WAYS TO MODERNITY IN GREECE AND TURKEY: ENCOUNTERS WITH EUROPE, 1850-1950

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WAYS TO MODERNITY IN GREECE AND TURKEY

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ENCOUNTERS WITH EUROPE, 1850-1950

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Introduction

Anna Frangoudaki and Caglar Keyder

This volume brings together papers on the theme of experiencing, reacting to and producing modernity. Greece and Turkey, nation-states constructed out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire, were countries which lived with similar tensions in confronting the challenge of European ascendancy. The impact of European political and economic domination had been acutely felt by the Ottoman population during the nineteenth century—not least through the successful secession of first Greece then other Balkan territories from the Empire. Ottoman bureaucrats reacted to their perceived humiliation by assuming the responsibility for modernizing the state. During the empire, the modernizationist zeal was confined to administrative, fiscal, and legal reform; it was not until the Turkish republic that this modernizing imperative was extended to the subjects as well.

Independent of what was engineered from above, the growing impact of Europe's material and cultural production and the ever increasing attraction of new forms of consumption and conduct, initiated a transformation of everyday lives. This Europeanization, however, was experienced very unequally: its consequence was a differentiation of the population according to their openness to the signals emanating from the West. Success in the market, which gradually replaced administrative logic and took over the regulation of the economy, became the most important marker of distinction. Throughout the nineteenth century there was a growing polarization between Greeks most of whom attained favourable positions to exploit their advantages in the new economy, and the Muslim population most of whom remained as poor peasants. It was the Greek population, especially in the Aegean coastal towns, who built stone houses, urban infrastructures, gas-lit streets, and consumed imported luxuries from Europe. They also read books, learned to play the piano, and published newspapers. The Muslims were left behind in all these manifestations of modernization and the gap between the communities widened.

On the other side of the Aegean, the newly independent Greeks embarked on the task of building a nation-state out of a former province. Their

modernization was a less encumbered affair: although the elite had to assume the mission of educating the masses in nationhood, they did not have to confront ethnic schisms. The conflicts within the elite were those that could be assimilated into factional disputes—concerning the extent of political liberalism and varying expectations as to the state/society balance. In the empire, however, state modernization fueled ethnic schism, because a formalized imperial administration and a unifying legal system created citizens with equal civil and legal rights out of subjects who used to be compartmentalized in a diversity of governmental regimes. Ethnic groups of different capacities in coping with modernity gradually separated from each other, eventually submitting to ethnic conflict.

Given the diversity of accommodations in the course of the confrontation with European modernity, it is not clear how imperial modernization could have been successful without generating unequal development, conflict, and separatist movements. In fact, during the decades before World War I, the Sultan and his bureaucrats worried about the disintegrating empire, while Greece benefited from attaining a nation-state status earlier in the game. It was only after the constitution of the nation state in what remained of the empire that Turkey's modernization project was launched in earnest. This was no longer a project targeting the state and its administrative apparatus alone: it attempted to sweep within its purview the entire society. There was, in this endeavour, a resentment rooted in the perception of backwardness, but also a desire to compensate for having missed the opportunity of the late nineteenth century. The inter-war period, however, was different: the market could no longer be counted on for positive incentives and Europe did not provide the gravitational attraction. Turkey's modernization followed the state-led blueprint of the period; where autonomous modernization was feeble, the authoritarian tenor of inter-war regimes endorsed the elite's impositions from above. Modernization-from-above was suspicious of the autonomous transformation of the society and presented itself as the only possible route toward westernization. Although Greece also experienced authoritarian interludes, the basic foundations of societal modernization had already been ensconced during the period before the Great War. This temporal disjunction explains the contextual differences that prevail upon the thematic similarities in the modernization experiences of the two countries.

Similar state traditions, a shared suspicion toward liberalism, and a desire to harness the social to political projects, contributed to the emergence of mostly converging responses to the experience of European modernity. All the debates and discussions of modernization, both sides of the Aegean, focused on the right balance between tradition and imported modernity. Nationalism, first in Greece and later in Turkey, came to the rescue: it was discovered as the perfect solution which permitted to build a modernity on a reconstructed bed of tradition. Nation-states could pick their own particular

kind of modernity, and its distinct articulation with their re-interpreted traditions, as the raw material of their nationalisms. While this was a mission mostly directed from above, it also required the enlisting of an often reluctant population. The process involved legislation, ordering the physical space, reconfiguring memory, and defining ideal constructs of family and household. For Greece, the Empire was what had to be left behind; while for Turkey, Greece was the standard against which it had to be established that peripherality did not imply externality. For both countries coping with modernity carried an urgency due to their uncomfortable proximity to the source: Greece had to prove that it was just within the East-West boundary, while Turkey's entire project seemed coloured by the anxiety of straddling the margin. The articles collected here describe and analyse various dimensions of projects, practices, and attitudes of modernity in the two societies, as they defined their practices and identities in tandem with or against Europe, and often against each other.

The first part of this volume is on state modernization through law making. Ioannis Tassopoulos investigates constitutionalism in Greece. He argues that the Constitution of 1864 was in the vanguard of European constitutionalism, based on the idea of constructing a unitary political community. He suggests that the ideological conversion from political liberalism and enlightenment ideals to national messianism and ethnocentrism reflected a fervent political romanticism which became the dominant approach to the "national problem". This romantic nationalism had the potential to undermine the liberal predilection of parliamentary institutions, but these were already well established, and thus prevailed. There was, however, a lasting contest between liberal constitutionalism and the desire to establish ethnic foundations for national unity, as evidenced by the persistent legitimacy problem of the Greek state, at least until 1975.

Zafer Toprak's article chronicles the delayed impact of the invention of the modern state on the Ottoman Empire. He documents how, starting with the *Tanzimat*, Ottoman bureaucrats wanted an efficient administration built on the European model. Modernizing the state would make the Empire stronger and able to hold its own against internal and external threats. They were also led to believe that a unified framework to replace the fragmented legal world of the empire would strengthen the feeling of Ottoman citizenship. There followed a series of legislation, especially in the economic field, more or less pursuing the course of action suggested by the paradigmatic French example. Toprak argues that this development would lead to the evolution of an "interactive state" which could respond to signals emerging from below.

Authors in Part II discuss strategies by Greeks and Turks to cope with the pressures of modernity. Haris Exertzoglou questions the meaning accorded to the concepts of the West and the East, through an analysis of authors writing on the modernization project in the late Ottoman Empire. He argues

that, in this period of change, modernity and tradition are not counterposed as contending alternatives. Instead, a modernity argued to be inherent in the Islamic classical tradition is presented as an alternative to the modernity embodied in the West. In the context of the debate among Ottoman reformists, supporting Islamic revivalism emerged as part of an effort to mobilize religion in order to legitimize reforms. By documenting the extent to which Islamic revivalism was informed by western discourses, Exertzoglou argues that this was a process of an ambivalent cultural negotiation, at a time when the global domination of modernity was becoming difficult to deny. He also points to similarities between Greek nationalist and the Islamic agendas in their willingness to use tradition strategically while coping with the unavoidable import of modernity.

Edhem Eldem focuses on a revealing sample of the modernizing population of Istanbul: Greeks who banked with the Ottoman Bank. Looking at the record of their signatures he is able to tease out a spectrum of modes of behaviour and attitude toward western forms. In this case alternatives existed as to the francisation of names, choices of different alphabets, use of the traditional seal as opposed to a signature. The diversity of alternatives is illuminating in exhibiting the individual choices in confronting a "modern" requirement, the affixing of a signature to establish identity. How did a Greek Ottoman in Istanbul feel about the Empire, about westernization, about the replacement of traditional forms with modern ones? What were the strategies available in a simple assertion of legal identity in the form of a signature, and how did behaviour change among different social groups, and between men and women?

Ioanna Petropoulou comments on the publication in the late Ottoman period of Western novels (mostly French), translated into Turkish, the particular *karamanlidika* Turkish written in Greek letters, used by the Turkish speaking Christian Orthodox subjects of the Empire. She suggests that the translation of Western novels, taking place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was a deliberate turn to the West, as evidenced by the secular content of the translated novels, followed by the introduction of modern methods for the production and distribution of books. She argues that these translated novels described transformations in the life of different social groups in great European cities. Through these novels, the readers could read between the lines, and foresee the advent of modern times.

In a wide ranging analysis of the modernization of architecture during the late Ottoman and early republican periods in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan also tries to understand the complex negotiation between tradition and modernity. Late Ottomans attempted to devise a "national style" by seeking inspiration in early and classical Ottoman monuments. While this confident revivalism of the 1910s and 1920s succeeded in inventing a new idiom and found ways of combining what was thought to be essentially Ottoman with what was desirable in Europe, republican Turks of the later period opted

for a particular version of the modern—the statist solution they could readily import from the inter-war modernisms of Europe. Bozdogan argues that such a directed and state-favouring option obviously could be accommodated more readily within the political proclivities of the rulers.

The papers in Part III deal with the formation of "modern" populations, especially the creation of modern forms of sociality. Ioanna Laliotou writes about the history of Greek migration, and its role in situating Greek within European and transnational cultures. She argues that trans-oceanic migration in the first half of the twentieth century transformed older notions of the diaspora and contributed to the emergence of a new and positive image of the modern migrant as the promising explorer of prosperity. After World War II, migration movements of large numbers of people, pushed and pulled by political strife and economic opportunity abroad, contributed to the formation of a new image in popular culture: the migrant represented all the negative aspects of Greek society relating to underdevelopment, but also, in the working-class version, the traditional virtues of the Greek national character. She suggests that the shifting interconnections between nationhood and mobility might shed new light on the transition from the image of Greece as a migrant nation to the xenophobic narrative of immigrant "invasion" that has been developing in Greek society during the last two decades.

Angelika Psarra discusses feminist ideas, from their introduction in Greece in the late nineteenth century till the 1940s. She argues that women during the "first wave" had to distance themselves from western manifestations of feminism, in order to avoid being ridiculed as aping anti-social behaviour originating in the degenerate West. Moreover, they adapted feminist ideas to the nationalist discourse of the time, by incorporating them into the official history of the Greek nation, thus radically separating themselves from the West. This distancing, however, posed the familiar East-West dilemma in nationalist and feminist discourse, especially in regards the feminists' attitude toward Turkish women. The dilemma was put on the agenda by the "first wave" of feminists in the nineteenth century, but survived through various transformations. While Greek feminists would have liked to cast themselves in a privileged position between the West and the East, stereotypes about women of the East persisted; even radical groups were unable to overcome their feminist orientalism.

Zafer Yenal's account of Girls' Schools in republican Turkey relates the story of the modernizing state embarking on an endeavour to educate women as home makers and wives. These schools emerged as alternatives to standard secondary schools, and were designed to teach modern domestic behaviour, cooking, and forms of civility to the future homemakers of the nation. The contribution of women to the making of a successful modernity, and to the formation of a westernized nation, was considered essential. Yenal demonstrates through interviews and contemporary accounts that these

schools gained much importance in terms of the numbers of girls they educated and the prestige they accorded to their graduates.

Continuing to investigate the role assigned to women in the modernizing imperative, Nükhet Sirman describes the transformation of the politically structured household of the empire to the ideal of the modern home based on the nuclear family in the Turkish republic. She traces the arguments concerning gender and the family through novels written (especially by women) during the decades of transition, contending that the modernity of the nation state eventually produced subjects who put an end to the society based on kinship and politics. She argues that the transformations in desires regarding the meaning and form of marriage amounted to a new imaginary of the family, and thereby of the society.

In Part IV of this collection Biray Kolluoglu Kırlı and Alexandra Yerolympos focus on changes in urban fabric, in İzmir and in three Aegean islands respectively. Kırlı describes the nationalist transformation of İzmir after the Greek occupation ended and the Greek and Armenian populations of the city were expelled. A fire destroyed the most cosmopolitan neighbourhoods of the city and upon the new empty area a conception of the modern, according to the authoritarian regime of the day, was inscribed. Taking their cue from Italian and Soviet examples, Turks created an extensive green space to be used as international fair grounds, complete with monumental structures. The transformation of the built environment in İzmir faithfully reflected the transition from the autonomous and heterogeneous modernization of the empire to the flattened and nationalist modernity imposed from Ankara.

Yerolympos explores the urban growth and development in three Aegean islands starting in the late imperial period. She argues that island cities, despite their comparatively small populations, were successfully transformed into capital cities with new spatial identity. Their new physiognomy represented a definitive break with traditional urban fabrics. The new cities were open rather than closed, and expansive; their new spaces were secularized, and they imported new urban technologies. The urban transformations in these islands mostly originated in the projects of local associations and administration. All these institutions of local decision-making lost their initiative in the post-war years: as commercial impetus declined, they were totally replaced by highly centralized structures which paralyzed and suffocated local development.

CONSTRUCTING THE MODERN STATE

Constitutionalism and the Ideological Conversion to National Unity under the Greek Constitution of 1864

Ioannis A. Tassopoulos

Introduction

Imagine that there are two corporations. The one undergoes a process of gradual takeover as competitors consistently bid to obtain shares in an effort to gain a controlling stake and eventually become the majority shareholders of the corporation. The competitors try to advance their respective ideas of the corporation's ends in order to redistribute power between its organs and reorient the prevailing philosophy. However, their struggle evolves internally, in the context of the corporation's existing framework, without contesting the Charter of Incorporation, i.e. its constitution and structure. We can call this type of transferring power the model of *conversion*.

The experience of the other corporation is quite different. Here the competitors aim directly at formal revisions and amendments to the Charter that would reflect their different and conflicting programs and ideals, and seek to introduce adequate institutional structures that would formally confirm their gains. In this case, the corporation's constitution itself becomes the battleground over which the conflict is fought. This is, literally, a model of *transformation*.

It is clear that the life of these two corporations is dissimilar. Obviously, they do not share the same attitude (or practice) towards the relationship between form and substance. It is ironic that while both corporations may suffer from excessive formalism, this is quite distinct in the two cases. The first corporation may be formalistic in the sense that the Charter and its provisions may not fully, or even accurately, reflect and capture the essence of its political life, which develops in a rather pragmatic manner. Here the formalism is an 'empty shell.' The other corporation may be formalistic in exactly the opposite sense being too rigid and intransigent as a result of intense polarization and the lack of pragmatism and accommodating

disposition of the competing forces, wishing to impose their own formal changes.

This article argues that the political evolution under the Greek Constitution of 1864 can be usefully understood in analogy with the two models described above; it is suggested that the Greek experience of the time is decisively closer to the model of conversion than to the second example. In fact, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a remarkable consolidation and growth towards the maturity of Greece's parliamentary government. Simultaneously, however, there was a gradual ideological conversion of Greek life, from the philosophy of political liberalism and enlightenment to national messianism, ethno-centrism and intolerance. This is what P. Kitromilides has insightfully called 'the contradiction, where the institutions of a liberal parliamentary system fully operate at the formal level in Greek political life from 1864 and on, at the very time of ideological rigidity and regress of liberalism as a system of political values.'[1] It is submitted that the alleged 'contradiction' can be explained by focusing on the meaning of 'national unity'.

In fact, constitutionalism offers a coherent idea of the unity of a political community consistent with its liberal system of political values (section 2). Combined, however, with the gradual ideological conversion of Greek life to Romanticist and ethno-centric ideals, national unity became the critical element, the currency, if you like, which undercut the liberal values of parliamentary institutions (section 3). At the same time, the progress of Greek constitutionalism after 1864 was quite impressive indeed (section 4). In the light of the development of constitutionalism in Greece in the second half of the nineteenth century it is possible to explain why the model of conversion prevailed and parliamentary institutions preserved their established role as effective generators of political legitimacy and governmental authority (section 5).

The Unity of a Political Community Under Liberal and Republican Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism provides a rational ideal of political unity based on full respect for the human rights of the individual. Through their mutual recognition as autonomous persons, individuals can establish their political unity on the basis of principles of justice guaranteed by law.

From a dynamic point of view, political unity is achieved through the public use of reason, i.e. by rational discourse in the public sphere between free and equal persons. Indeed, the liberal principle of public discourse is the very foundation of political representation in the classic system of parliamentary government.[2]

However, what might be called the ethico-political experience of individuals is not limited to the recognition of their distinct personality and the realization of the principles of justice.[3] It is the *public* use of reason and

political deliberation that reveal the existence of a substantive political community oriented towards the good.

The constitutional theory of the nation-state offers a rational ideal of the unity of a political community. For this purpose it has developed a threefold notion of the people. The people are at the same time a nation, a State-organ (the electorate), and a democratic society. Ideally, these conceptions of the people should be harmonious like a classical temple, and symmetrical: the moral entity of the nation is legally organized in a State where the people is the constitutive element and source of political power, so forming a democratic society which respects fundamental rights. This is a sensitive equilibrium.

The multifarious notion of the people invests popular sovereignty with moral authority and accounts for a rational political community, by personifying the people. This personifying involves the applicability of common standards of rationality in appraising the conduct of the collective political body and individual human beings. This is forcefully expressed in J. J. Rousseau's symmetrical propositions: 'L'impulsion du seul appetite est esclavage et la loi qu'on se prescrite est liberté'. 'La loi est l'expression de la volonté générale'.[4] This is essentially *a republican insight.* It is noble in its appeal to virtue, radical in its attempt to resolve the problem of legitimacy of the binding political decisions by a model of autonomy, and ambitious in its aspiration to transform society.

The culmination of the Greek Enlightenment that prepared the Revolution of 1821 was the adoption of this liberal and republican political philosophy. Referring to A. Korais, an archetypal figure of the Greek Enlightenment, P. Kitromilides notes that: 'Under the impact of the new ideas that came from enlightened Europe, the modern Greeks came to conceive of themselves as a distinct nation whose self- definition was based primarily on a historical connection with ancient Hellenism. The ethnic collectivity delineated by this historical identity was in the process of becoming an ethical community of free and equal citizens, that is a modern nation... The ideology of the nation as the community of free and equal citizens thus dispelled traditional mythologies of dynastic rights and enshrined in their place the human rights of the individual.'[5]

What is really astonishing is the conviction that this ideal of collective self-determination and civic virtue, far from being utopian, can be actually realized in history. The Declaration of Greek Independence of 1 January 1822, which was added to the first Constitution of the revolutionary period as its preamble, speaks of the 'Greek Nation' as a self-determining national community that is able to form its own political will and constitute itself as a new and independent political entity.[6] The same idea is forcefully expressed on less formal occasions. G. Filaretos, in his review of Greek constitutional history, cites the description in an Athens newspaper of the popular mood just before the uprising of the 3 September 1843. This uprising brought the end of the

period of absolute monarchy in Greece (1833-1843) and provided the country with its first Constitution establishing the regime of constitutional monarchy.

> And yet, if you let us speak in advance of history, we think that an attentive spectator was able to conclude from the very first hints that the nation was in concord, getting up and closing ranks, so to speak, for the common interest. There were no robberies, no conflagration, because, faced with the greatest danger, any partial pillage was fruitless, and individual revenge was silenced... The old passions calmed down and the differences between the parties faded out. All the members of the nation, as if they had a single head, avoided partial brawls, because they all intended to rise up, citizens and army, warriors of the old struggle and breed of the new age, people of all sorts of convictions and ideas, as if they were a single person, to reinforce the State that was disintegrating and collapsing.[7]

In retrospect, we all know that, though harmonious in constitutional theory, the synthesis of nation-electorate-democratic society proved to be profoundly unstable and much contested in political reality.[8] The ideological conversion to national unity that took place in the second half of nineteenth-century Greece under the influence of political Romanticism, offers a specific example of that inherent instability in Southeastern Europe.

The Ideological Conversion to National Unity

The ideological conversion to national unity is associated with the *Megali Idea*, The Great Idea,[9] formulated by I. Kolettis before the National Assembly which prepared the Constitution of 1844. Like the Great Idea itself,[10] the doctrine of national unity integrated a social, a geographical, and an historical element. Thus, national unity combined national homogeneity, the inclusion of all Greek populations within the borders of the Greek State, and the continuity of the Greek nation over time.[11] As Kitromilides notes, 'the appeal to national unity sanctioned a general intolerance in Greek political thought, which gradually elevated the exigencies of nationalism to the only acceptable ideological orthodoxy.'[12]

The position and role of the Constitution in the nationalist context of the Great Idea is illuminating. Kolettis stated: 'We are assembled to prepare the Constitution, this gospel of our political existence, so that from now on, we have two gospels, this of religion, and that of our political existence.'[13] 'Today Greece offers the greatest hopes to us, reborn and united in one State, one purpose, and one force; in one religion and, finally, in one Constitution, which we are making now.'[14]

There is nothing idiosyncratic in the idea of the Constitution as act of national self-determination, through which a nation attains its political existence. However, the Constitution is supposed to be the product of

deliberative reason. In *The Federalist*, A. Hamilton raises 'the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.'[15] Kolettis for his part assimilates the Constitution into his doctrine of national unity as a subordinate means to that supreme end. This approach sets aside the political conception of the nation as a liberal community of free and equal persons, while exploiting the Constitution, as the framework of political unity within a modern nation-state, to the maximum.

In the 1850s liberalism was fading as Greek Romanticist nationalism intensified. In 1852 S. Zambelios coined the term Greek-Christian, characteristic of the new spirit of the age. A highly symbolic issue that marked the ideological turn was the change in the Greek people's attitude toward Byzantium. The Byzantine empire had, understandably, been the scapegoat of the Greek Enlightenment thinkers. Its political system was theocratic, absolutist and utterly incompatible with democratic political ideals. But S. Zambelios in 1852 and K. Paparrigopoulos in 1875 re-established the reputation of Byzantium and the temporal unity of the Greek nation (ancient, Byzantine, modern). For many of those who shared this view, it was the hereditary institution of monarchy rather than the democratically-elected Parliament that became the symbol of national unity at the centre of political life.[16]

The following passage, from Zambelios' *Byzantine Studies* (1857), reflects well the *conversion to national unity*:

> We note three laws, three different unities, which constitute the entirety of the Greek struggle: (a) Greek unity, which connects regenerated Greece to ancient Greece; (b) Christian unity, which links the present struggle to all the struggles of the Christian religion; and (c) Roman unity, which springs from the Middle Ages and sets the limits of the modern Greek nation. In other words, three traditions are embodied in the people of Greece for the establishment of the nation: the historical, the spiritual, and the political – which means education and language, social harmony, national integrity. This is the... triumvirate of our national regeneration, and the termination of our political action.[17]

Moreover, we find *the defensive ideology of the solitary and companionless nation*:

> We proceed more or less unwillingly, pressed by enemies, spurred by antagonists and competitors. Would Greece exist today without the Persian, the Saracen, the Papist, the Iconoclast, the Frank, the Crusader, the Venetian, the Ottoman? I doubt... This is why modern Greek life, being pure and solitary... is entangled with the general history of the Middle Ages more than any other Christian era, and the causes of its

> existence and progress lie in counteracting both Western and Eastern nations.[18]

Finally, *faith becomes the substitute for liberty*: 'The independence of Italy, said the Philhellene poet from England, shall be the making of liberty, while this of the Greeks shall be the making of faith.'[19]

From the perspective of constitutionalism, the discussion of the ideological conversion to national unity would be incomplete without considering the proliferation of societies and associations in the 1870s. They were of every kind, e.g. political, educational, charitable, cultural, etc. The phenomenon was so intense that the contemporaries coined a special term to describe it, *syllogomania*, or 'association mania.'[20] Many European countries had a similar experience, and the word *Vereinseuphorie* was used in Germany for much the same situation.[21] The Greek case is interesting for offering a Balkan version of the general trend. What characterizes the Greek example is that (a) associations multiplied while democracy, according to the definition of the time,[22] had already been established; and (b) they were actively involved in the promotion of national unity, not through revolution and war, but by means of culture, education and instruction in the use of the Greek language.[23] Again, the national problem, rather than any other, internal social conflict, provided the thrust of civil society's activity in late nineteenth-century Greece.

To understand the paradox of progressive liberal constitutionalism and regressive liberal ideology (discussed at the beginning of this article) one should take into account the differences between the various Romanticist and conservative reactions against political liberalism and the Enlightenment in nineteenth-century Europe. It is plausible that some kinds of anti-liberal reaction are congenial to and more readily associated with the model of conversion, while others are directly confrontational and consistent with the model of transformation. For example, Zambelios' historicism does not eradicate classical Greek inheritance altogether; he does not extinguish the liberal element, although in his unitary nationalist vision the classical ideal is blunt and devoid of its enlightening potential; it is integrated into a historical scheme where the Byzantine tradition plays the seminal role. This kind of anti-liberalism appears to be of less radical quality and does not strike at the heart, as, say, the theological-political conservatism of J. Donoso Cortes, who argues that:

> The fundamental error of Liberalism consists in giving importance to nothing but questions of government, which, compared with social and religious order, have no importance whatever... But when Liberalism explains the evil and the good, order and disorder, by the various forms of government, all ephemeral and transitory; when, prescinding, on the one side, from all social, and, on the other, from all religious, problems, it brings into discussion its political problems

> as the only ones worthy by their elevation of occupying the statesman, - there are no words in any language capable of describing the profound incapacity and radical impotence of this school, not only to solve, but even to enunciate, these awful questions... [The Liberal school] has aimed at governing without a people and without a God. Extravagant and impossible enterprise![24]

To the extent that Zambelios' historicism is representative of the general ideological trend of the time in Greece, his program of national unity, which does not incorporate the deep social cleavage inherent in the thesis of Donoso Cortes, partly explains why the Romanticist takeover took the form of conversion rather than transformation. The point is that, in Greece, Romanticism attempted to accommodate constitutionalism in the straitjacket of national unity. Certainly, the effort was partly successful. However, the country's parliamentary institutions were already well established, and the program met with considerable resistance.

Achievements of Greek Constitutionalism: The Constitution of 1864 and the Parliamentary System of Government

The Greek Enlightenment, where the intellectual origins of the Greek Revolution can be traced, set forth Western political ideals with regard to the formation of the Greek State. The Constitutions of the revolutionary period were democratic. The political and constitutional organization of the Greek State according to European standards was a constant objective, and the democratic trend was in the ascendant[25] from 1844 to 1911. Suffice it to say that under the Constitution of 1844, the electoral law of 1844 had introduced universal male suffrage with only few exceptions,[26] and the first parliamentary elections were held in the same year. However, elections in the subsequent decade were a sham, due to King Otho's meddling. The uprising of 10 October 1862 succeeded in expelling the Wittelsbach dynasty from Greece, and in 1864 the Second National Assembly voted a Constitution that is a landmark in Greek constitutional development. Modelled after the Belgian Constitution of 1831,[27] it introduced the principle of popular sovereignty[28] with a hereditary monarch (royal parliamentary democracy).

The spirit of the Enlightenment imbued the discussions of the Second National Assembly. N. I. Saripolos, first professor of constitutional law at the University of Athens, presided over the committee that drafted the Constitution, and wrote the committee's report to the Assembly. Saripolos espoused the theory of natural rights, and held the idea that liberty is indivisible in essence. He was an ardent supporter of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association, and he argued before the Assembly that:

> The nation is sovereign – science says so, it is written in the Constitution; therefore the nation must be free to express itself. It must also be free

> to vote; the sovereignty of the nation, free elections and freedom of expression... are intertwined. Therefore, it makes no sense to recognize the first two principles while imposing limitations on the press... When the sovereign will is expressed through mild means instead of radical ones, the polity is safe... What is the mildest means? It is the free press... Do you want to force the people to resort to arms at once, by denying the nation this mild and rational means?[29]

Saripolos' analysis included all the basic elements of a sophisticated theory of freedom of expression,[30] and the Assembly protected the rights to free speech, press, assembly and association,[31] in full awareness of their liberal and democratic consequences.

With 211 votes out of 274, the Assembly rejected the establishment of a second Chamber, notwithstanding strong arguments to the contrary.[32] The prevailing democratic attitude is well captured in the following argument:

> The king has two great powers; to sanction the laws and to dissolve parliament, and whenever parliament goes astray and tries to seize his powers you may be sure that the Greek people will judge better and will refuse its confidence to those members of parliament, electing others. If however a corrupted authority tries to violate the rights of the people, the people will elect again those dissolved, and if they insist on what caused the dissolution, then the monarchy has the duty to yield, has the duty to bow down to national sovereignty; otherwise what happens is what took place on the 10th of October; the nation rises up and rejects him who dares to infringe on the nation's liberty.[33]

The most remarkable achievement of the Second National Assembly is, however, the constitutional recognition of universal male suffrage,[34] due largely to the influence of the politically articulate deputies from the Ionian Islands. The rationale was both legal and political. Universal suffrage was 'the expression and the realization of national sovereignty,' 'the means through which the supreme will of the people is externalized and activated.'[35] The most sophisticated constitutional argument provided a synthesis of liberty and representative democracy:

> If, gentlemen, you fail to inscribe in the regime the principle of universal suffrage; if you leave pending this most important right of citizen, I will tell you that your most valuable rights, being at the discretion of others, are not secure, and your liberties may become problematic. You will not have your liberties established, you will not see implemented the voted provisions of the Constitution unless you have good representation; and you will not have good representation unless you have deputies backed by the majority of the nation, unless you have representatives deriving their power from the entire body of this nation.[36]

In 1864, the only countries in Europe with universal suffrage were France, Denmark and Switzerland, but even there it was either inactive or combined with counter-measures that limited its effect and reduced its potential.[37] It was not until after World War I that universal suffrage was firmly established in Europe.[38] Therefore, the Constitution of 1864 was clearly in the vanguard of European constitutionalism.[39] Indeed, Greece fulfilled the era's definition of democracy quite comprehensively.[40]

The Constitution of 1864 was by no means an empty shell. On the contrary, it turned out to be a living constitution that, in the course of its application, evolved into maturity. Its ability to grow gradually was demonstrated by the most sensitive and fundamental issues of political development, i.e. the parliamentary system of government and judicial review of the constitutionality of laws.

The dualist parliamentary system, where the confidence of both the king and parliament are required for the government to stay in power (Orléanisme),[41] lasted in Greece from 1864-1875.[42] In 1875, however, the King was compelled to accept that he must select the prime minister from the parliamentary majority, and the requirement for dual confidence was dropped, at least in principle.[43] The circumstances of the crisis are quite informative, because all branches of government were entangled in it.

Objections against the royal practice of selecting the prime minister from the parliamentary minority had been raised with increasing frequency. In June 1874, C. Trikoupis published his article '*Tis Ptaiei*' in the newspaper *Kairoi* (Times), arguing that the administrations formed since 1868 represented the people's minority, lacked parliamentary confidence, and owed their power to the wrong interpretation of the Constitution stipulating that the king appoints and dismisses his ministers. For Trikoupis, the royal practice violated the will of the people and was the main reason for a malfunctioning political system because it obstructed the development of a stable, bipartisan parliamentary life. Trikoupis argued that it was the monarchy that was solely responsible for this situation.[44]

Trikoupis was imprisoned and the newspaper was confiscated. He was then released on bail. The public prosecutor argued that the offending article incited public hatred and contempt for the King.[45] Although it spoke of the monarchy, nobody failed to infer that it meant the King. The Judicial Council, however, ruled that there was no violation.[46] The strategy to reach this judgment is striking and amusing. The *ordinary* meaning of Trikoupis' language was irrelevant; what counted was the *legal* meaning and, for purposes of the law, the distinction between the person of the king and the institution of monarchy was of the utmost constitutional importance.[47] Citing William Blackstone and invoking the maxim that the king can do no wrong, the judges found that it was 'too strained' an interpretation to identify the monarchy with the king! Interpreted through the legal prism, 'monarchy' meant 'the ministers', who were the sole bearers of political responsibility

according to the Constitution of 1864.[48] The power of the normative nature of law to invalidate the ordinary sense of common words should be taken into account as a factor that contributed to the resistance of the constitutional tradition, against the pressures of the nationalist ideology.

In 1875, the King appointed Trikoupis as prime minister, and announced in his royal address that henceforth only prime ministers would be appointed who enjoyed 'parliament's proclaimed confidence.'[49] This was a landmark in the development of Greek constitutionalism. A bipartisan political system, which contributed to a higher rationalization of parliamentary life, was gradually established in late nineteenth century.[50]

The legal profession did not fail to vindicate the authority of law. During the 1890s Greek courts rendered conflicting judgments over their power to review the constitutionality of laws. The rationale in favour of judicial review was quite similar to that developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,[51] although there is no evidence that the American experience was widely known. It was argued that the Constitution had been created by the constituent power of the people. It set the foundation of the polity and was amended by a special procedure; therefore, the judge should resolve the conflict between the Constitution and a legislative act in favour of the former.[52] In a case that involved the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, the *Areios Pagos*, the Greek supreme court, decided in 1897 that 'when a statutory rule is contrary to the Constitution, changing by ordinary law a fundamental provision thereof, the court has the power not to apply the statute in the pending case'.[53]

Henceforth, judicial review of the constitutionality of laws was applied regularly and was guaranteed as a constitutional custom. It is significant that this power to resort directly to the Constitution in order to interpret it and apply it was not a privilege limited to a special court, but became, and has remained ever since, the basis and source of judicial authority in Greece.[54] In consequence, every Greek judge, irrespective of his rank in the judicial hierarchy, has the power to review the constitutionality of laws.

Greek political history shows that the ideals of constitutionalism were tried and reasserted time and again at the level of fundamental political texts, which closely followed developments in Europe and were even in the vanguard during the second half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis on formal documents, like Constitutions, may seem misleading – a lawyer's reading of history, so to speak. Yet Constitutions epitomize official, normative standards that shape the self-understanding of political societies. As we have seen, both the principle of proclaimed confidence and judicial review grew out of an interpretation and evaluation of the institutional interaction of the respective branches of government in the light of the principles and values of the Constitution of 1864. Both institutions evolved into conventions,[55] by more or less consistently following obligatory constitutional practice. It has been argued that not only judicial review, but also the

principle of proclaimed confidence attained full normative validity as constitutional customs.[56]

Technically speaking, constitutional conventions are not rules of law. For this reason, precisely, obeying a convention and consciously fulfilling the duties it imposes[57] is evidence of a constitutional political culture, powerful enough to shape consciousness and strengthen political self-discipline. In this process, constitutional practice acquires normative content and 'becomes the zone of convergence between the values that are recognized in the constitutional text and the operation of the legal system in society, setting an objective horizon for the development of legal and political argumentation.'[58] The cultural impact and constraint of the law is of obvious importance when we speak of societies in transition, such as the case of late nineteenth-century Greece.[59]

The argument is not that things were running properly. N. Dragoumis gives us a colourful description of electoral violations, cheatings and corruption that took place in the context of elections.[60] However, the fact is that parliamentary institutions established, developed and preserved their role as effective generators of political legitimacy and governmental authority.[61] The paragraphs above have given an account of this reality as evidenced in some important sources of constitutional history.

A coherent and thorough analysis of the various reasons that explain the vigor of constitutionalism in nineteenth-century Greece would go beyond both the limits of this paper and the ability of its author. Suffice it to say that, as there was no indigenous political tradition in Greece offering a viable alternative to the model of the constitutional State,[62] European constitutionalism provided the pragmatic and realistic limits of political imagination.[63] For some people, the creation of a modern constitutional State was a rational choice and a personal commitment. It is natural that C. Trikoupis and E. Venizelos, the two most important modernizers of Greece in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, have their names associated with the consolidation of the parliamentary system and of the Rule of Law respectively.[64] For others, it is plausible to assume that the unity of a political community under liberal and republican constitutionalism could be converted into a theory of national unity, organized in the form of a centralized and bureaucratic (constitutional) State suspicious of individual self-assertion and political dissent. Finally, for others still who, swayed by collective fantasy, nurtured by political romanticism, attempted to transgress the pragmatic limits of political imagination, the results were catastrophic (as in the war of 1897),[65] and the modernization of the State became a matter of prudence in the face of peril and necessity.

Normative Implications for Constitutionalism

To understand why the ascendancy of Romanticist nationalism and the regression of political liberalism was realized in the mode of conversion

rather than that of transformation, one has to consider the development of constitutionalism in relation to the social structure of Greece during the second half of the nineteenth century. According to C. Tsoukalas, the transition from absolutism to democracy was associated with national aspirations rather than social conflicts.[66] 'The demand for universal suffrage did not have the character of a *social-class* claim; rather, it remained steadfast to *national* restoration of power' as the indigenous political forces confronted the 'Bavarian' authorities.[67] This means that the 'claim to democratization referred not to the transformation of the internal system of representation, but to the reversal of the central attributes of power in favour of *all* the native political forces'.[68]

In other words, there was no transition from the liberal to the democratic constitutional State, like the Western European sequence that led to State democratization after the revolutions of 1848. According to N. Mouzelis, 'whereas in Western Europe the demise of oligarchic politics came after the development of industrial capitalism, in the semi-periphery it preceded it.'[69]

From the perspective of this article, however, the crucial question concerns the normative implications of the ideological conversion to national unity for Greek constitutionalism. Both liberalism and democracy are indispensable elements of constitutionalism.[70] However, while Tsoukalas emphasizes that liberalism and democracy prevailed jointly and simultaneously in Greece, Mouzelis notes that 'the institutionalization of civil liberties, which characterize western parliamentarism,' did not occur in this country.[71]

The point is that the critical dialectic between liberalism and democracy, individual rights and participation, which set the dynamics of constitutional development in Europe, never fully worked out in Greece[72] and the distinction between liberalism and democracy remained rather blurred and confused. If in some countries it was watertight and required time and effort to adapt it to existing circumstances and social conditions,[73] in Greece it was rather too permeable, and also tended to dilute freedom. Understandably, the most vulnerable freedom was that of the political dissenter, or of the person asserting his/her individuality in the face of social conformity. The ideological conversion to national unity intensified uniformity and intolerance, so eroding political liberty.[74]

Finally, the constitutional implications of the conversion to national unity, under the Constitution of 1864 are pertinent to the predicament that marks Greek constitutionalism, at least up to 1975:[75] the vigor and endurance of the constitutional form of government[76] that averts the worst and most extreme departures from it existing side by side with the (variable) deficit concerning the freedom of the political dissenter or the social non-conformist.

Conclusion

The constitutional theory of the nation-state offers a rational ideal of the unity of a political community. The moral entity of the nation is legally organized in a State whose constitutive element and source of political power are the people, forming a democratic society which respects the fundamental rights. This synthesis proved profoundly unstable and contested in political reality. The ideological conversion to national unity that took place in the second half of nineteenth-century Greece under the influence of political Romanticism represents a specific instance of that inherent instability in Southeastern Europe.

The Romanticist takeover came in the form of ideological conversion rather than that of anti-liberal institutional transformation. When Romanticism attempted to force constitutionalism into the mould of national unity, it was not altogether unsuccessful, but the country's parliamentary institutions were already too well established to be overturned altogether.

The Constitution of 1864 was well in the vanguard of European constitutionalism. In the definition of that era, Greece was indeed a democracy. Moreover, the Constitution of 1864 was no dead-letter document but a vital set of principles that grew and, in the course of its application, matured. It proved itself in the most sensitive and fundamental issues of political development, i.e. the parliamentary system of government and judicial review of the constitutionality of laws. In the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, Greek parliamentary institutions established, developed and preserved their role as effective generators of political legitimacy and governmental authority.

On the other hand, the dialectic between liberalism and democracy, individual rights and participation, which set the dynamics of constitutional development in Europe, never fully took root in Greece, and the distinction between liberalism and democracy remained rather loosed and unstable.

The implications concerning the conversion to national unity have affected Greek constitutionalism right up to at least 1975: They are evidenced by both the vigor and endurance of the constitutional form of government, which has suffered no major or extreme departures from it, and at the same time by the (variable) democratic deficit, where the freedom of political dissenters is concerned, or that of the person asserting his/her individuality in the face of social conformism.

I am indebted to Professor P. Kitromilides for his very helpful comments.

NOTES

1 See P. Kitromilides, 'Ideologika Reumata kai Politika Aitimata: Prooptikes apo ton Elliniko 19o Aiona,' [Ideological Trends and Political Demands: Perspectives

from the Greek 19th Century] in D. Tsaousis (ed.), *Opseis tis Ellinikis Koinonias* [Aspects of Greek Society of the 19th Century], Athens: Estia, 1984, pp. 23, 38.

2 See I. Tassopoulos, *To Ithikopolitiko Themelio tou Syntagmatos* [The Ethico-political Foundation of the Constitution] (Athens-Komotini: 2001) pp. 175-176.

3 See Tassopoulos, *To Ithikopolitiko Themelio tou Syntagmatos*, p. 104.

4 See P. Bastid, *L'Idée de Constitution,* Paris: Economica, 1985, p. 131. See also, P. Kitromilides, 'An Enlightenment Perspective on Balkan Cultural Pluralism. The Republican Vision of Rigas Velestinlis,' History of Political Thought, vol. XXIV, n. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 465.

5 See P. Kitromilides, *Tradition, Enlightenment and Revolution* (Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1978) pp. 450, 451.

6 See P. Kitromilides, *To Orama tis Eleutherias stin Elliniki Koinonia* [The Vision of Liberty in Greek Society] (Athens: Poreia, 1992) pp. 40-42.

7 See G. Filaretos, *Syntagma tis Ellados* [The Constitution of Greece] (Athens: Constantinidou, 1889) p. 61.

8 In the interwar years it totally disintegrated as fascism, liberal democracy, and communism polarized the three conceptions of the people.

9 See E. Skopetea, *To Protypo Vasileio kai i Megali Idea*, [The Model Kingdom and the Great Idea], (Athens: Polytopo, 1988) p. 257. To put it crudely, the Great Idea was a strong expression of Greece's nationalist effort to resolve the national problem. The meaning of the Great Idea varied from the restoration of the Byzantine Empire to the liberation and unification of all Greek populations within an expanded Greek State.

10 On the relation between national unity and the Great Idea, see P. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans, *European History Quarterly* 19 (1989) pp. 149, 165-168.

11 See Kitromilides, 'Imagined Communities,' pp. 167, 186.

12 See Kitromilides, 'Imagined Communities,' p. 168.

13 See *I tis Tritis Septemvriou en Athinais Ethniki Synelefsis*, [The National Assembly of 3 September, in Athens] (Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas, 1993) p. 190.

14 See *I tis Tritis Septemvriou en Athinais Ethniki Synelefsis*, p. 191.

15 See B. Wright (ed.), *The Federalist* (New York: Modern Library, 1961) p. 89.

16 See P. Kitromilides, 'On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea,' in D. Ricks and P. Magdalino (eds), *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, Ashgate Publ.: Hampshire, 1998, p. 25. Kitromilides, 'Ideologika Reumata kai Politika Aitimata: Prooptikes apo ton Elliniko 19o Aiona,' p. 35.

17 See S. Zambelios, *Vyzantinai Meletai* [Byzantine Studies] (Athens: Karavia, 1999) pp. 32-33.

18 See Zambelios, *Vyzantinai Meletai*, p. 687-688.

19 See Zambelios, *Vyzantinai Meletai*, p. 696.

20 See Skopetea, *To Protypo Vasileio kai i Megali Idea*, p. 155.

21 See P. Nord, 'Introduction,' in N. Bermeo and P. Nord (eds), *Civil Society before Democracy*, (Lanham MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) p. xvii.

22 See infra, note 40.

23 See K. T. Demaras, *Ellinikos Romantismos* [Hellenic Romanticism], Athens: Hermes, 1985, p. 401. Kitromilides, 'Imagined Communities', pp. 170-177.

24 See J. Donoso Cortes, *Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism* (Dublin: William B. Kelly, 1874) pp. 178-179. It is worth citing the final lines of the passage, which refers to the Liberal school: 'Its days are numbered; for on one side of horizon appears God, and on the other the people. No one will be able to say

where it is on the tremendous day of battle, when the plain shall be covered with the Catholic and Socialistic phalanxes.' See Donoso Cortes, *Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism*, p. 179. It is like a self-fulfilling prophecy that was realized in the darkest days of the 20th century.

25 See A. Svolos, *To Neon Syntagma kai ai Vaseis tou Politeumatos* [The New Constitution and the Foundation of the Regime] (Athens: Pyrsos, 1928) p. 253.

26 See G. Sotirelis, Syntagma kai Ekloges stin Ellada 1864-1909 [*Constitution and Elections in Greece 1864-1909*], Athens: Themelio 1991, p. 41.

27 See A. Manessis, *Deux Etats Nés en 1830. Ressemblances et dissemblances constitutionnelles entre la Belgique et la Grèce* (Bruxelles: Larcier, 1959).

28 See Const. 1864, art. 21. See A. Manessis, 'I Dimokratiki Archi eis to Syntagma tou 1864' [The Democratic Principle in the Constitution of 1864] in *Syntagmatiki Theoria kai Praxi* [Constitutional Theory and Practice] (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 1980) p. 65.

29 *Episimos Efimeris tis Synelefseos* [Official Gazette of the Second National Assembly], v. ΣΤ (Athens, 1864) p. 177.

30 See I. Tassopoulos, *The Constitutional Problem of Subversive Advocacy in the United States of America and Greece* (Athens-Komotini: Ant. Sakkoulas, 1993) p. 77.

31 See Const. 1864, art. 14, 10, 11.

32 See Const. 1864, art. 22.

33 See *Episimos Efimeris*, p. 347 (Kalos).

34 See Const. 1864, art. 66.

35 See *Episimos Efimeris*, p. 507 (Louzis).

36 See *Episimos Efimeris*, p. 562 (Antonopoulos).

37 See Sotirelis, *Syntagma kai Ekloges stin Ellada 1864-1909*, p. 80. See with regard to the Balkan experience, C. Tsoukalas, *Kinoniki Anaptyxi kai Kratos* [Social Development and the State], Athens: Themelio, 1981, p. 304. Commentators discuss whether the introduction of universal suffrage in Greece, which had been early and more or less easy, was premature or accidental. See Svolos, *To Neon Syntagma kai ai Vaseis tou Politeumatos*, pp. 249-253. Sotirelis, Syntagma kai ekloges stin Ellada 1864-1909, p. 157.

38 See Sotirelis, Syntagma kai Ekloges stin Ellada 1864-1909, p. 82.

39 See Sotirelis, Syntagma kai Ekloges stin Ellada 1864-1909, p. 157.

40 See Nord, 'Introduction,' p. xiv: 'Yet Europe before the Great War boasted just a handful of democratic states and none of them with pedigrees more than a few decades old. The point is all the more telling when the era's definition of democracy, less exacting than our own, is kept in mind: representative government elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage plus at least qualified legal guarantees of the three fundamental freedoms of speech, press and association. On these terms, France among the Great Powers might qualify, joined by an array of smaller states, among them Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.'

41 See M. Prélot and J. Boulouis, *Institutions Politiques et Droit Constitutionnel* (Paris: Dalloz, 1987) p. 430.

42 See N. Alivizatos, 'Oi Kykloi tou Ellinikou kai tou Europaikou Koinovouleutismou: Symptoseis kai Asymptota' [The Cycles of Greek and European Parliamentarism: Coincidences and Disparities], in *150 Chronia Ellinikou Koinovouleutikou Viou 1844-1944* [150 Years of Greek Parliamentary Life 1844-1944] (Athens: Sakkoulas, 2000) pp. 165, 169, where it is noted that only 5, out of the 22 governmental crises between 1863 and 1875, were due to lack of parliamentary confidence, while the rest were due to discord between the King and the administration.

43 The principle that the appointed prime minister should enjoy the confidence of parliament has been contested under the Constitution of 1864, both with regard to its legal nature (binding legal rule, constitutional custom, constitutional convention) and its exact content. The principle was not applied rigidly, and a number of qualifications were introduced. See from among the vast literature, A. Dimitropoulos, *I Archi tis Dedilomenis*, [The Principle of Declared Confidence] (Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas 1991). H. Mavromoustakou, 'I Dedilomeni ypo to Varos ton Pigon' [The 'Declared' Under the Weight of the Sources], in K. Aroni-Tsichli and L. Triha (eds), *O C. Trikoupis kai i Epochi tou* [C. Trikoupis and his Age] (Athens: Papazisi, 2000) p. 175.

44 See P. Petridis, *Politikes dynameis kai Syntagmatikoi Thesmoi sti Neoteri Ellada 1844-1936* [Political Forces and Constitutional Institutions in Modern Greece 1844-1936] (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 1984) pp. 57-72.

45 See for the legal doctrine of free speech in 19th-century Greece, Tassopoulos, *The Constitutional Problem of Subversive Advocacy*, pp. 70, 74, 80, 84, 88.

46 On an initiative of Voulgaris' administration, the judges who decided that C. Trikoupis should not stand on trial and the appellate judges who affirmed that judgment, were transferred from the courts of Athens to the province. The press scolded Voulgaris for this action. See G. Anastasiadis, *Apo ton Riga ston A. Papanastasiou* [From Rigas to A. Papanastasiou] (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 1999) p. 98. This incident shows insufficient respect for the Rule of Law; nevertheless, it also offers evidence of the relevance and the weight that constitutional institutions played in the development of the country's political life.

47 See on the relation between ordinary meaning and the law, H. L. A. Hart, 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence' in *Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) pp. 21, 28.

48 See G. Tsokopoulos, *Charilaos Trikoupis* [Charilaos Trikoupis] (Athens: Fexi, 1896) pp. 171-202.

49 See Alivizatos, 'Oi Kykloi tou Ellinikou kai tou Europaikou Koinovouleutismou: Symptoseis kai Asymptota,' p. 169, who underlines how exceptional in 1875 the combination was of one Chamber elected by universal suffrage with the principle of 'parliament's proclaimed confidence' for the appointment of the prime minister.

50 The leaders of the two parties were Trikoupis and Deliyannis.

51 1 Cranch 137 (1803) p. 45.

52 See Y. Drosos, *Dokimio Ellinikis Syntagmatikis Theorias* [An Essay on Greek Constitutional Theory] (Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas, 1996) pp. 186-194.

53 See Drosos, *Dokimio Ellinikis Syntagmatikis Theorias*, p. 199.

54 See I. Tassopoulos, 'I Syntagmatiki Thesi tis Dikaiosynis sto Politiko mas Systima,' [The Constitutional Position of Justice in our Political System] in D. Tsatsos, E. Venizelos, X. Kontiades (eds), *To Neo Syntagma* [The New Constitution], Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas, 2001, p. 357.

55 See G. Marshall, *Constitutional Conventions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 3.

56 See Mavromoustakou, 'I Dedilomeni ypo to Varos ton Pigon,' pp. 177-178.

57 See Marshall, *Constitutional Conventions*, p. 214.

58 See I. Tassopoulos, 'New Trends in Greek Contemporary Constitutional Theory: A Comment on the Interplay between Reason and Will, *Duke Journal of Comparative Law* 10 (2000) pp. 223, 243.

59 See G. Dertilis, *Koinonikos Metashimatismos kai Stratiotiki Epemvasi 1880-1909* [Social

Change and Military Intervention in Politics 1880-1909], Athens: Exantas, 1985.

60 See N. Diamantouros, 'I Egathidrysi tou Koinovouleutismou kai i Leitourgia tou stin Ellada kata ton 19o Aiona' [The Establishment of Constitutionalism and its Function in Greece during the 19th Century] in D. Tsaousis (ed.), *Opseis tis Ellinikis Koinonias tou 19ou Aiona* [Aspects of Greek Society of the 19th Century], Athens: Estia, 1984, pp. 55, 68.

61 See Tsoukalas, *Kinoniki Anaptyxi kai Kratos*, p. 319.

62 See N. Diamandouros, *Oi Aparches tis Sygrotisis Sygchronou Kratous stin Ellada 1821-1828* [Political Modernization, Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828], Athens: MIET, 2002, pp. 182-188.

63 In the context of our discussion, these limits set the point beyond which the attempt of 'imagined communities' to materialize their commonality in institutional and political terms is doomed to fail.

64 See with regard to E. Venizelos, N. Alivizatos, 'O Eleftherios Venizelos kai o Thesmikos Eksygchronismos tis Horas' [Eleftherios Venizelos and the Constitutional Modernization of the Country], in G. Mavrogordatos and C. Hatzeiosiph (eds), *Venizelismos kai Astikos Eksygchronismos* [Venizelism and Bourgeois Modernization], Heraklion: P.E.K., 1992, p. 33.

65 See on the Greek-Turkish war of 1897, L. Louvi, *Perigelotos Vasileion* [Ridiculed Kingdom] (Athens: Estia, 2002).

66 See Tsoukalas, *Kinoniki Anaptyxi kai Kratos*, p. 316. See also, N. Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery* (London: MacMillan 1986) p. 39.

67 See Tsoukalas, *Kinoniki Anaptyxi kai Kratos*, p. 310.

68 See Tsoukalas, *Kinoniki Anaptyxi kai Kratos*, p. 310.

69 See Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, p. 15.

70 See e.g. L. Henkin, 'A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects,' in M. Rosenfeld (ed.), *Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) pp. 39, 41-42.

71 Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, p. 6.

72 See e.g. B. Constant's insistence that 'all despotism is illegal. Nothing can sanction it, not even the popular will to which it appeals', in B. Constant, *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 183.

73 See e.g. the reaction of the Supreme Court of the United States to the New Deal legislation, W. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York: Harper, 1963) p. 145, 170, 236.

74 See I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1984) p. 118.

75 See Alivizatos, *Les institutions politiques de la Grèce à travers les crises*, Paris: L.G.D.J., 1979.

76 See Alivizatos, 'Oi Kykloi tou Ellinikou kai tou Europaikou Koinovouleutismou: Symptoseis kai Asymptota,' p. 165.

From Plurality to Unity: Codification and Jurisprudence in the Late Ottoman Empire

Zafer Toprak

The politics and ideology of the nineteenth century were styled mainly by the French. World politics between 1789 and 1914 were largely a matter of contending for and against the tenets of 1789. As the channels of transmission became broader and more versatile, the new ideas that disseminated all over Europe changed the very foundations of group cohesion in the emerging nation-states. New patterns of identity and loyalty crystallized. New national aspirations were formulated and realized.

France pioneered the revolution against the *ancien régimes* and gave the emerging nations their libertarian ideas. The vocabulary and the issues of liberal and radical-democratic politics for most of the nation-states were dictated by the French Revolution. France became the first great example of national identity, and the concept of nationalism in the wake of revolution was disseminated throughout the world. Codes of law, models of scientific and technical organization, the metric system of measurement in most countries emulated that of the French. And, finally, through French printed words the ideology of the modern world began to penetrate non-European civilizations, that until then had resisted European ideas.

French libertarian ideas did not only revolutionize the whole European continent but also spread into its marginal territories, including Ottoman lands. The French Revolution was *the* revolution of its time, and the Ottoman Empire, in its encounter with Europe, followed the path it laid out. However, both the widening of outlook and the withering of traditionalism in Ottoman society had started long before the outbreak of the French Revolution. The growth of what one might call a materialistic or deistic spirit was evident from the early eighteenth century onwards. To begin with, it was the French style and manners rather than French ideas that found a favourable milieu in the Empire. Thereafter, increasing contacts with Frenchmen contributed to a broader mental outlook and to a better realization that the Western world had superior knowledge, technology, industry and economic power.

The material world of the *ancien régime* exerted an unprecedented influence on the Ottoman Empire and on the population in the urban centres.

Then, following the Revolution, libertarian principles and revolutionary ideas found an echo among Ottoman intellectuals, particularly the non-Muslims. Greeks and Serbs led the way. The *Tanzimat* reformists followed, although slowly, as the Empire integrated itself into the global process of capitalism in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. Intellectuals and savants welcomed the centralizing impact of the nation-state and adapted the French style to Ottoman realities. The intellectual vistas of *Tanzimat* reformers from Mahmud II onwards, then of the Young Ottomans in the second half of the nineteenth century, and finally of the Young Turks in the early twentieth century were all imbued with the ideas of the French Revolution or, at least, the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The heretic and to some extent atheistic ideas of many Ottoman intellectuals were a reflection of the radical perspectives of French thought.

Ottoman jurisprudence was one of the realms where the legal concerns of revolutionary France could thrive. French concepts of justice spread throughout Europe and entered the Ottoman lands. Although the French Revolution heralded a radical reversal of previously established ideas, the Napoleonic codes were in fact the product of lawyers who had lived, worked, and been generally respected under Louis XV and Louis XVI. They did, however, pay something more than lip-service to the ideals of the Revolution, and it was this that accounted for their subsequent influence during the nineteenth century. From the second quarter of the new century onwards, contact between the Ottoman Empire and Europe became increasingly close, and henceforth legal development was conditioned almost exclusively by the novel influences to which this exposed Ottoman society: the rule and order shaped by new institutions, legal codes, and cultural practices in the nineteenth century were inspired mainly by France.

This meant a shift from the multi-centric, vernacular system of law of the classical Ottoman State to state-centred law, with tradition giving way to modernity based on the model of a nascent interactive state. The modern state required universality as well as direct contact with the future citizen, unmediated by and circumventing the religious-ethnic communities. From the French Revolution onwards, direct contact with the emerging citizen prepared the ground for an interactive modern state based on the rule of law.[1] At least in rudimentary stage, the new state enjoyed not merely politico-administrative superiority in the form of greater ability to utilize a given tax base, but it also seemed to be better at nourishing and developing the source of its revenues.

From the very start of the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire, the *Porte* strengthened the centre at the expense of ethnic and religious communities, put the individual rather than the community at the focus of its attention and tax revenues, and tried to create a new identity of

Ottomanism that would replace community identity. This novel formulation reflected the nineteenth-century concept of the modern state.

The influence of the *Code Civil* and of associated codes was wide-reaching as a result of their introduction into much of Europe following Napoleonic conquests and their use in the French colonies. The *Code Civil* was also widely imitated or borrowed thanks to its quality as a piece of legislation and its spirit that expressed more generally the ideals of the codification movement throughout the nineteenth century. It was imposed on Belgium and the Netherlands, on those Italian states which fell to the French, on Baden and the Rhineland. The Dutch code of 1838 was much indebted to it. The Italian codification movement, which was finally successful after Italy had been unified, was based on it. In Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon, in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, and in Indo-China it was the law of the colonial settlers and in most cases affected profoundly their legal systems after independence. In Louisiana and Quebec, the *Code Civil* exerted an indirect influence. In Spain and Spanish America, in Portugal and most of the Portuguese colonies, and in the Balkans the *Code Civil* was admired and largely absorbed.[2] The Ottomans translated and published it in book form. Midhat Paşa, the renowned constitutionalist, worked hard to get it implemented in the Ottoman Empire.

The Rule of Law and Constitutional Law

The interactive state forms direct contacts with citizens through universal rule of law, predictable administration, and in responsive feedback in the formation of state policies. The strength of the interactive state lies in its capacity to govern on the basis of cooperation and consent. The institutions that make this model possible provide at the same time the ground for economic development and endow the state with a favourable resource base. It was the introduction of this model at an early stage, and its continuation in certain countries, which contributed to the unique dynamism that characterized the European state system.

The rudimentary interactive state initiated in the Ottoman Empire with the *Tanzimat* reforms provided an improved environment for economic progress in line with the libertarian atmosphere of the nineteenth century. *Tanzimat* men believed that the patterns and structures that made up the interactive state with uniform legislation would enhance economic prosperity by opening considerable space for autonomous civic and economic activity, thus promoting market relations. The *Tanzimat* era heralded the end of the command economy and prepared the ground for a consent society.

This relationship between the interactive state and economic growth is not wholly symmetrical, however. Prosperity came as a result of the prime achievement of the interactive state, the rule of law, which itself was composed of three elements, namely, constitutional, administrative and civil law.[3] Constitutional law concerned the rights of citizen *vis-à-vis* the state,

and the distribution of power within it. It was on the basis of constitutionalism, which involved the separation of power and the maintenance of civil liberty, that the interactive concept developed. Constitutionalism came to the Ottoman realm with the Edict of 1838 promulgated by *Tanzimat* reformers.

The first moves for constitutionalism in the Ottoman period were made towards the end of the eighteenth century. Between 1789 and 1808, Sultan Selim III envisaged the formation of an Advisory Assembly (the *Meclis-i Meşveret*) within the context of the New System (-the *Nizam-i Cedid*). Students of constitutional law in Turkey interpret the establishment of the advisory assembly as a major step towards a constitutional system of government. The Charter of Alliance (*Sened-i Ittifak*) of 1808 was the first important document from the point of view of a constitutional order. It restricted the Sultan's exercise of power, and also delegated some authority to a senate body-, (the *Ayan*).

The first impact of French ideas was reflected in the Tanzimat edict of 1839 entitled *Gülhane Hatt-ı Humayunu*. This was in no way an Ottoman constitution for the purpose of limiting the powers of the Sultan. The Sultan himself issued it and could abrogate it at will. However, it can be considered as a proto-constitutional document, as it included a promise by the Sultan to abide by any law enacted by the legislative machinery. At the same time the edict formalized the new interpretation of the scope and responsibility of the state, including the protection of security of life, honour, and property, and the proviso of equal justice for all subjects regardless of religion. All the subjects were assured that their basic rights would be respected. The document is especially significant for its recognition of equal rights in education and in government administration for Muslim as well as non-Muslim subjects, thereby adopting egalitarian principles.[4] The *Tanzimat* edict of 1839, although devised in the context of Ottoman tradition and expressing particular goals rather than abstract principles, encompassed many of the ideals contained in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* of 1789.[5]

From the time of the first printing-house established in 1727 by Müteferrika to that of the *Tanzimat*, translations from European languages had been largely confined to scientific and technical fields. In the *Tanzimat*, interest broadened out into literary, philosophical, and legal works. This new trend reflected the search for new modes of thinking with a bearing on cultural and then judicial values. Translations were made of almost all of the French literature that had provided the intellectual background for the French Revolution. The works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Fénélon, Fontenelle, and Volney enjoyed particular attention, and were the favourite Western writers of the *Tanzimat* intellectuals.

Texts with legal connotations were not ignored. The French *Code Civil* was translated and published in the same period. The Turkish translation of *Télémaque* appeared in 1862. Its popularity seems to have been due to the

fact that the political theme of this famous utopian-political novel was the maxim, "Kings exist for the sake of their subjects, and not subjects for the sake of kings". *Télémaque*'s dictum for kings was, "Change the state and habits of the whole people and rebuild anew from the very foundations." This eighteenth-century belief in paternalistic government was in harmony with the expectations of the Ottoman intelligentsia in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The second crucial document reflecting French ideas, the Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermanı*) of 1856 in the wake of the Crimean War, constituted a most comprehensive set of rules securing equal rights to non-Muslims in various social and juridical fields.[6] It officially prohibited the use of degrading expressions and terms that denoted discrimination on the grounds of sect, religion, or ethnicity. It opened up the public schools to students of all communities, with competence and capability replacing religious differences as criteria for entrance. Non-Muslims were now admitted to the military service and to official posts. This document also provided for equal treatment in procedures of buying, selling, and paying taxes.

Then, in 1875, the Imperial Edict on Justice (*Ferman-ı Adalet*) provided for independence of the judicial courts, ensured the safety of judges, and reiterated once more that state positions and services were open to all subjects of the Empire. The most important step along the road to the rule of law came with the introduction of the 1876 Constitution (*Kanun-ı Esasi*) which also started the era known as the First Constitutional Period.[7] The basic concept in the 1876 Constitution was that it for the first time recognized a parliamentary system, although the powers it accorded to the parliament were somewhat limited. Among other things, the provisions of this constitution covered basic rights and privileges, the independence of courts and the safety of judges. Although it was in effect for a short period, its amended version was to be the legal basis of the Second Constitutional period in 1908 that laid the foundations for a constitutional monarchy.

The Interactive State and Administrative Law

Less obvious but still of importance in the interactive-state system was administrative law, which concerned the exercise of authority by the state apparatus. Administration on the basis of rules facilitated interaction with society in that it contributed to a high degree of procedural legitimacy. There are few phenomena so demoralizing and detrimental to popular consent as widespread corruption, nepotism, and public kleptomania. Such practices violate the virtually universal conception of fairness. The administration becoming subject to legal rules had another positive effect as well: it meant that state organs remained impartial in their operations *vis-à-vis* the various special interests in civil society instead of exacerbating conflicts of interest between different population groups. In consequence the state, as a neutral regulator of conflict, could assist co-operation between

various social segments. The effect was to strengthen society's capacity for coordination as well as that of the state for governance. This meant that the state then had a strong partner with which to interact.

The *Tanzimat* reforms paved the way for secular administrative legislation and the renewal of the Ottoman state's social and political structures along Western lines. Students of Ottoman administration point out that *Tanzimat* is the watershed in the full-fledged transformation of Ottoman institutions. New, mainly administrative and economic institutions, necessitated legal changes. The *Tanzimat* era was in fact a period of some decades of legal innovations and inaugurated a process of transformation in the rule of law marked by intense codification. In most cases the *Tanzimat* men adopted Western, mainly French codes. As *Şeriat*, or Muslim law, had been the legal apparatus for so many centuries, initial attempts at reforms were directed to the public sphere, which could be considered a marginal area.

Throughout the classical era, the structure of the Ottoman State and society had remained more or less static and unchanged, and Muslim law had been able to accommodate itself successfully to such internal requirements that were needed from time to time. The non-Muslim communities had their own legal regimes and *Şeriat* allowed them to practice their religio-communitarian pursuits. The pressures which now arose from both within and without confronted the Ottoman Empire with an entirely new situation. Communities of different creeds became intermingled as the emergence of a capitalistic market created common denominators and obliged them to share the same space. Furthermore, the internal market became integrated into the world at large, and required procedures common to all participants. The Ottoman society made up of juridical enclaves was passing away, to be replaced by more universal practices, at least in terms of economic pursuits.

Politically, socially, and economically, European civilization was based on concepts and institutions fundamentally alien to Islamic tradition and to the Islamic law in Ottoman Turkey which expressed that tradition. Because of the essential rigidity of *Şeriat* and the dominance of the theory of *taklid*, or strict adherence to established doctrine, an apparently irreconcilable conflict now arose between traditional law and the needs of Ottoman society in so far as it aspired to organize itself by Western standards and values.

There seemed, at any rate initially, no alternative but to simply abandon Muslim law and replace it with laws of Western inspiration in those spheres where Ottoman jurisprudence felt it particularly urgent to adapt itself to modern conditions of market economy and life styles. Any understanding, therefore, of the nature of modern Ottoman legal practice first requires an appreciation of the extent to which and how laws of European origin came to be adopted by the Ottoman realm.

The *Tanzimat* had already heralded secular trends within the field of law; legal transformation had started, continued at a rapid pace, and there was

large-scale reception of European law. The process began under Mahmud II (1808-1839). One of the advances in government during his reign was the transformation of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye*) into a judiciary body.[8] The system of courts (*adliye*) based on the principle of justice (*adalet*) was a novelty. The new concept of justice was distinct from that of the *Şeriat* and sultanic law (*kanun*). Just as the innovations under Mahmud II had introduced the concept of *maarif* not only as a way of learning unfamiliar things but also as a vehicle of modernization, so did the concept of *adalet* bring the sense of administering justice as well as legislating rules for establishing a new order.

Under the *Tanzimat* reforms, each of the ministerial departments (except that for foreign affairs) came to have a permanent council for the preparation of projects and regulations. These organs became increasingly divorced from both Muslim and Sultanic law as their old constituent members began to be replaced by a new type of educated man - the product of the secular schools of higher learning that had been copied from France.

These councils constituted the legislative organs of the Tanzimat. The Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances continued to function as the supreme body. In 1868 it was divided into the Board of Judicial Ordinances (*Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye*) and the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*). The former became the highest judicial organ and evolved into the courts; it was presided over by the conservative jurist Cevdet Paşa. The Council of State was presided over by the liberal administrator Midhat Paşa and became the source of the constitutional movement that resulted in the drafting of the Constitution of 1876.

The *Tanzimat* brought law codification rather than parliamentary legislation as its distinctive feature. Its attempts at codification constituted the first such experiment in a Muslim country in modern times. The Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances formed by Mahmud II, referred above, became under the Tanzimat the organ to undertake the job of judicial codification according to *adalet*, which was expressed in 1839 as the *Tanzimat*'s organic law.

The *Tanzimat* Charter declared itself loyal to Muslim law (the *Şeriat*) in line with the custom and the rhetoric of the time. It also declared with even greater emphasis the necessity of framing new laws. It stated that the major cause of misrule, injustice, and disorder was the lack of written laws as official instruments accessible to the public. Neither Muslim nor Sultanic laws fulfilled these conditions. *Şeriat* was not a codified or written law comprising civil, commercial, and penal provisions. The *kanuns* were written and promulgated, but they were not accessible; neither were they judicial in a real sense because, by definition, they were subject to the separate will of each ruler. For the first time the need was felt for laws framed on the basis of a superior kind of justice. Codification was, therefore, the first attempt to differentiate between law and religion and, after deliberation and

selection, to promulgate legislation based on available sources and on certain rational or secular criteria.

Codification in itself is an unmistakable sign of secularization in a Muslim society, given that it is a planned, concerted human effort to formulate the *Şeriat* provisions as positive laws. Even though the result may be based on Muslim law, the process makes it a code easily distinguishable from religious practices and relating only to legal action. Regardless of whether codification is accomplished through the acts of a legislator representing the will of the people or by a competent person or body, it is simply another step in the process of secularization involving selection and deviation from tradition as set by either religion or the state or both. Selection means screening the provisions of the religious schools (*fiqh*), or choosing between provisions of Muslim law and the Western codes, or making eclectic combinations of the two. Above all, doing this implies the existence of absolute criteria different from those of Muslim law and tradition and, as such, secular *par excellence*.

From Muslim Law to Civil Law

To function, the interactive state required a uniform code of civil law. By contributing to integration and imperial/national cohesion this code would strengthen both the state and civil society. It was understood that a people with a common identity was easier to govern through consent than through coercion, that despotic regimes maintained their power through strategies of "divide and rule", and that regimes basing their statecraft on legitimacy worked instead to achieve integration. A tool for realizing this objective was legal standardization.

Civil law was a precondition for economic growth. Entrepreneurship and productive investments could come about only within a framework of fixed and predictable legislation that could uphold contracts and ownership. When economic actors try to arrange this on their own, the risks and transaction costs become so large as to preclude productive economic investment. It was only the state that could furnish the legal infrastructure necessary for entrepreneurship.

In the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Europe it was the fields of public law (i.e. constitutional and criminal law) and of civil and commercial transactions which were particularly prominent, and it was precisely here that the deficiencies of the outdated classical Ottoman system were most apparent. The law of civil obligation was all too obviously inadequate to cater to modern systems of trade and economic development. Equally insupportable to the modernist view was the traditional form of criminal jurisdiction. Although alien to actual Ottoman practice, the existence in Muslim law of penalties such as amputation of the hand for theft and stoning to death for adultery were, of course, offensive to humanitarian principles, and the notion of homicide as a civil injury, acceptable though it might be to a tribal society, was unsuited to a modern

state. The main reason for a new criminal law was that modern ideas of government could not tolerate the wide arbitrary powers vested in the political sovereign under the *Şeriat* doctrine of deterrence (*ta'zir*).

European jurisprudence was not totally unknown to Ottoman Turkey. Both criminal and commercial laws had a foothold in the Empire through the system of capitulatory privileges, by which the Western powers ensured that their subjects, while resident in the Ottoman realm, would be governed by their own laws. This had brought about a growing familiarity with European laws particularly when, as in the sphere of commercial transactions, they were applied to mixed cases involving European and Ottoman Muslim traders. Naturally, therefore, it was to the laws applied under the capitulatory system that the Ottoman authorities turned when the desire for efficiency and progress appeared to necessitate a replacement of their traditional law. At the same time it was hoped that the adoption of these European laws might mean that the foreign powers might agree to abolish the capitulatory privileges, which were becoming increasingly irksome as growing emphasis was placed on national sovereignty.

Secularization of the law began with the formulation of the first completely secular code in an area that was traditionally outside the scope of Muslim law, and that code was the result of commercial relations with outsiders. The expansion of these relations after the Commercial Treaty of 1838 led to the codification of a commercial law, and to the organization of the first tribunal independent of both the *Şeriat* and Christian ecclesiastical courts.

From the early nineteenth century onwards Ottoman and foreign traders began to form mixed traders' councils to adjudicate between them. European customs and practices were applied in the settlement of disputes in these councils, which were formally recognized after 1840, under the title of Commercial Board (*Ticaret Meclisi*). Negotiations between the government and the European powers holding capitulatory privileges resulted in 1847 in the formal recognition of mixed tribunals composed of ten foreign, ten Ottoman Muslim, and ten Ottoman non-Muslim subjects. The recognition of these bodies and their manner of procedure was implicitly sanctioned by traditional Muslim law which recognized the right of disputants to choose their own arbiters. These tribunals did not utilize any formally codified law or procedure, and their members were not judges in the real sense. They acted entirely on the basis of established commercial precedent.[9]

The creation of these purely secular courts led to the promulgation of the first secular code in 1850. The Commercial Code was in part a direct translation of the French Commercial Code of 1807, and included provisions for the payment of interest. The *Code de Commerce*, made up of four books, dealt with commerce in general, with maritime law, bankruptcy, and mercantile jurisdiction. It drew heavily on the royal ordinances which had been the work of Colbert, the *Code Marchand* of 1673 and the *Ordonnance de la Marine* of 1681. It defined the status of merchant and dealt, for example,

with the duty to keep books, with companies and partnerships and bills of exchange. It did not innovate but produced a clear and rational statement of existing merchant law.

A second version of the code, again emulating French legislation, was enacted as an addendum in 1860. It stipulated that the commercial tribunals were responsible to the Ministry of Commerce. They therefore became the first official secular courts outside the jurisdiction of the Şeyhülislam, the highest religious authority. There followed a Code of Commercial Procedure in 1861, and a Code of Maritime Commerce in 1863, both of which were again basically French law.[10]

To apply these codes a new system of secular courts (*nizamiye*) was established. Civil jurisdiction, except cases of personal status, now fell within the competence of these courts. The basic law of obligations was codified between 1869 and 1876 in the corpus known as the *Mecelle*. Although the substance of this owed nothing to European sources but was derived entirely from the Muslim *Hanefi* jurisdiction, the secular courts could now refer to an authoritative manual. The first deviation from traditional Muslim-law procedure occurred in these courts as they began to accept non-Muslim witnesses testifying against Muslims. Allowing all subjects to take the oath according to the faith to which they belonged was seen as a liberal measure that contrasted with the civil and political vulnerability of Jews in England. When this practice was extended to the statutory secular courts as soon as they were established, it did not arouse any opposition.

Codification and New Jurisprudence

Acts of codification involved basic changes in Ottoman jurisdiction. The new courts began to expand their jurisdiction at the expense of those of the *Şeriat*. The need began to be felt for reorganizing the entire judicial system so as to separate the functions of the secular from those of the religious courts and demarcating their areas of jurisdiction. Efforts were made towards the codification of legal areas previously covered entirely by Muslim law.[11]

The first test in modernizing the *Şeriat* came with the attempt to draw up a penal code. It was inevitable that this would be the first step, since it was the very essence of the *Tanzimat* Charter to ensure "life, property, and honour." Penal law was a field of legislation that had been subject traditionally to the *kanun* enactments of the rulers, to Sultanic law. While *kanuns* on penal offences had not abrogated he penal provisions of the Muslim law, they had made obsolete such provisions as retaliation (*kısas*) and blood-money (*diyet*).

The Supreme Council prepared a new penal code for promulgation in 1840, which was a marked improvement over the one drawn up in Mahmud II's time. It was both the first legal expression of the *Tanzimat* Charter and the first expression of the *Tanzimat* duality, in that it contained legal provisions taken from modern secular criminal codes side by side with others

from the *Şeriat*. It confirmed the principle of equality, and decreed that no one would be punished without a trial and court sentence, that trials would be public, and that impartiality of the judges was essential. On the other hand, it revived the Muslim law provisions on retaliation and blood-money. The code was also defective in nomenclature, and several offences were omitted altogether in the definition and classification of criminal acts. Above all, it maintained the character of medieval law books, being a collection of precepts rather than a precise digest of acts, procedures, and penalties. These shortcomings of the 1840 code led to another code in 1851, not substantially different from the first. Both were attempts to modernize the penal provisions of Muslim and well as Sultanic law by producing a kind of digest rather than a new penal code.

The situation changed radically following the promulgation of the Edict of 1856, and with the entirely new Imperial Penal Code (*Ceza Kanunname-i Hümayunu*) enacted in 1858 and in force until 1926. This was an adaptation or translation of the French penal code and the first introduction of Western legal formulation in the field of public law. The French *Code Pénal* had been a revision of an earlier code of 1791 dealing with serious crimes and based on the idea that crimes and penalties should both be precisely defined by law without leaving room for judicial interpretation. Its successor, promulgated in 1810, was rather more flexible but retained the principle that crimes and punishments must be clearly defined in advance; however, its penalties were as severe as they were inflexible.

Under Ottoman penal legislation, the defined penalties of the traditional *Şeriat* law (*hadd*) were all abolished, except that of the death penalty for apostasy which remained in force longer than any other, with marked revisions in 1911 and 1914. The new Imperial Penal Code of 1858 introduced the legal principles that had been declared in the *Tanzimat* Charter of 1839 and in the Edict of 1856: the principle that no one could be punished for an act that was unspecified, and the principle of individual responsibility.

The Penal Code of 1858 was incomparably modern in form and substance. Its provisions were predominantly secular. However, it was not entirely free from certain *Şeriat* provisions in its original form. The first Article stated that the Code did not abrogate the penal provisions of Muslim law, that it was enacted merely to codify the limits of the rights of the chief executive (i.e. the ruler), and that it would not infringe on claims for cases of retaliation, blood-money, or on personal rights as determined by Muslim law. The code, in fact, contained specific articles on these issues and was an example of the effort to draw up secular legislation in the belief that it could be modern in form and content although based on traditional Muslim law. However, the co-existence of secular and Muslim law within the same code gave rise to several unexpected clashes in the field of judicial administration.

The new code was applied in the statutory secular courts (*nizamiye* or *adliye*) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. As a result of the

policy of separating the secular from the religious, these operated side by side with the Muslim courts that were left to the jurisdiction of the highest religious authority, the *Şeyhülislam*, until World War I.[12] In 1916, the *Şeyhülislam* was removed from the cabinet and his jurisdiction much reduced as the religious courts came under the aegis of the secular Ministry of Justice. The religious seminaries that had been teaching religious jurisprudence for centuries lost their autonomy and were brought under the Ministry of Education. Finally, their curricula were modernized and the teaching of European languages became mandatory.

The Final Analysis: Uniformity and Secularism

The continental European countries codified much of their law, both public and private, in the last quarter of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the notion of uncodified law prevailed and is still predominant, and the majority of legal rulings are derived from customary principles and judicial precedents.[13] Ottoman and later republican Turkey followed the continental pattern, and with the reception and codification of many European laws, legislation has become the most important source of law. Customary law and case law or judicial precedent are also considered valid sources in Turkish practice, but they are considered subsidiary. For example, in cases under the Civil Code or the Code of Obligations, judges are allowed to apply customary principles when the statutes are silent. In reality, judges will usually consult experts to ascertain the precise content of customary rules. Custom, contrary to statutory law, is not legally valid. It is axiomatic that statutory law is superior to custom, and that judges are bound by statutes passed by the legislature and in line with the Constitution.

The dichotomy between Muslim law and secular legislation lasted for almost a century in the Ottoman-Turkish case. In most instances *Şeriat* represented customs, as religious precepts generally were not codified. Attempts to remove the conflict between the two systems of law and of courts continued throughout the *Tanzimat* and succeeding periods. Stage by stage, increasing areas of life had to undergo legal redefinition and even reorientation, removed from the sphere designated as "religious", and brought under state law.

Codifications both in Ottoman and republican Turkey intended to achieve uniformity in the application of the law, a consideration that was of some moment in view of the widespread divergences of juristic opinion (as recorded in the *Şer'i* texts). The process of legal secularization encountered serious difficulties in defining the boundaries between the secular and religious when it reached the stage of codifying civil law and especially family law. The secular outlook of the French Third Republic during the Second Constitutional Period in the Ottoman Empire gave a further spurt to the Young Turks, and a radical family by-law was enacted in 1917.[14] However,

communitarian concerns were still valid in this piece of legislation. After the proclamation of the republic, the second wave in favour of modernization swept away all concerns on religious grounds and radical legal reforms could be introduced.

In the twentieth century the French *Code Civil* lost its earlier dominance for reasons either ideological or political. Brazil and Turkey have preferred to take the more modern German or Swiss code as a model while others, like Italy and the Netherlands, have produced new codes of their own. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and Code of Obligations (which contain the law of persons, family law, succession, property, contracts, torts and unjust enrichment), both of which were adopted in 1926 with some minor alterations, represented a profound change in the social life of Turkey. The Swiss lawyer and scholar Sauser-Hall noted that such a radical and rapid change was unknown to history.[15]

The process of legal codification beginning with the *Tanzimat* era opened the way to the gradual emerging of an interactive modern state. In its most inclusive form, the interactive state is democratically founded. Its structure – marked by power division, law-abiding governance, and an autonomous civil sphere –lays the foundation for a growing pool of collective capacities in society. This, in turn, stimulates both economic prosperity and democratic vitality. The evolution of civil society and democratic citizenship requires, above all, an institutional framework and jurisprudence to reinforce the preconditions for their existence. Herein lay the relative strength of the Ottoman movement of legal codification and administrative reform which republican Turkey inherited.

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TRANSFORMING TRADITION

Metaphors of Change: 'Tradition' and the East/West Discourse in the late Ottoman Empire

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I would like to begin this study with a brief discussion of two publications that appeared in Athens in the late 1860s. They are the short essay *East and West*, written by an anonymous author who styled himself Anatolitis (Easterner), and Scarlatos Vyzantios' three-volume opus *Constantinople, A Topographical, Archaeological and Historical Description of this famous City.*[1] The first is a polemical text written to incite Greek patriotism during the ill-fated Cretan Revolt. The second attempts to present the history of Constantinople in the Byzantine era and to give some insight into the social life of Istanbul in the nineteenth century. Despite their different scope and purpose, both texts discuss similar topics, including the ethnic complexities in the Empire and its relation with the West. However, the authors' views diverge widely in a number of issues. One striking difference is the way they portray the 'Turks'. Anatolitis represented the Turks, whom he claimed to know well because he had lived in the Empire for a long time, as a coherent ethnic group notorious for its barbarity and rapaciousness. He argued that they have a good reputation as soldiers and state employees but are incapable of any kind of productive work, including cultivation of the land. At the heart of the Turkish character was its incapacity of being civilized. The anonymous author defined civilization as the process of self-improvement in association with the historical experience of the West. He related the conditions of civilization to three succinct qualities: the treatment of women and their position in a given society, the opportunities available to the (male) individual to become independent, and the existence of the spirit of patriotism. Anatolitis found the Turks wanting on all three counts. The seclusion of women in the harem, the absence of a Turkish bourgeoisie with a spirit of patriotism, and the nomadic nature of the Turks were all supposed to be indications of the Turkish inability to embrace civilization.[2] Needless to say, the Christian nations

of the Empire were seen very differently. However, what matters most at this point is that the author deemed the Turks incapable of being civilized in terms of western historical development, or rather because of its absence. Turkish society was following a different, non-European, historical path and for this reason distanced itself from fruits of civilization inherent in western historical trajectory. Although Anatolitis did not consider the West a coherent unity -in fact he distinguished the 'Old Europe' from the 'more dynamic and liberal' American society- he nevertheless presented it as the locus of civilization against which societies should measure themselves.

The approach of Scarlatos Vyzantios, an Istanbul born Christian Orthodox Greek to the "Turks" was totally different. He repeatedly invoked his long acquaintance with Muslims in Istanbul and avowed intention to do full justice to his subject matter. He portrayed the Turks as decent and good-natured people. "Whoever is associated with them, Vyzantios wrote, that is, whoever speaks their language and knows how to approach them, will come to discover that underneath an unpolished and illiterate surface they posses a healthy and vigorous mind."[3] He also described the Turks as unpretentious, calm, tolerant, and god-fearing people, whose deep religious beliefs and ignorance often led them into fatalism. Suspecting that such sympathetic comments might arouse adverse reactions in Athens where the book was to be published, Vyzantios pointed out in his introduction that all he had written about the Turks was the plain truth and like all other nations, the Turks too possessed both good and bad qualities.[4] In fact, the book did arouse strong criticism, the most important being that of Stephanos Koumanoudis, a professor at Athens University, but this will not be discussed here. What it is interesting to note is Scarlatos Vyzantios' attitude to the West in his discussion of the Turks. The anonymous author of *East and West*, as mentioned above, questioned the ability of the Turks to become civilized. Scarlatos Vyzantios, on the other hand, sketched them sympathetically for the very reason that he found them untainted by western civilization. Europeans, he claimed, were not in a position to understand the true nature of the Turk, which escaped them entirely. Based as it was on ignorance, western understanding of the Turk resulted in a caricature of his true character.[5] For Scarlatos Vyzantios, the Turk as "noble savage" stands for the uncorrupted East. The spectre of the West is not absent, but its signification is different. Vyzantios was critical of the West on historical and religious grounds and held an idealized view of Byzantium as a Christian Orthodox Empire. I am not proposing that he claimed western culture to be corrupt or decadent; but he did believe that it had the power to corrupt other cultures because it presented itself as the only true source of civilization. As will be seen in what follows, he was not alone in this belief, which was actually widely shared in Ottoman society.

What these two texts demonstrate is that the understanding of the West among Greeks, far from being uniform, involved opposite and antithetical

meanings. This ambivalence indicates a rather symbolic use of the dichotomy of West and East. Instead of taking the meaning of these terms to be self-evident we had better examine how exactly it was constructed and contested. This cannot be a free-floating intellectual enterprise, however. The meaning of East and West, ambivalent though it was, rested on the acceptance of unequal relations, particularly on the West's domination of the East.

Taking this statement as a point of departure a number of observations can be made. The texts referred above are not unique but part of a broader textual corpus generated by the increasing penetration of the Ottoman Empire by the West and the climate of change this triggered in the fields of the economy, administration, and culture. While the shaping of social identity in the late Ottoman Empire was directly affected by the experience of change and the predicament associated with it, the crucial point is that available perceptions of the West were an integral part of the way individual subjects and social groups made sense of the world and themselves. The images of the West –personified in the archetypal characters of western penetration such as the missionary, the engineer, the trader, the diplomat etc- fed the social imagination and generated discourses about community and the self in both the Muslim and the non-Muslim segments of Ottoman society.[6] If one looks at how the West figured in public statements, one will find different or even competing representation of its supposedly true meaning. Despite their differences, however, these statements constitute a specific set of competing discourses important in its own right. But to suggest that different people saw the western presence in different ways does not take us very far. The real question is whether local agents were capable of restructuring their experience with this presence in terms other than western.

It is my contention that reference to the West was inherent in any meaningful discourse about the self and the community. 'Civilization', 'progress', 'novelty', 'literacy', 'respectability' and other key words of the western vocabulary of civilization were widely employed in public discourses as primary cognitive means to define particular situations. As the late Helle Skopetea noted: 'the Easterner found himself in a constant dialogue with the West even if he was not aware of this'.[7] The appropriation of western discourses in the East was a major outcome of the East-West encounter. The East was not mute and not represented only by the West.[8] This discursive condition not only shaped agency and the imagination, it also established western domination, because local agents appropriated and internalized fundamental polarities of the western discourse of modernity such as East-West, civilization- barbarity, modernity-tradition, old-new etc. Such polarities increasingly structured the imagination of the people living in the late Ottoman Empire, their ability to think and make sense of themselves and the world they lived in, even when they tried to establish a distance from the West and develop a critical voice towards it. More often than not this situation accounted for the tendency of individual subjects to read local

conditions in terms of 'lack', or 'absence', and to translate it into 'incapacity' of non-western societies to modernize. If what I have said indicates the domination of the West was it possibly to create a position from which to address the West differently?

I shall try to elaborate on these issues by discussing a specific example, that of the rise of Greek-Orthodox education in the late Ottoman Empire. This project directly involved the urban elite of the Greek-speaking Orthodox communities and fitted well into the Greek nationalist agenda. All this already sufficiently known[9] and what I want to discuss instead is the paradox inherent in this educational project. All who are familiar with the period will agree that, as far as education was concerned, reference to tradition was common. In a period of rapid development of education, and voluntary activities, the concept of *ta patria* (i.e established traditions) was widely used to denote a cohesive and time-honoured cultural force. I would go further and suggest that the variety of statements about tradition constituted a particular discourse of tradition, which of course drew heavily on the Greek nationalist discourse. The 'Greek tradition' became the object of this particular discourse that defined, classified and imbued it with new meanings. I do not suggest that this discourse invented something out of nothing. But I do claim that it attempted to create a meaningful order out of a polymorphous and disparate body of literary texts, and folk practices generated in different historical contexts. This operation was not easy or transparent; on the contrary it was inherently contradictory and involved a series of different but overlapping strategies that stressed the importance of tradition as a basis of legitimacy of the nationalist agenda. At the risk of simplification I would argue that tradition was usually associated with a set of indigenous values (religious, national and moral), necessary for meaningful social life. Tradition purportedly provided a diachronic and spiritual guideline, representing the source of stability and solidarity. This particular articulation of tradition necessarily involved its distinction from modernity and that juxtaposition in turn meant a temporal hierarchy between old and new. Contrary to the novel, and presumably menacing nature of modernity, tradition appeared as an indigenous and old cultural force. This polarity was often projected against the background of an East-West antithesis where tradition appeared as much a feature of the East as modernity was to the West. What is puzzling, though, is that this discourse did not argue for a return to the long forgotten past, but was closely related to the emergence of modern institutions, schools and education being a case in point. Furthermore, In addition, rather than the 'obscurantist' priests as one might expect, it was teachers, intellectuals and philanthropists who invoked tradition to promote education and new forms of sociability, institutions we know as explicitly modern.

In matters of education, tradition was invoked constantly though contradictorily. Statements underlining that modern institutions were

required to meet the challenges of a new era became quite common in the Greek Press of Istanbul and Smyrna since the Crimean War. For example, shortly after the conclusion of the Paris Treaty in 1856, the Greek daily *Vyzantis* declared that, despite its increasing wealth the Christian- Orthodox society of Istanbul lacked important cultural institutions such as schools, social clubs, public libraries, scientific societies etc.[10] The paper claimed this lack to be responsible for the stagnation of the Christian-Orthodox community, and urged prosperous people to channel their wealth accordingly. Not surprisingly, the comparison rested on differentiating between civilized or enlightened societies where similar institutions were highly developed, and uncivilized or unenlightened ones. After the Crimean War the institutional apparatus of the Greek Orthodox community increased considerably. The institutionalization of the Christian Orthodox community (Rum milleti)[11] and the growing interest in education as a means of cultivating national and civil bourgeois values led to the emergence of a broad network of schools throughout the Empire which was financed by local communities, the powerful *syllogoi* (i.e. voluntary literary and philanthropic associations) of Constantinople and, later on, by the Greek State. Unequal resources, political priorities, and the reluctance or suspicion of peasant societies towards school and schooling made this network vulnerable, expensive and difficult to manage. It was no secret that the principles of education, school organization and methods of teaching in primary and secondary education were based on European models. Yet, despite its modern and western background, the project of Greek Orthodox education was linked to the 'restoration of tradition' as a prerequisite of civilization. This process was not understood in abstract terms but located in geographical space: education was meant to become an instrument of civilizing the East, a term encompassing a wide area with Asia Minor at its centre. Certainly, the East in this sense was no new concept. In the past, East and West had been part of the ecclesiastical vocabulary of both the Catholic and the Christian-Orthodox Church in their effort to win over the souls of the Christians in that part of the world. The East-West controversy broadened widely during the nineteenth century, however, to accommodate new conflicts and social dynamics. The increasing political and economic influence of the western European States, as well the rise of local nationalisms in various parts of the Ottoman Empire reconfigured the East-West dichotomy in new ways. Increasing missionary activity, particularly in Asia Minor and the major port cities, complicated the situation by targeting Orthodox and Armenian Christians and alerted the local Christian Churches that felt threatened in the process. In this complex landscape 'tradition' and its defense became political issues as much as anything else connoting identity. The project of education and the restoration of tradition were formally part of the Greek nationalist agenda.

Let me give some examples to illustrate this. In an address to the Mikra Asia Society in 1872 the Orthodox metropolitan of Caesarea (Kayseri)

Efstathios Kleovoulos lamented the passing of the ancient Greek glory and told his audience about the misfortunes that befell Asia Minor and local Christians in consequence.[12] The loss of the ancestral mother tongue was considered of paramount importance. The metropolitan was referring to the fact that a large number of indigenous Christians in Asia Minor did not speak Greek but Turkish, Armenian or Arabic. This was an instance of the lost tradition being explicitly linguistic, and Kleovoulos urged his audience to contribute to the financing of schools, particularly in Turcophone areas, to remedy this situation. As he claimed: 'The teaching of the Greek language must come first followed by courses of general education, and instruction in music and gymnastics so that the Anatolian Christians develop a healthy mind in a healthy body... Then at the end should come the teaching of sciences and the arts which are expected to bring about the well being of our common fatherland, and in which the American and European nations are so advanced'.

Leonidas Isigones, a teacher living in Smyrna, used the same argument to discuss the situation of education in Smyrna and its prospects in a series of articles published in 1871.[13] According to Isigones it was the "linguistic barbarization" of the Greek tongue that was responsible for the decline of the Greek nation after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The increasing presence of foreign linguistic elements in the Greek language, along with the political subjugation of the Greeks, had distorted the pure national language and affected the state of the nation to such an extent as to almost kill it. It was to correct this state of affairs that, Isigones claimed, the nation should reclaim its past glories though education and learning of the true Greek. Nevertheless, and appearances notwithstanding, Isigones was not championing the teaching of exclusively ancient Greek, which at the time dominated the curriculum of Greek-Orthodox schools. On the contrary, he considered this teaching counterproductive unless it was balanced by the teaching of modern Greek. Moreover, Isigones strongly denounced the disorganization, as he put it, of the educational system as reflected in the absence of uniform methods of teaching and the absence of standard textbooks. He considered that the ensuing complete lack of all and any control undermined the scope of education, hindered the moral training of young children and threatened the regeneration of the Greek nation. It is interesting to note the way Isigones managed to accommodate the subject of school organization that was of major importance to him within the narrative of national regeneration and the restoration of tradition. Rather than stressing the modernist aspects of his argument and rejecting the emphasis on tradition, which would have been a possible strategy, he preferred to use the discourse of tradition for backing his argument. In other words, education, in the form of a disciplined system of knowledge transmission, was required to re-establish tradition and purify the souls and minds of the young.

In a similar vein Kalliopi Kehagia, head mistress of the prestigious Zappeion School for Girls in Istanbul, argued that the Greek national tradition, which according to Kehagia was the combination of Hellenism and Christian Orthodoxy, had greatly suffered due to the nation's long subjugation, but that it still contained authentic elements that could be used as springboards for national education.[14] Kehagia believed that national traditions were self-contained structures whose cultural power weakened if contaminated by foreign elements. In this context the rehabilitation of tradition was seen as a condition for keeping pace with civilizing processes. In addition, the emerging institutional apparatus was viewed as the means whereby both the rehabilitation of tradition and resistance to detrimental foreign influences could be achieved. For example, Kehagia believed that, if properly organized, the system of educating Greek- Orthodox girls would combat the 'aping of things foreign' and the threat this posed to the Greek nation.[15] She was referring to a widespread tendency, particularly among the urban middle classes, to adopt western ways in many areas of everyday life, including education. It must be noted that the meaning of the 'foreign' or 'alien' as a destructive force is in this case associated exclusively with the West and with no other 'outside', i.e. Islamic influences. The Greeks, Kehagia argued, had been inspired by foreign models concerning the way they behaved, dressed, and learned things. But, she continued, they were deceiving themselves if they believed that the appropriation of European ways was enough in itself to 'transfer the fruits of civilization'. Although Kehagia accepted that the West represented true civilization, she did not considered imitating the West a civilizing process. Where education was concerned, Kehagia offered an interesting paradox. She acknowledged the need for modern education, but denied its western origins by separating its organizing principle -the compulsory and standardized nature of modern education, for example- from the educational content. If education was to fit the different character of different nations, as she believed, then the universal principles of modern education were, or seemed to be, irrelevant. Each nation ought to learn what was necessary for its specific cultural development, without imitating European modes of thinking and ways of life. In this, Kehagia expressed the tensions existing between universal principles and particular situations that are implicit in any modernist project. Efthalia Adam, another headmistress of the Zappeion School, used similar language. Addressing the graduates of the year 1903, Adam tackled the issue of 'our [Greek] parental tradition' in modern times and claimed that the 'seductive modern (western) culture' was responsible for the abandonment of this tradition.[16] Adam believed that there was strong antagonism between 'parental' tradition and modern culture. The latter, being the product of the West, represented a state of civilization whose material abundance confused individuals and made them rush to take advantage of it without considering the effect of this on their identity and tradition. Unwise and

hasty choices, she claimed, were responsible for the weakening of the Greek national sentiment, the radical changes in the Greek family and the transformation of society in general. She acknowledged that a transitional period was required for a gradual adaptation 'to progress and the spirit of the times', and insisted that rapid changes were necessarily detrimental to tradition. By imitating all things foreign -which she considered to be the then currently dominant cultural fashion- the Greeks were embracing an alien culture that, eventually, would oust their own. Nevertheless, Adam allowed some room for western influences to the extent that she believed that severing all contacts with the civilized West would be detrimental to the Greeks. For this purpose the 'moderate' use of some aspects of modern western culture, which unfortunately she did not name, were deemed necessary. This was not, however, an open invitation to ape foreign ways: it was the most glaring, yet least beneficial aspects of the Western culture that seduced people into parroting. The only possible strategy to overcome the cultural predicament which change had brought on the Greek people was emphasis on education which, as Adam claimed, was indispensable to national reform and the only true path to knowledge recognized by the civilized world.[17]

The cases discussed above allow us to discern some overlapping patterns. The tradition discourse lamented the corruption of the authentic national self and required its restoration. Embedded within the narrative of national regeneration tradition represented the perfect, if dormant, national essence in need of purification from alien linguistic and cultural influences. The situation could yet be reversed and the true national identity restored.

There are a number of points that can be discussed in relation to this. First, the concept of tradition as an entity in need of restoration is full of ambivalence. Commentators seem to suggest that they knew what this tradition was, although at the same time they appeared to believe that at some point in time it had been lost. We may assume that they were referring to two different things. If tradition had to do with language then obviously the return to the 'parental tongue' and its teaching would be sufficient to stem the tide of 'linguistic barbarization'. But if tradition was a matter of social habits and ways of life then things are rather more complicated. It is, for example, much less certain what 'parental' /historical tradition meant in relation to the modern patterns of social life noticeable in the major port-cities of the Empire where a Christian-Orthodox and Greek-speaking middle class was fashioning its own cultural and social profile. Was this tradition associated with a specific set of social habits, a particular form of family structure, or of kind of nostalgia for a distant but familiar past? I would say not. The concept of tradition was used as a kind of metaphor when dealing with novel issues associated with a changing social and cultural environment, and its meaning should be sought in this context only and not in relation to some pre-existing set of cultural and social situation. I would suggest that

the emphasis on tradition went hand in hand with the concerns of particular individuals and groups about the implications of and their discontent with modernity. There was as much certainty that things were in the process of changing as there was ambivalence concerning the exact course this change might take. The sense of change established a new temporality and drew a deep line between the present and the past. The constant evocation of tradition, the endless statements that made tradition an object of discourse, was in fact a way of trying to come to terms with an inevitable but uncertain modernity whose long-term implications were unknown. The claims made for tradition were an acknowledgement of the irreversible change as much as an effort to understand and control a rapidly changing social and cultural landscape. From this point of view the use of tradition was not only a conservative reaction to change, but also part of the new changing environment, a facet of the modernist discourse.

Were the literate Greeks in the late Ottoman Empire aware of the ambivalent nature of their reference to tradition? Did they realize the modernist aspect of this discourse, and how its conservative tone concealed a reformist momentum? Did they actually mean what they said about tradition and its restoration or did they believe something different? One can be certain that the widespread exploitation of tradition certainly fitted in with local strategies and processes of identity making, particularly among the rising middle classes. This discourse actually addressed the literate urban middle classes that eventually came to associate education as a social program with their own identity, anxieties, and sense of civil duty. The changing social and economic environment in the urban areas of the Empire raised new anxieties and brought forward demands for social order. Although the concept of tradition was well embedded in the Greek nationalist discourse, and in this sense already part of the nationalist agenda, it was also appropriated for other purposes. Reference to tradition allowed individual subjects to address a variety of novel issues which they saw emerging in this period of rapid change. The management of the growing population of the urban poor, new patterns of consumption, the position of women, re-definition of the private and public were not simply new areas of public interest but also grounds of concern and anxiety. But to speak about these novel matters it was necessary to employ a language that took something for granted, and at this point the concept of tradition, as an unchanging indigenous set of values, was indispensable.

To the extent that modernist projects, such as education, were articulated in the language of tradition they involved a high degree of tension. I do not think that this was a form of ideological self-deception, but would rather suggest that this particular articulation was the outcome of a more consistent attempt to come to terms with the challenge of western political economic and cultural domination. The Greek discourse of tradition was in direct dialogue with the West and used explicit western ingredients. To be more

specific, I would say that the notion of tradition embraced a particular historical narrative that internalized major dichotomies of contemporary Eurocentric western discourses. One should bear in mind that the notion of tradition included also the acceptance of its absence. Tradition was not lost but neither was it present, it had to be restored. This aspect was crucial because, it was argued, it was due to its loss that the Greek nation had lost pace with the process of civilization. This development was considered to be the result of unfortunate historical circumstances, most particularly the fall of Byzantium and the subjugation of Greeks to Ottoman rule, and did not reflect any Greek inability to embrace civilization. However, the stratagem of absence was not truly original. The issue of absence or lack was instrumental in western Orientalist discourses, which constructed the image of non- western societies in terms of the lack of those dynamic cultural and social characteristics that had made modern civilization possible in the West.[18] The awareness of this 'civilizing gap' was grounded on the acceptance of the western historical experience as a universal pattern, the process of civilization *par excellence* against which all other cultures should be measured. As we know, articulating civilization with the western historical experience, far from being neutral was part of the discursive apparatus legitimizing the domination of the West. The fact that the Greek discourse of tradition actually acknowledged this articulation shows that it subscribed to a historical pattern of universal validity.

On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that the Greek discourse of tradition was informed by a sense of being different from this model. To begin with, this discourse stressed that the western historical experience respected its own tradition(s). The functionalism of this statement is evident; the western experience was discursively used to empower tradition in the different context of the late Ottoman Empire. But at the same time this argument also led to the conclusion that the universal validity of western civilization had its origins in a particular and unique tradition. Should the Greeks aspire to 'catching up with the West' then they should stand by their own tradition.[19] In this way the tradition discourse involved negotiation with a 'superior' civilization: the West became an ambivalent sign of progress as well as and threat. It represented both an alien culture whose imitation would have catastrophic consequences, and a model of a universal civilizing process.

The universality of the western model was also undercut by the specifically local task the nationalist discourse assigned to the Greek nation that is, the 'regeneration of the East'. It was 'through the East' that the East could reclaim its past glories, recover its true but dormant self, and enter the world of modern civilization. In this way the civilizing process/ task was not rejected but located in the East and linked directly with the restoration of the Greek national tradition. Any missionary activity was rejected outright as a threat to this tradition. Any association of the East with Islam and the Muslim

experience was ignored. The rehabilitation of the East became associated with 'Hellenization and the restoration of the Greek tradition' as a prerequisite for entering into the world of western modernity. Or as Kehagia herself put it: 'Through Hellenism we forge close relations with western nations [and] the more we become Hellenized the more this cultural encounter will benefit our nation'.[20]

In other words, the Greek nationalist discourse implied a certain distance between the Greeks and the West/Europe by suggesting that civilization can be achieved without imitation, while at the same time subscribing to the universal patterns of western discourse. Within this context the meaning of 'the West' was not coherent and uniform but remained ambivalent and contested. There is ample evidence that this ambivalent view of the West was widely shared by Greek-speaking intellectuals, who never lost the opportunity to declare it. The cases presented above are only a small portion of this general trend.[21]

K. T. Dimaras discusses a similar phenomenon in the kingdom of Greece arguing that there also the strong trend to follow the West was counterbalanced by an equally strong trend for self-sufficiency, which at various levels expressed an anti-European sentiment. The University of Athens, established in 1838, was meant to provide a springboard for the diffusion of western science and knowledge in the East. The Greek nation was seen as destined to make up the deficiencies of the civilization process in the East and act as the mediator of western knowledge. On the other hand, the 'aping' of European manners was still being denounced, and there was a strong mistrust of Europe.[22] Anti-western statements were initially expressed in times when the policy of western States did not live up to Greek national aspirations (e.g. during the Crimean War), and continuously informed the agenda of Greek self-sufficiency, another ambivalent and contentious notion.[23] Helle Skopetea also underlined the inherent tension of East-West encounters in the context of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. According to her sophisticated analysis, Christians were not necessarily in a more advantageous position to communicate with the West than Muslims. Although more predisposed to establish close ties with the West (considered a model of statecraft), they often developed anti-western sentiments which, however, should not be overstated. Both opposition to and identification with the West remained confused, and the ambivalent dispositions never reached the state of an articulated political agenda, as happened for example in Russia.[24] It is interesting that this ambivalence was never seen as a theoretical problem. Why were the West and its historical pattern at the same time both a source of admiration and threat? Why did imitating the West generate such strong reactions in the very people who acknowledged its cultural superiority?

I can offer no clear-cut answers. I can only suggest that the ambivalence noted above was already embedded within the Greek nationalist discourse,

and for that matter within the nationalist discourse in general, which accommodated both the universal and the particular. As a product of the West, this discourse in its different local articulations accepted universal western models, but at the same time stressed the particularity of nations and their unique character. National and universal aspirations were always in a degree of tension, which seems to be the case of all nationalist discourses. Partha Chatterjee has claimed that nationalist discourses are caught in the paradox of challenging the political domination of colonized nations, while accepting the intellectual premises of modernity on which this domination was based, including the East-West distinction.[25] Although he is referring to a different context (that of colonial India), his analysis can be used in a broader spectrum and is worth following. Nationalist discourses seem to copy the (colonial) situation they seek to defeat because they take post-Enlightenment knowledge as the only source of modernization, an attitude that testifies to the cultural domination of the West on a global scale. This perspective sheds light in the inherent contradiction of nationalist discourses, between the defense of the national self, which presumably antedates modernity, and the claim for self-government through western institutions. Is it possible to separate the workings of these institutions from the principles that articulated them in the first place? Is it possible to keep intact the national self from the encroachment of Western institutions? In fact, nationalist discourses have attempted to embrace both modernization and tradition, by separating form from principle in the case of the former, and by emphasizing the historical roots of the latter. As Tom Nairn has suggested, nationalism encouraged societies to propel themselves forward through a certain sort of regression.[26] Nations were invoked as historical subjects only to the extent that they could produce a 'verifiable' past. Nationalist historiographies have continuously struggled to confirm this past as legitimizing their claim for a place in the world of modern nations.[27] The issue simply could not be avoided. At the same time emphasis on the past was no indication of a return to the past; it must be seen as a kind of compensation for the discontents of modern life, which seems to be inherent in every nationalist discourse.

If the above tensions can be seen very clearly in the Greek nationalist discourse, they are similarly present in the debates that took place in the Muslim part of Ottoman society. The West directly influenced the process of modernization in the Empire during the nineteenth century, although in an uneven and contradictory way. Much has been said and written about the political, financial, and diplomatic aspects of this process. Western European geopolitical considerations and the conflict with imperial Russia, financial antagonisms and the drive of European investments, have strongly marked the encounter between the Ottoman State and the West.

The process of modernization was neither transparent nor self-evident, but again full of ambivalence. It would be convenient to dismiss this point

by suggesting that Ottoman bureaucracy, and Ottoman Muslim society in general, was divided into two broad sections, one supporting and the other resisting reform. In fact, things were much more complicated. Shifting political allegiances, conflicting ambitions, and differences in education within the bureaucracy were active factors in the reconfiguration of power in the late Ottoman period.[28] Although some of these factors had been already active in previous periods, in the nineteenth century they became inextricably associated with the issue of modernization/ westernization. As in the Greek case the presence of the West could not be ignored. It was difficult, if not impossible, to voice ambitions, concerns or strategies without taking the West into account. It was also difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the notion of tradition, which in the Muslim case was associated less with language and more with religion, for purposes of political mobilization. Eventually, modernization and religion became key words in the Muslim Ottoman political discourse. Şerif Mardin has argued that the Islamic discourse in the Ottoman Empire appropriated the 'cause of the just' in order to gain the support of the people who felt threatened by the influence of the West. He has also pointed to the cleavage between State and society and the absence of a civil society, at least in the form found in the West.[29] I am not certain about this absence, but I shall not pursue this point here. Instead, I want to suggest that the relation between modernization and religion was not necessarily antithetical, even if there are many instances where it is presented as such. If the making of political discourses in the Ottoman Empire drew on western discourses, it would be interesting to examine whether western- type modernization and the Islamic religion were actually embedded within the progress-regression discourse that underpinned the Ottoman project of Westernization. The extent to which this was desirable became a battleground for the Ottoman bureaucracy and raised many voices of opposition. Şerif Mardin has discussed the literary "Bihruz bey" stereotype of modernization in relation to the concerns and fears of thinkers such as Ahmed Midhat, Ali Suavi and Namik Kemal about "true" path to modernization.[30] Bihruz bey exemplified the kind of modernization that went wrong. His self indulgent and superficially westernized manners were matched only by his deep contempt of popular culture and by his intense desire to embrace every glittering aspect of western fashion. Being a complete failure as an individual, Bihruz bey also acted as a strong impediment to popular mobilization: he could hardly serve as an example on which anyone would want to model himself. The moral is evident: skin-deep modernization should be avoided.

Did Bihruz bey actually exist outside the figurative and political language that invented him in the first place? I think not. Nevertheless this stereotyped figure of the imagination became the focus of overlapping critiques of the modernization process that also exposed ambivalence towards the West and its values. The West conceived as a model invited discussion of the West seen

as a threat, these two aspects being inseparable. The upper echelons of Ottoman bureaucracy were criticized for demanding modernization while choosing only its most superficial, inauthentic aspects. This relates the discourse of modernization directly with the search for that authenticity that intellectuals like Ali Suavi for example, believed they found in the Islamic classical tradition.[31] The reign of Abdul Hamid II can also be seen from this perspective. Completely discredited in the Kemalist historiography, this last absolute ruler of the Empire did everything in his power to invigorate the Islamic bonds of his Muslim subjects as well as to present his State as the only creditable Muslim power, the protector of all Muslims the world over. The official backing of Pan-Islamism and the activation of the Caliphate,[32] the increasing concern he saw for the Arab provinces and the presence of Arab Muslims at his court,[33] testify to the Islamic turn of the Hamidian regime and the pronounced distances from the earlier Ottoman Sultans of the Tanzimat period. Was this proof of Islamic fundamentalism? Recent research has concluded otherwise. The Hamidian regime and the sultan in person mobilized religion for specific political purposes, and in the process legitimized his administrative and educational reforms.[34] Of course one should not go so far as to conclude that the Hamidian regime deliberately masked a secularist agenda under the guise of Islamic rhetoric. What can be accepted is that turning to Islam was a response to novel conditions and threats, and to a large extent sought to come to terms with them by appropriating western models and techniques. One can certainly draw a parallel here with the broader movements of Islamic reform that emerged in the nineteenth century as a response to European colonialism. A major component of their agenda was the search for spiritual authenticity, deemed as chief constituent of the unalterable core of the Islamic self.[35] Being completely inimical to any notion of change this kind of authenticity was presumably inherent in the Islamic self and should be restored to its previous position. However cyclical in historical terms this definition seems to be, it was not necessarily a call of return to tradition, but more of a claim for bringing Islamic societies into the framework of a threatening western modernity by the means of modernity itself. Thinkers such as Jamal al-Afgani for example, who was considered a major exponent of Islamic revivalism, were very much concerned about the spreading of education and modern technology in the Muslim world and argued extensively in favour of 'enlightening' Muslim societies. It was on these grounds that the Muslim world came to divide the 'spiritual East' from the 'material West'. Aspects of western civilization such as technology, for example, were considered separate from the western cultural core and pronounced culture-neutral. At the same time the Islamic historical experience was invoked to suggest that what was a possession of the West had always been inherent though in latent form, in the Islamic tradition.[36] This radical reinterpretation of the Islamic past, which appropriated aspects of western culture for the purpose

of making them familiar to an Islamic audience, indicates the extent to which Islamic revivalism was informed by western discourses, regardless of the task of challenging western domination that it set itself.

The above analysis has endeavoured to show the ambivalent and contentious nature of cultural negotiation associated with the advent and global domination of modernity. Although there were many differences between the Greek nationalist and the Islamic agendas, the common reference to tradition and the appropriation of western knowledge should be taken as an issue worthy of further discussion.

NOTES

1 Anatolitis, Ανατολή και Δύσις, Athens 1867; Scarlatos Vyzantios, Κωνσταντινούπολις, ήτοι Τοπογραφική, αρχαιολογική και ιστορική περιωνύμου ταύτης..., 3 vols, Athens 1869.
2 Ανατολή και..., op.cit., pp. 32-54.
3 *Κωνσταντινούπολις...*, op.cit., v. III p. 319.
4 Ibid., p. θ.
5 Ibid., pp. 318, 332.
6 Helle Skopetea, *Η Δύση της Ανατολής. Εικόνες από το τέλος της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορìας*, (The West in the East. Scenes from the end of the Ottoman Empire), Athens: Gnosi 1991, pp. 26-74.
7 op.cit., p. 96.
8 In his authoritative and influential study Edward Said seems to suggest that the only voice of the East was that of the West representing it. See Edward Said, *Orientalism,* London: Penguin, 1979, p. 6.
9 There is a growing literature on the issue of Christian Orthodox-Greek education in the Ottoman Empire and, at least part of it, acknowledges its strong relationship with the workings of Greek nationalism. See cf. Paschalis Kitromilides, '"Imagined Communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans', in M. Blinkhorn, Th. Veremis (eds), *Modern Greece, Nationalism and Nationality* (Sage 1990) pp. 23-66; Haris Exertzoglou, *Εθνική ταυτότητα στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ο Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως 1861-1912* (The Greek Literary Association of Constantinople 1861-1912), Athens: Nefeli, 1996; Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία 19ος αιώνας- 1919. Οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες* (The Greek Orthodox communities of Asia Minor, 19th century - 1919), (Athens: Hellenika Grammata, 1997); Sofia Vouri, *Εκπαίδευση και εθνικισμός στα Βαλκάνια. Η περίπτωση της βορειοδυτικής Μακεδονίας, 1870-1904* (Nationalism and education in north west Macedonia 1870-1904), Athens: Paraskenio, 1992; Efie Kanner, 'Φτώχεια, φιλανθρωπία και κοινωνικός έλεγχος στην ορθόδοξη κοινότητα της Κωνσταντινούπολης, 1750-1908' (Poverty, philanthropy and social control in the Christian Orthodox community of Constantinople 1750-1908), Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy University of Athens 2000.
10 *Τηλέγραφος του Βοσπόρου και Βυζαντίς*, 15 January 1858.
11 On this issue see Richard Clogg, 'The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire', in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, New York: Holems and Mayer, 1982,

vol. 1, pp. 185-207; Gerasimos Augustinos, *The Greeks of Asia Minor. Confession Community and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth century*, Kent State University Press, 1992; Paris Konortas, *Οθωμανικές θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο 17ος- 20ός αι.* (The Ottoman state and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, seventeenth to twentieth centuries), Athens: Alexandria, 1998; Dimitri Stamatopoulos, *Μεταρρύθμιση και εκκοσμίκευση. Προς μια ανασύνθεση της ιστορίας του Οικουμεκνικού Πατριαρχείου τον 19ο αιώνα* (Secularism and reform. Towards a reinterpretation of the history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in the nineteenth century), Athens: Alexandria, 2003.

12 *Νεολόγος*, 21/4, May 1872.

13 *Αμάλθεια*, 11 December 1871, 15 December 1871, 22 December 1871.

14 Kalliopi Kehagia, 'Εκθεσις των του Ζαππείον κατά το σχολικόν έτος 1875-76' (Report on the Zappeion School for the year 1875-76), *Νεολόγος* 23/5 (August 1876). See also Kalliopi Kehagia, 'Λόγος περί της εκπαιδεύσεως επί των ιδεών, ηθών και εθίμων της κοινωνίας' (Discourse on the impact of education on social ideas and habits), *Νεολόγος* 21/4 (July 1877).

15 Kalliopi Kehagia, *Παιδαγωγικόν Εγκόπλιον, ή συμβουλαί προς αποφοιτούσας Ζαππίδας* (Manual of Education for the advice of the Graduates of Zappeion school), Constantinople, 1880.

16 *Μνήμη Ευθαλίας Αδάμ, Διευθύντριας Ζαππείου Παρθεναγωγείου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως 1860-1954. Το αρχείο της* (The Archive of Efthalia Adam, Headmistress of the Zappeion School), Athens 2000, pp. 153-155.

17 Ibid., p. 156.

18 This is one of the main issues that Edward Said raised in his discussion of western discourses of the Orient, See *Orientalism*, op.cit. See also Gyan Prakash, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32/2 (1990) pp. 383-408; and Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History. Who Speaks of the Indian Pasts?', *Representations* 37 (1992), pp. 1-26.

19 It would be interesting to add here that the Greek nationalist discourse appropriated the image of Ancient Greece as it was constructed in the West. However contradictory and contentious, representations of classical Greece played an important role in the making of modern European identities in almost every ground and became the locus of symbolic competition from the years of the French Revolution onwards. See Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution*, University of California Press, 1984; Athena Leoussi, *Nationalism and Classicism. The Classical Body as National Symbol in Nineteenth-Century England and France*, St Martins Press: London 1998; Margarita Milliori, 'Αρχαίος ελληνισμός και φιλελληνισμός στη βρετανική ιστοριογραφία του 19ου αιώνα' (Ancient Greece and philhellenism in the British historiography of the 19th Century), *Μνήμων* 22 (2000) pp. 69-104.

20 Kehagia, *Manual*, op.cit., pp. 21-22.

21 K. T. Dimaras, 'Η Ιδεολογική υποδομή του νέου ελληνικού κράτους' (The ideological structure of the Modern Greek State), in K. T. Dimaras, *Ελληνικός Ρωμαντισμός*, Athens: Hermes, 1982, pp. 325-404. The criticism of the mimesis of the West was a common theme in the work of major intellectual figures in Modern Greece such as Ioannes Psychares, Ion Dragoumes, and Pericles Giannopoulos. See Ioannis Psycharis, *Το ταξίδι μου* (My itinerary), Athens, 1888; Ion Dragoumis, *Ελληνικός πολιτισμός* (Greek Culture), Athens: Grammata, 1914; Pericles Giannopoulos, 'Η ξευομανία' (Foreign-mania), *Ο Νουμάς*, 16 January 1903. See also Gerasimos Augoustinos, *Consciousness and History. Nationalists Critics of Greek*

Society 1897-1914, Boulder, 1977.

22 K. T. Dimaras, op.cit., pp. 347-357.

23 This notion was compatible with the Greek *Megali Idea* but it did not necessarily limit itself to the existing Greek state and was often used to underline the existing cultural intimacy shared by the peoples of the East as well as a loose disposition of collaboration with the Ottoman state. Expressed in the slogan the 'East through the East' this disposition, which was never articulated in a consistent political agenda, drew the line between East and West as distinct cultural units. See Ion Dragoumis, op.cit.; Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, *Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, edited by Katerina Boura and Thanos Veremis, Athens: Dodoni, 1984; Nicos Nicolaides, *Les Grecs et la Turquie*, Brussells, 1910.

24 Skopetea, op.cit., pp. 99-106.

25 Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. A Derivative Discourse*, Minnesota University Press, 1986.

26 Tom Nairn, *The Break Up of Britain*, London: Verso, p. 348.

27 See the recent discussion of Greek historiography in Effi Gazi, *Scientific National History. The Greek Case in Comparative Perspective 1850-1920*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000.

28 Carter Findley, *Ottoman Officialdom. A Social History*, Princeton University Press, 1989.

29 See Şerif Mardin, 'The Just and the Unjust', *Daedalus* 3 (1991) pp. 113-129, and his 'Super Westernization in Urban life in the Ottoman Empire in the last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century', in P. Benedict, E. Timuzketin and F. Mansur (eds), *Turkey, Geographic and Social Perspectives*, Leiden: Brill, 1974, pp. 403-445. See also the discussion of Ayse Kadioglu, 'The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity,' *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 32/2 (1996), pp. 177-193.

30 Mardin 'Super Westernization...' op.cit., pp. 407-409.

31 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas,* Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 366-384.

32 Jacob Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam. Ideology and Organization*, Oxford, 1988.

33 Engin Akarli, 'Abdul Hamid II's attempt to integrate Arabs into the ottoman system,' in D. Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period. Political, Social and Economic Transformations*, Leiden, 1986, pp. 75-89.

34 Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domain. Ideology and Legitimacy of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, London: Tauris, 1999.

35 Aziz al-Azmeh, 'The discourse of cultural authenticity,' in *Islam and Modernities*, London: Verso, 1994, pp. 47-51.

36 Nikki Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism. Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al Afgani'*, University of California Press, 1983, pp. 101-109.

Signatures of Greek Clients of the Imperial Ottoman Bank: A Clue to Cultural Choices and Behaviour?

Edhem Eldem

Introduction

This paper is an offshoot of previous work on customer files preserved in the Ottoman Bank archives. As such, it consists of a more focused, but still tentative, attempt at combining quantitative and qualitative data in assessing some aspects of the social and cultural profile of what I have come to name, perhaps somewhat abusively, an Ottoman bourgeoisie of the beginning of the twentieth century. In a first and rather general study of a particular series of these archives, I had concentrated on a number of objective criteria likely to contribute to an understanding of this bourgeoisie in the context of Istanbul. The series I am referring to consisted of some 6,000 deposit cards that attested to the entrusting of stocks and bonds to the bank by its customers (see the examples in Table I). As the said cards did not bear any indication as to the amount and value of the stocks deposited, I made the assumption that the action of depositing these negotiable assets – independently of their value – in itself constituted a basic, if vague, definition of bourgeois status along economic, social, and cultural lines. The existence of a surplus, however small, that could be invested in stocks and bonds, the speculative nature of this financial instrument, the modern connotation that was attached to it, the use of an agent perceived as modern and Western (*i.e.* the Imperial Ottoman Bank), and the element of integration it entailed with the capitalist world system were all indicators which corresponded to my (re)definition of a bourgeois. This made it possible to draw a portrait of this bourgeoisie between 1903 and 1918 (the time range covered by the cards) in terms of its residential and professional spatial choices, its professional and sectoral inclinations, and of the cross-tabulation of these criteria with the information gathered on the nationality and ethnic character of these individuals.[1]

The second step in my research based on this series came with the realization that the same cards could also be used for an analysis of less "objective" aspects of the information they contained, and that they could eventually disclose some indications as to the cultural profile of the same bourgeoisie. What triggered this expectation was the systematic presence on the cards of a form of authentication of the holder's identity, in the form of either a signature or a seal. The striking point of this crucial element of information was that it displayed a great variety of forms, depending on a number of cultural, educational, professional, national, ethnic, and religious variables. For one thing, the difference between the use of a signature and that of a seal was clearly significant. The seal might, of course, indicate illiteracy, and be a substitute for an unobtainable signature. Yet it was obvious from even a cursory glance at the sample that the real distinction between the two was cultural, in that Muslims tended – even when perfectly literate – to use a seal rather than a signature, and that similar behaviour could also be witnessed, albeit in much reduced proportions, among some of the non-Muslim customers of the bank. Second, quite obviously, a qualitative assessment of signatures, and for that matter of seals, was likely to reveal social, cultural, and educational differences between individuals, ranging from the sophisticated signature (or seal) of a highly-educated and potentially affluent customer, to the scribbles or even crosses drawn by near-illiterate or illiterate persons whose socio-economic and cultural background most probably was in correlation to their degree of literacy.

Finally, and probably most fascinatingly, a closer look at the signatures revealed that this basic and supposedly unchanging form of identification often did change, and for reasons more or less independent of literacy levels. Indeed, a fundamental and quite obvious distinction of identity could be made on the basis of the script used by the signer: each of the major ethnic groups in the Empire had its own alphabet which the clients might be expected to use when signing. Yet, rather interestingly, they had other options or choices, namely that of signing in "Turkish", *i.e.* in the Arabic script with a Turkified version of their name; and, most of all, signing in "French", *i.e.* in the Latin alphabet, with either a phonetic or Gallic form of their name. The first option, not surprisingly, was rarely used; however, when it came to signatures in Latin letters, the phenomenon was extremely widespread, even to the point of replacing ethnic alphabets such as Hebrew, Greek, Armenian, Cyrillic, or Arabic. This choice, combined with the frequent use of seals instead or together with signatures, constituted the theme of a second article which sought to compare the ability and willingness of certain groups to either adhere to their ethnic script or to adopt the use of an internationalized version of their signature through the use of the Latin alphabet.[2]

The Study

The present essay is therefore very much a continuation of this research, with the major difference that it intends to focus on one particular group, defined in ethnic/religious terms, namely the Greek-Orthodox customers of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. From the first study it draws the assumption that this group constituted a bourgeoisie in its broadest and vaguest sense ranging from the *haute bourgeoisie* of finance and civil service down to a very modest profile of artisans, small employees and even domestic servants and, more importantly, that this particular group possessed a relatively more powerful position within the general social and economic context of the period.[3] From the second study, it derives the assumption that some significant characteristics and attitudes can be ascribed to the nature and quality of the signatures used by customers in authenticating their cards.

Contrary to the first two studies which had been limited to the analysis of a more or less random sample of some 2,000 cards out of a total of approximately 6,000, the present analysis includes all individuals considered to belong to the ethno-confessional category examined, giving a database for scrutiny of 1,412 cards bearing either a signature or a seal or both.[4] The first step consisted then of establishing a basic typology of signatures and seals as they occurred throughout the sample (for examples, see Tables II and III). This typology in turn would include two orders: the nature and the quality of the object under study. The nature of the signature was relatively simple to define. There were four possibilities, all of which are shown in Table II: a Greek signature (1), a Latin signature (3), a combination of both (2), or just a sign, generally a cross, denoting total illiteracy (4). To this one should add yet a fifth possibility, that of the absence of a signature and its replacement by a seal. It is interesting that some variations, although theoretically possible, were totally absent in the sample. This was particularly true of "Turkish" signatures, *i.e.* signatures written in the Arabic alphabet: not a single Greek customer seems to have resorted to such an option, be it alone or in combination with another (Greek or Latin) signature.

In the case of seals, the situation is somehow more complex (see Table V). Indeed, in terms of the use of different scripts, seals appear to have presented a greater variety: Arabic (1, 2, 3), Greek (5, 6, 7, 8, 9), Latin (11, 12), Arabic and Greek (13, 14), and Latin and Greek (15), not to mention some ambiguous cases, particularly monograms and capital initials, which could sometimes be read indifferently both in Latin and Greek characters (4, 10). The variety of seals was not confined to these linguistic differences. A major and most significant difference had to do with their shape. One general type took the typical format of the traditional Ottoman Muslim seal, usually round and with incised inscriptions on a flat surface, leaving a negative imprint (1-6, 10-11, 13-14); the alternative was that of "modern" seals, *i.e.* rubber stamps with letters in relief, giving a positive imprint (7-9, 12, 15).[5] It is worth noting that these two differences in form and in language overlap

to a certain extent, in the sense that the Arabic script appears exclusively on traditional seals, that the Latin script is used only in one such case, and that the use of Latin-Greek biography is limited to modern stamps.

The second type of distinction applied both to signatures and seals is of a vaguer nature, since it rests on a relative assessment of their quality. This assessment is based on the tenet that it is possible to establish a scale for measuring the degree of perfection of both signatures and seals, which is based on such criteria as the fluidity, the assertiveness, and the sophistication of the handwriting. Table IV illustrates this scale in the case of signatures with, from top to bottom, signatures lined up in a decreasing order of quality, both in their Greek and Latin versions (left and right columns, respectively). For seals, the matter is certainly a little more difficult to assess, especially with a comparable scale-based system. Yet the quality of the script used on the seal, particularly in the case of Arabic seals, can vary rather significantly from crude and sloppy (1, Table V) to decent (2) and almost calligraphic (3), suggesting that seals and stamps can be evaluated more or less like signatures. There is one important difference, however: while the quality of the signature refers directly to the graphic capacities of the individual, that of the seal can only be related to the skills and/or know-how of the engraver. Nevertheless, it would probably not be wrong to assume a high probability of overlap between the two, as a poor signature and a coarse seal would most likely both tend to describe a comparable socio-cultural background.

Graph I.1 constitutes the starting point of this study, as it immediately draws attention to the rather remarkable frequency with which Greek-Orthodox Ottoman subjects tended to use the Latin script in signing their documents:[6] one out of two, against only 43 percent using their "ethnic" signature, and an additional 6 percent applying a seal only. The phenomenon was clearly not a marginal one, but what does it mean? The most obvious conclusion is that if these customers *did* sign in the Latin script, it meant they *could* do so. The first criterion therefore is that of an exposure, through either formal education or some informal practice to a certain degree of literacy in a foreign script, most likely via the French language. That Ottoman Greeks should have had the opportunity to acquire some French education is certainly not surprising when one considers that, around 1907, Greek-Ottoman students constituted about 15 percent of all students enrolled in French primary and secondary schools, not to mention approximately half of the 351 students of the Greco-French high school,[7] and that French was almost systematically taught in most Greek educational institutions. Moreover, it is well known that French had by then become a sort of *lingua franca* in the Levant, which made it all the more likely that it would be acquired even without schooling, through its simple practice in the streets and in most business, administrative and social circles. The real question is not *how* they came to use a Latin signature, but rather *why* they

did so. Considering the rather remarkable development of Greek schooling in the preceding decades, the probability of Greek-Ottoman subjects not being able to sign otherwise than in the Latin script is certainly extremely low. One may therefore safely assume that these customers not only *could* sign in the Latin script, but that they *chose* to do so. Most remarkable in this respect is the fact that this choice generally brought the abandonment of the Greek script: only 2 percent of the sample maintained their "ethnic" signature alongside the "French" one, against 49 percent of exclusively Latin signatures. This choice acquired still greater cultural weight from the fact that the Latin signatures were generally not limited to a transliteration of names, but involved complete Gallicization. Thus Δημήτρης would not become Dimitri but Démètre; Σοφία would turn into Sophie instead of a possible Sophia, as Αλέξανδρος would change to Alexandre, or Κωνσταντίνος become Constantin. The use of the Latin script, therefore, came with a form of acculturation that influenced the very way in which the most basic identity of the individual – his or her name – came to be expressed.

Towards an Interpretation

In the light of these observations, what significance is one to attach to this behaviour? In the broadest sense, one may say that Ottoman Greeks signing in Latin (or rather French) were complying with a format that was consistent with the perception of the dominant cultural and linguistic environment of the time. French was everywhere – spoken, written, read with varying degrees of competence and accuracy, but certainly used as the widest medium of communication throughout most of the Ottoman Empire and particularly in Istanbul at the turn of twentieth century. French may not have been the language of the streets, where the local vernaculars still dominated, but it certainly was one of the dominant and most widely used and accepted languages in business, education, the arts, the press, and even the administration. A quick glance at photographs and postcards of the period would be sufficient to give a sense of the high degree of visibility of this language in the public sphere: shop signs and advertisements were more often than not written in several languages, with French almost systematically dominating the local ones. This was particularly true of the "westernized" districts of Galata and Pera, where most of the residential and professional addresses of the individuals in the sample were to be found.[8] There is no doubt, then, that the use of, or at least exposure to, the French language was almost natural to a bourgeoisie predominantly located in the capital.[9] Nor is exposure the sole factor explaining the propensity of certain social groups to adopt a western(ized) attitude and conduct in the last decades of the Empire. If one is to believe many contemporary observers, mostly European travellers and residents, the local upper-middle classes frequently imitated Western habits and spoke French in order to display a "Western" profile. Ernest Giraud, president of the French Chamber of Commerce of

Constantinople and a long-time resident of the city gave very good descriptions of this. In several of his chronicles of Constantinople, he speaks of these local, mostly Greek, "*Lord Pastourma*s", and of the comical way in which they loudly talked to each other in broken French further deformed by the use of local expressions.[10] True, this tongue-in-cheek and rather snobbish appraisal of the indigenous population and ridiculing its social habits and culture was typical of the colonial attitude displayed by numerous European expatriates. Exaggerated and biased as it no doubt was, it did however testify to the rapid spread of certain linguistic and cultural practices more or less directly inspired by the West.

An additional factor that may have acted as an incentive for the use of Latin signatures is probably the Imperial Ottoman Bank itself, whose Franco-British identity and Western image might have suggested the use of that type of signature as more compatible with the institution's cultural profile. Yet although the bank's image may have implicitly suggested that a Latin signature might be more welcome than an ethnic one, there is no indication whatsoever to suggest that this would have gone anywhere beyond the free will of any customer. The fact that almost half of the bank's customers encountered not the least problem because of their ethnic signature, and that the probability of a Greek customer dealing with a "compatriot" clerk behind the counter was rather high,[11] should be sufficient evidence that the bank had neither the means nor the intention of imposing any particular conduct on its customers. Also, it is rather unlikely that any customer should have devised a Latin signature for himself just for use at the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Most probably, s/he would have already had such a signature, and the Ottoman Bank would have been only one place among others where its use would have come in handy. In other words, the bank alone was no sufficient explanation for such behaviour; rather, but just one of the many facets of a new cultural and socio-economic environment where local practices were gradually losing ground against global or Western ones.

In short, it seems plausible to explain the preference for a Latin/French signature by a combination of factors associated with modernity as it was perceived at the time. So one can speak of a contextual modernity through more or less intense exposure to the French language and the resulting ability to sign in that particular language; of a situational modernity, through the triggering of such a response by the activity of individuals in an environment more and more characterized by the use of the French language and the resulting incentive for the use of a Gallicized signature; and finally perhaps of a value-laden cultural modernity, whereby individuals are not only capable and willing to use the Latin script, but ascribe a higher value to it than to their traditional ethnic script, thus assigning to this practice a meaning that goes beyond the simple and practical purpose of a means to the end of acquiring a new identity.

The other side of the picture, the 43 percent of customers who signed in the Greek script, is much more difficult to evaluate. If the use of Latin letters may be interpreted as a choice of possible alternatives, the same cannot really be said of the use of a Greek signature. How many of these individuals were using their own alphabet when they could have used the Latin one? Or may one assume the contrary: they were using the Greek alphabet because they *could not* have used any other? It is practically impossible to answer any of these questions satisfactorily, and one has to be content with the observation that, for some reason of choice or ability, only less than half the sample used the Greek script when they signed their customer cards. Still, one cannot help but wonder whether at least some of these individuals were not perfectly capable of signing in French, but actively chose not to do so. Such a (negative) choice could be explained in a variety of ways. First of all, many might have rightly thought that, after all, a signature being a sign, its specific language was of no importance, as long as it was used consistently in the same form on all documents so as to enable the recipients (including the Imperial Ottoman Bank) to identify it as a standard and unique mark of the signer's identity. For such individuals, the use of a Greek signature would have been perfectly compatible with the use of the French language, or any other for that matter, elsewhere on the same document, as in the case of a business letter written in French and signed in Greek. Such individuals would have been further reassured by the undeniable fact that, among the local ethnic alphabets, the Greek – as opposed to Arabic, Armenian, and Hebrew – alphabet certainly came closest to the Latin one, making a Greek signature relatively easy to identify by a reader of French. Beyond these rather practical considerations that might have convinced Greek customers of the uselessness of a Latin signature, one cannot altogether discard a more ideological one. This could have been based on the refusal to comply with a format seen to infringe on an ethnic/religious identity regarded as "national". If it is taken into account that Hellenism was increasingly making way into the cultural and ideological environment of the Ottoman-Greek community, it is not impossible to imagine certain individuals wishing to assert their "national" identity through the exclusive use of the Greek alphabet in something as basic as a signature. The fact that not a single Ottoman-Greek in the sample should have used an Arabic – i.e. Turkish – signature probably tells more about the failure of Ottomanism than about the rise of Hellenic nationalism among Greek subjects of the Empire; but when it came to the much more realistic choice between a Greek and a Latin signature, it is likely that at least some Greeks thought twice before surrendering to a foreign influence, and eventually chose not to do so by adhering to a recognizable expression of their allegiance to Greek culture and identity.

Similar questions can be asked with respect to the use of seals instead or together with signatures. The seal-only option represented only a marginal

proportion of the sample, amounting to a mere 6 percent of all customers (Graph I.1). A closer look at the possible combination of seals and signatures (Graph I.2) reveals that the exclusive use of a seal, although a dominant trend, was not the sole option. Some 24 percent of all seal users (corresponding to approximately 2 percent of the whole sample) combined their use of a seal with a signature (either Greek or Latin) or, very rarely, with a cross as a sign of illiteracy. This last case, representing a mere 2 percent of all seal users and less than 0.15 percent of all customers, is certainly the only situation which can be explained with some accuracy. It denotes illiterate individuals who were identified as such through the use of a cross in lieu of a signature, often accompanied by a comment by a bank clerk, and whose seal constituted the only possible identification for purposes of authentication. Where customers combined the use of a seal with a signature, it is clear that illiteracy was not the issue; but what about the great majority of seals alone on the customer cards? Here again, as in the case of signatures, one can only speculate and propose tentative explanations. Although there is the temptation to read these seals as another expression of illiteracy, the existence of seals in combination with signatures contradicts this. It should also be remembered that, especially for Muslims, the seal was the most widely used form of authentication before the "invention", probably during the nineteenth century, of signatures. Seals are therefore ambiguously located at the crossroads of a widely used traditional cultural format and its modern replacement by signatures. The mere fact that about half of the bank's Muslim customers, whose profile hardly allowed for illiteracy, made exclusive use of seals clearly illustrates this point. Apart from the cultural value of a seal against that of a signature, seals allowed high-level bureaucrats or even members of the dynasty to delegate their authority by entrusting their seal to a private secretary or *homme de confiance* whose responsibilities would most likely have included mundane dealings with the bank. Indeed, the proportion of seal users was much lower in the case of Greeks – or for that matter of Armenians and Jews (4.4 and 2.9 percent respectively) – but it was still much higher than for foreigners (1.2 percent) for whom the use of a seal was almost automatically a sign of illiteracy.[12] The question then arises of how much the use of seals among the Greek community was due to cultural habit, and to what extent it should be ascribed to illiteracy.

Gender and Occupation: Additional Clues?

No answer to this question can be given at this stage but, as in the case of signatures, further investigation may lead to a better understanding of the multiple meanings underlying these factors. In-depth analysis of the sample can be conducted on either of two fronts: (i) one can try to narrow down the categories of signatures and seals by using some of the qualitative distinctions described earlier, or (ii) breaking down the sample itself into additional categories, such as gender and profession, is likely to entail a

slightly more accurate assessment of the respective meaning and value of each type of signature. A first step to this end can be made on the basis of gender, especially since the representation of women (36 percent) was noticeably higher among the Greeks than any other community within the sample (Graph II.1).[13] If we then look at the gender-based distribution of different types of signatures and seals (Graph II.2), we note a marked differentiation in practically all of the categories. Signing in Greek is much more frequent among women (51 percent against 39 percent for men), while Latin signatures were more often used by men (59 percent against 33 percent for women). The use of the illiterate cross was exclusive to women, but given the very small number of cases, the significance of this remains doubtful. The same is true of joint Greek and Latin signatures, for which the relevance of the difference between men (2 percent) and women (1 percent) is much weakened by the limited number of cases. However, when it comes to the exclusive use of seals, the habit appears to have been almost exclusively female (15 percent against only 1 percent for men). A closer look at the use of seals (Graph II.3) confirms this general impression: 91 percent of women were using their seal without a signature, while 71 percent of men combined it with a signature, either in Greek (24 percent) or Latin (47 percent).

Does the gender dimension clarify the picture we had previously? If it is accepted that on the average women were less educated than men, the findings above appear to confirm the correlation already assumed between educational level and types of signatures. The higher proportion of women signing in Greek would have to be taken as an indicator that the basic determining factor in the use of a Latin signature was the mastery of French, or at least of the Latin alphabet. The same applies to the use of seals. If the use of a seal appears to be typically female, it becomes all the more likely that the absence of a signature may be due to illiteracy. Used as a control variable, therefore, gender provides for a certain degree of focus and precision with respect to the issue of what the basic determinants might have been behind the use of specific forms of signature. But this still leaves out the question of choice; it does not explain the motivation for preferring to sign in one way rather than another where individuals would have been capable of either. Bringing in the dimension of tradition vs. modernity and arguing that women, who are generally thought to be more tradition-oriented than men, would display a greater propensity to use their ethnic signature, would explain the imbalance of Graph II.2. However, the argument that women hold on to traditions is too weak to justify an alternative reading of the data.

Let us try a second control variable, that of profession, since the sample seems to be sufficiently representative of the main occupational sectors to allow some investigation of the distribution of signatures and seals among professional groups (Graph III.1). The result is surprisingly differentiated. The use of Greek signatures varies from a high 90 percent among clergymen and a low 15 percent among white-collar employees, while that of Latin

signatures ranges between 85 and 5 percent depending on the occupational group. Also rather strikingly, signing habits within a certain professional category are either very clearly concentrated around one alternative – Latin or Greek – (clergy, professionals, bureaucrats, white-collar employees) or rather balanced between the two (domestic or business subalterns, merchants, representatives of the financial sector). Much can be said about this uneven distribution that may eventually lead to a better understanding of the dynamics and motivations involved. If we again distinguish between ability and choice and concentrate on the former, the category of subalterns (domestic servants and office underlings) is probably the clearest. With the most balanced distribution between the use of Greek and Latin signatures and seals, their attitude is obviously a question of ability rather than choice. It is certainly no coincidence that this category should display the highest percentage of seals, most likely to be interpreted as expressions of illiteracy, nor that it should reproduce the patterns observed among women, since it is mostly made up of maids and female domestic help. It could be argued that the same dynamics explain the rather balanced situation (except for the use of seals) observed in the commerce and finance sectors. The chances are that the proportions here more or less directly reflect the ability of this group to master the Latin alphabet – an ability that seems slightly higher among the (more educated/exposed?) financiers, from the local *sarraf* (money changer) to the *bona fide* banker, than among the less sophisticated merchants, ranging from the corner *bakkal* (grocer) to the major businessman.

This argument certainly does not hold true for the three categories with the highest rates of Latin signature, namely the (new) professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers), bureaucrats (state employees and civil servants), and white-collar employees (employees in business firms and, especially, in the large foreign-capital-based banking, insurance, railway companies and the 'multinationals' of the time, such as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration or the Tobacco Régie). In each of these categories the discrepancy between Latin and Greek signatures (70:30, 72:20, and 85:15 percent, respectively) clearly points to a situation where individuals *chose* French over Greek when signing their customer cards. The contextual explanation for this situation is quite simple. These three groups constitute the most westernized elements of the sample, at least from the viewpoint of their occupation. The new professionals enjoyed the best education of the time, acquired either through local schooling but with much of the curricula in French (medicine, architecture, law, etc.), or through education abroad. Greek bureaucrats in the service of the Porte, or occasionally of foreign legations, were not only, like their Muslim colleagues, exposed to a certain degree of education in French; more often than not they were specifically recruited for services that entailed a high level of experience with things foreign – as in the case of the diplomatic service, one of the major outlets for Greeks opting for

careers as civil servants. Finally, in the case of white-collar employees, the simple observation that most of them worked in the French-speaking corporations of the time, of which the Imperial Ottoman Bank is a perfect example, implies that knowledge of the French language was more than an option, it was a requirement.

It is clear then that the customers from these three categories were in a position that not only enabled them to use the Latin script, but actually encouraged them to prefer it to the Greek. (The idea that over 70 percent of these people were incapable of signing in Greek is too unlikely to be even considered.) What is striking, however, is that although these three groups correspond to a more or less similar profile of educated and westernized individuals – 'westernized' used here in the basic and neutral sense of being frequently and/or intensely exposed to things Western – the ratio of Latin versus Greek signatures shows considerable variations from one category to another. These differences may help to qualify the choice factor with somewhat greater precision.

A typical and rather obvious explanation for one specific difference concerns the presence, among bureaucrats alone, of almost 10 percent of seal users. Contrary to the interpretation made in the case of domestic servants and/or women, here this phenomenon can hardly be linked to illiteracy, and rather points to the use of seals being highly prestigious and, as for Ottoman Muslims of high social standing, should be interpreted as a cultural trait of persons in close relationship with the State. The fact that all these seals were in the Turkish/Arabic script, confirms this impression. In short, the use of a (Turkish) seal clearly constitutes an alternative to a Turkish signature and denotes its bearer's deliberate intention to express his identity as an Ottoman subject.

Interpreting the rather significant discrepancy between the 30 percent and 15 percent of signers in Greek among professionals and white-collar employees looks a little more problematic. It seems very unlikely that this difference can be explained in terms of a difference in education and exposure, as there is no reason to assume that the new professionals were less familiar with Western culture and languages – quite the contrary. A tentative explanation will, therefore, have to take into consideration the possibility of a relatively more assertive ethnic identity of these individuals, against a higher degree of acculturation and cultural flexibility among less autonomous individuals who were recruited by some of the most powerful foreign institutions of the time. So, while both categories seem to be highly receptive to the appeal of using a Latin signature, it may be the case that this appeal had its limits among doctors, lawyers, or architects, who could show a greater willingness to adhere to their Greek identity, while a low-level clerk in the Public Debt Administration or at the Imperial Ottoman Bank might feel less free to express such an identity, and might even find it advantageous to show a greater degree of integration with Western culture.

At the other end of the scale, the Greek-Orthodox clergy – a limited but still significant number of priests, archbishops and other clerics were clients of the bank – constituted a mirror image of the previous categories. With 90 percent signing in Greek, against a mere 10 percent using Latin signatures and seals, were these reverend customers of the bank really unable, or perhaps unwilling to sign in anything but the Greek script? Considering that these individuals were most likely educated through the traditional channels of religious schooling it may well be that their knowledge of any foreign language was close to nil. On the other hand, if some of them did master a foreign language, most probably French, would they not have tried to avoid using a *Latin* signature when signing in their quality of representatives of the Greek-Orthodox Church?[14]

The questions must remain open, but it does seem that taking a closer look at the sample in terms of the basic differentiations of gender and occupation has made it possible to bring additional qualifications to the specific signing behaviours of individuals within the sample. Yet another way to narrow down our quest is by using the scale devised for the *qualitative* assessment of signatures, both Greek and Latin. This scale, as suggested earlier, relies on a somewhat subjective categorization of signatures on a scale from best to very poor to measure sophistication and fluency, in the hope that significant differences in their distribution may help to lay bare the dynamics behind their use. Interestingly enough, a simple comparison between the distribution of the quality of Greek and Latin signatures (Graphs IV.1 and IV.3) already signals some basic differences between the two. Most striking in this respect is the contrast between the balanced distribution of signature quality among Greek signers and the clearly skewed one among Latin signers. Among the former, the superior qualities (best and good, a total of 29 percent) represent exactly the same proportion as the lower qualities (poor and very poor, again 29 percent), leaving a slightly higher but equivalent proportion (42 percent) to average-quality signatures. In the case of Latin signatures, the situation is very different. The best and good signatures represent over half the cases (57 percent), the two lowest amount to a mere 11 percent, and the remaining 32 percent constitute the intermediate category of average-quality signatures. In other words, on the basis of this qualification of signatures, it appears that signing in Greek was a habit rather evenly distributed among individuals of very different educational and cultural backgrounds, while almost 60 percent of Latin signers seem to have possessed a high degree of sophistication in their writing, and almost 90 percent at least a fairly decent one.

These basic differences between Greek and Latin signers are further accentuated when considered under the additional filters of gender and occupation. If one looks at the distribution of signatures by men (Graphs IV.2 and IV.4), it appears that the relatively even distribution of Greek signatures disappears completely where Latin signatures are concerned: a

mere 6 percent are below average, against 65 percent of good and 29 percent of average signatures. The women do not seem to follow the same pattern, and their signatures were much more evenly distributed on both sides of the majority of average signatures. The most notable characteristic of women was the overall lower quality of their signatures in both the Greek and Latin script; this expressed itself consistently in much fewer best/good signatures, and a larger number in the poor-quality categories. In a rather similar way, each occupational group tended to reproduce the general pattern of the sample. The proportion of low-quality signatures remained extremely low in the Latin-signing group: 10 percent for bureaucrats, 8 percent for merchants, 4 percent for white-collar employees, 3 percent for professionals, and nil for representatives of the financial sector. The same categories displayed a significantly higher level of poor signatures when they signed in Greek: 11, 22, 17, 4, and 5 percent respectively.

How are these patterns and differences to be interpreted? Once again the use of a Latin signature appears to have been closely linked to social status and cultural level. The profile of the average signer in Latin corresponded to a rather sophisticated level and, as such, did not allow for mediocrity. A Latin signature was used only if the person had the required fluency in that script. A probable corollary of this observation would be that individuals who had only a limited mastery of the Western script would tend to shy away from its use. By extension this meant that the incentive to use Latin script would not be strong enough to persuade individuals with only approximate knowledge to use it. The much lower proportion of good Greek signatures can then be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, it certainly means that the average social profile of the signer in Greek was much more demotic; on the other, it probably implies that a considerable number of those who could have signed in Greek with a high degree of sophistication tended to favour a Latin signature, their mastery of French possibly being comparable to their knowledge of Greek. This in turn seems to suggest that the Latin script (in fact, the French language) was most likely acquired in some formal process (schooling and formation) rather than in the street. All in all it seems, therefore, that the Greek community was pulled in different and to a certain degree even opposite directions, depending on the socio-cultural stratum to which individuals belonged. At the top of the social ladder, educated individuals exposed to western ways and interests tended to acculturate and sacrifice their ethnic identity; in the middle and bottom range the tendency was much less evident, as the middle and lower classes seemed to show a greater tendency to adhere to their original alphabet.

Finally, the distribution of different types and qualities of seals completes this analysis with a quantitative touch. As noted earlier, the use of seals amounted to only 7 percent of the whole sample, and 6 percent when used alone without a signature. Almost 80 percent of seal users were women, or

93 percent if seals without signature are included. Considering that almost two-thirds of the seals used by individuals whose profession can be ascertained belonged to domestic servants and business underlings, there is little doubt that the use of seal strongly correlated with illiteracy. Yet the use of seals together with signatures, or by individuals who would hardly have been illiterate, shows that seals also performed another function. What this function was is probably best expressed by Graphs V.1 and V.2. That 88 percent of the seals should have been of the older, negative format – widely produced throughout the Empire by craftsmen such as the seal carvers who survived well into the 1960s near the Valide Mosque at Eminönü – by itself speaks of a local dimension shared by other ethnic and religious communities. The remaining 12 percent of seals were resolutely modern in their difference: positive instead of negative, made of rubber instead of carved metal or stone, they were no longer seals but rather stamps, either reproducing a signature or taking the form of a company stamp, often including new elements such as the address and specialization of the firm. The languages on the seals also denote a strong degree of local culture. Most of them were in Turkish, followed by a good third in Greek, and a mere 16 percent using Latin script. It is clear then that language and format reiterated the same distinction between, (i), individuals of modest means, more often than not illiterate women, using a traditional seal, as well as individuals of some standing who considered it a matter of status to reproduce the model of the Muslim elite; and (ii), the use of modern stamps by individuals mostly from business circles, giving a new meaning to a modified adaptation of an old format. The frequent use of Turkish on the traditional seal had an additional purpose. Indeed, using a seal in Turkish was the closest an Ottoman Greek could come to signing in that language, given that members of the Greek community generally had only spoken knowledge of the country's language. As to their quality (Graph V.3), the overwhelming number of poorly-designed seals was a direct reflection of the low socio-economic status that generally characterized their holders. For most of these modest individuals, seals were roughly carved objects that had nothing to do with the artefacts of high calligraphic quality that belonged to high-level Muslim Ottoman bureaucrats or even members of the dynasty. The best to be hoped for was a Turkish seal decently designed for a Greek bureaucrat, a nicely carved monogram for some wealthy individual or his wife, or a typographically perfect but aesthetically disappointing company stamp.

Identity, Allegiance and Ideology

Let me try to wrap up all these diverse bits of information. This inquiry into the signatures by Greek customers of the Imperial Ottoman Bank has combined the quantitative with the qualitative, the obvious with the dubious, the definite with the probable, the futile with the useful. It was to some

extent weakened by a methodology that drew on subjective and impressionistic evaluations alongside more concrete elements. Above all, it focused on a number of concepts of varying strength and relevance, from literacy and illiteracy to socio-economic and cultural status, or from modernity and tradition to acculturation and Westernization. The best way to sort out all these methodological and conceptual problems is to order claims and hypotheses according to their degree of complexity.

It may be easiest to start with the most obvious observations that can be made:

– The level of literacy in the sample is extremely high, approximately 95 percent, and as such reflects the relatively high degree of education and instruction that seems to characterize the middle and upper classes of the Ottoman Greek community at the beginning of the twentieth century.
– About half of the sample displays an ability to use the Latin alphabet, so attesting to the rather wide spread of at least a basic knowledge of French by a large number of Ottoman Greeks.
– Not surprisingly, gender appears to be a major factor of differentiation in the sample, as women seem to represent almost exclusively illiteracy, while their ability to use the Latin is about half of that of the male population.
– Literacy and the use of foreign languages are unevenly distributed among occupational groups within the sample. Illiteracy is hardly found outside of the category of servants and underlings, which consists mostly of female domestic help. Employment of the Latin script shows enormous variations between infrequent or limited use among traditional sectors such as the clergy and servants, balanced use among merchants and financiers, and very extensive – indeed, dominant – use among bureaucrats and the new professions. This can be explained by the degree of exposure to, or autonomy from, the new world order as it found expression in the Ottoman capital at the turn of the twentieth century.
– The degree of fluency displayed in signatures shows a "normal" distribution among signers in Greek, with slight variations according to gender or occupation. By and large, most are of "average" quality, tending toward higher values for men, and lower values for women. The same is true for women signing in the Latin script; however, male Latin signatures display a very clear concentration in the highest qualities, suggesting that the use of a Latin signature is linked more to proper schooling and formation than to a somewhat informal exposure to the language.
– A closer look at the use of seals and their quality suggests that most of them were linked to a traditional or local culture, and that they

> constituted the only element through which Greek nationals could explicitly designate their status as Ottoman subjects/citizens. The marginal proportion they represent within the sample may suggest that both the Greek and a supra-national Western identity had made considerable headway in dissociating most of the middle classes from formal allegiance to the Ottoman nation.

The question of a potential allegiance to a supra-national identity as expressed by the use of the French language and the Latin script in signatures brings us to the less obvious issues brought out by this analysis. As stated earlier, the question of the ability of individuals to sign in one script or another, and the variations this ability may display according to gender, status, or occupation, are relatively easy to define and to explain. Yet when it comes to measuring the intent behind specific signatures in order to explain them, one can do little more than speculate. Knowing a foreign language, or at least being sufficiently familiar with it to use it in some basic written form is one thing; actually choosing to use it may be totally different, especially if it is accepted that not all French-speakers did. Trying to understand whether or not the individuals in the sample were aware of what they were doing and acting deliberately, rested on the assumption that, at a time when modernity and Western civilization were important issues, and when the Ottoman Empire and its constituent parts had become the target of competing ideologies ranging from Ottomanism to Turkism, from neo-Byzantinism to Panhellenism, or from nationalism to imperialism, expressions of personal identity were not likely to be innocently spontaneous but more or less tainted with, or at least conscious of, one or other of these schemes. The simple fact that signing in French generally went together with a Gallicized rendering of the name is a case in point. Within the limited scope of this study, those Ottoman Greeks who were able to sign in French had the choice of three possible ways of signing a document: a seal in Turkish, a signature in Greek, or a signature in French. Each of these options came with a potential meaning, which one may caricature as Ottoman-Greek citizen, Greek with a possible national connotation, and modern cosmopolitan Greek. None of these definitions would have meant a real sacrifice of a Greek identity, which was almost invariably guaranteed by the name or the surname. But each definition could be read with a different twist, in terms of exactly how the Greek identity was perceived within a broader and potentially more political context. If the first option of a Turkish seal remains extremely marginal and almost exclusively used by illiterate individuals of a lower socio-economic status and by a few bureaucrats and State officials, it does not seem too much of an exaggeration to associate the use of seals with a certain degree of allegiance to the Ottoman commonwealth or, *a contrario*, with a marked distance from the Greek national or cosmopolitan identities associated with Greek or Latin signatures.

The real question is therefore whether any qualification of signers in French might reveal a lesser or greater tendency to move towards a more cosmopolitan definition of identities or, on the contrary, to show a certain degree of resistance to the kind of acculturation it might imply.

The only way to answer this question would be to know what proportion of individuals signing in Greek were also able to sign in Latin but chose not to. In the absence of this information the question must remain rhetorical, although it might be possible to test this hypothesis, however obliquely, by comparisons with other groups within the larger sample. Indeed, one of the more striking findings of my previous work on the subject was that the proportion of Latin signers showed a great degree of variation from one community to another: 89 percent among Jews, 66 percent among Armenians, 59 percent among Muslims, and only 51 percent among Greeks.[15] Leaving aside the Muslims,[16] what can account for such significantly different levels in the use of French signatures among the three major non-Muslim communities? Objective criteria to explain such discrepancies would be levels of exposure, the educational system, degrees of integration with Western networks, etc. Some convincing arguments can be made in that direction, assuming for example that the Jewish and Armenian middle classes were relatively more dependant on foreign schools than Greeks, especially given the efforts of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in the case of the former, and to the existence of Catholic and Protestant communities in the case of the latter. Another important point is that both the Hebrew and Armenian scripts were certainly less easily legible to the European eye than Greek letters, which would explain a greater propensity for members of these two communities to transcribe their signatures when faced with the Western context of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Also, the simple fact that the Greek community was represented in the sample by a much higher proportion of women and of "modest" clients certainly accounted for the fact that the level of exposure of its members to Western cultural forms was somewhat more limited than that of the other communities, whose profile was rather less demotic.

Despite all these rational and objective explanations, one cannot help suspect that the relatively low level of Latin signatures among Greeks may have been due to certain cultural and ideological motivations. In a city where Greek was spoken by large numbers outside the Greek community, the language actually rivalled the other local *lingua franca*, French. Clinging to their own tongue may well have been a matter of national pride to Greeks, who were in many ways comforted in their belief that The City was theirs, at least partly. Let us not forget that at a time when all kinds of nationalism were claiming their share of the Ottoman communities, only the Greeks benefited from the support of an independent nation-state with a cultural policy very much centred on linguistic definitions of identity. In short, the Greek community of the Empire, and all the more so its bourgeoisie, had

both the means and the motives to display a strong ethnic and national stand, whose expression would at least partly infringe upon other potential definitions, national or supra-national. If some educated Ottoman Jew saw no harm in adopting a French signature, it is more than probable that some of his Greek counterparts would think twice before surrendering to the appeal of this new identity, however utilitarian it might be.

This discussion could be prolonged indefinitely but, in the absence of any corroborative information, not very helpfully. My aim, in any case, was not to sustain what is after all a very thin hypothesis, but rather to show by this long exercise, the interest that may lie in the exploitation of the mass of documentation relating to everyday life in the Ottoman Empire that still remains largely untapped. In the face of the diversity of the social, cultural, and mental environment of that *fin d'empire*, the use of such data and micro-analyses may help us understand better the profile and motivations of a society faced with the complex dynamics of change and continuity.

NOTES

1 E. Eldem, "Istanbul 1903-1918: A Quantitative Analysis of A Bourgeoisie", *Boğaziçi Journal. Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies*, vol. 11, 1-2 (1997) *Istanbul Past and Present Special Issue*, pp. 53-98. This article was also published in Greek: "Κωνσταντινούπολη 1903-1918. Ποσοτική ανάλυση *μίας* αστικής τάξης", *Synchrona Themata*, 22, 74-75 (December 2000), pp. 124-47. For a discussion of the practical definition of the sample as a bourgeoisie, see "Istanbul 1903-1918", p. 54-57.

2 E. Eldem, "Culture et signature: quelques remarques sur les signatures de clients de la Banque Impériale Ottomane au début du XXe siècle", *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée. Oral et écrit dans le monde turco-ottoman*, 75-76 (1995/1-2), pp. 181-95.

3 Eldem, "Istanbul 1903-1918", *op. cit.*, p. 61.

4 The identification of Greek-Orthodox individuals is based on the mention made from 1915 onwards of nationality combined with a "Greek-sounding" name, and for the preceding years on names alone. This basic information has been coupled with, whenever possible, a double-checking of nationality and religion through customer files in the same archives. Greek nationals – marked as "Hellenes" after 1915 – have been excluded from the database, although some may have slipped into it in earlier years, due to the absence of any indication on nationality. By and large, even though the corpus must certainly include some individuals wrongly identified as Greek-Orthodox Ottoman subjects, and exclude some others who were not properly identified as such, it is rather likely that the margin of error remains minimal compared to the size of the sample.

5 The distinction between "traditional" and "modern" is, of course, a slippery and dangerous one when it comes to evaluating the behaviour of individuals. I am using the terms here only within the limits of the rather concrete distinction between negative seals which were used by Ottoman subjects for centuries before the dates of the sample, and positive stamps made of metal or rubber, the appearance of which can be more or less accurately dated from the second half

of the nineteenth century.

6 One should not forget the purpose of the signature and/or seal on each of these customer cards. They constituted a sample of the client's signature, used for purposes of verification of any future document received by the bank's services. It is clear then that the customer would from then on use this signature exclusively in all his/her dealings with the institution.

7 Ernest Giraud, *La France à Constantinople*, reprint (Istanbul: Isis, 2002), pp. 35-61.

8 Within the sample, Ottoman Greeks made up approximately 45 percent of the professional addresses in Galata and the residential addresses in Pera. Inversely, almost 60 percent of the Greek individuals in the sample worked in Galata and resided in Pera (Eldem, "Istanbul 1903-1918," *op. cit.*, pp. 76-81.

9 Only 12 percent of the individuals in the sample resided in the provinces or abroad.

10 E. Giraud's "Constantinople - La rue," a chronicle of everyday life in the Ottoman capital, was more or less regularly published in the monthly *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople* between 1890 and 1912.

11 In 1906, about 15 percent of the bank's employees were Ottoman Greeks and 10 percent Hellenic subjects. These proportions, which corresponded to the average of the bank's extensive branch network throughout the Empire, were much higher in the Istanbul branches (E. Eldem, *A History of the Ottoman Bank*, Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Historical Research Center, 1999, p. 514).

12 For a discussion of seals and the distribution of their use in the wider sample, see Eldem, "Culture et signature,", *op. cit.*, pp. 184-90.

13 The proportion of female customers was of 30.6 percent for foreigners, 28.5 percent for Armenians, 22 percent for Muslims and 19.6 percent for Jews (Eldem, "Istanbul 1903-1918," *op. cit.*, pp. 82-85.

14 Two of them seem to have had no scruples in that respect, but one of them, Leonidas Nikoklis, was a lay clerk and simply the accountant of the ephoralty of Greek hospitals in Istanbul. The other, however, was a *bona fide* cleric, and not a minor one either, since Archimandrite Meletios Metaxakis was successively assigned to the Chapel of the Holy Sepulchre at the Patriarchate, to the Monastery of Saint George on the island of Halki, and to the Metropolitan see of Kitiou, in Larnaca, on Cyprus, before eventually becoming Patriarch in 1921.

15 Eldem, "Culture et signature," *op. cit.*, pp. 188, 191-93.

16 Due to the very particular character of the use of seals among this community, the proportion of Latin signatures concerns only those Muslims who signed, instead or alongside the use of a seal.

TABLE I - Examples of deposit cards



I. 1. Evdhokia Araboglou



I. 2. Const[antin] G. Lambros



I. 3. Ephtimia D. Papazoglou

I. 4. Alex[andre] Abadjibachi

TABLE II - Examples of signatures

II.1. - Georges Calfas	
II.2 - Christophore K. Koumarianos	
II.3 - Sophie A. Cambas	
II.4. - Hélène Doxara	

TABLE III - Examples of seals

III.1. - Thomayi Contostavlo	
III.2. - Eleni Diamandoglou	
III.3 - Constantin Makris	
III.4 - Eftichia Iconomou	

TABLE IV - Variations in the quality of signatures

1 	2 
3 	4 
5 	6 
7 	8 
9 	10 

TABLE V - Variations in the quality and types of seals

1 	2 	3 
4 	5 	6 
 7	8 	 9
10 	11 	12 
13 	14 	15 

GRAPH I.1. - General distribution of signature types in the sample



GRAPH I.2. - General distribution of seal and signature combinations



GRAPH II.1 - Gender distribution within the sample



GRAPH II.2. - Gender-based distribution of signature types



GRAPH II.3. - Gender-based distribution of seal and signature combinations



GRAPH III.1 - Professional distribution within the sample



GRAPH III.2 - Profession-based distribution of signature types



GRAPH IV.1 - General distribution of Greek signature qualities



GRAPH IV.2. - Gender-based distribution of Greek signature qualities



GRAPH IV.3. - General distribution of Latin signature qualities



GRAPH IV.4. - Gender-based distribution of Latin signature qualities





GRAPH V.1. - Seal types



GRAPH V.2. - Seal alphabets



GRAPH V.3. - Seal qualities

GRAPH VI.1 – Comparison of the use of signature and of Latin characters by the four major local religious/ethnic groups



From West to East: The Translation Bridge

An Approach from a Western Perspective

Ioanna Petropoulou

Le Spectateur Oriental, the so-called first political newspaper in the East, was published in 1821 at a geographical point on the border between East and West. The newspaper used the following poem under its masthead.

L' orageux empire des ondes
Vainement separe les mondes;
Le commerce les réunit

Commerce in the ports of the East handled a great variety of foodstuffs, both locally and colonially grown. In addition, however, products of the economy and culture passed through the channel of commerce too. There was an ebb and flow of people and their creations: books and works of art, ancient artifacts and manuscripts, and later, newspapers and novels. If, with poetic license, we play with words and replace *commerce* in the last line of the poem with *translation*, we obtain the framework within which was born the great production of translations into and from different languages in the large printing houses and urban centres of Smyrna and Constantinople at that time. What commerce and the translation of one language into another have in common is the inherent divergence between two worlds — geographical or other — opening up to new horizons, a desire to overcome isolation, a willingness to exchange, and ultimately a thirst for knowledge.

This study refers to one such opening — up to other civilizations and cultures, in particular to the presence of European literature in the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century. More specifically, it is concerned with the use of the foreign (primarily French) novel by Turkish-speaking Christian-Orthodox subjects, and its translation into *Karamanlidika* script — that is Turkish written in Greek characters.[1] This publishing movement

began around the middle of the century, during the Tanzimat Period, and although in the last quarter the works were printed exclusively in Constantinople, their distribution went well beyond the confines of the capital. The goal of this study is not to cite already published work or quote from the six volumes of *Karamanlidika* by the pioneer researchers Sévérien Salaville, Eugène Dalleggio and Evangelia Balta. In terms of actual data I have no new discoveries to present. Instead, basing myself on this bibliographic treasure, I intend to investigate the business of translations, and integrate it into the broader historical context — not only with respect to the Christian-Orthodox East, but also concerning its source, the place which gave birth to it: Europe.

My attempt will be made from the western perspective, trying to trace this publishing movement not as an isolated local episode but as a phenomenon that developed in parallel with, and related to the course of, the European and primarily the French novel. The questions I shall explore are the following: To what degree does the turn to the West, implied by the secular content of the specific translations seen for the first time in the history of Karamanli publications, also demonstrate an adoption of European innovations at the technical level? Were modern methods used for the production and distribution of books, and of what kind? If indeed they were used, to what extent does this modernizing of form constitute a declaration of modernity with regard to the actual content of the Karamanli translations?

The Environment of the Ottoman Empire: Historical Origins

The introduction of a western literary product — the novel — through translation into Karamanli during the last decades of the nineteenth century was not a unique phenomenon in the Ottoman realm. The appeal of the West for a small literate circle can be traced back to the previous century within Muslim, as well as Christian, Turkophone and Greek-speaking lovers of books and ideas.

For Muslim scholars, 1830 is a turning point in the history of Ottoman literature and the accompanying spread of western influence. Still, there had been contact with western literature earlier, although limited. With regard to the non-Christian elites of the Ottoman realm, we know that even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, attempts were being made from above to introduce European ideas into the culture. Of course the use of these elements did not extend beyond the confines of the court. Here we should mention very briefly that Lale Devri, *L'Époque des Tulipes*, in the first three decades of the eighteenth century constitutes tangible proof of some influences of French Enlightenment on the world of Muslim scholars. In the same vein, another current of ideas among Christian-Orthodox subjects was channelled by the Phanariots, who also attempted to pass on the new ideas of enlightened Europe in Greek, through a large quantity of books,

through the printed word generally, the teaching of language, reading and translations.

It must be understood that when we speak of elements of western culture in the Ottoman Empire in approximately the middle of nineteenth century, we are referring to literate, possibly multi-lingual, book-oriented people. In other words our attention is focused on the rather high social strata of the Muslim and Christian population.

With regard to upper-class Muslims turning towards the European intellectual *milieu*, we have evidence of travellers such as Charles MacFarlane. His work provides information about the public as well as the private Ottoman sphere. MacFarlane mentions that in 1847, in the library of the Medical School of Galata Saray, he noticed volumes on the history of the French Revolution, atheist books, and works by Diderot. He says that some Greek students, who called themselves *philosophes à la Voltaire*, were taking anatomy lessons there as a part of their medical training. And at the home of an Ottoman officer where MacFarlane had been a guest, the host read Milton and Shakespeare in the original with ease. The traveller does not hide his surprise that these Ottomans should study French materialism and read French novels.[2]

Perhaps such instances were rare, but they are indicative. In any case, some of the Muslim elite groups obviously read works in European languages, and through the tradition of French enlightenment came to know the novel.

Greek-Speaking Orthodox Christians: Reactions to the European Novel

Both in its place of origin, the West, and in that of the recipients, in this case the East, the novel is a product that flourishes in cities. That is to say, it presupposes some degree of urbanization. We shall focus our attention on the Orthodox Greek-speaking Christian community of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1861, Nikolaos Dragoumis, the owner-publisher of the periodical *Pandora*, would note that: 'clothing, theatres, steam ships, gas lighting, all inventions of the West, barge headlong into the birthplace of Islam'.[3] The capital of the Ottoman Empire is seen through the eyes of a resident of the newly formed Greek State who was born in Constantinople. There, in Constantinople, urbanization and secularism won ground, in combination with literacy, from the middle of the century onwards, and there was a gradual broadening of the social base of the literate community. A few years later, in 1865, the same observer noted that the French language was being taught in the lowest classes of schools to the young daughters of fishermen and wood-carvers. Language learning did not take place only by the systematic teaching of school-based education, of course, but also emerged from the communication between people of different nationalities. It is significant that in the 1860s, there were six foreign bookstores in the district

of Stravrodromi, and only three Greek ones in Galata. And, continues the astute observer, while the Greek bookstores carried primarily schoolbooks, the foreign ones had a wider variety. We assume that this also included foreign novels.[4]

In the cities, thanks to their foreign-language education, Orthodox Christians were able to have direct contact with works of literature in the original. In addition, a growing segment of the Greek-speaking reading public turned to translations. In the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a tremendous output of foreign novels, translated from European languages into Greek as well as into Ottoman. Indeed, a large number of works were often sold out and reprinted. Within quite a short time from publication in their foreign-language originals, voluminous and often expensive works were translated, published and republished, appeared serially in the daily or periodical press, of not only Constantinople but Smyrna too. This move towards western culture, the use of foreign education through the translation of literature into Greek is not just a chance assessment. Its quantitative importance has been demonstrated through modern scholarship, and the related literature on the subject is in the process of completion.[5]

The introduction of western elements into the education of Christian minorities can be seen among the Greek-speaking Orthodox of the large cities, if only from the opposition it engendered. More specifically, reactions evoked by this turn towards the West, concerned not only the field of literature but modern behaviour and manners more generally. The resistance to modernity by a certain social segment intensified during the latter half of the century. In the major urban centres of Smyrna and Constantinople, these objections were organized and recorded, and so they passed from the spoken to the written language. They became a public issue through lectures that were published as articles in periodicals and the daily press, or in serial form distributed by their authors who argued that they were trying to defend the old values being threatened.

There is no doubt that modern literature, and particularly the foreign novel, can be blamed for a great many things.

Foreign novels were conductors of modernity *par excellence*. Faithfully translated or adapted to the Greek language, and put out by the printing presses of residential centres such as Smyrna and Constantinople, these works speedily reached their customers and were able to penetrate the sanctuary of the family where women could read freely and on their own. A segment of the female urban population was sufficiently literate to read by themselves. In other words the reading of books was being emancipated from the status of religious, public / group process and official restrictions began to be lifted.

The precise reactions to the introduction of western values and models lie outside the framework of this study. Generally speaking, rejection of

European literature implied rejection of non-religious and possibly atheist texts. This attitude had a long history in Greek cultural life, but at this point it was also turning against romances. Despite some belligerent condemnation that protested against this newly imported type of literature, whether in the original or primarily in Greek translation, the new books were enjoying a huge distribution. The situation was similar to that which met the first long novel printed in the Greek language in the newly independent Greek State. This was the first Athenian translation in 1835 of an important work of European literature — *Corinne, ou L'Italie* by Madame de Staël.[6]

Throughout the entire Orthodox Greek-speaking world, the eager reception of the novel was accompanied by angry attempts at its elimination. There are many accounts testifying to this — primarily from the places where the novels were translated and published. They bear witness to the resistance of a pre-national community whose education was based on religion. It was also, connected however, with the increasing wave of historicism at the University of Athens. In the 1860s, Ikesios Latris, a scholar from Smyrna, who lived in Athens, appealed 'to all the Greek people' to send books to the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman territories. In the context of the newly established State, and following the rising wave of historicism, he recommended books on ancient and Byzantine Greece 'rather than the indecent and unnecessary books from abroad that corrupt the moral character of the people'.[7] He does not juxtapose novels with religion, nor does he stress or distinguish the issue of gender: the problem is the corruption of the people (του λαού) not only or specifically of the female reading public.

In the urban centres of the Ottoman realm, the European way of life had penetrated deeply not only into the upper class households of the Christian Greeks, but also into the middle-class homes that made up the bulk of Greek population of the cities at that time. It was only when the danger was understood as a palpable threat that the issue of gender was raised. The press of the period was full of pertinent references. As a result of urbanization and of the population increase in the cities, girls were able to study not only in communal Greek schools but also in foreign-language institutions of education. In Smyrna the defence of traditional values was undertaken by a representative of the female sex who held an important position in society: Sappho Leontias, the director of the Girls' School of Saint Photini. In 1865, speaking out against officially awarding graduation certificates to her female students, she thought it necessary to denounce 'the luxury of this grievous scourge on families' and to uphold ancestral and Christian values. She specifically addressed herself to mothers, dissuading them from sending their daughters to foreign educational institutions.[8] Two years later in the same forum speaking in her capacity as Head Mistress, Sappho Leontias made the novel a direct target: 'Part of your day, particularly in the morning, you must spend in study and reading, not of novels which corrupt morals,

but in reading of what you are taught in school and other socially useful books, better in Greek than in French or other foreign languages.'[9]

However, in Constantinople in the 1870s, the official line against this secular society, in order to be convincing, and widely heard, had to use a stricter, more ironic trenchant language, oral as well as written. Michail Hourmouzis, who lectured to educational associations like the one in 'Omonia' and also published the *Neologos* newsletter, in the *Chronos* paper, struck out against mimicking everything European. In a fiery article in 1871 entitled 'On our Divergence from Tradition and the Catastrophic Consequences of the so-called European Progress' he characterized European civilization as 'a cancer devouring our society'.[10] He even condemned the city's Christian children learning foreign languages from French, English or German tutors, and denounced the raising of children by foreign governesses. His position expresses a fear of de-Hellenization and of the increasing distance from religion — from the 'Cross and prayer' as he says. Ultimately, of course, he condemned not only romances but the whole modern western press. He rages against every type of periodical with a large circulation sold in the cosmopolitan urban centres, including those devoted to women's dress patterns. He is very clear on where he stands regarding modern printed matter versus religious texts: 'In the past, people had Bibles in their homes, but today they have the fashion magazine *La Mode Illustrée*, or magazines about the market like *Der Bazar* to which they are regular subscribers.'[11]

To sum up: the major issue of those years which also comes up in the Tanzimat Period, explicitly or otherwise, is that of growing secularism: emancipation from the pre-national world of religion along with all that it entails. The novel, as we have already noted, bears fruit in an environment of emancipation, demonstrating among other things the (albeit partial) displacement of religious texts and 'the loss of God'.

Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians: from Religious Books to Secularism

In the above we discussed the Greek-speaking Orthodox among the literate subjects of the Ottoman Empire to illustrate the general atmosphere. As regards the Turkish-speaking Orthodox community, their turning towards the foreign (French) novel, in Karamanli translations, did not take place in a vacuum. Only a few decades earlier, as translation made foreign literature accessible, a new, Greek-speaking reading public had come into being. For the Turkophone Orthodox Christian *millet* of the Empire, the introduction of western models of behaviour into intellectual life through printing developed towards the end of the century. The Karamanli books lagged behind similar publications in the Greek as well as the Ottoman language. Quantitatively speaking, the Karamanli list of publications was leaner with a total of only twenty titles of translations.

Karamanli books were in Turkish but written in Greek characters and primarily intended for the use of Turkish-speaking Christians. From their initial publication and until approximately the *Tanzimat* period, they remained in their overwhelming majority, religious and liturgical books. In 1864, the French traveller Georges Perrot characterized Karamanli writing *comme un dernier symbole de la nationalité disparue.*[12] This romantic point of view is indicative of how Philhellenes and Greeks of the nineteenth century preferred to regard Turkish philology and literature, not as it really was. However, Perrot's nostalgic dictum finds itself at odds with a modern historical viewpoint recorded by Philippos Iliou who maintained that the readers of the Karamanli books were the Orthodox Turkish speaking people of Asia Minor, descended, it appears, from early Christianized Turkish communities.[13]

Whatever the explanation of this ideologically very loaded issue, the Orthodox Turkophone Ottomans were not the marginal group, as Greek historians were later to regard them and whom they placed, for obvious historical reasons, in the periphery. There is empirical evidence that there were substantial population groups of Turkophone Christians in the interior of the country as well as on the coast. An indication of their quantitatively solid presence is the overall publication activity, amounting to almost seven hundred titles, in their own Karamanlidika script. The Turkish spoken by these particular Orthodox was not a learnt second language, but their mother tongue — *une langue maternelle.* For the literate among them, Greek was a second choice — *une langue de culture* — the language in which they were taught. This is illustrated by the banker Andreas Syngros mentioning in his memoirs that, upon reaching Constantinople in approximately 1845, he felt an absolute need to learn Turkish. This was not simply because important commercial activities were conducted with Armenians and Persians, but because the eastern-Orthodox Christians 'spoke Turkish, and few, if any knew Greek at that time'.[14]

Let us now look at the function of the Karamanli translations. With regard to Ottoman Turkish literature, A. Tietze very clearly states that the phenomenon of the 'acceptance and integration of new elements and non-religious contemporary western ideas was accomplished in Karamanli literature through borrowed texts — i.e. translations'.[15] The production of original literature did not develop to any extent. For historical reasons, original Karamanli publications never reached the level of creative fiction. Turning to already written, western books, indirectly contributed to (among other things) a paucity of fresh material, and the poor representation of native authors led to a lively interest in translations. The transition from the world bound by religious texts to the world of modernity was accomplished via the Karamanli, with translated literature acting as a bridge. It could be said that the linguistic transfer of one literature into another reflected the parallel transition from religious society to nation. It is also interesting that

it was precisely during the nineteenth century, that the term *millet* changed its religious meaning for an ethnic one.[16]

A society that did not know the concept of creative writing in our modern sense could have no original authors of non-religious books. As mediators on behalf of the divine, the Turkish-speaking Orthodox community was producing an ample volume of sacred texts but they did not express themselves in writing as individuals. Up to that time, there had been publishers, printers, translators, subscribers, collectors and adapters — but no authors. The world of the religious book knew nothing of the author's ego. The transition from sacred to secular writing required a substantial impetus to bridge the gap. This bridge was found in the novel that came from elsewhere, of foreign origin, written in a foreign language.

After the *Hatt-i Hümayun* Decree, the publication of secular as well as religious works was accomplished thanks to that very 'translation bridge'. Of course, the bridge carried not only translated novels but also secular non-fiction, which occasionally appeared as original works although in fact they were adaptations of foreign texts.[17]

With respect to the publication of primarily French novels as Karamanli translations, many of these had already achieved great success with repeated printings in every written language in the Ottoman Empire, that is to say in Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian, Hebrew, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. They had been tested in the publishing market of the Ottoman Empire and also in the newly formed Greek State — and were guaranteed to be successful in terms of their marketability and the likely financial profit. Whether or not the new Karamanli translations were made directly from the French (something which the translators noted on the title page),[18] their literate Turkish-speaking urban readership already knew about them from the Greek translations — though perhaps no more than the titles. Using the same alphabet as the Greek editions the Karamanli books frequently used names in their titles — *Ροβινσών Κρούσο, Ο Κόμης Μόντε-Χρὴστο* (Robinson Crusoe, Le Comte de Monte Christo) — which were easy for their readers to decipher and memorize. This indicates the existence of a reading public within the framework of the *millet* that was potentially much broader than that of the Turkophone Greek Orthodox. Since, compared with the official written Ottoman, the Turkish of the Karamanli, was a simpler, popular language, it was also more accessible to people who belonged to the Empire's other nationalities, and only knew the Greek alphabet. The translations were made *en langue turque courante* as it is noted on the first page of a novel.[19]

How, it may be asked, were these western and modern books accepted? What processes and criteria dictated the choice of these particular western novels? Did the translations have any impact on the Ottoman Empire and if so, what role did they play? At the time western novels reached the Turkish-speaking literate public in translation, a parallel effort had begun to bring

some information about the culture of other peoples through the printed medium. This was not confined to books but operated through the newly born journalism in the daily and periodical press. Curiosity about others, about the world elsewhere, resulted in some new types of anthologies, calendars and almanacs, which appeared sporadically, in an effort at 'encyclopaediazation', an attempt to popularize knowledge which had its roots in European Enlightenment.[20] In this way, knowledge of European history, in extremely simplistic form, came to the Turkish-speaking reading public of the East.[21]

Adaptations of western books were also part of this tendency to introduce the secular spirit of hard science and western rationalism. They included works of popular science that discussed and introduced new subjects to Karamanli readers for the first time — for example, the human body. That was due, of course, not to the Eastern-Orthodox tradition but to Western-European culture.[22] The originals were French textbooks, as the translators themselves noted. The same applies to the introduction of technical instructions translated from the French, as for example in the middle of the 1880s *Ισπού ρισαλέ ιπέκ ποτζεκλερὶ πεσλεμεσὶ*, a manual on sericulture.

The East as Recipient: Turkish-Speaking Orthodox Christians and Translations

The Table below catalogues all the works published in translation that we know of from the existing bibliographies. I shall attempt an historical presentation of this Table from a western point of view. While this is not the only possible approach, I propose to use it to interpret this material, printed and distributed in the Ottoman Empire, because it offers an interesting insight into the ideological make-up of the Turkish-speaking East. The analysis will be in two parts. The first (this section) concerns the publishing activity of the Turkophone Orthodox, and presents the history of that kind of book production with respect to the recipient — the East. The second (section 5) concerns the original foreign-language books, with respect to the transmitter, and presents the conditions in the place where production took place — i.e. examining the novel with respect to the West.

I shall begin with a brief comment on the Table. We would of course like to know: Who were the translators of these novels? Who were the financial sponsors, or which publishers took on the production costs? How was the distribution of these translations achieved? Was it accomplished through selling individual copies, or through advertisements in the daily or periodical press? What was the composition of the reading-public of this specific printing activity (age, sex, literacy, geographical distribution)? We must not be over-optimistic with respect to any answers. To the best of my knowledge there is very little written evidence from the novels' Turkish-speaking readers. Such literature on the subject, as exists, as well as copies of the translations themselves, remains literally unexploited and await those who can decipher

them as a data source. We shall have to turn towards the West, and specifically to France for an approach to the subject based on the knowledge accumulated and made available later in the country where these works were born. Already by the second half of the twentieth century extensive studies by the European scholars examining the production and distribution of books, were widely available. Not only has the French historiographic school analyzed the work of their own authors of the nineteenth century *roman feuilleton* some of whom were translated into Karamanlidika, but they have also studied the broader phenomenon of the book. They have placed their authors within historical time and the creations of those authors within the theoretical framework of the period.

One way of tracing the course of a particular book in the East during this period is to borrow some analytical tools that originated in the West. By doing so we find that between 1850 and 1880 there was on average one translation per decade. The first novel in translation appeared in 1853, the English work *Robinson Crusoe* by Daniel Defoe. *Les Mémoires de Napoléon* came out in the 1860s (1864), and another just a decade later in 1874. The numbers increased dramatically in the 1880s (11 titles) and the 1890s (6 titles). All in all there were about twenty French novels. The original texts, (on which most translations were based), are representative of nineteenth-century French literature: of Eugène Sue, the so-called King of the *roman feuilleton* in France for the first half of the century, and Xavier de Montèpin for the second half. Not only did the publishers understand the position these authors occupied in their country, not only did they comprehend the value and the reputation of these works but, as we would say today, they knew how to advertise the translations they were publishing.[23] In some cases, the translators are professionals employed by the Ottoman administration, at the Palace of the Sultan or at the Customs Office.[24]

Evangelinos Misailidis (1820-1890) may be considered one of these professional translators, although he was more than that. He studied at the University of Athens and in Smyrna. He was a printer and book publisher, a journalist and the founder of a newspaper. He had his own print shop with its own printing presses and may be seen as a patron of Karamanli publishing. When an explosion in reporting took place in the East in the nineteenth century, with the introduction of a modern medium of wider, mass consumption — the newspaper — this modernizing effort can be attributed primarily to Misailidis. He began publishing the Karamanli newspaper *Anatoli* (The East) in Constantinople in the 1850s. *Anatoli* was a long-lived publication that circulated from Athens to the Caucasus, from Arta and Ioannina to Odessa, Syria and Egypt. This was the very time that this form of publication had its European heyday. Lucien Febvre characterized the nineteenth century in France as 'the century of this newly introduced form, the century of the triumph of the newspaper', and a similar process was taking place in the East in a society becoming literate: 'le

triomphe du journal'. With mechanization, and new technical possibilities, newspapers became the main mass medium.

The Cappadocian scholar Emmanuel Tsalikoglou, in an account of handwritten texts in the Archives of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, clearly identifies the unifying role played by the Turkish-language publication *Anatoli* around the middle of the century:

> The powerful economic actors of Kilikia of my father's generation from the Black Sea, and Constantinople either had no Greek at all or else knew very little, and they had a great need for the newspaper *Anatoli* and for these [Karamanli] works.[25]

Of the twenty translated novels, fourteen were handled by the Misailidis family — that is, approximately two-thirds of the total. Evangelinos Misailidis himself participated actively, either directly as translator and publisher, or through his commercial enterprise, the Printing House he had founded in Constantinople. When he was not busy translating or directing, he was in the printing shop that turned out the books. However, it was Misailidis' newspaper that played the leading role in the distribution of western literature. Not only did it announce new novels being published, but actually printed the translations, in serial form. Thus, the founder-publisher and editor of *Anatoli* may also be considered the first transmitter of a western publishing method: the serialized novel (*le roman feuilleton*). And he knew this — in fact he advertised it, just as in the West. Publishing a novel in a newspaper enormously enlarged its sales in book form. So Misailidis was not only an owner and publisher, no mere literate journalist, but he also introduced publishing know-how and culture. This modernizing figure, this anticlerical 'press baron' was a true intellectual, an 'organic intellectual' in the western sense. Today we can see his endeavours as part of the modernizing currents that swept European publishing in the nineteenth century rather than observe it as an isolated local peculiarity of the East. He was in line with the modernist movement of the French novels as *le roman feuilleton* type, and the respective western publishing practices. It would not be an exaggeration to argue, that this modernist publisher should be considered the instigator of an 'acculturation' campaign in the East directed towards a wider public who read and spoke Turkish and not simply towards the Orthodox readers.

As already noted by Nathan Wachtel, acculturation is not a one-way path from native to western culture but also has a reverse process through which native culture integrates European elements without losing its original characteristics.[26] If we accept this definition of the term acculturation, we may note that the Karamanli press of the Ottoman Empire was, among other things, a channel to transmit elements of European intellectual life. For example, at the end of the 1880s, a flourishing decade for the publication

and translation of French novels into Turkish and Greek, the Karamanli newspaper *Terakki* (Progress) in 1888 listed among other names Victor Hugo, Balzac and Voltaire, Boccaccio and Beccaria, and provided material for the Turkish-speaking, not exclusively Orthodox, readers. And this was only one small example of what was mentioned in the daily and periodical press.

Who then exactly were the readers of these novels, either in newspaper serial form or in bound copies? Were they Turkish-speaking urban residents, i.e. expatriates who lived in cities? Or was it the agricultural population, isolated in the Cappadocian region, itself in the process of becoming literate? Many Cappadocians as well as expatriates of all sorts are to be found in the lists of subscribers for publication of translated books. Subscribers to the translation of the French novel *La porteuse de pain*, *Ετμεκτζὴ Χατούν* are recorded from Ankara, Ürgüb, Mersina, Smyrna, Halep, Rhodes, Chios and from as far away as Athens, Marseilles and Paris.[27] However, the question remains. Still, the question remains: who read those French novels, how and for what purpose?

The Archives of Oral Tradition at the Centre for Asia Minor Studies have anecdotal accounts from readers of those novels. One of these, handwritten in Karamanli by a Cappadocian, refers to publications from the 1880s. It is composed — and this is what is most important — in the first person and provides the moralistic dimension of reading, the power conveyed by the written word.

> I also did not neglect to read some novels [such as] *Ετμεκτζὴ Χατούν* (The Baker) and *Le Comte de Monte-Christo* and since I enjoyed reading them so much I was able to remember almost all of them. I tried to imitate their heroes and to hate bad people. It was for this reason that it became my habit not to harm others. Nor, however, did I neglect the sacred books, the Old and New Testaments and principally The Proverbs of Solomon...and when I reached a mature age, I put them aside. They had protected me from harm and led me to goodness.

And further on:

> I also did not neglect to read the novel *Le Comte de Monte-Christo* (1882), *Ετμεκτζὴ Χατούν* (The Baker) (1885) and I was taught other books [*Ιρφαναμέ*], *Βìους Αγìων* (Lives of Saints). Since I enjoyed reading them, I imprinted them and all the fine things that I read, in my mind and made them my own...if only I could become like the heroes who demonstrated those virtues! I may have read *The Proverbs of Solomon* five times in 1886. I memorized most of them and all my life they have protected me from the intoxication of youth and kept me on the straight and narrow.[28]

Another one from Endirlik, the Hellenized Andronikio of Cappadocia, refers approximately to the same period. It is written in the third person and takes us far back in time:

> My grandmother...born in 1830...knew how to tell stories humorously, a variety of stories that she had learned paying close attention to readings from religious and historical books as well as from novels. In order to prove that the events were true she told us that they were written in books...very often she had me read to her from Karamanli books or to translate various stories for her from Greek.[29]

The descriptions of the transition from the oral to the written word, as well as to the return to the traditional birthplace of the oral word are exceptionally interesting. So is the transmission of ideas from one sex to the other, linking up old and new, religious and secular ideas, which are the result of assiduous reading in a society slowly becoming literate. How precisely did the process of reading occur? What was the readers' gender? It is widely believed that the novel appealed above all to literate women. Perhaps this is because in the cities, the chief enemies of the novel, the avowed champions of traditional values tried to prevent books reaching the hands of women, causing an inverse response rendering the forbidden item attractive.

It may also be due to the fact that the leisure time available to 'shut-in' women made it easier for them to become immersed in the magic of books.

In the Turkophone agricultural communities of the interior, however, it was the men who emigrated and established themselves in the large commercial centres, while the women were obliged to stay at home.

Concerning the degree to which the geographical region of the East accepted the translated Karamanli western novel, we do not have much documentation on whether reading was solitary or organized in groups so as to allow many people to become familiar with a book although only one copy needed to be purchased. We do not know the role played by the likely production of handwritten copies. Nor do we know when, if at all, non-institutionalized reading passed from the oral collective stage to that of individual silent reading, as we know it today. We suspect that the female population had not yet reached the level at which one could generally speak of individual readers, and not simply of audiences for the Karamanli translations.

I would suggest the following as a working hypothesis. Perhaps mass printing and the innovative form of distribution (translated books of secular content, serial publication in newspapers etc.) also corresponded to a new subject, a modern content — that expressed the spirit of a changing world. As generally thought of, a newspaper simply carries a romance, i.e. that is in other words escape literature for women readers. However, by doing so, it also acts as a channel for the transmission of new ideas — that is 'the

medium is also the message'. This may indeed be a key for the investigation of this issue.

The West as Producer and Transmitter: The Authors and their Works

In this second part of the analysis, which concerns the West as transmitter of the foreign product, we shall take a look at European novel imported into East. Who and what were its authors? What did the specific works represent in the place where they were originally produced? Why were these particular works translated and put into Karamanli? Finally, what is the ideological content of these works, and what did the result of all of these efforts signify?

Referring to some authors' biographies and taking into consideration the conditions in which they were writing, we can put together the relevant historical data on the authors and their works and roughly identify their ideological co-ordinates.

We shall begin with Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* — the only complete work in English in our Table.[30]

Daniel Defoe (1659-1731). He was one of the social reformers of his time. His first work (1697), had already proposed political reforms, and shortly afterwards, he was fined, pilloried, and imprisoned for producing a seditious pamphlet. While in prison he published the periodical *The Review* (1703-1712). When he was released he withdrew from public life and in 1719 published *Robinson Crusoe*.

François de la Mothe Fénelon (1651-1715). An enemy of Louis XIV and of Bossuet, he was exiled as a result of pressure from the King: his work *Télémaque* was published in 1694 in the author's absence by an indiscreet book-seller. Using Homer's *Odyssey* as a veil, Louis' despotism is harshly criticized and there are many satirical portraits of high officials of the period. Here the world of ancient Greece is introduced to the Karamanli readers through the channel of western education — a phenomenon not uncommon in the East. *Télémaque* was immensely popular in the communities of the Levant who knew it in all the different languages and many editions.

L'Abbé Antoine-François Prévost d'Exiles (1697-1763). A Jesuit author (*Manon Lescaut*) and army priest, an exiled as his name indicates, he came under the influence of Defoe and discovered social drama while living in England. Despite his religious beliefs he was known for his unconventional morality and his heretical spirit.

Napoléon Bonaparte (1769-1821). No introductions are necessary. It should, however, be noted that *Les Mémoires*, this 'pseudo autobiography' is the story of his exile on Saint Helena. Thus even the memoirs of a great emperor transmit the voice of an exile.

Paul de Kock (1793-1871). He was the first of the modern French novelists to be translated into Karamanli. The son of a Dutch banker who was

beheaded during the French Revolution, he above all described *la bourgeoisie* of the cities. He published over 400 titles.

Alexandre Dumas (1803-1870). The well known prodigious author, *the Father*, a historical novelist and a newspaper publisher in France. His work, the fruit of modernity, was originally published in instalments. He travelled in both Europe and the East. A passionate supporter of Garibaldi he declared himself against absolutism, took refuge for years in Italy and fought on the side of the unifier of Italy.

Eugène Sue (1804-1857). *Le Roi du roman feuilleton*, took part in the Naval Battle of Navarino in 1827 as a doctor. He too became involved in politics, initially as a conservative parliamentary deputy: in 1851, he withdrew from this career, and changed his political views for socialist ideas. This is reflected in his novels. His *Les Sept Pêchés Capitaux*, based on the theories of the utopian Fourier, was translated more than once in the Ottoman realm for both Greek- and Turkish-speaking readers. In 1851, he was exiled for his ideas by Louis Napoléon. He was a modernist in the area of the French novel in the first half of the century.

Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849). Yet another exile (from his own family but, also, from the military school he was attending), an outlaw, outcast from American society, a gambler, an alcoholic, self-destructive and a perpetual wanderer. A charismatic writer belonging to the broader modernist trend — a journalist, contributor to various journals and an editor in chief himself of a Baltimore journal. His literary work needs no introduction. In the field of karamanli literature, it probably arrives through the French translations by Charles Beaudelaire (1856).

Xavier de Montépin (1823-1902). When he became involved in politics, he briefly published the newspaper *Le Canard* (1848). Politically conservative compared to the other authors, he was against the revolution and the Commune. He was, however, one of the symbolic figures of the popular dramatic French novel in the second half of the century.

Introduction of the Social Novel

We have no clear data concerning the readership of the social novel in Ottoman times. As far as the translations themselves are concerned it is possible that a careful sentence-by-sentence check with the originals might show arbitrary adaptations or even omissions by the translators as well as evidence of censorship or other external control.

Textual checks would also clarify the causal relationship a Karamanli translation may have had with the large, parallel production of novels into other *millet* languages — Greek, Ottoman, Hebrew or Armenian.[31]

Nonetheless, certain conclusions may be put forward here, relating to the nature and role of the translated works within the social body.

Popular. In his study dedicated to Eugène Sue, Jean-Louis Bory, focusing upon the first period of the French novel, stated sententiously: '*Le roman*

populaire (quant à son objet) devenant populaire (quant à son succès) ne tardera pas à devenir populaire quant à ses idées et quant à sa forme.'[32] Here in the Ottoman Empire too we obviously have an attempt at creating, to the extent possible, a popular readership through the novel which was accessible to the upcoming literate middle classes, either through serialization in newspapers or in a book form.[33]

Secular. Secularity is evident not only in the content of the novels themselves, but also in the biographies of their authors. The modern form and distribution of the translated texts as well as the role of the newspaper in the creation of a new readership demonstrate the presence of a new ideological, secular, content. In some cases it is openly anticlerical; in others the love topic treated depicts the new manners of the modern citizen.

Social. In European literature, as Umberto Eco has observed, a number of reassuring solutions compensate for the revelations of the abject social conditions shown in books like *Les Misérables* and *Les Mystères de Paris*. This is true also for the novels of the first half of the nineteenth century. For example, in Sue's *Mystères*, the life of the lower classes is described not in revolutionary but rather in popular-democratic terms. In the second half of the century, Eco continues, the failure of the socialist movements and the tragedy of the Paris Commune, changed the ideological base while the material and historical framework remained the same (as in Montépin for example). In this second phase, the heroes of the novels are representatives of the aristocracy or the bourgeoisie, and the plots reflect the viewpoints of law-and-order. Today we would say that they are 'politically correct'. Umberto Eco sees this period, the age of the urban nineteenth-century revolutions inspired by pre-Marxist popular reformism, as the golden age of the novel, of the *roman feuilleton*.[34] As far as the 'translation bridge' is concerned, the common denominator in all these translations is undoubtedly, the social and urban nature of the imported western novel.

Anti-authoritarian. While the Karamanli translations can be said to be an introduction to the social novel, it would be erroneous to define the material in terms of progressive versus conservative or to regard the translations as anti-authoritarian and deliberately anti-clerical or even as part of an organized literary movement against absolutism. On the contrary: the authors and their works cover almost the entire political and ideological spectrum: Fourier and Napoléon, Garibaldi and the anti-communards. The element that unifies them is their secular, social nature. These novels were selected for translation above all because they refer to civil society.

We should not, of course, think that the choice of all these novels reflects the existence of a common front of non-Muslim ethnic groups, in this particular case of Turkish-speaking Christians against absolutism. Even so, it would be naïve not to look into how the publication of a work, such as Fénelon's *Télémaque* which made its mark also in the years of the Greek Enlightenment, was related to the historical circumstances of the last quarter

of the century, the Sultan Hamid period. Obviously, the choice of a work with anti-establishment content and using allegorical speech, a language of disguise, would not escape attention, and would certainly be regarded as anti-authoritarian.

Counter-Balancing. *Le roman feuilleton* excites the collective imagination of the popular strata and as Gramsci notes functions as an escape mechanism. The oppressed and socially inferior classes could allow their imagination to take them on long daydreams of revenge and punishment of those they considered responsible for their suffering.[35]

Multinational - Intercultural. The interest in the French novel was due both to the Greek translations and the original works read throughout the Levant published and circulated within the multi-lingual communities of the Empire. Exactly how the nationalities resident in the large cities interacted, what lending and borrowing occurred between them, and the cultural osmosis between Muslim and non-Muslim multi-lingual neighbouring communities has not yet been sufficiently researched.

Andreas Tietze suggests a picture of the interdependence of national minorities in literature, preceding the factor of ethnicity, as a tool to interpret the Ottoman side's opening-up towards the West in the area of culture. He points out that modern i.e. Ottoman-Turkish literature had at an earlier stage come under the influence of a certain familiarity with European light literature which had been transmitted to the Turkish public via the ethnic minorities specifically the Turkophone Greek and Armenian millets. This familiarity created a climate that facilitated a gradual change of orientation towards Europe.[36]

Neighbouring national cultures and inter-religious and inter-cultural exchanges constitute a yet uninvestigated channel, perhaps a rich vein of information.[37]

Bringing this article to a close, I would like to return to the novels and their translations. In their original place of publication, many copies of these voluminous works were produced addressed to an ever-growing number of readers. With the mechanization of printing procedures it was possible to put out very large editions and many different works. We know that in Europe some authors were paid by the line, occasionally even having to hire others to assist them to meet the enormous demand from the reading public.

Even though the crucial textual analysis which would permit a closer understanding of the translated works is still pending, the known selection of specific authors and novels would suggest that the choices were not entirely in terms of escapist literature but more of literature with a counter-balancing role, a literature committed to a purpose. Through the pages of the novel, the urban middle classes, the poor, the popular element, and the new proletariat of the cities as formed in the Industrial Revolution, were brought to centre-stage for the very first time. By doing so, these works responded

to a deep need to find answers to and provide solace from the new social realities they were experiencing in their daily life.

In the European West, the novel corresponded to how its readers lived and what they knew and it was the revolutionary movements that brought about changes in attitudes and behaviour. In the East, however, the declining Empire already contained elements of modernity — of its overthrow.

In these translations from the French the daily life of city dwellers, the mysteries of the cities, wealth and poverty, social contradictions and the power of new ideas offered a foretaste of what was to come. Some subjects of the Empire, were able to read between the lines, observed the changing world, and foresaw the advent of modern times.

For the Turkophone Christian-Orthodox readers of the translations and particularly those resident in the country's interior, the French novel in their own Karamanlidika writing, opened up a window to a panoramic view of the world. If we can imagine what it was like to live in the isolated villages of the interior, a world without electricity, we may imagine the power of the written word when read aloud. It brought images from the urban public sphere to the private realm, from the cities, from the streets, from abroad where most people had never been — which perhaps they had not even imagined. *Le Roman c'est un miroir qu'on promène à travers un chemin*, said Stendhal. The novels in their Karamanli translations, despite their relatively small number, portray a current of change within that more collective phenomenon of printing in general which for the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century may be also be considered as 'an agent of change'.

We may safely assume that for the majority of the readers of the Karamanli books, the translations did not correspond to their life experiences but brought images of another world. They described not what they knew, but what they did not know. The readers, weather in the West or the East, surrendered in their own way to the magic of the novel, to the power of the written word. The novel, the 'translation bridge', gave them the promise of a new vision that fed the love of freedom.

NOTES

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17 Such as the best-seller *Ταμασάι Δουνγιά* (*Le spectacle du monde*), 1871-1872. See Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 175.

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19 See Balta, *Additions*, p. 33: *Robinson Crusoe*... traduit en turc courant... Also, See Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 223: *Les Sept péchés capitaux — L'Avarice*. Roman composé par Eugène Sue, fameux romancier de France. Traduit en langue turque courante par Évangélinos Misaélidis.

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21 Thus for example in *Ηοτηκδάφ Γιανιγιά* (*Recueil Concernant l'enseignement de la science et des connaissances historiques*) (1844), Balta, *Additions*, p. 20. We see information concerning figures such as Machiavelli [Ο Μαγλιαβέκης], The King François I or La Rochefoucauld, issues such as *Le Savoir vivre Français*. Let us keep in mind the name of the young translator who came from a Turkish-speaking environment in 1844, probably his first appearance: Evangelinos Misailidis.

22 *Σηχχατουμά Livre de la santé. Petit traité sur le régime du corps humain (A Short Dissertation on Diet and the Maintenance of the Human Body)* (1860), was translated from the French by a scholar from Fertek of Ikonium. Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 137. In 1881 a popularized, illustrated work followed *Χήφζ-η Σηηχάτ-η Αβάμ: Ouvrage populaire pour conserver la santé (Lessons in Health)* by Stavros Heroidis from Nevşehir, a graduate of the Imperial Medical School. See Salaville-Dalleggio, p.

208.

23 See Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 145: *Napoléon* ... il a eté traduit dans toutes les langues d'Europe, et même en langue ottomane..., Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 291: *La Bohémienne*... roman célèbre, tragique et curieux..., Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 272: *Princesse Anjol*... un beau roman d' E. Sue..., Salaville-Dalleggio, p. 262: ...les lecteurs des romans savent que X. de Montépin est un des plus éminents romanciers actuels de France... See also Balta, *Additions*, p. 66: ... A. Dumas... célèbre écrivain français... Balta, p. 72: ...Sue, fameux romancier de France... Balta, p. 131: Abbé Prevost, l'auteur — un des plus fameux de France...

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Edward Young into Karamanlidika. We have tried to find his reasons of this choice by examining the available Greek sources but without success. This Cappadocian manuscript was never published. Finally however, in the detailed catalogue of Books of the Armenian Printers of the Institute of Mehitaristes of Saint Lazarus in Venice 1876 we found that along with Plutarch, the *Iliad*, Racine and Byron, there is an 1858 translation of Young in Armenian. The prospective Orthodox translator knew about the Armenian version. He could read it easily. He may have borrowed it, probably from one of his neighbours, a scholar belonging to the Armenian millet. Finally a translation into Karamanli was published in 1910, in which all the previous editions in English, French and Armenian are recorded (Balta, 54).

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The last number in the references is the bibliography number.
The place of edition is not mentioned because the total of the works have been published in Istanbul. In the books the name of the city is printed in various ways.

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Turkish Architecture between Ottomanism and Modernism 1873-1931

Sibel Bozdoğan

Standard histories of Ottoman architecture written in the republican period reproduce one form or other of a notorious "theory of decline" – i.e. the assertion that the classical glory and innovativeness of Ottoman architecture was progressively lost sometime after the construction of Yeni Cami in Istanbul in 1663. Although there is a conspicuous lack of precision as to exactly when this decline began, the overall early republican consensus is that the *Tanzimat* was the decisive turning point for the worse, marking the infiltration of European styles and tastes into Ottoman architecture – especially the Baroque, Gothic, neoclassical and French-Empire styles. Reflecting the nationalist anti-cosmopolitanism of the time, many early republican authors also associate this "decline and contamination" with the work of foreign and non-Muslim Ottoman architects, Europeans, Levantines, Armenians and Greeks in particular.[1] Architecture in the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) is treated as especially paradigmatic of this "decline" and characterized as a "tasteless" and eclectic combination of European styles with assorted classical Ottoman and medieval Islamic references. For example, the Pertevniyal Valide Mosque in Aksaray (1871), one of the key monuments of the Azizian period designed by the Italian-Levantine Pietro Montani and the Armenian Sarkis Balyan, is dismissed by the prominent art critic Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu as "a gothic cathedral disguised as a mosque."[2]

Ironically, it was precisely in the Azizian period of the 1870s that an educated elite of patriotic Ottomans (many non-Muslims among them), laid the theoretical foundations of what was to become an Ottoman "national style" – one that departed from the prevailing eclectic repertoire of imported styles and instead sought its inspiration in early and classical Ottoman monuments anterior to the "decline". Promising to reverse the excess westernization of the *Tanzimat* and to restore Ottoman art, architecture and

culture to its former glory, their Ottomanism became a full-fledged architectural movement after the constitutional revolution of 1908. Known to its contemporaries as "National Architecture Renaissance", this modern Ottoman revivalism of the 1910s and 1920s combined formal elements and decorative motifs of classical Ottoman architecture (domes, pointed arches and tile decoration in particular) with French Beaux-Arts design principles (such as symmetry and axiality) and the latest western technologies (iron, reinforced concrete, modern plumbing etc.), applying them to modern building programs such as banks, offices, libraries, cinemas and schools in Istanbul and other major cities of the late Empire. The first major monument of this prolific style is the Central Post Office building in Istanbul (1909), designed by Vedat Bey, one of the first Muslim-Turkish architects in a profession hitherto dominated by Armenians and Greeks (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1 Central Post Office, Sirkeci, Istanbul (1909)

Republican architectural culture is surprisingly unenthusiastic and often negative about this turn-of-the-century "national style" which dominated Turkish architectural scene well into the1930s. In standard histories of Turkish architecture, this last-ditch effort to revitalize and modernize Ottoman architecture does not fare any better than the eclectic repertoire of imported nineteenth-century styles included in the broader decline theory. At best, it is regarded as an admirable but ultimately futile effort to dress modern buildings in Ottoman garb – an effort lagging behind contemporary architectural and technological developments in Europe, namely the advent of modernism, reinforced concrete and steel. At worst, it is regarded as a

"reactionary architecture" (*murteci mimari*) as the prominent literary figure Ahmet Hasim put it in 1928, "[an architecture] dressed in a robe and a turban – the imitation of a tomb or a medrese that does not deserve to be called an 'architectural renaissance'".[3]

What is particularly problematic about the "decline theory of Ottoman architecture" is that it reproduces precisely the same orientalist and Eurocentric biases that informed western scholars' view of non-western architectures for decades – i.e. the view that non-western architectures constitute "non-historical styles" frozen in their golden ages (the age of Sinan in the Ottoman case) and are incapable of evolution and modernity.[4] In this paper I suggest that, contrary to the received wisdom of the decline theory, the late empire saw a number of important efforts to modernize Ottoman architecture and to re-present it as a "European" discourse of building design and construction, albeit with a distinct Ottoman/ Islamic identity. Many other scholars have initiated a similarly revisionist picture of the late Empire,[5] and my aim here is simply to look at the theory and practice of Ottoman revivalism more closely in this light. Echoing these revisionist histories of the late Empire, I will argue that far from being a "reactionary" architecture, Ottoman revivalism offered the first comprehensive program to re-conceptualize classical Ottoman architecture as the "national style" of a modern secular State on par with its turn-of-the century Western counterparts. My discussion will follow the historical trajectory of Ottoman revivalism as an idea born in the Azizian 1870s, transformed into a prolific architectural practice during the Young Turk period, and gradually discredited after World War I.

Theoretical Roots of Ottoman Revivalism

Before everything else, we can begin by taking a second look at the very premise of the decline theory –i.e. that the infiltration of European influences into classical Ottoman architecture has devalued the latter. Today many late-Ottoman monuments in Istanbul testify to the fact that far from being a mark of decline and contamination, the grafting of European stylistic influences upon traditional Ottoman building-types like the mosque and the tomb can in fact be a highly creative experiment yielding remarkable aesthetic and architectural qualities. From the Baroque elegance of Nusretiye Mosque by Kirkor Balyan (1826) to the Art Nouveau tomb of Seyh Zafir by Raimondo d'Aranco (1904), many such examples illustrate that "influence" (in this case European influence) is not necessarily a negative thing and should not be seen as the imposition of certain "cultural goods" upon an imitating, uncreative and passive other. As Cemal Kafadar has observed in the context of earlier cultural exchanges with Christendom during the formation of the Ottoman State, "influence is a notion that needs to be recast now that historians realize influence is not possible without interaction, without a choice by the allegedly passive receiver."[6]

On the other hand it is also true that for the late Ottoman Empire, such stylistic westernization of traditional building types was, at best, an aesthetic novelty far from meeting the real architectural challenges of the nineteenth century. After the *Tanzimat* reforms, it had become increasingly obvious that the traditional building typologies of Ottoman architecture –such as the mosque, the tomb and the *medrese* (all of them connected to the religious institutions of the pre-modern Empire), could not respond to the new requirements of institutional and urban modernization. It was a legitimacy crisis of sorts, an architectural counterpart of the broader legitimacy crisis experienced by dynastic monarchies in the modern world when the established relationships between the ruler and the ruled were no longer effective. Analogous to that broader rupture about which historians like Selim Deringil and Şerif Mardin have written extensively, late Ottoman architecture could no longer rely upon the established building practices and institutions of the classical era. Architecture was now expected to respond to the secular needs of the modern State –to new building programs (such as barracks, office buildings, banks, cinemas, secular schools and hospitals) for which no precedents existed in the traditional repertoire.

The first important step towards the recognition of this challenge was the publication of the architectural album *Usul-i Mimariyi Osmani* or Principles of Ottoman Architecture during the reign of Abdulaziz, in the midst of mounting Young Ottoman patriotism. Produced for the Vienna Exhibition of 1873 by a team of architects and artists under the direction of the Minister of Public Works, Ibrahim Edhem Pasha, this album reflects the desire to install Ottoman pride in the architectural heritage of the Empire and offers a telling example of what Selim Deringil has called "the legitimation of the present by using the symbols of the past". Through meticulously drawn plans, elevations, sections and details, early and classical Ottoman monuments from Bursa and Istanbul (such as the Green Mosque and the Suleymaniye Complex respectively) were reframed as "national heritage", shared by all Ottomans and symbolizing the continuous glory of the sultan and the State over centuries. While the making of the album was motivated by national sentiments (or more precisely "proto-national", in the sense that Eric Hobsbawm has used the term),[7] its theoretical sources and representational techniques were unmistakably European, illustrating the desire of *Usul's* authors to elevate Ottoman architecture to the same theoretical level with its Western counterparts.

First, the very idea of studying architectural precedents for the purpose of deriving from them principles applicable to modern building programs was the essence of post-Enlightenment architectural theory in Europe, especially in France. In the same way that European architects studied Greek and Roman antiquities or medieval gothic cathedrals to become better practitioners of nineteenth century neo-classicism or Gothic revivalism respectively, the authors of *Usul* proposed the study of classical Ottoman

precedents as "a basis of operation and a fine source of instruction for contemporary architects."[8] Especially influential was the rationalist school of Eugene Viollet-le-duc in France, whose methods of studying and restoring Gothic cathedrals were introduced to the Ottoman context by his student Leon Parville. Parville worked in Istanbul as a contractor for Sultan Abdulaziz, undertook the restoration of major Ottoman monuments in Bursa and, based on these experiences, published his illustrated volume of Ottoman architecture and decoration in 1874 with a preface by his mentor Viollet-le-duc.[9]

Secondly, *Usul*'s codification of the three Ottoman orders (the conic, the diamond and the crystalline roughly corresponding to the Doric, the Ionic and the Corinthian) followed well-established western conventions repeated in countless treatises from Leon Battista Alberti during the Renaissance to Claude Perrault in the seventeenth century. Like Claude Perrault, who argued for the superiority of the "moderns" over the "ancients" because the moderns could scientifically calculate the correct proportions of the classical orders of antiquity,[10] *Usul* systematically delineated the orders, proportions and stylistic rules governing the design of classical Ottoman monuments – rules that these monuments were unaware of, so to speak, until they were rationally analyzed and drawn on paper in the manner used in western architectural texts (Fig. 2). That the Ottoman orders outlined in the *Usul* were applied extensively to the public buildings of early republican Ankara some fifty years later (Fig. 3) is further testimony to the significance of the 1873 album as a practical resource—an accessible repertoire of forms and details intelligible to the turn-of-the-century Ottoman/ Turkish architect. By re-canonizing Ottoman architecture in western terms, *Usul* offered not



Fig. 2 "Crystalline order" from Usul-i Mimariyi Osmani, 1873

Fig. 3 Crystalline order in republican Ankara: Ethnography Museum, 1925-28

only an *aesthetic theory* of Ottoman architecture but also a pattern book of construction for the first professional architects of the late Empire and the early republic. These architects were trained to be familiar with Western orders and compositional rules, primarily through the standard textbook *Fenn-i Mimari* or the science of architecture which included the drawings of details, elevations and sections of all western orders and was extensively used in the two major architectural schools of the late Empire, namely the Academy of Fine Arts (*Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi Alisi*, est. 1883) and the School of Engineering (*Hendese-i Mulkiye Mektebi*, est.1884).[11] That a 1926 edition of *Fenn-i Mimari* was co-authored by two leading practitioners of the Ottoman "national style" of the 1910s, Mimar Kemalettin Bey and Ali Talat Bey, testifies to the strong connection between Ottoman revivalism and Western classical conventions (Fig. 4).

Finally, *Usul*'s exquisite colour plates featuring decorative patterns of the tile work from various Ottoman monuments introduced another level of abstraction and codification in the manner of similar European studies – especially *The Grammar of Ornament* by Owen Jones (1856), a catalogue of decorative patterns collected from different ancient and Oriental cultures.[12] Abstracted from buildings, woodwork, tile work, textiles etc. and systematically analyzed in terms of the underlying geometric rules, these

patterns became an important source for Victorian manufacturers of wallpaper, ceramic tiles, floor mosaics, bookbinders etc. Owen Jones' career is echoed in that of Leon Parville again, whose life-long interest in the decorative patterns and manufacturing techniques of Ottoman tiles from Bursa and Istanbul led him to open up shop after his return to Paris and become a successful manufacturer of ceramic tiles. Largely influenced by Parville's work, the beautifully rendered colour plates of the *Usul* suggest that its authors were well-informed of the prevailing discussions of polychromy and ornament in the architectural culture at large and that they were deeply preoccupied with the possible revitalization of the Ottoman tile industry –something crucial for Ottoman revivalism to be a viable and large-scale architectural practice.



Fig. 4 Page from Fenn-i Mimari, 1926 published by Kemalettin Bey and Ali Talat Bey

Ottoman Revivalism as National Style

While the theoretical foundations of Ottoman revivalism were thus laid out in the *Usul* in 1873, its emergence as a prolific "national style" had to wait until after the turn of the century, gaining momentum with the Young Turk rule after 1908. At a time when the seminal texts of Turkish nationalism were being written, this style offered a compelling architectural counterpart to Ziya Gokalp's well-known distinction between "national culture" (in this case, represented by the Ottoman decorative motifs: domes, arches and tile decoration) and "western civilization" (i.e western building types, design principles and construction techniques). After the completion of the Central Post Office building in 1909 (see Fig. 1), many other public buildings followed suit, making Ottoman revivalism the official style of the Constitutional period. For the Western-educated Ottoman elites of the late Empire, these buildings offered powerful visual testimony to the possibility that Ottoman architecture too could be "modern" and "of its time" without surrendering its Ottoman/ Islamic identity. Not unlike the anti-orientalist "orientalism" of Osman Hamdi Bey's well-known paintings around the same

Fig. 5 "4th Vakıf Hanı" office block, 1912-26 by Kemalettin Bey

time,[13] they projected their Ottomanism with pride, showing at the same time that it is a rationalized/ modernized Ottomanism perfectly compatible with the latest trends in architectural design and construction.

This dual commitment to both modernization (read westernization) *and* Ottomanism is best captured by the life and career of Kemalettin Bey, the chief architect of the construction and restoration office of the Ministry of Endowment (*Evkaf Nezareti Insaat ve Tamirat Heyeti Fenniyesi*) which, under his tutelage, became a training centre for the dissemination of the so-called "national style."[14] His buildings for the *Vakif* administration still stand, as some of the most modern, urban, and "European" structures of the turn of the century (Fig. 5), while his small mosques and tombs embody his profound Ottomanism and religious sentiments that were re-kindled by the restoration work he did on major religious monuments in Istanbul and, later in his life, in Jerusalem.

The historical parallels between Ottoman revivalism and contemporary architectural developments in Europe can hardly be missed. Take Vedat Bey's Central Post Office building for example (see Fig. 1). It is a distinctly modern building type in a dense urban context and, apart from the obvious stylistic differences, it is very similar in spatial and structural expression to Otto Wagner's Postal Savings Bank in Vienna (1906) completed only a few years earlier. Likewise, the use of Ottoman revivalism for the passenger-ferry stops of Istanbul as some kind of a "corporate style" of *Sirket-i Hayriye* between 1913 and 1917 invites comparison with Otto Wagner's imperial metro stations in Vienna built about a decade earlier (Fig. 6).[15] In both cases, buildings associated with technological progress (steam boats and trains respectively) were adorned with an ornate style representative of imperial modernization.

Ottoman revivalism also marks the emergence of the first Muslim-Turkish architects on the professional scene, especially Vedat Bey, Kemalettin Bey and their students. Yet many non-Muslims, such as Alessandro Valeri, Mihran Azaryan and Guilio Mongeri have also contributed to the making of this national style in the 1910s and 1920s –something we can look at as an architectural validation of Hasan Kayali's argument that not all of the Young Turks were "Turks".[16] It was not so much the ethnicity of the architect but rather the increasing identification of Ottoman forms with Turkishness that distinguishes this period from the Ottomanism of the Abdulaziz era when *Usul* was published. Whereas during the last decades of the nineteenth century the relationship between the idea of Ottoman revivalism and Islam was still analogous to that between Gothic revival and Christianity, increasingly after the turn of the century, Ottoman forms were symbolically recharged with Turkishness, not unlike the symbolic association that emerged between Gothic revival and Englishness during the Victorian era. For example, by the time prominent art historian/ critic Celal Esat Arseven published his *Dictionary of Art* (1924),[17] the Ottoman orders of *Usul* had been re-identified as "Turkish" under the entry for "column capitals" (Fig. 7).

The progressive "Turkifikation" of Ottoman architecture went hand in hand with distancing the Turkish architectural culture from the self-conscious Ottomanism of the *Usul*. For example, in his published writings, Kemalettin Bey dismisses the *Usul* as a mere pattern book that focused exclusively on the stylistic elements or the *aesthetic discourse* of Ottoman architecture, rather than seeing it as part of a historically evolving *Turkish* building tradition.[18] It is quite telling, for example, that although in his 1906 article titled "*Mimari-i Islami*" (Islamic architecture) he uses the term "Ottoman architecture", discusses the Ottoman tradition in the larger context of Islamic architecture, and acknowledges creative exchanges with Byzantium, in his later piece "*Turk ve Musluman Mimarligi*" (Turkish and Muslim architecture) published in 1917, he switches to the term "Turkish architecture" which, he wrote, "was born out of the purity, nobility and

strength of the Turkish soul and had evolved rationally through Seljuk and early Ottoman periods, *without* any influence from Byzantine precedents" (my italics).[19]



Fig. 6 Haydarpasa Ferry Stop, Istanbul (1915) and Karlplatz Train Station, Vienna (1899)

The Demise of Ottoman Revivalism

One of the ironies of modern Turkish architectural history is that Ottoman revivalism became the first official style in the building of Ankara as the capital of the new republic, precisely when the new republican regime was radically dissociating itself from the Ottoman past. While the domes, arches, and tiles of the classical Ottoman repertoire were being transplanted from imperial Istanbul to republican Ankara during a frantic construction activity in the 1920s (Fig. 8), leading art historians and critics like Celal Esat Arseven and Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu were busy crafting the new lenses through which these forms and motifs were to be viewed. The writings of Arseven and Baltacioglu reflect a decisive shift from the imperial cosmopolitanism of the *Usul* towards essentialist notions of nationhood and ethnic purity that would come to enjoy the status of official dogma in republican architectural historiography. They also reveal the rationalist and modernist biases of republican architectural culture in terms of which Ottoman revivalism was criticized and ultimately rejected.

First, rather than looking at classical Ottoman monuments as the defining moment of Turkish architecture, republican authors delegated Ottoman architecture to one particular period within a much longer history of Turkish art and architecture extending back to Central Asia and pre-Ottoman Anatolia. For example in his paradigmatic *Turk Sanati* (Turkish Art) of 1928, Celal Esat Arseven covers some thirteen centuries of trans-historical "Turkish" art spanning many Empires, States and geographical regions but somehow always retaining its Turkish essence. He identifies a distant precedent for Ottoman domes in Timurid tombs which he, in turn, traces back to the draped tents (*yurts*) of Turkic tribes in Central Asia.[20] In contrast to the distinct Ottomanism of *Usul*, Arseven and other early republican authors use the word Ottoman only as a period identifier, rather than a marker of national identity (for which they use the trans-historical category *Turkish*).[21] By thus de-emphasizing the Ottoman component of the Turkish identity, they effectively suggest that a Turkish "national style" can be something other than Ottoman revivalism.

Secondly, republican authors sought to dissociate Ottoman architecture from its religious connotations by re-orienting attention away from mosques, tombs, and *medreses* towards non-religious and utilitarian structures in the Ottoman tradition. For example, Celal Esat Arseven criticized the fact that the *Usul* focuses exclusively on religious Ottoman monuments, thereby totally missing the vernacular sources of Turkish art as can be found in Anatolian houses and popular ornaments. This line of argument would be a primary justification to reject Ottoman domes arches and tile decoration of the national style without giving up nationalism and to turn instead to Ottoman houses (now called "Turkish houses") as alternative sources of a modern *and* national architecture. In the 1930s and 1940s, prominent architect and educator Sedad Hakki Eldem would lead this quest for a



Fig. 7 Page from Celal Esat Arseven's Dictionary of Art (1924)

Fig. 8 Turkish Hearth Building (1927-30) and Ethnography Museum (1925-28) by Arif Hikmet Koyunoglu during the construction of Ankara

modern Turkish architecture (or a "second national style") inspired by the traditional Ottoman/Turkish houses rather than classical Ottoman monuments.[22]

Finally, republican authors looked at Ottoman monuments largely through the positivist, functionalist and rationalist lenses of modernism, appropriating them in abstract formal and tectonic terms rather than in the form of an ornate revivalism. In a seminal article entitled "Cubism in Architecture and the Turkish Tradition" published in 1929 (the year when Le Corbusier's canonic Villa Savoie was completed in France as the iconic object of the modernist *avant-garde*), Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu offered a very interesting and articulate example of this final twist in the re-conceptualization of Ottoman architecture.[23] Consider this fascinating description of minarets: "Minarets are containers – tools for calling the faithful to prayer before they are works of art..." he wrote, directly echoing Le Corbusier's famous characterization of the house as "a machine for living".[24] "...Their bases are load-bearing foundations of these tall towers. The *şerefe* is a balcony for the muezzin to go around. The cap is a roof to protect the minaret from rain – the most appropriate roof form for a tall structure. The arabesque motifs of the *şerefe* balustrade are not the work of a mind exploring the mystical secrets of geometric shapes; it is the idea of the craftsmen who was trying to reduce the load of the masonry balustrade. The stalactites under the *şerefe* are not symbols of stalactite caves, nor the creations of a romantic mind. They are structural brackets to connect the *şerefe* to the body of the minaret."[25]

Such rationalist interpretations of architectural form as arising out of thoroughly rational considerations of function and technique rather than any religious, symbolic or decorative impulse abounds in Arseven's writing as well. In *Türk Sanatı* for example, he claims that tile decoration in Ottoman mosques should be explained not so much as a decorative idea but as a technical necessity "that protects the wall from weathering and allows easy maintenance."[26] Most significantly, he considers geometry, proportion, and volumetric composition or the "plastic effects" (*mücessemiyet tesirleri*) of Ottoman mosques as their defining characteristics, delegating decoration to a secondary status at best.[27] In this way he offers yet another theoretical justification for rejecting Ottoman revivalism–a style heavily dependent on ornate tile-decoration. With such selective reading of Ottoman architecture (as tectonic rather than decorative, as rational rather than symbolic or sensual), Arseven attributes a latent modernity to classical Ottoman precedents –one that waits to be recovered in some form other than Ottoman revivalism.

Officially, it was on the basis of such rational and modernist grounds that Ottoman revivalism was eventually rejected in republican Ankara. For example, declaring Ottoman revivalism to be "a malaise... the mummified expression of a dead art", Celal Esat Arseven wrote: "The Ottomans had no choice but to make domes to span their roofs: since the advent of reinforced concrete, this method has become obsolete."[28] What he fails to mention is that Turkey in the 1920s was far from being an industrial country and cement and iron were still imported luxuries, making the construction of reinforced concrete flat roofs a formidable challenge at best. Similarly, after expressing his reverence for the work of Vedat Bey and Kemalettin Bey, Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu portrays the national style as an ultimately romantic and futile idea belonging to a bygone era. He writes: "Each epoch produces its own art...today when it is possible to build flat roofs, it makes no sense to modernize the dome. The dome is *not a national motif*: it was merely a constructional necessity of the past" (my italics).[29]

What eludes these texts is that the dome was *not* just "a constructional necessity" that was surpassed by the modern *zeitgeist*. It was also a powerful symbol – one that was politically and ideologically impermissible in a modern, secular republic seeking to dissociate itself from its imperial past. In spite of all the theoretical efforts of Baltacioglu, Arseven and others, it was not possible to dissociate Ottoman forms from the memory of the Ottoman State, sultan, and caliph that they so powerfully evoked. In fact, as I have argued in more detail elsewhere,[30] it was precisely these associations that made Ottoman revivalism a strategically appropriate style for the early 1920s, in the aftermath of the new regime's radical decision to abolish the Ottoman dynasty (1922) and the office of the caliphate (1924). Evocative of mosques and tombs even when it housed modern secular functions, Ottoman revivalism was able to semantically recharge familiar religious codes and, in

Şerif Mardin's terms, "vibrate an important traditional chord" with a population still more loyal to Islam and the sultan than to the new regime.[31]

By 1931 however, with the consolidation of the Kemalist reforms, Ottoman revivalism had fulfilled its mission. Hurt by the increasing criticism of his work by younger modernist architects, Kemalettin Bey died a bitter man in 1927 and Vedat Bey resigned from the Academy in 1930. As German and Austrian architects took over the task of building of modern Ankara (Fig. 9), younger Turkish architects turned their attention to the European modernist avant-garde as the most appropriate expression of the revolutionary spirit of Kemalism. They confidently proclaimed: "The fountains and mosques of the Turks cannot be the source of art in the twentieth century when airplanes are hovering in the skies and ocean liners are crossing the seas at phenomenal speeds".[32] Ottoman revivalism was now portrayed as the anachronistic "other" of modernism – one that had emerged out of admirable (read "nationalist") sentiments but had already run its course.

But had it really? I want to conclude with the suggestion that if it had *really* been left to run its own course, Ottomanism could have evolved gradually into a more contextual, more culture-sensitive modernism as happened elsewhere in Europe and the U.S. For example, in the Vakif Apartments of Kemalettin Bey built in Ankara in 1927-28 as one of the last examples of the national style (Fig. 10), we can see a building conspicuously stripped of the ornate decoration of Ottoman architecture, leaving a large block of apartment units with a theater located at the centre of the block. This is a modern urban typology not unlike the famous Auditorium Building of Adler and Sullivan in Chicago (1889) built some four decades earlier. Or we can think of a building like the Amsterdam Stock Exchange by H. P.

Fig. 9 Construction of modern Ankara: Mulkiye Mektebi by Ernst Egli under construction, 1935-36

Fig. 10 Vakıf Apartments, Ankara by Kemalettin Bey (1927-28)

Berlage (1896-1903), in which the original Gothic-revival competition scheme was progressively simplified and stripped of stylistic motifs to leave behind an early modern building that succeeds in evoking the spirit of Gothic without replicating it. I would argue that Kemalettin Bey's work carried the same potential, albeit unrealized, for transmitting the spirit of "Ottomanism" into modernism.

Instead, in Turkey any possibility of such a smoother transition and exchange between revivalism and modernism was abruptly cut off with the arrival of European modernism (or *Yeni Mimari*) in Ankara in the 1930s. Ottoman architecture became history so to speak, as the education and professional practice of architecture were reorganized along the precepts of the New Architecture introduced by German and Austrian architects. Celal Esat Arseven's two books published only three years apart, *Turk Sanati* (1928) and *Yeni Mimari* (1931),[33] the former in the old Ottoman script and the latter in the new Latin alphabet, still offer the best testimony to the profound split that has defined republican architectural culture until fairly recently: a split between nationalist architectural historiography, which celebrates classical Ottoman forms as products of "Turkish architectural genius", and a modernist architectural practice, which rejects them as possible sources of inspiration for a modern Turkish architecture.

Conclusion:

The status of the Ottoman revivalist "national style" continues to be a contentious topic in Turkish architectural culture even today. Owing its own institutional origins to the shift from Ottoman revivalism to modernism in the 1930s, the architectural profession in Turkey continues to regard Ottoman revivalism as an outdated historical style that has no place in the inventory of *modern* Turkish architecture.[34] According to this view, what constitutes modernity in Turkish architecture is precisely this dissociation from Ottoman precedents, forms and motifs in favour of rationalist, functionalist principles of modernism in design. Modernism is viewed as a style with an internal consistency and a singular, linear historical trajectory, excluding plurality, heterogeneity and divergence from the canon – not unlike the republican project of modernity itself.

Against the received wisdom of this modernist orthodoxy, the recent critical and revisionist trends in architectural historiography propose that the Ottoman revivalism, which dominated Turkish architectural culture for some two decades during the transition from Empire to Republic, was every bit as "modern" in its own time, albeit a hybrid, cosmopolitan and conservative modernity different from the radical modernism of the New Architecture that replaced it. Far from being a period of irredeemable decline, the late Empire is now seen as the scene of some important openings towards modernity, both in society and in architecture, the significance of which we are able to appreciate only in hindsight. At a time when Turkish identity is once again a contested topic (to what extent is it European, to what extent Muslim, to what extent something in-between), rethinking the experience of the late Empire is not a nostalgia for Ottomanism, but a search for a better modernism in which there is room for culture, context and continuity. In this revisionist enterprise, history of architecture offers a powerful metaphor for Turkish modernity in general.

NOTES

1 For example in Celal Esat Arseven, *Turk Sanati* (Turkish Art), Istanbul: Aksam Matbaasi, 1928; Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu, *Sanat* (Art), Istanbul: Suhulet Kutuphanesi, 1934 and *Turke Dogru* (Towards the Turk), Istanbul: Yeni Adam Yayinlari, 1943; and in the writings of Aptullah Ziya (Kozanoglu) and Behcet Sabri (Unsal) in the architectural journal *Mimarlik* between 1931-1934

2 Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu, *Turke Dogru* (Towards the Turk), 1943, p. 92.

3 Ahmet Hasim, *Gurabahane-i Laklakan* (1928), Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1981, p. 152.

4 The classic example of this view can be found in Bannister Fletcher's *A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method* (1896), an important reference for architects and architectural historians until fairly recently. For a critical discussion of Fletcher's book and its subsequent editions see Gulsum Baydar, "Towards Postcolonial Openings: Reading Bannister Fletcher's History of Architecture",

Assemblage, April 1998, n.35, pp. 7-17.

5 I am especially inspired by Ahmet Ersoy, *On the Sources of the Ottoman Renaissance: Architectural Revival and Its Discourse During the Abdulaziz Era, 1861-76*, Unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation, Harvard University, 2000; and Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1999.

6 Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p. 24.

7 Hobsbawm defines protonationalism as "the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity" (Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Canto Edition, 1991, p. 73). Ahmet Ersoy uses the term "dynastic nationalism" to describe the patriotic Ottomanism of the educated elites during the Azizian era.

8 Ahmet Ersoy, *On the Sources of the Ottoman Renaissance: Architectural Revival and its Discourse During the Abdulaziz Era, 1861-76*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2000, p. 206.

9 Leon Parville, *L'Architecture et decoration turque au XVe Siecle*, Paris: 1874. On the career of Leon Parville in Turkey see Beatriz St. Laurent, Ottomanization and Modernization: *The Architectural and Urban Development of Bursa and the Genesis of Tradition, 1839-1914*. Unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation, Harvard University, 1989.

10 Claude Perrault, *Ordonnance for the Five Kinds of Columns after the Method of the Ancients* (1683), Los Angeles: Getty Trust, 1993.

11 On the history of architectural education and profession in Turkey see Gulsum Baydar Nalbantoglu, *The Professionalization of the Ottoman-Turkish Architect*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1989

12 Owen Jones, *The Grammar of Ornament* (1856), New York: Portland House, 1986.

13 For a recent discussion of the paintings of Osman Hamdi Bey in the context of postcolonial theory see Zeynep Celik, "Speaking Back to Orientalist Discourse" in J. Beaulieu and M. Roberts (ed.) *Orientalism's Interlocutors: Painting, Architecture*, Photography, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002, pp. 19-41.

14 The most authoritative source on the life and career of Kemalettin Bey is Yildirim Yavuz, *Mimar Kemalettin ve Birinci Ulusal Mimarlik Donemi* (Architect Kemalettin and the Period of First National Style), Ankara: ODTU Yayinlari, 1981.

15 On this topic see Sibel Bozdogan, "Istanbul 1900: Ferry Landings as Markers of Urban Modernity" in F. Grementieri, J. F. Liernur, C. Shmidt (eds.) *Architectural Culture Around 1900*, Buenos Aires: Universidad Torcuato di Tella, 2003, pp. 118-27.

16 Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 4.

17 Celal Esat Arseven, Ottoman-French *Dictionnaire des Termes d'Art*, Istanbul: Matbai Amire, 1924.

18 A collection of Mimar Kemalettin bey's writings were published by Ilhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin (eds.) *Mimar Kemalettin'in Yazdiklari* (The Writings of Architect Kemalettin), Ankara: Sevki Vanli Mimarlik Vakfi, 1997.

19 Mimar Kemalettin, "Mimari-yi Islami" (Islamic Architecture), *Hudavendigar Vilayeti Salname-i Resmisi*, Bursa, 1324 (1906), pp. 142-87; and "Turk ve Musluman Mimarligi" (Turkish and Muslim Architecture), *La Pensee Turquie*, v.1, n.8, April 1917, pp. 233-43, both of them reprinted in I. Tekeli and S. Ilkin (eds.) *Mimar Kemalettin'in Yazdiklari*, Ankara: Sevki Vanli Mimarlik Vakfi, 1997

20 Celal Esat Arseven, *Turk Sanati* (Turkish Art), Istanbul: Aksam Matbaasi, 1928, pp. 31-49.

21 As for example in Sedad Cetintas, *Turk Mimari Anitlari: Osmanli Devri* (Turkish Architectural Monuments: The Ottoman Period), Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1946.
22 See S. Bozdogan et.al. *Sedad Eldem: Architect in Turkey*, Singapore: Concept Media, 1987 and London: Butterworth, 1990.
23 Ismail Hakki (Baltacioglu), "Mimaride Kubizm ve Turk Ananesi" (Cubism in Architecture and the Turkish Tradition), *Darulfunun Ilahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuasi*, v.3, n.11, 1929, pp. 110-31.
24 Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture* (1923), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1960. There is enough evidence in his writings to suggest that Baltacioglu was an avid reader of Le Corbusier, as was his colleague Hilmi Ziya Ulken who published translations of Corbusier's writings in the magazine *Insan*.
25 Ismail Hakki (Baltacioglu), *ibid.*, p. 115.
26 Celal Esat Arseven, *Turk Sanati* (Turkish Art) (1928), Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1970, p. 196.
27 Celal Esat Arseven, *ibid.*, p. 183.
28 Celal Esat Arseven, *ibid.*, p. 173.
29 Ismail Hakki (Baltacioglu), "Mimaride Kubizm ve Turk Ananesi" (Cubism in Architecture and the Turkish Tradition), *Darulfunun Ilahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuasi*, v.3, n.11, 1929, p. 118.
30 Sibel Bozdogan, *Modernism and Nation-Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.
31 Şerif Mardin, "The Just and the Unjust", *Daedalus*, v.120, n.3, Summer 1991, p. 127.
32 Aptullah Ziya, "Yeni Sanat" (New Art), *Mimar*, 1932, v.2, n.4, pp. 97-98.
33 Celal Esat Arseven, *Turk Sanati* (Turkish Art), Istanbul: Aksam Matbaasi, 1928 and *Yeni Mimari*, Istanbul: Agah Sabri Kutuphanesi, 1931.
34 For example, in 2002, architect Sevki Vanli published a harsh polemical criticism of the inclusion of Ottoman revivalist buildings in the inventory of modern Turkish architecture which was prepared for the ICOMOS/UNESCO Conference on "20th Century Heritage." He wrote: "[These national style buildings] are nothing but costly and emotional experiments –a debilitating malaise that has prevented the progress of contemporary Turkish architecture until Ataturk put an end to it in 1927." (Sevki Vanli, "ICOMOS'un Dusundurdukleri: Donemin Mimarisi, 20. Yuzyil Sorumlulugu", (Architecture of the Period and the Responsibility of the 20th century), *Yapi*, n.248, July 2002, p. 60.

NEW NATIONS, NEW WOMEN

Crossings and Homecomings: Mobility and the Politics of Culture in Greece during the First Half of the Twentieth Century

Ioanna Laliotou

Mobility has played a central role in the contemporary history of European nation-states, affecting most aspects of social, economic, cultural, and political life on the continent throughout the twentieth century. This article traces the emergence of the migrant as a distinct social figure in European culture through the exploration of Greek migration and the intertwining between the experiences of migrancy and Greek notions of nationhood. The article has a dual focus. To begin with, a short overview of Greek migrations in the twentieth century will argue that trans-oceanic migration in the first half of the twentieth century transformed older notions of the diaspora and contributed to the emergence of new archetypal images of the modern migrant. I shall then focus on the impact that emigration and the diaspora communities had on the metropolitan culture and politics. Starting from early-century official as well as cultural reactions to transatlantic migration, the purpose of this article is to trace the constitutive elements–and the stages of its production–of the image of Greece as a nation of emigrants. To explore the complex history of mobility and its relation to modern Greek culture I shall extensively refer to the findings of Theodore Saloutos–a prominent Greek American historian of Greek migration to the United States–on the subject of transatlantic mobility and the formation of transnational subjectivity in the first half of the twentieth century. Exploring the history of mobility contributes to unraveling the political and cultural connotations of the image of the migrant, and marks the intersection between this image and other hegemonic and counter-hegemonic definitions of modern Greek nationhood. Bridging past cultural inscriptions of migrancy with contemporary debates over incoming migration, I propose that the history of Greek migration provides us with a deep insight into the intertwining between European culture, transnationalism, and mobility throughout the twentieth century.

We may safely argue that the close connection between European historiography and the history of the nation-state has resulted in the marginalization of migration as a subject of historical inquiry in Europe. It was not until very recently that European migrations and their impact on European cultures and politics became a subject of interest for European historians, whose research suggests that migration constitutes an integral part of European history, as well as of the national histories of the various European nation-states. This shift in the focus of interest was related to the impact that the re-orientation of historical studies towards issues of subjectivity and culture has had on the study of nationalism and national identities. Historians have begun to explore transnationalism and how the concept of nationhood was historically formed in social and geographical spaces that exceeded the borders of the nation-state, and traced the history of European nationalisms as well as phenomena of ethnic absolutism across the Atlantic. The transnationalization of historical studies has put mobility in the foreground of historical research, a process that may also influence contemporary discussions about the impact of migration and migration-policy on European societies.[1]

Exploring the cultural history of migration in the European context presupposes an analysis of the historical liaison between mobility and definitions of nationhood and its dynamic interplay with the politics of subjectivity. Migration is part of the wider phenomenon of mobility and its historical exploration presupposes an understanding of how history becomes modified by the impact of new flows of peoples, culture, and capital. Approaching migration from the point of view of mobility entails a dual procedure: first, to trace the different ways in which societies experience and conceptualize phenomena of mobility; and secondly, to study the emergence of new forms of flows, movements, and migrations. The popular image of the migrant-invader, very powerful in many European cultures today, is the product of understanding migration as a process external to the core of European history. Shifting the emphasis from migration to the study of phenomena of mobility and their impact on European cultures and politics could promote alternative understandings of Europe and its peoples. This would entail an alternative understanding of culture not only as connected with a particular territory and defined by locally rooted activities, but culture as a set of practices, outlooks, and performances associated with multiple kinds of movement across physical as well as symbolic borders.

Mobility, Diaspora, Migration and Greek Nationhood

As in many other cases of post-imperial and post-colonial nations, the diaspora has been very important for modern Greek politics, culture and economy before and after the creation of the Greek nation-state.[2] The continuous antagonism between nativism and irredentism determined Greek politics and culture throughout the nineteenth century and into the early decades

of the twentieth century. The political vision of irredentism, known as the *Megali Idea* (the Great Idea), constituted of a plan to enlarge the country's territories and liberate areas predominantly populated by Greek populations but were politically part of the Ottoman Empire.[3] Despite its political persistence and ideological impact, the *Megali Idea* was never unanimously accepted and created sharp conflict and political disagreement among Greeks within the Greek nation-state, Greek communities in neighbouring territories targeted by the official irredentist politics, and Greek communities located in the wider area of Eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe (Russia, Egypt and the Balkans). The debate around the *Megali Idea*, essentially a foreign-policy issue, produced strong cultural representations and ideological inscriptions of the intersection among territoriality, the diaspora, national identity and political subjectivity. The first two decades of the twentieth century were marked by historical developments that accentuated the political importance and cultural vitality of these concepts and representations. Two such developments –the change of the national borders with territorial expansion of the Greek State, and the massive movements of populations across them– took place in the context of rising Balkan and Turkish nationalism, the popularization of the notion of ethnically homogenous nation-states in the area, the Balkan Wars (1912-13), the impact of World War I for Near-Eastern politics, the Greek military expedition in Asia Minor (1919-22), the violent forced expatriation of over a million Greeks from Asia Minor and hundreds of thousand of Muslims from Greece, and the imposition of these compulsory population exchanges as a condition of peace according to the political objectives of the Great Powers. Within this context, scholars of the Greek diaspora have affirmed that 1922 marked the end of the *Megali Idea* as a political vision, and that this led to diminishing the importance of the diaspora in Greek politics. In the inter-war period, the Greek state followed a less interventionist attitude towards diaspora affairs, and viewed Greek communities abroad as economic auxiliaries rather than as organic parts of the Greek nation. The territorial expansion and stabilization of the Greek state was a pre-condition for the re-orientation of Greek politics towards domestic issues. The consolidation of statehood, the modernization and liberalization of politics, the formation of social, educational, and economic policies, and the establishment and institutionalization of a homogeneous form of national identity became top-priority political aims.[4]

On the level of cultural production, particularly as far as conceptualizations of subjectivity were concerned, a chain of catalytic transformations marked the inter-war period. Notions of territoriality and diaspora, well defined by a century of active irredentist and diasporic politics were filtered through the traumatic experiences of war, ethnic purification and refugeeness, and through their mutation played a crucial role in the formation of dominant as well as alternative concepts of nationhood during the interwar period. In this context, the crossing of national borders became key-points of reference

for cultural definitions of nationhood and national identity. With almost one and a half million ethnic Greeks were expelled from Turkey and came to Greece as refugees and about three hundred and fifty thousands migrating to the United States in the first two decades of the twentieth century, territoriality became less urgent issue on the level of cultural representation. By contrast, the content and defining elements of nationhood acquired more urgent importance as the movement of Greek populations in and out of the consolidated territories of the Greek nation-state led to parallel movements and flows of cultures, customs, beliefs and everyday life social identities.[5] As the political vitality of older notions of the diaspora was diminishing, the new historical experiences of deterritorialization shaped different conceptualizations of migrancy, the nation and Hellenism. Emerging forms of political and social subjectivity in Greece inspired perceptions, reflections and discourses on transatlantic labour migration. Official accounts as well as popular representations of migration illustrated central aspects of Greece's cultural history in that period. And vice versa, migration also generated dynamic cultural processes and introduced new elements into the symbolic order of collective self-identification.

Transatlantic Crossings

The early twentieth century was marked by an increase in the numbers of labour migrants moving from southern Europe to the United States. Migration to the United States is a very complex phenomenon, difficult to follow in demographic terms. For example, it is well documented that a large number of Greek migrants were repatriated, with scholars estimating that 61% of the migrants returned to Greece between 1908 and 1930. However, this number includes people who came back to Greece and then decided to leave again, which the demographic records of the time do not register. Largely taken for granted, the history of Greek migration to the United States and Canada and its impact on modern Greek culture and politics has hardly been examined. There are very few studies based on primary research. Even fewer of them concern themselves with the cultural and political impact of migration on the country of emigration, although the new experiences of labour migration from Greece to the United States had a great impact on conceptualizations of subjectivity in the context of mobility and shifting territoriality. To investigate the importance which migration and transnationalism had for shaping modern Greek culture, we can examine the representations, images, ideological discourses and narratives that were produced in Greece in the first decades of the century concerning the practices of migration, repatriation, and transnationalism. The study of this early period in modern Greek labour migration is important because the social experience of labour migration had a powerful cultural effect, producing images, descriptions, popular understandings, stereotypes, and even legislation that defined the migrant as a social and political figure.

This early view of the migrant as a distinct social and political figure operated in later decades almost as an archetype, and over-determined the later experiences of migration to Western Europe, Australia, Canada etc. Between 1900 and 1950 popular as well as official representations of labour migration developed around three themes:

a migration as an expression of national identity, or how the nation determines history.

b migration and the transformation of national identity, or how history determines the nation.

c visions of America and reformed subjectivities, or how America determines both history and the nation.

The emergence of these themes did not follow a specific chronological order, although there was a gradual shift in emphasis. I would argue that during the early decades cultural registrations of the experience of migration and phenomena of transnationalism were ambivalent. Accounts of migrant life played an important role in the cultural registration of migration. They evoked existing discourses of nationhood and in this way they rendered transnational experiences culturally intelligible. Migration narratives also show that existing concepts on nationhood were changed by the need to accommodate the new forms of social subjectivity that emerged in the context of transnational experiences. Simultaneously, both discourses on nationhood and notions of subjectivity were radically redefined by the emergence of cultural discourses that were related to images of America as a symbol of high civilizational value, progress and supra-national global power. This process culminated in the 1950s, when hegemonic representations of Greek diaspora were 'cleansed' of the migration experience and concerned mostly visions of America and images of 'Americanized' or reformed subjectivity.

The image of the Greek migrant that emerged in this transnational context radically transformed the older notions of the diaspora that had played a major role in Greek national politics throughout the nineteenth century. Transatlantic migration introduced new social subjects into the political and cultural universe of Hellenism and triggered re-definitions of nationhood, history, and subjectivity. The multiplicity of cultural representations of migration offers an insight into the osmosis between hegemonic discourses of nationhood and the lived experiences of migrancy, repatriation, territorial consolidation, global integration and cultural transformations, including the gradual emergence of U.S. global cultural hegemony. During the first half of the twentieth century representations of migration kept shifting. The early Greek reactions were determined by hegemonic definitions of national identity which saw migration was seen as an expression of national identity. From this point of view, it was the nation that defined the history of Greek subjects abroad. The proliferation of migration stories in the subsequent decades brought certain aspects of hegemonic notions of nationhood into crisis. Cultural representations of

migrancy in the inter-war period show the Greek migrant emerging as a central figure in the Greek social *milieu*. The understanding grew gradually that migration resulted in the transformation of national identity. In cultural terms, the history of transatlantic movement was determining the nation itself. The proliferation of migrant stories of hardship, failure, discrimination and struggle portrayed the migrant as a subject who embodied the nation's impossibility to transcend history. Towards the end of this period, and more clearly in the years after World War II, hegemonic images of America determined Greek narratives of migration. This "Americanization" of migration stories was followed by the re-consolidation in Greece of fixed definitions of the national culture, based on the introduction of notions of "reformed" subjectivity into accounts of migrancy, transnationalism, and history. In the 1940s and 1950s, migration stories conformed to increasingly hegemonic notions of "America" as a cultural and political force. "America" now appeared to determine both history and the nation. In post-War Greece, the subjective aspects of migration were marginalized and the profile of the Greek migrant became associated with images of reformed subjectivity. Alternative accounts were registered on different levels of cultural production, such as folk tradition and popular culture. Traces of these were encountered in post-World War II representations of migrant culture with reference to later Greek migrations to Western Europe and Australia.

The genealogy of representations of migration in Greek culture reveals the ways in which images of migration introduced the elements of ambivalence in national culture as well as contradiction and new images and expressions of self and subjectivity. Migrant communities shaped their own ways and expressions of migrant subjectivity and acted them out on different levels of the diasporic imagination and intellectual production.[6]

Homecomings

In 1956, Theodore Saloutos, a second-generation Greek American, published a book entitled *They Remember America: The Story of the Repatriated Greek Americans*.[7] This was the first book ever written by a professional historian about the history of Greeks in the United States. It focuses on the homecoming of thousands of Greek migrants who had been living for a long period of time in the United States. Saloutos was a trained historian, and a professor at the University of Los Angeles where he specialized in the history of agriculture.[8] A few years after his first book, he wrote *The Greeks in the United States*, the first comprehensive historical approach to the subject. He also published numerous articles on the topic and was treated as the main authority on Greek Americans among his migration-history contemporaries.[9]

Saloutos developed a strong interest in Greek-American history early on in his career, but did not feel comfortable pursuing it, because migration history was then considered a marginal field of study in the United States.

It was only after he had become an established historian and university professor that he devoted himself to the study of the Greek American community.[10] His starting point for investigating the history of Greek migration was his interest in post-World War II Greek-American political relations. In 1951, he applied for a Fulbright scholarship, proposing to study the influence of the returning migrants on Greece: first, as a 'phase in Greek American relations'; secondly, as a 'material factor in helping the weak Greek social economy'; third, as an aid in 'appraising anew the attitudes of these people toward the United States' after they resettled in Greece; fourth, as a 'cultural and spiritual force'; and fifth, as an 'agency for promoting understanding and good will' between the United States and Greece.[11] In a letter to Oscar Handlin–the famous historian of migration–Saloutos acknowledged that he chose this topic because he thought he had more chance to be funded since, given the political circumstances at the time, the Fulbright Foundation was likely to express interest in a project that concerned Greek American political relations,.[12] More generally it can be said that Saloutos' interest in the history of Greek migration to the United States sprang out of his conviction that the migrant was a transnational figure who could and should play an active role in the context of Greek American political relations. Saloutos' project and his historiographical insight were embedded in the contemporary political context of the expansion of American influence on Greek politics and culture.

Homecoming was the object of Saloutos' first study in Greek history. He explored the different groups of repatriated Greeks, the reasons for their return, their resettlement in Greece, the experiences of migrancy and transnationalism they embodied and the worldviews they brought back with them. His working hypothesis was that Greek returnees played an important role in the formation of Greek public opinion about the United States, since Greeks perceived them as representatives of America; vice versa, the way in which the returnees were received in Greece was influenced by Greek public opinion about America. However, homecoming was also a subjective experience for Saloutos, since his study made it necessary for him to travel to Greece in the course of his research. In September 1952, after receiving a Fulbright scholarship, Saloutos and his wife Florence left the United States to travel to Greece by sea. He began his research on repatriated Greeks, while on board, by interviewing fellow passengers who were returning to Greece for a temporary or permanent stay. He kept notes of these interviews in his boat journal which contains much information on the historian's expectations and personal dispositions towards his subjects of study: Greek American relations, Greek culture, mentalities and attitudes.

The boat journal records a double experience of homecoming: the historian's own and that of his objects of study. As we read the notes Saloutos made on his encounters, interviews, and small talks with fellow passengers, we see the way he engaged in dialogue with his fellow repatriates, and

compared and tested his own views and subjective experiences of life in America with theirs. Saloutos spent his first days on boat trying to collect ethnographic material about his fellow passengers. He notes that most of them were Greek and that they traveled 'leisurely': some of them as tourists, and others going back to Greece to live there permanently. He talked to the Greek women to find out why people had decided to return and was told about the negative effects the bad climate had had on their health in America, and the different ways of life on the two sides of the Atlantic.

Like a good ethnographer, Saloutos noted the level of his interlocutors' language fluency, and concluded that in general 'they speak Greek and broken English'. His ethnographic interest concerned also the social class of his fellow passengers, and he quickly found that 'the passengers are representative of the Greeks in the U.S. Certainly, there is nothing distinguishable looking about the rank and file passengers.' Associating social class with physical appearance, he also noted that 'if you are looking for a Greek physical type you will be disappointed. Here, they are of dark and light complexion, tall and short, thin and fat.' He often resorted to culturalist remarks, noting for example when mentioning the large quantity and high quality of food on board, that 'the Greeks believe in the abundance of food'.

Even his interest in Greek politics was ethnographically inspired. He had many discussions with supporters of the Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas, with royalists who informed him on the division of the Greek American community between Venizelists and Royalists, and with enthusiasts of General Papagos. During these discussions, he observed how much Greeks like to talk about politics, which impressed him more than the actual political views that were expressed. Many of the passengers commented on the anti-American feeling in Greece, which they attributed on the one hand to U.S. interventions in Greek politics and on the other to the 'bad' behavior of Greek Americans when they return to their homeland. Saloutos also showed an interest in the ship's crew, with whom he discussed their working conditions, employment, salaries, vacation period, and the Greek work ethic in general.

It becomes clear in his journal, that Saloutos used the interview method to construct his categorization of Greek migrants. He set out to isolate certain views, mentalities, reasons for repatriation and cultural attitudes, to classify them, and to relate each different group to a particular and identifiable type of migrant. In his attempt to create a typology of the Greeks who crossed the Atlantic, Saloutos registered a wide variety of crossings and homecomings which document the different forms of mobility that had developed in the half century of transatlantic exchanges between Greece and America. His own remarks as well as the way in which the other passengers speak of their choices and life-courses give us a deep insight into the various ways in which people experienced and conceptualized mobility.

Most of Saloutos' interlocutors were men returning to Greece after a long stay in the United States. A few of them intended to reside in Greece

permanently, while most of them seemed still undecided and weighed the pros and cons of life in each place. The final decision on where to live was always influenced by other family members, with wives and daughters usually over-estimating, as Saloutos implies, the advantages of living in Greece. In most the cases, the people Saloutos spoke to mentioned previous occasions when they had visited their homeland, in order to find a spouse or to visit relatives. Most of these earlier visits had taken place in the late 1920s and early 1930s, which is congruent with other evidence on the rise of numbers of repatriation and the first Greek Americans visiting their homeland as tourists. Most of the returnees were quite definite that they did not wish to engage in business activities in Greece, because they had no confidence in the professional practices current in their old homeland. The stereotypical divide between Greece as good for the 'natural' life, and America as a place for work and the modern life was very prominent and systematically employed by the returnees to justify their life decisions and mobility. Saloutos attributed this distinction to Greek traditionalism and does not seem to have taken sides on it himself. In his opinion, the distinction between Greek 'naturalness' and American modernity had very strong gender connotations. For example, the Greek American women seemed to insist more on the climate as the main reason for their decision to return to Greece, paying less attention to professional opportunities and modern standards of life. Presenting themselves as guardians of the 'natural' way of life, Saloutos' female interviewees confirmed the cultural differences between Greece and America on the basis of gender roles. As some of the more traditional Greek male passengers also insisted, gender roles are more natural in the Greek culture, particularly concerning women. This was confirmed when Saloutos discussed the Greek and American ways of life with one of the ship's officers, a graduate of Greek gymnasium, son of a German mother and Greek father, who became a sailor at the age of sixteen and remained at sea ever since. This man definitely did not wish to live in the United States because this would deprive him of his social circle and reduce him to an 'anonymous' individual. He thought that social life in America was too much based on material criteria, money being the most important factor, while the value of emotions and affective bonds was neglected. He associated this form of 'unnatural' social relations with the role that American women played in U.S. society. He noted that,

> Women belong in the house where they should devote themselves to their children and their husbands, not in the factory or in the office earning money to buy more of the conveniences of life. This has an effect on Europe for the U.S. is recognized as the leading country of the world and leadership qualities it demonstrates do influence the rest of the world.

Younger people, second generation Greek Americans who were born in the United States and taken back to Greece by their parents at a young age, constituted a different and more complex group of returnees. Many of them were educated in both Greece and the United States, and visited the U.S either to acquire more professional qualifications, or to discover their own roots and birthplaces. Saloutos described these younger people, the women especially, as particularly independent and free-minded. He mentioned a young woman who was born in Pennsylvania, taken back to Greece by her parents as a child and who later had returned to her birthplace on her own in order to 'know the U.S. She stayed on in the United States for three years and then decided to come back to Greece because she considered it a better place to live. Saloutos notes that she 'appears to be a rather pedestrian person' and able to make herself happy wherever she lives.

Another group was that of young professionals who had visited the United States for some time in order to study, train, or travel. They were particularly useful to Saloutos in that they had well-informed insights into Greek politics and social conditions, and provided him with much information on the problems of those who had returned to Greece before the World War II. They were generally agreed, because of the hardships during the war, most of these repatriates would readily have returned to the United States had they been allowed and had they had the economic means to do so.

Apart from businessmen and young professionals, Saloutos also met working-class people and small shopkeepers, whom he described as "American in dress, but Greek in preference, outlook and orientation". Most of these 'commoners' also insisted that the main reason they decided to move to Greece was the 'serenity' of Greek ways of life, which they described in terms of climate, quality of food, loving relationships etc. He repetitively characterized his acquaintances as informative, congenial, but 'undistinguished'. Although he also met some also famous people on the ship, such as the Greek musician Nick Gounaris, Saloutos remained unimpressed and was more interested in his conversations with crew members and 'commoners'.

The typology of Greek repatriates that Saloutos constructed and which includes Greeks moving between Greece and America, is extremely rich and varied. Saloutos traced multiple forms of mobility that had developed gradually at various stages of transatlantic migrant crossings during the first half of the twentieth century. His recurrent comment on the undistinguished type of the Greek repatriate points up the fact that there is no single type of migrant, but different forms and areas of subjectivity that emerge out of people's diverse experiences, activities and points of entry into the transatlantic world of culture, work, travel, and leisure. This form of understanding of transatlantic mobility and subjectivity contradicts earlier as well as contemporary depictions of the migrant as a distinct social figure embodying the Greek nation's inability to transcend historical determinism.

Saloutos' positive understanding of mobility echoes his commitment to the rising American hegemony and was embedded in the overall project of expanding U.S. influence on the European side of the Atlantic and in Greece in particular. This also explains the reason why Saloutos never identified with any of the types of mobility or transatlantic subjectivity he described in this boat journal. He did not take sides, neither did he become intimate with any of the Greek repatriates he met. Inspired by the overall project of strengthening transatlantic relationships, Saloutos cultivated his immersion in the transatlantic cultural world and thus he did not feel the need to identify with any of the particular aspects and types of mobility he encountered.

Later, in his book on repatriated Greeks, Saloutos developed these first impressions noted in his boat journal.[13] In *They Remember America*, he argued that the repatriates constituted a psychological and material benefit for Greece.[14] Their national devotion was progressive and healthy because it was consistent with American principles of progress and development. This 'healthy' type of nationalism was manifested on the level of everyday life where repatriated Greek Americans were 'emphasizing the utilitarian as against the impractical and sentimental and were reflecting a greater sense of timeliness, industry, and orderliness.'[15] Saloutos argued that the internalization of the cultural principles and values represented by the United States constituted a form of completion of the Greek national psyche. As he also argued consistently in his boat journal, he believed that migrant culture constituted an exemplary form of the Greek national culture, both in terms of its future potential as well as concerning the preservation of tradition. The Greek communities of urban America constituted an organic depository of Greek folk culture that was gradually disappearing in Greece.[16]

Saloutos did not view mobility as uni-directional. On the contrary, in his efforts to analyze anti-Americanism he alluded to the possible input that transatlantic contacts could have on American public opinion and understanding of the world outside the United States. As he remarked in his journal,

> If Americans can only hear what Europeans have to say about them, their behavior, their standards and their general outlook on life! There seems to be unanimity of opinion regarding the mechanical and technical progress of the US and its wealth of course, but serious doubts are expressed about other matters.[17]

Saloutos conceived his own intellectual endeavour as part of a wider project that sought to normalize United States foreign relations, and supported the propagation of the qualities of the American way of life, culture, and civilization abroad in the context of cold war politics, the Marshall Plan, and the consolidation of American political influence in Greece after the end of the Greek civil war and the defeat of the Left. In

the face of as yet undefined transformations of the Greek American community and the continuing new flows of culture, people, and politics across the Atlantic, the historian of migration sought to correlate transatlantic mobility. He did so by taking up the role of mediator, and constructing a definitive version of the history of transatlantic mobility thus far.

The dialogue between Saloutos and his fellow passengers, taking place in the middle of the Atlantic on their way to Greece, provides us with a distillation of all the different elements constituting the various types of homecoming that marked Greek transatlantic relations during the first half of the twentieth century. The experiences and reflections on homecoming that are recorded in Saloutos' travel log offer a unique insight into the history of mobility and its interplay with notions of culture and nationhood (Greek, American, and Greek American). Written during the 1950s and in the face of new emerging types of migration, this account of homecoming encapsulates forms and experiences of mobility that had taken place in the previous decades, and had already established a transatlantic context of understanding culture, politics, and subjectivity.

From Reformed Subjects to Invaders

In the aftermath of World War II, new migration movements marked the history of Greece. Political strife, economic underdevelopment, political changes, and arrangements that favoured the recruitment of foreign labour in North America and West Europe were factors that contributed to the increase in the number of people who left Greece to relocate themselves elsewhere. Under special programs dealing with the relief of displaced persons as well as the post-war advent of communism, the United States changed their immigration policy and started accepting migrants from Europe again. Other countries that attracted migrants from Greece were Canada, Germany, Belgium and Australia. Scholars of migration history after World War II have stated that the post-war movement of populations represents the most massive case of labour migration in the history of Greece.

Concurrent with these forms of mobility were the new ways in which migration manifested inscribed in Greek popular culture. The popular culture of the 1960s and 1970s frequently featured the subject of Greek migration at that time. The Greek migrant, became the protagonist in many films as well as popular songs of the period, embodied all the impossibilities of contemporary Greek history as well as the social and political impediments to progress and development. The migrant also embodied the rigid divide between the developed European North and the underdeveloped European South. At the same time the post-war Greek migrant represented many of the traditional virtues of the Greek national character in its working-class version; a working-class as seen through the lenses of the mainstream middle-class entertainment industry.

The 'cleansed' images of Greek migrant subjectivity that had been produced in the 1950s in connection with the earlier experience of transatlantic migration were disappearing. Now, there was no America to intervene as a transforming signifier of progress able to reform destitute dislocated Greek migrants into new transatlantic subjects. To explain the change in Greek notions of mobility after the 1950s, one could hypothesize that the images of the Greek migrant after World War II were affected by the experience of labour migration to northern and western Europe. If we view this migration flow from a European point of view, it was part of the wider movement from the European South to the European North and also part of the wider movement from the former colonies to the former metropolitan centres. Post-war migration was viewed in Europe as a symptom of the state of emergency in European societies that was brought by the war and the end of colonialism. Seen from this perspective, migration to Europe was part of the historical course of a state of emergency, and very different from the reformist and multiculturalist celebratory narrative that accommodated historiographically the conceptualization of migration in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. Europe symbolically intervening in the formation of the images of Greece as a migrant nation was not a force of reform, but a signifier of emergency and danger. The association between mobility and danger was accompanied by the idea of migrants being subjects of reform and progress shifting to the image of migrants as invaders. More in-depth research is needed to trace the transformations of notions of mobility after the 1950s under the impact of new forms of migration in the second half of the twentieth century. This research would pinpoint the shifting interconnections between Greek nationhood and mobility and might possibly explain the quick and sudden leap from the culturally intimate narrative of Greece as a migrant nation to the xenophobic feeling of immigrant invasion that has been developing in Greece during the last two decades.

Conclusion

The cultural remittances of Greek transatlantic migration were initially inscribed within a conceptual context marked by the spreading and consolidation of representations of the U.S. as a symbol of cultural and civilizational hegemony. In this respect, the idea that the migrant embodies the promising potential of progress and prosperity–an idea echoed in different emergences of reformed subjectivity–promoted a positive understanding of mobility. 'Cleansed' from other subjective aspects related to the experience of migrancy, mobility was associated with progress, liberation, and the chance to change one's own destiny and nature. This positive version of mobility was also associated with the gradual emergence of cultural pluralism in the United States that became hegemonic during the 1930s and 1940s, and provided the conceptual material for the

consolidation of multicultural definitions of nationhood and Americanism. The perception in Greece of emigration and mobility cannot be seen independently from the reception of Greek migrants in their host countries, because notions of mobility in the recipient country have a great impact on the formation of migrant subjectivity, and thus on the notions of mobility that the latter bring with them. This means that reconstructing the history of mobility requires multi-perspective research aimed at tracing the parallel and intersecting crossings and homecomings that are enacted performed in the context of the flow of people and culture.

NOTES

1 Saskia Sassen, *Guests and Aliens*, The New Press: New York, 1999.

2 For an overview, see Richard Clogg, *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century*, Macmillan, London:, 1999. Ioanna Laliotou, 'Greek Diaspora' in Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, & Ian Skoggard (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World*, vol. x; pp. xx., Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York 2005.

3 On the history of the politics of the 'Great Idea' in the broader area, see Antonis Liakos, *The Italian Unification and the Great Idea* (*Η ιταλική ενοποίηση και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα*), Themelio, Athens, 1985.

4 G. Maurogordatos & Ch. Chatziosif (eds.), *Venizelism and Civil Modernization* (*Βενιζελισμός και αστικός εκσυγχρονισμός*), Crete University Press, Herakleio, 1988.

5 On the impact of refugeness on Greek culture, see Grigorios Dafnis, *Greece between two wars* (*Η Ελλάς μετξύ δύο πολέμων, 1923-1940*), Athens, 1955. On the ethnic homogenization of the Greek population in that period, see Athanasios Protonotarios, *The Refugee Problem from Historical, Legal and State Perspectives* (*Το προσφυγικό πρόβλημα από ιστορικής, νομικής και κρατικής απόψεως*), Pyrsos, Athens, 1929, pp. 161-166; see also Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece*, Mouton & Co, Paris, 1962.

6 See, Ioanna Laliotou, *Transatlantic Subjects. Acts of Migration and Cultures of Transnationalism between Greece and America*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004.

7 Theodore Saloutos, *They Remember America: The Story of the Repatriated Greek Americans*, California University Press, Berkeley, 1956.

8 Saloutos had written a number of books before he turned his attention to Greek-American history. See Theodore Saloutos, & John D Hicks, *Twentieth-century Populism; Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1952; *The American Farmer and the New Deal*, Iowa State University Press, Ames, 1982.

9 Theodore Saloutos, *The Greeks in the United States*, Harvard University Press, 1956. The correspondence files in Saloutos' personal archive testify his relationship with historians like Oscar Handlin, Car Wittke, Theodore C. Blegen, Carlton C. Qualey and later Rudolf Vecoli and others. See *Theodore Saloutos Collection*, Section I (Correspondence), Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

10 Saloutos admitted that he consciously followed this career plan in a letter that

he wrote to migration historian Rudolph Vecoli. See the *Theodore Saloutos Collection*, Section I (Correspondence), *op.cit.*

11 *Theodore Saloutos Collection*, Box 65, FF 647, *op.cit.*

12 "Saloutos to Handlin", Sept. 11 1951, Box 1 FF 6, *op.cit.*

13 Theodore Saloutos, *They remember America*, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

16 See October 3rd, p. 5 in, "Diary, September 24 - October 11", Box 15, FF 87, Theodore Saloutos Collection, *op.cit.*

17 *Ibid.*, October 4th, pp. 6-7.

A Gift from the New World: Greek Feminists between East and West (1880-1930)

Angelika Psarra

From the very beginning, feminism in Greece was derided as a 'foreign affliction', the pointless aping of anti-social behaviours propagated by some more or less disturbed women in the advanced and yet degenerate West.[1] Because of this automatic and generalized correlation of Greek feminism with the detested western aspects of women's protest, the leading figures of the Greek women's movement adopted the term feminism in only a piecemeal and cautious manner. More specifically, despite the fact that the word *féministes*, just a year after its first appearance in French, had already been translated into Greek in 1873 as *gynaikofilai* (gynophiles) – an ancient-sounding term of ancient Greek origins - it would be a number of years before Callirhoe Parren and her colleagues dared to call themselves *feminists*.[2] For this acceptance to be deemed appropriate, the concept of feminism had first to be cleansed of its western connotations and presented as purely Greek, with a meaning very different to its conceptualization at the time: 'Feminism does not mean, as many think, the political liberation of woman. Feminism means humanism, nation[al]ism, patriotism', noted Callirhoe Parren in 1910, taking care to adapt feminism to the commands of the then prevalent nationalist discourse.[3] This intentional process of 'Hellenizing' of feminism was to be complemented by a contemporaneous search for the term's origins in ancient Greece – an attempt, in other words, to radically separate the concept from the West and incorporate it in the 'centuries-old history' of the Greek nation.[4]

Similar initiatives were taken by feminists in other European countries finding themselves faced with mutiny by their own women at the time. 'Study, study our history, Spanish gentlemen and Spanish ladies, before you accuse feminism of frivolously adopting foreign fashions', recommended the Spanish feminist María Lezárraga Martínez Sierra to her compatriots in

1917.[5] In Greece, Callirhoe Parren systematically resorted to the legitimizing discourse of history in order to give the contemporary women's movement the historical background that would allow her to demand its inclusion in the body of the nation. This attempt resulted in the constitution of an alternative narrative, which positioned female experience at the centre of the historical quest, bringing to the fore the female sex as a subject of history. As a distinct historical category, with their own specific contribution to human civilisation as well as to the struggles of the nation, Greek women could now convincingly demand a collective social identity and successfully undermine their supposed attachment to the immobility of nature. This would enable them to fight the battle for their rights from a better position.[6]

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the Greek feminists of the so-called first wave thus settled once and for all their accounts with western feminism in its various versions. On the contrary, the relations of the local women's movement to foreign feminist currents in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century were much more pronounced, or at least more ambiguous, than the constant reassurances by the women involved as to the pure 'Greekness' of their project would want us to believe. This rhetoric notwithstanding, in what follows I shall attempt to put forward some preliminary hypotheses about this silenced relationship which, in my view, constitutes a crucial and yet ignored chapter in the history of Greek feminism.[7] I hasten here to note that the Greek feminists' initial 'defensive' stance *vis-à-vis* the sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit accusation of *xenolatria* – the uncritical mimicry, that is, of some 'western' models – was also to be adopted by the women's movement in the inter-war years, particularly by its more moderate components. Considering also that the same accusation, a century old by now, was to enjoy an especially pronounced revival in our days, during the peak of the 'second wave', it is perhaps not surprising that even feminist historical research has been hesitant in systematically investigating the relations of the Greek women's movement and its constituent currents with the equivalent women's movements abroad, and especially with the feminist networks in which Greek women's organisations had been more or less active members.[8]

By emphasizing its nation-enhancing 'Greek' characteristics, feminism in Greece has thus tried from its beginnings to shake off the stigma of an imported feminine caprice. We have already noted that the recourse to history, and primarily to ancient Greek history, was of some importance in the constitution of the national identity of Greek feminism. The increasing participation of women in national crises, initiated by the – astonishing by the standards of the time – women's presence in the Greek-Turkish war of 1897, was to play a special part in this process.[9] As is now known, this national mobilization of Greek feminists was based on an essentialist discourse which correlated 'women's politics' with the supposed bio-social specificity of the female sex. Within this discourse, motherhood as a real or potential feminine

experience was transformed into a patriotic duty, allowing women to argue for the gradual lifting of their social exclusion on the basis of the obligations dictated by their nature.

There is no doubt that this careful attempt to legitimate feminist militancy through the margin of opportunity offered by the claim to 'patriotic motherhood' can be largely attributed to Callirhoe Parren, the prominent figure of the Greek women's movement during the final decades of the nineteenth and the two first decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, Callirhoe Parren attempted to provide a convincing argument for the Greekness of her feminism, both in her writings and in her choice of actions, taking care to stress its unbridgeable distance from the contemporary American and European versions of women's struggle for their rights. Within this framework, the systematic renunciation of the franchise functioned as the necessary price that Greek feminists had to pay to convince even the most suspicious of their opponents of the honesty – that is, the moderation – of their intentions. 'The Greek woman's political emancipation has not been a position either in our programme or in our head', noted Callirhoe Parren on the eve of the 1895 local elections, the moment when she considered that the time had at last come to propose the participation of women in municipal administration. She added, and so made her position even more explicit, that in the official conferences in Europe and in the U.S. where she 'represented her sex', she had declared with all her strength that the issue of the franchise was for Greece entirely premature, 'a matter of the unforeseeable future which, at least for the time being, we won't even allow ourselves to consider'.[10] Consequently, Maria Myrtou, the heroine of Parren's first novel *The Emancipated*, a few years later, supports an emancipation that is 'sensible' and 'in moderation', and does not want to 'even hear about women's franchise', believing that it was not for another century that women would be in the position to 'participate in politics in a really beneficial manner'.[11]

Satisfied by these reassurances, the most prominent of Callirhoe Parren's male supporters, of whom I shall single out here the poet Kostis Palamas and the writer Grigorios Xenopoulos, made sure to emphasize those positive characteristics of native feminism which shielded it from the 'unreasonable exaggerations' and the 'wild mores' of the European and American women's movements.[12] However, despite their approval of the 'modesty', the 'moderation', or the 'conservatism' of the Greek feminists, neither the women participating in the movement, nor the few men that supported them were willing to reject western feminism completely. In their view, Greek society was simply not ready to accept 'extremes' of this order, but the possibility of the future emergence of such phenomena in Greece remained open. It would not be far-fetched, in my view, to detect a gendered difference behind this common argumentation with regard to the so-called women's issue. Male proponents of women's emancipation were fencing off militant

feminism by flattering the least threatening versions of the women's movement. Women feminists, on the other hand, were lying low primarily for tactical reasons, whilst simultaneously holding on to the possibility of changes in the social conditions which, at some time in the future, would allow the assertion of the more radical of women's demands. Callirhoe Parren's strongly mixed feelings towards the British suffragettes and their violent methods is most telling on this issue, as is her frequently contradictory position with regards to politics – her tendency, for instance, to denounce with horror the franchise for Greek women, whilst at the same time dreaming of parliamentary laurels on their behalf.[13]

On the other hand, the camp of opponents of emancipation – male and female – appeared mostly pluralist, with serious divergences in both the positions and the degree of passion connoted in their enunciations. In any case, however, feminism was considered an alien body to Greek reality, a 'fruit' that could not grow in Greece, where 'everything still lives the archaic but beautiful and nostalgic life of superstitions'.[14] Often the matter would be closed before it was even raised, with the affirmation that, especially in Greece, 'there is no conflict between men and women',[15] while most of the time the women's movement was considered responsible for the derangement of the natural order of things, the symptom of a deliberate plan to overthrow the harmonious complementarity of the sexes through the feminization of men and the masculinization of women.[16] Thanks to this thorough defamation of the feminist struggles in the West, any Greek women's devotion to the cause could easily be presented as 'an attempt to ape' foreign and dangerous models, inappropriate to the 'mental health of Greek women'.[17]

It is worth pausing here to consider an exceptionally interesting discussion between several opponents and a single proponent of women's emancipation, which took place in *Bosphoris*, the Greek-language 'anti-emancipatory' journal of Constantinople at the turn of the century.[18] The undeniable source, according to all sides, of the contemporary women's challenge, i.e. the West (Europe and the U.S.), was presented by the enemies of emancipation as a stronghold of degeneration, corruption and the flowering of all sorts of materialist theories capable of polluting Hellenism, imposing on it models of social organization that were opposed to both the natural and the divine order of things. Women's protests held centre-stage in this phobic conception of modernity, as the insurgent women were held responsible for the destruction of the family and therefore of society as a whole. The women themselves, however, would also be subjected to the inescapable price of their disobedience, as most of the 'emancipated', demanding, and frightening 'new women' of the time were considered *a priori* destined to commit suicide or, in the best possible case, end up in the psychiatric asylum of some western metropolis. By considering the women's struggle for their rights as a sort of degenerative brain disease, a type of incurable derangement, the opponents of feminism borrowed their

arguments without a second thought from a medical and sociological-sounding discourse, also western, which identified feminism as the source of all evils in the modern world.[19]

Intensely xenophobic, this identification of the women's movement with the West offered opponents of emancipation the opportunity to claim that healthy Greek society would not allow, as it did not need, these female extremities, having settled the matter long ago to the benefit of both sexes in accordance with the decrees of divine and human law, and in complete harmony with the traditional complementarity of their familial, and therefore social roles. Thus, the few Greek women who considered taking up the same positions and practices as their western counterparts would not be simply betraying their sex, copying behaviours that could not possibly take root in Greek society. Importing the mores of emancipation into Greece – the simplified type of feminine dress, short hair, the bicycle, drunkenness and smoking – these women risked something much more serious than their personal reputation or their familial stability: the prevalence of such behaviours was bound to eventually lead to the decay of Hellenism itself. Of course, again, we are not faced simply with a Greek peculiarity. If, for instance, French feminism constituted for the Greek opponents of emancipation the absolute extreme of feminine degeneration, as is evident from the articles in *Bosphoris*, it would be useful to bear in mind that Anglo-Saxon feminism for decades embodied the same threat for the French peers of the Constantinople scholars, responsible in their view for every French feminine eccentricity.[20] Under this kind of reasoning, even the most moderate of women's demands, the slightest emancipatory move, could acquire the weight of a conspiracy against the nation. It is not all that surprising, then, that the proposal of women entering the postal services, for instance, was denounced in the columns of *Bosphoris* as 'anti-Hellenic'.[21]

The proponents of women's emancipation – in our case Virginia Evaggelidou – countered this automatic classification of feminism as one more imported western novelty with the beneficial influence of 'new women' on the western world, holding the 'eastern' mentality of Greek women greatly responsible for the entrenched archaic elements of modern Greek society. They went a step further, however, transgressing the West-East dichotomy by creating the conditions for the constitution of an imaginary global women's sisterhood. 'You do not consider just any woman anywhere in the globe as your sister, but only the one that carries a Greek name', Virginia Evaggelidou accused Cornelia Preveziotou, the publisher of *Bosphoris*, the woman, that is, who was lauded by the Constantinople Literary Association precisely on the grounds of her militancy against the 'dreaded enemy' of emancipation.[22]

By proposing the gradation of the 'danger' originating from the West, the opponents of feminism in Constantinople would assign to Athens, base of the *Ladies' Journal* and the women's movement under Callirhoe Parren, the role of an advance post of catastrophic western ideas; the dangerousness

of the rest of the 'developed' countries would then appear in direct proportion to their distance on the map. Thus the relentless attack on the French 'emancipated', the harlot-like figures of the 'New Babylon', did not so much result from France's leading position in women's revolt.[23] 'Closer' to Greece, due to the then dominant French language and culture, France constituted the standard point of reference, and would function for years as the constant measure of comparison for opponents as well as proponents of women's emancipation. The Anglo-Saxon world, on the contrary, would be perceived as something exceptionally distant and entirely alien. 'Emancipated' Anglo-Saxon women were not simply called to account, as were their French peers, for their betrayal of the family and for their total abandonment of moral restraint. Androgynous hybrids, the insurgent women of England, and even more America, were presented as monstrosities capable of irremediably shaking the foundational order of their unfortunate societies. Thus, in the satirical short story characteristically entitled 'Reversal of terms', a woman who is masculine by birth returns home from America having espoused all the manners of the American 'new women': she smokes cigars, drinks beer, converses with the utmost ease on the reproductive habits of animals, and pays her male companions' bills at the coffee shop.[24]

Obviously, Greek scholars were not left immune to the fear of the supposedly impending sexual anarchy so widely prevalent at the turn of the century.[25] More pertinent to our purposes here, however, is that this fear was the complete reversal of the image of the Parrenian 'New World', of the American mythology which Callirhoe Parren composed and propagated with special care (or, as her supporters put it, "moderation'), and which Kostis Palamas pointedly described as her 'positive dream'.[26] Though as we saw above, Callirhoe Parren and her colleagues attempted to shake off the accusation of mimicry of foreign (western) models and choose to give their feminism a Greek content by investing it with historical depth and assigning it a specific national mission, it was nonetheless difficult to conceal their admiration mixed with a measure of envy for the achievements of women in the West. The systematic monitoring of women's actions abroad in the specially designated columns of the *Ladies' Journal*, as well as the triumphant presentation to the Greek audience of any feminine success or 'achievement' anywhere in the planet, no matter how remote, are indicative of this attitude.

The serialized publication of her trilogy *The Books of Dawn* (*The Emancipated*, *The Witch*, and *The New Contract*), a fictional approach to the 'women's issue', gave Callirhoe Parren the chance to put forward her positions with a freedom she had not had in her apprenticeship in other types of discourse (journalism, translations, interviews with scholars and politicians, epistolary journalism/correspondence, journals, historical texts, travel chronicles).[27] Three novels, three different eras and, most important, three different places. The first one takes place in Constantinople in the 1870s, facilitating the constant comparison of the heroine with the docile

women (Greek and Ottoman) of the East. The second one, *The Witch*, places the action in Athens at the time of the 1896 Olympic Games, in order to present a girl raised on the principles of the American 'New World' as the ideal type of woman. 'In these novels the woman with an old-fashioned upbringing is examined and pictured in comparison to the woman of the New World, brought up in the practical spirit and the correct perception of her destiny as a human being', Parren noted in an advertisement for those two first novels in the *Ladies' Journal*.[28] Her first work was set in Constantinople, 'heart of the Eastern World', the second one in Athens, 'border line between the new and old ideas', whilst the third one in the U.S., 'this great and light-shedding centre of the renaissance of peoples today', to quote the author again.[29] For all that, in the end the third novel was not based in America but in Greece at the time of the 1897 Greek-Turkish war. The 'new contract', the contract of equality between the sexes, was to be drafted in Athens, and not in that distant place which had, according to the writer, given women their liberty already. The New World nonetheless remained at the centre of the narrative, constantly present thanks to its representatives, its positive heroes and admirable heroines. At the opposite end of this world of 'social progress and evolution', the 'eastern peoples' were represented *en masse* as carriers of ignorance, meanness, deceit and underdevelopment and the East is likened to 'hell' where 'rottenness', 'natural, spiritual, and social' prevails. In this extremely negative context – and here Parren's proposal echoes the then prevalent theories of eugenics– women take over the duty to re-educate society, and therefore lead to its renaissance through the creation of healthy generations, free from the hereditary 'stigma'.[30]

This strictly geographic bipolar division of the world into 'new' and 'old', 'healthy' and 'polluted', 'West' and 'East', allowed Callirhoe Parren and the first generation of Greek feminists to situate Greece at the centre of a very wide range of cultures – 'advanced' on the side of the West, 'backward' on the side of the East. In this schema, the one end of the spectrum, the West, was not constituted as an undifferentiated totality, but, as was also the case in the analyses of the opponents of emancipation, was divided in geographical terms into the Anglo-Saxon world and Latin Europe, the latter considered closer to Greece. At the other extreme, the East would appear, as we have seen, as a coherent and threatening cultural universe, exclusively responsible for everything stagnant in post-revolutionary Greek society. The central position of Greece on this map allowed Greek feminists to keep a safe distance from both extremes, whilst, simultaneously, their systematic recourse to ancient Greek glory made up for all that was lacking in contemporary Greece, and allowed them to assume the role of mediator between women of the West and East.

Let us not, however, confine ourselves to the conclusion that, thanks to this strictly bipolar conception of the world and hence of the women's

movement, the West functioned for the first Greek feminists as an endless source of inspiration, as evidence of the fact that the struggle for women's emancipation could easily aim at a distant yet possible 'elsewhere', thus moving away from the sphere of utopia. This view was nevertheless shared by the opponents of emancipation who, in keeping with their standpoint, referred to it as 'the horrible gift originating from the West'.[31] It remains to be seen, then, what sort of connections, and how active, the Greek women's movement – and especially the group around Callirhoe Parren and the *Ladies' Journal* – set up with the women's organizations abroad, particularly in the countries which were being eulogized by Greek feminist propaganda as ahead of their time. Given that this chapter of Greek feminism remains virtually unexplored, as already noted, I shall limit myself to a few points that demand more thorough enquiry. To start with, from the very first moment, information on the foreign women's movements, or more accurately, women's actions (in the particular context, the 'women's movement', broadly defined, indistinguishably included the activities of women's collectivities as well as the achievements of individual women) had been a firm priority of local feminist news production.[32] Occasionally, translations of foreign texts were also published in the Greek women's/feminist press, and there were fairly systematic attempts to inform women readers of the initiatives taken in other countries by male politicians who had gained the title 'feminist'.

Significantly, in one of the first issues of the *Ladies' Journal*, Callirhoe Parren published a letter by Juliette Adam Lambert, the author of the essay *Idées antiproudhoniennes*, who congratulated her on the publication of the journal and gave her some advice on how to continue her work.[33] Significant in more ways than one, the publicity given to a female personality known for her especially middle-of-the-road views bears witness, amongst other things, to the care ('moderation') with which Parren wished to introduce the international problematization surrounding the 'women's issue' in Greece. Equally telling, a much later recollection of hers sheds light on the somewhat vague origins of Greek women's contestation. When preparing all alone the first issue of the *Ladies' Journal*, Parren had at her disposal – as she, at least, claims years later – only an insignificant Italian women's magazine and Léon Richer's *Le droit des femmes*. From this she translated an article about an American woman journalist with whom, she remembers, she had completely identified.[34] Assuming that the recollection is accurate, it is clear that Parren chose to publicize a well-known French woman who stood for a clearly conservative version of women's struggle, despite the fact that the limited sources then available as the journal's models were much more radical.[35]

Callirhoe Parren's relationship to the contemporary women's movement abroad was not however limited to her frequent allusions to 'women's progress' in Europe and (especially) America, nor to her personal

acquaintance with some of its leading figures. Of particular importance is her attempt, virtually unremarked until today, to create solid lines of communication between the local and foreign women's movements, in other words to make the Greek women's struggle part of the international one. This observation does not in any way counter the fact that for a long time Callirhoe Parren and her colleagues devoted themselves to shake off the accusation of sterile mimicry of western models. Indeed, these women made every effort to purge their feminism of any western connotations, and present it in true Greek colours. Simultaneously, however, they attempted to explore the possibilities for their movement's organic inclusion in the international women's networks that were being set up around the turn of the century.

Callirhoe Parren's participation at international women's conferences, as well as her relevant correspondence regularly published in the *Ladies' Journal*, permit us to approach this unknown aspect of the history of the Greek women's movement with some assurance.[36] An avowed follower of international women's/feminist meetings, Parren often combined her experiences at a feminist gathering with her traveller's impressions of the host city and/or country.[37] At a time when travelling to faraway places meant a dangerous adventure, especially for women, the passage to an unknown world would acquire for Parren miraculous attributes, allowing her to lift herself above the Greek reality and sense the vision of her feminist utopia. In this mode, she presents the most significant of her life journeys as important turning points in her feminist awakening. Her wedding trip to Constantinople is indicative of this. It was then, according to a later recollection, that the slave-like life of the women of the East, this 'multitude of lying, hypocrisy and humiliation', led her to become the most 'fanatic of feminists' 'from one moment to the next'.[38] At the opposite extreme, her participation at the 1893 Chicago conference was crucial for the elaboration of her positions concerning the New World and its 'emancipated' women, allowing her to come back from America with the certainty that on the other side of the Atlantic she had seen her dream come true.[39]

The impressions she communicated to her readers from the French women's conferences she also attended appear different, but entirely in keeping with the aforementioned bipolar schema of West-East.[40] Half way to America, France and her women did not inspire the unreserved enthusiasm she felt about her U.S. counterparts. 'Closer' to home, and therefore more 'familiar' and/or 'comprehensible', French women are conceptualized by Callirhoe Parren with an ambivalence we can not detect anywhere in her impressions of Chicago. This does not mean that she did not refer with enthusiasm to her acquaintance with the protagonists of the French women's movement, as well as their male supporters. It simply means that the French state of affairs was not sufficiently inspiring to compete with her American mythology. Either way, in the hierarchy of civilizations which Parren often daringly produced, continental Europe appeared to occupy a

place much below her bright New World. At the end of her American travel she explicitly expressed how difficult she found it to abandon the 'true civilization' and return to the 'old and heavily made-up' Europe lagging 'aeons of backwardness' behind America.[41] Besides, it was an old-school American, Susan B. Anthony, who purportedly nominated Parren as the 'apostle' of the 'women's issue': at the time of farewell, the elderly fighter kisses the hand of the young Greek woman, who, deeply moved, asks for her blessing.[42] The scene, with its intensely religious connotations, sealed the initiation ceremony that participation in the transatlantic women's conference had been for Parren.

Contact, however, with the more 'familiar' European women's movement, primarily the French, gave Greek 'first wave' feminists the opportunity to draw ideas, prioritize their demands, measure reactions, consider their alliances and devise ways of measuring up to their opponents – in other words, to move from the space of utopia to the space of politics. The early division, for instance, of the French women's movement into distinct currents (radical, moderate, catholic, socialist), which went to such lengths as to organize their own separate conferences, was considered by Parren as an outcome of European pathology particularly prevalent in the 'Latin races'. French women would follow the political divisions of men, whereas Americans would recognize only the principle of 'woman-centred progress and the amelioration of humanity'.[43] This, however, did not lead her to the denunciation of 'politicized' French women. On the contrary, she defended them at every opportunity and, more importantly, often drew conclusions from their experience implying a degree of similarity between French and Greek reality.[44] The closeness of the two countries was central to her speeches at the Paris conferences, whereas in her speeches in Chicago it was the usual redemptive recourse to ancient Greece which provided the link between Greece and America and between their women. Naming America 'the younger sister of ancient Greece' and American women 'younger sisters of the women of Greek antiquity', Parren built a bridge connecting herself to her role models, again resting the legitimation of contemporary women's struggle on the past.[45]

It goes without saying that the ancient foremothers were also present in Parren's contact with the European feminists. More than two decades after the 1889 conferences, Parren recollected that during her debut in the Paris conference room she heard a French woman express out loud her surprise at seeing Parren dressed in 'European' clothing: '*Tiens! Les femmes grecques ne portent donc pas le caftan!*'.[46] The ancient Greek legacy appeared, in this context, as the basic argument in support of the 'distinction' of modern Greece as compared to the 'uncivilised' neighbouring countries, 'Balkan' and 'Eastern'. 'Distinction', that is, 'superiority': the stigma of backwardness could not possibly weigh on a nation with such an important contribution to the history of modern (Western) civilization. So when Parren accepted

the invitation to the Chicago conference which stated explicitly that "at least one daughter of classical Greece' had to be present at the event, she considered it appropriate to note that, indeed, Greece could not possibly be absent from a conference at which Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 'the semi-barbaric diminutive states of the Aimos' were represented.[47] Soon, a preoccupation with women of neighbouring countries (especially Turkey and Bulgaria) and their fortunes would become standard in Greek feminist discourse, in its attempt to convince that Greek society ought to demonstrate its superiority *vis-à-vis* its neighbours by banishing any trace of the 'eastern' heritage that kept women imprisoned in mentalities left over from the common 'Ottoman past' of the whole region. How could Greek women be compared with Muslim women, these 'covered mysterious statues of grief and pain' whom Parren claims to have met in her travels? And how could they possibly allow women from neighbouring countries to frequently be more effective in their own struggles for their rights? If we consider the Greek feminists' constant measuring of themselves through comparison with the 'difference' of their ever-so-close counterparts, alongside their tendency to denounce as 'eastern' anyone opposed to their emancipation, it becomes obvious, in my view, that we are faced with the beginnings of a peculiar feminist orientalism which, despite its occasional transformations in time, would accompany a great deal of feminist thought for quite a few decades.[48]

Let us not, however, allow the harmonious correspondence of this approach with the dominant nationalist discourse of the time deceive us, leading us into the identification of yet another Greek peculiarity. The image of the 'East' worked out by the women who found themselves heading the first international women's networks was very similar to the aforementioned one. According to their conception of the world, civilizations were ranked in stages corresponding to three concentric circles: the United States with Northern and Western Europe occupied the centre, Southern and Eastern Europe the semi-periphery, whilst Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa represented the periphery.[49] Given that a different condition of women and a different level of women's consciousness corresponded to every circle, the feminists of the centre took over responsibility for the guidance of their more oppressed sisters. It is, I think, obvious that the Greek feminists, placing themselves in the middle of two 'extreme' cultural realities, asserted a role that fitted with the conceptualization of 'West' and 'East' that had been the outcome of the relevant hierarchical classifications produced by the leading figures of the first international women's assemblies.

We are thus faced with the paradox which marked, in my view, this first period of women's contestation in Greece. At the same time as Callirhoe Parren and her associates were concerned about the 'Greekness' – the distinct national character – of their mission, they were well aware that they were sailing along the channels set by the official international women's movement which they followed much more closely than the frequently highly

nationalist tone of their interventions would allow us to assume. Unfortunately, on this point too, we are faced with a lack of archival sources, and again we have to make do with the vague and extremely selective information we can mine from the period's press. Even so, we have good reason to believe that during the decades from the Chicago conference (1893) and to the end of World War I, the Greek women's movement – with Callirhoe Parren leading, especially at the beginning of this period – systematically attempted to incorporate itself in one of the contemporary international women's networks, or at least to effectively co-ordinate actions with it.

I should perhaps be more specific, moving as I am in uncharted territory again. Parren's participation in the aforementioned international feminist conferences brought her into contact with the processes that led to the constitution of the first long-lasting international women's network, the International Council of Women.[50] To give a brief reminder: the foundation of the International Council was due to the efforts of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony who, at the beginning of the 1880s, ventured to convince English and, secondarily, French women of the necessity of an international organization aimed at gaining the franchise. Long deliberations led to the 1888 Washington convention, where the foundation of an International Council of Women with a much wider – and much less radical – programme was decided upon. A product of compromise between the then dominant currents – between women who supported the precedence of the struggle for franchise, and those who considered women's 'social' politics more important – the International Council appeared straightaway as the organization which could give space to the most distinct approaches to the 'women's issue'. The formation of local National Councils, with the task of bringing together the women's organizations of every country, was considered a condition for the successful outcome of the operation.[51]

We know with some certainty that no Greek women participated in the Washington convention, where 60 out of 68 participants were American and only eight European. The readers of the *Ladies' Journal*, however, were informed in detail about the events. They were likewise informed about the slightly later Parisian conferences mentioned above, some of which made evident the attempt to co-ordinate the French women's movement with the International Council.[52] There are indications to suggest that Callirhoe Parren was in close contact with the women of the International Council and that, from very early on, she had promised to work towards the establishment of the Greek section of the international organization. Of those indications, I shall point out two. First, the wish to create a women's Union similar to those already existing in Europe and America was put forward at the 1889 Paris International Conference of Women's Works and Institutions (Congrès des oeuvres et institutions féminines). Second, when Parren declared herself unable to participate at the 1892 Parisian

International Congress of Feminist Societies (Congrès général des sociétés féministes), she designated the French secretary-general of the International Council, Marya Chéliga-Levy, to represent Greek women.[53] Furthermore, in Chicago which would constitute a turning point in the relation of the Greek women's movement to the international movement, Parren appears to have represented not only Greek women but also, according to her statement, a large women's Union from Belgium.[54]

Upon her return to Athens from Chicago in the summer of 1893, Parren had already officially accepted the task of building the Greek section of the International Council. There is no space here to go into the details of this process, which proved laborious and time consuming.[55] Let it simply be noted that there was much opposition, and not only from the known and expected adversaries of women's emancipation. It is clear that a large section of the Greek women's movement, which was more divided than our silent sources would imply, was none too enthusiastic about this project. When in 1896 the Union of Greek Women (and not *The Women's* Union, as had been announced), which was to become the paradigm of Greek women's organizations, was founded by Callirhoe Parren, an explicit correlation of its work to the international women's movement was nowhere to be found.[56] Parren's tactical moves should not be allowed to deceive us, however: her contacts abroad had not weakened, as would be revealed soon afterwards, during the 1897 Greek-Turkish war, when she would attempt to co-ordinate an international women's network of support for the Greek positions. Besides, she herself did not hesitate to compare the Union of Greek Women to the organizations/sections of the International Council at times, underlining their differences but also implying their commonalities.[57] Why, though, did the Union of Greek Women not appear as the Greek section of the International Council as initially intended? The answer to this should perhaps be sought in its leaders' effort to promote the pure Greekness of their project, at a conjuncture when women's preoccupation with national matters was presented by themselves as the basic legitimizing mechanism of their inclusion in the public sphere. Or perhaps Callirhoe Parren's failure to unite the dispersed forces of the women's movement disallowed her from claiming that the Union of Greek women satisfied the conditions set by the International Council for the constitution of its national sections.[58]

The Greek women's organic connection with the International Council was finally realized in 1908 with the creation of the National League of Greek Women, in the foundation of which Parren, according to her own statement, simply 'participated'.[59] As a matter of fact, the *post hoc* 'official' accounts of the foundation of the National League, written as they were at a time when the divergence between the various women's organizations had already become explicit, did not include Callirhoe Parren. Two other executive members, Maria Kalapothaki and Eleni Griva, appear instead to have contacted the International Council and accomplished the creation of the

Greek section.[60] Nonetheless, the new organization made sure to keep up the appearance of unity: it drew together many women's associations, most of them charitable, their boards constituting its council.[61] This desired image of 'women's concord' is shaken by the weighty presence of the Union of Greek Women in the new organization, where five different departments of the Union participated; by the assignation of the National League's presidency to one of Parren's main colleagues, Eleni Griva; and by the initiatives Parren herself soon took in the name of the National League. This long list of Greek women's organizations would be extended, with the addition in 1911 of the Greek Women's Lyceum (again a project of Parren's, fashioned in the style of English lyceum clubs), and in 1914-15 of the Patriotic League of which Parren had been secretary-general for some time.[62]

Despite the periodic overlap between these organizations, or rather their constantly interchanging presence at the top of the local women's movement, the National League monopolized contacts with the International Council in the following years, having joined it as the nineteenth member. The foundation, on the other hand, of the second international women's network, the feminist International Woman Suffrage Alliance, in 1904, did not initially find support in Greece, where demands for the franchise were still considered premature.[63] Relations between the National League and the International Council appear quite close by prevailing standards: the National League sent frequent reports on its activities, and its president corresponded with the Scottish president of the International Council, Lady Ishbel Aberdeen. Nor should we consider as negligible the visits paid to Greece by prominent members of the international women's movement.[64] What is of special importance is that the Greek organization made sure to systematically follow the directions of the international centre. In 1909, for instance, guided by the International Council, it founded two new departments, of women's rights and of journalism.[65]

This initially cloudless contact seems to fall apart under the strain of the wars that scarred the 1910s (the Balkan Wars and World War I). This is not surprising. In the context of the hostilities, the international women's sisterhood turned out to more fragile than some of its initiators had hoped; the International Council was paralyzed, while the International Woman Suffrage Alliance was shaken by the oppositions among feminists of the fighting countries. Before long, this led to the creation of a more radical organization which concentrated on the issue of peace – the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).[66] In this atmosphere, the Greek women's movement did not suffer the internal discord caused by the division of feminists elsewhere into quiet supporters of the 'patriotic war' on the one hand, and active supporters of a peaceful solution to differences between States by any means on the other. In Greece, despite their various divergences, feminists had more or less all tried to endow their struggle with a 'patriotic' content. Consequently, the mobilization that

started with the Balkan Wars found them ready to incorporate their action into the collective 'national' effort of the entire population, so continuing in new conditions practices the Union of Greek Women had initiated at the time of the Greek-Turkish war in 1897.

According to a later account by Callirhoe Parren, the first serious friction between the National League and the International Council took place just before the Balkan Wars when the Greek organization was advised to include the creation of a 'department of pacifists' in its master plan. The National League reacted immediately, designating Parren to reply accordingly. She replied to Lady Aberdeen, still according to her own account, in a 'forceful' manner: as long as Greek women have 'enslaved brothers', she wrote, it was inconceivable that they would put themselves 'under the banner of pacifists'.[67] There were perhaps other moments of tension in those years; our sources, however, especially laconic on 'sensitive' matters, appear unwilling to enlighten us. However, it seems rather unlikely that Parren did not know, for instance, that in the context of their pacifist politics the international women's networks focused also on the issue of rape in war, charging Greek and Bulgarian soldiers among others with a multitude of rapes during the Balkan Wars.[68]

Although hardly surprising, the women's movement identifying with Greek irredentism as well as its wholehearted support for the nation's martial adventures still demands a clear explanation. How was it possible to combine women's belligerency in wartime with their well-advertised 'province' in matters of peace? Already present during the 1897 war, the contradiction would now be resolved with the argument that women's mobilization behind the lines constituted the 'peaceful' side of war, creating a 'peaceful army' that offered life, joy, and hope at the time of war, while in peace time it took on the country's defence from its internal enemies.[69] Incorporating the lexicon of war in their discourse in an attempt to deconstruct it and appear consistent with their own declarations in favour of peace, the women assumed a kind of 'patriotic pacifism' which did not challenge the need to defend the national rights.

Here again we are not faced with a purely Greek arrangement of this contradiction, dictated by the prevalent atmosphere in Greece during this period of constant wars. Similar positions lurk behind the serious crisis that led to the turmoil of the international women's networks during the Great War, which many women in Europe experienced, according to their own accounts, with a body split in two: a peace-loving heart and a warmongering head.[70] Bearing these international processes in mind may facilitate us in following the otherwise perplexing shift in Parren's positions from an absolute eulogy of peace to the implicit and yet unambiguous defence of the ('just') war. At this point, however, we need also to take into account the internal developments, which, although obscured, definitely played their part in the contingent choices by the leaders of the women's movement.

When, for instance, Parren was mourning the lost peacefulness of her fellow-European women in November 1915 and praising the peaceful stance of small States, including Greece, she was actually taking a position in the National Schism, declaring herself for the 'neutrality' of the country, a neutrality supported by the royalist camp.[71]

Postscript

The end of World War I would bring the end of inertia for the international women's networks. The Greek women's movement participated in the post-war reconstitution of international feminism, restoring its contact with the International Council and initiating a direct connection with the International Suffrage Alliance of Women.[72] These initiatives, however, would formalize the division that had been creeping for years, forcing Greek feminists to face the inevitable mutation of their until then homogenous self-image. Forcing them, in other words, to accept the by then explicit breakdown of local women's forces into various tendencies and currents. The more moderate ('conservatives' according to their own definition) rallied around the National Council (which was part of the International Council) which now took on a federal structure, whilst the 'more radical' (again, self-designated) would become members of the League for the Rights of Greek Women (part of the International Suffrage Alliance).[73] The creation of these new women's assemblies was the result, according to the women themselves, of the intervention of the aforementioned international networks, whilst their active participation at the two women's conferences of 1920 that signified the passage to a new era – the International Council's conference in Christiania (Oslo) and the International Suffrage Alliance's in Geneva – is perceived by the Greek participants as a peak moment of the ceremony of their initiation into the international women's sisterhood.[74] Callirhoe Parren's decision at exactly the same time to organize, unbeknown to the rest of the feminists, a purely 'Greek' conference in Athens symbolizes in the most telling manner the clash between 'old' and 'new' feminism.[75] Callirhoe Parren and the Lyceum of Greek Women came to represent an outdated, archaic feminism, which, after many vacillations, would take the same path as the most extreme antifeminist political and ideological forces – foreign and local – towards the end of the interwar period. Still, in those years, Parren appears to have continued leading a Greek section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). It is difficult to reconcile this with Parren's by now exceedingly xenophobic and Helleno-centric feminism, unless we were to attribute it to some old good contacts. Anyway, more of a title than a real organization, the Greek section of what in many ways was the most radical internationalist feminist network of the inter-war years must have retained very little contact with the headquarters of the Women's International League (WILPF) in Geneva, which meant it could pursue a more or less autonomous policy.[76]

By contrast, the Greek sections of the two other large feminist networks kept close and explicitly stated connections with the international organizations to which they belonged in the inter-war era. Their major difference was that the women of the National Council would often choose to undermine the dynamics of international feminist accord and to claim a 'purely Greek feminism', whilst the radicals of the League for the Rights of Greek Women appeared more willing to put forward the internationalist aspect of their feminist struggle, regardless of their occasional internal divergences. These latter too, of course, were not without their own contradictions, especially when serious 'national' matters were at stake. To conclude, the West-East dichotomy that had been elaborated by 'first- wave' feminists remained in force, and continued to assign Greek women the role of go-between between the 'advanced' women in the West and their 'undeveloped' sisters in the East. This does not mean there were no attempts to undermine this dichotomy. On this matter, the trans-Balkan women's accord that was attempted through the Little Entente of Women was not simply a significant moment in training feminists in (international) politics. It was also an attempt to shift interstate feminist action from its (Western) centre to the (European) periphery through the acceptance of a gendered Balkan identity, capable of allowing the women of the region to claim their rights more successfully.[77] Even so, these developments could not lead to the erasure of these feminist perceptions and attitudes that I have previously called a particular feminist orientalism. In the inter-war contingency, even the radicals would prove unable to challenge the mighty stereotypes about women of the 'East' and, especially, to overcome their intense ambivalence towards the women of Turkey.[78]

Translated from Greek by Martha Michailidou

NOTES

1 I am here using the terms 'West' and 'East' as they were being used during the decades examined in this article. The specific referents of these terms will be clarified as the text unfolds. For an exceptionally enlightening approach to these terms, see Elli Skopetea, *The East's West. Images from the end of the Ottoman Empire* [*Η Δύση της Ανατολής. Εικόνες από το τέλος της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας*], (Athens: Gnosse Publications, 1992). For various approaches to this matter, see Scientific Symposium, *Europe and Modern Hellenism (9-10 November 2001)* [Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο, *Ευρώπη και Νέος Ελληνισμός (9-10 Νοεμβρίου 2001)*], Athens: Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and Education, 2003.

2 For a preliminary attempt of recomposition of the Greek itinerary of the concept of feminism, see Angelika Psarra, 'Mother or citizen? Greek versions of women's emancipation (1870-1920)' [Μητέρα ή πολίτις; Ελληνικές εκδοχές της γυναικείας χειραφέτησης (1870-1920)], in Diotima Centre for Women's Studies and Research (ed.), *The Gender of Rights. Power, women and citizenship* [*Το φύλο των δικαιωμάτων.*

Εξουσία, γυναίκες και ιδιότητα του πολίτη], Athens: Nefeli Publications, pp. 90-92. For the various definitions of feminism in the course of history, see also her 'Feminism: The word, the time, the meanings' [Φεμινισμός: Η λέξη, ο χρόνος, οι σημασίες]], *Whirl* [*Δίνη*], 6 (1993), pp. 31-54. Feminism was initially identified in Greece with the woman-friendly activities of those peculiar male politicians who dared to commit themselves to the struggle for women's rights, whilst for a long time it was the concept of emancipation that expressed women's own demands.

3 'The International Council' [Ο Παγκόσμιος Σύδεσμος], *Ladies' Journal* 24/992 (1910), pp. 1290-1291; and Callirhoe Parren, 'The old laws and women' [Οι παλαιοί νόμοι και οι γυναίκες], Ibid., 24/994 (1910), p. 1343.

4 See, characteristically, E. L., 'Sappho the Lesbian and the feminist movement in Athens during the fourth century BC' [Σαπφώ η Λεσβια και η φεμινιστική κίνησις εις τας Αθήνας κατά του Δ΄ προ Χριστού αιώνα], Ibid., 26/1015 (1912), pp. 1858-1860. Unsurprisingly, the conception of ancient Greece mobilized in this matter followed established 'western' readings of the ancient Greek world.

5 G. Martínez Sierra (María Lezárraga Martínez Sierra), *Feminismo, feminidad, españolismo* (Madrid: Renacimento, 1917), p. 132, cited in Karen Offen, *European Feminisms, 1700-1950. A Political History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 6.

6 For the attempt to construct an alternative women's historical narrative, see Callirhoe Parren, *Woman's history from the beginning of the world until today, Part I, Volume I* [*Ιστορία της γυναικόν από κτίσεως κόσμου μέχρι σήμερον, Μέρος Α΄, τόμος Α΄*], Athens: Anastasios N. Trimis' Press, 1889; and, by the same author, *Woman's history. Modern Greek Women 1530-1896* [*Ιστορία της γυναικός. Σύγχρονοι Ελληνίδες 1530-1896*], Athens: Paraskevas Leonis' Press, not dated [1896]. Dispersed references to history are also found in the first 19th century women's magazines (*Thaleia, Euridiki*) [*Θάλεια, Ευρυδίκη*]. In the *Ladies' Journal* (1887-1917), though, women's history occupies a prominent position. See Eleni Varika's analysis of this issue, *The Ladies' revolt. The birth of a feminist conscience in Greece 1833-1907* [*Η εξέγερση των Κυριών. Η γένεση μιας φεμινιστικής συνείδησης στην Ελλάδα 1833-1907*], Athens: Research and Education Foundation of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1987, pp. 260-276. More on this in Angelika Psarra, 'The emancipation novel or the "moderate" utopia of Callirhoe Parren' [Το μυθιστόρημα της χειραφέτησης ή η "συνετή" ουτοπία της Καλλιρρόης Παρρέν], in C. Parren, *The Emancipated* [*Η Χειραφετημένη*], Athens: Ekati, 1999, pp. 414-417.

7 A more rounded approach to this matter presupposes, in my view, the systematic mapping of international contacts, and, more importantly, of Greek feminists participating in feminist conferences abroad, as well as a catalogue – as exhaustive as possible – of the feminist texts that had been translated into Greek at the time. Moreover, as the Greek organizations' correspondence with the international feminist networks is almost entirely obscured, a search of relevant material in the remaining archives of international organizations might prove especially useful. Either way, it is worth pointing out that the international literature remains also particularly poor on this matter, with very few references to Greek organizations.

8 For reasons of convenience, I here employ the nowadays classic distinction between 'first' and 'second' wave feminism, even though I am doubtful as to its usefulness. According to this distinction, the feminist movements which were beginning to emerge at the end of the 19th century come under the appellation 'first wave', whilst 'second wave' is the name of the contemporary women's

liberation movement that appeared at the end of the 1960s. This metaphorical taxonomy has been subjected to criticism, especially with regards to its obviously West-centred character. Attempts at replacing it, however, have not been widely adapted, at least for the time being. See, for instance, the suggestion of the American historian Karen Offen for the adoption of an equally metaphorical vocabulary, drawn from volcanic activity (ruptures, explosions, lava and so on): Karen Offen, *European Feminisms*, pp. 25-26.

9 On this, see, Efi Avdela and Angelika Psarra, 'Engendering "Greekness": Women's Emancipation and Irredentist Politics in Nineteenth-Century Greece', *Historia. Journal of the Historical Society of Israel, 5* (2000), pp. 109-121 (in Hebrew).

10 [Callirhoe Parren], 'Women and local elections, III' [Αι γυναίκες και αι δημοτικαί εκλογαί, Γ'], *Ladies' Journal*, Θ/412 (1895), p. 1.

11 Callirhoe Parren, *The Emancipated*, 2nd Edition (Athens: Ekati, 1999), p. 45. This is the first novel of a trilogy symbolically entitled *The Books of Dawn. The Emancipated* was to be translated into French for the *Journal des Débats* (February - March 1907).

12 See, characteristically: Grigorios Xenopoulos, 'Callirhoe Parren' [Καλλιρρόη Παρρέν], in *Collected Works*, Volume XI [*΄Απαντα*, τόμος ενδέκατος], Athens: Mpiris, 1971, pp. 20-23; and the same author, 'Valuable guide' (March 1910) [Οδηγός πολύτιμος (Μάρτιος 1910)], in N. K. Tselementes, *Cookery book* [*Οδηγός μαγειρικής*], Athens: Saliveros S.A. Publishing house, 1948, p. 7; also Kostis Palamas, 'Woman's novel' [Τυναικός μυθιστόρημα], in *Collected Works*, Vol. II [*΄Απαντα*, τόμος δεύτερος], Athens: Govostis, not dated, pp. 197-200.

13 See, amongst many similar, C. Parren, 'Women in politics, I' [Αι γυναίκες εις την πολιτικήν, Α΄], *Ladies' Journal*, 23/963 (1909), p. 577; 'Account giving of the Lyceum of Greek women, I' [Λογοδοσία Λυκείου Ελληνίδων 1911, Α΄], *Ladies' Journal* 26/1023 (1912), p. 2044; [Callirhoe Parren], 'Women and local elections' [Αι γυναίκες και αι δημοτικαί εκλογαί, Α΄], *Ladies' Journal*, Θ/412 (1895), pp. 1-2; 'What Greek women say' [Τι λέγουσιν αι Ελληνίδες], *Ladies' Journal*, Θ/414 (1895), pp. 1-2; and 'The great day' [Η μεγάλη ημέρα], *Ladies' Journal*, ΙΣΤ/725 (1902), p. 1.

14 This sentence is from Christos Zafeiropoulos' theatre play *The Emancipated. Drama in three acts* [*Η Χειραφετημένη. Δράμα σε μέρη τρία*] (Alexandreia, Egypt, [1907]), p 83.

15 This declaration belongs to the woman scientist and writer Sevasti Kallisperi, put this way in her interview on the issue of her women compatriots 'in writing'. See, Bohem [D. Hatzopoulos], 'The writing Greek women. Miss Sevasti Kallisperi. The scholarly damsel' [Αι γράφουσαι Ελληνίδες. Δεσποινίς Σεβαστή Καλλισπέρη. Η λογία δεσποινίς], *Scrip* [Σκριπ], (May 4 1896).

16 See, characteristically: 'Complete equality of the two sexes. The men and the women. The European and American women's movement. Dress-wearing men and trouser-wearing women. Reversal of the conditions of nature' [Πλήρης ισότης των δύο φύλων. Οι άνδρες και αι γυναίκες. Το εν Ευρώπη και Αμερική γυναιτκείον κίημα. ΄Ανδρες φουστανοφόροι και γυναίκες πανταλονοφόροι. Ανατροπή των όρων της φύσεως], *Acropolis* [*Ακρόπολις*] (December 19 1897), (correspondence from Paris).

17 The quotes come from Emmanuel Rhoides' text 'The Greek women in writing. i) Arsinoe Papadopoulou' [Αι γράφουσαι Ελληνίδες. Α΄ Αρσινόη Παπαδοπούλου], in *Collected Works, Vol. V* [*΄Απαντα*, τόμος Ε΄], Alkis Aggelou (literary editor), Athens: Hermes Publishing Company, 1978, p. 124.

18 Participating in the conversation were the editor of the magazine Cornelia

Preveziotou and some male scholars, amongst them Nikolaos Makridis, Kyriakos Ioannidis, and Georgios Valavanis, all of them sworn opponents of women's emancipation. Virginia Evaggelidou took on with great success the refutation of their views and the defence of the rebelled women. Of these texts I here note as especially indicative the following: Nikolaos G. Makridis, 'Emancipation! First Correspondence' [Χειραφέτησις! Επιστολή Πρώτη], *Bosphoris* [*Βοσπορίς*] A/12 (1899), pp. 91-92; 'Emancipation! Second Correspondence' [Χειραφέτησις! Επιστολή Δευτέρα], Ibid. A/14 (1899), pp. 107-108; 'Emancipation! Third Correspondence' [Χειραφέτησις! Επιστολή Τρίτη], Ibid. A/19 (1899), pp. 150-152; Cornelia L. Preveziotou, 'Old or new woman?' [Παλαιά ή νέα γυνή;], Ibid. Γ/8 (1901), pp. 85-87; Virginia P. Evaggelidou, 'Open letter' [Ανοικτή Επιστολή'], Ibid. Γ/10 (1901), pp. 111-115 and Γ/11 (1901), pp. 123-124; Cornelia L. Preveziotou, 'Reply to Miss V. Evaggelidou' [Απάντησις εις την Δίδα Β. Ευαγγελίδου], Ibid. Γ/13 (1901), pp. 145-148, Γ/15 (1901), pp. 160-171 and Γ/16 (1901), pp. 181-185; Virginia P. Evaggelidou 'Open Letter, II' [Ανοικτή Επιστολή Β΄], Ibid. Γ/16 (1901), pp. 196-108, Γ/21 (1901), pp. 243-245, Γ/22 (1901), pp. 258-260, Γ/23 (1901), pp. 270-272 and Γ/24-25 (1902), pp. 288-289; Cornelia L. Preveziotou, 'Reply to Miss Virginia Evaggelidou' [Απάντησις τη Δίδι Βιργινία Ευαγγελίδου], Ibid., Γ/28 (1902), pp. 323-325, Γ/29 (1902), pp. 335-336, Γ/31 (1902), pp. 359-361 and Γ/33-34 (1902), pp. 391-394. Also [Cornelia L. Preveziotou], 'Women and bees' [Γυναίκες και μέλισσαι], Ibid. Γ/35 (1900), pp. 309-311. On the general atmosphere that formed the background to this discussion, see also Efi Kanner, 'Discourses on women in the Greek-Orthodox literate community of Constantinople (1856-1908)' [Λόγοι περί γυναικών στην Ελληνορθόδοξη εγγράμματη κοινότητα της Κωνσταντινούπολης (1856-1908)], Historica [*Τα Ιστορικά*] 35 (December 2001), pp. 299-334.

19 For similar approaches in a different context, see, for instance, Annelise Maugue, 'Littérature antiféministe et angoisse masculine au tournant du siècle' in Christine Bard (ed.), *Un siècle d'antiféminisme*, Paris: Fayard, 1999, pp. 69-83. On the frequently western origins of Greek anti-western discourses, see Paschalis M. Kitromilidis, 'The western sources of anti-western argumentations in Greek culture' [Οι Δυτικές πηγές των αντιδυτικών επιχειρηματολογιών στην ελληνική παιδεία], in Scientific Symposium, *Europe and Modern Hellenism*, pp. 61-67; and Savvas Kontaratos, 'The anti-European tendencies in the construction of modern Greek identity' [Οι αντιευρωπϊκές τάσεις στην κατασκευή της νεοελληνικής ταυτότητας], Ibid., pp. 15-33.

20 See, characteristically, Christine Bard, *Les filles de Marianne. Histoire des féminismes 1914-1940*, (Paris: Fayard, 1995) p. 21. Let us not underestimate, however, the reverse process, as feminists had difficulty concealing their enthusiasm for the vanguard of their peers in other, more 'advanced' countries: the Greek for the French, the French for the English. See Bard, Ibid., pp. 44-45, but also the texts of Virginia Evaggelidou cited here, note 18.

21 'Around the world. The women's issue in the Greek Parliament' [Ανά τον κόσμον. Το γυναικείον ζήτημα εις την ελληνικήν Βουλήν], *Bosphoris* Β/33 (1900), pp. 294.

22 Virginia Evaggelidou, 'Open Letter, II' [Ανοικτή Επιστολή Β΄], Ibid., p. 260. Information about Cornelia Preveziotou's award from Giannis Papakostas in Alexandra Papadopoulou, *Short Stories* [*Διηγήματα*], Giannis Papakostas (ed.), (Athens: Odysseas 1987), pp. 15-16.

23 See, for instance, Nikolaos G. Makridis, 'Emancipation! First Correspondence' [Χειραφέτησις! Επιστολή Πρώτη], pp. 91-92; as well as all the texts by Cornelia Preveziotou cited in note 18.

24 Igissippus, 'Reversal of terms (Original short story)' [Αναστροφή των όρων (Διήγημα πρωτότυπον)], *Bosphroris* Δ/25 (1903), pp. 285-290.
25 Concerning this milieu see Elaine Showalter, *Sexual Anarchy. Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle*, (London: Virago, 1996).
26 Kostis Palamas, 'Woman. A letter to Mrs Callirhoe Parren' [Η Γυναίκα. Ένα γράμμα προς την κ. Καλλιρρόη Παρρέν], in Callirhoe Parren, *The New Woman: Drama in four acts* [*Η Νέα Γυναίκα. Δράμα εις πράξεις τέσσαρας*, (Athens: the Par. Leoni's Printing Press, 1908), p. 82.
27 'The Emancipated' [Η Χειραφετημένη], *Ladies' Journal*, 17 January 1899 (issue 559) - 30 April 1900 (issue 618); 'The Witch' [Η Μάγισσα], *Ladies' Journal*, 10 September 1900 (issue 630) - 16 December 1901 (issue 688); 'The New Contract' [Το Νέον Συμβόλαιον], *Ladies' Journal*, 23 December 1901 (issue 689) - 28 September 1903 (issue 761). For a first assessment of the parrenian trilogy in the context of the author's multifaceted work, see Angelika Psarra, 'The novel of emancipation, or Callirhoe Parren's "moderate" utopia', in Callirhoe Parren, *The Emancipated*, p. 425 ff.
28 'Presents for the Ladies' [Δώρα διά Κυρίας], *Ladies' Journal* IZ/731 (1903), p. 8.
29 [Callirhoe Parren], 'The New Contract' [Το Νέον Συμβόλαιον], *Ladies' Journal* IE/688 (1901), p. 2.
30 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
31 This is exactly as it was put by Cornelia L. Preveziotou, 'Reply to Miss V. Evaggelidou' [Απάντησις εις την Δίδα Β. Ευαγγελίδου', *Bosphoris* Γ/15 (1901), p. 171.
32 This type of news report would usually be the object of special columns. See, for instance, the columns of the *Ladies' Journal* entitled 'Page feminist and regarding women's action and progress', 'Page of women's movement', and so on. Analogous columns, obviously with different commentary, are also found in 'anti-emancipation' publications. See, the *Bopshoris* column entitled 'Around the world'.
33 'Conseils de Mme Juliette Adam au "Journal des Dames"', *Ladies' Journal* A/5 (1887), p. 1-2. During the first year of its publication the *Ladies' Journal* was to publish in serialized form a translation of one of Juliette Adam's works: Juliette Adam, 'Woman' [Η γυνή], *Ladies' Journal*, A/15 (1887), pp. 1-2 to A/19 (1887), pp. 2-3.
34 [Callirhoe Parren], 'From Mrs Parren's lecture to the Lyceum of Greek Women. Sappho Leontias, II' [Από την διάλεξιν της κ. Παρρέν εις το Λύκειον των Ελληνίδων. Σαπφώ Λεοντιάς Β΄], *Ladies' Journal* 29/1063 (1915), p. 2758; and 'Male and female feminists. Mrs Parren's speech at the Lyceum of Greek Women, II' [Φεμινισταί και φεμινίστριαι. Ομιλία της κ. Παρρέν εις το Λύκειον των Ελληνίδων Β΄], *Ladies' Journal* 30/1081 (1916), pp. 3044-3045.
35 Juliette Adam Lambert, Léon Richer, and Maria Deraismes, the famous radical feminist and colleague of Richer's for a while, are characters encountered not only in the *Ladies' Journal* but also in the adversary 'anti-emancipation' press (see, for instance, the *Bosphoris* texts cited in note 18). On the different currents of the feminist movement of that era in France, see Laurence Klejman, Florence Rochefort, *L'égalité en marche. Le féminisme sous la Troisième République*, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques et des femmes, 1989).
36 I am pointing out again that the archival sources which could enlighten us on the relation of the Greek women's movement to the international one have not been salvaged, whilst investigation of this matter in the international organizations' archives is still in progress. Either way, literature making extensive

use of this important archival material or taking it as its point of departure is very limited.

37 On Callirhoe Parren's enthusiasm about conferences as 'the linchpin, the most precious parameter of the women's movement', and her unreserved defence of women's 'conference-obsession', see, for instance, Callirhoe Parren, *A year's life. Letters from an Athenian to a Parisian woman 1896-1897* [*Ζωή ενός έτους. Επιστολαί Αθηναίας προς Παρισινήν* 1896-1897], (Athens: the Par. Leoni's Printing Press, not dated), pp. 153-158. For a text strictly in keeping with the genre of the travelogue, see her *My travels. Sweden*, vol. I [*Τα ταξείδια μου. Σουηδία*, τόμος Α΄], (Athens, not dated).

38 [Callirhoe Parren], 'How I became a journalist. From Mrs Parren's speech at the Lyceum of Greek Women I' [Πώς έγεινα δημοσιογράφος. Από την ομιλίαν της κ. Παρρέν εις το Αύκειον των Ελληνίδων Α΄], *Ladies' Journal* 29/1067 (1915), pp. 2732-2734.

39 On this conference, considered as the substantial first conference of the International Council of Women after its foundation at the Washington conference (1888), see Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, pp. 15-21. On the invitation addressed to Callirhoe Parren by the conference organisers, her decision to travel to Chicago, her conference speeches and the conference processes in general, see the issues of the *Ladies' Journal* published in the first half of 1893. Of special interest for the concerns of this article is Parren's account of the travel events as they were unfolding: 'From Athens to Chicago. Impressions of a Greek woman traveller' [Απ΄ Αθηνών εις Σικάγον. Εντυπώσεις Ελληνίδος ταξιδιώτιδος], *Ladies' Journal* Z/311 (1893), pp. 5-6 - H/378 (1894), p. 378.

40 I am here referring to the conferences that took place in Paris in 1889 (Congrès français et international du droit des femmes, and Congrès des oeuvres et institutions féminines), and in 1900 (Deuxième Congrès des oeuvres et institutions féminines, Congrès international de la condition et des droits de la femme, Congrès des femmes catholiques). The first conference characterizing itself as feminist, the Congrès général des sociétés féministes (1892), also took place in the period between these two events, with Callirhoe Parren not being able to attend. The 1892 conference is mentioned in the *Ladies' Journal* as an International Conference of Women's Societies [Διεθνές Συνέδριον των Γυναικείων Εταιριών] (ΣΤ/259), p. 5. On these conferences, see Laurence Klejman, Florence Rochefort, L'égalité en marche, pp. 82-147; and Maité Albistur, Daniel Armogathe, *Histoire du féminisme du moyen âge à nos jours*, (Paris, 1977), pp. 353-354.

41 [Callirhoe Parren], 'From Athens to Chicago', *Ladies' Journal* H/373 (1894), p. 3.

42 *Ladies' Journal* H/374 (1894), p. 5.

43 [Callirhoe Parren], 'The women's conferences' [Τα γυναικεία Συνέδρια], *Ladies' Journal* ΙΔ/630 (1900), p. 1. It is notable that the *Ladies' Journal* also published correspondents' reports from other international conferences of this period (Copenhagen, Berlin, Stockholm, Russia etc.).

44 See, for a typical example, Parren's reply to Sevasti Kallisperi: [Callirhoe Parren], 'What Greek women say' [Τι λέγουσιν αι Ελληνίδες], *Ladies' Journal* Θ/414 (1895), pp. 1-2.

45 'Official opening of the International Conference of Women's Works' [Επίσημος έναρξις του Διεθνούς Συνεδίου των Γυναικείων Έργων], *Ladies' Journal* ΙΔ/626 (1900), pp. 1-4; and 'Mrs Parren's speech at the International Conference of the Lyceums in Paris' [Η ομιλία της κ. Κ. Παρρέν εις το Διεθνές Συνέδριον των Αυκείων των

Παρισίων], *Ladies' Journal* 28/1054 (1914), pp. 2601-2605. On the related references to the Chicago conference, see Maria Anastasopoulou, *The moderate apostle of women's emancipation. Callirhoe Parren. The life and works* [*Η συνετή απόστολος της γυναικείας χειραφεσίας. Καλλιρρόν Παρρέν. Η ζωή και το έργο*], (Athens: Heliodromion Publications, not dated), p. 171. Further on this, see Karen Offen, *European Feminisms*, p. 219.

46 C. Parren, 'Prisoners of War, I', *Ladies' Journal* 28/1055 (1914), p. 2618; and 'Male and female feminists', *Ladies' Journal* 30/1081 (1916), p. 3047.

47 'Departure to Chicago of the editor of the Ladies' Journal', *Ladies' Journal* Z/302 (1893), pp. 1-2.

48 As the *Ladies' Journal* is full of references to the 'eastern backwardness' of the neighbouring societies, I am here singling out as entirely indicative two articles which underline the unexpected 'progress' of women in Bulgaria and the Muslim world: C. Parren 'The Bulgarian suffragettes' [Αι Βουλγαρίδες σουφραζέτται], *Ladies' Journal* 26/1020 (1912), pp. 1969-1970; and 'Feminist Ottoman Women' [Φεμινίστριαι Οθωμανίδες], *Ladies' Journal* 28/1048 (1914), pp. 2517-2518. Additionally, see [Callirhoe Parren], 'About the Emancipated' [Διά την Χειραφετημένην], *Ladies' Journal* ΙΔ/648 (1901), pp. 1-3 and ΙΔ/649 (1901), pp. 1-2. On the introduction of the term 'feminist orientalism', see Joyce Zonana, 'The Sultan and the Slave: Feminist Orientalism and the Structure of *Jane Eyre*', Signs 18/3 (1993), pp. 592-617.

49 On this matter, see Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, p. 75.

50 On the extremely short-lived first effort at an international women's cooperation with Switzerland as its centre, see Laurence Klejman, Florence Rochefort, *L'égalité en marche*, p. 32.

51 On the processes that led to the foundation of the International Council of Women, see Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, pp. 15-21; Edith F. Hurwitz, 'The International Sisterhood', in Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz (Eds), *Becoming Visible. Women in European History* (Boston and London: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), pp. 328-333; Karen Offen, *European Feminisms*, p. 175.

52 See, for instance, 'International Women's Conference' [Διεθνές Συνέδριον Γυναικών], *Ladies' Journal* A/50 (1888), p. 7; 'International Women's Conference' [Διεθνές Συνέδριον Γυναικών], *Ladies' Journal* B/67 (1888), pp. 5-6; Maria Gardeli, 'International Women's Conference in Washington' [Διεθνές Συνέδριον Γυναικών εν Ουασιγκτώνι], *Ladies' Journal* B/71 (1888), pp. 4-5. More on this issue in 'International Conference of Women's Societies' [Διεθνές Συνέδριον των Γυναικείων Εταιριών], *Ladies' Journal* ΣΤ/259 (1892), p. 5; Sofia Linar, 'The Paris International Conference of Women's Societies' [Το εν Παρισίοις Διεθνές Συνέδριον των Γυναικείων Εταιριών], *Ladies' Journal* ΣΤ/260 (1892), p. 2; and Maria Marten, 'The results of our conference' [Τα αποτελέσματα του Συνεδρίου μας], *Ladies' Journal* ΣΤ/262 (1892), pp. 1-2.

53 [Callirhoe Parren], 'Our Paris speeches regarding Greek women and our relevant articles' [Οι εν Παρισίοις περί Ελληνίδων λόγοι μας και τα περί αυτών άρθρα μας], *Ladies' Journal* Γ/132 (1889), pp. 2-3; and 'International Conference of Women's Societies' [Διεθνές Συνέδριον των Γυναικείων Εταιριών], *Ladies' Journal* ΣΤ/259 (1892), p. 5.

54 [Callirhoe Parren], 'From Athens to Chicago', *Ladies' Journal* Z/313 (1893), p. 3.

55 Following Parren's return from Chicago, the *Ladies' Journal* constantly published articles on the forthcoming foundation of the Women's Union. For ease of reference, see Maria Anastasopoulou, *The moderate apostle*, pp. 191-204.

56 On the Greek Women's Union, see *Report on the activities of the Greek Women's Union drafted by Callirhoe Parren, Secretary General of the Greek Women's Union. Year 1897 and 1898* [*Έκθεσις των πεπραγμένων υπό της Ενώσεως Ελληνίδων συνταχθείσα υπό Καλλιρρόης Παρρέν, Γενικής Γραμματέως της Ενώσεως των Ελληνίδων. Έτος 1897 και 1898*], Athens, 1899; and Callirhoe Parren, *A year's life*, p. 275 onwards. More on this in Angelika Psarra, 'Mother or Citizen', pp. 94-98; Eleni Fournaraki, 'The Olympism of the ladies: The international Olympic events in Greece (1896, 1906) and the *Ladies' Journal*', in Christina Koulouri (ed.), *Athens, Olympic city* (Athens: International Olympic Academy, 2004).

57 See characteristically, 'The proceedings of the Women's Conference. Day Four' [Αι εργασίαι του Γυναικείου Συνεδρίου. Ημέρα Τετάρτη], *Ladies' Journal* ΙΔ/627 (1900), p. 2, where Parren claims that the programme of the Union of Greek Women is wider than are those of foreign organizations.

58 On the difficulties of the process of setting up a national section, see the processes that led to the foundation of the National Council of French Women, in Laurence Klejman, Florence Rochefort, *L'égalité en marche*, pp. 149-160.

59 [Callirhoe Parren], 'Twenty-five years' [Είκοσι πέντε χρόνια], *Ladies' Journal* 26/1019 (1912), p. 1938. In this article Parren refers to 1906 as the founding year of the National League. (The National League would be silently renamed National Council a few years later.)

60 I am here alluding to the post-war rift between Callirhoe Parren's Lyceum of Greek Women and the National Council. The latter had therefore good reasons for not crediting the leader of an 'opponent' organization with the Council's foundation. See E[ireni] F[otiadou], 'The National Council of Greek Women' [Το Εθνικόν Συμβούλιον των Ελληνίδων Γυναικών], *Greek Woman* [*Ελληνίς*] Α/1 (1921), pp. 3-6; and Penelope M. Kairi, 'Greek women scientists' [Ελληνίδες επιστήμονες], Ibid., Β/2 (1922), pp. 42-44.

61 On this issue see Callirhoe Parren, 'Greek women involved in politics' [Αι πολιτευόμεναι Ελληνίδες], *Ladies' Journal* 24/987 (1910), pp. 1169-1170.

62 See characteristically, 'Mrs Callirhoe Parren's lecture in Parnassos' [Η διάλεξις της κυρίας Καλλιρρόης Παρρέν εις τον Παρνασσόν], *Ladies' Journal* 25/1002 (1911), pp. 1548-1550; 'Mrs C. Parren's speech at the International Conference of the Lyceums in Paris' [Η ομιλία της κ. Κ. Παρρέν εις το Διεθνές Συνέδριον των Λυκείων των Παρισίων], *Ladies' Journal* 28/1054 (1914), pp. 2601-2605, 'Speech at the official opening ceremony by the Secretary-General of the Patriotic League of Greek Women, Mrs C. Parren' [Ομιλία της κ. Κ. Παρρέν Γεν. Γραμματέως Πατρ. Συνδέσμου των Ελληνίδων κατά την επίσημον τελετήν της ενάρξεως], *Ladies' Journal* 28/1059 (1915), pp. 2681-2684. Also, *Account giving of the Patriotic League of Greek Women for the year 1921* [*Λογοδοσία του Πατριωτικού Συνδέσμου των Ελληνίδων του έτους 1921*], Athens, 1922.

63 The International Woman Suffrage Alliance was set up through a division of the International Council, which was validated at the Berlin conference in 1904. See, Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, pp 21-26. The *Ladies' Journal* informed its readers about that conference without however devoting much space to the 'unpleasant' developments. See, 'The Berlin International Conference' [Το Διεθνές Συνέδριον του Βερολίνου], 17/797 (1904), pp. 1-2.

64 See, for instance, the 1916 visit to Athens by Avril de Sainte-Croix, secretary-general of the International Council, as reported in C. Parren, 'A great apostle' [Μία μεγάλη απόστολος], *Ladies' Journal* 29/1077 (1916), pp. 2984-2986; and her 'A foreign woman's opinion on the activities of Greek women' [Η γνώμη μας ξένης διά την δράσιν των Ελληνίδων], *Ladies' Journal* 30/1078 (1916), pp. 2993-2994.

65 See, for example, Maria Kalapothaki, 'The National League of Greek Women' [Ο Εθνικός Σύνδεσμος των Ελληνίδων], *Ladies' Journal* 24/989 (1910), pp. 1232-1236; and 'The International League' [Ο Παγκόσμιος Σύνδεσμος], *Ladies' Journal* 24/992 (1910), pp. 1290-1292.

66 On these developments, see Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, pp. 26-33. Also Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 1915-1965*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965; Carrie A. Foster, *Women and the Warriors. The U.S. Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1946*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995; and Linda K. Schott, *Reconstructing Women's Thoughts. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Before WWI*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.

67 C. Parren, 'The ship-wreck of the pacifists' [Το ναυάγιον των ειρηνοφίλων], *Ladies' Journal* 29/1074 (1915), p. 2922; and, by the same author, 'Are women peace loving?' [Είναι αι γυναίκες φιλειρηνικαί;], *Ladies' Journal* 30/1101 (1917), p. 3362.

68 Relevant reports had been published in *Jus Suffragii*, a magazine of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance. On this, see Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, pp. 86-87.

69 Callirhoe Parren, 'Women and war' [Αι γυναίκες και ο πόλεμος], *Ladies' Journal* 26/1026 (1912), pp. 2122-2124; and 'Speech at the official opening ceremony by the Secretary-General of the Patriotic League of Greek Women, Mrs C. Parren', *Ladies' Journal* 28/1059 (1915), pp. 2681-2684.

70 Christine Bard, *Les filles de Marianne. Histoire des féminismes 1914-1940*, p. 48.

71 C. Parren, 'The ship-wreck of the pacifists'. Parren would subsequently be exiled to Hydra by the Venizelos government, a developments which obviously explains the interrupted publication of the *Ladies' Journal*.

72 On the recomposition of the National Council in August 1919, see E[irini] F[otiades], 'The National Council of Greek Women', and Penelope M. Kairi, 'Greek Women scientists'. On the constitution of the League for the Rights of Greek Women a few months later, see League for the Rights of Greek Women, *On the rights of Greek women. First Year of the League's action 1920*, [*Διά τα δικαιώματα της Ελληνίδος. Α΄ έτος δράσεως του Συνδέσμου 1920*], (not dated); and Avra S. Theodoropoulou, *The International Women's Conference in Geneva* [*Το Διεθνές Γυναικείον Συνέδριον της Γενεύης*], Athens, 1920.

73 On the inter-war feminist currents, see Efi Avdela and Angelika Psarra, *Feminism in Inter-war Greece. An Anthology* [*Ο φεμινισμός στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέμου. Μια ανθολογία*], Athens: Gnosse Publications, 1985; and Angelika Psarra, 'Feminists, socialists, communists: Women and politics in the inter-war years' [Φεμινίστριες, σοσιαλίστριες, κομμουνίστριες: Γυναίτες και πολιτική στο Μεσοπόλεμο], in George T. Mavrogordatos and Christos Hatziiossif (eds), *Venizelism and bourgeois modernization* [*Βενιζελισμός και αστικός εκσυγχρονισμός*], Herakleion: Crete University Press, 1988, pp. 67-82.

74 Anna Papadimitriou, 'Impressions from the Christiania conference' [Εντυπώσεις από το Συνέδριον της Χριστιανίας], *The Greek Woman* [*Ελληνίς*] A/1 (1921), pp. 8-9 (as well as the continuation in latter issues); and Avra Theodoropoulou, *The International Women's Conference in Geneva.*

75 See, *Bulletin of the Lyceum of Greek Women* [*Δελτίον Λυκείου Ελληνίδων*] throughout 1920 and 1921, as well as many relevant pieces in the first volume of *The Greek Woman* [*Ελληνίς*] in 1921, especially the critique by Athina Gaitanou-Gianniou.

76 Unfortunately, the Historical Archives of the Lyceum of Greek Women do not shed light on this matter. We do know, however, that there was wide discrepancy between the various sections of the International Women's League for Peace

and Freedom, due to the especially loose structure of the organization. For instance, apart from the Greek one, the Bulgarian section was also especially 'conservative', whilst the Turkish section even withdrew from the organization at some point. The 1932 visit to Athens of two main executives of the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom, Anita Augspurg and Lida Gustava Heymann, led to the restructuring of the Greek section which brought about C. Parren's honorary 'retirement from service'.

77 The Little Entente of Women (initially named Little Feminist Entente) was a trans-Balkan feminist organization set up on the sidelines of the Rome Conference (1923) within the International Woman Suffrage Alliance.

78 From this point of view, the disappointment by the feminists of the League for Women's Rights with the cancellation of the 1932 Athens conference of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, and its organization in Istanbul in 1935, is indicative of this tendency. The pride with which Avra Theodoropoulou represented the 'women of Europe' in a conference of 'women of the East' in Damascus is also telling. See, Avra S. Theodoropoulou, 'The Conference of Women of the East' [Το Συνέδριο των Γυναικών της Ανατολής], *The Struggle of Woman* [*Ο Αγώνας της Γυναίκας*], ΣΤ/122-123 (1930), pp. 1-3.

Constituting the Modern Family as the Social in the Transition from Empire to Nation-State

Nükhet Sirman

Introduction

An anonymous reader of *Asar-ı Nisvan* (Women's Works), in a letter to the journal in January 1924, declares daringly that he is not married and has no intention of doing so for the simple reason that he can find no woman to marry. He goes on to explain: "Unfortunately our girls' training, especially in these last few generations, does not produce housewives, that is, women who deserve to be married, who bring happiness to the hearth." In his opinion, what women of all classes are enamoured of is luxury, wealth, tea parties, and the like. The next issue of the journal published an angry response: "What needs to be criticized these days is not the women, but the men. Not only do they want to marry rich women, but they also want them to be beautiful, speak at least three languages, and play the piano!" These pieces are among many discussing marriage and the family in the context of gender identities that were published in the monthly Istanbul magazines which began to proliferate after World War 1.[1] The educated elite classes in Ottoman and early republican Turkey had discovered the short-essay form to vent their opinions on all aspects of social and political life in their country. This genre, having its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, really came into its own after the declaration of the Second Constitution in 1908. Both men and women of the educated elite classes enthusiastically adopted this literary form to express their views of the changes they were observing in the society around them.

In this paper, I shall trace the genealogy of some of the arguments that appeared in the transition from empire to nation-state with respect to gender and the family. I contend that the nature of intimate relations and the social institution within which they could be regulated constitutes a crucial aspect of the political regime that the nation-state finally put in place. Intimate

relations became a topic of discussion in new genres of writing that began to appear in the Ottoman Empire from the 1860s onwards: the short newspaper article, the play, the novel, and finally monthly magazines and journals are all forms that became possible through printing technology. Both the form and the content of these writings attest to the new ways in which the Ottoman intelligentsia began to think about their polity and the place of the concerned subject within it.

Changes in family structure and the social role of women are issues already analyzed by numerous researchers, but always as adjuncts to the change in the political regime rather than as located at the heart of this change. The texts on which I base myself have also served in most of these studies as the chief source of information. Their content was either thought to reflect existing social relations or, at best, the predominance in those texts of questions of love, marriage, and the proper expression of femininity was taken as forming an analogy to the affairs of state. As the state is a form of governance, the argument goes, so is the family, and the *Tanzimat*[2] authors and thinkers wrote about the latter because under the despotic regime of Abdülhamit II, they could not write about the former.[3]

The anxieties related to intimate issues did not disappear with the declaration of liberty and freedom in 1908, nor after the establishment of the republic. On the contrary, articles on this topic went on proliferating, as did the publications that carried them. I shall try to show that turning the family and the kind of emotions supposed to structure it into an analogy of relations with the state is a function of the transformation from empire to nation-state. It is only when politics is separate from kinship, when there is a public sphere that is distinct from the family as the seat of the private, that such an analogy becomes possible. Furthermore, I shall also try to show that women find a space in this public sphere where they can articulate their own opinion only when issues relating to the position of women in society begin to be seen as a social rather than a political issue.

These texts on which I base my arguments raise a number of questions of both form and content that need to be elucidated. Firstly, the genres themselves allow a person's opinion to be expressed. Even in novels or short stories, where events related to other people are narrated, the narrator's point of view is in dialogue with other, different views, so that each character or the narrator's voice turns out to be what Bakhtin calls a particular language or a normative standpoint.[4] The normative positions analyzed in this paper describe and legitimate a way of organizing intimate relations. These positions have not only become the dominant form of making sense of familial relations, but they have also been institutionalized in the Turkish republic through various legal, educational, and economic practices. As a result, these new forms now enjoy the status of common-sense normality, and deviations from them are seen as such. The discourses legitimizing these norms derive from a combination of nationalism and developmentalism,

with the result that any deviations from them are classed as remnants of tradition.[5] It is therefore with the aim of tracing a process of making a particular practice legitimate and normative that this paper turns to the texts in question and sees them as constituting the family as the modern form of regulating intimate relations.

The House as a Type of Social Structure

To situate the organization of intimate relations within the polity, the terms house and family have to be divested of their seemingly universal meanings. Ottoman society was based on the house rather than the family as the structure that organized intimate relations. Feelings of loyalty and affection were fostered by ties of dependency that existed between the heads of households and their dependents (not necessarily kinsmen), as well as between heads of households who were linked with each other through hierarchical relations of patronage and paternalism. A host of terms depicting kinship and household office were used to signal this hierarchy. The anthropological concept of kin-based society can be used to build a model of Ottoman society. In kin-based societies, relations cast as filiation and affinity regulate most of the social interactions including politics and economics. Kinship acts as a social code that defines social position as well as rights and obligations among the society's members. Since, however, the Ottoman polity was definitely ruled by politics, we should replace the term kin-based society with the term house society when describing a polity wherein it is large houses that provide the units ordering social relations.[6] These houses constitute the basic authority structure within which everyday life can unfold in an orderly and predictable way. In both urban and rural Turkey, the house (*hane*) usually refers to people who live under one roof and make up a single unit of production and consumption.[7] Topkapı, the largest house of the land, stands at the apex of all the others. All social relations, including marriage and familial relations, are ultimately political since they regulate codes of belonging to the houses. Appellations indicating service to the house (keeper of the door, coffeemaker, etc.) are used in addition to the idiom of kinship which they often override, to depict and organize relations both within and between houses. As amply discussed by anthropologists, the honour code serves to control dependents, both male and female, as well as serving to denote social position as argued by Charles Taylor.[8] Sexuality, to which the honour code primarily relates, becomes a means of controlling relations among dependents, as well as controlling the reproduction of the house.[9]

Critiques of the House

After the *Tanzimat* reforms, critics of social and political organization began to question these ties of dependency, especially those linking men to men.[10] Influenced by the emphasis in the French Revolution on equality (initially

understood as the equality between men), these critics saw in the house and its complex structure the source of all injustice and inequalities. As shown by Mardin, the Young Ottomans were especially critical of the power of the newly emerging bureaucracy, and to back up their criticisms, used the concepts of liberty and equality and adapted them to what they considered to be traditional and therefore legitimate forms of governance.[11]

The Young Ottomans were also pioneers in new literary genres. Namık Kemal in particular was held in high esteem by his peers as a man of letters and an expert in European and Ottoman literary forms. He was virtually alone in arguing that the best way to introduce European literature was not through direct translations, but by producing culturally meaningful texts using European techniques. He thought that such literature would help form the character of the Ottoman citizen and introduce the idea of free speech and patriotic consciousness. He himself wrote two novels and a number of plays trying to adapt Corneille's classics (such as *Le Cid*) into Ottoman and Islamic historical contexts. He was critical of the fantastic events that were the staple of traditional Ottoman stories and fables, and praised the realism of European novels. His own were influenced by Victor Hugo's romanticism and his plots sought to exalt virtues such as honour, loyalty and high moral standards of conduct. In his works, honour and sexuality are linked directly. In *Intibah* (The Awakening) for example, two forms of sexuality are juxtaposed: an illicit and consuming passion and a quiet, dutiful sexuality found in the arms of the slave girl purchased for the hero by his mother. Influenced by Hugo's play *Le Roi s'Amuse*,[12] the novel ends with the slave girl sacrificing her life for the hero (as did Rigoletto's daughter), thus dramatically showing that devotion to family and duty are the essence of a good life. I have argued elsewhere that these novels and especially his play *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (The Nation) can be read as critiques of the despotism of the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats, whose illegitimate rule is depicted through the injustice of fathers towards their dependents.[13] I have tried to show that love as a deep and total emotion is used to delegitimize the marriages arranged by heads of households without consulting the parties concerned. Although the European plays and novels that Kemal admired also show the devastating effects of this emotion, I have argued that the love depicted in his plays is to be seen as part of a divine design which must not be contradicted– an idea that has its sources in Sufi belief. In producing a hybrid notion of love, Kemal is able to talk about what he considers to be the right form of attachment between persons.

In a short article entitled '*Aile*' (the Family), published in the daily newspaper *İbret* in 1872, Namık Kemal lists all the ills he sees in the family: wife battering, women constantly demanding money to purchase cloaks, fathers not allowing their sons to choose their own careers, mothers treating their daughters as commodities to be sold, mothers-in-law constantly

bickering with their daughters-in-law over trifles, and so on. The picture is one of total discord within the family. The last few sentences are instructive: "Are we going to educate our children by not acknowledging their own rights? Are we going to realize the nation's independence by selling our own independence for a few pennies? Are we going to contribute to the comfort of the nation by removing comfort from our own houses (*hane*)?" These rhetorical questions are followed by a severe reminder: "The houses of a domain (*mülk*) are like the rooms of a house; can comfort exist in houses where each room is the scene of a perpetual hatred and squabble? ... Awake, awake, and see that we keep risking the safety of our boat with our never-ending disorderly conduct and then we blame the wind."[14] In this passage, relations in the house/domain are compared to relations in the house/rooms, clearly showing that the house is the pivot of order and government in Ottoman society. And, although the article is entitled "The Family", the author only talks about houses, an indication that he sees no important difference between the two terms.

The use of analogy, in itself a novelty in the Empire, indicates new ways of conceptualizing the polity. I believe that this analogy shows the beginning of the emergence of the idea of the social as an arena for political intervention. Diverse acts are related to each other, however implicitly, through notions of harmony, and the totality that allows these relations to be imagined is the nation. Even here Kemal is going back and forth between the old and new concepts of the polity, *vatan* (nation) and *mülk* (domain), but whichever polity he is analyzing, his concern is with the nature of relations between the ruler and the ruled and the effects it will have on order and harmony in the totality.

In his other articles Namık Kemal discusses various issues that produce or hinder the existence of harmony in what in due time came to be seen as social issues: the education of children, law and justice, which European ideas to import, the meaning of nation, of progress, free speech, public opinion, and the like. Writing in 1867 in the newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar* on the education and training of women, he complains that the women are ignorant and unaware of what goes on in the world as well as of their own rights and duties. This means that they are not able to properly educate their children according to the culture, mores and morals of the country. Children in the hands of such women become spoiled, unable to cope with life or to improve the morals and the wealth of the nation. He wants women to be educated in the arts of child education, domestic science, and proper morality. Issues of love and marriage do not figure much in these writings. What is at stake is the political order, the ways in which a just monarch can put his house in order, and the cultural configurations which would create responsible, enlightened, and patriotic subjects. Rather then as mere analogies, issues relating to house and family are seen by Namık Kemal as being directly related to how the country is to be ruled with justice. The

social thus emerged as a new dimension to consider for reform, a domain distinct from and yet strongly linked to questions of state.

The Separation of the Social from the Political

By the 1890s, however, issues of marriage and the family had become questions of social reform more than of government proper. The first women's magazines began to appear at this time, and women themselves timidly but gradually started writing articles themselves. The contrast between the style of these pieces and that of the first novel ever written by a woman in the Ottoman Empire is striking. Zafer Hanım's novel, *Aşk-ı Vatan* (Love of the Motherland) was published in 1877 and was prefaced by a profuse apology in which the author asks forgiveness for having dared to put pen to paper as a woman. But, she argues, it is the nature of the topic that will excuse her boldness. In this novel, politics are only indirectly linked to women's suffering. The novel tells the story of a slave girl in a large Ottoman house who goes through many adventures in order to return to Spain, her motherland. In the novel, women of upper-class Ottoman houses tell each other of these adventures with understanding and sympathy, suggesting that they, too, perhaps feel exiled from their "motherland" when they are brought to these large houses as brides.[15] In the last decade of the century, however, intimate relations and their regulation, as well as issues regarding women's proper place in society were addressed more directly but were taken up mainly as social rather than political issues that at most affect the nature of national identity.

Fatma Aliye Hanım, daughter of the statesman Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, is the first recognized woman novelist of the Ottoman Empire. Experimenting with different genres of writing such as the novel, the essay, books on philosophy, science, and history, Fatma Aliye represents one of the Empire's most erudite women. In an article published in *Yeni Mecmua* in 1917 entitled "*Kadın Nedir?*" (What is Woman?), she explains gender equality on the basis of anthropological arguments. Humans develop according to the conditions of their existence, she argues, and therefore in hunting and gathering societies women have the same bodily build and strength as men since both live in the same way. Quoting anthropological research in Tasmania and Malabar, she discusses the diversity of family types in the world. Using Bachofen's and Engels' schema, she provides a history of the evolution of the family from matriarchy to patriarchy and the enslavement of women, citing the French Revolution as a time when women's rights were put on the political agenda. She then lauds Islam for providing women with rights that were denied them at the time, and archaic Turkic societies for having instituted male-female equality. Woman, she concludes, is a category of humanity, just like youth.

The discourse put forward here by Fatma Aliye Hanım is strikingly different from that of Namık Kemal's work. It says very little about real or

imagined Ottoman traditions, nor is there any reference to society as a whole. Aside from a fleeting mention of Islam's virtues, the tone is dry and matter-of-fact. European science (i.e. anthropological conjecture) is cited in the same breath as the attitude of Islam to gender equality. Her earlier work is more in line with her predecessor's. In her *Taaddüd-i Zevcat'a Zeyl*, (Complement to Polygamy), a reply to Mahmut Esat Efendi who had earlier argued that Islam required polygamy, Fatma Aliye uses Islamic texts (the Koran, the Sunna and the *hadith*[16] as well as books on jurisprudence) to prove that polygamy in Islam is not a requirement but simply permitted in certain conditions. This harks back to Namık Kemal's exaltation of a timeless and just Ottoman order. Fatma Aliye too is concerned with defining the essentials of Islam as a just and timeless moral order. It is the personal aspects of this morality that she wants women to enjoy in a society that is in the throes of rapid social change. In her book *Nisvan-ı Islam* (Women of Islam) published in 1891-2, she creates scenes where European and Ottoman women discuss the traditions and beliefs about marriage and family life in Ottoman Turkey.[17] The points of view of European women travelers are accurately rendered in this text, but more importantly, the prejudice, ignorance, and curiosity of Europeans regarding the reality concerning intimate matters in the East is corrected, satisfied, and argued through point by point. This text is testimony of the extent to which at least some Ottomans were able to look at themselves from a European perspective.

By this time, and partly because the existing despotic regime was bent on suppressing political opposition, the questions that were hotly debated in Ottoman intellectual circles had less to do with the structure of the house and more with the nature of intimate relationships. The intensely political climate of the time had the effect of further divorcing relations within the house from relations within the polity, with the result that familial arrangements were seen to constitute social rather than political issues. The nature of marriage, polygamy, and repudiation constituted the main subjects that were raised in newspapers and magazines. It seems that questioning the relations regulated by the house brought a whole set of practices to intellectual attention only as categories of the social among which no connection could be traced. Instead of reinstating the relations that held the house together, as Namık Kemal expected, these discussions tore them apart without considering (as he did) the fabric of society as a whole.

In 1897-98, Fatma Aliye Hanım published a short book entitled *Levayih-i Hayat* (Scenes from Life).[18] Consisting of ten letters written by women to their friends, the book testifies to women's misery and despair in unhappy marriages. This is squarely blamed on the way marriages are arranged: by contracts based on interest organized by the guardians of the young women involved, without any concern for her consent or the character of the two people involved. In the letter of the sole woman who is married happily, matrimony is described as a most serious step in the lives of young people

(and especially women). Rather than wealth or social standing, personal character is specified as a central issue in marriage which is defined as the chief source of happiness (or otherwise) in all of a woman's life. Couples should share the same view of life, enjoy the same pleasures and above all derive the same satisfaction from each other's presence. The term used to define this kind of intimacy is *muhabbet*, a term which can be translated as "love" only by losing many of its connotations. This is the quiet, contented kind of love or loving enjoyed by individuals with similar goals in life. *Muhabbet* also includes talking to one another, an essential way of sharing; it is a much more intellectual than emotional kind of love or loving, and is based on reason and moderation, but it too enjoins wives to provide the husband with a genuine haven from a heartless world by attending to all his needs.

These concerns point to a different form of government from that articulated by Namık Kemal. In the house society, sexuality is the basic tie that regulates relations between houses. In its potential for procreation, sexuality does not involve the person in his or her totality. The married woman continues to represent her own house and thus becomes the means through which alliances between strong houses can be established. If it is agreed with Marcel Mauss and Marshall Sahlins that relations between equals can be maintained only through competition, then marriage can be seen as a way of keeping that competition within regulated boundaries. In the case of marriage between unequal partners (which in fact is the majority of marriages among the ruling classes where, as shown by Duben and Behar, women married hypogamously), marriage is the means through which the dominant party can control and monitor the actions of its clients.[19] In any case, marriage in the house society was based on antagonism and regulated by sexuality. The antagonism was due to the structural incompatibility between the primacy of the principle of agnation (descent through male links only), and the dependence on sexual relations with outsiders, i.e, women, to perpetuate agnatic continuity over time. Different agnatic systems resort to different strategies to minimize and contain this antagonism. So, the Berbers of the Western Egyptian desert use marriage with patrilineal women to keep the supremacy of agnation;[20] the Ottoman dynasty created the fiction of marriages within the confines of the house by marrying slave women from the harem.[21]

In the novel *Intibah*, Namık Kemal makes sexuality colour all relations among men and women. Both the slave girl and the *femme fatale* are involved with the hero through sexuality rather than love –with the difference being that the former relation is presented as legitimate and therefore as being able to bring out the good in the hero, whereas the latter is illegitimate and leads to his downfall. There is scant mention of love between the hero and the women. Since the slave, by definition, cannot belong to any house except that of her owner, no real antagonism can exist between her and the hero,

for whom she means very little until the end of the novel when she sacrifices her life for him.

By contrast, the kind of love discussed by Fatma Aliye is based on amity and affect rather than antagonism. It is through the emotion of loving that the individual realizes full personhood. The two people forming the couple are no longer representatives of the larger houses they come from, but the nucleus of a new, independent household unit. People other than the couple are seen as superfluous to this relation, both in terms of organizing the marriage and in regulating marital life and come to be defined as outsiders. While Namık Kemal brings new concepts like self and emotion to delineate a new code of conduct, he nevertheless retains the notions of honour and virtue, essential for discussing the individual's position in society, and does not dispose of them, but articulates them with the new. Honour now serves to make the individual cognizant of his/her duty within marriage and the family rather than applying only to sexual conduct. Sexuality becomes amity (*muhabbet*), so allowing the fiction of agnation to continue to dominate familial relations.

In Fatma Aliye's book these changes appear simply as desires expressed by Ottoman women. They are how upper class women imagine intimate relations, an imaginary having been shaped by European romantic novels in translation as well as the critiques of the house put forward by Namık Kemal and his successors. But rather than merely echoing these desires, Fatma Aliye places them in dialogue with the perceived culture and identity of the prevailing society. She attempts to curb the wild dreams of luxury and pleasure that are rife among young women of her class. Her version of love is not an exact copy of that found in Dumas' *La Dame Aux Camelias*. It is not based on the pursuit of individual satisfaction but on the desire to build a harmonious home that will produce rational, patriotic and moral children, who can keep away from the excesses of their times (as Namık Kemal had desired twenty years earlier). National identity and the desire to align emotions with this identity therefore are both behind this kind of textual practice. The social is imagined and constituted in such texts as standing alongside the political, rather than as having anything to do with structuring it.

The desires articulated in these texts were extremely potent, in the sense that they eventually produced subjects who put an end to the house society. They portray the formation of what has come to be called the nuclear family, based on love and affection between the conjugal couple whose intimacy becomes a private affair. Kinship and politics are evicted from the house which thereby becomes a home. And the rule of the father, whether just or unjust is exchanged for the rule of the husband. For the women who relinquish paternal protection for the purpose of setting up an independent household, it is now the character and honour of the husband that becomes a critical issue. In Namık Kemal's critiques of the post-*Tanzimat* political

order, we are told that women are asked to relinquish their father in order to make men equal. These texts, read avidly by upper-class women, produced subjects who wished to align their emotions in the way described, as attested to by the short autobiography written by Nezihe Muhiddin, one of the first women activists of Ottoman and republican Turkey.[22]

It is in the context of these arguments and changes concerning how Ottoman subjects regarded the family that we need to situate the criticism voiced in the introductory paragraph to this essay. In 1917, the government of the Young Turks promulgated an act that provided women with some guarantees against polygamy and repudiation. The law, however, was repealed a year later without ever having been put into practice. With the declaration of the republic in 1923, in fact, four months preceding its formal declaration, an organization calling itself The Women's People Party (*Kadınlar Halk Fırkası*) was established. Later changing its name to the Turkish Women's Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*), this organization vociferously claimed social and political rights for women.[23] In proliferating publications that were clearly turning into a popular press, women who were members of this organization or sympathetic to it denounced polygamy and repudiation as well as arranged marriages. After the declaration of the republic, the Turkish National Assembly decided to broach a revision of the 1917 Family Act. Parliamentary commissions, one secular and the other religious (*adliyye ve şerriyye encümenleri*), were established to study what changes could be made. While the commissions were working on the project, the Women's People Party tried to put pressure on them to ensure that the women's demands for the abolition of polygamy and repudiation would be met. A meeting at the offices of the Turkish Hearths[24] early in 1924, was attended by about 300 women. The leader of the Women's party, Nezihe Muhiddin, opened the conference by stating that polygamous marriages did not produce patriotic children. She argued that in a secular republic that did not exclude women from the national community women had to have equality with men in marriage, divorce, and inheritance.[25] For all that, it was decided by the majority that women of all classes of the new republic were not yet ready to enjoy equal rights with men, especially in the domain of divorce. The Istanbul press covered this meeting extensively, and the commission seemed willing to incorporate the women's demands in its draft. In the end, however, the government was reluctant to accept the changes proposed by the commission. Fatma Aliye Hanım joined the discussion in an article published in a special issue of the magazine *Süs*, and argued that feminism was a necessity of the times. The commissions were dissolved, and it was decided to regulate personal law only as part of civil law. A new commission was set up to work on drafting a civil code that was finally ratified by parliament in December 1926.[26]

It is in this context that a series of heated articles was published in the periodical *Resimli Ay*. The women's vociferous intervention in the affairs of

government was derisively condemned in many quarters. One author describes women as nothing more than frivolous consumers, another responds by denigrating men. I would suggest that this war of the sexes was the product of serious anxiety about the scope and content of the new social order that was then fast becoming reality. In these uncertain times, neither masculinity nor femininity meant what they had meant earlier, spouses did not know how to relate to one another, nor were expectations harmonious. It seems that the regime of love and affect that was introduced to dissolve the big houses of the old order could not, at least for the time being, in any way regulate the conduct of intimacy. Guidance in the matter was sought from a variety of sources. Şeyh-ülzade Ahmet Muhtar, in an article in the magazine *Süs*, looks at the example of both Europe and the Islamic tradition in order to formulate an opinion on the question of divorce and polygamy. What strikes the reader more than the content of what he says is how he says it, the uncertainty of his voice.[27] As seen in the case of Fatma Aliye, anthropology continues to be a favourite source of inspiration and legitimation for those trying to provide women with greater rights within the family. Ağaoğlu Nezir in 1926 summarizes the evolutionary lore of the time, drawing particularly on Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* as well as on Henry Maine's study of the Roman family.[28] In a tone that was to characterize all subsequent discourses on women, the author states that the essential characteristic of the Turkish woman is self-sacrifice. In the past, women had sacrificed themselves for their families out of instinct, today they knew how to use their reason to do so consciously and deliberately (*şuur*).

The constitution of the family as a sociological rather than political issue continued throughout the early years of the republic. One of the most important ways through which the family was defined as a social institution was by associating the governance of the family with women's issues. The women themselves contributed to this by appropriating questions such as divorce and polygamy as matters concerning primarily themselves. The introduction of scientific evidence, anthropological or medicinal, added to this process.[29] Necmettin Sadık, for example, a sociologist who had read Durkheim's sociology, wrote numerous short articles in popular journals, all showing how it was society itself that regulated the various forms of behaviour, and that it was normal (and natural) that such behaviour changed in accordance with changes in society. In one of these pieces he argued that the new morality was to be rational, no longer emotional morality as in the past, and defined it as a secular morality.[30] Another way of relegating familial issues to the social domain was through proliferating classifications of typologies of women and the family. A favourite way of constructing these typologies was on the basis of the neighbourhoods of Istanbul. Each was seen as corresponding to a particular social class and therefore to a different organization of the family and of the women's position within it.[31] Other

authors preferred to use social categories directly: rich families, middle class families where life was uneventful (*sakin*), and finally poor and destitute families.[32] Some of the typologies were based on women's characters: for instance the natural woman versus the artificial woman. Examples from European and American society, freely used in these popular pieces and without regard to context were employed to define femininity and the family as a distinct institution with its own evolutionary trajectory.

Conclusion

The transformation in the attitudes, wishes, and desires regarding the meaning and form of marriage amounted to what can be called a new imaginary of the family. I have tried to show that this imaginary was the product of increasing discontent in Ottoman society with the type of political rule succeeding the *Tanzimat* reforms. This discontent led to the discovery of the social as an organic whole (later developed in Ziya Gökalp and Necmettin Sadık's popularizations of Durkheimian sociology), and of the nation as an imagined community. The thoughts, character, emotions, in short the very subjectivity of the Ottoman citizen was laid bare for scrutiny and deemed in need of reform. In the 1924 discussions regarding legal reform, authors made it clear that the law had to take into account not only familial practices among the elites (*havas*), but especially among the people (*avam*). New literary genres such as the play and the novel, as well as newspaper articles served to provide citizens with material with which they could make such reforms in their lives themselves, or help reform others through philanthropic activities.

But as argued by Chatterjee, these encounters with European forms produced constant uneasiness in terms of authenticity and difference. These anxieties focused particularly on new ways of constructing masculinity and femininity, and the new kinds of desires depicted in European romantic novels. The Turkish novels and magazine articles were written in a deliberate effort to produce local, culturally acceptable counterparts, yet it is through these texts and the subjectivities they helped to constitute that the order of the house was transformed into the family. Namık Kemal may not have thought he was using the house as an analogy of the nation, but in the end his ideas became instrumental in changing the political regime itself as well as relegating the family to the private sphere. The republic, based on equality among men as heads of (small) houses whose political dependence on one another had been abolished (at least formally), required the citizen to be loyal to it and to love it over and above any other attachment. The independence of the conjugal unit was proclaimed in all legality and the dissolution of the house sealed by the civil code of 1926 and the Surname Law of 1934. The citizen could now become a subject ruled not by kinship ties and loyalties, but through his own sentiments: love for family and country. Thereafter, the nuclear family composed of mother, father, and children

became the norm; other forms were seen as "traditional", and familial issues regarded as having nothing to do with politics. Kinship ties between nuclear units, the quasi gender segregation of social life, the salience of concepts of honour in controlling women's conduct, and the persistence of the dominance of filiation over conjugality in defining marriage, could now be explained and exalted as a sign of national identity among the elite, and castigated as traditional where the lower classes were concerned.

NOTES

1 These articles are included in the appendix of Birsen Talay, *The Changes in Turkish Family Structure between the Years 1923-1930.* Unpublished M.A. dissertation, Boğaziçi University, Department of History, 1994. The translation is mine.

2 *Tanzimat* refers to the changes introduced in 1839 according to which all subjects of the realm were decreed equal *vis-a-vis* the law.

3 See Deniz Kandiyoti, 'Slave Girls, Temptresses and Comrades: Images of Women in the Turkish Novel,' *Feminist Issues*, 8,1, 1988, pp. 33-50.

4 See M. M. Bakhtin *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin, Texas: Texas University Press, 1981), pp.331-366.

5 Deviations from these norms are common among all social classes in Turkish society but become invisible among the middle classes while underlined and used as explanation for behavior by these middle classes when it is a question of the urban poor. For an account of the ways in which these deviations become invisible when perpetrated by the elites, see D. Koğacıoğlu *Law in Context: Citizenship and Reproduction of Inequality in an Istanbul Courthouse,* (unpublished PhD thesis, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2003).

6 See Joyce, R.A. and Gillespie, S.D. (eds.) *Beyond Kinship. Social and Marital Reproduction in House Societies,* University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. Levi-Strauss is the only anthropologist to develop the house (*maison*) and house-based society (*société à maisons*) as analytical categories, defining the house as a type of social structure comparable to the lineage, clan or family. For Levi-Strauss the house was primarily "a long-lived property-owning social unit" where this property could be material, like the house itself, or immaterial, such as names, titles and myths of origin. It is for these property rights and status that competition within and between houses emerged and expressed in the language of kinship and affinity or both. See Gillespie, S. D. 'Beyond Kinship. An Introduction,' in Joyce and Gillespie, op. cit., p. 7.

7 For the different definitions provided to the term *hane* in Turkish sociology, see A. Duben 'Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Ottoman-Turkish Family and Household Structure' in T. Erder (ed.) *Family in Turkish Society Sociological and Legal Studies* (Ankara: Turkish Social Studies Association, 1985), pp. 107-110. However, most of the definitions he cites and the one he finally subscribes to are economic in nature, and ignore the fact that a *hane* was primarily defined by the presence of its head and the authority relations that his existence made possible.

8 For the concept of honour as identity in traditional society, see C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition' in A. Gutmann (ed.) *Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1994. See L. Abu-Lughod *Veiled*

Sentiments. Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (Austin, Texas: Texas University Press), 1986 for an account of how honor operates to keep dependents under control.

9 See L. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem. Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford University Press, 1993.

10 See Ş. Mardin *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) for an analysis of the changes this decree introduced in social and political relations in Ottoman society.

11 Ibid.

12 İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, 'Namık Kemal'in Romancılığı ve Romanları,' in *Namık Kemal Hakkında*, prepared for publication by the Language, History and Geography Faculty, Ankara University, Institute of Turkish Language and Literature publications, 1942, pp. 81-125.

13 See Sirman, N. 'Gender Construction and Nationalist Discourse: Dethroning the Father in the Early Turkish Novel,' in Acar, F. And Güneş-Ayata, A. (eds.) *Gender and Identity Construction. Women of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey*, Brill, 2000, pp. 162-176.

14 In Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (ed.) *Namık Kemal Antolojisi* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi), 1942, pp. 55-56.

15 See Zafer Hanım *Aşk-ıVatan* (Istanbul: Oğlak yayınları), 1994. The equation assumed by the author between motherland and the house shows that the largest community imaginable is the house and that only a house can be the object of emotional attachment.

16 *Hadith* are the sayings of the prophet Mohammad considered in Islamic tradition to constitute a form of law second only to the word of God as established in the Koran.

17 *Fatma Aliye Hanım Yaşamı- Sanatı- Yapıtları* ve Nisvan-ı İslam, prepared for publication by Mübeccel Kızıltan, (Istanbul: Mutlu yayıncılık), 1993.

18 Fatma Aliye, *Hayattan Sahneler (levayih-i hayat)*, translated from Ottoman into modern Turkish by Tülay Gençtürk Demircioğlu, (Istanbul:Boğaziçi University Press), 2002, and into English by myself.

19 See A. Duben and C. Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

20 See L. Abu-Lughod, *Veiled Sentiments. Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society* (Austin, Texas: Texas University Press, 1986).

21 See Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem.*

22 Nezihe Muhiddin describes in passionate prose the effects on her of reading both Fatma Aliye and Namık Kemal with her governess in the secrecy of their rooms under Hamidian rule. See N. Muhiddin *Türk Kadını* (Istanbul: Numune Matbaası), 1931.

23 For an account of the political history of this organization, see Yaprak Zihnioğlu, *Kadınsız İnkılap Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği,* (Istanbul: Metis yayınları), 2003.

24 The Turkish Hearths were founded in 1912 by a group of military medical school students in order to uphold and protect the Turkish element of the flailing Ottoman Empire. They quickly became the seat of Turkish nationalist activism. See Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931,* (İstanbul: İletişim), 1997.

25 Ibid., p.143.

26 Ibid., p. 144.

27 *Süs,* 2 February 1340 (1924), pp. 4-7. I would like to thank Murat Es for translating

this and the subsequent articles from the original into Turkish.

28 Ağaoğlu, N. 'Ailede Kadın' *Hayat Dergisi*, 17 February 1926.

29 Physicians were considered to be authorities on women's questions. As early as 1878 the daily *Ikdam* carried an article that referred to medical viewpoints especially on matters such as the education of children and social morality. See 'Terbiye-Nisvan,' *Ikdam*, 24 August 1878.

30 See N. Sadık 'Yeni Ahlak' *Hayat Dergisi*, 17 February 1926.

31 See for example 'Bugünkü Türk Kadınları', *Resimli Ay*, 3 April 1340 (1924). The author of this piece is not named but probably was Sabiha Sertel, a woman trained as a social worker in the USA and long-time editor of the magazine.

32 M. Vehbi 'Kadın Ailenin En Pahalı Uzvudur', *Resimli Ay*, 5 June 1340 (1924).

"Cooking" the Nation: Women, Experiences of Modernity, and the Girls' Institutes in Turkey

Zafer Yenal

Introduction

When Ankara was declared the now capital city of Turkey in 1925, the task of building it was given to European architects. Most of the earliest structures of the republican capital, such as ministries, government buildings, sports facilities, university departments, and some of the oldest high-schools were designed by German, Austrian, Swiss, French, or Italian architects. Among them, the building of the İsmet Paşa Girls' Institute (now Zübeyde Hanım Girls' Vocational School), which stands next to the Radio Ankara building on the main boulevard (Atatürk Boulevard) running through the central city, is noticeable for its clearly modernist architectural aesthetic. Resting on "a more 'modern' composition of horizontals and verticals, rounded corners, and asymmetrical arrangements", the architectural design of this building carries the signs of "austere, heavy, and official-looking modernism".[1] Its design, and its location on the boulevard connecting the original National Assembly building in Ulus (the Nation Square) with the presidential residence in Çankaya, signified a central place in the modernization project, one that was marked by Western symbols and aspirations from its inception. This article will relate what transpired in that building until the 1970s. By focusing on the teaching of cooking and changing food-consumption practices since the 1930s, the construction of the identity of "modern women" will be examined, and the introduction of new notions of domesticity.

My main thesis revolves around the experience(s) of modernity. I shall argue that the reconstitution of the women's role through emulating Western norms facilitated the development of new ideals, forms and norms of domesticity as an integral part of the modernization project. I also suggest that this process has had important implications for the emergence of class,

status, and gender codes, and contributed to the construction of social hierarchies in the republican period. Focusing on the example of girls' institutes, I shall try to show how various "modern" categories, particularly in the realm of eating and cooking,[2] were defined, constructed and promoted by the state. Through educational institutions, but mostly through the girls' institutes, the state sought to inculcate in women modern practices and values pertaining to nutrition, healthy eating, proper table manners etc., in addition to other dimensions of domesticity. However, there has never been a fixed definition of the modern, and the understanding of "being modern" and its discursive production have changed over time in response to larger social and economic processes. As will become clear below, during the 1930s and 1940s modernity in the kitchen and at the dinner table were associated with Western manners and the ability to cook "European" dishes, whereas in the 1950s the symbolism of modernity turned to health and hygiene.

Although the popularity of the girls' institutes declined after the 1970s under pressure from market forces, one can say that they historically contributed to the development of a shared ground in middle-class perceptions and practices of cooking. Hence, new norms of domesticity that were promoted through the educational institutions of the state eventually became important signifiers of middle-class status and cultural taste in Turkish society. Therefore, a sub-text of what will be said in the following pages describes the institutional dimensions of the historical development of a middle-class *habitus* regarding domestic manners, cooking and eating. I believe that in order to understand various aspects of the intermingling of class and gender issues, and their articulation with modernization-from-above, it is first necessary to examine the place of women within the modernization and nationalist projects. This investigation, which is the theme of the following section, will locate the centrality of women's education in Turkey within the modernizing vision of the state.

The "Women's Question", Nationalism, and the State: A Comparison

The symbiotic existence of modernization and nationalist projects has been a central theme in the literature on nation-building processes in the periphery.[3] The gender blindness in theories of nationalism, the failure to see the gender question both as a constituting and constituted element of nationalist projects, has recently come under criticism by feminist scholars.[4] They have underlined women's active cultural and political participation in the forming of nation-states, as well as the impact of nationalist institutions on the constitution of gender roles and the domestic sphere.[5]

Partha Chatterjee's book *The Nation and its Fragments*, on the development of anti-colonial nationalism in India, has inspired studies that argue for a gendered understanding of nations and nationalism.[6] Chatterjee introduces a new dimension to the question of nationalism and modernization by

underlining the gender(ed) articulation of these projects in a post-colonial context. His main concern is to explain how the so-called women's question was articulated with nationalist politics in India. Nationalism's answer to the position of women in modern society was predicated on "a difference with the perceived forms of cultural modernity in the West". Only through establishing such a difference, which is based on the "discovery of 'tradition'", would the selective appropriation of Western modernity in line with the nationalist project be possible. In this process, while the *material* aspects of Western civilization in relation to science, technology, economic organization and state administration were to be adopted without any hesitation, the *spiritual* domain had to be protected from encroachments. The latter was the sphere where the East could claim its superiority and distinctiveness, and where the inner core of the national culture and identity lay. In this formulation of the nationalist project "the crucial requirement was to retain the inner spirituality of indigenous life. The principal site for expressing the spiritual quality of the national culture was the home, and it was the women's responsibility to protect and nurture this quality. No matter what the changes in the external conditions of life for women, they must not lose their essentially spiritual (that is, feminine) virtues; they must not, in other words, become essentially Westernized".[7] Consequently, in twentieth-century India, the resolution of various matters concerning the "everyday life of the 'modern' woman – her dress, food, manners, education, her role in organizing life at home, her role outside the home" – depended on a variety of sources including "a reconstructed 'classical' tradition, modernized folk forms, the utilitarian logic of bureaucratic and industrial practices, the legal idea of equality in a liberal democratic state".[8] Indian nationalists, refusing to make the women's question an issue of political negotiation with the colonial state, placed women and the domestic sphere at the centre of their nationalist imagination. This situation contributed to the "ideological justification for the selective appropriation of western modernity" through reconciling the modernist and nationalist trajectories.

In a similar vein, Shakry suggests that the women's question occupied a central place in the modernizing discourse in Egypt and was essential to the nationalist project in the early twentieth century. With emphasis on the direct relationship between proper mothering and the advance of the nation, the transformation of motherhood and domesticity became a constituent part of the nascent national discourse in this period. For Shakry, the similarities between colonial and nationalist discourses on motherhood around the turn of the century were quite striking. In both instances, the reconstruction of womanhood was promoted along scientific lines in accordance with modern, hygienic, and rational principles for developing "productive members of society".[9] However, there was one crucial difference between the two periods. In the nationalist discourse, "the formation of the new 'private sphere' within the Egyptian setting was fashioned within the

parameters of a historically constituted Islamic discursive tradition. Both Westernized modernizing reformers and Islamist reformers situated their own projects as a defense of true Islam and a critique of *taqlid* (or blind imitation of customs and traditions)".[10] This is to say that a desire for a "national non-secular modernity" produced the fundamental difference between the colonial and nationalist discourses. In this vein, particularly Islamist nationalists were eager to base their formulations on an indigenous tradition of moral and religious pedagogy for cultivating the body, disciplining the self and forming a moral character.[11]

These are important examples to show how the nationalist project as it pertains to the women's question in many non-Western settings diverges from a uniform and universal conception of modernity *à la* "the West". Although there seems to have been a constant dialogue with the West in formulating and imagining the contours of a modern and nationalist domesticity in both cases, the resolution of the issue depended on the distinctive features of a given social formation and its uneasy articulation with Western/modern ideals. De-linking the material and spiritual realms of modernity, localizing the *spiritual* in the Indian nationalist discourse, and a similar undertaking in Egyptian nationalism, are illustrative in this regard.[12]

In the case of Turkey the articulation between the place of women in society and the nationalist/modernizing project is different. For the Turkish nationalists, who were at the same time the state elite and the modernizers in the new republic, resolving the women's question translated into a wholesale Westernization of the role of women not only in the public realm but also in the private sphere. Many reforms and regulations concerning women's emancipation in the 1920s and the 1930s – ranging from the granting of various legal rights including the right to choose a spouse, initiate divorce, demand child custody, as well as to vote and run in municipal and national elections, and free elementary education for both sexes – had two interrelated goals: "the evacuation of Islam from the legislative and broader institutional sphere, and the inclusion of women into a new notion of 'citizenship' dictated by the transition from a monarchy to populist republic".[13] All these emancipatory reforms were part of a nationalist project that aimed at eradicating memories of the Ottoman past and creating a new sense of nationhood. Hence, "the 'new woman' of the Kemalist era became an explicit symbol of the break with the past"[14] and the women's question became an index of the Kemalist modernization project in Turkey.[15] This radical break with the past not only included attempts to change the position of women in the public sphere but also conscious efforts to transform and modernize "feminine" practices at home ranging from child-rearing and cooking to sewing and home management. So, within the context of nationalistic projects, "home" became a contested area in Turkey, just as in India and Egypt. However, in Turkey the quest was to modernize the private sphere along Western norms, rather than to preserve its non-secular or

"traditional" character.[16] Çağatay and Soysal draw attention to this specificity of the Turkish experience, by contrasting it with other Middle-Eastern nations. They contend that the Turkish nationalists did not negotiate with Islam – unlike other nationalist movements in the region – and followed a purely secular and Westernist path when formulating their policies for women.[17] This effort to westernize/modernize the private sphere is most easily visible in women's education. The development in the curriculum for girls' institutes gives a very clear picture of this process.

Educating Middle-Class Women: the Girls' Institutes

Girls' institutes in Turkey have been a central component of women's education, but they have rarely been the subject of scholarly research.[18] While in 1928 there existed only three girls' institutes in Istanbul and Ankara, in the early 1960s there already was at least one such institute in each of the 67 provinces (see Table 1), and until the mid-1970s the number of students who graduated from girls' institutes was higher than the number of female graduates of ordinary high-schools (see Table 2). For example, in the mid-1950s and the 1960s, the number of graduates of girls' institutes was almost double the number of girls who graduated from regular high-schools.

TABLE 1: Number of Female Students enrolled in Regular High Schools and Girls' Institutes for Selected Years

Years	Regular High Schools	Girls' Institutes
1923-1924	-	1375
1933-1934	2237	2460
1943-1944	6030	8379
1953-1954	6836	12880
1963-1964	26468	49062
1973-1974	96405	102517
1983-1984	221377	157589
1991-1992	383456	228253

Source: MEB (Ministry of Education). *Kiz Teknik Ogretimde Gelismeler II.* Ankara, 1993, 18-21.

Table 2: Number of Girls' Institutes for Selected Years

Years	Numbers
1927-1928	2
1931-1932	4
1941-1942	20
1951-1952	52
1961-1962	105
1993-1994	457

Sources: MEB (Ministry of Education). *Kiz Teknik Ogretimde Gelismeler II.* Ankara, 1993, 71, MEB (Ministry of Education). *Turkiye'de Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim.* Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1964, 37.

The teachers and administrators of these schools actively took part in public life in order to disseminate the dominant views on women's education to the general public. Many of them were among the founders of civil-society organizations such as the "Home Economics Society" or the "Nutrition and Dietetics Society" in the late 1950s and the 1960s.[19] Further evidence of the significance of girls' institutes in public life at mid-century was that, on numerous occasions, the teachers and students of the cookery department of the institute in Ankara did the catering for banquets given to visiting foreign dignitaries. Official foreign guests in Ankara were often taken on tours of the girls' institute. The millinery and sewing teachers also interacted with the political elites by sewing evening gowns and making hats for the wives of diplomats and statesmen (including the wife of the second president of the republic, İsmet İnönü). Several administrators of girls' schools were appointed "natural" senators after the national assembly was re-structured in the wake of the 1960 *coup d'état.* Home-economics teachers wrote cookbooks that went through several editions until the early 1980s.[20] As both numbers and the close interaction between these schools and wider society testify, girls' institutes occupied a significant place in the educational apparatus of the state from the 1940s onwards. The following words from an interview with a sixty-one-year old housewife, who graduated from the İsmet Paşa Girls' Institute in Ankara in 1957, summarizes the prestigious standing of these schools in society: "I lived in a typical old Ankara neighbourhood. The majority of the people there were small shopkeepers, with a few government employees. In the entire neighbourhood there were only three girls who went to school. When I finished the Institute, it was in the eyes of the neighbours as if I had graduated from the Sorbonne. It was a big thing."

Alongside the regular courses offered also in ordinary secondary schools, six main areas were taught in both theory and practice in the girls' institutes until the 1970s. These were dressmaking, millinery and artificial flower

making, undergarments and embroidery, drawing, home management and cooking, and childcare. The themes around which the courses were organized were hygiene, sanitation, cooking, food storage, sewing, fashions, cleaning, laundry work, lighting, furnishing and decoration, and the use of household goods and appliances. In a booklet published by the Ministry of Education in 1945, the functions and objectives of the girls' institutes were described as follows:

> For a nation to live in health, prosperity and joy, and to deserve to be called a modern society, the persons who constitute that society should be prepared for those tasks. Education of the woman who is the primary manager of such a preparation occupies a special place in our national education campaign. From the largest cities to the smallest towns, to provide women and the family with the place that they deserve in society; to make the woman the lady of her home; and to raise the woman as a mother who will be respected and loved in every field of society and who will make her home a cheerful, comfortable, and clean nest for her husband and children are among the main objectives of this campaign. It has become a matter of education and training to learn the ways and the methods for founding a comfortable, organized, and happy home and to become a modern mother and woman.[21]

As the above quotation illustrates, the original mission of these institutes was considered to be the training of the "ideal woman" who would be knowledgeable in every aspect of domestic life, and would take care of her home and family in a "civilized and modern" manner.[22] The curriculum was designed with the intention of teaching girls the duties associated with domesticity, wifehood and motherhood as well as proper conduct in public life. Afet İnan, a female historian and fervent supporter of the Kemalist modernization project, underlines the significance of the girls' institutes in the dissemination of modernizing reforms within the larger society. In her words, "these institutes ... first of all supply our Turkish girls with information necessary for a better and a more beautiful life with modern means".[23]

It is important to note that, until the mid-1970s, these schools were popular and reputable particularly among middle-class and provincial upper-middle-class families.[24] A retired teacher who graduated from the girls' institute in Bursa in 1942 summarizes the socio-economic background of her classmates as follows:

> The children came from the established families of Bursa. It was a very prestigious school. The pupils' parents were high-level bureaucrats. For example, the daughters of the governor, of the director of public finance, and the director of health were all my classmates. My father at that time was in charge of the water works in Bursa. When I was

> appointed a teacher to the Ankara Girls' Institute, I observed the same thing. The daughters of the Minister of Education, the Minister of Agriculture and of many prominent deputies in the National Assembly were students in our school.

The content of the cookery courses in the institutes also indicates for which social classes they were intended. The textbooks had recipes for cakes, cookies and desserts that were foreign to most of Turkish society. Many of these dishes were of European origin – especially French. In fact, until the 1950s cookery teachers in Ankara and Istanbul were either European or European-trained professional chefs. Most of the dishes were not simple to make and needed costly ingredients not accessible to the lower-income groups. For example, one of the cookery textbooks of the 1940s has five sections: arrangement of open buffet and dinner-party menus, child nutrition, nutrition for pregnant and nursing women, preparation of drinks with or without alcohol and ways of preserving food. Some of the dishes it suggests for dinner parties are artichokes cooked in olive oil, fish with mayonnaise, grilled red snapper, sea bass with sauce Hollandaise, chocolate pudding, roast beef with spinach pasta, schnitzel, various pastries and fruit tarts.[25] Needless to say, many of these dishes and desserts required elaborate preparation and expensive ingredients, and were probably unknown to most people at that time. This supports my interpretation of the education in these schools in the 1940s as being elitist and socially exclusive. Of course, to what extent the cooking of these dishes could be practiced in class is very questionable. Given the war-time shortages of even basic staples such as flour, sugar and oil, it may be assumed that cooking these dishes was taught mainly theoretically. Evidence for this is that some of older cookery teachers remember that they had to use potato flour instead of wheat flour, which was not available at the time.

Many of the ingredients for dishes to be cooked in the classroom were supplied by the students themselves. This was true for other courses too. For example, the cloth and other materials needed for sewing courses were also provided by the students' families. It is not surprising that these schools were considered to be costly, and were beyond the reach of most households until the late 1950s. Moreover, the level of their kitchen technology, particularly in Ankara and Istanbul, also points to the schools' social exclusivity. The technically rather advanced kitchen gadgets used for cooking in the institutes were not available in the majority of Turkish households at that time.

I shall invoke Bourdieu's conceptualization of *habitus* to situate my analysis about the character of the girls' institutes in a broader framework. According to Bourdieu, habitus provides different socio-economic groups in a society with a distinctive framework of social cognition and interpretation for creating their own cultural classifications of the social world. At the same

time, habitus endows different social groups with the capacity "to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste).[26] For Bourdieu, *cultural capital*, i.e. the possession and accumulation of certain cultural competence and knowledge, which is acquired predominantly through education and family, is an important means which reproduces and generates class habitus.[27] Just like economic capital, cultural capital is unequally distributed, expresses the differential levels of acquired and empowering competence, and so represents an important dimension of social hierarchies.

The state, which plays an important role in the construction of "proper" knowledge and the definition of social ideals, apparently controls some of the mechanisms through which class-habitus can be shaped in a society.[28] One obvious channel through which it seeks to fashion the practices that make up the habitus for certain classes is educational institutions. As the above discussion about the class character of Turkey's girls' institutes until 1950s demonstrates, the state was able to regulate the sphere of consumption by means of education and, consequently, to produce various cultural classifications and hierarchies. However, it is not only in non-Western countries such as Turkey, but also in Europe and North America that states have played a role in the teaching of food preparation and eating.

Many countries in Europe and North America introduced cookery and kitchen maintenance into school curricula and/or established schools of home economics and domestic science in the latter half of the nineteenth century.[29] In most cases, these classes and schools targeted both upper-middle-class and working-class families. The immediate concern for those addressing themselves to the former was to raise the valuation of housework in general and cooking in particular, and making them respectable practices in women's every-day life in the face of increasing shortages of domestic servants. With respect to working-class pupils, the basic motive was to educate these "ignorant" and "incompetent" girls to be able to cook nutritious and economic meals for their husbands, fathers, and brothers, the aim being to increase the general standard of living in the poorer households. In both instances, however, the emphasis was on teaching the importance of economy, health, hygiene, and other bourgeois virtues which were strongly advocated and propagated by middle-class reformers, physicians and educators. Many institutions therefore endeavoured to inculcate women with the dominant norms of the bourgeois ideology of domesticity. In Turkey, on the other hand, girls' education in home economics targeted specifically the middle classes and concentrated on teaching not nutrition but "manners", and cooking foreign dishes as an ideal part of domesticity until the 1950s.

In the 1930s and the 1940s, the teaching of cookery courses in Turkey emphasized the proper ways of cooking, serving, and eating. Subjects taught both in "theory" and practice included modern table manners such as using

silverware, setting dinner tables, proper ways of serving food, preparing open buffet dinner parties, and the introduction of modern kitchenware. Other topics were various foreign dishes, cakes, desserts and liqueurs, as well as some basic dishes (soups, salads, vegetable and meat entrées), special diets for infants or pregnant women, the sick and elderly, and food preservation. Although some general information on basic food groups such as carbohydrates, fats, minerals, vitamins and nitrogenous foods was covered in the curriculum, the emphasis on nutritional knowledge was negligible.[30]

Re-defining the Modern: Health and Nutrition

The 1950s marked the beginnings of the developmentalist period in Turkey. On the one hand, economic policies helped bring about national market integration, while on the other, they unleashed massive rural migration to the cities. As the industrialization drive and rapid urbanization led to the expansion of both the middle and working classes, the girls' institutes found a broader middle-class target in the cities. Moreover, Turkey in the 1950s, as elsewhere in the developing world, saw an acceleration of its modernization project under the American hegemony. Given a more popular audience as well as the influence of developmentalism, cookery lessons in girls' institutes turned into education in "scientific nutrition."

The exclusive emphasis on Western norms of civilizing gradually gave place to a focus on the value of nutritional information.[31] As broader segments of the urban middle classes came within the reach of the girls' institutes and, mostly within the context of Marshall Aid, many home-economics and cookery teachers from different institutes were sent to the U.S. and countries in Europe for short-term programs on advances in nutritional science and experimental cookery in the West; this resulted in greater general awareness of healthy eating and the nutritional aspects of cooking. The growing consciousness about the importance of nutritive values of food and its impact on health, compounded by concerns about malnutrition among the rural as well as the rapidly urbanizing population, made the inadequacy of the institutes' cookery classes at the institutes increasingly apparent. Uneasiness about them had already been voiced in the early 1950s by a senior cookery teacher working in the İsmet Paşa Girls' Institute in Ankara:

> Today we well know that a good diet is not just putting delicious food on the table and stuffing ourselves with it. In the old days, the measure of a good day was to stuff oneself with food, and even to be fat, which is testified in the saying "a gram of flesh covers a thousand faults". Whereas today fatness is regarded an eating disorder that needs to be treated as an illness. According to contemporary standards, a healthy person with a good diet should have proportionate weight and height and all his/her organs should physically be harmonious. ... To establish

> habits of healthy nutrition in our society, we must first of all initiate an educational project of scientifically teaching the standards of healthy nutrition. In order to achieve this, the first step would be to establish nutrition courses beginning with primary schools and continuing in high-schools and especially in girls' institutes.[32]

Such demands for extending the new nutritional knowledge to the general public were not isolated cases, and soon concrete steps were taken to this end. For example, the school administration in the Ankara Girls' Technical Teachers School (*Kız Öğretmen Okulu*) established a publication and communications bureau to facilitate the diffusion of information on nutrition, childcare, and home economics in 1953. This unit was also responsible for communicating the latest developments in scientific knowledge on these issues to former graduates (i.e. institute teachers) and current members of the school. For this purpose the bureau published bi-weekly letters about general issues of interest and made them available to not only the women affiliated with the school but also to "interested housewives". Not surprisingly, the theme of the first news letter was the issue of nutrition, "which had long been neglected in the country".[33]

The rising importance of nutritional principles in the post-war period is well illustrated by the establishment of a nutrition laboratory in the Girls' Technical Education College in Ankara in 1953. Here home-economics, cookery and chemistry teachers conducted rudimentary research in the nutritional properties of food and their impact on human development and health. One of the cookery and nutrition teachers who took part in these activities recalls her experiences there:

> ...That was a very important thing. It was possibly one of the first lab studies in our country. We conducted experiments. We had mice. We fed them. For example, we would give some of them more protein-rich food, and fatty food to others, and later observe the differences between the mice. Sometimes we used non-fat and regular milk powder in our experiments. The non-fat powdered milk had no vitamin A. We tested how this would affect the mice. We constantly weighed them. We wrote reports on the results of the experiments, and the school administration distributed them to other institutes. There were showcases at the entrance to our college and we regularly exhibited our mice there.

Although this laboratory ceased to function in 1955, the nutritionist approach to cooking continued to gain ground in the institutes in the later 1950s and culminated in changes in the curriculum. Courses related to cooking and eating were no longer called "cookery classes," but "cookery and nutrition classes." In the new program, the emphasis was on teaching the different

nutritional values of foods and how to cook and preserve food properly without losing its nutritional elements.[34] A cookery and nutrition teacher who worked in the Girls' Vocational Education College from 1958 to 1992 remembers that,

> When we were students we used to throw away the water in which we'd boiled the spinach. What a mistake... I realized that it was such a big mistake only during my post-graduate education. It's a mistake because it wastes the vitamins that have dissolved in the water. Our cookery teachers, although they were very talented and skillful people, didn't have any scientific approach to cooking. Such an approach became possible only in the sixties.

This particular teacher attended three nutrition and home-economics seminars between 1958 and 1965 in the Netherlands, Denmark and the U.S. with financial aid supplied by USAID, UNICEF, and the U.S. government. She was not alone: there were around 300 teachers who took part in similar courses in foreign countries between 1950 and 1974. The majority of them went to Germany, France, Britain and the U.S. The major sources for funding the teacher-training programs were UNESCO, USAID, and the European Council.[35] There were also foreign experts who took part in the reorganization of the home-economics and nutrition programs in Turkey in the late 1960s. Parallel to the changes in the content and the design of cookery classes, the home-economics courses in the institutes too underwent a major transformation in the late 1950s. Earlier they were mainly about housekeeping – that is cleaning, laundry, and similar domestic subjects. After the changes in the 1950s the program became more specialized by concentrating on household economy, home decoration, shopping, and the use of household durables.

Table Manners, Domestic Technology, and the Ambiguities of the Modern

Although there were major changes in the curriculum of the institutes in the late 1950s, these schools continued to be oriented mainly towards producing "educated housewives" up until the 1970s.[36] As Yeşim Arat notes in her study on the significance of girls' institutes in shaping gender relations, the state-led modernization project in Turkey sent a message to women informing them that "they were expected to contribute to the process of modernization not by becoming elite women professionals but by being housewives *à la* West, bringing 'order,' 'discipline,' and 'rationality' to homemaking in the private realm".[37] She particularly underlines the importance of girls' institutes in "channeling women to the task of 'modernization' at home by applying methods of Taylorism to housekeeping in Turkey".[38]

In a booklet prepared for the hundredth anniversary of technical education in Turkey in 1961, girls' institutes were described as preparing young women "to become talented, skillful and informed housewives and mothers as required by an advanced society".[39] Once again the emphasis was on the importance of women to have these characteristics for the socio-cultural development of society, and this continued to be the predominant theme in the 1960s as well. Women who went through a well-rounded education process on domestic subjects from table manners to the use of kitchen technology were thought to contribute greatly to the modernization of society as a whole. For example, note the implied relationship between the education of women and its impact on the modernization of the whole society in the following quotation. Here it is also important to underline how the adoption of table manners in individual households is treated as an indication of "civility" and a pre-condition for "achieving higher levels of civilization".

> A simple woman who is not well brought-up and has many failing sides cannot establish a good family home. Since it is not possible in a poorly-established home to raise children who as adults will be useful to society, the quality of that society will be inferior and the nation unable to protect its sovereignty and freedom. We can say, therefore, that women are the building blocks of family, therefore society... Our primary mission as women is to constantly carry our society to higher levels of civilization... The starting point for this mission should be family manners... In practice, the most important form of family manners is affectionate hospitality. Here, table manners are primary... One's civility can best be judged at the dining table. Hence, we should be attentive and considerate not only at formal dinner parties but also at the family table.[40]

This arduous task of transforming family life through the education of women, and, hence, "achieving a better society" continued to be the main mission of the schools in the 1960s. In textbooks on home management, the family is treated as the nucleus of society as a whole. It was emphasized how important it is to "have healthy, strong, happy and hardworking families" for the well-being of "the larger family which we call the nation".[41] While in the past the education of the family rested on the knowledge inherited from parents, in the contemporary era it was schools run by the state, and especially girls' institutes, that were considered responsible for training future generations.[42]

In other words, these schools were seen as one of the main vehicles of the Westernization and modernization of Turkish society after World War II. Transformation of households on "modernist" principles was an integral part of the project – but by no means an easy task. For example, in an article

on the education of the families and modernization of Turkish households, the author, a high-level bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education, discusses the differences between Western and "Eastern" ways of life and thinking, and the difficulties encountered in Westernizing society through social reform. For him, most of Turkish society is still struggling with adapting to the modern and Western ways of life, and cannot free itself totally of "Eastern" social norms and forms. In his words, "the co-existence of *alla turca* and *alla franca* toilets, the oud and the piano, the refrigerator and *sofra* (low table) in our homes is pointing at the fact that the West and the East continue to live together under the very same roof".[43]

Here even the use of simple household technology, such as refrigerators, is loaded with symbolic and cultural meanings. Refrigerators, like *alla franca* toilets and the piano, belong to the universe of Western civilization and ought not to coexist with traditional eating practices. Therefore, not only modern table manners and cooking practices, but even the adoption of modern household technology would serve the reformation of the private sphere, and hence the modernization of society.

The important point here is that notions pertaining to modernity, once imported from the West, did not remain intact. The above comment in fact attests to the Janus-faced experience of modernity in non-Western contexts. This seems always to have involved a re-working of modernity, and so has resulted in the "transforming [of] western universalizing forms".[44] In the Turkish case, although the private sphere was intended to be completely modernized and Westernized (as opposed to India and Egypt, for instance), the end product was peculiarly Turkish. The definitional elements of modernity in the Turkey, as in many other examples, always entailed "a shift, displacement and contamination".[45] Although modernization made a claim for universality it could never fulfill this claim, and therefore had to settle for defining itself through its difference from the traditional, the "Eastern" way of life. While even imports like refrigerators became signifiers of Western modernity, they had to coexist with the low table.[46]

In home-economics textbooks that were used in that period[47] there was usually a section on the organization of housework and maintenance of kitchenware and household durables. In these sections, different methods of doing housework that would ease its drudgery, the importance of hygiene, economizing in household expenditures, and the proper use and care of household durables and goods were particularly emphasized. Household durables such as refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and washing machines were introduced as devices that would increase the efficiency of housework, improve the hygienic conditions at home and, hence, contribute to the well-being of the family and consequently the society. The following paragraph taken from a home management book designed for first-year institute students adequately summarizes this point:

> Household durables are among the factors that play an important role in the happiness of a family. In a home equipped with necessary devices, work can be done in an easy and quick manner. Thanks to these devices individuals in the family find an opportunity to do other things and develop their personalities. Having the necessary equipment at home helps individuals to acquire good habits and increase their pride.[48]

Cowan, in her article on the diffusion of household technology and its impact on the gender division of labour in the United States, draws attention to the changing quality of housework alongside the domestic industrial revolution: "It was no longer a trial and a chore, but something quite different—an emotional 'trip'".[49] For Cowan, the mechanization of homes led to the emergence of new and higher standards of hygiene, cleanliness and orderliness in women's domestic responsibilities in the twentieth century. Naming this process the "emotionalization of housework," she emphasizes the heightened emotional context of housework when "a woman's sense of self-worth became a function of her success at arranging bits of fruit to form a clown's face in a gelatin salad".[50] Many books on etiquette, women's magazines, and advertising campaigns in the first half of the century gave impetus to this process as a result of which new norms, values, and standards of middle-class domesticity took shape. By contrast, one can argue that, considering the limited availability of modern channels of publicity such as advertising and printed media, educational institutions and particularly the girls' institutes attained greater importance in Turkey in terms of this "emotionalization of housework". As the above quotation from a textbook demonstrates, the emphasis was often on the extra-material qualities of housework and domestic technology, such as facilitating the family's happiness or contributing to the personal development or self-esteem of the women.

What is more important and distinct in the Turkish case is that new norms and standards of housework were not only introduced as necessary conditions for being a "better housewife or mother", but also as the main ways of embracing modernity and the modern way of life. In this respect, reformation of the domestic sphere and shaping a bourgeois domesticity have all along been part of the general context of the state's modernizing project.

Very significantly, the modernist symbolism of girls' education was received as such by its students and the general public, and did not simply remain an idea on paper.[51] The graduates of these schools were highly regarded and cherished as ideal would-be brides and housewives. Notice, for instance, the way Şevket Rado, publisher and editor of *Hayat*, the most popular magazine of the 1960s, connects the education of wives with attaining higher levels of civilization for the entire society.

> I should say with pride that our girls who graduate from girls' institutes carry all the qualities necessary for the best housewives. They are very knowledgeable about home and family affairs, but more importantly they have developed tastes. This taste, which shows itself in the hanging of a picture on the wall, placing flowers in a vase, arranging the guest room or sewing the curtains, has a very important positive impact on maintaining an orderly family life, increasing the cultural level of the family and advancing society to higher levels of civilization... That's why I always talk about our ladies who are graduates of the girls' institutes with admiration, and always recommend my male readers who ask for my opinion to marry the graduates of girls' institutes.[52]

The self-assessment of her education by a woman who went to the girls' institute in the 1950s as the daughter of a low-income working-class family in Ankara gives us a stronger instance of how the modernizing impulse was received on the ground:

> The 1950s were an era of great change in Turkey, a time of progress. If you want this progress, if you accept it, if you want the novelties, you want to learn how this wheel turns. You want to be a part of that process. You say, "I am happy to be part of it." I think this is what happened. In my instance, this was the case... I also had an inclination myself: I wasn't interested in luxurious meals, but I liked the table I set to be pleasing to the eye, to be proper. But above all, I was a person who wanted this type of change in Turkish society in general. That's what I thought back then.

From the State to the Market: Re-orienting the Girls' Institutes

In the mid-1970s, the programs and curriculum of girls' institutes were radically changed. These schools dropped the teaching of domestic subjects and re-oriented themselves towards training for employment in the private sector. Even their name was changed from "Girls' Institutes" to "Girls Vocational High-Schools" in 1974.[53] A report prepared to propose strategies for developing a new program for girls' technical education is illustrative in this respect. The report states at the very beginning that the goal of the new program is to contribute to the Turkish economy by supplying it with trained labour power. While universities and colleges would provide engineers for industry, technical education would be geared towards training technicians and skilled workers. Accordingly, new courses on food chemistry and microbiology, food technology, and food catering were proposed.[54]

The proposed changes were implemented to a considerable extent in the late 1970s and 1980s. Nutrition and home-economics branches at the institutes were reorganized and made suitable for training women to work in the food industry. In parallel to this, the middle classes began to turn

their back to technical education, starting from the early 1970s. The technical schools lost their prestige and high status and began to appeal more to the working classes which had no better education alternatives for their children. Public and private high schools oriented towards teaching foreign languages and which require highly competitive entrance examinations became much more attractive to the middle classes by the early 1960s than the girls' institutes.

In my interviews with retired institute teachers, the 1970s and the subsequent period were generally remembered negatively. Complaints about the declining importance of technical education, the decreasing quality of incoming students, government neglect of technical education and budgetary constraints were recurrent themes. There is no linear way of interpreting the decline of girls' institutes. As a matter of fact, during the 1970s the state sought to incorporate girls' vocational schools into its industrialization drive. It was hoped that both male and female graduates of vocational schools would supply skilled labour for industry. Nevertheless, import-substitution industrialization itself ran into trouble in the late 1970s due to rising oil prices and increasing international indebtedness. Financial problems led to a cutback in education budgets. During the 1980s, when industry was reoriented towards exports, the incorporation of graduates of vocational schools into the industrial labour force was selective. It is possible to suggest, for instance, that graduates of the renamed apparel department (formerly sewing) of girls' vocational schools were overqualified to be employed by export-oriented firms in the garment sector seeking cheap labour. On the other hand, graduates of the nutrition department might have been more easily incorporated into the growing catering sector after the 1980s. In any case the budgetary constraints of girls' vocational schools did not allow them to respond to the changing demands of the private sector. But, more importantly from our perspective here, the state had given up its regulation of the cultural realm around the 1980s and left it to market forces.

Simultaneously with the dismantling of the developmentalist project and the decreasing state regulation of the economy, the 1980s witnessed a growing ascendancy of market forces in the organization of food consumption. Into this field opened up by the state, market institutions moved to create new types of consumerism, introduce novel products, and promote these as the symbols of modernity and Western and cosmopolitan life styles to be adopted (or consumed) by the urban middle classes. This period brought the increasing commodification of cultural practices, in contrast to the previous period when modern ways were promoted through education and learned rather than bought. As a result, the role of cultural specialists and intermediaries, "who have the capacity to ransack various traditions and cultures in order to produce new symbolic goods, and in addition provide the necessary interpretations on their use" grew

considerably in the sphere of consumption.[55] From 1980 onwards there were increasing numbers of magazines, radio and television shows and books on fashion, food, tourism, arts, etc. devoted to consumption and the cultivation of certain lifestyles. In parallel to this, the role of marketing and advertising in the sphere of consumption grew in unprecedented fashion. In other words, the gradual withdrawal of the state from the cultural regulation of consumption went hand in hand with the increasing capacity of market-dominated cultural intermediaries in these fields.

Conclusion

For all that, there is a continuity between the pre- and post-1980 periods with regard to the gradual formation of a middle-class habitus with certain codes about modernity, whose practice signified the acquisition of cultural capital associated with middle-class status. As noted in the previous sections, the state played an important role in preparing the ground for new cultural needs essential for the formation of consumption markets in post-war Turkey. This is particularly evident where food-consumption practices are concerned. The nature of and the gradual change in the content of the education provided by the Girls' institutes after the 1930s were particularly illustrative in this regard: First, different varieties of dishes, drinks, and desserts foreign to the domestic culinary tradition (such as cakes, cookies, pasta, liquors, etc.) were introduced to a wider public through educational institutions. Secondly, and more importantly, teaching the proper ways of cooking, serving and eating food in accordance with the rationalist and scientific principles of what was perceived as Western modernity opened the way for new cultural codes and norms in the culinary realm. Accompanying this process, new notions of health, good nutrition, hygiene, ideal body, civility, and modernity were nurtured within the developmentalist period of women's education. When the 1980s arrived, – although the girls' institutes had already lost their privileged status in the education system – market forces found a field that was already ripe with codes and norms associated with the middle class, and only had to cultivate them to promote consumption in a way that deepened the existing social hierarchies.

For many authors, girls' institutes were "feminine" vocational schools that generally reinforced traditional gender roles and served the reproduction of patriarchy in Turkey.[56] Although it is hard to disagree with this assessment of girls' institutes perpetuating gender inequalities, it gives only a partial picture of the importance of these institutions in the modernizing drive of the Turkish state in the republican era. In this study, I have tried to highlight the significantly transformative role that these institutions have played in the creation of a new normative order through women. This order had two aspects. First, built on the premises of assumed Western civility, it not only included women but also men and children, the other constitutive parts of the modern family. Hence the emphasis was not only on the "feminine"

aspects of the private realm, such as cooking and sewing, but also on appropriate table manners, rules of public conduct and the importance of hygiene. In short, through women's education the modernizers sought to transform the family, and ultimately society as a whole according to Western norms. This process was not complete although it claimed to be universal. However, the very incompleteness of it created a modernity that was peculiarly "national". Secondly, modernization through women's education simultaneously contributed to the creation of a middle-class habitus with the attendant codes and conducts associated with Western modernity. As the state withdrew from this field after the 1970s, it was left to market forces to rework the same codes in order to promote certain life styles and contribute to the reproduction of social hierarchies based on cultural practices, including those of cooking and eating.

NOTES

1 Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 72.

2 The choice of food-consumption practices as a field to explicate my arguments is not arbitrary. In many historically grounded studies, food is taken as a domain in which class, status, demographic and gender relations and differences are both reproduced and reinforced, see for example, Arjun Appadurai, "How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in Contemporary India," *Comparative Study of Society and History* 30, no. 1 (1988), Jack Goody, *Cooking, Cuisine and Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Massimo Montanari, *The Culture of Food* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994). In that literature, food practices are interpreted as one of the basic sources of socio-cultural representation among different social groups in different areas and historical periods. Therefore, food practices make up an important dimension of culture that involves "both the means and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, through which they 'handle' and respond to the conditions of existence: and as the lived traditions and practices through which those 'understandings' are expressed and in which they are embodied" Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms," *Media, Culture and Society*, no. 2 (1980): 63.

3 See, Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993 (1986)), Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), Ernest Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

4 See, Lila Abu-Lughod, "Feminist Longings and Postcolonial Conditions," in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), Anne McClintock, "'No Longer in a Future Heaven': Gender, Race and Nationalism," in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Post-Colonial Perspectives*, ed. Anne McClintock, Ella Shohat,

and Aamir Mufti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London and Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1997).

5 McClintock, "'No Longer in a Future Heaven'," 90.

6 Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, 3.

7 Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 121-26.

8 Ibid., 127.

9 Omnia Shakry, "Schooled Mothers and Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn of the Century Egypt," in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 126.

10 Ibid., 128.

11 Ibid., 157.

12 On women's education in Iran and the redefinition of motherhood and domesticity in line with Western norms after the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Crafting an Educated Housewife in Iran," in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), Zohreh T. Sullivan, "Eluding the Feminist, Overthrowing the Modern? Transformations in Twentieth-Century Iran," in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998).

13 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Introduction," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 40.

14 Ibid., 41.

15 Nilufer Gole, *Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Ortunme* (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1991), 57.

16 Why is there such a discrepancy between the Turkish, and the Indian and Egyptian cases as far as the nationalist projects and their relation to the women's question are concerned? This is rather a big question which does not directly concern the subject matter of this article. Still, I want to speculate briefly on how the issue can be approached. To answer this question we may focus on one obvious difference: the Indian and Egyptian nationalisms were forged within a (post)colonial context, whereas in Turkey it was shaped in a (post)imperial context. This may provide some clues about why in Turkey the emphasis on local imageries and cultures, and "folk traditions" was fairly weak, and the bond between nationalism and modernization *a la* the West was decisively strong. The creation of its nation-state in Turkey did not require a long anti-colonial struggle, and the State elite did not necessarily develop a hostile attitude towards Western countries (Caglar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkinmaciligin Iflasi* (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1993), 57-58.). The adoption of Western norms and codes, both in the public and private realms in the name of modernizing the nation and "lifting it to the level of contemporary civilization" was easier to legitimize and, therefore, became an integral part of Turkey's nationalist project.

17 Nilufer Cagatay and Yasemin Soysal, "Uluslasma Sureci ve Feminizm Uzerine Karsilastirmali Dusunceler," in *1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin Bakis Acisindan Kadinlar*, ed. Sirin Tekeli (Ankara: İletisim, 1993), 334-37.

18 See, Yesim Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), Zehra Arat, "Turkish Women and the Republican Reconstruction of Tradition," in *Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, Power*, ed. F. Muge Gocek and Shiva

Balaghi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), Yael Navaro-Yasin, "'Evde Taylorizm': Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Yıllarında Evişinin Rasyonelleşmesi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 84 (2000).

19 See Osman N. Kocturk, *Beslenme Esaslari Uzerine Temel Sorular ve Cevaplari* (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1961), *Turk Ev Ekonomistleri Dernegi'nin Ana Nizammesi-1957* (Ankara: Ankara Basim ve Ciltevi, 1962), *Turkiye Ev Ekonomisi Cemiyeti Ana Nizannamesi* (Ankara: 1962).

20 Selma Birer and Zumrut Nahya, *Geleneksel Turk Mutfagi Bibliyografyasi Uzerine Bir Deneme* (Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi, 1990), Suna Colak, "Turk Teknik Egitiminin Turk Mutfaginin Gelistirilmesine Katkisi," in *Geleneksel Turk Yemekleri ve Beslenme*, ed. Feyzi Halici (Konya: Turizm Dernegi, 1982).

21 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Kiz Teknik Ogretim (Girls' Technical Education)* (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1945), my translation.

22 In several popular magazines of the 1930s, such as *Yedigün*, there appeared regular news features about girls' institutes that were written with reverence and admiration. For example, see Naci Sadullah, "Selcuk Kiz Sanat Mektebi'nde Bir Saat," *Yedigun*, March 21 1934, Rifat Server, "Ismet Pasa Kiz Enstitusu'nde," *Yedigun*, January 17 1934, Rifat Server, "Izmir Kiz Sanat Enstitusu'nde," *Yedigun*, April 24 1935, "Uskudar Bicki Dikis Kursu'nda," *Yedigun*, September 25 1935.

23 Afet Inan, *Ataturk ve Turk Kadin Haklarinin Kazanilmasi: Tarih Boyunca Turk Kadinin Hak ve Gorevleri.* (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1968), 148.

24 Tekeli notes that vocational training in Turkey has followed different trajectories for males and females, see Ilhan Tekeli, "Osmanli Imparatorlugu'ndan Gunumuze Egitim Kurumlarinin Gelisimi," in *Cumhuriyet Donemi'nde Turkiye Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: 1983). While the middle classes showed no interest in vocational training for their sons, the demand for girls' institutes was high. According to Tekeli, this is due to the nature of the curriculum followed in girls' institutes: "That the programs of these schools were designed not so much for providing vocational training for women but for bringing up informed housewives, and that they were not co-ed institutions led the conservative middle classes to be highly interested in them." See, Tekeli, "Osmanli Imparatorlugu'ndan Gunumuze Egitim Kurumlarinin Gelisimi," 664.

25 Sueda Gurel, *Yemek Pisirme* (Ankara: Maarif Matbaasi, 1947), 8-9.

26 Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 (1979)), 170.

27 Ibid., 53-54.

28 Aihwa Ong, "Anthropology, China and Modernities: The Geopolitics of Cultural Knowledge," in *The Future of Anthropological Knowledge*, ed. Henrietta L. Moore (1996).

29 Stephen Mennell, Anne Murcott, and Anneke H. van Otterloo, *The Sociology of Food: Eating, Diet and Culture* (London: SAGE Publications, 1993), 89. According to, Sweden took the lead in establishing such schools and incorporating cookery into regular secondary-school curricula in 1865. Germany followed the lead in the 1870s, and teaching of cookery in schools in England and France began in the 1880s. In the USA towards the end of the nineteenth century, teaching of cookery and home economics was not confined to secondary schools but became an integral part of many of the programs in respectable women's colleges. See, Stephen Mennell, *All Manners of Food: Eating and Taste in England and France from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996 (1985)), 231-32.

30 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Kiz Enstituleri Programi* (Ankara: Maarif Matbaasi,

1942), 120-29, MEB (Ministry of Education), *Kiz Enstituleri Yemek Pisirme Program ve Ders Dagitma Cetveli* (Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1947), 4.

31 See, for example, Necla Soysal, *Yemek Pisirme ve Gida* (Ankara: Kardes Matbaasi, 1967).

32 Zatiye Delibeyoglu, "Kiz Teknik Ogretmen Okulunda Ilk Ders: Beslenme," *Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* 2, no. 21 (1954).

33 Zerrin Tuzun, "Kiz Teknik Ogretmen Okulunda," *Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* 1, no. 10 (1953).

34 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Kiz Sanat Enstituleri Mufredat Programi ve Ders Dagitma Cetveli* (Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 1959).

35 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Kiz Teknik Ogretmen Okulu Ogretmenlerinin Yurt Disina Egitim Amaciyla Gonderilmesine Iliskin Hizmete Ozel Dosya* (1978).

36 Nevertheless, there were scattered attempts to orient the graduates of girls' institutes towards employment outside the home. For example, an employment workshop was organized in 1955 in the Higher Girls' Vocational Education College in Ankara. At the opening of this workshop, the president of the School's Parents' Association, who had organized the meeting, emphasized that the main duty of a woman was to be "an ideal housewife, a compassionate (*müşfik*) spouse and a caring mother". Later there were speeches about the employment opportunities for women in tailoring, nursing, and as stewardesses, see Zerrin Tuzun, "Kiz Teknik Ogretmen Okulu Tatbikat Enstitusunun Attigi Hayirli Bir Adim," *Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* 3, no. 29 (1955): 29. In the 1960s, the scope of jobs considered appropriate for women increased. In an article published in 1962 on the evaluation of female technical education in Turkey, the author drew attention to the fact that in Western countries, the technical education for women is not geared only towards graduating educated housewives, but also training women for working outside the home in workplaces such as offices, food factories and the catering industry. She suggests that although it is appropriate in Turkey to concentrate on educating housewives because of the country's prevailing socio-economic conditions, one should also think of giving more importance to training women for employment in the industrial sector. See Nezahat Oge, "Bizim Davamiz," *Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* 10, no. 112 (1962): 23.

37 Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey," 100.

38 See also, Navaro-Yasin, "'Evde Taylorizm'."

39 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Turkiye'de 100 Yillik Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* (Ankara: MEB Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim Mustesarligi Yayinlari, 1961).

40 Saadet Caglar, "Aile Icinde Kadinin Rolu ve Sofra Muasereti," *Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* 8, no. 90 (1960): 12.

41 See, for example, Suheyla Arel, *Yeni Ev Idaresi* (Istanbul: Kultur Kitabevi, 1969).

42 Leman Subasi, *Ev ve Aile Yonetimi: Ev Idaresi* (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1968).

43 Ekrem Altay, "Memleketimizde Aile Egitimi," *Mesleki ve Teknik Ogretim* 11, no. 128 (1963).

44 Ong, "Anthropology, China and Modernities," 64.

45 Timothy Mitchell, "Introduction," in *Questions of Modernity*, ed. Timothy Mitchell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), xiv.

46 Navaro-Yasin makes a similar point about the ambiguous character of the experience of modernity in her study of the girls' institutes in Turkey. She argues that there was always a constant dialogue and negotiation between "the local" and "the foreign" during the teaching and application of Taylorist principles of housework, which culminated in different and changing articulations of "the

modern" in the Turkish context. Therefore, rather than being a replication of the Western experience, Taylorism in housework has been an arena where different discourses by different generations and social groups have contested the meaning of "modern" categories such as "rationality," efficiency" and "order." Hence, she rightly criticizes the universalist and the unilinear conceptualizations of modernity. Navaro-Yasin, "'Evde Taylorizm'."

47 For example, see N. M. Becker et al., *Ev Idaresi, Yemek Pisirme ve Gida. Alisveris Isleri ve Butce* (Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 1959), Ayten Pehlivaner and Necla Soysal, *Ev Idaresi, Yemek Pisirme, Gida* (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1974), Subasi, *Ev ve Aile Yonetimi.*

48 Subasi, *Ev ve Aile Yonetimi*, 58. It was not uncommon to see newly acquired refrigerators placed in the most visible parts of dining rooms in the 1950s and 1960s. Apart from being a clear indication of economic wealth, they were, probably, signifying a modern lifestyle as well.

49 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, "The 'Industrial Revolution' in the Home: Household Technology and Social Change in the 20th Century," in *Technology and the West*, ed. T. S. Reynolds and S. H. Cutcliffe (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 306.

50 Ibid., 313.

51 It might also be argued that graduates of girls' institutes did not passively accept their role as mothers and housewives. My interviews indicate that as mothers or teachers they encouraged their daughters and students to get higher education and enter the professions.

52 Şevket Rado, "Izmirli Kizlarin Istegi," *Hayat*, September 23 1960, 39.

53 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Kiz Teknik Ogretimde Gelismeler II* (Ankara: 1993), 66.

54 MEB (Ministry of Education), *Meslek ve Teknik Lise Programlari* (Ankara: Milli Egitim Bakanligi, Kiz Teknik Ogretim Genel Mudurlugu, 1975).

55 Mike Featherstone, *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism* (London: SAGE Publications, 1991), 19.

56 See, for example, Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey.", Arat, "Turkish Women and the Republican Reconstruction of Tradition."

MODERN SPACES

Cityscapes and Modernity: Smyrna Morphing into İzmir[1]

Biray Kolluoğlu Kırlı

An anonymous contributor to *Blackwood's Magazine* in 1847 wrote that "Smyrna had no earthly right to the title of a Turkish city, except the accident of its happening to be in Turkey."[2] This echoes a widespread consensus in travellers' accounts where visitors routinely expressed their astonishment at the 'European character' of the city which made many of them feel that they were not in the 'real Orient'. Nineteenth-century Smyrna with its gas-lit streets, theatres, cafés, club houses, and department stores, its vigorous social life, its cosmopolitan population, and its urban make-up resulted in a spatial displacement in the foreigners' mental mapping of this Eastern Mediterranean port: since modernity was something that belonged to Europe, Smyrna appeared to be a European city.[3]

This vibrant Ottoman Smyrna was burnt down almost completely during the infamous Great Fire in 1922. The Izmir that rose from the ashes was a radically different city, now located within the boundaries of the Turkish nation-state. Differences between the two cities, nineteenth-century Smyrna and twentieth-century Izmir, can be articulated and discussed at different levels. Smyrna was organically linked to a world economy structured under the auspices of British hegemony, twentieth-century Izmir was bounded by the parameters of a nationalized economy; Smyrna was part of an imperial order, Izmir belonged to a nation-state; Smyrna boasted a multi-lingual, multi-confessional population, Izmir's population was drastically homogenized through *de facto* and *de jure* forced migrations and policies of Turcification; last but not least, Smyrna had a dense and heterogeneous urbanscape while Izmir was a hollow and homogenous city. This paper will be concerned with this last aspect and discuss Smyrna's and Izmir's changing patterns of urban development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The diverse patterns of urbanization of this city will be shown to have been aspects of the different experiences and articulations of modernity in these two periods respectively. The shifting articulations of modernity

will reveal different geographies of Europe structured in contrasting ways appropriate to different temporalities — a Mediterranean Europe shaped by the rhythms and periodicities of British hegemony, a continental Europe encased by the institutional scaffolding of a totalizing nationalisms.

It will be argued that while the modernity materialized and experienced in nineteenth-century Smyrna can be understood as a flexible and more or less impulsive and artless response to the rhythms of the socio-economic world in which the city was situated, the modernity that came to be expressed in twentieth-century Izmir represents a well-structured and rigid totality. Secondly, there is a discrepancy between the temporal perceptions of modernity in these periods. Nineteenth-century modernity was very much concerned with the present and with the management and mediation of the contemporaneous sea change, twentieth-century modernity was directed towards the future and the moulding of future society. Finally, it should be added that this city's varied encounters with modernity were inevitably enveloped by encounters with different centres of influence in Europe or different Europes. While nineteenth-century Smyrna's urban development patterns were organically linked to the dynamics of rapid urbanization that had become prevalent in ports all around the Mediterranean; twentieth-century Izmir, however was looking towards the totalitarian regimes such as Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union.

Let us begin with a brief contextual and historical background. Izmir, or Smyrna as the Hittites had christened it around 2000 B.C. is located half-way down the Western Anatolian coastline. The waters of the Aegean Sea flow past the Karaburun peninsula and take another turn towards the east to form a large, navigable, and secure gulf, at the tip of which lies the city. While Izmir is most fortunately situated in relation to the sea, it also occupies a central location in the fertile Western Anatolian basin. The city's remarkable transformation from a small town to a major port between the late sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries represents a phase in the long dialectic between the sea and the land that was so memorably charted by Braudel.[4] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Smyrna's trade volume increased remarkably, and in the nineteenth century it reached unprecedented levels as part and parcel of the economic restructuring of the Mediterranean economy under British hegemony. It alone handled about one-third of the entire Ottoman sea-borne trade until the end of the nineteenth century and remained one of the most favoured ports in the Mediterranean.[5]

Janus-faced, Smyrna looked both towards the sea and the continental land mass. Goods and people poured into the city on camels, whose languid motions created a thorough network integrating the Ottoman domains. Produce and commodities from Asia flowed through serpentine caravan trails, arteries of the land. In Smyrna these arteries dissipated into a filigree of densely intermeshed capillaries before they were pumped out again through the arteries of the Mediterranean. Perhaps, an apt pictorial

metaphor to encapsulate Smyrna in the nineteenth century is to conceive of it as an hourglass, connecting Marseilles, London, Ancona, and Trieste, with Usak, Afyon, Bursa, and Ankara. If maritime trade and terrestrial trade represented the two halves of the hourglass, the dense urban topography and the humanscape of Smyrna represented the confluence of trade.

The process of economic growth that Smyrna steadily experienced from the sixteenth century onwards was translated into an increase and diversification of its inhabitants, and also into a greater sophistication and diversification of its urban space and built environment. In the mid-seventeenth century there were sixty to seventy thousand inhabitants, Muslims constituting a bare majority.[6] The city's thriving economy acted as a magnet for different groups of people such as Greek merchants from Chios with their trade networks, Jews from Salonica and their expertise in textiles, Armenians on the heels of the silk trail, and Levantine merchants with ties to France, England, Italy and elsewhere in Europe. From the late seventeenth century onwards, Muslims began to constitute less than half of the city's population, making Smyrna, along with Istanbul, one of the most cosmopolitan cities of the Empire. In the first half of the nineteenth century the population of Smyrna was nearly 100,000, and had doubled by the end of it. With over 200,000 inhabitants Smyrna was five times larger than the second biggest city in Western Anatolia.[7] According to Cuinet, in 1890 the population of the city of Smyrna including its suburbs was 229,615[8] and at the turn of the century non-Muslims amounted to 61.5 per cent.[9]

As Smyrna's population was growing and becoming more cosmopolitan, the urban make-up of the city, especially in the nineteenth century, was also undergoing a notable transformation, becoming more and more "modern". Accounts of the modernization of Ottoman cities in the nineteenth century are usually compounded within the narrative of the *Tanzimat* reforms after 1839 and the overall efforts to modernize the backward Ottoman State. Discussions of *Tanzimat* in Ottoman historiography are deeply rooted in the discourse of imitation and replication of European institutions.[10] This perspective has been so powerful and pervasive that it has infiltrated almost all aspects of Turco-Ottoman history from issues of social history to urbanization.[11] For instance Celik's book begins as follows: "During the nineteenth century, a concerted effort was made to transform the Ottoman capital of Istanbul into a Western-style capital, paralleling the general struggle to salvage the Ottoman empire by reforming its traditional institutions."[12] Her account reproduces the generally accepted understanding that change (read modernization) was imported into the Ottoman Empire from Europe. Alternatively, as Jens Hanssen and other young scholars have observed, another salient trend in the urban literature is that modernization (always also understood as Europeanization) of the cities in North Africa and the Arab provinces took place only after the end of Ottoman rule and was initiated by European colonizers.[13] In other words, the "modernization" of

cities in the Ottoman territories is wrapped in a narrative of change that originated in Europe and was imported to this cartographic quadrant either through the mediation of the Ottoman State, or introduced directly by the European powers themselves through colonization.

While both *Tanzimat* and direct European colonization have left indelible marks on Ottoman and post-Ottoman cities, here I would like to argue that urban development in this region in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries should not be bound to the framework of *Tanzimat* or European colonization. I shall try to substantiate this argument by discussing the specific case of Smyrna's/Izmir's urban development.

But first let me clarify the difference between urban management and planning. The urban studies literature, especially on urbanization in the nineteenth century, suffers from the common failing of coupling industrialization and urbanization with the development of urban-planning schemes in response to the former. "Classical social theory from Marx to Weber," writes Davis, "of course, believed that the great cities of the future would follow in the industrializing footsteps of Manchester, Berlin and Chicago." Yet a very significant part of global urbanization actually took place without accompanying industrialization.[14] The reasons for this coupling are not difficult to fathom. Rapid industrialization, especially in Western European urban centres, old and bourgeoning, created a completely new set of problems: housing shortages, crammed slums, transportation difficulties, lack of proper sewage. Urban centres have always had problems peculiar to dense habitation, but responding to these problems systematically and on a large scale, that is urban planning, developed specifically in response to the conditions fashioned by rapid industrialization. As Benevolo argues, the hardships encountered by urban dwellers in the pre-industrial order were regarded as "unavoidable destiny which had existed since time immemorial", the hardships that the industrial town had fashioned were of a different order of magnitude and "had grown up during a limited period of time under the eyes of those people who were now experiencing its discomforts". The origins of modern town-planning are thus to be sought at this moment in time. Benevolo writes, "This was a unique phenomenon that shook contemporary habits and concepts, but which seemed the reverse of being pre-ordained and inevitable."[15] In other words, the foundational role that industrialization played in the emergence and structuring of urban planning cast a deep shadow on the multiple forms of rapid urbanization that were taking place in different parts of the world in the nineteenth century. The assumed organic connection between industrialization and urban development results in a dual reductionism. Explicitly, it bounds urban development to industrialization; and implicitly, by the latent synchronization of industrialization with modernization and the West, every other line of development becomes either an aberration or a mere emulation void of content.

An urban centre such as nineteenth-century Smyrna was not an industrial or industrializing city. Here, the new institutions and spaces of the nineteenth century took form in response to an expansion of commerce and trade, not of industry. Smyrna's urban-development patterns and processes would be quite different from Paris, London, Manchester – even, for that matter, from Istanbul, but similar to Beirut, Salonica, or Alexandria. Nineteenth-century Smyrna did not have a Haussmann or an Anspach, nor grand schemes of urban planning. Yet this does not mean that this city was not experiencing the advent of modernity in its spatial organization. The organization of urban development in nineteenth-century Smyrna can only be called urban management.

Nineteenth Century Smyrna

The governing aspect of Smyrna's urban management was that it was most notably locally induced, and that it developed in response to the increase in the city's economic activities. Smyrna was not alone in this, of course. Its ascendance in the nineteenth century was part and parcel of the mid-nineteenth century boom which also stimulated the development of other Mediterranean cities.[16] Many other port cities in the Mediterranean were facing similar problems such as inadequate ports, the need for more space for storage and commerce, or improved transportation within the city.[17]

From the mid-eighteenth century onwards Smyrna benefited from the growing trade between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe: "From 1745 to 1789, an average of 34 per cent of the annual exports of the Ottoman Empire passed through Smyrna; the city's percentage of this trade peaked in the last quarter of the century."[18] Following a brief stagnation caused by the Napoleonic Wars and the Greek War of Independence, "the trade of Izmir regained its vitality in the 1830s. Between [sic] 1840s and [sic] 1870s the total volume of trade of Izmir increased by four times, exports by three times, and imports by six times."[19] Hence, in the nineteenth century, Smyrna was the epicentre of the most wide-ranging trade networks within the Ottoman Empire.[20] Especially after the building of the Izmir-Aydin and Izmir-Kasaba railways in the 1860s, the structure of the economy took another turn. Indeed, as was observed by a contemporary:

> The houses of wood have given place to places of stone erecting in all directions. Smart shops abound with not only the necessities of house keeping and house furnishing, but the comforts and luxuries flow in abundantly from London and Paris... hotels upon hotels, invite the traveller. Not only a printing-press, but presses upon presses, and journals upon journals, French, Greek, Italian, and even English, have familiarized the inhabitants of Smyrna with the politics and literature of Europe.[21]

Smyrna's development exhibited a trajectory of intensification rather than spatial expansion, especially until the quay was built which I shall discuss shortly. The central commercial district of the city, the Frank quarter, began to form in the early seventeenth century towards the north of Kemeralti, the market area around the natural harbour called İç Liman.[22] Here Levantine merchants built their residences, trading houses, and consulates along the northern stretches of the shore. These buildings were situated directly on the waterline, with fire-proof stone warehouses attached and "each hav[ing] its separate wharf at the water's edge".[23] The legendary Frank Street, or Rue de Franque, was the city's main artery in the seventeenth century.[24] Frank Street, about 8 meters wide and narrowing down to 5 meters at certain points, ran through the Frank district for about 2.4 kilometers.[25] The remainder of Smyrna was made up of incredibly narrow and crooked streets, so narrow that when a loaded camel passed through the pedestrians had to seek shelter in doorways and shops to avoid being knocked down.[26] In the eighteenth century, the Frank district expanded one block to the west, towards the sea, making the Quai Anglais the border between it and the bay.[27]

The intensification in the pattern of urban development in pre-fire Smyrna is evidenced by the growing number of *ferhanes*, the dominant form of organization of commercial space in the Frank quarter. *Verhanes* or *Ferhanes* (the contracted pronunciation of Frankhane, "house of Franks") were quite narrow passageways, mostly covered, that usually lay at right angles to the sea and connected the streets running parallel to the shoreline with one another. *Ferhanes*, where businesses, shops, and offices were clustered, can be compared to arcades. The 1886/1887 Izmir official yearbook reports 26 *ferhanes*.[28] The 1905 insurance map shows 37 *ferhanes* – a substantial increase – 33 of which were located between Sari Street and the Arapyan Carsisi, streets that lay at right angles to the bay and formed the Eastern and Western boundaries of the Frank district.[29] There were no *ferhanes* connecting Cordon, the avenue along the quay, and Rue Parallèle, the avenue that lay immediately parallel to the quay, and only a very few between Rue Parallèle and the Quai Anglais, which ran parallel to Rue Parallèle a little towards the North. This tells us that when the city expanded towards the sea, this spatial form did not continue. The great majority of *ferhanes*, therefore, were located between the Quai Anglais and Frank Street. We can deduce that they began to appear in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries because the Quai Anglais, as mentioned before, was created towards the end of the eighteenth century. The overspill of shops and offices towards the east in the form of this dense network of passageways is an indication of the rapid economic growth experienced by Smyrna in this period. Muller-Wiener writes that the increasing commercialization of space in the nineteenth century drove out residential dwellings in this part.[30]

After Arapyan Carsisi the street forming the western border of the Frank quarter and towards Kemeralti the organization of commercial space

changed to *hans*. These were used as inns, as well as spaces of storage and commerce. *Hans*, like the *ferhanes*, specialized in specific businesses or lines of trade. For instance, while one *han* would be solely appropriated by shoemakers, another would be taken over by tailors. There were around 25 *hans* in the mid-seventeenth century, and by century's end more than 80.[31] The 1886/1887 yearbook lists 143 of them, the 1895/1896 volume reports 150, and the 1908 yearbook, 168.[32]

Urban design and architecture have primary importance in giving identity to cities and thereby creating their unique profile. Pre-fire Smyrna, especially before the building of the quay, had no open public spaces. The only place that came close to a park was the green area in front of the municipal building in Konak, the area that lies between Kemeralti and the sea, the former İç Liman.[33] More importantly, unlike other significant Ottoman cities - most notably Istanbul, but also Salonica, Bursa, and Manisa - the Ottoman signature was clearly absent in Smyrna. Schiffer notes that European travelers searched in vain for the landmarks of an "Oriental city", such as monumental mosques.[34] It must be noted that the multi-confessional make-up of the city was directly reflected in the distribution of the city's places of prayer: in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there was an equal number of mosques and churches, 22 of each, as well as 11 synagogues.[35] Goffman writes:

> The fact is that the Ottoman central government had little to do with the creation of seventeenth-century Izmir. It was rather local authorities and Christian-European intruders and their Ottoman Armenian Christian, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, and Muslim partners and sometimes rivals who were the principal architects and engineers of the port city's design and construction.[36]

American observers described life in the city in the first quarter of the twentieth century as "very liberal". "Indeed, it is almost extravagant. Smyrna is a miniature Paris as far as fashions go."[37] This "extravagance" seems to have prevailed for over a century. Indeed, Arundell, the British chaplain who lived in Smyrna between 1821 and 1840, complained about the "increasing love of amusements", such as the passion for gambling and the public theatre.[38] Another traveller at the turn of the nineteenth century noted the existence of a casino, "not excelled in Europe".[39]

The period around Christmas and New Year was known as the carnival season in Smyrna. Cockerell, arriving towards the end of January caught the tail end of it:

> To us it was the quintessence of gaiety to meet masques as bad as they were, with their forced hilarity, passing noisily from one Frank house to another. On the last days of the carnival there were processions, than which nothing could be more ridiculous.[40]

Private dinner parties, balls, and visits usually "spilled over from the houses into the streets" in the form of musical shows, theatrical performances, and street festivals.[41] This festive period was also significant in bringing together the various communities of the city. "The carnival at Smyrna is a season of gayety in which all sects appear to unite with equal animation" wrote De Kay, "even the taciturn Turk seems to catch a portion of the general animation".[42]

"Cities with ports differ from city-ports", writes Matvejevic, in "the former they are a means and an afterthought; in the latter, starting point and goal".[43] Indeed, in Smyrna it has been the centrality of its port which has shaped the city's built environment and human geography. The port itself, therefore, deserves a more detailed discussion. Talking about the building of Smyrna's quay will serve to elaborate my argument that the nineteenth-century experience of modernity in this city came as a response to the increasing volume of trade and commerce and, more importantly, that it was a locally induced process and an organic part of developments seen also in other Mediterranean ports.

The Frank quarter expanded once more towards the bay with the building of the port facilities in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As a result of this land reclamation, two new streets running parallel to the Quai Anglais were added to the city's map: Rue Parallèle and Cordon. By the second half of the nineteenth century, Frank Street had partially lost its prominence to the newly acquired shoreline, which furnished the city with an 18 meter wide avenue, Cordon, which ran about four kilometers along the water's edge. The land-fill quay, completed in 1875, gave Smyrna not only the much needed new and enhanced port facilities and a promenade that introduced new usages of public space, but also further enhanced the "European" image of the city. The quay straightened out the extremely ragged shoreline. As one French traveller said later in the century, it made one believe that one was still in Europe and henceforth made "Smyrna a façade of European regularity tacked on to Oriental confusion".[44]

However, this regularity came as a result of intense struggles between the local authorities, Istanbul, foreign capital, and local merchants, which continued for almost two decades.[45] Zandi-Sayek observes that by the mid-nineteenth century the press had begun to play an important role in formulating urban questions, and it was in the local press that the demand for a new quay begun to be voiced at this time. For Istanbul, the jagged wharves of Smyrna represented spaces of smuggling and vice. The local business community was looking for improved port facilities. If there was agreement so far, there was little consensus as to the location and the design of the new quay.[46] This demand cannot of course be separated from the other significant development: the building of the railways. Planning and building the new harbour for Smyrna began simultaneously with building the railways. As Kutukoglu underlines, improvements and developments in land transportation connecting the port cities with their hinterland were

synchronic with improvements regarding harbour capacity. For instance in Varna, Salonica, and Beirut the construction of new harbours were carried out simultaneously with the building of railways that improved transportation links with their hinterlands.[47] By the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Eastern Mediterranean port cities were much better integrated with their hinterlands and had significantly increased capacities to handle the booming trade.

The detailed analysis by Zandi-Sayek demonstrates that building the quay was an intense struggle within the business community, especially between owners of shore property, owners of sea lots, and the rest.[48] After a decade of commissions being formed and tentative plans being drawn up, in 1867 a group of British entrepreneurs - John Charnaud, Alfred Barker, George Guarracino - acquired the concession from the Ministry of Public Works to build the new harbour. However, the wharf tax the British company was to impose to finance and profit from the works arroused immense opposition from everyone– owners of sea lots, shore owners, and the rest of the local business elite. The sale of sea lots and their conversion to private ownership in the second quarter of the century too caused unbelievable confusion. As a result, the Quay Company of British entrepreneurs failed to generate the necessary local consent and concomitantly the local capital to finance the giant project, and the Smyrna Quay Company came to the brink of bankruptcy in 1869. It was at this point that the initial French contracting firm owned by the Dussaud brothers took over the project and finished the work in 1875.[49] What is most striking about this whole story is the inability of the Sublime Porte to impose its will on the local actors. In this arduous and conflict-ridden process, which lasted over two decades, local businesses managed to acquire substantial concessions.[50]

I have mentioned the absence of the Ottoman signature on the city in the pre-nineteenth century period. It must be acknowledged, however, that as the new century got underway the Ottoman State's presence began to be more visible in the built environment. If not the Frank district, the lesser centre of Kemeralti certainly was vulnerable to the interventions of the re-centralizing and modernizing Ottoman administration. Specifically *Kışla-i Humayun*, the military barracks (also locally known as *Sarı Kışla*) and the clock-tower should be considered as markers of Istanbul's presence in nineteenth-century Smyrna. *Kışla-i Humayun* was built at the southern end of the city in late 1820s immediately following the destruction of the janissaries, in order to house the new army. This building can be seen as symbolically introducing the presence of the modern Ottoman army, in an attempt to re-establish its authority in its sovereign domain as well as in this city.

The elegant clock-tower situated very close to the *Sarı Kışla* in today's Konak Square was erected in 1901 in celebration of the 25th anniversary of Abdulhamid's enthronement. As is well-known, after the first clock-tower was built in Istanbul in 1888, others soon followed in various Ottoman cities,

usually marking either the birthday or the coming to power of the Sultan. The one in Beirut was built in 1898 and Tripoli, Aleppo, Jaffa followed suit.[51] The organic relation between clocks as a modern artifact introducing precision, standardization, linearity, and new forms of social control and modernity is well established. The omnipresent tower in the old centre brought about an externalized and objective conception of temporality to this city whose socio-economic rhythm was already synchronized with other shores of the Mediterranean. So, it is no coincidence that the Ottoman State in its effort to adjust to the times would set up clock-towers in its ports - in places, that is, that were already in phase with modernity. We must add, however, that the Smyrna tower was also a local initiative, as is manifest from the mixed composition of the commission formed for its construction, and again from the diverse sources of the revenue generated for its completion. To sum up then, a closed city seems to be an appropriate image for the pre-twentieth century Smyrna's built environment and urban patterns. Economic and social activities and relations were crammed into every nook and cranny of the dark alleyways, *ferhanes*, *hans*, and narrow streets. Ottoman Smyrna consisted of claustrophobic urban forms which contrasted with the city's openness to the amplitude of Mediterranean networks and the liberality and openness of its everyday life and social structure. Its dense Ottoman urban structure was eventually overturned and replaced with the open spaces and boulevards of the post-republican city. Spatially, nineteenth-century Smyrna represented a fractured heterogeneity and an intense density, in contrast to the standardized homogeneity and apparent hollowness of the republican city to which we now turn.

Twentieth-Century Izmir

In the twentieth century, which for our purposes began with the 1920s, Izmir's urban development acquired distinctly new contours. For this period we can talk about (1) urban planning rather than urban management; (2) imposition of the aspirations and designs of Ankara rather than those of local agencies; (3) national capital instead of merchant capital for the realization of urban works; (4) and finally, and perhaps most distinctively, urban development geared towards a more totalitarian and nationalist interpretation of modernity.

As mentioned before, Ottoman Smyrna was destroyed at the end of the Anatolian war with the fire that began on 13 September, 1922, engulfed the Armenian, Greek, and Frank quarters, and became one huge inferno which by the time it had finally burned itself out two days later, had swallowed three quarters of the city. The post-1922 city, an enormous black hole encircled by a thin line of surviving quarters, presented an ideal opportunity for envisioning grandiose urban schemes. With the help of the changes introduced by Ankara in 1925 to the old *Ebniye Kanunu* (building regulations) of 1882, which permitted areas where more than 150 buildings

had burned down to be considered as agricultural land (*tarla*), the municipality to a great extent freed itself from the restrictions of burdensome and complex ownership claims in the fire zone.[52]

The reconstruction of Smyrna literally meant building a new and drastically different city. Born out of the ashes of Smyrna, Izmir reflected a new understanding of modernity. Post-fire spaces and places expressed a modernity rigorously defined in a national idiom. The early republican years witnessed a monumental effort towards the re-organization of the geography of Anatolia and production of spaces that would form the basis of constructing national spatialities.[53] The most spectacular aspect of this project was the designation and creation of the new capital of Ankara in the centre of the new homeland. Anatolia, one of the places of exile in the Ottoman period, known as the dungeon of the Empire, was adorned with a city that was to reflect the future promises of a national existence.[54] Equally important, if less remarkable facet of the organized effort towards creating national spatialities was the re-centring of Anatolian cities and towns around open expanses named Squares of the Republic and marked by a statue or bust – depending on the scale of the urban formation – of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; by creating parks or gardens of the republic around the squares or adjacent to them, and naming main streets again after the founder of the republic. It is remarkable that every single urban formation, small or large, shared these features and this repetitive pattern emphasized (especially in the small towns of Anatolia) that all were one and the same territory, all of them intrinsically Turkish.[55]

Izmir's post-fire urban development was part of this pattern that reshaped urban settlements of the Anatolian peninsula with republic squares and parks. In Izmir these took the form of the Republic Square and the *Kültürpark* that sprang up over a significant expanse of the fire zone.[56] An urban plan for Izmir, commissioned by the municipality, was drawn up in 1924 by René Danger and M. Raymond Danger, working under the supervision of the well-known urban planner M. Prost. This grid plan proposed restructuring the fire zone with wide boulevards criss-crossing the city, the main one being named after Mustafa Kemal. The Danger-Prost plan proposed to radically reshape the highly dense and labyrinthine urban make-up of nineteenth-century Smyrna with its narrow winding streets and frequent dead ends, while preserving the centrality of the former Frank district. It pivoted on utilizing the fire zone as the administrative, cultural, and educational centre of the city. The plan was never implemented. The Izmir municipality did not begin any works in the fire zone until the early 1930s, which for over a decade left a huge dark hole at the centre of Turkey's second-largest city during which time the fire zone became an area of public hazard and danger.[57] Reconstruction finally began with the opening of the Republic Square in 1932, followed by building the *Kültürpark* in the summer of 1936.

The local newspapers welcomed the "cleaning of the fire zone" with great enthusiasm, and scrupulously reported all developments regarding the commissioning and progress of the statue of Atatürk. The work was entrusted to an Italian artist, Pietro Canonica, who also sculpted the statue that stands at the entrance to the Museum of Ethnography in Ankara. The Izmir monument shows Atatürk in full control on a rearing up horse, his hand pointing to the Mediterranean; bas-reliefs on the base represent scenes from the "war of liberation" and the evacuation of the Greek army from Izmir. The monument bestows a powerful presence and a new form of control to the square, and concomitantly to the city at the heart of which the square lies. The dramatic gesture of opening up a white square at the centre of the black hole that nineteenth-century Smyrna was sucked into signifies giving a new identity to this zone as a space for the presentation and exhibition of the symbols of modern Turkey with its modern Turkish citizens.

After opening of the Republic Square, rebuilding of the fire zone progressed with clearing out the area behind the square to create a large park, the *Kültürpark*. While space for a rather humble park in this area had been foreseen by the Danger-Prost plan, the *Kültürpark* exceeded it in every respect. As the name suggests, this "culture park" was not designed merely as a place of relaxation and recreation. Like its Ankara counterpart, the Genclik Parki completed in 1943, the *Kültürpark* was devised as a monument to the aspirations and projections of the new regime. As Bozdogan observes, in the early years of the republic parks and places of public recreation had become "urban and architectural icons of republican modernity". She writes: "As in other nationalist contexts of the time, Italy and Germany in particular, early republican culture was permeated by a strong cult of youth and health." Bozdogan argues that the idealization and the emphasis on youth and health can be understood in relation to a new regime "that had successfully broken ties with 'the old empire' or 'the sick man of Europe', as the Ottoman Empire was known in the nineteenth century."[58]

By way of commenting on this I would like to argue that this fascination with monumental public spaces in the 1930s, which is not only observable in Germany and Italy but also in the Soviet Union, had more to do with the dominant interpretation of modernity in Europe. While the understanding of modernity of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was inspired by the so-called Industrial Revolution that was anchored in the sphere of production and epitomized in the images of railroads and coal mines, the interpretation of modernity in the 1930s opened up towards the realm of the symbolic. It is no coincidence that Atatürk's Turkey was "seeking the future in the skies". Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's Germany, and Stalin's Soviet Union were looking up skywards as well.[59] This was a period when minds were fascinated with aeroplanes, skyscrapers, and ocean liners. As the futurists had done earlier, fascism, observes Falasca-Zamponi, (and we must add socialism and lesser forms of contemporaneous totalitarianisms),

appropriated the aeroplane as the symbol of a new era.[60] The 1930s saw a qualitative shift in the orientation of modernity from the present to the future. While the late nineteenth century was very much about organizing the present and controlling the tremendous change that was actually taking place, the end of the World War I signaled the beginning of a new period marked by its future-orientation.

This was especially true in those parts of Europe where the social fabric had disintegrated due not only to the physical destruction of the Great War but more so to the concomitant defeatism in countries like Germany and Italy. As Scott observes the "incapacitated civil society provide[d] the leveled terrain on which to build (dis)utopias... Much of the massive, state-engineering of the twentieth century has been the work of progressive, often revolutionary elites... the great enthusiasm and revolutionary hubris that were part and parcel of high modernism."[61] For these revolutionary elites in Germany and Italy and also in countries like the Soviet Union and Turkey the inter-war period was a time during which the present itself became only a backdrop against which the future was envisaged and an arena of rehearsal and preparation for the time to come. The fascination was not with the ongoing change, which had ended in massive destruction everywhere, but with the imagined change that the future held in its promise.

A brief look at the sources of inspiration for creating the *Kültürpark* will help us to see the interaction between spatial forms and the future projections and promises of a new regime inspired by the dominant interpretation of modernity. In the summer of 1933 Suat Yurtkoru, the then-head of the Izmir Soccer Association and soon to be appointed as the city's deputy mayor, took a group of Turkish athletes to Moscow. His travel notes published in the daily papers show that he was awed by what he witnessed in the Soviet capital. One place that made an indelible impression on Yurtkoru was the Central Park of Culture and Rest, named after Maxim Gorky.[62] His notes describe this "culture park as a very important education and health institution" and relate in detail its various "educational and sports facilities" such as stadiums, amphitheatres, swimming pools, a parachute tower, libraries, and the like. One factor that Yurtkoru passionately emphasizes about Gorky Park was that it was built "in only three years".[63]

In the 1934 local elections Suat Yurtkoru was elected a representative to the city council, and Mayor Behcet Uz appointed him his deputy. In 1933 all ambitions collided: Yurtkoru's Moscow-inspired plans, coupled with the urgency of the task to develop the fire zone, the pressing need to find an area large enough for the economic exhibition that had been going on intermittently since 1923,[64] and the continuing hesitation about implementing the 1924 urban plan, all resulted in the creation of the *Kültürpark*. The park epitomized the effort to re-shape, and for that matter re-create, a novel social existence through the mediation of urban space.

About the *Genclik Parki* in Ankara, Zeynep Uludag writes that this 260,000 square-meter park for a city with a population of only 123,000 was an "incredible monumental undertaking".[65] If that was true for Ankara, the 430,000 square-meter park for a city of around 155,000 souls appears even more astonishing. The Izmir *Kültürpark* stands as a national monument at the heart of the city, reclaiming and re-possessing Ottoman Smyrna. It is a blatantly Turkish and republican space. Its five gates are named after the significant dates and foundational treaties in early republican history. Besides sports facilities and amphitheatres, the park includes permanent exhibition halls for State-owned enterprises and museums. It is worth noting that all but two buildings in the *Kültürpark* had a decidedly modernist style. Modern, national, urban public spaces like the *Kültürpark* and the Republic Square were seen as necessary components for the creation of modern habits and new sociabilities of the Turkish citizens, and more significantly for exhibiting the new citizenship. These spaces symbolized a radical break with the pre-fire urban forms, and were both novel and alien to the inhabitants of the early republican Izmir. Where there had been a void, both literal and symbolic, the new revolutionary elites filled it with desire, will, enthusiasm and, equally important, with power that was little challenged. This is why the republican elites chose to look towards the authoritarian States in Europe, rather than to England or France where people were demoralised and pessimistic after World War I, and whose governments were politically too weak to confront the challenges from below. Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union suited the projections of the new Turkish elites well, who were equally potent, enthusiastic, and determined to shape the future.

This article presented two different ways in which urban modernity has been experienced and articulated in Ottoman Smyrna and Turkish Izmir. Nineteenth-century Smyrna was a dense and heterogeneous city that prospered on trade and commerce. Its formative element was, perhaps, opportunity and initiative, and modernity was experienced as a response to change so as to capture opportunity through initiative. Most importantly, in this period Smyrna was tightly attached to the larger Mediterranean world whose economy was thriving under the British hegemony. Turkish Republic severed the city's links with the Mediterranean and pulled Izmir into the orbit shaped by the national social, economic, and cultural policies. Early twentieth-century Izmir's population was homogenized both ethnically and religiously in the aftermath of the Anatolian war and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Its urban structure was also homogenized with the reconstruction following the Great Fire. Republican modernity was geared towards the rational guidance of change, and the political centre imposed this regulation in blanket fashion. Put differently: while the encounter with modernity in this particular geography was an ongoing process that had taken discernible forms especially in the nineteenth century, we can nevertheless detect significant differences in the ways in

which modernity played itself out in two distinct historical periods. Nineteenth century modernity experienced in Smyrna and other port cities around the Mediterranean was reflexive and dominated by the fascination with the contemporaneous radical changes of the present. Izmir's early-twentieth century modernity, as part and parcel of the shift towards totalitarianism in Europe and elsewhere, was centrally planned and its temporality was dominated by the organization and the design of the future.

Notes

1 New temporalities and spatialities structured by the Internet made it possible for me to write this chapter in Berlin as a fellow of the Working Group Modernity and Islam at Wissenschaftskolleg, while drawing on helpful suggestions on earlier drafts offered by Cengiz Kirli in Istanbul and Ravi Arvind Palat in Binghamton. I also would like to thank the support I received from the Bogazici Research Fund number 03HB801.

2 Quoted in Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama: British Travellers in Nineteenth-Century Turkey*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999, p. 113.

3 This spatial displacement of Eastern Mediterranean ports was not unique to Izmir. See Robert Ilbert, "International Waters", in Robert Ilbert & Ilios Yannakakis with Jacques Hassoun (eds), *Alexandria 1860-1960: The Brief Life of a Cosmopolitan Community* (transl. Colin Clement), Harpocrates Publishing: Alexandria, 1997, originally published in 1992, p. 12.

4 Fernand Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

5 See Elena Frangakis, "The *Raya* Communities of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1690-1820): Demographic and Economic Activities", in *Actes du Collaque International d'Histoire: La Ville Néohellénique, Héritages Ottoman et état grec*, Athens: Asia Minor Studies 1, 1985, p. 29; Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812", in Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. II, 1600-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 734; Mubahat Kutukoglu, "Osmanli Dis Ticaretinin Gelismesinde Izmir Limani ve Gumruklerin Rolu", in *Izmir Tarihinden Kesintiler*, Izmir: Izmir Buyuksehir Belediyesi Kultur Yayini, 2000, p. 299.

6 Daniel Goffman, "Izmir: From Village to Colonial Port City", in Edhem Eldem et. al. (eds), *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, Istanbul*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 95.

7 Resat Kasaba, "Izmir" in Caglar Keyder et. al. (eds), *Dogu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri (1800-1914)*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1994, p. 13; Cem Behar, *The Population of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey 1500-1927, Historical Statistics Series Vol. II*, Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1996, p. 33.

8 Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, géographie administrative statistique descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure*, III, Paris: E. Leroux, 1894, p. 439.

9 Justin MaCarthy, *The Arab World, Turkey and the Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook of Historical Statistics*, Boston: G.K. Hall, 1983, p. 142.

10 The literature on *Tanzimat* is so abundant that it makes any list superfluous. Yet for two very influential examples see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968; and Stanford Shaw and Ezel

Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

11 For a critical perspective on Ottoman modernization in the Hamidian period see Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1999. For another insightful conceptualization of Ottoman modernization see Huri Islamoglu, "Property as a Contested Domain: A Re-evaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858", in Roger Owen (ed.), *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, Harvard Middle-Eastern Monographs, 2000, pp. 3-63.

12 Zeynep Celik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. xv.

13 See Jens Hanssen, "'Your Beirut is on My Desk': Ottomanizing Beirut under Sultan Abdulhamid II", in (eds) Peter Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, *Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City*, Prestel: 1998, pp. 41-67; Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 2002.

14 Mike Davis, "Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat", *New Left Review*, 26, March-April 2004, p. 10.

15 Leonardo Benevolo, *The Origins of Modern Town Planning*, (transl. Judith Ladry), M.I.T, 1971, p. 31.

16 Resat Kasaba *et. al.*, "Eastern Mediterranean Port Cities and Their Bourgeoisies" *Review*, Vol. X (1), Summer 1986, pp. 121-35.

17 Alexandria's population quadrupled between the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, and doubled again in the course of the latter, reaching 231,396 by 1882. Beirut's population rose from 10,000 early in the early nineteenth century to over 100,000 by the century's end. The Tunis's expansion, similar to Izmir's, began in the seventeenth century, and although it did not take part in the boom of the nineteenth century to the extent of the other Mediterranean cities, it retained its pivotal role. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Tunis had a population of around 80,000. See Michael J. Reimer, "Ottoman-Arab Seaports in the Nineteenth Century: Social Change in Alexandria, Beirut and Tunis", in Resat Kasaba (ed), *Cities in the World-System*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 137 and 139. Salonica is the city that showed the greatest similarities with Smyrna/Izmir in its rise and decline. With the migration of the Sephardic Jews to the Ottoman lands towards the end of the fifteenth century and at the end of the seventeenth century it became a bustling commercial center. By the eighteenth century Salonica was a port-city *par excellence* with a very mixed population of 50,000; by the turn of the century the city's population had reached 130,000. Apostolos P. Vacalopoulos, *A History of Thessaloniki*, (transl. T. F. Carney), Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1972, pp. 74-80, 93-98.

18 Elena Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)*, Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992, p. 119.

19 Resat Kasaba, *Peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1985, p. 242.

20 Frangakis, "The *Raya* Communities of Smyrna", op. cit. fn 5, p. 29. In comparative terms, in the second half of the 1880s Izmir's foreign trade volume was 35 to 40 per cent more than that of Salonica. In the 1890s, its trade volume surpassed that of Beirut by a similar margin. See, Mubahat Kutukoglu, "Osmanli Dis

Ticaretinin Gelismesinde", op. cit. fn 5, p. 299.

21 Francis Vyvyan, Jago Arundell, *Discoveries in Asia Minor*, Vol. I, London: Richard Bentley, 1834, pp. 418-419.

22 Cinar Atay, *Tarih Icinde Izmir*, Izmir: Tifset Basim ve Yayin Sanayi, 1978, p. 27.

23 John Fuller, *Narrative of a Tour through Some Parts of the Turkish Empire*, London: Murray, 1830, p. 42.

24 It was also called Via dei Franci or Strada Franca. The multiple naming of streets in Smyrna was not limited to the Frank Street. Almost all major streets had at least two names, like quai Anglais, alias Ingiliz Iskelesi. The 1914 trade almanac reports that each of the 1100 streets in Smyrna had signs both in Turkish and in French, and this was true even for the "exclusively Muslims areas upon which no foreigner has ever set foot". Huseyin Rifat, *Izmir 1914, Aydin Vilayeti 1330 Sene-i Maliyesi Ticaret Rehberi*, (transcribed and edited by Erkan Serce), Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1997, p.19.

25 Cevat Sami and Huseyin Husnu, *Izmir 1905: Aydin Vilayeti Celilesinin Ahval-i tabiiye, Ziraiyye, Ticariye ve Iktisadiye Vesair Ahvalinden Bahis, 1321 Sene-i Maliyesine Mahsus Nevsal-i Iktisat*, (transcribed by Erken Serce), Izmir: Izmir Buyuk Sehir Belediyesi Kultur Yayini, 2000, p. 62.

26 Charles Swan, *Journal of a Voyage up the Mediterranean; Principally among the Islands of the Archipelago, and in Asia Minor, Vol. I*, London: Rivington, 1826, p. 128; and John Cam Hobhouse, *A Journey through Albania and Other Provinces of Turkey in Europe and Asia, to Constantinople, during the Years 1809 and 1810, Vol. II*, (London: Cawthorn, 1813), p. 617.

27 Cinar Atay, *Osmanli'dan Cumhuriyet'e Izmir Planlari*, Izmir: Yasar Egitim ve Kultur Vakfi, 1988, pp. 7, and 43. This must have been rather late in the century, because Richard Chandler in 1764 still describes the houses on the Frank Street as "extend(ing) from the street backward to the beach." See Richard Chandler, *Travels in Asia Minor and Greece*, (New Edition with Corrections and Remarks by Nicholas Revett), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1825, p. 70.

28 Erkan Serce, (transcribed and edited), *Izmir ve Cevresi Resmi, Özel Binalar Istatitistigi 1918*, Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1998, p. 49.

29 Charles E. Goad, *Plans D'Assurance de Smyrne: Explication des Signes Employés*, 1905.

30 Wolfgang Muller-Wiener, "Der Bazar von Izmir: Studien zur Geschichte und Gestalt des Wirtschaftszentrums einer ägäischen Handelsmetropole", *Mitteilungen der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft*, vol. 27-28, 1980-1981, p. 432.

31 Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 116; and Resat Kasaba, "Izmir", op. cit. fn 7, p. 7.

32 Serce, *Binalar Istatistigi*, op. cit. fn 28, p. 49.

33 John Kingsley Birge, (Chairman of the Committee), *A Survey of Some Social Conditions in Smyrna, Asia Minor*, "General Information", typescript, May 1921,"Recreation", p. 4.

34 Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama*, op. cit. fn 2, p. 126.

35 Serce, *Binalar Istatitistigi*, op. cit. fn 28, p. 49.

36 Goffman, "Izmir: From village", op. cit. fn 6, p. 83.

37 Birge, *A Survey of Some Social Conditions*, "General Information", op. cit. fn 33, p. 1.

38 Arundell, *Discoveries in Asia Minor*, op. cit. fn 21, p. 422.

39 T. Macgill, *Travels in Turkey, Italy and Russia during the Years 1803 to 1806*, London: 1808, p. 97.

40 C. R. Cockerell, *Travels in Southern Europe and the Levant, 1810-1817, The Journal of C. R. Cockerell*, R. A. (ed.) Samuel Pepys Cockerrel, London: Longmans, Green,

and Co., 1903, p. 134.

41 Rauf Beyru, "Social Life in Izmir in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century", in Virginia Taylor-Saclioglu (ed.), *Three Ages of Izmir: Palimpsest of Cultures*, Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 1993, p. 148.

42 James Ellsworth De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832 by an American*, New York: J.&J. Harper, 1833, p. 477.

43 Predgrad Matvejevic, *Mediterranean: A Cultural Landscape*, (transl. Michael Henry Heim), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 14.

44 L. de Launay, *La Turquie que l'on voit*, Paris: Levant Herald, 1913, p. 245, quoted in Sibel Zandi-Sayek, "Struggles Over the Shore: Building the Quay of Izmir, 1867-1875", *City and Society*, vol. XII, no. 1, p. 55.

45 Ibid., p. 56.

46 Ibid., p. 64.

47 Mubahat Kutukoglu, "Izmir Rihtimi Insaati ve Isletme Imtiyazi", *Izmir Tarihinden Kesintiler*, Izmir: Izmir Buyuksehir Belediyesi Kultur Yayini, 2000, pp. 201, and 202.

48 Zandi-Sayek, "Struggles Over the Shore", op. cit. fn 44, pp. 55-74.

49 Kutukoglu, "Izmir Rihtimi," op. cit. fn 47, p. 211-212. The Dussaud brothers had already undertaken similar large-scale projects, such as building the ports in Cherbourg and Marseilles, and they were involved in the construction of the Suez Canal. Ibid., p. 211.

50 Zandi-Sayek, "Struggles Over the Shore", op. cit. fn 44, pp. 69-74.

51 Hanssen, "Your Beirut Is on My Desk", op. cit. fn 13, p. 56.

52 These changes were significant for the urban development of many Anatolian towns burnt down at the dusk of the war. The changes made to the former regulations were formulated by the Izmir municipality and offered to Ankara. See, Erkan Serce, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Izmir'de Belediye (1868-1945)*, Izmir: Dokuz Eylul Yayinlari, 1998, p. 172.

53 For a discussion of spatiality see, Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Theory*, London: Verso, 1989, p. 129.

54 Much has been written on the importance of moving of the capital from Istanbul, a city with a long tradition of functioning as an imperial center, to Ankara, a place without rooted traditions. See Ugur Tanyeli, "Turk Modernlesmesinin Kentsel Sahnesini Yeniden Dusunmek", *Arredamento*, 1997 (03); Ilhan Tekeli, "Turkiye'de Cumhuriyet Doneminde Kentsel Gelisme ve Kent Planlamasi", in Yildiz Sey (ed.), *75 Yilda Degisen Kent ve Mimarlik*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari, 1998, pp. 1-24.

55 This repetitive fashioning of national spatialities can be likened to the "malling" of America – the frenzied growth of retail spaces in shopping malls on the outskirts of towns that have led to the decay of 'Main Street USA'.

56 For a more detailed discussion of the post-fire reconstruction of Izmir see Biray Kolluoglu-Kirli, "The Play of Memory, Counter-Memory: Building Izmir on Smyrna's Ashes", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 26, Spring 2002, pp. 1-28.

57 Fazil Baskin, *Eski ve Yeni Devirlerde Izmir Belediyesi*, Izmir: Marifet Matbaasi, 1941, p. 7.

58 Sibel Bozdogan, *Studies in Modernity and National Identity: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 75.

59 See Robert Wohl, *A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

60 Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 70.

61 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 89 and 90.
62 The Gorky Park and six hundred others built in its image across the former Soviet Union were regarded as significant landmarks in the building of socialist cities that were expected to offer to the new Soviet citizens rest combined with "wholesome, rational recreation". See K. Ivanova, *Parks and Culture and Rest in the Soviet Union*, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1939, p. 12.
63 July 31, 1933, *Yeni Asir*.
64 It would be interesting to note the space cleared out for the 1923 rural trade exhibition held in Moscow prepared the ground works for the development of the Gorky Park which itself was completed in 1928. See Stephen V. Bittner, "Green Cities and Orderly Streets: Space and Culture in Moscow, 1923-1928", *Journal of Urban History*, vol. 25, no. 1, November, 1998.
65 Zeynep Uludag, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Rekreasyon ve Genclik Parki Ornegi" in Yildiz Sey (ed.), op. cit. fn 54, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari 1998, p. 69.

New Patterns of Urban Development in the Aegean Islands, 1850-1920s

Alexandra Yerolympos

In the 1830s the Aegean Sea was divided between the modern State of Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Following the geopolitical changes in the area, modernizing efforts in Greece and the Ottoman Empire had important spatial consequences for the urban settlements on the islands. As new economic activities and population strata moved in, they gave rise to urban elites with increased spatial requirements. Generally speaking, similar changes took place in almost all the coastal cities of the eastern Mediterranean, as a result of the transition from the traditional medieval town to modern patterns of urban development. An examination of the role played by public and private initiatives in favour of urban growth and development can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of these changes experienced by local societies.

This paper is based on research in planning legislation, as well as on studies by fellow historians and architects that have highlighted the evolution of many urban settlements in the Archipelago. It will try to follow the resulting alternative forms of the new urban setting, and also the aspirations and objectives (on a functional, ideological and symbolic level) inherent in them. The specific characteristics of the alternative forms can be explained by the islands' historical and geographical disparities. They are also due to the fact that during this period the islands came under two different sovereignties, Greece and the Ottoman Empire, each of them affecting in some particular way the making of cities on Lesbos, Chios, Crete, Rhodes, Syros, etc. The island of Samos at this time was governed as a principality of the Porte, and followed a course of its own while being influenced from both sides of the Aegean. In any case circulation of ideas and models was ensured in the islander 'polyplegma'[1] of the Aegean, that continued to display economic cohesion and a host of diversified channels of communication.

The rise of the coastal cities

Research has shown that population increase and reorientation of local economy to international markets provided the springboard for the area's economic take off in the second half of nineteenth century[2]. Imports of advanced technology and the expansion of industrial activities, the extension of market economy and the growth of urban populations were intimately connected phenomena, in Greece as well as in the Ottoman Empire.

In the latter, after the adoption of the *Tanzimat* reforms in 1839, the granting of political and civil rights to all Ottoman subjects encouraged individuals, communities, and public institutions to adopt new economic and social behaviours and to invest in land and building. The physical restructuring of the cities became an essential aspect of the reforms. In Greece, *ad hoc* processes of urban rebirth were accelerated in the 1830s. Indeed, the young Greek State began to create its own urban system by founding new cities or by recomposing the existing traditional ones, and so breaking with the old patterns. A world of cities emerged with new types of built-up and open spaces. Hermoupolis on the island of Syros, developing as one of the major Greek cities, is an eloquent example. Samos, on the other hand, stands alone in its interesting and unique destiny.

Whether in Greece, the Ottoman Empire, or in between the two, development of cities by the sea was quite similar. This confirms the fact that there is a "distinct demarcation line between coastal and inland cities. It is due to the significance of sea routes of communication for the growth of the market economy, a direct result of which is urban growth, especially when land communications (e.g. road and railway system), are not yet [before 1869] developed"[3]... Although 'this dichotomy was centuries-old",[4] in the nineteenth century it was accelerated and intensified by modern production and trading conditions. It was the harbour-cities that were best able to receive the industrial phenomenon.

The rise of urban strata who adopt new ways of living and new architectural forms and typologies is another important factor for urban change. By the end of the nineteenth century a *hegemonic* group had been constituted. Tradesmen, industrialists, bankers, etc. were traveling to central and west-European metropolitan centres to do business, acquire new manners and habits, and adopt new attitudes to matters relating to private and public space: new forms of residence, social life, political activity, education, entertainment. The expansion of new claims and the diffusion of models were supported by the daily and periodical press that developed during this period. Newspapers and magazines played an important role in advocating open and public exchange of ideas, and in campaigning for an arena where citizens formulate their views freely and rationally and where public opinion is shaped. Concurrently this *public sphere* began to acquire also physical form as an important element in the organization of urban space. Buildings and open spaces for political gatherings and discourse, and the functions of self-

government (town halls and civic squares, clubhouses and lecture halls, seats of professional associations, etc) soon appeared in the cities.

Using examples from three island cities of the Aegean, we shall try to show the stages through which evolving social and economic processes acquire territorial and material substance and create the *bourgeois city* we intend to sketch. If it is impossible not to include the highly paradigmatic case of Hermoupolis on Syros, Samos is a quite specific case, while Mytilene on Lesbos was selected because it shows a variety of initiatives that illustrate well the range and spirit of the Ottoman reforms.[5] Mytilene was also the capital of the Ottoman regional administration (*Vilayet of the Islands*) in 1867 and in 1911, after the loss of Rhodes to Italians.

At the risk of simplification, we can distinguish among four different periods in the process of urban transformation. It is evident that these urban changes in the Aegean were closely related to historical developments.

1. From 1820 to 1840, following the Greek War of independence and the associated insecurity, the general conditions emerge that will eventually allow important cities to come into existence:

- There is an end (at least for the time being) of mass movements of populations due to violence and destructions.
- The Greek State is constituted, first under revolutionary circumstances (with provisional institutions), then in an internationally secure environment.
- The future of Samos, which had revolted against Ottoman rule, is decided at an international conference in 1832. Despite its inhabitants' desire for the island to come under Greek sovereignty, the tributary status of a Principality under the Sultan is imposed.[6]
- In 1839, the *Tanzimat* reforms are announced officially in the Ottoman Empire, and an administrative restructuring is undertaken.

In other words, territorial sovereignties and the corresponding areas of hinterland within which the cities are expected to function are temporarily stabilized, allowing for sites to be determined on which new cities will develop.

2. The formative period of the *bourgeois city* is from 1840 to 1880, the time span of fundamental processes leading to urban development and of significant coordinated efforts. By 1860 Hermoupolis is already the most important port-city of Greece. Others need more time, but urban development soon becomes quite noticeable especially in the 1870s.

3. From 1880 until the Balkan Wars and the Greek-Turkish war (1912-1922), there is general prosperity and the coastal cities achieve their full development. In the second decade of the twentieth century, key geo-political change results in a new political setting for the islands under single Greek sovereignty. War and the subsequent population exchange between Greece and Turkey disrupt the old channels of communication and economic activity in the Aegean Sea.

4. From 1922 to 1940 and World War II, the cities keep up their economic potential, despite the new demarcation of borders and the islands becoming frontier areas and notwithstanding the economic crisis of the 1930s. Thanks to technological and commercial know-how and experience and their relative flexibility in production, thanks also to the dynamism of the new refugee populations, the cities are not only able to maintain an acceptable economic status, but even to develop.

After the war demographic and economic progress ends and the island cities follow the same course as the Greek mainland. In the first post-war decades the sea routes are less and less used,[7] ship yards, soap and olive-oil manufacture close down one by one. The islands are progressively isolated and unable to develop. This is the time of the great exodus of Greeks to Athens and the main industrial countries of Western Europe, and islanders are among the first to migrate. It is only in the 1980s when Greece has become a full member of the European Community that new prospects of development will appear. It is worth noting that although the Aegean islands have attracted the main flow of tourism to Greece, the three cities here studied are among the few that do not regard tourism as their main economic activity; they have preserved their character as urban centres as it was formed in the period under discussion.

Hermoupolis on Syros

Despite common elements in time and geography, the three islands under review differ considerably from one another. Syros is the smallest, only one-twentieth the size of Lesbos and one-sixth of Samos. On its 81 km2 of rocky and arid soil stood only one settlement prior to 1820 - Syra, which at an altitude of 140 m. had 4,000 inhabitants at that time.

The creation of Hermoupolis on the island of Syros forms an epic chapter in the history of modern Greek town-making.[8] Thanks to the strict neutrality observed by its Catholic inhabitants during the Greek War of liberation against the Ottomans, the island was a haven of peace and attracted fugitives from many revolted regions. Refugees from Chios, who fled their homeland after its devastation by the Ottoman fleet in 1822, were the most populous group. They brought with them their keen knowledge of banking practices, their commercial know-how, and their intricate family and exchange networks that eventually raised Hermoupolis to the major commercial and shipping centre in Greece until the 1860s.

The first settlers ignored the existing old settlement of Syra on the hills and the hostility of the native population. They established themselves on the shore, on a stretch of swamp they hastily filled in. By 1828 the population had reached 13,800. The small town consisted of houses and shops built in a ramshackle and precarious manner, being '*creations of necessity and strict economy*',[9] densely and informally grouped by the port among tanneries, shipyards, foundries, mills, furnaces and also cemeteries. In 1824 the



The island of Syros before 1820

inhabitants built themselves a church. In the absence of a public hall, the merchants gathered in this church in 1826 to decide what their city should be called. The name of Hermes, ancient god of commerce was proposed and unanimously accepted –Hermoupolis, the city of Hermes.

The effort to occupy and reshape the urban space motivated collective initiatives and introduced forms of local government. The power of the leading groups was legitimized, given that their activities contributed to the well-being of the whole city and created a sense of civic pride. The first public building to be put up was a hospital, built by the merchants in 1826.

By 1835 the growth of the city required more adequate measures of planning and control. A municipality was set up, and the Bavarian engineer Wilhelm von Weiler was commissioned to prepare a city plan. His proposals were approved in 1837. Since there was no planning legislation on a national scale in Greece, specific decrees were promulgated in 1837, 1839 etc. to allow implementation of the plan, and control land uses, urban expansion, and building. Only a few years later, in 1842, the Hermoupolis experience together with decrees for the planning of Athens provided the basic articles for the first planning Act that applied to the entire Greek territory.

The Weiler plan for Hermoupolis endowed the city with wide quays, an impressive civic square, and a well-designed main artery linking the town hall and the civic square with the port. In an area covering 20 hectares (0.2 km^2), the plan provided for 11 squares and 124 streets; it would be reviewed

Syros, abandoned factory

twenty years later (in the 1860s) to deal with new expansion and the relocation of disturbing or polluting activities. In fact tanneries, textile and other factories, warehouses, foundries and shipyards were developing massively in the southern districts along the sea front.

The local elite went further in its effort to embellish the city.[10] A committee of Hermoupolis merchants was formed in the early 1840s to supervise the preparation of the plan and its implementation, and express views about the location of specific activities and prospects for the future expansion of the shipyards etc..[11] In the next decade, the same people with the active support of the municipality formed a co-operative and built three commercial premises for a fish, a meat and a vegetable market. A few years later, another co-operative was set up (using British experience with municipal works which was known to the islanders), in order to finance the construction of a café. Then, in 1862, the merchants invited the Italian architect J. P. Sampo to design a theatre and a club house for Hermoupolis.[12] This was one of the first theaters to be built in the new Greek State. Theatres were also built in Patras in 1871, in Zante in 1872 and in Piraeus in 1881. This original mode of financing amenities for the community through a co-operative was widely discussed in the other islands. There are letters in the municipal archives of Chios that were sent to Syros by interested citizens who wanted to learn more about the Hermoupolis committee in order to imitate its practice.

Syros, theater

Syros, commercial buildings

Syros, town-hall

The most distinguished building in the new city was the town hall, an impressive three-story building measuring 40 by 70 meters, designed in 1876 by the German architect Ernst Ziller. A good many other buildings -such as churches, schools, hospitals and imposing residences were designed by well-known Greek architects, and created an almost theatrical urban setting.

During the 1860s Hermoupolis had 20 to 25,000 inhabitants and was second in size among Greek cities only to Athens. Two-thirds of Greek import trade passed through its port. When steam navigation led to the reorientation of trade routes bypassing Hermoupolis, the economy of the city received a severe blow. To survive, the local economy shifted successfully to industrial ventures (flour and pastas, spinning and textile factories) and shipyards. By the end of the century, the local elite were planning to invest in two major works in the hope to reinforce the economy of the island. The building of a dry dock in Hermoupolis was proposed in the hope of competing with Piraeus which was developing into the largest commercial port of Greece, especially once the Corinth Canal had been opened. The second project was highly utopian: the building of a railway to connect Hermoupolis with a summer resort less than 14 km away.[13] Neither of these projects materialized. Instead, investments in the textile industry allowed the local

Ano Syra and Hermoupolis today

economy to survive and kept the labour force in place until the 1920s. In 1928 the city had 21,156 inhabitants and 18,922 in 1940.

Let me conclude with a brief comment on the visual appearance of the city, and particularly the civic square. It is remarkable that although it was never designed as a single project, it somehow imposed a conceptual discipline on all architects involved. As historians of architecture have noted, any significant architectural work is capable of influencing subsequent development around it, and often in ways not expected by its creator. In the bourgeois Hermoupolis, the axial access from the port, the monumental volume of the town hall, the elegance of the open space and the elaborate architectural details of the public and private buildings surrounding it, make this a unique complex which displays the aesthetic values of the society that produced it.

Mytilene on Lesbos

Lesbos (1698 km^2) is one of the larger, more fertile and richer islands in the Aegean. Wheat, grapes, salt, resin, timber and stock-breeding were among its main products, together with the prime source of wealth in the island: its famous olive oil. In the nineteenth century there were around 100 villages and towns on Lesbos, and its population grew from 72,000 in 1840 to 120,000 in 1874, when the island economy really took off. In the same period the proportion of Muslims dropped from 22.6% to 15%.[14]

Mytiline, Ottoman Courthouse

During the Ottoman period (1462-1912), the capital of Lesbos developed on the same site that it had occupied since Hellenistic times. As early as the fifteenth century, it was described as "a well populated city: the houses crown the hill top of a peninsula that juts into the sea, on either side of which is a harbour. A strong wall with many towers surrounds the town: and behind it lies an extensive suburb".[15]

In 1840, the city was still known as *Kastro*, the Castle. The Muslim quarters were located around the North port, at the foot of the hill where the castle stood. The Christian population lived near the South port. The market had been developed on the site of the ancient channel between the two ports.[16] The British consular agent Charles Newton described Mytilene as a filthy village, with dark, narrow and irregular streets, wooden houses and miserable shops, six mosques, six orthodox churches and one catholic, a *medresse* (Muslim religious school), an *imaret* and a Greek high school. In the South port a small industrial concentration of soap-makers and olive-oil producers was developing, while the tanneries were located in the North port.[17]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Mytilene underwent important changes. In 1837 the monopoly in oil trade held by a local Turk *bey* was abolished; 40 years later (1880) the introduction of steam in the production of oil gave great impetus to the local economy based on the production and treatment of olives and oil. Its busy commercial port became a transit centre for imported products to be shipped to the Asia Minor coast.

Mytiline, town-hall

The remaking and expansion of the city started after 1850. Actually the planning and building regulations of the *Tanzimat* era (from 1848 onwards) were first implemented in Mytilene after the terrible fire of 1851 when many of the traditional wooden buildings were lost. An earthquake in 1867 completed the destruction, leaving 60,000 islanders homeless. The clauses of the Ottoman planning legislation of 1864 were applied, providing for the redesign of streets and blocks in new geometrical lay-outs and for the replotting of private lands.[18] The market was rearranged and a considerable number of public and private buildings were constructed with non-flammable materials. According to consular sources, 180 residences were built in newly formed suburbs by the Christian inhabitants.[19] The years from 1840 to 1880 have been described by Siphnaiou as a period of transition from '*a city of five churches to a city of two harbours*'. At the same time the urban population grew from 10,000 inhabitants in 1854, to 15,000 in 1885.

A few years later the operational centre of trade was definitely transferred from the North to the South port. The northern harbour now served fishing boats and the old tanneries etc, whereas the southern one was arranged for modern industrial activity and steamships.

The prevailing industrial developments in the following years directed the expansion of the city to the south. The commercial developments were also impressive. As the *Almanach of the Vilayet* 1301 (Salname) noted, Mytilene was one of the most important harbours in the Ottoman Empire in 1880.

Mytiline, Greek School

The municipality was founded in the 1870s, yet its contribution to the making of the city seems rather less in the first years, if compared to the activity of the Christian community's Council of the Elders.[20] The latter was busy with building schools, shelters for the old, churches, orphanages etc. It is worth noting that the Christian-Orthodox community played the main part in the remaking of urban space, and often succeeded in taking over from the municipal authority and putting forward projects for infrastructures, city services and embellishments. The restrained role of the municipality may be one of the reasons that we know (so far) nothing of a general plan for the city. By contrast, in the nearby island of Chios, the municipality ordered a plan for the city to be drawn up by engineers as early as 1878.[21]

Things changed probably around the turn of the century. The Ottoman authorities (*Vilayet*) built a *Konak*, an *Idadié* school for civil servants, and a high-school. Premises for the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the customs' house, a modern hotel, and a theatre were erected, next to new schools and churches for the Greek-Orthodox community. Mayor Kavetsos (1899-1907) provided Mytilene with a luxurious town hall, a municipal garden, and a well-paved quay. He improved the market and introduced a system of piped water and public lighting for the central part of the city. A very wealthy businessman himself, he made loans to the municipality and recuperated his money by selling the services to the townspeople in advance.[22]

Mytiline, the old *Konak* (Prefecture)

In 1905 the city had 17,000 inhabitants. By 1912 there were among other businesses, more than 110 oil manufactures, 42 soap factories, and 25 tanneries, all functioning on steam.[23] At the same time the local businessmen extended their interests to farming, manufacture, shipping and passengers' transport, banking, and the press. On the waterfront banks, hotels, a theatre, shipping and insurance company-offices, and behind them a new Orthodox church with a gigantic dome, completed an impressive façade. At the two extremes of the south port, elegant suburbs with private residences presented a great variety of architectural styles. During his visit, the Prussian writer and journalist Paul Lindau described Mytilene as '*the Neapolis of the Aegean*'.[24]

As reflected in the physical aspect of the city, the economic dynamism of Mytilene overrides processes of civic awareness. The area around the *Konak* and the market remained the main social centre, the town hall standing aside, alone in its garden.

The new capital of Samos

In contrast to the decisive activities of the first inhabitants of Hermoupolis to organize and name their new city, Samos encountered considerable difficulties in formulating its image and identity. And yet the moderate size of the population and the hinterland did not impede urban development. The island of Samos, with a surface of 486 km^2 is roughly one-third or a quarter the size of Lesbos. From the seventeenth century onwards, Samos



Samos 1800

had 16 settlements, none of them on the coast. The old capital of the island, Megali Hora, lies 60 meters above sea level and two miles from the coast.[25]

The new capital-to-be began its existence as a small hamlet by the sea, a mere fishermen's anchorage not far from the old village of Vathy on the hills. In 1828 John Kapodistria, the first Governor of Greece, appointed the shabby little township of 1,261 inhabitants as the seat of the Special Administration for the island.[26] The customs officials, sanitation authority etc. had to be housed in poorly appointed private buildings, while political gatherings took place in churches. Documents in the General State Archives concerning the provisional administration of the island testify to the authorities' slow and painful efforts to transform the fishing hamlet into a small city. They mention demolition of the private wooden moles, the creation of a rudimentary quay, efforts to introduce some type of sanitation control, public lighting etc. Evoking the Greek government's Decree no 10927 of 1829, the local authority asked that architects be sent from the mainland to prepare plans and regulations for the making of the city in accord with precise functional and aesthetic rules. Sometimes letters ended with a poetic touch, for instance by insisting on "the sweet hope that before too long the new town will take the form that would please the nineteenth century".[27]

Samos, abandoned factory

When the principality regime was established in 1834, the port of Vathy was again designated as capital, the main reason for this choice being that its natural harbour was the best in the island. The consular agencies of England, France, and Russia were already established there.[28] According to the *Organic Statutes of the Principality*, Samos was governed by the Prince, a parliament (a body of councillors to the Prince), and the municipalities.

The capital was renamed Stephanoupolis in honour of the first prince, Stephanos Vogoridis. When Vogoridis left office, the name was changed to Neapolis by the General Assembly of the Citizens in 1852. More names for the city (Pythagoreia, Anthemis, Lefkothea etc.) were proposed between then and 1879, but none was adopted. Informally the city was called Limin Vatheos (Port of Vathy), or Kato Vathy (Lower Vathy), or Yalos etc, until in 1950 it finally and officially became Samos.[29]

No planning initiatives were recorded until the 1850s, when Prince M. Aristarchis considered moving the capital to Tigani on the south coast of Samos, and even hired the engineer F. Bouchet to prepare surveys and choose what land was to be expropriated for public buildings. Meanwhile a municipality was established in the port of Vathy (1851), and in the 1860s the first public square was created according to plans prepared by Bouchet.[30] It was a commercial square open to the sea, with shops, a church, a fountain and a garden, that would become the centre of the city. Markets were traditionally considered to be the actual centres of old cities, so one could

Samos, government buildings

say that this design reproduced older urban patterns. It was only in the 1870s that new forms of urban space were introduced in the city. Two fires facilitated new streets to be cut and for new building rules to be drawn up and implemented. Samos actually had recourse to Ottoman precedents to improve conditions in the residential quarters.

Some years later various planning acts were ratified. Expropriation for public general interest was authorized, and public facilities were established in 1879; building regulations were introduced in 1882. More acts provided for the laying out of three squares (1884), for control of land uses (1886-1889), and for the erection of public buildings (1890).[31]

In 1875 the Dussaud Company, already involved in the construction of the quay and port of Smyrna [Izmir], was commissioned to improve and extend the harbour of Samos.

Unlike Mytilene, which did not have a public square, and in a different way from Hermoupolis' civic centre, a civic axis was created in the capital of Samos in the years that followed. This consisted of a sequence of open spaces, and extended for 200 meters at right angles to the quay. At one end of the axis, on the waterfront, stood the princely residence. Next came the Garden of the Prince, the Parliament (1892...), the Museum, and the new cathedral (1909-1910). In the immediate vicinity stood the imposing Pythagoreion gymnasium (1882), and behind the government buildings, the principality's publishing house and a large school-building that was



Samos, Pythagoreion highschool

regularly used as theatre, a hospital, and the prison. We do not know if it was conscious design that concentrated all civic and political functions in the same place, as was definitely the case in Hermoupolis, or the fortunate presence of vacant land. Whatever the answer, the result is an interesting and characteristic expression of how the Samians conceived of the political centre of their city. It should also be noted that the civic axis is quite apart from the commercial quarter, illustrating in a way a separation between political power and the city's economic life.

An overall plan for the capital of Samos island was finally prepared at the end of the nineteenth century, probably in 1897.[32] Until then, demographic growth had been insignificant,[33] with the urban population rising from 1,883 inhabitants in 1864 (according to the first official census in the principality) to 2,929 in 1890 and then sharply to 4,156 in 1898. The pace further accelerated in the years thereafter and demanded a plan for the location of new dwellings as well as for more amenities for both private citizens and businessmen. In 1904 the city's population was 5,411, reached 6,627 in 1913, and went up to 8,636 with the arrival of refugees (1923-1928).

Urban growth was of course directly related to economic development. The island's economy was based on traditional products such as wine, tobacco, and timber. Commercial exchanges with the Turkish coast and Izmir was intense. By 1900, 15,000 Samians were living across the straits and engaged in trading between the island and the mainland. They had to return

to Samos under the 1922 population exchange at the end of the Greek-Turkish War, but they managed to find employment in the island.

Samos wine, known in European markets since the eighteenth century, had acquired international recognition in the end of the nineteenth. The island also had tanneries and shipyards where small boats were built. When wine production declined in the 1890s due to an insect pest wiping out the plants, the economy shifted to tobacco. Tobacco and cigarettes were exported to Egypt, Eastern Europe, and even to China. After the Greek-Turkish war in 1922, American tobacco companies moved from Izmir to Samos, and large tobacco warehouses were built in the city between then and 1934. After the tobacco crisis in 1932, the Samians went back to the production of wine. The outbreak of World War II marked the end of a '*golden half-century*'.

The prosperous economic development of the island is reflected in the fine residences built by its businessmen, in the buildings donated by rich merchants to the municipality, and in investments in the summer resort of Malagari, the 'Riviera' of Samos. When the same Prussian writer Paul Lindau who had been in Mytilene arrived in Samos, he declared himself astonished by its environment so full of optimism, such as one finds only in American cities. He went on to note: '*In spite of its small size and the lack of importance of its prince, the city has the quality of a capital. It is very different, for instance, from Smyrne La Grande* (in French). *One feels here the air of the small princely court...*'.[34]

Concluding remarks

Despite their small size, oscillating between 5,000 and 25,000 inhabitants, the island cities were successfully transformed into capital cities and acquired a new spatial identity that met the requirements of the local elites. Each city shaped an urban physiognomy that represented a decisive break with centuries'-old traditions and guided its continued development through the twentieth century.

Compared to the traditional settlements in the Aegean islands, the new urban patterns conformed to a different set of priorities.

A significant change concerned the geographical location: new development moved from inland mountains and heights to the coasts, to naturally protected bays that encouraged port activities. The first *ad hoc* settlements on the coast were on wooden docks, but they were very quickly modernized and extended, in accordance with specific regulations. Further expansion of the cities took advantage of all possible stretches of waterfront and embraced the sea.

The new urban layout was quite different from the traditional patterns that had prevailed in the older settlements. All introverted secluded forms, old fortifications and defensive structures, were abandoned. The cities were open, able to expand, and they were easily linked with the surrounding region.

There was an end to the visual and functional emphasis on religious structures. The traditional city had consisted of unpretentious houses, modest workshops, warehouses, and religious edifices where every form of social life took place. The early political gatherings in Samos and Syros, at which the inhabitants made decisions for the future of their islands, had been held in churches. The new urban setting now presented a variety of specialized buildings and city-quarters. New forms of public and private space, and a great variety of building types were introduced: industrial and commercial premises, civic squares, open spaces for prestige and leisure, schools, theatres and hotels, city residences, and especially administrative buildings (a princely mansion in Samos, a monumental town hall in Hermoupolis, an elegant prefecture in Mytilini). When impressive religious buildings were also put up, they served only religious functions. Urban space had definitely been secularized.

New technology was imported and widely used in private and civic buildings, public works, and infrastructure. The shift to new materials and techniques was accelerated as a result of calamities such as earthquakes or fires.

At the same time buildings and the use of urban land became subject to precise rules, technical and social. Land registers and cadastral plans were drawn, and land values were secured. The road network was redesigned, opened up, and organized according to the new traffic priorities; infrastructures were established. Private plots acquired regular geometrical shapes and their use depended on their place in the city; rights and obligations of both individuals and the public domain were defined. Expropriation for reasons of public utility was enacted, the available public space was delimited and protected, controlled, and maintained by special services.

Although the three cities studied were under different sovereignties and despite their geographical restraints, the economic and social context prevailed and the cities acquired a rather similar persona that transcended the existing differences in architectural style: the elaborate classicism of Hermoupolis, the distinct eclecticism of Mytilene, the sober neo-classicism of Samos. Yet the urban patterns and building types of the bourgeois city are present in all three, and allowed the activities of private business, production and consumption, modern administration, leisure and prestige to flow freely.

A common parameter in all three cases was that spatial change was not dictated by central government. Transformations originated in local initiative and they were financed by local resources. Hermoupolis, for instance, was built without any assistance from the Greek State. In any case Greece had great difficulties to support and finance even the transformation of Athens as its capital and the national showcase. Samos, as expected, could count only on its own resources. Mytilene followed the Ottoman model that encouraged spatial reform as long as it mobilized local funding; guidelines

from the Porte were quite clear on this, as studies for other Ottoman cities have shown.

Alert awareness of the local societies was a key factor of change - citizens formulating demands, supporting decisions and often going so far as to themselves finance the construction of buildings and open spaces beneficial to the public. Local bodies of government were constituted with main objective to promote, monitor, and control the overall urban growth and embellishment of the city. All these mechanisms of decision-making (local self-government, co-operatives, communal groups and institutions) became weaker in the post-war years and were replaced by highly centralized structures, which were generally speaking far less effective and sometimes even fatal to local development.

If similarities in urban development are easy to detect, perhaps the main difference with regard to the three models should be sought in their respective local civic consciousness. In fact the feeling of the people belonging to the city is quite distinct in each instance. In the spectacular setting of Hermoupolis, one can sense the pride and unity of its bourgeoisie as it is reflected into urban space. The image of Mytilene rather expresses the city's multi-cultural references and aspirations of economic and social well-being. The attitude of the Samians is more complicated. They fought for the integration of the island with Greece, and when this was denied, they had to fabricate a new identity. Allegorically, their endeavours can be seen reflected in their difficulty to find a new name for the city, an adventure that only ended in 1950 when the modern city was definitely named Samos.

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3 Agriantoni, *Oi aparhes tis ekviomihanisis.*

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5 Yerolympos A. 'Urbanisme et modernisation en Grèce du Nord à l'époque des Tanzimat', in (P. Dumont and F. Georgeon, eds) *Villes Ottomanes à la fin de l'Empire,* Paris, Ed. L'Harmattan 1992, pp. 47-74.

6 Landros, C. *I metepenastatiki Samos se ypoteleia, 1834-1835 [The post-revolutionary*

Samos in tribute, 1834-1835], Samos: Pnevmatiko Idryma Samou, 2001.

7 In Greece these routes were called 'agones' (unproductive, infertile) for many years.

8 The following studies have provided valuable material to this paper: Agriantoni, C. 'Oi metashimatismoi tis viomihanikis domis tis Ermoupolis ton 19o ai.' [Transformations of the industrial structure of Hermoupolis in the nineteenth century], in *Proceedings of the International Symposium Neohelliniki poli. Othomanikes klironomies kai helliniko kratos (Modern Greek city. Ottoman heritage and Hellenic State),* Athens, 1985; Agriantoni, C. and Fenerli, A. *Ermoupoli - Syros, istoriko odoiporiko [Hermoupolis, Syros: a Historical Guide]*, Athens, Olkos, 1999; Kardasis, V. *Syros. Stavrodromi tis Anatolikis Mesogeiou 1832-1857 [Syros, a Crossroads in the Eastern Mediterranean 1832-1857],* Athens, The National Bank Cultural Foundation, 1987; Loukos, C. 'Mia elliniki poli se parakmi. I Ermoupolis sto deftero miso tou 19ou aiona' [A Greek city in decline. Hermoupolis in the second half of the nineteenth century] in *Proceedings of the International Symposium Neohelliniki poli. Othomanikes klironomies kai helliniko kratos (Modern Greek city. Ottoman heritage and Hellenic State)* (Athens 1985); Travlos, I. and Kokkou, A. *Ermoupoli. I dimiourgia mias neas polis stin Syro stis arhes tou 19ou aiona [Hermoupolis. The creation of a new city on Syros at the beginning of the nineteenth century],* Athens, Commercial Bank of Greece, 1980.

9 According to official letters of the City Council, quoted by Fenerli, A. 'O kallopismos tis Ermoupolis' [The embellishment of Hermoupolis], in Actes du IIe colloque international *La ville à l'époque moderne. XIXe – XXe siècles,* Athènes: Association des Etudes Néohelléniques, 2000.

10 The word 'embellishment' is used here to show planning practice as it had developed since the 18th century. It comprised operations and measures providing for the improvement of the city's sanitary conditions, infrastructure and aesthetics.

11 See Fenerli, 'O kallopismos tis Ermoupolis'.

12 Ibid., for names of the merchants and information on plans, building cost, and financial brief.

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15 The author is a Spanish fifteenth-century ambassador who was visiting the island. See Karydis and Kiel, *Mytilinis astygraphia*, p. 42-43.

16 Karydis believes that the channel was definitely filled in around 1500. Ibid., p. 43.

17 Newton, C. T. *Travels and Discoveries in the Levant,* London 1865.

18 Yerolympos A. 'Urbanisme et modernisation en Grèce du Nord à l'époque des Tanzimat', in (P. Dumont and F. Georgeon, eds) *Villes Ottomanes à la fin de l'Empire,* Paris, Ed. L'Harmattan, 1992, pp. 47-74.
19 Siphnaiou, *Lesbos,* p. 94, quoting the Austrian vice-consul.
20 Siphnaiou, 'Apo tin mousoulmaniki stin christianiki poli', p. 409.
21 Monioudi-Gavala, D. *The City of Chios,* Chios, 1996.
22 Siphnaiou, 'Apo tin mousoulmaniki stin christianiki poli', p. 409.
23 Siphnaiou, *Lesbos,* p. 197.
24 Lindau, P. *An der Westküste Klein-Asiens,* Berlin, 1900.
25 Hora was a common traditional name for the principal town in almost all the islands. See Belavilas, N. *Limania kai oikismoi sto Archipelagos tis peirateias, 15os-19os ai. [Ports and towns in the Archipelago during the era of piracy, 15th – 19th century],* Athens, Odysseas, 1997, and Dimitropoulos, D. 'Construction et intervention communale dans les iles de la Mer Egée (XVIIe-XIXe s.)' in *Mnimon*, v. 23, Athènes, Association des Etudes Néohelléniques, 2001. Valuable material for the making of the new capital of Samos is included in the papers by Belavilas, N. 'Istoriko topio tis polis tis Samou' [Historical landscape of the city of Samos]; Landros, C. 'Limin Vatheos Samou: Gennisi kai exelixi enos dioikitikou kentrou, 19os-20os ai.' [Limin Vatheos in Samos. Creation and development of an administrative center, nineteenth-20th century], and Vourliotis, M. 'Shimatismos kai poleodomikes paremvaseis se mia nisiotiki protevousa. Kato Vathy 1780-1830' [Creation and urbanism of an island capital. Kato Vathy 1780-1830], all published in the *Proceedings of the Conference The City of Samos, Physiognomy and Development,* Athens, Municipality of Samos and Public Archives of Samos, 1998.
26 Vourliotis, 'Shimatismos…', p.282.
27 Quoted by Vourliotis, 'Shimatismos…'
28 Landros, *I metepanastatiki Samos,* p. 13.
29 Landros, 'Limin Vatheos Samou', p. 18.
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32 I am indepted to M. Vourliotis for this information.
33 In 1828 the island of Samos was left with 28,000 inhabitants. Almost 50 years later, according to the official Ottoman census of 1872-74 the *Beylik* of Samos had 300 Muslims and 34,000 non-Muslims. Karpat, *Ottoman Population.*
34 Lindau, *An der Westküste Klein-Asiens.*

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