁸⁴ Theodore Tatsios, *The Megali Idea*.

⁸⁵ *Embos*, 22 November 1897.

⁸⁶ *Paliggenesia*, 1 August 1897; *Paliggenesia*, 28 September 1897; *Akropolis*, 31 May 1897; *Akropolis*, 10 and 11 May 1897; *Akropolis*, 22 and 23 May 1897; *Akropolis*, 8 June 1897.

⁸⁷ *Akropolis*, 17 May 1897; Maroula Kliafa, *Trikala*, vol. 1, 180.

6

Muslims in the New Lands (1912–1923)

A Sequence of Wars

By the end of the 1880s, the Macedonian Struggle was mostly a cultural and propaganda war. Balkan states with kin ethnic groups in Macedonia funded schools and published ethnographic statistics and maps that supported their territorial claims in the region.¹ Initially the struggle was between supporters of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople and affiliates of the Bulgarian Exarchate, a de facto independent Bulgarian Orthodox church established in 1870 by the Ottoman sultan without the consent of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Greco-Bulgarian antagonism soon spread to other ethnic groups, such as Serbs, Aromanian Vlachs, and Albanians. Ethnic antagonisms entered a new military phase after the establishment of the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, a pro-Bulgarian nationalist organization founded in 1893 in Salonica. Ethnic armed bands were formed and functioned as military wings of national committees that pursued intensive campaigns of cultural assimilation among the rural populace. Looting, arson, and assassinations were commonplace, as each side sought to intimidate the supporters of the others. The Young Turks, a coalition of secret societies driven underground along with political dissenters after the abolition of the Ottoman Constitution in 1878 by Sultan Abdülhamid II, led a coup in July 1908 that recalled parliament and restored the abolished Ottoman constitution (Photo 6.1). The Young Turks' coup ushered in a period of instability in the Balkans: Bulgaria unilaterally declared its full independence in September 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908, Crete declared its union with Greece, and Italy, taking advantage of the turmoil, attacked Libya and seized the Dodecanese islands.

¹ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*; Basil Gounaris, “National Claims”; Vemund Aarbakke, *Ethnic Rivalry*; Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat*.



Photo 6.1 Proclamation of the Ottoman constitution by the Young Turks, Salonica, July 1908 (Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives-National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, Angelos Papaioannou's Postcard Collection)

Spurred by the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911–1912, in May 1912 Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia formed the Balkan League under Russian auspices, a military pact chiefly aimed against the Ottoman Empire.² The Greek army was held in low esteem following its defeat in the 1897 Greco-Ottoman War, but Greece could offer its navy, which could effectively prevent transports of Ottoman reinforcements from Asia to the European fronts. On 8 October 1912 the First Balkan War began when the Balkan League declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and Greece occupied much of Macedonia, including the strategically important port city of Salonica (Photo 6.2), southern Epirus, and most of the Ottoman-held Aegean islands. The First Balkan War ended with the signing of the Treaty of London on 17 May 1913, which failed to satisfy any of the parties involved (Photos 6.3 and 6.4). The main point of friction was the partition of Macedonia. On 16 June 1913 Bulgarian forces started the Second Balkan War with a surprise attack against Serbia and Greece. After Romania and the Ottoman Empire launched an attack on Bulgaria, the Bulgarian position became untenable. The Second Balkan War ended on 10 August 1913 with the

² Philip Jowett, *Armies of the Balkan Wars*.



Photo 6.2 Port of Salonica, early twentieth century (Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives-National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, Angelos Papaioannou's Postcard Collection)



Photo 6.3 Arrival of the Greek army in Salonica, October 1912 (Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives-National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, Angelos Papaioannou's Postcard Collection)





Photo 6.4 Salonica's religious leaders at the funeral of King George I of Greece, 18 March 1913 (Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives-National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, Angelos Papaioannou's Postcard Collection).

On 18 March 1913, amid the First Balkan War and after Greek troops had captured much of Macedonia, including the port city of Salonica (Thessaloniki, in Greek), George I, King of the Hellenes, was assassinated while out on an afternoon walk near the White Tower in Thessaloniki. The king was shot at close range in the back by Alexandros Schinas and died instantly, the bullet having penetrated his heart. The Greek government denied any political motive for the assassination, saying that Schinas was an alcoholic vagrant. Schinas was tortured in prison and soon after his arrest by the Greek police authorities fell to his death from a police station window. The unfortunate incident occurred as King George I was approaching the fiftieth anniversary of his accession to the throne of Greece and was making plans to abdicate in favor of his son Constantine immediately after the celebration of his golden jubilee in October 1913.

Source: Walter Christmas, *King George of Greece*, New York: McBride, Nast & Co, 1914, 408, 413.

Treaty of Bucharest, which confirmed Greece's territorial gains in southern Epirus, adding eastern Macedonia to Greek control, as well as most of the Ottoman-held Aegean islands, including Crete. These gains became known as the Nees Chores (New Lands).

Approximately 470,000 Muslims lived in the New Lands after the Balkan wars, constituting 39 percent of their population (see Map 6.1 and Tables 6.1, 6.2,



Map 6.1 Concentration of the Muslim population in Macedonia in 1912.

Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique* (Berlin, 1986)

Table 6.1 1913 Census by the General Administration of Macedonia, Prefecture of Thessaloniki

District	Greek Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Bulgarian Exarchate Affiliates	Others
Thessaloniki	91,945	59,864	61,439	6,263	4,364
Archangeloi	2,573	5,070			
Veroia	33,521	7,501	612		
Giannitsa	22,752	9,407			3,902
Edessa	10,467	5,013		3,959	1,845
Karadjova	3,577	23,715		6,770	
Katerini	29,255	3,285	25		
Kato Theodoraki	5,256	7,924			
Kilkis	7,521	2,556			
Langadas	16,935	25,119	44		
Migiadag	6,875	9,700			1,450
Chalkidiki	40,804	2,336			
Notia	4,200	6,000		1,221	5,742
Total	275,681	167,490	62,120	18,213	17,303

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 399.

Table 6.2 1913 Census by the General Administration of Macedonia, Prefecture of Kozani (except Kozani District)

District	Greek Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Bulgarian Exarchate Affiliates	Others
Anaselitsa	32,453	7,390			
Grevena	47,306	7,855			
Elassona	29,183	2,242			
Kailaria	11,691	27,842			549
Servia	16,138	2,878			
Total	136,771	48,207			549

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 399.

Table 6.3 1913 Census by the General Administration of Macedonia, Prefecture of Florina

District	Greek Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Bulgarian Exarchate Affiliates	Others
Kastoria	35,311	11,922	1,263	12,191	
Prespes	7,325	1,475			
Sorovits	9,086	3,148			
Florina	32,286	9,379			
Total	84,008	25,924	1,263	12,191	

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 399.

Table 6.4 1913 Census by the General Administration of Macedonia, Prefecture of Serres

District	Greek Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Bulgarian Exarchate Affiliates	Others
Zichni	28,884	2,221	6	1	
Nigrita	20,627	3,597			
Serres	35,989	12,521	1,200		
Sidirokastro	25,258	14,817			
Total	107,758	33,156	1,206	1	

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 399.

6.3, 6.4, 6.5).³ Prior to the Balkan Wars, Greek Orthodox Christians were a narrow majority in the New Lands, with certain districts—for example, Yanya *vilayet* (Yanya province), which included Epirus—being heavily Greek Orthodox and others being heavily Muslim, for example, Drama, where there were seven times as many Muslims as Greek Orthodox. On the eve of the 1923 compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange, the number of

³ Gennadius Library (henceforth GL), Stefanos Dragoumis Archives (henceforth SDA), 131, “Statistical Table of Macedonia’s Population”; “Georgios Chomatianos to the Ministry of Interior, Kozani, 26 February 1913”; Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi*, 19–28.

Table 6.5 1913 Census by the General Administration of Macedonia, Prefecture of Drama

District	Greek Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Bulgarian Exarchate Affiliates	Others
Drama	29,618	58,369	628		
Thasos	14,478				
Kavala	26,369	23,815	2,246		
Pravi	10,069	10,469			
Sari Saban	3,598	19,978			
Total	84,132	112,631	2,874		

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 399.

Table 6.6 1915 Census by the General Administration of Macedonia

Prefecture	Kozani	Florina	Thessaloniki	Serres	Drama
Greek Speakers	136,967	33,055	205,134	65,992	45,358
Slavs	6,447	21,386	29,971	13,179	3,904
Refugees	3,149	976	84,087	26,260	42,410
Greeks	146,563	55,367	319,192	105,431	46,800
Former Schismatics	2,513	55,764	42,410	19,974	96,062
Bulgarians			1,912		
Muslims	56,032	27,858	123,553	20,335	125,522
Jews			62,030	1,500	2,900
Foreigners			7,424		
Total	205,108	138,989	556,521	174,240	237,765

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 400.

Muslims in the New Lands was approximately 400,000, or 20.6 percent of the entire population. The decline of the Muslim population during the intervening ten years was due to war mortality and emigration (see Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12).⁴ The vast majority, 80 percent of the Muslims,

⁴ DHAGMFA, 6.7 (1923), “Statistical Tables of Muslims in Greece, Athens, 12 April 1923”; GSA, Epirus Historical Archives (henceforth EHA), General Administration of Epirus Archives (henceforth GAEA), 156:4, “General Administration of Epirus to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Ioannina, 26 February 1921”; Emily Kolodny, *La population*, vol. 2, 780.

Table 6.7 1916 Population statistics sent by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Embassy in Paris, population by prefecture

Prefecture	Greeks	Former Schismatics	Bulgarians	Muslims	Jews	Others
Thessaloniki	331,192	30,410	1,912	123,553	62,030	7,424
Florina	71,367	39,764		27,858		
Kozani	146,563	2,513		56,032		
Serres	107,431	17,974		20,335	1,550	
Drama	96,062	13,281		125,522	2,900	
Total	752,615	103,942	1,912	353,300	66,430	7,424

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 400.

Table 6.8 1916 Population statistics sent by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Embassy in Paris, population by city

City	Greeks	Former Schismatics	Bulgarians	Muslims	Jews	Others
Thessaloniki	68,204		1,800	30,000	61,400	4,300
Florina	3,567	589		6,227		
Kozani	11,029					
Serres	15,200			4,000	1,500	
Drama	13,500			9,800	600	
Kavala	31,769			9,026	2,300	
Nigrita	4,529					
Kilkis	3,200		72			
Edessa	7,069	803		3,305		
Naousa	8,870			1,141		
Veroia	7,948			5,064	630	
Kastoria	6,315			1,565		

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 400.

were farmers who lived in rural areas, and the other 20 percent lived in urban centers. Ethnolinguistically, they were a diverse group: Turkish-speakers in Serres, Kilkis, Gianitsa; Pomaks in Kastoria, Florina, Pella, and Drama; Greek-speakers in Crete, Ioannina, and Preveza and the Valaades of north-western Macedonia; Aromanian Vlachs in Almopia; Albanian-speaking

Table 6.9 1920 Census of the Muslim population of Macedonia (State Statistical Service)

Prefecture	Kozani	Florina	Thessaloniki	Pella	Serres	Drama	Total
Greek Speakers	11,600		100				11,700
Turkish Speakers	54,900	17,000	61,800	18,900	15,100	96,700	264,400
Bulgarian Speakers		800	100	2,800		4,100	7,800
Roma		600	2,300	800	700	1,000	5,400
Albanian Speakers	100	10,200	1,900	200	100	300	12,800
Macedonian Speakers		600		12,400			13,000
Vlach Speakers				1,200			1,200

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 401.

Table 6.10 Ethnological statistics of Epirus sent in 1916 by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Embassy in Paris

Districts	Greek Orthodox	Muslims	Jews
Ioannina	86,320	5,932	3,711
Metsovo	6,043	140	
Leskovikio	11,750	4,034	
Preveza	13,570	2,100	325
Louros	21,200	800	

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 404.

Table 6.11 1920 National Census (State Statistical Service), Muslim population of Epirus

Prefecture	Ioannina	Preveza	Total
Greek Speakers	2,300	900	3,200
Turkish Speakers	700	300	1,000
Albanian Speakers	16,500	5,300	21,800
Roma		100	100
Total	19,500	6,600	26,100

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 405.

Table 6.12 Muslim Population of Crete (1881–1920)

Year	1881	1900	1911	1920
Total	73,234	33,496	27,852	22,999
Urban Population (Total)	34,648	28,566	22,498	17,281
Irakleio	15,489	11,820	9,248	7,998
Chania	10,561	9,866	8,246	5,322
Rethymno	7,077	5,829	3,913	2,776
Ierapetra	1,430	608	677	676
Siteia	312	434	414	505
Agios Nikolaos	8	6		4
Neapoli	91	9		
Muslim Peasants (Total)	38,586	4,930	5,354	5,718

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 407.

Çams in Epirus, Florina, Kastoria, and Drama; Roma in Thessaloniki, Drama, Ioannina, and Preveza; Arabic-speakers in Crete; and Dönme in Thessaloniki. Regardless of their mother tongues, Muslims who lived in mixed areas were often bilingual or multilingual. For instance, many Albanian-speaking Muslims in Epirus and Macedonia were fluent in Albanian and Greek, while the Muslims of the Aegean islands could converse in Greek and Turkish with ease. The majority of Muslims of the New Lands were Sunnis, but a great, though indefinable, number of Muslims followed Sufism, mostly the Bektaşı and Mevlevi orders, which were fairly popular among non-Turkish-speaking Muslims, as witnessed by the many scattered Sufi *tekkes* in Ioannina, Konitsa, Metsovo, Crete, and elsewhere.

In the spring and summer of 1914, Greece was in dispute with the Ottoman Empire over the status of the Aegean islands that Greece had occupied during the First Balkan War. Though these islands were under Greek control, in 1913 the final settlement of their territorial status had been left for the future. On 13 February 1914 the six signatory European powers of the 1913 Treaty of London ceded the islands to Greece, but the Ottomans disputed the decision.⁵ In the spring of 1913, the Ottomans started a program of forcible expulsion of Greek populations in Eastern Thrace, which after May 1914 also included Greeks from western Asia Minor. The Greek presence in

⁵ William Kaldas, “Background for Conflict.”

these areas was deemed to be a threat to national security because it could facilitate a possible landing of the Greek army in a future Greco-Ottoman war. Many expelled Greeks fled to Greece, while 153,890 Greeks were deported by the Ottomans to the Asia Minor hinterland by the end of 1914. Athens threatened a breach of Greco-Ottoman diplomatic relations and even war. Bilateral negotiations started, and on 1 July 1914 an agreement was signed that provided for a voluntary population exchange of Muslims living in the New Lands for Greeks of Eastern Thrace and western Asia Minor.⁶ The agreement, however, never took effect due to the eruption of World War I. The 28 June 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and of his wife, Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, by a group of Serb nationalists in Sarajevo led Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia. A network of interlocking alliances enlarged the crisis from a bilateral issue in the Balkans to one involving most of Europe. By July 1914 Europe was divided into two coalitions: the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia and the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy.

Despite its alliance with Serbia, Greece tried to remain neutral, but when it became evident that the crisis would expand to a general European war, fierce political divisions emerged. Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos believed that even if Germany and its allies prevailed in Central Europe, Britain, with its naval might, would emerge victorious at least in the Near East, where Greece's interest lay, and therefore Greece had to ally with the Triple Entente. Moreover, Greece's two main rivals in the Balkans, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, were likely to join the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, King Constantine I, backed by the General Staff, was convinced of Germany's ultimate triumph and sympathized with the German militarist political system. Because Greece was highly vulnerable to the navies of the Triple Entente and thus unable to openly side with the Triple Alliance, King Constantine and his supporters argued for firm neutrality. The disagreement soon escalated into a rift between Venizelos and the king, which became known as the Ethnikos Dichasmos, National Schism, that was to divide the country's politics and society between supporters of Venizelos, who had republican political leanings, and supporters of King Constantine I, who were proroyalists.⁷ On 5 October 1915 Venizelos requested and received parliamentary support to participate in the war, but the next day King Constantine dismissed him

⁶ Alexis Alexandris, *To Archeion*, vol. 2, 198, 211; GPD, 2 October 1914, "Memo of Asia Minor Refugees against the Exchange."

⁷ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, 1915: *O Ethnikos Dichasmos*; Giorgos Mavrogordatos, *Meta to 1922*.

and asked Alexandros Zaimis, who had been prime minister in 1897, to form a government. The rift took the form of an undeclared civil war: In August 1916, Venizelos set up the “Provisional Government of National Defense” in northern Greece (Thessaloniki) with the Triple Entente’s support, effectively splitting Greece into two entities. Diplomatic negotiations followed an armed confrontation in Athens between Triple Entente and royalist forces, and King Constantine abdicated in favor of his second son, Alexander. On 29 May 1917, Venizelos returned to Athens, and Greece, now unified, officially joined World War I on the side of the Triple Entente.

After the war, the Greek-Bulgarian Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of 27 November 1919 extended Greece’s sovereignty to Western Thrace, and the 10 August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire allowed Athens to take control of Eastern Thrace, except for Istanbul and the islands of Imbros, today Gökçeada, and Tenedos, today Bozcaada. Greece was to occupy a zone around Smyrna, which was to remain under Ottoman sovereignty but be ruled by a local parliament for five years. After the five-year period a plebiscite, overseen by the League of Nations, would decide the final territorial status of the occupied zone. Approximately 550,000 Muslims lived in Western and Eastern Thrace, constituting 51 percent of the total population, and one million (58 percent of the entire population) in the occupied zone of Smyrna in 1920.⁸ Greek control of Eastern Thrace and the occupied zone of Smyrna proved short-lived. After 1919, the Greek army engaged in war with the Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal Attatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. Greece was defeated, and by the terms of the 24 July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne Greece had to relinquish its territorial claims in Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, and the islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada but retained control of Western Thrace. On 30 January 1923 an agreement was signed as part of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that provided for the compulsory relocation of Muslims from the New Lands to Turkey, except those living in Western Thrace, and of all Orthodox Christians from Turkey (except for Istanbul, Gökçeada, and Bozcaada) to Greece. About 400,000 Muslims (7 percent of Greece’s population) were forced to move to Turkey (see Table 6.13),⁹ with approximately 135,000 remaining behind: 110,000 in Western Thrace and 25,000 Çams in Epirus, who were exempted at Albania’s insistence.¹⁰

⁸ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 29–34; Kyriaki Mamoni, “I Zoi.”

⁹ Their number given by the International Mixed Committee is 388,146. Adding a few thousands who left Greece on their own initiative and by other means of transportation than those placed at their disposal by the Turkish government, one may possibly reach the number of 400,000 as Muslim refugees from Greece. Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange*, 711.

¹⁰ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 17–23.

Table 6.13 Muslim Refugees from Greece (1921–1928)

Vilayets	Vilayets
Adana	8,440
Afyonkarahisar	1,045
Aksaray	3,286
Amasya	3,844
Ankara	1,651
Antalya	4,920
Artvin	46
Aydin	6,630
Balikesir	37,174
Beyazid	2,856
Bilecik	4,461
Biltis	3,630
Bolu	194
Burdur	448
Bursa	34,453
Djebel Bereket	2,944
Çanakkale	11,638
Çorum	1,570
Denizli	2,728
Diyarbakır	484
Edirne	49,441
Elazığ	2,124
Erzincan	116
Erzurum	1,095
Eskişehir	2,567
Giresun	623
Gümüşhane	811
Gaziantep	1,330
Hakkâri	310
Icel	1,037
İzmir	31,502
Total	463,534

Note: No exact official statistics exist on the Muslim refugees who entered Turkey from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, etc. The Turkish Department of Statistics has published the above data concerning Muslims settled in Turkey from the Balkans and Soviet Russia between 1921 and 1928. The largest part of these Muslims (approximately 400,000) moved to Turkey from Greece.

Source: Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*. New York, 1932
Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. New York: Mcmillan, 1932, 711–712

Muslim Mortality in the Wars

During the course of the two Balkan Wars, mass murder and looting disrupted Muslim social networks, seriously reduced the Muslim population, and established a long-lasting negative image for the region as Europe's powder keg. The speed of events was too fast for accurate accounts, and the main source of information on atrocities in Muslim settlements were international observers, who were seldom able to visit these settlements. Most of their reports simply mention once-thriving villages that were now empty, usually pillaged and burned. One of these reports describes the situation as follows: "more or less acute distress exists throughout Macedonia wherever a Muslim population remains, but in considerable sections of the country I doubt whether any 'Mussulman' population does remain outside the large towns."¹¹ As in the Greek War of Independence, massacres in these wars were often disorganized but no less lethal. One of the reports, for example, claims that Greeks took Muslim men from all over the district of Pravišta—along the west coast of Kavala—to the ravine of Kasurb and murdered them there.¹²

Among the causes of Muslim mortality were starvation and disease—the results of looting, and theft of land and crops, which left Muslims without food or housing. Greek soldiers and civilians plundered Salonica for weeks after its capture.¹³ Ottoman soldiers were also symbols of Ottoman authority, which the Christian allies intended to destroy, but there were a few cases when, due to long-standing community bonds in mixed areas, Greek Orthodox Christians and Muslims collaborated in the face of invasion by the Bulgarian army. For example, the heads of the Christian and Muslim communities in Serres had signed a bond of mutual protection and support before the Bulgarians entered the town in November 1912 during the First Balkan War. After the Bulgarian invasion of Serres, many Muslim notables and their families took refuge at the residence of the Greek Orthodox metropolitan bishop Apostolos. The bishop also intervened with the Bulgarian military command of the town and stopped a general massacre and pillage of the Muslim population by the Bulgarian army.¹⁴ Similarly, the Greek Orthodox

¹¹ FO, 371:1762, "Lamp to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Salonica, 9 March 1913."

¹² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire*, 282–283.

¹³ FO, 195:2438, no. 6380, "Lamp to Lowther, Salonica, 19 November 1912"; FO, 1915:2438, no. 6229, "Telegram from Lamp, Salonica, 27 November 1912."

¹⁴ FO, 195: 2438, no. 6866, "Lamp to Lowther, Salonica, 13 December 1912."

metropolitan bishop of Ainos, Joachim II, protected many Muslims after Bulgarians entered the town of Dedeağç, present-day Alexandroupoli.¹⁵ Joachim II's actions were not imitated by many of the city's Greeks, most of whom joined the Bulgarians in burning Muslim quarters, killing, and looting before surrendering the city to Bulgarians. Nor was his example followed by other priests and bishops who served in the war zone.

During World War I the scale of atrocities against Muslims was far smaller than that during the two Balkan Wars, for these reasons:

1. Greece did not enter World War I until 1916.
2. Greece's main enemy in World War I was Bulgaria, not the Ottoman Empire.
3. Major operations in World War I were conducted not by the militias but by the regular Greek army, which was more disciplined and easier to control.

During World War I a number of Muslims were arrested by the Triple Entente powers and detained in prison camps in the Middle East and Western Europe, suspected of espionage for the Ottoman Empire and its Triple Alliance allies. One such case was Talaat Bey, a Muslim of Mytilene who was arrested by a British detachment because he was suspected of furnishing military information to the Ottoman authorities.¹⁶ Talaat Bey was imprisoned in a British war camp in Egypt, and released without permission to return to Mytilene during the course of the war. Similarly, Mustafa Sefket, a Muslim from Chios, was detained in Alexandra Palace in London.¹⁷ Not only Muslims were arrested and detained by the Triple Entente Powers on suspicion of spying. Non-Muslims, including Greeks, shared a similar fate. In May 1916, three German nationals, Dr. Otto Ornstein and his two sons, Theodore and John, were arrested as active Ottoman and German agents on Chios.¹⁸ In the same month, a Greek named Giannis Vlachopoulos was detained for the same reason.¹⁹

After World War I, on 13 May 1919, the day Greek troops arrived in the port of Izmir, a shot rang out as they were approaching the government

¹⁵ Daily Telegraph, *Les Atrocités*, no. 2, 8–14.

¹⁶ FO, 383:129, no. 82280/16/P, 8 May 1916; no. 103472, 30 May 1916; no. 1/43090, 28 May 1916.

¹⁷ FO, 383:129, no. 117010, 10 June 1916.

¹⁸ FO, 383:129, no. 86672, 6 May 1916.

¹⁹ FO, 383:129, no. 95023, 19 May 1916.

buildings, triggering large-scale violence against the Muslims of the city.²⁰ From the city, violence spread to suburban towns and villages in the area. Muslim properties were sacked, and hundreds of Muslims were killed in their homes, their businesses, or the streets.²¹ After consolidating their hold on the occupied zone, the Greek army began to advance beyond the boundaries assigned to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres. They justified the advance on the basis that the Greek army had allegedly been attacked by Muslim irregulars outside the occupied zone and had to counteract these attacks to maintain the peace and security of the province of Izmir. This advance by the Greek army launched the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. The Greek army used methods employed in earlier wars: killing Muslims, looting their properties, and arming local Christians to finish whatever job they had left unfinished. In August 1922 the Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk held off the Greek army at the Sakarya line, turning the tide of this war. At first slowly and then precipitously, the Greek forces retreated from areas they had conquered, destroying Christian and Muslim properties along the way. Whole cities, such as Bilecik and Yenişehir, were burned and crops were destroyed. Greek soldiers took captive every able Muslim civilian they could find during their retreat, especially women and those men who could serve as guides; those who were not deemed useful were often killed.

War Refugees

During the Balkan Wars, a significant number of Muslims living in territories that Balkan Christian states had taken from Ottoman control had fled their residences before or soon after their homelands were occupied by these Balkan Christian states' armies and became refugees in the Ottoman Empire. It is not easy to provide the precise number the Muslim refugees, since Ottoman, Greek, and other sources are not always unbiased, fleeing Muslims occasionally repatriated during or immediately after military operations ceased, and war events often developed too quickly to allow the time necessary for all fleeing Muslims to be registered by state authorities and other

²⁰ FO, 371:4218, "Calthorpe to Curzon, Constantinople, 12 June 1919," enclosure C, "Events that happened in Smyrna on the 15th of May."

²¹ FO, 371:4218, "Cable from A.C.O Smyrna (18 May 1919)," in "Calthorpe to Curzon, Constantinople, 24 May 1919"; FO, 371:4219, "Appendix E, British Military Representative to Admiral Koukoulidis, Smyrna, 17 May 1919"; FO, 371:4218, "Cable from A.C.O Smyrna, Smyrna 15 May 1919."

interested parties, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a nonpartisan organization that was founded in 1910 in the United States and since its foundation has described itself as being dedicated to advancing peace and cooperation between nations. Some sources report as many as 1,445,179 fleeing Muslims, which represented approximately 62 percent of the entire population living in the territories controlled by Balkan Christian states.²² Only those Muslims who had left their homelands at the very beginning of the Balkan Wars could hope to flee while the lands through which they traveled were still safely held by the Ottomans. The remainder were forced to cross areas already conquered by enemy troops, and many of these did not survive.²³ Due to the rapid collapse of the Ottoman army during the First Balkan War, Muslim refugees had little time to reach places of relative safety before they were overcome by the troops of the Balkan Christian allies. Even if no regular troops reached the refugees, there was great danger from the militias that operated behind Ottoman lines, and when the Ottoman army broke up or surrendered, these militias outpaced regular armies in reaching Muslim settlements and refugees. They seized or extorted all they could from the refugees, assaulting, raping, and often killing many or all of a refugee group.

Diseases such as typhus, typhoid, and cholera were major causes of mortality among Muslim refugees. Ottoman and non-Ottoman relief agencies made efforts to assist the victims, but the speed and ferocity of these wars often made it difficult to organize relief measures.²⁴ Cessation of fighting did not always mean safety for Muslim refugees. They were caught between emigrating to an unknown but Muslim-ruled land or waiting for the chance to return to their settlements, now under Christian rule. Many chose the latter: the lands they wanted to return to had been in their families' possession for centuries, and their experiences as refugees made them unwilling to continue to travel to Asia Minor or elsewhere, where they had no land or history. On many occasions, Muslim refugees had no option of further flight.

During the First Balkan War, Muslims fled in great waves to three gathering points for refugees: the port city of Salonica (Photo 6.5), the city of Edirne, and the (today) Albanian coast. It is not easy for states to conduct reliable migration surveys and censuses amid the maelstrom of war, and therefore most

²² Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 164.

²³ FO, 195-2438, no. 6650, Lamb to Lowther, Salonica, December 3, 1912.

²⁴ Harrison Griswold Dwight, *Constantinople Old and New*, 459–499 and 521–533; Philip Hoffman, *Cholera in the Near East*.



Photo 6.5 Departure of Muslim refugees from Salonica, 1912–1913
(Photographical Archive, Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives)

of the available statistical data on Muslim refugees are unofficial estimates whose credibility is debatable. The count of Muslims in each of these estimates magnifies or diminishes depending on the source who provided the estimates and the political agenda that the source might have served. For example, the Ottoman governor of Salonica, Nazım Pasha, claimed that about 140,000 Muslim refugees sought shelter in the city during the First Balkan War until Greek armed forces took control of Salonica on 26 October 1912 (Photo 6.6). The Greek army, however, reported that it had found 10,000 Muslim refugees when it entered the city, while Osman Said Bey, the Ottoman mayor of Salonica, maintained that the number of Muslim refugees in Salonica far surpassed 22,000 in December 1912.²⁵ The Greek authorities claimed that between 3 December 1912 and 16 June 1913, Salonica hosted 13,000 Muslim refugees from the Greek New Lands, 21,000 from Serbian-occupied territories, and 40,585 from Bulgarian-occupied lands.²⁶

²⁵ Kleanthis Nikolaidis, *Istoria tou Ellinotourkikou Polemou*, 69–70; Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi*, 51; GL, SDA, 117, “Ministry of Interior, General Administration of Macedonia, 1914 Bulletin of Macedonia’s Office of Labor,” 15–16.

²⁶ DHAGMFA, A:21ζ (1914), “General Administration of Macedonia to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 July 1914.”



Photo 6.6 Muslim refugees in Salonica, 1912–1913 (Photographic Archive, Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives)

After the start of the Second Balkan War, new waves of Muslim refugees reached Thessaloniki and other areas under Greek control. These refugees were mostly from Bulgarian-controlled areas in eastern Macedonia and Thrace, such as Strumnitsa, Petrich, Melnik, Nevrokop, and Xanthi. By the beginning of August 1913 approximately 63,500 Muslim refugees had reached Salonica. By December 1913 most of the Muslim refugees had left for the Ottoman Empire, and their numbers in Salonica had dropped to 25,100.²⁷ The Refugee Office of the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior claims that approximately 177,302 Muslims who lived in territories occupied by the Balkan allies during the Balkan Wars became refugees in Ottoman lands, of whom 68,947 came from areas occupied by Greece.²⁸ Approximately 2,300 Muslims from Epirus became war refugees during World War I: most of them left for the Ottoman Empire, and about 200 emigrated to the United States.²⁹ There was a strong Muslim refugee movement from Lesbos to Asia

²⁷ GL, SDA, 117, "General Administration of Macedonia to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 July 1914," 20, 34–35.

²⁸ GSA, Historical Archives of Macedonia (henceforth HAM), 75, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the General Administration of Macedonia, Athens, 18 April 1914."

²⁹ GSA, EHA, GAEA, 111:2, "General Administration of Epirus to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ioannina, 23 January 1920." Approximately 1,033 Muslims emigrated to America from the port of

Minor during the wars, estimated at 11,000 people, or 60 percent of the island's Muslim population in 1912.³⁰ Crete was far from Asia Minor, and from the battlefronts of the Balkan Wars and World War I, and Greek was the mother tongue of most of its Muslims. Therefore, only approximately 200 Muslim men left Crete during the wars. After they became Ottoman citizens, these men left the island because they wished to escape military service in the Greek army.³¹

In addition to those seeking refuge in Ottoman-controlled lands, thousands of displaced Muslims abandoned their destroyed or intact homes. They sought protection in territories controlled by the Greek army, living with relatives and friends in villages and cities far from their homelands or in the refugee camps of big cities like Salonica (Photo 6.7). After the end of hostilities, many of the displaced Muslims attempted to repatriate to their home settlements. Many Muslims from Grevena, Kailaria (present-day Ptolemaida), Kastoria, and Anaselitsa (present-day Voio), left their homelands during the First Balkan War after they saw their homes being burned and looted by the Greek army or Greek militias and sought protection in neighboring villages or in the cities of Florina and Manastir (present-day Bitola). A number of them who had supported the Ottoman forces during the war left fearing retaliation by Greek armed forces and local Greeks. Many of these displaced Muslims had returned back to their homelands by the end of December 1912.³²

In Salonica and other areas, there were organized assistance programs for displaced Muslims. In Salonica, an international committee, under the leadership of the German colonel Klaus Von Anderen and with the participation of the British colonel Charles Delmé-Radcliffe gathered 8,000 displaced Muslims crowded into mosques and schools during the Balkan Wars and offered them temporary accommodation in an organized refugee settlement near the American Farm School of the city. The committee, funded by the Greek and Ottoman governments, the Red

Salonica during the Balkan Wars, 885 of whom originated from areas occupied by Serbia; HAM, General Administration of Macedonia Archives (henceforth GAMA), 76, "Report on the Reasons of Migration"; Ioannis Papadopoulos, "I Metanastefsi," 201–222, 531.

³⁰ Emily Kolodny, *La population*, vol. 2, 218–219; Emily Kolodny and Régis Darques, "Turcs, Grecs et Réfugiés," 66–67.

³¹ Nikos Andriotis and Tanju Izbek, "Mide Tourkoi," 340.

³² DHAGMFA, 103:6 (1912), "Administrative Commissioner of Grevena to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Grevena, 30 December 1912"; 102:1, "Administrative Commissioner of Florina to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Florina, 29 December 1912 and 31 December 1912."



Photo 6.7 Muslims in a refugee camp near the Agricultural School of Salonica, 1912–1913 (Photographical Archive, Hellenic Literature and Historical Archive)

Crescent of Egypt, and European diplomatic missions of Salonica, also created two hospitals for the needs of displaced Muslims.³³ In Ioannina, the Consulate of Austria-Hungary provided humanitarian aid for approximately 30,000 displaced Muslims and non-Muslims during the First Balkan War.³⁴

Between 1912 and 1923 a great number of Muslims from the New Lands left for Bulgaria or Serbia, and Muslims from Bulgaria and Serbia moved to the New Lands as a stopover on their migration to Ottoman-controlled lands, mostly Eastern Thrace and western Asia Minor, or settled there. By February 1915, 1,756 Muslims from Serbian territories had left via Salonica for Istanbul. Another 1,500 lived in Thessaloniki without plans to move to the Ottoman Empire, whereas 3,000–4,000 Muslim draft dodgers from Serbian

³³ GL, SDA, 117, “Ministry of Interior, General Administration of Macedonia, 1914 Bulletin of Macedonia’s Office of Labor,” 15–17, 34–35; John Mavrogordatos, *Letters from Greece*, 61–69.

³⁴ DHAGMFA, 38:3 (1913), “General Administration of Epirus to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ioannina, 10 April 1913”; Daily Telegraph, *Les Atrocités*, no. 1, 12–14.

lands lived in Florina.³⁵ Three hundred Muslims who lived in the region of Florina and Kastoria, temporarily occupied by the Triple Alliance, and who had openly supported the German and Bulgarian armies were forced to move to Bulgarian-controlled territories after the region was recaptured by the forces of the Triple Entente.³⁶ Approximately 1,200 Muslims from eastern Macedonia who had collaborated with the Bulgarian and Ottoman forces during World War I moved to Bulgarian territories after the Greek army occupied the region in September 1918, fearing retaliatory acts by the Greek armed forces.³⁷ Likewise, a great number of Çams moved from Epirus to Albania after World War I because they had collaborated with the Triple Alliance forces and feared retaliation by the Greek army and local Greek Orthodox, or because they wanted to avoid being drafted into the Greek army.³⁸ As soon as Greece took control of eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace after World War I, the government of Eleftherios Venizelos allowed the repatriation of Muslims from these areas who had fled to Bulgarian territories during World War I.³⁹ As a result of this, 29,500 Muslims who had fled to the Bulgarian hinterland and elsewhere during the time of the Bulgarian occupation (1913–1918) repatriated to Western Thrace.⁴⁰

Turkish Nationalism

A Turkish nationalist movement emerged in reaction to the rise of Balkan Christian nationalist movements and the influx of Muslim refugees from lost Ottoman territories. On 6 November 1889, the secret circle of liberal-minded students in the imperial military medical schools of Istanbul—who would become known as the Young Turks—had formed a society they called the Committee of the Ottoman Union (İttihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti). They

³⁵ DHAGMFA, A:19δ' (1914), “Greek Consulate of Monastiri [Bitola] to the General Administration of Macedonia, Monastiri, 22 April 1914”; GSA, HAM, GAMA, 101, “Prefect of Thessaloniki to the General Administration of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 12 February 1915.”

³⁶ GSA, Prime Minister’s Political Office Archives (henceforth PMPOA), 371, “Governor of Kozani-Florina to the Deputy Prime Minister, Kozani, 27 May 1919”; DHAGMFA, Thessaloniki Government Archives (henceforth TGA), A:5B (1917), “Prefecture of Florina to the Ministry of Interior, Florina, 20 October 1916.”

³⁷ DHAGMFA, A:5(8) (1919), “Muslim Residents of Various Villages to the Deputy Governor of Kilkis, Akindjali [present Mouries], 19 May 1919”; *Nea Edessa*, 1 November 1919.

³⁸ DHAGMFA, A:5X (1917), “Stergiadis to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preveza, 29 August 1917 and 9 September 1917”; Angeliki Sfika-Theodosiou, *I Italia*, 318–328.

³⁹ DHAGMFA, A:5E (1919), “Venizelos to the Deputy Prime Minister, Athens, 18 May 1919.”

⁴⁰ Dimitrios Svolopoulos, *I Thraki*, 45.

aspired to overthrow the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II and called for the democratization of the Ottoman Empire. Abdülhamid's police discovered and suspended the society as its cells spread among institutions of higher learning in Istanbul. After 1895, the Committee established contacts with exiled Ottoman liberals and changed its name to Committee for Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). After two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1896 and 1897, the Committee's leaders in the Ottoman Empire were imprisoned. Underground political activities intensified, particularly in Ottoman Macedonia, and in July 1908 a coup led by a group of army officers of the Third Ottoman Army in Salonica who were members of the Committee resulted in the restoration of the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and the Ottoman parliament, as well as the introduction of a multiparty system. After an attempted monarchist counter-coup in favor of Abdülhamid II the following year, he was deposed, and his brother Mehmed V ascended the throne.

The Committee for Union and Progress established a parliamentary group and in 1913 redefined itself as a political party, the Party of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Firkası). The 1908 coup had been welcomed by many non-Muslims and non-Turkish groups who opposed Abdülhamid's absolutist rule. However, the Party of Union and Progress, alarmed by Ottoman territorial losses in the Balkan Wars and the Caucasus, grew increasingly more nationalist. Its political objectives shifted toward establishing a homogenous country that would include all Muslim Turks, doing away with ethnic and religious groups who would be unable to integrate into the Muslim-Turkish nation that the party aspired to create.⁴¹ This change of objectives soon estranged non-Turks, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The party's three leaders, Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha, formed a triumvirate known as the Three Pashas and gained de facto rule over the party and the empire. The wartime emergency after 1914 facilitated the establishment of single-party rule, but the disastrous outcome of World War I discredited the party's leadership. In November 1918, the Three Pashas fled abroad, and the Party of Union and Progress was dissolved.

After the spring of 1913, the Party of Union and Progress had effected a program of expulsion of Greek Orthodox Christians, beginning with

⁴¹ Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism*, 3–4.

Eastern Thrace. After May 1914, the party expanded the program to expelling Greek Orthodox Christians from western Asia Minor.⁴² The program was part of the party's plan to replace the Greek Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the empire with Balkan Muslims, and was intended to meet the need to accommodate the thousands of Muslim refugees who had flocked to the empire after the Balkan Wars and World War I.⁴³ The party also saw the presence of the Greek Orthodox Christian population in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor as Greece's Trojan Horse in the empire, able to support Greek armed forces in case of a future Greco-Ottoman war. In addition, the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox Christians helped increase the empire's religious homogeneity, which the party believed would help the empire's future stability and territorial integrity. The program also encouraged Muslim migration from Greek-controlled areas. It is believed that under this program, approximately 100,000–150,000 Muslims from the New Lands emigrated through the city ports of Thessaloniki and Kavala to Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor.⁴⁴

Before the rise of the Young Turks, the term “Turk” had a derogatory meaning, usually referring to the unpolished peasants of Anatolia, and could be regarded as an insult.⁴⁵ A Muslim man of noble birth or high social position would call himself an Ottoman, never a Turk. The transformation from an Ottoman/Muslim to a Turkish national identity, as embraced by Turkish nationalism, was a slow process that gained momentum during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923), also known as the Kurtuluş Savaşı, the War of Liberation, or İstiklal Harbi, the War of Independence. This war was fought by Turkish nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (referred to as Atatürk after 1935) against Greek troops in western Asia Minor, the forces of the First Republic of Armenia in eastern Asia Minor, French forces in southern Asia Minor, and supporters of the Ottoman sultan and separatists in various Ottoman cities. Turkish nationalism appealed mainly to Muslim resistance against the “infidel” (non-Muslim) aggressors. Mustafa Kemal

⁴² Ahmad Feroz, *The Young Turks*; Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*.

⁴³ Erol Ülker, “Contextualizing Turkification”; Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Mikra Asia 190s–1919*, 527–532; Hasan Babacan, *Mehmed Talât Paşa*, 88–99.

⁴⁴ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 75, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the General Administration of Macedonia, Athens, 18 April 1914”; 76, “Report on Muslim Emigration”; DHAGMFA, 29 (1914), “A. Naoum to the Prime Minister, Athens, 8 June 1914”; Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question*, 176.

⁴⁵ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 20–26.

advocated a new ideology that aspired to establish a modern European secular state.⁴⁶ He adopted the Latin alphabet, the decimal numeral system, and the Gregorian calendar. Sunday replaced Friday as the day of rest, and he also banned the wearing of the fez by men and the hijab by women.⁴⁷

Islam remained an essential element of Turkish identity, making all non-Muslims social and cultural outcasts, but it was the Turkish ethnic origin (or sometimes “blood”), language, history, and culture that formed the basis of the Republic of Turkey. As such, the Turks of Turkey were a part of a much larger Turkish *irk*, or race, which inhabited lands beyond the borders of modern Turkey, but was nevertheless regarded as a kin ethnic group that, like Islam, constituted a strong ideological force of potential political value.⁴⁸ Kemalism propounded a historical myth that the Turkish language was the root of all other languages. The Turkish national identity was constructed so as to gloss over real ethnic and religious diversity in an effort to present the remaining population of the country as homogenous. This invention served to rival the competing nationalism of the Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs and was in line with other nationalist movements in Europe. A more ethnocentric Turkish national consciousness developed in which the name “Turk” was no longer a symbol of Ottoman backwardness and took on the connotation of guardianship of the enduring virtues of the Turkish nation.⁴⁹

Like Orthodox Christian nationalisms in the Balkans, which claimed members of the Rûm *millet* in an effort to establish an ethnic base for their nationalist movements, Turkish nationalism often targeted the Muslims of Anatolia and the Balkans for the same purpose. Unlike Arabs, the Muslims of the Balkans and Anatolia had no Islamic tradition outside the Ottoman experience, and many Muslims in these regions had elevated their social status and gained political and social privileges through Ottoman Islam. The threat posed by Christian nationalist movements left Turkish nationalism as the main pillar of support for the Muslims in the Balkans, and made the separation of Turks from Muslims of other descent a delicate

⁴⁶ Sina Akşin, *Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic*, 228–232; Reşat Kasaba, *The Cambridge History of Turkey*; Ahmad Feroz, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 87–90.

⁴⁷ Harold Courtenay Armstrong, *The Grey Wolf*, 291–293; Andrew Mango, “Attatürk,” 164.

⁴⁸ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*; Çağlar Keyder, “A History,” 9.

⁴⁹ Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent*, 81–89; Umut Özkiprimli and Spyros Sofos, *Tormented by History*, 66.

matter. Before the rise of the Albanian and Bosniak nationalisms, several non-Turkish Muslim groups in the Balkans had declared themselves to be Ottomans or Turks, depending on the time and place. For example, a great number of Çams in Epirus made use of the November 1913 Greco-Ottoman Convention of Athens, which gave Muslims of the New Lands the right to choose within three years between Ottoman citizenship with emigration to the Ottoman Empire or Greek citizenship and remaining in Greece to adopt Ottoman citizenship and migrate to the Ottoman Empire, instead of moving to neighboring Albania or remaining in Greece.⁵⁰ In turn, Turkish nationalists often regarded Balkan and Anatolian Muslims as Turks regardless of their ethnolinguistic background, a practice that continued—to the present day—from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, which has been able to play the kinship and religion cards when it has wished to make its influence felt in Southeastern Europe. For instance, Turkish politicians such as Bülent Ecevit, four times prime minister of Turkey between 1974 and 2002, argued that the Slavic-speaking Bosnian Muslims and Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christian Gagauz in southern Moldova, northeastern Bulgaria, and southwestern Ukraine, were Turks: the Bosnian Muslims due to their Islamic faith and the Gagauz due to their Turkish language and common ancestry.⁵¹

The overwhelming majority of Muslims were illiterate, religiously and socially conservative peasants who lacked the support of a strong bourgeoisie able to facilitate the development of connecting political, economic, and social links among the various ethnolinguistic Muslim groups. The Muslim populations in the New Lands did not form a cohesive national identity, as opposed to the Greek national identity, that could confront Greek nationalism and challenge Greek sovereignty. The political activity of the Young Turks movement was mainly confined to large cities such as Salonica and Istanbul and had limited impact on the vast majority of Muslims in the New Lands. Speaking about the future territorial status of Western Thrace after World War I, the politician Charisios Vamvakas, a close aide of Eleftherios Venizelos, argued that “the Muslim population yearns for its peace and is indifferent to whether [the future status of Western Thrace] will be political

⁵⁰ GSA, EHA, GAEA, 114:3, “Prefect of Ioannina to the General Administration of Epirus, Ioannina, 8 October 1920”; “District of Margariti to the General Administration of Epirus, Margariti, 15 July 1920.”

⁵¹ Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority,” 47.

autonomy or annexation to Greece.”⁵² An October 1917 report from the general governor of western Macedonia to the government reads: “[the Muslims] know that from conquerors they now have become the conquered and that the conquerors [Greeks] have the right to behave toward them as they behaved [to the Greeks] in the past [Ottoman times]. In any case, they [Muslims] believe that they have to be loyal to their rulers as the Koran commands.”⁵³

Muslim Emigration

The Greek authorities were concerned about the economic consequences of labor shortages in the New Lands following the Muslim mass exodus. Many farms were not cultivated, and agricultural production was in decline. On many occasions, the Ottoman authorities complained to their Greek colleagues about the mistreatment of Muslims in the New Lands that had led many Muslims to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire even in times of peace. Muslims were frequently harassed, tortured, and even murdered by Greek detachments during operations to disarm Muslim villages. For example, in April 1914, following the visit of former Muslim MP Ali Riza Bey to the city of Drama, Greek armed units searched Muslim and Bulgarian houses for arms. During the search many Muslims were arrested, a number of Muslim women were raped, and Muslim properties were looted. Ali Riza Bey was deported by the local Greek authorities, who had ordered the search after they had been informed that the local branch of the Party of Union and Progress, of which Ali Riza Bey was a leading member, was organizing a military coup and arming Muslims and Bulgarians in the region.⁵⁴ The Ottoman authorities did not hold the Greek authorities entirely responsible, however, for such incidents, aware that the Greek government was often unable to impose its authority amid the administrative chaos and lawlessness in the New Lands following the Balkan Wars. The Greek government’s decisions were frequently misunderstood or disobeyed, and

⁵² Kalliopi Papathanasi-Mousiopoulou, “Agnostes Ptyches,” 66; Kalliopi Papathanasi-Mousiopoulou, “Oi Diatheseis ton Pomakon tis Dytikis Thrakis, 1918–1923,” 25.

⁵³ GSA, PMPOA, 95, “Governmental Representative of Kozani-Florina to the Prime Minister, Kozani, 18 October 1917.”

⁵⁴ *Makedonia*, 20, 21, 26 April 1914 and 8 May 1914.

its directives often fell on deaf ears.⁵⁵ Indeed, local Greek authorities often exploited the change of sovereignty to take vengeance on Muslims, who were regarded as representatives of an allegedly oppressive Ottoman past. Greek police and field wardens frequently protected Muslims only after they had been bribed to do so. Muslims who refused to pay bribes were often beaten up or imprisoned. Local Greek civil servants often demanded that Muslims remove their fezzes in civil service offices, against Islamic custom. Local Greek administrative authorities often encouraged Greek Orthodox sharecroppers to stop paying the crop shares to their Muslim *ciftlik* owners, unless the *ciftlik* owner was Greek Orthodox.⁵⁶ Incidents of abuses of power like the ones committed by Greek armed units in April 1914 in Drama led Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos in May 1914 to ban any police or army searches of Muslim dwellings in the New Lands for arms.⁵⁷

It is believed that 413,922 Muslims emigrated from the New Lands to the Ottoman Empire between 1912 and 1920. From those, 132,000 settled in Eastern Thrace and 145,868 in western Asia Minor.⁵⁸ The Greek government worried that mass Muslim emigration could be weaponized by the Ottoman authorities to continue the mistreatment and forced expulsion of Greek Orthodox Christians in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor. The *muhacir* (the Ottomans' term for the Muslim migrants from the Balkans) were often involved in acts of revenge against local Greek Orthodox Christians for abuses they had suffered in the New Lands. These migrants also exerted political pressure on the Ottoman authorities to expel Greek Orthodox Christians from the empire. The Greek authorities often tried to halt the Muslim exodus from the New Lands through various administrative schemes designed to obstruct their emigration. For instance, Greek civil servants often purposely delayed issuing of passports to those wishing to emigrate. Greek authorities also frequently purposely delayed the process of authorizing Ottoman citizenship to Muslims who wanted to emigrate, running

⁵⁵ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 74, “Embassy of Greece in Istanbul to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Istanbul, 5 July 1914;” “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the General Administration of Macedonia, Athens, 28 June 1914”; 76, “General Administration of Macedonia to the Military Police Headquarters, Thessaloniki, 21 March 1914.”

⁵⁶ GL, SDA, 130, “Alexandros Diomidis to the Economic Authorities of Macedonia.”

⁵⁷ DHAGMFA, A:198' (1914), “Venizelos's Telegram to the General Administration of Macedonia, Athens, 5 May 1914.”

⁵⁸ David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors*, 65–71; Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio, *Mavri Vivlos*; Center for Asia Minor Studies, *I exodos*, vol. 1, 48–49, 52–55, 228, 231–236, 243–244, 246–247, 252, 254–255, 257–258, 322–323.

out the three-year deadline of the Greco-Ottoman Convention of Athens for choosing their citizenship.⁵⁹ On some occasions, Muslims who wished to emigrate or encouraged other Muslims to do so were persecuted as agents who conspired against the Greek nation. In the region of Florina, the imam of the village Elevits, present-day Lakkia, was prosecuted after he encouraged the Muslims of Elevits to choose Ottoman citizenship and emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. In Kozani, forty-six Muslims were to be deported to Crete after they formally declared to the local authorities that they wished to choose Ottoman citizenship, but the deportation did not take place because the Muslims changed their minds, adopted Greek citizenship, and decided to remain in Greece.⁶⁰

Some Muslim males were leaving in order to avoid being drafted into the Greek army, when most of the wars Greece fought at the time were against an Islamic state (*dar al-Islam*, abode of Islam), the Ottoman Empire. Muslims were first conscripted by Venizelos's Provisional Government of National Defense to serve in auxiliary positions, for example as trenchers. Muslims who did not want to be conscripted had to buy their way out of military service. These practices were discontinued after the government of Dimitrios Gounaris, lobbied by Muslim members of its electoral base in the New Lands, passed Act 2728 in September 1921, which provided for the exemption of all Muslim males in the New Lands from serving the Greek army.⁶¹

As with the Euboean and Thessalian Muslims in the past, the Muslim exodus was viewed as a result of Muslims' difficulty in adjusting to the changing environment of a non-Islamic state (*dar-ül harb*, abode of war). Many Greek officials saw the exodus as a natural outcome, as the norms and values of the Islamic faith were incompatible with the norms and values of the European Enlightenment, which guided the political and judicial systems as well as the societies and their elites in non-Ottoman Europe, including Greece. In the words of a Greek civil servant of the time, "the emigration of Ottomans [i.e., Muslims] is due to the equality before the law on which the Hellenic state [i.e., Greece] is founded. . . . The Ottomans are taught that they are destined to rule all the other nations and live at the expense of the other nations' work,

⁵⁹ DHAGMFA, A:19δ' (1914), "General Governor of Macedonia to the Prime Minister, Thessaloniki, 17 October 1914"; "General Administration of Crete to the Ottoman Consulate of Piraeus, Chania 10 December 1914."

⁶⁰ DHAGMFA, A:5(10γ) (1919), "Military Administration of Kozani-Florina, Intelligence Service, Weekly News Bulletin 24–31 July 1919," "Adosidis to the Deputy Prime Minister, Thessaloniki, 18 July 1919."

⁶¹ OGG, no. 173, 17 September 1921.

to break the law without being punished for their actions.” The Greek governor of the Langadas district claimed that Muslim emigration was due to “Muslims’ centuries-old habit to rule despotically against our nation.”⁶²

As soon as Greece took control of Eastern Thrace and the region of Smyrna, a number of Muslim emigrants and war refugees tried to repatriate to their original homes in the New Lands. Muslim repatriation coincided with a wave of repatriating Greek Orthodox refugees and emigrants to the New Lands from Eastern Thrace and western Asia Minor. Many Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians who returned were disappointed to discover that their former houses and properties were not available to them, as they were occupied by the refugees and emigrants who had moved in the opposite direction. Greek Orthodox Christians had occupied Muslim properties in the New Lands, and Muslims held Greek Orthodox Christians’ properties in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor. It is believed that, by the end of the 1920s, 61,443 houses originally occupied by Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire were occupied by Muslim refugees and emigrants from the New Lands. In February 1919, 217 Muslims from Doirani who had lived as refugees in Eastern Thrace were given permission by the Greek authorities to return to their homes.⁶³ In the summer of 1920, the Greek authorities of Drama and Thessaloniki did not have enough abandoned Muslim dwellings to accommodate Pontic Greek refugees from the Caucasus, because so many of the Muslims who had fled Drama and Thessaloniki during the Balkan Wars and World War I were being repatriated.⁶⁴ Approximately 25,000 Muslims from Bulgaria and a great number of Muslims from Serbia who had left their homelands for Eastern Thrace or Asia Minor during World War I also tried to return to their places of origin in Bulgaria and Serbia after Greece took control of Eastern Thrace and the region of Smyrna. Many Muslims could not resettle in their former homes due to either administrative obstacles created by the Bulgarian and Serbian authorities in order to complicate their repatriation or the fact that their properties had been destroyed or were occupied by other tenants and they could not reclaim them or obtain compensation. Muslims who could not repatriate in Bulgaria or Serbia returned as

⁶² DHAGMFA, A:198' (1914), “Police Directorate of Veroia to the Military Police Headquarters of Macedonia, Veroia, 2 May 1914”; GSA, HAM, 16, “Report of the District Governor of Langadas, Langadas, 12 January 1914.”

⁶³ DHAGMFA, A:5E (1919), “High Commission of Greece to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Istanbul, 1 March 1919.”

⁶⁴ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 66, “Ministry of Agriculture to the General Administrations of Drama and Thessaloniki, Athens, 14 September 1920.”

muhacir to Eastern Thrace or Asia Minor or settled under Greek rule in the New Lands as Serbian and Bulgarian citizens.⁶⁵

Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians

In the New Lands and elsewhere in Southeastern Europe, religious restrictions were not insurmountable, nor did they erase cross-faith interactions, even during times of war, ethnic nationalism, and religious fanaticism. In the words of Mohitin Yavuz, a Greek-speaking Muslim from Vrasno, present-day Anavryta in the Grevena district, who had moved to Honaz in Asia Minor after the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange, “none of [the Greek Orthodox and Muslims in Vrasno] were bothered with religion, language, the church or the mosque. My father had a Greek Orthodox priest friend. Sometimes, [the priest] visited our home and we exchanged the visit to his. There was cordiality between us. Muslims went to [Greek Orthodox] weddings and [Greek Orthodox] came to [Muslim ones]. Our [Greek Orthodox] friends protected us and we protected them.”⁶⁶

Apart from local antagonisms, long intertwined economic ties existed between Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians. In northwestern Macedonia, the Muslim peasants were the main suppliers of wheat, while the Greek Orthodox Christians provided the local market with salt, olive oil, soap, and shoes. This economic interdependence led the trade association of Kozani in January 1923 to ask the Greek government to exempt the Muslims of northwestern Macedonia from the 1923 compulsory population exchange, because Muslims’ departures would cause shortages of agricultural products in rural areas with sizeable Muslim populations.⁶⁷ Similarly, in September 1922, Greek Orthodox Christians from Iraklio protested the forced expulsion of Muslims from Foinikia, a settlement near Iraklio, to the Greek authorities because the Muslims of Foinikia supplied agricultural and livestock products to the city.⁶⁸ In October 1922, Muslim community leaders

⁶⁵ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 92, “Governor of Thessaloniki-Pella to the General Consulate of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Thessaloniki, 8 June 1921”; “General Consulate of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the Governor of Thessaloniki-Pella, Thessaloniki, 13 June, 1921.”

⁶⁶ Kemal Yaltsin, *Mia Proika Amanati*, 260.

⁶⁷ DHAGMFA, 5:2 (1923), “Prefect of Kozani to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kozani, 9 January 1923.”

⁶⁸ *Idi*, 28 September 1922.

from across Greece sent telegrams to the Greek government and to Fridtjof Nansen, the high commissioner for refugees at the League of Nations, protesting being forced to leave their homelands and be separated from their Greek Orthodox Christian neighbors and friends.⁶⁹ Ismet Altay, a Muslim from Crete, recalled: “my father’s Greek colleagues at the factory came to say farewell. A rich Greek friend of his took our family on his boat to a ship on the open sea that would take us to Turkey. Before we departed, he embraced my dad and cried. Leaving the country was very difficult”⁷⁰

Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians of various economic backgrounds and social classes often established business partnerships. There were several business partnerships in animal trade in Lesbos and Crete that often involved coownership of property. Hussein Ismail Kombakoğlu, a Muslim MP from Drama, had a Greek Orthodox Christian business partner in the tobacco industry in the city of Kavala. In Western Thrace and other areas, Greek Orthodox Christian notables often became proxies of Muslim *ciftlik* owners who were leaving for Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor but maintained their properties in the New Lands.⁷¹ Participation in professional associations, such as those of butchers, lemon sellers, lumbermen, and others, often helped people of different ethnic and religious background to forge bonds of solidarity through their work. These bonds were often tested by incidents such as the clashes between striking Jewish female tobacco workers and Muslim female strikebreakers in Thessaloniki during an industrial action in March 1914.⁷²

There was also collaboration in the context of federative initiatives that aimed to overcome ethnic nationalism, put an end to wars and ethnic conflicts, and protect minorities’ rights by creating a federative republic in the Balkans that would include several, if not all, of the nation-states of the region as well as people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds.⁷³ One such initiative was the Socialist Workers’ Federation, known simply as the Federation a socialist organization in Ottoman Salonica founded in May 1909 by Avraam Benaroya, a Bulgarian Jew, with the aim of uniting

⁶⁹ Ayhan Aktar, “To proto Etos,” 135–136.

⁷⁰ Kemal Yaltsin, *Mia Proika Amanati*, 260; Sinan Kalayoğlu, “The Greek Muslim Migration,” 76–78; GSA, PMPOA, 596, “The Governor of Thessaloniki to the Prime Minister, Thessaloniki, 10 January 1923.”

⁷¹ DHAGMFA, 91:3 (1922), “Çorlu’s Deputy Governor to the Political Administration of Thrace, Çorlu, 3 June 1922.”

⁷² Alexandros Dagkas, *Symvoli stin Erevna*.

⁷³ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*.

workers of different nationalities in Salonica within a single labor movement.⁷⁴ The organization took this name because it was built on the federative model of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria: it was conceived as a federation of separate sections, each representing the four main ethnic groups of the city: Jews, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Turks. The Federation initially published its literature in the languages of these four groups—Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish, and Ladino (the language of Sephardic Jews in Salonica)—and under Benaroya's leadership, it soon became the strongest socialist party in the Ottoman Empire. The “Ottoman Socialist Party” was essentially an intellectual club, and other socialist political formations, like the Istanbul Greek Socialist Center, the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, were mostly attractive to members of a specific ethnic or religious group, for example, Greeks or Armenians. The Federation created combative trade unions, attracted intellectuals, and gained solid support among workers in Ottoman Macedonia. By 1910, it comprised fourteen syndicates, and in 1912 it mobilized about 12,000 workers in various demonstrations.⁷⁵ The Federation cultivated strong links with the Second International (1889–1916), an organization of socialist and labor parties formed on 14 July 1889 at a Paris meeting, and had its own representative, Saul Nahum, in the International Socialist Bureau, the Second International's coordinating body headquartered in Paris.

Unlike other parties, which were organized on ethnic lines, as a cross-community group the Federation was tolerated by the Ottoman authorities. A prominent Bulgarian member, Dimitar Vlahov, was a socialist MP in the Ottoman parliament that was established after the 1908 Young Turks Revolution.⁷⁶ After the incorporation of Salonica in Greece during the Balkan Wars, Benaroya and other leading members of the Federation resisted the Greek government's attempts to impose ethnic divisions in the city. Opposed to World War I, Benaroya was exiled for two and a half years on the island of Naxos. In contrast to most of the prominent socialists in pre-1913 Greece, the Federation mobilized for Greece's neutrality in World War I. As this happened to be the policy pursued by King Constantine I, this led to the loss of political support for the Federation in Macedonia. From 1915

⁷⁴ Joshua Starr, “The Socialist Federation”; Iakovos Aktsgoglou, “The Emergence”; Abraham Benaroya, “A Note.”

⁷⁵ Donald Quataert, “The Industrial,” 395.

⁷⁶ Mark Mazower, *Salonica*, 288.

onward the Federation was buoyed by the popular reaction to World War I. Both royalist and Venizelist policy assisted the emancipation and radicalization of the left, and Benaroya, keeping equal distance from both established political groups, turned the situation to his own and the Federation's advantage. In the May 1915 general elections, the Federation elected two MPs representing Thessaloniki to the Hellenic Parliament and lost a third seat by only few votes. The Federation already had strong links with internationalist groups and organizations all over Greece and abroad, from which the Sosialistikiko Komma Ellados (Socialist Workers' Party of Greece), later renamed the Kommounistikiko Komma Ellados (Communist Party of Greece) sprung up. The Socialist Workers' Party of Greece followed the Federation closely on the issue of national self-determination and wished to transform the Greek state into a federation of autonomous provinces that would safeguard the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and participate in a federative republic of Balkan peoples. This party tried to gain the support of Muslim tobacco workers in the regions of Thessaloniki and eastern Macedonia. There were Muslim MP candidates on this party's ballot papers in constituencies with high numbers of Muslim tobacco workers, such as that of Drama in eastern Macedonia.

Federative movements, such as the Oriental Federation-Leonidas Voulgaris (Anatoliki Omospondia-Leonidas Voulgaris), founded in 1884 in Athens, promoted the rapprochement of Balkan Christians with the aim of establishing a federation of Balkan Christian states against the Turks and the Ottoman Empire. This idea did not appeal among Muslims and non-Christian ethnic groups in the New Lands. State officials like Ionas Dragoumis, a diplomat of Greece, distanced themselves from the Megali Idea and propounded the view of a Greco-Ottoman federal state whose citizens would be equal before the law and would enjoy their human and cultural rights regardless of their religious or ethnic backgrounds. Dragoumis's move was anti-Western in its nature and was later influenced by socialist ideas. During the National Schism, Dragoumis joined the anti-Venizelist camp and became one of its prominent intellectuals. He was assassinated in 1920 in Athens by Venizelists on his way to submit an article to a Greek newspaper in which he condemned the assassination attempt against Eleftherios Venizelos on 12 August 1920.⁷⁷ Similarly, Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, a close friend of Dragoumis and a

⁷⁷ Antonios Chamoudopoulos, *I Neotera Filiki Etaireia*.

Greek military officer from the Greek island of Syros, founded the Organosis Konstantinoupoleos (Organization of Constantinople), which distrusted the operation of the Greek state and supported the establishment of a federal state that would have a Greco-Turkish alliance at its core and would aim to include the Balkans and Asia Minor.⁷⁸ Like his friend Dragoumis, Souliotis-Nikolaidis supported the ideal of Greece's emancipation from the West, which they both referred to as the Anatoliko Idaniko (Oriental Ideal), and which Souliotis-Nikolaidis continued to support, even after Greece's defeat in the Asia Minor War of 1919–1922 and the subsequent forced transfer of Greco-Turkish populations, until his death in 1945.⁷⁹

The Anatoliko Idaniko did not appeal to Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities in Greece and in Greek-controlled areas in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, who viewed it as a political platform that would allow Hellenism to dominate in the region (the Balkans and Asia Minor). In addition, in the nationalistic atmosphere of the early twentieth century, including the economic protectionism and the extreme militaristic nationalism of the interwar years, ethnic and national antagonisms and passions, fueled by the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Asia Minor War as well as by the 1923–1925 forced population exchange, prevented federative ideas and movements of a cross-community nature from flourishing. In the general elections of 1915, for example, Muslim and other religious and ethnic minorities supported the Socialist Workers' Party of Greece and the Federation mostly because they were charmed by these parties' antiwar rhetoric, as well as their political position that the forthcoming peace should exclude any changing of borders or transfer of populations in the Balkans, and less as a result of a deep socialist conscience in support of all minorities receiving equal treatment.⁸⁰

Greek Orthodox Refugees

By the end of 1914, an influx of 200,000 Greek Orthodox Christian refugees had arrived in the New Lands from Bulgaria, Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, and the Caucasus region. By 1920, the figure had risen to 435,000. By March

⁷⁸ Thanos Veremis and Katerina Boura, *Athanasiou Soulioti-Nikolaidi*; Ioannis Zelepos, "Redefining the 'Great Idea.'"

⁷⁹ Dimitris Tzivias, *Oi Metamorfoseis tou Ethnismou*.

⁸⁰ George Leontaritis, *Greece*, 71.

1923, 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Asia Minor had followed the withdrawal of the defeated Greek troops to Greece, mostly in the New Lands. By September 1924, another 214,000 Greek Orthodox Christian refugees reached Greece due to the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange, mostly from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor. The Greek authorities began to settle Greek refugees in abandoned properties of Muslims who had left or were preparing to leave. But when the waves of refugees increased, and there were not enough abandoned Muslim properties available to house them, the pressing need to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of them led Greek authorities to take extraordinary measures, such as the confiscation of Muslim properties, especially those abandoned by Muslims who had left the country. They also forced Muslim families in the New Lands to share their properties with the incoming Greek Orthodox Christian refugees. On many occasions, refugees settled in properties regarded as abandoned by their Muslim owners when in reality they had left temporarily in search of protection during the wars and had never relinquished their property rights. They returned after the war to find their properties occupied by Greek Orthodox Christian refugees and entered into prolonged legal disputes with the refugee occupants and the Greek state.⁸¹ Sometimes they succeeded in recovering their properties, sometimes they lost them, and sometimes the disputes with the Greek Orthodox Christian occupants continued for a long period of time.⁸²

The Greek Orthodox Christians' cohabitation with Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities in the same settlements, or even the same houses, was often problematic. Religious faith was the principal determinant of who was to be forcibly exchanged, and there had always been a religious element in Greece's conflicts with the Ottoman Empire. Greek Orthodox Christian refugees often regarded Muslims in Greece as a priori endorsers of the policies and actions of the Ottoman state, including the hardships and persecutions they had endured. On their side, Muslims often held the Greek Orthodox Christian refugees responsible for the oppression they had been subjected to in accommodating the incoming refugees. In the words of a November 1923 report by the General Administration of Thrace to the Greek government: "the [Greek Orthodox Christian] refugees regarded the

⁸¹ GL, SDA, 30:2, "Pallis to Stefanos Dragoumis, Thessaloniki, 5 April 1915."

⁸² GSA, HAM, GAMA, 117, "Representatives of the Village Chanderes in the Caucasus to HM the King of Hellenes, Elassona, 13 May 1914."

Muslims as the reason for their misery, whereas the Muslims viewed the refugees as the reason for their malaise.”⁸³ The refugees often mocked and physically attacked Muslims and their properties, forcing them to feed and financially support refugee families or to work without pay carrying stones, water, and timber for refugees’ construction and other projects.⁸⁴ In April 1914, Muslim residents of the village of Lachanas in the Thessaloniki district complained to the local police because the presence of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees in their village restricted the movements of Muslim women and forced them to wear veils when they worked on the farms.⁸⁵ Elsewhere, for example in the village of Sarai in the Langadas district, present-day Scholario, Muslim residents protested because Greek Orthodox Christian refugees had occupied and often defiled or destroyed Muslim community property such as mosques, *tekkes*, and Muslim cemeteries or attacked or verbally abused Muslims.⁸⁶ Accommodation under the same roof was a frequent source of conflict. On many occasions, Greek Orthodox Christian refugees forced Muslims to leave their homes and go in search of accommodations and protection in urban centers such as Thessaloniki, Mytilene, and Iraklio, where the displaced Muslims often faced destitution and famine.⁸⁷ In Sari Saban, present-day Chrysoupoli, clashes between Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christian refugees led to an all-out conflict. A mob of Muslims attacked Christian refugees, forcing them out of Muslim properties.⁸⁸

The political, economic, and social turmoil following Greece’s military defeat in Asia Minor and the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace allowed a number of criminal gangs to emerge and operate extensively in the New Lands. These gangs were mostly formed of hot-tempered Greek military men and local Greeks with strong anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish feelings, as well as Christian refugees whose

⁸³ DHAGMFA, League of Nations (henceforth LoN), 8:3 (1923), “General Administration of Thrace to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komotini, 5 November 1923.”

⁸⁴ FO, 286: 874, “British Embassy to Foreign Office, Athens, 19 January 1923, registration number 35.”

⁸⁵ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 76, “Deputy Police Director of Langadas to the Police Headquarters of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 15 April 1914.”

⁸⁶ Hellenic Literature and Historical Archive (henceforth HLHA), Eleftherios Venizelos Archive (henceforth EVA), 7:5, “Petition of the Mayors of Doukoundji and Saradj to Prefect Argyropoulos, Thessaloniki, 6 April 1914.”

⁸⁷ GSA, PMPÖA, 610, “Muslim Notables of Villages in Irakleio to the Prime Minister, Irakleio, 12 May 1923”; 720, “Muslim Community of Thessaloniki to the Prime Minister, Thessaloniki, 24 October 1922”; DHAGMFA, 17:6 (1923), “Mufti of Mytilene to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mytilene, 22 August 1923.”

⁸⁸ Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange*, 424.

actions were driven by their experiences of hardship, persecution, and poverty. The gangs primarily targeted Muslim businesses, properties, and lives. A series of murders and robberies took place in Macedonia and Western Thrace after September 1922.⁸⁹ While many Muslims initially opposed the prospect of their forced transfer to Turkey, as the political and social environment became progressively more hostile, an increasing number of Muslims came to view the 1923 agreement for the compulsory population exchange as a blessing, not a curse.⁹⁰

Lawlessness in the New Lands was of great concern to the Greek government. Greece was in a vulnerable military and diplomatic position following its defeat in the Asia Minor War. Incidents of oppression and criminal behavior against Muslims might lead to violent revenge against the remaining Greek Orthodox Christians in Eastern Thrace and Anatolia. News of these incidents also reached Lausanne, where postwar Greco-Turkish peace negotiations were under way, and caused the Turkish delegation to toughen its position at the negotiating table. The efforts of Greece to help settle incoming Greek Orthodox Christian refugees there would be extremely difficult if Ankara refused to receive Muslims from the New Lands as part of a forcible exchange, or if the Turkish authorities insisted on a forced Greco-Turkish population exchange of the Greek Orthodox Christians of Istanbul, who had been exempted from the 1923 forced exchange. Therefore, the Greek government pressured the often bewildered local authorities in the New Lands to increase policing and take security measures to protect Muslims and other minorities in ethnically and religiously mixed areas.⁹¹

Tension, violence, and conflicts were not the norm in the relationship between Greek Orthodox Christian refugees and Muslims in the New Lands. Many Muslim families in Crete and northwestern Macedonia supported incoming refugees, offering accommodations and fundraising to cover their living expenses.⁹² Reşat Tesal, a Muslim from Thessaloniki, recalls that at the beginning his family did not like the idea of living

⁸⁹ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 87, “High Military Police Command of Macedonia to the Police Headquarters of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 20 October 1922.”

⁹⁰ FO, 286:874, “Embassy of Great Britain to Foreign Office, Athens, 19 January 1923”; Mark Mazower, *Salonica*, 345; Samim Akgönül, “Les nouveaux Turcs,” 243.

⁹¹ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 99, “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the General Administration of Thessaloniki, Athens, no date.”

⁹² *Nea Efimeris*, 21 and 29 September 1922; Nikos Andriotis, “Christianoī kai Mousoulmanoī,” 84.

under the same roof with a family of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees, but the reality was that his family lived together with a family of refugees without major problems until Tesal's family departed for Turkey.⁹³ Sharing a common language often helped natives and refugees to develop good relations. Ramazan Eser, a Muslim from Sevindikli in the Kilkis district, present-day Eptalofos, recalled that prior to his family's departure for Turkey, fifty to sixty houses in Sevindikli had been partly occupied by Greek Orthodox Christian refugees who were fluent in Turkish, and this facilitated communications and helped develop good relations between Muslims and Christians.⁹⁴ Müyesser Ertunc a Muslim from Ioannina, recalled no tension with the family of Greek Orthodox Christians with whom her family lived in Pendik, a settlement near Istanbul, after they left Greece. She recalled that her family spoke Turkish with the Greek Orthodox Christian family and that her mother made *kourambiedes*, Christmas cookies, with the women of the Christian family before they left Turkey for Greece.⁹⁵

The Legal Status of Muslims

After the end of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire started negotiations with each of the Balkan states that had been involved in the wars to make binding agreements ensuring that these states would protect the religious freedom of the Muslims living in them.⁹⁶ Following negotiations with Greece, the empire signed the November 1913 Peace Convention of Athens, which formally ended the hostilities between Greece and the Ottoman Empire and set the legal framework that determined the religious freedoms of Muslims in the New Lands and regulated their administration. The 1913 Convention built on existing legal practices for the Muslims of Thessaly and the Kritiki Politeia (Cretan State), while the Muslim communities in the New Lands were recognized as separate legal entities that enjoyed religious and cultural autonomy. The Greek authorities had to respect the hierarchy of the Muslim

⁹³ Reşat Tesal, *Selânik'ten İstanbul'a*, 60–63; Iskender Özsoy, *Iki Vatan Yorgunları*, 95, 98, 106; Tolga Köker and Leylâ Keskiner, "Lessons in Refugeehood," 197.

⁹⁴ Bruce Clark, *Twice A Stranger*, 176.

⁹⁵ Iskender Özsoy, *Iki Vatan Yorgunları*, 38.

⁹⁶ Stamatios Antonopoulos, *Ai Synthikai*, 198–199.

religious organizations and not intervene in the communities' internal affairs or the relations between the muftis and the *sheikh-ul Islam* of the Ottoman Empire. The 1913 Convention provided for a period of three years from the time of its signing within which all Muslim residents in the New Lands had to choose between Ottoman and Greek citizenship. Those who chose it and decided to emigrate reserved the right to maintain, lease, and manage their properties in Greece through legal proxies.

The 1913 Convention provided that the Muslim communities in the New Lands would exist as legal entities ruled by muftis and Muslim community councils. The muftis were to be elected by all of the adult Muslim men. They not only served as religious ministers but also performed political and judicial duties in their dioceses. The 1913 Convention abolished sharia courts in the New Lands. Muftis now held judicial and arbitration powers over family and property issues relating to sharia and assumed duties that in Ottoman times had belonged to *hakims* or *kadis*, sharia court judges.⁹⁷ The results of the muftis' arbitration had to be executed by Greek courts, unless some of the disputed parties were unsatisfied by the arbitration, which had then to be adjudicated in Greek courts.

The Convention also provided for the appointment of a chief mufti, whose seat would be in Athens. The chief mufti would be selected and appointed by the Greek monarch from among three candidates proposed by the council of all muftis in the country. His duties would be to supervise all Muslim religious leaders and ensure the compatibility of their decisions with sharia. The chief mufti's role would be similar to that in the Ottoman Empire of the *millet-bashi*, or ethnarch—the non-Muslim religious prelate, such as the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople—of the Rûm *millet* or the *haham-bashi*, chief rabbi, of the Yehudi *millet*. In 1914 the Greek government drafted bills that further specified the duties of the chief mufti and the muftis in the New Lands, but the bills were never ratified by the Hellenic Parliament, due to the political and social turmoil caused by the National Schism and the start of World War I. In July 1920 the parliament passed Act 2345, which provided for the election of an interim chief mufti and specified the rules for the appointment of muftis and the management of Muslim community properties in the New Lands.⁹⁸ However, Greece

⁹⁷ OGG, no. 229, 14 November 1913.

⁹⁸ OGG, no. 148, 3 July 1920.

remained preoccupied with the Greco-Turkish War in Asia Minor, and Act 2345 remained null and void.

The administration of the Muslim communities was to be conducted in line with organizational charters that would determine the responsibilities of the muftis and the Muslim community councils, as well as the way the muftis and the members of the councils were to be elected. The organization charter of the Muslim community of Thessaloniki, for example, provided for two committees that divided the work of the community council.

1. The main committee, consisting of thirty members and chaired by the mufti, selected the members of the second, managerial committee and oversaw its work. The main committee scrutinized the council's annual expenses, approved the annual budget, and advised the managerial committee. In cases of split votes, the mufti made the decisions.
2. The managerial committee, consisting of a chair, a treasurer, a secretary, and eight elected members, drafted the council's annual budget, oversaw the management of *evkaf* properties, supervised Muslim education, and took care of the Muslim community's orphans and refugees.⁹⁹ The members of the Muslim community councils were not paid for their service, except for a *serefiye*, or allowance, paid to the members of the managerial committee.

The Muslim community councils oversaw the maintenance of mosques, Muslim cemeteries, *tekkes*, and other Islamic shrines (Photo 6.8). The councils were also responsible for the appointment and payment of religious ministers, except muftis, for the organization of religious festivals, including Ramadan and Bayram. They created a welfare system that supported underprivileged Muslims, providing allowances to poor Muslim families, widows, orphans, sick, captives, and refugees (Photo 6.9). In 1918 the Muslim community council of Veroia covered the medical bills of Muslims who were affected by a smallpox epidemic, and in the same year the Muslim community council of Irakleio offered an allowance of 1,000 drachmas to all Muslim families affected by the plague that had broken out in the city.¹⁰⁰ The Muslim

⁹⁹ DHAGMFA, 18:3 (1913), "Greek Embassy in Belgrade to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 16 September 1913."

¹⁰⁰ Ayşe Adiyake, *Islamic Community*, 56–58.



Photo 6.8 The Yeni Cami (New Mosque), Salonica, early twentieth century (Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives-National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, Angelos Papaioannou's Postcard Collection)



Photo 6.9 Ceremony of circumcision of young Muslims in Salonica, early twentieth century (Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives-National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, Angelos Papaioannou's Postcard Collection)

community councils selected and paid the teachers at the Muslim schools, oversaw the maintenance, hygiene, and cleanliness of the Muslim school buildings, supplied Muslim schools with school textbooks, and, budget permitting, provided scholarships to bright Muslim students to continue their education in Greece or abroad. When community earnings were not enough to fully cover expenses for education, the Muslim community councils imposed tuition fees, raised funds, and encouraged affluent Muslims to make donations.

In line with the 1913 Convention, the managerial committees of the Muslim community councils oversaw the *mütevelli*, the trustees of *evkaf* properties, to ensure that they did not misuse funds and that the management of *evkaf* was conducted according to the terms of the *evkaf* donation. Embezzlement of *evkaf* revenues was not a rare phenomenon. In 1919, the Muslim community council of Mytilene, for example, accused the local *mütevelli* for failing to submit the annual revenue from the management of *evkaf* properties to the community council's treasury because he wished to use the funds to cover losses caused by his financial mismanagement of the *evkaf*.¹⁰¹ The Muslim community councils in urban areas often helped Muslim newspapers and journals to increase their subscribers. Their wide circulation was viewed as important for the maintenance and reinforcement of collective identity among the members of Muslim communities. Fourteen Muslim newspapers and two Muslim journals were in circulation in the New Lands until 1923. Ten newspapers (*Balkanlar*, *Beyan et Halk*, *Hakikat*, *Havadis*, *İmdat*, *Istikbal*, *Mucahede*, *Selabet*, *Yeni Asır*, *Yeni Ziya*) and two journals (*Islam Mecmuası* and *Nefir*) were in circulation in Thessaloniki; two newspapers in Chania (*Istikbal* and *Selâmer*); one in Mytilene (*Midilli*); and one in Xanthi (*Zaman*).¹⁰² Seven of the Muslim newspapers were dailies and the rest weeklies. In addition to these was *Le Droit*, a French-language newspaper published by Ali Sami Bey, a Muslim engineer officer. He had been persecuted by the Young Turks after the 1908 revolution as a political supporter of the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, and had been exiled to Thessaloniki.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ DHAGMFA, A5:10A (1919), "Muslim Community of Mytilene to the General Governor of Mytilene, Mytilene, 7 March 1919."

¹⁰² Paraskevas Konortas, "La presse."

¹⁰³ In 1924 *Le Droit* was issued in Greek as *Dikaion* (Law).

The Muslim community councils were actively involved in the 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange process. The International Mixed Committee for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, established on 26 January 1923 and composed of four Greek members, four Turkish members, and three members from countries that had been neutral in World War I, was responsible for the forced population exchange. One of the Muslim community councils' duties was to expropriate Muslim community assets prior to the population exchange and transfer religious books, archives, and precious community heirlooms to Turkey.¹⁰⁴ They were also responsible for communicating the terms of the exchange to the members of their Muslim communities and often mediated between the communities and the Greek authorities and the International Mixed Committee to resolve any problems that emerged during the population exchange. For example, the Muslim community council of Irakleio complained to the Greek government in August 1923 that the process of the population exchange had started in the city prior to the arrival of representatives of the International Mixed Committee.¹⁰⁵ In November 1923, the Muslim community council of Konitsa requested from the Greek government the immediate departure of the Muslims of Konitsa to Turkey, because all Muslim assets in Konitsa had already been expropriated.¹⁰⁶

The 1913 Convention did not allow the Ottoman authorities to raise any demands for converting mosques that had been turned into Greek Orthodox churches during the Balkan Wars back to mosques. In exchange, the Greek authorities had to respect *evkaf* properties and direct revenues from the former mosque, now church, to the local Muslim communities. The Greek government also agreed to erect at its own expense a mosque in Athens and four other mosques in poor Muslim villages of its choice, as well as to establish a *nuvap*, or Islamic theological school, to prepare future Muslim religious ministers (muftis, imams). Some of the Greek press and some members of the political class criticized the Greek government for committing to the erection a mosque in Athens, as well as for failing to include terms in the 1913 Convention providing for the protection of Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Anti-Venizelist politicians

¹⁰⁴ Ayşe Adıyeke, *Islamic Community*, 76–77.

¹⁰⁵ GSA, PMPOA, 619, "Muslim Community Council of Irakleio to the [Greek] Prime Minister, Irakleio, 20 August 1923."

¹⁰⁶ DHAGMFA, 11:6 (1923), "Muslim Community of Konitsa to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Konitsa, 3 November 1923."

such as Nikolaos Dimitrakopoulos, Konstantinos Theotokis, Dimitrios Gounaris, and others criticized Venizelos for accepting the granting to muftis of arbitration powers in family and property issues relating to sharia. These politicians also objected to his allowing the Ottoman state to intervene in the life of Greece's Muslim communities by allowing the *sheikh-ul Islam* to ratify the appointment of the chief mufti and grant him the authority to issue fatwas, adjudicate on all Muslim religious festivals and issues relating to the Islamic calendar, and set the times for Muslim prayer.¹⁰⁷ Venizelos's government argued that its intention was to secure a smooth integration of the Muslim population of the New Lands as well as to intercept Muslim emigration to the Ottoman Empire. The government also believed that it was high time for the country, which had added thousands of Muslims by annexing the New Lands, to erect a mosque in Athens. Act 1851, which provided for a plot in Piraeus for a mosque and Muslim cemetery, had passed the Hellenic Parliament in 1890 and had been inactive since then.

The Greek government implemented the provisions of the 1913 Convention as it saw fit. The Greek state never appointed a chief mufti, nor did it establish a *nuvap* school. The mosques in Athens and in four poor villages that the Greek authorities had committed to erecting were never built. As the number of the country's Muslims after the Asia Minor defeat was fewer than 150,000 souls, concentrated mainly in Western Thrace and Epirus (Çams), the government did not view it as necessary to appoint a chief mufti or erect a mosque in Athens. In addition, as in the past and contrary to the provisions of the 1913 Convention, the Greek state continued to appoint muftis after consultation with local Muslim communities. The Greek authorities feared that the election of muftis through universal Muslim male suffrage would leave room for Ottoman officials and Turkish nationalists to intervene in the electoral process and influence the election of Turkish nationalist muftis loyal to the Ottoman state.¹⁰⁸ Greece was at war with the Ottoman Empire during World War I and with the Turkish National Movement from 1919 to 1922. For the Greek authorities, the country's entrance into these wars, along with the signing of the

¹⁰⁷ GPD, 9, 11, and 13 November 1913, "Georgios Theotokis' Parliamentary Orations Regarding the [1913] Peace Convention of Athens."

¹⁰⁸ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "I Thesi tou Moufti," 288; DHAGMFA, B:150 (1914), "General Administration of Macedonia to the [Greek] Ministry of Internal Affairs, Thessaloniki, 6 March 1914."

Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, de facto invalidated the terms of the 1913 Convention.¹⁰⁹ Greece's main priorities after the Asia Minor War were to accommodate, feed, and integrate 1.2 million Orthodox Christian refugees from the war and the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange. In addition, the Republic of Turkey, which had been established after the Asia Minor War, was preoccupied with state-building, as well as with the integration of Muslim refugees from Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans and the Caucasus region. The Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk aspired to become a secular state, abolishing the caliphate and rejecting Islam as the official religion, and thus had no interest in becoming a patron state of Islam in Southeastern Europe as the Ottoman Empire had been in the past.

Education

One of the main tasks of the Greek authorities after the annexation of the New Lands was to help the ethnically and religiously diverse population living in these areas integrate into the new state. This was to be achieved mostly through education. Slavophones and other non-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians shared the religion of the ethnic majority of Greek citizens. Although many Slavophones were affiliates of the Bulgarian Exarchate and members of the Bulgar *millet*, the Greek authorities believed that the linguistic and cultural assimilation of the non-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians in the New Lands would be easier to achieve than that of groups of different religions, such as Muslims and Jews.¹¹⁰

Greece was bound by the 1913 Convention to recognize any Muslim community schools that operated in the New Lands, including the renowned Midhat Pasha School of Fine Arts and Professions in Thessaloniki, established in 1874 and named after Midhat Pasha, then prefect of Thessaloniki, a reformer, poet, and Mevlevi adept. According to the available statistical data, 627 Muslim schools operated in Macedonia in 1914, 16 in Crete, and 15 in Lesbos. There were no Muslim schools in Epirus until 1918, but between

¹⁰⁹ GSA, PMPOA, 232, “Eleftherios Venizelos to the Governmental Representative in Chania, Athens, 17 January 1918.” The Ottoman and, later, the Turkish authorities, however, considered the terms of the 1913 Peace Convention of Athens as never having been invalidated. Ayşe Adiyake, *Islamic Community*, 17–18, 46.

¹¹⁰ Tasos Kostopoulos, *I Apagorevmeni Glossa*; Tasos Kostopoulos, “Eteroglossia.”

1918 and 1920 the Greek authorities allowed the operation of ten Muslim schools in the region of Filiates. Of these only seven were operative in actual fact, due to lack of teaching staff or appropriate school premises and many Muslim parents' negative attitude toward education, while twenty Muslim schools operated in the region of Paramythia in 1920.¹¹¹ When Thrace was ceded to Greece in 1920, there were eighty-six Muslim *madrasas* (religious elementary schools) in Western Thrace. The Muslim middle schools of Gjumuldjina, present-day Komotini, were under Bulgarian administration from 1913 to 1918.¹¹² According to the available statistical data, a total of 750 Muslim teachers worked in these schools, teaching approximately 7,000 Muslim pupils.

The number of Muslim schools decreased as Muslims from the New Lands left their settlements. A number of Muslim schools in the districts of Pravi, present-day Eleftheroupoli, and Molyvos, on the island of Lesbos, closed in 1915 due to lack of pupils, since many Muslim families in these districts had emigrated to the Ottoman Empire.¹¹³ The Muslim schools in the Cretan villages of Daratso, Perivoli, and Kokino Metohi closed in June 1923 due to the resettlement of the Muslims of these villages in Chania.¹¹⁴ After Greece's defeat in the Asia Minor War, many Muslim schools in the New Lands interrupted their operations because their premises were being used by the Greek authorities to accommodate the incoming Greek Orthodox refugees. Some affluent Muslim parents paid private tutors to teach their children at home, while most of the local Muslim children were left without education because their parents could not afford to do so.¹¹⁵

The Muslim schools were administered by the local Muslim community councils, who hired all the teachers and paid those teaching Ottoman Turkish and other Ottoman Turkish subjects, such as the elements of Islam. The Muslim schools were financed by (1) income generated by *evkaf* properties, used to cover the schools' maintenance and operational costs of these schools; (2) tuition fees paid by Muslim parents, according to their income, with some schools waiving tuition or providing scholarships for talented poor students; and (3) the Greek state, which provided ad hoc financial

¹¹¹ Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi*, 298–301.

¹¹² Dimitrios Svolopoulos, *I Thraki*, 41.

¹¹³ DHAGMFA, A5:28 (1915), "Deputy Governor of Pravi to the General Administration of Macedonia, Pravi, 9 April 1915"; Nikolaos Eleftheriadis, *Gnomodotiseis*, 102–108.

¹¹⁴ OGG, no. 165, 18 June 1923.

¹¹⁵ GSA, PMPOA, 720, "Muslim Community of Thessaloniki to the Prime Minister, Athens, 24 November 1922."

support when the schools' existing finances did not suffice to cover school maintenance and operational costs. The Greek government also occasionally financed the construction of Muslim schools when Muslim communities lacked sufficient funds. The state also covered the salaries of all instructors in these schools who taught Greek or classes in the Greek language, such as history and geography.¹¹⁶ Muslim schools were religious in character, although the Young Turks and their supporters often exercised pressure on Muslim community leaders and Greek authorities to put less emphasis on Islamic religion and increase instructional hours for Ottoman Turkish and nonreligious courses. The Muslim clergy and conservative community members opposed the promotion of a secular curriculum.

The Muslim schools in the New Lands used the same textbooks as prior to 1912, but after Eastern Thrace and the district of Smyrna came under Greek control in 1920, new textbooks were imported from the collapsing Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁷ However, amid the lawlessness following the wars and the transition of sovereignty in the New Lands, state supervision of instruction and the content of textbooks in Muslim schools appears to have been inadequate. In February 1916, the editor-in-chief of *Proodos*, a Greek newspaper of Istanbul, wrote to Stefanos Scouloudis, banker, diplomat and thirty-fourth prime minister of Greece: "there is no superintendence at either Turkish [i.e., Muslim] or Jewish schools with regards to the content of textbooks. Muslim pupils are taught that the regime of the conqueror [i.e., the Greeks] would be temporary and that Ottoman sovereignty would soon return."¹¹⁸

The 1913 Convention provided for compulsory instruction in Greek in all Muslim schools in order to facilitate Muslim pupils' integration into the Greek national environment. The Greek government also planned to appoint Greek language instructors from "Old Greece" to Muslim schools. Old Greece was a more linguistically homogenous region than the New Lands; Greek language instructors from Old Greece would use only Greek in their classrooms, as they were unable to understand Turkish, Slavic, and other non-Greek languages. The government considered appointing Greek-speaking Muslims from Crete and western Macedonia—Valaades—as instructors, on the grounds that instructors who shared their pupils' faith would develop better relations in the classroom and make them more

¹¹⁶ OGG, no. 15, 9 January 1915.

¹¹⁷ Mark Mazower, *Salonica*, 319.

¹¹⁸ GL, SDA, "Report of K. Spanoudis, Athens, 11 February 1916."

effective teachers. There were also plans to enlist young Muslim adults for military service in regions of Old Greece in an attempt to help them improve their Greek language communication skills. The display of national symbols and observation of national holidays in Muslim schools were expected to cultivate a sense of national loyalty among Muslim students. However, Greek authorities often encountered fierce opposition when they tried to enforce the display of national symbols in Muslim schools against the wish of the school community. In July 1916, the public education inspector of Drama demanded that all Muslim schools in the city display Greek flags bearing the cross, charts with national holidays, and maps illustrating the conquests of Alexander the Great. The mufti and Muslim instructors of the city protested, and many Muslim teachers were arrested and imprisoned for insulting national symbols.¹¹⁹

However, only a few of the plethora of plans to facilitate Muslims' integration in Greek society were ultimately realized. Greek authorities were not always eager to invest in the education of the country's Muslims, whose Islamic faith made it more difficult for them to assimilate linguistically and culturally than non-Greek-speaking Christian ethnic groups. In the words of Efthymios Bountonas, state school inspector in the New Lands: "[among all ethnic and religious groups in the New Lands] Muslims should not be our priority. Therefore . . . there is no significant reason to expand our educational efforts to the Muslims."¹²⁰ The result was sporadic appointments of Greek instructors in Muslim schools: in 1921, for example, the Greek language was taught only in thirteen out of eighty-two Muslim schools in western Macedonia, whereas all but one Valaades Muslim school in western Macedonia and many Muslim schools in Crete had instructors in Ottoman Turkish.¹²¹ The plans for appointing Greek-speaking Muslim instructors in Muslim schools remained mostly on paper. Second thoughts led Greek authorities to question their effectiveness, since they believed many Muslim parents would view such instructors as Greek state agents and therefore neither parents nor pupils would support the instructors in their educational work.

¹¹⁹ DHAGMFA, B33:1 (1916), "Confidential Report from the Educational Inspector of Elementary Schools of Drama, Drama, 27 June 1916."

¹²⁰ GL, Ionas Dragoumis Archive (henceforth IDA), 10, "Efthymios Bountounas' Note on Act 568, Athens, 19 April 1915."

¹²¹ DHAGMFA, 41:1 (1921), "General Administration of Kozani-Florina to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kozani, 5 July 1921."

In addition to the lack of sufficient state support of Muslim schools, most of the Muslim communities across Greece often lacked the financial resources themselves to support Islamic education. For example, the Muslim communities of Kozani, Veroia, and Molyvos lacked sufficient funds to support school building maintenance, operational costs, and instructors' salaries.¹²² The result was that teaching conditions in many Muslim schools were extremely poor. Most Muslim schools in rural areas consisted of only one classroom for all school grades. Religious officials often assumed the role of teacher in these schools, teaching Islam and Ottoman Turkish and being paid by Muslim parents in kind, for example, an *oke* (2.8 pounds) of corn, wheat, or eggs. Many of these religious officials had completed only primary education and were unqualified to teach.¹²³ Most Muslim school buildings were in appalling condition: in 1915, many of the Muslim school buildings in the district of Paramythia had no roofs, desks, or blackboards, and pupils had to sit on dirty floors; classes took place in unhealthy conditions.¹²⁴ Only a few Muslim communities with fairly healthy finances were able to hire qualified Muslim instructors and maintain their school infrastructure in good condition. For instance, in the city of Thessaloniki, school *evkaf* properties generated sufficient annual revenue to support twice as many Muslim schools as were operating in the city.¹²⁵

Many school buildings were ruined during the wars. The Bulgarian army destroyed a number of Muslim schools in eastern Macedonia during the Balkan Wars and World War I.¹²⁶ The Muslim schools of Giannitsa did not reopen until 1919, because the Allied Powers had commandeered all Muslim school buildings; in Veroia, for example, the Muslim school was a military hospital during the war. In Thessaloniki, the Great Fire of 1917 destroyed four Muslim school buildings, and in 1919, more than a year after the end of World War I, Greek Orthodox Christian refugees were housed

¹²² GSA, HAM, GAMA, 15, "High Administrative Commissioner of Kozani to the Directorate of Domestic Administration and Agriculture, Kozani, 16 October 1913"; DHAGMFA, 23:2 (1913), "Economic Commissioner of Molyvos to the General Administration of the Aegean Islands, Molyvos, 8 October 1913."

¹²³ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 56, "Statistical Table of Muslim Teachers' Qualifications and Salaries in Kailaria, Sorovits, 16 May 1914."

¹²⁴ GSA, Archive of the Ministry of Religious and Public Educational Affairs (henceforth AMRPEA), 4th Cycle (under classification), "Public Schools' Inspector of Paramythia to the Ministry of Religious and Public Educational Affairs, Paramythia, 1 July 1915."

¹²⁵ GSA, HAM, GAMA, 60, "Inspector of Thessaloniki's Public Schools to the Prefect of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 26 August 1922."

¹²⁶ GSA, PMPOA, 316, "General School Inspector of Eastern Macedonia to the Prime Minister, Thessaloniki, 24 July 1919."

in many of the Muslim schools in the city.¹²⁷ The Greek government offered credits to the Muslim communities for repairing damaged Muslim schools and constructing new ones. In eastern Macedonia alone, the Greek government offered 1.2 million drachmas for the reconstruction of damaged minority schools, mostly Muslim, after World War I. In 1919 the Greek authorities in Epirus paid the salaries of Muslim instructors in Margariti and Konitsa and purchased furniture for Muslim schools in the district of Filiates.¹²⁸ State financial support improved but did not fully resolve the situation. During the school year of 1920–1921, eighty-two Muslim schools operated in western Macedonia with eighty-three instructors and 2,305 pupils. The number of Muslim schools in operation (105) had declined by 22 percent from 1914.

Most Muslim pupils stopped their education after they completed Muslim primary school. Kostantinos Tsitselikis, a Greek MP from Kozani, showed his frustration with the matter when he wrote of the Valaades after the 1923 compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange: “if some of their children finished middle school, studied history at the university and were then appointed as Muslim teachers in their villages, this would suffice to awaken their [Greek] national consciousness, which has been sleeping for one to two centuries now under the blanket of illiteracy and Islamic fanaticism.”¹²⁹ The only exception was Crete, where many Muslim pupils continued their studies at the Greek middle schools of the island. Most Muslim pupils in Crete were fluent in Greek, and their parents were more urbanized than the Valaades of western Macedonia. These parents often encouraged their children to be educated instead of staying home to help with the housework and the farm, as did most Muslims in rural areas. Muslim children whose mother tongue was Greek often attended Greek public schools; as long as a minimum of twenty Muslim pupils attended a school, the Greek state was legally obliged to offer classes in Ottoman Turkish and Islam. The large number of Muslim pupils at the Commercial School and the Greek middle school of Irakleio led the Greek authorities to allow the introduction of optional courses in Ottoman Turkish, funded by the local Muslim community council in 1920.¹³⁰ In

¹²⁷ GSA, PMPOA, 504, “Mufti of Thessaloniki to Venizelos, Athens, Thessaloniki, 8 December 1919.”

¹²⁸ GSA, EHA, GAEA, 105:4, “General Administration of Epirus to the Subdistrict of Margariti, Ioannina, 19 January 1919,” “Ministry of Religious and Educational Affairs to the General Administration of Epirus, Athens, 16 April 1919.”

¹²⁹ Kostantinos Tsitselikis, *Ena Xerizoma*, vol. 1, 40–64.

¹³⁰ *Nea Efimeris*, 28 March 1920.

Kozani, however, there were only three Muslim pupils at the boys' Greek middle school in 1921.¹³¹

The question of whether the language of vernacular, or demotic, Greek or the cultivated imitation of ancient Greek known as katharevousa should be the official language of Greece also influenced state efforts regarding Greek language instruction in Muslim and other minority schools. The question was finally resolved in 1976, when demotic was made the official language of Greece. Supporters of demotic Greek, like the linguist Manolis Triantafyllidis, often questioned the ability of the Greek state to Hellenize its non-Greek citizens, when katharevousa, a language hard to understand and to communicate with, was taught in Muslim and other minority schools: "up to the present day, the Greek state attempts to Hellenize with an official language that is not spoken by its citizens. Non-Greek speakers in Macedonia speak their mother tongues, living languages, at home and are expected to develop a Greek national consciousness through an incomprehensible [Greek] language."¹³² On the other hand, supporters of katharevousa believed that only katharevousa could make a diachronic connection with the Greek nation and achieve a successful Hellenization of non-Greek speakers in the New Lands.¹³³ The Provisional Government of National Defense passed Act 2585, which introduced demotic Greek as the instructional Greek language in all primary schools in May 1917. After the Greek unification in June 1917, Act 827 extended Act 2585 to the whole country. In a parliamentary debate in December 1914, Venizelos argued: "non-Greek citizens of Greece can learn Greek only if they are taught in vernacular Greek and not a fake language [i.e., katharevousa]."¹³⁴

Muslim Properties

After the Balkan Wars, Muslim land in the New Lands had amounted to 1,023,958.58 acres: 1,013,850 acres in Macedonia, 137.4 acres in Western Thrace, 24,349.3 acres in Epirus, 24,328 acres in Crete, and 9,921.8 acres in the Aegean islands.¹³⁵ Non-Muslims, exploiting the turmoil of war and

¹³¹ DHAGMFA, 41:2 (1921), "[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Public Education, Athens, 18 March 1921"; OGG, no. 109, 14 May 1920.

¹³² Manolis Triantafyllidis, *I Glossa Mas*, 5–6.

¹³³ Giannis Kordatos, *Dimotikismos*, 119–126.

¹³⁴ Ethnikos Kyrix, *Ai Agorefseis*, 386–387.

¹³⁵ DHAGMFA, LoN, 3:3 (1923), "[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Diplomatic Mission in Lausanne, Athens, 3 December 1922."

the flight of Muslims, encroached on and conducted fictitious purchases of Muslim lands and *evkaf* properties. On 2 March 1913, the Greek government passed Act 4134, which forbade any property transactions that transferred ownership or conferred any rights in the New Lands, considered any property transactions with members of the Greek military invalid, and prohibited the leasing of any property for longer than five years. Muslims often sold their properties in the New Lands, or sought to lease them at low cost for lengthy time periods, before they left for the Ottoman Empire, and these provisions were mostly aimed at restraining Muslim migration. Act 4134 did not, however, succeed in restricting the purchase or leasing of Muslim properties in the New Lands. Non-Muslims continued to buy and lease lands from Muslims who had migrated to the Ottoman Empire, often with the encouragement or mediation of local Greek authorities who, at the request of Muslims wishing to emigrate, had allowed them to sell or lease their properties, covering up their actions so that none would face penalties under Act 4134.

Although the 1913 Convention had recognized property titles and established property rights in the newly occupied territories during the Ottoman era, legal disputes often occurred because a number of Muslim and non-Muslim residents in the New Lands could not establish property rights due to the lack of property deeds: in Ottoman times, property transactions were often agreed verbally, without documentation.¹³⁶ Many *koligoi* exploited the lack of effective administration due to the change of sovereignty in the New Lands and, often encouraged by local civil servants, refused to pay their crop share to the Muslim *çiftlik* owners. After the Balkan Wars, the Greek government had ordered all civil servants to refrain from these rebellious acts because landholding conditions in the New Lands could not be changed and resistance of this kind violated the provisions of the 1913 Convention and harmed the country's international reputation.¹³⁷ The Convention did not allow the expropriation of *çiftliks* or their distribution to the landless, as many *koligoi* had requested. In cases of disputes between *çiftlik* owners and *koligoi* regarding sharecropping payments, the Greek authorities often collected the crop shares by force on behalf of the Muslim *çiftlik* owners.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Ai Anomaloi Dikaiopraxiai*, 5–8.

¹³⁷ GL, SDA, 130, “[Greek] Ministry of Economy to the Economic Authorities of Macedonia.”

¹³⁸ GL, Souliotis Nikolaidis Archive (henceforth SNA), 2, “Report by Koryskani Residents Regarding the Non-payment of *Çiftlik* Sharecrop, 1912–1914.”

The 1913 Convention protected state property rights in formerly Ottoman public lands: as the successor to the Ottoman Empire in the New Lands, the Greek state held the property rights of these lands.¹³⁹ Thus, it had the flexibility to administer and use them without being bound by the legal constraints experienced in Thessaly. This proved useful during times of influx of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Ottoman territories, since many of these lands were used for the resettlement of refugees. However, since the amount of public land did not suffice to accommodate the huge number of refugees—in Macedonia, for instance, there were only 41,267 acres (167,000 *stremmata*) of public land—the Greek authorities settled refugees in abandoned private Muslim lands and properties. This was often a source of conflict between Greek Orthodox Christian refugees and Muslim proprietors as well as between these refugees and the native Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians. These Christians did not always welcome the refugees, due to solidarity with their Muslim neighbors or because they viewed refugees as intruders in their communities and strangers to local customs.

On 10 May 1914 the Greek government passed Act 262, which would transfer the ownership of abandoned Muslim properties in the New Lands to the Greek state, if their proprietors failed to show the deeds for their abandoned properties to local tax collectors by 10 May 1915.¹⁴⁰ Act 262 complicated, rather than clarified, land administration in the New Lands. Tax collectors were not always certain of which Muslim properties were abandoned, because local Greek Orthodox Christians often encroached on abandoned Muslim properties with no intention to register them with the local tax collectors as abandoned. Ottoman cadaster ledgers had been destroyed or lost during the wars or had been moved to Istanbul by Ottoman officials. Muslim proprietors often submitted property deeds to local tax collectors that had allegedly been obtained by Istanbul's central cadaster but were fraudulent.¹⁴¹ By mistake or on purpose, long sojourns abroad by Muslim individuals or families were often regarded as emigration, and the local Greek authorities then rushed to declare their properties abandoned and occupy them. Muslim proprietors, after their return from long absences, often challenged the state occupation of their properties in Greek courts.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Ottoman public lands existed mostly in Macedonia and Epirus.

¹⁴⁰ OGG, no. 130, 12 May 1914.

¹⁴¹ GL, SDA, 130, "Director of Agriculture at the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 5 October 1915."

¹⁴² GL, SDA, 130, "Real Estate Agency to the [Greek] Ministry of Finance, Athens, 1 October 1915."

Act 262 contravened article 6 of the 1913 Convention, which had allowed Muslims to maintain properties in the New Lands and manage them through proxies when they emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman authorities complained to the Greek government about the occupation of allegedly abandoned Muslim lands and threatened to retaliate by occupying properties of Greek Orthodox Christians who had left the Ottoman Empire for Greece or elsewhere. The Ottoman reaction was often the result of political lobbying by powerful Muslim landholders of the New Lands who had political connections to the Ottoman government, such as the Ottoman governor of Izmir, Rahmi Bey, who owned extensive farmlands in the district of Thessaloniki.¹⁴³ The Greek government claimed that article 6 was no longer valid following the 1914 Greco-Ottoman agreement for a voluntary population exchange of Muslims in the New Lands with Greek Orthodox Christians in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, which had provided that all Muslims who were to leave Greece for the Ottoman Empire would cede ownership rights to the Greek state for the properties they would leave behind. The Hellenic Parliament did not ratify the 1914 Greco-Ottoman agreement, and it therefore never took effect, due in part to the eruption of World War I. Greece, however, claimed that regardless of the nonratification, the signing of the agreement was legally binding on both sides and voided article 6.

However, under diplomatic pressure from the Ottoman government, and fearing that the Ottoman authorities might retaliate by confiscating urban properties of Greek Orthodox Christians in the empire, Greece and the Ottoman Empire agreed to establish two Greco-Ottoman committees, one for the Greek Orthodox of the empire, based in Izmir, and another for the Muslims of Greece, based in Thessaloniki, that would estimate the property values of those who would migrate under the terms of the 1914 Greco-Ottoman agreement. Despite the assurances by Greek authorities that they would distinguish between Muslims emigrating to the Ottoman Empire and those who left for long visits, and despite their pledges to occupy only the properties of emigrants, very few Greek-occupied Muslim properties were ultimately returned to their Muslim owners. In the hostile climate of World War I that followed, the Greek government refused to return Muslim properties.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ DHAGMFA, A21ζ (1914), “Greek Consul of Smyrni to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Smyrna, 23 October 1914.”

¹⁴⁴ GL, SDA, 130, “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ottoman Embassy, Athens, 27 October 1914.”

Greek government policies regarding Muslim property were often determined by electoral politics in the New Lands. The Muslim electorate was too big to be ignored. Greek politicians across the political spectrum often promised major Muslim landowners with influence on the Muslims of the region favorable arrangements for their property issues in exchange for electoral support. At a meeting of representatives of the Muslim communities of Macedonia in Thessaloniki on the eve of the general elections of 31 May 1915, the representatives decided to tell Muslim voters to support Dimitrios Gounaris's Nationalist Party (*Komma Ethnikofronon*), which in 1920 was renamed the People's Party. Nationalist Party activists had promised influential Muslim *çiftlik* owners that if their party won the general elections, it would return Muslim *çiftliks* held by the Greek state to their proprietors.¹⁴⁵ Stefanos Dragoumis, minister of finance in Stefanos Scouloudis's government (25 October 1915–9 June 1916) and a former prime minister of Greece (January–October 1910), authorized the return to the Muslim Beytulah family of their *çiftliks*, confiscated by the Greek state, in Kastoria, Dragoumis's constituency, in exchange for its Muslims supporting him in the general elections of May 1915.¹⁴⁶

In an attempt to reduce the number of acres of nonfarmed abandoned fields and increase its power base in Macedonia, the Provisional Government of National Defense authorized Act 808 on 10 December 1916. The act allowed the government to occupy the immovable property of citizens who were fighting the Allied Powers and citizens who had emigrated following the Balkan Wars. After the dissolution of the Provisional Government and the unification of the country, Act 1073 of 18 November 1917 made Act 808 the law for all of Greece. In addition, Act 1073 allowed the Greek authorities to occupy immovable properties of Muslims who had not adopted Greek citizenship before 10 December 1916, according to the terms of the 1913 Convention.¹⁴⁷ Under the terms of Acts 262 and 1073, 533,435 acres (2,158,733 *stremmata*) of Muslim farmlands and 323.5 acres (1,309 *stremmata*) of Muslim urban estates in the New Lands came under the authority of the Greek state. Of these, 75 percent were expropriated and transferred to landless *kolligoi* and Greek Orthodox refugees. The

¹⁴⁵ *Nea Alitheia*, 2 May 1915.

¹⁴⁶ GL, IDA, "Zia Toptani to Ionas Dragoumis, Kastoria, 3 February 1916"; "Kosmas Filios to Ionas Dragoumis, Kastoria, 31 March 1916 and 21 January 1916."

¹⁴⁷ OGG, no. 268, 21 November 1917.

remaining 25 percent remained under state control.¹⁴⁸ The expropriation of these lands began with the adoption of Decree 2468 of 20 May 1917 by the Provisional Government of National Defense, extended by Act 1072 to the entire country.¹⁴⁹

The expropriation of public lands was part of an agricultural reform plan of the Venizelos government that aimed to create an agricultural economy for Greece based on small farming. It was designed to reassure the *kolligoi* in the New Lands who had fought for emancipation from major landowners. In addition, such an agricultural economy could reduce the state's dependence on major landowners for sufficient supplies of grain, of paramount importance during World War I, when the Provisional Government of National Defense had depended on the major landowners of Macedonia for grain. Many of them, however, were Muslims who did not support Venizelos and sabotaged his government's policies.¹⁵⁰

After the end of World War I, Venizelos's government returned farmlands held by the Greek state in eastern Macedonia to those of their Muslim proprietors, who had emigrated during eastern Macedonia's occupation by Bulgaria in World War I (1916–1918) and wished to return. This measure provided diplomatic ammunition to Greece at a time when the country was claiming territories with large Muslim populations in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor: Greece responded to accusations by Ottoman officials and the Ottoman press that Greek authorities were arrogating Muslim properties to Greece and discriminating against Muslim citizens.¹⁵¹ However, Greek authorities refused to return *ciftliks* and large estates to their Muslim proprietors and did not return lands to Muslim owners who had decided to become Ottoman citizens. The Greek government made the return of these lands to their Muslim proprietors conditional on the return of properties owned by Greek Orthodox Christians from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor whose properties had been confiscated by the Ottoman state when they migrated to Greece during and after the war.¹⁵² On many occasions,

¹⁴⁸ DHAGMFA, 88 (1922), “[Greek] Ministry of Agriculture to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 20 October 1922”; LoN, 3:3 (1923), “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Delegation in Lausanne, Athens, 3 December 1922.”

¹⁴⁹ OGG, no. 305, 29 December 1917.

¹⁵⁰ Kostas Vergopoulos, *To Agrotiko Zitima*, 173–174; Aristotelis Sideris, *I Georgiki Politiki*, 153–158.

¹⁵¹ DHAGMFA, A5:108 (1919), “High Commission of Greece to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Istanbul, 29 August 1919.”

¹⁵² DHAGMFA, 88 (1921), “Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Public Lands to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 7 December 1921”; A5:10A (1919), “Kafantaris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kavala, 10 September 1919.”

however, local electoral politics interfered with the Greek authorities' refusal to return confiscated land. For example, a *çiftlik* in the district of Anaselitsa was returned to the Ottoman wartime general and former grand vizier (14 October–8 November 1918) Ahmet İzzet Pasha (known as Ahmet İzzet Furgaç after 1934), despite his residing in Istanbul, due to his high social status and political connections with the Greek authorities of the region.¹⁵³ The Greek government often asked the help of Muslim members of the Hellenic Parliament, sending them to Eastern Thrace and the Greek-occupied zone in Smyrna to calm the Muslim population's reactions to the Greek military occupation. Many of these MPs were *çiftlik* owners in the New Lands, however, and often assisted the Greek authorities in exchange for property-related favors.

In the general elections of 1 November 1920, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the New Lands supported the winner of the election, the anti-Venizelist United Opposition Party, led by Dimitrios Gounaris. Despite promises to the contrary before the elections, once in power this party continued the Venizelos government's policy of favoring small farm ownership over large farm enterprises and did not return Muslim-owned *çiftliks* held by the Greek state to their proprietors. This disappointed Muslim MPs in the party, such as Abbas Seyit of Kozani and Omer Duri İzzet of Thessaloniki, who in their parliamentary speeches often reminded the United Opposition Party government how critical Muslim support had been for defeating Venizelos's Liberal Party in the election (see Table 6.14).¹⁵⁴ Many of these disappointed MPs voted against the United Opposition government in a parliamentary vote of confidence in March 1922.¹⁵⁵

Local Greek authorities in the New Lands did not always agree with the policies of ethnic and religious tolerance promoted by Venizelos's government and often sabotaged them: they improvised administrative obstacles that prevented emigre Muslim owners from repatriating to the New Lands. On many occasions these authorities required repatriated Muslims to pay rent to the Greek state for being allowed to live in their own properties.¹⁵⁶ This led Prime Minister Venizelos to remark, in a letter

¹⁵³ DHAGMFA, 4:8 (1921), "High Commission of Greece to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Istanbul, 2 November 1919 and 10 June 1920"; "Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Public Lands, to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 7 August 1920."

¹⁵⁴ GPD, 20 May 1921.

¹⁵⁵ FO, 371:7584, "British Embassy to the Foreign Office, Athens, 11 March 1922."

¹⁵⁶ GSA, PMPOA, 504, "Memo of Muftis of Thessaloniki, Drama, Serres, Pravi and Telechovo [present Zichni] to Eleftherios Venizelos, Athens, 8 December 1919."

Table 6.14 Muslim MPs Elected at the General Elections of 1 November 1920

MP's Name	Constituency	Political Party
Nadir Ramadan	Kozani	People's Party
Seit Abas	Kozani	People's Party
Yaya Bendri	Kozani	People's Party
Azmi Bey	Florina	People's Party
Ambdi Bey	Thessaloniki	People's Party
Riza Ali Hamdi Bey	Thessaloniki	People's Party
Douri Omer Izet Bey	Thessaloniki	People's Party
Kemaledin Sali Bey	Thessaloniki	People's Party
Hadji Yusuf Ali Riza	Pella	People's Party
Sali Sefik Hadji	Pella	People's Party
Hasan Mehmet Ali Bey	Pella	People's Party
Redjep Lutfi Hadji Mestan	Drama	People's Party
Mehmet Saadik Ismail	Drama	People's Party
Mehmet Mustafa Balaban	Drama	People's Party
Serafendin Ahmet Alisan	Drama	People's Party
Raip Hadji Kerim	Drama	People's Party
Husamendin Said Bey	Drama	Liberal Party
Hussein Ismail Kombakoglu	Drama	Liberal Party
Ahmet Hikmet Bey	Evros	Liberal Party
Mehmet Mustafa Enezli	Evros	Liberal Party
Hamit Mehmet Hamit	Evros	Liberal Party
Hussein Zade Ibrahim	Raidestos	Liberal Party
Dervis Hussein Zade Ali	Raidestos	Liberal Party
Kerim Sekerdji Redjep	Raidestos	Liberal Party
Mehmet Beyzade Bey Tayyip	Raidestos	Liberal Party
Mustafa Beyzade Neir	Raidestos	Liberal Party
Abdurahim Hasan Bey	Rodopi	Liberal Party
Hadji Hafuz Galip	Rodopi	Liberal Party
Arif Hafuz Zade Arif	Rodopi	Liberal Party
Sali Mehmetoğlu	Rodopi	Liberal Party
Hadji Mehmet Zade	Adrianoupolis	Liberal Party
Hasan Emin Ibrahim	Adrianoupolis	Liberal Party
Mehmet Rasid Ibrahim	Adrianoupolis	Liberal Party
Ferit Omer	Adrianoupolis	Liberal Party
Hursit Mustafa	Saranta Ekklies	Liberal Party
Ihsan Bey Zaade	Saranta Ekklies	Liberal Party
Nazmi Efendi	Saranta Ekklies	Liberal Party
Soukri Efendi	Saranta Ekklies	Liberal Party

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 411.

to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that “the blindness of the Greek administration is hopeless. [It] does whatever it can to cancel the success of our national claims. Please do try to control the actions of the local authorities.”¹⁵⁷

Despite efforts to create a small-farm agricultural economy after 1917 by expropriating large estates, the Greek state confiscated very few large estates in the New Lands between 1917 and 1922, for the following reason. In addition to the aforementioned politics that often undermined these efforts, Greek Orthodox Christians controlled some large Muslim estates, which they rented from their Muslim proprietors or from the Greek state, and lobbied the Greek authorities not to expropriate these lands.

As soon as it became clear that Muslims were to be exchanged, local non-Muslims encroached on many Muslim properties in the New Lands. This led the Greek government to issue an order on 6 October 1922 that forbade any transactions involving Muslim properties in Greece or the seizure of any of them whose owners were to be exchanged.¹⁵⁸ A number of Muslims violated this order and sold their properties at low prices in order to obtain money for their travel expenses and starting a new life in Turkey. Approximately 20 percent of the exchanged Muslims’ properties, with a value of 500,000,000 drachmas (\$8,566,770), was arbitrarily seized or sold and was never distributed to Greek Orthodox Christian refugees.¹⁵⁹ Following the signing of the 1923 agreement for a compulsory population exchange, after the arrival of the first Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Turkey, most of the Muslims of Crete living in rural areas abandoned their estates and sought protection in the urban centers of the island, fearing that they would become victims of acts of revenge by the incoming refugees. Local Greek Orthodox Christian Cretans and incoming refugees trespassed on the properties abandoned by fleeing Muslims and looted all of the Muslims’ movable assets.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, in western Macedonia, Greek Orthodox Christian *chorbaji*, or superintendents of Muslim *çiftlik*s, employed various methods, including

¹⁵⁷ DHAGMFA, A5:10A (1919), “Venizelos to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 13 August 1919.”

¹⁵⁸ OGG, no. 196, 10 October 1922.

¹⁵⁹ Efstathios Pelagidis, *Apokatastasi*, 90; Iakovos Michailidis, “Provlimata Ensomatosis,” 130.

¹⁶⁰ DHAGMFA, 11:6 (1923), “General Administration of Crete to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chania, 18 June 1923”; GSA, PMPOA, 596, “The Chairman of the Muslim Community Council of Irakleion to the Prime Minister, Irakleio, 4 January 1923.”

violence, in order to acquire the legal deeds to *ciftlik*s and, when their methods did not work, often forged these deeds themselves. On some occasions, Greek Orthodox Christian creditors exploited the forced population exchange to sequester the properties of departing Muslims who were unable to repay their loans.¹⁶¹

After the Greek defeat in the Asia Minor War, armed Greek units retreated to the islands of Lesbos and Chios under the leadership of colonels Nikolaos Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas, and commander Dimitrios Fokas, who launched a coup against the government of Nikolaos Triantafyllakos and forced King Constantine I to abdicate on 14 September 1922 and leave the country. A military government known as the Revolutionary Government of 1922 ruled the country until early 1924. In 1923 this government accelerated the land reforms conceived by the Provisional Government of National Defense in 1917, which had proceeded very slowly before the coup. The condition of national emergency triggered by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace created an urgent demand for land for the refugees' resettlement. Muslim lands and properties were often confiscated or expropriated by force without any compensation to Muslim landowners; in 1923 alone, 642 Muslim *ciftlik*s were expropriated.¹⁶² Turkey complained to the Greek authorities that the forced confiscations and expropriations were aimed mostly at Muslim lands. The Revolutionary Government argued that they affected Greek landowners more widely, as Muslims were protected by the terms of the 1923 agreement for the forced population exchange and would ultimately be compensated by being granted properties of much higher value, previously owned by Greek Orthodox Christians, in Turkey.¹⁶³

In an effort to avoid the forced population exchange and keep their properties, a number of Muslims claimed Albanian or other non-Ottoman citizenships, such as Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and Serbian. Even Ottoman citizenship might do, since all Muslims who had left Greece prior to 18 October 1912 were exempted from the population exchange and given the

¹⁶¹ Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat*, 164–167.

¹⁶² Kostas Vergopoulos, *To Agrotiko Zitima*, 178; Aristotelis Sideris, *I Georgiki Politiki*, 176–177.

¹⁶³ DHAGMFA, 11:6 (1923), "Kolokotronis to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 8 October 1923"; GSA, PMPOA, 619, "Aggelakis to the Leader of the Revolution, Thessaloniki, 10 August 1923."

right to keep their properties in the New Lands, estimated to total 49,322 acres (199,598 *stremmata*).¹⁶⁴ Some Greek-speaking Muslims in Crete, Serres, and Kavala and a number of Valaades in western Macedonia tried to avoid the forced population exchange by converting to Greek Orthodox Christianity.¹⁶⁵ Obliged to provide farmland to hundreds of thousands of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees, the Greek authorities did not have the luxury of exempting Muslims, particularly major landowners, from the population exchange, because this would deprive the state of assets it desperately needed. In order to prevent mass conversion, the International Mixed Committee decided that after 1 January 1922 religious conversions would no longer exempt the converts from being exchanged. It is estimated that approximately 3,000 Muslims avoided the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange by adopting non-Ottoman citizenship or converting to Greek Orthodoxy. This number excludes the approximately 25,000 Çams of Epirus who were exempted from the forced population exchange due to diplomatic interventions by Albania and Italy. All the rest were sent to Turkey, including 5,000 Çams and Albanian-speaking Muslims who had gone to Turkey before the exemption.

Social Stratification

The overwhelming majority of Muslims in the New Lands were middle- and lower-class citizens. At the top of the social pyramid were *çiftlik* owners, muftis, lawyers, doctors, affluent merchants, and those involved in the financial sector. In the middle of the social pyramid were the self-employed, teachers, craftsmen, and small businessmen, and at the bottom were serfs, small independent farmers, blue-collar workers, porters, and servants. Twenty percent—about 72,000—of the Muslims sent to Turkey as part of the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish Population exchange lived in urban centers, while the remaining 80 percent, about 288,000, lived in rural areas.¹⁶⁶ The Muslim rural population mostly worked as *kolligoi* on *çiftlik*s and other

¹⁶⁴ Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange*, 347–348, 467–475.

¹⁶⁵ DHAGMFA, 11:6 (1923), “Prefect of Kozani to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kozani, 12 October 1923”; Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Ena Xerizoma*, vol. 1, 63–64.

¹⁶⁶ DHAGMFA, LoN, 5:4 (1923), “2nd Military Staff Office to the General Administration of Thessaloniki, Athens, 23 July 1923.”

large estates. A number of them were small independent farmers who grew grain (in western and central Macedonia and Epirus) or tobacco (in eastern Macedonia and Thrace) or were occupied in the production of wine and olive oil (in Crete and the Aegean islands). Raising livestock was popular among the Pomaks of Western Thrace and the Muslims of Epirus.

Many of the Muslims who lived in urban centers were major landowners and worked in professions of the primary sector: 1,836 Muslims of Thessaloniki, or 6 percent of the city's Muslim population, were engaged in farming. Many Muslim *çiftlik* owners in western Macedonia lived in cities, such as Veroia, Kastoria, and Kozani. In 1913, 30 percent of the Muslim residents of Kastoria worked as fishermen in the city's lake, 13 percent worked in agriculture, and 16 percent were major landowners. Similarly, 20 percent of the Muslim population of Serres were farmers (Photo 6.10), 35 percent of the Muslim population of Crete farmed and resided in urban centers, and many Muslim *çiftlik* owners in Epirus lived in cities and towns such as Ioannina, Paramythia, and Filiates. In addition to agriculture and the primary sector, many Muslims who lived in urban centers were occupied in industry and crafts: they worked as bakers, blacksmiths, armorers,



Photo 6.10 Muslim Residents of Nigrita, 1915 (Serres-Photographic Archive, Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives)

confectioners, tanners, shoemakers, drapers, caners, wheelers, and tailors. A number of Muslims in the Aegean islands, including Crete, worked in the olive oil and soap industry.¹⁶⁷ Many Muslims also worked in public transport as carriage drivers, marines, and railway workers: 81 percent of those working in marine transportation in Crete were Muslims. Many Dönme in Thessaloniki, such as Hamdi Bey's family, and a number of Muslims in Crete were active in the banking sector, stockbroking, and insurance.¹⁶⁸

Some Muslims were involved in trade and commerce; 20 percent of those involved in these businesses in Thessaloniki were Muslims. In Florina, Muslims outweighed Christians in commerce in timber and wheat, whereas in Kavala several Muslims were engaged in the tobacco trade, although this trade in Kavala was controlled by Greek Orthodox Christians and Jews. Marine trade in Crete was controlled by Muslims; Muslims from Irakleio, Chania, and Rethymno exported olive oil, raisins, soaps, citrus fruits, and other indigenous products and imported cereals, tobacco, leather, and textiles from mainland Greece and places abroad, including Asia Minor, the Middle East, and North Africa. Ali Vafi Selianakis, a Muslim from Rethymno, transported oil from Egypt in his ships that was used to produce electricity for Rethymno.

Due to the high rates of illiteracy among Muslims (95 percent of the Muslim population), the low number of Muslims who completed secondary education, and the even fewer who pursued higher education, very few Muslims engaged in professions that required specialized knowledge, for example as doctors, lawyers, or notaries. In Crete, where the rate of Muslims who pursued secondary and higher education was higher than that in the rest of the New Lands, there were only two Muslim pharmacists, two Muslim doctors, one Muslim notary, and one Muslim lawyer on the entire island in 1920.¹⁶⁹ At a time when Greek nationalism was on the rise and the country was engaged in three wars against the Ottoman Empire, one might have expected the Greek authorities not to trust Muslims to work for the government. However, a reasonable number of Muslims worked in the public sector, and often held public offices: 40 percent of the civil servants of Thessaloniki in 1915 were Muslims. In 1919 the prefect of Drama, appointed by the Greek government, was Muslim, while four Muslims served as members of the

¹⁶⁷ Lena Tzedaki-Apostolaki, "Tourkokritikoi," 156.

¹⁶⁸ Alexandros Dagkas, *Symvoli stin Erevna*, 411.

¹⁶⁹ Emily Kolodny, "Des Musulmans," 9.

municipal council of Rethymno, one as a member of the municipal council in Chania and one as the deputy chair of the municipal council of Irakleio.

Muslims in State Politics

Statesmen like Venizelos regarded the Muslim population as part of the indivisible Greek nation. Venizelos believed that “Hellas is destined one day to become a Muslim power and the Muslims [of Hellas] should live fully satisfied . . . under isonomy and protection.”¹⁷⁰ He held the view that the success of the Megali Idea was inextricably linked with the way Greek authorities treated the country’s ethnic and religious minorities in the New Lands, including Muslims. If Greece had a record of treating its non-Greek populations badly, it would not find it easy to make territorial claims in the Balkans and Asia Minor with any realistic prospects of success. In addition, developing good relations with Muslims in Macedonia and Thrace would help Greece build good relations with the Ottoman Empire, which could be a useful ally in the fight against Bulgarian irredentism in the Balkans.¹⁷¹ In addition to Venizelos and his Liberal Party, many anti-Venizelists were of similar mind, especially as most Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities in the New Lands supported anti-Venizelist parties. Anti-Venizelist MPs such as Georgios Bousios, Dimitrios Rallis, Dimitrios Gounaris, and Nikolaos Stratos shared Venizelos’s view that Greece was destined to become ruler of lands with large Muslim populations that Greece hoped to take over in the future and argued that the Greek government had to adopt policies of isonomy and respect for religious and cultural rights toward its Muslims and other minorities.¹⁷²

Measures taken by the Greek authorities to achieve these aims included the return of confiscated mosques and schools to Muslim communities after the Balkan Wars and World War I (Photo 6.11); state financing of mosque and school repairs; the granting of amnesty to Muslims involved in war crimes in eastern Macedonia during World War I; the exemption from military service for Muslim religious ministers; and the establishment of Muslim orphanages.

¹⁷⁰ Nikos Andriotis, “I Stasi tou Eleftheriou Venizelou.”

¹⁷¹ Bruce Clark, *Twice A Stranger*, 8, 161; Mark Mazower, “The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie”; Victor Papacosma, *The Military in Greek Politics*.

¹⁷² GPD, 20 May 1921, 26 January 1921, 8 April 1921.



Photo 6.11 The Greek army returns the Eski Cami (Old Mosque) in Serres to the Muslim community, 1913 (Photographic Archive, Hellenic Literature and Historical Archives)

During parliamentary debates, Muslims were often called “brothers in full solidarity and love,” and Greek MPs emphasized “the common racial origin” of Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians.¹⁷³ This was especially so for Greek-speaking Muslims, such as the Valaades and the majority of the Muslim population of Crete. A number of anti-Venizelist scholars, including Georgios Skalieris and Konstantinos Lameras, viewed Muslim ethnic groups of Asia Minor, such as the Alevis, Circassians, and Yörüks, as descendants of Orthodox Christians who had been Islamized in early Ottoman times, whereas anti-Venizelist politicians, such as Ionas Dragoumis, aspired to the creation of an oriental empire in which Greek Orthodox Christians would assume the leading role.¹⁷⁴ Others, like Chrysostomos, the Greek metropolitan bishop of Smyrna, argued in favor of the retention of Greek-speaking Muslims, such as the Valaades of western Macedonia and Epirus. He believed that the Muslims of Macedonia were descendants of Greek Orthodox Christians who had been Islamized in Ottoman times and that because of

¹⁷³ GPD, 26 January 1921, 21 March 1916.

¹⁷⁴ Michalis Kokolakis, “Ellines Ethnikistes.”

their Greek Orthodox Christian ancestry it would be easier for them to convert to Greek Orthodox Christianity and become Hellenized.¹⁷⁵ He also pointed to the hostile attitude of many Greek-speaking Muslims toward Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor.¹⁷⁶

On the other hand a large part of the Greek elite and others viewed Muslims as religious fanatics, uneducated peasants of low cultural standards who should be left at the margins of Greek society or even be forced to leave the country. In a report to the Greek government on 5 July 1921 the governor of Kozani claimed that the Muslims under his jurisdiction “should be left in the gross ignorance in which they are sunk, being interested only in their mosque, their harem and their farming projects.”¹⁷⁷ Social conservatism, religious fanaticism, and illiteracy were seen as characteristics that excluded Muslims from any efforts to modernize the state and Greek society. Religious beliefs, for example, prevented Muslims in villages in Kozani from being vaccinated. A number of Greek soldiers who had raped Muslim females or had consensual sexual affairs with Muslim women were infected by syphilis; Greek Islamophobes almost always assumed that the Muslim women were infected and blamed these women for not taking precautionary measures, for not seeking treatment, and for not being aware of the consequences of the infection.

The Islamophobes associated Muslim neighborhoods, mosques, and Muslim cemeteries and marketplaces with the Ottoman past, viewing them as monuments of cultural backwardness that ruined the aspirations of the cities and settlements in the New Lands to a modern way of life. In a letter of March 1913, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraged the local authorities of the New Lands to demolish Ottoman monuments and buildings for the “beautification” of cities and villages in the New Lands before the signing of the 1913 Convention, as it might forbid the signatory parties to commit such actions.¹⁷⁸ The Provisional Government of National Defense viewed the great fire of August 1917 in Thessaloniki, which destroyed two-thirds of the city and left more than 70,000 people homeless, almost as a gift of divine providence. The Provisional Government hired Thomas Mawson, a British landscape architect, and asked him to proceed with a radical redesign of the city. The results were far-reaching and led to the eradication of the last

¹⁷⁵ HLHA, EVA, 2:1, “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Venizelos, Athens 24 May 1914.”

¹⁷⁶ Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi*, 264.

¹⁷⁷ DHAGMFA, 41:1 (1921), “General Administration of Kozani-Florina to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kozani, 5 July 1921.”

¹⁷⁸ DHAGMFA, 3:2 (1913), “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Governmental Representatives in Macedonia, Epirus and the Aegean Islands, Athens, 29 March 1913.”

downtown traces of the old Ottoman town. Many Ottoman buildings and monuments, seen as old-fashioned relics of an alien culture out of tune with the European architectural styles in fashion at the time, were destroyed. The city's Muslim community resisted many of these changes out of concern for maintaining *evkafs* and Muslim public properties.

One source of the Islamophobic attitudes that undermined polices aimed at integrating the Muslim population into the Greek national body was Muslim support for Bulgarian and German military forces during World War I, chiefly in eastern Macedonia and the districts of Kastoria and Florina, which led some Greeks to question Muslims' national loyalty. Following World War I, many Bulgarian *komitadji*, or paramilitary gangs, in Macedonia murdered, raped, and plundered, often supported by Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities. This context did not favor liberal policies of tolerance and isonomy for Muslims, and efforts to create a multicultural Greek state failed in the end. The Asia Minor defeat and the coming to power of the Revolutionary Government of 1922, a military regime, changed the political climate. The newly dominant view was that cultural homogeneity, not diversity, would secure the country's territorial integrity and future prosperity. That homogeneity could be accomplished through a forced Greco-Turkish population exchange.

Muslims were politically active in all three general elections between 1912 and 1922 (31 May 1915, 6 December 1915, and 1 November 1920). These elections were conducted under a first-past-the-post electoral system with no special provisions for Muslims or other ethnic and religious minorities (see Tables 6.14, 6.15, and 6.16). The Revolutionary Government of 1922 introduced a special electoral catalogue that limited Muslim voters' representation in the Hellenic Parliament to nineteen MPs. The Ottoman diplomatic missions in Greece were very involved in trying to influence the Muslim vote in Greek elections. A number of Muslim candidates for MP had strong links with, or were members of, the Young Turks' Committee for Union and Progress. Muslim politicians such as Derviş Bey, a Muslim *çiftlik* owner in Kozani, often sought the advice of the Ottoman consulates in Thessaloniki and elsewhere as to which political parties and Greek politicians to vote for in the general elections.¹⁷⁹ Muslim MPs often kept the Ottoman embassy and, through the embassy, the Ottoman government itself up to date on the work

¹⁷⁹ DHAGMFA, A2:3 (1915), "Embassy of Greece to the [Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Istanbul, 16 March 1915."

Table 6.15 Muslim MPs Elected at the General Elections of 31 May 1915

MP's Name	Constituency	Political Party
Lutfi Omer	Kozani	National Minded
Akif Zoulfikiar Bey	Kozani	National Minded
Hussein Nedim	Kozani	National Minded
Ferit Ali	Florina	National Minded
Arif Mustafa	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Vehit Ali Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Mustafa Osman Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Sirri Sali Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Hairret Sakir Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Hasan Mehmet Ali Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Hasan Ibrahim Halil	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Hafuz Mehmet Ferit	Drama	National Minded
Husamedin Said Bey	Drama	National Minded
Kemaledin Sali Bey	Drama	National Minded
Ismail Hussein	Drama	National Minded

Source: Giannis, Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–19123). Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 410.

of the Hellenic Parliament and sought advice on issues of Muslim interest. In April 1922 Sotirios Godjamanis, the independent MP for Thessaloniki, presented a letter in the Hellenic Parliament from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the Muslim MPs in which he advised them to support the government of Dimitrios Gounaris. The letter embarrassed the Muslim MPs and prompted a strong reaction from non-Muslim MPs and the Greek government.¹⁸⁰

According to Fuat Balkan, leader of the spy network of the Young Turks' Committee for Union and Progress and of the Muslim paramilitary forces in Macedonia and Thrace, the Ottoman government encouraged Muslims to support anti-Venizelist parties in the general elections of 1915 and 1916 with the aim of preventing Venizelos from coming to power and drawing Greece into World War I on the side of the Triple Entente.¹⁸¹ The German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic missions in Greece collaborated with the Ottoman embassy in Athens and the Ottoman consulates in the New Lands to attempt to influence Muslim voters to favor anti-Venizelist political parties in

¹⁸⁰ GPD, 27 April 1922.

¹⁸¹ Metin Martı, *Ilk Türk*, 16–18.

Table 6.16 Muslim MPs Elected at the General Elections of 6 December 1915

MP's Name	Constituency	Political Party
Lutfi Omer	Kozani	National Minded
Akif Zoulfikiar Bey	Kozani	National Minded
Ali Demir	Kozani	National Minded
Ali Ferit	Florina	National Minded
Yusuf Haki	Florina	National Minded
Arif Mustafa	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Vehit Ali Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Nikmendi Tzemil Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Osman Sesbes Avdi	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Tselio Teffik	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Hasan Mehmet Ali Bey	Thessaloniki	National Minded
Hafuz Mehmet Ferit	Drama	National Minded
Husamedin Said Bey	Drama	National Minded
Kemaledin Sali Bey	Drama	National Minded
Ismail Hussein	Drama	National Minded
Hadji Ibrahim Zade	Drama	National Minded
Idjet Nouri Omer	Drama	National Minded
Ali Dino Rasih	Preveza	National Minded
Mufti Emin Ramiz	Preveza	National Minded

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 410.

the 1915 and 1916 general elections. The German consulate in Thessaloniki financially supported the Muslim newspaper *Yeni Astir* to spread influence in favor of anti-Venizelist and anti-Entente propaganda, while the Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Ioannina provided funds to Muslim *çiftlik* owners and community members to promote its views to Muslim voters.¹⁸²

Before general elections, the chairs of the Muslim community councils called meetings of all male Muslim voters with the aim of adopting a common policy, which was not always easy to achieve. Debates in these meetings were often heated and did not necessarily produce consensus. For example, the majority of Muslims supported the anti-Venizelist Nationalist Party of Dimitris Gounaris in the May 1915 general elections. However, a number of Muslim notables in Serres supported the Venizelist

¹⁸² Gunnar Hering, *Die Politische Parteien*, vol. 2, 892.

MP candidate, Dimitrios Digkas, who had been their personal lawyer, and helped to develop strong personal bonds between him and many of his Muslim constituents. In addition to the meetings of Muslim male voters, Muslim community representatives in major cities such as Thessaloniki, Ioannina, and Chania also met to discuss and agree on a common electoral policy for Muslims in the New Lands. Many Muslims depended for their employment on Muslim notables and members of the Muslim elites. A great number of Muslims were *kolligoi* working in Muslim *çiftliks*, which helped develop a patron-client relationship between *kolligoi* and *çiftlik* owners. It was not easy, therefore, for many *kolligoi* and other proletarian Muslims to vote differently from their masters without facing consequences or even losing their jobs. Thus, at a meeting in Thessaloniki of representatives of Muslim communities of Macedonia prior to the general elections of 1915, the representatives of the Muslims of Kozani were not chosen by the community but instead were all appointees and puppets of Dervis Bey, a Muslim *çiftlik* owner in the region.¹⁸³

Sixteen Muslim MPs were elected to the Hellenic Parliament in the general elections of May 1915, all of them supporters of Dimitrios Gounaris's anti-Venizelist Nationalist Party (see Table 6.15). Nevertheless, in those elections, Venizelos's Party of the Liberals won 60 percent of the parliamentary seats (187 seats), whereas all the other political parties together won 129. New general elections were held on 6 December 1915, in which Venizelos's Party of the Liberals boycotted as unconstitutional, a result of Venizelos's confrontation with King Constantine I over Greece's participation in World War I, and soon afterward Venizelos led the Provincial Government of National Defense in Thessaloniki. In the general elections of 6 December 1915, nineteen Muslim MPs were elected, all with the anti-Venizelist Nationalist Party (see Table 6.16). The election took place in a highly polarized political climate due to the National Schism, and Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities were often called traitors to the nation. The anti-Muslim rhetoric did not discourage a number of Greek Orthodox Christian constituents from voting for Muslim MPs: many ballots supported Muslim candidates in a number of polling stations with only Greek Orthodox Christian registered voters.

¹⁸³ DHAGMFA, A2:3 (1915), "Chief Police Officer of Karadjilar (present Drepano) to the Police Directorate of Kozani, Karadjilar, 10 April 1915."

In the summer of 1916, Greece was preparing anew for a general election that fall, and the Venizelos's Party of the Liberals with the assistance of the Triple Entente forces, was trying to minimize the impact of the Muslim vote in the upcoming elections, which ultimately did not take place due to the National Schism. Armed units in Macedonia arrested Derviṣ Bey and the Muslim MP of Kozani, Akif Zoulfikiar, as well as the mufti of Kairalia; all three were exiled. This left the Muslim community of Kozani essentially without political patrons, making it easier for Venizelists to influence Kozani's Muslim voters in favor of Venizelist candidates. On Crete, Venizelist Greek Orthodox Christian and French paramilitary forces toured Muslim villages, arrested anti-Venizelist Muslim community leaders, and terrorized Muslim voters, forcing them to vote for Venizelist candidates.¹⁸⁴

In the general elections of 1 November 1920, thirty-eight Muslim MPs were elected, of whom sixteen belonged to Dimitris Gounaris's People's Party and twenty-two to Venizelos's Party of the Liberals (see Table 6.14). This was despite the fact that the Venizelists had tried hard to attract Muslim votes by returning Muslim lands occupied by the Greek state to their proprietors and returning to the Muslim communities the mosques, schools, and other Islamic public buildings that had been occupied by the Greek government or the Greek army. Venizelists also had provided funds to Muslim communities to repair mosques, Muslim schools, and other buildings and offered amnesty to Muslims in eastern Macedonia convicted of war crimes during World War I.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the Party of the Liberals won only 110 of the 370 seats in the Hellenic Parliament, whereas the anti-Venizelist United Opposition Party won 260 seats. The Party of the Liberals won only two Muslim seats in Drama and twenty Muslim seats in Thrace, where martial law was in force after the annexation of the region to Greece: General Emmanuel Zymvrakakis, army commander of the region, had not allowed the United Opposition Party to take part in the general elections. After the elections, however, all twenty Muslim seats of Thrace joined the United Opposition Party. According to Şevket Bey, mayor of Adrianoupoli, the leaders of the city's Muslim community had negotiated with representatives of the United Opposition Party and agreed that Muslim voters would support Muslim candidates who appeared to be independent in the general elections of 1 November 1920 but that

¹⁸⁴ Historical Archives of Benaki Museum (henceforth HABM), Eleftherios Venizelos Archive (henceforth EVA), 413, "Papakonstantinou to Iliaki, Kozani, 1 June 1916, 18 June 1916, 23 June 1916," "Iliakis to Venizelos, Kozani, 21 July 1916."

¹⁸⁵ HABM, EVA, 413, "Papakonstantinou to Iliaki, Kozani, 21 June 1916."

after they were elected the successful candidates would support the United Opposition Party.¹⁸⁶

Muslim support for anti-Venizelist political parties was due to a number of reasons. Venizelos's foreign policy came to be identified with Greco-Ottoman wars. The Muslims of Southeastern Europe had religious, cultural, and sentimental bonds with the Ottoman Empire and resented these wars. Venizelos's Party of the Liberals ruled for almost the entire period between 1913 and 1920. Muslims linked problems under Greek administration—for example, discrimination by the local Greek authorities, occupation of Muslim lands by the Greek state after the arrival of the Greek Orthodox Christian refugees, and more—to Venizelos's rule. Finally, a large number of Muslims were persecuted and exiled by Triple Entente forces stationed in the country during World War I, with the tolerance and often the collaboration of the Greek administration. This was because Muslims were viewed as Ottoman agents in Greece, and the Triple Entente forces as well as the Greek authorities often suspected Muslims of antinational and anti-Entente activities in collaboration with the Ottoman Empire and the forces of the Triple Alliance.

Although Muslim MPs were members of certain political parties in the Hellenic Parliament, they behaved as an independent political group to support the interests of their Muslim constituents. The Ottoman press often saluted their attitude. In December 1920 the Istanbul newspaper *Ikdam* claimed that Muslim voters of Greece wished that their Muslim MPs in the Hellenic Parliament would be primarily loyal to the Muslim constituents they represented rather than supporting Eleftherios Venizelos or Dimitrios Gounaris. When the agricultural act for the expropriation of major landholdings was debated in the Hellenic Parliament in 1922, a number of Muslim MPs lobbied for amending the bill to stop the expropriation of large estates in the New Lands. They were attempting to protect the interests of Muslim *ciftlik* owners who had supported their election with a view to their reelection.¹⁸⁷ Muslim MPs often complained to the Greek government of the oppression of Muslims in the New Lands by the incoming Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor as well as the massive requisitioning of Muslim lands by the Greek state. In January 1916, for example, Hasan Mehmet, a Muslim MP from Edessa, sent a letter to the Greek Ministry of Finance requesting the return of the lands of the

¹⁸⁶ HLHA, Dimitrios Gounaris Archive (henceforth DGA), 3:3, “Şevket Bey to the [Greek] Minister of Internal Affairs, Athens, no date.”

¹⁸⁷ GPD, 12 October 1915, 6 December 1919, 14 December 1919, 20 May 1921.

Dourdjidis family, one of the most influential Muslim families in the region of Edessa, which had been confiscated by the Greek state when the family had left Edessa in search of safety during the Balkan Wars.¹⁸⁸

Muslim MPs participated in parliamentary committees. They were not, however, appointed to any positions in government. Muslim MPs in the Hellenic Parliament were often subject to verbal attacks, pejorative comments, and accusations from their Greek Orthodox Christian colleagues. For example, Greek Orthodox MPs often blamed their Muslim colleagues for tolerating the persecutions of Greek Orthodox Christians in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, never protesting them to the Ottoman authorities.¹⁸⁹ The insufficient or nonexistent command of the Greek language of a number of Muslim MPs often caused communication problems and made it difficult for them to participate easily in parliamentary debates. On many occasions, Muslim MPs signed documents and amended laws without fully understanding their content.¹⁹⁰

Muslim Secessionism

Muslim MPs were often asked to assist the Greek government to fulfill the objectives of the Megali Idea, and they agreed. When the Paris Peace Conference was convened in 1919 to hammer out the terms of peace between the victorious Triple Entente and the defeated Triple Alliance after World War I, several Muslim MPs from Greece, at the instruction of the Greek government, sent a memo praising the tolerant policies of the Greek state toward Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities and contrasting these policies to the Bulgarian atrocities toward Muslims in eastern Macedonia and Thrace. The memo concluded that Western Thrace, under Bulgarian control prior to World War I, should be ceded to Greece,¹⁹¹ in opposition to the Bulgarian, Italian, and U.S. diplomatic missions to the Paris Conference, who opposed the idea of extending Greek sovereignty to the region. The

¹⁸⁸ GL, SDA, 130:3:2, “Hasan Mehmet Ali to the [Greek] Ministry of Finance, Edessa, 19 January 1916.”

¹⁸⁹ GPD, 8 April and 2 October 1921.

¹⁹⁰ GPD, 14 December 1919, 20 May 1921.

¹⁹¹ DHAGMFA, A5:10B (1919), “Note of Ch. Vamvakas to the [Greek] Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thessaloniki, 21 July 1919”; “[Greek] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Venizelos, Athens, 11 March 1919”; HABM, EVA, 314, “Repoulis to Venizelos, Athens, 20 March 1919”; “Muslim MPs from Eastern Macedonia to HE Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, Wilson and Venizelos, Athens, 17 March 1919.”

Greek authorities had also to confront the emergence of a Muslim political movement in Western Thrace that favored the establishment of an autonomous Thracian state, under Ottoman suzerainty, that would better protect the interests of all the people of Thrace than annexation to Bulgaria or Greece. This movement coordinated its efforts with a number of Muslim organizations that had operated in Istanbul since 1918, including the Trakya Mudafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti, the Trakya-Pasaeli Mudafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti, the Trakya-Pasaeli Mudafaa Heyeti Osmaniyesi, the Batı Trakya Mudafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti, and the Batı Trakya Komitesi, with the aim of protecting the Muslim populations in Thrace from intolerant policies, persecutions, and ethnic cleansing.

On 31 December 1918, the Greek authorities accused Ismail Hakki, a Muslim MP in the Bulgarian parliament representing Gjumuldjina, present-day Komotini, of conspiring to establish Macedonian autonomy. He and seven other Muslim MPs in the Bulgarian parliament sent a memo to the French general Franchet d'Espérey, commander of the Triple Entente forces in Thessaloniki during World War I, and to Venizelos that requested the protection of the Muslims of Western Thrace from atrocities committed by the Bulgarian army. The memo objected to any future autonomy of Western Thrace and praised the tolerance of the Greek authorities toward the Muslims of Greece. Ismail Hakki's memo was part of a deal with the Greek authorities: he and other Muslim MPs in the Bulgarian parliament would support Western Thrace's annexation to Greece in exchange for protection of the large estates that Ismail Hakki and the other Muslim MPs held in eastern Macedonia, which was under Greek sovereignty.¹⁹² In October 1919, per the treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Bulgaria handed over the administration of Western Thrace to the Triple Entente's forces, who in turn handed Western Thrace's administration over to the Greek forces.

Opposed to the Greek forces' occupation of Western Thrace, a number of Muslims and Bulgarians in the region declared the Turkish Republic of Western Thrace (Garbi Trakya Devleti Muvakkatesi) and established the "National Government of Western Thrace" on 25 May 1920 in the village of Hemetli, present-day Organi, in Rhodopi. A month later the "Turkish-Bulgarian Committee for the Liberation of Western Thrace" was formed in the Bulgarian city of Plovdiv, with the aim of establishing an independent

¹⁹² HABM, EVA, 23, "High Commission of Greece to the Greek Government, Istanbul, 1 September 1919"; DHAGMFA, A5:6 (1919), "Paraskevopoulos to the Greek Government, Thessaloniki, 29 August 1919."

republic. At the same time, Cafer Tayyar, a former Ottoman general and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's representative in Eastern Thrace, was organizing a military rebellion against the expansion of Greek sovereignty in Thrace, in collaboration with Bulgarian nationalists. Until the 10 August 1920 signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Greece extended its territorial control to the region of Smyrna in Asia Minor, Greek authorities tried to minimize the influence of any secessionist Muslim movements in Thrace by funding infrastructure projects in the region, including mosques and other Islamic buildings that had been destroyed by Bulgarians prior to and during World War I. The Greek defeat in Asia Minor encouraged Muslim secessionist movements in Thrace and brought Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Bulgarian government together in an attempt to end Greek control of Thrace. The rapprochement between Atatürk and the Bulgarian government did not go very far, due to disagreements over the future territorial status of Western Thrace, which Atatürk did not want to see under Bulgarian control.

At the same time, the Greek government collaborated with anti-Kemalist Muslims in Thrace and with Ottoman officials who had been persecuted by Atatürk for their affiliation with the Ottoman regime and their opposition to the secular character of his nationalist movement.¹⁹³ The Ottoman colonel Ali Sami Bey, aide-de-camp and personal photographer to the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II and later chief editor of the newspaper *Dikaion*, was one of these officials. He initially sought protection in Greek Thrace and worked closely with the Greek authorities to influence the Muslims of the region to oppose Atatürk's reforms in Turkey, eliminate ties between the Muslims of Thrace and Kemalist Turkey, and support the Greek government in postwar diplomatic meetings to retain control of Thrace. Under the 24 July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Greece lost control of Eastern Thrace but kept control of Western Thrace. The Muslim population of Western Thrace was exempted from the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange so as to balance the exemption of the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul and the two islands of Imbros, present-day Gökçeada, and Tenedos, present-day Bozcaada. Thereafter, all of the secessionist movements petered out.

¹⁹³ DHAGMFA, 6:7 (1923), "General Pangalos to the [Greek] Ministry of Defense, Athens, 29 November 1922."

7

The Interwar Years (1923–1940)

The interwar period for Greece essentially began in the aftermath of the defeat in Asia Minor and was shadowed by the consequences of the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange. The latter drastically changed the anthropography of Greece: 400,000 Muslims were sent from Greece to Turkey (see Table 6.13 in Chapter 6), and approximately 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christians arrived in Greece from Turkey and had to be accommodated, fed and, eventually, integrated into Greek society. The population exchange transformed Greece into a more religiously homogenous country than it had been in the past: Two years after signing the forced 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange, in 1925, approximately 97 percent of the country's population were Greek Orthodox Christians, whereas Muslims numbered 118,000 (2 percent of the entire population of Greece).¹ Next came a limited emigration movement, mostly of Muslims from Western Thrace to Turkey—5,000 Muslims are reported to have emigrated between 1923 and 1928—and 10 percent population growth due to a high birth rate. Apart from this, the overall size of the Muslim population remained nearly unchanged until Greece's entrance into World War II on 28 October 1940.² During this period, the Muslims of Greece belonged to four major ethnic groups: (1) approximately 59,000 Turkish-speaking Muslims, known to Greeks as Tourkogeneis, in the Rhodopi and Xanthi districts of Western Thrace; (2) about 33,000 Pomaks in the mountainous areas of north Xanthi; (3) approximately 25,000 Albanian speakers, mostly the Çams of Thesprotia in Epirus and a few other Albanian-speaking Muslim groups in northwestern Macedonia and Thessaly;³ and (4) about 1,000 Roma, mostly in the northern part of the Evros district (see Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5).⁴

¹ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 125–140.

² Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority,” 31. Muslim emigration was low due to the very few opportunities for Muslim migrants in Albania or Turkey.

³ Frederick Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam*, vol. 2, 526–529; Margaret Hardie-Hasluck, “Christian Survivals”; Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 17–23.

⁴ Efstratios Zeginis, “O Bektasismos,” 110. The 1951 Greek national census was the last one to record the religions and ethnicities of the minorities of Greece. National censuses after 1951 do not record the population's mother languages and, while they include a question about religious affiliation,

Table 7.1 Population Census for Western Thrace by the Allied Administration (30 March 1920)

District	Total	Turks	Pomaks	Bulgarians	Greeks	Others
Orestiada (Karagatch in Ottoman)	27,193	5		10,210	15,045	1,933
Didymoteicho (Demotica in Ottoman)	26,313	1,274		4,956	18,856	1,227
Sufli	21,250	2,770		10,998	7,435	47
Alexandroupoli (Dedeağac in Ottoman)	16,317	642		11,543	3,355	777
Komotini (Gümülcine in Ottoman)	64,951	39,601	2,341	14,794	4,773	3,442
Xanthi (Iskeçe in Ottoman)	48,666	30,438	9,507	1,591	6,650	480
Total	204,690	74,730	11,848	54,092	56,114	7,906
%		36.5	5.8	26.4	27.4	3.9

Source: Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace.” Vol. 1, Ph.D. diss. University of Bergen, Germany, 2000, 29.

Table 7.2 Demographic Development of Muslims after 1920 in Western Thrace

Census	Xanthi		Rodopi		Evros		Entire Region	
	Total	Muslim	Total	Muslim	Total	Muslim	Total	Muslim
1920							201,404	93,273
1928	89,974	39,229	89,488	50,432	124,417	12,510	303,879	102,171
1940	98,575		106,575		150,790		355,940	112,535
1951	89,891	42,245	105,723	49,660	137,654	6,934	333,268	98,839
1961	89,951		109,201		153,930		352,722	105,000

Source: Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace.” Vol. 1, Ph.D. diss. University of Bergen, Germany, 2000, 31.

Table 7.3 Muslim Minority Composition in Xanthi and Rhodopi (Western Thrace)

	Xanthi			Rhodopi		
	Turks	Pomaks	Roma	Turks	Pomaks	Roma
1928	63%	36%	1%	95%	4.50%	0.50%
1951	55%	44%	1%	82%	15%	3%
1981	24%	56%	20%	68%	18%	14%
1991	19%	63%	18%	71%	17%	12%

Source: Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace.” Vol. 1, Ph.D. diss. University of Bergen, Germany, 2000, 35.

Table 7.4 1920 National Census, Muslim population of Western Thrace

Prefecture	Turkish Speakers	Bulgarian Speakers (Pomaks)	Roma	Total
Evros	26,500	1,100	600	28,200
Rodopi	70,700	6,000	700	77,400
Total	97,200	7,100	1,300	105,600

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki:Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 406.

Table 7.5 1923 Census of the General Administration of Thrace, population of Western Thrace

District	Greeks	Turks	Bulgarians	Armenians	Refugees
Komotini	11,386	50,081	6,609	1,183	33,770
Xanthi	18,249	27,882			18,613
Alexandroupoli	9,228	2,705	9,102		17,518
Didymoteicho	21,759	3,213			9,649
Soufli	11,517	5,454	1,117		14,211
Orestiada	22,087	6,072			11,677
Total	94,226	95,407	16,828	1,183	105,438

Source: Giannis Glavinas, *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki:Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013, 406.

The Treaty of Lausanne

After the Turkish victory in Asia Minor had swept away the native Greek Orthodox Christian population, along with the Greek army, Fridtjof Nansen, the high commissioner for refugees, proposed a negotiation for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. The Greek government assumed that Turkey would not allow the return of any Greek Orthodox Christian refugees to Anatolia and believed that the transfer of Greece's Muslims to Turkey, through a forced population exchange, would free housing and farmland for the refugees.⁵ Venizelos was ready to consider an obligatory

the resulting data are treated as sensitive for the country's national security and not made public. The data from the 1940 census were lost during World War II, and the lastest available data on ethnic and religious minorities are those of the 1928 census.

⁵ John Petropoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange," 142; Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange*.

or voluntary population exchange but opposed the exchange of the Greek Orthodox Christians of Istanbul, for sentimental reasons. Constantinople, as the Greeks call Istanbul, had a place in the hearts of the Greeks as a major center of Hellenism and the former capital of the Byzantine Empire, which many Greeks regard as a medieval Greek empire and a center of the Eastern Orthodox Christian world, home to the see of the Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch, which is the official ecclesiastical title of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople. A departure of the Greek Orthodox Christians from Istanbul would signify the end of Hellenism in a city of major symbolic importance for Greeks and would dash any Greek aspirations that Constantinople one day might come under Greek control. Thus, it was very hard for the Greeks and the Greek political class to accept such an idea, especially as such acceptance would also mark the end of the Megali Idea, which Greeks had loyally dedicated themselves to for almost eighty years. In addition to this sentimental attachment, a practical aspect also worried the Greek political class: Greece already had too many Greek Orthodox refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, and the political class felt unable to accept more refugees. The Triple Entente forces, still in control of the city, also opposed these Christians' departure from it because of their importance in commerce and industry, fearing that their departure would disrupt the city's economic life.

The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed by Greece and Turkey at Lausanne on 30 January 1923, six months before the signing of the final peace treaty to which the Convention was affixed. The Convention specified the terms of a forced exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey for Muslims from Greece. The Convention did not apply to Greek speakers in Turkey who were not Greek Orthodox Christians, for example, Roman Catholics, Protestants, or Muslims. Turkish speakers in Greece who professed religions other than Islam were also excluded. The exchange, as well as the subsequent liquidation of property of the exchanged, applied to those Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians who had already left their home countries between 18 October 1912 and 30 January 1923 and those who remained in situ and were now to be transferred. The exchange of those currently in situ (except for "Greek inhabitants of Istanbul" and the "Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace") was completed by mid-1925 under the supervision of the International Mixed Committee for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations of the League of Nations.⁶

⁶ Charles B. Eddy, *Greece*, 202.

The Lausanne Convention aimed to increase the national homogeneity of Greece and Turkey by means of ethnic cleansing,⁷ and it equated religion with national identity. Because religion was the main criterion for the exchange, many Greek-speaking Muslims, for example, residents of Crete or the Valaades, were forced to leave Greece and start a new life in an alien linguistic and cultural environment in Turkey. Many Turkish-speaking Cappadocian Greeks with little or no knowledge of Greek were forced to live in Greece and were consequently regarded as Greek nationals simply because their declared religion was Orthodox Christianity. Articles 2 and 14 of the Convention exempted the Muslim residents of Western Thrace and the Greek Orthodox residents of Istanbul and the islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada. Those allowed to remain in these areas were recognized as *établis* (established). By 1934 the Mixed Committee had issued 106,000 exemption certificates to Muslim *établis* in Western Thrace and a total of 81,200 certificates to Greek Orthodox Christian *établis* in Istanbul (73,000), Gökçeada (7,000), and Bozcaada (1,200). In addition, 30,000 Greek citizens who had lived in Istanbul for generations were granted residence permits.⁸

The Albanian-speaking Muslim Çams of Epirus were initially intended to be included in the Muslim population of Greece to be exchanged, and indeed, approximately 5,000 Çams were deported to Turkey but they were finally exempted.⁹ The exemption of the Çams did not assume the form of an international treaty between Greece and any other international entity, not even Albania. It was the result of a declaration issued in January 1926 by the Greek prime minister, Theodoros Pangalos, and communicated to Albania a month later via the Albanian embassy in Athens. The Çams' exemption was the result of Albanian and Italian diplomatic pressures on Greece and the League of Nations. In addition, Greek foreign policy toward Albania changed after the rise to power in 1925 of General Pangalos, who had declared himself a friend of Albania. After his successful military coup of 25 June 1925 he proceeded to improve Greco-Albanian relations, with the hope that a Greco-Albanian rapprochement would bring economic benefits to Greece, particularly the commercial and economic

⁷ Article 1 of the Convention.

⁸ Alexis Alexandris et al., *Oi Ellinotourkikes Scheseis*, 64, 91.

⁹ The deportation of Çams to Turkey happened in part because many Çams regarded themselves not as Albanian nationals but as Ottomans, and expressed a desire to leave for Turkey. This desire often derived from feelings of uncertainty about their future, and the fate of their properties, as well as expectations of a better future in Turkey.

development of Epirus.¹⁰ The Albanian government was pleased with the Greek government's 1926 declaration, which later took the form of a Greco-Albanian agreement. It also pledged the unhindered operation of Greek Orthodox schools in Albania and the admission of Albanian-speaking Muslims to the Greek Military Academy. The Council of the League of Nations (a political agency whose main function was to settle international disputes) expressed its satisfaction with the Greek decision.¹¹

As of the writing of this book, the Greek state recognizes only one minority in the country, the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. The Treaty of Lausanne makes no mention of ethnic or national minorities other than Muslims and non-Muslims. The absence of such a mention reflects the Ottoman *millet* system; these minorities were excluded from the wording of the Treaty of Lausanne at the insistence of the Turkish government, which did not like the idea of ethnic or national minorities in its territories.¹² The Greek authorities of today emphasize the fact that religion was the main criterion of the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange and, therefore, view the Muslims of Western Thrace as a religious minority. The Greek government often engages in bilateral feuds with the Turkish government, which prefers to call this minority "Turkish" and its members "Turks." Due to the absence of an international treaty to define the legal status of Çams in Greece and oblige Greece to protect the political, religious, and cultural rights of Albanian-speaking Muslims, the Çams did not earn the state's attention, unlike the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. After 1923, whenever the Greek government made laws or took measures affecting the Muslims of Greece, it did so mostly with the Muslims of Western Thrace in mind.

Most laws with reference to the administration of Muslims in Greece after 1923 referred to the Muslims of Western Thrace and not to the Çams of Epirus, whose administration was conducted on the basis of the legal framework for Muslims prior to 1923. The Çams were seen as a Muslim group ethnically kin to the inhabitants of Albania, a state that Greece saw as politically and military weak. The Treaty of Lausanne placed the Muslims of Western Thrace under the political protection of Turkey, which was viewed as a politically influential and militarily strong state that had defeated Greece in the Asia Minor War and shattered its Megali Idea. In addition, the Treaty of Lausanne sanctioned the principle of equal treatment

¹⁰ Dimitris Michalopoulos, *Tsamides*, 65–74.

¹¹ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 23–39.

¹² Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 57–60.

for the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, Gökçeada, and Bozcaada. Indifference to or maltreatment of the Muslims in Western Thrace might cause reciprocal policies for the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, Gökçeada, and Bozcaada, and Greece tried to observe the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. The principle of reciprocity formalized a practice that already existed unofficially and placed the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Greek Orthodox Christians of Istanbul, Gökçeada, and Bozcaada within the strategic frame of Greco-Turkish relations. In doing so, the treaty reinforced the *droit de regard* over Greece's Muslims, which Turkey's predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had exercised de facto since the establishment of the 1832 Kingdom of Hellas and de jure since the 2 July 1881 Greco-Ottoman Convention of Istanbul. Both minorities (Muslims in Greece and Greek Orthodox Christians in Turkey) became hostage minority groups whose well-being depended on the state of Greco-Turkish relations.

The negotiation of the Treaty of Lausanne was motivated by the European Great Powers' desire to avoid the problems posed by the issues of minority rights that had arisen in earlier experiences in the Balkans, including the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The treaty was one of a series of international agreements under the auspices of the League of Nations that sought to provide protection of minorities in Europe. The Polish Minorities Treaty, signed between Poland and the League of Nations on 28 June 1919, provided a model for other states' agreements; a similar treaty was signed by Czechoslovakia on 10 September 1919, followed by similar declarations by Finland (27 June 1921), Lithuania (12 May 1922), Latvia (7 July 1923), and Estonia (17 September 1923). One might, however, question how far the "nationalist" sentiment of the Muslims in Western Thrace was comparable to those of some of the ethnic minorities in Central Europe.¹³ The forced Greco-Turkish population exchange brought the League of Nations into unchartered territory as the first compulsory population exchange in international history sponsored by an international organization. It would be repeated in British Palestine in 1937 and later in territories controlled by Hitler and Mussolini.¹⁴ The compulsory population exchange traumatized Greek and Turkish societies for decades. In Turkey, a sixty-five-year silence surrounding the population exchange was broken only in 1998 through the novel *Ceyiz-Mübadele İnsanları* (*The Entrusted Troussseau: Peoples of the Exchange*), by Kemal

¹³ Lucy Mair, *The Protection of Minorities*, 36; Stefan Wolff, *The German Question*, 32.

¹⁴ Joseph Schechtman, *European Population Transfers*, 22.

Yalçın, a Turkish philosophy teacher and journalist who was forced to leave Turkey after the 1980 military coup and settled in Germany.¹⁵

Disputes arose soon after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne: Greece complained to the League, and Turkey reciprocated with a complaint about Greek Orthodox refugees and Muslim properties held by the Greek state.¹⁶ Greco-Turkish negotiations began, and all outstanding issues were resolved in October 1930, when Venizelos visited Ankara and signed the Treaty of Ankara, or Friendship Pact, between Greece and Turkey.¹⁷ The Pact initiated a period of rapprochement between the two countries that lasted until the start of the ethnic conflicts in Cyprus in 1955. As a result of the Pact, the Muslim minority in Western Thrace disappeared from the international agenda, and Ankara made no significant attempts to promote the rights of its kin in Western Thrace. This stood in sharp contrast with many minorities of Central and Eastern Europe who pursued an energetic campaign for greater cultural autonomy via the creation of the European Nationalities Congress in Geneva in 1925.¹⁸ After the 1930 Greco-Turkish Friendship Pact and throughout the interwar period, Turkey did not make use of its *droit de regard* over the Muslims of Western Thrace and did not engage in the region via its consulate in Komotini. This attitude changed after the end of World War II.¹⁹

The Legal Status of Muslims

After the 1923 forced population exchange, the Muslims of Greece were ruled according to the Treaty of Lausanne, international treaties signed by the Greek state prior to 1923, and royal decrees for the country's Muslim population adopted before and after the Treaty of Lausanne. The treaty guarantees the political and civic rights of Muslims in Greece (article 39), their legal protection (article 40), their right to education (article 41), and their religious rights (article 42), which had been guaranteed in past bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding the Muslims of Greece. The novelty of the

¹⁵ Aslı İğsız, "Documenting the Past," 451; Bruce Clark, *Twice A Stranger*; Renee Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe*; Renee Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean*; İlay Romain Örs, "Beyond the Greek and Turkish Dichotomy."

¹⁶ Lucy Mair, *The Protection of Minorities*, 198; Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 54–55; Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange*, 478–480.

¹⁷ Lena Divani, *Ellada kai Meionotites*, 177–182; Ifigeneia Anastasiadou, *O Venizelos*; Neoklis Sarris, *Exoteriki Politiki*, 59–66, 250–272.

¹⁸ John Hiden, *Defender of Minorities*; David Smith and Karl Cordell, *Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Europe*.

¹⁹ Sabine Bamberger-Stemmann, *Der Europäische Nationalitäten Kongress*.

Treaty of Lausanne was that it placed all these guarantees under the supervision of the League of Nations, an international organization, thus helping to perpetuate a legal framework that set the Muslim minority apart from the rest of Greek society and left Muslims to endure much inequality.

The legal framework of the administration of Muslim communities in Greece after the forced population exchange was similar to what they had experienced prior to 1923. Where a substantial number of Muslims existed, the Greek state recognized the Muslim community as a legal entity led by a mufti. The powers of the muftis were not restricted to religious matters, as had been the case in Ottoman times, but extended to justice on issues relevant to sharia and the supervision of Muslim children's education, which in Ottoman times were conducted by civil servants. Muslim community councils chaired by the muftis and elected by Muslim male voters supported the Muslim communities.²⁰ For the Çams, the towns of Paramythia, Filiates, Margariti, and Parga were seats of muftis.²¹ Muftis served in Western Thrace in the towns of Komotini, Xanthi, Alexandroupoli (known as Dedeağaç prior to 1920), and Didymoteicho (the Ottoman Demotica) until 1926.²² From 1927 on, muftis served only in Komotini, Xanthi, and Didymoteicho.²³

The Muftis

As it had before 1923, Greek law regarded muftis as civil servants, similar to the status of non-Muslim religious ministers in Ottoman times. Act 2345/1920 governed the muftis' appointment and responsibilities and provided for the appointment of a chief mufti. Since the number of Muslims was seriously reduced after the population exchange and Muslim populations were mostly concentrated in Western Thrace and Epirus (Çams), the Greek authorities felt the appointment of such a senior Muslim religious figure was not justified. In addition, the appointment of a chief mufti could complicate relations with Turkey, due to the antagonism between *palaiomousoulmanoi*, Muslim conservatives, and Kemalists in Western Thrace during the interwar

²⁰ Stefanos Katsikas, "Millets in Nation States"; Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "The Pending Modernization."

²¹ Vassilis Krapsitis, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 41.

²² Dedeağaç was renamed Alexandroupoli(s) in honor of King Alexander I after his visit to the city in 1920.

²³ Symeon Soltaridis, *I Istoria ton Moufeion*, 92; Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, 123.

years. The Kemalists in Turkey had abolished the Ottoman caliphate and introduced secular reforms in an attempt to become more like a Western European nation-state. Ankara might see the appointment of a chief mufti in Greece as a hostile move aimed at emphasizing the religious character of Muslims in Western Thrace, whom Turkey regarded as Turks. It could also strengthen the voice of Muslim conservatives in Greece and Turkey in their fight against Kemalism.

The 1913 Peace Convention of Athens had abolished sharia courts operating in Greece, and transferred all sharia judicial powers relating to Muslims' marriage, divorce, tutelage, proxies, coming of age, Islamic wills, and intestate successions, among other religious issues, to the muftis. For all other legal concerns the Muslims of Greece were subject to the jurisdiction of Greek courts. The Treaty of Sèvres had abolished the muftis' sharia judicial powers, but this was not confirmed by the Greek parliament until much later. When it was confirmed, it had already been superseded by articles 42 (paragraph 1) and 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne, and the Greek government retained the provisions of Act 2345/1920 on the condition that the muftis' judicial decisions did not contravene Greek laws.²⁴ Turkey was not pleased, because the muftis' religious judicial powers were not in line with the Kemalist regime's secular reforms: a Turkish delegation led by İsmet İnönü, seven times Turkish prime minister and second president of the Republic of Turkey (1938–1950), visited Athens in October 1931 and asked for the abolition of the muftis' sharia judicial powers. Prime Minister Venizelos refused the request on the grounds that granting it would violate the Greco-Turkish agreements on minority protection and would be opposed by the four Muslim MPs of his Liberal Party.²⁵

The Muslim Community Councils

The muftis were assisted in their tasks by the Muslim community councils that served in every city, town, and village where a substantial number of Muslims resided. These councils consisted of elected members of the Muslim community, and their responsibilities included the management of Muslim community properties, including *evkaf* properties. Act 2345/1920

²⁴ Symeon Soltaridis, *I Istoria ton Moufteion*, 107.

²⁵ Ifigeneia Anastasiadou, *O Venizelos*, 81.

determined the election procedures and the responsibilities of these community councils. After he visited Western Thrace in 1929, Konstantinos Stylianopoulos, state inspector on national, religious, and linguistic minorities, a position established by Act 4125 on 4 April 1929, observed that the Muslim community councils did not function satisfactorily and there were many irregularities. They sold land without permission, lent money without proper procedures, and often spent considerable sums without proper justification. The members of the councils were unsalaried, but some of them often used their positions to increase their influence and gain economic and other benefits.²⁶

In the Çams' areas, there was only one Muslim community council committee, which was based in Ioannina and was responsible for the maintenance of mosques, *tekkes*, schools, poorhouses, hospitals, and orphanages, as well as the *evkaf* properties that covered these institutions' everyday expenses and maintenance. By decision of the General Administration of Thrace, after 1913 the Muslim community councils in Komotini and Xanthi were subdivided into two: one for benevolent institutions, such as mosques, *tekkes*, and schools, and one for *evkaf* properties. The two committees were maintained in Xanthi until 1932, when they merged, and in Komotini until World War II, when Western Thrace was occupied by Bulgaria (1941–1944).²⁷ In the cities of Alexandroupoli and Didymoteicho, which had smaller numbers of Muslims, the same Muslim community council functioned for both categories of Muslim communal properties. Despite the fact that the seats of the muftis of Alexandroupoli and Didymoteicho were merged into one in Didymoteicho, the Muslim community councils did not merge; each city kept its own.

The Greek Orthodox Christian Refugees

Following the Greek defeat in Asia Minor, destitute Greek Orthodox Christian refugees poured into Western Thrace, a safe haven, with the retreating Greek army. The Greek government worked hard to meet their basic needs by requisitioning rooms for housing and plots of land for cultivation, requisitioning 8,245 rooms in rural houses and 5,590 in

²⁶ Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 86.

²⁷ Konstantinos Andreades, *The Moslem Minority*, 12.

urban houses belonging to Muslim residents for accommodating Greek Orthodox Christians between 1923 and 1924. Refugees were also housed in 127 mosques and Muslim schools, as well as in 667 stables and granaries belonging to Muslims.²⁸ Greek properties were also requisitioned for the same purpose, but it was in Muslim properties that the accommodation of these refugees, with their different religion and family traditions, often gave rise to frictions between them and the Muslim owners in the hostile postwar climate.

After Greek Orthodox Christian refugee resettlement came under the auspices of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission of the League of Nations, Macedonia and Western Thrace became the main areas for resettlement. Muslim homes and other properties were available for the refugees in Macedonia and other areas that had large Muslim populations before the 1923 compulsory population exchange. Both Macedonia and Western Thrace were sparsely populated due not only to Muslim emigration but also the danger of malaria, which took its toll on both the indigenous and the new Greek Orthodox Christian population. The resettlement of the refugees increased the Greek population in Western Thrace. Through Act 3473 of 14 February 1923, the Military Revolutionary Committee of 1922 had expropriated large rural estates throughout Greece for the benefit of Greek Orthodox refugees and landless farmers. Ankara protested to the Greek authorities about the expropriation of large rural estates in Western Thrace because it violated the terms of the 1923 Convention concerning the forced population exchange. The Turkish authorities feared that through Act 3473 the Greek government aimed to alter the religious and ethnic composition of Western Thrace in favor of Greek Orthodox Christians, as well as to make inroads into the large Muslim properties that some Turkish sources estimated at approximately 84 percent of the entire immovable property of the region in the early 1920s.²⁹ The Greek authorities initially claimed that Muslims could not be treated differently from the rest of the country's population, but after immense diplomatic pressure from Turkey and the League of Nations, Athens finally reassured Turkey that Act 3473 would not apply to the Muslims of Western Thrace.³⁰

²⁸ Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 54–55.

²⁹ Ümit Halük Bayülken, "Turkish Minorities in Greece," 150–155.

³⁰ Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange*, 480–481, 505; Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 151–154.

Former pastures were converted to farmlands with the help of large state-owned tractors, and deep drilling was necessary to secure adequate water for the new refugee settlements. The settlers had small plots that required intensive cultivation, whereas Muslims and native Greek Orthodox Christians were little engaged with intensive agricultural production or new agricultural methods. By the end of July 1927, 7,024 Greek Orthodox refugee families had settled in Evros, 1,511 in Xanthi, and 2,610 in Komotini.³¹ By late 1928, the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission had settled 17,000 Greek Orthodox refugee families in 208 villages throughout Western Thrace: 103 of the villages were created on land belonging to the state, on large rural estates bought or requisitioned by the Greek government, and in abandoned Muslim villages whose residents had left for the Ottoman Empire or Turkey; fifty-two villages replaced Bulgarian villages whose residents had emigrated to Bulgaria; and fifty-three villages were settled on the land of partially evacuated Muslim villages.

Many of the Muslim residents of these villages resented the settlement of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees, but the Greek authorities regarded it as an unavoidable measure, applied throughout Greece, a view that also arose due to the high indemnities the Greek government paid to the Muslims of the region for expropriations of Muslim properties. The indemnities in Western Thrace were almost four times higher than the price per *stremma* in Greek Macedonia and other areas of the country, mainly due to the Greek government's sensitivity toward Muslims and concern to avoid possible complaints from Turkey.³² After the settlement of the Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, there was no expropriation of Muslim land in Western Thrace until 1952. In that year, the government of Nikolaos Plastiras passed Act 2058, which expropriated agricultural lands exceeding 500 *stremmas* (123.6 acres) in cases of landowners who cultivated their own lands and 250 *stremmas* (61.8 acres) for those who did not, in order to provide land for the landless. Due to Act 2058, out of the 59,905 *stremmas* (14,802.8 acres) that were expropriated in 1952 in Rhodopi, 4,055 *stremmas* (1,002 acres) belonged to Muslims, 8,300 *stremmas* (2,051 acres) to US companies, and the rest to local Christians.³³

³¹ Apostolos Doxiadis, "Apeleftheros-Ypodoulosis Thrakis," 68.

³² Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 65–57; Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 136.

³³ Konstantinos Andreades, *The Moslem Minority*, 30; Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 57.

The Properties of Exchanged Muslims

It is difficult to estimate the exact value of properties left behind by Muslims and given to Greek Orthodox Christian refugees. According to data provided by the National Bank of Greece in December 1928, the exchanged Muslim property was estimated at 60,169 estates, worth 4,450,892 million drachmas (£12,424,639).³⁴ Under the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration signed on 30 October 1930 between Greece and Turkey,³⁵ those properties later would become the property of the Greek state, and Greece would take responsibility for indemnifying the Muslims who had owned them. All immovable properties left by exchanged Muslims in Greece and by exchanged Greek Orthodox Christians in Turkey came under the complete ownership of the Greek and Turkish governments. Properties seized by the Greek government during the early years of the transfer that belonged to people who came to be exempted from the exchange would not be returned to their owners—because the government had settled Greek Orthodox refugees on Muslim estates in Western Thrace. Greece agreed to pay a total of £425,000 in indemnities, which included £150,000 in compensation for confiscated Muslim properties in Western Thrace, £150,000 for Greeks in Istanbul, and the balance for the set-off of Greek and Turkish properties.³⁶ Until the signing of the 1930 Treaty of Friendship, both Greece and Turkey had an interest in exaggerating the value of these properties, but with the signing of the Treaty, it was the opposite, because both states had to pay for the exchanged refugees hosted in their territories.³⁷

The 1930 Treaty of Friendship also settled unresolved Muslim property issues in Western Thrace, but it did not cover the expropriated properties of Albanian-speaking Muslims of Greece. A few hundred Albanian-speaking Bektashi Sufis remained after 1923 in Thessaly and Macedonia and continued to run their *evkaf* properties there: for example, the *evkaf* of the *tekke* of (den) Ntourbali Sultan in Farsala, the *tekke* of Hasan Baba in the Tempe valley in Thessaly, and the *tekke* of Abdullah Baba in Katerini. This last was shut down as an active Sufi religious sanctuary in the early 1970s and was declared a

³⁴ There were 30,256 estates, worth 3,033,620 million drachmas, in Macedonia and Thrace; 2,375 estates worth 11,869 million drachmas in Epirus; 8,673 estates worth 495,503 million drachmas in Crete; and 15,633 estates worth 909,900 million drachmas on other Aegean islands and in the territories of Old Greece.

³⁵ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 117–119.

³⁶ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 118.

³⁷ Neoklis Sarris, *Exteriki Politiki*, 251.

historical monument after the last dervish (ministrant) passed away. The *evkaf* assets of these *tekkes* and others in Greece remained a major issue in Greco-Albanian relations for years. After 1925, when all Sufi orders were dissolved by the Kemalist regime in Turkey, the Bektaşı of Greece recognized Ali Riza Dede, the chief of Bektaşı in Albania, as their spiritual leader, or *dedebaba*, who remained the *dedebaba* of Tirana until the establishment of the communist regime in Albania. After the establishment of communism in Albania, and in the context of strong anticommunist sentiments in Greece after the country's 1946–1949 civil war between communist partisans and the national army, the Bektaşı of Greece recognized Mohammed Ali Ahmed Siri, the *dedebaba* of Cairo, as their spiritual head. On 16 September 1952 he authorized the establishment of a five-member committee, based in Thessaloniki, and gave it legal authority for the management of the Bektaşı *evkaf*. The members of this committee were Baba Sheit, the sheikh, or ruler, of the *tekke* of Farsala; Baba Veli Mustafa, chief of the *tekke* of Katerini; Kamal Rifat, merchant and resident of Thessaloniki; Hussein Bektaş, doctor and resident of Katerini; and Halit Gerou, farmer and resident of Thessaloniki.³⁸

As Greco-Albanian relations soured, in 1959 the Greek government placed the vast property (almost 3,500 hectares of farming land plus almost 1,000 flocks of sheep and goats) of the (den) Ntourbali Sultan *tekke* in Farsala under state control. The Greek state wanted to make sure that the *tekke*'s staff, who were Albanian-speaking Muslim Bektaşı, had limited or no relations with Albania and that Albania did not benefit from the *tekke*'s substantial revenues. Baba Sheit, the sheikh of the *tekke*, appealed to the Council of State, Greece's Supreme administrative court, which upheld the government's decision. The *tekke*'s property passed into the control of the state, which in 1956 and 1958 expropriated 1,300 hectares of the *tekke*'s farmlands and distributed them to farmers in the region. In 1960 the state put the remaining 2,960 hectares and 700 sheep and goats under sequestration as "enemy property," since the *tekke*'s *evkaf* was deemed to be controlled by Albanian interests, and Albania, conquered by Fascist Italy, was technically at war with Greece, having declared war on Greece on 28 October 1940. The *tekke* gradually declined, and after Baba Sheit's death in March 1973, the shrine remained closed for worship for about thirty years. In 1981, it was declared a historical monument, but it was left to decay. Albanian Bektaşı immigrants from Athens and Thessaloniki had begun to visit the site of the *tekke* in the late

³⁸ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 362.

1990s to celebrate Islamic feasts, and they undertook basic maintenance of the building without official permits.³⁹

There were also large estates belonging to Albanian-speaking Muslims who were exempted from the 1923 compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange.⁴⁰ Many of these Muslims continued to live in Greece, but a great number of them had moved to Albania, some of them becoming influential political figures. A mass expropriation of *ciftliks* owned by Çams occurred in the context of the agrarian reform applied by the revolutionary government of 1922 in favor of landless peasants, mostly Orthodox Christians. The arrival of Orthodox refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor created pressing needs for housing and farming that led to the requisition and occupation, sometimes on a temporary and sometimes on a permanent basis, of the houses and plots of many Çams: approximately 1,000,000 *stremmas* (100,000 hectares) of Çams' farming lands and plots were expropriated.⁴¹ A letter of January 1923 to the editor of *Near East* magazine describes the situation as follows: "while the plight of the [Orthodox] refugees is pitiable in the extreme, it is clear that these people [Çams] are also suffering due to the mistaken policy of their government. . . . Urgent steps should be taken to reinstate the homes of the Albanians and to provide full compensation for their losses."⁴²

Property requisitions often caused discontent between Çam owners and Orthodox Christian refugees who settled in Çam villages: Çams often complained of the expropriation without justification of *ciftliks* as well as small farms, and of the miscalculation of indemnities and misclassification of real estate, all in order to help settle the incoming Orthodox Christian refugees. In 1924, the League of Nations urged the Greek government to "restore without delay the property of Moslem Greek nationals of Albanian origin [i.e., Çams] who have already been declared by the Mixed Committee as not subject to exchange."⁴³ A great, though indeterminable, number of Çams responded to the expropriations of their properties by leaving for Albania and, in so doing, often lost ownership rights in these properties. The majority of Çams, however, remained in Greece. Many took on Greek, Albanian, and

³⁹ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 362.

⁴⁰ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 40–41.

⁴¹ Lena Divani, *Ellada kai Meionotites*, 250.

⁴² Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 305.

⁴³ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 306.

even Serbian citizenship in order to be exempted from the 1923 forced population exchange and keep their properties.

Under Theodoros Pangalos's rule (25 June 1925–19 July 1926) Athens signed four treaties with Tirana, one of which established consular services. Article 3 of this treaty provided that in the case of obligatory expropriation or requisition, the citizens of the two states would not be subject to a compensation program less favorable than that which the natives or citizens of any third party enjoyed.⁴⁴ Given the large amount of land owned by Albanian-speaking Muslims that had been expropriated in Greece—estimated at 100,000 hectares by the Greek Ministry of Agriculture, along with a significant number of urban properties such as houses, shops, and mills—the economic burden on the Greek state would have been unendurable, and the Greek parliament refused to ratify the treaty. At the same time, the Greek authorities were unhappy with the treatment of the Greek Orthodox communities of South Albania by the Albanian authorities; Greek schools were gradually forced to close, and Greek education was virtually eliminated by 1934. Greek Orthodox often fell victim to the nationalist policies of the Albanian state and to the retaliatory acts of many Çams who had left Greece for Albania and often held the Greek Orthodox of Albania responsible for the oppression and any injustices they had been subjected to in Greece.⁴⁵

The Albanian state and some Çams complained to the Council of the League of Nations about the expropriation of Çam properties and the Greek state's refusal to indemnify their Çam proprietors. Greece promised to duly compensate the Çam owners of these properties, and the Council of the League of Nations investigated no further. After prolonged negotiations between the two sides, the Greek government opted for a unilateral solution to the problem by first distinguishing Muslims with Albanian citizenship from those with Greek citizenship. To respond to the Çams' grievances, the Greek government passed Act 5136 of 15 July 1931, which provided for the direct reimbursement to beneficiary Çams who were Greek citizens through the granting of analogous bonds and the direct return of wrongly expropriated urban properties.⁴⁶ However, Act 5136 had been passed mainly to appease the Council of the League of Nations and minimize international pressure

⁴⁴ DHAGMFA, A:4I (1928), “Convention Concernant l’ Établissement et le Service Consulaire entre la République Hellénique et la République Albanaise, Athens, 13 October 1926.”

⁴⁵ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 41–43.

⁴⁶ OGG, no. 217, 18 July 1931.

on Greece and failed to address most of the injustices generated by the 1922 agrarian reform. In a 1930 report to the Greek government, Konstantinos Stylianopoulos, state inspector on national, religious, and linguistics minorities, claimed that three-fourths of the Çams' expropriated land and properties should not have been subject to expropriation because they were not *ciftliks*, which were the primary targets of the agrarian reforms of 1922. He wrote: "in Paramythia small properties and gardens had been expropriated against the Constitution and the Agrarian Reform Act of 1922; not a single acre was left to them [Çams] for cultivation and for sustaining their families."⁴⁷

Stylianopoulos suggested that unjustly expropriated lands should be returned to their owners and that the new Greek Orthodox settlers should leave the region. On some occasions, the Greek authorities granted special prerogatives to heirs of powerful Çam landlords, for example the Demates and Selikates families in Filiates, who were allowed to exploit former Ottoman public lands that had come under state control after Epirus's annexation to Greece. The purpose of such ad hoc special treatment was to please these powerful families and make them feel indebted to the Greek government, hoping that they would influence unhappy local Çams and check their grievances. In addition, the Greek authorities hoped to maintain close political connections with these families in an effort to hamper Albania's influence on the Çams. Under the mandatory Act 375 of 14 July 1937, the Greek state acknowledged the right of Çams of Greek as well as of Albanian citizenship to reclaim their expropriated real estate and appointed the National Bank of Greece to manage the exchangeable property.⁴⁸ Çams had the right to claim their real estate, as well as *evkaf* assets belonging to them, until 2 February 1940.⁴⁹ Despite Act 375, the Greek authorities did not grant indemnities to Çams who had emigrated to Albania, and many of them complained to the League of Nations of discrimination regarding confiscated Çams' estates during the implementation of the agrarian reform. In addition, Act 376 of 14 December 1936 established a restricted buffer zone along the Greco-Albanian border, where fortifications would be constructed, and established restrictions on the free movement of the Çams of Epirus who had emigrated to Albania, as well as on the exploitation of the emigrant Çams' properties in Epirus.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Cited in Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 308.

⁴⁸ OGG, no. 228, 15 June 1937.

⁴⁹ Mandatory Act 1593 of 30 January 1939, OGG, no. 39, 2 February 1939.

⁵⁰ OGG, no. 546, 18 December 1936.

Greece's occupation by the Axis powers in 1941–1944 prolonged the problem of unpaid indemnities for real estate expropriated for the benefit of Greek Orthodox refugees settling in the region. In 1939 Italy occupied Albania. A number of Çam emigrants in Albania hoped that the Italian fascist regime would help them take back control of their properties in Greece, and their hope was bolstered when Italy declared war on Greece on 28 October 1940 and Italian troops invaded Greece. Many Çams formed paramilitary troops to assist the military operations of the Italian invading army and enjoyed preferential treatment by the Italian occupied forces—some received Italian citizenship. The Greek army achieved a provisional victory against the invading Italian troops in March 1941 and reconquered the Italian-occupied area. Local Greek Orthodox Christians joined the Greek military authorities in persecuting those Çams who had collaborated with the Italian forces. In April 1941 Nazi Germany came to the rescue of the retreating Italian troops and invaded and occupied Greece, which was divided into three occupied zones (Italian, German, and Bulgarian). German forces occupied Athens, Thessaloniki, central Macedonia, and several Aegean islands, including most of Crete; East Macedonia and Thrace came under Bulgarian occupation; and the remaining two-thirds of Greece, including Epirus, was occupied by Italy. After the Italian capitulation to the Allied Forces in September 1943, Germany took over the Italian zone.

The Italian occupying forces appointed a Greek puppet administration that attempted a new approach to the Çams' expropriated assets in Epirus, asking the native people and the Greek Orthodox Christian refugees who owned and used expropriated Çam assets to pay 15 percent of the income they gained from them annually to the Çam ex-owners. The new arrangement did not work. It produced conflicts and vendetta killings between Çams and native and refugee Orthodox Christians and created a belligerent climate in which the already tense relations between Çams and Orthodox Christians deteriorated further. In addition, the Çams collaborated with the Italian and German occupiers to a great extent. At the beginning of the occupation, Çam communities followed different politics as per circumstances, alternating between collaboration, neutrality, and less frequently, resistance. Çam and Greek Orthodox communities changed sides by allying with the stronger available patron and shifting their allegiances when a more suitable one appeared. The events were often part of a cycle of blood revenge between local communities over issues related to land ownership, state policies, sectarian hostilities, personal vendettas, and the need to take a side in an

environment of complete disorder and confusion.⁵¹ By 1942 the Italian forces formed what was called the Kehilla, or Council, of the Çam leaders from the Dino family, Nuri and Mazar Dino, to administer the region where Çams lived, known also as Çamëria. The aim of the Kehilla was to annex Çamëria into a greater Albanian state. Under the command of the Dino family, the Kehilla conducted a policy of terror and ethnic cleansing among the Greek population, which further exacerbated conflicts over contested land ownership and the sharing of agricultural resources.

After the capitulation of Italy to the Allies of World War II, in September 1943 the local British military mission of the Special Operations Executive—a secret British World War II organization formed on 22 July 1940 with the purpose of conducting espionage, sabotage, and reconnaissance in occupied Europe against the Axis powers and to aid local resistance movements—proposed an alliance to the Çams and fighting the Germans together, but the proposal was rejected. From 29 July to 31 August 1943, a combined German and Çam military force launched an anti-partisan sweep operation, codenamed Augustus, during which 600 Greeks and 50 Albanians were killed and seventy villages were destroyed.⁵² On 27 September 1943, combined Nazi-Çam forces launched large-scale military operations of burning and destroying villages north of Paramythia, including Eleftherochori, Seliani, Semelika, and Agios Nikolaos, killing fifty Greek villagers in the process.⁵³ In another incident, on 27 September 1943, Çam militias arrested fifty-three Greek citizens in Paramythia and executed forty-nine of them two days later, an action to eliminate the town's Greek local authorities and intellectuals, orchestrated by Mazar Dino, who was an officer of the Çam militia, and his brother Nuri. Çam militia collaborators with the Nazis were also active in southern Albania. Nazi general and local commander Hubert Lanz initiated armed operations in the region of Konispol, with the codename Horridoh, in which Albanian nationalist groups and a Çam battalion of approximately 1,000 men under the leadership of Nuri Dino participated. The death toll from these operations, which started on 1 January 1944, was 500 Albanians.⁵⁴ Most of the local Muslim *beys* (nobles) and the local mufti did not support these military operations.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, "Violence"; Eleftheria Manta, "The Çams"; Lambros Baltsiotis, "The Muslim Chams."

⁵² Herman Frank Meyer, *Blutiges*, 204, 476.

⁵³ Herman Frank Meyer, *Blutiges*, 469–471.

⁵⁴ Herman Frank Meyer, *Blutiges*, 539.

⁵⁵ Georgia Kretsi, *Verfolgung*, 283; Mark Mazower, "Three Forms," 25–26.

Although the majority of the Çams elites collaborated with the Axis powers, at the end of the war several Çams became part of an ethnically mixed battalion of the National Liberation Front, a major movement of the Greek resistance during the Axis occupation of Greece whose main driving force was the Greek Communist Party, while its membership throughout the occupation included several other leftist and republican groups. Following the withdrawal of the Axis forces in 1944, the National Republican Greek League, one of the major noncommunist guerilla resistance groups formed during the Axis occupation, entered the region. Led by Colonel Napoleon Zervas, a former Greek army officer who had been expelled from the army after the failed pro-Venizelist coup d'état of 1935, this group committed atrocities against the Çams in 1944–1945 that forced them to settle permanently as refugees in Albania, resulting in a great loss of life and property. Meanwhile, a special court on collaborations in Ioannina condemned in absentia 2,109 Çam collaborators of the Axis to death; but these war crimes remained unpunished since the criminals had already fled abroad.⁵⁶

In the aftermath of the paramilitary operations of the National Republican Greek League, Çam real estate was considered abandoned and was gradually confiscated or put at the disposal of landless peasants and refugees. Legally, this real estate was to have reverted to state ownership, as set forth in the various laws passed before World War II. In reality, the abandoned and devastated Çam properties were occupied by residents of nearby villages or by new settlers. After 1945 those Çams who held Albanian citizenship faced expropriation of their property due to its legal status as enemy property following the Italian invasion of 1940. Çams of Greek citizenship who lived in Albania were exempted from property sequestration or expropriation. Under several decisions by Greek courts, the properties of Çams of Greek origin were to remain under sequestration until the end of the state of war between Albania and Greece, which existed technically until 1987. Even then, the sequestration of Çam properties continued, because the declaration of war against Fascist Italy had not been legally ratified by the Greek parliament, which had been suspended during the Metaxas regime (1936–1941). Çams' access to property rights, the benefits of Greek citizenship, and the right to resettle in Greece remain unresolved issues as of this writing.

⁵⁶ Kosta Barjaba and Russel King, "Introducing"

The Egyptian *Vakif*

After the Greek defeat in the Asia Minor War, Greece was engaged in a long dispute over the future legal status of the “Egyptian *vakif*” in Kavala and the island of Thasos. The story of the Egyptian *vakif* began in 1811, when Muhammad Ali, also known as Mehmet Ali, a Bektaşı of Albanian origin born in Kavala, established Ottoman rule and became the unchallenged governor (pasha) of Egypt. He had destroyed the Mamluks, a knightly military caste developed from the ranks of slave soldiers that included Turkic peoples, Egyptian Copts, Circassians, Abkhazians, Georgians, Albanians, Greeks, and South Slavs, who had controlled Egypt for more than 600 years. Eventually Mohammad Ali established his own dynasty, which ruled Egypt until the 1952 coup d'état by Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser that overthrew King Farouk and the Egyptian monarchy.⁵⁷ On 20 March 1813, the Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II, gave properties to Mohammad Ali in Kavala and Thasos, with a firman (sovereign's edict) recognizing his good services to the Ottoman Empire and especially for his reinstatement of Ottoman rule in Egypt. These assets were known as the “Mohammad Ali *vakif*.⁵⁸ Later, under Ottoman suzerainty as well as British protection, the khedive (another term for the ruler of Egypt) became the owner of the Mohammad Ali *vakif*.⁵⁹ When Kavala and Thasos were ceded to Greece after the Balkan Wars, the *vakif* was managed under the terms of the 1913 Peace Convention of Athens. The Greek authorities were to respect and not change the status or management of the Mohammad Ali *vakif* without the prior consent of and payment to the interested parties of a fair compensation (article 12).⁶⁰ In November 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Triple Alliance, and Britain unilaterally declared a protectorate over Egypt. The ruling khedive

⁵⁷ Muhammad Ali was a military commander in an Ottoman force sent to recover Egypt from French occupation under Napoleon. Following Napoleon's withdrawal, Muhammad Ali rose to power through a series of political maneuvers, and in 1805 he was named *wāli* (viceroy) of Egypt and became pasha. As *wāli*, he introduced military, economic, and cultural reforms and initiated a violent purge of the Mamluks, consolidating his rule and permanently ending the Mamluk hold over Egypt. He recaptured Arabian territories the Ottomans had lost in the past for the sultan, and he conquered Sudan on his own accord. In 1831, he waged war against the Ottoman sultan, capturing Syria, crossing into Anatolia, and directly threatening Istanbul. Faced with a European intervention, he accepted a brokered peace in 1840 and withdrew from the Levant. In return, his descendants were granted hereditary rule over Egypt and Sudan. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt*.

⁵⁸ The Khedive (Hidiv, in Ottoman) is a title equivalent to the English term *viceroy*. It was first used, initially self-declared without official recognition, by Muhammad Ali. The Ottoman government officially recognized the title in 1867, and Ismail Pasha, then ruler of Egypt, and his dynastic successors used it until 1914.

⁵⁹ OGG, no. 229, 14 November 1913.

was deposed, and in December 1914 his successor, Hussein Kamel, was compelled to declare himself sultan of Egypt, independent of the Ottomans. The status and management of the Mohammad Ali *vakif* continued as before, but its future depended on the future territorial status of Egypt: whether it would be under Ottoman or British sovereignty.⁶⁰

The British protectorate in Egypt ended formally with the Declaration of Egyptian Independence on 28 February 1922, through which Britain granted independence to Egypt with the exception of four “reserved” areas: foreign relations, communications, the military, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Shortly afterward, Sultan Fuad I declared himself king of Egypt. The British control of the four “reserved” areas continued, and the situation was normalized in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which granted Britain the right to station troops in Egypt for the defense of the Suez Canal and to train the Egyptian army. After the Declaration of Egyptian Independence, the Mohammad Ali *vakif* came under the ownership of the Egyptian state and since then has been formally called the Egyptian *vakif*. When Muslim property was expropriated after the 1923 forced population exchange, the Mohammad Ali *vakif* remained untouched, as foreign property. Mustafa Sabri, the last sheikh-ul Islam of the Ottoman Empire, who had sought refuge in Western Thrace in 1926, requested, unsuccessfully, that the Muslim community council of Xanthi manage the *vakif*. In 1926, the Greek government concluded a bilateral agreement with the Egyptian government that arranged for the taxation of the *vakif* and assigned the administration of it to the Egyptian Ministry of Evkaf.⁶¹ Until 1952, the Egyptian monarch was the *mütevelli* (trustee) of the *vakif*, and a Greek citizen was authorized to manage it in situ. After the abolition of the Egyptian monarchy, the Egyptian Ministry of Evkaf became the *mütevelli* and appointed the Greek citizen who managed the *vakif* in situ.

On 28 September 1948 Greece concluded another bilateral agreement with Egypt, which regulated war indemnities for the properties of the large Greek community in Egypt—estimated at approximately 250,000 Greeks in 1940—and war damages for the Egyptian *vakif*, according to which Greece paid £16,209 as indemnity for it.⁶² When Nasser took power and many of the Greeks of Egypt were forced out of the country, the Greek Ministry of Finance declared Greece’s intent to occupy the *vakif* properties in Kavala

⁶⁰ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 356.

⁶¹ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 357.

⁶² Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 357.

and Thasos, redefining them as exchangeable properties in the context of the 1923 forced population exchange. Egypt sought a political solution to the problem and in 1964 agreed to sell the castle of Kavala, which belonged to the *vakif*, to the municipality of Kavala, receiving permission from Greece to claim compensation in Greek courts for the lost income from this asset. After extensive bilateral negotiations, Greece and Egypt signed an accord on 1 August 1984 that divided the *vakif* into three groups of assets:⁶³

1. Assets already occupied by the Greek authorities would be owned by Greece after paying a compensation of 72.2 million drachmas (£322,826.51) to Egypt.
2. A list of assets in Kavala and Thasos, principally in the area of Kallirachi, were acknowledged as Egyptian, although Egypt declared it was willing to sell them to Greece in accordance with Greek civil law.
3. Egypt would continue to own two properties: the house where Mohammad Ali was born and the Imaret, a nineteenth-century building in Kavala that he established as a religious, educational, and charitable institution, which would be managed by the Egyptian Ministry of Evkaf. In 2004 both the Imaret and Mohammad Ali's house were leased to Imaret AE, a private Greek company that restored the original appearance of both buildings and opened a luxury hotel.⁶⁴

Education

In Kemalist Turkey, Muslim education had assumed a secular character with the abandonment of the Ottoman scripture, the adoption of the Latin alphabet, the abolition of Islamic religious schools, and many other reforms. In Greece, education for Muslim citizens preserved the more religious character that had characterized Muslim education prior to the 1923 forced population exchange.⁶⁵ The Greek authorities did not abolish Muslim religious schools as neighboring Turkey did, because Greece was obliged (by the Treaty of Lausanne), and at the same time wanted, to preserve the religious character of Greece's Muslims, with the view that preservation of Islamic

⁶³ OGG, no. 172, 13 November 1984.

⁶⁴ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 358–359.

⁶⁵ Symeon Soltaridis, *Istoria ton Moufteion*, 137.

religiosity could help curb the influence of secular nationalism emanating from neighboring Albania and Turkey. The Greek authorities believed that Albanian and Turkish nationalisms could, in the long run, develop national consciousness among Muslims, encourage secessionist movements, and thus challenge Greece's territorial integrity. After 1920, all Muslim minority schools came under the authority of the Greek Ministry of Education. At the same time, a special directorate within the ministry, the Directorate for Foreign Private Schools, was established with the task of monitoring school curricula, appointing teaching staff, and overseeing every matter relating to Muslim education.⁶⁶

After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne there were 267 Muslim schools in Western Thrace, 235 of which operated in the district of Rhodopi. The language of instruction for most subjects was Turkish. Only geography and history were taught in Greek, and the teaching of the Greek language was restricted to fewer than ten hours per week. The main reason for this was that the teaching of Turkish was conducted by teachers appointed and paid for by the Muslim communities, while the teaching of Greek was the task of teachers appointed and paid by the Greek state. Greece was unwilling to spend state funds for Greek teachers in Muslim schools at a time of huge economic problems. The government's main priority was to integrate Greek Orthodox Christian refugees after the population exchange. By the end of the 1920s the teaching of Greek was mostly restricted to Muslim schools in cities.⁶⁷

In 1927, the Albanian government requested the opening of two to three Albanian schools for the education of Çams in Epirus, claiming that about sixty-five Greek Orthodox schools were functioning in areas of southern Albania that were populated by large groups of Greek Orthodox Christians. The Greek government, however, refused the request, arguing that Albanian schools had never operated in the region in Ottoman times. The government viewed the whole issue as a fabrication by Albanian authorities aimed at developing an Albanian national consciousness among the Çams.⁶⁸ The government believed that this would be the first step toward the emergence

⁶⁶ OGG, no. 111, 30 June 1928 (Act 3578); OGG, no. 160, 15 June 1931 (Act 5018); see also Acts 4862/1931 and Emergency Act 818, 6 August 1937 (Act on Amending and Completing Act 3578 Concerning Private Schools).

⁶⁷ Minutes HP, no. 79, 11 July 1924, 813, 819.

⁶⁸ DHAGMFA, A:20B (1927), no. 1321, 1 October 1927; A:4I (1928), no. 207, 11 January 1928.

of an Albanian national minority in Epirus that could later become a political vehicle for promoting Albania's interests in the region. The Greek authorities encouraged the Çams to enroll their children in state schools, but the effort was ineffective because many did not like the idea of Greek Orthodox teachers instructing their children. Çam student enrollment in state schools, even of children below the age of ten, was very low. In the village of Mazarakia, for example, only five or six Çam children were enrolled in state schools at the end of the 1920s, out of the fifty or sixty Çam children living in the village,⁶⁹ despite the fact that the Greek authorities had appointed Muslims to teach religion and Ottoman script in state schools in areas with mixed populations.⁷⁰ In addition, many Çam parents considered education for their children a luxury and preferred to keep them at home to help with farming and housework.

The Muslim children who did not attend Greek state schools preferred to be enrolled in Muslim community religious schools, similar to those operating in Western Thrace, in which they were instructed by Muslim clergymen in Islam, the Ottoman script, and the Albanian language.⁷¹ These schools were never officially recognized by the Greek state. In 1928, representatives from the Çam communities in Paramythia, Karvounari, and Filiates requested the opening of two Muslim schools for boys and one for girls, with the promise that the Çam communities themselves would support the operation of these schools.⁷² The Greek authorities rejected the request because they viewed it as a product of Albanian state propaganda and feared that these Muslim schools would become breeding grounds for anti-Greek national sentiments. Nevertheless, overall the Greek government believed that the existence of these Muslim community schools run by the Muslim clergy should remain in operation. The schools offered the double advantage that the Greek authorities could interrupt their operation as illegal whenever they wished to, while their existence could be exploited as a response to Albanian demands for the opening of new Albanian schools in the region.⁷³

⁶⁹ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 49.

⁷⁰ DHAGMFA, A:21I (1928), "Paramythia-Margariti Gendarmerie Sub-administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paramythia, 25 May 1928."

⁷¹ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 49.

⁷² DHAGMFA, A:21I (1928), "Paramythia-Margariti Gendarmerie Sub-administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paramythia, 25 May 1928."

⁷³ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 49–50.

Muslim Electoral Behavior

The electoral representation and behavior of the Muslim minority were characterized by the polarization and instability of the Greek political scene for most of the interwar years. From 1922 to 1936, a total of seven parliamentary elections took place, leading to a turnover of twenty-four governments under thirteen different prime ministers. During the same period Senate elections took place in 1923 and 1929 for one-third of the senators. Despite Venizelos's glory of signing the Treaty of Sèvres, which led to significant territorial gains for Greece in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, the minority populations, particularly the Muslims of Macedonia and the Jews of Thessaloniki, were held most responsible for the electoral defeat of Venizelos's Party of the Liberals in the general elections of 1 November 1920. As explained in the previous chapter, in addition to disagreements with his party's political agenda, Venizelos's foreign policy came to be identified with Greco-Ottoman wars, and the Muslims of Greece and elsewhere in Southeastern Europe had religious, cultural, and sentimental bonds with the Ottoman Empire and resented these wars, which upset people's economic and everyday lives. In addition, Venizelos's Party of the Liberals ruled for almost the entire period between 1913 and 1920, and a large part of Greek society, including many Muslims, Jews, and members of other ethnic and religious minorities, linked problems under the Greek administration to Venizelos's rule.⁷⁴

Hence, upon its return to power in 1928, the Venizelist camp changed the electoral law to implement a policy of separate electoral colleges for the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Jews of Thessaloniki, which entitled each of the two minorities to a fixed number of MPs in parliament. Although the change was portrayed as an attempt to improve minority representation, the real motive was to put an end to the minorities' power as the arbiters of Greek elections.⁷⁵ Under the new arrangement, a total of four Muslim MPs were to be elected to the Greek parliament on the basis of Muslim-only electoral ballots in Western Thrace. The result was a looser association between Muslim representation and national party politics. Muslim ballots often indicated some affiliation to national parties, such as Party of the Liberals, People's Party, or Agrarian Party, but the reality was that contact between local candidates and the leadership of the national political parties

⁷⁴ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, 236–242.

⁷⁵ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, 239.

remained, by mutual choice, minimal.⁷⁶ This disconnect between separate minority electoral colleges and national party politics did not seem to bother the members of the Muslim minority. On the contrary, Muslims, unlike the Jews of Thessaloniki, complained when the government abolished the separate electoral colleges for ethnic and religious minorities in 1934, following a decision of the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Council of State), Greece's supreme administrative court, that found separate electoral colleges to be unconstitutional.⁷⁷

Although Venizelos's Party of the Liberals was the main party that advocated assimilation policies in the New Lands, the majority of Muslims in all post-Lausanne elections until 1934 supported the party. This paradox is possibly explained by a sense of vulnerability among most minority voters in the interwar years, as well as the imperative to be in good terms with the party in power, that is, the Party of the Liberals from 1928 to 1932.⁷⁸ This may also explain why minority support for the People's Party grew substantially in the aftermath of the 1932 election, which brought defeat to the Venizelist camp.

The lack of strong ideological conviction among the Muslim electorate has been reflected further in their low levels of support for smaller parties. Outside the political dipole of Venizelism versus anti-Venizelism, the Greek Communist Party, despite its electoral strength among the Greek Orthodox of Western Thrace, like other small parties, did not manage to make significant inroads in the Muslim minority during the interwar years. Because of their considerable isolation from national party politics, Muslims' electoral behavior was shaped by local conditions, including the power struggle between Muslim conservatives and Kemalists. For most of the 1920s, the conservative camp within the minority dominated electoral politics, assisted in part by the tacit support of Venizelist statesmen who ruled Greece during this period. Although the electoral cleavage between Kemalists and conservatives did not map evenly onto the division between Venizelism and anti-Venizelism, the electoral performances of Kemalist candidates improved significantly in the early 1930s due to the expulsion of anti-Kemalist dissidents and the more concerted efforts of the anti-Venizelist camp to make inroads in the minority vote for its own electoral benefit. A major turning point in this process was

⁷⁶ Elias Nikolakopoulos, "Politikes Dynameis."

⁷⁷ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, 246.

⁷⁸ Kevin Featherstone et al., *The Last Ottomans*, 101.

the electoral victory of Hatip Yusuf Salioğlu, a staunch Kemalist who had defected from the Party of the Liberals and joined the People's Party, in the 1934 Senate by-election.⁷⁹

In addition, powerful political personalities, such as the long-serving MP Hafiz Ali Galip in Komotini, had established their power bases and were difficult for national parties and potential local political opponents to overlook. As with the electoral behavior of exchanged Muslim communities in Macedonia and elsewhere in Greece prior to the 1923 forced population exchange, the overall system of electoral representation was based on deeply entrenched networks of patronage. This made Muslim MPs and other community notables extremely influential mediators between the local Muslim population and the Greek state or the Republic of Turkey, through the Turkish Consulate in Komotini. These networks of patronage were a systemic feature of Greek political culture, not confined to Muslim minority areas, and were facilitated by high levels of illiteracy and the very limited knowledge of the Greek language among Muslims. They were also maintained by the need of many Muslim agricultural smallholders to remain on good terms with influential middlemen for access to national and international markets. For example, Hamdi Hussein Fehmi, the Muslim MP of Xanthi, was a wealthy tobacco merchant who bought the tobacco grown by many Muslim farmers in Western Thrace.⁸⁰

Turkish Nationalism

When Turkey abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 and replaced sharia with the Swiss Civil Code, the political conflict over the identity of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace intensified. Many high-profile Muslim religious leaders left Turkey, along with Muslims who opposed the secular political reforms of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (known after 1935 as Kemal Atatürk), and sought political asylum in Middle Eastern and European countries, including Egypt, Syria, Britain, France, Bulgaria, and Greece. In Western Thrace, the ascendance of Kemalism met a rather skeptical audience, despite the region's familiarity with Turkish nationalism, which had been on the rise since the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.

⁷⁹ Elias Nikolakopoulos, "Politikes Dýnameis," 177.

⁸⁰ Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 74.

Turkish nationalism found its first expression after the Second Balkan War, when the prospect of Western Thrace returning to Bulgarian administration led the non-Bulgarian local population to form joint committees of Muslims, Christians, and Jews that protested to the European Great Powers and exercised pressure on Greece and Turkey to intervene. Members of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace created the Turkish Western Thrace Committee (*Türk Garbi Trakya Komitesi*), which was intended to undermine the Bulgarian administration in Western Thrace and promote the idea of autonomy. Strong anti-Bulgarian feelings also existed among the Pomaks in the Rhodope Mountains, who had suffered bitterly at the hands of the Bulgarians' aggressive policy of "Bulgarization" and forced "Christianization" in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. Due to their linguistic proximity, the Bulgarians regarded Pomaks as "lapsed brothers." The Ottoman government endorsed the demand for Thracian autonomy but did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 that ended the Second Balkan War. The Greek government, committed to the Treaty of Bucharest, had not fully endorsed it. Anxious to retain a strong Greek presence in the area and control Greek Orthodox migration from Western Thrace, Athens encouraged local Greek Orthodox to cooperate with the Muslims in making joint representations to the Great Powers. Soon after the departure of the Greek army from the area, a number of guerilla groups with close relations with the Young Turks, supported by the Ottoman government, started to operate there. On 31 August 1913, weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, Ottoman-supported rebels entered Komotini and Xanthi unopposed and proclaimed the creation of the Provisional Government of Western Thrace (*Garbi Trakya Gecici Hükümeti*). This provisional government, led by Hafiz Salih Mehmetoğlu, a Pomak from the Komotini area, enjoyed considerable cross-community support, including representatives from the Turkish, Greek, Pomak, Armenian, and Jewish communities, and commanded a 30,000-strong army of volunteers from all the ethnic groups of the region. This government provided for the establishment of a twenty-five-member parliament, a sixteen-member executive committee, and three directorates, or ministries, of the military, justice, and the economy. It set up courts, tax collection, the payment of salaries to civil servants, the introduction of a state flag, the provision of bilingual passports in Greek and Turkish, and the newspaper *L'Independent*, published by Samuel Karaso, a local Jew.⁸¹

⁸¹ Joëlle Dalègre, "Les Musulmans Turcophones," 56; Konstantinos Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tou Voreiou Ellinismou*, 280–281.

Strong international pressure on Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders to dissolve the Provisional Government of Western Thrace and accept the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest angered many of the provisional government's leaders, and on 25 September 1913 Eşref Kuşçubaşı and Süleyman Askeri, both Muslims of Circassian descent, proclaimed the establishment of the Independent Government of Western Thrace (Garbi Trakya Bağımsız Hükümeti), known also as the "Republic of Gjumuldjina." The success of this republic was undermined from the start. The Treaty of Istanbul, signed between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria on 29 September 1913, which terminated the Second Balkan War between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, settled the border issue between the two states by ceding Western Thrace to Bulgaria. Without Ottoman support, the Republic turned to Greece, which offered the port of Alexandroupoli, which was under Greek control, to the Republic and promised to send armed bands to support their anti-Bulgarian struggle. The offer came too late, because the Ottomans had sent a delegation to Western Thrace to reassure the insurgents that, although the Treaty of Istanbul did not provide guarantees for the protection of non-Bulgarian Christians in Western Thrace, it did so for the Muslim population. In the end, the Muslim leaders' resolve broke, and on 20 October 1913 the Republic of Gjumuldjina ceased to exist. More than 2,000 Ottoman officers and volunteers and the Muslim leadership of the Republic left for Eastern Thrace, then under the Ottoman Empire.

The return of the Bulgarian administration to Western Thrace brought with it the resumption of the Bulgarization campaign, particularly against the Pomaks and the Greeks.⁸² When the Bulgarian troops were forced to withdraw from Western Thrace on 17 September 1918, after the end of World War I, a small Anglo-French force was sent to the area to protect the Xanthi-Istanbul railway line. In the meantime, the Greek army, under the command of General Louis Franchet d'Espérey, the French commander-in-chief of the Triple Entente armies of the Orient, remained in reserve in eastern Macedonia. The prospect of the Greek army returning to Western Thrace alarmed the Bulgarian government, which promoted the idea of Western Thrace as a French protectorate, a proposal that was eventually rejected by France. The Greeks plotted to place Western Thrace under Greek control, with the help of few Turkish and Pomak Muslim members of the

⁸² Alexander Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 144.

Bulgarian parliament. The Muslim MPs sent a memorandum to d'Espérey and the Peace Conference, meeting in Paris, requesting the removal of the Bulgarian administration and the deployment of Greek troops in Western Thrace. d'Espérey appointed General Georges Charpy as governor of Western Thrace, tasked with supervising the withdrawal of the Bulgarian army and establishing the Thrace Interalliée—the administration of the Triple Entente forces—to control Western Thrace until the resolution of the area's ultimate status. Greek troops under Triple Entente command occupied Xanthi in October 1919.

The Muslim leadership in Western Thrace was confused and at times divided over the best course of action. Those close to the Young Turks favored self-determination based on the numerical superiority of the Muslims in the region. Others looked to Italian patronage for counterbalancing the advancing Greek hegemony. The Pomaks in the Rhodope Mountains were more amenable to negotiations with the Greeks. The lowest common denominator of local Muslim preferences at the time seems to have been a desire to end Bulgarian rule. In May 1920 the Triple Entente forces handed over military control of the area to the Greek army, which days later began its advance toward Eastern Thrace, which was eventually ceded to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920. Alarmed by the prospect of permanent Greek control over Eastern and Western Thrace, the Turkish Western Thrace Committee, which all this time maintained its network of support and operated covertly, and the Young Turks opened channels of communication with Bulgaria with the view of supporting the creation of an independent Thracian state. On 25 May 1920 the Turkish Republic of Western Thrace (Garbi Trakya Devleti Muvakkatesi) was proclaimed in the village of Hemetli (Organi) in the Rhodope Mountains. This new republic, headed by Peştereli Tevfik Bey, and its military forces were placed under the command of Ali Fuat Cebesoy (or Fuat Balkan), a Kemalist officer who in July 1915 had created a revolutionary movement in Drama in eastern Macedonia that aimed to protect the local Muslim population from Bulgarian and Greek oppression. Shortly afterward he had established the Committee for the Liberation of Western Thrace (Batı Trakya Kurtuluş Komitesi) and occupied several Muslim villages in the area. In September 1917 he had been forced to flee to Turkey.⁸³

⁸³ Alexander Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 144.

The Turkish Republic of Western Thrace never developed state institutions and soon deteriorated into a guerilla movement against the Greek army at a time when Greek armed forces were preoccupied with the Asia Minor campaign. Following the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which demarcated the Greek-Turkish border and ceded Eastern Thrace to Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Western Thrace lost its vital channels of support from Turkey. Not long afterward its leaders were arrested and sentenced to death. They were subsequently exchanged for a group of Greeks of Istanbul who had been tried for treason by the Kemalist regime, because of their active support of the Triple Entente's occupation of Istanbul in 1918–1923, and were deported to Turkey.⁸⁴

With its overwhelmingly Islamic outlook, the Muslim community in Western Thrace mistrusted Kemalism's push to "modernize" and "secularize" the Muslim minority. Kemalism challenged traditional Islamic principles, practices, and customs and divided this minority community between Kemalists, also known as Young Turks, and "Old Muslim" conservatives. This cleavage became more apparent with the arrival in 1923 of a large number of Ottoman dissidents, who became known as "the 150" (*Yüz Ellilikler*), in reference to a list of dissidents declared personae non gratae by the new Turkish government. They had fled Turkey following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and sought political asylum in Greece. They were afraid to return to Turkey because they had incriminated themselves during the Turkish War of Independence. Among those who settled in Western Thrace was Mustafa Sabri, the last sheikh-ul Islam of the Ottoman Empire, whose opposition to Kemalism became a major rallying point for its opponents in the region. Sabri's immediate family took control of key minority schools and published influential Islamic newspapers such as *Yarin* (Tomorrow) and *Peyan-i-Islam* (News of Islam). The Ottoman dissidents sought to control minority institutions such as muftis' offices, Muslim community councils, and schools and their teachers and principals. They opposed the Kemalist reforms in Turkey and promoted the preservation among the Muslim minority of the same religious character as under the Ottoman *millet* system.⁸⁵ They supported the use of the Ottoman script, the teaching of the Qu'ran in Muslim schools, the application of sharia and Islamic traditions in everyday life, and the traditional dress code: the wearing of the fez by men and the hijab by women.

⁸⁴ Alexander Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique*, 144–145.

⁸⁵ Symeon Soltaridis, *Istoria ton Moufteion*, 197–200.

The Ottoman dissidents and their followers clashed with the Kemalist camp, which mostly included younger people, many of whom were graduates of schools controlled by the Young Turks. The Kemalists of Western Thrace drew heavily on the support of the newly established Turkish Consulate in Komotini and the Thracian Committee in Istanbul, an agency of the Kemalist regime whose main aim was to promote Kemalism in Thrace and monitor the activities of Muslim conservatives, including the 150 Ottoman dissidents. The Turkish Consulate of Komotini supported agents who toured the Muslim villages and pressured residents to collect money for the Turkish army and air force—some of which ended up funding the activities of the Kemalist organization in Western Thrace. They often terrorized Greek Orthodox refugees, saying that Western Thrace would soon be taken by Turkey and those who had cooperated with the Greek authorities would be persecuted by the Kemalist regime.⁸⁶ The Kemalists sought to propagate their ideology through the creation of youth associations, such as the Xanthi Youth Association (*İskeçe Türk Gençlik Yurdu*) and the Turkish Youth Union (*Turk Gençler Birliği*), founded by the influential Mehmet Hilmi, a Muslim teacher from Soufli. Hilmi, who was briefly imprisoned and exiled by the Greek security services, was also instrumental in the publication of several pro-Kemalist newspapers, such as *Yeni Ziya* (New Light), *Yeni Yol* (New Road), and *Yeni Adım* (New Step). Hilmi developed close ties with the Kemalist regime in Turkey via the Turkish Consulate in Komotini and used this relationship to voice complaints alleging oppression and attacks on Muslims by Greek authorities. His complaints were not always legitimate, often exaggerating or distorting issues to serve Turkish interests or to increase his prestige among the Muslim minority.⁸⁷ Later, the publication of *Ülkü* (Ideal) by Ismail Sadık Şahal and *Millet* (the Nation) by Hamdi Hussein Fehmi and Osman Nuri further strengthened the Kemalist voice. Fehmi was later to become an MP and a prime suspect of the Greek secret services, who regarded him as the main agent of Turkish nationalism in the Pomak areas of Xanthi.

Kemalists in Western Thrace supported the abolishment of sharia, the abandonment of the teaching of the Qur'an in Muslim schools, the adoption of the Latin alphabet, universal numericals, and dress customs similar

⁸⁶ Konstantinos Tsoumisis, "I Mousoulmaniki Meionotita," 251–252.

⁸⁷ Konstantinos Tsoumisis, "I Mousoulmaniki Meionotita," 119–120, 129–131, 252; Konstantinos Tsoumisis, "Igesia kai Prosopikofita," 122.

to those of Western Europe, with the abandonment of the fez and hijab. In the field of education, the clash between the two Muslim camps became particularly intense, as Kemalist teachers promoting aggressive secular reforms and the Latin alphabet and conservatives reacting by firing Kemalist teachers in schools they controlled and refusing to provide religious services to those with known Kemalist sympathies. Violent conflicts often took place between the two sides, and many parents withdrew their children from schools to keep them safe. In a letter sent on 28 December 1928 to Prime Minister Venizelos, 111 Muslim residents of the Pomak village Oreon (in Turkish, Yassiören) complained that Kemalist agents had terrorized them, telling them that a population exchange was imminent and there would be grave consequences for conservative Muslims who did not support Kemalist reforms when they arrived in Turkey. The senders of the letter claimed that they were “real Muslims” who did not love the “new and infidel Turks” and argued that they were not members of the Turkish race. They asked Venizelos to exempt them if there was to be a population exchange; they would rather remain in Greece or be moved to the Middle East, preferably Egypt and Syria.⁸⁸ The antagonistic atmosphere was also reflected in the minority press, with newspapers such as *İ'tilâ* (Exaltation) and *Yarın* supporting Muslim conservatives and others, such as *İnkılâp* (Revolution) and *Yeni Adım*, supporting the Kemalists.⁸⁹

The Kemalist regime of Turkey supported the Kemalists materially and diplomatically in their conflict with the conservatives in Greece. Ankara wished to prevent the Muslim minority from becoming a political bastion of anti-Kemalist forces that could create troubles for, if not undermine, the Kemalist regime in Turkey. By promoting secularization, Ankara also was favoring a greater integration of Muslims into Greek society. This would help Turkey’s efforts to integrate its Greek Orthodox minority into the Turkish nation and disrupt its separate institutions. Greece was more explicit in regarding the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey as part of the Greek nation, with Greeks often referring to them as *omogeneis*, of the same race, a term that had originated in the *millet* system. Turks often referred to the Muslims in Greece as *soydaş*, the Turkish equivalent of *omogeneis*, but on the whole the Turkish attitude was more ambivalent and varied throughout the post-Lausanne era.⁹⁰ Despite Turkey favoring a greater integration of Greece’s

⁸⁸ Symeon Soltaridis, *I Istoria ton Mousfeion*, 208, 267–270.

⁸⁹ Alexander Popovic, *L’Islam Balkanique*, 159–162.

⁹⁰ Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority,” 49–50.

Muslim minority into Greek society, Muslims and Christians lived as parallel communities for many decades after 1923. The integration of Muslims into Greek society was hampered by Greeks' traditional feelings of suspicion and hatred toward Islam and view of the minority as political proxies of neighboring state rivals Turkey and Albania. Geography was also a factor: the vast majority of the remaining Muslims of Greece were peasants who lived in rural areas in completely Muslim villages and had very little contact with Greek society at large.

Venizelos's government feared that a transformation of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace from a *millet*-style religious minority into a Turkish national minority under the influence of Turkey's Kemalist regime could potentially help Ankara exploit Greece's vulnerabilities after its defeat in the Asia Minor War. Greece faced intense problems relating to the housing, support, and integration of the approximately 1.2 million Orthodox Christian refugees who had poured into the country from Eastern Thrace and Anatolia after World War I, as well as later secessionist claims in Western Thrace. At the same time, Venizelos's government did not wish to antagonize the official minority leadership, who opposed the adoption of Kemalist reforms, or to be accused of violating international law by interfering with the internal affairs of the minority. During the course of the negotiations for the 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration,⁹¹ Venizelos eventually agreed to expel a number of individuals from the 150 to the Middle East, including Mustafa Sabri, who settled in Egypt in 1931,⁹² in exchange for removing from office Pavlos Karahisaritis, renamed in 1922 to Papa Eftim I, head of the Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, an unrecognized Orthodox Christian denomination founded on 15 September 1922 in Kayseri (Central Anatolia) to represent the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians of Anatolia who wished to remain both Orthodox and Turkish. Papa Eftim I was a renegade Orthodox priest who turned into a sort of anti-Greek Orthodox Christian Patriarch of Constantinople, in the service of the Turkish nationalists.⁹³ He and his Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate accused the Greek

⁹¹ The 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration with Turkey included a convention for the establishment of commerce and navigation between the two states and one for the settlement of unresolved issues related to the movable and immovable properties of Muslims and Greek Orthodox who had been exchanged in the 1923 forced Greco-Turkish population exchange. Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange*, 117–119.

⁹² Ifigeneia Anastasiadou, *O Venizelos*, 32; Minutes HP, 20 December 1930, 462–463. Konstantinos Tsoumis, "I Mousoulmaniki Meionotita," 216.

⁹³ Elçin Macar, "The Policies of Turkey."

Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople for being ethnically centered and favoring the Greek Orthodox and not the Turkish and other non-Greek Orthodox. Papa Eftim I made a series of unsuccessful attempts in 1923 and 1924 to occupy the premises of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and impose himself as the “general representative of all Orthodox communities,” while in 1924 he transferred the headquarters of the Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate from Kayseri to Istanbul. Despite promises from the Kemalist regime in Turkey, Papa Eftim I was never removed from office.

The purge of the 150 Ottoman dissidents marked a turning point in the policy of the Party of the Liberals that had helped the rise of Kemalism in Western Thrace and the gradual change in the nature of the Muslim minority from a religious minority to a Turkish national minority. The electoral machinations of the anti-Venizelist opposition in the mid-1930s further supported the rise of Kemalism. Religious conservatism in the region weakened on the ground, and the Kemalists gained supremacy in all aspects of Muslims’ everyday life. The internal power struggle over the “soul” of the Muslim community, however, continued until the 1960s. Following the expulsion of the 150 Ottoman dissidents, the conservative camp’s voice was the Association of Muslims in Greece, established in 1932 under the leadership of Hafiz Salih Mehmetoğlu. He was a key local ally of the Party of the Liberals and the 1933 Committee of Islamic Unity (*İttihat-i İslami Cemiyeti*), centered in Komotini, supported by the writings of Hafiz Ali Reşat, of Circassian descent, and by Hüsnü Yusuf in newspapers such as *Mudafa-i Islam* (Defense of Islam). The change in character of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace was such that on 28 January 1954 a memorandum from the local authorities in Western Thrace requested the replacement of the term “Muslim” with the term “Turkish” in Greek official documents issued by G. Fessopoulos, the general administrator of Western Thrace. The memo also requested the renaming of Muslim organizations, associations, and societies of the region.⁹⁴ These requests reflected a reality that was the outcome of a long political process of Turkification of the Muslims in Western Thrace, begun by Kemalists in the 1920s, that gained momentum in the 1930s with the encouragement of the Greek state authorities, who preferred to have the Pomaks and other non-Turkish Muslim groups adopt a Turkish national consciousness rather than be influenced by Bulgaria, a revisionist power in the Balkans and Greece’s main opponent in the region in the 1930s and 1940s.

⁹⁴ Symeon Soltaridis, *I Istoria ton Moufteion*, 208–210.

Albanian Nationalism

Like the Muslims in Western Thrace, during the interwar period the Çams in northwestern Greece also entered a phase of politicization of their group identity. However, unlike the Muslims in Western Thrace, the Çams were not engaged in an internal conflict between religious conservatives and Kemalists. Their politicization involved the defense of their political, religious, and cultural autonomy against the assimilationist policies of the Greek state. Greece rejected a 1926 official proposal from Albania for a compulsory population exchange between the Çams of Greece and the Greek Orthodox Christian population of southern Albania. Such a population exchange would terminate any Greek territorial ambitions toward Greek-inhabited territories in southern Albania that the Greeks called “North Epirus,” a name that betrayed the territorial aspirations Athens was nurturing in south Albania.⁹⁵ At the same time, Greece discouraged any policies that would promote the development of an Albanian national consciousness among the Çams and might transform them into an Albanian national minority in Greece. Such a process of transformation had begun during the interwar period, as a result of the political activities of Çams after the end of the 1920s, in which they were encouraged and supported by the Albanian state and Italy, which viewed Albania as its close political ally in the Balkans.⁹⁶

With the political support of Albania and, later, Italy, the Çams pressured the Greek authorities and international organizations such as the League of Nations to recognize their political, religious, and cultural autonomy. They wanted Greece to allow the operation of schools for the children of Çams in which the Albanian language could be taught. They demanded compensation for those Çams whose properties had been confiscated or abused by the Greek state. Greece had a host of reasons for the confiscations and abuses, among them the desire to provide accommodations for the Greek Orthodox Christians who had come to Greece under the compulsory population exchange and concerns over the increase of cultural contacts between the Çams and Albania. In 1927 and 1928 Çams from the Albanian-speaking Muslim communities of Gardiki, Dragoumi, Filiates, Parga, and other settlements in

⁹⁵ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, “*Oi Ethnikes Meionotites*,” 12–13.

⁹⁶ Italy signed with Albania the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1926 and the Treaty of Defense in 1927.

Epirus protested repeatedly to the League of Nations about their abuse by the Greek authorities and the suppression of their property rights. The Albanian government tried to reinforce these protests with diplomatic measures addressed to the secretary-general of the League of Nations and to European governments, especially those of Britain, France, and Italy.⁹⁷

On many occasions, the activists were Albanian-speaking Muslims who had lived in the regions of Epirus, Thessaly, and western Macedonia but had left for Albania soon after the annexation of these areas to Greece. In the meantime, they had become significant political figures capable of influencing the Albanian government to serve their interests. One such activist was Djafer Villa, the general secretary of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of the 1920s. Villa was personally interested in the issue of compensation of Albanian-speaking Muslim landowners who had lost their properties in areas under Greek control. He became the main instigator of an intense anti-Greece campaign in the Albanian press. He asserted the Albanian government had to take drastic measures against Greece, such as the closing of the Albanian Embassy in Athens and a reduction in the number of Greek Orthodox schools operating in Albanian territory.

These political activities succeeded in their aim of transforming the Çams into an Albanian national minority within Greece. The Greek government itself facilitated the transformation by frequently abusing its power and violating the Çams' political, religious, and cultural rights. The very character and nature of Çams communities also assisted in the process. They were poorly educated and, as Muslims, had not been integrated into the Greek population. They lived in isolation, were plagued with vendettas under their own unwritten laws, and usually looked to the provincial elders as their leaders, whom they obeyed. Life in their societies was governed by sharia. In addition, the terrible economic conditions and poor infrastructure of northwestern Greece, where they lived, and the inertia and inefficiency of the Greek administration created favorable conditions for the development and proliferation of political activities that alienated the Çams from Greek society. All of these problems together led them to look to Albania as the state that would defend their political, economic, religious, and cultural rights; that shared a similar culture and religion; and was where they, as a nationality, rightly belonged.

⁹⁷ Eleftheria Manta, *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides*, 52.

The Metaxas Dictatorship (1936–1941)

From 13 April 1936 to 29 January 1941, Greece was ruled by Ioannis Metaxas, a Greek military officer and politician who governed constitutionally for the first four months of his tenure and thereafter as the strongman of the authoritarian 4th of August Regime. With the support of the Greek king, George II, Metaxas suspended the Greek parliament on 4 August 1936 and went on to preside over a conservative, staunchly anticomunist government that took inspiration in its symbolism and rhetoric from Fascist Italy but retained close links to Britain and the French Third Republic rather than the Axis powers. After Nazi Germany's invasion in April 1941, Greece was occupied by the Axis powers, and the Greek government was forced into exile in the Middle East.

The 4th of August Regime attempted to achieve national homogeneity by launching a policy of terror and violence against ethnic and religious minorities aimed at their forcible assimilation into the national body. Greece was preparing for the upcoming World War II, and the regime believed that if it wanted to fight successfully, it needed a spirit of “national unity” and that this could be achieved through a policy of forced assimilation of the non-Greek, ethnic, and religious minority population. With time running out, policies of state terror and violence were considered to be much easier, faster, and more effective than the Venizelist policies of assimilation primarily through education and accommodation of minorities’ interests. A series of other political measures were part of Greece’s war preparations, such as fortifying Greece’s northern borders and making plans, ultimately never realized, to forcibly relocate ethnic and religious minorities.⁹⁸

At the core of Metaxas’s policy toward ethnic and religious minorities was the prohibition, enforced by the police, of any public display of their cultural differences. Thus, in 1936 the General Administration of Macedonia issued an order that forbade ethnic and religious minorities in the region to speak their own languages in public. Instead, all the people living in the region had to communicate in Greek. For those who could not comply because they did not know or were not fluent in Greek, the order established special night schools where they could attend Greek language classes. At the same

⁹⁸ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, “Oi Ethnikes Meionotites,” 35; Tasos Kostopoulos, *I Apagorevmeni Glossa*, 117.

time, the general administrator of Epirus believed that the Qu'ran should be taught to Çams in Greek.⁹⁹ One defense measure along Greece's northern borders was the creation of a military surveillance zone in Western Thrace to prevent any contact between Greek and Bulgarian Pomaks. Because Bulgaria nurtured territorial claims in northern Greece, it had established a close relationship, and later established an alliance, with Nazi Germany. It appeared that Greece and Bulgaria would end up in different military camps in World War II. Under the policy of terror and violence against ethnic and religious minorities, the Çams suffered more than the Muslims of Western Thrace because of Albania's alliance with Italy, which regarded the Çams as an Albanian minority in Greece. If the links between Albania and the Çams were not weakened through cultural assimilation of the Çams, and if the Axis forces were victorious in a world war, Athens might be forced to make political compromises concerning its claims for the Greek Orthodox Christian minority in south Albania. This could take the form of a compulsory population exchange between the Çams and the Greek Orthodox Christian minority or, worse, a cession to Albania of the territories of northwestern Greece inhabited by Çams.

In the case of Western Thrace, the Greco-Turkish rapprochement inaugurated by Venizelos with the 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration was still in force. In addition, Ankara declared its neutrality in case of a world war, which lessened the Greek authorities' concerns regarding the Muslims of Western Thrace. This is not to say that these Muslims did not suffer from discriminatory policies under the Metaxas regime; they did. For example, there were reports of arbitrary occupation of Muslim communal properties and aggressive behavior by the local authorities in Western Thrace.¹⁰⁰ Overall, however, these measures were not as systematic and organized as in the cases of the Çams and the Slav-speaking population of northern Greece, who were exposed to heavy-handed treatment. The Metaxas regime continued the tight control of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace that they had begun with King George II's November 1935 appointment of Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis as general governor of Thrace. He established the governmental Section of Political Affairs (Tmima Politikon Ypotheseon), which was placed under the auspices of the General Administration of Thrace during the Metaxas

⁹⁹ Lena Divani, *Ellada kai Meionotites*, 257.

¹⁰⁰ Konstantinos Andreades, *The Moslem Minority*, 31–32.

regime. Its tasks, among others, was to make recommendations concerning minority affairs, to supervise the implementation of minority protections, and to check foreign political influence and the activities of foreign agents and propaganda, mostly Bulgarian and Turkish, among the Muslim minority of Western Thrace.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Konstantinos Tsoumisis, “I Mousoulmaniki Meionotita,” 228–229, 237–245.

Conclusion

The Greek War of Independence is often regarded as a political movement that broke the political, economic, and social bonds with a ruling class and a system of government that most insurgents viewed as alien to contemporary liberal ideas. Greek insurgents and state elites strove to model a modern Greece, inspired by the political, economic, and social structures of non-Ottoman Europe. The national character and the economic and social dimensions of the Greek War of Independence are often overemphasized. Such emphasis downplays the fact that it was a liberal political movement, influenced by the liberal ideas of the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, and the European Enlightenment. In non-Ottoman Europe, liberal ideas and movements had confronted political systems of absolute monarchy and enlightened despotism, as well as the conservatism of the Christian establishment. For Greece, the rival powers were Islam and what Greeks of the time termed “the oriental absolutism of the Ottoman administration.” Any attempts by Ottoman sultans, such as Selim III (1761–1808) or Mahmud II (1808–1839), to reform and modernize the political system, the economy, and the military came too late and were not adequate for averting secessionist movements and centrifugal trends. These rulers’ reforms also failed to restore law and order or fight corruption, anarchy, and the arbitrary actions of armed gangs who ravaged the countryside.

Unlike the anticlerical sentiments and secular character of revolutionary movements like the French Revolution of 1789, Eastern Orthodox Christianity was not seen as a problem in the postrevolutionary world order the Greek insurgents sought to create. Islam on the other hand was the religion of the enemies of the Greek rebels, the Ottoman dynasty and its ruling class. As such, the Islamic faith became synonymous with the entire value system the insurgents held responsible for the maladies of the Ottoman rule and the political, economic, and social backwardness of the Ottoman state and society. Unlike Islam, Eastern Orthodox Christianity was seen as an ally of the revolutionary movement and a driving force of the faithful of the Rûm *millet*, the Eastern Orthodox Christian community that was under

the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. The newly established state of modern Greece and the Greek national identity were inextricably linked to the Eastern Orthodox Christian faith. Inverting the past power structure, Eastern Orthodox Christianity became the religious faith of the state's new ruling class: the dominant religion, protected by the constitution and the government of the new state.

The Greek War of Independence accelerated a process that had been in progress since the Modern Greek or Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment at the end of eighteenth century. During this period, members of the Rûm *millet*, Grecophone Christian Orthodox, primarily products of Greek education, started to self-identify and call other members of the Rûm *millet* Ellines (Hellenes) and to use less the attributive Romioi (Romans) or Graikoi (Greeks). The old theological objections abated. Hellenes and Hellenism were not connected so much with ancient Greece, ancient Greek education, and paganism but were increasingly connected with Orthodox Christianity. In the legal and other documents of the Greek War of Independence, such as the constitution, administrative memos, and letters of officials, as well as in the press and other publications of the time, the terms Hellenes and Hellenism were dominant and associated with Orthodox Christianity. At the same time, these concepts were transforming the ways of thinking of the wider public. Ordinary people began to identify with these ideas in the context of the new political and social environment, and they became familiar with Enlightenment concepts such as independence, sovereignty, liberty, and fraternity. The Greek War of Independence accomplished that process at a faster rate and with more sweeping effects than the earlier era of Modern Greek Enlightenment, whose influence was mainly restricted to educated circles of the Greek diaspora or of the Rûm *millet* in the Ottoman Empire.

This is exemplified in contemporaneous texts such as the *Memoirs* of Germanos III, the Christian Orthodox metropolitan bishop of Old Patras. Born Georgios Gotzias in Dimitsana in central Peloponnese in 1771, Germanos III studied in the famous school of his hometown and was connected to his compatriot the high-ranking prelate Grigorios, who would later become Patriarch Grigorios V of Constantinople. Germanos became a member of the Filiki Etaireia and played an important role in the Greek revolution of 1821.¹ In his *Memoirs*, believed to have been written in 1823, the

¹ Maria Efthymiou, "Oi Oroi Ellin."

terms Romios (Roman) and Graikos (Greek) are almost absent: the insurgents and the Christian Orthodox inhabitants of the rebellious areas are referred to as Hellenes, and terms such as *ethnos ton Ellinon* or *genos ton Ellinon* both describe the Rûm *millet*, according to the eighteenth-century European and American views of the nation. The areas in rebellion are referred to as Hellas. Anything relating to the insurgents and to the territories under their control is Hellenic, for example the Hellenic flag, the Hellenic army, and the Hellenic navy. The Muslims are often referred to as Turks, a term not always used to describe the Turkish-speaking Muslims; whereas the term Ottoman is mostly used to describe anything related to the Ottoman administration, for example the Ottoman Porte, Ottoman troops, and Ottoman tyranny. The *Memoirs* also refer to the redeeming role of the Christian Orthodox Church for Hellenism as follows: “The Hellenic nation, having succumbed to the barbaric . . . yoke of the Ottoman tyranny, was deprived of . . . its education. And the Hellenic language would have disappeared from the Nation, had not the [Christian Orthodox] Church saved it, and the Nation should be grateful [to the Church] . . . Around the eighteenth century the Hellenes began to arise and recall their ancestral Muses . . . Remembering their ancestral nobility, they sighed [under the Ottoman yoke].”²

Muslims were not necessarily seen as enemies in the new state. A great many Muslims were killed or fled to Ottoman-controlled lands during the Greek War of Independence, but a sizeable number remained in Greek territory and continued to practice the Islamic faith, or came to terms with the new reality and converted to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The status of the Muslims living in the newly established Kingdom of Hellas was mostly defined by their role during the Greek War of Independence. The war was a historical and political landmark that allowed the actors to capitalize on their wartime activities and use them as a “political mortgage” that determined their status and privileges in the postwar era. Many Muslims supported the Greek War of Independence for the same reasons that other Greek and non-Greek insurrectionists did. Some were driven to embrace the cause by insurgents with whom they forged social and other bonds at a local level. As is often the case with historical events, it is local conditions, including social, economic, and other relations, alliances, adversaries, and animosities, that determine the attitudes of individuals to these events, even when they occur on a large scale with impact that extends far beyond the village, town,

² Germanos III, *Apomnimonevmata*, 75.

or city. The attitudes of local actors and local conditions often influence the dynamics and the outcomes of regional and state historical events.

The liberal atmosphere of the time and the aspirations of the political class of modern Greece to create a modern European state that would be acceptable by the club of the Great Powers of Europe of the time are reflected in the liberal principles that transcend state legal documents such as constitutions, legal acts, and royal decrees. These documents address religious freedom and the rule of law, as well as equality before the law for all citizens of the newly established Greek state. The liberal character of these documents exemplified the intention of the new political class to break away from obsolete Ottoman structures and establish a new European polity modeled on the advanced industrialist nations of Europe. Despite these aspirations, however, the Greek War of Independence could not erase all of Greek society's ties with its Ottoman past. For example, just as in Ottoman society, religion continued to play an important role in people's identities, and had a close relationship with the state. The only difference was the switch in the status quo to Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the religion of the ruling class, making Muslims, or Muslim nationals, as they were known at the time, a religious minority.

Moreover, Muslim institutions and community affairs continued to run according to custom in the same way they had in the recent Ottoman past, as if they were on "autopilot." Up to the 1881 annexation of Thessaly, the Greek authorities felt that statutes that addressed liberal principles, such as the respect and protection of religious worship, were sufficient to protect the political, religious, and civic rights of Greece's Muslim citizens and provide them with a quality of life equal to that enjoyed by ethnic Greeks and all other citizens. In the first forty-nine years of the new state, no special corpus of laws has existed to regulate Muslim affairs, including the political structures and government of Muslim communities and the status of Muslims and their relationship with the new state. The Greek state justified the lack of such laws by citing the very small number—less than 3,000—of Muslim nationals in the newly established state, too small to offer Muslims any special treatment, particularly since they shared the same religious faith as the ruling class of Greece's prime enemy. In addition, the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the Greek War of Independence meant that it lacked negotiating power to enforce any special protection for its former Muslim subjects who remained in the land of the infidels.

The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 and the ensuing Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 had encouraged Orthodox Christian national movements

in Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria and Serbia), which, with Russian support, further disempowered the frail Ottoman Empire, known in European political and diplomatic circles of the time as the “Sick Man of Europe.” As in the Greek War of Independence, the new Orthodox Christian national movements instigated persecutions and atrocities against non-Christians, including Muslims and Jews in the territories they claimed. After lengthy diplomatic negotiations following the Great Eastern Crisis, the Greek state annexed Thessaly with its sizeable Muslim population. The Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers of Europe forced Greece to adopt a special corpus of laws that regulated the administration of the Muslim populations of Thessaly. Newly established Orthodox Christian nation-states, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, adopted similar laws regulating the administration of Muslim nationals in their territories.

These special corpuses of laws introduced the principle of collective rights for Muslims in Southeastern Europe and recognized the Muslim populations in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria as collective legal entities in their host states. These laws drew from the administration system of the non-Muslim *millets*, confessional communities of the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era (1839–1876) that had liberalized the way non-Muslim *millets* were ruled. The Ottoman Porte had increased the autonomy and self-governing powers of non-Muslim *millets* through a hierarchical system and organizational charters with general regulations that determined the power structures within *millets* as well as the way they were governed. This had systematized and formalized the regulation of confessional communities within the Ottoman Empire without compromising the self-governing aspects of the system.

After the annexation of Thessaly, Greece introduced an Ottoman governance model for the Muslims of the region under which the muftis’ role was not restricted to religious duties but extended to nonreligious community affairs. Muftis even assumed judicial authority and could judge family, inheritance, and property issues according to sharia. Lay Muslim community councils supported the muftis in their role. The Greek corpus of special laws served as the organizational charter for the administration of the Muslim population, as had the general regulations for non-Muslim *millets* during the Tanzimat era in the Ottoman Empire. After the annexation of Thessaly, sharia remained de jure in force as a parallel legal system to regulate the family, inheritance, and property affairs of the country’s Muslims, along with the Byzantine and Roman law of the *Hexabiblos* and local customary laws that provided the legal framework for property and civil relations in Greece.

Under this model of governance, muftis assumed powers that in Ottoman times had belonged to the *hakim* or *kadis* (judges). This model also applied to the Muslim populations of territories that would come under Greek sovereignty in the future and is still in force for the Muslim minority of Western Thrace at the time of this writing.

At the time, this appeared to be a promising system of minority governance that aimed to protect the religious freedom and rights of Muslims from state discriminatory policies and abuses of power as well as from acts of aggression and violence from non-Muslims. Today, it is an obsolete system that has often created problems, some of them hard to solve without new bilateral agreements between Greece and Turkey. On the one hand this system is still needed for protecting the religious freedoms of Greece's Muslim minority in line with their own cultural and traditional values. On the other hand this system is not always in conformity with standards of human rights at the EU and international levels, including the right to religious tolerance. The bottom line of international legal documents on human rights, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, is that all human beings are to be regarded and valued equally, regardless of gender, religion, or race. Sharia, however, provides special benefits to men and disfavors women in cases of family disputes, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. In divorce cases, for example, a man can simply divorce his wife without any judicial proceedings; that right is not extended to Muslim women. In cases of inheritance, sharia provides that daughters are entitled to only half the share received by sons, unlike the practice in the European Union, including Greece, where male and female children enjoy equal treatment when they inherit.

These provisions and practices of sharia stand in contradiction to Greek civil law and family law elsewhere in Europe but apply to the Muslims of Western Thrace, as provided by Greek-Ottoman treaties, most recently the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923. The muftis judge on the basis of sharia in cases pertinent to Muslim family law, inheritance, or property, and Greek courts ratify the decisions taken by the muftis. No change to this system of governance, including a possible abolition of sharia, will take place unless a new Greco-Turkish bilateral agreement changes the legal status of the Muslims of Western Thrace. Such a change would be a challenge, given the complex nature of Greco-Turkish relations since 1955 and especially since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In addition, like the system of governance for non-Muslim *millets* in the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era, the administration system for Muslims in Greece treats Muslim communities as a

homogenous religious group, overlooking religious and cultural differences within the Muslim communities. The system imposes a uniform administrative structure that employs muftis—scholars of the Sunni Islam ulama—and is indifferent to Sufism, which includes orders like the Bektaşı, influenced by Shia Islam. In the period following Greece's defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, a ruthless political conflict took place between supporters and opponents of the Kemalist reforms in the Republic of Turkey. Both groups were competing to control the Muslim minority's institutions, including the offices of muftis and the community councils, in order to use them to enforce their respective agendas among Muslims and influence the identity and character of the minority.

The Great Powers of Europe and the Ottoman Empire enforced this system of governance for Muslim populations in Greece and the other Eastern Orthodox Christian nations of the Balkans. Following the Greek War of Independence, the Ottoman state had been forced to introduce its Tanzimat reforms, including a more hierarchically structured system of governance for non-Muslim *millets* that engaged the laity more extensively. As with the non-Muslim *millets* in the Ottoman Empire, the diffusion of powers to the Muslim communities to rule their own community affairs was seen as a liberal and democratic form of minority governance. It would facilitate problem solving at the Muslim community level and minimize, if not eliminate, cases of arbitration and power abuse by state authorities, thus helping Muslims integrate into Greek society and discouraging any segregation or secessionist movements. In addition, this system of governance matched the historical experience and the practices of self-rule for religious groups in Ottoman times. As such, it was seen as a tested model, handy, and familiar to former subjects of the Ottoman Empire. It was believed that this system would be better accepted than any new system aligned with the precepts of the Great Powers of Europe, which would better suit their countries' needs.

The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 and the emergence of new Eastern Orthodox Christian national movements in the Balkans, mostly in Slavic-speaking populations, threatened the very existence of the Ottoman Empire and triggered atrocities against the Muslim populations in areas where these movements were active. Muslims fled to Ottoman-controlled lands in search of security and protection. In response to the territorial shrinking of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Christian nationalist movements, a number of counter-movements led by Muslims emerged that were inspired by the liberal ideas of the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

Some of these counter-movements, such as the Committee for Union and Progress, started out as political initiatives aimed at the democratization of the Ottoman Empire through the introduction of an Ottoman parliament. All subjects of the empire would be equal under the law and have representation under such a system, and would be able to check the powers of the sultan. These counter-movements often lobbied for the promotion of liberal reforms and appealed to Muslim and to non-Muslim subjects of the empire.

Other counter-movements, such as Pan-Islamism, called for sociopolitical solidarity among all the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. Although Pan-Islamism had existed as a religious concept since the early days of Islam, it emerged as a modern political ideology in the 1860s and 1870s when conservative Islamic scholars and religious activists saw dangers to the Ottoman Empire. One threat was the emergence and intense activism of various Christian national movements in the empire; another was European colonialism, which sought to promote the political and economic interests of the Great Powers of Europe in territories controlled by the Ottoman state and far beyond. Pan-Islamism proposed that the sultan be a universal caliph to whom Muslims everywhere owed allegiance and obedience. This could offset military and economic weaknesses in the Muslim world by favoring central government over the periphery and Muslims over non-Muslims for educational, official, and economic opportunities. Pan-Islamism became the favored state policy during the reign (1876–1909) of Sultan Abdülhamid II and was adopted and promoted by members of the ruling bureaucracy and the intellectual elites of the empire. It ultimately failed, and it collapsed after World War I and the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

National movements also arose that appealed to Muslims of certain ethnic groups or aimed to establish a certain ethnic identity and character among Muslim populations of the empire. Albanian nationalism, for example, dates to the period of the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878. It intensified with the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans following the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. It aimed to create a nation-state that would accommodate Albanian-speaking people in the Balkans regardless of their religious affiliation. Meanwhile, by the eve of World War I, the Committee for Union and Progress had evolved into a Turkish national movement. It appealed to Muslims of the empire, particularly Turkish-speaking Muslims, and aimed at the Turkification of the Ottoman Empire. It would become a state with a Turkish character and would progressively submit to Turkish

culture: Turkish would be the official language, and Turks would control the state administration.

However, these movements were of limited influence outside major urban centers such as Istanbul and Thessaloniki. Muslim rural populations were illiterate and deeply religious, and most of the Muslim elite had not experienced or been influenced by the European Enlightenment. In addition, Ottoman Turkish, *lisân-i Osmâni*, the official language of the Ottoman Empire, is different from modern Turkish. It mostly derived from Arabic and Persian, and was written in the Ottoman Turkish alphabet, a variant of the Persian-Arabic alphabet. Consequently, Ottoman Turkish was largely unintelligible to the less educated lower-class and rural Muslims, who continued to use vulgar Turkish, *kaba Türkçe*, which is the basis for modern Turkish. Moreover, the network of secular Muslim schools that taught vulgar Turkish or vulgar Albanian in the region was very limited, unlike the wide network of nonreligious Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian schools in Southeastern Europe that aimed to infuse Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian national consciousness into the Eastern Orthodox Christian populations of the region by teaching vulgar Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian. After 1912, the Balkans were mainly controlled by newly established Eastern Orthodox Christian nation-states that severely persecuted Turkish and Albanian nationalist activists and did their best to undermine the growth of Albanian and Turkish nationalisms in the region. These nationalist movements did not easily take root due to the religious and social conservatism of the Muslim populations, who were suspicious of liberal ideas such as equality before the law for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the limitation, or even questioning, of the absolute powers of the caliph, the Ottoman sultan. Most Muslims felt liberal ideas were alien to the cultural tradition of the Muslim world and the Ottoman Empire, having emerged and developed in the non-Muslim European world. At the same time, the ethnic character of Albanian and Turkish nationalism was often unpopular among Muslims of non-Albanian or non-Turkish ethnic origins.

Large numbers of Muslims fled from the territories annexed by the Greek and Eastern Orthodox Christian nation-states in the Balkans. In the long run, this reduced the size of the Muslim populations in these nation-states. Greece had no centrally conceived government plan to drive Muslims out of Greek territory. The abuse of power and arbitrage by state officials and Greek individuals at the local level was partly due to the inability or apathy of the Greek government in exercising control over the actions of local officials.

The Greek state administration was new and inexperienced, lacking both the traditions and the culture that would have allowed it to exercise its power effectively and cope easily with the integration of new territories into state sovereignty. The abusive acts were often caused by local antagonisms generated by certain state officials' and Greek individuals' exploitation, to their own benefit, of the change of sovereignty and the chaos it brought. For example, they could usurp Muslim properties at low or no cost, force Muslims out in revenge for ongoing personal and family disputes or simply out of religious fanaticism and bigotry. Many Muslims fled, insecure after the changes in state administration, cultural environments, and townscapes that appeared to suit Greek Orthodox Christian values and sensitivities. Some also embraced Islamic fanaticism, encouraged by Ottoman religious agents who visited the territories to urge Muslims to leave non-Islamic lands (*dar-ül harb*, abode of war) for territories where Muslims could practice their religion freely (*dar al-Islam*, abode of Islam), such as the Ottoman Empire.

From 1844 to 1923, Greek nationalism and the Megali Idea influenced Greek foreign policy, which aimed to create a Greek state that would encompass all areas historically inhabited by ethnic Greeks. In the twentieth century, the Megali Idea is often seen as static ideology reflecting the ethnonationalist tendencies of the interwar period and is identified with wars, violence, bigotry, religious and ethnic cleansing, and population expulsions, practices that emerged with nationalist movements. Greek nationalism, however, can also be seen as a young political movement that energized, those self-identified as Greeks or Hellenes offering vision and hope at a time when the Ottoman administration was in decline. Similarly, today Soviet communism appears to be viewed not through the historical conditions leading to its emergence in the early twentieth century but through the lens of the historical conditions that led to its collapse in 1991. Despite the military conflicts, atrocities, and violence that took place, Greek nationalism not only divided but also united people. It became the vehicle for the promotion of the liberal ideas of the European Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions, introducing ideas such as isonomy, political and religious tolerance, and the abolition of absolute monarchy and many other innovative principles.

The Megali Idea on the other hand aimed to unify, under Greek administration, all areas historically inhabited by ethnic Greeks in Southeastern Europe and Anatolia. Achieving the Megali Idea did not necessarily entail the expulsion of any nonethnic Greek populations from these lands. Venizelos and his Party of the Liberals, which dominated Greek politics in the early

twentieth century and pursued the Megali Idea, aspired to successfully integrate nonethnic Greek populations in territories ceded to Greece and were careful to be tolerant and respectful of any religious and ethnic differences in territories controlled by Greece. Venizelos and his party were afraid that otherwise Greece would not be in a position to make successful claims for new territories in the future that would bring Greece closer to fulfilling its Megali Idea goals. Anti-Venizelist governments, often supported by the majority of the sizeable Muslim vote, also respected this policy, and the Greek political class considered religious tolerance and the integration of Muslims into Greek society important for policymaking.

In continental Europe, the start of World War I brought to an end the belle époque, a period that began with the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 and was characterized by optimism, peace, economic prosperity, the height of the European colonial empires, and technological, scientific, and cultural innovations—as well as the beginnings of the later ethnic nationalism and economic protectionism of interwar Europe. For Greece, it was the 1922 defeat in the Asia Minor War that brought the Megali Idea to an end and inaugurated a period of political introversion as well as political and economic problems. Many of these problems were the outcome of Greece's perennial engagement in wars and of the first-ever forced population exchange, which created one of the largest humanitarian crises in human history. For decades, the Megali Idea had offered a national vision and a driving force for national politics, which collapsed under the debris of the Asia Minor defeat. This was the beginning of the policy of reciprocity, such that the policies of Albania and Turkey toward their Greek Orthodox Christian populations drove Greek policy toward the country's Muslims, even today. The policy of reciprocity had transformed the Muslim populations of Greece into a hostage minority group whose well-being depends on the attitudes of their “patron-states” in the region (i.e., Albania and Turkey) toward their own Greek Orthodox Christian minorities, as well as toward Greece. The policy of reciprocity developed gradually in the aftermath of the creation of modern Greece, but it was only after Greece's defeat in the Asia War in 1922 that this policy became formalized—in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne—and more systematized as a foreign policy practice.

Among the Muslim minority of Western Thrace, a political and religious conflict emerged between supporters of secular political reforms promoted by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who wished to see the Muslims of Western Thrace adopt similar reforms, and the opponents of these reforms, who

favored the use of a religion-oriented, *millet* type of system for the Muslim minority, as in Ottoman times. Opponents to Kemalist reforms also included senior Muslim religious figures of the Ottoman Empire, including the last sheikh-ul Islam of the empire, Mustafa Sabri, who had fled Turkey and sought political protection in Western Thrace in order to escape persecution, criminal conviction, and possibly execution by the Kemalist regime. Greece offered discreet support to these fugitives throughout the 1920s, but the Greco-Turkish rapprochement of the early 1930s, culminating with the 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, changed the context. Greece no longer opposed Kemalist reforms, and the senior Muslim religious officials who had sought protection in Western Thrace were forced to flee to the Middle East. The Muslims of Western Thrace were increasingly influenced by supporters of the Kemalist regime in Turkey. Greece's policy of favoring Kemalist reforms among the Muslim minority of Western Thrace continued through the interwar period, World War II, and the first postwar decade. It began to be revised only after the mid-1950s, when Greco-Turkish relations were deteriorating due to Greco-Turkish conflicts in Cyprus that followed the end of British rule of the island.

"Identities are constructed over time, and these identities are continually shaped by social and political processes," wrote Margaret Moore in her *Ethnics of Nationalism*.³ The status of Muslims in Greece has been inextricably linked with the project of Greek nation-building that began with the Greek War of Independence and continued until 1923. This project unsuccessfully attempted to match citizenship with ethnicity. Modern Greek national identity—the cultural elements that allowed one to call oneself Hellene—was defined primarily in terms of Christian Orthodoxy and secondarily by command of the Greek language. Greek nationals were mainly Christian Orthodox affiliates to the Autocephalous Church of Greece, founded in 1833, and the Rûm (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of Constantinople. Knowledge of the Greek language also defined Greek nationals but to a lesser extent. Religious faith played an important role in identifying Greek nationals: the main criterion for the 1923 forced population exchange between Greece and Turkey was religion. The "Greeks" of Turkey who were forced to move to their alleged national homeland in Greece were Orthodox Christian populations who were under the religious jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, regardless of their mother tongue.

³ Margaret Moore, *Ethnics of Nationalism*, 15.

By the same token, the “Turks” of Greece who were forcibly moved to their alleged national homeland in Turkey were the Muslims of Greece, regardless of whether their mother tongue was Turkish, Greek, Slavic, or any other language. The Greek authorities never considered Muslims to be Greek nationals (Hellenes). Muslims and Jews were often seen and treated by Greek authorities and people as second-class citizens. Greek state documents of the time refer to Muslims as “Ottomans,” “Muslims,” “Mohammedans,” or “Turks” (a term often used interchangeably with “Muslim”). With few exceptions, such as during the Second Balkan War and World War I, Muslim men did not serve in the Greek army. Muslims who became Greek citizens voted in general elections, and a number of them were elected members of the Greek parliament, while others became mayors. In parliament, Muslim MPs mostly promoted issues of interest to their Muslim communities and rarely showed active interest in debates on other issues. This attitude was welcomed by the Greek MPs and the Greek authorities who often negotiated ad hoc political deals on issues of interest to the Muslim MPs and the Muslim communities in exchange for the Greek MPs and the Greek government having their hands free to promote their own political agendas on issues the Muslim communities were indifferent to.

Muslim communities were organized in a patriarchal family structure, with economically or politically powerful individuals and families assuming roles as political patrons, influential in the political and social life of the community and mediating between the community and the state. On many occasions, Muslim community patrons bargained with state authorities for personal, family, or other advantages for their own benefit, showing little or no care for the rest of the Muslim community. Turkish and Albanian nationalism took shape in the early twentieth century but even then did not easily attract the majority of the Muslim population of Greece, whose identity had been defined through their Islamic faith. That religious identity, however, became overlaid by their Turkish or Albanian ethnic character following Greece’s defeat in the Asia Minor War, as the Muslims of Western Thrace increasingly interacted with the Republic of Turkey and the Muslim Çams of Epirus with Albania. Facilitating these shifts was the Greek state’s growing preoccupation with the country’s political instability; the immense task of accommodating, feeding, and integrating the approximately 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor following the 1923 forced population exchange; and Bulgaria’s foreign policy of territorial revisionism in the Balkans.

Greece is the first independent nation-state in Southeastern Europe founded on the principles of ethnonationalism, a form of nationalism wherein nation and nationality are defined by a shared heritage, which in the case of Greece included a common faith (Christianity, primarily Christian Orthodoxy), a common language (Greek), and a common ethnic ancestry, loosely defined as Hellenic and connected with Greek antiquity. In this respect, Greece is also a pioneer in experimenting with minority issues in the region. In the period under examination, the newly formed Greek society developed patterns of behavior and practices toward its minorities, its non-Greek nationals, which defined state policies and public attitudes toward Islam and Greece's Muslim populations for years to come. Greece's policies and public attitudes also influenced how the societies of other Christian nation-states established in the region were to approach Islam and their Muslim-minority populations.

Greek nation-building showed little interest in integrating Muslim populations into Greek society. The few governments that aspired to do so, such as those formed by Eleftherios Venizelos, failed in the end. The failure was mainly due to the very nature of ethnonationalism which by nature is exclusionary toward minorities. With regards to Greek nation-building, in particular, it emerged and developed counter to Islam, its political exponent in the region (i.e., the Ottoman Empire) and its faithful. The only exception up to an extent was the few Muslims who supported phases of the Greek nation-building project, such as Muslims who supported the Greek War of Independence. Furthermore, through the Megali Idea, Greek nation-building engaged Greece into a series of wars with the Ottoman Empire, the country's prime enemy, which did not allow feelings of hostility against Islam to subside. In addition, these wars kept disturbing the country's young and inexperienced state machinery as well as the ability of the Greek government to control Greece's local authorities and provided fertile ground to injustices and discriminatory policies against the country's minorities. The incorporation of aspects of sharia into Greece's civil and family law and the adoption of a special corpus of laws that aim to protect the religious freedoms and the cultural autonomy of the Muslim communities were insufficient to protect the members of these communities from discriminatory policies. As a result, the provisions of these special corpus of laws often became moot, and the country's Muslims, when they did not fall victim to discriminatory policies and abuse of power, were tolerated but not integrated into Greek society. Muslims' successful integration into Greek society required a different form

of nation-building project, more inclusive in nature; one in which Greek nationality was not defined by a shared heritage, but by birth in the country (Greece), as well as by political institutions and liberal principles to which all citizens of the country would pledge to uphold.

The Muslim community elites tried to cope with the exclusionary nature of Greek-nation building by seeking political support from the Ottoman Empire or shelter in ethnonationalist projects operating in the region defined by a shared heritage that was based on ethnicity, language, and included or was friendly to Islam, such as the Albanian and the Turkish nation-building projects. In this process, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Greece, illiterate and with little or no education, influenced by their community elites were to reassert their national loyalties and redefine their collective identities from primarily religious (Islamic) to ethnic or national ones (Albanian or Turkish). The Greek nation-building had a domino effect on the politics and societies of Southeastern Europe. It opened the Pandora's box to a chain of political and social developments and accelerated political and social processes that were simmering for some time in the region. The emergence of Greek nation-building redefined loyalties within the Rûm *millet*, other non-Hellenic national movements appeared, and an intensely conflictual environment was created that eventually led to the disintegration of the Rûm *millet* and to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Greek nation-building also led the country's Muslim communities to reassert their self and collective beings from religious communities in a multi-religious, multicultural imperial environment to state minorities whose identity were to be progressively defined more by ethnicity and nationalism and less by religion. In this process, the role of state tutelage seems pivotal. State institutions facilitate the nation-building process of collectivities who become both national majorities in nation-states (i.e., Hellenes in the case of Greece) and national minorities. The interaction between the Muslim communities with the state institutions and nation-building projects of neighboring to Greece nation-states (i.e., Albania and Turkey) seem paramount for the development of national movements amidst the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Çams, which eventually help redefine the "imaginary communities" of their members and helped reassert their political loyalties. This explains the fact that Albanian nationalism held grounds on the Çams who in the long run were to reassert themselves as an Albanian national minority, or that Turkish nationalism succeeded in transforming the Muslim minority of Western Thrace into a Turkish minority, with the tacit consent of the Greek authorities.

after the early 1930s, when Bulgaria was regarded as Greece's prime enemy and not the Ottoman Empire's heir, that is, Turkey, anymore. Like Greek nationalism, Bulgarian nationalism was primarily defined through the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and in opposition to Greek Orthodoxy, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople as well as the Orthodox Church of Greece, and to Islam, which explains why Bulgarian nationalism was not appealing to Slavic-speaking Muslims, including the Pomaks of Western Thrace. The latter eventually fell under the spell of Turkish nationalism. The same happened to the Roma of Western Thrace, who like other religious and ethnic collectives, such as the Jews, lacked an outside state patron and a state nation-building project to support their reassertion into a national minority collective on their own merits, which could seek to expand its influence by proselytizing non-Roma Muslim coreligionists in Western Thrace like Turkish nationalism via the Kemalists did.

References

Primary Sources

Archival Collections

- Diplomatic and Historical Archives Service of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DHAGMFA):
Archive of the General Administration of the Aegean Islands (AGAAI)
League of Nations (LoN)
Thessaloniki Government Archives (TGA)
- Foreign Office Archives, British National Archives (FO)
Gazette of Parliamentary Debates (GPD)
General Gazette of Greece (GGG)
Gennadius Library (GL):
 Ionas Dragoumis Archive (IDA)
 Souliotis Nikolaidis Archive (SNA)
 Stefanos Dragoumis Archive (SDA)
- General State Archives, Athens (GSA Athens):
 Archive of the Ministry of Religious and Public Educational Affairs (AMRPEA)
 Areios Pagos, Judgments 181/1890, 309/1892, 396/1893, 544/1904, 314/1914
 Athens Appeals Court, Judgment 733/1914
 Epirus Historical Archives (EHA):
 General Administration of Epirus Archive (GAEA)
- Historical Archives of Macedonia (HAM):
 General Administration of Macedonia Archive (GAMA)
- Ioannis Kapodistrias Archives (IKA):
 Archive of the General Secretariat, Ioannis Kapodistrias (AGSIK)
 Archive of the Ministry of Religion and Education (AMRE)
- Joined Committee for the Compromise between Greeks and Ottomans about Disputed Real Estate Properties (JCDREP)
- King Otto's Archives (KOA):
 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greco-Turkish Affairs, 1832–1859 (AMFA; GTA)
 Archives of the Secretariat of Religious Affairs and Public Education (ASRAPE)
- Prime Minister's Political Office Archives (PMPOA)
- Thessaloniki Government Archives (TGA)
- Vlachogiannis Collection (VC)
- Hellenic Literature and Historical Archive (HLHA):
 Dimitrios Gounaris Archive (DGA)
 Eleftherios Venizelos Archive (EVA)
- Historical Archives of Benaki Museum (HABM):
 Eleftherios Venizelos Archive (EVA)

Official Governmental Gazette (OGG)

T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı (BA)

Documents

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*. Washington, DC, 1914.

Center for Asia Minor Studies (Athens). *I exodos. Vol. 2. Testimonies from the Provinces of Central and Southern Asia Minor*. Athens, 1982.

Constitutions and Standing Orders:

Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados, 1822.

Nomos tis Epidavrou, 1823.

Politikon Syntagma tis Ellados, 1827.

Igemonikon Syntagma, 1832.

Syntagma tis Ellados, 1844.

Syntagma tis Ellados, 1864.

Daily Telegraph. *Les Atrocités des Coalises Balkaniques*. No. 1. Constantinople, 1913.

Efimeris ton Syzitiseon tis Voulis, 1862-1936.

Ethnikos Kyrix. *Ai Agorefseis tou Ellinikou Koinovouliou 1909–1956. Periodos B. Vol. 8. Athens: Ethnikos Kyrix, 1957.*

Ethnikos Kyrix. *Istoria tis Ellados: Ai Agorefseis tou Ellinikou Koinovouliou 1843–1909: Periodos 1B. Vol. 2. Athens: Ekdoseis Ethnikou Kyrikos, 1964.*

Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament (Minutes HP).

Protocols of Conferences Held in London Relative to the Affairs of Greece: Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 1832. London: Harrison & Son, 1832.

Newspapers

Aion

Akropolis

Arta

Astir tis Thessalias

Chronos (of Nafplio)

Echo tis Macedonias

Efimeris ton Athinon

Embros

Ethnikon Pnevma

Evoia

Evripos

Filos tou Nomou

Idi

Makedonia

Nea Alitheia

Nea Edessa

Nea Efimeris

Paliggenesia

Thessalia

Times (London)

Secondary Sources

- Aarbakke, Vemund. *Ethnic Rivalry and the Quest for Macedonia. 1870–1913*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2003.
- Aarbakke, Vemund. “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace.” 2 vols. PhD diss., University of Bergen, Norway, 2000.
- About, Edmond. *La Grèce Contemporaine*. Paris: L. Hachette et Cie, 1858.
- Adanır, Fikret. “The Formation of a ‘Muslim’ Nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Historiographic Discussion.” In Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*. Leiden: Brill, 2002, 267–304.
- Adiyake, Ayşe. *Islamic Community Brotherhood Administration in Greece: “Cemaat-I İslamiye” 1913–1998*. Ankara: National Committee for Strategic Research and Studies, 2002.
- Akçura, Yusuf. *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.
- Akgönül, Samim. “Les Nouveaux Turcs: Les Muhacirs de 1923 en Turquie.” *Balkanologie* 5, no. 1/2 (2001), 239–255.
- Akşin, Sina. *Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to the Present*. London: Hurst, 2007.
- Aktar, Ayhan. “To Proto Etos tis Ellinotourkikis Antallagis ton Plythismon: Septemvrios 1922–Septemvrios 1923.” In Kostantinos Tsitselikis, ed., *I Ellinotourkiki Antallagi ton Plythismon: Ptyches mias Ethnikis Sygkrousis*. Athens, 2006, 111–156.
- Aktsoglou, Iakovos. “The Emergence/Development of Social and Working Class Movement in the City of Thessaloniki (Working Associations and Labor Unions).” *Balkan Studies* 38, no. 2 (1997), 285–306.
- Alexandris, Alexis, ed. *To Archeion tou Ethnomartyros Smyrnis Chrysostomou opos Diesothi apo ton Mitropoliti Afstrias Chrysostomo Tsiter*. 3 vols. Athens: Morfotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis, 2000.
- Alexandris, Alexis, ed. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918–1974*. Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983.
- Alexandris, Alexis, Thanos Veremis, Panos Kazakos, Vangelis Koufoudakis, Christos Rozakis, and Giorgos Tsitsopoulos. *Oi Ellinotourkikes Scheseis, 1923–1987*. Athens: Gnosti, 1988.
- Allamani, Effi. “Gegonota, Energeies kai Apofaseis kata tous Teleftaious Mines prin tin Epanastasi.” In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 12. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975, 70–100.
- Allamani, Effi. “I Thessalia sta Teleftaia Peninta Chronia tis Tourkikis Kyriarchias (1832–1882): Mia Prospatheia Dierevnisis ton Politikon, Oikonomikon kai Koinonikon Domon.” In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 75–101.
- Allamani, Effi. “I Zoi kai i Drasi ton Ypodoulon Ellinon, 1833–81: Thessalia.” In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 13. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975, 394–408.
- Anagnostopoulou, Sia, Mikra. *Asia, 190s ai–1919: Oi Ellinorthodoxes Koinotites: Apo to Millet ton Romion sto Elliniko Ethnos*. Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1997.
- Anastasiadou, Ifigeneia. *O Venizelos kai to Ellinotourkiko Symfono Filias tou 1930*. Athens: Filippotis, 1982.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

- Andreades, Andreas. *Les Effets Économiques et Sociaux de la Guerre en Grèce: Histoire Économique et Sociale de la Guerre Mondiale (Série Grecque): Publications de la Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale*. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de la France, 1928.
- Andreades, Konstantinos. *The Moslem Minority in Western Thrace*. Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1956.
- Andriotis, Nikos. “Christianoi kai Mousoulmanoi stin Kriti 1821–1924: Enas Aionas Synechous Anametrisis Entos kai Ektos Pediou Machis.” *Mnimon* 26 (2004), 63–94.
- Andriotis, Nikos. “I Stasi tou Eleftheriou Venizelou apenanti stous Mousoulmanous epi Kritikis Politeias.” In *Proceedings of the Symposium Eneninta Chronia apo tin Enosi tis Kritis me tin Eleftheri Ellada*. Rethymno, Greece: Istoriki kai Laografiki Etaireia Rethymnon-Ethniko Idryma Erevnon, 2007, 151–161.
- Andriotis, Nikos, and Tanju Izbek. “Mide Tourkoi Tourkoi Mide Ellines Ellines Ypikooi Eimaste: Oi Mousoulmanoi tis Kritis 1898–1939: Apo tin Kriti stin Tourkia.” In *Pepragmena 9ou Diethnous Kritologikou Synedriou*. Irakleio, Greece: Etaireia Kritikon Istorikon Meleton, 2004, 335–349.
- Anscombe, Frederick. “Albanians and ‘Mountain Bandits.’” In Frederick Anscombe, ed., *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750–1830*. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2006, 87–114.
- Anscombe, Frederick. “The Balkan Revolutionary Age.” *Journal of Modern History* 84, no. 3 (2012), 572–606.
- Anscombe, Frederick. “Continuities in Ottoman Centre-Periphery Relations, 1787–1915.” In Andrew Peacock, ed., *Frontiers of the Ottoman State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 235–252.
- Anscombe, Frederick. *State, Faith and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Antonopoulos, Stamatis. *Ai Synthikai Londinou, Voukourestiou kai Athinon*. Athens: Typois “Avgis Athinon,” 1917.
- Apostolides Evangelinos, Sophocles. *A Romaic Grammar*. Hartford, CT: H. Huntington, 1842.
- Arai, Masami. *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
- Armstrong, Harold Courtenay. *The Grey Wolf: Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator*. London: Arthur Barker, 1932.
- Arseniou, Lazaros. *I Thessalia stin Tourkokratia, 1393–1881: Istoriki kai Ethnologiki Prosegisi*. Athens: Epikairotita, 1984.
- Asdrachas, Spyros. *Istorika Apeikasmata*. Athens: Themelio, 1995.
- Babacan, Hasan. *Mehmed Talât Paşa, 1874–1921*. Ankara: Altinpost Yayınları, 2012.
- Baedeker, Karl. *Greece: Handbook for Travellers*. Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1889.
- Baer, Marc David. *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquests in Ottoman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Bakalov, Georgi. *Istoriya na Búlgarite: Kúsno Srednovekovie i Búzpayhdane*. 2 vols. Sofia: Trud, 2004.
- Balivet, Michel. “Aux Origines de l’Islamisation des Balkans Ottomans.” *Revue des Mondes Musulmanes et de la Méditerranée* 66, no. 4 (1992), 11–20.
- Balta, Evangelia. “I Othomaniki Martyria gia tin Epanastatimeni Karysto.” *Archeio Evoikon Meleton* 35 (2003–4), 189–200.
- Baltsiotis, Lambros. *O Exthros Entos ton Teichon: I Mousoulmaniki Koinotita tis Chalkidas (1833–1881)*. Athens: Vivliorama, 2017.

- Baltsiotis, Lambros. "The Muslim Chams of Northwestern Greece: The Grounds for the Expulsion of a 'Non-Exist' Minority Community." *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 12 (2011). <https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4444>. Accessed on 15 April 2021.
- Bamberger-Stemmann, Sabine. *Der Europäische Nationalitäten Kongress 1925 bis 1938: Nationale Minderheiten Zwischen Lobbyisten und Grossmachtinteressen*. Marburg: Herder Institut, 2000.
- Bantekas, Ilias. "Land Rights in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman State Succession Treaties." *European Journal of International Law* 26, no. 2 (2015), 375–388.
- Barjaba, Kosta, and Russel King. "Introducing and Theorizing Albanian Migration." In Russel King, Nicola Mai, and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, eds., *The New Albanian Migration*. Eastbourne, Sussex, UK: Academic Press, 2005, 1–28.
- Bass, Paul. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991.
- Batalden, Stephen. *Catherine II's Greek Prelate: Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771–1806*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1982.
- Baumgart, Winfried. *The Crimean War, 1853–1856*. London: Arnold, 2002.
- Bayülken, Ümit Halük. "Turkish Minorities in Greece." *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 4 (1963), 145–164.
- Bekiaris, Georgios. *Oi Mouftides Os Thriskeftikoi Igetai ton Mousoulmanon tis Periferias Ton kai Os Dimotikai Archai*. Athens: n.p., 1973.
- Belin, François. *Étude sur la Propriété Foncière en Pays Musulman et Spécialment en Turquie*. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1862.
- Benaroya, Abraham. "A Note on 'The Socialist Federation of Saloniki?'" *Jewish Social Studies* 11, no. 1 (Janaury 1949), 69–72.
- Benend, Ivan Tibor. *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.
- Beshevliev, Veselin, Nikolaï Todorov, and Tatiana E. Kirkova, eds., *D-r Nikola S. Pikkolo: Izследvaniia i Novi Materiali, Izdadeni po Sluchai Sto Godini ot Smurta Mu (1865–1965)*. Sofia: BAN, 1968.
- Billing, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1995.
- Biondich, Mark. *The Balkans: Revolution, War and Political Violence since 1878*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Birge, John. *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*. London: Luzac, 1937.
- Biris, Kostas. *Ta Prota Schedia ton Athinon: Istoria kai Analysis Ton*. Athens: n.p., 1933.
- Blaquière, Eduard. *The Greek Revolution: Its Origin and Progress Together with Some Remarks on the Religion, National Character, &c. in Greece*. London: Whittaker, 1824.
- Blommaert, Jan, and Jef Verschuren. "The Role of Language in European Nationalist Ideologies." In Bambi B. Schieffelin, Kathryn A. Woodlard, and Paul V. Kroslkrity, eds., *Language, Ideologies: Practice and Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 189–210.
- Booras, Harris. *Hellenic Independence and America's Contribution to the Cause*. Rutland, VT: Tuttle, 1934.
- Bouchon, Alexander Jean. *Voyage dans l'Eubée, les îles Ioniennes et les Cyclades en 1841*. Paris: Émile-Paul, 1911.
- Bowering, Gerhard, Patricia Crone, Wadad Kadi, Devin J. Stewart, and Muhammad Quasim Zaman, eds. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

- Braude, Benjamin. "Foundation Myths of the Millet System." In Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982, 69–90.
- Breuilly, John. "Approaches to Nationalism." In Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., *Mapping the Nation*. London: Verso, 1996, 146–174.
- Brewer, David. *The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman Oppression*. London: Duckworth and Overlook, 2011.
- Bronzetti, Carl Joseph. *Erinnerung an Griechenland aus den Jahren 1832–1835*. Würzburg: Stahel'schen Buchhandlung, 1842.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Cadirci, Musa. *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.
- Calloway, Colin. *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Camariano-Cioran, Ariadna. *Les Académies Princières de Bucharest et de Jassy et leurs Professeurs*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1974.
- Castellan, Georges. "Les Balkans et la Grèce au le Demain du Traité de Berlin, 13 juillet 1878." In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Volos, 27–30 September 1981; reprint, Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 113–124.
- Castellan, Georges. *Histoire des Balkans (XVe–XXe Siècle)*. Paris: Fayard, 1991.
- Çelik, Zeynep. *The Remaking of Istanbul*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Center for Asia Minor Studies. *I Exodos*. Vol. 1. *Martyries apo tis Eparchies ton Dytikon Paralion tis Mikrasias*. Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1980.
- Chamoudopoulos, Antonios. *I Neoera Filiki Etaireia: Ion Dragoumis, Ath. Souliotis-Nikolaidis, G. Bousios: Agnostai Selides tis Ethnikis Mas Istorias*. Athens: Tsailas, 1946.
- Chasiotis, Ioannis. "Anazitontas Esoterikes kai Exoterikes Martyries gia ton Ethniko Prosdiplomato ton Ellinon Kata tin Proimi Tourkokratia." In Olga Katsiardi-Hering, Anastasia Papadia-Lala, Katerina Nikolaou, and Vangelis Karamanolakis, eds., *Ellin, Romios, Graikos: Sylogikoi Prosdiplomoi kai Taftotites*, Athens: Evrasia, 2018, 299–316.
- Chenavard, Antoine-Marie. *Voyage en Grèce et dans le Levant Fait en 1843 et 1844*. Lyon: L. Perrin, 1867.
- Christides, Vassilios. "The Raids of the Moslems of Crete in the Aegean Sea Piracy and Conquest." *Byzantion* 51, no. 1 (1981), 76–111.
- Christmas, Walter. *King George of Greece*, New York: McBride, Nast & Co, 1914.
- Christopoulos, Charalambos, Stefanos Euclides, and Theodoros Deligiannis. *Efimeris tou Ypourgeiou ton Esoterikon: Itoi Syllagi kata Chronologikin Taxin kai kath' Ylin ton Dotheison Exigiseon epi Zitimaton Anafyenton kata tin Efarmogin ton eis tin Armodiotita tou Ypourgeiou ton Esoterikon Anagomenon Nomon*. 2 vols. Athens: Ioannis Aggelopoulos, 1853.
- Clayer, Natalie. *Mystiques, État et Société: Les Halvetis dans l'Aire Balkanique de la Fin du XVe Siècle à Nos Jours*. Leiden: Brill, 1994.
- Clark, Bruce. *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*. London: Granta, 2006.

- Clogg, Richard. "Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence." In Richard Clogg, ed., *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1973, 1–40.
- Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Clogg, Richard. "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire." In Benjamin Braude, ed., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014.
- Clogg, Richard, ed. *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770–1821: A Collection of Documents*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976.
- Conversi, Daniele. "Homogenization, Nationalism and the War: Should We Still Read Ernest Gellner?" *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 3 (July 2007), 371–394.
- Crawley, Charles William. *The Question of Greek Independence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931.
- Dagkas, Alexandros. *Symvoli stin Erevna gia tin Oikonomiki kai Koinoniki Exelixi tis Thessalonikis: Oikonomiki Domi kai Koinonikos Katamerismos Ergasias 1912–1940*. Thessaloniki: Epaggelmatiko Epimelitirio Thessalonikis, 1998.
- Dakin, Douglas. *The Greek Struggle for Independence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
- Dakin, Douglas. *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966.
- Dalègre, Joëlle. "Les Musulmans Turcophones de Grèce." *Cahiers Balkaniques* 25 (1997), 157–163.
- Daskalov, Rumen. *The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival*. Budapest: Central European University, 2004.
- Davison, Roderic. "The Ottoman-Greek Frontier Question, 1876–1882, from Ottoman Records." In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 185–204.
- Davison, Roderic. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*. New York: Gordian Press, 1973.
- D'Espérey, Franchet. "Les Musulmans en Thessalie." *Revue du Monde Musulman* 13 (1911), 87–94.
- Deguilhem, Randi. *Les Waqf dans l'Espace Islamique: Outil de Pouvoir Socio-Politique*. Damas: Institut Arabes de Damas, 1995.
- Deligiannis, Theodoros, and Angelos Ioannis Zinopoulos. *Elliniki Nomothesia apo tou 1833 mexri tou 1869*. 7 vols. Athens: Ioannis Aggelopoulos, 1860–1876.
- Despotopoulos, Alexandros. "Teliki Rythmisi tou Ellinikou Zitimatos." In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 12. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975, 575–577.
- Diamantourou, Ioanna. "Explosi tis Epanastaseos Kata ton Aprilio kai ton Maio: Epektasi kai Entasi ton Pollemikon Sygrouseon." In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 12. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975, 100–101, 110.
- Dimaras, Konstantinos Thiseos. *La Grèce au Temps des Lumières*. Geneva: Droz, 1969.
- Dimaras, Konstantinos Thiseos. *Neοellinikos Diaforismos*. Athens: Ermis, 1985.
- Divani, Lena. *Ellada kai Meionotites: To Systima tis Diethnous Prostasias tis Koinonias ton Ethnon*. Athens: Nefeli, 1995.

- Doukas, Neofytos. *Logoi ton Attikon Ritoron: Dimosthenis*. Vol. 1. Vienna: Johann Bartholomäus Svecck, 1812.
- Doxiadis, Apostolos. "Apeleftherosi-Ypoudoulosis Thrakis: Metanastefsis kai Egatastasis Thrakiki, 1920–27." *Thrakika* 1 (1928), 53–69.
- Doxiadis, Evdoxios. *State, Nationalism and the Jewish Communities of Modern Greece*. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.
- Drace-Francis, Alex. *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture: Literacy and the Development of National Identity*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.
- Dwight, Harrison Griswold. *Constantinople Old and New*. New York: Scribner's, 1915.
- Eddy, Charles B. *Greece and the Greek Refugees*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1931.
- Efthymiou, Maria. "Oi Oroi Ellin, Graikos, Romios sta Apomnimonevma tou Palaion Patron Germanou: I Martyria Enos Orimou Politikou." In Olga Katsiardi-Hering, Anastasia Papadia-Lala, Katerina Nikolaou, Vangelis Karamanolakis, eds., *Ellin, Romios, Graikos: Sylllogikoi Prosdiorismoi kai Taftotites*. Athens: Evrasia, 2018, 531–539.
- Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur. "The Origins of the 1897 Ottoman-Greek War: A Diplomatic History." MA thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2006.
- Ekmečić, Milorad. *Stvaranje Jugoslavije, 1790–1818*. 2 vols. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1989.
- El-Cheikh, Nadia Maria. *Byzantium Viewed by the Arabs*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- El-Cheikh, Nadia Maria. "Rûm." In C. E. Bosworth, E. Van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs, and G. Lecompte, eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, 1995, 601.
- Eleftheriadis, Nikolaos. *Gnomodotiseis peri Ktimatikon Zitimatton kai Diaforon en tais Nees Chores*. Athens: Raftanis, 1915.
- Eleftheriadis, Nikolaos. *Oi Mousoulmanoi en Elladi*. Athens: P. A. Petrakos, 1913.
- Ersanlı, Büşra. "The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal Decline." In Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*. Leiden: Brill, 2002, 115–154.
- Eryilmaz, Bilâl. *Osmânlı Devletinde Gayrimüslim Tebaanın Yönetimi*. Istanbul: Risale, 1996.
- Farantos, Charalambos. "O Nomarchis Evoias Georgios Zacharias Ainian kai to 'Imerologio tis kata tin Eparchian Karystantian kata ton Iounion Mina tou 1835 Etous Periodias mou.'" *Archeio Evoikon Meleton* 37 (2007), 101–126.
- Farah, Ceasar E. *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861*. London: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2000.
- Featherstone, Kevin, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis, and Georgios Niarchos. *The Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940–49*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Feroz, Ahmad. *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: OneWorld, 2003.
- Feroz, Ahmad. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1969.
- Filaretos, Georgios, and Adamantios Koraes. *Simeioseis eis to Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados tou 1822 Etous*. Athens: Themistocles P. Volidis, 1933.
- Filippidis, Daniil, and Grigoris Konstantas. *Geografia Neoteriki*. Edited by Aikaterini Koumarianou. Athens: Estia, 1988.
- Finlay, George. *History of the Greek Revolution*. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861.
- Finlay, George, and Henry Fanshawe Tozer. *A History of Greece from Its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864*. 7 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877.

- Fleming, Katherine E. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Fleming, Katherine E. "Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography." *American Historical Review* 105, no. 4 (2000), 1218–1233.
- Florescu, Radu. "The Impact of 1878 on Romania." In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Volos, 27–30 September 1981; reprint, Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 245–256.
- Fortna, Benjamin. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Fournarakis, Konstantinos. *Tourkokrites*. Chania, Greece: Giannakoudaki, 1929.
- Fousaras, Georgios I. "I Metepanastatiki Chalkida sta Anekdata Apomnimonevmata tou Georgiou Psylla." *Archeio Evoikon Meleton* 8 (1961), 122–151.
- Frary, Lucien, and Mara Kozelsky, eds., *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014.
- Freedman, Victor. "The Balkan Languages and Balkan Linguistics." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40, no. 1 (2011), 275–294.
- Gallant, Thomas. *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: The Long Nineteenth Century*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.
- Gaunt, David. *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006.
- Gazi, Effi. "Symvolikos Logos kai Politiki Praktiki kata tin Periodo tou Polemou tou 1897: Sygklesi, Apoklisi, Sygkrousi." In *O Polemos tou 1897: Diimero Sunedrio me tin Efkarria ton 100 Chronon (4 kai 5 Dekemvriou 1997)*. Athens: Etaireia Spoudon Neoellinikou Politismou kai Genikis Paideias, 105–115.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.
- Georgiadis, Nikolaos. *Thessalia*. Athens: Ermis, 1880.
- Georgeon, François. "Selanik Musulmane et Deunmè." In Gilles Veinstein, ed., *Salonique 1850–1918: La "Ville des Juifs" et le Réveil des Balkans*. Paris: Autrement, 1992, 105–118.
- Georgoulis, Stamatis. *O Thesmos tou Moufti stin Elliniki kai Allodapi Ennomi Taxi*. Athens: Sakkoulas, 1990.
- Germanos III, Metropolitan (Bishop) of Old Patras. *Apomnimonevmata: Epigrafomena Apomnimonevmata Tina tis kata tou Tyrannou ton Ellinon Oploforiai kai Tinon Polikon Symvevikoton en Peloponniso kata tin Protin tis Dioikiseos Periodou*. 2nd ed. Athens: Dimitrios Kambouroglou, 1900.
- Gianoulopoulos, Giannis. "I Egenis Mas Tyflosis . . .": *Exoteriki Politiki kai "Ethnika Themata" apo tin Itta tou 1897 Eos ti Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi*. Athens: Vivliorama, 1999.
- Gladstone, William Ewart. *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*. London: John Murray, 1876.
- Glavinas, Giannis. "I Eklogiki Symerifora ton Mousoulmanon tou Nomou Kozanis tin Periodo 1915–1923." In *Proceedings of the 26th Panhellenic Historical Conference*. Thessaloniki: Hellenic Historical Society, 2006, 301–320.
- Glavinas, Giannis. *Oi Mousoulmanikoi Plythismoi stin Ellada (1912–1923): Apo tin Ensomatosi stin Antallagi*. Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Stamouli, 2013.

- Gordon, Thomas. *History of the Greek Revolution: And of the Wars and Campaigns Arising from the Struggles of the Greek Patriots in Emancipating their Country from the Turkish Yoke*. 2 vols. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1844.
- Gorski, Philip. "The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism." *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 5 (2000), 1428–1468.
- Gouglaki-Ziozia, Evangelia. "Oi Othomanoi tis Ventistas (Amarantou) Kalabakas kai to Chroniko tou Kouvara." *Trikalina* 16 (1996), 133–142.
- Gounaris, Vasilis. "National Claims, Conflicts and Developments in Macedonia, 1870–1912." In Ioannis Koliopoulos, ed., *The History of Macedonia*. Thessaloniki: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle Foundation, 2007, 183–213.
- Gounaris, Vasilis. "Doing Business in Macedonia: Greek Problems in British Perspective (1912–1921)." *European Review of History* 5, no. 2 (1998), 169–180.
- Gos, François. *L'Agriculture en Thessalie: Petite Étude d'Économie Rurale et d'Agriculture Compare*. Paris: Éditions G. Masson, 1884.
- Green, Philip James. *Sketches of the War in Greece*. London: T. Hurst, 1827.
- Gritsopoulos, Tasos. *Ta Orlofika: I en Peloponniso Epanastasis tou 1770 kai ta Epakoloutha Aftis*. Athens: n.p., 1967.
- Halaçoğlu, Ahmet. *Balkan Harbi Sirasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçler*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995.
- Hallaq, Wael. *An Introduction to Islamic Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Hardie-Hasluck, Margaret. "Christian Survivals among Certain Moslem Subjects of Greece." *Contemporary Review*, no. 698 (February 1924), 225–232.
- Hasluck, Frederick. *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*. 2 vols. New York: Octagon Books, 1973.
- Hastaoglou, Wilma. *Volos: To Portraito Mias Poleos apo to 19o Aiona Eos Simera*. Volos: Ekdoseis Volos, 2007.
- Hering, Gunnar. *Die Politische Parteien in Griechenland: 1821–1936*. 2 vols. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992.
- Hiden, John. *Defender of Minorities: Paul Schiemann, 1876–1944*. London: Hurst, 2004.
- Hirschon, Renee, ed. *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2003.
- Hirschon, Renee. *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus*. New York: Berghahn Books, 1998.
- Hitchins, Keith. *A Concise History of Romania*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." In Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1–14.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914." In Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 263–308.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Hoffman, Philip. *Cholera in the Near East*. Santa Barbara, CA: Hoffman Philip, 1947.
- Höpken, Wolfgang. "Flucht Vor dem Kreuz? Muslimische Emigration Aus Südosteuropa nach dem Ende der Osmanischen Herrschaft (19./20. Jahrhundert)." *Zwangsmigrationen in Mittel- und Südosteuropa Comparativ* 6, no. 1 (1996), 1–24.

- Höpken, Wolfgang. "From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilization: The Turks of Bulgaria before, during and after Communism." In Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds., *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*. New York: New York University Press, 1997, 54–81.
- Horowitz, Richard. "International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of World History* 15 (2004), 445–486.
- Hroch, Miroslav. "National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective." In Sukumar Periwal, ed., *Notions of Nationalism*. Budapest: Central European University, 1995, 65–82.
- Hroch, Miroslav. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- İgsiz, Aslı. "Documenting the Past and Publicizing Personal Stories: Sensescapes and the 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange in Contemporary Turkey." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26 (2008), 451–487.
- Immig, Nicole. "The 'New' Muslim Minorities in Greece: Between Emigration and Political Participation, 1881–1886." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2009), 511–522.
- Immig, Nicole. *Zwischen Partizipation und Emigration: Muslime in Griechenland 1878–1897*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015.
- Inalcık, Halil. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Ioannidis, Nikolaos. *Evretirion its Ellinikis Nomologias*. Athens: I. Kassandrefis kai Sia, 1867.
- Jackson, Jennifer. *National Minorities and the European Nation-States System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Jowett, Philip. *Armies of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913: The Priming Change for the Great War*. London: Bloomsbury, 2012.
- Kahl, Thede. "The Islamization of the Meglen Vlachs (Megleno-Romanians): The Village of Nânti (Notia) and the Nântinets in Present-Day Turkey." *Nationalities Papers* 34, no. 1 (March 2006), 71–90.
- Kairofylas, Giannis. *IAthina kai oi Athinatoi 1834–1934*. 2 vols. Athens: L. Skourias, 1978.
- Kalayoğlu, Sinan. "The Greek Muslim Migration: Rethinking the Role of Security and Nationalism within the 1923 Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey" MA thesis, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2004.
- Kaldis, William Peter. "Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey and Aegean Islands 1912–1914." *Journal of Modern History* 52, no. 2 (1979), 119–146.
- Kalicić, Maria, Asparuh Velkov, and Egveni Radushev, eds. *Osmansi Izvori za Islamizasionite Protsesi na Balkanite (XVIIe–XIXe s)*. Sofia: BAN, 1990.
- Karakasidou, Anastasia. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Karathanassis, Athanasios. "Le Rôle Culturel des Grecs dans les Pays Roumains." In Paschalides Kitromilides and Anna Tabaki, eds., *Relations Gréco-Roumaines*. Athens: Institut de Recherches Néohelléniques, 2004, 251–257.

- Karkavitsas, Andreas. *O Tekes ton Bektasidon*. Athens: Gavriilidis, 2005.
- Karpat, Kemal. "The Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire." In William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 69–90.
- Karpat, Kemal. *Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Kasaba, Reşat, ed. *The Cambridge History of Turkey*. Vol. 4. *Turkey and the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Katartzis, Dimitrios. *Ta Evriskomena*. Edited by Konstantinos Thiseos Dimaras. Athens: Ermis, 1970.
- Katsikas, Stefanos. "To Metaothomaniko Islam mesa sto Elliniko Ethniko Kratos: Nomiki Antimetopisi ton Mousoulmanikon Plythismon tis Ipeirothessalias, 1881–1912." 3 vols. BA thesis, Ionian University, Corfu, 1998.
- Katsikas, Stefanos. "Millet Legacies in a National Environment: Political Elites and Muslim Communities in Greece (1830s–1923)." In Benjamin C. Fortna, Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis, and Paraskevas Konortas, eds., *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830–1945*. London: Routledge, 2013, 47–70.
- Katsikas, Stefanos. "Millets in Nation-States: The Case of Greek and Bulgarian Muslims, 1912–1923." *Nationalities Papers* 37, no. 2 (2009), 177–201.
- Katsikas, Stefanos. "Muslim Minorities in an Orthodox World: A Comparative Study of the Greek and Bulgarian Policies towards the Muslim Communities in Macedonia (1912–1923)." MA thesis, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 1999.
- Katsikas, Stefanos, and Anna Krinaki. "Reflections on an 'Ignominious Defeat': Reappraising the Effects of the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 on Greek Politics." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 38, no. 1 (May 2020), 109–130.
- Kellas, James G. *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*. London: Macmillan, 1991.
- Keyder, Çağlar. "A History and Geography of Turkish Nationalism." In Birtek Faruk and Thalia Dragonas, eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*. London: Routledge, 2005, 3–17.
- Kiel, Machiel. "Das Türkische Thessalien: Etabliertes Geschichtsbild versus Osmanische Quellen." In Reinhard Lauer and Peter Schreiner, eds., *Die Kultur Griechenlands im Mittelalter und der Neuzeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996, 162–185.
- King, Charles. *The Black Sea: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Kishwar, Madhu. *Religion at the Service of Nationalism and Other Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Kitromilides, Paschalidis. *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
- Kitromilides, Paschalidis. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe*. Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1994.
- Kitromilides, Paschalidis. "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans." In Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis, eds., *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*. Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990, 23–66.
- Kitromilides, Paschalidis. *Neoellinikos Diafotismos: Oi Politikes kai Koinonikes Idees*. Athens: MIET, 1996.
- Kitromilides, Paschalidis. "Orthodox Culture and Collective Identity in the Ottoman Balkans during the Eighteenth Century." *Oriente Moderno* 18 (1999), 131–145.

- Kliafa, Maroula. *Trikala: Apo ton Seifoullach os ton Tsitsani*. 2 vols. Athens: Kedros, 1996.
- Knight, Charles. *Geography: The English Cyclopaedia*. London: Bradbury, Evans & Co., 1867.
- Kofos, Evangelos. "I Eisvoli tou Ellinikou Stratou sti Thessalia." In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 13. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975, 330–333.
- Köker, Tolga, and Leylâ Keskiner. "Lessons in Refugeehood: The Experience of Forced Migrants in Turkey." In Renee Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*. Oxford: Berghahn, 2003.
- Kokolakis, Michalis. "Ellines Ethnikistes kai Tourkoi Alevides." *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon* 15 (2008), 373–435.
- Koliopoulos, John. *Brigands without a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821–1912*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- Kolodny, Emily. "Des Musulmans dans Une Île Grecque: Les Turcocretois." *Mediterranean World* 14 (1995), 1–10.
- Kolodny, Emily. *La Population des Îles de la Grèce: Essai de Géographie Insulaire en Méditerranée Orientale*. 3 vols. Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1974.
- Kolodny, Emily, and Régis Darques. "Turcs, Grecs et Réfugiés dans l'Île de Lesbos au XXe Siècle." *Méditerranée* 3, no. 4 (2004), 65–74.
- Kolokotronis, Theodoros. *Diigisis Symvanton tis Ellinikis Fylis* (1770–1836). Athens: Estia, 1889.
- Kondis, Basil. "The Albanian Nationalist Movement and the Epiro-Thessalian Boundary Problem." In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 305–315.
- Konortas, Paraskevas. "From Taife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community." In Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi, eds., *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1999, 169–179.
- Konortas, Paraskevas. "Les Musulmans en Grèce entre 1821 et 1912." Diplôme d' études approfondies, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1980.
- Konortas, Paraskevas. *Othomanikes Theoriseis gia to Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio: Veratagia tous Prokathimenous tis Megalis Ekkliasias (17os–Arches 20ou Aiona)*. Athens: Alexandria, 1998.
- Konortas, Paraskevas. "La Presse d' Expression Turque des Musulmanes de Grèce pendant la Période Post-Ottomane." *Turcica* 17 (1985), 245–278.
- Koraes, Adamantios. *Peri ton Ellinikon Symferonton. Dialogos Dyo Graikon*, Hydra, Greece: Elliniki Typografia, 1825.
- Kordatos, Giannis. *Dimotikismos kai Logiotatimos: Koinoniologiki Meleti tou Glossikou Zitimatos*. Athens: Boukoumani, 1974.
- Kostantinidis, Konstantinos. "Anekdotos Anafora Tourkou Filhellinos." *Nea Estia* 25, no. 294 (March 1939), 421–422.
- Kostopoulos, Tasos. *I Apagorevmeni Glossa: Kratiki Katastoli ton Slavikon Dialekton stin Elliniki Makedonia*. Athens: Mavri Lista, 2002.
- Kostopoulos, Tasos. "Eteroglossia kai Afomiotikoi Schediasmoi: I Periptosi tis Ellinikis Makedonias meta tin Apeleftherosi (1912–1913)." *Ta Istorika* 19, no. 36 (2002), 75–128.
- Krapsitis, Vassilis. *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides tis Thesprotias, 15os–20os Aionas*. Athens: Fotis Tsironis, 1986.

- Kremmydas, Vasilis. *I Megali Idea: Metamorfoseis Enos Ethnikou Ideologimatos*. Athens: Typothito, 2010.
- Kretsi, Georgia. *Verfolgung und Gedächtnis in Albanien*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2007.
- Krstic, Tijana. *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Kurban, Dilek, and Konstantinos Tsitselikis. *A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey*. Istanbul: Tesev, 2010.
- Kushner, David. *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908*. London: Routledge, 1977.
- Kyriakopoulos, Elias. *Ta Syntagma tis Ellados*. Athens: Ethnikon Typografeion, 1960.
- Ladas, Stephen Pericles. *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*. New York: Mcmillan, 1932.
- Lemaitre, Alfred. *Musulmans et Chrétiens: Notes sur la Guerre d' l'Indépendance Greque*. Paris: G. Martin, 1895.
- Leontaritis, George. *Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917–1918*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1990.
- Levy, Avigdor. *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1994.
- Lewis, Bernard. *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Lithoxou, Dimitris. *Meionotika Zitimata kai Ethniki Syneidisi stin Ellada*. Athens: Leviathan, 1992.
- Livanios, Dimitris. “Pride, Prudence, and the Fear of God: The Loyalties of Alexander and Nicholas Mavrokordatos (1664–1730).” *Dialogos* 7 (2000), 1–22.
- Livanios, Dimitris. “The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism and Collective Identities in Greece (1453–1913).” *Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 3 (2006), 33–70.
- Lopasic, Alexander. “Islamisation of the Balkans with Special Reference to Bosnia.” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 5, no. 2 (1994), 162–186.
- Loucatos, Spyros. “Les Arabes et les Turcs Philhellènes pendant l’Insurrection pour l’Indépendance de la Grèce.” *Balkan Studies* 21, no. 2 (1980), 233–273.
- Macar, Elçin, “The Policies of Turkey toward the Ecumenical Patriarchate: The Single Party Era (1923–45).” In Benjamin C. Fortna, Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis, and Paraskevas Konortas, eds., *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830–1945*. London: Routledge, 2013, 132–152.
- Macfie, Alexander Lyon. *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923*. New York: Longman, 1996.
- Mackridge, Peter. *Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766–1976*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Mair, Lucy. *The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations*. London: Christophers, 1928.
- Malesevic, Sinisa. *Identity as Ideology*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Mamoni, Kyriaki. “I Zoi kai i Drasi ton Ypodouloun Ellinon, 1881–1913: Thraki.” In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 14. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 358–367.
- Mango, Andrew. “Attatürk.” In Reşat Kasaba, ed., *The Cambridge History of Turkey*. Vol. 4: *Turkey and the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 147–173.
- Mango, Cyril. “The Legend of Leo the Wise.” *Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta* 6 (1960), 59–93.
- Manikas, Konstantinos. “Scheseis Orthodoxias kai Romaikokatholikismou stin Ellada Kata ti Diarkeia tis Epanastaseos.” PhD diss., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2001.

- Manta, Eleftheria. "The Çams of Albania and the Greek State (1923–1945)." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29, no. 4 (December 2009), 523–535.
- Manta, Eleftheria. *Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamides tis Ipeirou, 1923–2000*. Thessaloniki: I.M.X.A., 2004.
- Mantouvalou, Maria. "Romaios-Romios kai Romiosyni." *Mantatoforos* 22 (November 1983), 34–72.
- Marcellesi, Jean-Baptiste. "Bilinguisme, Diglossie, Hégémonie: Problèmes et Tâches." *Langages* 61 (March 1981), 5–11.
- Margoliouth, David Samuel. "Mawlawīya." In M. Th. Houtsma, T. W. Arnold, R. Basset, and R. Hortmann, eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, 479–481.
- Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid. *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Marti, Metin, ed. *Ilk Türk Komitacisi Fuat Balkan 'in Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Arma Yanınları, 1998.
- Mavrogordatos, Giorgos Th. *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Mavrogordatos, Giorgos Th. *1915: O Ethnikos Dichasmos*. Athens: Patakis, 2015.
- Mavrogordatos, Giorgos Th. *Meta to 1922: I Paratasitou Dichasmou*. Athens: Patakis, 2017.
- Mavrogordatos, Giorgos Th. "Oι Ethnikes Meionotites." In Christos Chatzisif, ed., *Istoria tis Ellados tou 20ou Aiona: Mesopolemos (1922–1940)*, vol. 2. Athens: Vivliorama, 2003, 9–35.
- Mavrogordatos, John. *Letters from Greece Concerning the War of the Balkan Allies 1912–1913*. London: M. Secker, 1914.
- Mavrokordatos, Nikolaos. *Philotheou Parerga*. Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1989.
- Mazower, Mark. *The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day*. London: Phoenix Press, 2001.
- Mazower, Mark. *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. London: Penguin Press, 1998.
- Mazower, Mark. "The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and Politics in Greece, 1909–1912." *Historical Journal* 35, no. 4 (December 1992), 885–904.
- Mazower, Mark. *Salonica: The City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950*. New York: Vintage, 2004.
- Mazower, Mark. "Three Forms of Political Justice, 1944–1945." In Mark Mazower, ed., *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation and State in Greece, 1943–1960*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000, 24–41.
- McCarthy, Justin. *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922*. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995.
- McGrew, William. *Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1880–1881: The Transition in the Tenure and Exploitation of Land from Ottoman Rule to Independence*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985.
- Melikoff, Irène. "Recherches sur les Composantes du Syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi." In *Studia Turcologica, Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata*. Naples: Instituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, 1982, 379–395.
- Meyer, Hermann Frank. *Blutiges Edelweiß: Die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: Verlag, 2008.
- Michailidis, Iakovos. "Provlimata Ensomatosis Prosfygon ston Agrotiko Makedoniko Choro: Prosfyges kai Gigeneis." In *Proceedings of Academic Symposium Opseis tou*

- Mikrasiatikou Zitimatos: Istoriki Theorisi kai Proektaseis.* Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 1994, 127–134.
- Michalopoulos, Dimitris. *Tsamides*. Athens: Arsenidis, 1993.
- Millas, Hercules. “History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey.” *History Workshop* 31 (1991), 21–33.
- Millman, Richard. *Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875–78*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Minkov, Anton. *Conversions to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahasi Petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 1670–1730*. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Moore, Margaret. *The Ethics of Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Moutafis, Georgios. “To Zitima tis Samou kai i Diaskepsi tou Londonou tou 1830.” In General State Archives, ed., *Samos kai Epanastasi: Istorikes Proseggeiseis: Praktika Synedriou*. Athens: General State Archives, 2011, 59–111.
- Müller, Dietmar. *Staatsbürger auf Widerruf. Juden und Muslime Als Alteritätspartner im Rumänischen und Serbischen Nationscode: Ethnonationale Staatbürgerschaftskonzepte 1878–1944*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005.
- Mutafčieva, Vera P., and Strashimir Dimitrov. *Sur l’État du Système des Timars des XVIIe et XVIIIe ss.* Sofia: Académie Bulgare des Sciences, 1968.
- Nadolski, Dora. “Ottoman and Secular Civil Law.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8, no. 4 (1977), 517–543.
- Nakos, Georgios. “Ai ‘Megalai Dynameis’ kai ta ‘Ethnika Ktimata’ tis Ellados (1821–1832).” *Epistimoniki Epiteris Sxolis Nomikon kai Oikonomikon Epistimon* 9 (1976), 465–546.
- Nakos, Georgios. *To Nomiko Kathestos ton Teos Dimosion Othomanikon Gaion, 1821–1912*. Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 1984.
- Nikolaïdis, Kleanthis. *Istoria tou Ellinotourkikou Polemou*. Athens: Georgios D. Fexis, 1915.
- Nikolakopoulos, Elias. “Politikes Dynameis kai Eklogiki Symerifora tis Mousoulmanikis Meionotitas sti Dytiki Thraki, 1923–1955.” *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon* 8 (1990–91), 171–199.
- Nikolaou, Georgios. “Islamisations et Christianisations dans le Péloponnèse (1715–ca 1832).” PhD diss., Université des Sciences Humaines Strasbourg II, 1997.
- Nicolle, David. *The Janissaries*. London: Osprey, 1995.
- Norris, Harry T. *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World*. London: Hurst, 1993.
- Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio, ed. *Mavri Vivlos Diogmon kai Martyrion tou en Tourkia Ellinismou, 1914–1918*. Istanbul: Patriarchiko Typografeio, 1919.
- O’Leary, Brendan. “Ernest Gellner’s Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner’s Philosophy of Nationalism?” In John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 40–88.
- Örs, İlay Romain. “Beyond the Greek and Turkish Dichotomy: The Rum-Polites of Istanbul and Athens.” *South European Society and Politics* 11, no. 1 (2006), 79–94.
- Özkırımlı, Umut, and Spyros Sofos. *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*. London: Hurst, 2008.
- Özsoy, Iskender. *İki Vatan Yorgunları: Mübadede Acısını Yaşayanlar Anlatıyor*. İstanbul: Bağlam, 2003.
- Panagiotopoulos, Vasilis. “Oi Tektones kai i Filiki Etaireia: Emm. Xanthos kai Pan. Karagiannis.” *Eranistis*, no. 9/10 (1964), 138–156.

- Papacosma, Victor S. *The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup D'État*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977.
- Papadopoulos, Ioannis. "I Metanastefsi apo tin Othomaniki Autokratoria stin Ameriki 19os Aionas–1923: Oi Ellinikes Koinotites tis Amerikis kai i Alytrotiki Politiki tis Elladas." PhD diss., Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, 2008.
- Pagegeorgiou, Stefanos, ed., *Archeio Stratigou Vasou Mavrovounioti (Vaso Brajović)*. 8 vols. Athens: Panteion Panepistimio, KENI, 2013.
- Pagegeorgiou, Stefanos. "Vasos Mavrovouniotes: A Montenegrin Chieftain on the Threshold of Modernity: From the Service of the Sublime Porte to the Service of the Greek Revolution and the Kingdom of Greece." *Mediterranea-Ricerche Storiche* 32 (December 2014), 463–488.
- Papathanasi-Mousiopoulou, Kalliopi. "Agnostes Ptyches ton Agonon gia tin Apeleftherosi tis Thrakis." *Thrakika* 46 (1972–73), 334–354.
- Papathanasi-Mousiopoulou, Kalliopi. "Oi Diatheseis ton Pomakon tis Dytikis Thrakis 1918–1923." *Thrakiki Estia* 9 (1992–94), 19–28.
- Paxton, Roger Viers. "Nationalism and Revolution: A Re-Examination of the Origins of the First Serbian Insurrection 1804–1807." *East European Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (1972), 337–362.
- Peacock, Andrew. *Early Seljuk History: A New Interpretation*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Peacock, Andrew. *The Great Seljuk Empire*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.
- Pelagidis, Efstathios. *I Apokatastasi ton Prosfygon sti Dytiki Makedonia (1923–1930)*. Thessaloniki: Kyriadiki, 1994.
- Pentzopoulos, Dimitri. *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact on Greece*. London: Hurst, 2002.
- Perdicaris, Gregory A. *The Greece of Greeks*. 2 vols. New York: Paine & Burgess, 1845.
- Petropoulos, Ioannis, and Aikaterini Koumarianou. "I Periodos Vasileias tou Othonos, 1833–1862." In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 13. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975, 8–105.
- Petropoulos, John. "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations: Greek-Turkish Peacemaking, 1922–1930." *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 2 (1976), 35–160.
- Petsalis, Athanasios. *Syllogi Apanton ton Nomon, Diatagmaton, Diatagon tou Stratou tou Vasileiou tis Ellados, Enkyklious, Odigion kai Eidopoieseion ton Grammateion, Synthikon tis Ellados Meta ton Allon Ethnon, en Ois Prosetethi kai o Organismos tis Chorofylakis ktλ. Apo tou Etous 1833 mechri Telous tou 1840*. Athens: Filolaou Typografieas, 1842.
- Philliou, Christine. *Biography of an Empire: Practicing Ottoman Governance in the Age of Revolutions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
- Phillips, Alison. *The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833*. London: Smith, Elder, 1897.
- Phrantzes, Amvrosios. *Epitomi tis Istorias tis Anagnithisis Ellados, 1715–1835*. 3 vols. Athens: Konstantinou kai Syntrofias, 1839–1941.
- Pikros, Ioannis. "O Ellinotourkikos Polemos tou 1897." In *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 14. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1977, 125–160.
- Popovic, Alexander. *L'Islam Balkanique: Les Musulmans du Sud-Est Européen dans la Période Post-Ottomane*. Berlin: Osteuropa-Institute an der Freien Universität Berlin in Kommission bei O. Harrassowitz, 1986.
- Poulton, Hugh. *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*. London: Hurst, 1997.
- Prontzas, Evangelos. *Oikonomia kai Gaioktisia sti Thessalia, 1881–1912*. Athens: Morfotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis, 1992.

- Prontzas, Evangelos. "I Trapeziki Politiki apenanti sto Tsifliki." *Ta Istorika* 3, no. 6 (1986), 315–348.
- Puto, Arben. "Le Congrès de Berlin et la Question Albanaise." In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 421–430.
- Quataert, Donald. "The Industrial Working Class of Salonica, 1850–1912." In Avigdor Levy, ed., *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth through the Twentieth Century*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002, 194–213.
- Ragavis, Iakovos. *Ta Ellinika: Itoi Perigrafi Geografiki, Istoriki, Archaeologiki kai Statistiki tis Archaias kai tis Neas Elladas*. 3 vols. Athens: K. Antoniadis, 1854.
- Ramsaur, Ernest E. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Raybaud, Maxime. *Mémoires sur la Grèce: Pour Servir à l'Histoire de la Guerre de l'Indépendance*. 2 vols. Paris: Tournachon-Molin, 1824–25.
- Rosen, Fred. "Bentham's Constitutional Theory and the Greek Constitution of 1822." *Balkan Studies* 25, no. 1 (1984), 31–54.
- Roudometof, Victor. "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453–1821." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 16, no. 1 (1998), 11–48.
- Roudometof, Victor. "Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830–1880)." *East European Quarterly* 32 (1998), 429–468.
- Rotzokos, Nikos. *Ethnafipni kai Ethnogenesi: Orlofika kai Elliniki Istoriorafia*. Athens: Vivliorama, 2011.
- Sarris, Neoklis. *Exoteriki Politiki kai Politikes Exelixeis stin Proti Tourkiki Dimokratia: I Anodos tis Stratokratografeiokrateias (1923–1950)*. Athens: Gordios, 1992.
- Schechtman, Joseph. *European Population Transfers, 1939–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Šedivý, Miroslav. *Crisis among the Great Powers: The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2017.
- Seirinidou, Vaso. *Ellines sti Vienni (18os–Mesa 19ou Aiona)*. Athens: Irodotos, 2011.
- Sevastakis, Alexis. *Samiaki politeia 1830–1834. Logothetis Lykourgos*. Athens: Diogenis, 1985.
- Sfika-Theodosiou, Angeliki. *I Italia ston Proto Pangosmio Polemo: Oi Scheseis tis me tis Megales Dynameis kai tin Ellada*. Athens: Papazisi, 2004.
- Shaw, Stanford J. *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel K. Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Sideris, Aristotelis. *I Georgiki Politiki tis Ellados kata tin Lixasan Ekatontaetian (1833–1933)*. Athens: S. K. Papadogianni, 1934.
- Şimşir, Bilâl. *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians (1856–1880)*. Vol. 1. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989.
- Şimşir, Bilâl. *The Turks of Bulgaria (1878–1985)*. London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988.

- Singer, Amy. *Charity in Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Sivignon, Michel. *La Thessalie: Analyse Géographique d'Une Province Grecque*. Lyon: Institut des Études Rhodaniennes de l'Université de Lyon, 1975.
- Skiotis, Dennis (Dionysios). "From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepelen, 1750–1784." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, no. 3 (1971), 219–244.
- Skopetea, Elli. *To "Protypo Vasileio" kai i Megali Idea: Opseis tou Ethnikou Provlimatos stin Ellada (1830–1880)*. Athens: Polytypo, 1988.
- Skouras, Theodoros. "To Proto Cheirografo tou Georgiou Filaretou." *Archeio Evoikon Meleton* 25 (1983), 19–36.
- Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity*. London: Penguin, 1991.
- Smith, David, and Karl Cordell, eds. *Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Smith, Michael Llewellyn. *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor*. London: Hurst, 1999.
- Soltaridis, Symeon. *I Istoria ton Mouftein tis Dytikis Thrakis*. Athens: Nea Synora-A. Livanis, 1997.
- Soutsos, Alexandros. *Syllogi ton eis to Exoterikon kai Dimosion Dikaion tis Ellados Anagomenon Episimon Eggrafon*. Athens: Ypourgeio epi tou Vasilikou Oikou kai ton Exoterikon Sxeseon, 1858.
- Spiliadis, Nikolaos. *Apomnimonevmata*. 3 vols. Athens: X. N. Filadelfeos, 1851–57.
- Starr, Joshua. "The Socialist Federation of Saloniki." *Jewish Social Studies* 7, no. 4 (October 1945), 323–336.
- Stamatopoulos, Dimitris. "I Ekklesia os Politeia: Anaparastaseis tou Orthodoxou Millet kai to Modelo tis Syntagmatikis Monarchias (Deftero Miso tou 19ou Aiona)." *Mnimon* 23 (2001), 183–220.
- Stavrianos, Leften Stavros. *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1964.
- Stavrianos, Leften Stavros. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Rinehart, 1958.
- St. Claire, William. *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Stefanidis, Dimosthenis. *Eisagogi eis tin Efirmsmenin Koinonikin Oikonomian*. Athens: n.p., 1952.
- Stoianovich, Traian. "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant." *Journal of Economic History* 20 (1960), 234–313.
- Stouraiti, Anastasia, and Alexander Kazamias. "The Imaginary Topographies of the Megali Idea: National Territory as Utopias." In Nikiforos Diamandouros, Thalia Dragonas, and Çağlar Keyder, eds., *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010, 11–34.
- Striebeck, C. T. *Mittheilungen Aus Demtagebuche des Philhellenen*. Hannover, Germany: E. A. Telgener, 1834.
- Svolopoulos, Dimitrios. *I Thraki ypo Elliniki Dioikisi*. Istanbul: n.p., 1922.
- Tambini, Damian. "Explaining Monoculturalism: Beyond Gellner's Theory of Nationalism." *Critical Review* 10, no. 2 (March 1996), 251–270.

- Tatsios, Theodore. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866–1897*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1982.
- Tesal, Reşat. *Selânik'ten İstanbul'a: Bir Ömrün Hikâyesi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998.
- Todorov, Nikolai. *The Balkan City, 1400–1900*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.
- Todorova, Maria. *Imagining the Balkans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Tomić Mišeska, Olga. *Balkan Sprachbund: Morpho-Syntactic Features*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006.
- Tourmakine, Alexandre. *Les Migrations des Populations Musulmanes Balkaniques en Anatolie (1876–1913)*. İstanbul: ISIS, 1995.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contacts of Civilizations*. London: Constable, 1922.
- Triantafyllidis, Manolis. *I Glossa mas sta Scholeia tis Makedonias*. Athens: n.p., 1916.
- Trikopis, Spyridon. *Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastasis*. 4 vols. London: Taylor and Francis, 1853–57.
- Tsetlaka, Athanasia-Marina. “Les Musulmans Hellénophones de Macédoine Occidentale: Un Exemple de Conversion Massive à l’Islam (16e–19e Siècles) dans l’Espace Balkanique Ottoman.” PhD diss., Université de Provence Aix-Marseille, 2011.
- Tsioumis, Konstantinos. “Igesia kai Prosopikotita sti Mousoulmaniki Koinotita tis Dytikis Thrakis kata tin Periodo tou Mesopolemou (1923–1940).” *Endochora* 2 (February 1995), 120–126.
- Tsioumis, Konstantinos. “I Mousoulmaniki Meionotita tis Dytikis Thrakis kai oi Ellinotourkikes Scheseis (1923–1940).” PhD diss. Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 1994.
- Tsiovaridou, Theano. “I Allagi tis Domis tis Georgias meta tin Prosartisi tis Thessalias.” In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l’Hellenisme (1878–1881)*. Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 485–494.
- Tsirimonaki, Maria. *Aftoi pou Efygan kai Aftoi pou Irthan: Apo tin Aftonomia stin Antallagi*. Rethymno, Greece: Mitos, 2002.
- Tsitselikis, Konstantinos. *Ai Anomaloi Dikaiopraxiai epi Akiniton en tais Nees Chores*. Thessaloniki: n.p., 1926.
- Tsitselikis, Konstantinos. *Ena Xerizoma*. Athens: n.p., 1925.
- Tsitselikis, Konstantinos. *Old and New Islam in Greece: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers*. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2012.
- Tsitselikis, Konstantinos. “The Pending Modernization of Islam in Greece: From Millet to Minority Status.” *Südoesteuropa* 55, no. 4 (2007), 354–372.
- Tsitselikis, Konstantinos. “I Thesi tou Moufti stin Elliniki Ennomi Taxi.” In Dimitris Christopoulos, ed., *Nomika Zitimata Thriskeftikis Eterotitas stin Ellada*. Athens: Kritiki, 1999, 271–330.
- Tsopotos, Dimitrios K. *Gi kai Georgoi tis Thessalias kata tin Tourkokratian*. Volos: Typografeio Efimeridos i Thessalia, 1912.
- Tsoutsoumpis, Spyros. “Violence, Resistance and Collaboration in a Greek Borderland: The Case of Muslim Chams of Epirus.” *Qualeatoria* 2 (2015), 120–138.

- Tzedaki-Apostolaki, Lena. "Tourkokritikoi: Anazitisi mias Taftotitas." *Ta Istorika* 18, no. 34 (2001), 147–166.
- Tziovas, Dimitris. *Oi Metamorfoseis tou Ethnismou kai to Ideologima tis Ellinikotitas sto Mesopolemo*. Athens: Odysseas, 2006.
- Ülker, Erol. "Contextualizing Turkification: Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918." *Nation and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005), 613–636.
- Vagiakakos, Dikaios. "I Dimografiki kai Toponymiki Katastasi tis Thessalias kai Artis kata tis Prosartiseos eis to Elliniko Kratos to 1881." In Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, ed., *Actes: Symposium Historique International: La Dernière Phase de la Crise Orientale et l'Hellénisme (1878–1881)*. Athens: Association Internationale des Études du Sud-Est Européen Comité National Grec des Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1983, 506–507.
- Vakalopoulos, Apostolos. *Istoria tis Makedonias, 1354–1833*. Thessaloniki: n.p., 1969.
- Vakalopoulos, Apostolos. *Istoria tou Neou Ellinismou*. 8 vols. Thessaloniki: n.p., 1974–88.
- Vakalopoulos, Apostolos. *Ta Kastrta tou Platamona kai tis Orias Tempon kai o Tekes tou Hasan Baba*. Thessaloniki: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1972.
- Vakalopoulos, Apostolos. "Symvoli stin Istoria kai Organosi tis Filikis Etaireias." *Ellinika* 12 (1952–53), 66–78.
- Vakalopoulos, Konstantinos. *Istoria tou Voreiou Ellinismou: Thraki*. Thessaloniki: Adelfi Kyriakidi, 1990.
- Vamvetsos, Alexandros. *Mikrai Nomikai Meletai*. Athens: Estia, 1917.
- Veremis, Thanos, and Katerina Boura, eds. *Athanasiou Soulrioti-Nikolaidi Organosis Konstantinoupoleos*. Athens: Dodoni, 1984.
- Vergopoulos, Kostas. *To Agrotiko Zitima stin Ellada: To Provlima tis Koinonikis Ensomatosis tis Georgias*. Athens: Exantas, 1975.
- Vogli, Elpida K. "Ellines to Genos": *I Ithageneia kai i Taftotita sto Ethniko Kratos ton Ellinon (1821–1844)*. Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2007.
- Von Maurer, George Ludwig. *Das Griechische Volk in Öffentlicher, Kirchlicher und Privatrechtlicher Beziehung Vor und nach dem Freiheitskampfe bis zum 31. Juli 1834*. 2 vols. Heidelberg: Der Akademischen Buchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr, 1835.
- Vryonis, Speros. "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans, 14th–16th Centuries." In Henrik Birnbaum and Speros Vryonis, eds., *Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change: Contributions to the International Balkan Conference Held at UCLA, October 23–28, 1969*. The Hague: Mouton, 1972, 151–176.
- Vryonis, Speros. *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1971.
- Vournas, Tasos. *Filiki Etaireia. I: To Paranomo Organotiko tis. II: O Diogmos tis Ap' tous Xenous*. Athens: Tolidi, 1982.
- Ware, Timothy. *The Orthodox Church*. New York: Penguin, 1993.
- Watzel, David. *The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Wolff, Stefan. *The German Question since 1919: An Introduction with Key Documents*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- Woodhouse, Christopher Montague (Monty). *The Philhellenes*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969.

- Yaltsin, Kemal. *Mia Proika Amanati: Oi Anthropoi tis Antallagis*. Athens: A. Livanis, 2000.
- Zallony, Marc-Philippe. *Essai sur les Fanariotes*. Marseille: De L'Imprimerie D' Antoine Ricard, 1824.
- Zeginis, Efstratios. "O Bektasimos sti Dytiki Thraki: Symvoli stin Istoria tis Diadoseos tou Mousoulmanismou ston Elladiko Choro." PhD diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 1988.
- Zelepos, Ioannis. "Metemorfosi gar kai Eginen o Ellinismos Christianismos. Ellines, Ellinikon Genos kai Ellinismos ston Thriskeftiko Logo kata tis Paramones tis Ellinikis Epanastasis (Teli 18ou Aiona eos 1821)." In Olga Katsiardi-Hering, Anastasia Papadialala, Katerina Nikolaou, Vangelis Karamanolakis, eds., *Ellin, Romios, Graikos: Syllogikoi Prosdiorkismoi kai Taftotites*. Athens: Evasia, 2018, 343–359.
- Zelepos, Ioannis. "Redefining the 'Great Idea': The Impact of the Macedonian Struggle 1904–1908 on the Formation of Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis' 'Oriental Ideal.'" *Neograeca Bohemica* 15, no. 1 (2015), 13–31.
- Zografos, Georgios Christaki. *To Agrotiko Zitima en Thessalia*. Athens: Typois "Avgis Athinon," 1911.

Index

Tables, photos, maps and footnotes are indicated by *t*, *p*, *m* and *n* following the page number

- Abbas Seyit, 153
Abdüleziz, 4n8
Abdülhamid II, 95, 118, 138, 171
Abdullah Baba, 185
Abdülmecid I, 4n8
Abdurahim Hasan Bey, 154t
Abel, Karl von, 55n32
Acropolis massacre, 21–22
acts of Greek government. *See* Greek government acts
Adamantidis, I., 68
Aegean islands, 105–106
Agehi Mansur, 6
agriculture
annexation of Thessaly and, 81–94
Association of Farmers and, 81
in Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 54, 56, 64–65
in New Lands, 103, 122, 132, 150–158, 162
timar system and, 3–4, 3n5
Ahmed I, 4
Ahmed Resmi, 6
Ahmet İzzet Pasha (Furgaç), 153
Ainian, Georgios, 58
Akif Zoulfikiar, 167
Akif Zoulfikiar Bey, 164t–165t
Albanian Nationalism, 209–210
Alexander of Hellenes, 107
Ali Demir, 165t
Ali Dino Rasih, 165t
Ali Ferit, 165t
Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 203
Ali Pasha of Tepelena, 19, 30
Ali Riza Bey, 122
Ali Riza Dede, 186
Ali Sami Bey, 138, 171
Ambdi Bey, 154t
Anatolia
Byzantine era and, 2
Ottoman conquest and, 2
Pax Ottomana and, 3
Anatoliko Idaniko, 130
Andalus, Al-, 1
Anderson, Benedict, xiii–xiv
Ankara, Treaty of, 179
annexation. *See* Thessaly, annexation of *Antifonisis (Response)* (Parios), 31
Arif Hafuz Zade Arif, 154t
Arif Mustafa, 164t–165t
Armansperg, Josef Ludwig von, 55n32
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 128
Armenopoulos, Konstantinos, 64
Arnautoğlu, Halil, 50
Arnautoğlu, Ibrahim, 47, 50
Ash'ari creed, 9
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 11, 107, 111, 164, 171
capitulation system and, 18
Kemalists and, 171, 180–209, 220, 225, 229
Turkish War of Independence and, 119–120
Athari school, 9
Athens mosque, 85–86
atrocities
against Christians, 20–21, 20n8, 22–23
against Muslims, 21–27, 109–111, 163
Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, 207–208
Axis powers, 190–192, 211
Azmi Bey, 154t
Baba Sheit, 186
Baba Veli Mustafa, 186
Balkan, Fuat, 164

- Balkan League, 96
- Balkans. *See also specific areas*
- Great Eastern Crisis and, 72–74, 78
 - millet* system and, 49–50
 - nationalism and, xii, xiv–xvii
 - power rearrangements within Rûm
millet and, 35–38
 - Balkan Wars, 96–98, 97p–98p, 99m,
100t–102t
 - Muslim mortality rates during, 109–110, 112
 - Muslims as refugees of, 111–117, 113p–114p, 114n29, 116p
 - Bass, Paul, xiii
 - bedl-i askeri*, 4n8, 78
 - Belgrade uprisings, 20
 - Benaroya, Avraam, 127–129
 - Bentham, Jeremy, 46
 - Berbers, 1
 - Berlin, Congress of, 73, 76, 86
 - Berlin, Treaty of, 73–74, 89
 - beylik, 2
 - Billings, Michael, xv
 - Botsaris, Markos, 40
 - Bouboulina, Laskarina, 40
 - Bousios, Georgios, 160
 - boyars*, 19
 - Brajović, Vaso, 40
 - Breuilly, John, xii–xiii
 - Brubaker, Roger, xv–xvi
 - Bucharest, Treaty of, 98, 201
 - Bulgarian Exarchate, 95
 - Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 34
 - Byzantine era, 1–2, 2n4
 - Cafer Tayyar, 171
 - caliphates, 11–12
 - Çams, 176–177, 176n9, 180, 182, 187–192, 196–197, 209–210, 212
 - capitulation system, 17–18
 - Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 112
 - Çelik, Zeynep, 18
 - Cemaat-i İslamiye Encümenleri*. *See*
community councils, Muslim
 - Ceyiz-Mübadele İnsanları* (Yalçın), 178–179
 - Charpy, Georges, 203
 - Chios massacre, 20–21
 - Christians/Christianity. *See also dhimmi*; Orthodox Christians
 - atrocities against, 20–21, 20n8, 22–23
 - crypto-Christians/crypto-Jews and, 6
 - Eastern Orthodox, 214–216
 - Islam in Southeastern Europe during
the Ottoman Empire and, 10–14
 - non-Orthodox, Greek national identity
and, 44–46
 - political rights of, 42–46
 - religious composition of Epirus and
Thessaly (1880) and, 76t
 - Treaty of Bucharest and, 202
 - Chrysostomos, 161–162
 - ciftlik*s
 - annexation of Thessaly and, 75, 84–86, 88
 - exchange of property and, 187
 - in New Lands, 123, 127, 148, 151–153, 155–158, 166
 - citizenship of Muslims
 - in Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 49–50, 50n16
 - in New Lands, 135
 - in Ottoman Empire, 82, 121
 - civil wars following Greek War of
Independence, 27–29
 - colonization, 3–4, 3n5
 - community councils, Muslim, 80–81, 181–182
 - “Concerning Religion” (Negris), 43
 - Constantine I of Hellenes, 98p, 106–107, 166
 - abdication of, 156
 - socialism and, 128
 - conversion to Islam
 - devşirme* and, 5
 - dhimmi* and, 4–6, 4n8
 - dual faith and, 6
 - Islam in Southeastern Europe during
Ottoman Empire and, 4
 - taxation and, 4–5, 4n8
 - court system within Ottoman Empire, 5
 - creed, Islamic, 9–11, 9n27
 - Crete, Emirate of, 1
 - Crimean War, 17–18, 51, 59, 78
 - crypto-Christians/crypto-Jews, 6
 - Dagović, Kristo, 40
 - Daniil of Moscopole, 37

- Deligiannis, Kanellos, 28
 Deligiannis, Theodoros, 93–94
 Delmé-Radcliffe, Charles, 115
 Derviş Bey, 163, 167
 Dervis Hussein Zade Ali, 154t
 D' Espérey, Louis Franchet, 202–203
devşirme, 5
dhimmi, 4–6, 4n8
millet system and, 12–14
 Sufism and, 6
 Tanzimat reforms and, 14–18
 Digkas, Dimitrios, 166
Dikaios (newspaper), 171
 Dikaios, Grigorios, 44–45
 Dimitrakopoulos, Nikolaos, 140
 Dino, Mazar, 191
 Dino, Nuri, 191
 Doukas, Neofytos, 39
 Doukas, Neophytos, 31
 Douri Omer Izet Bey, 154t
 Dragatsani, battle of, 19–20
 Dragoumis, Ionas, 129–130
 Dragoumis, Stefanos, 151
 Dritsakos, Youpis, 42
Droit, Le (newspaper), 138
- Eastern Orthodox Christianity, 214–216
 economics, 16–17
 education of Muslims, 54
 annexation of Thessaly and, 82–83
 Greek nationalism and, 34–35
 in Kingdom of Hellas/Greece,
 195–197
 language and, 147
 mektep and, 54
 mercantile class and, 34–35
 in New Lands, 141–147
 Orthodox Christians and, 31–32
 within Ottoman Empire, 31–33
 Phanariots and, 34
 power rearrangements within Rûm
 millet and, 37
 Tanzimat reforms and, 16
 Valaades and, 8, 8n18, 11, 87, 103,
 143–146, 161
 Efendi, Osman, 58
Efimeris ton Athinon (Negris), 45
 Egyptian *vakif*, 193–195, 193n57–193n58
- Ellines, 38–40
 emigration of Muslims
 discrimination complaints and, 89–90
 from Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 54–59
 New Lands and, 119–126
 Orthodox Christians and, 125
 from Thessaly, 86–93
 Epirus, 76t
Ethics of Nationalism (Moore), 225
ethnikes gaies, 66
ethnomartyras, 20, 20n8
ethnos, 39–40
 Euboea, Muslims of, 47, 49–50, 52–61
 patronage of Ottoman Empire towards,
 59–61
 religious practice and, 55–56
 European Enlightenment, 30–31, 46
evkaf, 5, 65–66
 Act 1183 and, 90–91
 annexation of Thessaly and, 80, 83
 education fees and, 142, 145
 exchanged property and, 185–186
 in New Lands, 136, 138–139, 148
 Tanzimat reforms and, 80–81
Evoia (newspaper), 62
Evripos (newspaper), 62
 Examining Committee of Ottoman Land
 Properties, 67
 Exchange of Greek and Turkish
 Populations, Convention
 Concerning. *See* Lausanne, Treaty of
 exodus of Muslims. *See* emigration of
 Muslims
- Farmakidis, Theoklitos, 31
 Farmers, Association of, 81
 farming. *See* agriculture
 Farouk, King of Egypt, 193
 Ferdinand, Franz, Archduke, 106
 Ferit Ali, 164t
 Ferit Omer, 154t
 Fessopoulos, G., 208
 Fichte, Johan, 50
 Filaretos, Georgios, 90
 Filiki Etaireia (Society of Friends)
 atrocities against Muslims and, 24
 civil war and, 27–28
 Greek War of Independence and, 19–20

- Filos tou Nomou* (newspaper), 43
 Fokas, Dimitrios, 156
frangoforemenos, 55
 Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, Treaty of, 185
- Gekas, Mustafa, 41
 Gellner, Ernest, xi–xii
 General Administration of Thrace, 131–132
genos, 31, 39–40
 George I of Hellenes, 88, 92–94, 98p
 George II of Hellenes, 211
 Germanos III, 21, 215–216
 Godjamanis, Sotirios, 164
 Gonatas, Stylianos, 156
 Gordon, Thomas, 24
 Gorski, Philip, xii
 Gounaris, Dimitrios, 140, 151, 153, 160, 164–168
 government of Ottoman Empire
 bedl-i askeri and, 4n8
 beyliks and, 2
 caliphates and, 11–12
 capitulation system and, 17–18
 court system within, 5
 devşirme and, 5
 dhimmi and, 4–6, 4n8
 economics and, 16–17
 evkaf and, 5
 Islâhat Fermâni (Ottoman Reform Decree of 1856) and, 17
 itlizam and, 5
 Janissaries and, 5
 judicial system and, 13–14, 16
 Kingdom of Hellas/Greece and, 29
 millet system and, 12–14, 13n37
 Muslims in, 11–12, 11n34
 Phanariots and, 32
 power rearrangements within Rûm
 millet and, 35–38
 sharia law and, 11–12, 63–64
 Tanzimat reforms and, 4n8, 14–18
 taxation and (*see* taxation in Ottoman Empire)
 timar system and, 3–4, 3n5
 warlords and, 19
 Graikoi, 38–39
- Great Eastern Crisis, 72–74, 78, 88
 Great Fire of 1917, 145, 162
 Greco-Ottoman Committee, 67–71
 Greco-Ottoman Convention of Athens, 121, 124
 Greco-Ottoman Convention of Istanbul, 77, 77n12, 83, 178
 Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, 96
 annexation of Thessaly and, 93–94
 emigration of Muslims and, 87
 Greece. *See* Kingdom of Hellas/Greece
 Greek Communist Party, 192
 Greek government acts
 Act 262, 149–151
 Act 808, 151
 Act 1038, 79–80, 80n22
 Act 1183, 90–91
 Act 1851, 140
 Act 2058, 184
 Act 2345, 135
 Act 2345/1920, 181–182
 Act 3473, 183
 Act 4125, 182
 Act 4134, 148
 Greek nationalism
 education and, 34–35
 Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 and, 93–94
 Greek War of Independence and, 30
 Kollyvades movement and, 31
 Megali Idea and, 61–63, 73, 85–86, 129, 160, 169, 223–224
 mercantile class and, 33–35
 Muslims and, 35, 40–46
 national identity, Muslims and, 40–46
 Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment and, 30–32
 Orthodox Christians and, 40–46
 Phanariots and, 32
 power rearrangements within Rûm
 millet and, 35–38
 Rûm *millet* and, 35–40
 Rûm vs. Hellenic identification and, 38–40
 Russko-Ottoman War and, 32
 Greek Orthodox Church. *See* Orthodox Christians

- Greek Refugee Settlement Committee, 184
 Greek War of Independence
 atrocities against Muslims and, 21–27
 civil wars following, 27–29
 emigration of Muslims and, 88
 Kingdom of Hellas/Greece
 1832–1862, 26*m*
 mercantile class and, 33–35
 muhacir and, 4
 Muslims support for, 41–42
 nationalism and (*see* Greek nationalism)
 outcome of, 27–29
 political rights of non-Christians and, 42–43
 property rights of Muslims and, 65–66
 taxation in Ottoman Empire and, 65–66
 territorial expansion of Greece 1932–1947, 25*m*
 uprisings leading to, 19–21, 20n8
 Grigorios V, 20–21, 20n8, 27, 215
- Hadith, 9
 Hadji Hafuz Galip, 154*t*
 Hadji Imbrahim Zade, 165*t*
 Hadji Mehmet Effendi, 79
 Hadji Mehmet Zade, 154*t*
 Hadji Yusuf Ali Riza, 154*t*
 Hafiz Ali Galip, 200
 Hafiz Ali Reşat, 208
 Hafiz Salih Mehmetoğlu, 201, 208
 Hafuz Mehmet Ferit, 164*t*–165*t*
 Haireddin Bey Osman Ağa, 91
 Hairret Sakir Bey, 164*t*
 Halit Gerou, 186
 Hamdi Hussein Fehmi, 200, 205
 Hamni Ismail Effendi, 79
 Hanafi *madhab*, 9
 Hasan Baba, 185
 Hasan Emin Ibrahim, 154*t*
 Hasan İmbrahim Halil, 164*t*
 Hasan Mehmet Ali Bey, 154*t*, 164*t*–165*t*
 Hatip Yusuf Salioğlu, 200
 Hellas, Kingdom of. *See* Kingdom of Hellas/Greece
 Hellenic identification, 38–40
Hexabiblos, 64, 77
 Hobbsawm, Eric, xiii
- hospodars*, 19, 33
 Howe, Samuel Gridley, 34
 Hroch, Miroslav, xiv–xv
 Hursit Mustafa, 154*t*
 Husamendin Said Bey, 154*t*, 164*t*–165*t*
 Hüsnü Yusuf, 208
 Hussein Ağa Sampan, 91
 Hussein Bektaş, 186
 Hussein Ismail Kombakoğlu, 127
 Hussein Nedim, 164*t*
 Hussein Zade Ibrahim, 154*t*
- Ibrahim, Ismail, 58
 Ibrahim, Keli, 58
 Ibrahim Pasha, 28
 Idjet Nouri Omer, 165*t*
 İhsan Bey Zaade, 154*t*
İkdam (newspaper), 168
Independent, L' (newspaper), 201
 Independent Government of Western Thrace, 202
İnkılâp (newspaper), 205
 interfaith marriage, 10–11
 International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 95
 International Mixed Committee for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 139
 İslâhat Fermâni (Ottoman Reform Decree of 1856), 17
 Ismail Hakkı, 170
 Ismail Hussein, 164*t*–165*t*
 Ismail Sadık Şahal, 205
 Ismet Altay, 127
 Istanbul, Convention of, 73
 Istanbul Greek Socialist Center, 128
İtilâ (newspaper), 205
itlizam, 5
- Janissaries, 5
 atrocities by, 26
 uprisings and, 20
- Jews/Judaism. *See also dhimmi*
 atrocities against, 27
 crypto-Christians/crypto-Jews and, 6
 education and, 82
 labor movements and, 127–128
 millet system and, 12–13

- Jews/Judaism (*cont.*)
 political rights of, 42–46
 religious composition of Epirus and
 Thessaly (1880) and, 76*t*
 Treaty of Bucharest and, 202
- jizya*, 4, 4n8
- Joachim II, 110
- Joseph II, 33
- judicial system. *See also* sharia law
 crimes against Muslims and, 91
 government of Ottoman Empire
 and, 13–14
 of Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 69–71,
 77–78
 muftis and, 80, 80n22
 Tanzimat reforms and, 16
- jus sanguinis*, 50
- Kairis, Theophilos, 31
- Kalender Kösk, Treaty of, 29
 Muslims rights under, 48–49, 51
 property rights of Muslims and, 66–68
 violations of, 58
- Kamal Rıfat, 186
- kanun-name*, 11–12
- Kapodistrias, Ioannis, 28, 52, 67
- kapudan pasha*, 32
- Karahisaritis, Pavlos, 207
- Karaso, Samuel, 201
- Katartzis, Dimitrios, 38
- Kemal Atatürk. *See* Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal
- Kemaledin Sali Bey, 154*t*, 164*t*–165*t*
- Kerim Sekerdji Redjep, 154*t*
- kharaj*, 4, 4n8
- Khurshid Pasha, 23
- Kingdom of Hellas/Greece. *See also*
 Western Thrace
 1832–1862, 26*m*
 Aegean islands and, 105–106
 agriculture in, 54, 56, 64–65
 citizenship in, 49–50, 50n16
 education of Muslims in, 195–197
 Egyptian *vakıf* and, 193–195,
 193n57–193n58
 emigration of Muslims from, 54–59
 government of Ottoman Empire and, 29
 Greco-Ottoman Committee and, 67–71
 Greek national identity and, 40–41, 43, 46
- Hexabiblos* and, 64, 77
 judicial system of, 69–71, 77–78
 Lausanne, Treaty of and, 107,
 107*n9*, 108*t*
 laws of Ottoman Empire and, 63–71
 legal status of Muslims in, 48–52, 50n16
 Muslims in, 47–71
 Orthodox Christians and, 48–52,
 50n16, 55–58
 Ottoman Empire and, 51–52, 63–71
 political rights of Muslims in, 198–200
 property rights of Muslims in and, 48,
 53, 57–60, 63–71, 69n87, 71n92
 Regency Council of, 55, 55n32, 58
 sharia law and, 63–64, 71
 territory of, 24–26
 Treaty of Lausanne and, 174–179, 176*n9*
 World War I and, 105–107
 World War II and, 190–192
- kodjabashi*, 34
- Kolettis, Ioannis, 28
- koligoi*, 84, 148, 151, 157, 166
- Kollyvades movement, 31
- Kolokotronis, Theodoros, 23–24, 27–28
- Kommounistiko Komma Ellados, 129
- Konemenos, G., 68
- Kontostavlos, Alexandros, 42
- Koraes, Adamantios, 46
- Kosmas the Aetolian, 37
- Koumoundouros, Alexandros, 88, 91
- Kountouriotis, Georgios, 27–28
- Kuchuk-Kainarji, Treaty of, 32–33
- labor movements, 127–129
- laity, councils of, Tanzimat reforms and, 15
- Lameras, Konstantinos, 161
- language
 annexation of Thessaly and, 74
 Islam in Southeastern Europe during
 the Ottoman Empire and, 6–9, 6n17,
 7n18, 8n20–8n21, 8n24
 in New Lands, 147
 Ottoman Turkish, 222
 power rearrangements within Rûm
millet and, 36–38
- Lanz, Hubert, 191
- Lausanne, Treaty of, 107, 107*n9*, 108*t*,
 174–179, 176*n9*

- legal status of Muslims and, 179–180
 muftis and, 181
- League of Nations, 107, 127, 176–178, 180, 183, 187, 188, 189, 209, 210
- legal status of Muslims
 in Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 48–52, 50n16
 in New Lands, 134–141, 137*p*
 in Thessaly, 76–78, 77n12
 Treaty of Lausanne and, 179–180
- Levidis, Nikolaos, 92
- Liberal Party, 154*t*, 166–168
- London, Treaty of, 96, 105
- London Protocol
 Greek War of Independence and, 28–29
 Kingdom of Hellas/Greece and, 48, 51, 57
 property rights of Muslims and, 66–67
 violations of, 58
- Londos, Andreas, 27–28
- Ludwig I, 41, 55
- Lutfi Omer, 164*t*–165*t*
- Macedonia
 Balkan Wars and, 96–98, 97*p*–98*p*, 99*m*, 100*t*–102*t*
 Macedonian Struggle and, 85–86, 95
 Muslim war refugees and, 112–116, 113*p*–114*p*, 114*n*29, 116*p*
 population of Muslims in, 98–105, 99*m*, 100*t*–105*t*
 Young Turks and, 95, 96*p*
- Maghreb, the, Byzantine era and, 1
- Mahmud Dramali Pasha, 22
- Mahmud II, 19, 30, 193, 214
- marriage, 10–11
- Maturidi school, 9
- Maurer, George Ludwig von, 55
- Mavrokordatos, Alexander, 14, 27
- Mawson, Thomas, 162
- Mazower, Mark, xii, xiv–xvii
- Megali Idea, 61–63, 73, 85–86, 129, 160, 169, 223–224
- Mehmed II, 2
- Mehmet, Derviṣ, 41
- Mehmet Beyzade Bey Tayyip, 154*t*
- Mehmet Hilmi, 205
- Mehmet Ismail Effendi, 79–80
- Mehmet Mustafa Balaban, 154*t*
- Mehmet Saadik Ismail, 154*t*
- Mehmet the Conqueror, 11
- mektep*, 54
- Memoirs* (Germanos III), 215–216
- mercantile class. *See also* trade
 education and, 34–35
 Greek nationalism and, 33–35
 Greek War of Independence and, 33–35
 in New Lands, 157–160, 158*f*
- merchants. *See* mercantile class; trade
- Metaxas, Ioannis, dictatorship of, 192, 211–213
- military of Ottoman Empire
 decline of, 31–33
 Janissaries and, 5, 20, 26
- Miller, Jonathan, 34
- Millet* (newspaper), 205
- millet-bashi*, 16
- millet* system. *See also* Rûm *millet*
 Balkans and, 49–50
 Islam in Southeastern Europe during Ottoman Empire and, 12–14, 13n37
 power within, 35–38
 Tanzimat reforms and, 12–13, 14–18
- minorities, xvii
- Misac Palaeologos Pasha, 6
- missionaries, 1
- Modern Greek Enlightenment, 30–32
- Mohammed Ali Ahmed Siri, 186
- Mohammed Naguib, 193
- Mohitin Yavuz, 126
- Monemvasia, 22
- Moore, Margaret, 225
- Moors, 1
- Morea uprising, 20–23
- mortality rates of Muslims
 during Balkan Wars, 109–110, 112
 during Greek War of Independence, 24–26
 during World War I, 110–111
- Mudafaa-i Islam* (newspaper), 208
- Mufti Emin Ramiz, 165*t*
- muftis, 180–181
 in New Lands, 139–140
 in Thessaly, 79–80, 80n22
- muhacir*, 4, 123
- Muhammad Ali, 28, 193, 193*n*57–193*n*58
- mülk*, 64
- multiformity of Islam, 7–9, 7n17–8n18, 8n20–8n21, 8n24

- Murad I, 5, 11
- Muslims
- annexation of Thessaly and, 74–94, 76t
 - Athens mosque and, 85–86
 - atrocities against, 21–27, 109–111, 163
 - Çams, 176–177, 176n9, 180, 182, 187–192, 196–197, 209–210, 212
 - citizenship of (*see* citizenship of Muslims)
 - colonization by, 3–4, 3n5
 - crimes against, 91
 - discrimination complaints by, 89–90
 - Eastern Orthodox Christianity and, 216
 - education and (*see* education of Muslims)
 - Egyptian *vakıf* and, 193–195, 193n57–193n58
 - emigration of (*see* emigration of Muslims)
 - of Euboea, 47, 49–50, 52–61
 - Greek national identity and, 40–46
 - Greek nationalism and, 35, 40–46
 - in Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 47–71
 - Lausanne, Treaty of and, 107, 107n9, 108t
 - legal status of (*see* legal status of Muslims)
 - Megali Idea and, 61–63
 - mortality rates of (*see* mortality rates of Muslims)
 - in New Lands, 126–134, 131
 - of Ottoman Thessaly and, 74–76, 76t
 - patronage of Ottoman Empire towards, 59–61
 - political rights of (*see* political rights of Muslims)
 - population of (*see* population of Muslims)
 - power rearrangements within Rûm *millet* and, 35
 - property rights of (*see* property rights of Muslims)
 - protection of by the Orthodox Christians, 109–110
 - as refugees from New Lands, 113, 115–116
 - religious composition of Epirus and Thessaly (1880) and, 76t
 - religious practice in Euboea and, 55–56
 - rights of under Treaty of Kalender Köşk, 48–49, 51
 - secessionist movements among, 169–171
 - sharia law and (*see* sharia law)
 - social strata in New Lands, 157–160, 158p
 - Treaty of Bucharest and, 202
 - Treaty of Lausanne and, 174–179, 176n9
 - Turkish nationalism and, 117–122
 - as war refugees, 111–117, 113f–114p, 114n29, 116p
- Mustafa Beyzade Neir, 154t
- Mustafa Ismail Effendi, 79
- Mustafa Kemal Young Atatürk. *See* Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal
- Mustafa Osman Bey, 164t
- Mustafa Sabri, 193, 204, 207
- Mustafa Sefket, 110
- musta'min*, 4n8
- Müyesser Ertunç, 134
- Nadir Ramadan, 154t
- Nansen, Fridtjof, 127, 174
- Nassar, Gamal Abdel, 193–195
- National Government of Western Thrace, 170
- nationalism. *See* Albanian Nationalism; Greek nationalism; theories of nationalism; Turkish nationalism
- Nationalist Party, 151, 165
- National Liberation Front, 192
- National Minded Party, 164t–165t
- National Republican Greek League, 192
- National Schism, 166
- Navarino, 22–23
- Nazim Pasha, 113
- Nazmi Efendi, 154t
- Nea Imera* (newspaper), 62
- Near East* (magazine), 187
- Negris, Theodoros, 43, 45
- Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, 30–32
- Nerves Varjabedyan, 17
- Neuilly-sur-Seine, Treaty of, 107
- New Lands, 98–108, 99m, 100t–105t, 108t
- agriculture in, 103, 122, 132, 150–158, 162
 - citizenship in, 135
 - emigration of Muslims and, 119–126
 - language and, 147
 - lawlessness within, 133

- legal status of Muslims
 within, 134–141, 137*p*
muftis in, 139–140
Muslim refugees from, 113, 115–116
Muslim social strata in, 157–160, 158*p*
Orthodox Christian refugees to, 130–
 134, 131, 149–150
political rights of Muslims in, 153, 154*t*,
 160–171, 161*p*, 164*t*–165*t*
property rights of Muslims in, 135, 140,
 147–157, 154*t*
- Nikmendi Tzemil Bey, 165*t*
- Nikousios, Panagiotis, 14
- Nomos tis Epidavrou, 42–43
- Ntourbali Sultan, 185
- Omer Duri İzzet, 153
- Omer Husni Bey, 94
- Organosis Konstantinoupoleos, 130
- Oriental Federation-Leonidas
 Voulgaris, 129
- Ornstein, John, 110
- Ornstein, Otto, 110
- Ornstein, Theodore, 110
- Orthodox Christians. *See also* Christians/
 Christianity; *dhimmī*
atrocities against, 20–21, 20n8, 22–23
atrocities against Muslims and, 21–27
Eastern Orthodox Christianity and,
 214–216
education and, 31–32, 37
emigration of Muslims from Kingdom
 of Hellas/Greece and, 54–59
Greek nationalism and, 30–35, 40–46
interfaith marriage and, 10–11
Islam in Southeastern Europe during
 the Ottoman Empire and, 10–14
Kingdom of Hellas/Greece and, 48–52,
 50n16
Kollyvades movement and, 31
millet system and, 12–13
Muslim emigration and, 125
Muslims in New Lands and, 126–134, 131
nationalism and, x, xiv–xvi
Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment and, 31
Patriarchate of Constantinople and, 36–37
power rearrangements within Rûm
 millet and, 35–38
- protection of Muslims by, 109–110
as refugees of war, 182–184
as refugees to New Lands, 130–134, 131,
 149–150
- Rûm vs. Hellenic identification and,
 38–40
- Russo-Ottoman War and, 32
- Sufism and, 6, 10
- Tanzimat reforms and, 15–17
- Treaty of Lausanne and, 174–179, 176*n9*
- Turkish nationalism and, 119
- uprisings and, 20–21, 20n8
- Osman I, 2
- Osman Nuri, 205
- Osman Said Bey, 113
- Osman Sesbes Avdi, 165*t*
- Otto (Wittelsbach), 41, 50
 1844 Constitution and, 68
- Euboean Muslims and, 55
on Muslim citizens, 47
- Ottoman Empire and, 59
 property rights and, 60
- Ottoman conquest, 2–3
- Ottoman Empire, 2–3, 11–12, 11n34
 Aegean islands and, 105–106
annexation of Thessaly and, 72–94, 76*t*,
 77n12, 80n22
- Balkan League and, 96
- capitulation system and, 17–18
- citizenship in, 82, 121
- conversion to Islam and, 4–6, 4n8
- court system within, 5
- education within, 31–33
- Egyptian *vakıf* and, 193–195,
 193n57–193n58
- emigration of Muslims and, 89–93
- exodus of Muslims from Kingdom of
 Hellas/Greece and, 54–59
- government of (*see* government of
 Ottoman Empire)
- Great Eastern Crisis and, 72–74, 78
- Greco-Ottoman Committee and, 67–71
- impact of Tanzimat reforms and, 17–18
- İslâhat Fermâni (Ottoman Reform
 Decree of 1856) and, 17
- Islamic creed and, 9–11, 9n27
- Kingdom of Hellas/Greece and, 51–52,
 63–71

- Ottoman Empire (*cont.*)
language in, 6–9, 6n17, 7n18,
8n20–8n21, 8n24
laws of Kingdom of Hellas/Greece and,
63–71
military of (*see* military of Ottoman Empire)
millet system and, 12–14, 13n37
muhacir and, 4
multiformity of Islam and, 7–9, 7n17–8n18,
8n20–8n21, 8n24
Muslim colonization during, 3–4, 3n5
non-Muslim religious communities in,
10–14
Ottoman Thessaly until 1881, 75*m*
patronage towards Greek Muslims
by, 59–61
Pax Ottomana and, 3
Tanzimat reforms and, 14–18
taxation in (*see* taxation in Ottoman Empire)
trade within, 31–33
Turkish nationalism and, 117–122
World War I and, 105–107
Ottoman-Italian War of 1911–1912, 96
Ottoman Kanun, 11
Ottoman Reform Decree of 1856 (İslâhat
Fermâni), 17
Ottoman Socialist Party, 128
Ottoman Turkish language, 222
Ottoman Union, Committee of the, 117–118
Paisiy Hilendarski, 37–38
Pangalos, Theodoros, 176, 188
Pan-Islamism, 221
Papa Eftim I, 207–208
Parios, Athanasios, 31
Paris, Congress of, 51
Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 169
Patents of Toleration, 33
Patriarchate of Constantinople, 36–37, 40,
86, 95, 207–208, 215
Pax Ottomana, 3
Peace Convention of Athens, 134–135,
139–140, 181, 193
education and, 141, 143
property rights and, 148–151
Peasants into Frenchmen (Weber), xvi–xvii
People's Party, 151, 154*t*
Peri ton Ellinikon Syferonton (Koraes), 46
Peştereli Tevfik Bey, 203
Phanariots, 13–14, 13n37
education and, 34
Filiki Etaireia (Society of Friends) and, 19
government of Ottoman Empire and, 32
Greek nationalism and, 32
as *hospodars*, 19, 33
power rearrangements within Rûm
millet and, 36–37
purges of, 21
Phillips, Alison, 23
Phrantzes, Amvrosios, 24
Pittaris, Ioannis, 58
Plastiras, Nikolaos, 156
Polish Minorities Treaty, 178
political rights of Muslims, 42–46
in Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 198–200
in New Lands, 153, 154*t*, 160–171, 161*p*,
164*t*–165*t*
in Thessaly, 81–82
Politikon Syntagma tis Ellados, 21, 43–44
population of Muslims
in Macedonia, 98–105, 99*m*, 100*t*–105*t*
in Western Thrace, 172, 172*n4*, 173*t*–174*t*
Proodos (newspaper), 143
property rights of Muslims, 48, 53, 57–60,
63–71, 69n87, 71n92
annexation of Thessaly and, 83–85, 90–91
exchanged property and, 185–192
Greek War of Independence and, 65–66
in New Lands, 135, 140, 147–157, 154*t*
Prosorinon Politevma tis Ellados, 42
Protestants. *See* Christians/Christianity
Provisional Government of National
Defense, 107, 124, 147, 151–152, 156,
162, 166
Psyllas, Georgios, 58
Rahmi Bey, 150
Raip Hadji Kerim, 154*t*
Rallis, Dimitrios, 160
Ramazan Eser, 134
reciprocity, 178
Redjep Lutfi Hadji Mestan, 154*t*
refugees of war
Muslims as, 111–117, 113*p*–114*p*,
114*n29*, 116*p*
Orthodox Christians as, 182–184

- Regency Council, Kingdom of Hellas/Greece, 55, 55n32, 58
- Reşat Tesal, 134–135
- Revolutionary Government of 1922, 163
- riba*, 16
- Riza Ali Hamdi Bey, 154^t
- Roman Catholics. *See* Christians/Christianity
- Romanian uprising, 19–20
- Romioí, 38–40
- Rûm *millet*
- Byzantine era and, 1–2, 2n4
 - Greek national identity and, 40
 - Greek nationalism and, 35–40
 - Hellenic identification vs., 38–40
 - language in, 36–38
 - Ottoman conquest and, 2
 - power rearrangements within, 35–38
 - Turkish nationalism and, 120–121
 - uprisings and, 20, 20n8
- Russo-Ottoman War, 28–29
- emigration of Muslims and, 86
 - Greek nationalism and, 32
 - Orthodox Christians and, 32
- Sali Mehmetoğlou, 154^t
- Sali Sefik Hadji, 154^t
- Salonica, Macedonia, 97^p–98^p
- Muslim war refugees and, 112–116, 113^p–114^p, 114n29, 116^p
 - Young Turks and, 95, 96^p
- San Stefano, Treaty of, 72–73
- Schinias, Alexandros, 98^p
- Scouloudis, Stefanos, 143, 151
- secessionist movements among Muslims, 169–171
- Seit Abas, 154^t
- Selim I, 11
- Selim III, 26, 214
- Seljuks, 1–2, 6
- Serafendin Ahmet Alisan, 154^t
- Şevket Bey, 167
- Sèvres, Treaty of, 111, 171, 181, 203
- sharia law, 181. *See also* judicial system
- government of Ottoman Empire and, 11–12
 - Kingdom of Hellas/Greece and, 63–64, 71
 - muftis and, 79–80
- sheikh-ul Islam*, 11–12
- Simeon I (Bulgarian tsar), 1
- Sirri Sali Bey, 164^t
- Skalieris, Georgios, 161
- Smith, Anthony, xv
- Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, 128
- Social Democratic Workers' Party, 128
- Socialist Workers' Federation, 127–130
- Socialist Workers' Party of Greece, 129–130
- Society of Friends. *See* Filiki Etaireia (Society of Friends)
- Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, 106
- Sophocles Evangelinos Apostolides, 40–41
- Sosialistiko Komma Ellados, 129
- Soukri Efendi, 154^t
- Souliotis-Nikolaidis, Athanasios, 129–130
- Stratos, Nikolaos, 160
- Stylianopoulos, Konstantinos, 182, 189
- Sufism
- annexation of Thessaly and, 74–75
 - dhimmi* and, 6
 - in Euboea, 52–53
 - Islam in Southeastern Europe during the Ottoman Empire and, 9–10, 9n27
- Suleiman the Magnificent, 2
- Summary of the History of Reborn Greece* (Phrantzes), 24
- Sunni Muslims
- annexation of Thessaly and, 74
 - in Euboea, 52–53
 - Islam in Southeastern Europe during the Ottoman Empire and, 9
- Talaat Bey, 110
- Tanzimat reforms, 4n8, 5, 78
- capitulation system and, 17–18
 - education and, 82
 - evkaf* and, 80–81
 - impact of, 17–18
 - Islam in Southeastern Europe during the Ottoman Empire and, 14–18
 - millet* system and, 12–13
- tassaruf*, 64–65
- taxation in Ottoman Empire
- bedl-i askeri* and, 4n8
 - conversion to Islam and, 4–5, 4n8
 - dhimmi* and, 4–5, 4n8

- taxation in Ottoman Empire (*cont.*)
 Greek War of Independence and, 65–66
itlizam and, 5
jizya and, 4, 4n8
timar system and, 3–4, 3n5
- Tefik, Ahmet, 48
- tekkes*, 9–10, 53, 58, 80, 185–186
- terdjümân bashı*, 32
- territorial expansion of Greece
 1932–1947, 25m
- theories of nationalism, xi–xvii
- Theotokis, Konstantinos, 140
- Thessaly, annexation of, 72–94, 76t, 77n12, 80n22
 agriculture and, 81–94
 Athens mosque and, 85–86
 community councils of Muslims and, 80–81
 crimes against Muslims and, 91
 education of Muslims and, 82–83
 emigration of Muslims from, 86–93
 Great Eastern Crisis and, 72–74, 78
 Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 and, 93–94
 legal status of Muslims and, 76–78, 77n12
 muftis in, 79–80, 80n22
 Muslims of Thessaly and, 74–94, 76t
 Ottoman Thessaly until 1881, 75m
 political and social life of Muslims and, 81–82
 property rights of Muslims and, 83–85
 religious composition of (1880), 76t
timar system, 3–4, 3n5
Times of London (newspaper), 62
- Tourkos, 39
- trade within Ottoman Empire, 31–33. *See also* mercantile class
- Triantafyllakos, Nikolaos, 156
- Triantafyllidis, Manolis, 147
- Triple Alliance, 106, 117, 169
- Triple Entente, 106–107, 110, 169–170, 203
- Tselio Teffik, 165t
- tsiflikades*, 84–85
- Tsitselikis, Kostantinos, 146
- Turkey, Republic of, 141, 174–179, 176n9
- Turkish-Bulgarian Committee for the Liberation of Western Thrace, 170
- Turkish nationalism, 117–122
 national identity and, 119–120
 Orthodox Christians and, 119
Rûm millet and, 120–121
 Western Thrace and, 200–208
- Turkish Republic of Western Thrace, 203–204
- Turkish War of Independence, 119–120
- Tzavelas, Kitsos, 40
- ulama, 9–12, 16
- Ülkü* (newspaper), 205
- Union and Progress, Committee for, 118, 163–164
- Union and Progress, Party of, 118–119, 122
- Valaades, 8, 8n18, 11, 87, 103, 143–146, 161
- Valentin, Edmond François, 59
- Vamvakas, Charisios, 121
- Vehit Ali Bey, 164t–165t
- Venizelos, Eleftherios, 106–107, 123, 129, 140, 152–181, 192, 199, 207–208
- Vienna, Congress of, 51
- vilayet*, 72
- Villa, Djafer, 210
- Vlachopoulos, Giannis, 110
- Vladimirescu, Tudor, 19
- Vlahov, Dimitar, 128
- Von Anderten, Klaus, 115
- Voulgaris, Eugenios, 31
- Voulgaris, Leonidas, 129
- Vrachori, 27
- warlords, 19
- Weber, Eugen, xvi
- Western Thrace
 Committee for the Liberation of, 203
 Independent Government of, 202
 population of Muslims in, 172, 172n4, 173t–174t
 secessionism and, 169–171
 Turkish nationalism and, 200–208
 Turkish Republic of, 203–204

- World War I, 105–107
Muslim mortality rates during, 110–111
Muslims as refugees of, 114–117
World War II, 190–192
- Yalçın, Kemal, 179
Yarım (newspaper), 205
Yaya Bendri, 154*t*
Yeni Adım (newspaper), 205
- Yeni Astır* (newspaper), 165
Yeni Ziya (newspaper), 205
Young Turks, 95, 96*p*, 117, 119, 138, 143,
163–164, 201, 203
Ypsilantis, Alexander, 19–20, 30
Yusuf Haki, 165*t*
- Zaimis, Alexandros, 107
Zografas, Konstantinos, 55