

The Politics of TURKISH DEMOCRACY

*İsmet İnönü and the Formation
of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950*

JOHN M. VANDERLIPPE

The most significant yet least known periods of modern Turkish history is its second president, İsmet İnönü. Following the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, Turkish politicians and intellectuals struggled to redefine Kemalist modernity and democracy, Islam and secularization, the role of the state, and Turkey's place in the world. *The Politics of Turkish Democracy* examines İnönü's presidency (1938–1950), which developed amid the crises of World War II and the Cold War, political transformation, and economic and social change within Turkey. John M. VanderLippe analyzes the political discourse of the era and argues that İnönü was a pivotal figure who played the decisive role in Turkey's transition to a multi-party political system.

"This book is an outstanding contribution to the study not only of modern Turkey, but also of the modern Middle East and the modern non-Western world. It tells the story of a peaceful transition from a single-party state to multi-party democracy in a country that is virtually unheard of in the modern third world."

— Douglas A. Howard, author of *The History of Turkey*

VANDERLIPPE is Associate Professor of History at the State University of New York at New Paltz.

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Anka Giyane

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Introduction

İsmet İnönü and Multi-Party Politics in Turkish History

The presidency of İsmet İnönü, 1938–50, developed amid the crises of World War II and the Cold War, global economic and political transformation, and economic and social change within Turkey. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the scope of political debate had been narrowly defined and participation in the political arena restricted to a limited group of participants, who shared similar backgrounds, experiences, and views of the Turkish nation, its needs and its future. As the Republic's first Prime Minister, during the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İnönü had played a central role in shaping both the major political issues, and the nature of political participation in Turkey. For both Atatürk and İnönü, politicians and political debate were more obstacles than instruments to progress and advancement. Outcome was more important than process for both men, but during World War II and the Cold War İnönü found his government increasingly confronting demands to open up the political process, to accept new and different voices into the political arena, and to allow new discussion of old issues as well as the introduction of new issues.

A strong believer that caution and preparation were essential to avoid the irreparable mistakes of the Young Turk regime, İnönü had to balance demands from many in the ruling People's Party for restriction and tighter control, with demands from others within and outside the party to open debate on domestic and foreign affairs. Believing that the crisis of the war demanded greater central direction of all aspects of the economy and curtailment of political debate for the sake of national unity, İnönü asserted his own authority as National Chief, President of the Republic, and Permanent Leader of the People's Party. But new forms of domination produced new

forms of resistance, and increasing numbers of politicians, journalists, land-owners and private entrepreneurs, and academics and technocrats, representing the voices of different constituencies, pushed political discourse beyond its previously allowed limits.

Within the context of the presidency of İsmet İnönü, it is then crucial to ask, how did global and local changes lead to new types of struggles, and what kind of antagonisms did the struggles express as a response to new types of limitations imposed by the Turkish state? Also, what kind of implications did these antagonisms have for the emergence and molding of democracy in Turkey during the period since 1945?

In the longer time frame of Ottoman and Turkish Republican history, the articulation of antagonism that reached a new level of struggle in the period of İsmet İnönü's presidency carried questions first raised during the late Ottoman period, continued by the Young Turks, and brought into the Republican period by the Kemalists and their opponents, on four major concerns: (1) how to achieve economic development, and what constitutes progress; (2) what roles can, and should, the bureaucracy and the military play in economic and cultural affairs and in the electoral system; (3) what are vital national interests, and how should they be protected; and (4) how can relations with the Western powers, particularly Britain, Germany, and Russia, and later the United States be established in such a way as to benefit Turkey, without compromising its sovereignty and independence in international affairs?

In the early Republican period, during the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, politics were defined within the constraints of Kemalism, a set of ideological prescriptions regarding nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism, reformism, and statism that were embedded in the ruling People's Party program. Even though it had its roots in the ideas of the Young Turks, Kemalism was proclaimed as a break from the Ottoman past, and as an ideology of progress for the new Turkish Republic. Thus the acceptability of any debate, and any political actor, was measured in reference to Kemalism. While struggles expressed antagonism, emerging as a response to the dominant formulation of Kemalism, they also tended to develop in continuity with the ongoing implications of the Young Turks' ideas and policies. The single-party regime enforced a singular interpretation of past as well as future, and antagonism developed between supporters of Kemalist singularity and those who proposed alternative interpretations of the past, or alternative visions for the future.

In contrast to the singularity of Kemalist ideology, opposition discourse reflected a multiplicity of views of past, present, and future. As much as the

dominant ideology is tied to political and economic conditions both at the state and the global level, so are the contesting ideologies linked to the legitimization and delegitimization of the economic and political arrangements in specific state and global contexts. Thus, from 1938 to 1950, alteration of economic conditions created contesting political voices representing different interpretations of change and progress. In this period, new interpretations emerged to question the moral validity of state-sponsored development, the legal rational aspects of policies, and the resulting systems of domination.

As Kemalism developed within the perspective of monopoly capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s, and as the power of the state and global capital generated new forms of domination during the period from 1938 to 1950, different expressions of resistance emerged. But Kemalism's focus on outcome rather than on process meant that alternative proposals also focused on outcome. Thus, in Turkey, opposition to all or parts of the Kemalist regime did not lead to a democratic process, but rather to the incorporation of new hegemony, with new personnel, imposing their own agenda in the same way as their opponents. Reform during the period of İnönü's presidency has not assured full participation in the economy and politics, confrontation of social differentiation, or freedom to express cultural plurality. In effect, it has resulted in the development of political systems separate from society, fostering politics and society as two separate entities linked by the political domination of experts, career politicians, and the military. In this context, not only do bureaucrats and career politicians control political power, but those who question the dominant ideology or group do so within the confines of a narrow discourse.

For the Turkish people, this means that the only way they can participate is through an unresponsive system, or by challenging the system itself from the outside. Examples of the latter approach include communists and Islamists. During the decades of the Cold War leftist alternatives were squashed, after which the military took on the role of taming the Islamists and forcing them to enter into the Kemalist framework.

İSMET İNÖNÜ IN TURKISH HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

As successor to Atatürk as President and Permanent Leader of the single, ruling party, İsmet İnönü played a pivotal role in defining the meaning and relevance of Kemalism and deciding whether and how to perpetuate

Atatürk's legacy. Most historians have treated İnönü's claim of continuity with Atatürk as the logical and inevitable course of Turkish history. But history, including Ottoman history, is replete with leaders who have disavowed their predecessors' ideas and policies. The appearance of continuity between Atatürk and İnönü needs to be problematized to reach a more nuanced vision of Turkish Republican history.

Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1884–1973) was born in Izmir, the son of an official in the Ottoman bureaucracy. After a highly successful military education he joined the ranks of Ottoman officers who were discontented with the Ottoman system, and had become members of the secret Committee of Union and Progress. He served as an officer in Yemen, and in the Balkan campaigns prior to World War I, and while in Yemen he contracted scarlet fever, which left him nearly deaf and dependent on his famous hearing aid. During World War I he served at the front with, among others, Mustafa Kemal, and was promoted to colonel before returning to Istanbul to take a position in the Ottoman Ministry of War. When the War of Independence began in 1919, İnönü remained in Istanbul, but worked for the nationalist cause. Finally facing arrest, he escaped to Ankara in April 1920. During the rest of the War of Independence, he commanded the Western front, achieving major victories over Greek forces in the two battles of İnönü, hence the family name he was later given by Atatürk. At the end of the war in 1922, İsmet Pasha, as he was more commonly known throughout his later career, led the nationalist delegation to negotiate first a cease-fire, then a treaty recognizing Turkish independence and sovereignty, which was signed by the great powers at Lausanne, Switzerland. İsmet Pasha subsequently served twelve years as Prime Minister, then twelve more as President. He remained active as leader of the People's Party, and retained his seat in the National Assembly, during Democrat Party rule in the 1950s. After the military coup of 1960 removed the Democrat Party from power, İnönü was asked to return as Prime Minister in 1961. He led three coalition governments, and remained Chair of the People's Party until 1972. He remained an active force in Turkish politics until his death the following year.

During an eight-decade long political career, İnönü participated in, or influenced, every major development in Turkey's domestic and international affairs. Yet, in scholarly research and the popular imagination, İnönü has always existed in the shadow of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and İnönü's presidency has been assessed within a framework that places Atatürk at the center of Turkish history.

This "Kemalocentric" interpretation of Turkish history was proposed by Mustafa Kemal himself, in his six-day speech (*Nutuk*) to a meeting of

the Republican People's Party in October 1927. Kemalist historiography emphasizes the foundation of the Republic as central to Turkish history, and credits Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with the original and unique conception of the political, economic, and social reforms of the early Republican period, even though İnönü was Prime Minister throughout nearly all of Atatürk's presidency. This pronouncement defines an ideology that legitimates the interpretation of a distinctly Turkish past, by ratifying the Republican present and by proposing a nationalist-secularist-progressive model for the future. Kemalist historiography has been maintained and fostered by the force of law, as well as by the Turkish Historical Society, and is popularized through public schools, the mass media, and the Ministry of Culture. To use Jean-Francois Lyotard's term, Kemalist historiography is a "metanarrative," influencing the investigation and meaning of the past, and legitimating domination and control of the existing power structure by confining definitions of development, progress, nation, and democracy to narrow boundaries.

This work differs from existing scholarship in that it deals specifically with the period of Turkish history coinciding with İnönü's presidency, 1938–50, during which the central tenets of Kemalism faced the challenge of voices from beyond the previously accepted boundaries of political discourse. Two questions are central to this book: (1) In what ways did İnönü pursue the Kemalist agenda, and in what ways did he move away from it, or beyond it, to pursue his own "İnönü-ist" program; and (2) How did İnönü perceive the multi-party system he helped create in the early years of the Cold War—as the outcome of Kemalism, or as part of a process of achieving progress and development, freedom and justice, and equality and democracy?

İnönü's presidency can be seen as an intersection in modern Turkish history, from which two roads could be followed. Following one road would mean stifling dissent and the possibilities of any democratic development, while the other would mean opening the system to all voices of dissent and alternative views of the Turkish future. The road chosen was neither the route to complete suppression of dissent nor to truly open, representative democracy. Rather, it was a path of multi-party politics, a truncated form of democracy, the promise of which has yet to be fulfilled.

The key to understanding the period 1938–50 lies in the politics of the creation of the multi-party system in Turkey. During this period the limits of the discourse were redefined by establishing acceptable margins of deviation from the Kemalism mandated by the ruling party. Within this context, a new Kemalism emerged, updated according to the experiences

of World War II for the Cold War world, under which acceptable mainstream political parties rallied to claim the legitimacy of their own interpretation of Kemalist discourse. Meanwhile socialist and communist discourse was conceptualized as dangerous to the state, demonstrating not only the thrust of new domestic arrangements but also the emerging geopolitics of the Cold War. After July 1947 as the relationship between the United States and Turkey intensified, the confines of the relationship became clear as American policy makers revised their global strategic plans for the post-war world, and as Turkish leaders integrated issues of foreign policy and American assistance into the domestic agenda. Out of this complex connection emerged the conceptualization of the Turkish future as a “Little America.” Therefore, this period was not only a withdrawal from the Kemalist notion of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” but also from the Kemalist notion of an uniquely Turkish past, leading to an uniquely Turkish future. In the multi-party period, the reformulation of the terms of progress, freedom, equality, and justice, and thus of democracy, began to reveal the fragmentation of antagonistic struggles. While some of the antagonistic struggles were integrated into the structural hierarchies of the existing system, others from the Islamist right to the socialist left were officially marginalized and suppressed. The Turkish state did not cover its legitimization crisis with the “Band-Aid” solution of multi-party politics. Rather, this was a prelude to military interventions, weak coalitions leading to chronic instability, unequal and oppressive economic conditions, and curtailment of cultural expression. Contrary to the expectations of the people, and of the intellectuals and politicians that influenced its articulation during the period 1938–50, neither the process nor the outcome of creating a multi-party system meant the coalescence of a democratic political community. But this does not mean that new forms of antagonism cannot arise to challenge new forms of domination. Turkish politics today show that the challenge continues.

Chapter One

Political Discourse and Reform in Turkey

The political discourse of the period 1938–50 developed in continuity with the political discourse of the Ottoman period, which was carried forward by the National Struggle into the Turkish Republic. Four main issues remained salient from the late Ottoman Empire through this period: defining and achieving development and progress; expanding or limiting the influence of the central bureaucracy and the military; defining nation and community, and establishing beneficial relations with the Western powers, particularly Britain, Germany, and Russia, and later the United States. The longevity of the debates over these four issues reflected continuity between the Ottoman and Turkish Republican periods in terms of the makeup of the political elite and access to the forum of political debate. But this longevity also demonstrates long-running and significant disagreements, within the elite, regarding these four main issues in Turkish politics. And while the continuity between the Ottoman and Turkish periods is striking, domestic and international changes meant that political perspectives and possibilities evolved and altered according to new circumstances.

The reforms of the nineteenth century Tanzimat (reorganization) emerged out of the growing awareness of the West and the relative weakness of the central Ottoman government, both of which presented political and economic challenges. In this period, growing military pressure from Russia was matched by increasing economic pressure from Western Europe as the Empire confronted divisions brought by separatist-nationalist movements, including the Greek Revolution of 1820–28, insurrections in the Balkans, and the growing power of Mehmet Ali and his successors

in Egypt. During the Tanzimat period, the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist system was facilitated through the terms of the 1838 Commercial Convention redefining the Empire as a free trade zone.¹ The Tanzimat, as a means to reorganize the Empire's internal economic and political structures, including its tax and land-holding systems, emerged from the belief among prominent reformers such as Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha, and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and Midhat Pasha, that the restoration of old religious and military institutions, which had given strength to the Empire in the past, would no longer meet the needs of changing circumstances. The Tanzimat, as a reform movement, reflected the changing ideas of power and progress in the minds of the administrators of the Empire.² The sense of advancement that had earlier stemmed from the expansion of territories gradually left its place to the exertion of control by a stronger central government in the shrinking Empire.

The reforms of the Tanzimat, designed and enacted by palace administrators, were aimed at modernization of the Empire's military and bureaucracy, and centralization of power for more efficient administration. Ultimately, economic development, and reform of the tax and land-holding systems were also viewed in this light. As the autocracy was strengthened, a group of intellectuals, known as the Young Ottomans (*Yeni Osmanlılar*), who included İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, and Ziya Pasha, emerged as its critics. Using the new devise of newspapers, especially *Tasvir-i Efkâr* [Description of Ideas], the Young Ottomans began to debate political ideas regarding the state, progress, nation, and relations with the West, and called for adoption of representative institutions to check the power of the Sultan.³ While there were disagreements over methods, the Young Ottoman intellectuals and the Tanzimat reformers shared similar goals: to modernize the state and protect the homeland. Their arguments centered on two focal points: redefining the nation in light of the challenge of European expansion, and the role of the bureaucracy and military in maintaining and modernizing the state.

In this context one of the central issues confronting intellectuals was the role of Islam. Part of the Young Ottoman agenda was the simplification of Ottoman Turkish by excluding Arabic and Persian words and by altering the Arabic script. Supporters of language, legal, and educational reforms argued that public expressions of religion must be in a new progressive form, which would also serve to fill the vacuum left by the replacement of traditional institutions by the Westernizing Tanzimat reforms.⁴

As the central and provincial administrations were reformed to extend the power of the state into the provinces, military reforms were carried out

to create a more clear and effective chain of command, a more efficient use of resources, and to make the military presence more obvious in cities, towns, and villages, increasing control and easing recruitment of the population. Another function of military reform was aimed at integrating Western technology and methods into Ottoman usage. Altogether, the reforms of the Tanzimat, and reforms of successive administrations aimed at expanding bureaucratic control into the military and religion, by underpinning the military, and by weakening the influence of traditional Islam and its institutions, as well as articulation of popular religion.⁵

It is important to remember that the impetus for reform came from the top of the system, from the top levels of the bureaucracy, and that their purpose was to increase the power of the state. Participation in political discourse was limited and popular participation and support, was unimportant to the point of non-existence. The Imperial War Academy (Harbiye) emerged as a center for dissemination of the political plans of the Young Ottomans and later of the Young Turks. Ottoman officers and candidates came to see themselves as the vanguard of a new Ottoman Empire, which emphasized the reformed military and central bureaucracy as alternatives to the authority of both the Sultan and the religious establishment. The War Academy thus created a space for a new generation of soldiers and administrators to connect with the ideas of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks.

Within the Young Turk discourse three loosely defined, and often overlapping, perspectives emerged regarding progress, the role of the military and bureaucracy, defining nation and foreign relations. The first perspective reflected a discourse that was nationalist, and stressed the primary role of the state in leading and developing the nation. The second and third trends were liberal, and pan-Turkist visions of the Empire's future. Nationalists represented by the Society (later Committee) of Union and Progress (CUP), led early on by Ahmet Rıza, called for preservation of the Empire, but with curtailment of the powers of the Sultan. The CUP reform agenda included separation of religion and the state, expansion of secular public education, language reform, and greater rights for women and minorities. CUP supporters called for more representative government that would respect the needs of all communities within the Empire, thus strengthening central administrative and military powers to protect against external threats as well as the internal pressures of economic dislocation and national secession, while developing the economy and culture.

One of the CUP's most prominent supporters was Ziya Gökalp, especially after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Drawing on the work of Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies, Gökalp argued that the Turks

formed a nation (*millet*), which had a distinct culture (*hars*) centered on the peasant culture of Anatolia. But Gökalp argued that Turkish culture had been submerged in Islamic/Arabian/Byzantine civilization (*medeniyet*), which had kept Turkish culture from developing to its full potential. For Gökalp, the Turkish nation must maintain its culture while joining European civilization, an idea popularized under the slogan first pronounced by Huseyinzade Ali: *Türkleşmek, İslamlasmak, Muasırlasmak* (Turkify, Islamicize, Modernize).⁶

At the first Congress of Ottoman Liberals, in Paris in 1902, Prince Sabahettin led a movement to develop a liberal program of reform that would reduce the powers of the central administration, and encourage individual initiative and free enterprise as the means to preserve and restore the Empire. Sabahettin differed from Ahmet Rıza both on the role the central administration should play in directing change, and on the role of foreign intervention to promote reform. Sabahettin called for the deposition of Abdulhamid II, and supported European involvement in Ottoman affairs to assure reform of the Empire along the lines of British liberalism.⁷

The third line of thought among the Young Turks, pan-Turkism, developed as a counter both to the pan-Islamist goals of Abdulhamid and to the Anatolian-centered nationalism of Gökalp. Pan-Turkism, calling for the unity of all Turks of the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus, and central Asia, first emerged in the late nineteenth century among Tatar and Turkic intellectuals of the Russian Empire, who confronted the realities of Russian political and cultural domination. For intellectuals like Yusuf Akçura, İsmail Bey Gasprinski, and Ahmet Ağaoglu, pan-Turkism was a means to unite diverse and dispersed Turkic populations in order to preserve political autonomy and cultural sovereignty.⁸ For the Ottomans, pan-Turkism became an ideological weapon against division and decline only after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had delegitimized Abdulhamid II and his efforts at pan-Islamism. For the Committee of Union and Progress, and especially for Enver Pasha, pan-Turkism offered a program for expansion of Ottoman power and for the extension of the political influence of Turks of Anatolia into the Caucasus and central Asia, against Russian interests. World War I marked the high point of officially sponsored pan-Turkism during the twentieth century, but it remained a serious alternative to nationalism and liberalism.⁹

Among teachers and students at the War Academy, the most influential political group was the secret CUP.¹⁰ Harbiye students such as Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü, Kâzım Karabekir, Asım Gündüz, Fuat Cebesoy, Fethi Okyar, and Kâzım Orbay had the opportunity to meet and discuss issues confronting the Empire with older graduates such as Fevzi

Çakmak and Enver Pasha. Many Harbiye graduates joined the CUP, and saw the revolution of 1908, led by the CUP as a crucial movement against rotten and oppressive rule, which by restoring the constitution would solve the Empire's domestic and foreign problems. İsmet İnönü, looking back a half century later, would recall how young and naive the revolutionaries of the CUP had been in their expectations of sudden change in the Empire, and believed that their lack of caution in carrying out reform had led to unexpected, often negative results.¹¹

While the 1908 revolution did not fulfill the expectations of the young officers and intellectuals of the Empire, it framed the four issues of progress, state, nation, and foreign relations in a new context of revolutionary transformation that remained at the center of political debate during World War I and during the War of Independence, and into the period of the Republic. As defeat in World War I appeared more and more certain, CUP leaders began to prepare for a second phase of war against Allied and Russian occupation of the Ottoman Empire, by creating an organization known as Karakol (The Guard), to accumulate arms, supplies, and personnel in eastern Anatolia. Karakol had two major aims: first to protect CUP personnel, who comprised much of the central and provincial administrations and military, from retribution for the Armenian genocide and maltreatment of minorities; and second, to prepare the ground for an independence struggle to protect the Turkish Muslim community from incursions, or claims on territory by the Allies, Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, or any other group. Working with local CUP members, religious leaders and urban and landowning elites, Karakol sponsored the formation of Societies for the Defense of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri), beginning in November 1918.¹² These societies, along with the army, created a bridge tying the Young Turk period to the formation of the Republic by bringing together military/bureaucratic, religious, and landed elites, all of whom had ties to the CUP, and by tying the institutional base of the Turkish National Struggle to the political discourse of the Young Turks.

THE TURKISH NATIONAL STRUGGLE

As the Turkish National Struggle began in the spring of 1919, political and military considerations took central importance, shaping the nature and limits of the movement for Turkish independence and revolutionary transformation, which in turn would emerge out of the war to shape the political discourse of the Republic. After returning from the Caucasian front,

General Kâzım Karabekir told other commanders in early 1919 that the only thing to do was “to go back to Anatolia, again lead the armies and work for this country’s salvation.”¹³ Indeed, Karabekir left Istanbul before Mustafa Kemal, who was then seeking a post in the Ottoman cabinet. Following Mustafa Kemal’s arrival in Samsun in May 1919, and Karabekir’s subsequent acceptance of his leadership of the resistance, the initiative began to shift from civilian forces loyal to the CUP to the military, and the National Struggle came to be defined as a military struggle against Allied, and especially Greek, occupation. Defining the struggle in military terms meant acceptance of Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, and also that the religious and landed elites in the Societies for the Defense of Rights would play a secondary role in establishing goals, and setting limits on the struggle. In June 1919, Mustafa Kemal, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Kâzım Karabekir, each representing military districts in Anatolia, agreed on a basic plan of action for a national movement against occupation.¹⁴

The following month, representatives of resistance organizations in eastern Anatolia also met in Erzurum to establish a plan to deal with the occupation. The result was a ten-point declaration that reflected the influence of Young Turk political discourse, but also established a new framework for a political discourse of independence and nationalism, which would coincide with military objectives that were being set at the same time. Claiming to speak for the nation while the Ottoman government was under occupation, the Erzurum declaration called for the assertion of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and protection of the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate against all claims of Europeans and non-Muslim minorities. Article four declared: “In case the central government, under foreign pressure, is forced to abandon any part of the territory, we are taking measures and making decisions to defend our national rights as well as the Sultanate and Caliphate.” The declaration further proclaimed that “this assembly is totally free of party interests. All Muslim compatriots are the natural members of this assembly.”¹⁵ Thus the Turkish National Struggle would aim to establish the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Muslim population. But it was not to be a class struggle or a social revolution in the mold of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The Erzurum declaration was reaffirmed by a national congress held in Sivas in September 1919, and formed the basis for the National Pact (*Misak-i Millî*) of February 1920. The National Pact defined the acceptable borders of a new Turkish state, which included Anatolia and eastern Thrace, along with Istanbul. The Arabs were left to decide their own

affiliation, but the Pact called for plebiscites in Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, and in western Thrace, which were all beyond the firm control of the nationalist military forces, to determine the makeup of the new nation. The National Pact denounced all outside interference in the country’s financial and political affairs, and specifically rejected intervention on behalf of minorities within the Turkish nation, promising respect for their rights in return for protection of the rights of Muslims in neighboring countries.

First and foremost, the National Pact defined the territorial boundaries of the Turkish nation, boundaries which could be controlled and defended militarily.¹⁶ Second, the National Pact offered a definition of a Turkish nation, which would be Muslim Turkish speakers of Anatolia and Thrace. This nation did not include Turkic Muslims of the Caucasus, central Asia, or the Balkans, and the National Pact made no mention at all of the Kurds or non-Muslim groups. Third, the Pact asserted a notion of national unity, making no case for class antagonisms or class interests having any place in the National Struggle.

When British forces occupied Istanbul in March 1920 in response to the National Pact, the nationalist-dominated Ottoman parliament pro-rogued itself and more than ninety members joined the nationalists in Ankara. The nationalists then claimed that only the Grand National Assembly, formed in Ankara in April 1920 could enact the National Pact. The emergency of the Greek invasion and advancement, followed by the British occupation of Istanbul, served the aim of Mustafa Kemal to cement a unified movement in opposition to both foreign occupation and the collaboration of the Ottoman government. For Mustafa Kemal, this unity would be forged in the nationalist military forces, and in the Grand National Assembly.

While Mustafa Kemal’s control of the military struggle went uncontested, from the beginning, groups within, and outside, the National Assembly challenged his political agenda. Political opposition centered on Mustafa Kemal’s personal power, and his political agenda, and the debates in the Assembly reflect both the continuing influence of the Young Turk discourse and the main debates of the subsequent republican period.

When the National Assembly began to meet in 1920, its membership reflected a diverse range of interests and beliefs. Forty percent of the members were from the military and bureaucracy, while 20% were professionals, 20% were businesspersons or landowners, and 17% were religious leaders.¹⁷ Immediately the Assembly split over several issues, including the personal power of Mustafa Kemal, the relationship of the National Assembly to the Ottoman state and Turkish nation, and the ultimate goals

of the National Struggle, in particular the need, desirability, and nature of political, economic, and social reform. Many in the Assembly, including Kâzım Karabekir and former CUP supporters, feared the growing power of Mustafa Kemal. Opposition also developed among Assembly members who favored the continuation of the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate, while challenges from outside the Assembly came from those who favored a revolutionary transformation on the model of the Bolshevik Revolution, or the pan-Turkist alternative of Enver Pasha.

After three years of struggle against their occupation, the British, French, Italians, and Greeks called for a conference in October 1922 to discuss an armistice. İsmet İnönü, as the commander of the Western front, represented the government of Ankara. As a result of the successful negotiations at Mudanya, İnönü, now as Foreign Minister, left in November 1922 to lead the Turkish delegation at the peace conference at Lausanne. İnönü and the Turkish delegation represented the Ankara government's goal of the complete recognition of Turkey's sovereignty, and the end of the capitulations.¹⁸ Furthermore, the aim was to force recognition of Turkey as the equal of the other nations, and as the victor in the war against European occupation. The adversarial atmosphere of Lausanne, and the knowledge that his failure could lead to further disruption and struggle, seems to have convinced İnönü that since only the Turks had Turkish interests in mind, caution and strength in foreign policy had to be complemented with unity and purpose in domestic affairs.

Through the Lausanne Treaty, the nationalists achieved recognition of the legitimacy of their government and recognition of the boundaries claimed in the National Pact of 1920. The treaty recognized the abolition of the capitulations, but imposed conditions on tariffs and trade, and the repayment of the Ottoman debt. İnönü felt that even though the treaty did not give Turkey economic independence, it provided a secure political base on which to build. But, his compromise at Lausanne created disagreement and dissension in the National Assembly.¹⁹ Some members focused on Lausanne to express their opposition to both İnönü and Atatürk, reflecting the division within the Assembly into two groups, and leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Rauf Orbay upon İnönü's return from Lausanne.²⁰

Orbay's resignation reinforced already existing opposition within the National Assembly, dividing it into groups known unofficially as the First and Second groups. These two groups represented divisions, which arose during the War of Independence, based on the "Eastern" and "Western" ideals. The "Eastern" ideal, of the First Group, stood for opposition to a

Western mandate for Anatolia, and aimed to replace the Sultanate and Caliphate with a Republic. Although impressed by the efforts of the Bolsheviks, the "Easterners" were nationalists and by following the Young Turk reformers, they set their goals to establish constitutional, secular, and republican governments. The "Western" ideal of the Second Group on the other hand, supported the Ottoman order and constitutional monarchy, and aimed to preserve the Islamic foundations of political institutions. Even with this conservative agenda, the "Westerners" supported liberal economic policies in opposition to the emphasis of the "Easterners" on central control of the economy.²¹ Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy led the debate of the "Westerners," while Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü represented the "Easterners."

On the night of October 28, 1923, İnönü and Mustafa Kemal together completed the final draft of the law declaring Turkey a Republic. Even though the National Assembly accepted the declaration the next day, they were aware of the opposition that was waiting for them. When Mustafa Kemal was elected first President of the Republic, and İnönü became Prime Minister, the First Group continued supporting the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and the reform programs of the government. The Second Group's opposition to the Republic in favor of the restoration of a constitutional monarchy continued, and in 1924, the Second Group officially separated to form the Progressive Republican Party as an alternative to the People's Party.

For Mustafa Kemal and his supporters, efficiency was the essential aspect of any reform program. Opposition, in the form of democratic antagonism, posed a threat to the reform agenda, which stressed outcome over process. Thus, the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1924–25, and the supposed plot against Mustafa Kemal's life in 1926 supplied the catalysts for eliminating legitimate opposition in the National Assembly. The revolt was suppressed violently, and its leaders were subjected to summary execution or exile. The Progressive Republican Party was smeared with the taint of complicity in the rebellion, and closed down. This was followed by the uncovering of an apparent plot against Mustafa Kemal's life, which led to the arrest and trial of several prominent military men, including Kâzım Karabekir, all of whom opposed the personal power of Mustafa Kemal in the People's Party and in the National Assembly.²² The elimination or silencing of opposition opened the possibility, and necessity, of announcing a coherent program of reform promising development and progress, national unity, and strength based on the power of the state, military, and single party.

FROM THE YOUNG TURKS TO KEMALISM

In October 1927 Mustafa Kemal articulated his own vision of the goals of the National Struggle, and the purpose of continuing reform, in a six-day long speech to the People's Party. By outlining his views of the history of the Turkish War of Independence and the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal's Nutuk (speech) was designed to establish his place at the center of the creation of the Turkish Republic, and to demonstrate not only the necessity of reform, but also its historical inevitability. Through the speech, he attacked heroes of the War of Independence who had become political opponents, portraying them as conservative, power-hungry, and dangerous. Thus, his speech served as the justification for establishing a single interpretation of the Turkish past, present, and future, and for suppressing alternative definitions of state, nation, and homeland.²³

The various reforms of the 1920s and 1930s, and their ideological justification, have come to be known as Kemalism. Kemalism, which promised a peaceful social revolution, was a program aimed at reforming Turkey's political institutions and at developing a national economy free of foreign domination, through statist economic policies.²⁴ The elimination of the Sultanate, abolition of the Caliphate, and declaration of the Republic were followed by alphabet reform, changes in the legal codes, dress laws, and women's suffrage. Altogether, these reforms were aimed at moving Turkish society closer to the West.²⁵ Kemalism is also significant for the changes it did not advocate, such as redistribution of land or wealth, or elimination of private property.

The Kemalist approach to defining the nation was inspired partly by solidarist notions adopted from Gökalp, partly by fascist programs of the 1920s and 1930s, and partly by pragmatic considerations of the limits of possibilities in Turkey. The Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*), the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*), and the People's Party, especially through the People's Houses, served as the instruments for defining and disseminating the new national identity, and for carrying it into everyday discourse.

The first congress of the Turkish Historical Society, in 1932, marked the proclamation of an official version of Turkish history—and thus of the Turkish future. The Kemalist vision of Turkish history stressed the historic role of the pre-Islamic Turks in forming great civilizations and states, and in carrying knowledge and technology to regions beyond central Asia, including China, Europe, and the Middle East.²⁶ The Ottoman period was interpreted as one of backwardness and decline, in which Turks were

subjected to the corrupting influence of Arabs and Persians. The Congress also served to proclaim the "Turkishness" of all of the people of Anatolia, thus stressing national unity over ethnic or class affiliation. Likewise, the Turkish Language Society, from the time of its first meeting in 1932, was charged with the task of building on the change of scripts in 1928, to Turkify language and culture, by purging foreign, especially Persian and Arabic, words and developing a language for the masses of Anatolia. The Turkish Language Society served to proclaim the uniqueness and superiority of the Turks and Turkish culture. But more importantly, the language reform aimed at carrying the official language and culture of Kemalism into everyday discourse.²⁷

The Historical and Language Societies were meant to carry the Kemalist agenda in popular culture, while the ruling People's Party embodied the Kemalist agenda for the state. The People's Party grew out of the CUP and the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, formed at the Sivas Congress during the Turkish War of Independence. In the winter of 1922–23 Mustafa Kemal began to discuss the formation of a party as the representative of the people. In his public speeches he stressed the "organic nature" of Turkish society and the role of a party in addressing the interests of all: "[Because it] is obvious that classes help each other and their interests are not opposed to one another, to ensure our people's common and general well-being and prosperity the formation of a party under the name 'People's Party' is being considered."²⁸ From the beginning, the People's Party served as an instrument of control in the National Assembly, providing a forum for debate beyond the procedural limits of the Assembly, and assuring the party leaders of majority votes in the Assembly. The single-party system was legitimated with the assertion that the People's Party represented the entire Turkish nation. Since there were no recognized class or ethnic tensions in Turkish society, the People's Party was defined as the party of, and for, all Turks.

In 1931 the People's Party closed the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) that had been created by the CUP, and replaced them a year later with Halk Evleri (People's Houses). In 1939 Halk Odaları (People's Rooms) were created to spread the movement to small towns and villages. The CUP had formed the Turkish Hearths in 1911 as cultural extensions of the Young Turks, and they had been reestablished in 1924 as autonomous organizations, under the leadership of Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, the Minister of Education. In the 1920s the Turkish Hearths grew to more than two hundred and fifty branches, where lectures, courses, and social events were held to spread the secularist and nationalist messages of the Turkish Republic.²⁹

Possibly inspired by Fascist Italy, Atatürk decided that the time had come to create a youth organization that would be under more firm control of the People's Party. The People's Houses were envisioned as spaces for continuing education, where the masses would be educated in practical skills like literacy, hygiene, and childcare, while being indoctrinated in the fundamentals of Kemalism. In practice, most members of the People's Houses were state employees, particularly teachers, and the intellectual elite of the cities dominated the leadership. The People showed little interest in the People's Houses, viewing them rather as instruments of state control and party propaganda.³⁰ Indeed, the Kemalist stress on outcome over process meant that the People's Houses could not serve as space for the people, controlled by the people, since this could allow the emergence of particularist sentiments challenging the universalist claims of Kemalism.

STATISM IN TURKISH POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In May 1931, during its Third Congress, the People's Party adopted a program stating that the party held six main values: republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and reformist. The articulation of party principles, which were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937 further tying the state and the People's Party, came in part as a response to the criticisms of the Free Party (see the following section), and perceptions among the leadership that the goals and principles of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters had to be clearly spelled out for the people. Of the six principles, republicanism and nationalism were generally accepted among the politically active elite by the 1930s. Populism and reformism were diluted enough to mean little other than a stress on solidarism and avoidance of Bolshevik style revolution. Statism and secularism have proved to be the principles subject to most debate and disagreement, both within and outside the People's Party. Debate on the meaning of secularism, and the state's role in controlling the public expression of religion, remained muted in the 1930s, but emerged during the presidency of İsmet İnönü, particularly with the advent of multi-party politics. Statism, however, was the subject of serious debate throughout the 1930s, and has remained a central issue in Turkish political discourse ever since.

According to the People's Party's 1931 program: "While holding individual effort and industry as essential, it is among our important principles that the State take an interest—especially in the economic area—in the work required ... to bring the nation satisfaction and the country prosperity

in as short a period as possible".³¹ This meant that in economic policy the People's Party would stress state investment and control, and central planning and intervention in the movement of capital. But in a broader sense, statism meant not only central control of the economy but also of the political and social development of Turkey, resulting in the state becoming the primary actor in all spheres of Turkish life.³² The popular term Devlet Baba (Father State) reflected this patriarchal image of a state that interfered in everything and that was supposed to take care of all needs. İnönü, the prime minister and a strong advocate of statism, saw it as a pragmatic measure during the period of constant economic crisis in the early years of the Republic.³³

During the 1920s the aim of achieving economic independence was hampered by the commercial clauses of the Lausanne Treaty, which restricted Turkey's right to set tariffs until 1929. Furthermore, this treaty did not extend economic aid to Turkey, forcing it to pursue policies to encourage industrial development and to increase agricultural output on a limited budget. Even though the period 1923–26 saw marked growth, it was mainly due to recovery from the war, and 1927–29 was a period of stagnation, with a disastrous drought in 1928. The Great Depression hit Turkey hard when world agriculture prices dropped, foreign capital investment was curtailed, and foreign trade decreased.³⁴

Beginning in 1930 the İnönü cabinet began to take a more interventionist approach to the economy, leading to the adoption of statism as party policy.³⁵ In addition, the National Assembly passed legislation that brought sweeping changes in economic strategy in two main areas. First, protective measures were extended to cover local industry, restrictions were placed on foreign investment, and the state began nationalizing industries. Second, the government extended control over internal markets with price controls and controlled interest rates. The government set prices for the purchase of commodities and established a monopoly for agricultural products. Payment in kind to government employees was introduced to supplement paychecks. Moreover, state monopolies were taken away from private management and placed under state control as ambitious programs of investment in industry and mining were launched.³⁶ These policies proved moderately successful in developing the Turkish economy during the thirties. Between 1933 and 1939 the Gross Domestic Product grew an average of 8 percent per year, compared to 3.2 percent during the period 1927–29. Statism also brought a structural shift in the economy toward more industrial production. By 1939 industry made up 18 percent of the GDP as opposed to 16 percent in 1932.³⁷

While supporters of statism saw the economic development of the 1930s as evidence of its success, advocates were divided among those who saw statism as a temporary program, and those who saw statism as a permanent alternative to liberalism and Bolshevism. The first implied state support for private enterprise, the second state control, or regulation. Among supporters of permanent statism were those who leaned toward fascism and those who favored socialism. The two leading proponents of the fascist approach were Tekin Alp and Recep Peker, the party ideologue who, in 1931, visited Italy and returned favorably impressed by Fascist methods.

The leading proponents of the socialist version of statism, the Kadrocular (Cadres) wrote for the journal *Kadro* (Cadre), a monthly magazine of political and economic commentary published by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu from 1932 to 1934. The most active of the Kadrocular was Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897–1976). Aydemir was a member of the Turkish Communist Party during the twenties before shifting his alliances to Kemalism. Aydemir and the Kadrocular pushed for greater state control of the economy, often criticizing the Kemalist regime for not going far enough. Their criticism eventually prompted Atatürk to order the journal closed and to exile Karaosmanoğlu to Albania as Ambassador.³⁸

İnönü pronounced his own interpretation of statism in his speech opening the rail line between Ankara and Sivas, during which he defended the government's purchase of the Anatolian Railroad in 1930.³⁹ İnönü also defined his interpretation in an article in *Kadro*, in which he interpreted the policy of statism as a defense mechanism, to build a state that could make up for centuries of economic neglect, to right injustices, and to face difficult conditions in the worldwide depression by taking over areas of the economy where private initiative was insufficient. For İnönü, statism was "not only a means of defense, but a means of development." At the same time, he maintained that statism would not replace individual initiative, but that the state should reserve rights in matters that would affect the entire nation's welfare.⁴⁰

CRITICS OF KEMALISM

Despite claims of progress and of the success of statism and the Kemalist program in developing Turkey, discontent with Mustafa Kemal and with the People's Party's monopoly on power continued to develop during the 1920s and 1930s within and outside the National Assembly. Opposition opinion in the 1920s centered on the reform program, especially secularism,

single-party rule, and centralization of power within the government. In the 1930s the statist economic policy of the People's Party became a subject of debate. Liberal opponents continued to advocate liberal economic policies and reduction of government regulatory powers, a critical stance that developed during the Young Turk period, and continued as an integral aspect of political debate in the republican period, right through İnönü's presidency. Decrying what they called the personal autocracy of Mustafa Kemal, opponents objected to the reforms as well as the dictatorial manner in which they were being imposed. In this context, they argued that the nation, not Mustafa Kemal, should decide its own fate.⁴¹ The first open expression of opposition after the foundation of the Republic came with the formation of the Progressive Republican Party less than a year after the foundation of the Republic, which threatened the Kemalist vision of reforms by shifting the focus of political debate from outcome to process.⁴²

The Progressive Republican Party (PRP) was founded by several men who had played prominent roles in the War of Independence, including Kâzım Karabekir and Rauf Orbay, and thus had the potential of undermining the legitimacy of the People's Party, also a party created by military heroes. Moreover, the PRP called for a more representative political system and greater respect for religion, both popular causes. According to İnönü, the Progressive Republican Party was reformist, but in the context of the Ottoman Empire rather than according to the realities of the Turkish Republic.⁴³ The members' discontent with the government's policies forced the resignation of İnönü from the Prime Ministry in November 1924, and his replacement by Fethi Okyar, a member of the new party, which generated newspaper headlines like "The Entire Nation Says Whew!" and "We Have Escaped from İsmet Pasha, Whew!"⁴⁴ İnönü remained out of office until March 1925, when he was asked to return to confront the Kurdish movement led by Sheikh Said in eastern Anatolia. Facing accusations of complicity in a rebellion, the Progressive Republican Party was closed in July 1925.⁴⁵

After the Progressive Party experiment the People's Party moved to consolidate its control over the state, but another experiment with multi-party politics in 1930 coincided with growing economic problems and popular discontent, with the formation of the Free Party.⁴⁶ Fethi Okyar, who had replaced İnönü as Prime Minister for a few months during the Progressive Party period, was asked to lead the Free Party by Atatürk, who also chose the other leaders and declared that he would remain non-partisan in the new multi-party system. The Free Party announced a program calling

for relaxation of state control over the economy, reduction of taxes and encouragement of foreign investment, more liberal policies, and less coercion in the carrying out of reforms, especially dealing with religious practices. The main difference between the parties, displaying the continuity of debates from the Ottoman period, was their interpretation of state intervention in the economy and cultural matters. The People's Party leaders, in particular İnönü and Recep Peker, called for an extension of state control into new areas of the economy to deal with the crisis stemming from the global depression. Opponents of expanded state control, and of the People's Party, blamed Prime Minister İnönü for stifling development and for impeding progress through heavy-handed and unnecessary economic regulation.

The Free Party attracted considerable attention from the electorate, who hoped the new party would be a genuine alternative to the People's Party in upcoming elections.⁴⁷ When Okyar traveled to Izmir to deliver a campaign speech the whole waterfront was alive with cheering throngs. It took half an hour for him to walk twenty yards into the crowd. Every corner of the city had been hung with flags, and thousands of residents marched in the streets. When police tried to break up the demonstration, an officer was thrown into the sea. Some demonstrators attacked the offices of a pro-People's Party newspaper, leading to violence and the death of a child. The father of the dead child came to Okyar, laying the body at his feet and supposedly saying, "Here is a sacrifice! We are prepared to give others. Save us! Save us!"⁴⁸ This support and attention pushed the Free Party leaders to move beyond their designated role as "loyal opposition" to mount a real challenge to the People's Party government. The most vocal critic was Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who argued that Atatürk's presidency was different from the government of İsmet İnönü:

The head of the party was completely ignorant of the position of the party in the country. He was being deceived, deluded and exploited! How many sincere people were there around him? He could not learn the truth. He imagined that the party that had given the country so much service that had saved the country from slavery and carried out the revolution was still honored and valued by the people.⁴⁹

Declared a "deceiver, deluder, and exploiter," Prime Minister İnönü became the focus of the Free Party's attack. Atatürk was a national hero, the symbol of the Turkish Revolution and thus above direct criticism, but İnönü represented the bureaucracy, and his policies were freely debated. In Izmir, Okyar called for the resignation of İnönü, to which the excited crowd responded by ripping up pictures of the Prime Minister.⁵⁰ In response, İnönü led the

attack on the Free Party, calling their program "hazy liberalism," claiming that the party had nothing new to offer.

Atatürk withdrew his support for the multi-party experiment eight months after its formation, and the leaders of the Free Party declared it closed in November 1930. According to İnönü's interpretation the second multi-party experiment ended and the Free Party closed because Fethi Okyar was devastated that he had been chosen to form a party to represent such tremendous popular discontent and opposition. Furthermore, Atatürk, instead of supporting the free expression of opposition, criticized the Free Party for not controlling and managing its supporters, thus maintaining narrow limits on participation in political discourse. Overall, in the People's Party, the feeling was that the Free Party movement had the potential to damage the reforms that were at the heart of Kemalism.⁵¹

ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF KEMALISM: İSMET İNÖNÜ AND CELÂL BAYAR

After the closing of the Free Party, İsmet İnönü remained Prime Minister for the next seven years. Although his position remained unchallenged, the 1930s saw growing disagreement between Atatürk and İnönü over domestic as well as foreign policy. Disagreements over policy were compounded by personality clashes, Atatürk's deteriorating health, and by conflicts over the proper role of the President in the day-to-day running of the government. As a result, opposition to İnönü simmered within the People's Party and especially among a group close to Atatürk. Ultimately, İnönü found his position untenable, and in September 1937 he resigned his post as Prime Minister in favor of Celâl Bayar.

Mahmut Celâl Bayar (1884–1987) joined the CUP prior to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, then worked as CUP representative in Izmir, where he organized resistance to the Greek invasion in 1919. Trained as a banker, in 1924 Bayar became Director of İş Bankası, the first major bank formed in the Republican era. He served in various cabinet positions in the 1920s, and by the 1930s Bayar had come to represent a clear alternative to İnönü, both in terms of leadership and in terms of policy.

Both Atatürk and İnönü were convinced of the dangers posed by German and Italian aggression, and by the threat of war, but were divided on how to handle potential crises. On a number of issues, from negotiations with the French over the province of Hatay, to revision of the Regime of the Straits, to meeting the challenge of Italian expansion in the Mediterranean,

İnönü consistently called for caution, while Atatürk tended to favor a more assertive stance and more cooperation with France and Britain.⁵² For instance, when Britain and France convened the Nyon Conference in September 1937 to establish a patrol against piracy in the Mediterranean, İnönü sought to limit Turkey's obligations, in order to avoid a conflict with Italy, while Atatürk favored full participation in the agreement along with Britain and France. The Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turkey's delegate to the conference, was caught between contradictory instructions from the Prime Minister in Ankara and the President, who was in Istanbul. The conflict over the Nyon Agreement was compounded by tensions stemming from the disagreement between İnönü and Atatürk over the Hatay issue, which was resolved by prolonged negotiations under İnönü's direction in 1937, instead of by military action, which Atatürk seems to have seen as a quick and direct solution.⁵³ In terms of domestic policy, İnönü returned from a visit to the Soviet Union in 1932 convinced of the utility of central economic planning, and the need for a strong policy of statism.⁵⁴ But, after initial support for statism, during the 1930s Atatürk began to shift his views toward more liberal policies represented by Bayar.

After serving as the first Director of İş Bankası, in 1932 Bayar became Minister of Finance in the İnönü cabinet at the insistence of Atatürk. A leading proponent of the view supporting statism as a temporary measure, Bayar saw statism as an expedient, which would build up the economic infrastructure, encourage capital accumulation, and spread entrepreneurial and technical skills, then give way to private enterprise, rather than as a permanent replacement of private ownership and management. In the early 1930s Bayar expressed his views of statism to the Istanbul press: "Beside the areas of government enterprise there is a lot of industrial work to be done by private enterprises. We will help with all our might enterprises of the people and owners of capital who want to work."⁵⁵ Atatürk was impressed with Bayar's success as Director of İş Bankası, and contrasted his success with the İnönü cabinet's reluctance in engaging foreign capital, anti-inflationary policies, and commitment to a balanced budget. İnönü also was convinced that Atatürk was increasingly in favor of a liberal economy: "from the beginning Atatürk believed in private enterprise and followed that principle."⁵⁶

Even though Bayar later said, "I always respected İnönü, he was my boss ... we understood each other," he was aware of Atatürk's support and İnönü's opposition regarding his own views: "Atatürk moved away from narrow statism, [but] İsmet Paşa was stuck there."⁵⁷ Indeed, as conflict between Prime Minister İnönü and Finance Minister Bayar continued

during the 1930s, Atatürk intervened and was insistent in his support of Bayar.

Differences between Atatürk and İnönü, on economic policy as well as domestic and international affairs, left the latter increasingly isolated politically. Despite his position in the state and in the party, without Atatürk's support İnönü could not last, and by September 1937 tensions between Atatürk and İnönü had reached a breaking point. On September 17 a meeting at Atatürk's farm, followed by an anxious dinner with cabinet ministers at the Presidential Residence in Çankaya, served only to heighten the tensions, and ended with İnönü's early departure.⁵⁸ The next day, Atatürk and İnönü met again on the presidential train going to Istanbul, where Atatürk planned to preside over the Second Turkish History Conference at Dolmabahçe Palace. Having served twelve years as Prime Minister, İnönü resigned his position, and agreed with Atatürk that Bayar was the logical choice to replace him.

The replacement of İnönü by Bayar represented not simply differences of opinion between politicians, or the tensions that had developed over the years. The change of Prime Ministers illustrated the growing division of ideas among politicians and intellectuals regarding expectations and aspirations for the future of Turkey. Although many shared common views of the experience of the transition from Empire to Republic, they differed in their definitions of progress, approaches to the role of the state, and foreign and domestic policies that would carry Turkey for the next generation. The crises of the transition period let them compromise on their differences, but as the Republic was established, they became an integral part of the increasingly heated political debate during the last years of İnönü's prime ministry. Still, political debate in Turkey remained confined to a small group within the single party, and to a narrow range of political possibilities. Politically, the differences between Atatürk, İnönü, and Bayar remained quite limited, a matter of subtle differences of emphasis within general agreement on the larger assumptions regarding the nature of the Turkish nation and homeland, and the role of the state.

Chapter Two

The Election of İsmet İnönü as President Kemalist Hegemony and Alternative Definitions

In November 1938, Turkey's long-standing President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, passed away. İsmet İnönü succeeded Atatürk in an atmosphere of considerable domestic and international tension, and confronted not only the problem of defining his own roles, as President and leader of the People's Party, but also the problem of dealing with Atatürk and his legacy.

Most scholarship presents the presidency of İsmet İnönü as a simple extension of that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and portrays the decisions, policies, and reforms of the period 1938–50 as the logical and inevitable continuation of the Kemalist program. To be sure, the continuity between the two presidencies is striking. But this approach tends to overlook İnönü's own role in redefining Kemalism to suit new needs, and minimizes the new international and domestic challenges that arose during World War II and the early Cold War, and the innovations devised to deal with new realities.

While we cannot speak of anything approaching "İnönü-ism," it is possible to identify certain underlying assumptions and consistencies that guided the domestic and foreign policies of İnönü's presidency. First, the four main issues of Turkish politics continued throughout this period: defining and achieving development and progress, setting the role of the bureaucracy and military, defining nation and community, and establishing sound relations with the Western powers. Second, İnönü's presidency saw the development of consistent approaches to these four issues, based on principles that guided İnönü in all matters: preparation, caution, and accountability. These principles guided İnönü throughout his presidency, as they

had throughout his military and political career, but the first year of his presidency was the crucial year, as he had to establish his own authority, and deal with domestic and international crises of a massive scale.

This chapter examines the election of İsmet İnönü as the second President of Turkey, and the significance of his first year in office for the development of Turkish politics at the beginning of World War II. As President, he worked to prepare for war by balancing diplomatic relations with Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union, so as to avoid active participation if possible, or at least to avoid a repeat of the disaster of World War I. At the same time his caution meant controlling political discourse, and defining the limits of acceptable alternatives to the Kemalist program. By reintegrating former opponents of Atatürk into the People's Party, İnönü worked both to form his own cadre, and to make the government more accountable—not in the sense of popular participation, but in the sense of broader representation of opinion. Adopting the National Defense Law not only established the government's perception of preparation and caution within the country in the face of war, but also imposed the themes of "sacrifice, effort, cooperation, and patience" as the responsibilities of Turkish citizens.

THE QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENCY: İNÖNÜ OR BAYAR?

According to the Turkish Constitution of 1924, the President of the Republic was to be elected by the Grand National Assembly from among its members. By the summer of 1938, Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was seriously ill, and hushed debates about the future of Turkey centered around the presidency. One group in the People's Party saw İsmet İnönü as the only possible choice to be the next President, and as the logical successor to Atatürk in leadership. But opposition to İnönü came from others who interpreted his methods as dictatorial and his vision as conservative, and were convinced that his presidency would weaken the Kemalist reforms. Some of those who opposed him also had personal convictions that İnönü would bring his own cadre into power, excluding them from the new government. Celâl Bayar was their alternative for President.

İsmet İnönü, hero of the War of Independence and Prime Minister for twelve years, and Celâl Bayar, current Prime Minister, were the two main possibilities for the presidency. Opposition to İnönü's presidency centered around a group of cabinet members including the Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya, and Prime Minister Celâl Bayar. Their reservations, shared by others, were rooted in the period

of İnönü's Prime Ministership. For example, Aras believed that İnönü was conservative and would disrupt the Kemalist reforms by giving in to reactionaries if he became President.¹

Tevfik Rüştü Aras (1883–1972) was born in Çanakkale, and educated at the French College of Beirut. After taking a seat in the first National Assembly, Aras served twelve years as Foreign Minister. Aras's plan in 1938 was to remove İnönü from the scene by having him appointed as Ambassador to Washington. When he learned of the plan, İnönü warned Aras that if he attempted to exile him to Washington as Ambassador, İnönü would "bring the world down on his head,"² and after becoming President, appointed Aras as Ambassador to London. Aras was not alone in attempting to remove İnönü from the Assembly. Kaya, the Interior Minister, was a strong proponent of a plan to hold elections with the hope of removing İnönü and his supporters from the Assembly before the choice of President would have to be made.³

Supporters of Bayar, the Prime Minister since September 1937, argued that İnönü's replacement as Prime Minister by Bayar showed that İnönü and his policies had fallen out of favor with Atatürk. His supporters claimed that Atatürk had come to endorse the economic policies advocated by Bayar, favoring the private sector. Bayar interpreted statism as a stage in the economic development of Turkey in which the state would foster private enterprise. Even as Economic Minister in İnönü's cabinet from 1932 to 1937, he recommended policies to this end. In contrast, İnönü interpreted statism to mean that the state would develop industry, but retain control of ownership, management, and profits, as representative of the interests of the people. İnönü's interpretation of statism was compounded by his apparent disdain for private entrepreneurs, especially in the production of basic commodities. While İnönü favored state ownership of major industries as one aspect of assuring the security of the nation,⁴ Bayar and his supporters believed that too much state intervention and regulation would prove detrimental to continued economic growth. Years later, Bayar said that İnönü's views on the economy stemmed from his experience in the Quartermaster General's Office of the Ottoman Army, which made his outlook on the economy narrow and concentrated on the problem of provisions, rather than on economic growth and the long-term picture.⁴

As support and opposition became articulate, the debate over the presidency was fueled by rumors that although Atatürk refused to name his successor publicly, he had written a political will. Even though Atatürk never sent a clear message, rumors abounded concerning a political will. Some claimed that Atatürk advised, "do not elect a President with a military

background," specifically referring to İnönü. According to İnönü, Şükrü Kaya, Hasan Rıza Soyak and Dr. Aras tried their best to obtain a political will, or to fabricate one. When they alluded to a verbal will excluding İnönü in favor of Bayar, even Bayar refused to believe them. Some interpreted Atatürk's silence as reluctance to support İnönü for the presidency. There were even rumors that Atatürk suggested holding elections ahead of schedule in order to oust İnönü and his supporters from the Assembly.⁵ In the midst of this speculation, following his resignation as Prime Minister, İnönü spent most of his time at his home in Ankara. During the winter of 1937–1938 İnönü and Atatürk saw each other for weekly meetings or dinners at the latter's residence in Çankaya. But in public they saw each other only rarely, which reinforced the public impression of lingering animosity between them. After Atatürk went to Istanbul to stay in the Dolmabahçe Palace, İnönü visited him for a week. They continued to correspond regularly, sometimes Atatürk sending his regards and messages to İnönü with Prime Minister Bayar or his adopted daughter Sabiha Gökçen, and even with Aras, the Foreign Minister.⁶ İnönü did not see Atatürk during the last months of his life, and there was no public reconciliation of their political differences, leading to divergent views about their relationship, and İnönü's fitness to carry Atatürk's legacy.

On the other hand, Bayar was at the forefront, taking a larger role as Prime Minister since the President was ill. Bayar's increasing responsibility and frequent trips to Istanbul reinforced the image that he was representing the President. This image was fortified when, for the first time in the Republic's history, the Prime Minister delivered the President's message to the opening session of the Assembly on November 1, 1938. Opposition to İnönü seized on this highly publicized profile of Bayar to discredit İnönü and to suggest that Bayar was the solid choice for a President who would follow the footsteps of Atatürk.

Who favored İnönü's election as President? Among his strongest supporters were military commanders, who had served with him in World War I and in the War of Independence. The only other potential candidate of the military was Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff. But Çakmak was not a member of the National Assembly, and at any rate stated his own lack of interest in the position when approached by Bayar. Furthermore, he made known his own support of İnönü for the position, which had significant influence in the Assembly and in the party.⁷ In his memoirs, Asım Gündüz, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, recounts a meeting of the General Staff at which it was decided that the armed forces had no authority in the matter of the election of President and therefore should not get involved. Despite

this decision, the army was involved, specifically the commanders of the First Army who decided to support İnönü as President. Fahrettin Altay, Commander of the First Army explained to Gündüz and Çakmak:

This nation is accustomed to following leaders who have been tried and who have made a name for themselves. The Marshal [Çakmak] fills this place from every view. But if the Marshal does not want it, then İnönü must come to the presidency. Otherwise the person brought to this position will not reassure the nation. A more important reason is that the horizons are darkening in Europe... Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, all three are chasing adventure. In this position Turkey is in need of a strong personality.⁸

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

On November 10, 1938, the day Atatürk died, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Abdülhâlik Renda, informed members of the Assembly in accordance with the constitution that a special session would be held the next day to elect a new President. That night, Bayar returned to Ankara from Istanbul to meet with the cabinet, and on the morning of November 11, the parliamentary group of the People's Party met to vote on its nominee for President. Members of the party expected party leaders to name the candidate. But when Bayar called the meeting to order, he told the gathered party members, "you are to use your votes freely. Everybody should vote for the candidate they favor, and whomever collects the most votes will be put forth as the candidate in the general assembly."⁹ Without prejudice directed from the party leaders, party members were left free to vote for the candidate of their choice in a closed ballot. It was clear by then that the two leading candidates were İsmet İnönü and Celâl Bayar, and their support was not to be based on a newly proposed platform, but was to be given according to the credit of the candidate's past accomplishments. Out of 323 votes, İnönü received 322 and Bayar received 1.

According to popular belief, when Atatürk was first elected President in 1923, he received every vote except his own, which he gave to İnönü. After İnönü was selected as the party's candidate for President, a popular belief developed that the one vote given to Bayar was cast by İnönü. But contrary to popular belief, İnönü was not present at the party meeting, or in the Assembly when it voted.¹⁰ It seemed that at a time of crisis in domestic as well as foreign affairs, party members favored an experienced soldier and diplomat.

That afternoon, November 11, the National Assembly met to elect a new President. Since the absolute majority of the Assembly was made up of

People's Party members, İnönü was nominated without opposition. The chamber was crowded with visitors and foreign diplomats. Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of the General Staff and the commander of the first army, Fahrettin Altay, also came to observe the election. İnönü's seat was empty, so he did not witness the vote in which he received 348 out of a possible 387 votes.

After the vote the Speaker of the Assembly called a recess so that the new President could join the Assembly. İnönü then told the Assembly:

The Turkish nation has risen in a short time to the level of a great civilization; the reforms that opened a fresh life of society to the Turkish nation from the shortest path are the most precious in our hearts and consciences.... We know that the most valuable blessing of the Republic is to place our nation far from anarchy and violence, and all citizens in an equally secure atmosphere.¹¹

In his speech, İnönü reflected three concerns. First, he sought to dispel expectations that the reforms implemented during the early years of the Republic would be revised or rescinded with the death of Atatürk. Second, he stressed the primacy of security and control over further reform. Third, like Atatürk, who had warned, "the world would be going to war,"¹² İnönü wanted to present a strong, united, and prepared posture for Turkey. These three points reinforced the expectations that İnönü would be the "second Atatürk" by continuing Atatürk's reforms and policies, and by maintaining Kemalist ideology.

While there were no votes against İnönü in the Assembly, there were thirty-nine abstentions, signaling the existence of a "silent" opposition led by Şükrü Kaya and Tevfik Rüştü Aras. But in later years İnönü reflected that "the election of a man withdrawn from power, even known as being not loved but feared by those in positions of power will pass into history as a truly free election."¹³ Thus the election reinforced belief in the constitutional process, and opened a new era in Turkish political history.

İNÖNÜ AS PRESIDENT: "THE SECOND ATATÜRK?"

Immediately upon his election as President, contrary to expectations that he would be a "second Atatürk," İnönü reinforced his own image and power. But in the process of this assertion, İnönü seemed caught in a paradox. He sought to emphasize the strength that would come from unity around the ideology known as Kemalism, by claiming, "the characteristic feature of Kemalism is continuity."¹⁴ But, by emphasizing his own interpretation of

Kemalism, which differed from that of Atatürk as well as Bayar, İnönü began to separate his own administration and policies from those of the past.

One of his first acts as President was to ask Bayar to form a new cabinet, specifically asking him to replace the Foreign Minister, Aras, and the Minister of the Interior, Kaya. He justified these changes by pointing out, that "I see that foreign affairs and domestic affairs are not going well."¹⁵ Later, İnönü maintained that "Dr. Aras' and Şükrü Kaya's leaving power gave the nation genuine relief. Everybody was amazed to see that the personal antipathy toward them was so widespread."¹⁶ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, editor of *Yeni Sabah* [The New Dawn] interpreted these changes as a sign of opening and liberalization, especially in foreign affairs.¹⁷ Yet, the program of the new Bayar cabinet presented to the Assembly was the same as the program he had submitted a year before, reinforcing the notion that even though changes were taking place, continuity was an overriding consideration in this time of transition and global uncertainty.

In the new Bayar cabinet, Dr. Refik Saydam was appointed as Interior Minister and Şükrü Saracoğlu became Foreign Minister. Both were known as longtime supporters of İnönü. Saracoğlu (1887–1953), who was active in the Aegean region during the War of Independence, had been a member of the Grand National Assembly since 1923. He served in nearly every cabinet as Minister of Education, Finance, or Justice. As Finance Minister in the 1920s, Saracoğlu had developed plans for the establishment of a Central Bank in Turkey. In 1931 he went to the United States to seek investment in Turkish agriculture and industry, and to study American agricultural methods. Saracoğlu also served as the Turkish representative on several international commissions.¹⁸

Refik Saydam (1881–1942) was also active in the War of Independence and was a member of the first Grand National Assembly. A military doctor by training, he had served long years as Minister of Health. His opposition to Bayar led him to refuse a cabinet position in the previous Bayar government, and only after İnönü became President did Saydam return to the cabinet.¹⁹ While these two cabinet members represented change from the previous administration, they were not new to Turkish politics, or to the political struggles that awaited İnönü's presidency.

THE "PERMANENT LEADER" AND THE "NATIONAL CHIEF"

Following İnönü's election as the President of the Republic, on December 26, 1938 at a meeting of the People's Party, İnönü was also named

"Permanent Leader" of the party, a title that Atatürk held during his lifetime. Refik Saydam, who introduced the motion, also suggested the title Eternal Leader (*Ebedi Şef*) for Atatürk, thus symbolically designating Atatürk and Kemalism as eternal guides for the People's Party. Raising İnönü to the status of "Permanent Leader" within the party was meant to legitimize his position. At this congress the term National Chief (*Millî Şef*) also came into usage.²⁰ Popularized in the press, the "National Chief" overshadowed İnönü's title as President or as Permanent Leader of the party. In fact, the first half of his presidency has come to be known as the National Chief period. İnönü summarized his main concerns at the time, focusing on the state of the foreign and domestic affairs of Turkey:

After I was elected to the presidency in November, 1938, I considered these the important issues confronting me: I definitely believed the outside world was going into conflict. How to pass safely the harsh storm becoming clear on the horizon was occupying my mind the most. Our foreign relations were indecisive and without foundation. Our relations with the Soviets were in shadows, our relations with the Nazis were suspicious and our relations with the Western world were without a strong base. ... In domestic politics we needed calm and order. ... Placing the state's domestic and foreign affairs on a trustworthy foundation was the first duty.²¹

Shortly after his election, in a speech to a provincial party congress in Kastamonu, he argued that stability depends on the accountability of the state: "Domestically, a secular, republican and nationalist regime is full of the ideas that all citizens will benefit from its earnest service, from making the nation prosperous and from raising the material and spiritual level of the citizens in [an atmosphere] of stability and free from anxiety."²² Confronted with the urgency of these domestic and foreign problems, İnönü began to bring back into political life members of the "old opposition," who had participated in the War of Independence, but who had later opposed Atatürk's increasing personal power, and his political tactics. The old opposition, who had been forced out of politics in the mid-1920s, included some of the most prominent names in the Republic, such as Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, Fethi Okyar, Ali İhsan Sabis, Cafer Tayyar, Adnan Adıvar, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın. Some of these old allies of Atatürk had been tried by a special Independence Tribunal set up in Izmir in 1926, accused of plotting to kill Atatürk. While none were convicted of involvement in the plot, some, such as Adıvar and Orbay went into exile, while others retired from political life.²³ Okyar had

remained in political life, and formed the Free Party in 1930. But in 1934 he was sent as Ambassador to London, where he remained until after Atatürk's death. Inviting those in exile to return to Turkey, and by meeting with those who remained in the country, İnönü tried to convince them that the time had come for them to play an important role for Turkey:

All of us, together worked to save the nation. You sacrificed to carry out your great and honorable responsibilities. Later, disagreements emerged between you and Atatürk. ... You may believe injustices were carried out against you. ... I do not dispute this. Now it is over. In front of you all service to the country and the highest positions of responsibility are open. We will work together.²⁴

İnönü imposed one condition, however: that there would be no argument in any shape or form whatsoever regarding Atatürk. He asked the men to swear to abide by this condition, and said that their lives were beginning a new period. Most agreed with İnönü, and joined the government. Karabekir became Speaker of the Assembly; Fuat Cebesoy served as Speaker and in the cabinet; Okyar became a cabinet minister; Orbay served as Ambassador to London during the war; and Bele, Adıvar, and Yalçın served in the Assembly.²⁵

By bringing these men into the government, İnönü created a new stage surrounded by people respected for their past records of patriotism and who would support İnönü in confronting many of "the harsh storms becoming clear on the horizon."

THE FIRST CHALLENGE: THE THREAT OF INSTABILITY AND THE RESIGNATION OF CELÂL BAYAR

In January 1939 two scandals tested the new presidency and the new cabinet, by involving cabinet members, government officials, and state purchases. Since the War of Independence, the Turkish government had used commissioned middlemen for the purchase of goods and supplies. But in January 1939 a scandal broke, involving a fraudulent order of airplanes supposedly for the Turkish Air Force. Ekrem Hamdi König, a middleman, was accused of forging official documents as well as the signatures of the Minister of Defense, Kâzım Özalp, and the Foreign Minister, Sükrû Saraçoğlu in order to buy airplanes from Canada, which he intended to divert for resale for use in the Spanish Civil War.²⁶ König escaped, and the

scandal threatened to bring down the government. Minister of Defense Özalp resigned under pressure from members of the parliamentary group of the People's Party "for the good of the investigation," even though İnönü was convinced of his innocence. Özalp was later cleared of any wrongdoing, and returned to become the Chair of the parliamentary group of the People's Party.²⁷

The other scandal that broke in January 1939 involved the Bayar government more directly, and Bayar personally. During an investigation of a "middleman company" called İmpeks, Bayar's son, Refi Bayar, one of the founders of the company, committed suicide. While the company was implicated in illegal transactions involving government purchases and illegal dealings with a state-owned bank, Denizbank, rumors grew about corruption in the past and present Bayar cabinets.

The scandals surrounding the Bayar government, growing "like runs in a sock,"²⁸ led İnönü to decide that Bayar must resign his position immediately. This decision reflected İnönü's intolerance of official corruption, as well as his dislike of commissioned middlemen, and thus his opposition to a system that he described as "influence commerce" that he thought allowed government officials to grow rich on kickbacks.²⁹ İnönü also believed that because of the scandals, not only was the accountability and the authority of the government "growing weaker every day," but also that Turkey's posture in international relations would suffer damage as well.

Meeting with party leaders on January 25, İnönü pointed out the need for a new cabinet to carry out the duties involved in general elections scheduled for the spring. In his resignation letter Bayar agreed "that it is more fitting and useful to the purpose and principle of our party to go into the election new and with fresh strength. To give this opportunity to the state I am offering my resignation." İnönü replied,

Upon the probability of new elections of the Grand National Assembly, your resignation has been accepted. I want to express my sincere thanks and appreciation in recollecting the time you and your friends served in positions of power. Our nation will always remember the high value of your good administration in a difficult period of our political history [the illness of Atatürk] with thanks and feelings of appreciation.³⁰

Despite the politeness of their letters, and their continued cordiality, İnönü and Bayar were aware of the differences of perspective that they represented. At the time of Bayar's resignation, İnönü believed that Bayar's economic policies would soon lead to fiscal disaster at a time when the country had to prepare for an international conflict. İnönü wanted a new

cabinet that he could believe was fiscally responsible and efficient. With the establishment of the new cabinet led by former Interior Minister Refik Saydam, a longtime ally of İnönü and supporter of his vision and policies, İnönü's government prepared to tackle the complex of domestic and foreign affairs.

İSMET İNÖNÜ AS NATIONAL CHIEF: ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

The drive that shaped domestic and foreign policy initiatives, was the establishment of accountability. Accountability was meant to increase the legitimacy of the government to generate stability, and to control opposition. İnönü, as President, continued Atatürk's practice of very close involvement in the workings of the cabinet and the party. In terms of the cabinet, İnönü's vision of responsible and efficient administration that would advance the nation while retaining economic and social control was reflected in the policies adopted by the government of Refik Saydam during its first year in power. These policies to strengthen the central administration and the military were a response to the crisis in the administration, as well as a response to the growing tension in Europe, as Germany annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia and as Italy invaded Albania in the spring of 1939. In May, while Germany and Italy signed the "Pact of Steel," Britain began conscription. In preparing for the conflict, the Turkish government entered negotiations with the British and French for a Treaty of Mutual Assistance, pledging an alliance against aggression. Thus while these considerations weighed heavy in the Saydam government's economic initiatives, President and Party Leader İnönü also directed a major administrative restructuring, in the name of efficiency and openness in the government to establish stability through generating consent and consensus among the governing elite, and the people. Crisis management, in terms of accountability, meant an attempt to avoid crisis, or to control it effectively. It was also a way to silence opposition to the government and to the ruling party.

The first action of administrative restructuring involved separation of the People's Party apparatus from that of the state, which had been combined in 1936 when Recep Peker was both Secretary-General of the People's Party and Minister of the Interior.³¹ Reversing the established pattern by separating the party from the state was an attempt to make the party more independent, and to insulate the state from criticism of the party. This move was followed in July by another set of administrative reforms to increase the

power of the central government, which included detaching the provincial governors from their positions as provincial party leaders, thus tying them to the state. Whereas Atatürk had used the People's Party to limit opposition in the National Assembly, İnönü used his position as President and National Chief to reduce the power of the party as well as the Assembly.

March 1939 brought the first general parliamentary election under İnönü. This general election, like preceding elections, was conducted according to a modified version of the 1908 election law enacted by the Young Turks. As an extension of the administrative reforms implemented during İnönü's presidency, the next three general elections, in 1943, 1946, and 1950, would be held under new election laws.³²

Following the elections, the backgrounds of new members of the Assembly showed the beginnings of a change in the Turkish ruling elite that would accelerate during the period of the war, having a profound impact on Turkish politics in the post-war period. This change was initiated by the emergence of new groups, spurred by economic changes resulting both from the statist policies of the 1930s and from the rapid growth of the private sector during the war. The growing numbers, and influence, of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and businesspeople, all increasingly employed in private practice or in the private sector, can be seen already in 1939. Among the newly elected members, as compared to the last election in 1935, the number of lawyers increased from 9 to 13, while those who listed their occupation as commerce rose from 10 to 15. Meanwhile, the number of new members from military and bureaucratic backgrounds, who had formed the core of the ruling elite under Atatürk, declined from 18 to 12 for soldiers and from 15 to 12 for bureaucrats. Along with the administrative reforms, the entrance of these newly empowered groups into the Assembly signaled major alterations in Turkish politics.³³

At the end of May 1939 the People's Party held its fifth Great Party Congress. At this congress İnönü announced the formation of an Independent (*müstakil*) Group in the National Assembly. This group of 21 deputies would be drawn from members of the People's Party who would resign their membership to form an independent voting block. İnönü announced:

We hope that taking responsibility, discipline and order from the great congress and the party leader, those representatives who are in the position of directing a recognized and hard-working independent group will be performing a fundamental service to the majority and to the government and our great nation, and will also prepare new trust for its own work.³⁴

Remembering past experiences with independent parties in 1924 and 1930, İnönü envisioned the new group as a type of controlled loyal opposition, rather than as a separate and independent party. In fact, the members of the newly formed group and its new leader Ali Rana Tarhan, were known supporters of İnönü. Furthermore, its small size meant it could not sway votes in the Assembly. İnönü did not see the Independent Group as an experiment in multi-party politics, nor does he seem to have believed that it would lead to the formation of genuine opposition. Its function would be limited to spurring debate in the Assembly on People's Party policies. Until its elimination in 1946 the Independent Group never offered serious opposition to the government, and none of its members played prominent roles in the creation of opposition parties after World War II.³⁵

In a speech given to students at Istanbul University in March 1939, he explained the need for the Independent Group, and for other administrative reforms, while promising a more open system that would respond to the needs of the people: "Together with this, we are going to increase candidates' contacts with the people, and from now on we are going to test and develop new methods to bring the party organization and the leadership into closer contact with one another."³⁶ In his speech at Istanbul University, İnönü also pointed out that he was confident about Turkey's future because a politically mature generation would teach the next generation how to avoid the disasters it had experienced.

The exact meaning of İnönü's speech has remained a subject of debate ever since it was first delivered. Some have argued that İnönü called for a democratic, multi-party system, and would have proceeded to carry out extensive reforms if the war had not intervened. Others have pointed out that in his speech, İnönü made no mention of freedom of thought, the press, or assembly, and thus argue that this was a call for efficiency, not democracy.³⁷

THE SECOND CHALLENGE: TURKISH DIPLOMATIC PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

After his election, İnönü confronted what he saw as indecisiveness in Turkish foreign policy, especially in terms of relations with the Soviet Union and Germany. Relations with the Soviet Union, which had been close in the 1920s and early 1930s, had cooled considerably after the Montreux Conference of 1936 due to differences over control of the Straits. On the other hand, Germany's influence in Turkey was deeply

rooted, due to its domination of Turkish trade, and admiration for German recovery after World War I was strong.

Turkey's military, economic, and cultural ties to Germany survived the defeat of World War I. In part, this was because Turkey's military was led by officers who had studied at the German-staffed Ottoman War Academy before World War I and as Ottoman officers, like İnönü, had served with German officers during the war. Included among these officers was Alaiyeli Ziya Bey (Cuvaç), who later served in the War of Independence among the commanding officers of the ship *Hamidiye*. Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff, was a known admirer of the Germans, and Asım Gündüz, Çakmak's assistant, was a friend of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.³⁸ Along with the experiences of higher-ranking officers, younger officers who studied in Germany in the 1930s, witnessed its growing economic and military strength.³⁹ A good example is Major Mustafa İhsan Batur, who after graduating from Istanbul University as a military student, went to Germany for advanced study. He later became Director of the Elmadağ Gunpowder and Explosives Factory (Barut Fabrikası), a government installation that supplied the Turkish Army, during and after the Second World War. Germany's influence was also carried by German technical and military advisors, and financial consultants and teachers, who numbered more than two thousand in Turkey before the war. These advisers came as German trade increased and German investment in the Turkish economy grew.

Prominent members of the Turkish press reflected pro-German sympathies in their newspapers as well. Yunus Nadi, a member of the Assembly and publisher of *Cumhuriyet* [The Republic], the largest circulation daily in Turkey, was known for his admiration of Germany. *Cumhuriyet*, edited by Nadi's son, Nadir Nadi, consistently followed a pro-German line in the war, even urging Turkish entry into the war in 1940. In July 1940 Nadi argued in his editorial, that "It is necessary to see the reality of the world as it is. ... Today in Europe there exists a German power. ... The states of Europe must see reality as it is and decide their path accordingly."⁴⁰ The article launched a storm of conflicting editorials from other papers that attacked Nadi's stance and provoked an angry confrontation between İnönü and Yunus Nadi over the issue of putting foreign interests ahead of national interests. A week after the editorial appeared *Cumhuriyet* was ordered closed for three months as punishment for accepting foreign support. Many believed Yunus Nadi followed a pro-German line less from conviction than out of commercial interest. During the war the Germans supposedly supplied Nadi with subsidized newsprint, while other papers scrambled for the scarce commodity, and Nadi's support for the Germans earned him the

sobriquet "Yunus Nazi."⁴¹ Necmettin Sadak, editor of *Aksam* [The Evening] and a member of the Assembly, was among those whose closeness to Germany was known. Sadak supposedly received a Mercedes from the Germans, and the German Embassy reportedly paid off his gambling debts on more than one occasion.⁴²

In order to maintain Germany's dominant posture in Turkey, the German Propaganda Ministry published the magazine *Signal*, the German language daily *Türkische Post*, the French language magazines *Beyoğlu* and *İstanbul*, and the Turkish language *Yeni Dünya* [New World] to publicize the National Socialist perspective on news and world events. Along with the newspapers, the Germans broadcasted several radio programs and sponsored lectures to local civic clubs and organizations throughout Turkey. In its propaganda, the German government stressed historic ties and friendship, and praised the accomplishments of Atatürk.⁴³ Nazi Germany was presented as an alternative to Soviet communism, and Germany claimed to offer protection against Soviet expansionism.

Along with cultural and military ties, Turkey was included in German plans to expand trade with southeast Europe, which Berlin thought was not only rich in raw materials, but also easier to protect than overseas trade in the event of war. While in 1932 Germany took 13.5% of Turkey's exports and supplied 23.3% of its imports, by 1935, the volume had increased to 49% of exports and 38% of imports. The averages for the next three years were maintained at 44% for exports and 46% for imports. In contrast, Britain took 3% of Turkey's exports in that year and supplied 11% of its imports. Table 2.1 shows the percentage of the share of Turkey's trading partners during the war years.⁴⁴

While Turkey's main exports to Germany were agricultural commodities and chromite, an ore used to manufacture artillery, Turkey's imports from

TABLE 2.1 Turkey's Major Trading Partners, 1938–1945

		1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Germany	Exports	44	37	9	22	25	24	23	0
	Imports	48	51	12	12	28	38	30	1
Britain	Exports	3	6	10	16	15	11	22	15
	Imports	11	6	14	25	23	16	18	23
USA	Exports	12	14	14	13	17	21	24	44
	Imports	10	10	11	5	5	2	5	18
USSR	Exports	4	3	1	1	0	0	1	0
	Imports	4	3	1	0	1	0	0	0

Germany consisted mainly of machinery and machine parts, manufactured goods, and armaments. It seemed that the trade patterns reinforced dependency and signaled an alliance between Turkey and Germany, which seemed more problematic with the increasing conflict in Europe.

Furthermore, Germany's alliance with Italy, and the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939, signaled a potential threat for the Balkans and further conflict in the Mediterranean. As Prime Minister Refik Saydam pointed out to the National Assembly, "Turkish policy had thus far been one of complete neutrality designed to keep the country as far as possible apart from international complications. When, however, trouble had spread to the Balkan and Mediterranean regions Turkey had no longer been able to remain neutral without jeopardizing her own security."⁴⁵ To bring a balance, in the spring of 1939 the Turkish government began to seek closer diplomatic and commercial ties with Britain and France. İnönü later discussed his reasons for seeking an alliance with Britain: "I saw the conduct of the Nazis and especially the Fascists against Turkey, greedily awaiting the opportunity to invade.... The Nazis were on the road to domination of the Balkans. Our salvation would be with the West. We were to work... from this main conviction."⁴⁶ This decision was supported by policy makers such as Fethi Okyar, longtime Ambassador in London, Saydam, a staunch supporter of Britain throughout his time as Prime Minister, and Sükrü Saracoğlu, the Foreign Minister.⁴⁷

At the time, British policy makers were also making plans to enter negotiations for a formal alliance with Turkey. The British approach carried the proposal of assistance to Turkey in return for its commitment to help the Balkan states against German aggression. Turkish leaders agreed in principle to British proposals for joint action in both the Balkans and the Mediterranean, but because their immediate concern was Italy, İnönü decided that any commitment must center on the problem of Italian expansion. According to İnönü, "the expansionist policy and the clamorous speeches of the Fascist regime kept the Turks in a state of considerable uneasiness."⁴⁸ During the 1930s Turkish newspapers reported that Italian schoolchildren were learning that historically Anatolia was part of the Roman Empire, and should be part of a new Italian Empire. In 1934 Mussolini declared that "Italy has no future in the west and north. Her future lies to the east and south in Asia and Africa."⁴⁹ Saydam related İnönü's concern to the National Assembly: "any regime in the Mediterranean intent on hegemony presents a constant threat to Turkey's national interests."⁵⁰

On May 12, Britain and Turkey announced their intentions to "enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character in the interests

of their security."⁵¹ But, there were conditions. First, the Turkish government insisted that all negotiations must be open and that the Germans and Soviets had to be informed of all developments, in order to avoid any suspicion of aggressive intentions. Second, they wanted to limit their involvement in any mutual defense pact to the eastern Mediterranean and Balkans. Third was the amount of aid Turkey would receive to prepare for war. The Turkish military would require financial aid from the Allies to build dock facilities and airstrips and to fortify the Straits, as well as to update equipment and weaponry. In addition, the Turkish government asked Britain to purchase the raw materials and commodities that Germany had been buying before it cut off trade in May following the Anglo-Turkish declaration. The Allies agreed to supply some military and economic aid, and in June a team of negotiators led by General Rauf Orbay journeyed to London to work out an agreement over the type and amount of aid.⁵²

In June 1939, the British and French governments offered Turkey a £25 million credit for the purchase of war material only from Britain and France, and an additional a £15 million bullion loan to help the Turkish economy, along with £3.5 million to liquidate Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish trade balances. In July the Turkish government replied with a demand for £35 million for the modernization of the Turkish armaments industry and for purchases of weapons from countries of its own choosing, a £15 million bullion loan to be repaid by deliveries of tobacco, and £10 million to liquidate all of Turkey's debts to free currency countries.⁵³ In addition, the Turkish negotiators asked that the Allies make large-scale purchases of commodities to free the Turkish economy from German domination.

The difference between the two positions, which proved unbridgeable throughout the war, stemmed from complex presuppositions regarding Turkey's role in a war. Turkish leaders were interested in balance and were reluctant to transfer dependency from Germany to Britain. It seemed that Turkish leaders knew that they were bargaining from a position of power in the context of Allied need, and wanted to be recognized as an equal partner in negotiations. In contrast, British negotiators believed that Turkey would play a secondary role, assisting in deterring further Axis aggression in the Balkans and hindering German expansion into the Middle East, and would not be involved in hostilities for several months. Another reason why British planners wanted to supply only a minimum supply of arms to Turkey was their fear that Turkey might lose weapons to the Axis or even join Germany in the war. In the long run, the discrepancy reflected a Turkish objective to build its own war economy and to utilize the weaponry for its

own defense, while the Allies saw Turkey as an immediate deterrent and sought to tie Turkey both economically and militarily to the Allied side.

Throughout negotiations in the summer and fall, reflecting İnönü's belief that open diplomacy would serve Turkey better than secret agreements, the Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu met regularly with the German Ambassador Franz von Papen as well as with the British Ambassador, Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen.⁵⁴ But open diplomacy was only one aspect of the struggle to balance Turkish foreign relations. These careful and painstaking efforts can be demonstrated by the Turkish Army's purchase of helmets.

In an attempt to show impartiality, the General Staff, and İnönü, invited the German and British Ambassadors to witness a bullet test of helmets. The Turkish government's preference became clear when a bullet damaged a German, but not a British helmet.⁵⁵ The Turkish government was careful to exhibit a balance even in diplomatic functions in Ankara. For example, during state receptions, İnönü met with the British and German representatives separately and equally. Furthermore, the Turkish Press Directorate instructed newspapers to restrict news of the war to one column, and to devote equal amounts of space to news from each side in the war. Metin Toker, a reporter for *Cumhuriyet* during the war, points out that newspapers were even prohibited from printing parts of the weather forecast, for fear that one side might take it as a signal.⁵⁶

While the British diplomats tried to tie Turkey to the Allied cause, the Germans strove at least to keep Turkey neutral, and to deter an alliance with the Allies. As Turkish-British negotiations continued, Germany stopped all shipments of arms, including 68 planes, 29 cannons, and 4 submarines that were being built for Turkey. Papen informed the Turkish government that Germany could only interpret an agreement with the Allies as an expression of hostility. Berlin also applied economic pressure, refusing to renew the German-Turkish agreement governing the exchange of goods and payments between the two countries after it expired in August 1939.⁵⁷

Despite the Germans' increasingly hostile posture, the Turkish government insisted on maintaining an appearance of balance. Saracoğlu told the National Assembly in August 1939, "In the first days a hesitation and indecision with Germany was clear. ... Today, with the exception of one problem, the two sides have no objection about each other. And we are hoping that this one problem will be corrected in the near future."⁵⁸ The "one problem" was Turkish insistence that Germany deliver the previously ordered weapons, before Turkey would deliver 60,000 tons of chrome ore, considered the indispensable yearly minimum for German arms production. In the fall of 1939, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop

warned that Turkey was committing "a very unneutral and therefore unfriendly act" by not selling chrome to Germany. German Ambassador Papen urged his government to comply with Turkish demands, reporting from Ankara that "the chromium ... is only obtainable against compensation in the form of war material." This standoff led the Turks to sign a deal with Britain in February 1940. According to the agreement, Turkey committed all surplus chrome ore to the Allies until the end of 1942. But in March 1940, Germany countered by offering delivery of three naval ships to Turkey in return for 110,000 tons of chrome ore as partial payment.⁵⁹ Ankara refused the deal, pointing out that it meant breaking a commercial contract, but did not rule out the possibility of chrome sales after the agreement with the Allies expired.

These events reinforced Turkish leaders' belief in the need for caution and balance in foreign relations, which also included the Soviet Union. In April 1939, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Vladimir Potemkin arrived in Ankara to discuss Turkish-Soviet relations, German aggression, and the importance of strengthening ties among the Balkan states.⁶⁰ Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoğlu informed Potemkin of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations and proposed a similar arrangement between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Discussions concluded with a joint communiqué declaring the common views of the two countries, and expressing their intentions to remain in close contact and to exchange political information. Following Potemkin's visit, the Soviet government responded positively to the announcement of the Anglo-Turkish preliminary agreement of May 12, 1939. An article in *Izvestia* called these developments "one of the links in that chain which is the only sure means of preventing the extension of aggression to new parts of Europe."⁶¹

Moscow continued to show enthusiasm for the Allied-Turkish negotiations throughout the summer, and Turkish-Soviet talks led to a Soviet proposal of a pact, similar to the Allied-Turkish agreement, and an invitation to Saracoğlu for talks in Moscow. But, after signing the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in August, the Soviets began to urge Turkey to break its ties with the Allies.⁶²

In September, during the war's first weeks, Saracoğlu left for Moscow to discuss questions of assistance in the Straits and in the Black Sea, and the situation in the Balkans. Official talks began immediately, but were interrupted by the visit of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and Saracoğlu was diverted for the next week with various excuses.⁶³ When negotiations finally opened, Saracoğlu presented Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov with a copy of the Allied-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and Molotov raised the Soviet demands: a pact for joint defense of the

Straits, and a guarantee that they would be closed to all warships of non-Black Sea powers, along with a reservation providing that the treaty could in no way bring about a conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany. A member of the Turkish delegation, Cevat Açıkalın, later recalled that "the Soviet government also made it clear that the policy followed by the Turkish government was not the most suitable to the policy of the Soviet Union because Turkey had sided with Britain and France who were fighting against Germany."⁶⁴ Soviet demands also reflected German concerns regarding Turkey, and that the neutrality of Turkey had become the common interest of the Germans as well as the Soviets. The rude treatment of the delegation in Moscow, along with the shift in the Soviet position, outraged and convinced Saracoğlu that no agreement could be reached. He canceled the talks and returned to Ankara on October 16.

Three days after Saracoğlu returned to Ankara, Britain, France, and Turkey signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The terms of the treaty pronounced that Turkey and the Allied Powers would assist each other in the event of a Mediterranean war arising out of the aggression of a European power. But, a special protocol was added to the treaty with Turkey's insistence: Turkey was not obliged to honor its commitments if they entailed armed conflict with the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

The Turkish aim in negotiations was to survive the war by means of establishing a cautious balance in foreign relations. On November 1, 1939, during his address at the opening of the National Assembly, İnönü pointed out that "With this pact, we are pursuing the aim of preventing this disaster's future intrusion by establishing a zone of security in a Europe suffering the tragedy of war ... our ties with our allies and our unity on the high ideals we pronounced together are not of the character to violate our normal and friendly relations with other states." İnönü believed that emphasizing Turkey's peaceful intentions and diplomatic openness, and keeping relations with all sides in the European war would strengthen Turkey's position and allow it to remain out of the conflict:

After recent events, publications about Turkey, especially those in neutral countries have stressed our nation's two high qualities: Turks are loyal to their friends and true to their commitments. These qualities assure the general confidence being shown for the policies of the Republican government. As up until now, from now on our true friends can expect from us only honesty and benevolence, and actions along these lines.⁶⁶

But Turkish policy makers also realized that diplomacy could fail, despite the best of intentions. Turkey had to back up its diplomatic resolve with

military strength and build its war economy, both to show it could and would fight if necessary, and to deter an attack by any of the European powers. But in the autumn of 1939 Turkey was not prepared for combat; the Saydam government devoted considerable effort to this problem during the early months of the war.

THE THIRD CHALLENGE: TURKISH MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Immediately following the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in October 1939, negotiations aimed at alleviating Turkey's economic dependence on Germany and preparing Turkey for war began. By February a set of commercial agreements concerning trade and payments had been settled, chief among them that the British would purchase all of Turkey's chrome exports for a period of two years. Turkish leaders would have preferred an agreement on chrome for the duration of the war, but the British refused to enter an open-ended agreement with Turkey.⁶⁷

In terms of weaponry, the Allies promised to deliver Turkey 800 heavy machine guns, 350 anti-tank guns, and 200 anti-aircraft guns. Of these, Turkey received 200 heavy machine guns, 100 anti-tank guns, and 100 anti-aircraft guns by April 1940. The Turks also asked Britain for 159 airplanes to modernize the air force of 240 planes it possessed before the war, most of which were obsolete or even left over from World War I. Throughout 1940, the British delivered planes to Turkey, but of the 159 requested, they were able to supply only 80. Since most of these replaced outdated planes, they had little effect on the actual strength of the Turkish air force. In addition, Turkey had no domestic source of fuel or oil to supply the planes, and spare parts were difficult to acquire.⁶⁸ Thus the Allies estimated that the Turkish Air Force would last at most a few days in the event of invasion, before being grounded by lack of fuel and parts, and by losses in combat.

According to accounts of military officers, at the time the Turkish army's weaponry consisted "entirely of museum pieces," and its soldiers lived on rations of "bulgur (cracked wheat) for breakfast, bulgur for lunch and bulgur for dinner."⁶⁹

Turkey lacked modern weaponry, and would suffer greatly if it had to join the conflict in Europe, but İnönü time and again made clear Turkey's readiness to defend itself: "The entire Turkish nation is turning its careful consideration and attention in this period to means of self-defense. The government of the Republic is determined to spare no effort to perfect plans

for defense." İnönü also stressed to the nation the sacrifices that would be necessary to support military needs:

From the financial and technical point of view along with the effort not to neglect any means of defense even though they are very laborious and expensive, if the government and the nation have a special concern, it is definitely that when soldiers see the battlefield the sacrifices being made by citizens will produce results nobody will regret.... The armies of the Republic are ready at every moment to prove they are worthy of the sacrifices we have made and will make.⁷⁰

In the summer of 1939 İnönü instructed the Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, "the war may start very soon. Let us hold maneuvers in Thrace and see our deficiencies."⁷¹ In August, as the Turkish Army began exercises, İnönü, accompanied by Saydam and some of the leading commanders of the War of Independence, began viewing the maneuvers, as a "red" army held off an attack across the Bulgarian border by a "blue" army. As part of the exercises, civil defense drills were held in Istanbul, during which two "enemy planes" flew over the city to drop "poison gas." As the citizens took cover, teams of civil defense workers drove through the city to neutralize the "gas" with lime. The next night a blackout drill was held, amid the wailing of air-raid sirens. The maneuvers and drills went off well, to the excitement of the participants and foreign journalists who had been called to witness Turkey's preparedness and determination.

Upon returning to Ankara, İnönü met with his cabinet and ordered all ministers to remain in the capital with the warning: "We may make the decision to mobilize at any moment. It is necessary that we make this decision together."⁷² Even though war seemed inevitable, the maneuvers further convinced İnönü of the need to remain out of the war until such a time as Turkey could be prepared for the conflict, because the maneuvers showed the serious flaws in Turkey's defenses, in terms of its lack of modern weaponry. Thus, in his congratulatory letter to Marshal Çakmak, İnönü related his pride in the success of the armies and diligence of the soldiers "under extreme hardship" during the maneuvers, but he, like other Turkish leaders, was convinced that under these conditions, Turkey was not ready for war.⁷³

Kâzım Karabekir, commander of the eastern front during the War of Independence, and a member of the National Assembly during World War II, compared the situation to that of World War I. He argued in the Assembly that Ottoman leaders had made a mistake by entering the war

too early, before the military was prepared, and before the tide of the war was clear.⁷⁴

THE RESPONSE TO THREE CHALLENGES: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW AND EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A WAR ECONOMY

The Turkish government had no economic policy to deal with the changes imposed by the possibilities of war in Europe, or any blueprint for the economy in the event of Turkish participation in a war. Overall, the concept of a war economy was new to Turkish leaders. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who worked for the Turkish government during the war, later pointed out that Turkish leaders did not know the extent to which they would have to mobilize the economy in order to support general mobilization in preparation for war. Thus, they were late in preparing for mobilization, and found themselves reacting belatedly and hastily to the rapidly changing conditions of the conflict, in terms of its influence on the domestic economy.⁷⁵ The result was the National Defense Law.

Aydemir himself first suggested the need for the establishment of a "defense economy" in a report to the government in May 1939. In November 1939 İnönü explained to the National Assembly the extent of restructuring needed to create a war economy: "The extraordinary circumstances in which we are found show that in order to protect our economic system, there is also a need for legal measures. Our nation is sure that the National Assembly will always take just the right measures to protect and preserve the country's economic structures in a sound condition."⁷⁶ Following his speech, a parliamentary commission formed by Saydam began work on a project of National Economic Defense Laws in December 1939. During debates on the project in the National Assembly, Fuat Sirmen argued that "in order that difficulties not reach insurmountable proportions... systematic, programmed and active state intervention to meet the needs of a war economy is needed in all economic activities, even to the level of consumption."⁷⁷ The commission, reflecting shared perceptions in the Assembly, asserted that "the world's daily political developments made it probable that every day the country could be confronted with a new and sudden event."⁷⁸ Furthermore, in its report, the commission proposed that the war "makes necessary government economic efforts from the angle of organization, and prohibiting speculation, in a system of intervention and

regulation more broad and sensitive than in normal times in everything from production to consumption.⁷⁹ The report of the commission and its call for increased government control led to the formation of a new commission, headed by Recep Peker, who had served at different levels of the government and in the People's Party. Work began immediately on a National Defense Law on January 6, 1940.⁸⁰

Approved by the Assembly on January 18, 1940, the National Defense Law (*Milli Korunma Kanunu*) reduced the power of the legislature over cabinet decisions by giving the government extraordinary powers beyond the constitution to deal with restructuring the economy, controlling political expression, and regulating social life.⁸¹ Martial law was used to enforce the National Defense Law.⁸²

The law had three purposes. The first was to insure the production of supplies for the military and the provisioning of metropolitan areas by establishing government control of production, prices, investment, and trade. The second was to provide means to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the executive branch in the face of war. The third aim was to control productive and social life, as well as political expression of the citizens in order to assure stability within the country as Turkey expected to find itself in an international conflict. "Because during war circumstances may require action quicker than normal procedures allow," the law granted the government sweeping powers under any of three conditions: in times of mobilization, when war was deemed probable, or when a war between other countries would likely affect Turkey. In early 1940 all three of these conditions existed. The law remained in effect, with substantial revisions, until a new constitution was adopted following the military coup of 1960.⁸³

According to the law, the government had the power to decide production and allocation in industry and mining. To facilitate this control, the law gave the government the right to seize property and operate factories and mines temporarily, and the right to requisition private vehicles for transportation of goods, in return for fair compensation. As a result during the war the government took control mostly of cement factories, textile mills, and mines. Through the National Defense Law the government also had authority over agricultural production, allowing it to determine the planting of crops, as well as letting the government plant its own crops on any unplanted plot of land larger than five hundred hectares.

Another feature of the law granted the government control over distribution and consumption, by extending government powers to seize stocks of goods "necessary for the protection of the people and nation," and to sell them without a profit, at a fair market price. The National Defense

Law prohibited hoarding, price gouging, overstocking and price fixing among producers and traders, and extended the government's control over export and import of commodities in terms of quantities and price.⁸⁴

The law also allowed the government to regulate labor by means of imposing mandatory work, extending the workday, and prohibiting travel or transfer without official approval. Besides workers, peasants were also subject to mandatory work under the law. Even though the law required workers and peasants to receive "fair wages" or "normal pay" or wages "matching their equals," it did not regulate or restrict the windfall profits of private entrepreneurs. Workers and peasants were to bear the burden of inflation and shortages under the National Defense law.

Moreover, the National Defense Law granted the government power over the press. The law did not give the government the right to censor press coverage, but it did allow the Press Directorate of the Interior Ministry to use administrative, rather than judicial, means to close newspapers and magazines, and to fine their owners, for printing stories deemed detrimental to the national interest. During the war, *Cumhuriyet* was closed five times, for a total of five months, *Tan* [The Dawn] was closed seven times, *Vatan* [The Homeland] was closed nine times, and the other major independent daily newspapers all suffered similar punishment.⁸⁵

Despite the sweeping, dictatorial nature of the powers granted to the government, the National Defense Law passed the People's Party Parliamentary Group and the National Assembly without much debate or opposition. Some concern focused on the definition of the law as a temporary measure under wartime conditions, which should be rescinded as soon as conditions allowed. As a member of the Assembly, Berç Türker said,

If economic and commercial matters are left free they develop. If these matters are necessarily restricted in unusual times, our country's economy and commerce is hurt. It is for this reason that the government must act with great care in the application of these measures. Since a normal situation will return, the development of the current situation of our private enterprises must be recognized and the commercial world's morale must not be broken.

While this law reflected the statist debate, which centered on state control of the economy and its role in fostering the private and public sectors, it also led to questions regarding the state's commitment to private property. Furthermore, it directed attention to the state's attitude toward workers and peasants, which later became a focal point in opposition against this

law and also the opposition's arguments against İnönü and the People's Party that adopted the law in the Assembly.

Among the most heated debate was that centered on article 41 of the law, which obliged peasants with less than four hectares of land, who were considered to be producing at subsistence levels, to surrender their draft animals to the government. These animals would be transferred to owners of more than ten acres of land, who would presumably make more efficient use of the animals in producing surplus crops. Hikmet Bayur opposed the article, saying it would serve only to make poor peasants poorer, forcing them off the land or putting them in the position of having to rent draft animals from wealthier landowners who could exploit the poor peasantry. Bayur's complaint did not change the law, but it was the first of many complaints about the law that surfaced in the years following its adoption.⁸⁶ Later critics of the law said that it did nothing to defend the nation, while giving the government too much power and the citizenry too little protection. Even Aydemir, who was among the first to suggest the need for national defense laws, later expressed doubts about how a law could be for the "national defense" when it ignored the constitution and its guarantees. In addition, the law was designed without much concern regarding its ramifications: "I joined in the efforts between the ministries during the preparation of the National Defense Law. A problem of perspective immediately attracted attention: not a single person [on the commission] was not a heartfelt defender of extraordinary measures for ordering and intervening in society."⁸⁷ Along with its conception, there were problems in the application of the law, since the government bureaucracy, especially local officials, received limited or no guidance on how to administer the law, so its application varied widely.⁸⁸ Yet, proponents of the law believed the government needed extraordinary powers to deal with the extraordinary situation, in order to protect the nation and its economic, political, and social life. To those who supported the law, it was an aspect of survival and preparation; thus it did not spell out oppression but protection and caution. Prime Minister Saydam told the Assembly, that "We will work as much as possible not to shake up the normal life of the citizen, not to limit the profits of citizens who own businesses, to work with zeal, and to ask the ideas of commerce and industry.... We will work to keep our economic life from being disturbed." Saydam later tried to explain the problems the government was having with the economy even with the powers granted by the National Defense Law, and called on all citizens to make sacrifices: "We are in the first steps of a tightly ordered economic system. We are in a period to which neither the producer, nor the consumer, the merchant or the buyer have yet

become accustomed.... Here only the minimum needs are to be kept in mind. That is, we will give no value or attention to things that could be called luxury goods."⁸⁹ The themes of "sacrifice, effort, cooperation, and patience" were at the core of the government's views of the National Defense Law, and it was part of the rhetoric by which the government legitimated its need for extraordinary powers. This law formed the framework of Turkish economic, political, and social policy throughout the war. Along with the diplomatic efforts and military preparations of 1939 and early 1940, this law rounded out attempts to prepare for the uncertainty of the future. But in the spring of 1940 it appeared that preparations might be too late to keep Turkey out of the war in Europe.

Chapter Three

War at Home, War Abroad: New Terms of Domination

In a world dominated by powerful states, to what extent can a less powerful state determine its own terms of participation in war? If it wants to remain at peace, but still confronts the belief in the rationality of conflict, what is the impact of its non-belligerency on its foreign and domestic relations? When the German war effort turned toward the West in May 1940, Turkish statesmen were facing these questions regarding the rationality of Turkey's participation in the European conflict, and were searching for an answer to the question of how much autonomy Turkey had in matters of war and peace. As İsmet İnönü pointed out in the fall of 1940:

Since last year there has been no change in the foreign policy of the Republican government. The foremost reason for this is that our foreign policy holds independence in policy and the protection of our entire citizenry to be fundamental, and it is in no way connected to greedy ambitions. ... No state, if it does not have hostile intentions, can criticize us... or be anxious about our policy, which seeks only to protect our rights.¹

While Turkish policy was formulated around these ideas, which İnönü expressed time and again, the great powers all tried to include Turkey in their own equations for victory in the war. In the period from June 1940 to July 1942, Turkish foreign policy was one of caution, aimed at maintaining a balance between the warring sides that would allow continued non-belligerency. Events tested the resolve of Turkish policy makers, and made them realize that the key to survival was not only balance and caution, but also obtaining and retaining autonomy in Turkish foreign affairs.

Maintaining autonomy required preparation and caution, which İnönü, reflecting on his experience at the Lausanne Conference, believed to be a vital part of Turkish foreign policy.

This chapter, by concentrating on the period from June 1940 to July 1942, examines the impact of the early years of the war on Turkish foreign and domestic affairs. While Turkish foreign policy reflected Turkey's struggle for autonomy in the turmoil in Europe, domestic policy in this period centered on the state's efforts at organization and control of economic activity and political expression. As the heavy demands of foreign affairs shook the concentration of the administration on domestic affairs, calls from policy makers for sacrifice, effort, cooperation, and patience within the country began to meet with protest and disapproval from the people. Yet the question remained: what was the price of non-belligerency in terms of economic development, relations with the Western powers, freedom of speech, and democratic principles?

THE WAR IN EUROPE, DIPLOMATIC OBLIGATIONS, AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Following the German attack through the Low Countries into France in May 1940, and after Italy's subsequent declaration of war in June, the Allies called on Turkey to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of October 1939. The question was whether when Italy declared war, did Turkey's obligation to render "all assistance within its power" to the Allies mean Turkey's entrance into the war? The British and the French Ambassadors called on Foreign Minister Sükrü Saraçoğlu to urge the Turkish government to execute the treaty by immediately cutting diplomatic relations with Italy, but not Germany. They also called on Turkey to begin general mobilization and to place naval and air bases in Turkey at the disposal of the Allies. They suggested that when ready, the Turkish government would declare war on Italy.²

The Turkish reply did not come immediately. Saraçoğlu had been receiving regular reports from the Turkish Ambassador in France as well as from reporters who had visited the western front in May. Their reports had been consistently gloomy and full of the most dire predictions of impending disaster for the Allies. Furthermore, members of the parliamentary group of the People's Party split on the question of whether or not to enter the war in Europe. Refik Şevket İnce and the retired General Refet Bele were among those who favored entering the war. Recep Peker, one of the architects of

the National Defense Law, argued that Turkey was automatically at war, and could not risk delay in honoring its commitments:

The decision to be made will be inspected by all of world opinion. It is not enough to say that our own action [declaring non-belligerency] is permissible under the terms of the agreement. This is mere politics. ... [T]here will be no escaping from the dangers of war, and from this war coming to us. It will come shortly. For a few months of life—at the expense of losing our allies—having nothing will not take the place of trust in the future.³

Others in the Assembly argued against entering the war, pointing out that the Allies had not kept their own promises but regardless, expected Turkey to fulfill its commitment. İnönü and his cabinet were convinced that Turkey was simply not yet prepared for war, and entry into the conflict at this point would prove disastrous. Refik Saydam advocated prudence, and İnönü's sudden appearance at the meeting during the debate swayed the Assembly to the side of caution.⁴ As Saraçoğlu pointed out: "We had to consider conditions, the position of our allies and ultimately the defense of our nation. There was no question of being swept into an adventure for the interests of others as in the First World War."⁵

Saydam advised the Assembly that the cabinet had decided to apply Protocol Two of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which released Turkey from any action that might lead to war against the Soviet Union. And he stressed that "we hope that just as our caution will keep our country away from excitement, it will also help to protect the peace in surrounding areas."⁶

Tensions with the Soviets were a pretext, since the Treaty of Mutual Assistance called upon Turkey to assist Britain and France according to its capabilities, such as providing facilities for use by the Allies, even if it (Turkey) didn't send troops to fight the Axis. But Turkish leaders believed that allowing the Allies to use facilities would do nothing to improve Turkey's own defenses, while greatly increasing the risk to Turkish cities and industry. Also, the idea of allowing the Allies to use Turkish facilities evoked memories of World War I, when the Germans had used Ottoman facilities to attack Russia. Especially after the German Ambassador, Franz von Papen warned Saraçoğlu that Berlin felt that opening facilities to the Allies "in any case meant war," the Turkish government insisted on its decision to continue to prepare for war while putting forth every conceivable effort to remain out of it as long as possible.⁷

In his memoirs, thinking about the First World War, İnönü asked, "what could be worse than going to war? ... If we had not entered the war

at all, and had known the dangers ... we probably would have defended ourselves ... against them.⁸ İnönü believed that if the Ottoman government had shared the same understanding and experience as the Republican government, it would not have entered the First World War. But did that mean it was possible for Turkey to remain out of the current conflict? Since İnönü argued that the Second World War was inevitable and inescapable, his objective was to keep Turkey out of it as long as possible. Thus Turkish foreign policy reflected caution and preparation, as İnönü and his cabinet sought diplomatic means to forestall Turkey's entrance into the conflict. İnönü's assessment of the First World War was that one of the reasons for the war was that the European states "believed their disagreements were unsolvable through diplomacy, and left the solution entirely to the military mentality."⁹ İnönü, as a soldier and as a statesman, believed that diplomacy would provide the better solution for Turkey. This belief led not only to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, but also to the argument that the treaty should not be interpreted as a hostile intention or as a contract to enter the war.

The struggle to remain free of the war was fueled by the concerns of İnönü and Turkish leaders about the military and the economy. The National Defense Law emerged from these concerns. But the law brought its own problems for the government to confront in the following years. In fact, war in Europe, and implementation of the National Defense Law signaled the connection between two fronts, domestic and foreign, which İnönü had to confront in his presidency.

TURKISH FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1940: CAUTION AND BALANCE

At the same time as Germany's attack against France, and the debate over Turkish obligations to the Allies, negotiations between Germany and Turkey for a new commercial agreement began. The talks were delayed not so much by the war as by questions of chrome sales to Germany, and German arms shipments to Turkey. The agreement was finalized in July 1940, one month after the fall of France. Not only Turkish leaders' concerns for balancing international relations, but also the state of the Turkish economy led them to pursue and reach a trade agreement with the Germans. The government as well as small businesspeople were in need of spare parts and machinery from Germany, and by the spring of 1940 stockpiles of agricultural commodities were spoiling in warehouses. The agreement meant that Turkey could export

agricultural commodities that the Allies had refused to buy. Furthermore, the agreement demonstrated Turkey's importance in German strategic concerns. For the Germans, the agreement was a sign of goodwill, more valuable as propaganda than in meeting German military and industrial needs.¹⁰

İnönü made clear that the commercial agreement did not replace Turkey's formal alliance with Britain, as the Germans tried to portray it as a change of direction in Turkish foreign policy. İnönü was determined that the Germans must respect Turkey's diplomatic autonomy, and he remained equally certain that Turkey must not enter the war on either side. The tightrope that Turkey was walking had not only Britain and Germany as obstacles, but the Soviet Union as well. Even though the Soviet Union, since the Soviet-German pact, shared the German conviction in the value of Turkish neutrality, Turkish-Soviet relations had been distant since the Saracoğlu-Molotov talks in Moscow in October 1939. Furthermore, throughout the winter and spring of 1940, Germany had played the role of mediator between Turkey and the Soviet Union, to the detriment of the relationship.

In the summer of 1940, the Germans published a set of documents they claimed were captured secret French files. The documents purported to show Turkish collusion with the Allies in planning the destruction of Soviet oil fields and production facilities at Baku. According to the documents Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoğlu enthusiastically endorsed a plan for Allied bombers to pass over Turkish territory to bomb Baku. The Turkish government disavowed any knowledge of the scheme, and the French Ambassador claimed the conversation never occurred. Turkish-Soviet relations were further hampered by Soviet demands to share control over the Straits, which persuaded the Turkish government to turn to British assistance to sound out the Soviets about ways to improve Turkish-Soviet relations. In July, the new British Ambassador to Moscow, Stafford Cripps, carried this mission by meeting with Stalin to discuss areas of dispute. Stalin made clear that the Soviet Union welcomed British interference, and took it as a sign insuring Turkey's good intentions.¹¹ He emphasized that the Soviet Union had no hostile intentions in the Black Sea or in the Bosphorus, but was convinced that modification of the Regime of the Straits was necessary to protect Soviet security. Stalin's reiteration of the demand for Turkish consent to joint defense of the Straits by placing Soviet troops and ships in the Dardanelles suggested serious consequences for Turkey's sovereignty.¹² When the Cripps mission failed, the Turkish government refused to offer help to Britain in the Balkans.

In September, believing expansion of the war to the Balkans was imminent, and a change in the Turkish position was possible, the British Foreign Office again instructed its Ambassador, Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, to ascertain the exact Turkish attitude toward war in the Balkans. In his reply, he anticipated that Turkish planners had "taken no decision beyond one to lie low as long as possible and hope for the best,"¹³ but he warned Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoğlu that "any weakness Turkey [might show] in regard to an Italian attack on Greece would be merely likely to encourage Stalin and Hitler to deal with Turkey in a like manner."¹⁴

On October 7, 1940, German troops entered Rumania, and the Italians appeared on the verge of attacking Greece. The British general staff developed plans for an Allied counterattack in Greece. According to Churchill, the operation would keep the Germans from spreading the war to the Middle East.¹⁵ When Italy invaded Greece on October 28, 1940, the British approached the Turks to join an operation as part of their commitment under the 1939 Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Also, the British stressed that they were expecting the Turks to convince the Yugoslavians to join the Allied operation and to pressure the Bulgarians to stay out of the conflict. The Turkish approach to Yugoslavia did not bring an affirmative outcome, but the Turkish Ambassador in Sophia warned that if the Bulgarians attacked Greece, Turkey would have no choice but to come to the aid of the Greeks. Turkey also assured Greece that it could withdraw all troops from the Turkish border to concentrate on the Italian front.¹⁶

Yet, the Italians and Germans had correctly assumed that even though Turkey was active diplomatically, it would not enter the war just to help Greece or Rumania.¹⁷ Indeed, arguing that in order to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union, Turkey once again applied Protocol Two of the Mutual Assistance Treaty and declared neutrality in the Italian-Greek war. Churchill demanded that Turkey enter the war, but he had to accept Knatchbull-Hugessen's warning that continued pressure would only harm Anglo-Turkish relations by alienating the Turkish government. The Ambassador saw no point in demanding belligerency when Britain could not supply Turkey with weaponry it had promised.¹⁸ On the Ambassador's advice, Britain dropped its demands on Turkey, and the Axis claimed Turkey's neutrality as a diplomatic triumph. Indeed, Turkey had not entered the war on the side of the Allies and was actively seeking better relations with Germany.

At the beginning of November 1940 in his opening speech to the National Assembly, İnönü reiterated that while the Turks wished to remain out of the conflict, they would defend themselves: "Our country has passed through these difficult times, through the struggle surrounding us, without

being shaken in its security and unity. Certain of justice, respectful of rights, and committed to defending the homeland, the country quietly organizes to stand firm." Despite the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain, İnönü now portrayed Turkish non-belligerency as neutrality, and proclaimed its benefits for Axis and Allied powers alike:

Our non-belligerent status is not an obstacle for all states to show us equally good intentions and to pursue most normal relations. Likewise, our non-belligerency is preventing, without exception, the use of our air, sea or land by any of the belligerents against the other. And so long as we have not entered the war we will remain definite and serious about preventing such use.¹⁹

FROM NON-BELLIGERENCY TO NEUTRALITY

Following Axis advancement into the Balkans in the fall of 1940, Turkish leaders stepped up efforts to convince the Germans that despite the alliance with Britain, they would not interfere with German plans in the Balkans, so long as Germany did not threaten Turkish security. In February 1941, Turkey signed a treaty of non-aggression with Bulgaria, which seemed a direct contradiction of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain. The Turkish government argued that the treaty with Bulgaria should not be seen as a hostile gesture against Britain, because it would actually help the Allies by ensuring peace in the Balkans. Foreign Minister Saracoğlu told the press, "sometimes great accomplishments and good can be done in small ways. Maybe the arrangements we signed today will bring order to the confusion in the Balkans."²⁰

Even though the Turkish government had not kept the British informed about the negotiations, it had hoped to soften British criticism by inserting a clause into the treaty acknowledging Turkey's existing obligations. But the British were outraged by the treaty. According to Knatchbull-Hugessen, "We had wished for some strong deterrent against Bulgarian dealings with Germany. There seemed to be some justification for fearing that, assured by the terms of this declaration against attack by Turkey, Bulgaria would find the road of non-resistance to German pressure easier than before."²¹ At the end of February 1941, as a last-ditch effort to convince Turkey, along with Yugoslavia, to resist German pressure in the Balkans, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and John Dill, Chief of the Imperial Staff, traveled to Athens, Ankara, and Cairo. Convinced that the Turks would not take on a combat role on their own initiative, Eden and Dill asked them to take a firm stand

against German encroachment on Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, by assisting in a plan to land British troops in Greece. Turkish leaders agreed to pursue diplomatic measures but again refused to allow Allied use of Turkish bases. Numan Menemencioğlu, Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, argued that given the current military situation Turkey's belligerency would only end in German control of the Straits. He informed Eden and Dill that the Turkish position had not changed and that the Turks would fight only if attacked.²² The Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, told Eden that he expected the German Army to launch a feint at Greece then attack full force against Turkish defenses in Thrace in order to seize the Straits. His demand for quick delivery of weaponry to oppose the attack was dismissed by British planners who thought the Germans would attack only Greece, where the Italians had been bogged down since October. As the meetings were closing in Ankara on March 1, 1941, German troops began to occupy Bulgaria.

Aware that Eden was still in Ankara, and Turkish suspicions of German intentions were growing, Papen urged Hitler to assure the Turks that Germany had no hostile intentions. On March 4, Hitler sent a personal letter to İnönü assuring him that Germany hoped to avoid any hostilities with Turkey and as a gesture of good faith the German army had orders to remain forty miles from the Turkish border. When Hitler's letter arrived, the Turkish army had already blown up the bridges over the Maritza River on the Bulgarian border and had massed troops in Thrace. On March 12, İnönü's reply to Hitler reaffirmed Turkey's position: no action against Bulgaria was planned and would not be taken unless provoked. İnönü also conveyed his wish to maintain cordial relations with Germany.²³ İnönü's letter to Hitler confirmed the Germans' convictions that they could also proceed with an invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece with little concern of resistance from Turkey.²⁴ On April 6 Germany invaded Yugoslavia and Greece, both of which surrendered in less than a month.

Assuring Turkish neutrality, the Germans still hoped to draw Turkey away from its alliance with Britain. The German aim was to convince Ankara to allow transit of troops and war materials through the Straits and across Turkish territory, in an effort to secure the southern flank before attacking the Soviet Union. Meeting with the Turkish ambassador, Hüsrev Gerede, in March, Hitler urged greater cooperation between the two countries by stressing Germany's peaceful intentions toward Turkey. And Hitler stressed that it would be against Germany's own interests if anything were to happen to Turkey. During this meeting the Germans also told Gerede that in November 1940 Molotov had raised demands for Soviet control of the

Straits and of the province of Kars after the war.²⁵ Germany was expecting that disclosure of Soviet intentions would serve to show German friendship and convince Turkey to join Germany against a Soviet threat.

By the spring of 1941 it was clear to both the Allies and the Axis that Turkish policy operated on one objective only: that of remaining out of the war unless Turkey was attacked directly. The rapidly changing conditions of the conflict left Turkey vulnerable, but also allowed Turkish policy makers a degree of autonomy in foreign affairs. Even though Turkey's strength seemed to lay in autonomy, at this stage, İnönü and the government were constantly pressured from within to go to war by various factions in Turkey, especially on the side of Germany. Their efforts matched with German pressure and expectations that Turkey would soon adopt a new foreign policy.

In May 1941, when the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop met with Mussolini and with the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano to discuss Axis plans for the summer, Mussolini asked if Turkey would soon join the Axis. Ribbentrop replied that he was confident Turkey would join the Axis, and as extra enticement Hitler was considering offering Syria to Turkey.²⁶ Papen telegraphed Berlin that the Turkish government would not respond to such attempts at bribery. Even though the Ambassador turned around and hinted to Turkish policy makers that refusal to sign a treaty could be interpreted as a hostile intention and could provoke German action, Papen knew Turkish foreign policy already supported non-aggression pacts, and as the Turks had made clear, they were prepared to conclude such an arrangement with Germany.²⁷

The British were dismayed when Ankara announced its intention to sign a non-aggression treaty with Germany. Knatchbull-Hugessen believed Turkish policy makers sought only a temporary accommodation with Berlin aimed at getting through the summer without being at war, since Numan Menemencioğlu told the Ambassador in May that he was "racking his brains to discover how to do this."²⁸ Knatchbull-Hugessen also suggested that British interests would be served by a Turkish accommodation of Germany provided that nothing vital was given away. Indeed, the Turkish government gave a verbal commitment to Knatchbull-Hugessen not to allow German arms to transit its territory. But Ribbentrop was pressing for omission of any reference to Turkey's existing obligations to Britain, as well as for a hidden agreement allowing Germany to transport arms and troops through the Straits.²⁹ Under Turkey's continuous insistence, the treaty signed on June 18, 1941, contained reservations as to the two countries' prior treaty obligations and had no secret clauses. By the terms of the treaty, which was to last two years, the two states promised to

respect each other's territorial integrity, and to abstain from direct or indirect action against each other.³⁰ İnönü justified the treaty in terms of self-defense: "How could we be expected to refuse a German guarantee of non-aggression when we were left alone facing the Axis power... when Britain was employing all her forces to defend the Isles against a German invasion?"³¹ The Foreign Minister, Saracoğlu, told the National Assembly, "the creation of [the Turco-German treaty] is amidst the burning and destruction and collapse caused by the war, a fine and felicitous work of peace for the Turkish nation and even for all humanity."³² While the British admitted there was little they could do to prevent the signing of the treaty, they were outraged by Turkey's claims of a diplomatic triumph. After the German invasion of Russia, Knatchbull-Hugessen reported to London that Ankara was elated about the attack, and that Saracoğlu claimed it was a direct result of the Turkish-German treaty. Apparently, Saracoğlu even suggested that Foreign Minister Eden say something in the House of Commons about this success of Turkish diplomacy. The Foreign Office found Saracoğlu's reasoning "absurd."³³ Yet, the treaty stood as another safeguard against a complete commitment to either side in the conflict for Turkey. In essence, by providing a temporary arrangement, it assured Turkey's continuing autonomy.

PAN-TURKISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE ON TURKISH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Turkish opinion was divided on the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The attack meant that the two countries that presented the greatest danger to Turkey were at war with each other, which could weaken both, thus delaying possible aggression against Turkey. In the long run, however, the destruction of either power could increase the danger from the other. Turkish leaders expected to be the next target, if Germany could defeat the Soviet Union by autumn. Indeed, the Germans' Plan Orient, developed in the spring of 1941, called for a drive from Bulgaria to Syria through Turkey. German strategists believed that ten divisions would be needed to occupy Turkey if it cooperated. If not, twenty divisions would be used. The plan was based on the supposition that the Turks would not resist.³⁴ Turkish planners also speculated that a Soviet victory would leave the Red Army occupying Eastern Europe and the Balkans, cutting Turkey off from Western Europe. But in the short term, the German-Soviet conflict raised the danger of the war spreading to the Straits or to eastern Anatolia, and

Turkey could again have to face strong demands for passage of troops or supplies across its territory, finding itself in the middle of the conflict.³⁵

When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, the Turks declared their neutrality in the conflict, in accordance with agreements with Russia and Germany. But within Turkey, as Faik Ahmet Barutçu, a member of the National Assembly, recounts in his memoirs, "the German-Russian war created a festive air in the country. . . . Everybody congratulated each other, calling for a celebration."³⁶ On June 23 the British Ambassador met with Saracoğlu, who was "delighted over the Russo-German war."³⁷ The British were dismayed by what they interpreted as the Turkish government's anti-Soviet stance as the German invasion proceeded, and they warned that Germany, not the Soviet Union, was the major threat to Turkey. On the contrary, Turkish policy makers pointed out that the Soviet Union was the only power since the beginning of the war that openly demanded concessions of Turkish territory. Thus the Turkish government maintained that in the long term the Soviets, not the Germans, posed the greatest danger.

The most confrontational response to the German-Soviet war came from pan-Turkists, inside and outside the Turkish government. In 1941 pan-Turkists became the first group openly to oppose government policy toward the war. The German invasion of the Soviet Union sparked an ideological struggle within Turkey over its official response as pan-Turkists took this opportunity to try to revive hopes of the unity of Turkey with the Turkic people of the Caucasus and central Asia.³⁸ During the war years, the Turkish government did not give official support to the pan-Turkists. However, it was widely known that some high-ranking officials such as Hüsrev Gerede, Ambassador to Berlin, and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff held pan-Turkist sympathies. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Gerede helped arrange a visit to Berlin by Nuri Pasha, the brother of Enver Pasha, a leader of the Young Turk government in World War I. During his visit, Nuri Pasha offered to start an anti-Soviet uprising of one hundred thousand men in the Caucasus once the German army had passed Rostov. Gerede apparently concurred in the plan and hinted that Nuri Pasha's visit was semi-official.

The German response to the pan-Turkist advances was cautious. The pan-Turkists' goals did not exactly coincide with German goals in either Turkey or Russia, and the Germans feared that open encouragement of the group would alienate high-ranking officials in Turkey.³⁹ But the Germans still hoped to use pan-Turkist sentiments. As German armies marched on the Crimea and Caucasus, Papen developed a plan to gain Turkey's collaboration by conceding to Turkey the right to reorganize the Turkic speaking

areas. Papen also considered offering Iranian Azerbaijan to Turkey in return for a breach in Anglo-Turkish relations.⁴⁰ İnönü and the cabinet rejected these plans outright, and in a message addressed to Hitler, said that "Turkey had enough to do in fully developing her own country and had not the slightest interest in any acquisition of territory."⁴¹ Berlin's attempt to lure Turkey with pan-Turkist appeals had little practical effect other than raising suspicions among Turkish leaders, and the entire project was dropped in September 1942 due to opposition within the German Foreign Ministry.⁴²

While the pan-Turkists were unable to bring a change in Turkish foreign policy, they did affect political discourse within Turkey by offering alternative models and criticizing Turkish foreign policy.⁴³ Pan-Turkism had always represented an alternative to Kemalist visions of Westernization and of Turkey's place in European diplomacy. Now, during the war, pan-Turkists were also responding to domestic economic problems created by the decline in trade with Germany.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE WAR: INFLATION, HOARDING, AND SHORTAGES

The uncertainty and anxiety in Turkey's foreign affairs in the early years of the war intensified the impact of the war on Turkish domestic affairs. The sense of crisis and danger in Europe reinforced belief in the need for caution and preparation for survival, and control pervaded government policies in all matters, from economic policy to restrictions on the press, to treatment of government employees, to regulating the movement and actions of Turkish citizens. İnönü and the government of Prime Minister Refik Saydam tried to limit the impact of the European conflict on Turkey, but in general the effects of the war proved beyond the capacities of the government to control.

The most immediate impact of the conflict in Europe, felt even before the war began, came in Turkey's foreign trade. Steadily increasing since 1933, exports equaled 127 million TL, and imports were 150 million TL in 1938. But in July 1939, responding to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Turkey, Britain, and France, Germany cut off most of its trade with Turkey. Before cutting off trade, Germany supplied 51 percent of Turkey's imports and took 37 percent of its exports, but in 1940 and 1941 these figures dropped to 12 percent and 9 percent, respectively. As trade with Germany fell, trade with Britain and the United States made up only part of the shortfalls in the early years of the war. Between 1940 and 1944 England supplied 19 percent of Turkey's imports and took 15 percent of its exports.

In 1940, 14 percent of Turkey's exports went to the United States, a figure that rose to 44 percent by 1945.⁴⁴ While exports, mainly of raw materials and agricultural commodities, recovered partially with a commercial agreement with Britain, imports of machinery, spare parts, and manufactured goods continued to drop, to 118 million TL in 1939, 69 million in 1940, and 75 million in 1941. With the reduction of foreign trade, factories were forced to close from lack of spare parts. Work on the new National Assembly Building in Ankara was stopped, and coffee stocks fell to a one-month supply. As shipments of coffee from Brazil were seized by the French at Marseilles, Turks began to extend coffee by adding barley or chickpeas.⁴⁵

As provisioning of the army took precedence in all government economic plans, shortages of domestically produced goods also developed. In February 1940 rationing of basic commodities was introduced, with extra allocations for workers in heavy industry. According to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who worked in the government Provisioning Directorate during this period,

[A]s the morning sun rose every citizen, opening their eyes to the new day, thought about whether or not there would be a slice of bread for the table that day; and every commander ... worried about what he would feed his soldiers, whether or not a handful of feed would be found for the starving animals, how many days worth of fuel there was for planes and ships, and how many spare tires he could find for transport trucks.

Those who worked in the Provisioning Directorate struggled constantly to find supplies and transport:

Every day began in the anxiety of thinking whether or not meat, oil, tea and sugar could be found. Our telephone rang into the late night hours. Without stopping, we received anxious news from provincial governors saying they had no food to distribute to the people the next day, or from the army ... [saying] that animals had no feed, soldiers' rations were insufficient or trucks had broken down.⁴⁶

Using the National Defense Law, the government responded to inflation and shortages by setting official prices for goods. The aim of the measure was not only to keep prices low in the cities, but also to contain the cost of supplying the army. İnönü justified the intervention by arguing that "In the conditions of today, the basic goal of our provisioning policy is to meet the needs of the people and of national defense. To meet this goal the government decided to intervene in the chain of economic activity extending

from production all the way to consumption, and to impose new order on these activities.⁴⁷ Under the National Defense Law, the government established a monopoly on the purchase of grain and on all agricultural products, and set official prices for all commodities. Prices of necessities, such as flour and coal, were set low in urban areas, while prices on other goods, such as fabric and sugar, were set near the market price. The state-set prices rose only moderately during the early years of the war, which seemed to indicate that the Saydam cabinet was succeeding in controlling prices. But goods at state prices were scarce, and many items could be found only on the black market. Thus real inflation rose faster than official statistics indicated. By 1941 the price of food had risen 60 percent, while the price of wholesale goods rose 75 percent. The price of sugar rose from 30 *kurus* in March 1940 to 500 *kurus* by the end of 1942. In the countryside, the price of oxen rose from 150 to 500 lira by 1942, and the price of a pair of water buffalo rose 400 percent in the same period.⁴⁸

Government price controls, shortages, and hoarding expanded the black market during the war years. According to Faik Ökte, head of the tax collection bureau in Istanbul, as soon as the war began, importers who had goods on hand began to hoard them to wait for prices to rise. They later released the goods onto the black market and smuggled their profits out to European banks. Even small shopkeepers began to hide goods in anticipation of official price increases, or to demand higher than official prices from customers. Small presses began printing and selling counterfeit ration tickets to consumers desperate to get their hands on scarce goods. Basic commodities such as soap, tea, or sugar could not be found at the government set prices and had to be purchased on the black market at several times the official rate.⁴⁹

In 1941 the government moved to deal with shortages and the black market by trying to expand its control over the distribution of goods. First opening a Directorate of Provisions (*İaşe Müsteşarlığı*), the government followed with an Office of Petroleum (*Petrol Ofisi*) and an Office of Commerce (*Ticaret Ofisi*), both of which were connected to the Ministry of Commerce. These initiatives were followed by the creation of separate provisioning subdirectorates in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and committees in the rest of the provinces, and by the foundation of an Office of Distribution (*Dağıtma Ofisi*). The aim was to coordinate all economic activity to reduce waste and alleviate shortages by controlling the purchase, transportation, stockpiling, and distribution of goods by state organizations throughout Turkey.⁵⁰ Increasing bureaucratic measures to impose control on the economy were becoming a characteristic feature of the administration. Saydam, who had served at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy of the

TABLE 3.1 Military Expenditures, 1938–1945

Year	Expenditures (million TL)	Per cent of total budget
1938	94.5	30
1939	173	43
1940	290.5	53
1941	322.5	55
1942	497.5	54
1943	542.5	53
1944	554	51
1945	248	41

Republic, believed in tried and tested measures, instead of sweeping changes in his approach to control of the economy. İnönü also preferred the established system and sought to reform the system from within.⁵¹ Thus, in its confrontation with hoarding and black marketeering, the government tried to coordinate and control economic activity. The government reached a solution by increasing the bureaucracy rather than confronting black marketeering by reducing its impact on the market. İnönü and the cabinet blamed the extraordinary circumstances of the war for the country's economic woes. İnönü told the Assembly in 1941: "What I want citizens not to forget is that in the economic life of every nation the effects of the world war are wide and deep. For our country international markets and routes are all but closed off. Also, with the decisions made to secure the defense of the homeland, in our country much of the workforce has been removed from production."⁵² By the beginning of 1942, Turkey had 1 million men mobilized in the armed forces, out of a total population of 17.8 million. By contrast, the total number of workers in Turkish industry was approximately 650,000 in 1942. As İnönü pointed out, these million soldiers had ceased to be producers, and were now consumers of cloth, leather, food, and other materials that were already in short supply. But not only had the workforce been shifted from producing to the military, the war also brought a sharp shift of government spending away from production to defense. The figures in table 3.1 illustrate the percent of the budget devoted to defense, and the yearly expenditures by the Ministry of Defense.⁵³

Besides seeing the war as a primary cause of the country's economic dislocation, İnönü and the Saydam cabinet displayed a marked distrust of merchants and private profit during this time of crisis. The Minister of Commerce, Nazmi Topçuoğlu, told the Assembly:

We are convinced that the merchant has a function in society and economic life.... However, in the conditions of today we will not give

permission to a commercial system that leans on individual greed. If the merchant continues to see his interests as beyond and opposed to the public interest, he will be denying the very reason for his existence. Within the framework of commercial agreements between states today, the most important import and export trade is quite favorable for nationalization.⁵⁴

In January 1941, Saydam warned: "I will try to explain to [merchants] that their responsibility is not restricted only to their own interests, but that the public interest is paramount. ... If it is not understood ... I will work to make the state solely responsible for imports."⁵⁵ As the government blamed difficulties on the war and on the private sector for fueling inflation, hoarding, and black marketeering, the Turkish people were told that their suffering, deprivations, and inconveniences were for the common good and for the defense of the country. Some members of the National Assembly suggested that sacrifice for the common good should be legally required of all citizens. Some of the proposals went so far as suggesting that only one type of clothing should be available for everybody to wear, and that parties could be banned as wasteful, while women should give up makeup and stockings.⁵⁶

Indeed, the early war years brought a serious decline in the quality of life in Turkey. During this period, real wages dropped 40 percent. In 1941 the government officially announced anticipated shortages of food, and in May 1942 it was forced to cut bread rations in Istanbul in half, from 300 grams per day to 150.⁵⁷ Metin Toker, then a reporter for the daily *Cumhuriyet* [The Republic], recalls fights over bread among families, with arguments over who ate more than their share.⁵⁸

A growing number of poor peasants, forced off the land by high taxes, low commodity prices, and high interest rates, and unable to find work and food, migrated to the big cities searching for possibilities: "first the men come to the city and after finding work as porters or laborers, bring part of their families from the village and move into cramped rooms costing 4–5 lira per month in the city's poorest neighborhoods." At the same time, an estimated 5,000 children lived on the streets of Istanbul: "a crowd of children in wretched clothes and bare feet are found in every part of the city ... some sell small things like candy and newspapers, others work as porters. Some are begging. ... In general they are of elementary school age. Among them are even some five year olds."⁵⁹ Along with the peasants, workers shouldered the burden of the government's attempt to increase production. For example, most of Turkey's coal came from the Zonguldak mines near the Black Sea, where 25,000 to 30,000 workers labored in the

mines around the clock, including villagers who worked in the mines for six-week periods to fulfill their labor obligation under the National Defense Law. Among those who worked in the mines were also soldiers and about 1,500 state prisoners. Working conditions in the mines were deplorable, miners were overworked and underpaid, and with a constantly shifting workforce, the miners did not have time to receive proper training in safety techniques. Villagers were forced to travel sometimes for days to arrive at the mines. Separated from their families, working underground for long hours, eating pitiful rations, and forced to sleep in dirty and cramped quarters, the worker-peasants suffered terribly.⁶⁰

The accelerated production, and lack of training, also resulted in increased workplace accidents. In 1939, 203 workers were killed in mining accidents, and each year between 1940 and 1943, 120 to 163 workers lost their lives in the mines. In 1941, 75 miners died at the Zonguldak mines alone, and in 1942 63 miners died in an explosion in the mine. That year 108 miners died at Zonguldak, and the death toll remained at around 80 for the remainder of the war. Accidents were frequent in other sectors as well. For example, accidents at the Karabuk Steel Factory, opened by the state in September 1939 rose 500 percent in its second year of operation and had risen 4,000 percent by 1943. In 1939 there were 7,482 total workplace accidents reported in Turkish industry. The number of accidents rose steadily during the first years of the war as workers were forced to work longer hours, and more days without rest. In 1940 the total number of accidents rose to 8,620 and reached 11,958 by 1943. Approximately 50 percent of the industrial accidents occurred at the Zonguldak mines.⁶¹

At the same time, workers had little power to oppose or change working conditions. Since 1936, the Law of Organizations had outlawed unions and banned strikes and collective bargaining. Workers were isolated and divided, and the only way to escape the dangerous work conditions was to flee. But according to the National Defense Law, workers could not leave their work without permission. When this failed to prevent peasant-workers from escaping to their villages, the Saydam cabinet amended the law to allow the forcible return of escaped workers.

In general, government employees were among the hardest hit by the economic difficulties of the war years. To supplement their incomes while keeping wages low, the government introduced a program to pay employees in kind, with sugar, flour, and clothing produced by state enterprises. While their wages were low, government employees' access to goods proved a source of resentment among the people. They believed the government was doing nothing for them, but was handing out special privileges to government

employees. Added to this were rumors of official corruption, which increased along with prices, taxes, and shortages during the war. During a People's Party meeting, Hikmet Bayur, a representative from Istanbul, responded to complaints about officials taking bribes, demanding to know "how officials with salaries of 100 lira are able to live."⁶² In particular, a decision in 1940 by the Saydam cabinet to purchase four cars for official use spurred heated debate within the party and within the nation over apparent double standards.⁶³

Meanwhile, the tremendous increase in government spending, and the inflationary economy created opportunities for private entrepreneurs, and made merchants and some private grain producers wealthy. According to Faik Ökte, hundreds of millionaires emerged in Istanbul during the war. The war millionaires included newly rich peasants and small town merchants who flooded to Istanbul after they discovered ways to sell crops at high prices on the black market in the big cities. As migrants crammed into the poor neighborhoods, the newly rich entertained themselves in nightclubs, giving rise to a new idiom, *cumbadan rumbaya*, a term that described nouveau riche moved from traditional neighborhoods to new Western-style apartment blocks.⁶⁴

The largest group of war rich were middlemen who bought goods cheap from producers strapped for cash then sold them dear on the black market, or to the state after taking their commission. The press at the time was full of stories about dealers who bought wheat in Konya at 30 *kuruş* and sold it in Istanbul at 200 *kuruş*, or who bought 16,000 tons of olive oil at 85 *kuruş* per kilogram and sold it at 350 *kuruş* per kilogram. Stories of black marketeers, such as Ahmet Çanakçılı, the "Rice King" also emerged in the press during this period. Apparently, Çanakçılı bought unprocessed rice in southeast Anatolia for 14–24 *kuruş*, then sold it in Istanbul for 120–140 *kuruş*. He was called before a special court and charged with violating the National Defense Law on three occasions. But later on, because of his connections, Çanakçılı was selected to serve on the Rice Control Board by the government. After his appointment to the board Çanakçılı did the country the "favor" of selling thousands of bags of rice in his stock for 95 *kuruş* per kilogram, thirty *kuruş* below the black market price. But this maneuver netted Çanakçılı a profit of 42 *kuruş* per kilogram in the sale.⁶⁵

The appearance of war profiteers and wealthy migrants in Istanbul and Ankara emphasized the difficulties most citizens were experiencing. While people thought the government was not stopping profiteers, ending shortages, or providing better goods for the market, they began to blame the government for its inaction and inability, or unwillingness, to alleviate

the situation. For many whose confidence in the government was shaken, İsmet İnönü, as President personified the failings of the government and the suffering of the people. In the absence of press freedom, one form of protest was to burn the ears off of İnönü's portrait on Turkish money, to send the message that he was not listening to the cries of the people.⁶⁶ The attitudes and beliefs of the people presented a sharp contrast to İnönü's portrayal of the success of the government in confronting the problems of the nation: "our domestic policy has shown itself to have created an order based on reality and law while respecting the rights and gaining the trust of the citizen."⁶⁷ His unwillingness to accept criticism, and his insistence on sticking to existing measures, led many to believe İnönü himself was oblivious to the needs of the people. His caution and deliberateness, while keeping Turkey out of the war, seemed to many less successful in dealing with domestic problems.⁶⁸

THE LIMITS OF OPPOSITION

Even though voices of protest and disapproval were raised by the people, there was no organized opposition to the government's policies and no open challenge by opponents during the first years of the war. The Independent Group in the National Assembly, formed by İnönü in 1939, did not put forth alternative programs or criticize specific measures. When the People's Party parliamentary group debated policy decisions during weekly meetings held on Tuesdays, debate was considered open. The party meetings gave members the chance to question cabinet ministers, at length if necessary, about government policies. Having never overturned a cabinet decision, the parliamentary group became a tool to reaffirm already established policy decisions by the cabinet. When issues reached the National Assembly, it granted nearly automatic approval, since it was dominated by the People's Party.

President İnönü and Prime Minister Saydam, as Permanent Party Leader and as Acting Party Chair, continued the practice of choosing candidates for election to the Assembly and made appointments to executive positions within the party at the national and provincial levels. Through this centralized control, the party leadership's dominance was assured. The mechanism allowed İnönü to override any opposition, such as raised by Recep Peker's call for Turkey to enter the war in June 1940.

İnönü's belief in the need for careful control was especially evident in the government's treatment of the press during this period. The Turkish

constitution of 1924 assured freedom of speech, thus prohibiting censorship. But according to the Press Laws of 1931 and 1938, those wishing to publish a periodical had to take out a bond between one and five thousand lira to guarantee their proper conduct. Along with the threat of forfeiture of the bond, the government had complete discretion in withholding permission for a publication. Under article 50 of the Press Law, the government had the power to close down presses: "newspapers and periodicals may be temporarily suspended by decision of the Judicial Committee should the publication adversely affect the public policies of the country. During the period of suspension, those responsible for a periodical's suspension may not publish any other periodical under another name."⁶⁹ The government's administrative power was supplemented by the National Defense Law, and furthered by the declaration of martial law in November 1940, following the German occupation of Rumania and the Italian invasion of Greece, in the provinces surrounding Istanbul where most printing presses were located.

While the government still did not have the legal power to censor, it restricted the press through the threat of closure.⁷⁰ During the war the Saydam, and later Saracoğlu, cabinets adopted a wide interpretation of the notion, "detrimental to the national interest." On numerous occasions the Directorate of Press, led by Selim Sarper, made "suggestions" about appropriate coverage. According to Nadir Nadi, editor of *Cumhuriyet*, the largest circulation daily, "it was prohibited to stick one's tongue out at the National Chief, the government and the People's Party. In no way could the government be criticized."⁷¹ Foreign policy was a particularly sensitive area for the government. Nadi recalls frequent meetings at which Refik Saydam, Selim Sarper, or other officials would explain to editors what to write in their papers. At one meeting Saydam "... after a lengthy explanation of what we were supposed to write the next day about a certain topic in foreign affairs, looked at me and in a slightly hostile tone asked 'Did you understand?' When I muttered 'I understood,' Saydam, as though he were examining me, said 'In that case, explain. What are you going to write tomorrow?'"⁷² The government's efforts to influence press coverage extended even to the level of the movement of the İnönü family. The travels and activities of the President, including attendance at concerts and ceremonies, his speeches, and his trips in the country received wide coverage with the zealous encouragement of the Press Directorate. Metin Toker recalls an incident in which the Press Director gave Nadir Nadi a severe scolding for printing news about the President's wife, Mevhibe İnönü, actually a very private person, on the third page instead of on the first.⁷³

The exertion of tight control over the press and over the expression of opposition, or even alternatives, reflected a belief shared by many in the government and in the military during the first years of the war: the existence of opposition would weaken the state, divide the nation, and inhibit development, while the expression of dissent would encourage enemies within and outside to take advantage of any sign of division or weakness. Remembering the Ottoman period, and World War I, İnönü was determined to restrict outside interference in Turkey's domestic affairs, and believed the only way to prevent it was to be strong and united. In fact, during the first years of the war, as the German Army expanded into Eastern Europe and into the Balkans, and as Turkey became a battleground for spies and saboteurs, the threat of invasion or attack loomed large in the minds of İnönü and his cabinet ministers. Only after the Germans went on the defensive after 1942 did the government begin to show tolerance for expression of alternative viewpoints, and that tolerance remained quite narrow.

In the summer of 1942 events within Turkey and in the war worked to bring a change in Turkish domestic affairs and politics, and in foreign policy. On July 7, 1942, after Prime Minister Refik Saydam died suddenly in Istanbul, İnönü named as his successor Sükrü Saracoğlu. The Saracoğlu cabinet quickly enacted a number of political, economic, and legal changes that would continue the efforts of the Saydam cabinet, but that would open a new phase in Turkish political life. As the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Numan Menemencioğlu took on the difficult task of helping to steer Turkey through a quickly changing and uncertain international setting. The country was facing more difficult times ahead in both foreign and domestic affairs. Holding onto the autonomy of Turkey in foreign affairs seemed to produce an impression of balance, and reinforced İnönü's belief in caution and preparation. But enforcing the same agenda of self-reliance in domestic affairs did not lead to the anticipated results, because of the fragility of Turkey's economy and because of its dependence on the warring powers. After 1942 İnönü and the Turkish government would face new pressures for change from outside and within Turkey.

Chapter Four

New Alliances and Demands for Change

By the end of 1942, the Turkish economy was showing the strains of the war. Mobilization, disruption of foreign trade and investment, shortages, a sharp expansion of the black market, and resentment toward war profiteers raised new demands on the state. As popular discontent spread, the government responded through policies meant to assert greater control over the market. The new government of Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu passed a series of reforms meant to alleviate economic dislocations even while punishing supposed war profiteers.

At the same time, and related to domestic concerns, İsmet İnönü maintained tight control over foreign policy, with the aim of keeping Turkey out of the war, and minimizing the impact of the war on Turkey's infrastructure and economy. But as the Allies began to gain the initiative in the war the British, Americans, and Soviets raised demands that Turkey enter the war immediately on the Allied side, by providing access to airstrips from which Allied bombers could strike targets in the Balkans, or face isolation after the war. The German Ambassador worked to maintain non-belligerency, as the Germans negotiated stronger economic ties.

Even though İnönü had always believed that Germany could not win the war, at the beginning of 1943, he was convinced that Germany was not yet defeated. German armies were still strong, and a summer offensive in Russia might turn the war back in their favor. Despite setbacks, the Germans were also still firmly in control of the Balkans and the Aegean Sea, thus nearly surrounding Turkey. Within Turkey, pro-German sentiment was still strong, and Turkish political and military leaders contended that the total

defeat of Germany would allow the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Europe after the war, leaving Turkey isolated from the West by hostile regimes in the Balkans. For İnönü, caution and balance still dictated Turkish foreign policy. He continued to trust the security of self-reliance and relative autonomy that came from trying to maintain relationships with all sides. Thus, throughout 1943 İnönü worked to maintain a balance between Germany and the Allies in foreign relations, and to convince Allied planners to maintain Germany as a block to Soviet expansion in Europe.

THE SARAÇOĞLU CABINET

On July 3, 1942, Prime Minister Refik Saydam, along with the Minister of Finance, Mümtaz Ökmen and the Director of Provisioning, Şükrü Sökmensüer, traveled to Istanbul to study shortages, problems with distribution, and constantly rising prices of staples, like bread and coal. Their trip was a response to complaints from the people that government policies seemed only to favor the new "war millionaires." In Istanbul, Saydam held three days of meetings with the provincial Governor and local party officials, discussing problems and the impact of government policies. Saydam also met and listened to the complaints of bread producers, millers, coal distributors, and others.¹

Changes in economic policy had been under consideration since the spring, and in May, during discussion of the budget for 1942, Saydam had told the Assembly: "Today we see that all of the endeavors we have made since the day the war began must be changed from A to Z. There is definitely a need to renew our arrangements."² Thus, Saydam's trip to Istanbul was aimed not only at quieting criticism, but also resulted from the promise of sweeping changes to make government policy more accountable. By the summer, Saydam's commitment to implement "Change from A to Z" had become a popular slogan, and heightened peoples' expectations of change from the government.³ The sudden death of Saydam from a heart attack in Istanbul, on the night of July 7, prevented him from carrying out changes and the responsibility fell to the Foreign Minister, Saracoğlu, who was designated Prime Minister by İnönü. The designation of Saracoğlu as Prime Minister was an indication of İnönü's primary concern with foreign affairs. Also, Saracoğlu was a close associate of both İnönü and Saydam, and as a long-term member of the cabinet, his choice reflected the objective of continuity. Saracoğlu was already familiar with the plans for changes in domestic affairs.

Within a week of becoming Prime Minister, Saracoğlu announced a new economic program that entailed the removal of price controls on most goods, followed by the elimination of the provincial and then central offices of the Directorate of Provisioning, and the discontinuation of the activities of the Office of Distribution, which controlled the circulation of food and goods throughout Turkey. Responsibility for the provisioning of cities was handed over to municipal governments.⁴ According to Faik Ahmet Barutçu, a member of the National Assembly at the time, the change of cabinets and Saracoğlu's announcement of new policies was met with an air of celebration in the country, as if an era had changed, or peace had been declared. People believed that "black marketeers would leave their place to the real market, everything would be available, competition would balance prices in the market ... and that the new decisions would deal with the severe troubles that were being experienced."⁵ The announcement of the relaxation of government controls on prices and distribution was interpreted as a fundamental change in the state's economic policies, and the end of bureaucratic domination of the economy. The prevailing assumption among many was that government policy would undergo a transformation from statist intervention to free market liberalism. This announcement, seen as a first step in this direction, met with enthusiasm especially among politicians and merchants, and some members of the press hailed the prospect of better times ahead. But others were skeptical, including Ahmed Emin Yalman, editor of *Vatan* [The Homeland], who warned of the dangers of freeing the market: "everybody agrees on this point, that at times like these the law of supply and demand needs a brake." But Yalman argued that the government was removing the brake, and that "the government's decision has roused pessimism and hesitation."⁶ This pessimism and hesitation that he detected soon turned into dissatisfaction and criticism as the new policies proved insufficient for dealing with the economic problems.

The new economic policies did not represent a complete break with past policies, but rather were a response to growing complaints and to an adjustment to changing conditions. Whereas during the period of Refik Saydam, domestic policies were aimed at surviving a crisis, the policies of the Saracoğlu cabinet reflected a realization that the war was likely to last, as were the economic problems. The government continued policies to insure its ability to meet the minimum needs of the military and the cities, while relaxing its control on the economy and allowing private enterprise some room to operate in the growing margins of the Turkish economy. The government expected that increased supply of goods in the market as the result of these changes would satisfy people without requiring drastic

measures. In fact, the new Prime Minister, in announcing the new policies, stressed the continuity between the previous cabinet and his own and portrayed the changes as a response to the demands of the people:

The government before this one ... used its authority to make many tough decisions and began a difficult struggle against inflation and economic problems. But as the days passed it became clear that complaints were being made that these decisions were not producing the desired results, that goods were not to be found at official prices. For that reason the government ... decided to soften harsh measures, to lift them bit by bit and to change them in places.⁷

The policies of the Saracoğlu government, reflecting İnönü's interpretation of statism, were based upon the same premises regarding the state's role in the economy. What changed were not the basic assumptions regarding the goals, but assumptions about how best to achieve those goals. The Saracoğlu cabinet expected that with the removal of controls, prices would rise to a level above officially set low prices, but still remain below black market prices. As merchants responded to higher prices, the flood of goods onto the market was expected to keep prices from rising. These expectations were also revealed in a new grain procurement policy.

The government revised its control of the grain market to assure a continued supply of grain. Policy makers expected that allowing peasants to keep more of their grain to sell on the open market would combat the black market and inflation by eliminating the practice of selling grain illegally to avoid low official prices. Known as the 25% decision, the new grain-purchasing policy of the government required grain producers to sell 25% of the first fifty tons, 35% of the next fifty tons, and 50% of the output above 100 tons to the government. In a speech in Samsun in August 1942 İnönü argued that "When the harvest is over, and when the grain has passed into our control, many of the problems will quickly disappear. [Therefore] ... the most important point is to give 25% to the government as soon as possible."⁸ Like the elimination of price controls, the new grain policy was at first hailed as a liberal relaxation of state restrictions on the grain market. In fact, the new policies increased government control of the grain market by imposing quotas. Furthermore, the state continued to purchase grain at low official prices of 20 *kuruş* per kilogram of wheat, even while the open market price was 40 *kuruş* in 1942, and rose to more than 100 *kuruş* in 1943. Since the vast majority of Turkish peasants produced less than fifty tons of grain per crop, after they had set aside seed, met their own needs and sold 25% of the crop to the government, they

were left with very little or nothing to sell on the open market. The 25% rule shifted the burden of supplying grain onto the poor peasants, while allowing large producers of more than 100 tons to make profits. In its first year, the 25% rule failed to increase the amount of grain purchased by the state. Peasants continued to hide grain, and to sell it on the black market at prices above the officially set prices. The state purchasing office, the Office of Land Products, fell short of its goal of purchasing 25% of the total crop for state needs.⁹ Therefore, the new grain policy did not ease the burden on poor peasants, or confront the problems of urban areas. In the cities, bread prices continued to rise as shortages of grain persisted throughout the war and afterward. İnönü and the Saracoğlu cabinet heard complaints about the impact of government overestimates of grain yields, a bad harvest in some parts of Turkey, and increased need for seed for the next harvest. Under pressure to supply the cities and the military, they dismissed these complaints. İnönü argued that if citizens expect the government to fulfill its promise and to do its duty, citizens must also fulfill their duty to the government.¹⁰

Overall, the new pricing and distribution policies of the Saracoğlu cabinet failed to produce the anticipated results. In particular, turning responsibility for provisioning the cities over to municipal authorities did not remedy shortages.¹¹ Immediately upon the elimination of state controls, prices began to rise as expected, but instead of leveling off, they continued to rise past the previous black market prices. In anticipation of higher prices, hoarding increased, and shortages grew more severe. Inflation, which had been partially checked by official price controls in the early years of the war, climbed sharply. The cost of living index rose from 100 in 1938 to 132.5 in 1941. By 1942 it had risen to 220.9 and by 1945 was up to 345.7. The index of foodstuffs rose from 100 to 160.5 in 1941 before nearly doubling in 1942. The price of bread rose 285% between 1938 and 1943, while meat rose 367% and sugar rose 110%.¹²

The state also fueled inflation, as it continued to pursue inflationary policies to meet the needs of an expanding budget. Government expenditures grew from 304 million TL in 1938 to 885 million TL in 1942 and passed one billion TL in 1943.¹³ To cover a growing budget deficit, the government printed money. The amount of money in circulation rose from 191 million TL in 1938 to 636 million TL in 1942, and reached 980 million TL in 1945.¹⁴ In this inflationary atmosphere, those who had favored the new government policies began to change their views of the benefits of the new administrative measures, and joined the critics of the new policies.

In August, İnönü traveled to the Kayseri region, to examine the crops and the situation of the residents of the area. As his car passed through one

village, a group of peasants surrounded the car, and pounding on the windows, shouted "we're hungry, we're hungry!"¹⁵ İnönü responded to the incident by trying to assert control over a situation before it could escalate. On August 19, he appointed Recep Peker as Interior Minister to replace Fikri Tüzel, who had died of a heart attack.

After his education in military schools and the Imperial War Academy, Peker (1888–1950) served in the Ottoman military in World War I and commanded troops in the War of Independence. He joined the National Assembly in 1923, and served as editor of the People's Party newspaper, as well as holding various cabinet positions. He also held the position of General Secretary of the People's Party, and in the 1930s he taught university courses on the history and meaning of the Turkish National Struggle. Peker was known for his preference for strong central authority, and was a known admirer of Italian fascism. His presence in the cabinet was meant to help strengthen the government against criticism.

By the fall of 1942 İnönü and his cabinet were trying to counter both the problems and the complaints about the new economic policies and their implementation.¹⁶ On November 1, in his opening speech to the National Assembly, İnönü warned of the dangers of dissension and conflict within the country centering around economic difficulties. Also, İnönü picked carefully targets outside his administration to blame for Turkey's economic problems:

The old hoarding landowner, counting this uncertain time as an opportunity not to be missed, and the speculating merchant, never satisfied, fruitlessly endeavoring to turn the air we breathe into a commodity, and a few politicians working for unknown foreign governments, who see all these problems as a great opportunity for political complaints, are all insolently attempting to destroy a great nation's entire life.¹⁷

In choosing to lay blame on identifiable groups such as merchants and landowners, İnönü was responding in part to popular views of the problems of the day. He and the Saraçoğlu cabinet were seeking to resolve problems within the context of the established boundaries of the administration. The expectation of duty, responsibility, sacrifice, and patience from the people was still an integral part of the government's rhetoric of preparation and readiness in the face of the war. The government felt not responsibility, but profit maximization, was the driving force of private enterprise, as profiteers attempted to take advantage of both the country's enterprise, as profiteers attempted to take advantage of both the country's and Turkish people's situation in difficult times. İnönü and the Saraçoğlu

cabinet moved to penalize the groups they claimed were responsible for the failure of government policies.

THE WEALTH TAX AND THE LAND PRODUCTS TAX

The government's response came with the announcement of a new tax by Prime Minister Saraçoğlu on November 11, 1942. The new tax, called the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi), was to be a one-time levy on what were defined as exorbitant profits made by taking advantage of the extraordinary economic situation. The new tax had three purposes. First, the government hoped to raise 465 million TL through the tax, to close the growing deficit in the budget without a general increase in taxes. Of the 465,384,820 TL (\$166 million) the tax was expected to raise for the treasury, 75 percent, or 317,275,642 TL (\$124.5 million) was to be collected in Istanbul. Another 26 million TL (\$928,000) would come from Izmir, and 17 million TL (\$607,000) from Ankara.¹⁸ Second, the tax would force hoarders and black marketeers to sell off goods the government suspected were being held in warehouses, in order to lower their total tax burden, and to raise the cash required for payment of the tax. Planners believed a drop in gold prices would mean that taxpayers were selling off gold to meet their liabilities, but if the price did not drop, it meant that they were still hoarding as much gold as they possibly could. Gold prices did not fall in the weeks following the assessments.¹⁹ The third reason for the Wealth Tax was to punish war profiteers. It aimed at deterring their activities while showing the public that the government was actively pursuing those who were profiting while the country suffered. It was also widely believed among politicians, the press, and others that a forth reason for the tax was to force the non-Muslim minorities of Istanbul from their position of dominance in the Turkish economy. Sevket Süreyya Aydemir relates a conversation with a leader of the Izmir Jewish community, Baba Gomel, and Professor Avram Galanti, a member of the National Assembly and a leader of the Istanbul Jewish community about minorities and the Wealth Tax. Aydemir raised a popular argument voiced among supporters of the tax that for centuries Turks had fought to protect the land and the people while the minorities, who were exempt from service in the army, had time to enter business and accumulate wealth. According to this argument, this one-time levy, because of their previous exemptions, should demand more from the minorities, and was justified to meet the dire needs of the country.²⁰ According to Faik Ökte, Director of the Bureau of Taxation in Istanbul, during debates in the National Assembly on the Wealth Tax, Saraçoğlu

singled out the non-Muslim minorities as the hoarders and war-profiteers. The impression given by the Premier that the tax measure was waged solely against the minorities was certainly very strong. Later, many deputies, indignant about the fact that taxes were also levied on Turks, argued that this violated the assurances given by Saraçoğlu.²¹

It was argued whether Saraçoğlu targeted minority businesspeople as scapegoats by singling them out as profiteers, or was reflecting a belief shaped during the Ottoman period that minorities had loyalties to foreign powers. But foremost, it was clear the Prime Minister believed that the tax law would bring a remedy by being financially punitive on one hand and economically constructive on the other. Along with other members of the cabinet, he also believed that the tax would renew the faith of the people in the government. The preamble of the Wealth Tax bill stated that it was "aimed at those who have amassed inflated profits by exploiting the difficult economic situation, but do not pay commensurate taxes. Its purpose is to compel them to participate in the sacrifices demanded by the extraordinary circumstances in which we find ourselves, to an extent commensurate with their profits and capacity."²² Actually, a punitive tax on war profiteers had been under consideration since the fall of 1941, and followed a similar blueprint of the war profits tax imposed by the Ottoman government in World War I. Furthermore, intellectuals and the people supported an extra tax on the wealth of the "war millionaires." In the spring of 1942 the editors of *Tan* [The Dawn] and *Vatan* were both calling for a tax on profiteers. Zekeriya Sertel, in *Tan*, wrote: "In the extraordinary circumstances brought by the war ... the adoption of this [tax] law will satisfy the resentment against illegal profits won because of the war, it will strengthen the population and the government's authority, and at the same time would secure a new source of revenue for the state."²³ According to the Wealth Tax Law, the tax was to be levied one time on merchants, manufacturers, and landowners deemed to have gained extraordinary profits during the war. The assessment of the tax was left to local tax boards, which were given the power to determine the amount of the tax, according to the presumed wealth of the person. There was no right of appeal, and the tax had to be paid in cash within two weeks of the assessment. Those failing to pay the tax at the end of a month were subject to arrest and deportation to a labor camp at Aşkale, near Erzurum in eastern Anatolia while their property would be seized and sold at auction to meet their liabilities to the state.²⁴

Merchants criticized the tax law as discriminatory, unfair, and excessive and described it as "killing the sheep for its wool instead of fleecing it."²⁵

Critics of the law focused on four major problems in its design and execution. First, the law was confiscatory, designed to punish merchants, property owners, and landowners for their presumed past activities. Since the tax was to be levied only once, and against estimated wealth instead of income, it failed to prevent the presumed activities of the taxpayers, such as excessive profiteering, in the future. Second, the tax rates were unfair, since they imposed unequal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims. In practice, the Wealth Tax led to the taxation of non-Muslims at ten times the rate of Muslims, and *dönmes*, Jewish converts to Islam, at twice the rate of Muslims. Foreigners were taxed at the same rate as Muslims, except Jewish nationals of the Axis countries were assessed at higher rates. Non-Muslims were assessed 52 percent of the total amount, while Muslims were charged with 29 percent and foreigners with 19 percent. Of the total of 315 million TL (\$11.25 million) collected, 53 percent was paid by non-Muslims, 36.5 percent by Muslims, and 10.5 percent by foreigners.²⁶ The unequal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims was also evident in penalties. Of the fourteen hundred people who were deported to the labor camp at Aşkale for failing to pay their taxes, none were Turkish Muslims.²⁷ The third problem with the Wealth Tax was that assessments were left to the discretion of local tax boards. In practice, the accuracy of the tax boards' estimates of wealth varied. Since the people were expected to pay the amount assessed by the local tax board, some people were forced to pay extraordinarily high taxes while others who convinced the administration of their relative lack of wealth paid less. The fourth problem stemmed from the application of the tax to foreigners and merchants with foreign passports, received under the caputulatory regime of the Ottoman Empire. As they appealed to their embassies for protection, the Turkish government revised its policies, lowering the taxes on those with foreign passports, but retaining the higher tax rates for non-Muslim Turkish citizens. In November 1943, one year after imposing the Wealth Tax, under continued foreign and domestic criticism the Turkish government released the detainees at Aşkale and ceased collection efforts.²⁸ In February 1944 the government forgave all outstanding debts and canceled the tax.

Even though during the period of the Wealth Tax, wholesale prices were temporarily stabilized, the tax did not solve the problems of inflation and shortages. It gave the government the chance to withdraw money from circulation, and to pursue a deflationary policy. But the tax was not used to limit the circulation of money, nor did it force down prices. Some observers argue that the tax actually increased black market activity in the long run.²⁹ Also, to make their tax payments, many small operators were

forced to sell their stocks and businesses to large operators, leaving the market under the control of big business interests.

In May 1943 the government supplemented the Wealth Tax with a similar tax on rural producers, called the Land Products Tax (*Toprak Mâhsulleri Vergisi*). Like the Wealth Tax, the Land Products Tax had its roots in the Ottoman administration, and was compared to the hated Ottoman tithe, which had been repealed in 1925.³⁰ The Land Products Tax was also a confiscatory tax meant to punish those who had profited from the shortages of grain in the previous years and was aimed at the Muslim landowners of Anatolia. But unlike the Wealth Tax, which excluded most small businesspeople, the Land Products Tax did not exclude small rural producers, adding to the peasants' burden of the 25 percent rule. Thus besides 25 percent of the grain, the government demanded additional grain at below market prices in lieu of the tax. Like the Wealth Tax, the Land Products Tax proved to be ineffective in solving the problems of inflation, hoarding, and black marketeering. In the long run, the tax benefited large landowners who loaned seed or money at high interest rates to peasants then ended up forcing them off the land.³¹

In this sense, both of the tax policies of the government led to the growth of new groups of private entrepreneurs and landowners producing cash crops. The growth of these groups in the private sector, independent of the bureaucratic elite, underlay the emergence of opposition in Turkey during and after the war. Resentful of government interference, discontent with existing policies, and convinced that the government under İsmet İnönü was autocratic and ineffective, these groups formed the core of a disorganized opposition that confronted the ruling People's Party during the war years. The general discontent of the people with the government added to the strength of these sources of opposition. The emergence of an organized and effective opposition, willing to work within the existing system depended on the reform of Turkish political institutions, especially the single political party. The People's Party and İnönü were challenged to modify the existing political system, and the reforms of 1943 lay the groundwork for the profound changes after the war.

THE CONTEXT OF WAR AND TURKEY'S UNEASY NEUTRALITY

By the end of 1942 the Allies were beginning to take the initiative in the war. In North Africa, British troops had taken el-Alamein, and in Russia

the Red Army was breaking the siege of Stalingrad. In the Pacific, the Americans had the momentum after their victory at Midway. In November the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa began, and in February 1943 the Soviets retook Stalingrad. In 1943 the Allied leaders, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, held a series of conferences to coordinate military efforts, and to plan for victory and how they would shape the post-war world.

As in the early years of the war, İnönü believed Turkey had nothing to gain by joining the war just to help the Allies, and would risk disaster if it entered the conflict before it was fully prepared. But changes in the war again increased pressure from the Allies. In particular, Britain began to raise new demands on Turkey to assist the Allies by providing access to airstrips from which Allied bombers could strike targets in the Balkans. İnönü continued to pursue a cautious foreign policy aimed at balancing the influence of all sides to escape overwhelming pressure from one. But during the latter half of the war, the time came when Turkish foreign policy began to lose its independence and shifted toward the Allies in order to avoid the risks of isolation. As Germany grew weaker and as the Soviet Union emerged as a powerful state and put forth claims on Turkish territory, the new strategic outlook forced Turkey to seek closer ties with Britain and the United States as a counter to Soviet power in the Black Sea and the Balkans.

Churchill and Roosevelt, along with members of their staffs, met at Casablanca, January 17–27, 1943, in the first of a series of meetings to coordinate Allied policy in the war. Two decisions affecting Turkey came out of the conference. First, the British maintained that the eastern Mediterranean was within the British sphere, and that therefore they should "play the cards" for the Allies in Ankara.³² The Americans would ship military weapons and supplies to the British, who would then retransfer them, rather than shipping supplies directly from America to Turkey. The second decision taken at Casablanca was to pursue the total defeat of the Axis, and to refuse a compromise peace settlement that would leave Germany weakened but undestroyed in central Europe.

Both of these decisions went against the aims of Turkish policy makers regarding their determination to preserve their autonomy in foreign affairs and their concerns about allowing the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Europe.³³ They believed that the total defeat of Germany, along with a failure of the Americans to extend their strength to southeastern Europe would result in the "Bolshevization" of Europe after the war. In May 1943, when the British Ambassador met with İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff, İnönü said that "Turkey wished a strong Germany which

would act now and in the future as a bulwark against Bolshevism." Çakmak argued that "though the Turks wished [the British] to win, he hoped that the victory would not be so decisive that Germany would cease to exist as a force in Europe." The general's "nightmare was a Russian link with a Bolshevized Slav Bloc at Turkey's door."³⁴

After getting American approval to take the lead in dealing with Turkey in military matters, Churchill decided that a personal visit with İnönü would convince him that the time had come for Turkey to increase its support of the Allied war effort.³⁵ The meetings between Churchill and İnönü took place aboard the presidential train outside of Adana, in southeastern Turkey, on January 30–31, 1943. Churchill told İnönü of the decisions taken at Casablanca and of the Allies' hopes "that Turkey should be safe and strong, and that she should be closely associated with the two great Western democracies not only during the concluding stages of the war, but in the general work of world rehabilitation which will follow."³⁶ Churchill promised that if Turkey entered the war, the Allies would assure Turkey's territorial integrity and security, and would do everything possible to protect Turkey from a German air attack.³⁷ In return, Churchill requested that the Turkish government make airbases available for bombing Axis targets in the Balkans. When Churchill first requested the meeting, İnönü had assumed he would ask that Turkey enter the war on the side of the Allies, and thought Churchill and Roosevelt expected the Turkish military to play an active role in concert with Allied armies.³⁸ Thus, İnönü did not envision that Turkey would play a passive role in the conflict, merely providing airbases for use by others. Even the passive role did not convince İnönü, who was firm in his commitment not to enter the war unprepared or unprovoked.³⁹

The view held by İnönü and by the cabinet was that Turkey had no obligation to enter the war, and did not seek to gain from the conflict. Turkish officials consistently rejected the notion that Turkey was neutral in the war, and maintained that they had been of considerable service to the Allied cause by keeping the Germans out of the Middle East. While the British argued that a German attack was unlikely by 1943, İnönü pointed out that German bombers could easily destroy the cities of Istanbul and Izmir, the commercial and industrial centers of Turkey, or the coal mines at Zonguldak. A single raid could throw Turkey's economy into utter chaos and cut off communications and transportation.⁴⁰ Thus Turkey had to take utmost care not to provoke a German air attack, or it would destroy itself while doing the Allies no service at all. İnönü insisted that Turkey could not enter the war, or make air bases available, until such time as its air defenses were completely in place.

Overall, İnönü believed the Allies had no right to demand Turkish belligerency until the material that had been promised had been delivered, and that once it had been delivered, the Allies should make clear their exact plans for Turkey's role before they asked Turkey again to enter the conflict. The British continued to argue that the best tactic was to prepare quickly, by accepting the minimum amounts of weaponry and supplies, then allowing Allied bombers and fighter planes to protect Turkish cities.⁴¹ This option proved to be unsatisfactory to İnönü and the cabinet, who saw Allied use of Turkish territory as an unacceptable infringement of Turkish sovereignty. Furthermore, in early 1943 İnönü's conviction was confirmed by the reaction in Turkey to the announcement of the Adana meetings, showing that the Turkish public was opposed to entry into the war and it reaffirmed İnönü's belief that on the whole the Turkish people supported his foreign policy.

ANXIOUS NEIGHBORS: TURKEY AND THE SOVIET UNION

In September 1943, an article, "Who Benefits from Turkish Neutrality?" in the Soviet publication *War and the Working Class* declared that Turkey's policy of non-belligerency served only the Axis, and accused the Allies of tolerating Turkish neutrality for the purpose of weakening the Soviet Union.⁴² The Soviets made their attitude even more clear when the American and British Foreign Ministers, Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden, met with V. M. Molotov in Moscow from October 19 to November 1, 1943.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Union demanded that Turkey enter the war immediately. Molotov expressed suspicions that the Allies were supplying Turkey with weapons to use against Russia rather than Germany. He said that the Soviet Union saw no reason to supply arms to Turkey "without getting some fight out of her," and that the three powers should "command" Turkey to enter the war.⁴³ While the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, resisted this demand, the conference ended in agreement that Eden would meet the Turkish Foreign Minister, Numan Menemencioğlu, in Cairo. Eden was to ask Turkey again to allow Allied use of air bases immediately, and to enter the war by the end of the year.⁴⁴ Once again, the British government was taking the lead in urging Turkish leaders to enter the war, while the Soviets voiced demands and the United States stepped aside according to its agreement with Britain regarding Turkey.

Menemencioğlu refused to make any promises to Eden in Cairo. After the meeting the Turkish cabinet again debated the possibility of going to war, and afterward informed the Allies of the decision "in principle to enter the war." However, this decision was accompanied by two conditions: no action would be taken until Turkey received adequate defense against German air attack, and no commitment would be made until the Allies presented a definite plan regarding Turkey's participation in the war. Churchill was encouraged by the reply, and admitted that Turkey could not be expected to do more.⁴⁵

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met at Tehran from November 28 to December 1, 1943, in the first of the "big three" meetings. The discussion regarding Turkey centered around the benefits of its participation in the war, its role, and the amount of time and manpower that could be devoted to gaining Turkish cooperation. Hoping to have Turkey enter the war before Christmas, Churchill reiterated his argument that Turkey should help with operations in the Aegean, and eventually in the Balkans. He proposed that two or three British divisions could be diverted from Italy and Egypt, along with twenty air squadrons, to protect Turkish cities from air raids. Roosevelt agreed on the need for Turkey to enter the war, but argued that Operation Overlord had to take precedence in the allocation of supplies and troops, and was reluctant to commit any resources to the eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁶ Stalin agreed with Roosevelt that Operation Overlord should be the basic operation in 1944. Stalin also told Churchill that he did not expect the Turks to agree to enter the war but said, "We ought to take them by the scruff of the neck if necessary." Churchill replied to Stalin that "Turkey would be mad if she declined the Russian invitation to come in on the winning side, and at the same time lost the sympathy of Great Britain."⁴⁷

During talks on the second day of the conference, the three leaders reached an agreement on how to proceed with Turkey. Britain was not only to take the lead in convincing Turkey to enter the war, but also to assure that Turkey would open air bases to the Allies, assist in operations in the Aegean, and open the Straits to Allied shipping convoys supplying the Soviets. Also, Churchill and Roosevelt decided to meet President İnönü at Cairo after the Tehran conference to ask Turkey to join the Allies as soon as possible. In an attempt to convince Turkey that the Soviet Union did not have hostile intentions, Stalin guaranteed a Soviet military response if Bulgaria retaliated against Turkey for participating in the war.⁴⁸

On the third day of the meeting, Stalin raised the question of the post-war regime of the Straits. The three leaders agreed that the Montreux

Convention of 1936 should be revised in favor of the Soviets, although Churchill warned that the time was not right to raise the subject with the Turkish government. Churchill hinted, however, that he personally "favored a change in the Regime of the Straits if Turkey proved obdurate," and Britain would be amenable to a new Regime favoring the Black Sea powers.⁴⁹ The talks ended with the decision to try to convince Turkey to enter the war to meet Allied needs, and a conviction among the Allies that in the post-war world Turkey should have less autonomy than it presently enjoyed.

İNÖNÜ, CHURCHILL, AND ROOSEVELT AT CAIRO

Churchill and Roosevelt met with İnönü at Cairo, December 4–6, 1943. The British Ambassador wrote that İnönü had replied to the invitation with the conditions that

If the object of the visit is discussions on the basis of decisions already taken in conversations with Stalin in Tehran, the President would not be willing to come. ... If, however, the object is to afford the opportunity of free, equal and unprejudiced discussion as to the best method by which Turkey can serve the common cause, the President would be willing to come.⁵⁰

After İnönü accepted the assurance of Roosevelt that indeed the aim of the conference was the free and equal exchange of ideas, both Roosevelt and Churchill sent planes to Adana to pick up İnönü and the Turkish negotiators. Roosevelt also sent his son-in-law, Major John Boettiger, and Churchill sent his son Randolph as emissaries. Faced with the choice of planes to take to Cairo, İnönü preferred to fly in the American plane. At the time, the arrival of two planes to pick up İnönü was interpreted by the Turkish delegation as evidence of a division between the Americans and the British regarding Turkey.⁵¹ British and American negotiators also read İnönü's choice as a telling sign of Turkey's intention to establish better relations with the United States, and discontent with Britain and Churchill's attitude.⁵²

When the talks began in Cairo, İnönü learned that contrary to their assurances, the Allies had already decided that Turkey should join the war by the end of December. İnönü was famous for his hearing aid, and it is said that he had a habit of simply turning it off whenever he disagreed with someone. An American observer at the Cairo conference, referring to İnönü's practice, joked that every member of the Turkish delegation "wore hearing devices so perfectly attuned to one another that they all went out of order

at the same instant whenever mention was made of the possibility of Turkey's entering the war."⁵³

At the conference, İnönü warned that setting dates was impractical, and maintained that Turkey could not even consider entering the conflict until substantial improvements were made in its defenses. Churchill emphasized the friendly stance of Stalin at Tehran, and said that the advantages of entry into the war would be permanent and lasting, especially from the point of view of Turkish-Soviet relations and warned İnönü that if Turkey missed this opportunity, it would be isolated after the war. İnönü dismissed this warning, arguing that "so long as Turkey was not in the war she was not in danger," and pointed out that thus far preparations and supplies had not been encouraging and he refused to commit Turkey to war.⁵⁴

Roosevelt and his advisers let Churchill put pressure on İnönü, but did not join in. Roosevelt feared on one hand that Churchill would jeopardize Operation Overlord by promising much-needed supplies to Turkey, and on the other hand, he had considerable sympathy for İnönü's arguments.⁵⁵ Roosevelt's consideration of İnönü's arguments served further to emphasize the differences between the American and British positions. The conference ended with İnönü agreeing in principle that Turkey would enter the war, but maintained the condition that he had raised and repeated since the conference with Churchill at Adana in January 1943: Turkey would enter the war only after the Allies supplied the weaponry they had promised, and divulged the details of their specific plans for Turkey's role in the conflict.

The three leaders agreed that Turkey would have until February 15, 1944 to decide whether or not to enter the war. Meanwhile, the Allies pledged to supply the weaponry they had promised within six weeks, and to send military advisers to coordinate plans. If the Turkish government decided to enter the war it would do so by making air bases available to the Allies, and by opening the Straits to facilitate shipment of supplies to the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the Allies would exclude Turkey from their plans. Churchill cautioned, however, that a negative reply would be taken to mean that British policy had been mistaken, and advised that the Anglo-Turkish alliance would suffer accordingly. İnönü said he was sure a suitable solution could be found, and agreed to arrange for the arrival of British experts in Ankara.⁵⁶

In January 1944 a team of British experts arrived in Ankara to begin talks. The negotiations were based on Turkish demands for 180,000 tons of material and 60,000 tons of petroleum, considered the bare minimum for Turkish defenses, based on estimates originally presented by İnönü to Churchill a year before at Adana. The talks again bogged down because British experts insisted on discussing the purpose of the requested equipment, while Turkish

negotiators were interested in discussing the quantity. On February 3, 1944 the British canceled all talks and withdrew their negotiators. They accused the Turks of negotiating in bad faith, and said that due to Turkey's refusal to cooperate, the Allies would immediately cease military and economic aid. Furthermore, the British declared the Allies absolved of any and all commitments to Turkey. Their plan was to drive home to Turkish policy makers the risk of isolation they faced by not joining the Allies immediately.⁵⁷

İnönü reflected the dilemma and difficult decisions that faced Turkey in different levels of negotiations with the Allies:

In international negotiations, when we sit down at a table with the representatives of other states to discuss their and our political problems on an equal footing, we present and protect our position clearly and honorably. But when these conversations finish and we are forced to deal with economic issues, our tone of voice changes. We lose our voice. Because we need everything from the needle to the thread from them, our words regarding political issues lose their value. [Our posture] shrivels.⁵⁸

Actually, İnönü and the cabinet were pleased that negotiations at Cairo had ended without committing Turkey to war. Yet, İnönü was agitated about the economic position of Turkey and furious that economic conditions were forcing Turkey into a lesser position in international discussions. While Turkish planners suspected that the Allies would not fulfill their promise of supplying weaponry, they had no choice but to accept a British mission. When the British mission began to seem more like a pretense than a prelude to action, Turkey responded by renouncing cooperation with the mission. Turkish policy makers were aware that by not compromising, and by immediately joining in the war effort, they might be playing into the Soviets' hands. The absence of a high-ranking Soviet official at the Cairo Conference proved to policy makers that regardless of earlier demands for Turkish participation, the Soviet Union hoped for Turkish isolation, in order to extend claims on territory and control of the Straits after the war. At this stage, Turkish leaders did not know that the calculations regarding the Straits in the post-war world between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union had already been made.

CONTINUING TIES WITH GERMANY

The German reaction to the Adana Conference of January 1943 was surprisingly mild. The German Ambassador, Franz von Papen, actually

expressed satisfaction with the conference. He later wrote in his memoirs that he was satisfied because he, unlike his British counterpart, knew that Turkey would never go to war against Germany. Papen says that he merely gave the Turkish government renewed assurances that Hitler had no hostile aims, to which it replied that it too had no hostile intentions.⁵⁹ Axis propaganda stressed that the meeting took place on Churchill's initiative, and claimed that he had unsuccessfully attempted to force Turkey into the war.⁶⁰

By May, the German position began to harden, and Papen reminded Turkish leaders that too close ties to the Allies would be taken as a hostile gesture hostility to Germany. At the same time, Turkish leaders began to use the argument regarding the possibility of a German attack on Turkey as one of the reasons for Turkish non-belligerency. According to one scenario, the Germans were not through with Russia and a new campaign might be aimed at Turkey, if it entered the war too early. While the British Ambassador insisted that the threat of German attack was nearly non-existent, Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu pointed out that Turkey would not "immolate herself" to fulfill some British scheme.⁶¹

Even though the danger of a German raid was genuine and a single German air raid could severely damage Turkey's resources and plunge its communications into chaos, Turkish leaders used the German threat as an excuse to remain out of the war.⁶² Prime Minister Saracoğlu admitted in May 1943 that he believed the Germans were unlikely to attack Turkey. While the British Ambassador frequently accused Turkish leaders of purposely overestimating German strengths and Allied weaknesses, as late as the Cairo summit meeting in December 1943 İnönü repeated that Turkey was not ready to face conflict with Germany.⁶³ During this period Papen was beginning to make threats and divulge damaging information about the Allies' intentions, backed up by a new source of information from the British embassy in Ankara.

In October 1943 a man approached an official in the German embassy claiming he had access to top secret documents from the safe of the British Ambassador in Ankara. Under the code name "Cicero" the valet of Knatchbull-Hugessen sold documents to the Germans from late 1943 to the middle of 1944. Through this source, Papen and the German government were able to learn the details of the conferences at Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran, and thus were able to anticipate developments in Anglo-Turkish relations. Yet, the Germans did not entirely trust their source, fearing that it was a British ploy, and failed to take full advantage of the inside information.⁶⁴

The bottom line of the arguments regarding the German threat lay in the Turkish reluctance to participate in the war on either side. The reasoning behind the Turkish position was complex. On one hand, İnönü and the cabinet were firm in their belief in non-belligerency, and Germany provided Turkey with an anchor securing Turkish diplomatic autonomy in foreign relations, allowing it to maneuver between the Axis and Allies. Furthermore, the Turkish economy remained dependent on German trade. As a consequence of entering an alliance with Britain in 1939, Turkey's trade with Germany, which had constituted about half of Turkish foreign trade in 1938, dropped to about 10 percent at the beginning of the war. The Allies were unwilling to make up the difference, with the result that prices of Turkish exports had dropped, and imports grew scarce, forcing shortages and resulting in factory shutdowns. Since that time the Turkish government had worked to restore trade with Germany, and by 1943 Germany accounted for 28–38 percent of Turkey's imports and 23–25 percent of its exports.⁶⁵

Besides considerations regarding diplomatic autonomy and dependency on German trade, on the other hand Turkish-German relations reflected long-term pro-German sentiment in Turkey, not only among the people, but also in the administration and the military. In particular, Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak combined pro-German sentiment with hostility toward the Soviets, fueled by pan-Turkist sympathies. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Çakmak apparently went so far as to propose the establishment of Turkic states carved out of Soviet territory to serve as buffers between Turkey and the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ Also, the pro-German sentiment, reflecting the alliances of the First World War, and admiration for Germany's recovery, paralleled the suspicion of the British and bitter memories of the British occupation of Istanbul after the First World War. A popular joke in Turkey at the time pointed out that the reason why "the sun never set on the British Empire" was that God never trusted the British in the dark. Furthermore, Britain was allied with the Soviet Union, the only power since the beginning of the war to demand territory and to threaten Turkish sovereignty. In terms of the balance of foreign relations, losing the German alliance still meant risking Soviet aggression. In actuality, Turkish planners believed that in the long run the Soviet Union, not Germany, represented the greatest danger to Turkey. They believed that Turkey had to be ready for the conflict with the Soviet Union after the war in Europe had ended.⁶⁷

Thus, even though the Allied effort in the war gained momentum, and the pressure increased for Turkey's entrance into the war on the Allied

side, Turkey continued relations with Germany. As late as February 1943 Germany sponsored a traveling exhibition of German manufacturing, in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. While in Ankara, İnönü visited the exhibition with Papen as his guide.⁶⁸ The careful effort to maintain Turkish relations stemmed from Germany's political considerations and its efforts to secure chromite ore.

The heart of trade issues with Germany as well as with the Allies was the sale of chromite ore, which again emerged at the center of commercial negotiations with Germany in the spring of 1943. Chrome had proved to be a volatile point for Turkey in its economic and political relations since it had first surfaced after the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Turkey, Britain, and France, in 1939, and the issue emerged again with Britain and Germany in 1941. In April 1943, in accordance with earlier discussions in 1941, Turkey and Germany signed a new one-year commercial agreement that included deliveries of chrome to Germany.⁶⁹ Despite Allied protests, Turkey delivered forty-five thousand tons of chrome to Germany throughout 1943 and into the spring of 1944.⁷⁰ But what convinced Turkish leaders to cut off chrome deliveries and prepare to end relations with Germany in the spring of 1944?

During 1943, the fast-changing realities of the war, influencing the Turkish economy, forced İnönü and the cabinet of Şükrü Saracoğlu to seek quick remedies, and their policies reflected a continuing conviction that control, rather than consent and cooperation, was needed to operate under these extraordinary circumstances. Thus, the Saracoğlu cabinet did not change the basic premises of its expectations from the people. Duty, responsibility, sacrifice, and patience continued to be expected from Turkish citizens, along with their trust in the government. But this trust was coming into question, as the state increased its coercive powers over peasants, producers, and minorities. İnönü defined statism as a policy of defense, through which the state protects the nation by managing its resources. But as external pressure mounted, the state sought new forms of dominance, not protection. As the cabinet and İnönü contemplated the possibilities, domestic opposition was growing, and seeking a new voice.

Chapter Five

The Emergence of Organized Opposition

The early years of the war brought Turkey economic dislocation, popular discontent, and tension in foreign relations. The state responded to the demands of the domestic and international situation by increasing control of the economy, and by imposing restrictions on free speech, political expression, and movement, with the justification that duty, responsibility, sacrifice, and patience would be rewarded with increased prosperity and greater international influence. But by 1944 growing numbers within the People's Party and outside the government were convinced that the immediate danger of the war had passed and that the time had come for relaxation of some state controls. İsmet İnönü, favoring caution and control in domestic as well as in foreign policy, refused to consider reducing the state's vigilance, for fear that any concessions could be construed as weakness, promoting attack by foreign enemies or domestic critics. Thus, during the last years of the war İnönü and the cabinet of Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu continued trying to assert control over all aspects of Turkish domestic and international relations, and opposition to the state continued to develop in Turkey. Initially limited to a few remarks within the National Assembly or within the press, or to groups outside the government, opposition grew as the state worked to contain and channel its expression in ways it found useful. As a result, as the war in Europe ended, opponents of the government refused to accept a limited role, and began to put forth alternative strategies for Turkish development in the post-war world. Still, opposing lines of political discourse on development, the role of the state in the economy, the needs of the nation, and foreign relations continued to reflect the continuity of discourse from the

Ottoman period, as well as the constraints of the international situation as the war came to an end.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE: THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

In the spring of 1944 events in the war in Europe pushed Turkish leaders toward making an unavoidable change in the balance of foreign relations. After talks with the Allies broke down in February, Turkish-Allied relations cooled considerably, while relations with the Soviets remained tense. In March, Soviet armies were driving the Germans out of the Ukraine, and crossing the border into Rumania. The Allies now controlled Italy, and the second front in France would soon be launched. By the summer, Soviet troops would also cross into Poland. The defeat of Germany was clearly inevitable. Thus, following the Cairo Conference, İnönü began to make changes in foreign and domestic policies that would place Turkey squarely on the side of the Allies in the war, and lead to the severing of relations with Germany.

During the spring, the Turkish government discussed with the Allied Ambassadors how Turkey could cut off chrome shipments to Germany, but it still took no action. When German negotiators came to Turkey in April 1944 to extend the chrome agreement, the Allies informed the Turkish government that if the agreement with Germany was renewed, they would apply the same blockade measures used on neutral countries during the war.¹ Although some in Turkey feared that cutting off chrome shipments to Germany would further damage the Turkish economy, considering the German withdrawal on all fronts and the possibility of an Allied blockade and isolation, on April 20 the Turkish government announced that it would cease all shipments of chrome to Germany.

This announcement was followed by the Allies' reconsideration of the possibility of cooperation with Turkey. The Allies made no offers of military aid, but the United States offered economic assistance if Turkey cut off all economic relations with Germany. On May 20 Turkey responded that it could not completely sever economic relations with Germany, but chrome deliveries to other Axis countries would be stopped, and shipments of strategic materials would be reduced by 50 percent.² But the Allies upheld their demands, and threatened Turkish leaders that if they wished to be considered a partner of the Allies, Turkey would have to cut all relations with Germany and declare war on the Axis. Churchill, anticipating

Turkish refusal, declared in the House of Commons that the war could be won without Turkey, and that its actions thus far would not earn it acceptance as one of the Allies. Sure of the victory of the Allies, and conscious of the commitments regarding the Straits given to Stalin at Tehran, Churchill argued that the change in the attitude of Turkey would not "procure for the Turks the strong position which would attend their joining the Allies."³

Regardless of the Allied demands, İnönü and the Saracoğlu cabinet began to put into motion procedures that would lead gradually to cutting relations with Germany and the Axis. But such a change in policy required İnönü and the cabinet to make adjustments not only in foreign policy but also in the country's domestic affairs. Foremost among these adjustments was the retirement of the pro-German Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, which became a political struggle. Not only was Çakmak a respected Ottoman Turkish military officer, he also had the support of pan-Turkist interests in the government. Since he reached the mandatory retirement age in January 1944 his retirement provided a good opportunity to replace him with an officer more sympathetic to the Allies. Despite his age of sixty-eight, many felt Marshal Çakmak should retain his position until the end of the war, and that the time was too critical to make such a change. But İnönü was determined to remove Çakmak; he notified the civil police to prepare for trouble, including even the possibility of a military coup, then forced Çakmak to accept his retirement.⁴ Çakmak's retirement allowed İnönü to replace him with a new Chief of the General Staff, Kâzım Orbay, who was more sympathetic to the Allies.

The changes of high-ranking officials included Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu, who was widely perceived as pro-German. The issue that sparked his resignation was the passage of several German warships, which had been disguised as civilian vessels, through the Bosphorus in violation of the 1936 Montreux Convention. Although Turkish authorities had previously allowed similarly disguised German warships to pass, by June 1944 Turkey could not risk further alienating the Soviets, so Menemencioğlu took the blame and resigned his position on June 15.⁵ The removal of Çakmak and Menemencioğlu was part of a shift in policy away from the pro-German stance that had dominated since 1941.

In addition, pan-Turkists and their aspirations for unification with the Turks in the Soviet Union, which had been tolerated, now met with official discouragement in this period. In August two Soviet officials convicted in 1942 of attempting to assassinate the German Ambassador, Franz von Papen, were released from jail, and in September 1944, forty-seven leading pan-Turkists went on trial for sedition, in an effort aimed partially

at improving relations with the Soviet Union. The trials of the pan-Turkists ended in March 1945 with the imposition of sentences ranging from one to ten years, although the convictions were appealed and in October 1945, when relations with the Soviets had become openly hostile, the convictions were overturned.⁶

While these changes were not encompassing, they were signs of a gradual shift in policy. They were accompanied by efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, and finally by the cancellation of relations with the Axis.

THE PREDICAMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS

Part of the shift of policy in Turkish foreign affairs were Turkish efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, as Soviet armies entered the Balkans in the spring and summer of 1944. In his May 19 Youth Day speech, İnönü recalled the support of Lenin and the Bolshevik government after World War I, pointing out that "the day the War of Independence ended our only friends were the Soviets."⁷

Also in May 1944, then Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu approached the Soviet Ambassador, Sergei Vinogradov, about the possibility of normalizing relations and to find out Soviet intentions in the Balkans. But the Ambassador rejected the Turkish initiative, making apparent that the Soviet Union was no longer concerned with Turkish policy, and that the only way for Turkey to improve relations was to declare war on the Axis.⁸

The cool reply of Vinogradov to Menemencioğlu equaled Stalin's attitude regarding Turkey throughout the war. At this stage, Stalin was encouraging the Allies to "leave [Turkey] entirely to its own will." In August, the Soviet Ambassador again told Menemencioğlu that "Turkey's entry into the war would serve no purpose and was no longer desired." When the Turkish government suggested a joint statement emphasizing the friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the reply pointed out that "such a statement would add nothing to the treaties already in existence between the two countries."⁹ This was the last attempt by the Turkish government to seek improved relations with the Soviets during the war.

The coolness in Turkish-Soviet relations in 1944 presaged the hostility of the post-war period, when the Soviets would try to use Turkey's non-belligerency during the war as a basis for demanding changes in the regime of the Straits to their advantage. With Germany defeated, if the United States did not maintain a presence in Europe, İnönü believed that the

Soviets would dominate Europe. In the summer of 1944, it was clear that Turkey had to join the Allies, or face isolation and a hostile Soviet Union in the post-war period.

TURKEY JOINS THE WAR, CAUTIOUSLY

On July 3, the Turkish cabinet decided to enter the war. Before the meeting Prime Minister Saracoğlu informed the American and British Ambassadors that they should anticipate that Turkey would be "prepared to break off all relations with Germany immediately." After the meeting İnönü wrote a letter to Roosevelt concerning Turkish policy: "This is what it has always been, that is, an attitude of unwavering fidelity... to its alliance, open solidarity with the cause of the Allies, and the determination... to give, at the proper time, more effective and tangible expression to this strong desire for cooperation." İnönü also wrote of his expectations from the United States in the post-war world: "We understand and admire [the great ideals of the American people] because we see in these ideals of justice and peace aimed at safeguarding the independence of all nations, even the smallest, in untroubled tranquility, the very expression of our own aspirations."¹⁰ The Allies reacted to the Turkish proposal favorably, but decided to ask Turkey only to sever relations, but not to enter the war as an active belligerent. Churchill now feared that Turkey's entry into the war would only lead to demands on the Allies that they could not fulfill.¹¹ Recalling the Turkish-German alliance in World War I, Churchill believed that merely severing relations would now produce as strong an effect on Germany as would Turkey's active belligerency in the Balkans. Churchill argued that at this stage any Turkish opposition to Germany "would be a knell to the German soul," and that it was a good time "to strike such a knell."¹²

The Turkish Grand National Assembly voted to sever economic and diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, 1944. The Americans hailed the move as "a step towards full cooperation against Nazi aggression."¹³ Churchill issued his praise as well, saying that he had not forgotten that "Turkey declared her alliance with us before the present war, when our armaments were weak and our policy pacific."¹⁴ He also expressed hope that the move would serve to improve Turkish-Soviet relations. The Soviets, however, complained that the Turkish move was too little, too late, would serve no purpose, and was no longer desired. Stalin told Churchill that he saw no reason to support "half-measures" by Turkey, as they would

have no benefit for the war against Germany. He also thought that in view of its "evasive and vague attitude" in the past, the claims of Turkey to special rights in post-war matters should lapse.¹⁵

Stalin's attitude was a prelude to the problems the Turks had anticipated since the beginning of the war, when the Soviets had demanded bases on the Straits in October 1939. İnönü was happy with Turkish determination to survive the turmoil of the European war untouched, even though the future seemed full of serious problems in foreign relations. As the diplomatic compromise led Turkey to cut relations with the Axis, İnönü and the Saracoğlu cabinet were convinced that participating in the war at this time would not mean actual combat. Some members of the Assembly, who had supported participation in the war from the beginning, criticized İnönü and the cabinet for their cautious approach by arguing that "for a nation, participation in a war is what pruning is to a tree: the more it is pruned, the stronger it becomes," while popular criticism accused İnönü of jeopardizing Turkish honor and "blemishing the manhood of the country." For İnönü there had been no alternative to the cautious policy of non-participation:

Why did we do it, who did we do it for? What would have been the cost of the destruction, after inheriting a Turkish land in ruins [twenty years ago] and then going into a war which would bring the destruction, within twenty four hours, of the entire country from Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara to those industrial centers, roads and bridges that we created with a thousand drops of the sweat of our brows? And at the end, if Turkey was invaded, who was going to save it? The United Nations Churchill talks about? Or the Soviet Union, which liberated Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries from Germany?¹⁶

After severing relations with Germany, the Turkish government prepared to repel air raids, ordered blackouts of cities, expelled suspected German agents, and opened talks for the opening of the Straits to Allied shipping. By January 1945 the Allies were sending supplies to the Soviet Union through the Straits, and Turkey formally declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945, following the Yalta Conference. On February 27 Turkey signed the Declaration of the United Nations, securing a place at the San Francisco Conference.

Prior to the declaration of war on Germany and Japan, Foreign Minister Hasan Saka told the National Assembly that "the framework of the decisions taken by the Allies at the Crimean Conference... raise the possibility and opportunity for our nation to make a new and decisive

contribution to the Allied cause." He continued to claim that entry into the war was not a change of policy, but a continuation of the policy of helping the Allies according to Turkey's abilities.¹⁷

The shift in foreign policy in 1944 coincided with the emergence of increasing discussion in the Turkish press contrasting democracy with totalitarianism. To some Turkish intellectuals, the victory of the Allies over Germany was interpreted as a victory of democracy over tyranny, which meant that the changes in Turkish foreign affairs should coincide with changes in the government's attitude in domestic policy. In the period of 1943 to 1945, the cabinet was to grapple unsuccessfully with the impact of the war on the Turkish economy and domestic affairs. Tired of the war economy and carrying the burden of the failures in domestic policy, İnönü and the cabinet faced demands for change. As they contemplated the possibilities, opposition in Turkey had been growing.

REFORM OF THE PEOPLE'S PARTY: PREPARATION, CAUTION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

In December 1942, in anticipation of general elections scheduled for 1943, the National Assembly passed the first new election law in the Turkish Republic's history. Until that time all elections had been held under the election law adopted by the Ottoman government in July 1908.¹⁸ The new law did not differ greatly from the old election law. In its application, İnönü, as leader of the party, retained power to give final approval to the list of candidates. But in the 1943 general elections, in 38 of 62 provinces, there were more candidates than available seats in the Assembly, with the aim of providing voters with alternatives. By making candidates compete with one another in elections, İnönü and the party leadership were not trying to establish the beginning of a democratic process. Instead, they were trying to judge the mood of the people, and the increased number of candidates on the ballot allowed the exclusion of members of the Assembly who were particularly unpopular. While some Assembly members supported this as an innovation in the usual practice, others resisted the change and feared the consequences of having to compete for the support of the voters. One candidate complained, "My whole life I always thought of the revolution and of my leaders; to say to me now go and ask the people for their vote is like putting me up for sale is it not?"¹⁹ In the general elections, 61 percent of People's Party and 46 percent of the Independent Group members were reelected to the Assembly.²⁰

As a result of the election, the composition and nature of the membership of the National Assembly changed in such a way as to foster the emergence of opposition within the Assembly during the last years of the war. The 1943 general election changed the composition of the Assembly in two ways: by bringing into the Assembly younger members, and by bringing in new members with different backgrounds than the previous membership. Of newly elected members, 38 percent had backgrounds in the bureaucracy, the military, or in education; 42 percent came from the professions of law, medicine, and engineering, while 16 percent came from private enterprise, including merchants, bankers, and landowners. When compared to new members elected to the Assembly in 1939, members from the professions showed a substantial rise, while membership from official backgrounds remained unchanged and the percentage of new members from private enterprise dropped.²¹ The average age of first-time members fell from 46.1 years to 43.9 years, compared to the average age of all members, which was 54 years in 1943.²² İnönü was 58 years old at the time of the 1943 elections. This younger group of professionals became witness to the changes in Turkish politics after the 1943 elections.

In his opening address to the Party Congress in June 1943, İnönü signaled more changes in electoral procedures and in party operations:

A reform we began as an experiment in the previous election was applied in a more advanced form [in the latest election], particularly in seeking the voters' decisions. ... To win a greater degree of trust and support of the citizens, while increasing the country's political development, our party is on the path of acting more extensively in this sense in the future. ... We want this method widely followed also in the Party's own elections for those who will occupy administrative and authority positions.²³

In mid-1943 İnönü appeared to be seeking ways to make the government more responsive to the demands of the people. It was in this spirit that the first secret vote of confidence on a standing government took place in the assembly in March 1944, resulting in 251 "yes" and 57 "no" votes (19 percent), a telling indication of the level of discontent within the Assembly for the policies of İnönü and the Saracoğlu government.²⁴

As shortages continued, tax laws were labeled as failures and inflation increased. İnönü, always wary of disorder, tried to experiment with new ways within the established system that would increase the accountability of the government, but without giving the people a real say in their own political system. Outcome remained more important than process to İnönü. Yet, he was not seeking a wide spectrum of reforms or contemplating reducing

his own power, either as President or as the leader of the People's Party. Thus, as with the reforms introduced in 1939, including formation of the Independent Group of the National Assembly, the reforms of 1943 were cautious and measured steps toward reorganizing the party and modifying the relationship between central authority and the people in Turkey. But demands for significant and immediate change challenged İnönü's attempt to control the pace in 1943 and 1944.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE PRESS AND PAN-TURKIST OPPOSITION

As the immediate danger of the war in Europe seemed to recede in 1943, the government was able to turn its attention to pressing domestic issues. Its relaxation of controls on the press was part of the general reconsideration of policies. This relaxation reflected a more responsive mood of the government to the people. Furthermore, it was an attempt to direct growing opposition and criticism into acceptable channels. Invisible limits on the press were set: not to go too far in criticizing the government, and not to print stories that could damage Turkey's relations with other countries. Thus, İnönü and the Saracoğlu cabinet were trying to show a willingness to tolerate some freedom of the press, as long as it was "responsible," and debates remained within acceptable boundaries.²⁵

In 1943, the nature of discussion in the independent press changed when some of the wide circulation dailies began to publish more open and direct criticism of the policies of İnönü, the cabinet, and the government bureaucracy. Also, encouraged by the apparent relaxation of control of the press and vocal opposition, leftist and rightist intellectuals debated openly along with the mainstream press.²⁶ Whereas prior to 1943 the press had concentrated largely on covering events in the European war, or reported economic problems without criticizing government policies, after a People's Party Congress in June 1943, writers began to concentrate on the administration and policies of the government. Specifically, the 1943 elections stirred criticism of the indirect voting system and the control of the People's Party leadership over the National Assembly. In December, Sabiha Sertel wrote in *Tan* [The Dawn] that "democracy that is under the control of the ruling class helps only the interests of that class. It cannot establish a democracy comprising all of the people."²⁷ Ahmed Emin Yalman, editor of *Vatan* [The Homeland] and a vocal opponent of the Wealth Tax, joined Sabiha Sertel and Zekeriya Sertel, owners of *Tan*, in publishing editorials critical of the government.

Ahmed Emin Yalman (1885–1972) was born in Salonika, and educated at the German High School in Istanbul, before studying at Columbia University. He began his journalism career in 1907, and served as writer, editor, and/or owner of several newspapers during the Republican period. In 1938–39 he led a Turkish trade exhibition in New York, before returning to Turkey to publish *Vatan*. Zekeriya Sertel had also been educated in America, and for several years they published *Tan* together, Sertel as editor and Yalman as chief correspondent. After Yalman left *Tan* to publish *Vatan* the two papers took different editorial lines. Yalman consistently supported American efforts in the war and called for closer relations with the United States, and for the Turkish government to play a more active role in support of the Allied war effort, while Sertel called for better relations with the Soviets. But both shared a belief that the government was increasingly unresponsive to the people and its policies were growing more arbitrary and oppressive.²⁸ According to Metin Toker, then a writer for *Cumhuriyet* [The Republic]:

In the Spring of 1944 [the Press Law, and article 50] were still in effect. But there was a feeling that there was some relaxation in its application. *Vatan*, making use of this relaxation, was taking new steps. Yalman was taking a step forward, then waiting to see the results. If the reaction was good, he was trying another step, then stopping and waiting.²⁹

As the press cautiously tested the reality of the new openness policy, the government became concerned and defensive. During the latter half of 1943 and early 1944, İnönü and the Saracoğlu cabinet responded to criticism through the People's Party official paper, *Ulus* [The Nation], edited by Falih Rıfkı Atay. In a series of articles, Atay bluntly rejected Yalman's charges that the regime was undemocratic and the government unresponsive to the people. According to Metin Toker however, Atay's contentious tone aroused more sympathy for Yalman and led to more, not less, criticism of the government.³⁰

Tan and *Vatan* began to publish articles stressing that a victory for the Allies would mean a victory for democracy over totalitarianism. According to their argument, to claim a share in the victory, Turkey would have to adopt a more democratic and open system of government. As Yalman reflected in his memoirs:

I began to publish strongly worded articles, full of facts, discussing the vital role Turkey could play in a world of democracy; but also pointing out the fact that she was being prevented from playing such a role by the

unfortunate [Wealth] tax and its aftereffects, by a one-party system which, though good on paper, failed in reality by using democratic forms as a show-window display, and maintaining an arbitrary, slow, and inefficient bureaucracy and personal government sustained by the selection of the unfit and the blindly obedient.³¹

During the spring of 1944, as the government continued to extend latitude to the press, in their editorials in *Vatan* and *Tan*, Yalman and the Sertels grew increasingly critical of the single-party system, the use of the title "National Chief" by İnönü, and the use of article 50 of the Press Law to stifle free debate and expression.³² The government tolerated the editorials, but when they began to give voice to opponents of İnönü and the cabinet in the People's Party, the head of the Press Directorate, Selim Sarper, moved in August and September to shut down *Tan* and *Vatan* indefinitely. Both were kept closed until the spring of 1945.³³

The limited tolerance shown to the independent press in its criticism of policies reflected a mistrust of the government for opposition from elements beyond its control. İnönü considered all expressions of opposition to be inefficient and detrimental, thus potentially harmful to the security of the country and to the strength of the state. The government saw the criticism of Yalman and the Sertels as an abuse of freedom of the press, that could lead to partisan strife and weakness.

At the same time that *Tan* and *Vatan* were closed down, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* [Depiction of Ideas], a known advocate of pan-Turkism, was also closed by the government.³⁴ When Germany's defeat had become a strong possibility, pan-Turkist criticism of foreign policy became unacceptable to the government. Even though during the war close ties between the German embassy and the pan-Turkists were occasionally useful, their activities were tolerated rather than encouraged in Ankara. İnönü had prominent pan-Turkist leaders followed throughout the war, and ordered that his picture not be printed in pan-Turkist publications.³⁵ But at this stage, their continuing vocal support for Germany and the Axis began to conflict with government efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union.

The pan-Turkists, advocates of the unity of all Turkic peoples, were organized in three main groups during the war period. One was led by Zeki Velidi Togan, a professor of Turkish history at Istanbul University. Togan had been forced to leave the country in 1932 for his pan-Turkist activities, but had returned to Istanbul from Germany after Atatürk's death as part of the general return of political exiles, and in 1938, he formed a secret society, making new members swear their allegiance on a pistol and

Koran, in the style of the Committee of Union and Progress. The second group centered around Togan's star student and prominent pan-Turkist, Reha Oğuz Türkkan. He also formed a secret society, and published a number of pan-Turkist pamphlets and periodicals including *Bozkurt* [Wolf of the Steppes], which carried the slogan "The Turkish Race above all Races." A third group was led by Nihal Atsız, who favored a Hitler style haircut and mustache, and advocated Nazi racist doctrines. Atsız and Türkkan despised each other, and devoted much energy to proving that the other was unfit to carry the banner of pan-Turkism. Türkkan accused Atsız of being Circassian, rather than Turkish, while Atsız claimed Türkkan (whose name means Turkish Blood) was actually Armenian.³⁶

Atsız's journal *Orhun* [Warrior] carried a map on the front showing an area from east of Iran to the west of China with the caption "unliberated Turkish lands," and Atsız called on all Turkish youths to take up the struggle to liberate their brothers.³⁷ By 1944 pan-Turkist agitation for Turkey's involvement in the war to liberate the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union was reaching a fevered pitch. In April 1944 Atsız published an open letter to Prime Minister Saracoğlu in *Orhun*, accusing the government of harboring communists and Soviet sympathizers in its ranks, and singling out the Ministry of Education, headed by Hasan Ali Yücel, for particular criticism. Atsız said that the writer Sabahattin Ali, who worked in the Ministry at the State Conservatory, was an enemy of the country.³⁸

Minister Yücel, who was known to be sympathetic to left of center intellectuals, ordered Ali to sue Atsız for slander. When the case came to trial in Ankara in April 1944, Atsız's lawyer maintained that the trial was a political struggle between two competing and exclusive ideologies for the mind of the Turkish nation, while Ali's lawyer countered that the trial was no more than a simple slander case. On the day the verdict was read, and Atsız was found guilty, pan-Turkist sympathizers carried out a demonstration in the courtroom, and outside in the street against the verdict of the court. When the judge ordered police to restore order, the demonstrators began to sing the national anthem, further adding to the confusion. Shortly after the trial, Ali was assaulted by rock-throwing sympathizers of Atsız, and pan-Turkist demonstrations continued in Ankara.³⁹

The government responded to the growing agitation by arresting pan-Turkist leaders and known sympathizers, such as Zeki Velidi Togan, Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, and several army officers, including retired General Hüseyin Erkilet and First Lieutenant Alparslan Türkeş.⁴⁰ During the search of houses, police uncovered a number of documents revealing the existence of secret societies and German support for the pan-Turkists.

On May 19, Youth Day, İnönü addressed a gathering at the May 19 Stadium in Ankara: "Pan-Turkism is a dangerous and sick demonstration of the latest times.... In this condition we are facing efforts hostile to the existence of the Republic and the National Assembly under the cover of attractive ideas.... It is clear that those who want to put forth these ideas, who will bring only trouble and disaster, can be of no help to the Turkish nation."⁴¹ In September, 47 pan-Turkist leaders went on trial for conspiracy against the government. When the trial concluded in March 1945, Zeki Velidi Togan was sentenced to 10 years in jail and 4 years internal exile. Reha Oğuz Türkkan received a sentence of 5 years in jail and 2 years exile, while Nihal Atsız got 4 years in jail and 3 years in exile. Others received lighter sentences of up to 1 year in jail.⁴² While the trial of the pan-Turkists demonstrated the limits of the government's toleration of opposition, after the war had ended and tensions in Turkish-Soviet relations had increased, a court of appeals found that the evidence of a plot against the government was weak, and reduced or eliminated the sentences of the pan-Turkists.

The government dealt directly with the pan-Turkist demonstrations of April 1944 because the pan-Turkist movement posed a potential challenge to government authority, and especially confronted government policies regarding foreign affairs. The criticism of the press, in contrast, focused on undemocratic practices of the government, the increasing bureaucratic control and specifically targeted the government's failure to solve economic problems. While the opposition of the pan-Turkists gave a voice to fringe elements in Turkish politics, and the left of center press tried to reflect the criticism of the people, the most challenging confrontation arose from within the very core of the People's Party.

THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZED OPPosition IN THE PEOPLE'S PARTY

The first signs of significant opposition within the People's Party to the policies of the Saracoğlu cabinet, and İnönü's position, could be felt in Ankara at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943. Celâl Bayar, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Hasan Rıza Soyak, and others in the party who had played prominent roles in cabinets under Atatürk, but who had been out of power since İnönü became president, began to meet privately to discuss their complaints and criticism of İnönü and the government. Bayar, who had been removed from the Prime Ministership in January 1939, had not

played an important role in the People's Party or in the National Assembly since that time. He rarely spoke in the Assembly, and did not attend its sessions regularly.⁴³ One of the first meetings was held in the home of Sabiha Sertel at the beginning of 1943, between Bayar and Aras, who had just retired from being Ambassador in London. By then, Aras was voicing his disagreement with İnönü's foreign policy and was arguing that Turkey should seek closer relations with the Soviet Union. Bayar, a known critic of İnönü's interpretation of statism, opposed the government's economic policies, and advocated lowering taxes and restructuring to assist the development of private enterprise. At this meeting, Bayar accused İnönü of being despotic: "We cannot talk in the Assembly. He is having me followed continuously." When Sertel pressed Bayar on why Assembly members did not express their opinions, he replied, that "opposition has awakened in the Assembly against İnönü's despotic administration. But everything has its time. Today, during the danger of this war, it would not be right to damage national unity."⁴⁴ At the time of their meeting neither Bayar, nor Aras, seemed to have the intention of forming a new party or organizing opposition. But throughout 1943 rumors spread that opposition to İnönü and the government's policies was forming in the Assembly.

These rumors, along with a high number of "no" votes in a secret vote of confidence on the Saracoğlu cabinet in March 1944, appear to have caused a widespread reaction. A week after the confidence vote, by-elections were held to fill twenty empty seats in the Assembly. But, unlike the 1943 general elections and despite İnönü's previous posture favoring different candidates competing for seats, in these by-elections the candidates were designated by the party leadership and İnönü for each seat and did not compete among themselves. Thus, the list of candidates did not offer alternatives to the people, and as the leader of the party, İnönü retained the final say over who was elected to the Assembly. But the elections stirred controversy in the press, and *Vatan* began a series of articles on freedom of expression and thought in Turkey. Yalman invited guest writers such as Behice Boran, a professor at Ankara University and a leftist intellectual, and Aras, a known advocate of liberal policies, to write articles for the paper. In these articles, both criticized İnönü's apparent abandonment of democracy at a time when what they labeled the democratic powers were clearly winning the war in Europe.⁴⁵

Bayar did not express his criticism of İnönü and his government in public until May 1944, when the National Assembly met to discuss the budget. Bayar argued that the people were suffering from high inflation

and from the government's failure to eliminate the black market, and warned that if the government failed to give a satisfactory answer to his questions, he would vote against the budget. Indeed, the final vote on the budget was 392 for, 167 abstentions, and 1 against. Moreover, the high number of abstentions was a signal that opposition was growing within the Assembly.⁴⁶ Although Bayar's criticism was fairly mild, the General Secretary of the National Assembly issued a statement the next day that Bayar's speech had been misinterpreted by the press. Despite the administration's effort to play it down, Bayar's criticism aroused attention in the press. The words of Hikmet Bayur, a former Minister of Education, also stirred considerable controversy. During the budget discussions, Bayur assailed the government: "I want to stop on the subject of our economic and moral condition, and criticize the government. As much as these criticisms are expressed, the National Assembly's moral authority over the people will be strengthened. However much we relate the complaints of the people here, we will be doing that much service to the government." Bayur continued his attack to say that the government had deviated from the path of Atatürk, and was ruining the economy and causing panic.⁴⁷

As the debate over the budget grew into a heated argument within the Assembly over the future of Turkey, Hikmet Bayur's attack met with equally strong words from Prime Minister Saracoğlu, who condemned Bayur and other critics as reactionaries. Saracoğlu, in defense of the government and his administration, told the Assembly, "we will continue to make our country the home of free people," but said that this freedom would never be such as to allow a reactionary uprising.⁴⁸

During the summer and fall of 1944, Saracoğlu and İnönü continue to defend government policies against the charges of Bayar and others. In his speech to open the Assembly on November 1, İnönü concentrated on the various beneficial programs the state had pursued despite the terrible burdens imposed by the war. He also tried to justify the crackdown on the pan-Turkists and the press during the summer:

We understand equal justice, and freedom of ideas and conscience to be basic. Our laws are strong and effective in protecting life and order in the country. Under the continuous control of the National Assembly, all of the government's efforts in domestic and foreign policy are made in front of the nation's eyes and with its knowledge. Not one reality in Turkey can be hidden from the nation.

İnönü also addressed the charges leveled by Bayar and by others that his administration was dictatorial, that he stifled debate on important issues in the Assembly:

What members of the Assembly say about the work of the state and nation from the podium of the National Assembly is subject to no other influence than the Assembly's own regulations and laws. There are countless examples that demonstrate that the words raised from this podium about the government's affairs are not always words of approval and appreciation.

Finally, İnönü, rejected the charge that his government had ignored the needs of the people:

We can find much incontrovertible proof of the nation's control in the work of the National Assembly. With the trust of the Turkish nation, the patriotism of the National Assembly has made it possible for us to make good and useful decisions from every criticism, right or wrong. Our administration, in every sense, is the people's administration.⁴⁹

Regardless of the defense of the administration, and İnönü's assertion that the government represented the people and their interests, and that it stood strong in a time of war and turmoil, opponents within the party were not deterred. The opposition not only reflected the discontent of the war years, but voiced alternative interpretations of development and progress, and the nature of the Turkish nation and state, which had been part of ongoing political debate since before the establishment of the Republic. This debate caught İnönü in the paradox that had been part of his administration since the beginning of his presidency. İnönü's paradox, reflecting the need to revise the old methods of the Kemalist program, carried the commitment of continuity with its ideological premise. The emerging opposition was not questioning the continuity of Kemalism as an ideology, but criticizing İnönü where he himself had criticized the previous president: on his method of policy making and implementation.

Furthermore, in its criticism, opposition in the party was focusing on domestic policies, rather than on İnönü's cautious and deliberate approach in foreign affairs. As the ending of the war promised peace, albeit with problems, opposition challenged and forced the administration to change its domestic policies for the post-war period. As the government prepared its economic plans in the spring of 1945, Bayar and other members of the Assembly began to raise demands anticipating the coming of political and economic changes in Turkey, as well as in the world at the end of the war.

Chapter Six

Post-War International Tensions, and the Expression of Opposition

On May 19, 1945, during his address on the national day celebrating Turkish youths, İsmet İnönü announced his vision of the future:

The Turkish nation is entering a new period of effort. We have the responsibility of working without stopping in order to complete the formation of ... an advanced society as quickly as possible. In order to solve the fundamental problems of our society, we will expand the efforts we showed during the eight years of the war.... The political system and the administration of the people, formed with the Republic, will continue to develop in all aspects and in every way. As the difficulties of the war that showed the need for cautious measures disappear, democratic principles will prevail in wider measure in the political and cultural life of the country.⁵⁰

It was the end of the war, and İnönü was calling for changes. But his speech prompted questions: Was İnönü's call for change a response to the growing criticism of the government, or did he believe that the end of the war would allow abandonment of cautious domestic policy, perhaps leading to the democratization of the political process? A group of members of the National Assembly who had dinner with İnönü earlier in the year, anticipated that what he called for would alter the political process in Turkey. During this dinner İnönü talked about the need for a multi-party system and recalled the failure of the first two experiments, the Progressive Republican Party of 1924 and the Free Party of 1930. İnönü said that in restraining their development, both Atatürk and he had "made a mistake." According to Faik Ahmet Barutçu, İnönü believed, that "At whatever the cost, we should have protected the second party and made it survive. If we had ... we would

not have this deficiency now. [But] we will make up for this deficiency. Those that carried out a revolution will also succeed at this... it needs a struggle of only ten years.² İnönü also confided privately to Nihat Erim, a member of the Assembly, that "I could live the rest of my life with a single-party regime. But I am thinking of later. I am thinking of what happens after me. For that reason, we must enter this work without delay."³ It was clear for İnönü that the "formation of an advanced society" demanded democracy, which required establishing a multi-party system.⁴

As İnönü, political leaders, and the Turkish people contemplated changes in the political process, the cabinet of Şükrü Saracoğlu prepared plans for the government's economic policy after the war.⁵ The Post-War Development Plan was based on the assumption that the government would continue to play a major role in all aspects of the economy; thus there would be no significant alterations in statist economic policies after the war. The continuity reflected in the Post-War Development Plan was in contrast to İnönü's May 19 speech promising changes in the political process. But, they both reflected an ongoing trend in İnönü's presidency: an intention to introduce reform of political institutions to make them more open and responsive to the people, while maintaining government control of economic development. For İnönü, these two currents were not contradictory, but complemented each other. He believed that if the economic development of the country were directed by private interests, rather than by the government, such direction would interfere with the political process. For İnönü, statism was a policy of the state designed to protect the people.⁶

Pressure for substantial change was widening the debate on the nature and extent of the need for new policies in the post-war world, and these discussions were greatly influenced by changing Turkish foreign relations. In the post-war world, Turkey's key to survival changed from neutrality to alliance, which required changes not only in foreign but in domestic policy. Changes and concessions in Turkish domestic policy, especially on statist policies, were seen as part of the ideological readjustment demanded by the dynamics of the bi-polar world, and integral to being part of the Western alliance. Just as the Western powers began to demand change as a part of alliance, within Turkey landowners, private merchants, and manufacturers, groups that had gained economic power during the war, began to demand alterations in statist economic and political policies to meet their own interests. Some members of the People's Party and members of the National Assembly voiced strong opposition to the continuation of the statist policies of the Saracoğlu cabinet, and demanded significant changes in support of private enterprise. The emergence of this opposition, led by

Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü, and others, raised a prominent voice in a widespread debate on all aspects of the government's program and of the future of Turkey. As the debates intensified, the period from the spring of 1945 to the summer of 1947 became a period of change, trial, and adjustment. The formation of the multi-party system was a major aspect of this process, and for İnönü, this difficult first stage was an "experiment." The period ended with the certainty of the continuation of the multi-party system, opening a new era in Turkish history.

OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PEOPLE'S PARTY: DISCUSSIONS ON STATISM, LAND REFORM, AND THE BUDGET

On May 14, 1945, Agricultural Minister Raşit Hatiboğlu submitted a Land Reform Bill to the Assembly. Submission of this bill overlapped with the announcement of the government's plans for the post-war economy, and the budget discussions for 1945, and immediately became a focus of opposition within the People's Party. Critics interpreted the Land Reform Bill as the epitome of statist policies, extending the stronghold of the government on the economy. For its supporters, the purpose of this bill was to redistribute land to landless peasants and to those with insufficient land to support themselves. The land was to be taken from large private estates of more than 5,000 *dönüms* (1235.5 acres), from state-owned land and from religious foundations (*waqfs*). If this land proved to be insufficient, estates of 2,000 *dönüms* (495 acres) would be broken up. Article 17 of the law proved the most controversial, with its provision to break up estates of more than 50 *dönüms* (12 acres) in densely populated areas where state-owned or *waqf* land proved to be insufficient to meet the need.⁷ If fully enacted, the sweeping provisions of the Land Reform Law would have eliminated the class of large landowners in Turkish society.

It can be argued that the bill was aimed at countering the hostility of the peasantry toward the government for its wartime policies of forced grain sales below market prices; thus the bill was an act of the government to secure the support of small landowners and landless peasants by rewards of land.⁸ But it can also be argued that the Land Reform Bill was an integral aspect of the statist agenda, the enactment of which had been delayed because of the war. The war years not only demonstrated the weakness of the agricultural sector in Turkey, but also exhibited the power of the large landowners who acted as brokers between small landholders and the government. Blaming the problems of the wartime agricultural sector on the power of this group

of brokers, statist ideology dictated that the government interfere to protect the peasantry. This protection would also serve to extend further the government's control from industry to every facet of production. İnönü firmly supported the Land Reform Bill. Support also came from members of the Assembly from urban areas, and from intellectuals who saw the bill as a means to carry social change to rural areas, by eliminating exploitation of the landless peasantry by wealthy landowners.⁹

Stiff opposition to the measure quickly developed in the Assembly, led by landowning members, and by those who had the support of landowners outside the government, as well as from those who believed redistribution of land was not the solution to the problems of the peasantry. Opposition within the Assembly was led by Adnan Menderes and Emin Sazak, both landowners, and by Refik Koraltan, a lawyer.

Sazak told the Assembly, "be careful, do not disrupt this social order. When the wife of a peasant dies I help out and get him married again. When somebody's ox dies, I buy them a new one... if you disrupt this order, well friends the country will curse you."¹⁰ Koraltan attacked the Land Reform Bill for ignoring constitutional guarantees of the property rights of the individual. Menderes (1899–1961) was from a prominent landowning family in the Aegean region. After serving in the Ottoman Army in World War I, he joined the nationalists and fought against the Greeks in the Izmir region. He entered politics as a member of the Free Party, then joined the People's Party in 1931. Menderes opposed the Land Reform Bill from the beginning as the Chair of the Agricultural Committee, arguing that it was based on false assumptions that unequal distribution of land was the cause of the undeveloped state of Turkish agriculture. Menderes argued that Turkish agriculture suffered from primitive tools and techniques, from a lack of credit, and from the failure of the government to help villagers produce more on the land they already possessed.¹¹

The heated discussions on the Land Reform Bill overlapped with debate on the budget in 1945, and turned into a critique of the Saracoğlu government and of the one-party system. Menderes emerged more and more as a voice of opposition, and along with Sazak and Koraltan had shown that members of the National Assembly would no longer accept the role of immediately approving the decisions of the cabinet. In fact, during discussions in the Assembly, Menderes accused Saracoğlu of unconstitutional interference in the workings of the Agricultural Committee that had formulated the proposal for land reform. Menderes argued that Saracoğlu had tried to stifle free debate on article 17 of the Land Reform Bill, which called for the breakup of all large and medium private properties. According to

Menderes, "as long as we remain a one-party system the situation will become more deplorable."¹²

Menderes's attack on the Land Reform Bill quickly spread to include discussion of the budget. Finance Minister Nurullah Esat Sümer's proposal to increase taxes and to borrow to meet the deficit of 65.5 million TL (\$23.39 million) in a 603.5 million TL (\$215.5 million) budget met with opposition from members of the Assembly. The opposition pointed out that during the war Turkey had a trade surplus, and thus had accumulated a sizable amount of foreign currency and gold reserves.¹³ The government argued in favor of retaining the reserves in light of continuing international tensions, but opponents maintained that higher taxes would put an additional burden on taxpayers, especially on private enterprise. While the Budget Commission called for an increase in taxes and borrowing by the government to meet the deficit due to wartime spending, opposition not only attacked the government for mishandling affairs during the war, but also blamed its policies for inflation and high taxes. Emin Sazak argued: "The nation can do everything, but statism is a barrier to this. ... Under statism we assigned people tasks they could not perform and we pushed them to lengths they could not reach. But today there are no clear limits. The state is doing everything. The State must take its hand from the work it did during the war."¹⁴ Hikmet Bayur, an ardent critic of the previous year's budget, joined Sazak in attacking the government's domestic policies during the war: "Even those who thank the government for keeping us out of the war say they have seen total incompetence in economic matters. ... Within the country not a single useful element has been protected." Bayur rejected the government's defense that its policies would produce a better future for Turkey: "But it is dangerous to walk if one concentrates only on the future, without looking at the suffering and destitution of today. Like somebody who catches their foot on a rock while looking at the sky, it is not right to forget the current situation of the people while making a revolution." Menderes, in a detailed critique of the budget, agreed with the need to continue government spending to develop industry to "reduce and even close" the gap between Turkey and the industrialized countries of the world, but said that change was needed to prevent the damage done by the war from becoming permanent.¹⁵

Prime Minister Saracoğlu defended the budget and the government's policies during the war, pointing out that despite the burdens of maintaining and supplying a mobilized military, the government had continued to fund economic development and had accumulated a surplus of 200 tons of gold and 52 million TL (\$18.5 million) in foreign currency to be used

for emergency needs. Responding to calls for the resignation of his cabinet, Saraçoğlu told the Assembly:

The Saraçoğlu government, like every Turkish cabinet, is in the position of authority for only one thing: to struggle, to work everyday to meet even better its own responsibilities. While having the support of the majority of my friends present here, I cannot escape from this responsibility; I will continue my duties with the same trust and belief even if that majority is [defined by] only a single vote.¹⁶

After Saraçoğlu defended his cabinet and the policies of the government, the National Assembly accepted the budget with 368 votes, while 5 votes were cast in opposition and 77 members abstained. The five opponents were Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü, and Emin Sazak. After the budget passed, the question remained whether or not the confirmation of the budget had served as a vote of confidence in the Saraçoğlu cabinet. Bayur argued that the "the formality of voting on the budget is a required formality, we are required to vote for it because if we vote against the budget the government's work would stop." In light of Bayur's accusation that a vote for the budget did not mean confidence in the cabinet, Saraçoğlu demanded that the Assembly also hold a vote of confidence.¹⁷

The results of the vote of confidence were 359 in favor, 7 opposed, and 84 abstentions. The 5 who voted against the budget were joined by Hikmet Bayur and Recep Peker in opposition to the Saraçoğlu cabinet. Even though the number of open opponents to the cabinet and government program was small, they were well-known and vocal members of the Assembly. At this stage they did not agree among themselves regarding alternatives, and they pronounced their differences from each other. For example, after the no-confidence vote, Peker immediately distanced himself from the others who voted against the cabinet. In his address to the Assembly, Peker argued that the government had failed to use its powers to solve the economic problems of the citizens, and expressed "the need for a new order."¹⁸

The opposition in the Assembly, and the reaction it generated in the press, led İnönü and Saraçoğlu to respond by changing the Minister of Commerce and the People's Party General Secretary. On May 31, Commerce Minister Celâl Sait Sirmen resigned, to be replaced by Raif Karadeniz, as a demonstration that the government took the complaints of Assembly members regarding economic policy seriously. Also, the People's Party General Secretary Memduh Şevket Esendal was replaced by Nafi Atif Kansu. Even though the lack of support from the party for the Saraçoğlu cabinet was evident, İnönü believed that leaving the cabinet in power but replacing the

party's General Secretary would satisfy critics in the Assembly.¹⁹ Along with these changes, on June 7, 1945 Prime Minister Saraçoğlu announced that the People's Party would not submit an official list of candidates for the June by-elections. Thus candidates were expected to compete without the official support of the People's Party. More than the changes in the cabinet and party leadership, the announcement of "free" elections aroused considerable excitement within the government, among the people and in the press. According to Metin Toker, "I remember well the excitement this bomb spread in those days. Suddenly Istanbul... shook to its roots. Until then the regime's promises of liberalization had been no more than a platform of words.... But Saraçoğlu's announcement brought action to this business." Quickly, candidates organized, and the by-elections took on a new atmosphere, "very lively, fiery, even entertaining.... Platforms are printed, speeches are given, propaganda is spread."²⁰ Some of those elected to the National Assembly in these by-elections were known critics of the government and İnönü, such as Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who had been one of the discussants of an alternative political system since 1943.

Even though elected, Aras was one of many who believed in the spring of 1945 that, despite the apparent changes, the People's Party leadership would not release the strings of control. In fact critics maintained that regardless of the relative freedom of choice, the People's Party leaders "whispered into the ears of the electors whom they should vote for."²¹ Thus, the belief continued that İnönü and the People's Party leadership were not serious about changing the system, but were planning simply to continue old policies under the guise of reform. Opposition, to stress the government's abuse of power, accused the government of prolonging martial law in June 1945 in order to use its extraordinary powers to silence criticism in the Istanbul press.²² Even though the government attempted to justify its decision with the possibility of Soviet aggression, opponents maintained that singling out Istanbul was a political move in defense of the party rather than the country. In the spring of 1945 the gap between the opposition and the government was growing.

THE "STATEMENT OF THE FOUR," AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

On June 7, 1945, as debate on the Land Reform Bill continued, and on the same day Saraçoğlu made the announcement regarding the by-elections, Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü presented a list of demands to the People's Party Parliamentary Group for change in

the administration of the party and the government. Known as the Statement of the Four (Dörtlü Takrir), the note acknowledged the need to restrict constitutional rights in the interest of the security of the nation during the presidency of Atatürk and the Second World War, while pointing out the existing democratic nature of the Turkish Constitution of 1924. The statement argued that in line with the victory of the democracies in the war and the emergence of a new global accord, Turkey must remove all restrictions on civil liberties in order to take its place among the world's democracies by calling for three specific changes:

- 1) As the most natural consequence, and at the same time being the foundation of our national sovereignty, the National Assembly [must use its authority] to search for measures to fulfill not only the wording but also the spirit of our constitution.
- 2) Also, the ability of citizens to exercise their political rights and liberties according to the guarantees of our constitution [must be] ensured.
- 3) All endeavors of the [People's] Party [must be] put in order from a new beginning to conform to the above principles.²³

The note concluded with a statement affirming the belief in the principles established by Atatürk, and called on the People's Party to fulfill the promise of İnönü, made on May 19, 1945 to pursue more democratic practices in the administration of the party and the government.

The note led to a heated, seven-hour long debate on June 12 in a People's Party Parliamentary Group meeting, which İnönü chaired for the first time since becoming the Party's Permanent Leader in 1938.²⁴ Saracoğlu attacked the four signatories for ignoring proper procedure and argued that "since the aim of our friends is merely to change some laws that are not in accordance with our constitution, and some of the provisions of the party, [they should know] there are specific means for this purpose. They [should] propose them to the Assembly, and to the Party Congress." In his reply to the statement, İnönü argued that the issues raised in the note were already part of the People's Party program: "The [four] should not make their demands within the Party. Let them leave and openly oppose us, form their organization and enter the struggle as a separate party."²⁵ In response, the four claimed they had no intention of leaving the party, and Bayar declared: "this proposal was not submitted just to be retracted." The discussions came to a close as the Parliamentary Group voted to reject the statement on procedural grounds, thus not officially acknowledging its contents.²⁶

This rejection of the demands of Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan, and Köprülü by the People's Party Parliamentary Group left an ambivalent atmosphere in

the Assembly and in the country. In the midst of this uncertainty, the long-debated Land Reform Bill was passed by the National Assembly in June 1945, but the articles of this bill calling for expropriation of private land were barely enacted, and by 1947 only 36,000 *dönüms* (8,900 acres) of private land had been redistributed. Instead, state-owned land and *waqf* land was distributed, and in 1947 the People's Party decided to alter the bill to meet the demands of opponents. Some in the press expected that the opposition group would now break away from the People's Party in the Assembly. But the four leaders of the opposition chose not to express openly any plans to form a new party at this stage, and rumors about another party being formed by Aras were not warranted.²⁷

As the conflict brewed in the Assembly, a millionaire businessperson, Nuri Demirag, unexpectedly applied in July 1945 for permission from the government to form the National Advancement Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi), the first opposition party of the multi-party period. The party's platform called for the end of statism, a tougher position in relations with the Soviet Union, and closer relations with the Muslim world.²⁸ None of the party's founders were members of the Assembly, nor were they associated with Bayar's group. But their platform contained a number of planks that would become central to opposition parties in the post-war era.

CONTINUING OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PEOPLE'S PARTY

The rejection of their demands by the Parliamentary Group did not deter "the Four." Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan, and Köprülü used the occasion of the National Assembly's discussion of ratification of the United Nations Treaty to press their views that the victory of the democracies in the war proved that Turkey must also pursue democratic reforms. Menderes argued that the United Nations Charter and the Turkish Constitution were in total agreement on respect for fundamental human rights and political liberties, but the government had enacted a number of laws that violated these principles. Thus acceptance of the United Nations Charter also required elimination of these restrictions. In August and September 1945, Köprülü and Menderes extended calls for change beyond the Assembly and beyond the closed meetings of the People's Party, into a public forum. They expressed their views through editorials in the independent press, especially in *Vatan*, edited by Ahmed Emin Yalman, who had been a consistent critic of government policies and restrictions on the press and freedom of expression in Turkey.²⁹

A heated debate in the press was sparked by Fuat Köprülü, with an editorial in *Vatan* on August 25. Fuat Köprülü (1890–1966) was an historian of the Ottoman Empire, founder of the Institute of Turcology, and first director of the Turkish Historical Society. Descendant from a prominent family of Ottoman statesmen, he entered politics with his election to the Assembly in 1934. Köprülü condemned what he called the government's attempts to silence opposition by portraying it as reactionary and disloyal, especially through the coverage of opposition in the People's Party's official newspaper *Ulus* [The Nation]. The editor of *Ulus*, Falih Rifki Atay responded to Köprülü, but received a rebuke from Adnan Menderes, who joined Köprülü's criticism of the government with his own editorial in *Vatan*.³⁰ As this exchange in the press extended the debate within the party to a public arena, the government chose not to use its powers under martial law and the National Defense Law to force the closure of *Vatan* for its criticism, as it had done in 1944. Instead, on September 6, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu replied to Köprülü in the Assembly:

The war ended, but still peace has not taken its place. We have covered a long distance on the road of democracy. It is possible to reexamine the precautions that we have taken to protect the revolution. [But] meanwhile, in light of the fact that not one freedom [not already assured] has been called for in the reactionary materials in the continuing disputes in the newspapers, the resulting disagreement is not being solved.³¹

The week after Saraçoğlu's remarks, Menderes and Köprülü each received letters from the People's Party General Secretary, Nafi Atif Kansu, reminding them that they had been elected to the Assembly as People's Party members and thus were expected to uphold the standards and policies of this party. The letters said that lately each had shown opposition to the party's principles, and used improper methods to raise objections to party procedures. The letters asked Menderes and Köprülü to make clear to the party leadership their intentions for the future. Both of them replied that they were defending the principles of democracy, as well as the principles of the People's Party. They argued that the deviation from the founding principles of the People's Party was not to be found in their criticism, but in the current policies of the existing regime. When Menderes and Köprülü refused to alter their stances, the People's Party Executive Committee met on September 21, and decided to expel them from the party.³² Koraltan reacted to the expulsion with another series of critical articles, which led to his expulsion in November.

Throughout the conflict of the summer, Bayar had maintained a low profile. He had not published any critical articles, although he was known to support the views of Menderes and Köprülü. Bayar chose to take a less confrontational stance than his associates at the beginning. But, following the expulsion of Köprülü and Menderes, Bayar resigned his seat in the National Assembly, even though he kept his membership in the People's Party until December 1945. While his resignation from the Assembly was interpreted by some as a protest against the expulsions, others believed that his resignation signaled the formation of a new political party. Bayar later told Metin Toker, "Separating from the Republican People's Party was extremely difficult for me. It was like leaving my own home. Only after all of our decisions were made was I able to leave."³³ Indeed, by the time Bayar resigned from the People's Party, work on the new party's program had already begun.

During his speech to the National Assembly on November 1, 1945 İnönü defended the practices and policies of the government, arguing that it had achieved revolutionary changes in a short time, and "moreover, all of these reforms were carried out without the methods of a dictatorial regime, all were created by the laws of the National Assembly. . . ." İnönü rejected the arguments of those who accused his administration of being dictatorial: "besides the fact that dictatorship as a principle has never been accepted, it has always been seen as detrimental and unappealing to the Turkish nation." He took this opportunity to reaffirm his conviction in the establishment of a multi-party regime:

Our only shortcoming is that there is not a party in opposition to the ruling party. . . . But in line with the needs of the nation, and the natural functioning of freedom and democracy, it is possible to form another political party. . . . We can say with confidence that under every condition the administration of the people is on the road to advancement within the [atmosphere] of freedom and trust of our nation.

İnönü continued in his speech to promise legal changes that would eliminate unconstitutional laws and assure freedom of the press and association, and called for the next general elections in 1947 to be direct elections. But in his speech, İnönü also drew the boundaries of acceptability in this new era of Turkish politics. Foreign interests were not to be brought into domestic problems, and İnönü warned that political debate must not serve to weaken the government or damage the authority and reputation of the National Assembly.³⁴ This directive assumed that the multi-party system would control criticism and direct it constructively to support the function

of the existing order and its reforms. Along with believing that multi-party politics was an integral aspect of the advancement of the nation, İnönü was convinced that the new system would facilitate a more open and responsive government to the needs of the citizens and present a strong and democratic image in international relations. Overall, İnönü's November 1945 speech was another step toward a multi-party system. A month later, Bayar resigned his membership from the People's Party and announced that he would work to form a new opposition party.³⁵

Along with İnönü's speech in November, events in December 1945 redefined the limits on expression of opposition in Turkey. On December 4, as tensions in Turkish-Soviet relations escalated and opposition to the government in the press was hardening, a mob attacked and burned the presses of *Tan* [The Dawn], *La Turquie*, published by Cami Baykurt and Sabahattin Ali, *Yeni Dünya* [New World], and *Görüşler* [Debates], all considered "leftist" newspapers in Istanbul. Sabiha Sertel and Zekeriya Sertel, publishers of *Tan* were particular targets, whom the mob accused of being Russian agents and carriers of communist influence in Turkey. Sabiha Sertel (1895–1968) studied Sociology at Columbia University, before taking up a career as a journalist. Zekeriya Sertel (1890–1980) studied at the Sorbonne and Columbia. Together, the Sertels published a number of journals and newspapers, and were frequently under investigation or prosecution for "leftist" activities. Of the two, Sabiha was known as the more radical, and both left Turkey in 1950. Sabiha spent most of the rest of her life in the Soviet Union.

The rioters who attacked the offices of *Tan* carried placards denouncing the Soviets and "communist sympathizers" in Turkey, and also destroyed a "leftist" bookstore in Istanbul. Rumors circulated that the attack not only stemmed from animosity toward the Soviet Union, but was sponsored, or at least condoned, by the government to silence opposition. The Soviet news agency Tass called the demonstrators who had destroyed the presses "cut-throats and fascist hooligans who staged a pogrom against democratic institutions," and said that the "organizers of the Istanbul pogrom indubitably beat all records in hypocrisy."³⁶ The "press offensive" kept up through the spring, reflecting the ongoing tensions in Turkish-Soviet relations.

Through *Tan* the Sertels had been vocal opponents of the government since 1944. Throughout the summer and fall, along with Yalman of *Vatan*, Zekeriya Sertel had published editorials against what he called anti-democratic practices, featuring writers such as Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Behice Boran, a professor at Ankara University.³⁷ Moreover, Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel had both supported the efforts of "the Four," and invited Bayar,

Menderes, Köprülü, Koraltan, and Aras to contribute articles for a new weekly, *Görüşler*. In fact, the first issue of December 1 carried pictures of all five on the cover, promising articles by them the next week. After the attack, Bayar, Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan immediately published letters in the press disavowing any association with *Görüşler*, and pointing out that they were not sympathizers of communism.³⁸ Bayar, who had maintained relations with the Sertels and Aras until 1945, was careful to distance himself after the incident, assuming that both the government and the public associated the "left" with Soviet aggression. Even though Menderes later said that in relation to the People's Party, the Democrat Party was "to the right on some issues, and a little to the left on others,"³⁹ the definition of "left" moved to the center in the new party's platform. As a result, it became clear that as the tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey continued to escalate, leftist alternatives were not supported by the government or by its "accepted" opposition. By being pushed away from the mainstream at this early stage of multi-party politics, leftist debate would become marginal in the following period. As debates were reflecting the entrance of Turkish domestic politics into a new era, they also carried the influence of changes in foreign relations in the post-war world.

DOMESTIC POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS: THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

Turkey's declaration of war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945 resulted in Turkey's participation in the United Nations, and led to an invitation to the San Francisco Conference. The conference held out the promise of an international order after the war that would allow small states like Turkey to maintain their autonomy and independence in foreign relations, and also serve to protect them from the aggression of the major powers. Diplomatically isolated at the end of the war, faced with Soviet hostility, and uncertain of their position in international politics following the defeat of Germany, Turkish leaders believed that through an international organization Turkey could retain relative autonomy in diplomatic affairs, not having to depend on one of the major powers for support. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the former Foreign Minister, reflecting Turkish leaders' views, wrote in *Tan*, "for practically every nation of the world, having passed through six years of war that appeared would never end, the first joyful news to make faces smile is the announcement of the San Francisco Conference." Necmettin Sadak, in *Aksam* [The Evening] agreed that "the

San Francisco Conference ... is being seen as the first step ... that will form the peace and security of tomorrow.”⁴⁰

With expectations of a new accord from the San Francisco Conference, İnönü appointed the Foreign Minister Hasan Saka to lead the delegation, which also included the Ambassador to the United States, Hüseyin Ragip Baydur. According to Ahmed Emin Yalman, who accompanied the delegation as editor of the newly reopened *Vatan*,

It was generally expected that the representatives of forty-nine nations would set to work with noble zeal to erect indestructible moral barricades against the demons of war. They would meet each other cordially and act as trustees and servants of the ideals of equity, honesty and security; they would forget greed and self-interest and be mindful of the interdependence of human beings above all racial, religious or even national barriers to unity of purpose.⁴¹

Contrary to expectations, from the beginning the conference served to emphasize the continued dominance of the big powers in international affairs. The creation of a Security Council, with five permanent members who held veto power over the Council's decisions, belied the promise of a democratic organization aimed at protecting all nations from aggression. The San Francisco Conference perpetuated the domination of the big powers, and was part of the process of the polarization of international politics in the post-war period. İnönü later interpreted this outcome as inevitable:

The San Francisco Conference of 1945 and the inauguration of the United Nations marked the peak of friendship between the Allies. Great hopes were centered on the United Nations as an institution of peace. ... But ... the pressure of world events, led to a situation in which the lining up of the nations in two opposing groups could not be avoided.⁴²

After the San Francisco Conference, Turkish leaders again confronted an uneasy task of attempting to balance relations between two competing powers. Turkey was to abandon the security of self-reliance and relative autonomy of pursuing relations with different sides, as conditions were forcing Turkey to pronounce its foreign policy according to the terms of an increasingly bi-polar world. Turkish leaders interpreted the outcome of the San Francisco Conference to mean that while non-belligerency was debatable during World War II, in the post-war period it was no longer an option. According to Yalman, “The medium and small powers had no

choice but to seek the protection of a big power and to enter into a strictly feudal sort of relationship—service and obedience—the price for protection.”⁴³ Indeed, during the years following World War II, Turkish policy makers found that along with non-belligerency, isolation was also no longer an option. In fact participation in the international organization that failed to establish democratic participation of small powers in global affairs meant a reduction of their options in foreign relations, leading to the development of relationships that did not confront the post-war imbalances, but reinforced them. Although İnönü and Turkish leaders saw the problems developing out of the San Francisco Conference, and subsequently the United Nations, they felt they had only limited choices.

THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR FOR TURKEY: SOVIET PRESSURE

While Turkey worked to protect its rights at the San Francisco Conference, events were already beginning to shape the possible boundaries of Turkish foreign policy in the post-war period. At the Yalta Conference of the Allied leaders in February 1945, Josef Stalin had mentioned Soviet intentions to seek revision of the Montreux Convention governing the Regime of the Turkish Straits, since “he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered ... [and] that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat.”⁴⁴ Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt agreed on revision of the Montreux Convention, in order to reassert international supervision of Turkey’s administration of the Straits. The conference ended with an agreement that modification of the Montreux Convention should be considered at a later date and that Turkey should be informed that the matter had been discussed at Yalta.⁴⁵

After the Yalta meeting, the Soviet Union raised the issue directly with Turkey, rather than with the American and British governments. On March 19, 1945 Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, in a note to the Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper, announced the Soviet Union’s intentions of not renewing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Turkey.⁴⁶

The note did not make explicit demands or suggestions as to what the Soviet Union expected in return for extending the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Since it was submitted in accordance with the existing treaty, and was a proposal for revision, the Turkish cabinet decided not to interpret the note as a hostile act. But according to Feridun Cemal Erkin, a member of the Turkish delegation to the San Francisco Conference, the

state of Turkish-Soviet relations was a source of concern because of the timing of the denunciation as well as the uncertainty that it brought regarding future relations at the beginning of Turkish participation in the United Nations.⁴⁷ Thus it reinforced the conviction of İnönü and the cabinet even on the eve of the San Francisco Conference that not peace, but struggle and conflict would shape the post-war world.

Finally, on June 7, 1945, as the San Francisco Conference continued, Molotov met with Ambassador Sarper to present the Soviet government's demands for a new treaty: the cession of territory in eastern Anatolia to the Soviet Union, the establishment of Soviet military bases on the Dardanelles, and a bilateral agreement regarding future revision of the Montreux Convention.⁴⁸ These demands were virtually identical to demands Molotov had first presented to then Foreign Minister Saracoğlu during his trip to Moscow in October 1939, and that the Soviet government had reiterated during the war in negotiations with both the Germans and the Allies.

On June 18, Sarper informed Molotov that the Turkish government found the Soviet demands unacceptable as a base for negotiation of a new treaty. Sarper told Molotov that Turkey was interested in renewing the treaty, and in continued Turkish-Soviet friendship, but that the Turkish government would not negotiate its sovereign territorial rights with any nation. Moreover, Sarper pointed out that the Montreux Convention was a multilateral agreement, which could be altered only by another international conference, and bilateral negotiations would serve no purpose.⁴⁹ In early July, Saracoğlu talked to the new American Ambassador, Edwin Wilson, about the Turkish position regarding Soviet demands: "All Turkey wants is to be let alone to work out our social and economic questions. We are no danger to anyone.... Our concern is to safeguard our territory. We will not accept Soviet domination."⁵⁰ The Soviet posture did not come as a surprise, but it raised a debate within Turkey regarding how to respond, in terms of whether to reject outright any negotiations, or whether to seek improved relations and express a willingness to continue talks. Ziyat Ebuzziya, writing in *Tasvir* [Description] a conservative newspaper, argued that the Soviet Union's demands contradicted its own commitment to the Charter of the United Nations being prepared in San Francisco, and that a move against the Charter could cause a third world war. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, in *Tanin*, maintained that Soviet pressure on the countries of the Middle East could lead to hostilities between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, sparking another general war. But Zekeriya Sertel, in *Tan*, accused Yalçın of being busy "with spreading an air of anxiety and alarm in the

country." Sertel argued that Soviet intentions were as yet unclear, but panic mongers were obfuscating Soviet policy and clouding the possibilities for Turkish-Soviet friendship.⁵¹

According to Feridun Cemal Erkin, as he traveled by train through Anatolia after returning from San Francisco, the people favored action:

Perceiving the danger, the Turkish nation was in complete control and calm. With its famous boldness, belief in the homeland and trust in God, it was ready once more to carry out its duty. In Turkey I found the opportunity to witness personally the national sentiment, born of a love for the soil, and fed by the most noble and oldest warrior-like and historical traditions, continuing and unmistakable despite the enemy's superior strength or even the seriousness of the situation.⁵²

İnönü and the cabinet, who had believed that World War II would eventually enter Turkey from the Soviet border, meanwhile contemplated the impact of a stronger alliance between Turkey, the United States, and Britain as a deterrent to Soviet demands.

The Soviet demands, and Turkey's rejection of them, also caused the United States and Britain to reconsider their own positions regarding Turkey. The British foresaw that Soviet bases on the Dardanelles could present a danger to British interests in the Mediterranean, and approached the problem on a global level. By calling on the American government on June 18, Britain asked the United States to join in "firm representations to the USSR... on the grounds that Russian desiderata concerned the powers responsible for the World Security Organization and that Molotov's action is contrary to explicit assurances given by Marshal Stalin at Yalta."⁵³ British planners favored approaching the Soviets before the Potsdam Conference, instead of confronting Stalin during the meeting. But the American government expressed reluctance to approach the Soviets prior to Potsdam, for fear of spoiling the air at the meeting. Along with the Turkish government, the United States sought to avoid making the discussions between Molotov and Sarper seem even more hostile and threatening than they really were.⁵⁴ The Americans were trying to maintain the impression that the conversations between Molotov and Sarper were strictly preliminary, and did not represent the Soviets' final word on the subject of renewing the treaty with Turkey. Since Turkey's position was clear, discussion among the Allies regarding the Soviet demands on Turkey was delayed until the meeting between Churchill, Stalin, and Harry Truman at Potsdam, July 16 to August 2.

POTSDAM AND INCREASING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

Two issues regarding Turkey came up at the Potsdam meeting, Soviet demands for territorial concessions in eastern Turkey, and alteration of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulated Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. During the Conference, Churchill stressed to Stalin that revision of the Regime of the Straits could not be left to bi-lateral negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, and offered restricted support for revision of the Montreux Convention by multi-lateral discussions.

During the conference, Stalin argued that the Turkish province of Kars had formerly been the territory of Armenia and Georgia, and that any mutual defense of borders would depend on the borders being correct. That correction would require territorial concessions from Turkey.⁵⁵ Thus, Stalin maintained that "if there were no territorial concessions, Turkey could not expect an alliance."⁵⁶

Regarding the Straits, Stalin argued that under the present regime a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal.⁵⁷

Churchill agreed with Stalin that the Straits should be open to Soviet merchant and warships in times of peace or war, while Truman countered both Churchill and Stalin with a proposal that all of the world's waterways be open and free for passage by ships of all nations. Soviet policy makers were not prepared for the American proposal for international control of the Straits along with other waterways. The following day, July 24, Stalin withdrew from the discussion of waterways, claiming that the question of the Straits was apparently not "ripe" for a solution. But, he stressed that the Soviet Union would continue bi-lateral negotiations with Turkey on that matter.⁵⁸

The Potsdam Conference ended with an ambivalent atmosphere among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union regarding the Straits and a less than firm commitment to the sovereignty of Turkey in the post-war period. The results outraged Turkish leaders, who interpreted the British and American initiatives as lukewarm support of Turkish territorial rights.

Prime Minister Saracoğlu had already told the American Ambassador before the conference that "he could not believe that [the United States] wanted Turkey to carry on further conversations with the USSR on matters relating to cession of Turkish bases and territory."⁵⁹ After the conference, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Hüseyin Ragip Baydur, disclosed his government's view to George Allen of the State Department that

Several things have happened...which...indicate a...letdown in American support for Turkey. The first of these was [the American] refusal to participate with the British in making representations to the Russians...regarding Russian demands on Turkey. The American reference to the fact that the Russian-Turkish conversations had been "friendly" was disappointing to Turkey, because no demand for two Turkish provinces could possibly be regarded as friendly.

The Ambassador further protested that at the Potsdam Conference the United States had taken the attitude that use of the Straits should be unrestricted at all times, in which case "there would be nothing to prevent Russia from sailing its entire...fleet into the Sea of Marmara at any time, leveling its guns at Istanbul, and presenting Turkey with demands."⁶⁰

In August 1945 the Turkish government issued a communiqué stating its position on the American proposal at Potsdam regarding the Straits. The communiqué to the British and American governments listed two conditions under which Turkey would consider revision of the Montreux Convention: "a) There must be not one restriction on Turkey's sovereignty and security in either theory or practice. b) The suggested changes must leave no room for any disagreement in Turkish-Soviet relations and must put a definite end to the period of tension that gave rise to the Russian demands."⁶¹ Along with reinforcing their position, throughout the summer and fall Turkish leaders maintained that further talks deviating from these guidelines would only reduce Turkish sovereignty, while increasing Soviet privileges. On November 1, 1945, in his address to the National Assembly, İnönü recalled the service Turkey had given to the Allies in the war, and expressed his indignity at the Soviet demands of the summer: "To demand territory and rights over Turkey cannot be justified even under the slightest pretext.... We say openly that we have no obligation to anybody to give up Turkish territory or rights. We will live as honorable people, and we will die as honorable people."⁶²

The Turkish press reflected İnönü's unequivocal rejection of the Soviet demands, and his expectation of support from the Western powers. Asım Us, in *Vakit* [Time], argued that "these words are holding a projection

of divine wisdom in front of our eyes, taking its strength only from logic and right." Nadir Nadi, of *Cumhuriyet* [The Republic] wrote "just as we have walked a road we know to be right without losing our way until today, from now on we will continue walking with the same firm steps."⁶³

Despite Turkish reservations, American planners continued to develop a proposal for negotiations for revision of the Montreux Convention to place the Straits under international control. On November 2, 1945, American Ambassador Wilson presented the Turkish government with a proposal to resume negotiations with the Soviets, based on Truman's belief "that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and all rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country."⁶⁴ Apparently oblivious to the fact that neither of these conditions actually applied directly to the Straits, or to the Turkish situation, the Americans proposed that the Straits should be open to commercial vessels of all nations at all times, and that the Straits be open to warships of the Black Sea powers at all times. Moreover, the warships of non-Black Sea powers were to be denied access in time of war, except with the permission of the Black Sea powers or of the authority of the United Nations.⁶⁵

Turkish leaders pointed out that the proposal had some serious flaws, the most important of which was that if the Black Sea powers had the right to pass ships at all times, without restrictions on number or weight, the Soviets and their allies could send whole navies into the Straits at the same time. Taking away Turkey's right to close the Straits during time of war could also mean that Turkey would have to allow passage of Soviet ships even if the two countries were at war. Thus, like the Potsdam Conference, the American initiative of November 2 left continued uncertainties about Turkish-American relations, and American support for Turkey against Soviet pressure. Turkey was now sandwiched in the middle of an increasingly bi-polar world, and the issue was no longer just risking diplomatic isolation. Increasing tensions led Turkey to respond to the American proposal later in the month of November 1945. It seemed that Turkish policy makers chose an option that even though not favorable, was negotiable. Accepting the American note of November 2 as a basis for an international conference to be held at some date in 1946, the Turkish government also informed the Soviet Union that it awaited a response to the American proposals and an offer for a date to begin negotiations. The Soviets took nearly nine months to formulate a formal reply to Turkey's offer. In the meantime, Turkey,

Britain, and the United States began to reconsider their own policies, and the potential for closer cooperation.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC CONCERNS, AND "THE PROBLEM OF TURKEY"

During the fall and winter of 1945–46, British officials calculated the weight of Soviet pressure on Turkey, concluding that "direct action by Russia against Turkey seems improbable at present." However, the British felt that Turkey should be encouraged to maintain a high level of military mobilization despite the strain it placed on the Turkish economy. The British Ambassador in Moscow reported his view that "the first essential to the safety of Turkey is that the Turks themselves should stand firm," and that the United States and Britain should show unwavering support.⁶⁶ The Americans, echoing İnönü's earlier call for international support against Soviet pressure, concurred with the decision that a show of backing for Turkey would deter further Soviet demands. The American Ambassador, Wilson, raised another issue that was central to Cold War debates: the Soviet objective was "to bring about change in Turkey's internal regime," to replace it with a "friendly" regime. According to Wilson, "The Soviet pressure on Turkey ... forcing Turkey to maintain large military forces mobilized with consequent strain on [the] already unsatisfactory economic situation is doubtless intended to 'soften up' Turkey." Wilson argued that a "friendly" regime in Turkey "under Soviet domination would mean ... termination of the Turkish-British alliance and the end of western liberal influence in Turkey and probably ultimately in the Middle East." With this warning, he claimed that Soviet tactics had not so far succeeded in "softening up" Turkey. "But any agreement among the great powers giving Russia a privileged position at the Straits at the expense of Turkish security would so upset conditions in Turkey as conceivably to bring about the downfall of the present regime with the resultant situation playing into Soviet hands."⁶⁷ These multiple scenarios, as a whole, reflected the conviction of British and American planners that supporting Turkey would ultimately help prevent Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Along with this conviction, they also believed in Turkish determination to stand up to Soviet aggression. The Turkish media voiced firm confidence that "the whole of Turkey is ready to throw itself into the fire for one inch of Turkish soil." Along with the media, Turkish policy makers reiterated their position.

Cevat Açıkalın, the former Ambassador to Moscow, asserted the "Turkish government was quite resolved not to yield to Soviet pressure."⁶⁸ While determined to resist Soviet pressure, Turkish leaders believed that the Soviets would try to achieve their goals by bluffing and posturing, and could be deterred from risking a war that would certainly involve the United States and Britain. In December, Saracoğlu told the press that the Turkish government was pleased with the efforts of the British and American governments toward helping to improve Turkish-Soviet relations. Along with this statement, the Turkish government began to work to convince the Americans to expand their long-term commitment to the security of the region and to closer economic relations with Turkey. In February 1945 the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Turkey had been renewed, and in the fall, Turkey raised the issue of increased trade with the United States, and the possibility of a loan to support industrialization efforts. The American government agreed to talks on both issues.⁶⁹

These developments reflected continuing British and American fears regarding the creation of a regime in Turkey "friendly" to the Soviets, and encouraged creating blueprints to assure that Turkey would remain "friendly" to the West. Convinced that discontent generated by economic problems could be used by the Soviets, the British and Americans sought economic and political reform within Turkey to assure that it would remain out of the Soviet camp. In effect, Western planners decided that Turkey had to be "softened up" and made "friendly" to their side in the emerging struggle between the Soviet Union and Britain and America.

The tactics were outlined as policy makers debated the extent of a Western commitment. In August 1945, an official in the British Foreign Office, Geoffrey McDermott, declared that "fear of Russian intentions dominates Turkish policy at the moment." He argued that because of that fear, Turkey would seek the protection of Britain and the United States. But he believed the "undemocratic" nature of the Turkish political system, and Turkish economic policy could stand in the way of truly close relations. McDermott pointed out that in the past the British had tried to convince the Turkish government of the need for new economic policies, and should renew efforts to give "salutary advice": "I think that we should... tell the Turkish government officially that, however unpalatable it may be, they should in their own interests, including the interests of Anglo-Turkish relations, grasp the nettle." McDermott continued:

A more delicate question still is that of Turkish internal political organization.... The Turkish system of government is on the face of it more a

farcade of democracy than a genuinely democratic organization.... I feel that it should in some way be made clear to the Turkish Government that sympathy for Turkey in this country, and hence our ability to support Turkey, would be greatly strengthened if a more democratic system could be set up.⁷⁰

At a time when the British government was working to nationalize industries in Britain, the Turkish government came under pressure from within and from American advisors to expand the private sector and to reduce government control of trade, investment, and production.

While the Western powers pretended not to interfere in Turkish domestic affairs, they continued to insist that changes in economic policy favoring the private sector and foreign investment would encourage a more favorable stance in the West toward loans and financial assistance to Turkey, and they followed closely the development of the multi-party political system after May 1945. While the new era of multi-party politics in Turkey meant democratization of the political process, it also brought a wide range of possible changes. The Democrat Party, the first major party to be formed in opposition to the ruling People's Party, by Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan, reduced Western concerns regarding a political development reflecting Soviet influence. The platform of the Democrat party promised greater encouragement of the private sector and foreign investment, while maintaining the commitment to closer ties with the Western powers, and continued opposition to Soviet pressure. As the new party declared: "Along with retaining the opinion that the national existence can be protected only with national strength, we believe a peaceful and open foreign policy aimed at the unity of nations to be the most suitable and realistic path for the nation's interests."⁷¹ Thus with this development, the Americans and British felt encouraged that Turkey's allegiance to the West would not be challenged by a powerful opposition party, while the political debates on economic issues would benefit Western economic interests in Turkey.

In the aftermath of World War II and the victory of the Allies, Turkish policy makers, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals were confronted by the stark realities of an emerging bi-polar world, in which the possibilities for countries like Turkey to choose their own paths in international relations and domestic politics would be increasingly circumscribed by the conflict between the Americans and the Soviets. From the beginning of new debate within the People's Party and in the National Assembly, post-war Turkish political discourse was shaped by the limited possibilities of

this bi-polar reality, and the security concerns of World War II were replaced by the security concerns of the post-war world. Thus, political discourse continued to reflect the constricted imagination of Kemalism, with its stress on progress and outcome over process, as well as the need to conform with the models of Cold War international political discourse.

Chapter Seven

The Emergence of the Democrat Party The Challenge, and Limits, of Organized Opposition

In the period from late 1945 into 1947 the possibilities as well as limits of a multi-party system in Turkey were defined by the opening and organization of a number of new political parties, representing perspectives across the spectrum, from socialist to religious. The most significant of the new parties proved to be the Democrat Party, formed in 1946 by Celâl Bayar and former People's Party members. From the beginning the Democrat Party leaders presented themselves as the party that could bring an end to the rule of the People's Party, while bringing the least upheaval and disruption. At the same time, hostility toward Bayar and his associates and toward the very idea of multi-party politics, within the People's Party, meant that the continued existence of the Democrat Party and its chances of electoral success were uncertain.

The developing Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union made the post-war period a time of uncertainty and tension, and served to emphasize the dangers of experimentation in domestic policy, which could put all of the development and progress achieved under the Republic at risk. But increasing American military influence also carried with it a model of a stable and powerful two-party system, juxtaposed against the failed single-party Fascist regimes and the hostile Communist regime of the Soviet Union, and promised stronger relations with the Western powers.

Throughout 1945 and 1946 the multi-party experiment remained just that: an experiment in altering the relationship between the people and the

state. But in July 1947, İsmet İnönü issued a firm declaration, coinciding with a treaty of assistance with the United States, that the multi-party system was to be a permanent feature of Turkish politics. But even with İnönü's July 12 Declaration, the boundaries of acceptable political discussion remained circumscribed, and democracy in Cold War Turkey developed in continuity with Kemalism, with its stress on the centrality of state power to achieve development and progress. Discourse remained limited to the best ways to interpret and enact the Kemalist program. Groups on the left and right that proposed alternatives to Kemalism were silenced, reflecting both the possibilities and the limitations of the Cold War.

THE FORMATION OF THE DEMOCRAT PARTY: PLATFORM AND ORGANIZATION

In their first months as founders of the new opposition party in the Assembly, Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan faced the tasks of developing a party platform and setting up a new political party organization. The new party's founders also confronted the problem of how to exchange criticism as an opposition party, as well as establishing a working relationship with the ruling party. Their major challenge was to establish and maintain the party's identity and exist within the vaguely defined limits of acceptable political activity.

Following completion of the plans and platform of the new party, Bayar suggested submission of the details to President İnönü as a "nice gesture." Bayar gave İnönü a Democrat Party button, and a statement of the new party's platform. İnönü, without reading the document, asked Bayar if the program supported secularism and education, and if it called for changes in foreign policy. When Bayar said the new party would respect secular principles, support education and that there was no deviation on foreign policy, İnönü replied, "in that case, it is fine."¹

After the meeting with İnönü, on January 7, 1946 Bayar, Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan announced the formation of the new party. Throughout December, there had been speculation regarding the name of the party. Some of the names considered were the Democrat People's Party, the Kemalist Democrat Party, and the Peasant and Farmer Party. According to Metin Toker, the selection of the name Democrat Party reflected the influence of the American two-party system.² The program of the new Democrat Party reflected the experience of its founders as members of the People's Party. The program pronounced that the Democrat

Party's chief goal was the achievement of "democracy," which came to mean free and fair elections, an end to arbitrary and authoritarian rule, and greater respect for the rule of law. The Democrat Party platform called for changes in the Association Law, in election laws, and for sovereignty for universities. In economic policy the Democrat Party pledged to support "liberal statism" by which the state would support the development of industry as well as the private sector. The program suggested that state enterprises should be gradually turned over to the private sector, while government control of trade and investment was reduced. It also outlined greater support for the agricultural sector, giving it a more prominent role in Turkey's development. The Democrat Party program called for a reduction of taxes, greater efforts to control inflation, and for cutting the size of the bureaucracy.³

The program of the Democrat Party reflected the influence of landowners and private merchants and manufacturers. At the same time, however, it was not widely divergent from the platform of the People's Party, offering more a difference of emphasis than a complete alternative. Upon its creation, many in Turkey saw the Democrat Party as no more than a foil for criticism, and believed it would have no real function, and would not last. Since the founding principles of the new party seemed to run parallel to the platform of the People's Party, and basically continued to call for more democratic principles and greater support for private property and private enterprise, the Democrat Party seemed to have trouble distinguishing itself from the ruling party on other issues. While some of the critics of the Democrat Party derided its supporters as being war profiteers and black marketeers, leaders of the People's Party greeted its foundation with enthusiasm. They saw the Democrat Party as an extension of the People's Party, administered by leaders who were long-term associates in the National Assembly and fundamentally calling for reform and adjustment rather than radical changes.

One of the most important tasks confronting the Democrat Party was establishment of a national organization to widen its base and gather support. The first provincial branch was symbolically established in Samsun, the Black Sea port where Atatürk had landed in 1919 to join the national resistance. Thereafter, the Democrat Party quickly organized a number of provincial branches, and by March 1946 had organizations in sixteen provinces.⁴ After initial hesitation, support for the new party began to grow rapidly, especially among private merchants and manufacturers, government employees, intellectuals, workers, and landowners in western Anatolia who produced commercial crops. As support began to grow, it reinforced

the Democrat Party leaders' position against what they described as undemocratic and unconstitutional administrative practices, and the economic policies of the People's Party, and İnönü's policies. Coupled with the unpreparedness of the People's Party leadership at the fast-growing support of the Democrat Party, the continuation of sharp criticism of the government locked both parties into a contentious political struggle.

In March 1946 Bayar publicly protested that government officials were interfering in the efforts of the Democrat Party to organize in the provinces: "The party has received even more support from the people and is developing even faster than hoped for, but organizing committees have met with obstructions from some provincial governors."⁵ Bayar also carried his protest to the foreign press, complaining that the ruling party was obstructing the new opposition and the adoption of a democratic system. Bayar's move angered İnönü. He believed Turkey's domestic politics were not an appropriate subject for discussion with foreigners, especially at a time when it was important for Turkey to project a strong, unified image. In May, Fuat Köprülü repeated Bayar's attempt to draw foreign as well as domestic attention by discussing Turkey's domestic situation with two American papers: "the Turkish government is guilty of using illegal and undemocratic methods in the nation's politics."⁶ Foreign pressure was becoming an aspect of multi-party politics and Turkey's image abroad was becoming a prominent issue in multi-party debates.

TENSIONS IN THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

In the spring and summer of 1946, the struggle between the People's Party and the Democrat Party led to a number of decisions regarding relations between the parties and elections that became integral to political debate in the multi-party period. In April, the People's Party Parliamentary Group decided to move forward municipal elections from September to May, arguing that moving the municipal elections forward would facilitate testing of a new direct election system before the general elections. The Democrat Party saw the decision as an attempt to hold elections before it was prepared, and decided to boycott the municipal elections as a protest. In announcing the boycott, Bayar again accused the People's Party of being undemocratic and unconstitutional. People's Party deputies defended the decision's legitimacy, and argued that the decision was not based on the preparedness of the opposition. Furthermore, they claimed that regardless, the Democrat Party could not have been ready for elections even in September.

In May, in a special session of the People's Party leadership, İnönü argued that despite his original promise not to hold general elections until 1947, "the realities of foreign and domestic politics have shown the need to adjust the nation's administration immediately." Thus, the municipal elections had to be moved forward in order to test the new direct election system prior to general elections that he now envisioned for the summer of 1946.⁷ İnönü promised that government officials, many of whom were also members of the People's Party, would not interfere in the upcoming elections, which would be free and fair: "If we win we will continue in our duty. If we lose, we will cross the aisle to become the opposition and we will work to defend our ideas and policies; and even on that path, while remaining friendly to the party in power, we will take pleasure from appreciating and encouraging its successes and its service."⁸ Furthermore, İnönü used the special session of the People's Party to institute reforms within the party to redefine his position as leader of the People's Party, by eliminating his position as Permanent Leader of the People's Party, and by changing the position of Party Leader to a four-year elected position. This alteration of the status of the party leader also brought an end to use of the term *National Chief*. Besides discussions on the election and changes in the position of Party Leader, the meeting also agreed to abolish the Independent Group, formed by İnönü to facilitate discussion in the Assembly in 1939.⁹

This meeting signaled the passage to multi-party politics for the People's Party. As such, it was aimed as a response to criticism of the Democrat Party, and was an attempt to address some of the issues that had been repeatedly raised by intellectuals and the press, such as revision of the University Law to grant governing autonomy, and changes in the Press Law transferring regulative functions from the administrative to the judicial branch of the government. The meeting discussed the controversial Association Law, proposing changes to allow the formation of organizations based on class interests, such as unions and special interest political parties.¹⁰ These issues, now properties of the multi-party debates, were brought by the People's Party leadership to the National Assembly, which adopted the proposed changes in the summer of 1946.

Even though concessions were given, the changes remained on the surface, and they did not fulfill the demands of the opposition. For example, the new Association Law allowed the formation of labor unions, and within months hundreds of unions were formed around the country. But the new law continued the ban on strikes, severely limiting the power of the unions. As a result, opponents of the government attacked these

changes as "half-measures," accusing the government of trying to perpetuate undemocratic practices under the facade of democratic reforms.

THE 1946 GENERAL ELECTION

After the Democrat Party's boycott of the May 1946 municipal elections, the National Assembly voted in June to hold the general election on July 21, one year ahead of schedule. The Democrat Party protested the decision, and considered another boycott.¹¹ But provincial Democrat Party leaders insisted on participation, to gain notoriety and to obtain more seats in the Assembly. İnönü publicly reminded the parties of the critical times confronting Turkey; not only was Turkey living a troubled period in foreign affairs, and facing conflict with the Soviet Union, but also multi-party elections were a challenge to the unity of the country. İnönü asserted that as President he would not tolerate disruption or actions by the opposition that would harm national security: "To this I will give no chance. I am a revolutionary and a nationalist. We brought this state from nothing to the level it has today. We will not turn it over to a few plunderers. What we are doing is an experiment. If we are successful, that is great. If not, we will give up and continue a few more years under the old system. After that we will try again."¹² During the month-long campaign for the general election of 1946 the People's Party campaigned as the party of the nation, of Atatürk, and of the revolution, reminding voters that the People's Party administration had led Turkey through the Second World War, and that it was the only party with governing experience. The Democrat Party's platform overlapped in many areas with that of the People's Party, and while failing to present itself as a clear alternative, the Democrat Party concentrated on criticizing the ruling party on issues such as high taxes, inflation, government interference in the economy, and restrictive and undemocratic practices. Thus the Democrat Party hoped to establish its candidacy on the discontent within Turkish society with the existing system.

By the summer of 1946, the Democrat Party was the most popular and best organized of the opposition parties, but others were emerging to offer alternatives to the People's Party as well as to the Democrat Party. In May the Turkish Socialist Party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*) was founded, and in June the Socialist Workers and Peasant Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*) was formed. They competed among other parties formed in the spring and summer of 1946, but did not win any seats in the 1946 election. Both parties were closed in December 1946

as part of a government crackdown against leftists and supposed Soviet sympathizers.¹³

With the creation of the direct election system in the 1946 multi-party general election, candidates and parties had to take their campaign directly to the people of Turkey. Candidates journeyed to villages and towns to meet voters.¹⁴ As the campaign developed, huge crowds met candidates at rallies. When Fevzi Çakmak, the former Chief of the General Staff announced his candidacy as an independent on the Democrat ticket, a crowd of twenty thousand turned out in Istanbul to greet him. Çakmak's support of the Democrat Party came as a blow to the People's Party leaders who had offered him a place in the Assembly as a People's Party deputy five times since his retirement in 1944. Çakmak had always refused, claiming he was not interested in politics. Slogans and campaign posters also became a way to bring the parties' message to the people, such as the Democrat Party poster that showed a hand held up in a gesture of "stop," with a caption reading *Yeter! (Enough!)*.¹⁵

The 1946 general elections were held without incident, although not without some interference from government officials during the campaign and election. In early July, Hilmi Uran, Minister of the Interior, had ordered all government officials to show impartiality in their dealings with the different parties, but rumors circulated that some tried to prove their loyalty to the regime by stuffing ballot boxes.¹⁶ When the ballots were counted, the People's Party won 395 seats. Among the 273 candidates of the Democrat Party, 66 were elected. The Democrat Party won outright in 12 provinces, mostly in the area around Istanbul, and it won 17 of 27 seats in Istanbul. The People's Party did best in the east, and in rural areas, where its organization was stronger. Independent candidates, including Çakmak, won 4 seats in the National Assembly.¹⁷

Democrat Party leaders immediately accused the People's Party of corruption. Bayar would later claim that before the elections the People's Party had offered to arrange the elections to give the Democrat Party 60–62 seats in the Assembly in return for its support of continued People's Party rule. Bayar says he rejected the offer, but knew the People's Party had rigged the elections when the results were announced. According to Bayar's calculations, the Democrat Party had actually won 279 seats and the People's Party only 186.¹⁸ Despite warnings from the martial law authorities in Istanbul that they would not tolerate accusations of fraud in the press, three papers carried Bayar's allegations. Two of them, pro-Democrat Party papers, were immediately shut down, but a pro-People's Party paper was allowed to continue publication. This treatment further fueled the

argument between the two parties over the results of the election, an argument that continued well into the autumn after the new Assembly began its session.¹⁹

In response to the controversy over the results, İnönü announced the elections a success for Turkey, and called for an end to the animosity for the good of the country:

We are now entering a new era in the national life of Turkey. Above all the first obligation is to open the new era with calm in the country, with each side forgiving and forgetting the agitated words of the campaign.... As a nation, in the National Assembly, the municipalities and in the press, we will test the ability of the ruling party and opposition parties to work together productively. The success of this test will be beneficial to the generations of today and the future.²⁰

İnönü believed now that the elections were completed, politics should end and governing should resume. Wary that continuing division could sap the strength and damage the prestige of the government, both at home and abroad, İnönü moved to control dissent and to exert the power of the government by appointing Recep Peker as Prime Minister, replacing Sükrü Saraçoğlu, who had served for four years.

THE RECEP PEKER CABINET: CAUTION AND CONTROL IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

Recep Peker had always been known as a "law and order" leader in the People's Party. Since the 1930s, serving in leadership positions in the People's Party, Peker had advocated greater extension of the powers of the government, and had favored the use of coercion if necessary to enact and enforce reforms. A strong proponent of statism, Peker was also known to be skeptical, if not hostile, to the idea of establishing a multi-party system. As one of the Assembly members who had openly opposed the Saraçoğlu cabinet in 1945, Peker had frequently advocated more responsive government that would solve Turkey's economic problems in the post-war world. His appointment as Prime Minister reflected the decision of İnönü and the party leaders to start a new period with a new cabinet, along with their commitment to maintaining the strength of the People's Party government to deal with complex issues in foreign affairs, as well as the increasing complexity of domestic affairs.

In his first speech to the Assembly as Prime Minister, Peker said at the beginning of this new period, the Assembly's first task was to overcome the acrimony and hostility generated by the election campaign:

Freedom, the right of all citizens, must be protected from the enemies of freedom. It is a very clear reality that from every good thing danger can arise if it is misused.... It is necessary to know living in freedom does not require the destruction of the certainty and security that are valuable to citizens. In particular, recent history is full of bloody and terrible adventures caused by the failure of big and small nations to find the way to make freedom and authority exist together.²¹

But Peker's call for order and unity, and his aspiration to balance freedom and authority, did not stress reconciliation and improvement of relations between political opposition and the ruling party. Peker reflected İnönü's concern about a weakening of the political fabric while Turkey needed to appear strong in the face of Soviet demands for territory and bases, and American and British demands for political and economic reform. In this context, İnönü saw domestic tension as not only distracting, but as having the potential to lead to destructive alternatives. While Peker's leadership meant stability, he refused to acknowledge the need to reconcile the parties. As a result, personal attacks in the Assembly continued unabated throughout the fall of 1946.²²

Following the general election of July 1946, the Assembly reelected İnönü as President of the Republic, with 388 votes for İnönü and 59 for Çakmak. Prior to the vote, the 66 Democrat Party deputies debated whether or not to protest the "corruption in the elections" by refusing to take their seats in the Assembly, but instead displayed their position by remaining seated and silent while the Assembly applauded the reelection of İnönü.²³ Democrat Party members of the Assembly also showed their discontent by targeting the reforms of 1946 as means of co-optation rather than an action to insure the freedom of the people and democratic institutions in Turkey. In the Assembly, the tensions increased to a boil by December 1946, convincing İnönü to intervene as President between the parties.

In December, during discussion of the budget, Democrat Party members attacked a series of economic measures taken by the Peker cabinet known as the "September 7th Decisions." These new policies aimed to facilitate foreign trade by relaxing restrictions on imports and devaluing the lira. The cabinet expected that these decisions would lead to increased imports of consumer goods and manufactured items to reduce some of the shortages of the war years. But the immediate impact was price increases,

hurting consumers already battling inflation on fixed salaries. In contrast, some importers and merchants, who took advantage of the relaxation of import regulations, enjoyed large profits.²⁴ In all, the September 7th Decisions served primarily to increase resentment of the government's intervention in the economy among the public and freshened the memory of other hasty policies that showed similar results, such as the Saracoğlu cabinet's decision to remove price controls in the fall of 1942.

In the Assembly, the September 7th Decisions became a focal point for Adnan Menderes, who spoke for the Democrat Party during the budget discussions.²⁵ Menderes emphasized the continuing position of the Democrat Party, and highlighted public sentiment to attack the Peker cabinet, apparently following each point with a slight smile. When Menderes finished his speech, Peker stormed to the podium and instead of responding to the issues, said that the attack of Menderes and his method of delivering it reflected a "psychopathic" personality. Outraged, Menderes and the other Democrat Party deputies left the Assembly in protest, an unprecedented boycott of its proceedings.

The Democrat Party's boycott of the Assembly raised an immediate crisis in this new era of multi-party politics. İnönü, at this stage intervened as President not only to convince the Democrat Party leaders of his impartiality, but also of his continuing support for the multi-party system. His meetings with Bayar and Fuat Köprülü, the Chair of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group, convinced them to return to the Assembly on the assurance that there would be no recurrence of such events.²⁶

While İnönü's intervention in the crisis, against Prime Minister Peker, signaled his continuing support for multi-party politics, two events in December showed his concern with control. The first was the extension of martial law in the provinces surrounding Istanbul, which had been extended every six months since the end of the war. According to the government, the continuing tension with the Soviet Union warranted the extra caution, while opponents of the government argued that the extension of martial law was a device to allow the government to control the press and opposition parties, which had established strongholds in Istanbul, in contrast to the ruling party in Ankara.

The extension of martial law and the insistence of the government and İnönü on maintaining uncompromising extraordinary caution, was meant to demonstrate intolerance for debates involving national security. But the question still remained whether the government legitimized its control by claims of external threats. The second event, the closure of the Turkish Socialist Party, and the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party, along with

several labor unions that had been formed in 1946, convinced some government critics that even though there was a real international crisis, the government was using the crisis for its own benefit to legitimate its policies.²⁷ Along with extension of martial law, the closure of the "leftist" political associations with the claim that they were promoting class struggle in violation of the law, defined the restricted boundaries of political expression. These boundaries reflected suspicion of Soviet influence on one hand and keeping the government strong on the other, and also served to keep opposition within the mainstream of political debate.

İnönü, while supporting the development of multi-party politics, was searching to find means to confine and control it within narrow margins to assure the success of the "experiment." But Peker, as the new Prime Minister, displaying a noticeable preference for order and control, was having trouble finding the balance between "freedom and authority." As a leader of the government, contrary to the pledge he made at the beginning of his term, he was not facilitating the operation of the multi-party system, leading him to an unavoidable conflict with İnönü.

THE CRITICAL YEAR, 1947: FROM THE DEMOCRAT PARTY CONGRESS TO THE JULY 12TH DECLARATION

In January 1947 the Democrat Party held its first general congress in Ankara. During his opening speech to the party congress, Bayar put forth three principles that would be the basis of Democrat Party efforts in the coming months.²⁸ First, Bayar called for "the elimination of laws restricting the rights and freedom of citizens and not matching the spirit or wording of the constitution." Second, Bayar demanded changes in the Election Law "to assure the safety and security of the citizen's vote," and third he called for "acceptance of the principle that the President of the Republic and the Leadership of a political party should not be held by one person."²⁹

These demands reflected the conviction of the Democrat Party leadership that the People's Party was unwilling to carry out reforms that might reduce its power, and that the People's Party was willing to use most any means to remain in power despite growing opposition and criticism. The demands also reflected a belief that İnönü did not necessarily share the views of other People's Party leaders, and that his separation from the People's Party would serve to further the cause of political reform. The Democrat Party congress concluded with the adoption of the three principles articulated by

Bayar in the form of a Freedom Charter (*Hürriyet Misası*), a name meant to evoke images of the National Charter (*Milli Misası*), which served as the fundamental document of the War of Independence, linking the Democrat Party to Atatürk.

With the Freedom Charter, the Democrat Party also declared a boycott of the National Assembly if it failed to meet the party's demands. The threat of a boycott was becoming a tested and effective weapon, drawing public attention to the Democrat Party's activities, as well as its criticism that Peker's cabinet and the People's Party were refusing to carry out reforms.³⁰

The People's Party leaders met the news of the Democrat Party's plans with surprise and dismay. İnönü told Nihat Erim, "They are struggling with me again. Will our efforts produce no results?"³¹ İnönü had already made clear his belief that there was no need to separate the presidency from party leadership to further the multi-party system and democracy by pointing out that in the United States the President was also the head of his party.³² Besides, İnönü argued that he had already left his active duties as leader of the party, leaving its administration to Şükrü Saracoğlu, the Vice-Chair of the People's Party. As for the other reforms, many in the People's Party, including Peker, believed that the reforms of 1946 insured democratic, constitutional practices, and saw the Democrat Party's demands as unconstitutional and anti-democratic in themselves. Peker bluntly tried to assure İnönü: "Don't worry Pasha, we will tame them. We trained the people to board buses in an orderly fashion by making them pass through turnstiles. . . . We will do the same with these."³³ When the National Assembly refused to accommodate a hearing of the Freedom Charter on the terms specified by the Democrat Party, instead of boycotting the Assembly, the Democrat Party decided to boycott by-elections in four provinces scheduled for April 1947.³⁴ İnönü, feeling strongly that the Democrat Party should join the elections, worked to convince Bayar as the party leader. But the Democrat Party leaders postponed a decision until a meeting in Izmir at the beginning of April, which coincided with Prime Minister Peker's scheduled visit to the city.

After arriving in Izmir, in front of a huge gathering of People's Party supporters, the Prime Minister delivered a sharp attack against the Democrat Party: "The Democrats, by not entering the elections, would be making a serious mistake. I am reminding them of this so they do not commit an error that will forever be considered a crime against the homeland."³⁵ The next day, when Bayar arrived from Ankara, he was greeted by a tremendous and enthusiastic crowd blocking the streets and cutting off traffic. The police responded to the disorderly crowd by making random

arrests and firing shots into the air to disperse the gathering. This event evoked memories of the Free Party of 1930, which had been closed after police forcefully intervened in a huge gathering in Izmir that turned out to greet the founder of the Free Party, Fethi Okyar. Bayar and the Democrat Party leaders held their meeting under the suspicion that the Free Party episode in Izmir could be repeated with the same outcome for the Democrat Party. But despite the events, Peker's warning and İnönü's urging, they decided to boycott the elections.

At this stage of the establishment of multi-party politics, along with the boycott, personal attacks were becoming part of the political discourse. Even though the mainstream political debate always displayed suspicion of the left, during this period, accusations of "leftist sympathies," as well as "treasonous intentions" were becoming an effective political weapon. For example, personal attacks led to a lawsuit between Hasan Ali Yücel, the former Education Minister and Kenan Öner, the head of the Istanbul branch of the Democrat Party, who accused Yücel of harboring communists in the government. Then in the autumn of 1946, People's Party members tried to brand Çakmak, the former Chief of the General Staff and an ardent opponent of the Soviet Union, with communist sympathies after he became associated with the Human Rights Association, which had been formed by Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, Cami Baykurt, and Tevfik Rüştü Aras. After highly publicized accusations that the Sertels were Soviet sympathizers, Çakmak claimed he had been duped into lending his name to the organization, and had no sympathies or ties to communists.³⁶ Expressed through boycotts and personal attacks, the critique of the opposition parties was not displaying new alternatives, or facilitating constructive discussions. But as an outlet for conflicts they served to keep Turkish politics tense and angry in the spring and summer of 1947. The strain reached a new level when Adnan Menderes was accused by members of the People's Party of threatening the security of the nation in a speech, prompting discussions in the Assembly regarding procedures to lift Menderes's parliamentary immunity.³⁷ In June, while the Assembly extended martial law for another six months, relations between the two major parties had deteriorated to the point of rendering the new multi-party system nearly inoperable.

THE JULY 12TH DECLARATION

As negotiations for a Treaty of Assistance with the United States reached completion, İnönü also decided to intervene to bring some accord to

inter-party relations. İnönü first met with Bayar and Köprülü on June 7. During the meeting, Bayar reiterated his position that certain laws and practices had to be changed for the betterment of the democratic system, including lifting martial law, and drew İnönü's attention to Prime Minister Peker's heavy-handed treatment of the Democrat Party and his threats of lawsuits and punishment of the opposition. Furthermore, Bayar emphasized the importance of ending the interference of government officials in the operation of the Democrat Party, and called for non-partisan use of the state radio and the People's Houses as community centers.³⁸ Following this discussion, İnönü held a series of meetings with Bayar and Peker to hammer out ways to improve relations between the parties, as well as between the government and the opposition. While both sides accepted the need for talks, within both parties there was a pronounced suspicion that only they would be forced to compromise. In fact, some Democrat Party leaders feared that Bayar had made a secret deal with İnönü that would allow the party to continue, but in a weakened form.³⁹ Finally on July 12, İnönü issued a statement regarding the meetings and his assessment of the future of multi-party politics.

Known as the July 12th Declaration, issued on the same day the Treaty of Assistance with the United States was signed, İnönü's statement was a promise of continued support for the multi-party experiment. The declaration assured the nation that both the People's Party and the Democrat Party would compromise for the benefit of the democratic system, and cooperate for the smooth and productive working of the Assembly. İnönü made clear his expectation that the two parties work together: "The opposition will be secure and accept that the ruling party does not have intentions of stifling it. The ruling party will accept that the opposition is not thinking of anything but its legal rights. . . . To overcome problems I want the sincere assistance of the administration and opposition leaders directing our political life." In his Declaration İnönü also reemphasized his role as President, and pledged his impartiality in dealing with the political parties. İnönü related that

In my opinion the one and a half year experiment we have passed was difficult and sometimes disappointing; but it also has assured the success of all hopes for the future. It is the obligation of both the ruling and opposition parties to protect and develop this condition. . . . An opposition party working with a legal political party's methods must be assured that the ruling party will work under the same conditions. On this foundation, as the head of state I consider myself equally responsible to both parties.... The imperative of impartial and equal treatment of legal parties is the fundamental requirement for the security of political life.⁴⁰

The multi-party system began as an experiment, but with his July 12th Declaration, İnönü unequivocally pledged his support to the system and to his impartiality. He committed himself to further reform of the political system, as well as to readjustment of the government's economic and social policies according to new political realities.

İnönü's Declaration was greeted with enthusiasm among the people and opposition parties, especially by Bayar, and was interpreted as a guarantee that the multi-party system was now a permanent aspect of Turkish political life. Menderes portrayed the Democrat Party's acceptance of the declaration as a change of tactics, not as a compromise. The Turkish press hailed the declaration as a turning point.⁴¹ But the Declaration did not change the relations between the two major parties. It also greatly influenced İnönü's relations with Prime Minister Peker. Peker questioned İnönü's constitutional position to interfere between the parties, and openly rejected the Declaration. Peker's rejection started a period of conflict between the Prime Minister and İnönü as President of the Republic, which elevated when İnönü forced Peker from office, and exposed the division in the People's Party. Furthermore, while some argued that İnönü's Declaration in effect admitted that the People's Party had used questionable tactics to put pressure on the Democrat Party, others interpreted Bayar's acceptance of the Declaration as an admission that the Democrat Party had engaged in disputable political practices. Thus, the tensions within the multi-party system would continue unresolved throughout 1947 and beyond, despite İnönü's belief that domestic politics must not risk derailing development, weaken the state, or create problems in foreign relations.

TURKEY AND THE EARLY COLD WAR

In the early months of 1946, global tensions increased and the Truman administration identified the Soviet Union as the enemy, and the region stretching from the Balkans through the Middle East as a likely arena of conflict. Although the American, along with the Turkish government, continued to believe that the Soviets were unlikely to attack Turkey in the immediate future, American planners reached the decision that a greater level of support for Turkey would not only help it resist Soviet pressure over the long run, but would also bolster the American image throughout the region.

Thus American support for Turkey in early 1946 came in two ways: directly, with financial assistance and the transfer of \$10 million worth of

war material from Allied stocks,⁴² and indirectly with the visit of American ships to Istanbul to emphasize Turkish-American friendship and especially American interest in the region. In early April, the *USS Missouri*, accompanied by two cruisers, sailed into the harbor at Istanbul, to return the remains of the former Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegün, who had died in Washington in 1944. The visit of the *Missouri* was not only an act of diplomatic courtesy, but was interpreted as a sign of America's commitment to the security of the eastern Mediterranean and a show of American strength against Soviet intentions.⁴³ While in Istanbul, the captain of the *Missouri* hosted a visit by President İnönü, who expressed his appreciation for the American gesture. The visit of the most famous of the American battleship aroused considerable excitement in the city. *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic) called the visit "a shining example of Turkish-American friendship."⁴⁴

Turks contrasted the American gesture with continuing Soviet demands for cession of territory in eastern Anatolia. In December 1945 *Izvestia* had published the report of two Georgian professors as evidence that the province of Kars in eastern Turkey had historically been part of Armenia and Georgia, and was now occupied by non-Turks. At the same time, the Soviets continued a campaign of hostile commentary on the radio and in the press. In response, the Turkish press carried articles critical of Soviet policy, with such titles as "Machiavelism Now Molotovism," and "Stalin Is Doing What Hitler Did."⁴⁵

In May 1946, several weeks after the visit of the *Missouri*, İnönü traveled through the eastern provinces, addressing the people of Kars and Erzurum in preparation for the general election. In Kars, İnönü told the citizens:

After talking with citizens in every corner of the country, I can explain the Turkish nation's clear and unwavering will to you in this manner. Turkey's honorable and correct state is understood by the nations of the world that recognize rights and justice. We believe that the promise of the rights of freedom, territorial sovereignty and independence in the Charter of the United Nations do not consist of empty words.

Four days later, in Erzurum, İnönü reinforced the point he made in the Kars speech, and prepared the people of Erzurum for the possibilities of armed conflict with the Soviets: "I have always considered you one of the solid supports of the nation."⁴⁶

On August 7, 1946 the Soviets presented the Turkish government with a new note regarding proposals for a change in the regime of the Straits.

The Soviet note outlined accusations that Turkey had violated the Montreux Convention during the war by allowing the passage of German and Italian warships. Next, the note outlined the proposals put forth by Harry Truman at Potsdam and the American proposals of November 1945. Finally, the Soviet note proposed the establishment of a new regime of the Straits based on five principles. The first two principles maintained that the Straits should be always open to merchant vessels of all countries and always open to warships of the Black Sea powers. But the third point restricted access to the Straits for warships of the non-Black Sea powers, except "in cases specially provided for." The fourth point was that the new regime of the Straits would be negotiated by Turkey and by the other Black Sea powers. The fifth point argued that Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested in the Straits, "shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers."⁴⁷

Although the note ignored the existence of the United Nations, and sought to exclude the Western powers from a new regime of the Straits, it did not specifically demand Soviet bases on the Straits, except to call for "joint means of defense." Turkish leaders took the note to be a signal of a continued willingness to negotiate on the part of the Soviet Union, and some interpreted it to mean that the Soviets were backing down from their initial demands for bases and territory made the previous year. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the former Foreign Minister, told a British official that the Soviet initiative was "a real offensive of peace towards Turkey on the part of the Soviets. There is no point whatsoever in the note which could not be discussed with the Soviets in a friendly way." Zekeriya Sertel, known to favor better relations with the Soviet Union, told a British reporter of his opinion that "Russia does not want to go to war with any country. ... I know that the domestic situation of Russia is a very weak one. She is not in a position to carry a war. I cannot possibly think that there is any immediate danger from the viewpoint of our present relations with the Soviets."⁴⁸ Even Çakmak, former chief of the General Staff, known for his dislike of the Soviet Union, told the press that he "did not believe Moscow was trying to undermine the unity of the Turkish people nor that the question of the provinces and the Straits might become urgent."⁴⁹ A week after the Soviet note was presented, the new Prime Minister, Recep Peker, discussed the Turkish government's policy: "According to our own estimation, we will be happy only when we observe that future Turkish-Soviet relations will be based on the same outstanding friendship and mutual trust upon which they leaned in the past." Peker continued, expressing the cabinet's

first reaction to the Soviet note: "I can say this right now, that we are bound in this matter by the authority of international agreements. And we must hold above all the defense of our territorial integrity and sovereign rights. For us this is fundamental and unchanging. Still, the government of the Republic has made note of the Soviet requests."⁵⁰ The Turkish government replied to the Soviet note on August 22, 1946 by refuting Soviet charges of misconduct in managing the Straits. The Turkish note acknowledged the need to revise the Montreux Convention, but only by an international agreement.

Besides Turkey, the Soviet government also presented the note of August 7, 1946 to the governments of the United States and Britain. Both of these governments objected to the note on the basis that it made no reference to the United Nations, or the principle of international control of the Straits. The American and British Ambassadors in Turkey expressed support for the Turkish position and agreed that no negotiations should be held unless under the aegis of the United Nations. In a direct reversal of the policy of the previous year, the two governments quickly came to the conclusion that they actually had nothing to gain by supporting any negotiations to change the regime of the Straits. According to the American Ambassador, Wilson: "Our interest would seem to lie in maintenance of the status quo.... [W]e and the British should avoid taking the initiative to convene such a conference and leave any initiative in this sense to the Soviet Union."⁵¹ Therefore, the Americans and the British advised Turkey to refute the Soviet claims and to wait for their next move.

In October, the Soviets dropped their efforts to revise the Montreux Convention in their own favor, and expressed no more demands for territory in eastern Turkey. The Soviets apparently came to the conclusion that Turkey would not negotiate a bilateral settlement of the regime of the Straits, and that an international conference on the Straits had the potential to produce an agreement unfavorable to Soviet interests.⁵² Thus the matter remained unresolved until the spring of 1953, when following the death of Josef Stalin, the Soviet government officially renounced all claims to Turkish territory, and abandoned its call for joint defense of the Straits. Therefore, the Montreux Convention of 1936 remained the basis for Turkey's administration of the Straits.

Overall, in response to the possibility of isolation and renewed Soviet demands, the Turks abandoned their policy of balance, by clearly allying with the Western powers. The warming of relations after the collapse of the Russian and Ottoman Empires that shaped the Lenin and early Stalin years, left its place to a static, suspicious, and hostile atmosphere. The conflict

became an integral part of Turkey's view of the Soviet Union in the Cold War years and became an aspect of the legitimization of both foreign and domestic policy in Turkey.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

In February 1947, the British Ambassador to Washington delivered a note to Secretary of State George Marshall stating that Britain was running out of money and could not continue to assist the Greek government in its war against communist sympathizers. According to the note, both Greece and Turkey faced the danger of falling under Soviet influence, and the Greek government would certainly collapse if economic and military aid were not administered quickly. The note proved to be the catalyst for massive amounts of American military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey in the following decades. Soon after the notes were delivered, American planners concluded that

Greece and Turkey, without financial and other aid from either the United States or Great Britain, may become Soviet puppets in the near future. Their loss to the western world would undoubtedly be followed by further Soviet territorial and other gains in Europe and the Near and Middle East. The resulting chaos would be accompanied by an immediate weakening of the strategic and economic position of the whole western world ... and the very security of the United States would be threatened.⁵³

At this stage, American planners decided that Turkey was not in immediate danger of Soviet invasion, but they were convinced that the Soviets would continue to exert pressure with the aim of eventually undermining the Turkish government and installing a pro-Soviet regime, making it the first domino. In return for support, American planners sought to achieve three goals. First, they wanted Turkey to maintain a mobilized army as a deterrent to Soviet pressure. Second, they believed that giving military and economic assistance to Turkey would enhance American strength and prestige in the region. Turkey would serve as a demonstration of the American ability and willingness to stop Soviet expansion in Europe and the Middle East. And third, the Americans expected the Turkish government to accept American advice, including economic policy and military decisions.

While American planners saw aid to Greece in terms of its short-term consequences, they envisioned aid to Turkey as a long-term extension of American power into the region of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.⁵⁴ This was in concurrence with a strategic plan known as "Griddle," developed by the Joint War Plans Committee, which emphasized the value of Turkey as a forward base for American operations against the Soviet Union in the event of war.⁵⁵ The problem for American planners, then, was how to convince Congress and the American people to fund assistance to Turkey, which had not been devastated by World War II, and was apparently no longer in immediate danger. According to Truman, getting substantial amounts of aid for Turkey in 1947 entailed the "greatest selling job ever facing a President."⁵⁶

On March 12, 1947, Truman went before Congress to call for \$400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey: "The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. . . . Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action."⁵⁷ The following day, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff met to decide the priorities for assistance to Turkey. They decided that the primary goal should be to "stiffen the Turkish will and ability to resist," while the secondary goal was to "improve the Turkish military potential so that . . . the Turks . . . will have the maximum possible military capability to undertake a holding and delaying action in their own country."⁵⁸ Thus, according to the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, aid to Turkey should emphasize strengthening the army for defensive action against a Soviet attack and guerrilla action behind Soviet lines as the Turkish Army fell back to the Mediterranean and awaited American and British air assistance from North African bases. The report also called for the integration of economic assistance to Turkey into military plans, so that construction of roads and communications facilities would be carried out with strategic concerns in mind.

American planners decided that the administration of American assistance would require a team of technical experts that would first ascertain the specific needs of Turkey, then advise the Turkish government on how best to utilize the military and economic assistance. A State/War/Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) assigned a task force that arrived in Turkey on May 22, and immediately began meetings with Turkish officials. Although the American Ambassador, Wilson, stressed in his reports about the mission the cooperation between the American and Turkish

governments, tensions over the purpose and nature of American assistance to Turkey developed soon after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.

The American government took for granted that the Turks would react favorably to both financial and administrative involvement in support of its military and economy. Thus American planners saw American control over the financial aspects of the assistance as natural, and in exchange for aid, insisted that the money be spent on projects in accordance with American strategic planning. Furthermore, they interpreted Turkey's acceptance of assistance from the United States as an unconditional commitment to support the United States in the growing struggle against the Soviet Union. But Turkish policy makers were growing concerned with the apparent costs of a close military and economic alliance with the United States. Turkish leaders realized that the Truman Doctrine's offer of assistance demanded a serious compromise of the very autonomy in diplomatic affairs that they had striven to maintain throughout the Second World War.

In public, Turkish officials praised the benefits of American financial and military assistance: "While directing global politics, the value of the deep friendship America has devoted to Turkey is great. We understand that this friendship not only carries the idea of strengthening Turkey, but its meaning is in the noble service it will make to world peace."⁵⁹ But the Americans' insistence on maintaining control was a growing source of tension within Turkey. Many officials "were privately worried about President Truman's reference to an American mission." They expressed fears of a "revival of the capitulations," and the "Egyptianization" of Turkey. According to a British official, "it seems obvious that replacement of British personnel by Americans could only have the effect of increasing Turkish fears of American domination, which . . . are without any doubt genuine and generally in force."⁶⁰

In April 1947, Prime Minister Recep Peker, in an attempt to reduce growing doubts, dismissed criticism that the Americans were trying to control Turkey for their own purposes:

I imagine that the intentions behind trying to awaken negative currents in America, and in our country behind the ideas that this assistance will damage Turkey's independence and the interests of the country stem from hidden sources of propaganda. It is unthinkable either that America's intention is hostile to Turkey, or that our government would accept a formula that would damage Turkey's right of sovereignty and independence.⁶¹

On July 12, 1947 the United States and Turkey signed a Treaty of Assistance, outlining the nature and scope of American aid to Turkey and the mutual commitment of the partners. According to the treaty, aid was being supplied by the United States at the request of Turkey "to strengthen its security forces and maintain economic stability." The treaty restricted Turkey's use of American aid to projects that the "President of the United States authorizes in accordance with acts of Congress," and prohibited Turkey from using the aid "for any purpose other than that intended without U. S. consent."⁶²

With this treaty, Turkey had eliminated the risk of diplomatic isolation, and unequivocally committed itself to the Western camp in the growing Cold War struggle. While Turkish leaders still believed that better relations with the Soviets were possible, they were convinced that survival in international politics now required a strong commitment to, and of, the United States. The price of this new commitment, even though the Turkish government refused to acknowledge it officially, was a compromise of Turkish sovereignty and autonomy.

The signing of the Treaty of Assistance between the United States and Turkey marked a turning point in Turkey's post-war foreign policy. Since the Second World War had ended, Turkish leaders had attempted to maintain some sense of the balance in foreign affairs that they had successfully pursued throughout the war. But the polarization of international politics, along with Soviet pressure for territorial concessions, had made the maintenance of the previous position difficult, rendering Turkey's cautious diplomacy of World War II ineffective. Moreover, the United Nations, despite early expectations, failed to provide a framework for peaceful negotiations or guarantees for autonomy of small states like Turkey. In the post-war global situation, Turkish leaders felt they could no longer maintain neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some believed that closer relations with the United States could induce balance by countering Soviet pressure. But close ties to the United States were forcing a compromise of Turkey's autonomy. American military assistance strengthened Turkey's army and air force, but it also gave the United States partial control over how Turkey could use military force. Economic assistance brought foreign investment in Turkey, but it was investment aimed at meeting the strategic needs of the West, more than the economic needs of Turkey. Furthermore, the developing ties with the United States, and the debate surrounding their legitimization, influenced Turkey's domestic politics in the late 1940s. The image of the United States, the victory of the Allies in World War II, and the promise of democracy and freedom in the

post-war world, and the rhetoric of the Cold War all became aspects of political debate in Turkey in the period of multi-party politics.

"Domestically, İnönü's July 12th Declaration marked the end of two years of uncertainty regarding the future of multi-party politics in Turkey and established boundaries for partisan activity for the future. Even though it failed to achieve accord between the opposing parties, it restored the prestige of the government at home. Also, it served to improve the stature of Turkey in the new climate of international affairs. In the history of the Turkish Republic, the years of 1945 to 1947 have been known as a transition to multi-party politics, an era that greatly influenced the future of Turkish political life. The debate on this period concentrates on the degree of İnönü's conviction in democracy and his motivation in continuing to support the multi-party system even though it encountered crisis as Turkey itself was going through a dangerous and uncertain period in its foreign affairs. Some arguments maintain that İnönü was a dictator who was confronted with overwhelming opposition, and was forced to relinquish the powers he held under the single-party system.⁶³ It can also be argued that İnönü, with his experience in Turkish politics and administration, became gradually convinced of the benefits of the multi-party system. İnönü saw the multi-party system as a way to maintain order, and to assure the consent and cooperation of the people through a system allowing a free voice to opposition, even though the definition of acceptable opposition remained narrow. In this context, for İnönü the multi-party system offered a reasonable and fair balance. In the late 1950s İnönü wrote about this period:

The new life we entered in 1945 opened the way to the nation's learning and adopting to the struggles of civilization and freedom. The [tensions and uncertainty] of this period came from arguments that were necessary but for which our milieu was not prepared. I never felt the smallest regret at the decision we gave in 1945. In no way am I feeling any now.⁶⁴

Chapter Eight

The Confines of the Cold War and the Redefinition of Kemalism

For Turkey the period from the end of World War II until July 1947 was a time of realignment in foreign and domestic affairs. The post-war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union forced Turkish leaders to reevaluate the policy of caution, balance, and autonomy pursued during World War II. Even though Turkish leaders perceived the developing relationship with the United States as a part of the formulation of a new balance in the bi-polar world, this alliance lay the foundation for abridgement of Turkey's autonomy in both international and domestic affairs. This was reflected in the Treaty of Assistance of July 12, 1947 between the United States and Turkey.

After July 1947 as the relationship between the United States and Turkey grew, leaders from both countries began to define its limits. The confines of the relationship became clear as American planners revised their global strategic plans for the post-war world and as Turkish leaders integrated issues of foreign policy and the American assistance into the domestic agenda. The period after July 1947 exhibited not only the limits but also the repercussions of close relations with the United States on Turkish foreign and domestic policy on two fronts.

First, Turkish diplomatic relations began to reflect the influence of the strategic concerns and goals of American planners. These plans immediately influenced Turkey's posture within Europe as well as its position with the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries. Furthermore, Turkey's alliance with the United States became an integral part of Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East. Thus, during this period as Turkey became part of American policy to rebuild Europe as protection against Soviet influence, it also took

up the burden of being the first line of defense against possible Soviet aggression in the Middle East.¹

Second, during this period Turkey was integrated into the capitalist economy of the post-war world. The nature of this integration has been interpreted as resulting from the post-war interests of Western corporations as well as stemming from Turkey's failure to achieve success with a strong statist economy, and reflecting the pressures of the emerging power of Turkish private entrepreneurs, merchants, and landowners after the war. This process of "modernization," as well as its legitimization, was orchestrated by increasing numbers of American advisers.

American advisers who came as administrators along with military and economic assistance began to suggest ways to reorganize Turkish foreign and domestic policy to insure continuation of loans and assistance from the American government and from international lending institutions. One of the first assumptions that American advisers questioned was the benefit of the government's commitment to statism and industrialization. Instead, they advocated development of the private sector and Turkish agriculture, with the aim of securing food and raw materials to facilitate the reindustrialization of Europe. As these controversial issues were debated by the Turkish government, the recommendations of American advisers became part of the political debate in Turkey. The Democrat Party claimed that American expertise supported the party's platform of reformulation of statist economic policies in favor of development of the private sector and commercial agriculture in Turkey. Other politicians and some intellectuals, concerned by its impact on Turkish autonomy, argued against the growing American influence in foreign as well as domestic affairs.

The discontent among politicians and intellectuals was in contrast with government efforts. Hasan Saka, who was Foreign Minister at the time the Treaty of Assistance was signed, and who subsequently became Prime Minister, defended the treaty in the National Assembly in September 1947: "In the history of neither the Turkish nor American governments can any agreement contrary to a state's independence be shown, nor can any precedent be mentioned of any treaty or agreement between any country and Turkey that will negatively affect Turkey's own independence."² İnönü, now more than ever concentrating on maintaining the multi-party system, was also assessing the impact of foreign policy issues on interparty relations, and called on opposition parties to support the government's decision to seek closer ties to the United States: "The homeland has benefited and will continue to benefit from it being known around the world that there is no separation on the issue of foreign policy

and the protection of the nation. I congratulate those statesmen both in power and in opposition for assuring the security and prestige of the nation."³ Thus, the period between July 1947 and 1950 became a period both of growing ties to America and the world economy, and increasing doubts about the nature and shape of those ties. In this period foreign relations became an integral aspect of political debate in the multi-party system.

THE WILSON REPORT, AND AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY UNDER THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Following Harry Truman's announcement in March 1947 of the need for military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, a team of American military and civilian advisers traveled to Turkey to assess the amount and type of aid that Turkey required. The mission completed its study in July, and the Ambassador, Edwin Wilson, who was also Chief of the American Mission, submitted his report to the State Department. According to the American team, "the primary mission of the Turkish armed forces is to provide a deterrent of such a nature to a potential aggressor that an all-out costly war would be necessary for the aggressor, in order to realize territorial or political objectives in Turkey." Wilson's report continued, to recommend extensive modernization of "inadequate and outmoded" equipment, reorganization of the Turkish defense establishment, and emphasized the urgency of the need for American assistance.⁴ Congress had appropriated \$100 million under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine to Turkey for the fiscal year 1948, which the Wilson report recommended be divided into \$48.5 million for the army, \$14.75 million for the navy, and \$26.75 million for the air force. In addition, \$5 million was to be spent for road building for military purposes and \$5 million for improvement of the Turkish arsenal.⁵

But in his report, Ambassador Wilson went further, maintaining that "in the absence of a program for continuing aid to Turkey, it is believed that much of the benefit hoped to be obtained from the present program will be lost." Wilson called for the continuation of the program for a five-year period, at a total cost of \$500 million. He pointed out that the Turkish government was devoting roughly half of its present budget to maintain a mobilized military of a half million soldiers, "resulting in curtailment of essential governmental services, reduction of current economic productivity and diminished potential for capital development necessary to

raise the standard of living of the Turkish peasant and worker." Wilson believed that the burden of defense spending would lead to economic crises, reducing Turkey's resistance to the influence of communism. He expected that American assistance would lift the burden of military spending from the budget, allowing the government to invest in economic development. Wilson argued that the increased outlays to support Turkey "can be considered in the nature of a national life-insurance premium for the United States."⁶

The Wilson report was a reflection of the changing concerns of American foreign policy during the Cold War. In this context, American policy makers viewed assistance to Turkey in terms of the overall strategic concerns of the United States and Great Britain for the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean area, which held that "the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of Turkey was essential."⁷ Both American and British leaders still assumed that the Soviets sought domination of the Straits as a long-term goal, although they now believed that the most immediate danger to Turkey was destabilization caused by the economic burdens of maintaining a large military. But, even under these assumptions, American policy makers did not envision an expanded commitment to Turkey. In their assessment, military aid to Turkey should be sufficient to prepare Turkey to block a Soviet advance on the Middle East for a period of a few months in order to allow American and British reinforcements time to launch a counterattack. Thus, they primarily saw American military aid as a measure against Soviet influence and Soviet aggression, which were to be kept at bay by stabilizing the Turkish economy and by fortifying the Turkish armed forces. Along with its reluctance to enter a formal commitment for the defense of Turkey, the impermanent character of the aid lay the foundation of American policy in this period.

In contrast, some Turkish leaders believed that the Truman Doctrine and military assistance were just the beginning of increasingly close ties to America and Western Europe. Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak wrote that "Merely in itself, America's attention in the dangerous condition of the world today... is opening wide horizons to Turkey."⁸ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, editor of *Tanin*, commented that "the assistance treaty, as we see it, is the beginning of a series of other agreements."⁹ While critics of American aid continued to warn of its future problems and maintained their skepticism, the optimistic appraisals of the government and the press began to dominate public discussions. At the same time, however, events were revealing the limits of America's commitment to Turkey as well as expectations from Turkey in the Cold War.

In July 1947, sixteen European countries, including Turkey, met in Paris to discuss the American offer of assistance known as the Marshall Plan. Discussion regarding Turkey revealed that American policy makers assessed Turkey as a country that had survived the war without physical damage, possessing gold and foreign exchange reserves, and rich in agricultural goods and raw materials.¹⁰ Thus, they believed that Turkey could assist in the reconstruction of Western Europe to prevent the further spread of communism and Soviet influence. Contrary to the American position, the Turkish delegation led by Numan Menemencioğlu, now Ambassador to France, presented a request for economic assistance to offset the losses caused by eight years of full mobilization and the cutoff of foreign trade due to the war. The Turkish delegation called for \$615 million in assistance for industrial development. American policy makers rejected Turkey's request for economic assistance, on the grounds that the Marshall Plan was meant to assist in the reconstruction of countries destroyed by the war. Furthermore, they argued that Turkish agricultural potential and mineral wealth could adequately facilitate its economic development plans.¹¹

While Marshall Plan economic assistance to Turkey was rejected at this point, in July 1947 American policy makers supported Turkey's efforts to secure loans from the International Bank for Development or the International Monetary Fund. American policy makers saw the loans as short-term supplements to military aid, and as a way to discourage Turkey from relying on direct American financial assistance.

THE "35" AND THE RESIGNATION OF RECEP PEKER

Despite the rejection of economic assistance, Turkish leaders were convinced that closer relations with the United States were essential in the new international setting. Thus, changes were necessary in the political system as well. Recep Peker, İnönü's Prime Minister since the 1946 general elections, reflected a different view, that Turkey needed internal stability and a strong cabinet. He outright rejected İnönü's July 12th Declaration calling for compromise. Peker said that İnönü, as President, had no constitutional right to interfere and argued that the Declaration undermined the power and responsibility of the Prime Minister.¹² Determined not to give in to pressure from the Democrat Party, or from the President, Peker launched an attempt to take control of the People's Party, leading to a rift within the party.

The split in the People's Party, especially within the Parliamentary Group of the People's Party, reflected a division between "hardliners" and "moderates" on the issue of interparty relations. The "moderates," who favored continued reform of the party's organization and platform, included Nihat Erim, a relative newcomer to the party leadership, who had become close to İnönü since 1945. Peker, who led the "hardliners," opposed making any concessions or compromises to the opposition, and hoped to remove İnönü from effective control of the party by naming himself Vice-Chair which according to reforms enacted in 1946, would make him Acting Chair of the People's Party, since the Chair was also President of the Republic.¹³ The conflict within the party came to a crisis in August, when Peker demanded a vote of confidence during a meeting of the People's Party Parliamentary Group.¹⁴ When asked if he planned to use the vote of confidence from the group against İnönü, Peker maintained that İnönü had agreed with his point of view regarding relations between the parties, arguing, "there is no important difference between İnönü and myself. If any difference is found, even if the meeting votes for me I will resign."¹⁵ When all the votes were tallied, Peker received 303 votes in support, while 35 voted against him. This group, known as "the thirty-five," was led by younger members of the Assembly such as Nihat Erim, Memduh Sevket Esençal, Kasim Gülek, and Tahsin Bangoglu.

From the beginning it was assumed that İnönü was behind "the thirty-five," and his support signaled the lack of support for Peker and the "hard-line" position among the party leadership. Furthermore, when Peker followed the meeting by attempting to change five members of the cabinet, İnönü demanded that the changes be approved according to constitutional procedure by the National Assembly, thus forcing Peker to ask for another vote of confidence. This time the affirmative votes fell to 194 as the negative votes rose to 47. Three days later, on September 9, Peker, claiming health reasons, submitted his resignation.¹⁶ The Democrat Party greeted the resignation of Peker with relief, if not joy. Fuat Köprülü wrote, "history will record the resignation of the Recep Peker cabinet as this cabinet's first and last service."¹⁷

The "moderates" in the People's Party had now gained ascendancy over Peker and the "hardliners," and their victory meant a change in inter-party relations more in accordance with the outline İnönü had put forth in his Declaration. Peker's resignation was followed by other events that manifested the ascendancy of the "moderates," such as the resignation of Falih Rıfkı Atay, a Peker supporter and longtime editor of *Ulus* [The Nation],

the official paper of the People's Party. Erim, who had led the opposition against Peker replaced Atay.¹⁸

THE SAKA CABINET AND THE REEXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

While Hasan Saka, the Foreign Minister replaced Peker as Prime Minister, Necmettin Sadak became the new Foreign Minister in the Saka cabinet. While the new cabinet's program continued to promise efforts to fight shortages and inflation, it also reflected a revisionist approach to the statist policies of past administrations. More in line with the "moderate" position, Saka called for easing of restrictions on imports and assistance for the development of private manufacturing.

The more liberal economic policies of the Saka program seemed to demonstrate the administration's desire to realign its economic goals according to developing relations with the United States. It also showed the increasing influence of the "moderates" and the demands of the developing private sector in Turkey. Besides this alteration, the Saka cabinet promised and called for cooperation with opposition parties: "Supported by the principles of our reformist party, the founder of this democratic system, we count our government's first responsibility to be to develop this system in our country over time, and to assure political security."¹⁹ The new cabinet's program pledged to respect the rights of all political parties that worked within the law, as well as the political rights of the citizens, even while promising vigilance against political activities of the far "left" or "right." In effect, the program of the new cabinet incorporated the promises and demands of President İnönü, as expressed in his July 12th Declaration.

Following the appointment of Saka, İnönü took a tour of the country in order to explain the changes of the past few months, and to reemphasize the importance of maintaining the multi-party system. İnönü directed all government officials at every level to show impartiality toward the parties: "The fundamental law securing political life is that the administrative mechanism, down to the [lowest level], must view the parties with neutrality and justice, while all activities of the parties must remain within the law."²⁰ İnönü's trip served to emphasize his July 12th Declaration, and to further the redefinition of the role of the government official in a system that was accustomed to an affiliation of party and government

administration. This was a step beyond the redefinition of the presidency as an impartial executive, and it was a call for impartiality for the benefit of the system, not for the People's Party or the Democrat Party. İnönü reinforced his argument with his actions, by visiting the Democrat Party office in Erzurum, using the opportunity to stress: "Erzurum is the place where the great revolutionary country began. For the first time I am visiting the Democrat Party in Erzurum. With this visit, to all Democrat friends I wish success."²¹ Upon his return to Ankara, İnönü was met at the train station by a large crowd of supporters, including Fuat Köprülü, of the Democrat Party.

Just one year after the tense events surrounding the elections of 1946, İnönü was continuing to reinforce the multi-party system through his stress on greater cooperation between the parties, and toward reform of the People's Party and the government to respect the main opposition and to meet the demands of the new system. The events of the summer of 1947 showed the willingness of İnönü to work together with the "moderates" in the People's Party as well as with Celâl Bayar to shape the future of the multi-party political system.²² But this alliance led to two outcomes. First, their cooperation served to reinforce the boundaries of acceptable political expression in the multi-party system. As a result, the "left" and "right" of the political spectrum would be denied a voice, while the two main parties would represent different perspectives on a generally agreed political agenda. As a consequence of the first outcome, the second outcome of the cooperation between İnönü and Bayar insured that the political debate would have to accept the primacy of the Kemalist reform program, and the secular, republican bases of the government. These two outcomes, along with changes in Turkish foreign relations, influenced the Turkish political system and political debate until 1960.

THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY, AND TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT

Among many problems, the cabinet of Hasan Saka immediately faced the problem of how to pay for continued mobilization, as the Ministry of Defense continued to take 60 percent of the budget. By the summer of 1947 it was clear that to maintain mobilization at current levels, the government would have to raise taxes and further curtail spending in other areas. The Turkish General Staff believed that the international situation, and continuing tensions with the Soviet Union, warranted maintaining

mobilization at the existing level. While the new Prime Minister agreed in principle, other members of the cabinet favored reducing the troop levels from 485,000 to 330,000 to cut expenses. In line with its new foreign policy, the Turkish government informed the British and American Ambassadors that maintaining the existing level of troops would require an additional 190 million TL, approximately \$67 million, for the Turkish budget. Thus, if the United States failed to provide extra funds above the \$100 million promised under the Truman Doctrine, the Turkish government would choose to reduce the number of troops instead of raising taxes or soliciting new loans.²³

In light of the increasing American commitment to Western European countries, American planners chose to advise Turkey to demobilize troops to reduce the Turkish armed forces to 330,000 soldiers. Furthermore, since they were convinced that the Soviet goal was the economic destabilization of Turkey, demobilization of troops and the consequent savings would actually make the Turkish economy stronger, thus obstructing Soviet plans. But the Americans were uneasy about the consequences and the long-range impact of the decision in terms of the ramifications for relations with Turkey, American prestige with other countries, and its effect on the American posture with the Soviet Union. Thus the American Ambassador advised the Turkish government that when it demobilized the troops, for purposes of propaganda Turkey should announce that demobilization had been made possible by the increased efficiency and effectiveness of the Turkish military due to the receipt of American equipment.²⁴

Meanwhile, the Turkish government was still trying to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union. In September 1947 a Turkish delegation traveled to Moscow to participate in the celebration of Moscow's 800th anniversary.²⁵ During this period İnönü was consumed by his drive to ensure the continuation of the multi-party system and was concentrating on domestic issues. As he traveled in Turkey that fall, his public comments were directed overwhelmingly at the future of the Turkish political system. But in his letters to his son Erdal, who was studying in the United States, İnönü wrote: "the international situation is very tense. What an effort the world is giving to this struggle." Amid the tensions of global uncertainty in the winter of 1948, İnönü wrote to his son that the false rumors about Turkey's withdrawal of its Ambassador from Moscow had caused a stir in Europe: "The world's nerves are tense. The situation is uncertain. It appears that the development of any event affecting us is tied to the world situation in general. We are as calm as we can be under these conditions."²⁶ Indeed, Turkey was confronting rapid changes in its political

and economic system, while trying to adjust to a foreign policy of realignment. It was reassuring for Turkish policy makers that in January 1948 Truman told Congress that the United States was pledged to aid Turkey and Greece because their continuing freedom and liberty would be an inspiration to other nations in Europe and the Middle East trying to maintain their independence.²⁷

But, in the spring of 1948, six months after the signature of the Treaty of Assistance, and despite Truman's assurances, the Turks were still waiting for the delivery of American weaponry and equipment. Since the assessment of Turkey's needs was not completed until December, by the spring only small amounts of goods had arrived. The problem stemmed from the slow arrival of American equipment, combined with the early arrival of American advisers. Before the supplies began to arrive in large amounts, 182 American advisers, including 71 from the army, 34 from the air force, 13 from the navy, and 51 civilians, arrived to help train the Turks in the use of American weaponry, road-building equipment, and other supporting supplies.²⁸ Turkish policy makers felt that they had agreed to receive military equipment to use for the defense of Turkey in accordance with the bi-lateral agreement with the United States. But now it seemed even after receiving the aid, they were losing control of its administration and even allocation within the country. Furthermore, they felt pressured by American advice that seemed to falter when it came to fulfilling the promise of financial and military assistance.

In 1948, this scenario began to be increasingly reminiscent of the negotiations Turkey undertook with Great Britain at the beginning of World War II. Turkish policy makers at that time also felt that Britain was willing to interfere as long as it was not expected to extend itself. But at the time, Turkish policy makers had the option of balancing foreign relations with Germany, which gave them power to negotiate their demands. In 1948, Turkish leaders saw themselves as caught in the replay of an old scenario while lacking the options that they utilized in the past. While the government tried to portray the ever-growing number of advisers as evidence of increasing American interest in Turkey and friendship with the United States, this situation was becoming a source of embarrassment for the government, as well as a source of resentment among the Turkish people as the issue of relations with the West entered political debate.²⁹ And with changing conditions, the Turkish government, once reluctant to acknowledge or retreat from its original platform that only good would come of the relationship with America, gradually moved to reconsider its relations with the United States. By early 1948 doubts were spreading.

REFORM OF THE PEOPLE'S PARTY: THE 7TH PEOPLE'S PARTY CONGRESS AND THE AGENDA OF THE "35"

The establishment of the multi-party system not only led to new political parties, but also to reorganization within the ruling party. The People's Party 7th Congress, held in November 1947, demonstrated the increasing division between "hardliners" and "moderates," and the growing effort to reform the party organization and party platform. As the Congress met, "hardliners," who retained considerable influence within the party, even after the resignation of Peker, mounted a major challenge for leadership of the party. Their point of unification was their opposition to reforms, which they believed would mean abandonment of the Kemalist platform in favor of appeasing the opposition parties, conservative voters, and the Americans. The challenge of the "hardliners" came at the very beginning of the twenty-day long Congress, as a contest for the election of the Deputy Chair of the party. Hilmi Uran, whom İnönü supported, received 328 votes against 159 supporting Recep Peker. Defeated in his bid for leadership, Peker continued to defend his opposition to the Democrat Party and what he termed the conciliatory policies of İnönü toward the opposition.³⁰

The ascendancy of the "moderates" at the Congress opened the way for the adoption of a number of proposals, prepared by party committees during the spring and summer. These proposals led to major debates and changes in party organization, and to the party platform especially in terms of the approaches of the People's Party to economic and social policy. Changes in party organization stemmed from preliminary discussions at the provincial and central levels of the party and reflected the changing agenda of local officials, who called for greater democracy within the party and for a fundamental voice in appointments and the making of party policy.³¹ These decisions also showed the growing strength of the "moderates," many of whom were local party officials, who opposed the centralist stance of the "hardliners."

The Party Congress, as a base for revising the party platform, also adopted changes in the six arrows defining the ideology of the People's Party: Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, Reformism, Statism, and Populism. In place of reformism, which implied a continuing top down imposition of reforms, the People's Party would now advocate "evolutionism," implying gradual change with respect to existing circumstances including the changing needs of the people. The Congress also decided to change the status of the People's Houses, which had been formed as

cultural vanguards of the Kemalist reforms and became organs of the People's Party. Not only Bayar's insistence on allowing the People's Houses to be used as community centers, and the development of the new spirit of cooperative multi-party politics, but also revision of the reformist ideology that influenced the fundamental character of the People's Houses led to the decision at the Congress to turn the People's Houses over to the government, for use by all.³²

Besides the fundamental alteration of the defining ideology of the People's Party, interpretation of its existing platforms was modified to reflect the influence of Turkish foreign policy and the ongoing debate with the Democrat Party, especially in the area of statism. The People's Party 7th Congress adopted a more liberal definition of statism. According to this modified position, private enterprise would now be encouraged as a matter of economic policy, with the understanding that the state would continue to play the major role in heavy industry or enterprises demanding intensive investment of capital with delayed profits such as mining, and the slow-developing Turkish defense industry, among others.³³ According to this revised policy, transportation and shipping were to be gradually turned over to private enterprise, and in all facets of industry, state-private joint ventures were to be encouraged. Within the context of these alterations, the Congress maintained that "our party holds as elemental the state's encouragement, protection and assistance of every type of economic activity formed by the hand of private enterprise." Besides industry, the People's Party interpreted the state's role as a major supporter of agriculture. In addition, the 7th Congress called for the retraction of the controversial article 17 of the Land Reform Bill of 1945, which called for the confiscation of privately owned land.³⁴

Besides statism, the policy of secularism became an issue for heated debate reflecting divisions within the party and Turkish society. The controversy surrounded the issue of religious instruction in public schools. When a bill had been introduced to the National Assembly in December 1946, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver suggested courses on Islam "to strengthen spiritual resistance against the threat of communism." When it was proposed, few members of the Assembly supported the motion, and Peker derided the idea, arguing, "using religion as a means of defense resembles the idea of trying to cure a fatal poisoning by taking another poison which is not less fatal." The Assembly's reluctance, and Peker's discouragement did not deter Tanrıöver's efforts to raise the issue again at the People's Party 7th Congress. While several other party members joined in supporting the resolution, a heated debate on the matter of religion

revealed the diverse opinions about secularism in the party, and led to an announcement of a party policy on religion: "Our party considers that [all laws] ... must correspond to the requirements of modern civilization ... and that the exclusion of religious ideas from the secular affairs of government and politics constitute the main factor of success, progress and development."³⁵ Even though the Congress maintained secularism as a part of People's Party policy toward religion, the debates revealed the diverse opinions about government interference in religious expression and in Islam's place in modern Turkish society, and most importantly the growing possibility of the revision of the People's Party's platform of secularism.

The changes adopted by the People's Party 7th Congress in 1947 have led to various interpretations. One interpretation concentrates on the impact of changes within Turkish society during the war, especially due to the growth of the private sector and commercial agriculture. According to this argument, the growth of the private sector contradicted the basic premise of statism, which failed to meet all economic needs. As a result, the private sector grew faster, filling the margins left by state enterprises. This rapid growth demanded revision of the policy of statism, to free capital for investment, to reduce restrictions on trade, to lower taxes, and to provide support for private enterprise and private agriculture. Furthermore, the growth of the private sector led to the growth of the power of private entrepreneurs and big landowners, who as a coalition not only challenged, but effectively influenced existing policy interpretations for their own benefit.³⁶ Even though the Democrat Party accommodated these growing concerns of the new contenders for power, those who remained in the People's Party as "moderates" also influenced changes in the economic platform, including changes in the Land Reform Bill.³⁷

While one set of assumptions about change concentrates on the dynamics of economic change in Turkish society, others explain the change in the People's Party platform by examining the impact of foreign relations, including the growing influence of the United States in Turkey. According to this argument, İnönü carried out reforms in order to prove to the West that Turkey was democratizing its politics and privatizing its economy, and thus worthy of continued assistance.³⁸ A third explanation, by focusing on the political discourse and the development of multi-party politics examines the change in the People's Party platform with attention to changes within Turkey and in Turkish foreign relations. This argument points out that in order to compete effectively in the upcoming general election, the People's Party was forced to modify its platform to appeal to the electorate. This modification reflected sweeping changes within Turkey

since the foundation of the Republic and the impact of World War II, as well as the effect of the bi-polarization of global politics.

The development of multi-party politics forced the People's Party to reexamine its platform in the context of these changing circumstances. The new platform was an attempt to acknowledge the interests of new groups within the party and among the electorate; thus it aimed at preventing the party from splitting into two or more smaller political parties as well as at gaining support among voters. The discussions at the 7th Congress also led to reexamination of the party position on other issues, such as the continuation of martial law. Following the congress the National Assembly lifted martial law, which had lasted seven years in Istanbul and in surrounding provinces. The decision in the Assembly not only reflected the changing agenda of the People's Party but also the impact of the pressure of the opposition and the independent press, which had focused on this issue to criticize the People's Party since the end of the war.³⁹ The effort to broaden the appeal of the People's Party proved to be successful in increasing its popularity after the 7th Congress, and allayed fears of the party's further fragmentation. The 7th Congress also had an impact on the Democrat Party, which was divided over how to respond to the new platform of the People's Party.

THE SPLIT IN THE DEMOCRAT PARTY AND THE FORMATION OF THE NATION PARTY

The conflicts within the Democrat Party between its founders, and between the central leadership and local party officials were evident from its foundation. Also, the development of a conflict between former members of the People's Party and those who had not been involved in politics before joining the Democrat Party became unavoidable.⁴⁰ Rumors about growing dissension in the party circulated as early as the summer of 1946, and some believed that Kenan Öner, head of the Istanbul branch, would break away to form a new party with Fevzi Çakmak in the spring of 1947.⁴¹ But confrontation with the Peker cabinet held the party together until İnönü issued his July 12th Declaration. The announcement of the declaration led opposing sides in the party to take positions regarding the response to İnönü's declaration and on the issue of cooperation with the People's Party. Hikmet Bayur led the criticism of the July 12th Declaration, saying that it was aimed at undermining the fighting spirit of the Democrat Party. This launched a series of attacks on İnönü in the

pro-Democrat Party press, and sharp replies in *Ulus*, the People's Party newspaper. This was followed by a controversy within the party over the issue of salary increases for Assembly members. "Hardliners" favored voting against the raise as a show of opposition to the People's Party. But "moderates" such as Fuat Köprülü pointed out that "We will both give negative votes, and put the increased salary in our pockets." Ultimately all but one Democrat Party deputy voted against the salary increase, which was passed, but the debate reflected the growing division within the party concerning tactics.⁴²

As these issues brought divisions to the surface, Öner came under attack for his stance against compromise, and his opposition to the Democrat Party central leadership. Öner resigned his position in January 1948 as a protest, accusing Bayar of trying to eliminate opponents of İnönü from the Democrat Party in order "to curry the favor of the President." Furthermore, Öner accused Bayar of accepting financial assistance from İnönü to start the Democrat Party,⁴³ and of reaching a secret agreement to maintain the Democrat Party as secondary to the dominance of the People's Party.⁴⁴

The opposition within the party solidified around Öner and Bayar, and came to a showdown in February 1948 when Öner supporters in the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group rejected the authority of Bayar by not reelecting his candidate, Fuat Köprülü, to the leadership of the Parliamentary group. Bayar, as leader of the Democrat Party's Central Committee, argued that the elections were improper since the Parliamentary Group was expected to yield to the Central Committee, which represented the Party as a whole. Bayar emerged victorious from the confrontation, which was followed by the expulsion of Öner and four other members for disrupting party unity. The expulsions prompted the resignation of six more members of the Central Committee in protest.⁴⁵

The expulsions and resignations prompted more defections from the Democrat Party, as well as the formation of a group of "Independent Democrats" within the party in May 1948. Those who left the Democrat Party formed the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) under the leadership of Kenan Öner, Fevzi Çakmak, and Hikmet Bayur in July 1948. The program of the Nation Party advocated the replacement of statism with economic liberalism, the establishment of genuine opposition to the rule of the People's Party, fair and free elections, better relations with Muslim countries, and the end of government interference in religious affairs.⁴⁶ Çakmak argued that the Nation Party was formed because the Democrat Party failed to create genuine opposition, but had kept the people occupied

with unimportant issues. According to Çakmak, the Nation Party, in contrast, would not compromise with the People's Party and would strive to form a government based on the needs and demands of the people, with respect for religion and the family.⁴⁷

By launching a strong attack against both the People's Party and the Democrat Party, the Nation Party immediately tried to prove its distinction as "the only true opposition." Consequently, its attacks came under strong criticism from both parties on the grounds of espousing reactionary and fanatic goals, for aimlessly criticizing other parties, and for being a party of "old men."⁴⁸ In addition, opponents of the government feared that the Nation Party would weaken efforts to remove the People's Party from power by splitting the opposition.

As concerns about the Nation Party mounted, support for its cause remained limited. But by being a third party in the Assembly, its members immediately influenced political debate, and their voice forced the reexamination of issues that were not integral to the platforms of the other two parties. They exerted increasing pressure for compromises on religious policy, questioned the government's efforts to strengthen ties with the West, and more importantly, forced both the Democrat Party and the People's Party to define their positions more clearly.

While the political debate focused in 1948 on the redefinition of party platforms, and reorganization, the Turkish government was also concentrating on Turkey's position in the fast changing atmosphere of global uncertainty. A second conference in Paris between the sixteen European countries and discussions regarding Turkey's participation in the defense of Europe were occupying the government's foreign policy efforts. In April 1948, Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the administrative body for Marshall Plan assistance. This action led to reconsideration in domestic affairs, in economic policy, and in terms of defining acceptable political activity. As Turkey decisively moved into the Western camp, the government supported efforts to eliminate the "left," such as the establishment of youth organizations to fight against "leftist" subversion.⁴⁹ This signaled a new period of suppression of the "left" in Turkish politics, which would further define mainstream political debate.

TURKEY AND THE MARSHALL PLAN

One of the first actions of Turkish policy makers to try to redirect American intentions came through a meeting between the Turkish Ambassador to the

United States, Hüseyin Ragip Baydur, and State Department officials in January 1948. Baydur pointed out that "while he appreciated the fact that Public Law 75 (aid appropriations under the Truman Doctrine) was a tangible expression of America's common interests with Turkey, he could not forebear to express concern over the successive delays in implementing the program." The Ambassador continued, to argue that Turkey did not view American assistance as a handout, but that it was doing its share for the common good. He stressed that "in so doing [Turkey] will expect to be treated as an equal and taken into full confidence regarding [American] plans and policies." Baydur compared the situation of 1947 to that of 1943, when the Turkish government informed the Allies it would join them in the war only if they provided clear and definite plans regarding the role Turkey would play in the defeat of the Axis, plans that the Allies refused to provide prior to a Turkish declaration of war.⁵⁰ In March, Foreign Minister Sadak followed up by informing the British Ambassador, Kelly, that the uncertainty about the arrival of American aid to Turkey had weakened the government's position. Sadak also pointed to the importance of the arrival of a new Soviet Ambassador after an absence of a year, which Sadak interpreted as a Soviet attempt to realign its policy in order to utilize growing public discontent in Turkey regarding the relationship with America. Sadak warned that together, the present conditions were driving a wedge between Turkey and the Western powers.⁵¹

The debates in the Assembly seemed to warrant Sadak's arguments. Indeed, the apparent shortcomings of the American assistance program were becoming an element of conflict among the parties. The opposition in the Assembly interpreted the reluctance of the United States to supply aid to Turkey through the Marshall Plan as the failure of the Turkish delegation led by Numan Menemencioğlu at the Paris meeting in July 1947. The Democrat Party claimed that the government had not adequately prepared for the meeting, or been forceful in presenting Turkey's position. The Democrat Party also maintained that continuing undemocratic practices in Turkey were damaging Turkey's image abroad, resulting in reluctance in the Western commitment.⁵²

As the different interpretations grew in the press and in public debates, the United States reconsidered Turkey's initial request for assistance under the Marshall Plan.⁵³ This reconsideration may have stemmed from Turkey's recent warnings, or may have developed out of a change of policy after an American reappraisal of the Turkish situation. Some even argued that İnönü's July 12th Declaration had a persuasive impact in convincing key American policy makers that Turkey intended to continue to

pursue further democratic reforms in order to secure its place in the Western camp.⁵⁴ Regardless of the varying interpretations of the change in American policy, the Turkish government assessed the change as the success of the earlier efforts of Menemencioğlu and the Turkish delegation, and as a vindication of the government's foreign policy.

Reconsideration of Marshall Plan assistance to Turkey led to a decision in February 1948 to extend funds, and consequently on July 4, 1948, Turkey and the United States signed a Treaty of Economic Assistance. This like the Treaty of Assistance of the year before that gave Turkey support under the Truman Doctrine, was intended to bolster Turkey's military capabilities against the Soviet Union and its allies. Along with the Truman Doctrine assistance, Marshall Plan aid carried certain restrictive conditions. The treaty was based on the assurance that the Turkish government would use economic assistance for "purposes in accordance with the common effort."⁵⁵ Furthermore, the treaty bound Turkey to accept an American mission for the study of the Turkish economy to determine distribution of the assistance. It was in this context of the treaty that American economic assistance would be used predominantly to support development of the private sector, rather than the public sector, in Turkey.⁵⁶

The treaty's clause on maintaining control over the spending of Marshall Plan aid in Turkey was manifested in increasing numbers of missions sponsored by the American government, private organizations, and corporations. One such mission was sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund, led by Max Thornburg, a petroleum engineer. In his report on Turkey's economy, Thornburg called for more planning of Turkey's economy by experts in various fields, the setting of more modest goals for economic growth and investment, and more attention to the agricultural sector. Thus, Thornburg echoed the American State Department's previous position. In his report, he asserted that "laws and customs which leave power to make arbitrary decisions with government officials" should be eliminated.⁵⁷ While the American audience assessed the reports of the "experts" to reinforce already established beliefs and policy decisions, in Turkey their advice was seen by many as an abridgment of Turkish sovereignty in political and economic matters. But at the same time, the American interpretation of Turkish reality was increasingly becoming a point of legitimization for political parties. This continuing rejection of American advice on one hand and reliance on the other was deepening the gap between the sides, influencing the political debate in Turkey and the people's assessment of Turkey's future in the bi-polar world.

PROPONENTS OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE AND CRITICS OF THE "AMERICAN BAND-AID"

When American assistance had been announced in the spring and summer of 1947, critics in Turkey accused the government of selling Turkish independence to the United States for \$100 million. Now, in the spring of 1948, they were arguing that American advisers were interfering in Turkey's domestic affairs, turning Turkey into a "satellite of America": "Turkey, in order to get assistance from the United States, made an agreement that did not sit with our national independence. With this agreement Turkey lost its independence, became America's satellite; it became impossible to pursue a political course or publish anything that disagreed with American national interests."⁵⁸ Some Turkish intellectuals and politicians interpreted American interest in Turkey as an integral part of the Cold War. They saw Turkey as a pawn in a game played by powerful contenders, and argued that by becoming subservient Turkey was betraying not only itself, but also other small nations: "The major powers are intriguing to divide up the small nations. This is the way to a third world war. Against this the small nations must unite to create a balance against the major states."⁵⁹

In contrast to intellectuals and politicians who opposed the government's alliance with the United States, and with the terms of Turkey's participation in the Cold War, the government and the People's Party were insistent in their proclamation of the benefits of alliance with the United States. Nihat Erim, in 1949 went so far as to claim that this affiliation would soon lead Turkey to become a "Little America."⁶⁰ At the same time, there was an outpouring of popular support for American involvement in Turkey, and Turkish citizens, ranging from artists to peasants to businesspeople to schoolchildren, sent letters and gifts, including stamps, a clay bust of Harry Truman, embossed plates, raisins, and Christmas cards to Truman expressing their gratitude for American assistance.⁶¹

In its position of strengthening ties to the United States, the government and the People's Party received the greatest support from the Democrat Party.⁶² Bayar believed the growth of American influence would help to eliminate what he saw as anti-democratic practices and excessive state control of trade and the economy. But strong opposition to the growing relationship with America came from Nation Party leaders Hikmet Bayur, Fevzi Çakmak, and Kenan Öner. Contrary to the position of the government and the Democrat Party, the Nation Party attacked what it called the increasing domination of American capital in Turkey.⁶³

The Nation Party was not alone in voicing this view regarding American domination of Turkey's economic development. Nadir Nadi, editor of the daily *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic), argued that "Turkey's economic development has to be according to its own needs and own plans, not those of the Marshall Plan." Nadi wrote that the government had made a mistake in trying to make its policies fit the Marshall Plan while ignoring Turkey's own needs.⁶⁴ Those who were concerned about not only the political domination but also the economic control of the United States in Turkey blamed the government for surrendering to American pressure and expressed concern for the government's failure to make its own assessment of Turkey's economic situation. Their concern also reflected mistrust of American "advisers and experts" who came to Turkey with no knowledge of Turkish society, culture, and language, but who were armed with the "equation of modernization." Intellectuals felt that this formula, designed with underlying political assumptions and with a Western model in mind, was not adequate to understand or solve the problems of Turkey. The Americans brought not assistance or aid, but an "American Band-Aid."⁶⁵ They argued that the aim was to maintain Turkey as a producer of agricultural goods and raw materials for the industrialized world, and a consumer of manufactured goods.

Turks resented being judged by the Americans. Both the government and the Turkish people were aware that there was opposition within the United States to assistance to Turkey. This opposition reflected reluctance on the grounds that Turkey was not a democratic country, and its commitment to free trade and democracy was questioned. During congressional hearings on assistance to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, House members referred to the Turkish government as "unreliable, irresponsible, dishonorable," as well as treacherous, traitorous and double-dealing.⁶⁶ Another member of the House complained that the "corrupt dictatorship" of Turkey had erected "a wall which keeps information from coming out of that country which makes the iron curtain look like tissue paper."⁶⁷ Sabahattin Ali was among those who responded to such criticism, asking why Turks should believe those who were judging them:

Drunk American reporters whose entire knowledge of Turkey is gathered in Ankara from the Süreyya Bar and Karpıç's Restaurant, and in Istanbul from the Park Hotel and the balcony of the Taksim Nightclub; naive American diplomats who view our country from the smoke of cocktail parties or from the windows of luxury automobiles; swindling politicians trying to divide up world markets. ... What is it to America what

condition Turkey is in? ... Are we going to learn if there is freedom and democracy in our country from the American government?⁶⁸

Arslan Humbaraci worked for the United States Office of War Information during the war, and afterward when American advisers arrived, "[t]he more Americans came to Turkey, the better I was pleased. I believed that the presence of this democracy-loving people would spread the ideals of social and political freedom in my country, and that this was in fact one of the ends to which they were working." But as American plans became clear, Humbaraci became a critic of American treatment of Turkey:

I did not realize at first that the United States, like Britain before her, was concerned not so much with the aspirations of the Turkish people as with the part they could be relied upon to play in the *cordon sanitaire*. It has been the tragedy of Turkey, old and modern, that the Western powers have never seen her as anything more than a buffer to Russia—Tsarist and communist.⁶⁹

Complaints about the Americans came not only from opponents of the government, but also from Turkish officials who pointed out that American advisers were beginning to offer less advice and to give more directives. When the Vice President of the World Bank visited Turkey, he urged the Turks to "follow the American example of humble beginnings as an agricultural country, leaving ambitious industrial projects until later."⁷⁰ The suggestion met with resentment in the Turkish government and among members of the National Assembly, who since the foundation of the Republic had strove for industrialization and saw the industrialization project as the first priority of the government's Post-War Development Plans. Still, the Saka government was firmly committed to close relations with the United States even if it meant interference in domestic affairs. But the logic of American aid, presented as security against Soviet pressure, required a response to pro-Soviet, or any other, critics from the left.

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE LEFT IN TURKISH POLITICS

Since the foundation of the Republic, socialism and communism had always been treated with suspicion by the dominant ideology, and was interpreted as tools of the Soviet Union. Following the suppression of the Turkish Socialist Party and the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party in December 1946, the multi-party system lacked a political party representing

the left. But intellectuals who identified themselves with the left remained active even following the suppression of the socialist parties, and in 1947 the government began to curtail more forcefully their activities, and the activities of those identified as "leftists."

In March 1947 students at Ankara University's Language, History, and Geography Faculty held a meeting to condemn the teaching of Pertev Naili Boratav, a Professor of Folklore and Linguistics. Following the meeting the students marched to the center of Ankara and burned copies of the journal *Marko Pasa*, published by Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin.⁷¹ At the same time, in Izmir students demonstrated against the publication of the journal *Zincirli Hürriyet* (Chained Freedom), published by Mehmet Ali Aybar and Sabahattin Ali. These events culminated in an announcement in December 1947 by the National Turkish Students' Association and by the Istanbul University Student Association declaring a struggle against communism in Turkey.

The interpretation of global developments, and events in Turkey were quickly setting the tone of the popular trend: blaming the communists for Turkish problems. In December 1947, an electrical short caused a fire in the National Education Ministry Building in Ankara, but some, including members of the National Assembly, immediately blamed the fire on communists. A few days later, students occupied the administrative offices of the Language, History, and Geography Faculty in Ankara to denounce "leftist" professors. Shouting "damn the communists," the students then marched to Atatürk's grave and sang the National Anthem before attacking the offices of the Turkish Youth Society, which was seen as an organization that harbored leftists.⁷²

Joining in the "Red Hunt," the right of center press sanctioned these attacks and demanded government action to curtail leftist activities in Turkey. Peyami Safa's call for the National Education Ministry to investigate if teachers in Turkish schools "were teaching communism?" in 1946 now became a major issue of debate.⁷³ For example, Cihad Baban called on the government to be more careful about communist influences in education, arguing that while communism as an economic doctrine was safe to teach, as a political doctrine it was unsafe due to its advocacy of the Soviet system. Thus, Baban stressed that those who taught communism in schools were stooges of Russia. Asim Us also praised the stance against communism taken by Istanbul University students, proposing that it would save Turkey from the fate of Greece.⁷⁴

The 7th Congress of the People's Party called for tougher laws against activities aimed at promoting class conflict, and in December 1947 the

National Assembly began discussing the issue of leftist influence and communist propaganda in the public education system. The discussions centered on professors at Ankara University's Language, History, and Geography Faculty, and on communist influence in the Village Institutes, schools created by the government in 1940. These discussions also revealed that both the students and the opponents of leftists were legitimating their position with reference to "democratic America," and attitudes toward the left in the United States.⁷⁵

The demonstrations and parliamentary discussions culminated in efforts to remove leftist influence from higher education and targeted three professors of Ankara University as examples. Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkes, and Behice Boran were accused of spreading communist propaganda and of abusing the authority of their positions for purposes contrary to the goals of Turkish education.⁷⁶ Since the University Law guaranteed the autonomy of the Faculty, administrative efforts to relieve them of their positions were rejected by the courts. But in June 1948 all three professors, along with other "leftists" were put on trial for activities threatening to national security. The trial lasted two years, and even though Boratav was acquitted and Berkes and Boran won on appeal, they all lost their positions at Ankara University. Boratav took a position at the Sorbonne, and Berkes joined the faculty at McGill University in Canada, while Boran remained in Turkey to continue her political efforts.⁷⁷ At the same time the writer, and Ministry of Education official, Sabahattin Ali was murdered. According to official accounts, he was killed near the Turkish-Bulgarian border by Ali Ertekin, a guide who was aiding Ali's escape to Bulgaria. According to Ertekin, Sabahattin Ali provoked him by cursing Turkey, and saying, "I am a communist and I am going to work among communists." Ertekin claimed to be a patriot, and the court gave him four years' imprisonment for the murder of Sabahattin Ali.⁷⁸

Besides the higher education institutions, another target was the National Education Ministry, in particular the Village Institutes. When the Village Institutes were created in 1940, their purpose was to train young villagers as teachers to educate other villagers in reading and writing, health practices, and modern agricultural methods. By 1948 there were 21 institutes, and about twenty-five thousand graduates and students.⁷⁹ The Village Institutes were then seen as an innovative approach to fighting illiteracy and spreading the ideals of the Republic, and those trained in the Institutes came to see themselves as a vanguard of progressive ideas in the villages, fighting ignorance and superstition. One of the leading proponents of the Village Institutes was Hasan Ali Yücel, a longtime Minister of

Education and a frequent target of the government's opponents on the grounds that he harbored leftists, such as Sabahattin Ali, in the Ministry of Education.

When Recep Peker became Prime Minister in August 1946, Yücel was replaced as Education Minister by a conservative, Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, who was later replaced by Tahsin Bangoğlu. Sirer, and later Bangoğlu, along with a former director of a Village Institute, Emin Soysal, led the attack against supposed communist influence in the Ministry of Education, attempting to remove Boratav, Boran, and Berkes from the Ankara University Faculty, and searching for communist subversion in the Village Institutes. From this assumption, they charged that the Village Institutes facilitated incitement of the Turkish peasantry to class warfare against landowners. As a result of these attacks, the curriculum of the Institutes was changed to lay more stress on Republican Turkish culture and less on practical matters, and they were segregated according to gender.⁸⁰

The government's efforts to suppress the left in Turkey were hailed by the press and received the approval of the Democrat Party and the Nation Party. In this era, the danger of being branded "communist" proved too much for free debate to overcome. Even though there was opposition in the Assembly, the overwhelming tide swept aside such considerations. And while the People's Party formally declared its intentions to oppose both the "extreme left" and the "extreme right," the widening definition of the "extreme left" that fell under the rubric of leftist subversion, was in contrast to a narrowing definition of the "extreme right" and "religious reaction." It became a more and more acceptable practice to coincide the rightist platform with morality and religion in the press, in the parties, and in the Assembly.

THE EMERGING DEBATE ON RELIGION

The public debate on communism and on the left in Turkey coincided with a growing debate on religion, especially as the debate grew about Islamic instruction in public schools as a necessary instrument to fight communism, ignorance, and extremism. This period brought reexamination of secularism and the government's attitude toward Islam, particularly in the areas of religious education and public religious observances. Religion had been a political issue in the Ottoman Empire, and was integral to the debates at the founding of the Republic. Secularism, as an adopted policy of the Turkish Republic and as a platform of the People's

Party, was based on the assumption that if unregulated by the state, religion could impede progress, and threaten state authority and national sovereignty. Thus since the foundation of the Republic, the People's Party leadership remained committed to controlling the expression of religion and limiting its influence in Turkish society. But the multi-party system facilitated the emergence of issues that had been suppressed by the government and restrained by the People's Party. Religion was among the leading issues raised from the beginning of the multi-party system, first by the National Action Party of Nuri Demirag, formed in 1945. Especially with the formation of the Nation Party in 1948, the debate on religion became part of interparty competition.

The political debate on religion focused on Islam in Turkish society and reflected three positions. The dominant view argued that religion posed a danger to the Kemalist reforms and to the secular basis of the Turkish Republic, and therefore, concessions on religion would be contrary to the fundamentals of the Republic. The opposite of the dominant position asserted that there should be complete separation of religion and state, thus eliminating state intervention in religious affairs. A third position emerged from arbitration between the dominant and opposing views, and proposed that while maintaining control over religion in Turkey was necessary, the state should modify its policies to meet both new needs and popular demands. The dominant position, once the basis of official policy of the Republic, was advocated mostly by founding members and "hardliners" in the People's Party, who were strongly opposed by Nation Party members in the Assembly. The majority, the "moderates" and the new generation in both the People's Party and the Democrat Party increasingly advocated a point of compromise between the two opposing views favoring retaining state control over religious activities while making substantial changes to allow greater religious freedom, in particular establishing state-controlled religious instruction in schools. The debates surrounding religion in this context also addressed concerns about freedom of expression and the meaning of democracy.

The integration of religious issues into the mainstream political debate insured the integration of rightist concerns into the mainstream, and the reluctance of the government to take a strong stand against the "religious right," even though such restriction was considered part of the government's official policy. Furthermore, public interest in the issue, and the accessibility of the debate to the general public facilitated religion becoming as important a concern as the economy during the last years of the People's Party government and in the 1950 general election.

THE FAILURE OF THE SAKA CABINET AND CONTINUING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

On January 14, 1949, Hasan Saka resigned his position as Prime Minister, after having served since September 1947. The Saka cabinet's conciliatory position toward multi-party politics led to criticism within the People's Party and the Democrat Party. The opposing points argued either that Saka was too willing to compromise, or too uncompromising. In foreign policy, 1948 was a period of reconsideration of the impact and consequences of American assistance. As the press criticized American attitudes toward Turkey it also criticized the government's increasing weakness in foreign affairs. Furthermore, during the period of Saka's cabinet, Turkey's economic condition continued to grow worse, as spending on the military continued to take more than half of Turkey's yearly budget. Inflation remained high and shortages continued despite the ending of the war more than two years earlier. In the spring of 1948 reports reached the capital that famine was spreading in some villages in Anatolia. Celâl Bayar told villagers, "What blessed people you are, for thinking of paying your taxes even before you think of filling your stomachs. First of all feed yourselves! If there is to be hunger in this country we should be hungry together."⁸¹ As the year progressed, economic problems grew. By the summer, unemployment was beginning to grow in Istanbul. In July the government ended price controls on some items, including sugar, with the aim of alleviating shortages. Prices rose immediately, but shortages did not end, and the new policies became a subject of intense debate in the National Assembly. Saka defended his cabinet's policies, insisting,

You understand it would not be correct to study the problems our country is suffering in isolation from global political and economic conditions. Around the world economic difficulties are still not decreasing. In fact, in many countries these difficulties are growing. Of course working to eliminate these difficulties ... comes at the top of our responsibilities.⁸²

But attacks against Saka's economic policies grew along with the economic problems. The criticism of Saka's economic policy was part of a more general debate on statism. At the People's Party 7th Congress, the Party called for a relaxation of government controls on the economy, but these measures were still criticized by the Democrat Party, and interpreted as the People's Party's intentions to retain much of the government's control.⁸³ Increasing discussions came to center stage as the Istanbul Chamber of

Commerce organized an Economic Congress to discuss the government's economic policies in November 1948. The Congress attracted 1,100 members of the Istanbul business community, who advocated greater government support for private enterprise. They also blamed existing statist policies for retarding the country's economic development through bureaucratic inefficiency and state monopolies.⁸⁴

The debate on economic policy was concurrent with the changes in the economy resulting from Turkey's growing ties to the Western countries. In July 1948 Turkey and the United States had signed a treaty of economic assistance under the Marshall Plan, and in 1949 technical assistance to Turkey under the Point Four program began. Economic development taking shape under American assistance was skewed toward meeting the strategic needs of the West, also having an immediate impact on the Turkish economy and domestic affairs. For example, in 1946 there were about 1,000 tractors in Turkey. In 1949 tractors began to arrive in Turkish villages in large quantities as part of American aid designed to support agricultural production for export to Europe. By 1955 there were 43,000 tractors in Turkey, and the area of cultivated land increased from 23.5 million acres in 1946 to 35 million acres in 1955.⁸⁵

The Saka cabinet fell in January 1949, unable to solve immediate economic problems and unwilling to answer the demands for more liberal economic policies from opposition parties and businessmen. The People's Party paper *Ulus* wrote, "it is not news to anybody that at the top of the reasons forcing the removal of the Saka cabinet came economic problems."⁸⁶ The cabinet of Şemsettin Günaltay would propose more liberal economic policies, adopting the new definition of statism as a measure by which the state would encourage economic activity and the development of the private sector.

Chapter Nine

Multi-Party Politics and the Defeat of Democracy

The general election of May 1950 was a turning point in Turkish history, in the sense that after twenty-seven years of uncontested power, the People's Party handed power to another party, and took on the uncomfortable role of opposition party. İsmet İnönü saw the defeat of the People's Party as proof of the success of the post-war multi-party experiment, and he considered the creation of the multi-party system to be his own greatest accomplishment. İnönü had guided Turkey through the dangers of World War II and the early Cold War and the uncertainties of changing political realities within Turkey.

Only in later years, however, would the shortcomings of the multi-party system become evident. Throughout the period 1945–50, the goal of the multi-party system was to have multi-party elections. But how competition between parties would lead to a more democratic, just, egalitarian, and free society remained marginal to the debate. Instead, the struggle between the People's Party and Democrat Party remained at the level of electoral procedure, and if, or how, to make the elections more fair for the competing parties. The main political issues continued to be development and progress, the role of the state in the economy, protecting national sovereignty, and relations with the Western powers. The main issues were the same basic issues that had occupied Ottoman and Turkish statesmen for more than a century. What had changed was the bi-polar global struggle of the Cold War, which meant that Turkish sovereignty had to be negotiated, and that the multi-party system never became a truly democratic system. As the election of 1950 approached, the struggle over procedure intensified, with the formation of a new cabinet, by the sixth Prime Minister to serve during İnönü's presidency.

THE GÜNLATAY CABINET: DEBATE ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY, AND ELECTION REFORM

The replacement of Hasan Saka by Şemsettin Günaltay in January 1949 marked the complete ascendancy of the young, "moderate" group in the People's Party. Günaltay (1883–1961) studied in Switzerland before joining the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and serving in the Ottoman parliament during World War I. He served in the National Assembly from 1923 to 1954, and he was also an historian, known for his modernist interpretation of Islam. The Günaltay cabinet's program was more liberal than that of Hasan Saka, and Günaltay pledged the improvement of relations between the People's Party and the Democrat Party. The appointment of the Günaltay cabinet, in combination with the changes in the program of the People's Party carried out since July 1947 also had the effect of decreasing the differences between the platforms of the People's Party and the Democrat Party. While some members of the People's Party continued to blame the successive cabinets for blending the objectives of the two parties, "hardliners" in the party targeted İnönü and his attitude regarding the multi-party system. They argued that whereas the Democrat Party had gained support and popularity by attacking the economic, social, and legal position of the People's Party, the latter was expected to compromise, thus make concessions in areas ranging from its platform to campaign practices for the upcoming elections. But İnönü continued to maintain his position, and his cordial relations with Celâl Bayar. In a letter to his son in 1949, İnönü wrote that he had lunch with Bayar and talked politics, and in good humor added: "we were very nice to each other today. May the evil eye not cast upon us."¹

Despite the dissension and concerns about their acceptance among the people, by 1949 the popularity of İnönü and the People's Party were growing. This renewed popularity of the People's Party presented the opposition parties with the possibility of again losing the general election in May 1950. Thus during the period of Günaltay's cabinet, the People's Party policy was to consolidate and increase its popularity with the voters, while the opposition parties, in particular the Democrat Party, aimed to differentiate themselves from the ruling party and to maintain their image as alternatives in the minds of Turkish citizens.

As the 1950 elections approached, changing concerns in domestic policy concurring with alterations in foreign policy led the political debate to concentrate on social and economic issues as well as reform of the election law. Among the social issues, discussions about religion came to the

forefront. During debates in the National Assembly on religious policy, some members complained that their formal education had lacked any training in Islamic doctrine or practices, while others pointed out that in the modern West, religious life was unrestricted, even encouraged by governments. Furthermore, it was argued that formal religious education would combat ignorance and religious fanaticism, while the lack of formal instruction would leave people exposed to teachings hostile to the Republic.² The new Günaltay cabinet stressed that religious training was not meant to challenge the secular principles of the Republic: "It must not be imagined that there is any possibility of our separating from the principle of secularism. In particular, we will give no room for the reappearance of the superstitions that, under the guise of religion, put this nation to sleep for centuries. Also, we will not tolerate the use of religion for political or personal gain."³ In January 1949, the government decided to introduce optional courses on Islam in public primary schools. The courses were to be held after hours, and were voluntary, requiring the written permission of parents. Lessons were to be taught from a book prepared by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, a branch of the Prime Ministry, and approved by the Ministry of Education (in 1950 the Democrat Party government would make the courses on Islam mandatory, unless parents requested their children not participate).⁴ This was followed in May, when the Assembly voted to reestablish the Preacher and Prayer-Leader Schools (*İmam ve Hatip Okulları*), and a Faculty of Divinity connected to Ankara University. In 1924 the government had opened a Faculty of Divinity at Istanbul University, and Preacher and Prayer-Leader Schools, but the secularizing reforms of the 1920s undercut the authority and prestige of religious figures, and in 1933 both the Faculty and the Preacher and Prayer-Leader Schools were closed.⁵ The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University opened in 1949 under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, rather than the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The curriculum of the faculty reflected the aim that religious instruction and religious leaders also serve secular civic duties while fulfilling their religious functions.⁶ The government asserted that the purpose of religious education was to provide religious training in accordance with the principle of secularism, and aimed to prevent the spread of religious obscurantism and fanaticism.

The government's compromises on policies regarding religion came during the year prior to the general election of 1950. Opponents interpreted them as manipulation in to gain electoral support. Along with religious education, the National Assembly hotly debated the controversial issue of the return to the Arabic Ezan (call to prayer) from the Republican practice

of the Turkish Ezan. In February 1949 two men stood during debates in the Assembly and began reading the Ezan in Arabic, which was forbidden by law. The Nation Party blamed the People's Party for the incident, saying that it had resulted from the government stifling the expression of the true sentiments of the people. The People's Party newspaper *Ulus* carried an editorial arguing that if the Ezan were returned to Arabic, reactionaries would go on to demand a return to the Sharia. The People's Party government took no action on the Ezan, but shortly after their victory in 1950 the Democrat Party restored the Arabic Ezan. The third major issue regarding religion was the 1925 law closing shrines and Sufi convents, which was repealed in March 1950, before the election.⁷ By 1949 the vote of the peasants, who still made up about 80 percent of the population, was an important consideration in multi-party politics, and it was widely believed that the peasants wanted more religious freedom. These relaxations in religious affairs were also tied to the changing power balance within the People's Party, reflecting the ascendancy of the "moderates" and the increasing influence of provincial party officials over policies toward religion. Furthermore, some argued that relaxing restrictions on religion was not in conflict with modernization, and pointed out that in the West religion was a prominent aspect of society, especially in "modern" America.

While the religious reforms of the Günaltay cabinet gained the support of the Democrat Party, the economic policy of the People's Party and the Günaltay cabinet remained contentious issues in the preelection debate. Adnan Menderes told the National Assembly in February 1949,

The economic problems stem from the mistakes in financial and economic policies. This mistaken policy, followed up to now, has sapped the nation's strength. Harmful intervention in the sphere of work and production, stemming from the improper enforcement of statism which results in taxes that constantly challenge the country's ability to pay and an economic policy that loads unreasonable burdens onto the citizen, is continually hampering the country's economic development.

Menderes continued, to argue that taxes must be lowered, the size of the bureaucracy must be reduced, and the government should show greater support for private enterprise and agriculture.⁸ Even though this was not a new platform, it worked to reinforce citizens' complaints about the economic situation. Further criticism of the economy was also directed at the government's inability or unwillingness to allocate American assistance for the greater benefit of the country. Even though attacks targeted the People's Party as a whole, they gradually came to focus on İnönü and his

interpretation of statism, thus blaming the current economic condition of Turkey on İnönü's presidency.

Along with the economy, the Democrat Party registered its major complaints against the continuing failure of the People's Party government to adopt legal reforms to insure democracy and fair elections. The Democrat Party objected to the existing election law on the grounds that without judicial supervision, and without secret balloting and open tabulation, it failed to insure just elections. Furthermore, the Democrat Party continued to demand fair use and equal access to state facilities such as the radio during election campaigns. While İnönü assured that opposition parties would have equal access to the state radio and the People's Houses to hold political rallies, he opposed establishing judicial supervision of elections on the ground that it would drag the judicial branch into politics. Democrat Party leaders decided to use the Second Democrat Party Congress in June 1949 to force the issue of election reform into open debate.

During the 2nd Democrat Party Congress, in discussions of a fair election law, it was agreed that without a new law, under the current circumstances the People's Party could retain power regardless of the wishes of the electorate. Thus a party committee was created to formulate an answer to the question, "[If] anti-democratic laws are not changed, and the election law does not provide security and guarantees of justice; ... if the methods [used in the 1946 elections], ... are [again] adopted, what should be the response?"⁹ The answer to this question formed the basis of a declaration by the Democrat Party Congress known as the National Hostility Oath (Milli Husumet Andi). The National Hostility Oath declared that in the event that the ruling party remained in power through corrupt election tactics, the Turkish nation was not to accept the legitimacy of the resulting government, and respond through revolt.¹⁰

The announcement of the National Hostility Oath incensed the People's Party, which was struggling within itself to maintain the guidelines of İnönü's July 12th Declaration, and working to maintain a "spirit of cooperation" between the parties. Moreover, the Oath was interpreted as a direct challenge to the government, accusing it of illegal activities, and inciting the people to disobedience, even insurrection. According to Prime Minister Günaltay, the Oath belied Bayar's promise to work to improve relations between the parties. The Prime Minister told a gathering at Istanbul University, "Freedom does not mean the freedom to swear, but rather the freedom of beneficial thought."¹¹ Nihat Erim, now a member of the Günaltay cabinet, journeyed through Turkey, attacking the Democrat Party for trying to provoke the people to violence and illegal activities.

Adnan Menderes countered by claiming that the real purpose of Erim's trip was to prepare the army and the administration to keep the People's Party in power whatever the outcome of the upcoming election. Furthermore, Menderes compared People's Party rule with the Stalinist regime, provoking further animosity.¹²

At the beginning of August 1949, in this tense atmosphere, İnönü began a long trip through western Turkey to reaffirm the commitment of the People's Party to free and fair elections, and called on all opposition parties to restrain from questionable or dangerous tactics. İnönü told a gathering in Izmir: "Political currents will not reduce or destroy our civilized relations. ... Whatever the struggle between political ideas and political parties, they must not make enemies of citizens. You must not allow this, we certainly will not. Hostility has entered the currents of our political life... like a poison." In Manisa, İnönü warned: "If the poison of hostility enters our political system, the events that we see beginning now will become disastrous in the future."¹³ While warning voters and opposition parties not to jeopardize the workings of the government through party politics, İnönü also used the trip to reinforce his position as President of the Republic, as well as leader of a party preparing for an election. This was a direct result of the multi-party system and increasing criticism by the opposing parties that led to the reevaluation of the President's role as a leader of the country as well as leader of the party. Thus İnönü was trying to carry out his duty as President to reconcile the tense political situation and to maintain the integrity of democratic principles, while at the same time trying to legitimize his own and the People's Party's position. This overlapping agenda influenced İnönü's posture among the people: "If I show every village up close who and what I am, citizens will be able to judge very well how much of what is being written and said about the President is correct and how much is wrong."¹⁴

The Democrat Party reacted strongly to İnönü's trip, complaining that he was not exercising impartiality between the parties, but was campaigning as Chair of the People's Party. In Izmir, the Democrat Party organized a protest meeting of sixty thousand people the day before İnönü arrived. Bayar told the gathering, "if the administration continues in its current heedlessness, this business can become a fight between brothers, causing unmeasurable disasters."¹⁵ Bayar also accused İnönü of partisanship after the President's address to the National Assembly on November 1, saying, "Inönü thinks only of his own party. He forgets easily that he is the head of state."¹⁶ Thus, at the end of 1949, with the election only six months away, relations between the main political parties were deteriorating, as

partisan politics seemed finally to outweigh İnönü's July 12th Declaration that cooperation between parties was more important for the country.

Furthermore, Democrat Party leaders maintained that the continuing refusal of the People's Party government to change the election law to allow judicial supervision, secret ballots and open tabulation stood in the way of fair elections. The Democrat Party and the Nation Party both registered their complaints about the election law by boycotting by-elections in October 1949. The elections were contested only by the People's Party, and voter turnout proved to be extremely light in comparison to past elections. The boycott raised the possibility that the major opposition parties would also boycott the upcoming general election, questioning the legitimacy of the multi-party system.

In response to increasing tension, at the beginning of 1950 the government created a commission made up of judges and lawyers, with members from the major parties to develop a new election law. After a month of deliberations, the National Assembly passed a new election law in February 1950. The new law, the first entirely new election law in the history of the Republic, met most of the opposition's demands including judicial supervision of elections, secret ballots and open tabulation.¹⁷ The approval of the new election law marked the beginning of the campaign for the general elections, and the existing parties entered the campaign at least partially assured that this would be a fair and free election.

STRATEGIC PLANS AND THE QUESTION OF A COLD WAR ALLIANCE

İnönü's stress on cooperation and efficiency in the campaign process stemmed from his conviction that acrimonious politics could make Turkey appear divided and weak in a time of ongoing international uncertainty. For İnönü, therefore, the proper course to pursue was to seek harmony at home and a secure alliance with the West. Despite opposition and reservations about the cost of an alliance, Turkish leaders continued to interpret the global situation as requiring Turkey to maintain close relations with the United States. In the spring of 1948, the United States endorsed the Brussels Treaty, which created a regional defense pact between Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. At the same time, the American government called for the expansion of the pact to include other European countries and assured the signatories of American military backing.¹⁸ The Turkish government expressed its concern that the United States would

extend formal military guarantees against aggression to the countries of Western Europe while excluding Turkey. Turkish leaders pointed out the greater possibility of aggression against Turkey, along with their concern that the Soviet Union would interpret a formal American military alliance with only Western European countries as an abatement of its commitment to the security of Turkey. The American government replied that as it was still considering the matter of territorial guarantees, no decision to exclude Turkey from such guarantees had been made, and American support to Turkey was defined clearly under the Truman Doctrine.¹⁹

In the spring, American and British planners debated the possibility of asking Turkey to join regional defense pacts that would include nations of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. But Turkish policy makers were skeptical of such a plan succeeding without the association of the United States or Great Britain, or both. The American Ambassador wrote that according to the Turkish view, "any such scheme might prove dangerous by seeming to give peoples of the Middle East a sense of security when in fact no added security would be provided; [it] also might furnish the Soviets and satellites an excuse for stepping up action against Turkey and Greece on the grounds that the pact is directed against them."²⁰ In August, in a meeting with the American Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, İnönü stressed his conviction that the Soviet Union continued to pose a danger to Turkey, and that while Turkey did not wish to fight alone against the Soviet Union, it would do so if necessary. İnönü also told Symington that in light of Turkey's commitment to a common defense against the Soviets, it sought "increased sympathy from, and understanding with, the United States."²¹

Along with showing a strong posture, İnönü was convinced that Turkey's position would be greatly strengthened by a formal commitment from the United States to the defense of Turkey. In January 1949 İnönü told Averell Harriman, Coordinator of Marshall Plan Assistance to Europe, "he believed that war could be avoided if the United States could develop unity among the free countries of Europe, which required determination and maximum effort by each country, and that Turkey would do her part. He emphasized that firm American moral support is of even greater value than material aid."²² İnönü's stress on "moral support" and "increased sympathy and understanding" stemmed from his doubts about the American commitment to Turkey. In the final analysis İnönü was still skeptical about whether the United States would participate in an armed conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Union, even though he was sure that Turkey could not avoid becoming involved in a conflict between the

United States and the Soviet Union. Thus İnönü refused to consider the possibility of neutrality in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, despite views that a conflict between them would not necessarily involve Turkey.²³ İnönü's skepticism was fueled by American restrictions on any commitment to the defense of Turkey, in contrast to its increasing commitment to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan.

THE FORMATION OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THE EXCLUSION OF TURKEY

As negotiations for a North Atlantic defense arrangement proceeded in the spring of 1949, American planners insisted that only countries in the North Atlantic region would be included in the pact, excluding countries like Italy, Greece and Turkey. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak told the Turkish National Assembly in March:

We have been explicitly informed by the founders of the reciprocal military assistance agreement known as the North Atlantic Pact, which is restricted to a specific geographical area, that since Turkey is not located on the Atlantic, its entrance is not a subject of discussion. ... Close contacts and discussions are continuing with Britain and America on the subject of what kind of measures can be taken for the protection of peace and security in the region of Turkey.²⁴

With this assurance, the Turkish press praised the creation of a North Atlantic Pact as a step toward defending all of Europe and the Mediterranean from Soviet aggression. Asım Us wrote that with the pact, across from the Iron Curtain, the West was erecting "a Nuclear Curtain."²⁵ Nadir Nadi, in *Cumhuriyet* [The Republic] wrote, "after the signing of the North Atlantic Pact, it is understood that with defense agreements like a Middle East Pact, a defensive chain will be erected against the Soviet Union."²⁶

But on April 4, less than one month after Sadak assured the Assembly that only North Atlantic states would be included in any mutual defense agreement including the United States, the Atlantic Pact was signed, and it included Italy and some provinces of Algeria within the region it covered. Turkish leaders and others were outraged by the implications of the Pact. *Cumhuriyet* wrote, "the Western Allies closed the road of attack in North and West Europe with the agreement for a defensive alliance, but since they left the Mediterranean road open, it is natural that the Soviet Union

will prefer this way and will threaten and put more pressure especially on Turkey.²⁷ Two other concerns were also voiced in the press. One addressed how Turkey would protect itself against renewed Soviet pressure, and the other debated whether or not the signing of the Atlantic Pact would mean a reduction of American support for Turkey. From the discussions it seemed that Turkey was right back where it started in 1945. Soviet pressure was evident, but Western support was not.

Just one week after the signing of the Atlantic Pact, Necmettin Sadak became the first Turkish Foreign Minister to visit the United States, during a previously scheduled trip to the United Nations.²⁸ During his trip, Sadak met with President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Sadak carried a letter to Truman from İnönü, in which the latter wrote of his hopes "that the close friendship which binds our two countries and the sincere collaboration which characterizes their mutual relations shall be further promoted and strengthened." In a meeting with Acheson, Sadak reviewed Turkey's attempts to negotiate a long-term security agreement with the United States, and reminded the Secretary that the United States government had repeatedly assured Turkey that no defense pact that would include Mediterranean states but exclude Turkey was being contemplated. Sadak told Acheson that Italy's inclusion in the North Atlantic Pact had

created serious problems for the Turkish government and caused confusion and perturbation in Turkish public opinion.... It was difficult to avoid the impression that Turkey, in the most exposed position of all European countries as regards pressure and possible attack from Soviet Russia, was being abandoned and left outside the thinking of the Western powers as regards security arrangements.²⁹

Sadak continued to stress that Turkey had been under constant Soviet pressure since 1945, and that the burden of withstanding that pressure was becoming unbearable. Sadak said Turkish leaders had begun to fear that "the United States had altered its position regarding Turkey and that it no longer maintained the powerful interest in the maintenance of Turkey's independence and integrity.... Soviet propaganda, it might be added, had not been slow to make the most of this situation."

Acheson replied to Sadak by pointing out the support America had given to Turkey at the time Soviet demands for territory and bases on the Straits were made in 1946, and argued that the American government had taken a strong position "in support of Turkish independence with the full knowledge of the possible consequences." According to Acheson "the President considered this the most important decision he had made

subsequent to the bombing of Hiroshima." Acheson went on to assure Sadak that although Turkey was excluded from the North Atlantic Pact, "the importance to the U.S. of the independence and integrity of Turkey was in no wise diminished."³⁰

But Sadak asked Acheson since Turkey had been the first area of concern after the war for the United States, why was America willing to come to the aid of the European countries immediately if they were attacked, but "no such pledge existed as regards Turkey?" Furthermore, Sadak asked Acheson, "if... the U.S. position toward Turkey had not changed, why had it been impossible for this government to extend the Atlantic Pact to include Turkey, or for [the American] government at least to consider the extension of a similar guarantee to an Eastern Mediterranean Pact?" Acheson maintained that the United States remained committed to the security of Turkey, but refused to make any pledges regarding future American actions. When Sadak voiced İnönü's doubts by asking, "will the United States fight if the Russians attack Turkey?" Acheson wavered, saying, "that this was a decision that was largely in the hands of the President and that [Sadak] must realize that it was very difficult to give a direct answer to this type of inquiry." But Acheson "wanted to point out two of the most important characteristics of President Truman: (1) that he never went back on a friend, and (2) that Mr. Truman never overpromised."³¹ The talks between Acheson and Sadak did not reveal more than the Turkish government already assumed, but one more time it reinforced the understanding of the limitations of the relationship for both countries. Upon returning to Turkey, Sadak told the press at the Istanbul airport that he was certain that his visit had strengthened ties between Turkey and America, and that "there is great love and respect for Turkey in America."³²

Despite Sadak's officially optimistic appraisal of Turkish-American relations, Turkish leaders took exception to the exclusion of Turkey from the Atlantic Pact, calling for a reconsideration of Turkish foreign policy. *Ulus* [The Nation], the newspaper of the People's Party, published an editorial about Turkey's exclusion, suggesting that "as compensation it increases the possibility of Turkey remaining neutral" in a conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.³³ Günaltay said that "from the beginning, Turkey had seen no practical advantage in adhering to the Pact and had shown no particular desire to do so; in fact from a security point of view, Turkey is better off than if she had taken over useless commitments under its terms."³⁴

While Turkish leaders began to debate the merits of inclusion in a North Atlantic Pact, İnönü continued to stress that Turkey would always defend

its independence and sovereignty with or without American assistance. On May 19, 1949, in his address to Turkish youths, İnönü pointed out:

It has been four years since the active hostilities of the Second World War ended. Before the joy was more than a few weeks old, the world again faced the possibilities of great disaster. Against us an unrelenting struggle was opened. At that time we were pretty much alone. For four years, as a nation we have been proving the rightness of our struggle and the Turkish nation's high qualities and merits while proving its unshakable and definite will to live free and independent.³⁵

CONTINUING EFFORTS TO SECURE TURKEY'S POSITION

After the initial setback with NATO, Turkish efforts concentrating on the establishment of a regional defense arrangement that would include the United States, or Britain, or both as guarantors continued throughout the summer and fall of 1949. Turkish efforts led American policy makers to reconsider the strategic value of Turkey and the need to extend formal guarantees.³⁶

American interest in Turkey also intensified in 1949 due to the Soviets' detonation of an atomic bomb. In November 1949 a Middle East Chiefs of Mission Conference was held in Istanbul, chaired by George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs. The conference agreed that "The basic objective of U.S. foreign policy in the Near East must be the maintenance of peace and the development of area political and economic stability and security; the enhancement of U.S. prestige and the orientation of the area to the U.S. and the Western powers and away from the USSR."³⁷ The Chiefs of Mission reemphasized the standing policy assumption: to deter Soviet influence in the Middle East, the United States should extend military, technical, and financial assistance, with the goal of maintaining the stability and economic strength of the countries of the region. But the Chiefs also discussed and agreed on the limits of the American commitment in the region:

The United States should not attempt to negotiate multilateral or bilateral security pacts with the Near Eastern states, at least until such time as it is prepared to commit military forces required to carry out the guarantees given. In the meantime, the Chiefs of Mission should do everything possible to prevent requests for U.S. consideration of any such pact, or for joint staff talks, being made by the Near Eastern states.³⁸

Thus, in the autumn of 1949, the United States remained committed to assisting Turkey in developing its military capabilities in line with Western strategic goals, to the extent possible without taking on a formal pledge to the defense of Turkey against attack. In this framework, the United States would continue to supply military assistance under the Truman Doctrine, and economic assistance under the Marshall Plan. During his inaugural address in January 1949 Truman had promised continued support for the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and regional military agreements such as NATO, and announced a fourth point: technical assistance to underdeveloped countries of the world. The Point Four program was meant to give technical assistance and to encourage private investment in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in order to develop their economies as a bulwark against deprivation and communism. The Point Four program did not play an important role in Turkey until after the Korean War began, but together, these programs were portrayed as the best way for Turkey to develop its own potential under American guidance.³⁹ By March 1950 Turkey had received \$236 million under the Truman Doctrine, and in fiscal year 1950 it had received \$114 million. The American government estimated Turkey's needs for the next fiscal year at \$45 million in military aid, down from \$81 million the previous year, and \$76 million in economic assistance under the Marshall Plan. In addition, plans were now being made to support Turkey with technical assistance under the Point Four program.⁴⁰

İnönü and Turkish leaders, in light of the ongoing tension with the Soviet Union, favored continuing closer ties with the United States. But Turkish leaders also believed that without a formal commitment to Turkey's defense, Turkey and the United States could not be full partners, and the relationship would remain limited. Thus, Turkish policy makers both asserted that Turkey would defend itself from attack with or without American help, and began to seek ways to distance Turkey from the United States in the event of a Soviet-American conflict.

At the end of 1949 Turkey was still without a formal defense alliance with the United States or with any of the major Western powers. But in March 1950 Turkey and Italy signed a Treaty of Friendship, meant as a first step to the formation of a Mediterranean regional defense pact. Also, the Turks began negotiations for a similar treaty with Greece.⁴¹

The signing of the Turkish-Italian treaty was timed according to the visit of Secretary of State Acheson to Europe in May for meetings concerning European defense. Turkey used this opportunity and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship with Italy to present a formal request to the

Atlantic Pact members to consider Turkey's adherence to NATO. The Turkish request pointed out that the Arab-Israeli conflict, and tensions between the Arab states were obstacles to the formation of an eastern Mediterranean defense pact; moreover, Turkish leaders argued that Egypt would be unlikely to enter any regional defense arrangement including Britain. Turkey's request was not acted upon immediately, but was taken under consideration. In September 1950 Turkey's application for membership was denied, with only Italy voting to include Turkey.⁴²

THE 1950 ELECTION: A "MAJOR DEFEAT AND A GREAT VICTORY"

In the spring of 1950, Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, told State Department officials that a formal military alliance, or even an American "assurance ... in the form of a declaration by the President which would specifically place Turkey in the same category as members of the North Atlantic Pact" made before upcoming elections in May, would strengthen the position of the People's Party government and President İnönü, who, according to Erkin, would best maintain relations between the United States and Turkey.⁴³ While Erkin's reasoning exhibited the extent of the influence of the alliance with the United States in Turkish political debate, in itself it was not convincing. Despite Erkin's argument, American policy makers, assuming the People's Party's stronghold on Turkey, also believed that the Democrat Party presented a favorable alternative due to its support of American plans and American views of Turkish economic development policy.⁴⁴ Thus, in this instance, the Americans would not have to overthrow a democratically elected government to install one more pro-American.

İnönü was also convinced that the results of the upcoming election would prove the success of the multi-party experiment. He wrote to his son Erdal, "I do not like to exaggerate, but I have lost almost all my anxiety; next year if we win the election, or if we lose, it is not a concern of mine."⁴⁵ İnönü entered the election campaign of 1950 confident that the People's Party would be reelected by the people. He was also committed to accepting the defeat of the People's Party in the election.

As the parties prepared for the elections, tensions mounted, and it appeared that the campaign would be even more acrimonious than the preparations. But in April, the death of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, and a demonstration at his funeral convinced both the Democrat Party and the

People's Party of the need to cooperate. Çakmak (1876–1950) was Chair of the Nation Party at the time of his death. A hero of the War of Independence, and longtime Chief of the General Staff, Çakmak was widely respected and admired.⁴⁶ Çakmak was also known to be a religious man, and as leader of the Nation Party had attracted the support of people who opposed the secularist policies of the People's Party. When Çakmak died on April 10 the government decided to give him a state funeral. Religious conservatives demanded a religious burial for Çakmak, and thousands showed up to protest during the funeral ceremony. İnönü and Bayar both blamed the Nation Party for the demonstration, and accused it of trying to use religion for political purposes. The event seemed to confirm fears that religion could become a political tool and undermine the secular foundations of the Republic.⁴⁷

In May, the parties published their election platforms. The People's Party reminded voters of its service to the country, and the reforms it had carried out since 1947. The People's Party promised more reforms of the economy, including a redefinition of statism, greater encouragement of private enterprise, reforms to encourage foreign investment, and lower taxes. To gain the peasants' votes, the People's Party pledged distribution of state-owned land, more village schools, irrigation canals and tractors, along with more credit for agricultural expansion. The People's Party platform was also committed to administrative reforms, and constitutional reforms including removal of the six arrows of the People's Party from the constitution.⁴⁸

The Democrat Party platform criticized the People's Party program: "We must point out that the [People's Party] platform is not rational and is not supported by a realistic view of the country's problems." The Democrat Party platform also promised support for the peasantry with credit and construction of irrigation works, called for lower taxes and administrative reform to reduce the budget, and promised reduction of the state sector and greater support for private enterprise, including encouragement of foreign investment and foreign technical assistance. Even though it seemed that both parties' campaign promises overlapped in many areas, the Democrat Party differed in its promise to support workers' right to strike, a right the People's Party continued to oppose.⁴⁹ During the campaign, Bayar assured government workers that a Democrat Party victory would not put their positions in jeopardy, and that reductions in the size of the bureaucracy would be offset by increased opportunities in the growing private sector.

The Nation Party's platform, published just prior to Çakmak's death, accused the government of being undemocratic and of using pressure on

opposition parties to remain in power despite the will of the people. The Nation Party charged İnönü with being insincere in his promises of fair elections, and claimed he was only interested in increasing his own personal power. The platform said, "According to the outcome of the elections of May 14, all of us will either enter a period of independence and advancement or we will face the danger of suffering even worse than what we have suffered for the last four years."⁵⁰ Overall, the election promises of the parties exhibited mainstream views on wide ranging topics that had become part of political debate since the beginning of multi-party politics in 1945.

Prior to the election, Prime Minister Günaltay met with Bayar, to assure him again that the elections would be free and fair, and that there would be no interference in the balloting by government officials loyal to the People's Party. Günaltay, confident of a People's Party victory, apparently also offered the Democrat Party fifty seats in the National Assembly whatever the outcome.⁵¹

On May 14, 1950 the general election was carried out in an atmosphere of calm, and without incident. The election was free and fair, and 89.5 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots. Of 7,953,055 votes, the Democrat Party won 4,242,831, or 53.6 percent, the People's Party won 3,165,096 (39.9 percent), independents received 258,698 (3.4 percent), and the Nation Party polled 240,209 (3.03 percent). Since the electoral system in Turkey called for majority distribution of seats in the National Assembly, the Democrat Party received 396 seats, the People's Party 68 seats, independents received 7 seats, and the Nation Party took 1 seat.⁵² The Democrat Party received not only an absolute majority of the popular vote, but it also gained an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. The Democrat Party would follow up its victory in the general election with stunning victories in municipal and village elections in the following months, which left the Democrat Party in control of all levels in Turkey, just as the People's Party had been.

Some called the Democrat Party victory a "white revolution," a bloodless overthrow of the existing regime and its replacement by a democratically elected government of the people. Rumors circulated after the election that military commanders had approached İnönü with an offer to overturn the election to prevent the Democrat Party from taking power. İnönü flatly denied the rumors, saying, "They could not have come to me with such an offer, nor could I have approached them to ask such a thing."⁵³ In a letter to his son on May 22, 1950 İnönü asked the question, "Why did we lose?" His assessment at the time was, "there are a thousand

and one reasons. But the first among them was the nation's desire for change."⁵⁴ İnönü later told Metin Toker: "If I had been of a different mind, if I had wrongly diagnosed the condition of the world and the country, perhaps the People's Party would have fallen from power later [than it did]. But it definitely would have fallen from power, and it would have been destroyed."⁵⁵ According to İnönü delays in the establishment of the multi-party system would have resulted not only in the deterioration of the power of the People's Party, but also would have been a catastrophe for the nation.

İnönü offered to turn authority over to the Democrat Party immediately, but Bayar asked that the Günaltay cabinet remain in power until the National Assembly met on May 22. On that date the National Assembly elected Bayar President of the Republic, and Bayar asked Adnan Menderes to form a new cabinet. Fuat Köprülü became Foreign Minister, and Refik Koraltan was elected Speaker of the Assembly. On May 29 Menderes presented his cabinet's program to the Assembly.

Menderes's program exhibited the Democrat Party's longstanding economic platform to develop the agricultural sector and to increase opportunities and support for the private sector, along with encouraging foreign investment, and a pledge to reduce government involvement in the economy. The Menderes cabinet pledged to lower inflation and reduce the budget, including cuts in defense spending. Also, the new cabinet took this opportunity to guarantee freedom of the press and the passage of a general pardon that had been under consideration by the Assembly for some months, and they registered a commitment to fight against extremism on the "right" and "left."⁵⁶

The new government announced the continuation of the foreign policy of the People's Party. Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü announced, "our foreign policy, which has been directed at better relations with the West since World War II, will take an even more active form as a result of the last election."⁵⁷ Köprülü summed up the direction that the Democrat Party would take in foreign and domestic policies in a talk with foreign correspondents: "We are not considering building new institutions, but we will assure that existing ones work better. We will achieve a balanced budget and attract foreign capital. If we remain content only with our own sources, reaching a living standard slightly higher than today will require a wait of many years."⁵⁸ Following the defeat of May 14, İnönü and the People's Party took on their new role of opposition in the National Assembly. İnönü retained his position as Chair of the People's Party, and became Chair of the People's Party Parliamentary Group. As leader of the

opposition, İnönü maintained his position of insisting that the political parties work together in the Assembly: "We know that as an opposition we shall be faced with the difficult task of further establishing the will of the people."⁵⁹

The first confrontation between the parties after the election came following Menderes's defense of the new cabinet's program. When the People's Party demanded the chance to reply to Menderes's answer to criticism, Refik Koraltan, the new Speaker of the Assembly denied the People's Party the podium. In protest, the People's Party members, along with others, left the Assembly, and the new government received only 282 votes in favor, with 192 abstentions.⁶⁰ The tensions between the parties were further fueled when the Democrat Party moved to change the Chief of the General Staff and other commanding officers on the basis of their relations with the People's Party. Furthermore, the personal attacks between the members of the parties continued, and the Democrat Party's attacks, especially those of Menderes, targeted İnönü, calling him "power hungry" and accusing him of not accepting the victory of the Democrat Party.⁶¹

For İnönü, the elections of 1950 marked more than just the defeat of the People's Party. After being the ruling party for twenty-seven years, it was time to reflect and redefine its role. The election of 1950 marked the success of the multi-party experiment, and the culmination of the reforms of the People's Party and İnönü's presidency. Later reflecting on the election and the defeat of the People's Party at the polls, İnönü wrote, "My biggest defeat is my greatest victory."⁶² After transferring the presidency to Bayar, and moving back to his own home, İnönü wrote to his son Erdal, "I announced that I am becoming the leader of the opposition and taking over the People's Party Chairmanship. Our country's honor is sound. Our honor is sound. We have begun the work of a new era. Everything will be understood, everything will be good."⁶³

THE DEMOCRAT PARTY GOVERNMENT: CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN POLICY

The sweeping victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 general election came as a surprise to the Western powers, who had assumed that İnönü and the People's Party were widely popular in Turkey. Bayar and the Democrat Party were not well-known outside of Turkey, except as vociferous opponents of the ruling party and as supporters of greater possibilities for private enterprise and foreign capital investment.⁶⁴ Upon election,

Bayar immediately confirmed the continuity of Turkish foreign policy: "Our greatest desire is to strengthen our political and economic relations with the United States in an atmosphere of sincerity and understanding. Everybody, friend or enemy, should be sure that the change of government in our country will not bring any change in our foreign policy."⁶⁵ President Bayar and the new Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, had been proponents of strong relations with the United States, and Turkish participation in NATO since the formation of the Democrat Party in 1946.

A month after coming into office, Bayar and the Democrat Party government faced the decision of joining American and United Nations troops in Korea against North Korea's invasion of the South. On July 25, 1950 Bayar announced that Turkey would send a brigade of forty-five hundred soldiers and officers to Korea to join the United Nations Command. Turkish leaders argued that participation in the Korean campaign proved once again Turkey's commitment to international collective security and its alliance with the West, as well as its suitability for partnership in NATO. President Bayar told the American Ambassador that Turkey had shown its good faith by its action toward meeting the Korean crisis. Turkey's decision to fight in Korea indeed led to Western reconsideration of formal commitments to the defense of Turkey. In October 1951 NATO extended an offer of membership to Turkey and Greece, which had also sent troops to Korea, and in February 1952 both countries became full members of the alliance.⁶⁶ In accordance with the objectives of the Western Alliance, Turkey later took a leading role in the establishment of regional defense arrangements such as the Balkan Pact of August 1954 and the Baghdad Pact of February 1955. Turkey's membership in NATO combined with its regional commitments made it the linchpin in a network extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans.

Turkish leaders also saw participation in the Korean War as a way to show the Soviets Turkey's military capabilities and resolve. In the Cold War world, the term *limited war* meant a political war to contain the opponent's power and to force a change of the opponent's mind by negotiating from a position of strength. In this sense, sending troops to Korea as well as participation in NATO can be interpreted as a type of limited war. As the Soviet Union protested that Turkey's membership in NATO was aimed at surrounding the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Menderes denied any aggressive intentions, but argued that "In order to negotiate with Russians one should be powerful. Russians understand power and respect it."⁶⁷

The Democrat Party presented involvement in the Korean War as Turkey's responsibility in its alliance with the West. Critics accused

government officials and policies of representing Western interests in Turkey instead of Turkish interests in the West. Although popular sentiment favored participation, criticism came from intellectuals and from groups such as the Turkish Organization for Peace, and from the opposition People's Party. The People's Party attacked the decision on the basis that Bayar and the cabinet committed troops without consulting the National Assembly. Bayar countered that as Commander in Chief he had the constitutional right to order the military into battle. For İnönü, now leader of the main opposition party, Korea was a tragic crisis. But the remilitarization of Germany and NATO were more serious matters of concern. In his letter to his son in December 1950 İnönü wrote, "in a year the world will either explode, or take a new direction."⁶⁸ The People's Party continued to express its protests and its reservations until December 1950, when Turkish troops won fame for their role in the Battle of Kunuri. At that moment concern for the troops and pride in their courage seemed to unite Turkey and deter criticism of the government. News and correspondence from Korea replaced continuing concerns about inflation and the faltering economy.⁶⁹

Turkish-Soviet relations began to thaw following the death of Stalin. In May 1953, the Soviet Union dropped all claims to Turkish territory made after World War II and asked to renew the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Gradual warming of relations led to a Soviet offer of economic aid in 1956. The Turks' interest in Soviet aid signaled their discontent with American aid and unfulfilled promises of Western capital investment.

The major question of this period remains: why Turkey, once reluctant, insisted on full alliance and a formal commitment with the West? The Turkish foreign policy decisions from 1945 to 1950 are in great contrast with the emphasis on caution and balance and self-reliance as the keys to survival that marked Turkish foreign policy during World War II. The sharp change can be interpreted as recognition of new global realities, or as reflecting a new connection between foreign policy and domestic politics, in which the performance of the government came to be judged by the amount of American aid. In the political discourse of the multi-party period, alliance with the United States was closely tied with economic development, making "modernization and economic advancement" synonymous with American advice and aid, for both proponents and opponents. These ties were established even though it meant continuing concessions on Turkey's industrialization plans. But another reason lies in the Turkish government's and İnönü's assessment of global uncertainties.

After the Second World War Turkey confronted Soviet pressure, which arose partly as a result of Turkish non-belligerency and neutrality in World War II. İnönü, in his reflection on those times argued that "The emergence of the post-war division between Soviet Russia and the Western Allies was a great turning point. From that moment onwards all the great powers started preparations for a future war."⁷⁰ For İnönü, the conviction of the inevitability of war resulted in growing insecurity, leading Turkey to prepare by seeking an alliance with the West. Formal alliance meant that Turkey would be prepared before the "inevitable" war. İnönü believed that "the main danger for peace is the mutual feeling of insecurity." It seems that World War II lay the groundwork for the mutual distrust and insecurity creating "the opposing blocs' need for continuous self-protection." The nuclear threat reinforced the existing strains, pushing not only the Soviet Union and the United States into opposing blocs, but also other countries, as well as Turkey in the Cold War. In this bi-polar world the hopes of peace only reflected idealistic discussions. İnönü always retained his hope for the future. For him peace was a goal "worth patience. The bringing about a new way of life holding out for mankind the prospect of peaceful progress would be such a momentous happening that it would be a cause for rejoicing unknown in history—however late, hard, and gradual its realization may be."⁷¹

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London, 1987), pp. 29–32.
2. Şerif Mardin, "The Mind of the Turkish Reformer, 1700–1900," *Western Humanities Review* XIV (1960): 423–36.
3. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 208–218; Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1977), vol. II; pp. 58–69, 71, 80, 130.
4. Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, pp. 218–22.
5. Pınar Batur-VanderLippe and John VanderLippe, "Young Ottomans and Jadidists: Past Discourse and the Continuity of Debates in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 18/2 (1994): 62–63.
6. Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, 1993), p. 136; Batur-VanderLippe and VanderLippe, "Young Ottomans and Jadidists," p. 75.
7. Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 81–88.
8. Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* [Three Ways of Policy] (Istanbul, 1995); Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Üç Medeniyet* [Three Civilizations] (Istanbul, 1972); Edward Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinski and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878–1914," unpublished PhD Dissertation (University of Washington, 1973).
9. Jacob Landau. *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, 1995), pp. 74–76.
10. M. Şükrü Hanoğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford, 1995), p. 104; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. III: *İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi* [Political Parties in Turkey, vol. III: Union and Progress, the History of an Era, a Generation, a Party] (Istanbul, 1989), pp. 249–50.
11. İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* [Memoirs] (Ankara, 1985), vol. I, pp. 44–45, 144–45.
12. Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 140–41.
13. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. I, p. 171.

14. Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, pp. 343–44.
15. Ibid., pp. 344–45.
16. Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (New York, 1997), pp. 92–93.
17. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, 1965), p. 181.
18. Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 13.
19. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, p. 97.
20. Ibid., pp. 98–100.
21. Halide Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York, 1928), pp. 170–173; Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II, pp. 151–52.
22. Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923–1931* [The Establishment of Single-Party Administration in the Turkish Republic] (Ankara, 1981), pp. 161–71.
23. Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent*, pp. 87–88; Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması*, pp. 175–83; Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 183.
24. Paul Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Jacob Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder, 1984), pp. 25–44; Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1905–1926* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1984); Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, 2000), p. 21.
25. Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* [The Social Order of Turkey: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow] (Ankara, 1971); Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London, 1981); Landau, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*; Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi: Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli* [The Atatürk Revolution: A Model for Development] (Ankara, 1981).
26. Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent*, pp. 101–7.
27. Ibid., pp. 109–14; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* [History of Modern Thought in Turkey], 4th ed. (İstanbul, 1994), pp. 460–64.
28. Quoted in Hikmet Bila, *CHP Tarihi, 1919–1979* [The History of the RPP] (Ankara, 1979), p. 56.
29. Kemal Karpat, "The People's Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Growth," *Middle East Journal* 17 (1963): 56–58; Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 295–99.
30. Karpat, "People's Houses in Turkey," pp. 64–66.
31. Quoted in Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p. 448.
32. Berch Berberoğlu, "State Capitalism and National Industrialization in Turkey," *Development and Change* XI (1980): 97–121; Faruk Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932–1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semiperipheral Economy," *Review* VIII (1985): 407–38; Korkut Boratav, "Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism," in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk*, pp. 165–90, *Economic Policies and Etatism*, in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk*, pp. 165–90,

- and Boratav, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik* [100 Questions about Statism in Turkey] (Istanbul, 1974); Doğu Ergil, "From Empire to Dependence: The evolution of Turkish Underdevelopment," unpublished PhD Dissertation (Suny, 1975) Çağlar Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923–1929* (Cambridge, 1981).
33. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, pp. 266.
 34. Z. Y. Herslag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1968); Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923–1950* [The Economic History of the Republican Period], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1986); Owen and Pamuk, *History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 16–17.
 35. Scholarship on statism is split between those scholars who argue that the change was an integral aspect of Kemalism from the beginning and those who see statist economic policies as a reaction to events. Dumont argues that statism was the continuation of Ottoman economic practices. Dumont, "Origins of Kemalist Ideology," pp. 40–41. Birtek argues that statism emerged as a political solution to basically economic problems, and was designed to break the emerging ties between the agricultural sector and the world market that were circumventing central control. Birtek, "Rise and Fall of Etatism," pp. 408–9. See also, William Hale, "Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey, 1930–1945," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin* VII (1980): 103–4; Boratav, "Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism," pp. 170–73; also, Boratav, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 136–40.
 36. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları* [Turkey's Economic Politics in the 1929 World Crisis] (Ankara, 1977), pp. 206–15; Boratav, "Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism," 174–76.
 37. Hale, "Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey," p. 108.
 38. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat* [Involuntary Diplomat] (İstanbul, 1955), pp. 21–48.
 39. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* [The Second Man] (İstanbul, 1979–1980), vol. I, pp. 363–66.
 40. İsmet İnönü, "Firkamızın Devletçilik Vasıfı" [The Statist Character of Our Party], *Kadro* XXII (1933): 4–6.
 41. See Nürşen Mazıcı, *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalifet, 1919–1926* [Documents on Opposition in Atatürk's Period] (İstanbul, 1984), pp. 79–82.
 42. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, 194–96, 203–5; Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1973), pp. 47–51. Bila, *CHP Tarihi*, pp. 76–79. Erik Jan Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924–1925* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1991).
 43. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, p. 204.
 44. Ibid., p. 196.
 45. No action was taken against the party's leaders at the time, but the following year, Kâzım Karabekir, Refet Bele, Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, and Adnan Adıvar were tried for conspiracy before an Independence Tribunal. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and*

Democracy in Turkey, p. 51. On the Independence Tribunals, see Ergün Aybars, *Istiklal Mahkemeleri* [The Independence Tribunals] (Ankara, 1975). In his memoirs, İnönü points out that he felt that the closing of the Progressive Republican Party was too harsh a reaction to conflicts of opinion in politics, and when he became President in 1938 he tried to reintegrate the party's members into public life. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, pp. 206–7.

46. Several reasons have been put forth to explain the formation of the Free Party. Whether Atatürk genuinely believed in multi-party politics, or whether he merely sought a new scapegoat for the failings of the reforms is still a matter for heated debate. Weicker argues that the Free Party was formed because Atatürk thought the country was ready for multi-party politics, and because he needed a new infusion of life into politics to deal with urgent economic problems. Weicker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 55. Doğu Ergil dismisses any democratic urges on the part of Atatürk, pointing out that the entire leadership of the party was handpicked by the President, and argues that the Free Party was formed to facilitate constructive discussion within the Assembly about Kemalist programs. Ergil, "From Empire to Dependence," p. 394. Aydemir asserts that the party arose as a response to general unhappiness with Kemalist reforms, which was compounded by the economic problems caused by the Great Depression. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal* [The Single Man: Mustafa Kemal], 7th ed. (Istanbul, 1981), vol. III, pp. 379–81.
47. Özbudun argues that because of the "instrumental character" of the People's Party's program, it remained vulnerable to the rational criticism that Kemalist goals could be better obtained in a competitive system. Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, pp. 21–22.
48. During its existence general elections were never held, but Aydemir argues that if they had been held the Free Party would have won. Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, pp. 389–92. See also, Ergil, "From Empire to Dependence," pp. 395–98.
49. Quoted in Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, p. 390. See also Samet AĞAOĞLU, *Babamın Arkadaşları* [My Father's Friends] (Istanbul, n.d.), pp. 100–111.
50. Ergil, "From Empire to Dependence," p. 397.
51. In his memoirs, İnönü relates that as the critics became more vocal Atatürk decided that the target was himself, not İnönü. Thus when Fethi Okyar came to Atatürk saying he would close the party, Atatürk only halfheartedly opposed. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, pp. 229–31. İnönü when asked if he was responsible for the closing of the Free Party in a later interview, related that he raised hell thinking that Atatürk was responsible. Apparently Atatürk responded that the leaders themselves had decided to close the party, and that he was not involved. Abdi İpekçi, *İnönü, Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor* [Inönü Explains Atatürk] (Istanbul, 1981), p. 28.
52. İpekçi, *İnönü, Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor*, pp. 162–70, 182–85.
53. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, pp. 283–90; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, vol. I, pp. 491–94; Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi, 1938–1945* [The National Chief Period in Turkey] (Ankara, 1986), pp. 30–32.
54. Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929–1939* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1998), pp. 126–27.

55. Celâl Bayar, *Celâl Bayar Diyor Ki*, [Celâl Bayar Says...], ed. by Nazmi Sevgin (Istanbul, 1951), p. 52; Hale, "Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey," pp. 106–7; İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Famous Turks] (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 63–64; Avcioglu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, vol. I, pp. 248–50.
56. İpekçi, *İnönü Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor*, p. 36.
57. Abdi İpekçi, "Her Hafta Bir Sohbet" [A Conversation Every Week], *Milliyet*, November 12, 1973.
58. The "Farm Event" centered around the Agricultural Ministry's attempt to purchase a model farm owned by Atatürk on the outskirts of Ankara. In his memoirs, İnönü relates a tense discussion with Atatürk during which he convinced Atatürk that the best action would be giving, rather than selling, the farm to the government, since the farm had been developed by Atatürk's efforts, using state finances. Atatürk agreed with İnönü, but the problem lingered because of Atatürk's decision to keep a beer factory adjacent to the farm as his own property. İnönü, *Hatıralar*, vol. II, pp. 288–89; İsmet Bozdağ, *Bir Çağın Perde Arkası: Atatürk-İnönü, İnönü-Bayar Çekişmeleri* [Behind the Curtains of an Era: The Struggles between Atatürk and İnönü, and İnönü and Bayar] (Istanbul, 1973), pp. 104–7; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, vol. I, pp. 493–94.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Kurtul Altuğ, "Celâl Bayar Atatürk ve İnönü'ü Anlatıyor" [Celâl Bayar Explains Atatürk and İnönü], *Tercüman*, June 17, 1981.
2. Metin Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar" [Pages from İnönü's Memoir Notebook], *Hürriyet*, January 19, 1974.
3. Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi, 1938–1945* [The National Chief Period in Turkey] (Ankara, 1986), pp. 51–54.
4. Abdi İpekçi, "Her Hafta Bir Sohbet" [A Conversation Each Week], *Milliyet*, November 12, 1974.
5. Emin Tanrıyar, "Atatürk'ün Gizli Vasiyeti: Cumhurbaşkanı Asker Kökenli Olmasın" [Atatürk's Secret Will: The President Must Not Have a Military Background], *Nokta* (January 17, 1988): 27; Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar," January 13, 1974; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 28–29. İsmet Bozdağ also argues in his work that considerable tension existed between Atatürk and İnönü even after September 1937. See Bozdağ, *Bir Çağın Perde Arkası: Atatürk- İnönü, İnönü-Bayar Çekişmeleri* [Behind the Curtains of an Era: The Struggles of Atatürk- İnönü, İnönü-Bayar] (Istanbul, 1972), pp. 5–15.
6. İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* [Memoirs] (Ankara, 1987), vol. II, p. 299.
7. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* [The Second Man], vol. II (Istanbul, 1979–1980), p. 22.
8. Asım Gündüz, *Hatıralarım* [My Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1974), pp. 216–18.

9. Bozdağ, *Bir Çağın Perde Arkası*, p. 214.
10. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 58–59; Bozdağ, *Bir Çağın Perde Arkası*, pp. 214–15. See also, Altuğ, "Celâl Bayar Atatürk ve İnönü'yü Anlatıyor." Asım Us, a reporter, points out in his memoirs that everybody believed at the time that İnönü gave his vote to Bayar, but later it became apparent that the vote came from Hikmet Bayar. See Us, *Asım Us'un Harekâ Notları: 1930 dan 1950 Yıllına Kadar Atatürk ve İsmet İnönü Devirlerine Ait Seçme Fıkralar* [The Notes of the Memoirs of Asım Us: Selected Articles from the Periods of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, 1930 to 1950] (İstanbul, 1966), p. 313.
11. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 24–25. For press commentary on İnönü's election, see *Ayın Tarihi* [History of the Month] 60 (November, 1938): 19–49.
12. Quoted in Altuğ, "Celâl Bayar Atatürk ve İnönü'yü Anlatıyor"; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 59.
13. Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar."
14. *Documents on International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1942), vol. I, p. 300.
15. Quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 25; Bozdağ, *Bir Çağın Perde Arkası*, pp. 216–18.
16. Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar."
17. *Yeni Sabah*, November 14, 1938, quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 27.
18. İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Famous Turks] (İstanbul, 1946), pp. 345–46; see also, Turhan Aytul, "Ankara'yı Titreten 5 Yıl" [Five Years that Shook Ankara], *Güneş*, September 19, 1988.
19. Mahmut Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi 1939–1945* [The National Chief Period] (Ankara, 1974), p. 4; See also Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*, p. 347.
20. Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 8. Koçak credits Hasan Ali Yücel, later Minister of Education, with devising the term *National Chief*, and he argues that the titles "National Chief" and "Permanent Leader of the Party" stemmed from two sources. First, such terms were used in the authoritarian regimes of Germany, Italy, and Spain to add to the prestige of the leader. Second, and more importantly, the death of Atatürk created a leadership void, which was only partially filled by the immediate election of İnönü as President. The use of honorary titles would serve to increase İnönü's legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 67. Nadir Nadi asserts that calling İnönü "National Chief" developed out of the title given to Atatürk as *Eternal Chief*, a term he claims to have coined. See Nadi, *Perde Arılığından* [From a Part in the Curtain] (İstanbul, 1964), pp. 14–15. According to Osman Akandere, prior to 1938 the title "chief" had been applied to various political figures, including Atatürk, Fevzi Çakmak, and İnönü, and reflected the general practice derived from the Ottoman period of using honorifics for political figures. Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi: Çok Partili Hayata Geçişte Rol Oynayan İç ve Dış Tesirler* [The National Chief Period: The Role of Domestic and Foreign Influences on the Passage to Multi-Party Life] (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 30–42.
21. Quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 33.

22. Kemal Kadri Kop, ed. *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları* [Speeches, Sayings, and Messages of the National Chief] (Ankara, 1945), p. 16.
23. Nürşen Mazıcı, *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet, 1919–1926* [Documents on Opposition in Atatürk's Period] (İstanbul, 1984), pp. 155–57.
24. Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar." See also, Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden, Netherlands: 1998), p. 113; Erdal İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler* [Memories and Thoughts] (İstanbul, 1998), vol. II, pp. 110–13.
25. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 68–71; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 94–95.
26. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 42; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 74.
27. Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar"; E. İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler*, p. 114; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 74–76.
28. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 42.
29. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 408–12; Heper, *İsmet İnönü*, p. 175. Lord Kinross argues that as Prime Minister İnönü demonstrated his intolerance for corruption by blocking lucrative deals at the government's expense, even though they were initiated by friends of Atatürk. Kinross, *Atatürk* (New York, 1964), p. 551; Toker, "İnönü'nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar," January 16–17, 1974.
30. Quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 40; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 99–100.
31. Recep Peker, *İnkılâb Dersleri Notları* [Notes on the Lessons of the Revolution] (Ankara, 1935), pp. 30, 63–64; Kemal Karpat, "The Republican People's Party, 1923–1945," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (London, 1991), pp. 56–58.
32. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 218–20; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 115–20.
33. W. Frey, *Turkish Political Elite*, pp. 200–215; Leslie Roos and Noralou Roos, *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey, 1950–1969* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 34–52; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 111–27.
34. Quoted in Kop, *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 35; Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi, 1839–1950* [History of Turkey's Democracy] (Ankara, 1995), pp. 350–51; Neşe Erdilek, "Hükümet ve Programları" [Governments and Programs], in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Republican Turkey] (İstanbul, 1983), vol. IV, pp. 978–81.
35. Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 18–19. Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 87–90, 132–41.
36. Kop, *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 27; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 219.
37. Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler* [Political Gallery: Busts and Portraits] (İstanbul, 1970), pp. 289–90; Heper, *İsmet İnönü*, pp. 128–33; Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, pp. 348–49. Metin Toker argues that İnönü was committed to the creation of a multi-party system, but delayed his support because of the threat of war. Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944–1950* [From a Single Party to

- Multiple Parties, 1944–1950], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1990), p. 15. Koçak rejects this notion, saying at most that İnönü sought reform of the People's Party and relations between the party and the government. See Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 217.
38. See Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası* [Fascist German Propaganda in Turkey] (Ankara, n.d.); see also, Aytul, "Ankara'yı Titreten 5 Yıl," *Propaganda* 25, 1988; and Aytul, "Mareşal'ı Kırım Yedi" [The Crimea Destroyed the Marshal], *Güneş*, July 31, 1987.
39. Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri, 1923–1939: İki Dünya Savaşı Arasındaki Dönemde Siyasal, Kültürel, Askeri ve Ekonomik İlişkiler* [Turkish-German Relations: Political, Cultural, Military and Economic Relations in the Inter-war Period] (Ankara, 1991), pp. 181–82.
40. Quoted in Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 132.
41. Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 78–81; Barry Rubin, *Istanbul Intrigues* (New York, 1992), p. 45.
42. Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 81–82.
43. Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 44; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 18–20, 29–30, 44–46; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, pp. 15–16.
44. Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923–1950* [The Economic History of the Republican Period], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1986), pp. 145, 153; J. C. deWilde, "German Trade Drive in Southeastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports* XII (1936): 214–15, 219; Frederick T. Merrill, "Twelve Years of the Turkish Republic," *Foreign Policy Reports* XI (1935): 196–97; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, pp. 200–209.
45. Great Britain. Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939* (hereafter DBFP), Series III (London, 1952–1954), vol. V, p. 537.
46. Quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 107.
47. Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 64–66.
48. İsmet İnönü, "Turkey," in Walter Yust, ed. *10 Eventful Years: A Record of the Events of the Years Preceding, Including and Following World War II, 1937 through 1946* (Chicago, 1947), p. 375.
49. Quoted in John Birge, "Turkey between Two World Wars," *Foreign Policy Reports* XX (1944): 196; see also, Cevat Açıkalın, "Turkey's International Relations," *International Affairs* XXIII (1947): 478; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 220.
50. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Başkanlığı, Basın ve Matbuat Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ayın Tarihi* [History of the Month] 66 (5/39): 214.
51. See DBFP, vol. V, p. 367, for the text of the agreement.
52. DBFP, vol. V, pp. 97, 191, 220, 240, 259, 340, 591, 740, 789; W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* (London, 1952), vol. I, p. 273; Harry N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey during the Second World War," *Department of State Bulletin* XIX (1948): 64.
53. DBFP, vol. VI, p. 353; Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London, 1971), vol. I, p. 26.

54. Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (London, 1949), pp. 201–2; Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (London, 1952), p. 464.
55. Aytul, "Ankara'yı Titreten 5 Yıl," September 18, 1988.
56. Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 22; Koçak, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını" [The Second World War and the Turkish Press], *Tarih ve Toplum* XXXV (1986): 286.
57. DBFP, vol. VII, pp. 225–26; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, p. 103; United States, Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (hereafter DGFP), Series D (Washington, 1950–1964), vol. VI, pp. 364, 638–39, 666–70.
58. Quoted in Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 118; see also, Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, pp. 153–73.
59. DGFP, vol. VIII, p. 380, 391, 451; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 101–5.
60. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 64.
61. Necmeddin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs* XXVII (1949): 452; George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (London, 1952), p. 443.
62. United States, Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941* (Washington, 1948), pp. 85–87; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 92.
63. Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," p. 453; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 121.
64. Cevat Açıkalın, "Turkey's International Relations," *International Affairs* XXIII (1947): 481.
65. J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1914–1956* (Princeton, 1956), vol. II, pp. 226–28; George Kirk, "Turkey," in Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee, eds., *The War and the Neutrals* (London, 1956), p. 346. According to a joke about Russia's policy toward Turkey circulating in Turkey during the war a sheep says to a butcher: "But you saved me from the wolf, how can you now butcher me?" To which the butcher replies, "Because that is why I saved you." Us, *Asım Uş'un Hatira Notları*, pp. 422, 472.
66. Nafi Demirkaya, ed., *Atatürk ve İnönü Başkanlarında Cumhuriyet Yılları* [The years of the Republic in the Presidencies of Atatürk and İnönü] (Ankara, 1942), pp. 184–85.
67. *Ayın Tarihi* 71 (10/39): 120–23, 75 (2/40): 98–101; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 165; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, p. 121; Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "A Survey of Economic Policy in the Turco-German Trade during World War II," *Bulleten* XXV (1961): 109–10. Türkkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939–1945* (Ankara, 1965), pp. 68–69; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, vol. I, pp. 25–26.
68. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 132–33.
69. Quoted in Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 421–22; Gary Leiser, "The Turkish Air Force, 1939–1945: The Rise of a Minor Power," *Middle Eastern Studies* XXVI (1990): 383–86.
70. Demirkaya, *Atatürk ve İnönü Başkanlarında*, p. 185.
71. Aytul, "Ankara'yı Titreten 5 yıl," September 20, 1988.

72. Ibid.
73. Kop, *Millî Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 44.
74. Kâzım Karabekir, *Ankarada Savaş Rüzgârları, II. Dünya Savaşı: CHP Grup Tartışmaları* [The Winds of War in Ankara, World War II: Arguments of the RPP Group] (İstanbul, 1994), pp. 53–61, 89–91.
75. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 206–12.
76. Demirkaya, *Atatürk ve İnönü Başkanlarında*, p. 188.
77. Quoted in Korkut Boratov, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik* [100 Questions about Statism in Turkey] (İstanbul, 1974), pp. 314–15.
78. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 213.
79. Quoted in Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, p. 314.
80. Karabekir, *Ankarada Savaş Rüzgârları*, pp. 139–45, 151–63.
81. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 247–57; Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 326–38; see also, Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 213–28.
82. Halim Alyot, *Türkiyede Zabıta: Tarihi Gelişim ve Bugünkü Durum* [Martial Law in Turkey: Historical Development and the Situation Today] (Ankara, 1947), pp. 893–906; Akandere, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 233–37.
83. Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 326–27; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, p. 249; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 214.
84. Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 327–37; Memduh Yasa, ed. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923–1978* [The Economy of Turkey in the Republican Period] (Ankara, 1980), p. 88.
85. Koçak, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını," p. 30; Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, 1956), pp. 189–90. Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* [My Remembrances], 3rd ed. (İstanbul, 1977), p. 214.
86. Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 317–18, 333.
87. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 214.
88. Ibid., p. 216.
89. Quoted in Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 315–16.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

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2. Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), FO 371/25018, Minute by Bowker, June 11, 1940.
3. Quoted in Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939–1954* [Political Memoirs, 1939–1954] (İstanbul, 1977), p. 96; Nadir Nadi, *Perde Aralığından* [From a Part in the Curtain] (İstanbul, 1964), pp. 75–76.

4. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* [The Second Man], 4th ed. (İstanbul, 1979), vol. II, p. 135; Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi, 1938–1945* [The National Chief Period in Turkey] (Ankara, 1986), p. 105; Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, pp. 85–100; Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, [My Remembrances], 3rd ed. (İstanbul, 1977), pp. 222–26; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, p. 101.
5. Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, pp. 90–91.
6. Mahmut Goloğlu, *Millî Şef Dönemi, 1939–1945* [The National Chief Period] (Ankara, 1974), p. 93.
7. United States, Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945* (hereafter, *DGFP*), Series D. (Washington, DC, 1950–1964), vol. IX, p. 513.
8. İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* [Memoirs] (Ankara, 1985), vol. I, pp. 141–42.
9. Ibid., p. 139.
10. *DGFP*, vol. X, p. 279.
11. George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (London, 1952), pp. 446–48; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 132–36; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, vol. I, pp. 102–3, 113. Selim Deringil argues that the Turks did not oppose the plan, but asked that it be carried out with no prior warning to the Turkish government. That way, the Turks could claim to have known nothing of the attack. Deringil, "The Preservation of Turkey's Neutrality during the Second World War: 1940," *Middle Eastern Studies* XVIII (1982): 32; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 159.
12. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy*, vol. I, p. 468; Necmettin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs* XXVII (1949): 445.
13. PRO, FO 371/24917, Palairet to FO, September 7, 1940.
14. Ibid., Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, August 20, 1940.
15. Winston Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (Boston, 1949), pp. 546–47.
16. Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (London, 1949), p. 167; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası" [Turkish Foreign Policy in the Second World War], in Suat Bilge et al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919–1990* [Turkish Foreign Policy with Events], 8th ed. (Ankara, 1993), pp. 151–53.
17. *DGFP*, vol. X, p. 488; Galeazzo Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries (1939–1943)*, ed. H. Gibson (New York, 1946), p. 302.
18. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, pp. 167–68.
19. Kop, *Millî Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, pp. 67–68.
20. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Başbakanlık, Basın ve Matbuat Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ayın Tarihi* [History of the Month] 87 (2/41): 27.
21. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 160.
22. Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon* (Boston, 1965), pp. 237–41; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, p. 144.

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24. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, trans. by B. Connell (London, 1952), pp. 471–73.
25. DGFP, vol. XII, p. 310.
26. United States, Department of State, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1947), vol. IV, pp. 499–500; Türkarya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939–1945* (Ankara, 1965), p. 91.
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28. PRO, FO 371/30091, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, May 9, 1941.
29. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 170.
30. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 153–71.
31. Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 94.
32. PRO, FO 371/30127, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, June 26, 1941.
33. PRO, FO 371/30126, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, June 23, 1941; FO 371/30126, FO to Knatchbull-Hugessen, June 28, 1941.
34. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 421–24.
35. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, vol. II, p. 20.
36. Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, p. 206.
37. PRO, FO 371/30126, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, June 23, 1941.
38. For more on pan-Turkism, see Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, 1995).
39. DGFP, vol. XIII, pp. 284, 473–74, 571–75. Lothar Krecker says that Nuri Pasha had official support for his visit to Berlin in September 1941. See Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt, 1964), pp. 214–18. Frank Weber maintains that the British and German sources “strongly suggest” that pan-Turkism was an official program of the Turkish government. See Weber, *The Evasive Neutral* (Columbia, 1979), p. 113.
40. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 178; George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, 1956), p. 142.
41. Paul Schmidt, *Hitler's Interpreter* (New York, 1952), pp. 249–50.
42. Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 246–56; Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 96–98; Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, p. 112; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 138.
43. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 189–203, 293–302.
44. Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923–1950* [The Economic History of the Republican Period], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1986), pp. 159–60.
45. Ibid., pp. 102–3; *Yakın Tarihimize* [Our Recent History], prepared by *Milliyet* (Istanbul, 1982), pp. 102–3; Asım Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları* [Notes of the Memoirs of Asım Us] (Istanbul, 1966), p. 460.

46. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 203.
47. Kop, *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 100.
48. One hundred Kurus equaled one Lira. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 251–57; Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları*, pp. 461, 512, 522; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 151–66.
49. Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları*, p. 424; *Yakın Tarihimize*, p. 103; Korkut Boratov, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik* [100 Questions about Statism in Turkey] (Istanbul, 1974), p. 303.
50. Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 223; Memduh Yasa, ed. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923–1978* [The Economy of Turkey in the Republican Period, 1923–1978] (Ankara, 1980), pp. 186–87.
51. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 224–25.
52. Kop, *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 100.
53. Chart from Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 487n, 247; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 146–49.
54. Quoted in *Ayın Tarihi* 81 (8/41): 13; Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 316–17; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 253–54.
55. Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, p. 320.
56. Ibid., p. 324.
57. Ibid., p. 222. Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları*, p. 512.
58. Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye* [From a Single Party to Multiple Parties], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1990), p. 23.
59. Quoted in Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, p. 307.
60. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 486–88; Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları*, pp. 272, 276; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 193–202.
61. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 486–88.
62. *Yakın Tarihimize*, p. 102.
63. Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 84–85.
64. Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 305–6.
65. Ibid., pp. 302–3.
66. Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London, 1987), p. 112.
67. Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 86.
68. Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1998), pp. 73–74, 114.
69. Cemil Koçak, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını” [The Second World War and the Turkish Press], *Tarih ve Toplum* XXXV (1986): 285.
70. Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, 1839–1950* [History of Turkey's Democracy] (Ankara, 1995), pp. 388–93.

71. Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, pp. 21–22. Nadi claims that because the government was sensitive to criticism, newspapers were forced to concentrate on foreign affairs. In his study of Turkish foreign policy, Edward Weisband claims that Nadi overlooks the fact that many editors were personally interested in foreign affairs, and their paper's coverage reflected that interest. See Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 72–73. Koçak points out that during the first years of the war, press coverage concentrated on economic problems because discussion of domestic policy was sensitive, and the press tended to follow the government's line in foreign affairs. See Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 254; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 211–24.
72. Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, pp. 40–41.
73. Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 22.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* [My Memoirs] (Ankara, 1959), pp. 361–63; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* [The Second Man], (Istanbul, 1979), vol. II, pp. 219–25.
2. Quoted in Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii* [The Place of the Republican People's Party in Turkish Political History] (Ankara, 1965), pp. 145–46; Mahmut Gologlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939–1945* [The National Chief Period] (Ankara, 1974), pp. 148–49.
3. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 223.
4. Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi, 1938–1945* [The National Chief Period in Turkey] (Ankara, 1986), pp. 356–62.
5. Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939–1954* [Political Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1977), p. 258.
6. *Vatan*, July 26, 1942.
7. Gologlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 152–53.
8. Kadri Kemal Kop, ed., *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları* [Speeches, Sayings, and Messages of the National Chief] (Ankara, 1945), pp. 125–26.
9. Şevket Pamuk, "War, State Economic Policies and Resistance by Agricultural Producers in Turkey, 1939–1945," *New Perspectives on Turkey* II (1988): 19–36.
10. Kop, *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, pp. 126–27.
11. Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, p. 262.
12. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 363; Memduh Yasa, ed. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923–1978* [The Economy of Turkey in the Republican Period] (Ankara, 1980), p. 112.
13. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 227–28.
14. Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923–1950* [The Economic History of the Republican Period], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1986), p. 111.

15. Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, p. 259.
16. Asım Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları* [Notes of the Memoirs of Asım Us] (Istanbul, 1966), p. 553.
17. Kop, *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 135.
18. Faik Ökte, *The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax* (London, 1987), p. 89; Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları*, p. 558; Osman Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi: Çok Partili Hayata Geçişte Rol Oynayan İç ve Dış Tesirler* [The National Chief Period: The Role of Domestic and Foreign Influences on the Passage to Multi-Party Life] (Istanbul, 1998), p. 173.
19. Ökte, *Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, p. 49; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 234.
20. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 235–36.
21. Ökte, *Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, p. 23. Çağlar Keyder maintains that the Capital Tax stemmed from a search for scapegoats for the country's economic problems. He argues that the extraordinary circumstances of the war, combined with German inspired anti-Semitism and resentment at the wealth and power of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie of Istanbul, led to the enactment of a tax aimed specifically at the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek merchants of Istanbul. Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London, 1987), pp. 112–14.
22. Ökte, *Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, p. 24.
23. *Tan*, June 10, 1942.
24. Edward Clark, "The Turkish Varlık Vergisi Reconsidered," *Middle Eastern Studies* VIII (1972): 205–16; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 369–73; Korkut Boratov, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik* [100 Questions about Statism in Turkey] (Istanbul, 1974), pp. 339–51.
25. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 235; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 174.
26. Clark, "Varlık Vergisi Reconsidered," pp. 206–7.
27. Ökte, *Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, pp. 68–74; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 177–83, 202–6.
28. Clark, "Varlık Vergisi Reconsidered," p. 213; Nur Özmel Akın, *Rauf Orbay'ın Londra Büyükelçiliği* [Rauf Orbay's London Ambassadorship] (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 173–82. According to C. L. Sulzberger, news of the Capital Tax outside Turkey was censored by the Allied governments, to deter anti-Turkish sentiment. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memories and Diaries, 1934–1954* (Toronto, 1969), pp. 216–17.
29. Ökte, *Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, p. 91.
30. Pamuk, "War, State Economic Policies and Resistance," p. 32.
31. Boratov, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp. 351–53; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 168–73.
32. Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), pp. 649, 660–95; United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943* (hereafter FRUS), (Washington, 1964), vol. IV, pp. 1065–69; Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore, 1974), pp. 170–73; Howard, "The Entry of Turkey into World War II," *Bulleten XXXI* (1967): 221–75.

33. *FRUS*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 1091–92; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 261–62; Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 123–30.
34. PRO, FO 37468, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, May 20, 1943; FO 371/37469, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, June 19, 1943; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 130–32; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 258–62.
35. Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning* (Boston, 1965), p. 421; Winston Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 699–705. See also, Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (London, 1949), pp. 187–89; Akın, *Rauf Orbay'ın Londra Büyükelçiliği*, pp. 122–26.
36. Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, p. 706.
37. Ibid., 699–712, 716; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 190.
38. PRO, FO 371/37516, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, February 19, 1943; FO 371/37516, Warner to Eden, February 26, 1943; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 265. Koçak argues that Churchill's failure to mention a date for Turkey's entry into the war misled the Turks and caused much of the later tension in Turkish-Soviet relations.
39. Turhan Aytul, "Ankara'yı Titreten 5 Yıl" [Five Years that Shook Ankara], *Güneş*, September 29, 1988.
40. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 130–36.
41. PRO, FO 371/37468, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, May 26, 1943; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 265–70.
42. PRO, FO 371/37473, Memo by Eden, September 27, 1943; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 167–68. For Turkish press reaction, see *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Başbakanlık, Basın ve Matbuat Genel Müdürlüğü, Ayın Taribi* [History of the Month] 118 (9/43): 56–61.
43. United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943* (Washington, 1961), pp. 117, 121.
44. PRO, FO 371/37517, FO Minute, December 15, 1943; Eden, *Reckoning*, pp. 476–86. Also see, *Ayın Taribi* 189 (10/43): 57–65.
45. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 196; Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1951), p. 335.
46. *FRUS, Conferences*, pp. 533–40, 540–52.
47. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 355–58; Eden, *Reckoning*, pp. 496–97.
48. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 368.
49. PRO, FO 371/44064, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, December 19, 1943; Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 381; *FRUS, Conferences*, p. 484; Howard, "Entry of Turkey into World War II," p. 249.
50. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 197; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 264–68.
51. *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, p. 666; Weisband, *Turkey's Foreign Policy*, p. 204.

52. According to Elliot Roosevelt, "there had been an amusing diplomatic contest between the P.M. and Father," regarding İnönü's choice of planes to Cairo. Even though nobody could pinpoint its significance, the Americans were pleased nonetheless. Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York, 1946), p. 201. According to Koçak, while İnönü took the American plane, the Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu traveled with the British plane to protect the "balance." Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 282.
53. Howard, "Entry of Turkey into World War II," p. 250. Knatchbull-Hugessen, on the other hand, later said the Turks had every reason to be suspicious of the Allies. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, p. 198; *Time* (May 19, 1941) carried a portrait of İnönü on the cover with the caption "Allah be praised, I am deaf."
54. *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, pp. 693, 712–18.
55. Howard, "Entry of Turkey into World War II," p. 253.
56. *FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, pp. 751–55; Howard, "Entry of Turkey into World War II," pp. 255–56; Keith Hamilton, "War by Conference: Britain, Turkey and the Cairo Conference of December, 1943," in Center for Strategic Research, *Panel on the 55th Anniversary of the Cairo Conference* (Ankara, 1999), p. 35.
57. PRO, FO 371/44064, Memo by COS, January 10, 1944; FO 371/44066, Eden to Knatchbull-Hugessen, January 30, 1944, Minute by Clutton, February 10, 1944; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 302–5.
58. Quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 273.
59. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, trans. by B. Connell (London, 1952), p. 495.
60. PRO, FO 371/37516, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, February 6, 1943.
61. PRO, FO 371/37468, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, May 27, 1943.
62. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 130–36.
63. PRO, FO 371/37468, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, May 10, 1943, May 29, 1943.
64. Papen, *Memoirs*, pp. 509–13; L. C. Moyzisch, *Operation Cicero* (London, 1950); Richard Wires, *The Cicero Spy Affair: German Access to British Secrets in World War II* (Westport, 1999).
65. Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 159.
66. Aytul, "Mareşal'ı Kırım Yedi" [The Crimea Destroyed the Marshal], *Güneş*, July 31, 1987.
67. PRO, FO 371/37468, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, May 24, 1943; Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 357–58.
68. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 288–89.
69. United States, Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945* (hereafter DGFP), Series D (Washington, USGPO, 1954–1964), vol. XII, pp. 413–14, 587–88, 602–4, 626–27; see also William N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* (London, 1959), vol. II. Weisband argues that one reason why Turkey agreed to ship chrome to Germany despite vociferous complaints from the Allies was to prevent Germany from bombing Turkish mining facilities. Weisband, *Turkish Foreign*

- Policy, pp. 104–5, 108; see also Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 287–93; Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 159; Akin, *Rauf Orbay'ın Londra Büyükelçiliği*, pp. 200–10.
70. Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy*.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. On the chrome question, see William N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* (London, 1959), vol. II, pp. 542–46.
2. PRO, FO 371/44074, War Cabinet Memo, May 15, 1944; Harry N. Howard, "The Entry of Turkey into World War II," *Bulleten XXXI* (1967): 262–63.
3. United Kingdom, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons) 5th Series, vol. 400, cols. 762–86.
4. Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi, 1938–1945* [The National Chief Period in Turkey] (Ankara, 1986), p. 306; Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (London, 1952), p. 590; Turhan Aytul, "Sansaryan Han'dan Bugüne" [From Sansaryan Han to Today], *Güneş*, June 28, 1989; Aytul, "Mareşalı Kırımlı Yedi" [The Crimea Destroyed the Marshal], *Güneş*, July 31, 1987; William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London, 1994), pp. 82–83.
5. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 310–15; Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An "Active" Neutrality* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 169–72.
6. Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, 1995), pp. 117–20.
7. Kadri Kemal Kop, ed. *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları* [Speeches, Sayings, and Messages of the National Chief] (Ankara, 1945), p. 199.
8. Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* [Turkish-Soviet Relations and the Problem of the Straits] (Ankara, 1968), pp. 241–42.
9. United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944* (hereafter, *FRUS*) (Washington, 1965), vol. V, pp. 893, 898–99.
10. *FRUS, 1944*, vol. V, pp. 870–72.
11. Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), pp. 79–80; See relevant files in, FO 371/44070.
12. Howard, "Entry of Turkey into World War II," p. 271.
13. PRO, FO 371/44070, Eden to Knatchbull-Hugessen, July 21, 1944.
14. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th Series, vol. 402, cols. 1459–87.
15. PRO, FO 371/44070, Eden to Kerr, July 10, 1944; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 81.
16. Quoted in Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 269.

17. Osman Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi: Çok Partili Hayata Geçişte Rol Oynayan İç ve Dış Tesirler* [The National Chief Period: The Role of Domestic and Foreign Influences on the Passage to Multi-Party Life] (Istanbul, 1998), pp. 311–12.
18. Tarik Zafer Tunaya, "Elections in Turkish History," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (4/54): 116–19.
19. Quoted in Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939–1954* [Political Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1977), p. 277; see also Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 331–32.
20. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 335.
21. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, 1965), p. 181.
22. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 333–34.
23. Kop, ed. *Milli Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 164.
24. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 350.
25. Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1998), pp. 103, 111.
26. Ibid., pp. 344–46.
27. Tan, December 17, 1943.
28. Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, 1956), pp. 207–8, 223; Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* [My Remembrances], 3rd ed. (Istanbul, 1977), pp. 209–14; Aytul, "Sansaryan Han'dan Bugüne," July 5, 1989.
29. Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944–1950* [From a Single Party to Multiple Parties], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1990), p. 27.
30. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
31. Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, p. 207.
32. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 350–51.
33. Cemil Koçak, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını" [The Second World War and the Turkish Press], *Tarih ve Toplum*, XXXV (1986): 285–287; Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, pp. 235–38; Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, pp. 208–15.
34. Koçak, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını*, p. 286.
35. Aytul, "Sansaryan Han'dan Bugüne," July 1 & 4, 1989.
36. Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, pp. 89–90, 93–95; Aytul, "Sansaryan Han'dan Bugüne," June 28–30, July 3, 1989.
37. Aytul, "Sansaryan Han'dan Bugüne," June 30, 1989.
38. Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız had been friends during their schooldays. The two split after Ali published his novel *İçimizdeki Şeytan* [The Devil Within Us], which ridiculed Atsız. Alparslan Türkeş, *1944 Milliyetçilik Olayı* [The 1944 Nationalist Event] (Istanbul, 1968), pp. 20–30.
39. Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* [Like a Novel], 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 216–18; Us, *Asım Uş'un Hatıra Notları*, pp. 599–601.
40. Türkeş, *1944 Milliyetçilik Olayı*, pp. 36–44, 54–65.

41. Kop, *Millî Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, pp. 199–200.
42. Aytul, "Samsaryan Han'dan Bugüne," July 4, 1989; Landau, *Pan-Turkism* pp. 114–15; Türkeş, 1944 Milliyetçilik Olayı, pp. 65–105.
43. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, p. 346; Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 30.
44. Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, pp. 228–29.
45. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 350–51.
46. Ibid., p. 352; Akandere, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 251–53.
47. Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, pp. 30–32.
48. Ibid., p. 32.
49. Kop, *Millî Şef'in Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, p. 232.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

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2. Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939–1954* [Political Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1977), pp. 285–86.
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5. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* [The Second Man], 4th ed. (Istanbul, 1979), Vol. II, pp. 397–416; İlhan Tekeli, "II. Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Hazırlanan 'Savaş ve Sonrası Kalkınma Plan ve Programları ...'" [The Post-War Development Plan and Programs Prepared during the Second World War], *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi Özel Sayısı* (1979–80): 289–328.
6. İsmet İnönü, "Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfi" [The Statist Character of Our Party], *Kadro* 22 (1933): 4.
7. Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 118; Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiyenin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* [The Social Order of Turkey: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow] (Ankara, 1971), vol. I, pp. 322–23.
8. Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London, 1987), p. 126.
9. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 118–19.
10. Avcıoğlu, *Türkiyenin Düzeni*, p. 322; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, p. 300.
11. Osman Akandere, *Millî Şef Dönemi: Çok Partili Hayata Geçişte Rol Oynayan İç ve Dış Tesirler* [The National Chief Period: The Role of Domestic and Foreign Influences on

- the Passage to Multi-Party Life] (Istanbul, 1998), pp. 358–66; Abdurrahman Dilipak, *İnönü Dönemi* [The İnönü Period] (Istanbul, 1989), p. 80.
12. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 122.
13. *Ayın Tarihi* 138 (5/45): 53–54; Mahmut Goloğlu, *Millî Şef Dönemi, 1939–1945* [The National Chief Period] (Ankara, 1974), p. 344; Akandere, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 366–73; A. C. Edwards, "The Impact of the War on Turkey," *International Affairs* XXII (1946): 389–400.
14. Goloğlu, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 345–46; See also, *Ayın Tarihi* 138 (5/45): 53–72.
15. Goloğlu, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 346, 347–50.
16. *Ayın Tarihi* 138 (5/45): 72–74, 75.
17. *Ayın Tarihi* 138 (5/45): 182–84; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, p. 384.
18. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, p. 385; *Ayın Tarihi* 138 (5/45): 186–87; Goloğlu, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 354–55.
19. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi*, p. 385; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, pp. 297–98.
20. Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 66.
21. Ibid., p. 67.
22. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 144.
23. For the complete text of the Statement of the Four, see Fahur Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partinin Mevkii* [The Place of the Republican People's Party in Turkish Political History] (Ankara, 1965), pp. 169–71. See also, Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 144–45; Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, 1956), pp. 221–22; Goloğlu, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 365–67; Akandere, *Millî Şef Dönemi*, pp. 373–80.
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28. See Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859–1952* [Political Parties in Turkey] (Istanbul, 1952), pp. 638–45.
29. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 142; Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim* [The Events I Have Seen and Experienced in Recent History] (Istanbul, 1971), vol. IV, p. 31; Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, pp. 221–24.
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31. Yalman, *Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, p. 34.
32. Vatan, September 22, 1945; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 393–408.
33. Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, p. 395; Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 77.
34. *Ayın Tarihi* 144 (11/45): 22–25.
35. Heper, *İsmet İnönü*, pp. 184–85; Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 79; Fahriye Üstünler, "Türkiye'de Çok Partili Dönem Geçerken Demokrasi Tartışmaları" [Debates on Democracy during the Passage to the Multi-party Period], in Mete Tunçay, ed., *75 Yıldır Düşünceler Tartışmalar* [Thoughts and Debates of 75 Years] (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 55–66.
36. PRO, FO 371/48710, Kerr to FO, December 10, 1945; Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* [My Remembrances], 3rd ed. (Istanbul, 1977), pp. 258–62; Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* [Like a Novel], 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 302–22.
37. Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 384–92.
38. Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, pp. 296–303; Turhan Aytul, "Sansaryan Han'dan Bugüne" [From Sansaryan Han to Today], *Güneş*, July 6, 1989. Toker points out the controversy aroused by the shape of the G in the title of *Görüler*, which appeared to be in the shape of a sickle, leading many to assume the journal was pro-communist and sympathetic to the Soviets. Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 82.
39. Us, *Asım Uş'un Hatıra Notları*, p. 666; see also Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde CHP'nin Mevkii*, pp. 172–75.
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41. Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, p. 216; Akandere, *Milli Şef Dönemi*, pp. 336–40.
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45. See relevant files in PRO, FO 371/48697; *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 328–29, 903–4; see also, Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore, 1974), pp. 212–16.
46. *Ayın Tarihi* 136 (3/45): 52–53.
47. Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* [Turkish-Soviet Relations and the Problem of the Straits] (Ankara, 1968), pp. 249–50.
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49. Mehmet Gönlubol and Hâlük Ulman, "İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası, 1945–1965: Genel Durum" [Turkish Foreign Policy after the Second World War: The General Situation], in A. Suat Bilge et al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919–1990* [Turkish Foreign Policy with Events], 8th ed. (Ankara, 1993), p. 193.

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51. See *Ayın Tarihi* 139 (6/45): 136–45.
52. Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p. 255.
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54. *FRUS, Conference of Berlin*, pp. 1027–32.
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57. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 376.
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59. *FRUS, Conference of Berlin*, vol. I, pp. 1034–35.
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63. Quoted in *Ayın Tarihi* 144 (11/45): 31, 33.
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