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'Demographic engineering': the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation

John McGarry

Abstract

In this article I examine the state-directed movement of ethnic groups. Such movements include the settlement of majority groups in peripheral regions inhabited by minorities, the relocation of minority groups within the state, and the expulsion of minorities from the state. An important theme of the article is that, while such policies have been implemented for centuries, modern state-directed movements are closely linked to the growth of nationalism. The study seeks to answer three important questions: (1) Why do states move ethnic groups? (2) How do states move ethnic groups? (3) Under what circumstances will states engage in such policies?

Keywords: Migrations; diasporas; refugees; deportations; expulsions; settlements.

States have an impressive array of techniques at their disposal when it comes to dealing with ethnic diversity (McGarry and O'Leary 1994). One of these is to move ethnic groups. States have induced groups into moving through a variety of incentives or pressures, or have moved them by blunt force. Groups loyal to the state have been settled in peripheral regions inhabited by minorities. Disloyal, or unfavoured, groups have been relocated from one part of the state to another, or have been expelled from the state altogether.

The movement of ethnic groups as a technique for regulating conflict has received little detailed comparative analysis. There are three types of publications related to this subject, all of which have limits. First, there are a large number of books which focus on single cases, whether the settlement of majority groups in minority regions, or the relocation/expulsion of minorities.[1] One virtue of these works is that they draw attention to the centrality of the state's role in moving ethnic groups. Their major shortcoming, however, is that they focus on a particular

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group or region and, following from this, do not advance generalizable theoretical explanations.[2]

Second, there are conventional migration-studies. Many of these are comparative, but they are normally focused on economic and social push-pull factors, such as economic/demographic pressures in the source-region and opportunities in the destiny-region, rather than on the role of purposive state policies in moving groups (for example, Hatton and Williamson 1987). Some of them, even those which focus on the migration of particular ethnic groups, are dedicated to denying an important role for the state in population movements (for example, Lewis, Rowland and Clem 1976).

Third, there are a number of comparative studies of refugee/diaspora movements, that is, the movement of groups under duress (for example, Marrus 1985; Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo 1989). These are much more likely than migration studies to attribute an important role to the state. Like many of the other publications listed here, they provide an indispensable resource-base for the current article. The problem with refugee/diaspora studies is that they tend to cover all flights and not focus sufficiently on the state-directed variety. Thus, these works cover flights from wars which are unrelated to ethnic conflict; which stem from conflict which is ethnically based but is spontaneous rather than state-directed (such as the massive flight in 1947 of Muslims from India and Hindus from Pakistan[3]); which result from state-persecution but are an unintended consequence of that persecution (the flight of Huguenots from seventeenth-century France[4]); and which are – the subject of this study – an intended consequence of state action. In addition, refugee/diaspora works not only fail to focus on the creation of state-directed movements, they are usually, like migration studies, as concerned with how the groups are integrated into destiny-states, as with how they are created. A final problem with refugee/diaspora works, from the perspective of this article, is that they normally focus on groups which are forced across international frontiers, with much less (and only relatively recent) discussion of groups which are internally relocated, and hardly any treatment of majority settlements in minority regions.

There is therefore need for a comparative and analytical study of the movement of ethnic groups as a technique which states purposefully use to manage ethnic diversity. While such movements represent only a small subset of total migrations, it is a significant proportion which has affected many millions of people this century and which is lost sight of in the dominant explanations of migrations, diasporas and refugee flows.

The article breaks the state-directed movement of ethnic groups into a simple dichotomy. On the one hand, state authorities move *agents*, that is, groups which are intended to perform a function on behalf of the state. State agents are normally *settled*, that is, made provision for, and they are normally moved to peripheral parts of the state occupied by minorities.

On the other hand, the authorities move *enemies*, that is, groups which in their present location pose a problem for the authorities and an obstacle to their goals. 'Enemy' status is subjectively assigned by the authorities, and need not correspond with anti-state activity on the part of targeted groups.[5] Enemies are moved from their homes and either relocated to other parts of the state or expelled from it. When dealing with such enemies, state authorities normally make little provision for their resettlement, and often move them under extremely harsh conditions.

One of the themes of the article is that state-directed movements in the modern era have been shaped by the development of nationalism and, in particular, the tendency of many nationalist movements to be based on specific ethnic groups.[6] As a result a number of states have become 'ethnicized', that is, governed by regimes which are associated with the state's dominant ethnic group and which are ethnocentric in nature. Another result is that a number of states have been confronted by minority-based nationalist movements, or have come to suspect the allegiance of their minorities in time of war, particularly war with states dominated by the minority's ethnic kin. In all these cases, minorities have come to be seen by authorities as threats to state security. It is such concerns about security which drive the authorities to move minorities or settle minority regions with individuals from majority groups.[7]

This article seeks to answer a number of important questions about state-directed movements: (1) Why do states move ethnic groups? The argument is that ethnicized regimes in control of a state's resources (and in some cases non-ethnicized regimes faced with a perceived threat from an ethnic minority[8]) use state-directed movements to further self-defined statist security objectives. (2) How do states move ethnic groups? Here the article discusses the range of mechanisms which states employ to move groups. Such measures go beyond the use of crude compulsion and include an array of incentives and pressures. A discussion of these measures helps to show how widespread the use of state-directed movements is. (3) When do states engage in such policies? Here, the aim is to come up with a manageable typology of circumstances which will not only help us to understand why past state-directed movements occurred when they did, but also when future movements might occur. These questions are addressed in sequence.

1) Why does the state move ethnic groups?

State-directed movements, whether of 'agents' or 'enemies', are undertaken in the belief that it will promote security. States may seek to augment security in the short term by garrisoning enemy territory with agents or by expelling enemy groups. Alternatively, they may seek to increase security over the long term by directing agents into enemy

territory or enemies out of these territories in order to promote assimilation. Here, the goals behind the movement of agents and enemies are treated in turn.

Why are state agents moved in?

Agents are settled in particular regions to consolidate the state's control of the area and its resources. The function of agents is to deter rival ownership claims or military aggression from neighbouring states and to minimize the risk of dissent and rebellion from local minorities.

The introduction of agents into peripheral regions, particularly disputed regions, is undertaken to help the state to assert its sovereignty against external competitors. In this case, agents establish 'demographic facts' and act as 'human flagpoles'. Agents, it is thought, may also deter external invasion because they constitute a hostile population in the path of an invading army. To this end, agent-colonies are often made up of soldiers, or demobilized soldiers, or particularly militant sections of the state's population. Thus, Greece settled its border region with Turkey with ethnically Greek refugees who had been expelled from Turkey and who could reasonably be expected to guard the frontier zealously.[9] Israel's first settlements in the West Bank after 1967 were primarily designed to ward off external military aggression. They were positioned along the Jordan rift valley on the frontier with Jordan, and their function was to give the Jewish populations in pre-1967 Israel advance warning of Arab attack.[10]

Agents are also settled to cow local groups who otherwise might be inclined to revolt. In some cases, such as in Israel (or the plantation of Ulster in the early seventeenth century), the settlers remain apart from local populations, and act as 'garrison-peoples'. Settler towns such as Londonderry or many Jewish settlements in the West Bank are designed with such functions in mind. They are located in strategic sites, such as tops of hills or entrances to passes, and they are surrounded by fortified walls.

Other states, however, introduce agents into minority regions with the goal of encouraging intermixing. The aim here is to dilute the minority's demographic strength, thus undermining its ability to reproduce itself and leaving it more susceptible to assimilation into the state's dominant group. Such assimilationist strategies may be followed for their perceived long-term stability and security benefits, but they may also be valued for reasons of ideological mission or efficiency.

Assimilationist goals have formed important parts of settlement policies in a variety of communist countries, although there are disputes about whether the aim was to create transcendent identities or to expand that of the dominant (Russian/Han/Vietnamese) group (Connor 1984). They have also been behind Turkish and Arab settlements in Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq, respectively. In the mid-nineteenth century,

it was Lord Durham's hope that the French-Canadian presence in British North America could be extinguished through swamping by English settlers, although his recommendation was not energetically pursued (Durham 1992, p. 159).

Why are state 'enemies' moved out?

The goals behind the movement of enemy groups are similar to those behind the settlement of state agents, which explains why the two different types of movement frequently occur in tandem.[11] In some cases, local minorities are removed, or partially removed, to make way for the settlement of state agents. Local minorities may also be removed to rehouse co-ethnics of the state's dominant group expelled from neighbouring states.

Just as authorities settle agents to consolidate control, so they may also move enemies for the same purpose. The existence of a perceived enemy group in a strategic region, it is thought, can encourage irredentism and military aggression from neighbouring states, and facilitate the success of external invasions. The removal of the group reduces this risk and, like the introduction of agents, establishes 'demographic facts' which augment the state's sovereignty over the region.[12] The group may also be removed to counter the risk of a secessionist bid or revolt in the relevant area. A state may seek to undermine the prospects of a successful rebellion by removing a sympathetic population base, as the Turkish government has done recently with its Kurdish minority (Human Rights Watch 1994b). South Africa's apartheid regime removed large numbers of blacks from urban areas in part because of the belief that urban populations were more easily mobilized and more likely to threaten the regime than their rural counterparts (see Price 1990, pp. 13–27). The eviction of some blacks was undertaken not only to remove them as a threat but to deter those who remained from challenging the state. South Africa's government also removed blacks to nominally independent 'Bantustans' within the state in an attempt to consolidate white control in the remainder of South Africa by persuading international opinion that blacks were self-governing rather than disenfranchised South Africans.

Enemy groups may be removed from their homelands and scattered across other parts of the state to assist in their assimilation.[13] Relocation of the minority, like the settlement of the state's agents in their midst, is pursued to dilute the enemy concentration, and to force a degree of interaction. Relocating enemies also breaks the link between the enemy group and its 'homeland' – with its physical and sentimental reinforcements for particularist identities – a break, which, in the minds of some central élites, facilitates assimilation.[14] In one prominent case of demographic engineering – Verwoerd's vision of 'Grand Apartheid'

in South Africa – the relocation of enemies was designed not to assimilate them, but to *dissimilate* them, that is, fragment the huge black population into ethnic pieces by making them citizens of ethnic 'homelands'.

Some state élites believe that enemies can be converted into state agents when relocated from their homelands to other parts of the state. Oded, in a study of the Assyrian empire's routine deportation policy, points out that dissident minorities were relocated to the territory of another dissident minority as part of an imperial divide and conquer policy. According to him, the policy worked, with the relocated minority, dependent on the regime for its new homes, acquiring an interest in upholding the centre's authority (Oded 1979, pp. 46–48). In the Soviet Union, Russified minorities from the west of the state, such as Balts or Ukrainians, performed a pro-state Russifying function when they were introduced into Muslim regions in central Asia.[15]

State-directed movements do not necessarily produce the sought-after results. In fact, they are often counterproductive. Thus, the targeting of minority groups for control or assimilation often results in the strengthening of group solidarity and plays into the hands of élites from the group who stress its uniqueness. The flooding of minority homelands with majority settlers, or the relocation of minorities to majority areas, rather than promoting assimilation in line with classic diffusionist (liberal and Marxist) thinking or subduing the minority, often enhances minority mobilization against the outsiders. Such a counterproductive response is evident in the nationalist responses of moved groups like the Kurds of Turkey, Tatars of Crimea, or Uighurs of China, and most obviously, perhaps, in the case of the Chechens.[16] The latter's intense nationalist mobilization, resulting in a bloody war with Russia and the *de facto* independence of Chechenya, can be traced in part to the bitterness caused by their forced relocation to Siberia in 1944. Similarly, the apartheid regime's attempt at dissimilation also failed spectacularly. Instead of strengthening ethnic solidarities among Xhosa, Tswana and Zulu, the state's movement (and related) policies had the effect of bolstering the position of those élites who stressed pan-Africanism and, even more significantly, non-racialism (Adam and Moodley 1993, p. 29).[17]

2) How are ethnic groups moved?

Here, the article is concerned with the range of methods which states employ to move agents and enemies, and with how state-directed movements can be distinguished from more conventional migrations shaped by economic and demographic factors, and with refugee movements that are not state-directed.

Conventional migration versus state-directed migration: i) State agents

Ethnic groups migrate for a variety of reasons unrelated to purposeful state action. Members of a dominant ethnic group migrate to another part of the state because of conventional push–pull factors. Socio-economic factors peculiar to the group, such as a high birth rate, or the level of economic development in the region from which the group comes, may be at play. Group-specific ideological proclivities, such as the desire among some Jews to settle biblically-important Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), may also be influential. There are numerous cases, moreover, as in parts of Tsarist Russia or in Gaelic Ulster, where groups of settlers arrived before the state did (Stewart 1986; Kolstoe 1995, pp. 1–12). But the migration of dominant group members can also be directed by the state. Political authorities can manipulate push–pull factors in a way which suggests they may not be the independent factors that many sociologists and economists assume.

How do states 'pull' their agents to desired locations? The most obvious magnet throughout history has been free or heavily subsidized land, often expropriated from enemy groups, as with the Cromwellian regime in Ireland during the 1650s or Israel in the West Bank and Gaza after 1967, or purchased from them, as by the Settlement Commission established by the German government to buy up Polish owned land in 1886 (Blanke 1993, p. 51). More recently, it is good houses or jobs which lure settlers, as in the case of Russian settlement in the Soviet Union's Baltic Republics after 1945. A common policy of the Tsars, when they wanted to encourage settlement, was to offer recruits subsidized travel and exemption from military service and taxes. Russian settlers in Turkestan were exempted from taxes for three years, and rewarded with a 50 per cent reduction in taxes for a further three years (Kolstoe 1995, p. 24). These incentives were bolstered by generous land allotments, which were far larger than those allowed to locals (ibid., p. 29). More recently, the Israeli government has offered a variety of incentives to increase Jewish settlement in the West Bank, including subsidized housing, tax breaks and low mortgages (Benvenisti 1984, p. 60).

In addition to these direct incentives, states facilitate settlement by building communications infrastructures which carry its agents to the site of settlement, or, as in the case of Jewish settlements in the West Bank (Benvenisti 1984, pp. 22–23), allows them to commute from their settlements to jobs elsewhere. A favourable linguistic environment is also created, in which the state provides schools, jobs and public services in the language of the dominant group, as in peripheral parts of the Soviet Union (Connor 1984). Finally, states frequently provide military installations to protect their agents, a *sine qua non* for settlement in some cases.[18]

States can also 'push' their agents to move, although such policies are more normally employed with state 'enemies'. Some settlers do not have

any say in the matter: they are soldiers ordered to garrison peripheral outposts (ibid., p. 329). Such tactics are understandably more likely, and more likely to be successful, in totalitarian regimes. Soviet authorities sometimes required graduating students to spend three years in positions assigned by government anywhere in the Soviet Union, and apparently used this towards conflict regulation ends (ibid., pp. 317–18).[19] Chinese communist authorities are alleged to have forced members of the Han Chinese majority to migrate to outlying minority regions (ibid., p. 327).

Many settlements would not occur or be as popular without these purposeful state measures. Contrary to Zionist mythology, not all Jews who settled in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1970s and 1980s were religiously-motivated and keen to liberate land which the Bible promised to them. An honest fifth of those who responded to surveys (although the real figure is probably much higher) said that it was cheaper (government-subsidized) housing packages which were responsible for their decision to settle (Newman 1991, p 32). Even the two-fifths who claimed they were there for pure 'ideological' reasons may well have been influenced by state policy, as the Likud government was also involved in propagating the ideological imperative of settling Judea and Samaria through public statements and government-controlled advertising campaigns.

Conventional migration versus state-directed migration: ii) State enemies

As with dominant groups, the migration of minorities within states or across state frontiers occurs for a number of reasons unrelated to state policy. Population pressures and lack of economic opportunities may prompt minorities to migrate to urban regions or to other countries where there are more jobs. Ideological pressures might play a part also, as in the movement of Jews from various countries, particularly from eastern Europe in the first half of this century, to Palestine. The migration of minorities may also result from a rise in social discrimination or political persecution (Marrus 1985, p. 28). Conflict in an ethnic group's territory, whether inter- or intra-state, may unleash ethnic refugee flows, both within the state and across its frontiers. It is natural that groups will move to flee violence, particularly if it appears that their side is losing and that the new order is going to be less hospitable than the old.

In some cases, the authorities are indifferent to such movements. In other cases, minority exoduses take place against the government's will, as in the case of the Huguenot departure from France after 1685. While some rank and file Quebec separatists might have rejoiced at the Anglophone exodus from the province after 1976, there is little evidence that this was what the provincial government desired, let alone engineered.[20]

When the massive Hutu flight from Rwanda took place in 1994, it was clear that this was *against* the wishes of the new regime, as it spent most of the next two years trying to get the refugees back.[21]

But in many cases, authorities want to move enemy groups and take steps to achieve this. Often, this is uncontroversial, as the authorities involved make no secret of their intentions. Senior officials in Nazi Germany were explicit about their pre-Holocaust determination to drive Jews out of Germany.[22] Idi Amin expelled his Asian minority from Uganda by public decree. In several other cases, decisions to expel or to exchange or transfer ethnic minorities are the focus of international agreements, such as the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which provided for the exchange of Orthodox and Muslim minorities between Greece and Turkey, or the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which sanctioned the expulsion of German minorities after World War II (Ladas 1942; de Zayas 1989). While Stalin was understandably secretive about his violent deportation of several national minorities in the 1940–44 period, these policies were later disclosed by Kruschchev at the famous 1956 Communist Party Congress.

Even if the state-directed movement of enemy groups is restricted to such uncontroversial cases, this technique of conflict regulation would be deserving of attention. In addition, however, there is a range of more controversial cases where the state's role in moving minorities is less clear, and a subject of partisan debate.[23] Many states, such as Israel with respect to Palestinians in 1948, deny responsibility for the intentional creation of refugees. This may be because moving ethnic groups, particularly if it imposes a burden on neighbours, can result in international retaliation and pariah status. In certain circumstances, as in Bosnia in the early 1990s, the state-creation of refugees can result in the indictment of those responsible by international human-rights tribunals.

Conversely, refugees and minority migrants may over-emphasize the state's role in their decision to move.[24] In these contested cases, there is no substitute for assiduous research in uncovering the degree of the state's responsibility (for example, see Morris 1987, 1994; Blanke 1993, ch. 2). Few can seriously deny, however, that the state-directed movement of enemy groups is a phenomenon which stretches considerably beyond those instances where states admit culpability.

States which want to move enemy groups employ a range of weapons. First, they may use direct force. Stalin had several national groups transported from the Caucasus in 1944 into the Soviet interior, by surrounding their villages with interior ministry [NKVD] troops and loading the inhabitants into cattle-cars. Similar direct coercion has been used to move state enemies across international frontiers, as in the case of Austrian and German Jews after the *Anschluss* of 1938, or German minorities of eastern Europe after 1945–1947.

Indirect coercion is also frequently employed. A state may induce the

movement of an enemy group through destroying its habitat and making it impossible to survive at home, a tactic that the Iraqi regime applied in Kurdish regions in the 1980s (McDowall 1992, p. 108). In the former Yugoslavia, indirect coercive tactics, used notably but not exclusively by Serbian authorities to create refugees, included the murder or expulsion of élites, mass-killings, psychological warfare, rape, artillery onslaughts on urban areas, use of snipers, commando raids and destruction of the physical infrastructure on which urban life depends (such as electricity, heating plants, kiosks selling newspapers, TV and radio transmitters, communal bakeries) (Woodward 1995, p. 245). Another tactic was to imprison males and inform their families that they would only be released if they 'agreed' to leave the territory (Bell-Fialkoff 1993, p. 119). Israeli forces employed psychological intimidation to promote a Palestinian exodus in 1948, and methods used by Jewish irregulars included assassination and massacre (Morris 1987).

Beyond these violent actions, in which authorities participate directly, there is a grey area where state representatives use surrogates to inflict violence on minorities, or play a less than enthusiastic role in preventing mob violence against minorities. Nazi authorities, in control of a totalitarian state, clearly orchestrated pogroms against Jews to induce their emigration, such as those which occurred during *Kristalnacht* in 1938 (Burleigh and Wippermann 1991, pp. 89–90).[25] One senior Polish official, explaining his government's reluctance to stop deadly assaults on the country's German minority in 1921, stated that he 'could not possibly have Polish workers fired upon to protect Germans' (cited in Blanke 1993, p. 41).

In addition to using violence to achieve their aims, states can seek to pressure enemy groups into moving by a variety of discriminatory measures designed to make life unpleasant for the targeted community. Before proceeding to direct forced expulsions in 1938, Nazi authorities sought to pressure Jews into emigrating through an array of repressive legislation, including the Nuremberg laws of 1935 (Burleigh and Wipperman 1991, p. 88). The inter-war Polish state directed discriminatory measures against its German and Jewish minorities to induce their emigration (Mendelsohn 1983, p. 39; Blanke 1993, p. 43; Brubaker 1996, p. 86), and it also seems plausible to suggest that the harassment of and discrimination against Arabs in east Jerusalem, Muslims of Western Thrace, and Slavs of Greek-controlled regions of Macedonia are aimed at promoting their emigration, although it is difficult to prove this (Human Rights Watch 1990, p. i, Human Rights Watch 1994a; *The Economist*, 23 November 1996, pp. 46–47).[26]

A useful adjunct to such measures is the denaturalization of those who emigrate, flee or are expelled, to prevent their return. Greece, which has put pressure on its Turkish population in Western Thrace and its Slavic population in Greek-Macedonia to emigrate, employs a range of

measures to strip citizenship from those ethnic minorities who leave the country (Human Rights Watch 1994a, pp. 26–36).[27] Turks and Slavs, unsurprisingly, are more likely to be denaturalized than Greeks. Israel, according to both leftist Jewish and Palestinian sources, is employing similar tactics towards Palestinians in east Jerusalem, annexed by Israel in 1967 but not recognized by any other state as part of Israel. Palestinians from east Jerusalem are 'permanent residents' of Israel but, since 1994, large numbers of Palestinians leaving to live or study elsewhere have been unable to renew their residency status.[28]

3) When do states move ethnic groups?

Thus far, this article has argued that states move ethnic groups to achieve a range of goals, one of the most important of which is the consolidation of control over territory. It has also shown the vast array of measures which states have at their disposal to bring about such movements, measures which are both indirect and direct, and which involve both inducements and blunt force. An understanding of goals and methods, however, tells us little about the timing of such state policies. Any complete explanation of state actions must also address the temporal question: when will a state undertake the movement of ethnic groups?

States have moved ethnic groups as part of imperial control strategies since antiquity (Oded 1979), but from the nineteenth century, the state-directed movement of ethnic groups has been inextricably linked to the rise of ethnically-based nationalisms – with the associated creation of states dominated by particular ethnic groups and/or containing nationalist movements based on ethnic minorities. Nationalist ideologies are responsible for determining which groups become state agents and which state enemies.[29] While it is impossible to list the circumstances which lead states to resort to state-directed movements with precision, it is clear that such policies are linked to two broad, sometimes related, temporal factors: 1) periods when the state is captured by radical (chauvinistic or anti-nationalist) élites; and 2) periods in which state security is seen to be threatened by minority groups. Together these factors account for practically all state-directed movements this century.

1) State-directed movements and the presence of radical élites

State-directed movement policies, particularly those involving extreme coercion, are more likely to be employed when the state is captured by politicians with hardline nationalist (or anti-nationalist) positions. The success of such politicians, in turn, can be explained by a range of factors, including economic downturns, external dangers, the culture of

the state's dominant group, as well as political factors such as the relative skill of hardline politicians over their opponents and, in democracies, the vagaries of the electoral system. The success of radical politicians may even come down to what Machiavelli called *fortuna*, as in the Israeli-election of 1996 when the 'success' of Islamic terrorist bombs wiped out a substantial lead for the moderate Labour leader, Shimon Peres, and led to the election of the pro-settlement Netanyahu. One reason why state-directed movements of ethnic minorities have not occurred in much of western Europe or North America since the nineteenth century is that these countries have usually been centrist liberal democracies.

The importance of political leadership can be seen by looking at single states over a time period in which leadership changes. Thus, policies to induce Jewish emigration from Germany in the inter-war period began only after the takeover of the state by the Nazis in 1933. Similarly, anti-Semitic policies in inter-war Poland were linked to the electoral success of the Polish nationalist right, the National Democrats (Mendelsohn 1983). Settlement policies in Israel have been related to the fortunes of the right-wing Likud party, and have been less common, though still practised, under Labour. Asians were expelled from Uganda in 1971 only after the establishment of Amin's dictatorship. The heyday of South Africa's internal relocations occurred under Prime Minister Verwoerd in the 1960s. Many of the state-directed movements carried out in the Soviet Union, such as the deportation of Volga Germans in 1940 and several groups from the Caucasus in 1944 took place under Joseph Stalin, and can be attributed, to some extent, to his penchant for radical policies. His more moderate successors refrained from such extreme actions, and allowed several of the deported groups to return home.

2) State-directed movements and threats to state security

The timing and location of state-directed movements is also linked to perceived threats to state security. These in turn can promote the fortunes of hardline politicians, although, as explained above, the latter's popularity may be due to factors unrelated to security. A claim that security is threatened is likely to be plausible under the following four circumstances: (i) the state's authority is rejected by minority leaders; (ii) inter-state conflict occurs in which a minority is, or is believed to be, a security risk; (iii) the state's control over minority regions is disputed by neighbouring states; (iv) a state acquires new territory occupied by dissentient minorities, or an ethnonational group acquires statehood in a heterogeneous territory. The article goes through these four circumstances and shows that they account for the main instances of state-directed population movements in the past century.

(i) ***The State's authority is rejected by minority élites – the 'rebel threat'***
States move their agents into minority regions to deal with minority rebellion, or with a rise in nationalist/secessionist sentiments among a minority. Canada's first prime minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, recommended the swamping of Metis areas with settlers after they rebelled in the 1880s.[30] German settlements in Germany's Polish territories in the late nineteenth century were implemented at a time of rising Polish nationalism, part of a general rise in ethnonationalism in eastern Europe (Blanke 1981). Communist settlements in China and the Soviet Union have also been a response to nationalist mobilization among minorities.[31] Iraq's decision to settle the oil-producing Kirkuk region with Arabs during the 1970s and 1980s was a response to increasing Kurdish national assertiveness (McDowall 1992).

States may also decide to respond to minority rebellion by moving enemies. The Moriscos of Spain were resettled across the country after a revolt in 1570, in an attempt to assimilate them (Hess 1968, p. 5). The Kurdish people of Iraq and Turkey were moved from their homes during rebellions against their respective states within the past twenty years.[32] In the case of Turkey, Kurdish peasants were relocated from rural to urban areas in the 1980s and 1990s so that they could be more easily controlled and subjected to assimilation pressures, Kurdish PKK guerillas could be denied a supportive minority population which would harbour it and supply it, and the Turkish army could operate without the constraints imposed by operating among a civilian population (Human Rights Watch 1994b).

(ii) ***A security danger in the event of external attack – the 'fifth-column' threat***
States become especially concerned about minorities and about control of their peripheries in periods of high inter-state tension, particularly in the period preceding, during and immediately after inter-state war. The concern is over the loyalty of minorities and their preparedness to act as a fifth-column for rival states. Such anxieties existed in the pre-nationalist era: the decision of the British crown to settle Ulster in the early seventeenth century can be explained not only by the rebelliousness of the local Gaelic élites, but, more importantly, because of the dangers of the Catholic powers (France and Spain) using Ulster as a backdoor through which to invade Britain. But they have become more pervasive in the age of nationalism as states frequently find that their border-regions in particular are occupied by the ethnic kin of the groups which control neighbouring rival-states, or by groups seeking opportunities to throw off alien yokes.

Greece's settlement of Greeks in its Western Thrace and Macedonian regions from the 1920s was motivated by fears of Turkish and Bulgarian attacks on these regions respectively, and the first Jewish settlements in

the Golan Heights and the West Bank (Jordan river valley) regions after 1967 were influenced by fears of another war with Syria and Jordan respectively.

State enemies are also routinely moved in such situations. Both world-wars this century led to the relocation of multiple ethnic minorities from strategic regions.[33] Tsarist and Soviet Russia forcibly resettled ethnic Germans in the Russian interior during World Wars I and II respectively (Marrus 1985, pp. 53–54), while Poles and Balts were internally exiled by the Soviets during World War I (ibid., pp. 196–97). Fears of a German fifth-column also help to explain measures to reduce the size of the German minority in Poland in the aftermath of World War I, as well as the forced eastward deportation of ethnic Germans from the Polish frontier with the Reich in the opening days of World War II (for the latter, see Blanke 1993, pp. 232–33). [34] Even democracies normally liberal in their politics have deported what were perceived as 'enemy-affiliated' ethnic minorities in wartime: both the United States and Canada deported their ethnic-Japanese populations from their West-coast regions into internment camps in their interiors. There were also moves to disperse these populations so that they would be assimilated (Daniels 1993).

Even victory in war can be followed by state-directed movements, in this case because the struggle has provided evidence, at least in the minds of dominant groups, that minorities have collaborated with invading forces. Stalin's deportation of national minorities from the Caucasus region was fuelled, at least in part, by the belief that they had collaborated with Nazi forces (or, in the case of regions not reached by the Nazis, would have done if given the opportunity). After World War II, several German minorities, which had existed in eastern central Europe for several centuries, were expelled from their states because they were regarded as security threats (Claude 1955, pp. 99–100; de Zayas 1989). Large numbers of Arabs were expelled from Israel in 1948 for similar reasons (Morris 1987).[35] In the 1990s Palestinians were forced out of Kuwait after the allied victory over Iraq in the Gulf war because their leadership had sided with Saddam Hussein and they were believed to be a fifth-column sympathetic to Iraq's claim on the area (Crystal 1992, p. 168). Such postwar movements are both punitive, in relation to past collaboration, and preventive, in that they rule out future collaboration between internal enemy groups and outside enemy forces.

Wars between states (or civil wars) produce state-directed movements based on revenge and instrumental reasons. As one state (or group) expels an enemy-related minority for reasons of security, the state with which it is fighting may reciprocate. The latter expulsion makes way for the minority removed by the former expulsion and addresses the desire for vengeance. Several Jewish minorities were expelled from their homes in Arab states following the Israeli-Arab war of 1948 and the expulsion

and flight of Palestinians from what became Israel. This pattern was a common one during the two Balkan wars accompanying the breakdown of the Ottoman empire at the turn of the century (Marrus 1985), and also during the third Balkan war which followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991.[36] Sometimes third-party minorities get caught up in the struggle. Ingushis were removed from North Ossetia to help make room for South Ossetians expelled from Georgia in the early 1990s (Birch 1995).

Wars facilitate movements for other reasons also. Wars radicalize people, and bring militant leaders to the fore who are prepared to execute policies, such as relocating or expelling minorities, which would be unthinkable in peacetime. These policies seem less extreme and easier to justify when violence is everywhere.[37] Wars also produce a number of opportunities to carry out radical policies which are not normally available under peacetime conditions. War conditions and censorship allow states to screen forced movements of ethnic groups from international and domestic media exposure. Finally, wars enable states to disguise state-directed expulsions of ethnic groups as 'voluntary' flight from fighting.

(iii) ***When sovereignty over a minority region is disputed – the 'irredentist threat'***

There are a variety of scenarios in which control over territory is likely to be disputed, such as during civil wars, pending a final peace settlement demarcating boundaries, or in the aftermath of a secession. State-directed movements, whether the movement of agents into the disputed region, or the movement of enemies out of it, can be used to create 'demographic facts' on the ground which undercut the claims of competitors, strengthens one's own claims, and present *fait accomplis* at negotiations. Blanke, discussing the period immediately after 1918 in Poland, argues that

> continued talk of frontier revision, not only in Germany but in other western countries, including even rumours of a belated plebiscite solution to the Corridor problem [that is, the area separating east Prussia from the rest of Germany], could only spur Poland's leaders on to eradicate the demographic basis for any reconsideration' (Blanke 1993, p. 63).

Ironically, as in Bosnia just before the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, impending negotiations can lead to an escalation of settlements and expulsions. [38]

Disputes over a state's control of territory are usually waged between rival states, or in the case of state implosion or civil wars, as in Yugoslavia, between rival ethnic groups. But the dispute can also be internal to one

of the ethnic competitors. Israel's Likud government is aware that its ability to hold on to large parts of 'Judea and Samaria' depends on its winning the intra-Jewish struggle between contractionists and expansionists, and not on securing outside approval, and its settlement policies are aimed at winning this internal dispute (Lustick 1993). There is also some evidence that Israel, in preparation for the 'final status' talks on Jerusalem's future (which must be completed by 1999), is pressuring Arabs to leave eastern parts of the city, and to prevent those who do leave from returning. Disputes over ownership, and accompanying movement policies, may occur when territory has been recently acquired. These cases are discussed in the following section.

(iv) ***When a minority-occupied region has been recently acquired or when an ethnonational group has gained statehood in a heterogeneous territory***

States with newly-acquired minority-occupied territories, and new states, dominated by one ethnic group but containing minorities, are likely to combine many of the above features. A state's right to its new territory is more likely to be disputed by other states than its sovereignty over areas which it has controlled for a long time (Lustick 1995).[39] This is because the new territory will normally have been taken from another state, which may harbour irredentist claims.[40] Minorities resident in the new territory (or new state) may well resent their new status, particularly if they have been transformed by the border changes from a dominant group to a minority, as were the Germans in inter-war Poland, or Serbs in post-1991 Croatia, or Turks of post-1960 Cyprus (in their case, after a lengthy transitional period of British mandatory government). They are therefore likely to question the new state's sovereignty over them and to welcome external intervention from their ethnic compatriots. The presence of minorities in newly-acquired territory or new states may thus represent a serious threat to the state's control of part of its territory, or even to its very survival as a state, and may give rise to resentment on the part of the state's dominant group. State-directed movements may well occur in such circumstances, unless the states have liberal centrist regimes in place (as with Masaryk's government in inter-war Czechoslovakia).

In many cases, new 'nationalizing'[41] states, such as inter-war Poland, post-1948 Israel, or post-1991 Croatia, will be resentful of the minority presence for additional reasons to those discussed already. Independence for them may have come after long struggles with the group from which their present minority is comprised, as in the Polish case with respect to Germans (Blanke 1993, p. 1). The fruits of independence, a state in which promotion of the dominant group's culture becomes official state policy's, might be thought to be at risk because of the minority's presence (see Zolberg 1985; Brubaker 1996).

It is hardly surprising, particularly when such states are captured by

right-wing nationalist elements, that there should be attempts to weaken the minority's presence and strengthen that of the majority. Policies may be passed to discriminate against minorities with the intent of inducing migration, and/or which are aimed at expanding majority settlements.[42] Forced movements of minorities are unlikely outside of open conflict, but can sometimes happen when Idi Amin expelled Uganda's Asian community.

If conflict does occur in these new nation-states, particularly if it involves minority rebellion or aid to invading external powers, it presents an opportunity to chauvinist élites to forcibly expel the minority and to replace that minority with members of the dominant group. This is what happened in Croatia in 1995, as the Croatians effectively expelled their Serbian minority, and in Israel in 1948, when large numbers of Palestinians were driven out. In such circumstances, minority 'treachery' allows radicals to increase support for, and implement, a removal option which they may have desired all along. Disloyalty allows expulsion to be justified to outsiders and insiders as punishment and/or as necessary for security.[43]

The creation of new states dominated by particular national groups who often possess 'nationalizing' agendas (that is, a programme of intended discrimination against their minorities) can, understandably, lead to pre-emptive or defensive strikes by minority groups. This is particularly likely to occur, or at least to enjoy some success, if the minority has outside help. Thus, when Croatia declared independence in 1991 and its government made it clear that it intended to favour Croats (Hayden 1992), Croatia's Serbs, with help from the Serb-dominated JNA, seized the initiative by 'cleansing' their areas of Croats. Their goal was to create 'demographic facts' to be used towards the creation of a greater Serbia, or at least to prevent the incorporation of their territory into Croatia. Their action was only temporarily successful. In 1974 Turkish Cypriots launched a similar pre-emptive strike with the help in this case of an invading Turkish army. They responded to an Athens-backed coup in Nicosia (which in their minds heralded *enosis*) by seizing the northern 40 per cent of the island and removing Greek-Cypriots from it. Ossetians of south Ossetia sought to prevent their incorporation in independent Georgia in 1992 by taking arms and expelling ethnic Georgians. Without external assistance, their success was even more short-lived than was the Croatian Serbs', and some of them were expelled to North Ossetia, a part of Russia (Birch 1995). Bosnia's Serb minority also took the initiative in 'ethnic cleansing' after Bosnia's declaration of independence in 1992, but in their case without the same levels of provocation suffered by their Croatian counterparts.

In many other cases, the acquisition of new territory (or statehood) has been followed by state-directed movements.[44] In the nineteenth century, the United States followed its acquisition of the southwest from Mexico

in 1848 by settling immigrants in the area, the aim being to disempower the local Chicano and indigenous populations. In the twentieth century, state agents were settled in eastern Poland after it acquired statehood in 1918; in those parts of western Poland annexed by the German Reich in 1939; in western Poland (formerly eastern Germany) after it was acquired by Poland from Germany in 1945; in the Balkans during the expansion of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia at the expense of the Ottoman empire from 1878 onwards; in the West Bank and Gaza, after it was acquired by Israel in 1967; in northern Cyprus (by Anatolian Turks) after the invasion by Turkey in 1974; and in East Timor, after it was acquired by Indonesia in 1974. State enemies were relocated when the Soviet Union acquired the Baltic territories and eastern Poland in 1939 (Marrus 1985, pp. 196–97),[45] and when East Timor was taken over by Indonesia in 1974. Discriminatory policies were passed to induce minority (German and Jewish) migration from Poland after 1919.

Conclusion

This article has focused on the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of ethnic conflict management. In many cases, states have moved their agents into minority regions and/or relocated perceived enemy groups to other parts of the state or expelled them altogether. Since the growth of ethnically-based national movements, the state's agents have normally been recruited from its dominant ethnic group, while those designated as enemies have been ethnic minorities. The main goal behind such movement policies is the consolidation of the state's hold over a particular piece of territory. The state-directed movement of ethnic groups is thought to achieve this consolidation by facilitating control and/or assimilation of a minority group, or by removing the minority from the territory in question.

States have a wide array of tools which can be used to move ethnic groups. These tools exist on a continuum, with incentives designed to pull groups at one end, and sanctions designed to push them at the other. Incentives are normally employed to relocate state agents, while sanctions are more likely to be targeted at state enemies.

As the state-directed movement of ethnic groups is employed as a form of conflict regulation, ethnic groups are particularly likely to be moved during periods of high inter-ethnic tension or conflict. Such periods occur when radical politicians are in office and/or under a range of circumstances in which the security of the state is endangered, such as war, minority rebellion, external irredentism, state expansion and state disintegration.

State-directed movements have affected tens of millions of people in Europe alone this century, and hundreds of thousands in the past few years. There is every likelihood that the phenomenon will continue to be

important in the near to medium future. And yet there has been very little comparative analysis of such movements. The current literature on refugees and migrants is instead dominated by discussion of causal factors which have little to do with intentional and ethnocentric state policy.

This article is a first step towards a comparative and state-centred explanation of these movements. There is much more to be done, however, in establishing why, how, and when, states employ such policies. There is also need for more comparative work on the consequences of such movement policies, both in terms of state aims and from the perspective of the targets of state policy. Finally, there is a need for further study on the conditions in which states might reverse these policies, by withdrawing agents and/or by allowing minorities to return to their homes. These are issues which will be addressed in future research.

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Notes

1. There are books/reports on the expulsion of Germans from eastern Europe after World War II (de Zayas 1989; 1994), Palestinians from Israel in 1948 (Morris 1987; 1994), Muslims from the Balkans in the late Ottoman period (McCarthy 1995) and Muslims from Bosnia in the early 1990s (Cigar 1995). There are also single case-studies which focus on internal relocations, such as that of Soviet minorities under Stalin (Conquest 1970; Nekrich 1978) or of Turkish Kurds in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch 1994b), and studies which examine the settlement of particular majority groups in minority regions (Newman 1991).

2. Many of the case-study accounts are also victim- (rather than state-) centred and/or partisan. By focusing on a particular type of movement, such as an expulsion or an internal relocation or a majority settlement, their approach also precludes discussion of the ways in which these movements are related to each other, or why one type of movement may be selected rather than another. Thus, states may move minorities to make room for majority settlement. One state may relocate internally a minority, while another state expels its minority, or indeed, the same state may take these contrasting steps against different minorities, or against the same minority at different times.

There are a number of books by historians which focus on forced expulsions across a range of countries, but they are chronological and descriptive rather than analytical in nature (Schechtman 1946, 1962; Kulischer 1948).

3. This is the classic explanation of the massive refugee-producing riots in India in 1947 (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo 1989, pp. 130–32). Culpability on the authorities' part is restricted, at most, to an unpreparedness or inability to take the action necessary to prevent the conflict.

4. The flight of the Huguenots – the group responsible for the introduction of the word refugee to the English language – was, according to Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, an unintended consequence of their persecution (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo 1989, pp. 5–7). Louis XIV, operating in a mercantilist system, did not want to lose his valuable entrepreneurial Protestants. He merely wanted them to convert to Catholicism. The decision to leave was theirs, not his.

5. In some cases, allegiant groups, such as the German Jews in the 1930s, were branded as 'enemies'.

6. The association between nationalism and ethnicity is so strong that Walker Connor uses the term 'ethnonationalism' instead of nationalism (Connor 1994). However, there are nations, such as the United States, which, having little sense of shared ancestry, are not ethnic nations.

To argue that nationalisms in many instances are based on distinct ethnic groups does not mean accepting what Brubaker criticizes as a 'Modiglianesque' vision of the social world – the view that such groups are 'real entities' – primordial or biological in nature, internally homogeneous and externally bounded (Brubaker forthcoming). Rather, group solidarities are politically and socially constructed, with varying degrees of permeability depending on context. Whether an individual identifies politically with a particular group, as this article shows, is crucially affected by state policies, though not necessarily in the way policy-makers intend. Thus, while some state-directed movements were aimed at assimilating groups, as with Stalin's relocation of Chechens in 1944, the result was instead the construction/reinforcement of a particularistic Chechen identity. Similarly, while the South African apartheid regime moved blacks into ethnic homelands in order to *dissimilate* them, the result was the strengthening of a South African identity among blacks and the rejection of sub-South African ethnic identities.

7. This focus on nationalism allows us to distinguish between at least some pre-modern state-directed movements and more recent examples. In the pre-nationalist era, rulers were not as concerned with subjects' culture or ethnicity: the Tsars settled Greeks, Germans and others in the Black Sea region and elsewhere, often privileging them over local Russian-speakers (Kolstoe 1995, p. 21; see also Bartlett 1979); the Habsburgs invited Serbs and others into the Krajina region of modern Croatia; and eighteenth-century Poland welcomed German settlers (Blanke 1993, p. 45). In the age of nationalism, however, many states have relied on their largest ethnic group as state agents and treated minorities with suspicion or as enemies. By the end of the nineteenth century, Germany was expanding *German* settlements in its eastern borderlands (Blanke 1981, pp. 185–92); in the inter-war period, Poland was moving *Polish* settlers into both its eastern and western territories; and even the Soviets, who were officially non-nationalists, came to rely on *Russians* and related western Slavs when settling their periphery (Connor 1984). One consequence of the new nationalist order was that several of those minorities who had been employed as state agents in the earlier period now found themselves depicted as state enemies and either forcibly relocated or evicted, as in the case of the Black Sea Germans and Greeks (1940s), the Germans of Poland (1945–47) and, most recently, the Serbs of Krajina (1995).

8. Here I am primarily referring to the United States, which forcibly relocated Japanese Americans during World War II. This example makes clear that the state's view of people as identifying with a particular group does not necessarily square with self-identifications. Many Japanese Americans identified with the United States rather than with Japan and, when offered the opportunity, displayed their loyalty on the battlefield.

9. The Greeks settled in these regions had been displaced from Anatolia by Kemalist forces in the early 1920s. They could be expected therefore to be fiercely anti-Turk, reliable police for the local Turkish population and border-guards. (For Greek Macedonia, see Human Rights Watch 1994a, pp. 5–6; for Western Thrace, see Poulton 1993, p. 183).

10. This article is concerned primarily with the conditions under which settlements are established rather than with the conditions under which they might be dismantled. It is possible, however, to infer the latter from the former. Thus, as threats to security are an

important reason for acquiring territory and settling it with agents, a reduction in the threat can lead states to consider withdrawing from the acquired territory, and either repatriating or abandoning its agents.

In Israel, Shimon Peres and other leading elements in the Israeli Labour Party believe that there is no longer a serious threat to Israel's security from the PLO – which has recognized Israel's right to exist – or from an Arab military incursion via the West Bank. More important dangers in their view are internal terrorist activity, and missile attacks from Iraq or Iran, which make irrelevant the 30 to 50 kilometre 'strategic depth' that Israel gives as a reason for holding on to the entire West Bank (cited in Lieberfeld 1997, p. 17). Given this revised assessment of threat, Labour has opted for peace with the PLO, withdrawal from most of the West Bank and the abandonment or (more likely) repatriation of the state's agents (Jewish settlers).

11. 'Indigenes out, non-indigenes in', according to Connor, was a conflict management strategy of several communist states (Connor 1984, pp. 327–45). Similar tactics have also been applied by non-communist states.

12. Just as a state may seek to induce the emigration of enemy groups to undercut irredentist claims, so the irredentist state may take action to prevent such an outflux. Thus, Germany employed a range of measures to keep German citizens from leaving Poland between the wars, including calling on them to take Polish citizenship, giving them economic aid, and making it more difficult for them to come to Germany (see Blanke 1993, pp. 48–49; Blanke 1993, pp. 142–52).

13. The '10 lost tribes of Israel' disappeared as a result of deportation and subsequent assimilation by Assyrians (Norwood 1969, p. 37; Oded 1979, pp. 30–31). According to Norwood, 'The exiles, involuntary refugees, were, following the Assyrian custom, scattered in various cities and assimilated into the larger local population. In this way the Israelite refugees lost their identity in social merger'.

14. Whether authorities are correct to think that this kind of forced mixing will promote assimilation, or that a group forced out of its homeland will therefore be more amenable to assimilation, is clearly questionable. As the article discusses below, such measures frequently produce the opposite effect from the intended one, reinforcing particularistic identities among targeted groups.

15. The Canadian government is alleged to have relocated Inuit people from their homes in Quebec to the Northern Arctic during the 1950s in order to promote Canadian sovereignty against competing claims from the Soviet Union and United States. The Inuit and their supporters claim they were treated as 'Human flagpoles' (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1994).

16. While the targeting of Japanese-Americans and Canadians for internal relocation during World War II did not prevent their assimilation into the American and Canadian mainstreams, it seems highly likely that it would have delayed this by heightening the victims' awareness of themselves as Japanese.

17. The belief that such settlement/internal resettlement policies fail to achieve their purpose may help to explain why some states implement the more radical policy of expelling minorities from the state altogether. For an argument on the shortcomings of settlement policies and in support of expulsions in the context of the West Bank, see Kahane 1981.

18. It will be interesting to see how many of the 400 or so Zionist settlers located in the middle of Hebron stay there if peace negotiations with Palestinians result in a withdrawal of the Israeli state's security forces.

19. Soviet Communist authorities hinted that some compulsion was used to secure a Russian influx into the Kazakhstan region (Connor 1984, p. 373, n. 250).

20. The claim by the prominent Anglophone writer, Mordechai Richler, that the Anglophone exodus was 'ethnic cleansing', a term which implies intent as well as the use of extreme violence to bring about the exodus, is disingenuous (*New Yorker*, 30 May 1994, p. 54).

21. This does not mean that the new Tutsi regime necessarily has the welfare of the Hutu refugees in mind. On the contrary, the Tutsis were concerned that the refugee camps were being used as bases for rebel attacks on Rwanda (and Burundi). It made more sense, from the Tutsi perspective, to have the refugees back in Rwanda, where they could be more easily controlled. Whether this is a wise decision is another question. Tutsis may also have wanted to get Hutus back to try/punish them for the 1994 genocide.

22. As a German Foreign Office official explained in January 1939: the 'ultimate aim of Germany's Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living on German territory' (cited in Marrus 1985, p. 215).

23. For a detailed treatment of such a partisan debate, that between Germans and Poles on the role of the Polish state in bringing about a huge German exodus in the post-1918 period, see Blanke 1993, ch. 2. The most famous debate is probably that waged over the responsibility of Israel for the flight of Palestinians in 1948 (Morris 1987).

24. While the inter-war Polish state took several steps to rid itself of its German minority, the minority none the less exaggerated the state's role in their decision to leave. Blanke argues that while many in the Polish government clearly wanted rid of the Germans, their anti-German measures played only a secondary role in the German exodus (Blanke 1993, p. 40).

25. State-orchestrated pogroms and discriminatory legislation contributed to the emigration of 150,000 of Germany's Jewish population of 500,000 between the Nazi takeover in 1933 and 1938. The numbers would have been higher had countries outside Germany been more hospitable towards immigrants (see Marrus 1985, pp. 145–58).

26. There is not necessarily a concerted and agreed-upon plan by authorities to force minorities out. It is more likely that in the cases referred to, certain state agencies, or certain individuals within the state élite, push this option, whereas other agencies and individuals take different, even contradictory positions.

27. Art. 19 of the Greek Nationality Law, No. 3370, enacted in 1955 declares: A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality' (Human Rights Watch 1994a, p. 31).

28. According to *The Economist* the consensus among Palestinians, shared by some Israelis, is that this policy 'is a deliberate attempt to whittle away Palestinian numbers in East Jerusalem' (*The Economist*, 23 November 1996, pp. 46–47).

29. The emphasis here is on the subjective and constructed nature of agent and enemy status.

30. 'these impulsive half-breeds . . . must be kept down by a strong hand until they are swamped by the influx of settlers' (MacDonald, cited in F. G. Stanley 1961, p. 95).

31. The Chinese authorities settled 'millions' of Han Chinese in minority regions in what Connor describes as 'The Great Leap Westward' (Connor 1984, p. 327).

Discussing western Chinese province of Xinjiang, the home of Uighurs, a minority of Muslims of Turkic origin, *The Economist* recently stated: 'Large numbers of Chinese have been moved to Xinjiang. In 1949, about 300,000 Chinese made up 3.7% of Xinjiang's pop and the Uighurs were in the majority. Today over half the population is Chinese' (*The Economist*, 13 July 1996).

32. 'Ethnic cleansing Iraqi style', *New Statesman and Society*, 21 May 1993, pp. 20–21; Human Rights Watch 1994b.

33. During World War I, both Russia and the central powers engaged in relocating ethnic minorities from the military front into their respective interiors. Thus Russia deported 50,000 ethnic Germans to the east during World War I (Marrus 1985, pp. 53–54; de Zayas 1989, p. 3). The Germans and Austrians, similarly, deported thousands of Poles westwards from zones of military activity (Marrus 1985, pp. 57). With the war in eastern Europe being fought largely over the 'Pale of Settlement', an area with a dense Jewish population, both sides also deported large numbers of Jews during the fighting (ibid., p. 61) The Russian High Command believed that Jews would welcome a German victory, a belief

which flowed in part from the Jews' Yiddish language, which was a German-Jewish dialect (Marrus 1985, p. 62)

During World War II, the Soviets forcibly relocated the Volga Germans, several national minorities from the Crimea and Caucasus regions (Tatars, Ingush, Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechens and Balkars), and large numbers of Balts and Poles after the areas in which they lived had been recaptured from the Germans. Canadians and Americans of Japanese origin were interned after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Daniels 1993).

34. A 'representative' Polish newspaper editorial warned in 1921 that 'the German population of western Poland is carrying on treason and espionage with the understanding of Germany and forms the avant-garde of the German army. All German properties in Poland are strategic footholds of Germany'. The paper also recommended that 'we must strive to get rid of this population as soon as possible' (cited in Blanke 1993, p. 60).

35. Even before 1948 Zionists had argued that their experience in the Diaspora demonstrated that they needed a state in which they would be demographically dominant. The war of 1948, initiated by surrounding Arab states and their Arab allies within Palestine, strengthened this view.

36. If we take mid-1995 alone, we can see this ethnic-cleansing dynamic at work. Bosnian Muslims expelled Serbs from central Bosnia to make way for expelled Muslims, while Bosnian Serbs expelled Muslims from the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa apparently because of the Muslim expulsions of Serbs in central Bosnia. In August 1995 Bosnian Serbs expelled Croats and Muslims from northern Bosnia (Banja Luka) to make room for, and retaliate for, the Croatian expulsion of Serbs from the Krajina region during the previous month (*Globe and Mail*, 15 August 1995).

37. Thus, the allies approved the expulsion of large German populations from eastern Europe during 1943 at the height of the European conflict (Claude 1955, p. 102).

38. In one paper's view, the cease-fire in Bosnia which resulted from the Dayton Accords was preceded by 'one of the war's worst rounds of ethnic cleansing', *Globe and Mail*, 12 October 1995, p. 1.

39. Lustick points out that the longer a state possesses a territory, the more likely it is that outsiders will acknowledge its 'right' to that territory. Length of tenure contributes to a state's ownership of territory becoming 'hegemonic', that is, unchallenged (1995).

40. Inter-war Poland is an example of a case where distrust of the [German] minority was linked to irredentism. Germany refused to accept the revisions to its eastern border made by the Treaty of Versailles, and was particularly rankled by the creation of a corridor which cut the larger part of Germany off from east Prussia. In Blanke's words, the spectre of border revision was one factor that 'spurred Polish officials on to diminish the size and economic influence of the German minority (Blanke 1993, p. 121).

41. In this context, the term 'nationalizing' does not mean the expansion of the state sector at the expense of the private. Rather it refers to the expansion of the dominant group's sector at the expense of minorities. The term is taken from Rogers Brubaker's excellent book (Brubaker 1996, pp. 55–106).

42. For details of Polish settlement policies in western Poland between the wars, see Blanke 1993, pp. 111–13.

43. The perpetrators of expulsions usually exaggerate the disloyalty or treachery of minorities, and gloss over any pre-existing desire they may have had to create an ethnically pure state, as this makes the expulsion more justifiable. On the other hand, those expelled will highlight such pre-existing ideological inclinations on the part of the dominant group and play down any role they themselves might have played in contributing to their fate, such as by siding with invaders or rebelling (e.g., Masalha 1992). The truth usually lies somewhere between these competing arguments.

44. According to a historian of the Assyrian empire, mass deportation was a 'cornerstone' of its construction and development (Oded 1979, pp. 2 and 9). Similar policies were implemented during the expansion of other empires, including the Egyptian, Hittites and Mesopotamian empires.

45. Discussing the Polish territories acquired by the Soviet Union in 1939, Marrus writes: 'To facilitate their annexation of newly conquered Polish territory, the Russians deported hundreds of thousands of Poles eastwards . . . The idea was to send important segments of the Polish population deep into the Soviet interior, far away from formerly independent Poland'. The evacuation involved between 1 and 1.5 million Poles. At the same time 61,000 Balts were evacuated (Marrus 1985, pp. 196–97).

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