

THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The Political Economy of Demographic
Engineering in the Modern World

Milica Zarkovic Bookman

THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUGGLE FOR POWER

This page intentionally left blank

THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The Political Economy of Demographic
Engineering in the Modern World

MILICA ZARKOVIC BOOKMAN
Department of Economics, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia

First published in 1997 by
FRANK CASS & CO. LTD.

This edition published 2013 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1997 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data:

Bookman, Milica Zarkovic
The demographic struggle for power : the political economy
of demographic engineering in the modern world
1. Demographic transition 2. Population 3. Power (Social
sciences)
I. Title
307

ISBN 0-7146-4732-2 (cloth)
ISBN 0-7146-4282-7 (paper)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

Bookman, Milica Zarkovic.
The demographic struggle for power : the political economy of
demographic engineering in the modern world / Milica Z. Bookman.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7146-4732-2. — ISBN 0-7146-4282-7 (pbk.)
1. Ethnic groups—Political activity. 2. Ethnic relations—
—Political aspects. 3. Forced migration. 4. Population transfers.
5. Population policy. 6. Boundary disputes. I. Title.
JF1061.B66 1997
909'.040825—dc20 96-38905
CIP

*All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior
permission of the publisher.*

Typeset by
Vitaset Ltd, Paddock Wood, Kent

To Edda and Gordana

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

List of Tables and Figures	ix
1 Introduction	1
2 The Demographic Struggle for Power	17
3 Demographic Statistics: What They Reveal, What They Conceal	47
4 Pronatalist Policies	79
5 Involuntary and Induced Assimilation	105
6 Forced Population Movements: Ethnic Dilution, Ethnic Consolidation and Ethnic Cleansing	121
7 Demographic Change Through Boundary Alterations: Secession and Irredentism	147
8 Economic Pressures and Incentives Underlying Demographic Change	171
9 The Political Economy of Engineered Demographic Change	193
Appendix	
Brief Description of Ethnicity and Inter-ethnic Conflict in Selected Regions	225
Select Bibliography	259
Index	265

This page intentionally left blank

Tables

Table 2.1:	Ethnic Groups, Regions and Economic Equality	23
Table 2.2:	Ethnic Heterogeneity, Political Systems, and Levels of Development in Selected Regions	36
Table 2.3:	Policies of Demographic Engineering in Selected Regions	38
Table 3.1:	Characteristics of the Census in Selected Countries	65
Table 4.1:	Birth and Death Rates, Religion, Female Literacy and Female Employment in Selected Regions	95
Table 9.1:	Administrative Territories of Yugoslavia	215

Figures

Figure 2.1:	Ethnic Dominance and Demographic Engineering	40
Figure 2.2:	Political Characteristics and Demographic Engineering	41
Figure 2.3:	Economic Development and Demographic Engineering	41

In Remote Southern Marsh, Iraq is Strangling the Shiites

Government forces in Iraq have stepped up a campaign to empty wide sections of the country's southern marshlands ... of Shiite Muslims by diverting rivers. ... First the rivers are diverted, then the army builds a cordon.

NEW YORK TIMES, 16 November 1993

Patient's Race May Affect Doctor's Advice

Expectant mothers of different races may not get the same quality of prenatal care, according to a study ... [therefore] black babies are twice as likely as whites to die before their first birthday.

THE MIAMI HERALD, 20 January 1994

Croatia Is Said To Oust Many

The government of Croatia has forced thousands of its enemies (mostly Serbs) from their homes and from the country, according to ... Helsinki Watch.

NEW YORK TIMES, 8 December 1993

Serbs Continue Cultural Cleansing

Mosques and Ottoman cultural monuments have been favorite targets of Serbian gunners throughout the war.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY

Daily Report, 16 December 1993

Introduction

THE QUOTES OPPOSITE were published over the course of a few months in 1993–94. While it may seem that the events and locations described are unrelated, there is in fact a common link between them that this book strives to identify and analyze. The quotes portray cultural oppression, diversion of natural resources, discrimination in health care, eviction of individuals, and destruction of property. They describe direct and indirect sources of change in the composition of a region's population. Since each of the victims described in the quotes is of a distinct ethnic or religious group, the articles are thus indications of inter-ethnic struggles for space and the control of that space.

Throughout history there have been struggles for territory and control of its resources. Only sometimes have these struggles been based on ethnicity. Such struggles for power and resources among ethnic groups manifest themselves in various ways: on one level, violent wars are being waged as populations, usually of varying ethnic or religious orientations, attempt to militarily achieve supremacy and power (in the 1990s most ongoing struggles in the Balkans, as well as the former Soviet Union, Asia and Africa, are based on ethnicity). Indeed, of the world's 82 conflicts that took place during 1989–92, 79 took place within borders and among different ethnic or religious groups¹). At another level, an 'inter-ethnic war of numbers' is taking place. While this expression of inter-ethnic animosity may be non-military and subtle, it has far-reaching ramifications. The goal of this war of numbers is to increase the economic and political power of an ethnic group *relative* to other groups, and the method by which this is achieved entails the increase in size of one population relative to others. Most ethnic groups in multinational states across the globe are engaged in this activity in varying degrees, thus clearly manipulating population numbers in their struggle for power. They have similar goals, but only differ in the form and intensity of the struggle. The war of numbers may precede, accompany or follow the war of militias.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

This inter-ethnic struggle may be called the ‘demographic struggle for power’. In describing this struggle, two questions will be answered. First, what is it that ethnic groups think they can achieve by augmenting their numbers? To answer this, the link between the size of an ethnic group and its economic and political power is to be identified. The conditions under which this link exists and the conditions under which it can be prevented from developing are analyzed. Moreover, this link is observed across levels of development, degrees of ethnic heterogeneity and systems of political organization (in other words, a comparison is made between the demographic struggles in less developed Turkey and more developed Canada, as well as those within federal India, unitary Romania and ethnically homogeneous Slovenia and heterogeneous Lebanon). Second, by what methods do leaders of ethnic groups actually manipulate demographic characteristics in their struggle for power? Do they just wage wars to exterminate their opponents, or are there in fact more subtle components to their efforts? This study analyzes such demographic alterations as caused by pronatalist policies, population resettlements, religious and linguistic conversions, immigration policies, etc. This book then places phenomena like ethnic cleansing, mass rapes and genocide into an economic and political framework, according to which the guiding motivation is to alter the ratio of an ethnic population to territory in an effort to increase economic and political power.

Thus, this book is a study of comparative ethnic demography and its political and economic significance. The emphasis lies in the analysis of the various dimensions of demographic policies that have been used by governments in multinational states. An index of demographic engineering policies is constructed to enable the assessment of demographic policies under varying structural conditions. Moreover, parameters are established which set limits on the analysis of the demographic struggle and thus enable the delineation of states in which such struggles occur and can be studied. The establishment of these parameters enables, for example, a comparison between policies of demographic engineering in ethnically more or less homogeneous states.

The literature on ethnicity and nationalism, inter-ethnic conflict resolution, and nation-building already abounds and is growing precipitously to keep up with the intensification of inter-ethnic conflicts in the post-cold war period. However, there seems to be a void in the literature pertaining to organized efforts (by legitimate governments and/or non-elected ethnic leaders) aimed at altering relative population

Introduction

sizes of ethnic groups in the quest for political and economic dominance. This book strives to fill this gap by (i) providing a framework for the analysis of demographic engineering that is embedded in the existing literature on economic and political dimensions of inter-ethnic relations in multinational states, (ii) by providing a methodical discussion and analysis of various population policies that have been adopted across states with different levels of ethnic homogeneity, levels of economic development and political systems, and (iii) by offering an alternative structure for inter-ethnic accommodation aimed at diffusing the need (perceived and actual) to engage in the demographic struggle for power.

This book is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 contains a description of the link between ethnic size and political and economic power, as well as the conditions under which this link is positive. A classification of demographic engineering policies is presented and their implementation in some 35 regions across the globe is described (Appendix I provides a background to the ethnic composition of the states, the inter-ethnic conflict that preceded or followed policies of demographic engineering, and the particular characteristics of the demographic policies). Chapter 3 conveys the problems and realities associated with the measurement and definition of demographic data, and it contains an analysis of the politicization of the population censuses. Chapters 3 through 7 contain descriptions of methods by which ethnic leaders alter the demographic composition of populations including: pronatalist policies (chapter 4), assimilation (chapter 5), forced population movements (chapter 6) and boundary alterations (chapter 7). In the realization of the above policies, one feature (other than direct force) has been consistently present, and that is the exertion of economic pressure on targeted groups with the aim of altering the demographic composition. This pressure takes the form of ethnic discrimination in employment, property rights (especially with respect to land), real estate taxes, etc. Because of the prevalence, simultaneity and subtlety of economic pressures, an entire chapter is dedicated to the exploration of this method of achieving a desired inter-ethnic redistribution (chapter 8). Finally, chapter 9 contains a suggestion for institutional changes at the state and sub-state levels that are aimed at easing inter-ethnic conflict by reducing the necessity for a demographic struggle for power. This suggestion follows from the literature on nation-building, consociational democracy, and nationalism.

While this book is broad in its geographical scope, it is narrow in its temporal dimension. Its limitation to the contemporary period (post-

The Demographic Struggle for Power

World War II) is not due to a lack of examples of demographic engineering in past centuries. Indeed, demographic engineering policies that caused the resettlement and ethnic cleansing of targeted populations have characterized Emperor Justinian's quests in North Africa; the Spanish expulsion of Jews and Moors from Spanish territory; European conquests of North and South American indigenous populations and the forcible removal of Africans for sale into slavery. Moreover, economic pressures were used as a tool of conversion across the Ottoman Empire, India and South America in the 19th century. However, not only is information pertaining to the demographic struggle for power more extensive in the contemporary period, but also the international norms of acceptable inter-ethnic behavior are more clearly defined and more clearly articulated, providing a common denominator for policy comparisons. Indeed, the examples from ancient history and the age of colonialism are embedded in vastly different political systems and different norms for acceptable behavior (certainly, ethnic cleansing of Native Americans was generally acceptable in the 1800s, but not acceptable in the Balkans in the 1990s). Thus, with several exceptions, it is contemporary examples from across Asia, Europe, Africa and the former Soviet Union that provide the illustrations in this book and the cases for analysis. Chapter 2 contains an assessment of the forms of demographic struggle for power that prevail under specific structural conditions in all 35 regions. Moreover, some territories are discussed in detail with respect to a single method of demographic engineering that has been particularly notable in that setting (for example, in Nigeria, the politicization of the census; in Croatia, the assimilation efforts of the central authorities, etc.) and one, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is analyzed in detail using all the categories of demographic engineering set out in chapter 2.

To the extent that there is a disproportional emphasis on the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it is because, at the time of writing, these regions seem a microcosm in which the struggle for power among ethnic groups has focused global attention in part because so many aspects of demographic engineering are present. Indeed, the current war in the former Yugoslavia is but the culmination of a comprehensive ongoing demographic struggle for power that has characterized that region throughout this century. The view that this region lends itself to a study of inter-ethnic relations and conflicts was also expressed by Paul Brass, who remarked that 'the whole range of

Introduction

government policies towards ethnic groups has found expression at different times in Eastern Europe.²

SOME DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

There are numerous terms and concepts used throughout this book that warrant explanation. They are terms whose definition is not agreed upon in a literature that is characterized, according to Connor, by ‘terminological chaos’.³ The introduction of these terms serves merely to describe how they are used in the text, rather than to offer a definitive explanation or resolve some outstanding contradictions in the literature. Moreover, in defining concepts such as ethnicity and nationalism, an overview of the literature is conspicuously absent, as that is beyond the scope of this study. The works of Anthony Smith, Walker Connor, Paul Brass, James Kellas, Donald Horowitz, Milton Esman, Ted Robert Gurr, and others have contributed so greatly to the field that there is little added here by way of definitions, and attempts are made in subsequent chapters to embed the discussion of demographic policies in their rich contributions. Despite this abundant literature, the question of how to classify and define peoples remains unresolved and continues to dominate debates on ethnicity and nationalism: indeed, while scholars have made great strides in the study of peoples from the time when the Pope proclaimed, in the 1530s, that the American Indians were indeed human, there is still disagreement pertaining to the definition of people by ethnicity, race and nation.

The term *ethnic group* warrants explanation. Since Pareto said that the term ‘ethnic’ is one of the vaguest known to sociology,⁴ research has attempted to clarify the term. According to Paul Brass, an ethnic group may be defined in three ways: in terms of objective attributes, with reference to subjective feelings and in relation to its behavior.⁵ All the definitions that follow focus on at least one of those categories. An ethnic group, according to Narroll, is defined as a biologically self-perpetuating group that shares fundamental cultural values and differentiates itself from other groups.⁶ These cultural values may be embodied in language, religion or myth of origin. Which of these predominates is pointed out by Uri Ra’anan: in ‘eastern regions’, ancestral language seems to be the dividing factor, while in ‘southern regions’ religion is the primary differentiating aspect of ethnicity.⁷ Barth has focused his definition of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

ethnicity on the boundary that defines an ethnic group, rather than its cultural components.⁸ According to Anthony Smith, an ethnic group is composed of a people that share a cultural bond and that perceive themselves to share a common origin.⁹ Glazer and Moynihan describe an ethnic group as ‘any group of distinct cultural tradition and origin’.¹⁰ Ted Robert Gurr focuses on another angle: ethnic groups, which he refers to as communal groups, ‘are psychological communities’, underscoring the perception of collective identity that membership in a group connotes.¹¹ Finally, in today’s climate, George Brock’s definition of an ethnic group is perhaps the most *a propos*: he defines an ethnic group as a people united by a common dislike of their neighbors and a common myth of their origin.¹² In these and other definitions of ethnicity, a crucial question has arisen that has divided scholars into two categories: are characteristics that place individuals in a given ethnic category primordial or instrumental ('modernist', according to Anthony Smith) in nature? In other words, are ethnic communities natural, primordial and given, or are they created by the interests of leaders, elites or the particular political system? The debate, stimulated by Shils and Geertz as proponents of the primordial view and Wallerstein, Hechter, and Gellner as modernists, is ongoing.¹³ For the purposes of this study, ethnic affiliation is viewed as flexible and in some instances transitory, underscoring that ethnicity is neither given nor fixed.¹⁴ This dynamic view is based on evidence of demographic engineering that has been successful as a result of changing ethnic affiliations (see especially chapters 3 and 8).

While the above definitions may vary in focus, they all connote a group of people that are united (or perceive to be united) in some way. Such a lack of clarity fosters a wide range of interpretations so that the real-world applications of ethnic group boundaries results in a lack of comparable classifications. This confusion is best illustrated by the attempts to classify the various peoples inhabiting the Balkans. While this issue is discussed in detail in chapter 3, it suffices to say here that the unconventional official divisions of the Balkan population have given rise to a plethora of groupings that belie the above classifications: peoples are distinguished by religion (the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, as well as the Bulgarians and the Pomaks), by levels of development (the Albanian Albanians and the Kosovo Albanians), and by language (the Tosks and Gegs; possibly the Macedonians and the Serbs). For the sake of simplicity, peoples of the

Introduction

Balkans will be referred to as ethnic groups throughout the text, even through they do not necessarily conform to the standard definitions of ethnicity.

How is an ethnic group related to a *nation*? It should first be noted that confusion shrouds this term because ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are sometimes used synonymously. To compound the confusion, the United Nations has adopted the term nation as synonymous with state. For the purposes of this study, state and nation are not interchangeable. A state is a political term that connotes a country. A nation refers to a group of people who share culture, history and usually language in a specific territory and who give political expression to this common identity. According to Anthony Smith, a nation is ‘a body of citizens bound by shared memories and a common culture, occupying a compact territory with a unified economy and identical rights and duties’.¹⁵ A nation is therefore a wider concept than an ethnic group. According to Kellas, there is more to the difference: ‘ethnic groups are essentially exclusive or ascriptive, meaning that membership in such groups is confined to those who share certain inborn attributes. Nations on the other hand are more inclusive and are culturally or politically defined.’¹⁶ Another aspect of the term nation is that it *de facto* carries with it an association with rank and status. The status of a nation is perceived to be the highest order in the ranking of peoples. Indeed, representatives of ‘indigenous’ peoples across the globe recently demanded that their status be elevated to that of a ‘nation’ instead of their designation (by the International Labor Organization) as ‘tribal populations’. The concept of the nation as the highest ranking is also evident in the distinction among ethnic groups that existed in former Yugoslavia: the federal government distinguished between nations (‘narodi’), nationalities (‘nacionalnosti’) and national minorities (‘manjine’). Nations are those whose population centers are located mainly within the Yugoslav federation (such as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.), while the latter refer to those ethnic groups that have their homelands in neighboring states, the Albanians and Hungarians.

The term nation underlies two other concepts used in this study: nation-state and nationalism. Both are clearly political in nature, underscoring the political character of ethnicity. A *nation-state* is a state in which national and political borders coincide. According to Uri Ra’anan, the term refers to ‘a polity whose territorial and juridical frontiers coincide with the ethnic boundaries of the national entity with

The Demographic Struggle for Power

which that state is identified, frequently by its very name'.¹⁷ Most countries of the world are not nation-states. Indeed, a study by Connor (discussed in chapter 7), found that of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 are ethnically homogeneous.¹⁸

Thus, given the multi-ethnic character of most states, usually there emerges some ranking between the various ethnic groups. Often times, they are simply divided into majorities and minorities. The defining characteristic of a *minority* ethnic group is usually size: the minority group is simply the numerically smaller ethnic group. According to that definition, clearly the Maghrebis are a minority in France, the Basques in Spain, the Jews in Italy, and so forth. However, depending on one's point of reference, the size distinction between a minority and majority may become blurred. Indeed, are Tamils the minority in Sri Lanka, or are the Sinhalese in fact the minority in the entire South Asia?¹⁹ Similarly, are the Serbs the minority in Kosovo, or are the Albanians the minority in Serbia? Wars have been fought to answer these questions. In addition to size, political power also distinguishes minority and majority peoples. Minority groups suffer limited social mobility, political disadvantage, restricted access to material well-being, and government policies have directly or indirectly perpetuated these conditions.²⁰ According to Messina, minorities may be described as 'groups that are underrepresented in positions of authority and control in the major institutions of society. They are limited to ineffectual, low prestige, poorly paid positions within major institutions or excluded from the institutions altogether'.²¹ In that case, political minorities need not be numerical minorities. Moreover, a nation differs from a minority insofar as, according to Gurr, the minority has a defined status within a larger society, and it seeks to improve upon that status, while the nation seeks some form of autonomy from the state.²² In other words, the minority wants to improve its position within the system, while the nation strives for exit from the system.

While *nationalism* is simply defined by a dictionary as 'the devotion to one's nation; patriotism or chauvinism',²³ it does in fact connote more, embodying culture, ethnicity, language. Indeed, according to Smith, nationalism is 'a doctrine of autonomy, unity and identity, whose members conceive it to be an actual or potential nation'.²⁴ Just as the term nation is submerged in contradictory terminology, so too is nationalism. Connor has attempted to rectify the semantic sources of misunderstanding by clarifying words: a sloppy use of the term nationalism connotes loyalty to the state. It is, in fact, loyalty to the nation.²⁵ Loyalty

Introduction

to the state is patriotism. In the case of nation-states, the two forms of loyalty coincide, but they must be treated separately in the literature. To avoid this confusion, Connor introduced the term *ethno-nationalism*. The mix of ethnicity and nationalism leads to ethno-nationalism, which according to Connor and Shiels, is ‘the sentiment of an ethnic minority in a state or living across state boundaries that propels the group to unify and identify itself as having the capacity for self-government’.²⁶ Thus, ethno-nationalism involves demands by the ethnic group, a phenomena that will be discussed at length below. Other variations of the term nationalism exist. *Ethnic nationalism*, according to Francis, is an ideology: ‘all ethnic nations have a right and sacred duty to preserve and unfold the distinctive culture that is their heritage and the expression of their “spirit”’.²⁷ Kellas’s definition takes nationalism one step further by claiming that it is ‘both an ideology and a form of behavior’.²⁸ That extension underscores its political character, which is clearly identified by Paul Brass, who claimed that ‘nationalism is a political movement by definition’.²⁹ However, not all ethnic groups view themselves as nations, and not all nations exhibit nationalist ideology. What accounts for the transition from ethnicity to nationalism? Miroslav Hroch described the transition in three stages: in the first, intellectuals begin to propagate the characteristics of an ethnic group, in the second, political, economic, and social interests take over from the intellectuals in the formative period of ‘national awakening’, and in the third, nationalism becomes a mass movement.³⁰ The second phase is especially relevant in our discussions of the link between ethnic size and political and economic power.

The burgeoning literature on the subject on nationalism cannot possibly be reviewed at length here. However, there are some aspects of it that warrant mention because of their relevance to this study. First, not all forms of nationalism are the same, either over time or over space. This variation is evident even in the limited number of contemporary cases that are included in this study. The literature on nationalism has identified various types of nationalism, described here in order to provide a compass for this text. With respect to historical forms, Kellas offers the following typology: pre-nineteenth century nationalism (involving nation building, as in France); nineteenth to early twentieth-century nationalism (involving the development of nation to state, culminating in national unification (such as Italy and Germany) or independence (such as among the nations of the Ottoman and

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Habsburg Empires); post-1945 anti-colonial nationalism (such as in India); post-industrial developed world nationalism (such as in Scotland and Quebec); post-independence communal nationalism in the Third World (such as in Punjab and Biafra); and post-authoritarian regime nationalism (such as in Catalonia and the Soviet Republics).³¹ The demographic policies described in this book are the product of nationalist sentiment of the last three types. However, there are currently strains of nationalism that have greater parallels with historical forms from the turn of the century than the present (as, for example, the goal of national unification of Serbs across the former Yugoslavia is reminiscent of similar goals in Italy and Germany in the past century).

Second, the nature of nationalism differs across the above historical forms: some forms of nationalism are constructive insofar as they result in the creation of new states that lend a democratic mechanism for political expression of peoples within those states. Such nationalism, which resulted in the creation of democratic institutions in nineteenth-century France, underlay movements for self-determination and independence from the Ottoman to the Habsburg Empires before World War I, and brought about self-rule in the colonies in the mid-twentieth century. Destructive nationalism, on the other hand, suppresses human rights in the quest for aggrandizement of one peoples, adopts undemocratic forms of political expression and ultimately is counter-productive for the establishment of long term inter-ethnic harmony. This distinction has been called different names by different scholars, but with slight variation has been recognized by many (for example, Breuilly distinguishes between reform nationalism and separatist nationalism³²). To some extent, classifying nationalism by its constructive and destructive properties instills a measure of subjectivity into the analysis since it introduced a distinction between good and bad. Indeed, whether one views the nationalism in Slovenia and Moldova (that led to the establishment of sovereign states) as constructive (it led to the establishment of sovereign states) or destructive (it led to the destruction of a political entity which afforded ethnic minorities a large measure of protection) may in part be in the eye of the beholder. However, an objective measure of the constructive or destructive properties of nationalism may entail an assessment of the effect on the entire spectrum of ethnic groups, not just the dominant ones. This is relevant for the discussion in chapter 9, where a proposal is made for the diffusion of inter-ethnic conflict that in part results from nationalist policies that benefit only the dominant ethnic group.

Introduction

Third, it is imperative to invoke both history and territory in order to fully appreciate the force of nationalism that underlies the demographic struggle for power. In this effort, Anthony Smith focused on the importance of myths, traditions and historical symbols in sustaining ethnic allegiances and the sense of belonging.³³ Also R. J. Johnston focused on the importance of territory and geography for sustaining and guaranteeing national coherence.³⁴ Moreover, the fact that contemporary nationalist movements strive to create conditions that enable an ethnic group to dominate on a given territory underscores the importance of territory for the definition of that group. Indeed, the concept of territory and the concomitant demographic or historical claims to that territory underlie numerous contemporary efforts at altering the demographic composition of a region.

Lastly, a few words are in order about race and class. The debate on how *race* is related to ethnicity is extensive, and for our purposes largely irrelevant. Race is the distinguishing feature among peoples in some population classifications (see chapter 3). Suffice it to say that while race emphasizes physical properties and biological heredity, ethnicity emphasizes social organization and cultural characteristics. Racism is the ideology associated with race as nationalism is the ideology associated with nations. What is the relationship between ethnicity and class? *Class* and ethnicity offer different affiliations to the individual. Class cleavages in society sometimes coincide with ethnic cleavages – when they do, Horowitz calls the societies ranked, otherwise they are unranked.³⁵) When they coincide, the pre-existing conflict between class interests is magnified. Brass says ‘... conflicts for control at the center and for control over local territories and communities take on an added significance when elites in competition are from different ethnic groups and/or use different languages.’³⁶ The fact that class and ethnicity do not necessarily coincide creates multiple levels of potential conflict, leading some, such as Baaklini, to claim that there is as much competition within various classes as there are between ethnic groups.³⁷ Both class distinctions and ethnic distinctions can create conflict among groups in society. However, class lines are fluid and permit mobility, while ethnic lines are crossed with greater difficulty (following choice or successful demographic policies, as described in chapters 3–8). Moreover, according to empirical evidence, the bonds of ethnicity and nationalism (not patriotism) are stronger than class bonds: indeed, Kellas claimed ‘nationalism is an ideology which claims supreme loyalty from individuals’.³⁸

The Demographic Struggle for Power

POPULATION SIZE AND POWER IN THE 1990s: A BACKGROUND

Countries compete with each other in a variety of ways, some of which reflect an almost childish obsession with numbers. For example, countries compete with respect to their histories to determine whose cultural roots reach greater depths of antiquity: countries like Italy and Greece reap benefits from the temporal dimension of their institutions. Countries compete with respect to territory, as they prefer more land to less: the former Soviet Union reveled in its size and the fact that it spanned seven time zones. Countries also prefer larger population sizes: China connotes power on a world scale simply as a result of its population size. Throughout history, the drive to numerically outdo one's neighbors has fueled numerous exaggerations, wars and conquests. However, in the modern age, the numbers game has become sharpened: at the close of the twentieth century, relative numbers have ascended to a new level of importance. With respect to population numbers, the size of a population subgroup relative to others has become imperative. In the 1990s, the 'relative' has become as important as the 'absolute' for the following reasons.

First, nationalism has resurfaced to become a dominant element in political interaction, despite Breuilly's statement in 1982 that its day has passed.³⁹ While its emergence in the 1990s is not new from a historical perspective, its geographical concentration is new to the post-World War II period. Indeed, it seems to have presently accelerated in importance in the former communist world, where for the past half a century it has been dormant or suppressed. The demise of communist ideology has opened a window of opportunity for both constructive and destructive nationalist strains to appear. With respect to the inter-ethnic war of numbers, the importance of a proliferation of nationalist sentiment is not to be discounted because nationalism by definition entails a credo of the importance of one people relative to others. The more important the group, the greater the legitimacy of its demands as perceived by its members.

Second, the 1990s are characterized by a general economic insecurity across the globe. Economic insecurity serves to accentuate differences among peoples as each group struggles to hold on to the economic benefits that it already enjoys as it competes for more. In countries in which ethnicity already has emerged as a relevant cleavage in society, economic competition may occur along ethnic rather than class lines.

Introduction

There are several reasons why economic insecurity is strong in the 1990s, including: (i) The transition from socialism to capitalism in much of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has caused turmoil in their internal economies as well as in their relations with their traditional trading partners. Moreover, the rejection of a quick reform path (i.e., the 'Big Bang' approach) by voters in many of these countries has underscored the economic schizophrenia that resulted from a divergence in goals between leaders and voters (notably in Hungary, Ukraine, Poland). (ii) The Third World countries have encountered fierce competition in the market for aid and investment capital since the former communist states have joined in the global demand. With global attention focused on the possible profits associated with the transition process in post-communist countries, many less developed states have found themselves marginalized with respect to trade and investment. Moreover, former client states of the two superpowers presently find they are less interesting than during the bipolar struggle. (iii) Economic growth, once virtually assured in industrial countries, has increasingly become difficult to sustain. Two leading economic powers, Germany and Japan, have been experiencing difficulties new to their economies in the modern period. Indeed, unification has brought about a recession in Germany, while market turmoil and instability have characterized the once stable Japan. Clearly, the slip-over effects of such economic problems on their economic partners are not negligible.

Third, the 1990s are characterized by a continuation of the political reshuffling on the world scene that began in the late 1980s. As part of this reshuffling, the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended, and the bipolar world ceased to exist. The United States emerged as the single world superpower. However, the end of the cold war also brought uncertainty on the political scene, as new roles were not yet clearly defined by the old players. Evidence of this ambiguity is seen in President Clinton's policy in Somalia and Bosnia, in the European Community's fragmented policy towards Bosnia, in the apprehension towards a unified Germany that is perceived across Europe, in the mixed reception to Japan's and Germany's demands for ascension to the Security Council, in the lack of clarity in President Clinton's preferences towards Asia vs. Europe, etc. Global political insecurity of this kind cannot but provoke internal political insecurity and lead to turmoil within states, especially in those that are already predisposed due to the proliferation of cleavages along ethnic or tribal lines.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Fourth, the late 1980s have witnessed the emergence of movements for self-determination based on ethnicity. Unlike previous movements throughout history that tended to be genuinely democratic (as in the nineteenth century) or movements for liberation from imperialism (as in the post-World War II period), these modern movements call for self-determination of a peoples simply on the grounds of ethnic dominance on a given territory. Moreover, not only were these demands abundant in the early 1990s, but their acceptance by the world community was widespread. Many secessionist movements were acceptable in the West because they were perceived to be a rebellion against communism. With time, it became clear that they were not universally democratic, but rather that in the process of increasing the rights of one ethnic group, those of another were crushed. The recognition of movements based on ethnicity stimulated and motivated ever smaller groups, with ever smaller legitimacy and ever lower viability, to reach to the stars and demand statehood. Such a potentially attainable 'carrot' of recognition could not but provoke and intensify inter-ethnic competition and strife.

As a result of the above, the inter-ethnic war of numbers has a fertile environment in which to develop. The extent to which it develops and the direction that it takes is not entirely predictable, but it is likely that its acceleration will harm individuals according to their ethnicity rather than their class or citizenship. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize the source of the inter-ethnic demographic struggle for power, to devise methods to alter conditions under which this war of numbers takes place and, most importantly, to decrease the importance of relative ethnic numbers.

NOTES

- 1 The study was conducted by the UNDP, and armed conflicts are defined as those in which over 1000 people were killed (*The Economist*, 4 June 1994, p. 43).
- 2 Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, p. 50.
- 3 Walter Connor, *Ethinationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 89.
- 4 Vilfredo Pareto, quoted in Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, p. 311.
- 5 Paul R. Brass, see note 2.
- 6 R. Narroll, 'Ethnic Unit Classification', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1964.
- 7 Both of these are personal characteristics, as opposed to the western concept

Introduction

- of nationality, which is closely tied to territory and state. See Uri Ra'anana, 'Nation and State: Order out of Chaos', in Uri Ra'anana et al, eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 14.
- 8 Fredrik Barth, 'Introduction', in Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969, p. 15.
 - 9 Anthony Smith, 'Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15, no. 3, July 1992, p. 450.
 - 10 N. Glazer and D. P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 4.
 - 11 Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 3.
 - 12 Cited in Alfred Pfäbigan, 'The Political Feasibility of Austro-Marxist Proposals for the Solution of the Nationality Problem of the Danubian Monarchy', in Uri Ra'anana et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 54.
 - 13 Edward Shils, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, 1957; Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution', in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*, New York: Free Press, 1963; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, New York: Academic Press, 1974; Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975; E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
 - 14 Anthony Smith claims that in addition to dynamism in ethnic affiliation and therefore in ethnic numbers, there is also dynamism in the strength of intra-ethnic bonds, further underscoring the flexibility of the concept of ethnicity (Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991, p. 23).
 - 15 Anthony Smith, 'Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15, no. 3, July 1992, p. 450.
 - 16 James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 4.
 - 17 Uri Ra'anana 'The Nation State Fallacy', in Joseph V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 5.
 - 18 Walter Connor, 'Nation Building or Nation Destroying', *World Politics*, 24, 1972, p. 320.
 - 19 Tamils in Sri Lanka have been trying to defend their culture and ethnicity against the dominant Sinhalese. However, to the Sinhalese, the oppression of the Hindus that speak Dravidian languages from India is perceived as a major threat. Indeed, according to a Sinhalese politician, 'In this country, the problem of the Tamils is not a minority problem. The Sinhalese are the minority in Dravidistan. We are carrying on a struggle for our national existence against the Dravidian majority' (Sri Lanka, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 48, col. 1313, 3 September 1962, quoted in Robert Kearney, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka', *Asian Survey*, vol. XXV, no. 9, September 1985, p. 903).
 - 20 Owens Smith, quoted in Anthony Messina, Luis Fraga and Laurie Thodebeck and Frederick Wright, *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial*

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- Democracies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 2.
- 21 Richard Shingles 'Minority Consciousness and Political Action: A Comparative Approach' in Messina, *Industrial Democracies*, p. 161.
- 22 Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 15.
- 23 *Webster's Dictionary*, New York: Warner Books, 1979.
- 24 Anthony Smith, see in note 9.
- 25 Walter Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 41.
- 26 Frederick L. Shiels, ed., *Ethnic Separatism and World Politics*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1984; Walter Connor, 'Politics of Ethnonationalism', in *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1, 1973, pp. 1–21.
- 27 E. K. Francis, *Inter-ethnic Relations*, New York: Elsevier, 1976, p. 78.
- 28 Kellas, see in note 16, p. 3.
- 29 Paul Brass, see in note 2, p. 48.
- 30 Miroslav Hroch, 'Die Vorkampfer der nationalen Bewegung in den Kleinen Volkern Europas', Prague, 1968, quoted in Peter Kruger, 'Introduction' in Peter Kruger, ed., *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1993, p. 17.
- 31 With respect to the nature of nationalist demands, Kellas offers the following: cultural (often involving language), constitutional (having to do with self-determination), peaceful direct action (involving demands outside the constitutional process, as Quebec and Lithuania), violent direct action (involving paramilitary groups as the Basques), and communal violence (mostly in third-world countries). Kellas, p. 167.
- 32 John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, chapters 13 and 14.
- 33 Anthony Smith, see in note 9.
- 34 More on territory and ethnicity follows in chapter 2. R. J. Johnston et al., eds., *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, London, 1988.
- 35 Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 30.
- 36 Paul Brass, see in note 2, p. 274.
- 37 Abdo I. Baaklini, 'Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Lebanon', in William C. McCready *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 17.
- 38 Kellas, see in note 16, p. 6.
- 39 Breuilly, see in note 32, p. 352.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

The larger the nation, the more soldiers it could mobilize for its armies; the more densely populated the land, the better it could resist the incursions of its neighbors; the more rapid the growth of population, the more easily could men be spared to found colonies, engage in international trade, and carry abroad the national language and culture.

C. ALISON MCINTOSH¹

SIZE OF ETHNIC POPULATION AND POWER (SEPP)

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN the size of an ethnic group and its economic and political power is usually positive. While this may seem obvious and thus of limited interest, it is the ramifications of this relationship that are of importance to scholars and policy makers.

Pioneering research, discussed throughout the text, has been made in the areas of comparative ethnic demography and its political significance by scholars such as Wright, Guyot, Wriggins, Alonso and Star, among others.² Issues pertaining to the size of an ethnic group and its effect on inter-group power relationships have been analyzed in the literature. According to Allen, the largest group in society engages in distinct behavior because it is both large and largest: he observes that ‘members of the largest group are most “conservative” because they have the most control, status and privilege to conserve.’³ Mayhew and Levinger, and later Blau, described how the large group interacts with other groups, while Fisher has claimed that size produces a ‘critical mass’ in political and social systems.⁴ Schermerhorn introduced the term ‘mass subjects’ in describing the strength and legitimacy derived from

The Demographic Struggle for Power

majority rule. However, the literature does not contain an explicit description of the political and economic benefits of size.

This chapter attempts to fill that void by presenting an elaboration of the positive link between size and power, as well as an analysis of that link under different political systems, levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and levels of economic development. The discussion of these structural variables includes the development of indicators to assess their existence. Policies of demographic engineering are scored in the selected regions, a Demographic Engineering Index compiled, and the value of this index is observed by structural variable. Two additional aspects of the link between ethnic size and power are discussed: First, political and economic power do not necessarily coincide, as political power does not necessarily translate into economic power, and vice versa. Second, this positive link is not universal, as there are examples in which a numerical minority is in power. The conditions under which these exceptions to the SEPP link occur are discussed.

(i) Size and political power

Throughout history, the *relative size* of a peoples has been crucial in determining its political and economic strength, both domestically and internationally.⁵ With respect to political power, the larger the ethnic group within a state, the less it can be ignored. Size implies (i) enhanced representation in political bodies, which translates into decision making that tends to reflect the interests of that group. Thus, demographic statistics that show relative ethnic sizes serve to distribute representation within the political system, for example Nigeria, Romania and Switzerland. Size also implies (ii) political legitimacy to partake in the political arena and to express ethnic demands in an organized fashion. It is on the basis of size that numerous population groups claim political legitimacy: the Karanga in Zimbabwe or the Serbs in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, small minorities are more easily ignored than large minorities. Size connotes (iii) the participation in the political system, insofar as it gives the group in question equal or preferential access to legal protection and the legal system, access to civil service positions and access to the military and police service. Finally, size connotes (iv) the right to make demands on the political system, as some groups are of insufficient size to even be recognized in the political spectrum as groups.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

The assertion of these rights in the spheres of economics, politics and ethno-cultural issues is classified into three types of demands.⁶ The mildest demand of a peoples entails policy changes whose effects will favor the group in question. These are usually of a cultural nature, such as the right for schooling in a non-titular language. Such a right was granted by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 to minorities such as the Hungarians and the Albanians. Another type of demand is for full integration into the decision making process. This usually entails minority groups that strive for rights equal to those enjoyed by the titular majority, including the right to own property and to defend property rights in courts, the right to vote or partake in political life, and the right to enjoy social welfare of the country. An example of this right is embodied in the Austrian Constitution of 1876, which Francis described as the Magna Carta of Nationalities. It declared that 'all nationalities had equal rights; and that each of them had the inalienable right to the preservation and cultivation of its identity, culture and language'.⁷ In the United States, affirmative action legislation such as the Equal Employment Act of 1972, is an example of legislation to make into law such civil rights.

The strongest demand is for autonomy. While this demand may be satisfied by the extension of increased political rights to the region where the group resides, the demand may also include the right to secession based on self-determination. The latter is of increasing importance in the secessionist climate of the 1990s (the example of the Chechens, Tibetans, Punjabis, Kashmiris and the Albanians of Kosovo are just some of the examples of peoples that have voiced the demand to leave their union. The larger the ethnic group, the greater its claim to statehood. Indeed, the Sorbs within Germany do not have the same clout in their autonomy drive as the Catalans within Spain). Autonomy demands by ethnic groups may thus be classified according to their underlying view of future participation in the political union. Some demands are based on the long-term view that the group will remain part of the state while others are based on a future divergence from the state. These two types of demands have been discussed in the literature: Rothchild called them the internal dimension and the external dimension, Leslie called them the 'we want out' and 'we want in' demands.⁸ Whatever the name, this distinction among ethnic demands is relevant because it serves to accentuate both the potential intensity of demands and the likely nature of the struggle that may take place in the future. The demand is likely

The Demographic Struggle for Power

to determine the range of government responses in managing conflict: obviously, the demands that presuppose remaining in the union are more easily negotiated than those that demand territorial autonomy.

In representative democracies characterized by universal suffrage, each person has one vote and power is distributed through balloting. Under those conditions, and when ethnicity is the basis for political choice, the dominant ethnic groups in society retain their power only if they retain the numerical balance in their favor. Universal suffrage is expressed through a multiparty system: In industrial societies, multi-party systems tend to be divided along class lines, but since class barriers are fluid, so is membership in parties. In pre-industrial societies, as well as some industrial ones, there are multiple parties that reflect the countries' vertical split of the population along rigid tribal or ethnic lines, that are significantly less fluid.⁹ Party systems, according to Horowitz, may be ethnic (such as in the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Nigeria, at various points in their modern history), multiethnic (such as in the United States, Italy, Philippines, etc.), or non-ethnic (the vast majority of countries fall in the in between range).¹⁰ In a system of ethnic parties, ethnic voting takes place, according to which members of ethnic groups vote for their ethnic leaders, thus ethnic considerations take precedence over economic, regional and social considerations.

When ethnic parties exist, the size of an ethnic group is crucial in the determination of who rules. Horowitz showed this simply by dividing the population of a country into two ethnic groups, A and B. Group A comprises 60% of the population; B only 40%. If the two groups have similar rates of natural population increase and similar age structures, and if political parties form along ethnic lines, as they often do in multiethnic societies, then Group A will always form the government.¹¹ This view of the importance of size is also voiced by Olugbemi, who claims that ethnic groups believe 'might is right' and have as objective to

secure adequate representation of group interests in the political, economic and administrative leadership structures either in the direction of preserving an established hegemony and the attendant privileges or in the direction of redressing the status quo in favor of a previously disadvantaged group of groups. The close association between the desire for group hegemony and the democratic ethos of universal suffrage and majority rule are the stimulators of the 'ethnic numbers game' by which

The Demographic Struggle for Power

groups in competition seek to adjust their numerical ratios for sectional hegemonic interests.¹²

Inter-ethnic political competition arises because politics is viewed as a zero sum game in which the loss to one ethnic group is perceived as a gain to another. However, even with universal suffrage, some leaders have engineered ways of preventing the numbers from translating into political power: for example, by engineering electoral laws (such as in Lebanon)¹³ or by intimidating and harassing members of non-ruling ethnic groups and inventing charges against ethnic leaders (such as in Nigeria).¹⁴ These cases and others are discussed below.

(ii) Size and economic power

Most states are characterized by inequality between its ethnic groups and its sub-state regions (where income per capita is the indicator of equality). Such economic inequality fosters economic competition. Whether this competition occurs among ethnic groups that are dispersed or territorially concentrated, ethnic population size plays a crucial role. The vast literature on ethnicity and economic development does not sufficiently address the role of ethnic size in economic competition. Studies by Tilly and Portes and more recently Olzak, and Olzak and Nagel have tried to fill this gap: they made the case for a strong positive link between size of ethnic groups and economic benefits in the United States. Many of their arguments, however, are applicable in a wide variety of contexts.

The economic rewards that size conveys include the following. First, ethnic population size is usually positively related to access to scarce resources. The larger the size, the greater its power to appropriate those resources through various forms of political manipulation. The distribution of scarce resources is often the primary source of conflict among ethnic groups. If there is no scarcity, there is no economic source of conflict.¹⁵ According to Van Den Berghe, ‘Ethnic conflicts, like class conflicts, result from the unequal distribution of and competition for scarce resources’.¹⁶ According to Hoetink, ‘group competition is commonly used if two or more groups try to limit each others access to scarce resources’.¹⁷ It is exactly this relationship between ethnic competition and scarce resources that has been the underlying source of conflict in the Yugoslav wars of 1991–94, since the size of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

the economic pie shrunk in the 1980s, and competition for resources took place among ethnic groups rather than along class lines. While this source of conflict is discussed in chapter 9, suffice it to say here that the inter-ethnic competition in Yugoslavia intensified as nationalism developed, just as Skinner claimed it did in the African context as the countries prepared for independence and African nationalism developed.¹⁸

Second, ethnic size is usually positively related to group input in policy making. As a result of their rights to voice concerns and make demands, ethnic groups also obtain economic rewards.¹⁹ As a result of the political powers that are allocated by size, the dominant ethnic group is capable of extending its powers into various aspects of policy so that benefits accrue to its particular group. Evidence of this was provided by Horowitz, who pointed out that ethnicity is an important factor in the following economic aspects of governmental functioning: development plans, educational controversies, trade union affairs, land policy, business policy, and tax policy.²⁰ Clearly, if one ethnic group benefits disproportionately from tax laws, business policies or development projects, then repercussions will permeate throughout the economic, political and social system with broad ramifications and will further perpetuate the initial advantages of the group in question. This was clear with the ethnically biased educational policy in Malaysia and Tanzania, or the land policy of Guyana, Ethiopia and Thailand.

Third, ethnic size is usually positively related to control over productive inputs on a given territory. This is especially true if ethnic groups dominate in specific territories and there is some measure of decentralization of power. Under those circumstances, the dominant group exercises control over raw materials, industrial sites, urban developments and other infrastructure.

Fourth, ethnic size is usually positively related to the allocation of economic favors. Favors doled out by ethnic group include jobs, positions in educational facilities, industrial location, etc. While this was a major issue in the former colonial countries (in which departing powers allocated economic rights and favors after independence by ethnic group), there is mounting evidence of such allocation of favors in the 1990s. This, however, does not necessarily involve an ethnic group: it may be religion (such as in Iraqi politics); race (such as in the Malay educational system), or horde (such as in the Kazakhstani bureaucracy).

In the relationship between size and economic power, economic

The Demographic Struggle for Power

equality is a crucial variable. A state may be characterized by economic equality or inequality between its ethnic groups and its regions. The former is more difficult to attain: indeed, it is rare to find countries in which all ethnic groups and all regions enjoy the same economic benefits, have the same resources, and have equal opportunities for future economic development. Instead, it is more common to find economic inequality between ethnic groups and between regions. Inequality implies ranking, as one group or region is by definition *relatively* more developed and/or more advantaged than another. These possibilities are shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Ethnic groups, regions and economic equality

	<i>Equality</i>	<i>Inequality</i>
Ethnic groups	dispersed	dispersed
Ethnic groups	concentrated	concentrated
Sub-state regions	homogeneous	homogeneous
Sub-state regions	heterogeneous	heterogeneous
Ethnic and regional boundaries coincide	dominant group concentrated; homogeneous or heterogeneous	dominant group concentrated; homogeneous or heterogeneous

Ethnic groups may be concentrated within a sub-state region or dispersed throughout the state. Even when dispersed, their members are bound by bonds that transcend regional demarcations. Thus, if there is *inequality among ethnic groups*, the group may press for legislation to protect or further their economic advantage irrespective of their concentration or dispersal. Moreover, group members help each other because of kinship ties that bind members of ethnic groups in an intricate system of intra-ethnic economic assistance (for example, in securing jobs, in providing housing for migrating family members and in aiding in schooling members to help them get ahead). Members of the advantaged group have their economic privileges to defend and members of the underprivileged group have tangible economic goals to strive for. As a result, both the privileged and underprivileged ethnic groups may perceive a sense of threat, which is an integral component of the economic basis for separatist nationalism.²¹

Sub-state regions may be homogeneous (in which the population is

The Demographic Struggle for Power

mostly of a single ethnic group) or heterogeneous (in which no single group is dominant in size). States contain varying numbers of such regions and are characterized by inter-regional economic inequality or equality. *Inequality among regions* is manifested in differing rates of economic growth and development. Such territorial variations may be the result of uneven distribution of resources resulting in a condition known in the literature by different names: uneven development, discontinuous development, relative deprivation, and differential modernization,²² or deliberate discrimination on the part of the leadership to foster political or economic advantaged regions: internal colonialism.²³

Industrialization and economic development leads to an accentuation of the differences among regions which will further result in an unequal distribution of both power and resources that ultimately become institutionalized and difficult to overturn. To the extent that no single ethnic group is associated with the region (i.e. regional heterogeneity), relative advantage or disadvantage cannot provide any ethnic group with a source of grievance. Examples of regions that are not politically defined by their population's ethnicity yet have grievances against their union include Lombardy (Italy) and Istria (Croatia).

When an ethnic group is concentrated in a region, and it is the dominant ethnic group in that region, then *ethnic and regional boundaries coincide*. The region may be either homogeneous or heterogeneous, depending on the presence of other ethnic groups. Also, the region may be recognized as an ethnic territory if the central authorities designate the ethnic group as the dominant (often titular) group on a territory that has administrative boundaries. When ethnic and regional boundaries coincide, the relative advantage or disadvantage of a group and its region is reinforced. In other words, if the region is poor, the ethnic group tends to be poor, and vice versa. Moreover, if the region and the dominant ethnic population are underprivileged, the seeds of discontent are sown and nationalist tendencies have a fertile ground in which to propagate. When region and ethnicity coincide, the nationalist sentiment easily becomes separatist in nature. This separatist sentiment is not limited to the underprivileged regions, but occurs under conditions of relative advantage as well as disadvantage. Indeed, separatist movements have developed in regions of relative economic deprivation (e.g. Kosovo) and relative economic prosperity (e.g. Catalonia and Slovenia). In both of these categories, ethnic

The Demographic Struggle for Power

leaders cite exploitation as the economic basis for their separatist aspirations.

(iii) The coincidence of economic and political power

Political and economic powers usually coincide such that an ethnic group that has one tends to also have the other. However, there are times when the two forms of power do not coincide, resulting in a paradox that is the source of much inter-ethnic conflict. A recent study by Gurr indicated that some groups enjoy political power, others enjoy economic power, and while the two often go hand in hand, they do not always coincide. He found that, out of 214 peoples studied, 17 have economic power with little political power (such as the Kikuyu, the Ashanti, the Turks in Germany, Palestinians in Jordan, etc.), while very few have more political power than economic power (including native peoples in Canada, Northern Ireland Catholics in the United Kingdom).²⁴

The most common form of this divergence of powers occurs when a minority ethnic group has economic power but lacks political power: this occurs in societies where minorities are the money-lenders (such as the Jews and Lombards in medieval Europe; the Armenians in the Middle East; the Chinese throughout South-East Asia), the merchants (various communities in South India), or the government bureaucrats (such as Serbs in Croatia in the former Yugoslavia). This phenomenon, described by Zenner as the 'paradox of the middleman-minority position' occurs when 'economic success is combined with political impotency'.²⁵ When ethnoprofessionalism is present (according to which certain ethnic groups are associated with certain professions) then the economic power of ethnic groups is determined by the status and income accrued to that profession. For example, in Malaysia, Malays are found in farming or civil service, the Chinese in business and the Indians in rubber-tapping and liberal professions.²⁶ Similarly, in the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs were predominant in the armed forces and in the government bureaucracy;²⁷ in Israel, the Sefardim account for the vast majority of unskilled labor;²⁸ and in Kenya, the Kikuyu dominate in the government bureaucracy.²⁹ The evidence of such widespread ethnoprofessionalism led Horowitz to claim that capital and labor in some multiethnic societies are organized along ethnic lines,³⁰ and

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Furnivall to say, ‘even in the economic sphere, there is a division of labour along racial lines’.³¹ Bonacich focused on the consequences of economic differentiation by ethnic group: she claims that these ethnoprofessional, ‘trading minorities,’ can become so powerful, economically and organizationally, that the host country is pushed to ever more extreme reactions in order to break their monopoly on some economic activity.³²

(iv) Exceptions to SEPP positive link

There is no doubt that in some societies, ethnic (religious/racial) groups simply do not have the power that their size might warrant. History is replete with situations in which numbers did not have concomitant relevance, such as those in which power was concentrated in the hands of a few by divine right or inheritance. These ruling elites usually had at their disposal power-enforcing abilities (weapons, education, economic skills, etc.). Lower level power concentrations were sometimes tolerated: across the Ottoman empire, the millet system allowed religious communities some power, as did the ‘estates’ system of medieval Europe.

While the exceptions to the positive link between ethnic size and power cover a wide range of conditions, geographical areas, and political traditions, the following categories clearly emerge. (1) When there is no universal suffrage, so that size cannot be expressed into power through the political process, then the SEPP link does not exist. While this is discussed below, suffice it to say here that in such an instance, power of an ethnic group is based on entirely non-size factors. A poignant example is South Africa, where blacks who accounted for some 90 percent of the population yet did not partake meaningfully in the political process until the elections of 1994. (2) When political structure is so defined that the majority population is prevented from exerting power proportional to its size, then the SEPP link does not exist. In these situations, while there exists universal suffrage, the political system prevents majority rule. Another acute example is the former Yugoslavia, a federation of six republics in which representation from the republics in the bicameral federal chambers did not reflect size of the population.³³ (3) When colonial powers favored one ethnic group, groomed it for powerful positions, and following

The Demographic Struggle for Power

independence those colonial power structures remained in place, then the SEPP link does not exist. An example of this is Lebanon, where at the time of independence, most positions of power were in the hands of the Lebanese Maronite Christians, who accounted for slightly less than 50% of the population.³⁴ After independence, the political structure introduced by the French was retained. Similar experiences were shared by the Kikuyu in Kenya, the Yoruba in Nigeria, the Baganda in Uganda, etc. Horowitz claimed that the reasons for the ethnic distribution of colonial opportunity had much to do with good location, push migration, facilities for education.³⁵ (4) When the majority/minority distinction at the state level does not coincide at the regional level, then the SEPP link does not exist. Sometimes a people that are a majority in a region are in fact a minority in the entire state. In that case, while they are a majority *in the region*, they do not have the commensurate power *in that region*. Examples include blacks and Mexican Americans in some communities across the US, as well as American Indians on their reservations. (5) When a group of people has no state in which they are the titular or dominant nationality, and are in diaspora wherever they reside, then the SEPP does not exist. Under such circumstances, it is likely that despite their total numbers, they do not partake (as a group) in the economic and political life of their host states. The principal examples of this were the Jews prior to the creation of Israel and presently the Romas (Gypsies) of Eastern Europe who, while increasing in size, are experiencing a decrease in power and rights.³⁶

Does the existence of the above conditions invalidate discussion pertaining to the ramifications of a positive link between size and power? There are two reasons why it does not. First, the conditions that are listed do not prevail in most regions of the world and as such do not affect the majority of global ethnic groups. Therefore, the link remains important by sheer magnitude of the ethnic groups and territories that do not exhibit the above conditions. Second, irrespective of evidence of exceptions to the positive link, it is the *perception* among peoples that size is important that guides human behavior. This perception is clear in statements of ethnic and religious leaders as well as followers, as described in numerous quotes throughout chapters 3–6. As long as members of ethnic groups believe that size is relevant, they will attempt to engage in demographic engineering and augment that size, giving scope and meaning to an analysis of their policies.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

SEPP AND ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY

Ethnic heterogeneity is a precondition for the demographic struggle for power: clearly, in the case of a nation-state in which there is ethnic homogeneity, the inter-ethnic struggle for power does not exist since there are no ethnic groups to compete with.³⁷ Ethnic heterogeneity implies that there is more than one ethnic group of significant size (significant enough to exert power in the political or economic arena), that there is sufficient distinctiveness among ethnic groups so that they are identified as distinct (either officially or by group leaders), and that they are motivated to promote their power as an ethnic group. Alternatively, there are numerous countries in the world in which ethnic groups are associations that focus on culture and language, but fail to mobilize their power as an ethnic group in the political sphere.

Thus, when there is only one ethnic group, the link between size and power is irrelevant since there is no scope for inter-ethnic competition. However, when at least one additional group enters the political theater, then inter-ethnic competition for political and economic benefits may arise. Since ethnic heterogeneity is not a binary variable but rather its values lie along a spectrum, the closer the numerical equality between ethnic groups, the greater the competition and therefore the more important size becomes.

The above discussion pertains to ethnic heterogeneity at the state level. However, the sub-state level is also relevant in the SEPP link, as is the difference between the ethnic composition of the population at the state and the sub-state levels. An explanation of this relevance necessitates a distinction between spatially concentrated and dispersed ethnic groups. Three possibilities exist: first, an ethnic group may be spatially concentrated but that concentration is not officially recognized by the authorities.³⁸ Under these circumstances, ethnic groups may strive to achieve official acknowledgment of their demographic or historical rights to a given territory. Second, central authorities may acknowledge the link between an ethnic group and a sub-state region by officially designating sub-state boundaries that coincide with the ethnic group boundaries. Under these conditions, ethnic populations may perceive that numerical advantage could easily lead to success of the ‘we want out’ demand. Third, the ethnic group may be dispersed

The Demographic Struggle for Power

and there may be no link between ethnicity and territory. When ethnicity and territory are unrelated, regional demands made to the center do not have an ethnic dimension but are instead based on non-ethnic political or economic interests.³⁹

SEPP AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In a society characterized by universal suffrage, the relationship between ethnic size and power is in part determined by the nature of the political system as defined by the relationship between the center and sub-state regions. This relationship may be formally described as confederal, federal and unitary. A confederation is a loose joining of sovereign states that includes elements of economic, political and military association. It is defined as 'a voluntary association of independent states that, to secure some common purpose, agree to certain limitations on their freedom of action and establish some joint machinery of consultation or deliberation'.⁴⁰ A federation is defined as a state in which executive and legislative powers are shared between central and sub-central governments.⁴¹ Finally, a unitary state is one in which only the center has executive and legislative powers. The way in which ethnic power is apportioned in each of these three systems depends in part upon whether the ethnic group is concentrated or dispersed and whether administrative regional boundaries coincide with ethnic boundaries. In confederations or federations, when the administrative unit is also an ethnic territory (such as in former, post-World War II Yugoslavia or India), the power of the ethnic group is most concentrated and its voice most audible. When administrative divisions in confederations or federations do not coincide with administrative boundaries (such as post-civil war Nigeria and Zaire, or inter-war Yugoslavia), then it is more difficult to voice ethnic demands through the political system. In the case of unitary states, in which administrative regions have little power, ethnic demands are voiced with even greater difficulty than in federations (such as in Romania or Albania). This difficulty is sometimes offset by the granting of a 'special status' to selected regions, according to which a region enjoys greater autonomy and decentralization in decision-making than other sub-state regions.

Thus, the positive link between the size of a group and political and

The Demographic Struggle for Power

economic power is most clearly visible in ethnically heterogeneous countries in which regional demands are articulated along ethnic lines. The weaker the territorial concentration of the ethnic group within an administrative boundary, the harder it is to identify the link between size and power (this is elaborated upon in chapter 9).

SEPP AND THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Does the level of economic development⁴² affect the link between ethnic size and power? It would seem logical that the inter-ethnic struggle for power, which includes inter-ethnic economic competition, would be more intense when there is less to go around (namely, when the level of economic development is lower) and would intensify in the aftermath of an acute deterioration of economic conditions (namely, when there is a decrease in economic growth).

A body of literature in the 1960s claimed that economic development results in a decrease in ethnic and racial conflict. In the words of Esman, ‘it has become an article of conventional wisdom that economic growth mitigates ethnic conflict. Simply put, when there is more to go around, everybody benefits, thus relieving material grievances and reducing incentives for conflict.’⁴³ Indeed, inter-ethnic conflict was perceived as traditional and expected to pass in the course of modernization. Four groups of theories support this view.⁴⁴ In the first, the prosperity associated with the post-World War II period enables more equitable distribution of resources; in the second, class identity takes precedence over ethnic bonds; in the third, ethnic conflict declines due to the intervention of the state on behalf of minorities; and in the fourth, mass education and communications would decrease the minority-majority issue. However, evidence from the 1960s to the present indicates that ethnic conflict in the industrialized countries in fact did not diminish. Deutsch was the first to say that ‘social mobilization’ (related to overall change) produced ethnic conflict.⁴⁵ Brass claimed that ethnic competition in the modern sector accentuates inter-ethnic conflict.⁴⁶ Lijphart identified economic reasons why conflicts persist, despite economic growth.⁴⁷ Richmond claimed that inter-ethnic cleavages are too deeply rooted in the political institutions and socioeconomic structures to be eliminated with economic growth,⁴⁸ and Messina et al. offered a reconciliation of the two models.⁴⁹

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Economic growth and development does not affect all ethnic groups equally. It is during times of comprehensive change, such as that associated with intense economic growth, that political and social competition among ethnic groups for advantages of their members is most acute, accentuating the SEPP link. The reason why modernization causes such inter-ethnic competition is because it upsets the balance of employment, distribution of resources, education opportunities, and economic advantages as a result of development, migration, expansion, mobility. Hechter said that ‘The uneven wave of industrialization over territorial space creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups, and therefore acute cleavages of interest arise between these groups. As a consequence, ... there is a crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups.’⁵⁰ A chief proponent of this view of inter-ethnic competition during modernization is Paul Brass: ‘Ethnicity and nationalism are ... political constructions. They are creations of elites who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or *to gain political and economic advantage for their groups* as well as for themselves [italics mine].’⁵¹ Kellas also claims: ‘Nationalism seeks to defend and promote the interests of the nation’,⁵² adding that nationalist sentiment and aspiration often comes from a sudden change in economic and political division of labor among ethnic groups (as caused by the onset of economic development).⁵³ Also, Gellner argues that rapid change, such as that caused by economic development which, among other, causes or forces people to move to cities, alters traditional roles that people had and forces people to place themselves in new social relationships.⁵⁴ The most logical place to begin to look for such relationships is to identify oneself as a member of a larger something, based upon those attributes that one carries around with oneself, namely ones language, historical place, race, religion. These then are the basis of a new identity. Modernization implies the search for this new identity, and thus the importance of nationalism.

The link between economic growth, inter-ethnic competition and the struggle for numerical supremacy has been aptly pointed out by Wright: ‘One of the causes of conflict between ethnic groups ... is that modernization may make their relative numbers politically significant more quickly than it can erase ethnic differences’.⁵⁵

The Demographic Struggle for Power

POLICIES OF DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING

According to Barth, 'In order to enhance their power in an ethnic system, competing groups use any biological, linguistic and socio-cultural characteristics they possess to delineate their groups' boundaries and give them cohesion against their neighbors. This is especially true of the dominant ethnic groups who have more to defend.'⁵⁶ Wright pointed out, 'if an ethnically distinct ruling elite lacks a majority in the total population, it is likely to become conscious of this defect and begin playing the numbers game to forestall its own displacement'.⁵⁷

Given this perceived need to defend ones ethnic group and to alter the relative size of that group on a given territory, what are the methods by which the numerical balance is maintained or tilted? Baaklini discussed the following in the context of Lebanon: converting others, eliminating others, holding key positions in non-elected jobs, or 'structuring the political game and electoral process in such a way that their preeminence might last irrespective of their size'.⁵⁸ Wright discussed ways of changing the numerical ratio in India in the following ways: religious conversion, differential fertility rates in response to family planning, immigration and emigration, manipulation of the census, language differentiation or aggregation, political boundary changes, changes in the definition and procedures for obtaining citizenship or other changes in a group's legal status, exogamy where the partner from outside the community can be brought in, exchange of populations with other countries or expulsion, and genocide.

Much of the literature on demographic engineering deals with either the developing world or a specific historical period. There are none, to my knowledge, that address cases of contemporary demographic engineering, including those in the post-communist world. In this book, six methods have been chosen for study that seem to be the most relevant in the 1990s. They are broad in scope insofar as they incorporate all the methods discussed by Baaklini and Wright and include others.

1. Population measurement: statistical recordings that count births, deaths and migrations by ethnicity have become very important because they determine the relative size of ethnic groups. The least intrusive method of altering relative numbers is to change how populations are defined and measured. The census, universally the principal measure of population size, lends itself to this kind of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

manipulation principally by alterations in definitions which *de jure* result in a change in the ethnic population size, even if they may not *de facto* change that size.

2. Pronatalist policies: a relatively non-intrusive method of altering demographic characteristics is the encouragement of procreation of a particular ethnic, linguistic or religious group. Such a pronatalist population policy aims to increase the size of one population relative to others. This effort may include the simple urging of peoples to procreate, or may entail direct monetary compensation for births, financial stimuli for children of all ages, or the outright prohibition of birth control.
3. Assimilation: waiting for pronatalist policies to alter fertility rates and to translate into increased population requires patience that many leaders cannot afford in a climate of competing nationalisms. Since time is of the essence, other measures have been found to be more efficient: assimilation is sought by ethnic leaders with the goal of increasing their numbers. Assimilation implies the elimination of differences between groups, as the smaller (or weaker) groups are expected to conform to the larger, dominant or titular group, and takes place in the spheres of religion and language most easily.
4. Population transfers: ethnic leaders may also encourage or sponsor mass population transfers in order to alter the relative balance among ethnic groups. Population transfers are of several kinds: first, members of an ethnic group may be relocated into an area in order to dilute the pre-existing population (this type of resettlement targets individuals by ethnicity (or religion or language) with the goal of diminishing the strength that the group derives in numbers); second, they may be resettled in an area to consolidate the presence of a desired group; and third, they may be forced out of a region to 'clean' it of undesirables (ethnic cleansing).
5. Boundary changes: ethnic leaders may alter the composition of their population by achieving boundary alterations that are secessionist or irredentist in origin. Irrespective of whether the boundary adjustment has been made through war or negotiation, the demographic result is the same. With the act of secession, a minority turns

The Demographic Struggle for Power

into a majority and thus achieves numerical dominance as well as sovereignty. Similarly, an irredentist region, by separating from one union and joining another, can increase the relative size of its dominant ethnic group.

6. Economic pressures: ethnic leaders have at their disposal a variety of economic pressures or incentives to use in order to alter the relative size of ethnic groups. These pressures include selective tax policy, discrimination in hiring, employment restrictions, migration laws, laws pertaining to land ownership and property rights, etc. While these pressures may force people to relocate or induce a decrease in fertility, they also may simply be tools of harassment in order to induce assimilation.

These are the broad categories of demographic engineering policies studied in the following chapters.⁵⁹ All are based on the assumption of the shifting and transitory nature of ethnic affiliation, as described in chapter 1 (indeed, the fact that conversions do occur and that people do change their ethnic identification indicates ethnic affiliation is a dynamic concept and to some degree, the result of choice following the outcome of a personal cost-benefit analysis). Moreover, all are ethnic policies based on the rejection of the concept of pluralist accommodation within multinational states.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES WITH DEMOGRAPHIC STRUGGLES FOR POWER (DSP)

The selection of regions and populations for inclusion in this study was difficult given the large number of ethnic groups across the globe (estimates of total numbers of ethnic groups include 3,000–5,000, 575, and 170⁶⁰). The final choice of states was the outcome of an effort to include regions of varying levels of economic development, levels of multiethnicity, and a variety of political systems. Moreover, the availability of reliable statistics played a role in state selection. Finally, a requirement for inclusion is the documented occurrence of at least one form of demographic engineering. There is ample diversity among the selected countries with respect to policies of demographic engineering that are known to have been adopted. These policies do not affect the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

same proportions of populations across the regions, and the magnitude of their impact on the regions is not equal. Ultimately, some 30 countries (and 35 regions) were chosen for this study. The regions are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below, while each region is described in Appendix I with respect to its inter-ethnic struggle. While these regions by no means constitute an exhaustive list of demographic struggles across the globe, they do fulfill all the criteria listed above.

Table 2.2 includes estimates of the three structural variables (ethnic heterogeneity, political characteristics and economic development) in the 30 countries, listed by geographical location. Only the political characteristics are binary, while the remaining variables are continuous, as all countries have some ethnic heterogeneity and some economic development.

Ethnic heterogeneity in column one (Table 2.2) describes the proportion of the population belonging to the majority group, as well as the proportion of the targeted non-titular ethnic group, to the extent that such statistics exist. The Ethnic Dominance Index (EDI), plotted in Figure 2.1, refers to the proportion of the population that belongs to the dominant ethnic (or religious or racial) group.⁶¹ Most of the values in Table 2.2 pertain to the state, but in seven cases (for example, Chechnya, East Timor, and Assam), the values pertain to the ethnic composition of the region in which the demographic struggle takes place. The reason for this inconsistency is that the regional population distribution is so vastly different from that of the state, and the dominant regional ethnic group is so minor at the state level, that its regional dominance would be completely obliterated by state-level statistics.

Political characteristics are presented in the second column (Table 2.2). These refer to the system in effect *at the time* of the demographic struggle for power (described in the appendix for each region). Thus, to the extent that political characteristics changed after the struggle for power (as in Nigeria), the changes are not included in the table. The political system is described as either federal or unitary (F, U). This designation is followed by a notation pertaining to the basis of sub-state administrative boundaries: are they recognized by the authorities to coincide with ethnicity or not (E or NE, respectively). Moreover, if the region in question has a special status within the political union that connotes a level of decentralization in economic and political decision making that differs from other regions, it is designated by (SS).

The Demographic Struggle for Power

The third column (Table 2.2) contains an indicator of the level of economic development. GDP per capita was adopted in this study: while it is an imperfect measure, it is adequate for the level of detail required here. The values of GDP per capita pertain to the state level. However, in some countries under study, the demographic struggle for power is limited to a single region and therefore it is also useful to include information pertaining to regional income. If regional income differs from that of the state, the relative economic status of the region is included in parentheses and is designated as H (higher) or L (lower). If regional income does not differ from the state-level or if a regional demarcation is not relevant in the demographic struggle for power (such as in Rwanda), then the designation is A (average).⁶²

Table 2.2. Ethnic heterogeneity, political characteristics and economic development in selected regions

<i>Country (region)</i>	<i>Ethnic/racial/religious composition (%) State(S) or Region (R)</i>	<i>Political characteristics during DSP (F or U; E or NE; SS)</i>	<i>Economic development GNP/P, 1992, US \$ (region: H, L, A)</i>
AFRICA			
Sudan	(S) Sudanese Arab 49, Southern 30 (of which Dinka 11)	U; NE	420 (L)
Nigeria	(S) Hausa/Fulani 49, Ibo 24, Yoruba 20	F; E	320 (H)
Rwanda	(S) Hutu 85, Tutsi 15	U; NE	250 (A)
Uganda	(S) Ganda 19, Teso 9	F (U since 1967); E	170 (A)
South Africa	(S) Black 70, White 16, Colored 10	U; SS; E	2,670 (L)
MIDDLE EAST			
Lebanon	(S) Muslim 60; Maronite Christian 40	U; NE	690 (A)
Israel	(S) Jewish 82	U; NE	13,220 (A)
Turkey	(S) Turkish 85, Kurdish 11	U; NE	1,980 (L)
Iraq	(S) Arab 77, Kurd 19	U; SS; E	710 (1991) (L)
ASIA			
India (Punjab)	(R) Sikhs 60, Hindu 40	F; E	310 (H)
India (Assam)	(R) Assamese 50	F; E	310 (L)
Sri Lanka	(S) Sinhalese 74, Tamil 18	U; SS; NE	540 (L)
Indonesia (East Timor)	(R) Timorese 80 (on Timor)	U; SS; E	670 (L)
Pap. New Guinea	(S) P.N.G.-ians 84	U; SS; E	950 (H)
China (Tibet)	(R) Tibetan 75 (China: Han 92)	U; SS; NE	470 (L)

The Demographic Struggle for Power

<i>Country (region)</i>	<i>Ethnic/racial/religious composition (%) State(S) or Region (R)</i>	<i>Political characteristics during DSP (F or U; E or NE; SS)</i>	<i>Economic development GNP/P, 1992, US \$ (region: H, L, A)</i>
Malaysia	(S) Malay 62, Chinese 30	F; NE	2,470 (A)
Myanmar	(S) Burman 69, Karen 6	U; E	400 (L)
Australia	(S) White 95, Aborigine 1.5	F; NE	17,260 (L)
THE AMERICAS			
Guatemala	(S) Amerindian 45; Ladino 45; White 5	U; NE	1,110 (L)
FORMER USSR			
Moldova	(S) Moldovan 65, Ukrainian 14, Russian 14	U; NE	1,300 (A)
Ukraine	(S) Ukrainian 72, Russian 22	U; NE	1,820 (A)
Tajikistan	(S) Tajik 62, Uzbek 23, Russian 8	U; NE	490 (A)
Russia (Chechnya)	(R) Chechen 80; Russian 20	F; E	2,680 (L)
Latvia	(S) Latvian 54, Russian 33	U; NE	1,930 (A)
EAST EUROPE			
Romania	(S) Romanian 78, Hungarian 11	U; NE	1,130 (A)
Albania	(S) Albanian 98, Greek 2	U; NE	1,300 (A)
Macedonia	(S) Macedonian 66, Albanian 23	U; NE	780 (1993) (A)
Yugos (Kosovo)	(R) Albanian 86, Serb 14	F; SS; E	3,093 (1990)† (L)
Croatia	(S) Croat 75, Serb 12	F; E	4,399 (L)
Bosnia	(S) Muslim 44, Serb 34, Croat 17	F; E	2,454† (1990) (A)
Bulgaria	(S) Bulgarian 85, Turkish 9	U; NE	1,330 (A)
Cyprus	(S) Greek 80; Turkish 20	U; E	9,820* (H)
WEST EUROPE			
Germany	(S) German 93	U; NE	23,030 (A)
Italy	(S) Italian 94	U; SS; NE	20,460 (A)
Spain	(S) Spanish 72, Catalan 16	U; E	13,970 (H)
N. Ireland	(R) Protestant 66, Catholic 33	U; NE	14,610 (L)

Source: Various Tables in The World Bank, World Development Report Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 and Encyclopedia Britannica World Data Annual, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1993.

* refers to Greek Cyprus.

† refers to pre-breakup statistics. The income per capita has decreased significantly as a result of the war and international sanctions.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Demographic engineering policies described in Table 2.3 include the following: population census, natalist policies, assimilation, population transfers, boundary alterations, and economic pressures. For most of these, the table indicates merely a yes or no (Y, N) to designate existence, with the exception of the census, in which an affirmative value indicates some form of census manipulation (possibilities are discussed in chapter 3). Some categories lend themselves to additional information: with respect to assimilation, there may have been language laws (LL), religious conversions (RC) or citizenship restrictions (CR); boundary alterations may have occurred (or are being attempted) through war (W), violence (V),⁶³ negotiation (Nego), secession (S) or any combination (if there are none, then the designation is N); economic pressures may include employment restrictions (ER), taxation (T) and land rights (L). A Demographic Engineering Index (DEI) is developed to enable the assessment of demographic policies in the 35 regions. The DEI was compiled by a consideration of the twelve characteristics in six categories (listed above), each of which was scored zero or one.⁶⁴ The index is then computed as the average of these twelve Boolean variables.

Table 2.3. Policies of demographic engineering in selected regions

<i>Country/ region</i>	<i>Census</i>	<i>Natalist policies</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>Pop. transfers</i>	<i>Border adjust.</i>	<i>Econ. pressures</i>	<i>DEI</i>
AFRICA							
Sudan	N	—	RC	Y	W(S)	ER, L	0.64
Nigeria	Y	anti	LL	Y	W(S)	ER	0.55
Rwanda	N	—	—	Y	N	—	0.09
Uganda	N	—	LL, CR	Y	N	ER, L, T	0.55
South Africa	N	—	—	Y	Nego	ER, L	0.36
MIDDLE EAST							
Lebanon	Y	—	CR	Y	Nego	ER	0.36
Israel	N	pro	LL, CR	Y	W	ER, T, L	0.91
Turkey	Y	anti	LL	Y	V	L	0.27
Iraq	N	—	—	Y	W(S)	ER, L	0.45
ASIA							
India-Punjab	N	anti	—	Y	V(S)	—	0.27
India-Assam	N	anti	—	Y	V(S)	L	0.36
Sri Lanka	N	anti	LL, RC	N	W(S)	L	0.55
Indonesia	N	anti	—	Y	V(S)	ER, L	0.45
Pap. New Guinea	N	—	—	Y	V(S)	L, T	0.45
China	Y	anti	LL, RC	Y	V	ER, L	0.64
Malaysia	Y	anti	LL	Y	N	ER, T, L	0.45

The Demographic Struggle for Power

<i>Country/ region</i>	<i>Census</i>	<i>Natalist policies</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>Pop. transfers</i>	<i>Border adjust.</i>	<i>Econ. pressures</i>	<i>DEI</i>
Myanmar	N	-	LL, RC	Y	W(S)	L	0.55
Australia	N	-	-	Y	V	L	0.36
THE AMERICAS							
Guatemala	N	-	LL, RC	Y	V	L	0.55
FORMER USSR							
Moldova	N	-	LL, CR	N	Nego	ER	0.36
Ukraine	N	-	CR	N	Nego	-	0.18
Tajikistan	N	-	-	Y	Nego	-	0.09
Russia	N	-	CR	Y	W	-	0.50
Latvia	N	-	LL, CR	Y	Nego	ER, L	0.55
EAST EUROPE							
Romania	N	pro	LL	Y	N	ER, L	0.45
Albania	N	pro	LL	Y	N	L	0.36
Macedonia	Y	-	LL, CR	N	N	-	0.18
Yugos-Kosovo	Y	pro	LL, CR	Y	V(S)	ER, L	0.73
Croatia	N	pro	LL, RC	Y	W(S)	ER, T, L	0.91
Bosnia	Y	pro	LL, RC	Y	W(S)	ER	0.73
Bulgaria	Y	-	LL	Y	N	-	0.18
Cyprus	N	-	-	Y	W(S)	L	0.45
WEST EUROPE							
Germany	N	pro	LL,RC,CR	Y	W	ER, T, L	1.00
Italy	N	-	-	N	N	ER	0.09
Spain	N	-	-	N	N	-	0.00
N. Ireland	N	-	-	N	V(S)	-	0.18


- question does not apply or information is unavailable

An effort was made to understand whether there was a relationship between the three structural variables and the DEI. While such an analysis may be of limited usefulness since it covers only 35 regions in 30 countries, it nevertheless does shed light on the circumstances under which policies of demographic engineering seem to prevail. With respect to ethnic heterogeneity, Figure 2.1 indicates a very weak inverse relationship between the Ethnic Dominance Index and the Demographic Engineering Index. In other words, states in which one ethnic group dominates are less likely to implement a multitude of demographic engineering policies. This is logical, since the dominant group already enjoys dominance. Those states that have two ethnic

The Demographic Struggle for Power

groups of similar sizes tend to have a greater number of demographic policies.


Figure 2.1. Ethnic dominance and demographic engineering



Political characteristics in selected states are plotted against the Demographic Engineering Index in order to understand the prevalence of demographic policies by political characteristics (Figure 2.2). Regions that are federations and are characterized by a coincidence of ethnic and administrative boundaries are concentrated at higher levels of DEI. In other words, those regions tend to have a greater prevalence of demographic policies. Indeed, there are no low scores of the DEI in federal systems, nor in states with ethnic sub-state boundaries. The evidence with respect to the special status of sub-state regions is less clear, indicating that special status regions can have both a large and small prevalence of demographic policies.


The Demographic Struggle for Power

Figure 2.2. Political characteristics and demographic engineering



With respect to economic development, Figure 2.3 indicates that there is no relationship between the level of economic development and policies of demographic engineering. In other words, both high and low income states engage in demographic engineering.

Figure 2.3. Economic development and demographic engineering



The Demographic Struggle for Power

In conclusion, the data from 35 regions undergoing the demographic struggle for power seem to indicate that while demographic engineering policies tend to occur in states at all levels of economic development, there seems to be a weak inverse relationship between the ethnic dominance of one group and demographic engineering. With respect to political characteristics, the existence of a special status for sub-state regions did not seem to correlate with demographic engineering, but federations and ethnic sub-state administrative regions did seem to experience greater demographic engineering. While the subsequent six chapters focus on the policies associated with the demographic struggle for power, the concluding chapter contains a further discussion of these variables.

NOTES

- 1 C. Alison McIntosh, *Population Policy in Western Europe*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1983, p. 28.
- 2 Wright in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983; W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, 'Demographic Change and Politics', in W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, *Population, Politics and the Future of Southern Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973; William Alonso and Paul Starr, eds., *The Politics of Numbers*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1987.
- 3 Irving Lewis Allen, 'Variable White Ethnic Resistance to School Desegregation: Italian-American Parents in Three Connecticut Cities, 1966', in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 14.
- 4 Ibid., p. 15
- 5 This relationship between size and power is duplicated on the global scale: size connotes power on a regional scale (note the position of India in South Asia; Nigeria in Africa) as well as on a global scale (note China's position in the world). This size defines relative status and determines government policy, as the recent rebuff of the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher by the Chinese leaders in March 1994 has shown the power of size. Within the Balkans, the question of who is the largest people has constantly been a struggle between the Greeks, the Serbs and the Romanians. The unification of Germany has produced trepidation in both Eastern and Western Europe because once again, the increased size of the German population is, at least psychologically, associated with power. Conversely, the breakup of the Soviet Union has been hailed in the West as the defeat of a superpower in part because the population of this giant has been reduced from over 250 to 149 million.
- 6 See Joseph Rudolph Jr. and Robert Thompson, eds., *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the Western World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, p. 47.
- 7 The wording of the constitution actually did not call the peoples nationalities but ethnic groups (*volksstamme*), which had the right to preserve their

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- nationalitat). E. K. Francis, *Inter-ethnic Relations*, New York: Elsevier, 1976, p. 97.
- 8 The distinction between 'we want in' and 'we want out' was drawn by Peter Leslie, 'Ethnonationalism in a Federal State: The Case of Canada' in Joseph Rudolph Jr. and Robert Thompson, *Ethnoterritorial Politics*, p. 47.
 - 9 Such lines are not entirely rigid, as clear from the success of demographic policies that attempt to convert and assimilate populations. See chapters 3–9.
 - 10 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, p. 302.
 - 11 Ibid., pp. 83–4.
 - 12 Stephen O. Olugbemi, 'The Ethnic Numbers Game in Inter-elite Competition for Political Hegemony in Nigeria' in McCready, op. cit., p. 266.
 - 13 Baaklini describes that Lebanon after independence had both one man-one vote, and the 'list system' which relied on a system of local alliances and compromises that ensured that ethnic (sectarian) politics was not possible in mixed districts. Baaklini, op. cit., in McCready, p. 26–9.
 - 14 Olugbemi describes the use of political intimidation to increase electoral support among the ruling ethnic group. Olugbemi, *Culture*, p. 274.
 - 15 If there is no scarcity, then there is no problem. While there is scarcity in all goods in society, there must be limited access and attainability. Hoetink describes this condition as one that competition comes from scarcity that is both objective and subjective; it is not only are all economic goods scarce (in the objective sense) but members of society must perceive them as such (subjective). Harmannus Hoetnik, 'Resource Competition, Monopoly, and Socioracial Diversity', in Leo Despres, ed., *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies*, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975, p. 10.
 - 16 Pierre L. Van Den Berghe, 'Ethnicity and class in highland Peru', in Despres, *Ethnicity and Resource*, p. 72.
 - 17 Hoetink, in Despres, *Ethnicity and Resource*, p. 9.
 - 18 Elliot Skinner, 'Competition within ethnic systems in Africa', in Despres, *Ethnicity and Resource*, p. 142.
 - 19 These rewards, and the lack thereof, are the subject of a study by Susan F. Feiner, *Race and Gender in the American Economy*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
 - 20 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, pp. 8–12.
 - 21 See the discussion on the economic basis of secessionist aspirations in Milica Z. Bookman, *The Economics of Secession*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
 - 22 Uneven economic development is associated with Tom Nairn (*The Break-up of Britain*, London: New Left Books, 1977); discontinuous development with Milica Z. Bookman (*The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development*, New York: Praeger, 1991); relative deprivation with William Beer (*The Unexpected Rebellion: Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France*, New York: New York University Press, 1980); and differential modernization with Peter Alexis Gourevitch, 'The emergence of peripheral nationalisms: some comparative speculations on the spatial distribution of political leadership and economic growth', *The Comparative Study of Society and History*, 21, July 1979).
 - 23 Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
 - 24 Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 56.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 25 According to Zenner, it is especially prevalent when the minority is in a middleman position: in the middle between the ruling elite and the masses and between the producers and the consumers. See Walter P. Zenner, *Minorities in the Middle*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. xi.
- 26 A consensus was developed after independence because the political and economic powers were allowed to develop and sustain themselves separately: Basham claims that Malays were dominant in employment and development schemes, their language and religion (Islam) dominated, but the Indians and Chinese were allowed to flourish in economic and professional activities. However, each side viewed the other as controlling too much politics or economics, leading to the ethnic riots of 1969. See Richard Basham 'National racial policies and university education in Malaysia' in William McCready, *Culture*, p. 58.
- 27 However, they were present in large quantities and at lower levels, while the quality, elite and powerful positions were not in their hands.
- 28 Goldberg and Harel have found that they are underrepresented in higher status positions: while they are 47% of the population, they account for only 16% of first degree students, 15% of members of Parliament, 6% of industrial managers. They do, however, account for 77% of production workers. See Albert I. Goldberg and Gedaliahu H. Harel, 'Sensitivity to ethnic discrimination: The case of Israeli production foremen' in McCroarty, pp. 141-2.
- 29 In Kenya there was the 'kikuyuization' of the country's bureaucracy after independence, as members of the Kikuyu tribe took over what the British vacated.
- 30 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, pp. 8-12.
- 31 J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1948, p. 304.
- 32 She said, 'when all else fails, "final solutions" are enacted' (this form of inter-ethnic conflict resolution is discussed below). Edna Bonacich, 'A theory of middleman minorities', *American Sociological Review*, 38, October 1973, p. 592.
- 33 Kostunica says of the Yugoslav federal system that was introduced with the 1974 constitution: 'Such an equal representation of the constituent units in both chambers of a bicameral federal legislative assembly is not found in any other contemporary federation. As a result, the principal feature of the Yugoslav solution is that small federal units are highly over represented, while large units are correspondingly under represented.' (Vojislav Kostunica, 'The Constitution and the Federal States', in Dennison Rusinow, ed., *Yugoslavia, A Fractured Federalism*, Washington: The Wilson Center Press, 1988, p. 81.) This would be analogous to California having the same representation as Rhode Island.
- 34 This situation developed in part because the Lebanese Muslims were unwilling to cooperate with the colonizing French, and also because their levels of education and qualifications were lower than those of the Christians.
- 35 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, p. 155.
- 36 They are spread out over the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and have been the great losers by the demise of communism: they lost their subsidized education, housing and quotas in employment. In the absence of regulations in these areas, discrimination has come to the surface and prevented the Romas from participating in the economic and social life of the states as they did before. As a result, they are voting for the communist parties, such as in Slovakia

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- New York Times*, 17 November 1993).
- 37 It may, however, exist on an international level, although that is beyond the scope of this study.
- 38 In other words, the group has not been made the titular group nor a territory officially designated as its homeland.
- 39 Ethnicity is not associated with territory as a result of the following: government policy that dispersed (for example, the Vlahs of Eastern Europe) or resettled them (such as the American Indians concentrated on the reservations) or they were nomadic and lacked property rights (such as the Gypsies in Europe, or the Tareq in Algeria), or their territory ceased to exist (such as the Yugoslavs). Alternatively, minority peoples that simply migrated for economic reasons to new locations might find themselves without territory, such as the various diasporas of Asians in Africa and Chinese in Malaysia. Most economic immigrant workers across the globe find themselves in this position, as the former colonial subjects now residing in western Europe (the Magrebis in France, Indians and Pakistanis in England, Moluccans in the Netherlands), or the 'guest workers' from Turkey and Yugoslavia.
- 40 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 25, Chicago: 1992, p. 1005.
- 41 The number of definitions and variations of federations are many. According to Davis, there are forty-four types of definitions currently in use by scholars. The classical definitions, as exemplified by the U.S., Canadian, Australian, and Swiss governments, have been imported, with slight modifications, by India, Pakistan, and Nigeria, among others. Rufus Davis, *The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 204
- 42 Economic growth is merely the increase in income per capita. Economic development is a broader term that encompasses economic growth but includes a description of the before and after (according to Simon Kuznetz). Economic growth comes about as a result of the application of innovative technology that enables sustained, long term growth. The repercussions of this growth are a structural transformation of the economy that entails a decrease in the importance of agriculture and an increase in the importance of both industry and services. This relative importance is measured in terms of the sectoral distribution of income and the industrial classification of the labor force. There are then other factors that tend to accompany economic development but they do not necessarily do so, such as an increase in the standard of living, an increase in indicators of basic needs (such as health, education, nutrition, etc.), and a democratization of the political process: industrialized countries tend to have political systems that are based on the principle of the right of individuals to participate, so that implies the existence of elections, political parties, and constitutions that guarantee some human rights.
- 43 Milton J. Esman, 'Economic performance and ethnic conflict' in Joseph Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 477.
- 44 Anthony Messina and Luis Fraga, 'Introduction', in Anthony Messina et al, *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992, pp. 3–5.
- 45 Karl W. Deutsch 'Social mobilization and political development', *Political*

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- American Science Review*, 55, September 1961.
- 46 Paul R. Brass, 'Ethnicity and nationality formation', *Ethnicity*, 3 September 1976.
- 47 Arend Lijphart, 'Political theories and the explanation of ethnic conflict in the Western World', in Milton Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- 48 Anthony Richmond, *Immigration and Ethnic Conflict*, London: Macmillan 1988.
- 49 Messina, *Industrial Democracies*, pp. 10–12.
- 50 Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 39.
- 51 Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi: Newbury Park, 1991, p. 8.
- 52 James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 3.
- 53 Ibid., p. 164
- 54 Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London, 1964, pp. 147–78.
- 55 Theodore P. Wright Jr., 'The ethnic numbers game in India: Hindu–Muslim conflicts over conversion, family planning, migration and the census', in McCready, p. 405.
- 56 Skinner, 'Competition within Ethnic Systems', in Despres, p. 132
- 57 Wright, 'The Ethnic Numbers Game', in McCready, 406.
- 58 Baaklini, 'Contemporary Lebanon', in McCready, p. 19.
- 59 Minor efforts, while gruesome, are not sufficiently large scale to result in permanent alterations in the demographic picture of a region. Examples of these include reports (perhaps improbable), from the Balkans where Bosnian Serbs are accused of impregnating Muslim women in order to force them to bear Serbian babies, while Croats are accused of administering blood transfusions to Serbian prisoners of war to make them Croat (an interview with one such blood recipient was published in *Duga*, 23 July–5 August 1994, p. 5).
- 60 These estimates are described by Gurr (p. 5). They do not include the 233 communal groups that Gurr studied, since that study is limited to politicized groups.
- 61 It is merely the percent of the dominant ethnic group relative to the entire state population, as given in Table 2.2.
- 62 For purposes of orientation, it is useful to use the World Bank classification of countries to place the 30 states into a global context: according to the World Bank guidelines, countries are classified as low income (GDP per capita under \$635 in 1991), lower middle income (GDP per capita between \$635 and \$2,555 in 1991), upper middle income (GDP per capita between \$2,555 and \$7,911 in 1991) or high income (GDP per capita above \$7,911 in 1991). See World Bank, *World Development Report 1993*, New York Oxford University Press, 1993, p. x.
- 63 The difference between war and violence is measured by the number of dead.
- 64 Census ($N=0, Y=1$); nativist policies (anti or $-=0$, pro=1); assimilation (each of three policies=1 point); population transfers (N or $-=0, Y=1$); border adjustments (each of three policies= 1 point); economic pressures (each of three policies=1 point).

Demographic Statistics: What They Reveal, What They Conceal

Projected population trends may be thought to foretell changes in the political fortunes of competing ethnic groups ... Accordingly, demographic changes may loom large in the minds of competing political leaders of groups fearful of losing their positions.

W. HOWARD WRIGGINS AND JAMES F. GUYOT¹

Numbers are an indicator of whose country it is ... it is clear that a census needs to be 'won'. So the election is a census, and the census is an election.

DONALD HOROWITZ²

Who counts depends on how you count.

JAMES F. GUYOT³

No method of collecting and processing [demographic] data is safe from errors.

SLOBODAN S. ZARKOVICH⁴

THE RENEWED GLOBAL interest in the size of ethnic groups during the 1990s is accompanied by a renewed interest in statistical recordings that count births, deaths, residences, and migrations by ethnicity. In numerous countries, decennial census enumerations have always caused inter-ethnic turmoil as the relative strength of ethnic groups is revealed. The Indians play guessing games as they try to predict

The Demographic Struggle for Power

the strength of the unruly populations of Kashmir, Assam and Punjab between population censuses. Indeed, each ten years, the census reveals just how much legitimacy the demands of the Muslim Kashmiris, the Sikhs, and the Assamese will enjoy. Farther to the east, the authorities in Myanmar try to ‘rectify’ the religious population balance *before* census workers go into the field by encouraging the out-migration of Muslims from Arakan Province. And lastly, perhaps the most glaring example of the politicization of the population census is Nigeria, where the census was the proximate cause of the civil war between the Hausa and the Ibos.

Census politicization has taken place with ferocious intensity most recently in the Balkans. The Bulgarian census of 1992 was awaited with great trepidation, as it represented the first compilation of data on ethnic affiliation in decades. Human rights activists confronted nationalists as both groups waited for results to support their respective positions. Also, it is because of the political significance of ethnic population size that the Albanians of both Kosovo and Macedonia have boycotted recent censuses, enabling them to claim a larger number of people than the censuses might indicate. Official sources in Greece, Bulgaria and Romania have underestimated the numbers of their minority populations, while the adjoining home countries of those minorities have over-estimated them (for example, according to Turkish official sources, the Turkish population in Bulgaria and Greece is significantly larger than that claimed by Bulgaria and Greece). These minority statistics are used to corroborate evidence of minority ill-treatment or lack thereof. Finally, interest in demographic statistics is all too clear in the current civil war in Bosnia, where all three sides are using population size to bolster claims that their populations deserve more territory and political power. Bogosavljevic describes this numbers struggle aptly:

Members of many nations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are vying in stories on who has not been properly counted, (what) their numbers (are), who ‘dominates’ (in numbers) and who has the right to more sunshine.⁵

If population size is important in determining the political and economic status of an ethnic group, then the determination of that size is crucial. Indeed, if ethnic population size is politically important, then the process of statistical collection, compilation, analysis and interpretation becomes politicized. To the extent that demographic statistics

Demographic Statistics

indicate that the ruling ethnic group is not in fact demographically dominant, its hold on power becomes tenuous. Alternatively, if ethnic groups outside of the leadership are more populous, then political instability may emerge. In either case, in an atmosphere of competing nationalist sentiments such as characterized much of the world in the early 1990s, population counting is too important a matter to be left to the statisticians. This chapter describes how the information provided by demographic statistics is used, manipulated and misinterpreted in order to achieve political and economic goals.

DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT

Population measurement began in ancient times, although it is only in the modern age that ethnicity, religion and language of the individual have been counted. Early censuses counted households, property, and valuables for the purposes of taxation, military service and possible forced labor. Census taking became more comprehensive in the seventeenth century, but it was not until the decade after World War II that the vast majority of the world's population was enumerated.

Presently, the principal measure of ethnic population size is the population census, which offers information pertaining to the numbers of a particular ethnic, religious and linguistic group, as well as births, deaths, residence and migration by ethnicity. While demographic statistics may also be derived from various types of sample surveys and fertility surveys, the census provides the most reliable and comprehensive collection. It is usually decennial, in part because of the large expense and organizational effort required in harnessing the resources and organizing the manpower for the task. It is comprehensive and simultaneous, so census workers must be trained and in the field in sufficient numbers to carry out the interrogations. It is compulsory, so all the citizens must by law partake.

However, the census in particular (and demographic statistics in general) can be a direct source of inter-ethnic conflict. Conflicts associated with demographic statistics arise as a result of the following: (i) the environment in which the census results are to be collected and analyzed, (ii) the goals of the census, and (iii) the goals of the respondents. Conflicts may also be associated with the particular specifications of the census (such as definitions of terms and boundaries,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

both discussed below). Moreover, there are numerous ways in which errors, accidental or purposeful, can occur and in which data may be polished: in the pre-census preparations, in the choice of enumerators, in the way it is presented to the respondents, in the way the questions are formulated, and in the collection, tabulation and final presentation of the data. Indeed, according to Alonso and Starr, ‘Official statistics ... reflect presuppositions and theories about the nature of society. They are products of social, political and economic interests that are often in conflict with each other.’⁶

(i) The environment

The environment in which the census takes place will influence the way governments present the census process to the population as well as the way the population responds to it. In countries in which inter-ethnic animosities are non-existent or under control, the census is not likely to be politicized. However, in countries predisposed to ethnic conflict and where hostile inter-ethnic relations create an electrified environment, the census may be presented by the government as an election (according to Horowitz, ‘numbers are an indicator of whose country it is ... it is clear that a census needs to be “won”. So the election is a census, and the census is an election’). In such an environment, the results may be *a priori* rejected by the population before they are even collected.

An electrified pre-census environment develops under the following conditions. If a minority is in power, and wants to retain its position, the census will produce anxiety for both minority and majority. Alternatively, if the majority ethnic group is politically dominant, and the census is to study the minorities of the society, the minorities may worry about how the revelation of their size will affect their rights. Warwick describes this situation, stating that ethnic group interests are closely tied to population studies (especially in countries that are divided along ethnic lines and have a record of political instability). Then, when the government attempts to study population, charges are often made that the largest ethnic group is plotting to impose birth control to hold down the numbers of the smaller groups. Warwick also explains how, depending on who is determining the questions and who is in power, questions on natality have been viewed in Kenya as ‘colonialism’ (‘they are trying to keep us from being a major power by keeping our numbers

Demographic Statistics

down'), racism, ('they don't want too many non-white people in the world') and even as genocide, ('what they once did with slavery they are now doing with birth control').⁸ Thus, the environment of data collection becomes linked to questions of ethnic dominance. The history of the recent Bulgarian census is a case in point about the effects of the environment on the census. Nikolaev said, 'the census was the cause of considerable controversy, with Bulgarian nationalists pitted against human-rights experts, statisticians and ethnic Turks over the government's decision to include questions on the ethnicity, the native language and the religion of the country's citizens.'⁹ Similarly, the Macedonian census of 1994 was under dispute even before enumeration began because of the ongoing conflict between the Albanians and Macedonians.¹⁰ Indeed, the two leading Albanian political parties, the Party of Democratic Prosperity and the Democratic People's Party, urged their populations not to participate in the census.¹¹

(ii) The goal of the census

The goal of the census determines the nature of the census and consequently the questions that are asked. Indeed, the census *per se* would not be politicized if it were not for the uses to which it is put. It is because it is the principal source of information for the policy makers and the development planners, and as a result, the lives of numerous people may be affected by its results, that the census has acquired a political, and thus an ethical, dimension.¹² Since census results are used by all levels of government for the allocation of tax revenue among various levels, for planning of programs, and for justifying eligibility for financial assistance, governments are apprehensive about the results.

An apprehension concerning the census has always been present, although for different reasons. Historically, the census was used to convey information to the rulers on how many workers they could count on for labor, how many men they could call into the army, and how much property they could tax. Thus, for centuries, the census was a method of control that had few benefits for the respondents, hence there was consistency under enumeration. The shift towards willing participation on the part of the respondents was elucidated by Madison's view, as expressed in the Federalist Papers, according to which the census should be used not only to take from the respondents (such as taxes) but also to give to them (such as benefits).¹³ This two-way goal of the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

census in theory underlies modern censuses worldwide. The most important goal of a census is to convey a realistic picture of the society so that this economic, demographic and social information can then be used to formulate policy. However, other goals that serve the interest of particular groups often predominate within societies characterized by inter-ethnic hostility. Below are some examples of goals.

Sometimes, the goal of the census is to confirm the leadership role of the group in power. In that case, the census will not necessarily objectively represent the society. Moreover, the simplicity and clarity of questions, as well as the objectivity of workers, might even be a hindrance. In the process of data collection, the government may be insensitive to minority groups, as expressed in the choice and training of census workers. The government may also set rules for participation that automatically disqualify large numbers of people (such as the citizenship rules that affect who can participate in the census). In the stage of data analysis there is further scope for misinterpretation and unreliability that may taint the validity of the results.

Sometimes, the goal of the census is to achieve or deny independence to a peoples. The greater the number of people, as determined by the census, the greater their case for independence or statehood. Mandelbaum said, ‘historically, the prize of independence has gone to those powerful or clever or fortunate or merely numerous enough to achieve it.’¹⁴ An analysis of Ottoman statistics indicates how various of the subjugated peoples tried to use census statistics to claim their rights (Russian leaders used population statistics pertaining to the population of Bulgarians in order to forward their desires at the creation of the San Stefano Treaty, the Greek Patriarchate provided demographic statistics to show the number of Greeks in Anatolia that were presented at the Peace Conference in Versailles, and the Congress of Berlin worked with the statistics pertaining to the Armenian population in the Ottoman regions¹⁵). In more recent times, the Muslim population of Sandzak (in Serbia) is striving for independence on the basis of the population count of the region,¹⁶ as are the Serbs in Bosnia and the Albanians in Kosovo.

Alternatively, the goal of the census may be to determine the size of minorities and hence to set policy pertaining to minority participation or equitable apportionment. In that case, problems in counting those groups may result in inappropriate policy. For example, to the extent that the American census undercounts segments of the population, such as black young males, then public policy that relates to them will be

Demographic Statistics

wrong.¹⁷ The accurate determination of the size of minorities may be prevented by regulation pertaining to the participation of minorities in the census. Indeed, if participation requirements are sufficiently stringent to prevent minority enumeration, the size of the minorities and therefore their political strength, will seem smaller. This was an explosive issue in the 1994 Macedonian census, in which restrictions were placed on participation in the census: no one could participate unless they were citizens of Macedonia, yet there were controversial questions (having to do with lineage and parentage) pertaining to who could become a citizen. Numerous Serbs born and raised in Macedonia did not or could not opt for Macedonian citizenship, and therefore were not enumerated and thus effectively became non-entities. At the same time, Albanians in Macedonia feared that the census regulations will enable the authorities to claim that many Albanians are not Macedonian citizens because they are migrants from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Sometimes the goal of the census is to gather information, but not to use it since it is considered too provocative. Indeed, some governments enumerate their populations but fail to publish the results in order to avoid revealing population size for various reasons. An example of this is the Saudi Arabian census, that has yet to be officially released (perhaps because their population size is smaller than supposed: there is fear that their neighbors will delight in such a relatively low population¹⁸). When a country's territory is perceived to be threatened by hungry neighbors, the publication of a census is a sensitive matter. Indeed, the forthcoming publication of the Macedonian census cannot but be a source of concern for its government, which must have considered how its results can be used by neighbors to deny the existence of Macedonian ethnicity and therefore pursue the breakup of the country. These perceptions reflect what was envisioned by Talleyrand for Belgium, when he claimed in 1830 that 'there are no Belgians, there never have been, there never will be. There are Frenchmen, Flemings ... and Germans'.¹⁹

Finally, census information has even been used to show that blacks in the United States were better adjusted to slavery than to freedom: in 1840, the category 'insane and idiot' appeared on the census forms. The enumeration showed that the proportion of blacks in that category was higher in the north, where blacks were free, than in the south, where slavery existed!²⁰

The Demographic Struggle for Power

(iii) Goals of the respondents

As a government may use the census results for motives other than a simple conduit of information, so too the respondents may have ulterior motives that transcend compliance with the law. Indeed, inaccuracy and manipulation of responses come from many sources. While it is possible that a segment of the respondents are uninformed and illiterate and simply do not know how to answer questions (and then their responses do not constitute conscious manipulation), in environments marked by inter-ethnic hostility, ulterior motives may influence responses.

Sometimes the population is hostile to the concept of the census, fearing how the information collected will be used. Respondents may refuse to be enumerated. For example, the Albanian population in the former Yugoslavia has resorted to noncompliance in 1981 and 1991. In 1991, the political parties of Kosovo formulated the requests that would have to be met in order for them to encourage their constituents to participate: one request pertained to the procedures for enumeration while two others pertained to political issues²¹ (the first entirely coincided with the procedures laid out by the Federal Statistical Office, so their noncompliance was not as a result of disagreement with the census, but rather due to political differences).

Sometimes people have multiple nationalities, and chose not to reveal them to the enumerator, either out of fear, ignorance, or a desire to confuse the authorities. El-Khodary writes about the Bedouins of North Africa: ‘multiple nationality proved to be most common among nomadic Bedouins who cross national borders. The problem is still uncontrollable as most of them have more than one nationality and do not show their papers to the enumerators.’²² Alternatively, people allow themselves to be enumerated twice, possibly to bolster the numbers of their group. This phenomenon of over enumeration, described by Zarkovich, occurs most easily when people are resident in one location and work in another, yet are enumerated in both locations.²³ Moreover, sometimes the population simply ridicules the effort to understand the ethnic composition of the country, as was evident in the recent Bulgarian census in which some people identified themselves as Chinese, Eskimos and Martians.²⁴

What is at stake in the census may determine how respondents respond. If a member of an ethnic group perceives personal gain from responding in a particular way, then the appropriate answer will be

Demographic Statistics

offered, rather than the truth. Evidence of this is found among the Yugoslav Gypsies, who often identified themselves as Albanians in order to have preferential access to housing. When housing policy changed, so did the enumeration: there is anecdotal evidence that during the 1980s, many Albanians began identifying themselves as Gypsies, against whom there was less discrimination at the time.²⁵ In Romania, Gypsies have been accused of identifying themselves as Hungarians because they have received direct payment by Hungarian parties in order to bolster the Hungarian numbers.²⁶ In India, the Bengalis in Assam identified their language as Assamese in order to obtain access to land rights. If members of an ethnic group perceive societal gain, that too will determine their responses. An example is the language identification in Erstwhile Punjab. At stake was the division of Punjab among Sikhs and Hindus: at the time, Punjabi-speaking Hindus were identifying themselves as Hindi-speaking in order to indicate a majority Hindu, and thereby avoid the breakup of Punjab.²⁷ Alternatively, respondents may fear deportation from their state of residence, and thus list themselves as the titular ethnic group. In all likelihood, this fear underlies some census responses of those that have found themselves in a diaspora following border changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Russians of Estonia, not racially distinguishable from the Estonians, may find that lying about their mother tongue may enable them to live where they are. Another example are the Bengalis in Assam, that sometimes provide incorrect information pertaining to their language in order to avoid deportation back to Bengal.²⁸ Such declarations *de jure* alter the size of an ethnic group, even if they do not alter the *de facto* size.

A census enables people to express how they view themselves. Indeed, who a person is in the ethnic/national classification is as much a function of how they perceive themselves as how others perceive them. This may or may not coincide with how others view them. For example, Europeans had named the numerous different populations that inhabited the Americas ‘Indians’. These peoples differed linguistically, culturally and historically from each other. They never perceived themselves as a unified category, but rather as the Mayas, the Sioux, the Navaho, etc. (thus, there were no ‘Indians’ before the Europeans came along). Alternatively, respondents may list themselves as something they aspire to rather than what in fact they are. In the U.S., Peterson claims that such upward mobility was observed when Negro-Indian-Whites

The Demographic Struggle for Power

in the US south several decades ago succeeded in classified themselves as Indian, and the Portuguese and Spanish of Hawaii got themselves listed as Caucasian.²⁹ This type of projection was also found among Hindus in India of the lower castes, that adopted customs of the upper castes and listed themselves as such in the censuses.³⁰

Finally, there are times when it is the census worker that is the source of inaccuracies in the enumeration process. In an atmosphere of inter-ethnic hostility, the ethnicity of the enumerator is relevant in determining the answer the respondent gives. Sometimes ethnic minorities are intimidated into giving the response that is desired by the authorities. Critics have accused the Bulgarian enumerators of intimidation of ethnic minorities in the 1992 census, and therefore claimed the ethnic count unreliable.³¹ There have also been allegations that the enumerators in some of the Indian censuses have falsified language data to reflect their own impartiality.³²

CENSUS SPECIFICATIONS AS SOURCES OF CONFLICT

The importance of definitions and classifications is imperative in the outcome of a census count. Alonso and Starr state: 'By the questions asked (and not asked), categories employed, statistical methods used, ... the statistical systems change images, perceptions, aspirations. The Census Bureau's methods of classifying and measuring the size of population groups ... spur various allegiances and antagonisms through the population.'³³ Waring even claimed that there was a 'statistical conspiracy' insofar as the way in which concepts are defined and the way in which activities are counted largely alters the picture that the statisticians are trying to present.³⁴ In many censuses, alterations in census specifications such as definitions, boundaries, languages and scripts have been sources of inter-ethnic conflict. These are discussed below.

(i) Definition

Definitions are crucial in demographic statistics. Not only do different cultures and languages have different meaning for the same word, but within the same language, difficulties arise in defining and classifying terms. If a definition is altered, a problem may be created or dispelled.

Demographic Statistics

For example, in the United States, the unemployment rate fell in 1985, at least in part because the definition of the natural rate of unemployment was changed.³⁵ Similarly, in the Indian census, the number of employed seemed to increase over the decade 1971–81 in part because the definitions adopted in the industrial classification of the labor force was changed. Finally, the census results in Ghana were problematic because the distinction between hometown and birthplace, as well as between family and household, was not presented clearly to the respondents, and the terms have similar meaning.³⁶

With respect to racial and ethnic definitions, problems arise when the stratification between groups is unclear. When boundaries are fluid, and the stratification dubious, then identification of membership in a group is highly subjective. For example, with respect to race, the Iberian countries of South America show a much vaguer boundary between races (such as whites and coloreds). This dichotomy is more precisely defined in the United States.³⁷ Moreover, the question of how to define categories, especially overlapping ones, is crucial to the accuracy of the census (indeed, Jews have been classified in various censuses by ethnicity, religion and race). Peterson claims that ‘enumerations have helped create groups, moved persons from one group to another by a revised definition, and through new procedures changed the size of groups.’³⁸ All of this has led some to question the accuracy of the data that are collected and to conclude that ‘essentially, race and ethnicity cannot be measured accurately’.³⁹

How an ethnic, linguistic or religious group is defined is also crucial to determining its relative size. Indeed, definition has the power of decreasing, increasing, or negating a population. This point is exemplified in several instances.

(a) It is possible to *decrease the size* of an ethnic group by subdivision, on the grounds that its members have sufficient distinguishing characteristics to warrant the creation of a new group. Examples of such subdivision span the centuries and the continents. In the Ottoman times, censuses in the subjugated territories reflected the desire to decrease the apparent size of the Muslim population. This was done by dividing the Muslims into several small sub-groups, so that none alone seemed large: according to Karpat, ‘Muslims would be divided into tribal groups, or into Shiite and Sunni, and classified as non-Muslim in order to promote the preferred group to numerical majority.’⁴⁰ Another

The Demographic Struggle for Power

example is Poland between the two world wars, where a new nationality was invented ('natives' or 'people from here') for areas in which the Belorussians predominated.⁴¹ When Belorussians identified themselves as 'people from here', the result was to decrease the instances in which the Belorussians were the regional majority.

Such definitional alterations took place on two occasions in post-World War II Yugoslavia. First, the Macedonians, previously counted as Southern Serbs, were granted nation status by President Tito (he also declared the Macedonian Orthodox Church autocephalous and thus distinct from the Serbian Orthodox Church, of which it had historically been a part⁴²). The question of whether Macedonians are a separate group, or whether they are really Serbs or Bulgarians that simply speak a different language, is unresolved in the minds of many.⁴³ Second, Montenegrins were recognized as a distinct nationality at the time of the 1946 constitution, despite the fact that Montenegrins and Serbs share the same religion, language, and script, and differ only in historical experience.⁴⁴ Thus, with a simple change in definition that entails subdivision, the size of the Serbian population was decreased in both of the above instances.

Moreover, it is possible to create a nationality or ethnic group where one did not previously exist. The creation of new nationalities with which people can identify has the effect of drawing members from their original group affiliation, and in the process altering relative ethnic sizes. Such an effort has often failed throughout history (the Ottoman rulers never succeeded in building an Ottoman nation, nor did the Habsburg rulers or the Russian tsars), although some efforts have succeeded, such as in Italy. The Italian authorities in the 19th century were confronted with the task of creating a nation: at the time of the unification of Italy, D'Alessio said, 'We have created Italy, now we must create the Italians.'⁴⁵ In the former Yugoslavia, two such nationalities were created in the post-World War II period: that of the Yugoslavs and the Slavic Muslims (including Bosnian Muslims). With respect to the former, President Tito attempted to create a unifying nationality, that of the Yugoslav, that would transcend purely political connotations (such as the Czechoslovak identity). By 1953, it was possible to be enumerated on the census as a 'Yugoslav without national identification', and in 1971 and 1981 it was possible to merely declare oneself as a Yugoslav. With respect to the latter, Slavic Muslims are another example of a created nation.⁴⁶ Their nation status was granted to them by President Tito in 1945, despite the

Demographic Statistics

fact that they are distinguished only by their religion. Indeed, Bosnian Muslims are racially identical to the Serbs and Croats, with whom they share a language. According to Allcock (1992, p. 283), ‘precisely what is the content of Muslim identity in this ethnic sense, however remains (deliberately?) unclear, as linguistically they are not distinguishable from either Serbs or Croats, and they are quite explicitly not people of Turkish descent, from whom they are distinguished in the census returns.’ In the 1961 census, Muslims could identify themselves as Muslim-ethnic (rather than in a purely religious sense). Since 1971, Muslims have been enumerated on the census as a ‘peoples’, with status equal to that of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The creation of a separate category of Yugoslavs and Slavic Muslims contributed to the decrease of other ethnic categories in which these respondents were previously members.

(b) It is possible to *increase the size* of one’s ethnic group simply by enveloping another group or merging several groups. While the Indian census did not succumb to it, pressure was made to list Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists in the census as Hindu in order to increase the Hindu count.⁴⁷ In the United States, the creation of the category Hispanic served to bolster the size of the Cuban Americans, Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans. In Britain, the category ‘Asian’ plays the same role. Across the former Yugoslavia, both Croats and Serbs are trying to increase their size by embracing the Bosnian Muslims. Both Serbs and Croats deny that religion is sufficient reason for the bestowing of nationality or ethnic status on a peoples, as was done by President Tito. However, they do not agree on who and what the Bosnian Muslims are. While it is clear that they are converts to Islam from the Ottoman era, there is disagreement as to whether they were Serbs or Croats before they became Bogumils and then Muslims. In the course of 1993, Bosnian Muslims have been claimed both by President Tudjman and Dr. Karadzic on several occasions.⁴⁸ whichever ethnic group they can be attached to has succeeded in increasing its numbers by some 2 million people.

Moreover, the major Yugoslav groups are all trying to absorb the former Yugoslavs. In the post-World War II period, the number of people that have identified themselves as Yugoslavs in the census enumerations has been on the increase, culminating in 1981. However, in the heated atmosphere prevailing in 1991, Yugoslavs as a category almost

The Demographic Struggle for Power

disappeared from the census. In Bosnia, Yugoslavs dropped from 8% in 1981 to 5% in 1991 (Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia 1992, p. 4). Given the irrelevancy of such a hybrid national category in times of competing nationalist sentiments, there is an attempt by all ethnic leaders to appropriate the Yugoslavs. To the extent that the Serbs, Croats or Muslims succeed in embracing the Yugoslavs, they add to their numbers and thus bolster their claims to a larger proportion of the population.⁴⁹

A similar effort took place in India during the 1950s, when untouchables were encouraged to convert to Buddhism (ostensibly in order to improve their position, since within Hinduism they were denied social mobility). This effort simultaneously altered the power structure of the Buddhists, as did the conversion to Christianity of Hindus and Muslims in earlier historical periods.

When the purpose warrants it, groups agree to be grouped together in order to bolster their size. This has occurred among the Muslims, when it has proved useful to count the Sunni and the Shiites together. Similarly, in the Balkans, classifying all Albanians together (the Tosks, the Ghegs, the Albanians of Kosovo, and those of Macedonia) increases the total size of the group.⁵⁰

(c) In addition to incorporating and partitioning ethnic groups, it is also possible to deny an ethnic group by simple *negation* of their distinctiveness.⁵¹ Indeed, if a government does not recognize that a people exist on its territory, then the census cannot count them, since there is nobody to count.

Examples of such negations abound. Ukrainians claim that Ruthenians do not exist as a separate ethnic group and that their language is just a dialect of Ukrainian.⁵² In the Balkans, some ethnic groups that are recognized in one state are denied recognition in another: although Macedonians have been granted national status in former Yugoslavia, they are not recognized by Bulgaria, for whom they are simply western Bulgarians (despite the fact that Bulgaria was among the first in 1992 to recognize the state of Macedonia), nor are they recognized by the Greeks, for whom they are simply Slavic Macedonians (Greeks recognize neither the nation nor the state).⁵³ Moreover, when the Bulgarian and Greek Prime Ministers, Popov and Mitsotakis respectively, met in March 1991, they issued a joint statement denying the

Demographic Statistics

existence of ethnic minorities on their territories, including Macedonians.⁵⁴ Vlahs in Bulgaria are dissatisfied because they were not listed as a separate category in the 1992 census: they were only given the opportunity to list themselves in the category of ‘other’, while in previous censuses they had been listed by name.⁵⁵ In 1992, the Bulgarian socialist party attempted to omit those sensitive questions from the census, arguing that their inclusion would only serve foreign interests (in this case, foreign refers to Turkish). This is a perpetuation of the myth that only ethnic Bulgarians live in Bulgaria.

Even when neighboring countries do not negate the existence of each other’s populations, they conduct their counts so differently that there is no agreement on how many of each other’s population reside on each other’s territory. The Albanian census of 1989 concluded that the number of Greeks in Albania is 58,000 (about 2% of the population).⁵⁶ This proportion of the population has been basically consistent in the recent past censuses (1955 and 1961).⁵⁷ At the same time, Greece maintains that there are between 300,000 and 400,000 Greeks in Albania. A similar disagreement arose with the Macedonian census of 1994: while not yet tabulated nor published, it has infuriated the Bulgarian population because preliminary information has leaked out that the report will state that ‘in Macedonia there live only several thousand Bulgarians’. According to the Bulgarian newspaper *Kontinent*, such a statement ‘will result in the deterioration of relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia’.⁵⁸

Another example of ethnic negation is that of the Turkish Kurds. Kurds were, until recently, not allowed to identify themselves as Kurds because the Turkish government denies their existence. Indeed, until 1990, the Kurds were referred to as Mountain Turks, and the Kurdish language, both spoken and written, was banned. Under the Demirel government, people are no longer sent to prison for saying there are Kurds in Turkey, as in the 1980s, but they are not allowed to speak Kurdish in official places, and they risk arrest if they sing Kurdish songs. The authorities claim that Turkey is made up of only Turks. A Turkish journalist claims ‘to say there are people here who are ethnically different is an act of treason’.⁵⁹

Governments that refuse to acknowledge ethnic diversity in their states are not limited to the Balkans. In Guatemala, the censuses do not provide accurate ethnic information: Padilla claims that this is due to ‘the legal fiction of the homogeneity of the “Guatemalan nation”’.⁶⁰ This

The Demographic Struggle for Power

fiction is insisted upon, despite independent studies indicating that some 50% of the population is Mayan Indian.

(ii) Administrative boundaries

Censuses count population by ethnicity within the country and by sub-state administrative regions. The relative ethnic composition of both the state and sub-state regions is altered if the administrative boundaries are altered. A peoples can be a minority or a majority, depending upon where the boundary is drawn. People can become a scattered diaspora by the stroke of a pen or the result of a war. Evidence of such boundary adjustments and their effect on enumerated ethnic groups abounds. The colonial powers drew boundaries across their former colonies that did not coincide with ethnic boundaries. When they then conducted censuses, the resultant ethnic mix was different from what it would have been with a different administrative boundary. The first census in Sudan (1955) followed to some degree tribal boundaries, however, these boundaries were neither listed or clearly defined.⁶¹ The British in India drew boundaries in their effort to consolidate the principalities and the pre-Independence censuses indicate a completely different ethnic mix from the post-1947 censuses which reflected ethnic boundaries drawn in part on ethnic lines. The subsequent division of Erstwhile Punjab and the creation of Haryana dramatically changed the relative ethnic mix in those states. A similar occurrence took place in Yugoslavia: the relative size of the Serbian, Hungarian and Albanian populations changed when the administrative boundaries changed. After the communists came to power in 1945, President Tito carved out of Serbia two administrative units: Vojvodina and Kosovo, both of which were granted autonomy status. The results of this that are relevant to census questions are that the Hungarian population increased in relative size in Vojvodina, as did the Albanian population in Kosovo. The implications of the introduction of these boundaries are vast, insofar as minorities turn into majorities and, to the extend that the political system reflects that, the power structure of the region changes.

(iii) Language and script

With languages as with ethnic groups, the omission or inclusion of the language question on the census says much about the census and the

Demographic Statistics

environment in which it is conducted. Indeed, should a census be listed in one dominant language or script, conveying the desirability of assimilation, or in many, conveying the image of tolerance? Sometimes, the script and language that is used in the census sends a message to the population of what answer is considered appropriate. In the nationalist era in which scripts and languages have become politicized, the limitation of the language choice by the enumerator does not bode well for minority populations.

Sometimes the census negates differences between languages: There have been reports that Indian censuses (both during the British era as well as after Independence) have been inaccurate in defining the differences between some languages (such as Hindi and Urdu) and dialects, thus lending themselves to manipulation by partial census enumerators.⁶² In Macedonia, opposition parties objected to the census of 1994 because the questionnaires were to be printed in the languages of the national minorities as well as in Macedonian. They argued that this was unconstitutional and indicated apprehension about the future of a country in which minorities were given such extensive rights.⁶³ Sometimes the census negates a language altogether. The question of the Macedonian language was raised at the time of the Bulgarian census: Is there such a thing as a Macedonian language? In April 1994, the Bulgarian Education Minister Marko Todorov refused to sign an official protocol differentiating between the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages.⁶⁴ Moreover, during the pre-census preparations for the 1991 censuses across Yugoslavia, political parties representing Bosnian Muslims attempted to differentiate the language spoken by Muslims by naming it Bosnian, and to legitimize it by listing it separately in the census.⁶⁵

Alternatively, the government may try to diffuse a potential political problem by omitting the language question altogether. In Pakistan, in order to decrease the chances of groups agitating for political power, the government has dropped the question of native tongue in all censuses after 1961. Since 1981, the language question has been posed only to a random sample of respondents.⁶⁶

Scripts have also become politicized, as populations attempt to strengthen their traditions in a time of change by emphasizing their script. The choice of script for inclusion in the census reveals government intentions pertaining to ethnic groups that do not use the dominant script. Examples of the politicization of the script are common

The Demographic Struggle for Power

in the 1990s. After Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, it prohibited the official use of the Cyrillic script. Soon after independence, Moldova officially changed its script to the Roman, as it was before Cyrillic was imposed by Moscow. In Serbia, both the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts were used interchangeably until the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Latin script has presently been eliminated from public use. This politicization of languages and scripts, as evident in censuses brings to mind the 19th century statement by a Briton, ‘every language must have an army’.⁶⁷

CASES OF POLITICIZATION OF THE CENSUS

Characteristics of the census have been observed in selected countries (Table 3.1). To the extent that a country has two regions characterized by the demographic struggles for power (such as India: with Assam and the Punjab), the regions have been collapsed into a single entry since census characteristics do not vary by sub-state region. With respect to the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, several new states have yet to carry out their independent censuses. Consequently, they have all been included under the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Macedonia is an exception: it is listed separately since it conducted a post-independence census. For some countries, the ‘initial census’ refers to the first post-independence census while the date in parentheses refers to a census during colonial times (column 1). The regularity in the post-World War II years gives an indication of the degree to which the society has adjusted to such a form of population enumeration (column 2). Given that some censuses do not wish to tackle sensitive subjects, questions pertaining to ethnicity, religion and native language are sometimes omitted (column 3). Lastly, the table contains information on whether the census was directly responsible for inducing inter-ethnic hostilities, either during enumeration or in the aftermath of publication (column 4).

It is clear from this table that the census has been ongoing in most countries, despite the inter-ethnic conflict that accompanies it. It seems to be irregular in countries where it results in inter-ethnic hostility, although the causation cannot be proven. Moreover, it seems that hostility tends to occur in countries in which sensitive questions pertaining to ethnicity, race and religion appear on the census. Once again, it is not clear that the hostility follows from such questions.

Demographic Statistics

Table 3.1. Characteristics of the census in selected countries

<i>Country/region</i>	<i>First census</i>	<i>Regularity (post W.W.II)</i>	<i>Questions eth./rel./lan./</i>	<i>Resulting ethnic host.</i>
AFRICA				
Sudan	1955	IR 1973; 1982 (not published)	E/R	Y (L)
Nigeria	(1866), 1963	IR 1973 (results cancelled)	E/R ('52,'63) R ('52,'63)	Y (H)
Rwanda	(1899), 1978	IR	E/R, R	N
Uganda	(1911), 1969	IR ('69, '80)	E/R, R ('59)	Y (L)
South Africa	(1865), 1960	R (dec. since 1960)	E/R, L, R	N
MIDDLE EAST				
Israel	(1922), 1948	IR ('61, '72, '83)	E, L, R	N
Turkey	1927	R (every 5 yrs since 1927)	L, R (until '65)	N
Lebanon	(1922), (1932, '43**)	none (sample survey in '70)	E, L	Y (H)
Iraq	1947	IR ('57, '65, '77)	E, R, L ('57)	N
ASIA				
India	(1871), 1951	R (dec. since '61)	E, R, L	Y (L)
Sri Lanka	(1871), 1953	R (dec. since '53)	E, R, L (until '63)	Y (L)
Indonesia*	(1880), 1961	R (dec. since '61)	E, R, L	N
Pap. New Guinea	na	na	na	na
China	1953	N ('53, '64, '82)	E, R, L	N
Malaysia	1947	IR ('70, '80)	E/R, R, L ('70, '80)	Y (L)
Myanmar	(1872), 1953	IR ('73, '83)	E/R, R	N
Australia				
THE AMERICAS				
Guatemala	na	IR	R, L	N
FORMER USSR†	(1897)	IR ('59, '70, '79, '89)	N, L	N
EAST EUROPE				
Romania	1838	IR ('48, '56, '66 '77)	N, L	N
Albania	1923	R (every 5 years to '60; dec. since '69)	N	N
Macedonia	(1890), 1921	R (dec. since '61)	N, R, L	Y (L)
Yugoslavia	(1890), 1921	R (dec. since '61)	N, R, L	N
Bulgaria	1881	R (dec. since '45)	N ('56, '65), L ('65)	Y (L)
Cyprus	1881	IR (last complete in '60)	E, R, L	N

The Demographic Struggle for Power

<i>Country/region</i>	<i>First census</i>	<i>Regularity (post WWII)</i>	<i>Questions eth./rel./lan./</i>	<i>Resulting ethnic host.</i>
WEST EUROPE				
Germany (West)	1871	IR ('46, '50, '61, R (dec. since '51)	R, L, ('46, '50) N none N	
Italy	1861			
Spain	1768, 1859	R (dec. since 1900)	N N	
N. Ireland	(1821), 1926	R (dec. since '51, also '66)	R (except '66) M	

Source: Doreen S. Goyer and Vera E. Draaijer, *The Handbook of National Population Censuses*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Explanations: Regularity: R= regular; IR irregular; dec= decennial.

Questions: E=ethnicity; E/R= ethnicity and race; N= nationality; R= religion; L= native language (as given by individual censuses). Individual year is given only if the question appeared only in that year.

Inter-ethnic Hostility: Y= yes; N= no; H= high; L= low.

* East Timor had an independent census in 1970, conducted with the aid of the Portuguese, but the results cannot be found.

** These are the years of the highly controversial censuses that led ultimately to the civil war in Lebanon, and are therefore included in the table.

† Latvia had a census in 1920 while an independent state.

In several countries, the census has been a major source of controversy and has resulted in social upheavals. The censuses in Nigeria, Lebanon, and Macedonia are described below: a historical overview is presented together with the strategies adopted by the dominant political group and the responses of the minorities. These states were chosen for discussion because of the role played by the census in fomenting inter-ethnic conflict, despite the fact that they offer little diversity with respect to the three structural variables presented in chapter 2. Indeed, with respect to ethnic heterogeneity, all three states had at least two large ethnic groups as well as several minor ones. In two of these, Nigeria and Lebanon, the two dominant groups were close in population size, thus accentuating the war of numbers. They were also the states where civil war erupted as a result of the demographic struggle for power. With respect to characteristics of the political system, Nigeria and Lebanon prior to the wars, as Macedonia presently, were unitary states in which no sub-state administrative region enjoyed a special status. In Nigeria, however, the sub-state boundaries did largely coincide with ethnic boundaries.⁶⁸ Finally, with respect to economic development, all states fall into the middle income category as per the World Bank guidelines.

(i) *Nigeria*

The Nigerian census of 1962–63 remains one of the most prominent examples of how the war of numbers, culminating in the publication of census data, resulted in a destructive war of enormous human and material cost. The participants of this war of numbers are the principal ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani (concentrated in the north), the Ibos (concentrated in the east) and the Yoruba (concentrated in the west).⁶⁹ According to the 1952 census (the last census during British rule) the relative numbers of these groups were the following: 55.3%, 23.7% and 20.1%, respectively.⁷⁰ When independence from Britain resulted in attempts at democracy with universal suffrage, as well as the allocation of parliamentary seats according to population size, the north, and therefore the Hausa-Fulani, predominated in politics and consequently also in economics, especially with respect to scarce federal allocations. Indeed, since the seats in the House of Representatives were apportioned on the basis of regional population distribution, each region would benefit from a higher census count. The fact that there were economic disparities between the north and the south and east, namely that the former was less developed while the latter, with higher rates of production, was funding the allocations to the north, only further exasperated the perceptions of political disparities.⁷¹

With this background of rising inter-ethnic tensions, the census could not but produce further controversy. It was viewed by the smaller groups as a way to increase their political power and by the dominant group as a way to consolidate its power. As a result, there was significant manipulation of the census for these ends. According to Olugbemi, this manipulation took place in the following ways (and was not limited to a single group): (1) outright inflation of census figures, (2) alleged discovery of new communities, (3) a more thorough head count than in any previous census, (4) encouragement of population movements for the purpose of the count and (5) criminal violation of established administrative procedures.⁷²

As a result, the preliminary results of the 1962 census indicated that the north had lost its majority status and that the south was more populous. These results were immediately followed by new evidence that there was an undercount in the north, which in turn led to charges of fraud and further aggravation of inter-ethnic tensions. The census results were cancelled, and a new one called for 1963. This new one

The Demographic Struggle for Power

was also disputed. Inter-ethnic tension mounted until elections in January 1965, at which time the victorious government was perceived to reflect dominance by the north. In this atmosphere of distrust, an Ibo-led army *coup d'état* occurred in which the President, Balewa and the Premiers of the western and northern regions were assassinated.⁷³ This resulted in retaliatory violence against the Ibos that resided in the northern region and was followed by a counter-coup by northern troops that placed Gowon (the military leader of the northern province) into power.

Between August and September 1966, one million Ibos fled to the Eastern Region in hope of escaping the violence and thirty thousand were killed. In May of the following year, the Eastern Regions Assembly voted to secede from Nigeria. The civil war broke out one month later, leading to mass starvation and casualties. The war persisted until January 1970, when the Biafran government ceased all resistance. The federal government had previously in 1967, subdivided the country into twelve administrative regions so as to prevent ethnic population counts from determining and maintaining the political dominance of the majority.⁷⁴ However, after the civil war, it subsequently altered the internal administrative boundaries again in 1976 to increase them from 12 to 19. The new boundaries did not prevent the next census in 1973 from also being politicized because the methods of manipulation adopted in 1963 were largely repeated.⁷⁵

(ii) Lebanon

Another example of how the war of numbers can translate into a civil war is Lebanon, a country with large ethnic/religious groups where population size took on a new importance with the approach of independence. Prior to independence (in 1943), power was granted by various colonial rulers to groups in society on an arbitrary basis. The way in which the Ottoman rulers, and then the French, chose to allocate power among the Muslims and the Christians had little to do with size. Indeed, during the French mandate, the Christians were favored repeatedly in administration, development projects, and education, despite their virtual population parity with the Muslims.

The French undertook a census in 1932 which yielded the following percentages: 54% of the population was Christian, while 46% was Muslim.⁷⁶ The census was immediately disputed as some claimed that

Demographic Statistics

the French authorities manipulated the census in order to increase the size of the Christians. Baaklini claims the manipulation occurred largely because citizenship requirements had not been clearly defined before enumeration.⁷⁷ In an effort to increase the number of Christian citizens, citizenship was granted to people of Lebanese ancestry, some in Egypt, some Palestinian Christians, and some Armenians. Simultaneously, the Muslim Kurds and the Arab Muslim tribesmen, all long-term residents of Lebanon, were denied citizenship, and consequently were not enumerated. Moreover, there is evidence that wealthy Christians were more easily able to purchase citizenship than Muslims.

Despite the controversy aroused by the census, the distribution of political power following independence (namely the National Pact), continued for decades. During this time, 'If the Christians (of Lebanon) were to maintain their political prominence, they had to maintain the reality or the myth that they were numerically superior to the Moslems, or they had to neutralize whatever numerical edge that the Moslems might develop.'⁷⁸ A new census was called for by various Muslim groups but was not acceded to. Indeed, the Muslim groups claimed that there was an undercount at the onset of independence and that the relative size of the Muslims was growing. Between 1943 and 1975, the Lebanese Muslim population had increased at a higher rate than the Christian, so that in the beginning of the 1980s it is estimated to constitute some 60% of the population.⁷⁹ The manipulation of the census, coupled with the nature of the electoral law and Christian domination of law and order institutions, was in part responsible for the civil war that ensued.

(iii) Macedonia

Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia in early 1992, although it did not immediately receive international recognition because of Greek opposition.⁸⁰ From previous censuses, it was clear that there were Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs, Bulgarians and Gypsies residing in Macedonia. The last enumeration conducted by the Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia (1991) was boycotted by the Albanians, so only estimates exist pertaining to their population size, according to which 65% of the population is Macedonian and 21.7% is Albanian. However, Albanians disagree and claim their numbers comprise 30–40% of the total. Given the importance of ethnic issues in the 1990s, it was deemed necessary by the post-independence government to conduct a new

The Demographic Struggle for Power

census to ascertain the relative population sizes. The new Macedonian census began on June 21, 1994, and was an explosive exercise. *The Economist* wrote of it: 'Numbers mean power. Playing with them can be dangerous.'⁸¹

Macedonia's National Statistics Bureau reported on some preliminary returns of the June census. According to these returns, the total population of the country amounted to 1.9 million people, of which 66% were Macedonian while 23% were Albanian.⁸² The remaining peoples are Turks, Serbs and Roma.

The Albanian population, the principal minority in Macedonia, has many reservations about the census, and its leaders have rejected the published preliminary report, claiming that the Albanian population is at least one third of the total population. The two ethnic Albanian political parties (the Party of Democratic Prosperity and the Democratic People's Party) criticized the census even before it occurred on the following grounds: poor census preparation, large parts of the population were not been issued census forms, and the registration started too late. Also, ethnic Albanians from the Bureau of Statistics were not duly included in the process.⁸³ At first they urged Albanians not to participate, but at a later date, some Albanian leaders did urge compliance while simultaneously demanding a constitutional amendment declaring equality between the Albanian and Macedonian populations.⁸⁴

In addition to the Albanians, the Union of Serbs and Montenegrins, a political party, is expressing doubts about the reliability of the census results, in part because it was reported that Serbs and Montenegrins were warned to list themselves as Macedonians.⁸⁵ In addition, the leader of Macedonia's pro-Bulgarian Party for Human Rights, Iliya Ilievski, said that his party would not recognize the census since the Bulgarian language is not mentioned in the questionnaire.

One explosive regulation pertaining to the census that affects all the smaller ethnic groups residing in Macedonia has to do with the restrictions placed on participation in the census: no one could participate unless they were citizens of Macedonia. However, there were some controversial questions pertaining to who could become a citizen, having to do with lineage and parentage. Numerous Serbs who lived in Macedonia all their lives did not or could not opt for Macedonian citizenship, and therefore were not enumerated and thus effectively became non-entities: about 80% of Serbs in Skoplje and 90% in some other districts did not receive Macedonian citizenship and there-

Demographic Statistics

fore were excluded from the survey. Moreover, Albanians feared that the citizenship census regulations would enable the authorities to deny citizenship (and enumeration) to Albanians who came from Kosovo.

CONCLUSIONS: WHO COUNTS DEPENDS ON WHO COUNTS

Guyot said that with respect to demographic statistics, ‘who counts depends on how you count.’ This implied that how census questions are defined and how populations are measured in effect determines which group will be the dominant group. In this chapter, Guyot’s concept has been expanded to ‘who counts depends on who counts’. In other words, not only is the method of counting important, but also the ethnic group that is in power (‘counts’, i.e., is important) is the one that organizes the census (and therefore ‘counts’ (i.e., enumerates) itself and other groups. At the same time, the group that the government is biased towards in the censuses (the one that counts, or rather, is important), is determined by those that are in power (that ‘count’, i.e., that enumerate). The ethnic group that is dominant is the one that does the counting in the census, and often it is dominant *because* it does the counting.

The census, in theory, clarifies the relative representation of ethnic groups, religions, scripts and languages in a society. Moreover, birth and death statistics clarify which ethnic group is growing most rapidly. However, this is dangerous information: in the 1990s, ethnicity has been used to withhold rights of a peoples and has become a sufficient reason to kill and commit atrocities, as shown by the policy of ‘cleanse or be cleansed’.⁶⁶ The census is thus, according to Horowitz (1985, p. 194), ‘related to the fear of extinction’ that minority groups have. In some cases, the census has been at the root of inter-ethnic conflict that resulted in war, such as in Nigeria (where the Hausa, the Ibo and the Yoruba all claimed their undercounting and overcounting of the others) and in Lebanon (where the Muslims and Maronite Christians vied for demographic supremacy). It is clear that in the Balkans today, and especially in the former Yugoslavia, demographic struggles for power are ongoing and the census is like an election that ethnic groups attempt to win in order to justify their economic and political power. The titular

The Demographic Struggle for Power

nationalities that are in power are the ones that write the census (the Croats in Croatia, the Serbs in Serbia, the Greeks in Greece, the Bulgarians in Bulgaria), consequently, their biases may be reflected in the censuses. As long as ethnic population sizes are important in connoting economic and political power, the census, as a measure of size, will retain its political importance and its potential for promoting inter-ethnic conflict.

The polarization of the census has been dealt with differently by authorities. Some have chosen to omit the sensitive ethnic question from the census in order to avoid inter-ethnic conflict, such as Bulgaria until the 1990s, when under pressure it reintroduced the question for the first time since 1975; Tanzania has omitted the question since 1978. Others, such as the Belgians, quibble over how to phrase the ethnicity question. Others yet, such as the Saudis (and the Mauritians in 1978), do not publish the results.⁸⁷ Other governments have chosen not to conduct a census at all, in order to avoid the problems that it is sure to generate (for example, Lebanon, which has not had a census since 1932).⁸⁸ Similarly, Iraq refused to honor Kurdish requests for a new census. However, governments' refusals to introduce sensitive questions into the census, or the populations' refusals to be counted, are at the root of further controversy. Indeed, lack of information does not cause inter-ethnic issues to disappear, but rather their potential explosive impact may be augmented. The regularity of censuses and the consistency of questions adds predictability to the census process. While there is scope every decade for ethnic and religious leaders to rejoice or recoil as they compare their demographic success with that of competing groups, regularity and predictability reduces the scope for an inter-ethnic crisis.

This presentation of censuses and their politicization leads to the next four chapters which contain a discussion of the methods used by ethnic leaders for the augmentation of the size of their populations. Indeed, the manipulation of the census results, or the alteration of definitions and methods of measurement, are ways of altering the *existing* demographic reality. These methods of changing the size of an ethnic group are non-intrusive insofar as they do not *in reality* alter the size of the population nor directly alter the behavior of the population. In the pages that follow, policies of demographic engineering are used that are of increasing levels of intrusion and do, in fact, change the demographic composition of the population.

Demographic Statistics

NOTES

- 1 W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, 'Demographic change and politics' in W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, *Population, Politics and the Future of Southern Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 6.
- 2 Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 194, 196.
- 3 James F. Guyot, 'The Puerto Rican population of New York City: who counts depends on how you count' in *New York City Perspectives*, 2, no. 2, 1975.
- 4 S. S. Zarkovich, *Quality of Statistical Data*, Rome: FAO of the United Nations, 1966, p. 366.
- 5 *Vreme*, no. 84, 3 May 1993.
- 6 William Alonso and Paul Starr, eds., *The Politics of Numbers*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987, p. 1.
- 7 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, pp. 194–5
- 8 Donald P. Warwick, 'The politics and ethics of field research', in Martin Bulmer and Donald P. Warwick, eds., *Social Research in Developing Countries*, Chichester: John Wiley, 1983, p. 317.
- 9 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 6, 5 February 1993, p. 58.
- 10 Macedonia's National Statistics Bureau reported on some preliminary returns of the June census. According to these returns, the total population of the country amounted to 1.9 million people, of which 66% were Macedonian while 23% were Albanian (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 15 November 1994, p. 6). However, *Nova Makedonija* on 14 September 1995, published as 'unconfirmed reports' that there were slightly over two million people residing in Macedonia. Some 3,000,000 Albanians are Macedonian citizens, while some 120,000 Albanians have not 'regulated their resident status in the new Macedonian state' (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 15 September 1994).
- 11 The Albanian population, the principal minority in Macedonia, have many reservations about the census, and its leaders have rejected the published preliminary report, claiming that the Albanian population is at least one third of the total population. Albanian political parties criticized the census even before it occurred (see text below). (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 14 June 1994, p. 7).
- 12 See some of the chapters on the ethical dimension in Bulmer and Warwick, see in note 8.
- 13 See Kenneth Prewitt, 'Public Statistics and Democratic Politics', in Alonso and Starr, see in note 6, p. 268.
- 14 Michael Mandelbaum, 'The reluctance to intervene', *Foreign Policy*, no. 95, Summer 1994, p. 8.
- 15 According to Karpat, these demographic statistics were inflated in order to manipulate. Their political purpose tainted their reliability, since they were collected and presented in order to achieve a stated goal. See Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, pp. 4–5.
- 16 While the 1978 and 1988 censuses show that the Serbian portion of the population dropped from 39% to 29.5% (while that of the Muslims rose from 58% to 67%), the 1991 census indicates that the Muslim's share of the population is only 51.5%. Other sources put the latter figure at 82%. Whether

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- the region has a right to self-determination in part depends upon which statistics are valid. See *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 6, 11 February 1994, p. 29.
- 17 See Carole W. Parsons, ed., *America's Uncounted People*, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1972.
- 18 Alonso and Starr, see in note 6, pp. 2-3.
- 19 Quoted in Martin O. Heisler, 'Hyphenating Belgium: Changing State and Regime to Cope with Cultural Division', in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 177.
- 20 William Peterson, 'Politics and the Measurement of Ethnicity' in Alonso and Starr, see in note 6, p. 230.
- 21 Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia, 'The 1991 census in Yugoslavia: statistics and policy', *Statistical Commission and Economic Commission for Europe*, Geneva: Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1 May 1992, p. 7.
- 22 M. A. El Khoudary, quoted in D.J. Casley and D.A. Lury, *Data Collection in Developing Countries*, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 30.
- 23 Slobodan S. Zarkovich, quoted in Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia, 'The 1991 census in Yugoslavia: statistics and policy', *Statistical Commission and Economic Commission for Europe*, Geneva: Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1 May 1992, p. 6.
- 24 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 6, 5 February 1993, p. 61.
- 25 In September 1990, leaders of the Macedonian Romany Community called upon their people to stop identifying themselves as Albanians simply on the basis of a shared religion.
- 26 The accusations came from the Mayor of Cluj, and it is the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania that supposedly 'blackmailed or bought' some one half million gypsies to register as Hungarians (*OMRI Daily Digest*, no. 37, Part II, 21 February 1995, p. 6).
- 27 Horowitz, see in note 2, p. 195.
- 28 This lie on the census is said to decrease the Assamese population by some 10-12 percent, while increasing that of the Bengalis by 30-32 percent (Walter K. Anderson, 'Multiethnic conflict and peacemaking: the case of Assam', in Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking*, p. 331). It is not clear that it is in the interest of the Assamese government to reveal that reality since it will necessitate granting more power to the Bengalis.
- 29 Peterson in Alonso and Starr, p. 189.
- 30 M.N. Srinivas, quoted in Peterson in Alonso and Starr, p. 189.
- 31 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 12, 19 March 1993, p. 35.
- 32 Bass, quoted in Wright in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983.
- 33 Alonso and Starr, see in note 6, p. 2.
- 34 She focuses on the omission from statistical censuses of activities usually performed by women: statisticians construct reality 'in a way that excludes the great bulk of women's work-reproduction (in all its forms), raising children, domestic work and subsistence production'. Cooking, according to economists, is 'active labor' when cooked food is sold and 'economically inactive labor' when it is not; housework is 'productive when performed by a

Demographic Statistics

- paid domestic servant' and 'nonproductive' when no payment is involved. Marilyn Waring, *If Women Counted*, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988, pp. 30–1.
- 35 In 1991, the Bush administration raised the definition of the natural rate of unemployment to 5.5% of the labor force.
- 36 B. Gil and E. N. Omaboe, 'Population Censuses and National Sample Surveys in Developing Countries', in Bulmer, op. cit., pp. 47–8.
- 37 See Harmannus Hoetink, 'Resource competition, monopoly and socio-racial diversity', in Leo A. Despres, ed., *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies*, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975, p. 15.
- 38 Peterson in Alonso and Starr, see in note 6, p. 188.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Karpat, see in note 15, p. 5.
- 41 Uri Ra'anana et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 7.
- 42 A similar effort was made by Croatian President Tudjman when he sponsored the creation of a Croatian Orthodox Church that was to be distinguished from the Serbian Orthodox Church.
- 43 Macedonia's independence in 1991 has resulted in the renewal debate on whether the Macedonian peoples are really a separate peoples. The arguments of those doubting this are presented in *The Macedonian Affair* published by the Institute of Internal and Strategic Studies in Athens in 1993. For a pro-Macedonian viewpoint (albeit written before independence), see Stephen E. Palmer and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971.
- 44 The debate on whether Serbs and Montenegrins are the same group has been recently revived in both the academic and popular literature. See, for example, *Duga*, 30 April 1994, pp. 34–9.
- 45 Massimo D'Azeglio, quoted in E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 44.
- 46 'Bosnians' do not exist as a national or ethnic group, only a territorial group: they are residents of Bosnia that are of Serb, Croat and 'Muslim' ethnicity.
- 47 Wright, *The Ethnic Numbers Game*, p. 421.
- 48 Indeed, President Tudjman in his January 1994 meetings in Bonn with Izetbegovic, claimed that Croats and Muslims must renew their ties because they are natural allies since the Muslims were Croats before they became Muslim. Similarly, Dr. Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, claimed on numerous occasions that Serbs and Muslims will iron out their differences since they are of the same origin.
- 49 The battle for the Yugoslavs is based on differing views as to who, in fact, are the Yugoslavs. Some Yugoslavs are products of mixed marriages. Since there exists no prescribed pattern of ethnic determination, ethnic definition is the result of choice, interest or pressure (in other words, it is not prescribed that the paternal nor the maternal ethnicity is of necessity inherited by the child, as it is in some religions: in Judaism, for example, Jewish identity is transmitted through the mother, while Christian Orthodoxy is transmitted through the father). Some people have chosen to identify themselves as Yugoslav because they view Yugoslavism as a political expression of preferences rather than an

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- ethnic orientation. They have associated themselves with the concept of Yugoslavia, often in spite of a homogeneous heritage. The demise of the idea of Yugoslavia has been accompanied by the demise of the Yugoslav identity. So, to which ethnic group do these Yugoslavs now belong? Some Serbian writers have taken for granted that all Yugoslavs are Serbs (see Jovan Ilic, 'Characteristics and Importance of Some Ethno-National and Political-Geographic Factors Relevant for the Possible Political-Legal Disintegration of Yugoslavia' in Stanoje Ivanovic, *The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade: Srbostampa, 1992). However, in the absence of hard evidence as to the ethnic orientation of Yugoslavs, the appropriation of this group by any of the competing ethnic leaders serves only to fuel the fires.
- 50 In Albania, there are two main groups, the Tosks and the Ghegs, that are distinguished by dialect and location: the former tend to live in the south, while the latter live in the north and Kosovo. Nevertheless, they have been placed into a single category for the purposes of this study, along with the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia. These are of the same ethnic stock, same religion and same language (they are of course different from the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzak by ethnicity, although not by religion). It is noted, however, the Albanians outside of Albania have forged a new national personality as a result of historical circumstances, mostly due to the higher levels of economic development that they have lived in since World War II.
- 51 All reference to Bosnia has been removed by the Serbs in Bosnia by official decree: for example, Bosanski Brod has been renamed Brod.
- 52 *RFE/RL, Daily Digest*, 31 January 1995.
- 53 Moreover, even when neighboring countries do not negate the existence of each others populations, they do their counts so differently that they cannot agree on how many of each others population reside on each others territory. The Albanian census of 1989 concluded that the number of Greeks in Albania is 58,000 (about 2% of the population). This proportion of the population has been basically consistent in the recent past censuses (1955 and 1961). (See *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 3 no. 11, 18 March 1994, p. 20.) Greece maintains that there are between 300,000 and 400,000 Greeks in Albania. *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 10, 11 March 1994, pp. 36-9.
- 54 Christopher Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, p. 102. In 1992, Bulgaria conducted a census which included questions on ethnicity, language and religion, thus pitting nationalists against human-rights experts.
- 55 In 1934, the census enumerated 16,405 Vlahs (*RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 6, 5 February 1993, p. 60).
- 56 There has been a dramatic increase in the recent past of statistics emerging in the private sector in Albania: however, it is indicative of the sensitivity of ethnic statistics that these private sources do not even attempt to measure ethnic questions (*RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 10, 11 March 1994, pp. 36-9).
- 57 See *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, p. 20.
- 58 Quotes from Kontinent appeared in *Politika*, 12 August 1994.
- 59 Jeri Laber, 'The hidden war in Turkey', in *The New York Review of Books*, 23 June 1994, p. 50.
- 60 Luis Alberto Padilla, 'Conflict resolution theory and its application to

Demographic Statistics

- Guatemala's socio-political context', in Kuman Rupesinghe, ed., *Internal Conflict and Governance*, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 270.
- 61 K.M. Barbour, 'Population mapping in Sudan', in K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero, eds., *Essays on African Population*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975, p. 102.
- 62 Wright, *The Ethnic Numbers Game*, p. 421.
- 63 They in fact feared federalization of the country (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 20 May 1994, p. 7).
- 64 This refusal resulted in the premature ending of his visit to Macedonia. *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 15 April 1994, p. 7.
- 65 They failed in this attempt during the unified Yugoslavia, but since their secession from Yugoslavia, there has been movement in the creation of such a language, culminating in the publication of a Bosnian dictionary.
- 66 Such random samples indicate that the Punjabi and the Seraiki speakers form the majority (some 58% of the population). Yet, the minority speakers (the Baluch, the Sindhis and the Pashtuns) account for some 30% of the population (but have claims on their ethnic homelands that account for some 70% of Pakistani territory). This is a cause of potential inter-ethnic conflict. According to Harrison, the Baluch are alienated from the political system because 'as a result of their numerical weakness, they see no hope for achieving significant power in Pakistani politics, even under a democratic regime.' Selig S. Harrison, 'Ethnic conflict in Pakistan: The Baluch, Pashtuns and Sindhis', in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 303.
- 67 Quoted in Peter Berger, 'Preface', in Uri Ra'anana et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, p. ix.
- 68 This was true until the end of the civil war, when the boundaries were redrawn – see chapter 9.
- 69 There are also some 250 small ethnic or tribal groups, but they aligned themselves with the major groups and did not constitute a major force by themselves. Also, the federal regions, North, East, West and Lagos, largely corresponded to the ethnic boundaries, so that administrative and ethnic boundaries coincided.
- 70 Stephen O. Olugbemi, 'The ethnic numbers game in inter-elite competition for political hegemony in Nigeria', in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 267.
- 71 For a discussion of the economic aspects underlying the efforts of secession from Nigeria by the Ibos in the east, see Milica Z. Bookman, *The Economics of Secession*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- 72 Olugbemi, see in note 70, p. 271.
- 73 See John De St. Jorre, *The Brother's War: Biafra and Nigeria*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972.
- 74 For a discussion of administrative boundaries and federalism, see Sam Egite Oyovbaire, *Federalism in Nigeria*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- 75 The 1973 census resulted in 64% of the total population was from the six northern regions, a number supported by some and disputed by others.
- 76 Abdo I. Baaklini, 'Ethnicity and politics in contemporary Lebanon', in William McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 23.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 77 Baaklini, see in note 76, pp. 22–3.
- 78 Baaklini, see in note 76, p. 21.
- 79 Baaklini, see in note 76, p. 43.
- 80 Greece objected to the use of the name Macedonia because it claimed the rights to that name.
- 81 *The Economist*, 25 June 1994, p. 50.
- 82 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 15 November 1994, p. 6.
- 83 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 14 June 1994, p. 7.
- 84 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 23 June 1994, p. 7.
- 85 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 21 June 1994, p. 6.
- 86 This phrase is attributed to *The Economist*, 6 February 1993, p. 53.
- 87 In Mauritius, until 1982, the classification of ethnic groups included four categories: the Hindus, Muslims, Sino-Mauritians, and the General population. This classification is not racially based (as was their census of 1901), nor is it by religion nor geographical origin as the single criterion, but rather is based upon political alliances. It was a taxonomy that was introduced at the time of independence to ensure that all groups would be politically represented, but now seems obsolete as political alliances have shifted. Part of the region why there has been relative calm with respect to the census is that census has proved to be flexible and change with the times (Thomas Hylland Eriksen, ‘Containing conflict and transcending ethnicity in Mauritius’, in Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., *Internal Conflict and Governance*, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 110).
- 88 The Christian Lebanese have refused to adapt to the reality of growing Muslim population through ‘legalistic maneuvers of defining who is Lebanese’ and ‘through the granting of citizenship to Christian aliens while denying it to the Muslims’ (Baaklini, p. 43).

Pronatalist Policies

The belief that population numbers are directly related to national power is one of the most persistent themes in the history of population theory and policy.

C. ALISON MCINTOSH¹

The 10.7 per cent of Muslims (in India) in 1961, in union with other religious groups, will numerically overtake the Hindus in A.D. 2051 so decisively that the Hindus will be at the mercy of the non-Hindus.

S. L. HENDRE²

Now that the war [in El Salvador] is over, Esmeralda has had her IUD removed ... She was being urged by men in the political leadership to imagine her post-war life as one devoted to being a good mother.

CYNTHIA ENLOE³

To govern is to populate.

JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERTI⁴

A RELATIVELY NON-INTRUSIVE method of altering demographic characteristics is the encouragement of procreation of a particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious group.⁵ A pronatalist population policy entails the active support of procreation in order to increase population size. A pronatalist policy may include the urging of peoples to procreate (such as the call made by religious leaders on Jews worldwide, in response to falling birth rates), or may entail direct monetary compensation for births (such as in Italy under Mussolini and under the slogan strength in numbers), or propaganda (such as the award of medals or titles: Heroine of the Soviet Union was awarded to women who bore

The Demographic Struggle for Power

more than five children), or financial stimuli (such as child allowances, free pre-natal and post-natal care, release time for working pregnant women, preferential housing, and free education for larger families, as in Singapore during the 1970s), or the outright prohibition of birth control, accompanied by punitive measures (such as in Romania). In this context, policies aimed at controlling population growth are perceived to be a method by which one ethnic or religious group attempts to restrict the growth of another. In the 1990s, there has been a global rise in both the efforts to increase natality by ethnic group (in part as a result of the rising influence of nationalists) as well as the perceived desire to decrease natality of some peoples (note the expression of anger from some Islamic fundamentalists at the United Nations Conference on Population and Development in 1994).

Pioneering research has been made in the areas of comparative ethnic demography and its political significance by scholars such as Wright, Guyot, Wiggins, Alonso and Star, among others.⁶ In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars became alerted to the potential dangers of the perception (on the part of some ethnic groups) that other groups were purposefully attempting to increase fertility rates. Since perception is as dangerous as reality, the possible ramifications of inter-ethnic fertility differences ranged from retaliatory policies of selective procreation encouragement to outright genocide. This chapter contains a discussion of pronatalist policies, differential birth and death rates among ethnic groups, as well as perceptions of forced population control.

FEAR OF FERTILITY

Fears of high fertility rates are common among politicians, policy makers, and scholars. This sensitivity in part results from the sheer size of the global population. Currently, there are 5.6 billion people inhabiting the earth, an increase from 1.6 billion in 1900. Global population growth peaked in 1960 at 2%, and has now dropped to some 1.6%. A mid-range estimate is that the world will contain 8.5 billion people by the year 2025.⁷ The increase in population that it took to reach this number is revealing of the power of momentum and fertility. When Malthus warned of population problems (1825), the world contained 1 billion people – it had taken the world millions of years to get to that point. Sen says that it took 123 years to get to the second (billion), 33

Pronatalist Policies

years to get to the fifth, 14 years to get to the fourth, 13 years to get to the fifth billion, with a sixth billion to come, according to one UN projection, in another 11 years'.⁸ All of these estimates must be taken with a grain of salt, since it is impossible to be clear about future fertility rates: indeed, there is no way of knowing how economic growth or economic stagnation will in fact affect rates, despite theories linking each of those to fertility rates.⁹

There is ample regional variation in population growth rates. While East Germany and Italy have negative growth rates,¹⁰ Bangladesh is expected to triple its population of 1960 by the year 2000, and Brazil is expected to reach 173 million (in the year 2000) from 73 million in 1960. The increase in population is not uniform across the regions nor across ethnic groups. While 90% of the increase in population is taking place in the Third World, even there variations exist. In Africa, the per cent rate of growth is highest (3.1% in the 1980s), but the largest absolute increases took place in Asia (of the 923 million people that were born in the 1980s, 517 were born in Asia).¹¹

Fertility phobias may also stem from perceptions of low rates of population growth. In other words, some ethnic groups have experienced decreases in fertility rates, leading to anxiety about their long term survival chances. Since replacement fertility of 2.1 children per women is considered necessary for a society to reproduce itself (while less results in net negative growth), ethnic groups experiencing lower growth have reason for anxiety. Such anxiety is explained by the following demographic statistics: each Russian woman had only 1.4 children in 1994, down from 2.2 only six years before, amounting to a 35% drop in the birth rate.¹² Moreover, from 1989 to 1993, the birth rate in Poland fell (by more than 20%), in Bulgaria (by some 25%), in Estonia (by 30%), in Romania (by 30%), and in East Germany (by over 60%).¹³ It is estimated that in 2010, in Germany there will be less than half as many children in Eastern Germany as there are today.¹⁴

Fertility phobias sometimes refer to fear of high fertility rates among members of another ethnic group. Differing birth rates among neighboring ethnic groups have become a major source of concern in the prevailing climate of competing nationalisms because they are perceived to translate into future political rebalancing. Wriggins and Guyot describe this fear: 'Projected population trends may be thought to foretell changes in the political fortunes of competing ethnic groups Accordingly, demographic changes may loom large in the minds of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

competing political leaders of groups fearful of losing their positions.¹⁵ Kennedy described how there emerges 'a resentment against other peoples who reproduce at a much faster pace – the assumption being that, as in a Darwinian struggle, the faster-growing species will encroach upon, and eventually overwhelm, a population with static or declining numbers.'¹⁶

Brzezinski warned that 'the approximately 50 million Soviet Muslims currently produce as many babies per year as the 145 million Russians.'¹⁷ Russians are alarmed by this reproductive activity in the peripheral Soviet republics, especially when coupled with the fact that the Muslim birth rate is the highest in the world (3% per annum). Moreover, the Muslim countries of the Middle East, as well as Libya and Sudan, have population growth rates of 3–4.9% per year and it is estimated that the populations in these countries will double in 14 years.¹⁸ The Russians are not the only ones that have increased anxiety levels as a result of the Muslim birth rate. Indeed, Israelis realize that the Arab population within Israel is growing at a faster pace than that of the Jews, while the Christians in Lebanon are faced with a faster growing Muslim population. The Albanian ethnic minority in Yugoslavia has the highest birth rate in Europe: 35 babies for every 1,000 people. Their growth rate is stable at 2.4%, much higher than in the remainder of the former Yugoslavia (in Croatia, it is 0.4%) and curiously much higher than in neighboring Albania.¹⁹ It is estimated that, with current population growth rates, the Albanians would be the most numerous population in Serbia in the first quarter of the 21st century.²⁰ In the coming year, less than one third of new-borns in Serbia will not be to Serbian families.²¹ Some Serbs claim that 'the major political weapon of ethnic Albanians towards achieving demographic domination in Kosovo and Metohija is a very high birth rate'.²² This is similar to the view held by some Hindus in India. Hendre claims that Hindus will be overtaken by Muslims: 'The 10.7% of Muslims in 1961, in union with other religious groups, will numerically overtake the Hindus in A.D. 2051 so decisively that the Hindus will be at the mercy of the non-Hindus'.²³ Such fear is also evident in Kenya, where the results of the 1981 census caused panic and rejection because it showed that the population of the Kikuyu had grown at twice the rate of the dominant Luo in one decade.

Population growth rate differentials also cause concern between races. For example, the growth rate of the black population in South Africa surpassed that of the white population, leading to the ever

Pronatalist Policies

increasing questionability of the apartheid system and the pressure for one man/one vote (the white population was one fifth in 1951, and dropped to one seventh in 1980). Racial differences in population growth rates also underlay inter-racial tensions in Fiji.

When race and religion are not the source of fertility fears, the question of language may be, such as in Canada, where the birth rate differences between French-speaking Quebecois and the 'Anglo' English-speaking population raises questions pertaining to the future of Quebec as the bastion of French culture in North America. Moreover, sometimes strategic questions are raised by regional differences in birth rates, such as the concern that the West experienced with respect to the population rates of its strategic enemies: before the breakup of the Soviet Union, NATO planners warned of the security consequences of the West's falling natality rates relative to their enemies.²⁴ Similar concerns have prompted Europeans to worry about the increased size of Germany after unification. Sometimes, birth rates are linked to political destabilization: Enloe described how U.S. national security officials viewed with trepidation the high fertility rates of women in some countries of strategic importance to the U.S., such as Egypt, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia because they 'would destabilize their regimes and make them dangerously susceptible to communist subversion'.²⁵

PRONATALIST POLICIES

When leaders are faced with evidence of declining birth rates or when they perceive a possible threat to birth rates, there are several courses of action that can be taken to forestall the altered demographic balance that they foresee.²⁶ Policies range from simply calling attention to the falling birth rates among the population to Draconian measures such as impregnating women of another ethnic group.²⁷ The ability with which leaders can take pronatalist steps such as those described below depends upon their control on the population and/or the respect that they command, as well as the extent of the supporting infrastructure that they need to rely on. Pronatalist policies are rarely declared to be what they are for fear of instigating controversy and anxiety, and are instead often masked as a policy for increasing standards of living.²⁸ Despite the sensitivity associated with such policies, Berelson notes that

The Demographic Struggle for Power

most of the more developed states are pursuing mild pronatalist policies to forestall their fertility declines.²⁹

(i) Encouragement

The least intrusive pronatalist policy is one in which large families are encouraged, family values are exalted, and family expansion is made a source of pride. Pronatalist pronouncements are made in speeches and writings by ethnic, religious and nationalist leaders. Appeals are made to the population to procreate both for personal reward and for social well-being.

(ii) Restrictions on birth control, especially legal abortions

Some pronatalist policies focus on the prevention of birth control. In the absence of birth control, including abortion, it is believed that women will of necessity conceive and give birth. Pronatalist policies sometimes allow birth control but prohibit abortion. Indeed, while numerous countries do not allow abortion (such as Italy and Spain), and others have outlawed it after allowing it for years (such as Romania in 1966 and Poland in 1993), in these countries other forms of birth control are available. It is when no methods of birth control, including abortion, are available, that the effect on fertility is especially marked³⁰ (as in Romania³¹).

Restrictions on birth control are sometimes accompanied by restrictions on divorce, forcing people into a communal existence that results in higher birth rates. In Romania, the government altered the divorce law so that divorce was only possible in rare instances.³² In some countries, divorces are encouraged if the marriages proved sterile, in order to enable procreation in another union (such as in Nazi Germany). Alternatively, countries encourage marriage by providing loans for student marriages (such as Poland).

It is not often that pronatalist policies are overtly aimed at selected ethnic groups. There is some evidence that Romania was more permissive of abortion for Gypsies, for example, than for Romanians.³³ Moreover, in Germany during World War II, Nazi pronatalist population policy dictated that the Aryan race should be enlarged, and in support of that goal, the means for controlling the population were gradually abolished in 1941.

Pronatalist Policies

(iii) Children and employment

Women who are in the labor force may be reluctant to have children for at least two reasons. First, fear of loss of seniority or even employment may prevent applications for maternity leave. Second, women fear they will not find adequate child care once they do go back to work (adequacy of child care is measured in terms of both availability and quality). As a study by Ann Bookman recently confirmed, issues of child care and leave are of crucial importance to over 50% of the female labor force.³⁴

Given these universal concerns of working mothers, in order to encourage births, governments have addressed both of these issues: some countries have legislated maternity leaves that are accompanied by several months at full pay (16 weeks in Luxembourg, 6 months in the former Yugoslavia) and the possibility of extended maternity leave at lower pay (in Hungary up to three years). In addition, women are assured of their rank upon their return, they are assured their job or one of equal rank, their promotion prospects are not frozen and their maternity time counts towards retirement. With respect to child care, some governments have increased the number of nurseries and day care centers, and have enlarged the capacity of existing ones. They have increased the pay of child care providers to attract workers and have extended the requirements for qualification for providers to improve the care they provide.

Sometimes, policy of pronatalist governments is rooted in a belief that fertility is inversely related to female employment. In that case, policy aims to curtail female employment opportunities and child care options in order for women to have little choice but to remain in the home (and, hopefully, procreate). This recently happened in post-communist Poland, when bishops 'supported cut-backs in day care, suggesting that women leave the workforce to ease unemployment'.³⁵ In Croatia, legislation eliminated numerous child care programs, as described below, with the goal of encouraging women to stay at home. In Russia, the Minister of Labor has proclaimed in 1995 that 'it's better that men work and women take care of the children'.³⁶

(iv) Financial inducements

Children are expensive. It has been estimated that income must increase by 40% in order to retain one's standard of living after having children.³⁷ If the cost of children can be offset, the relative price of children will

The Demographic Struggle for Power

decrease and the number of children produced will increase. This basic tenant of the microeconomic theory of fertility³⁸ has provided the basis for numerous pronatalist policies. In order to offset the cost of children, governments have provided some of the following: lump sum payments to parents for the birth of each child and children's allowances to be paid out over a period of years. The most direct approach is simply to pay people to procreate. Indeed, the decreasing birth rates in East Germany have recently prompted the state of Brandenburg to pay \$650 to parents for each new baby (such a direct payment method is also practiced in Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal).³⁹ This payment is in addition to the baby-related health care that is part of national health insurance, as well as the *Kindergeld*, the monthly allowance that is used for child rearing expenses (distributed in Western Germany since 1955). In France, parental allowance became a cornerstone of the electoral platform of candidate Jacques Chirac in 1995: the introduction of an allowance for mothers that produce more than one child was promised.⁴⁰ In Russia, a new system of child benefits was introduced, that includes a onetime payment for future mothers, a pregnancy allowance, a one-off payment at the time of the birth, monthly benefits until the child is 18 months old, and further monthly benefits until the children reaches age 16.⁴¹ Dill reports that the former Yugoslav republics are considering various pronatalist policies such as adding several years of pensionable service for each child born.⁴² Some governments provide loans at low interest rates to large families that have difficulty satisfying basic needs. These loans, tied to the birth of children, are to be used for housing which further enables even larger families. Finally, governments may also alter the tax structure to ease the burden of big families (such as in Greece in 1971).

RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC AND THIRD WORLD VIEWS ON NATALITY AND FAMILY PLANNING

Pronatalist inclinations of nationalist leaders are contrary to family planning programs that have been advocated across the globe, especially in the less developed countries. As a result, a vociferous negative response to family planning policies has emerged. Some leaders claim that global family planning efforts and policies have nothing to do with population but rather are related to underdevelopment (because at

Pronatalist Policies

higher levels of development, the population issue takes care of itself); others claim that the problem is depletion of resources and the inequality of that depletion (developed countries, with less than one quarter of the world's population, consume almost 80% of the world's resources⁴³); others say that the problem is the distribution of population growth, rather than the growth *per se* (some regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, are in fact under-populated, while others, notably parts of Asia, are over-populated). The above are negative responses to population control methods in general. However, there are also negative responses by particular groups that perceive population control efforts to be specifically directed at them. This type of response has been identified at the level of the religious group, the ethnic group and the economic-geographic group (namely the Third World). Thus, even in states in which the government officially takes an anti-natalist stand, ethnic leaders and populations may refuse to partake. Each group fears that it will limit its population while others will not, and thus they would be empowering their competitors. Such reasoning was clearly the case in Kenya, where, despite the leadership's support of family planning, tribal rivalries have contributed to the blossoming population growth.⁴⁴

However, the most important reasons why ethnic groups are concerned with inter-ethnic fertility differentials are political and economic. As discussed in chapter 2, the political aspects of demographic competition is rooted in the concept of power and representation: the greater the numbers of people, the greater the power of the group. The economic reason for competing in the birth race has to do with employment, production, consumption markets, investment, as well as pressure on education, housing, food, and infrastructure. Indeed, just like the North is concerned with over-population in the South because such population pressure affects it (in the form of migration), so too ethnic groups are worried about the encroachment on their territories and economies of faster-reproducing groups. Theories of migration point out that labor flows to regions of high economic growth in order to partake in the growth process. Thus, while cheap sources of labor may be welcome, they also carry a price, as evident by the following examples: Arabs go to Israel, Albanians go to Serbia, and 'Anglos' go to Quebec in search of employment. Differences in real income accentuate that migration. To the extent that employment opportunities do not grow at a rate that would keep unemployment down, ethnic differences in accessibility to employment opportunities may manifest themselves.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

With respect to food, similar arguments apply. While there is clear evidence that the world as a whole is not running out of food, but rather that the quantity of food is increasing over the years,⁴⁵ it is also clear that there are regional differences in the growth and distribution of food. By analogy, food availability among ethnic groups, to the extent that they inhabit distinct regions, is not equal.

(i) Natality, family planning and religious leaders

Religious leaders have the ability to influence their brethren in numerous ways through religious texts, through speeches and communications in places of worship, and through inter-personal contacts with their emissaries.⁴⁶ More indirectly, they also reach the population through the educational system. Thus, in regions where religion is taught in schools and in which religious education underlies the educational system, religious views on population have been effectively transmitted. Evidence of this is clear in a comparison between parochial educational institutions and secular educational systems, such as the Indian secular and missionary schools.

Roman Catholic doctrine is pronatalist. The Catholic Church clearly teaches that the purpose of intercourse is for procreation – every sexual act should have the possibility of creating new life. Day describes the ways in which Catholicism may be considered to be directly or indirectly pronatalist: there are teachings on the desirability of large families, settlement in rural areas, discouragement of employment of wives outside the home, discouragement of status-striving and migration to cities, and the exertion of political pressure against birth control.⁴⁷ There is evidence that strong loyalty to the Catholic Church is positively related to natality among Catholics.⁴⁸ However, this relationship seems to hold most clearly in the United States and less so in Catholic countries such as Italy, France, or Hungary.⁴⁹ Indeed, despite demands by the Catholic Church that its brethren not control their family size, the fact is that most women, to the extent that they have the information and ability, have taken matters into their own hands. Indeed, evidence from the most populated catholic country in the world, Brazil, shows that the average size of the family has dropped from 6 children in 1970 to slightly over 2 in the 1990s.⁵⁰ Under pressure from the Catholic Church, Poland outlawed abortion in 1993 after its free use for decades under communism.

Jewish religious law forbids contraception until a couple has had at

Pronatalist Policies

least one boy and one girl. Moreover, under religious law, a couple must refrain from sexual relations until two weeks after the woman begins menstruating. Consequently, the couple will resume relations exactly at the time when the woman is most likely to conceive. In addition, events such as the loss of lives during the Holocaust and the possibility of great losses in Israeli wars with neighboring states, have led to what has been described as a nationwide obsession with fertility (indeed, Israel has one in-vitro fertilization clinic for every 28,000 citizens, more than any other country in the world).⁵¹

Islam also has views on natality, although it is not exactly clear what these are: the *Koran's* teachings on procreation have been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some scholars have claimed that the *Koran* does not deny the right to plan one's family, and religious leaders (muftis) in countries such as Egypt and Pakistan have issued formal statements to this effect.⁵² Others, however, have claimed that the *Koran* forbids population planning. Adel Hussein, of the Federation of Islamic Countries Medical Organizations recently said, 'We declare that we are for the increase in population, in Egypt, in the Arab region and Islamic nation at large, we are for the increase in population to the highest level possible.'⁵³ To the extent that others do not agree with this goal, it is perceived that they 'are not thinking of our interests but are thinking in an antagonistic way against the Arab and Muslim nation'. Sheik Mohammed Ghazali, an Islamic preacher, said that efforts to control population, as expressed by the UN Conference on Population and Development, 'was a conspiracy by the West against Islam'.⁵⁴ Some Muslims claim that the enemies of Islam are 'working to destroy our main resource, which is our human strength'.⁵⁵ Moreover, the writings by the President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, are relevant in this discussion: in the *Islamic Declaration*, Izetbegovic states that Muslims cannot coexist with other ethnic groups, thereby implying that Muslims are not to intermarry with other groups and procreate with them.⁵⁶

Hindus in India perceive that the Muslims are shunning population control methods. This is due in part to the evidence of higher fertility rates among Indian Muslims than among Indian Hindus (during 1981–1991, the Hindu population of India rose by 22.8% while the Muslim rose by 32.8%⁵⁷), and in part to what they have been led to believe by some provocative writings and sayings on population. Wright cites the Indian Islamic journal *Radiance*, as well as a popular book on birth control for Muslim women, all of which reflected a negative

The Demographic Struggle for Power

position on birth control. Hindu scholars have added to this their analysis of the Muslim lifestyle, especially the practice of purdah and polygamy, and the result is a fertility fear expressed in writing such as that by Hendre:

The 10.7% of Muslims in 1961, in union with other religious groups, will numerically overtake the Hindus in 2051 so decisively that the Hindus will be at the mercy of the non-Hindus. ... [Indian Muslims] are directly encouraged by our democracy to multiply at a fast rate with a view to eventually overcome the Hindu majority. Hindus therefore must oppose family planning and either impose monogamy on the Muslims or amend the present Hindu code to enable Hindus to follow polygamy.⁵⁸

More recently, the Bharatiya Janata party has openly accused Muslims of deliberately aiming to outnumber Hindus.⁵⁹ As a result, militant Hindus are requesting a revision in the legal system in India which allows Muslims to practice polygamy, while it does not allow others the same privilege, as per the Muslim Personal Law.⁶⁰

The Russian Orthodox Church has begun discussing natality and speaking out against abortion after years of quiet in a country that boasted one of the highest rates of abortion per capita in the world. In spring 1994, the first Russian conference on abortion took place, co-sponsored by the Orthodox Church. Its importance is underscored by the fact that Patriarch Aleksy II, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, was invited to open the conference.⁶¹ While the message was not specifically aimed at Russians only, it did reflect the realization that Russian birth rates are declining.

(ii) Natality, family planning and ethnic leaders

Nationalist leaders in Russia have recently become vocal against the proliferation of foreign adoptions of Russian children. Since 1989, there has been an increase in adoptions by western families of abandoned children throughout the former Soviet bloc, but as in Romania, recent steps have been taken to discourage that trend. This reversal is the result of nationalist indignation that Russian babies are leaving Russia, and call for efforts to retain those babies in the motherland. As a result, a bill has recently passed by the Russian Parliament that requires a more

Pronatalist Policies

thorough search for Russian adoptive parents before children are released to foreigners.⁶²

In Croatia, the effort to strengthen the natality of the Croatian peoples has taken the following form. Under the program of 'Renewal of the Republic of Croatia', lawmakers passed a package of laws aimed at increasing the birth of Croat children.⁶³ These included the following: the elimination of the 'anti-life mentality' from books, television, media, and medicine; the effort to link Croatia with pro-natality movements in the West in order to work out a program of revitalization; draft legislation that will elevate the profession of 'the mother as educator of children'; the increase in child benefits; the replacement of working mothers with children from jobs 'unsuitable' for them; the alteration of the tax structure so as to benefit couples with children and discourage one or no child families; an effort to make divorces more difficult; and lastly, the elimination of child care programs to induce mothers to care for their children.

The emphasis that is being placed on natality among ethnic leaders manifests itself in Sarajevo, where the birth rate has been booming during the war. Indeed, there has been a 20% increase in births since the war broke out in 1992. While that birth boom may have something to do with shortage of birth control devices, as well as the nightly lack of electricity, at least some of it is due to a feeling, perpetrated by the leaders and the media, that the city will die out if its population does not procreate. People justify their natality with the following statements: 'if babies weren't being born, the city would die' or 'when we see how many children are being killed, we feel we have to have more'.⁶⁴ While there is not concrete evidence, anecdotal evidence indicates that this baby boom is limited to the Muslims of the city.

There is alarm among Serbs because of the falling population rate of Serbs relative to other former Yugoslav peoples: estimates are that by 2050, Serbs will be a minority in Serbia; in ten years (the mid 2010s) the Serbian population over 65 will be larger than that under 15. Moreover, Serbia has the highest abortion rate in Europe. In 1990, the natality of Serbs dropped to 11.4%, while that of the Croats was 12.5%, of Muslims 18.4% and of Albanians was 28.8%.⁶⁵ While president, Dobrica Cosic submitted to the Parliament a request for emergency deliberations on the population crisis; the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts had a meeting in May 1994 to discuss population issues. However, no clear resolutions were turned into action. In an interview,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Zeljko Raznjatovic (better known as Arkan) said he would like to see all Serb women to have four children if possible, to offset the Albanians 'who produce like rabbits'.⁶⁶

The pronatalist bias of ethnic leaders is further reinforced by elements of the transition from socialism to capitalism that has affected women throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. New legislation, coupled with changes in work ethic and social norms, have led to greater pressure and smaller choices for the post-communist woman. Sharon Wolchik shows how women in Eastern Europe have been made worse off by the transition: women's employment rates are reduced everywhere except in Hungary, their unemployment benefits are lower (since their wages continue to be lower), women face open discrimination now that the communist commitment to gender equality is gone, women feel the elimination of subsidized child care, etc.⁶⁷ All this leads to pressure on the woman to abandon the workplace and focus on the home and children (incidentally, it is therefore not surprising that women tend to feel they were better off under the old system and as a result tend to support parties of the left more than men).

(iii) Natality, family planning and Third World leaders

Some Third World leaders have taken a pronatalist stand, pointing out that family planning is a way to discourage population growth in the Third World in order for the West to retain its supremacy through 'demographic colonialism'. According to this view, rich countries pressure poor countries to curb their family size so as to maintain the status quo in which they dominate. It is thought that large numbers of Third World populations will inevitably spill over into the more developed world and thereby begin eroding the standard of living in the West. This type of thinking has roots in the neo-colonial experience and is tied to the dependency theory of underdevelopment. Moreover, the West has been accused of racism in its attack on natality since the population growth is more prominent among people with black, brown or yellow skins.⁶⁸ Yet, the population control advocates are mostly white-skinned. Population policies are even said to be a form of genocide of indigenous populations: this view is espoused by Rigoberta Menchu, the Nobel Peace Prize recipient from Guatemala who advocates that population policies be left to the individual Third World countries.⁶⁹ This view is shared by some private groups, such as the highly vocal

Pronatalist Policies

Brazilian Association of Doctors of the State of Guanabara, who protested that genocide was being conducted against the population in the family planning programs.⁷⁰ Sensitivity to western views on population control was at the root of the failure of Project Camelot, in which local distrust in a South American barrio for North American social scientists was misinterpreted as an effort to sterilize local children when the scientists claimed to be administering anti-measles vaccinations.⁷¹ Similarly, rural women in a remote Philippino village distrusted the tetanus shots that were given because they feared they were injectable contraceptives.⁷²

Given the prevalence of underutilized land in parts of the Third World, some Third World leaders believe that underpopulation is their problem. Colin Clark argued that growth of population could in fact be a stimulant for economic growth.⁷³ Indeed, a larger population would enable greater use of resources and thus be conducive to economic growth. Also, a larger population provides the basis for a modern division of labor within the economy, which also leads to economic growth. In addition, more population could protect under-populated border regions from expansionist neighbors. Hussein said 'in all the areas of Muslim society, perhaps we suffer from not having enough people to meet these resources and to develop these resources'.⁷⁴

Moreover, Third World leaders often view the overconsumption of world resources by the West as the culprit for environment pressures. According to this view, the West is responsible for the destruction of natural resources through its profligate consumption.⁷⁵ Those who uphold this view are demanding an equitable share of the global wealth and technology, rather than more population control methods.

As a result of the above, government attitudes towards population growth rates in some countries are clearly in favor of growth, despite great pressure by the international community. However, it is often difficult for Third World leaders to take a strong position of controlling births. Ivan Illich described this, especially with respect to Latin America: 'where can politicians afford to take a strong, positive stand ... Only a strongman could afford simultaneously to date traditional Catholics who speak about sin, communists who want to out-breed the United States imperialists, and nationalists who speak about colonizing vast unsettled expanses.'⁷⁶ Not all Third World leaders are opposed to family planning. Indeed, countries such as Indonesia, Colombia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe among others, have been

The Demographic Struggle for Power

very successful in curtailing their population growths in the course of two decades. Their methods, combined in a program called 'Partners in Population and Development: A South South Initiative' indicate that population planning need not be viewed as an imposition from the West (hence the south/south slant), nor does it have to be religion-specific or territory-specific: indeed, the countries above include Muslim, Buddhist and Christian cultures.⁷⁷

INTER-ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN DEATH RATES

Nationalist leaders that want to increase the birth rate of their populations in order to achieve political and economic goals can achieve those same goals if the death rate of their adversaries were to increase.

While it may be morally repugnant and politically incorrect to pursue a policy of death for target ethnic groups, it nevertheless has been a common practice throughout history. During wartime, maximizing the death toll of one's opponent is an acceptable goal. Genocide is also pursued in order to eliminate members of target ethnic or religious groups. The recent efforts of the Hutu and the Tutsi peoples to exterminate each other in Rwanda is but one example of many genocidal efforts (described in chapter 6). Short of genocide, there are other ways in which the population of an adversary may be affected. Germ warfare has been used against target peoples with the goal of their elimination, such as by the Iraqis against the Kurds. Accelerated death of a target population was a policy used against the native Americans by white folk: indeed, the spread of European diseases that the Indians had no resistance to, such as through the donations of blankets infested with smallpox, have been identified. Today, differences in medications available to different populations across the globe determine their health, and in part explain health differences between the Third World and the West. Even within the same state, health policies may be different for different ethnic groups: as indicated in the quote on page 1, in the United States black women receive inferior prenatal care than white women, leading to a higher infant mortality rate than among whites. Moreover, to the extent that ethnicity is related to economic status, then death rates may be said to correlate with ethnicity: in England it was found that the least privileged 'can expect to die eight years sooner than the most privileged', thus accentuating health inequality.⁷⁸

Pronatalist Policies

DATA ON BIRTH AND DEATH RATES

Table 4.1 contains data on birth rates, death rates, female literacy and female labor force participation, as well as the principal religion within the state.⁷⁹ Due to unavailability of disaggregated data at a regional level or by ethnicity, the table presents demographic values at the state level. While this aggregation obliterates intra-state differences in religion and birth rates, and fails to show values for minority populations, it was nevertheless included because it at least sheds light on the characteristics of majority populations. Due to the lack of complete and comparable statistics pertaining to religion, it was not possible to group countries by religion to observe the relationship between religion and other variables on the table. Possibly the differences in fertility across states are unrelated to religion and religious teachings on natality, but rather are determined by variables such as personal income, education, place of residence (rural or urban), etc.⁸⁰ Female education affects fertility insofar as it opens up alternatives for women, and to the extent that one ethnic or religious group controls women access to education, it also controls access to modernity and employment opportunities.

Table 4.1. Birth and death rates, religion, female literacy and female employment in selected regions

<i>Country/region</i>	<i>Principal religion (%, secondary religion)</i>	<i>Birth rate/death rate (per 1000 population), 1992</i>	<i>Female literacy (% of female population), 1990</i>	<i>Female employment of labor force</i>
AFRICA				
Sudan	Muslim (73; Traditional 17)	42/14	12	22
Nigeria	Muslim (45; Protestant 26)	43/14	39	34
Rwanda	Catholic (65; Traditional 17)	40/17	37	47
Uganda	Catholic (49; Protestant 29)	31/9	35	41
South Africa	Black Independ. Church (22; Afrikaans Reformed 12)	37/10	50 (total population)	36
MIDDLE EAST				
Lebanon	Muslim (60; Maronite Christian 50)	30/8	73	n.a.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

<i>Country/region</i>	<i>Principal religion (%, secondary religion)</i>	<i>Birth rate/death rate (per 1000 population), 1992</i>	<i>Female literacy (% of female population), 1990</i>	<i>Female employment of labor force</i>
Israel	Jewish (81; Muslim 14)	21/6	89	34
Turkey	Muslim (90)	28/7	71	34
Iraq	Muslim (Shiite 62; Sunni 34)	n.a.	49	
ASIA				
India-Punjab	Sikh (60; Hindu 40)	29/10		
India-Assam	Hindu (50)	29/10		
Sri Lanka	Buddhist (69; Hindu 16)	21/6	83	27
Indonesia	Muslim (87)	25/10	68	31
Pap. New Guinea	Protestant (58; Catholic 33)	33/10	38	35
China	Folk Religion (20) in Tibet: Tibetan Buddhism	19/8	62	43
Malaysia	Muslim (53; Buddhist 17)	28/5	70	n.a.
Myanmar	Buddhist (89)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Australia	Catholic (26)	15/8	>95	38
THE AMERICAS				
Guatemala	Catholic (75)	36/8	52	26
FORMER USSR				
Moldova	Orthodox (78)	17/10	n.a.	n.a.
Ukraine	Orthodox (Ukrainian Catholic)	12/13	n.a.	n.a.
Tajikistan	Muslim (apx. 85)	36/6	n.a.	n.a.
Russia-Chechnya	Muslim (80)			
Latvia	Lutheran (apx. 50; Orthodox apx. 30)	12/13	98	n.a.
EAST EUROPE				
Romania	Orthodox (80)	11/12	96 (total)	47
Albania	Muslim (65; Orthodox 20)	24/6	n.a.	41
Macedonia	Orthodox (70; Muslim 30)	17/7	84	n.a.
Yugos-Kosovo	Muslim (90)			
Croatia	Catholic (77; Orthodox 11)	12/11	92	n.a.
Bosnia	Muslim (45; Orthodox 35; Catholic 17)	14/6	n.a.	n.a.

Pronatalist Policies

<i>Country/region</i>	<i>Principal religion (%, secondary religion)</i>	<i>Birth rate/death rate (per 1000 population), 1992</i>	<i>Female literacy (% of female population), 1990</i>	<i>Female employment of labor force</i>
Bulgaria	Orthodox (27; atheist 64; Muslim 8)	10/12	n.a.	46
Cyprus#	Orthodox (82)	19/9	92	n.a.
WEST EUROPE				
Germany	Catholic (43)†	10/11	>95	39
Italy	Catholic (83)	10/10	>95	32
Spain	Catholic (97)	10/9	93	24
N. Ireland	Protestant (80; Catholic)			

pertains to Republic of Cyprus (Greek)

† pertains to West Germany only

CONCLUSIONS

Ethnic and religious leaders that urge procreation in order to increase their relative size are so enmeshed in their nationalist goals that they fail to consider the numerous negative implications of large increases in population, theirs or anyone else's. Among these implications are the pressures on natural resources and infrastructure, as well as the deterioration of household quality of life. While one may argue that technological change enables the sustenance of increasing numbers of people (as it has over the course of the past two centuries, while the neo-Malthusians have predicted doom), it is difficult to argue that the quality of life of women improves with increased population. Indeed, it is exactly those people that bear the greatest burden on the new increase in population size, namely women, that suffer the most long-term consequences. Indeed, there is sufficient convincing evidence that the position of women in society rises as her education and labor force participation rise, both of which are inversely related to her fertility. The encouragement of procreation, even if viewed from the point of view of improving the ranking of one's ethnic group, and therefore, by extension, of one's own, is bound to be in conflict with other goals of women that may wish to reap more benefits from economic development (Cynthia Enloe saw reason for concern for women as nationalist policies in Eastern Europe resulted in a deterioration of the quality of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

life of women⁸¹). The population is thus simultaneously given conflicting messages: the secular element in the leadership may promise modernization and a chance for advancement through family planning, while the religious or nationalist leadership conveys an opposing message.

The above considerations have not been pressing on the minds of most ethnic leaders, who have, in the early 1990s, rediscovered procreation as yet another way to wage the numbers war. However, the scope for inter-ethnic conflict due to such policies is enormous. Population programs and strategies that espouse differential pronatalist policies by ethnicity are not only morally repugnant, but are also potentially explosive. Such espousal, whether done publicly or *sub silentio*, is highly destabilizing and risky, resulting in social and economic disruption, political destabilization and possibly violent inter-ethnic conflict. The Soviet leadership encountered this destabilization when it embraced differential policies in the face of falling natality among the Slavic populations, coupled with the high birth rates of the Muslim republics.⁸² These effects of differential pronatalist policies also converged in India: the radical Hindu and Muslim groups had so agitated around the fertility issue that when Emergency was proclaimed (1976), their organizations were banned. Nevertheless, Indira Gandhi, then followed by Sanjay Gandhi, introduced the sterilization policy of family planning which was perceived as a direct provocation to Muslims and, according to Wright, ‘it was regarded as un-Islamic by orthodox Muslims’.⁸³ The response of the Muslims was riots in Delhi in 1976, which were in part responsible for the fall of the Gandhi government in the 1977 elections.

Differential pronatalist policies, whether real or perceived, must be viewed in the general context of changing world demographics and its link to world peace. To the extent that differential policies give rise to inter-ethnic conflict, they have far reaching ramifications on future prospects for peace and as such demand immediate attention. Indeed, Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’⁸⁴ and Kennedy’s ‘vast demographic-technological fault line’⁸⁵ are only some of the ways in which issues of differential pronatalist policies may play themselves out in an electrified atmosphere of competing nationalisms.

Pronatalist Policies

NOTES

- 1 C. Alison McIntosh, *Population Policy in Western Europe*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1983, p. 28.
- 2 S. L. Hendre, quoted by Wright in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 415.
- 3 Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 1.
- 4 Juan Bautista Alberti wrote this in 1853, and is quoted in Nicholas Sanchez-Albornoz, *The Population of Latin America*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, p. 151.
- 5 In this chapter, there will be greater focus on religious groups than in other chapters only because natality has been the focus of religious leaders (such as those of the Catholic church and Islam, and more recently the Orthodox Church also). However, for the sake of consistency and simplicity, all these groups will simply be referred to as ethnic groups.
- 6 Wright in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983; W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, 'Demographic Change and Politics', in W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, *Population, Politics and the Future of Southern Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973; William Alonso and Paul Starr, eds., *The Politics of Numbers*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1987.
- 7 See Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 22.
- 8 Amartya Sen, 'Population: Delusion and Reality', *The New York Review of Books*, 22 September 1994, p. 62.
- 9 For these reasons, Eberstadt says that 'false precision' underlies population projections. *Miami Herald*, 11 September 1994.
- 10 In Italy, there is a drop of 1% per year, it is the lowest rate of population growth in the world (*Wall Street Journal*, 18 June 1993). For Germany, see Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany', in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2, May/June 1994.
- 11 Sen, see in note 8, p. 62.
- 12 *The New York Times*, 6 March 1994.
- 13 *The New York Times*, 6 April 1994. It was noted here by Nicholas Eberstadt that these falls in birth rates, accompanied by dramatic increases in death rates, do not occur in states that are still communist. He says, 'is it entirely coincidental that every communist regime with falling death rates is still in power – China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam – while virtually every communist government that collapsed is reporting sharp deterioration in health?'.
- 14 *The New York Times*, 25 November 1994.
- 15 W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, 'Demographic Change and Politics' in W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, *Population, Politics and the Future of Southern Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 6.
- 16 Paul Kennedy, see in note 7, p. 40.
- 17 *Foreign Affairs*, winter, 1989–90, p. 13.
- 18 *The New York Times*, 4 September 1994.
- 19 Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia, 'The 1991 Census in Yugoslavia:

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- Statistics and Policy', Statistical Commission and Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva: Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1 May 1992, p. 9.
- 20 *Politika*, 4 July 1994.
- 21 Interview with Aleksandar Despic in *Politika*, 4 August 1994.
- 22 *Politika*, 4 July 1994.
- 23 S. L. Hendre, quoted in Wright, *The Ethnic Numbers Game*, p. 415.
- 24 Paul Kennedy, see in note 7, p. 34.
- 25 Cynthia Enloe, see in note 3, p. 16.
- 26 See Robert J. McIntyre, 'Pronatalist Programs in Eastern Europe', *Soviet Studies* vol. 27, no. 3, July 1975; C. Alison McIntosh, *Population Policy in Western Europe*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983; Bernard Berelson, *Population Policy in Developed Countries*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1974.
- 27 The latter is not considered in the text since it results in intimidation of a population rather than the alteration of the demographic structure since children born following inter-ethnic rape are usually rejected by both cultures (that of the rapist as well as that of the raphee). Examples of this occurred in the former Yugoslavia, where there have been reports of efforts to impregnate women, through rape, with children of another ethnic group during the civil war especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pregnant women were detained long enough to prevent abortions.
- 28 This is especially true in Western Europe, as shown by C. Alison McIntosh, *Population Policy in Western Europe*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983, p. 18.
- 29 Bernard Berelson, *Population Policy in Developed Countries*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1974, p. 773.
- 30 Moreover, pronatalist policies such as restricting abortions may have a negative long run effect on natality insofar as they may increase the death rate of women that undergo illegal abortions under unsafe conditions. Indeed, in the long run, women will adjust to laws preventing abortions, and to the extent that their health is negatively affected, so will their future childbearing possibilities.
- 31 In Romania, when faced with a drop in the crude birth rate during 1955–65, the government responded by restricting legal abortions, and banning the importation and manufacture of birth control.
- 32 This coupled with the pre-existing housing shortage, effectively helped raise the birth rate in the short run (it doubled in one year), but adjustments were made in the following years. See William Moskoff, 'Pronatalist Policies in Romania', in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 28, no. 3, April 1980.
- 33 Kathleen Hunt, 'The Romanian Baby Bazaar', *The New York Times Magazine*, 24 March 1991.
- 34 Ann Bookman, *Working Women Count*, Washington: U.S. Department of Labor (Women's Bureau), 1994, p. 7.
- 35 A statement by Catholics for a Free Choice, *The New York Times*, 2 September 1994.
- 36 *The Economist*, 12 August 1995, p. 46.
- 37 Interview with demographer Milos Macura on TV Channel 2, Belgrade Yugoslavia, 28 July 1995.

Pronatalist Policies

- 38 See Gary Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- 39 *The New York Times*, 25 November 1994.
- 40 *The Economist*, 27 May 1995, p. 42.
- 41 OMRI, *Daily Digest*, 15 September 1995.
- 42 Susan Dill, quoted in *Pembroke Associates' News*, vol 11, no. 1, 1994, p. 3. She adds that such pronatalist policies have been perceived in Croatia as asking women to 'raise soldiers for Croatia'.
- 43 Michael Todaro, *Economic Development*, Fifth Edition, New York: Longman, 1994, p. 202
- 44 Gillis etc., p. 179.
- 45 Indeed, the Malthusian prophecy of doom has proven incorrect. See statistics on food production provided by various issues of FAO, *Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics*.
- 46 To what extent do the populations actually heed their religious and ethnic leaders when they try to stimulate population growth? Ultimately, procreation, to the extent that it is a choice, is a personal choice. There are many factors that determine the degree to which they are heeded, many that we cannot even fathom. It is likely that under times of duress, women will feel more responsibility for society and reproduce. This is evidenced by the high rates of population growth in Israel, where the fear of the Arab neighbors permeates daily life. It is also clear that the Catholic religion is reaching more people in Northern Ireland, where there are external threats, than in countries such as Brazil. Indeed, the latter is the largest Catholic country in the world and, most studied show, that most of those Catholics ignore the church's teachings on population.
- 47 Lincoln H. Day, 'Catholicism and Fertility: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', in David Chaplin ed., *Population Policies and Growth in Latin America*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971, p. 38.
- 48 Ibid., p. 38.
- 49 Indeed, Day found that Catholics have high rates of natality under two conditions: when there exists a high level of economic development, and when Catholics constitute a minority within a society. Ibid., p. 43.
- 50 *The New York Times*, 7 September 1994.
- 51 *Wall Street Journal*, 4 May 1994.
- 52 Wright, see in note 6, p. 416.
- 53 Quoted in the *Miami Herald*, 30 August 1994.
- 54 *Miami Herald*, 30 August 1994.
- 55 Sheikh Mitwalli Shaarawi, a preacher from Egypt, is quoted in *The Economist*, 27 August 1994, p. 34.
- 56 Alija Izetbegovic, *The Islamic Declaration*, Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990.
- 57 *The Economist*, 19 August 1995, p. 31.
- 58 S. L. Hendre, *Hindus and Family Planning: A Socio-Political Demography*, Bombay: Supraja Prakashan, 1971 quoted in Theodore P. Wright Jr, p. 415.
- 59 *The Economist*, 19 August 1995, p. 31.
- 60 This law prevents the secular government from interfering with the Sharia – the religious law – when legislation is legislated by a non-Muslim parliament.
- 61 As it turned out, he was called away to Bosnia for an emergency, so others filled

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- his place. *The New York Times*, 19 May 1994.
- 62 See *The New York Times*, 8 December 1994.
- 63 These have been described in detail by Cynthia Enloe, see in note 3, pp. 241–3.
- 64 *Miami Herald*, 11 February 1994.
- 65 *Duga*, 28 May 1994, p. 4.
- 66 *Vanity Fair*, June 1994, p. 170.
- 67 Sharon Wolchik, 'Gender Issues During Transition', in *East-Central European Economies in Transition*, Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, Washington, November 1994.
- 68 See the *Wall Street Journal*, 22 August 1994.
- 69 She received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, and this pronouncement was the focus of several speeches at the time she received notoriety.
- 70 Vivian Xenia Epstein, 'The Politics of Population in Latin America', in David Chaplin, *Population Policies and Growth in Latin America*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971, p. 160.
- 71 Part of the problem was due to the fact that the vaccinations were labeled 'sterile'. See Charles D. Klemeyer and William E. Bertrand, 'Misapplied Cross-Cultural Research: A Case Study of an Ill-Fated Family Planning Research Project', in Margaret Stacey et al., eds., *Health and the Division of Labour*, London: Croom Helm, 1977, pp. 217–36.
- 72 *Wall Street Journal*, 8 September 1994.
- 73 Colin Clark, *Population Growth and Land Use*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1976.
- 74 *Miami Herald*, 30 August 1994.
- 75 The West, of course, does not have a monopoly on resource destruction.
- 76 Ivan Illich, 'Sexual Power and Political Potency', in David Chaplin, *Population Policies and Growth in Latin America*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971, p. 177.
- 77 See *The New York Times*, 7 September 1994.
- 78 *The Economist*, 17 September 1994, p. 63.
- 79 Censuses count populations using different yardsticks and different measures. How to count babies who died immediately after childbirth? If one day is the limit, then a different number of deaths will be counted than if seven days is the limit. A curious statistic showed up in Russian demographic statistics. From 1993 to 1994, 12% more people died in one quarter in the latter year than they did the previous year (*The Economist*, 9 July 1994, p. 50). It turns out that under the Soviet system, a baby that died within the first seven days was not recorded in deaths. Since 1994, they are, thus increasing the numbers of people dead. Thus, depending upon which yardstick is used, same ethnic groups living under different censuses will have different death rates, a fact that may be interpreted as genocide (or infanticide?) by some.
- 80 The birth rate tends to be higher among less educated females, in the rural areas, in low income households. Also, since communist ideology supported female education and employment, the formerly communist countries consistently exhibit high levels of female employment and literacy.
- 81 Cynthia Enloe, see in note 3.
- 82 See, among others, David Heer, 'Three Issues in Soviet Population Policy', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 3, no. 3, September 1977. In 1981, the

Pronatalist Policies

leadership did in fact devise a differential plan that was somehow found to be acceptable.

- 83 Wright, see in note 6, p. 417.
- 84 Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993.
- 85 On one side are the fast-growing adolescent, undercapitalized, undereducated societies; on the other the rich, technologically inventive yet demographically aging population.' He says that these exist in the Mediterranean, between Europe and North Africa, as well as along the Rio Grande in North America, between the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of Asia, etc. (*International Herald Tribune*, 23–24 July 1994).

This page intentionally left blank

5

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

Where majority and minority are distinguished by religion
... conversion of unbelievers to the true faith is the method
of reversing their ratio.

THEODORE WRIGHT¹

Language is a symbol of domination.

DONALD HOROWITZ²

ASSIMILATION REFERS TO the elimination of differences between peoples, as smaller (or weaker) ethnic groups conform to the larger, dominant or titular group. Assimilation of peoples of varying religions, cultures, languages or ethnic backgrounds alters the composition of a population. Indeed, if people define themselves by any of these characteristics, and they convert their religion and cease using their native language in favor of another, then the relative size of groups is altered. Thus, assimilation is an important tool in simultaneously increasing numbers of one group and diminishing the size and consequently the political potential of other groups. Assimilation is a weapon in the war of numbers. In an atmosphere of competing nationalisms, where time is of the essence, methods of assimilation that are fast and efficient are preferable to those whose results are only revealed in the long run.

Assimilation can be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary assimilation is encouraged by the dominant culture and eagerly accepted by the minority individual. Indeed, immigrants to the New World attempted to rapidly assimilate; even assimilation into 'created-identities' such as Yugoslavs or the Soviets was a voluntary process. However,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

these voluntary assimilations, while they do tilt the demographic balance among populations, do so over a long period of time. This chapter deals with involuntary assimilation which occurs under threat and duress, as the dominant peoples strive to justify their leadership and solidify their power base by abruptly and quickly increasing their numbers.

ASSIMILATION

(i) What it is; what it isn't

Theories of assimilation abound in the social sciences, as sociologists, political scientists, international relations specialists and anthropologists have addressed the issue at length. One set of theories claims that smaller ethnic groups are assimilated into the dominant group as a result of modernization and that such a process cannot be arrested. Others yet view the process of assimilation as a coercive process, one that reflects exploitation of a minority by a dominant group, thus it carries the name *internal colonialism*. The theoretical debate on which form of assimilation least fosters inter-ethnic conflict has not abated. Moreover, on a practical level, government policies of assimilation of ethnic groups within society have been in flux: while efforts at assimilation were common for decades, at present integration of separate cultures seems to be the preferable option.

The terms integration and assimilation are often used in conjunction with each other. Assimilation refers to the acceptance of another's culture (or language or religion or values) and the simultaneous loss of one's own traditional characteristics.³ According to Gurr, assimilation 'is an individualistic strategy that gives people incentives and opportunities to subordinate or abandon old communal identities and adopt the language, values, and behaviours of the dominant group'.⁴ Integration is a broader term than assimilation. It takes place in social, economic, and political spheres. Within each of these, Birch has identified several gradations.⁵ With respect to social integration, the gradations include assimilation (entailing the complete loss of distinctive features of a society and the full acceptance of another), 'melting pot' (referring to a mixture of cultures that gives rise to a blend), and cultural pluralism (in which different cultures retain their distinctiveness while becoming

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

part of the larger society). Within economic integration, there is full and partial segregation (in the former, there is no relation between ethnicity and economic advantage, income or occupation; segregation, such as in South Africa, indicates total segregation in economic factors based on ethnicity. Partial segregation lies in between). Within political integration, there is political assimilation, accommodation, ethnic conflict and majority control. With respect to political integration, assimilation implies that ethnicity plays no part in politics, accommodation refers to those conditions so that minorities do not feel left out of the political process, ethnic conflict results when there is little inclination towards compromise, and finally, in majority control, minority ethnic groups are completely excluded from the normal channels of power, such as blacks in South Africa during apartheid. Thus, integration is a broader term than assimilation and it underscores what the groups have in common rather than their differences.

Assimilation can also be further subdivided into types. Indeed, Gordon distinguishes between several types of assimilation: cultural (change of cultural patterns to those of host society), structural (large scale entrance into clubs and institutions of host society), marital (large scale intermarriage), identificational (development of sense of peoplehood based on host society), attitude receptional (absence of prejudice), behavior receptional (absence of discrimination) and civic (absence of value and power conflict).⁶

In this chapter, the emphasis is on assimilation, because only total immersion in an alien culture will show up in the demographic statistics. Integration that is pluralistic in intent and focus will instead foster the coexistence of cultures, and thus fails to satisfy impatient nationalist leaders in their demographic struggle for power.

(ii) Methods of assimilation

As mentioned above, minority ethnic groups within a state become part of the majority either voluntarily (with no external prodding) or involuntarily.⁷ Voluntary assimilation is positively related to modernization, economic development, and industrialization: during those processes, forces emerge that act to pull individuals into the mainstream (majority) culture and away from fringe (minority) characteristics. As a result of pragmatic assessments of the demands society places on the minority individual, total or partial acceptance of majority culture (language,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

values, etc.) is often the result of a cost/benefit analysis that underscores the large benefits of assimilation relative to costs. Indeed, success in the modern world is often tied to the degree of assimilation into the mainstream culture.

However, not all assimilation occurs spontaneously and voluntarily. If ethnic or religious leaders wish to alter relative numbers within their state, they must take active steps to either speed up the process of voluntary assimilation, or to facilitate, encourage and otherwise involuntarily force people to assimilate. The following policies foster assimilation:

(1) *Negation of the existence of minorities* Some governments have simply chosen to negate the existence of minorities on their territory (for example, in Turkey, the Kurdish population was not acknowledged, thus assimilation was not overt policy since there were no non-Turks to assimilate.⁸ Similarly, the German government continues to claim that Germany is a homogeneous state, despite the growing number of *gastarbeiter* fueling its economy⁹). With avenues of expression of ethnic differences blocked, minorities may find the resistance to assimilation too difficult to sustain over the long run. Conversion into dominant culture often follows, although examples exist in which existential denial of a people has in fact increased their resiliency (for example, the Bahai's in Iran, while they have dispersed among more tolerant Middle Eastern countries, have by no means converted *en masse*).

(2) *Education* Assimilation is carried out through the educational system which strives to socialize individuals by advocating their common characteristics rather than their distinctions. The educational system is one of the most effective methods of assimilation insofar as it reaches individuals at an early age and can control their minds over an extended period of time. For that reason, education is crucial to the concept of national integration and state-building. Since the educational system is an instrument of socialization, the curricula tend to serve national purposes. Examples of countries in which schools are used for assimilation purposes include the United States, where public schools students are expected to salute the flag daily, take courses in civics and are exposed to the President's photograph in each classroom. In South Korea, pupils spend class time learning the '26 virtues' concerning

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

family, nation and future unification with North Korea. In Taiwan, children are taught ‘moral education’ on a weekly basis, while in Singapore, ‘moral education’ is the only subject never taught in English, indicating the affinity of morality with the local language.¹⁰

(3) *Language* Language is the glue that holds societies together, therefore language policy constitutes the backbone of a country’s assimilation efforts. If there is a common language that is used by the majority, it is likely to be adopted as the official language (as French in France). Sometimes, ethnic leaders will force the official use of their language even if it is not the majority language (for example, the use of Russian in Tajikistan before 1990). The official adoption of a neutral language that is not claimed by any of the member groups may reduce the possibility of inter-ethnic tension. For example, India retained English as the state language to avoid the choice among 14 major national languages; South Africa is considering using English rather than Afrikaans because the latter is associated with apartheid (despite the fact that more people speak Afrikaans than English (44% versus 40%), English is more useful as a ‘politically correct’, neutral language).¹¹ The widespread introduction of compound languages, such as Esperanto, is largely viewed as impractical in this era of nationalism in which language is perceived as a national symbol.

(4) *Symbols* Some leaders introduce symbols of nationhood that serve to convey to the population that by assimilating, they too will partake in all the benefits connoted by those symbols. Symbols that provoke pride and a sense of belonging include the national anthem, national holidays, the national airline, sports teams, national folklore ensembles, etc.

(5) *Institutions* The proliferation of institutions that represent the assimilated peoples in society is useful in cajoling minorities to join the dominant culture. When the benefits of assimilation are presented clearly to the minorities, their desire to retain their differentiation dwindles as their personal cost/benefit outcome changes. Indeed, participation in the political system and benefitting from distributive fiscal policy, are but some of the measures, discussed in chapter 8, that provide incentive for assimilation.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

COERCED ASSIMILATION

Involuntary assimilation requires coercion, which entails a cost. Part of that cost may be in political terms as the pressured peoples vent their resentment against those exercising power. Nordlinger claimed that, unless people voluntarily want to assimilate, pressures towards assimilation will be viewed with hostility and may provoke further ethnic conflict.¹² McGarry and O'Leary also wrote about the role of assimilation in the intensification of inter-ethnic conflict: they claim that assimilation cannot be successful if it happens only on the terms of one group (its language, culture, religion and national myth) because then what is under discussion is annexation and ethnocide. Such assimilation requires coercion, including compulsory education in a selected language and the imposition of educational standards (such as the Russification of schools throughout the Soviet Union; the schooling of black South Africans in Afrikaans; the Romanization in Transylvania¹³). It is these involuntary efforts at assimilation, which occur with the explicit goal of increasing the size of one ethnic group at the expense of another, that are discussed below.

(i) Linguistic conversions

While it is understandable that ethnic leaders want to encourage linguistic conversion, it may not be immediately clear why the population is resistant to it. Indeed, voluntary adoption of a new language should be easy, since language is the passport to middle class jobs and aspirations. Moreover, language acts as a social and political barrier for those outside the mainstream. Nevertheless, ethnic groups often resist the adoption of foreign tongues. In part, this is due to the powerful symbolism associated with language: language is associated with the myth of origin, group folklore, group unity, etc. Thus, when minorities demand linguistic parity, they are not only asking for language rights, but rather a broad range of cultural rights that have come to be an extension of language. Indeed, Horowitz said that 'linguistic parity is transparent code for equality more generally'.¹⁴ To the extent that nationalism has some defining characteristics and some symbols that bind its adherents, language is among the most important of those. Language is an expression of the character of a peoples. Indeed, when a non-titular peoples press for cultural rights within a dominant culture,

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

the right to use their language is primary. Thus, the language programme is crucial because it is viewed both as an instrument of history, through which the group identifies itself, and it is the symbol of the future, through which a program for the future may be formulated and executed. For this reason, Hroch lists a common language as imperative to national revivals and nationalist movements.¹⁵ The example of Albania clearly underscores the relevance of language in defining a program for the future. First, the lack of a written Albanian language was an impediment to state formation: when Albanian representatives pressed the international community for statehood, Bismark responded, ‘But you haven’t even gotten an alphabet or a written language. How do you expect to create a State?’¹⁶ Second, the unification of Albanian dialects became synonymous with nation-building: the Ghegs were the majority, spoke one dialect and favored the Arabic alphabet, while the Tosks tended towards the Roman alphabet (they were more educated and had ties with the Albanian diaspora). It was then decided to use the dialect of Elbasan, between the north and south as it was understandable to both groups,¹⁷ and to use the Roman script which, it was deemed, would make them more acceptable in the west.

When there are competing nationalisms that do not allow for wasting time in the war of numbers, then unplanned assimilation cannot be allowed to take its course, but rather stringent language policies are enforced. Among the coercive methods of linguistic conversions that have been used across the globe, the two broadest categories include the outright prohibition of a minority language, and the discouragement of the use of the non-official language.

(1) *Prohibition of minority language* Leaders have prohibited the use of minority languages in both public and private with the goal of forcing assimilation into the dominant language. In the previous century, the French punished children that were heard using the Breton language while the English prohibited the use of Welsh in schools. In this century, Italy introduced a policy of Italianization of the Germanic population in Alto Adige in 1922.¹⁸ At this time, German was banned in public schools and Italian became compulsory. In Bulgaria, Turks were not allowed to use their language as part of a Bulgarization of Turks that took place during the 1970s. In Macedonia between the two world wars, the Bulgarian language was prohibited by the Serbian authorities.¹⁹ In post-independence Macedonia, the Ministry of Education banned

The Demographic Struggle for Power

classes outside the state educational system. As a result, in 1995 Turkish-language schools were torn down by the authorities.²⁰

(2) *Discouragement of non-official languages* In some cases, ethnic leaders have condoned the existence and use of minority languages, but discouraged their use in favor of an official language. Examples abound. In 1956, elections in Sri Lanka brought to power a coalition that favored making Sinhala the sole official language of government. Despite the fact that use of minority languages was not illegal, language became the issue behind the 1958 Tamil-Sinhalese language riots. In Bosnia in the 1990s, there has been a rise in Islamic teaching in schools and the introduction of imported Turkish expressions into Serbo-Croatian: presently, children are required to say 'merhaba' for hello, and 'selam azejkum' for 'good day'.²¹ Moldova passed a law in 1989, replacing Russian by Romanian as the official language and cyrillic by Roman as the official script. Non-Romanian native speakers previously employed in leadership positions were required to prove language proficiency through testing.²² Albanian authorities have shut down primary schools that teach in Greek (on the grounds that they have too few students) while Greeks claim that they have been prevented from setting up private schools.²³ In Estonia, Russians (as all foreigners) must pass a competency exam in order to retain their jobs.²⁴

Bulgarian language policy with respect to its Turkish minority, was so broad that it included names. During the mid-1980s, the Bulgarian government engaged in massive Bulgarization of the Turkish population by compulsory name changes (similar to that instituted by the Italian government in the 1920s in the Alto Adige, when German family and place names were Italianized). Those who resisted assimilation were pressured into emigrating, resulting in the expulsion of up to 300,000 Turks (this was an integral part of a broad policy of ethnic homogenization, for which the former President Zivkov now stands trial²⁵). The new government is more liberal in its language policy, although a proposal to allow the use of Turkish as a second official language in the military was rejected by the Bulgarian Parliament in June 1994.²⁶

While not espousing coercion in language policies, some states are characterized by the lack of official equality between minority and majority languages. Government policies differ with respect to the tolerance awarded to minority languages: at one extreme is the highly permissive language policy (such as in former Yugoslavia), at the other

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

extreme is the restrictive policy (such as in France). In France, some allowance is made for indigenous languages (such as Breton) but not for foreign languages (such as the Arabic of the Maghrebis). Some states tolerate bilingualism, such as Belgium and Canada, others operate with several languages, such as the former Yugoslavia, India and Spain. Indeed, in former Yugoslavia and India, there exists a plurality of official languages, and only in the army is there use of a single language. In Spain, one quarter of the population uses a tongue other than Castilian. Thus, while the constitution claims that Castilian is the official language across Spain, the Autonomous Communities may designate their languages as 'co-official' with Castilian (this happened with Catalan, Euskeria (Basque language), Galician, Valencian and Majorcan).²⁷

RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS

When religion is the distinguishing factor among peoples, then religious conversions serve to augment the numbers of one group relative to another. Despite the fact that religion is a more personal matter than language or race insofar as religion is not immediately visible (such as race is) nor does it emerge in contact (as language does), in times of nationalist awareness, religion is crucial in fostering and supporting a political and economic structure. Religion is also a major source of conflict. Indeed, numerous ongoing conflicts across the globe have inter-religious intolerance at their root. The fact that the Southern Sudanese rebel groups are Christian in a state populated by a Muslim majority cannot be discounted, nor can the fact that the Karen are Christians while Myanmar's official religion is Buddhism. The role of religions is even more poignant in the case of Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kashmir and Sri Lanka. It seems that the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (he who controls the area, controls the religion) is applied in reverse, so that he who controls the religion in an area, controls the area.

Since it is impossible to assess just how much religious conversion is the result of coercion and how much of persuasion, it is difficult to claim foul play. In some situations, persuasion is the likely reason for conversion. Indeed, some individuals are attracted by aspects of other religions, such as the untouchables or low-caste Hindus who are attracted to Islam because of its egalitarianism. Alternatively, some are

The Demographic Struggle for Power

attracted to Protestantism because of its association with the work ethic. However, some religions are by nature more forceful in their persuasion of non-believers: proselytizing, for example is an acceptable characteristic of Catholicism and Islam. Proselytizing, while generally voluntary, has also been known to include some measure of force. Indeed, militant Christianity and Islam were not hesitant about forced conversions: according to Gurr, 'Militant Christianity and Islam used the sword to subjugate heretics and infidels who were reluctant to adopt the true faith or to acknowledge the rightful heir of the prophet.'²⁸ In Islam, *Jihad* is said to be the Muslim version of crusades,²⁹ and in some form has been at the root of fighting in Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine and Bosnia. However, Islam is not the only religion that has entertained compulsory conversions. In his book on compulsory religious conversions, Dedijer says 'history demonstrates numerous examples of compulsory conversions in Christianity. All Christian churches have taken part: the Roman Catholics, the Anglicans, the Protestants, and the Orthodox, as well as numerous sects such as the Baptists.'³⁰

The religious map of the world is what it is as a result of centuries of conversions, voluntary and involuntary. Indeed, Islam came to South Asia through the work of missionaries, Catholicism came to South America also by missionaries, and Christianity in general, to the extent that it penetrated Africa and Asia, did so through missionary work. The residents of the Balkans converted to Islam during the rule of the Ottoman Empire and Jews in Spain converted or were banished from the Iberian peninsula. In modern Europe, a galling example of mass efforts at conversion was that of the Serbs in Croatia during World War II, when the policy of the Croatian government was to engage in mass conversions. According to Mile Budak, the Minister of Education, this policy was expressed in the following way: 'One-third of the Serbs we shall kill, another we shall deport, and the last we shall force to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and thus meld them into Croats.'³¹

In the 1990s, examples of intolerance towards non-majority religions are too common to enumerate. Sometimes this intolerance translates into harassment that would be deemed illegal in most western democracies. However, harassment persists in environments in which the legal system does not protect individuals irrespective of religion, and/or in which the goal is to break the will of the people to force conversion. For example, in Iran, the Baha'i's (a sect of Islam) has 3 million adherents as well as in adjoining countries, but in Iran it is not officially

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

considered a religion. From 1978–1985, the Iranian government persecuted members of the sect. In 1983, it became a crime to be a Baha'i, and Baha'i owned enterprises were confiscated, children born to Baha'i's were illegitimate.³²

Coerced religious conversions are very successful when individuals are threatened with death. While it is difficult to measure the magnitude of such practices, it is useful to acknowledge their existence in the current configuration and size of religious affiliations across the globe. Examples include the following. Armenian women in Turkey were prepared for deportation and massacre during 1915–1916, and were then offered the option of immediate conversion to Islam through marriage to a Muslim and the surrender of children to be brought up as Muslims.³³ Serbs were given a similar choice during World War II: Kuper describes 'some Catholic priests ... conducted ceremonies of forced conversion by which thousands of Serbs escaped massacre'.³⁴ In Croatia in the 1990s, Orthodox children have to attend Catholic religious classes. According to the EU mission, some 15,000 Serbian children have thus become Catholicized.³⁵

In the absence of outright force, with the penalty of death or expulsion in the case of refusal, incentives are devised to encourage the population to convert. In colonial times, the distribution of social rewards within Christian society occurred through religion. According to Francis, in South Africa, by differentiating between baptized and nonbaptized, the colonizers could exclude the non-Christians from the system of distributing social rewards.³⁶ Thus, converting implied access to rewards (economic incentives of conversion are discussed at length in chapter 8).

Minority religious groups are concerned with conversions by dominant religions. While few precautionary steps can be taken by individuals, governments are taking a stand against encroaching religions from outside their borders. In India, Hindu nationalist parties have tried to enact laws forbidding proselytization of converts from other faiths. During the rule of the Janata Party (late 1970s), a 'Freedom of Religion' Bill was introduced in parliament which would have prohibited the use of force or intimidation in the conversion process.³⁷ In China, Christian conversions are not tolerated and people who engage in them are harassed.³⁸ In Russia, efforts are made by the state and the Orthodox church to decrease the number of Western sects that are allowed to operate and distribute information within the state.

CITIZENSHIP

Assimilation also entails the granting of citizenship to members of different ethnic groups, religions and languages.³⁹ When people acquire the citizenship of a country, their sense of belonging to the state, and their capacity and incentive to assimilate into its culture increases. However, in the 1990s, the question of who has the right to claim citizenship and who doesn't has caused an escalation in inter-ethnic conflict. Instead of embracing people of various ethnic groups into the state population, and thus increasing the total number of people (as occurred in the United States at the turn of the century), there is evidence across the globe of the emergence of stricter rules pertaining to citizenship rights in an effort to weed out undesirable groups. New eligibility restrictions underscore the fact that relative numbers of target ethnic groups are more important to leaders than total population numbers. In addition to the highly publicized cases of individuals living at airports for years due to unresolved citizenship rights,⁴⁰ large numbers of peoples may be displaced or have rights denied them simply because the rules of citizenship have been altered. Indeed, even in Israel, where the Law of Return grants every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship, the government is currently under pressure to alter that arrangement.⁴¹ Moreover, Christians cannot become citizens of Middle Eastern countries except with difficulty.⁴² In Eastern Europe, Czechs have introduced laws that effectively deny citizenship to some 20,000 Gypsies (10% of the total Gypsy population).⁴³ However, no current case of citizenship denial has been as large scale as that of the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet Union.

The number of Russian post World War II immigrants to Lithuania was relatively small, so they were granted immediate citizenship. Bildt claims that before World War II, Russians constituted less than 10% of the population, while 'Soviet policies of heavy industrialization and deliberate demographic change gradually brought wave upon wave of Russian immigrants'.⁴⁴ After independence in 1991, new standards for citizenship were set: a certain number of years of residence, declaration of loyalty to the new state, and a knowledge of the new official language. This law was harsh insofar as it included a quota of only 2,000 resident aliens per year to be granted citizenship. Amidst a furor, the law was amended to provide for naturalization of most non-citizens by the year 2000. In Estonia, residents need only two years of residency, and a

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

language test in order to attain citizenship (among the Russians that found themselves in Estonia at the time of independence, some 48,000 have opted to become Russian citizens, while some 65,000 are undecided as to whether to take Estonian papers⁴⁵). In Latvia, Latvians are virtually a minority in their own country. According to the 1990 census, Latvia has a population of 1.4 million Latvians, 900,000 Russians, 120,000 Belorussians and 100,000 Ukrainians.⁴⁶ As a result the citizenship regulations in Latvia are highly restrictive.

These citizenship rules in the Baltic states are having a positive demographic impact on Russians and Russia. With respect to the former, the harsh rules for citizenship in Latvia have also caused many of the 80,000 Ukrainians in Latvia to take Russian citizenship (70% of which were born in Ukraine).⁴⁷ Given that they cannot get Latvian citizenship except with difficulty, they have opted for Russian since Ukraine does not grant citizenship to those that do not reside there. This Ukrainian administrative ruling will greatly tilt the demographic balance in favor of Russians in Latvia.

Another example of demographic benefits to the Russians is the large number of Armenians that have applied for Russian citizenship: some 10,000 have registered with the Russian Embassy in Erevan for citizenship and future emigration to Russia.⁴⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Assimilation takes place in the spheres of religion and language most easily and is most successful among people who are culturally similar to the dominant group. When race is the distinguishing feature, assimilation efforts become irrelevant. When the goal is to increase relative numbers, and when the distinguishing characteristic between peoples is language or religion, governments are known to have resorted to mass conversions. In these cases, people are forcibly converted with choices for alternatives limited to death or expulsion. A precondition to such coerced assimilation is the destruction of the former culture (ethnocide).⁴⁹ Alternatively, assimilation policies may be passive, such as when populations are encouraged, cajoled and stimulated to convert. The prize may be acceptance into the dominant culture or financial gain (for example, the Ottoman empire in its Balkan dominions was known to have compensated and rewarded those that converted to Islam).

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Forced assimilation has been a characteristic of inter-ethnic relations throughout history and continues to be so in the modern period. Because proving coercion is difficult, there are few cases in which it unequivocally underlies assimilation. Indeed, it is rarely clear if a minority individual accepts the dominant language in order to advance in his career, or whether the minority individual changes religions because he has 'seen the light' or because he perceives it to be necessary in order to retain his land. What is clear is that through such voluntary or involuntary changes, the ethnic, religious and linguistic picture of the world has been altered. As a result of such changes, censuses that measure the composition of the population by religion and language indicate shifts in relative sizes. How the conversions took place, the circumstances, and the relative degree of coercion become irrelevant. In the demographic struggle for power, the end justifies the means.

NOTES

- 1 Theodore Wright, 'The Ethnic Numbers Game in India: Hindu–Muslim Conflicts Over Conversion, Family Planning, Migration and the Census' in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 407.
- 2 Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 219.
- 3 Anthropologists have favored the term 'acculturation' which has a slightly narrower meaning.
- 4 Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, p. 308.
- 5 Anthony Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 49.
- 6 Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 71.
- 7 Birch, see in note 5, p. 36, calls this distinction 'planned' and 'unplanned integration'.
- 8 The origins of this policy of negation lie with the repudiation of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 that recognized the right of Kurds to establish their state after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Kemal Ataturk repudiated this treaty two years after it was signed, and the new one, of Lausanne (1923), contained no mention of Kurds. See Omar Sheikhoous, 'The Kurdish Question in Regional Politics: Possible Peaceful Solutions', in Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., *Internal Conflict and Governance*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 131.
- 9 Nevertheless, Germany does have very liberal laws pertaining to immigrants and their integration. See Marilyn Hoskin and Roy Fitzgerald, 'Public Acceptance of Racial and Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative Analysis', in Anthony Messina et al., eds., *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial*

Involuntary and Induced Assimilation

- Democracies*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 53.
- 10 *The Economist*, 8 October 1994, p. 39.
- 11 *The Economist*, 17 September 1994, p. 48.
- 12 Nordlinger quoted in John McCarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict*, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 20.
- 13 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
- 14 Horowitz, see in note 2, p. 220.
- 15 Miroslav Hroch, 'Linguistic Conflicts in Eastern Europe and Their Historical Parallels', in Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga Vorkunova, eds., *Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World*, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 200.
- 16 Quoted in P. Pipinelis, *Europe and the Albanian Question*, Chicago: Argonaut Inc., 1963, p. 24.
- 17 Brian Weinstein, 'Language Planning as an Aid and a Barrier to Irredentism' in Naomi Chazan, ed., *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, p. 123.
- 18 Those who were not assimilated by 1939 were allowed to migrate north of the Alps (Gurr, see in note 4, p. 157).
- 19 After the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, Macedonia was split between Bulgaria (19%), Greece (about half) and Serbia got the rest. According to Palmer and King, 'The Serbian government began a religious, educational and political campaign in Vardar Macedonia to reorient the pro-Bulgarian Macedonians'. Even after the first world war, Bulgarian speech was forbidden. Stephen E. Palmer and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971, p. 8
- 20 OMRI, *Daily Digest*, no. 113, 12 June 1995.
- 21 *The New York Times*, 12 May 1994.
- 22 This law was suspended in 2 April 1994 (*The New York Times*, 2 April 1994).
- 23 *The Economist*, 17 September 1994, p. 59.
- 24 After years in which Russian was the primary language, the new state is reversing that legislation. After Estonian, English has become the second language, and Russian, while available in some schools, is not very popular. Increasingly, this is causing the emergence of a bipolar culture, in which the schism between the young people is vast.
- 25 RFE/RL, *Daily Report*, 16 November 1993.
- 26 RFE/RL, *Daily Report*, 5 July 1994, p. 7.
- 27 See Robert P. Clark, 'Spanish Democracy and Regional Democracy', in Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson, eds., *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, p. 18.
- 28 Gurr, see in note 4, p. 34.
- 29 Wright, see in note 1, p. 407.
- 30 Vladimir Dedijer, *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs during World War II*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Press, 1992.
- 31 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, p. 116. Also see Dedijer, p. 141. Also, see Edmond Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia: A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres*, Chicago: The American Institute of Balkan Affairs, 1961.
- 32 Gurr, see in note 4, p. 243. Moreover, in Macedonia, where the official religion is Macedonian Orthodox, part of the Christian Orthodox church, there is overt

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- harassment of the Serbian Orthodoxy: Serb Orthodox priests have been expelled from Macedonia, demonstrating intolerance and inflexibility, rites in Serbian have been banned, and priests are harassed, just as Greek Orthodox priests have been harassed in neighboring Islamic Albania (*Serbian Unity Congress Bulletin*, No. 44, 28 January 1994).
- 33 Leo Kuper, *Genocide*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981, p. 110.
- 34 Ibid., p. 89.
- 35 *Srpska Stvarnost*, 3 November 1994, p. 22.
- 36 E. K. Francis, *Inter-ethnic Relations*, New York: Elsevier, 1976, p. 357.
- 37 Wright, see in note 1, p. 414.
- 38 *Wall Street Journal*, 29 September 1994.
- 39 Citizenship is easily verifiable while religion is not. In situations in which race is the decisive factor, group identity is easily recognizable. Indeed, color of skin enabled the effective monitoring of apartheid rules in South Africa. However, when it is not possible to distinguish between peoples, then some other form is necessary. The obligatory carrying of identity cards, and the right of law enforcement personnel to check on those is one way of monitoring who has assimilated (it may also foster a system of legalized discrimination). Examples abound: in Burundi, under the rule of Juvenal Habyarimana, discrimination against the Tutsis was enabled by the required identity cards that enabled quick distinction between the Tutsis and Hutus. Similarly, the Soviets were required to carry identification cards which described their nationality and religion.
- 40 One man has been detained in the Paris airport for seven years because he has no citizenship (the British are denying his citizenship, while the Iranians have revoked it). *Wall Street Journal*, 7 October 1994.
- 41 The pressure is coming up because of numerous Asians that are claiming to be members of the lost tribe, causing strain on the economic and social aspect of such a receptive policy (*The New York Times*, 6 October 1994).
- 42 Gurr, see in note 4, p. 250.
- 43 *The New York Times*, 27 December 1995 and 7 January 1996.
- 44 Carl Bildt, 'The Baltic Litmus Test', *Foreign Affairs*, vol 73, no. 5, p. 78.
- 45 *The New York Times*, 1 July 1994.
- 46 *The New York Times*, 24 July 1994.
- 47 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 30 June 1994, p. 11.
- 48 This poses great concern for the demographic structure of the Caucasus also, since during 1992–94, 20% of the Armenian population (of over 3 million) has left the country. *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 27 June 1994, p. 4.
- 49 McGarry and O'Leary, see in note 12, p. 19.

Forced Population Movements: Ethnic Dilution, Ethnic Consolidation and Ethnic Cleansing

In 1838, the State of Georgia compelled 17,000 Cherokee Indians to undertake a forced march west from Georgia to Indian territory. The march, later known as the Trail of Tears, claimed thousands of lives through exposure and starvation.

HELEN JACKSON¹

Terrorized by what they say is a campaign of ethnic cleansing against them in Abkhazia, some 200,000 ethnic Georgians have fled across a forbidding mountain region.

THE NEW YORK TIMES²

40 years (ago), the new [Israeli] state sought uncontested control over the Negev. The Government expropriated the land and began settling it with Israeli Jews while evicting Israeli Bedouins, who had lived there for centuries.

CLINTON BAILY³

THE QUEST FOR numerical superiority in a region may entail the transfer of populations.⁴ Such transfers are often coercive and are resorted to either in time of war or in time of desperation when immediate alterations in the demographic composition are deemed to be required. Indeed, the speed with which population transfers are executed indicate an efficiency that is not shared by the less rapid policies

The Demographic Struggle for Power

of assimilation or pronatalism. As morally repugnant as the practice may seem, inducing migrations for the sake of ethnic consolidation or ethnic dispersal is an expedient method of the demographic struggle for power. Population transfers are made to achieve several goals: first, people may be resettled in an area in order to dilute the pre-existing population (ethnic dilution); second, people may be resettled in an area in order to strengthen the desired ethnic group (ethnic consolidation); and third, people may be expelled from an area to cleanse the existing population of 'undesirables' (ethnic cleansing). These methods of population transfers are described in this chapter.

Forced, or involuntary, migration, produces refugees. Refugees have been defined as those individuals that flee from man-made disasters: Gordenker defines refugees as 'persons who have left their customary homes under the pressure of fear for their present or future lives, because of immediate, overt threats or – more comprehensively – clear denials of basic human rights whose enjoyment is required for continued life over a short or longer period'.⁵ The practice of population transfers has gained notoriety in the 1990s because there has been a global increase in refugees: in 1992, more than 20 million refugees fled from communal conflicts;⁶ there are over 2 million displaced persons in the territory of former Yugoslavia.⁷ While these numbers pale in comparison to the number of Afghani or Palestinian refugees (4.6 million and 2.7 million respectively), they nevertheless represents a significant demographic shift of a pre-war population of 23 million.⁸

Population movements have been a persistent component of world history. People have left their homes in pursuit of better jobs and political or religious freedoms. Some have fled from persecution, wars or natural disasters. Indeed, both push and pull factors contribute to the migrant's decision to relocate. Population movements, whether voluntary or involuntary, entail economic, political and demographic implications for both the host and losing regions, as well as for the individual. Large waves of economic migrants have enabled economic development in host regions, including the United States, the Middle East, and Germany. At the same time, losing states have suffered in numerous ways, including as a result of 'brain drain', such as that associated with the Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and the politically-based exodus from pre-World War II Germany.

Since the turn of this century there has been an increase in the number of politically induced population movements, some of which entailed

Forced Population Movements

forced evictions. The communist revolution in Russia produced some 1.5 million refugees, while Turkish policies induced the movement of some 250,000 Armenians and later over one million Greeks. During and after World War II, Hitler's government induced migrations of 10 million people in Eastern Europe, while the partition of India caused a displacement of over 10 million Muslims and Hindus. More recently, the creation of Bangladesh uprooted over 10 million people, Sudan accepted approximately 350,000 Eritreans, Somalia took in 800,000 people fleeing Ogaden Province, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sent two million people into Pakistan, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait sent 380,000 Palestinians out of the Persian Gulf, 80,000 Cubans fled Cuba over the course of a few weeks, 100,000 Jews fled the Soviet Union in a few years during the 1970s and some 60,000 Ingushis refugees live in squalor in Ingushetia after being cleansed from Northern Ossetia. The current war in Chechnya produced some 800,000 Chechen refugees.⁹ During 1979–89, some eight million people were driven from their homes by 'superpower proxy wars' in places such as Afghanistan, Cambodia and El Salvador.¹⁰ In the first three years after the end of the cold war (1989–92), some 4.5 million refugees were produced as people fled inter-ethnic strife. In Africa alone, rampant inter-ethnic wars have resulted in a situation in which only four African states have neither gained nor lost over 1,000 refugees.¹¹

PART I: INVOLUNTARY MIGRATIONS

Population movements are forced or voluntary. Some movements are clearly one or the other, such as the forced resettlement of Cossacks during the Stalin era and the economically motivated immigration from Italy to America at the turn of the century. However, it is often very difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary movements. Clearly, if someone is forced from their home at gunpoint and given two hours to pack a single bag, that person is an involuntary migrant. However, such Draconian measures do not constitute the principal conditions of migration, as much more subtle means of pressure and coercion are usually applied.

Refugees of a target ethnic group flee from a set of international or domestic circumstances. Among the former are wars involving armed intervention and/or political warfare, such as propaganda or a victorious

The Demographic Struggle for Power

new political system. War situations provoked Chinese population movements in Indo-China following the victory of North Vietnam and Jewish emigration from Germany, Poland and Croatia during World War II; Greeks and Turks exchanged residences following the Greco-Turkish war of 1922. New political systems were responsible for the pressure on Germans to leave the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe following World War II and Asians to leave Uganda in the 1970s. Wars of liberation or decolonization provoked a mass exodus of Portuguese from Mozambique and whites from Malawi and Rhodesia. Another component of the international circumstances of refugee creation is the redrawing of borders in peace, when it puts national, religious or racial groups on the wrong side of a border. While this phenomenon will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, suffice it to say here that it causes mass population movements, such as the population movement of Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union as well as the movements of various Yugoslav ethnic groups in the aftermath of the Yugoslav breakup.

With respect to domestic pressures on populations to relocate, the most important is turbulence of various forms: a violent government change, such as one associated with a revolution or a *coup d'état* that carries with it either policies adverse to a given people or simply violence, creates refugees. In this environment, persecution on the basis of religion, race or ethnicity, whether by sporadic harassment or planned genocide, is apt to arise and result in refugees (for example, the Armenian exodus from Turkey, the Indian flood from Guatemala, the Muslim exodus from Myanmar). However, minorities are not the only ones suffering from what might be a brutal, dictatorial government that harasses members of society: the political opposition may also be a target, resulting in political migration (for example, the exodus of political opponents of Pinochet from Chile or of the Ayatola Khomeini from Iran).¹²

Given that involuntary migrations have been present throughout history, why are forced population movements and the resulting refugees receiving so much attention in the 1990s? Gordenker claims that the post-World War II involuntary migrations have several novel characteristics.¹³ First, the sheer volume of refugees has risen dramatically since 1945, as has information of their plight through the mass media. Second, most refugee situations since the war have taken place in less-developed countries, with the exception of Hungary in 1956 and former Yugoslavia in 1992. Such movements of population to and from

Forced Population Movements

developing countries have influenced the development plans of both the losing and the receiving region. Third, many of the population movements have been on such a large scale and have remained unresolved for so long that they have become permanent, putting strain on the immigration system of the receiving state. Indeed, the Palestinians from Israeli territory and the Chinese from Vietnam are examples of generations living outside of their native territory. Fourth, there has been an unprecedented increase in international organizations to assist refugees, in response to the sheer volume of displacement. Although most of these have been through the UN systems, there are also numerous efforts at the bilateral level.

There are three types of involuntary population transfers, two of which describe the movement of a target population into a region (ethnic dilution and ethnic consolidation) and one of which describes the movement out of a region (ethnic cleansing). The difference between the two intra-region movements is based on the goal that the movement is supposed to achieve, as described below. There are a variety of terms that are used for population transfers. Kuper lists euphemisms that have been used to describe the population that has been transplanted: he quotes Solzhenitsyn who referred to 'special settlers' for the exiled nations, from the vocabulary of Nazi Germany, he describes the following phrases: 'resettlement of alien elements', 'evacuation', 'special treatment', 'cleaning up operation', 'securing the army's rear', 'executive measure'.¹⁴ When eviction also entailed genocide, then the terms 'liquidation' and 'final solution' were used. For the purposes of this chapter, we will simply use the term eviction or relocation.

(i) Ethnic dilution

Sometimes ethnic leaders resettle populations in order to dilute the population of the receiving region. This type of resettlement, in which an ethnic group is diluted because members of a different ethnic group are pushed onto its territory, differs in goal from, for example, the desire to increase labor supply (that preceded population movements to Siberia) or to alleviate population pressures (that preceded population movements in Malaysia) or to extend into new land (that preceded Boer population movements into the African hinterland; the Treks). Indeed, ethnic resettlements target individuals not by their skills or income levels, but rather by ethnicity (or religion or language) with the goal of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

diminishing the political and cultural strength that the group derives in numbers. Despite the fact that it is illegal, according to the 1949 Geneva convention, to send colonists into occupied territory¹⁵, such a practice nevertheless continues across the globe. Examples of this practice include the dilution of the Golan Heights and the Gaza strip by the infusion of Israeli citizens into these occupied territories, the dilution of Tibet due to the forced in-migrations of the Han, the dilution of western Poland by Hitler through the importation of Germans from across Eastern Europe, and in the Balkans, the dilution of the Hungarian population by the resettlement of Romanians into Transylvania and the dilution of the Istrians by the relocation of Croat refugees from Slavonia, Krajina and Bosnia.¹⁶ Serbian refugees from across Croatia are being resettled in Eastern Slavonia (indeed, some 8,000 Serbian refugees were resettled in Baranja during 1992 alone¹⁷) while some refugees from Bosnia are being resettled in Kosovo. After the takeover of Western Slavonia by Croats, some 10,000 Serbian refugees from the area are to be resettled in Kosovo.¹⁸

These dilutions are often couched in misleading terms to mask their true intent. For example, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Romanians were resettled in Transylvania (from which, it is estimated that some 100,000 Hungarians were deported and resettled in other parts of Romania¹⁹) largely with the goal of diluting the local population. However, it was claimed that the resettlement was part of a manpower planning policy to increase the supply of labor in the newly industrializing region. Moreover, there is a proposal to relocate Russians into Siberia: 1–2 million people annually for the next decade because the demographic trends show that the population of Siberia could decline by one third in the next 15–20 years (since the life expectancy of males has declined dramatically²⁰). While this has been presented as an effort to reinvigorate the Siberian population, it may also be considered an effort at dilution since the proposal called for the infusion of Russian-speaking peoples from throughout the CIS. Also, in East Timor, in 1994 some 1,000 Indonesians per week are said to have arrived.²¹ While the government claims that this is not part of its official transmigration policy (according to which people from densely populated regions are relocated to those sparsely populated) but rather the expression of pull factors due to economic development in East Timor, the local population is sceptical since the new arrivals, with strong pro-Indonesian sentiments, are causing an unequivocal dilution of the local

Forced Population Movements

population. Lastly, Albania is trying to encourage Albanians from the north to settle in the southern areas where the population density is lower. However, that is also where Greek speakers reside, so the population movement would also serve to dilute what is left of the minority population.²²

Sometimes unintended dilution occurs and the affected ethnic leaders must enact policies to protect themselves from further erosion of the ethnic composition status quo. The dilution consists of inflows of migrants of other ethnic groups that inevitably alter the inter-ethnic population ratio. Such perceptions of inundation translate into measures that include the placement of barbed wire along state borders. This has in fact occurred in Assam, where the inflow of the Bengalis from West Bengal and Bangladesh has tilted the population ratio in favor of the Bengalis. This process has been ongoing since the 1950s, and despite the Bengali claims that the migrants make no demands in their new land, the population numbers speak louder than the words, resulting in strict measures restricting Bengali rights and inflow.

Sometimes just the prospect of the possible dilution that might occur sends shock waves throughout a country. Indeed, the possible return of hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians back to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip troubles Israel's leadership since such a move would represent a dilution of the Israeli population: According to a former Israeli ambassador to the U.S. 'The Palestinians have never made a secret of their intention to try to bring down the Jewish state by flooding it with hundreds of thousands of Arabs from abroad'²³ (however, some of these would simply be returning to their homeland. The question of how many actually lived in those areas before the 1967 war is in dispute: the Arabs claim that there were 800,000, while the Israelis say 200,000 to 250,000).

Another example of unintended dilution is that of the U.S. population in South Florida following the arrival of Cuban migrants. The Mariel boatlift brought 125,000 Cubans to America and most of them settled in Dade County. In addition, each year in the 1980s and 1990s, some 5,000 illegal rafters reached the United States.²⁴ Then, in August 1994, a record 20,000 were picked up by the coast guard in the Florida straits. Cuban President Fidel Castro is asking for 100,000 more to be allowed to immigrate.²⁵ These migrations have unequivocally altered the ethnic ratios in South Florida.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

(ii) Ethnic consolidation

Governments may alter the ethnic population composition by encouraging a selective infusion of peoples which will serve to consolidate the presence of the desired group. The method by which this is done is through the adoption of a policy of receptive, selective immigration. This open-arms policy serves the purpose of strengthening the size of one group by increasing its relative size. As such, the immigration policy does not discriminate by skill or familial ties but rather by race, ethnicity or religion. Immigration policies across the world are increasingly exhibiting this tendency to be selective: witness the current changes in the Italian immigration law pertaining to immigrants from Africa or the German attempts to relocate Gypsies from their territory. In the Balkans, in-migration is encouraged only when the nationality of the immigrant reflects that of the titular majority: indeed, Greece is not receptive to the inflow of illegal Albanian immigrants; Yugoslavia has strengthened its borders to control the inflow from Albania; Romania and Bulgaria are on the lookout for Gypsy migrants; and so on. Balkan governments do, however, welcome some ethnic groups, especially when they are perceived as both strengthening the majority (as would result from the Bulgaria's decision to accept some 700,000 Bulgarians from the former Soviet Union) while increasing economic growth (as resulted from the influx of Croat expatriates after the Cold War). Aleksandr Vengerovsky, Vice President of the Russian Parliament, said that the settling of 200,000 Russians in the Serbian territories of Bosnia was under consideration.²⁶ Kashmiri Muslims that emigrated to Pakistan are invited to resettle back in Kashmir, and thus increase the ratio of Muslims to non-Muslims.²⁷ Similarly, the Israeli government encouraged Jews to settle in the occupied territories of Gaza Strip and the West Bank with the aim of consolidating the Israeli presence. Finally, following the Croatian takeover of Western Slavonia in May 1995, President Tudjman announced that Croatian refugees from Serbia and the Banja Luka area will be resettled in the area.²⁸ This will be done to fill the void created by the departing Serbian refugees as well as to consolidate the Croat population in the region.

In addition to altering the population composition, ethnic consolidation efforts are sometimes so intense that they destroy the existing population. Such intensity is exemplified by the arrival of Europeans to the Americas. The demographic shifts that were induced by the

Forced Population Movements

Europeans occurred for several reasons. First, there was a war against the Indians, that the Europeans easily won with superior weaponry. Secondly, the European continuous arrival served to steadily increase their numbers, while those of the Indians steadily decreased (in North America, there may have been some 1 million in the native population when Europeans arrived, while in South America there were even more (some 15 million in Mexico). In the north, unlike in Mexico, there were more Europeans than Indians by the 18th century. Third, Europeans brought diseases to which the Indians were not immune, resulting in widespread deaths.²⁹

(iii) Ethnic cleansing

Another form of population transfer takes place when a targeted population is forced out of a region, thus cleansing it of undesirables. This results in an immediate increase in the relative size of the desired ethnic group. The population that is forced to depart is prevented from returning and often is prevented from concentrating elsewhere (this is the case of ethnic Hungarians who were dispersed across Romania; Vlahs and Pomak Turks who were also dispersed across Bulgaria; as well as Greeks who were dispersed throughout Albania). Alternatively, those that have been cleansed are sent to a region where they were previously concentrated or where their co-nationals reside (eg. Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II were sent to Germany).

Forced population movements, with the purpose of cleansing the region of undesirables, has come to be called ethnic cleansing. Bell-Fialkoff has defined ethnic cleansing as ‘the expulsion of an “undesirable” population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these’.³⁰ Ethnic cleansing has been in operation across the globe since time immemorial.³¹ As Bell-Fialkoff points out in his study of the practice, it is ‘historically speaking neither new nor remarkable’.³² Indeed, Procopius, writing about the lives of Emperor Justinian and his consort Theodora in the sixth century A.D., describes how the Emperor’s men were directed to obliterate entire populations to clear the territory of them. ‘Examining the countries that he made desolate of inhabitants, I would say he slew a trillion people’.³³ In the Americas, the arrival of Europeans led to attempts at extermination of the indigenous American Indian populations, and when that failed, their containment

The Demographic Struggle for Power

on reservations. Jews have been expelled throughout Europe and throughout history, culminating in the Holocaust of the mid-twentieth century. Turks cleansed regions of the Armenians, Eastern Europe cleansed their states of Germans (removing over ten million people in one sweep³⁴), Stalin resettled entire nationalities (Chechens, Kalmyuks, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars and Crimean Tatars).³⁵ Asians were forced from Uganda, and Chinese were forced from Vietnam. Ethnic cleansing is a practice usually associated with war, although as clear from the examples above, this is not necessarily the case. McGarry and O'Leary remind us of wartime population movements such as 'Oliver Cromwell's transplantation strategies in Ireland, Tsarist and Turkish policies in the Caucasus in the 19th century, Stalin's movement of the Volga Germans, Cossacks and others' among others, while Pfaff called them 'horrific wartime and post war acts of demographic surgery'.³⁶

As a result of extensive media exposure, the practice of ethnic cleansing has been brought into the popular consciousness and has come to be associated with the Yugoslav war. Yet, as it is not appropriate to identify ethnic cleansing as something new to the 1990s, it is also not appropriate to view it as limited to the Yugoslav context. As the examples below attest, ethnic cleansing is a popular form of demographic engineering practiced across the globe. However, since ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav wars of succession has received so much attention, it warrants a separate discussion. The evidence points to extensive ethnic cleansing by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The numbers of total people evicted from their homes is not yet clear, although 700,000 is a figure that has been offered. A breakdown on a regional basis indicates, for example, that around Banja Luka there are fewer than 50,000 Muslims and Croats left out of a pre-war population of 550,000.³⁷ In Eastern Bosnia, according to the 1991 census, there were 18,699 Muslims living around Vlasenica, of which there are none left.³⁸ However, while the Serb irregular and paramilitary forces have undoubtedly engaged in much terror against non-Serbs in this recent civil war, they are not alone in their efforts. While Serbs have expelled Croats from eastern Slavonia and Muslims from Eastern Bosnia, so too have Serbs been victims of similar tactics and have been expelled from Herzegovina and western Slavonia. The Serbian community of Mostar was eradicated: the pre-war population of 24,000 people was entirely cleansed. Also, on 7 May 1992, 200 Serbs from the Sarajevo suburb of Pofalici

Forced Population Movements

were taken from their apartments and shot; Serbs were cleansed from their ancestral homes in 70 cities including Mostar, Zenica, Travnik, Bosanski Brod; 50 Serbian villages in Eastern Bosnia were burned and destroyed. Finally, in the largest single act of ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav wars of succession, some 200,000 Serbs from Krajina were evicted during the summer of 1995. If Serbs alone were the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, it would be difficult to explain the 1 million refugees in Serbia, one third of which are from Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is also difficult to explain that there are presently virtually no Serbian inhabitants in Krajina, western Slavonia, or western Herzegovina. Thus, it is not appropriate to attribute the practice solely to the Bosnian Serbs.³⁹ Moreover, ethnic cleansing took place among the Croats and the Muslims: for example, some 15,000 Bosnian Croats were cleansed from Vares by the Bosnian Muslims.⁴⁰ The evidence of Croatian ethnic cleansing was clear long before the May attacks against Muslims in Mostar: indeed, Lord Owen suggested in November 1992 that Croatia too should be given sanctions for its role in ethnic cleansing.⁴¹ Moreover, human rights activists in Croatia have been protesting that their government is doing nothing to stop the 'well-organized provocations aimed at driving ethnic Serbs out of Croatia'.⁴² The Yugoslav war is a dirty civil war, in which neighbor has turned against neighbor, and each group is trying to be the first to cleanse undesirables lest they cleanse him instead. As *The Economist* aptly put it, it is a war in which the options are to 'cleanse or be cleansed'.⁴³

Contemporary examples of ethnic cleansing outside of Yugoslavia abound and selected examples are listed to indicate geographical and ethnic breadth of the practice: (i) The war in Georgia between Abkhazian separatists and Georgians resulted in the outflow of 200,000 Georgians from Abkhazia that were forced to flee in the course of 1992–93. The government has issued a statement that it will never again allow a Georgian plurality in Abkhazia. Before the war, the population of Abkhazia was 45% Georgian and 17% Abkhazian.⁴⁴ While the Abkhazian government has encouraged Armenians, Russians, Greeks and other minorities to return, Georgians can only do so with special permission after an application process. (ii) In South Africa, between 1960 and 1980, some 3.5 million blacks were removed from their land by the white government and put on reserves (black 'homelands'), the only place where they were allowed to own land (this amounted to 13% of the country).⁴⁵ (iii) According to human rights activists, more than 70

The Demographic Struggle for Power

villages have been emptied of Kurds in south-eastern Turkey in the period between March and June 1994; during 1990 to 1994, 800 villages have been evacuated under government pressure; the town of Cizre has been abandoned, under pressure, by more than half of its 60,000 residents between January and June 1994; some 8,000 Kurds have crossed into northern Iraq (some of which were among the 1.5 million that crossed to Turkey from Iraq after the Gulf war).⁴⁶ 874 villages and hamlets in the southeast of Turkey were cleansed and burned to the ground by the army.⁴⁷ Death squads have been responsible for the assassination of hundreds of Kurdish doctors, lawyers, writers, human rights activists and political leaders as well as numerous kidnappings.⁴⁸ (iv) During the reign of terror of Macias Nguena Biyogo of Equatorial Guinea, Idi Amin in Uganda and Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, the targets were always of a distinct ethnic group, and the violence perpetrated against them included the forced departure of large groups of people, accompanied by looting and death. (v) In El Salvador, the massacre at El Mozote in 1982 was done by the government to villagers reported to be sympathetic to guerillas. Some 750 people, mostly women and children refugees from other less safe areas, were slaughtered over the course of one weekend.⁴⁹ (vi) Russians are leaving Tajikistan at approximately 2,000 per month (at the time of independence, 600,000 Russians lived in the republic, in mid-1994 only some 80,000 were left⁵⁰). While these are voluntary migrations, Russians have been cleansed from the key positions in politics and industry that they previously occupied. (vii) Entire cities formerly occupied by Azerbaijanis have been burned and pillaged and children taken hostage by the Armenians.⁵¹ Similar events occur on Armenian territories. Refugees from the Azeri war with Armenia have come to Iran, where 50,000 have come in a few weeks in the fall 1993.⁵² (viii) Since the invasion of East Timor in 1974, there have been mass killings and evictions of Timorese civilians by the Indonesian government. It is claimed that, of a pre-invasion population of 688,000, some 100,000 to 200,000 peoples have died as a result of the conflict. (ix) It is estimated in 1994 that some 90,000 blacks live in the bondage of the Berbers in Mauritania, while 300,000 former or freed slaves continue to serve their former masters because of economic dependence or psychological factors. When taken into bondage following the sporadic sweeping through and cleansing of their villages, slaves are stripped of their ethnic and religious orientation, often forced to become the religion of the owner.⁵³

Forced Population Movements

(x) Hawaiians claim they have native rights to land, and that white men came to their islands and cleansed them from their territory. As a result, they now demand sovereignty for the 140,000 native Hawaiians, who make up 12.7% of the population.⁵⁴ (xi) In Georgia, in Abkhazia, one half of the population (that was Georgian) was either killed or forced to leave.⁵⁵ (xii) In Greek Macedonia, Bulgarians were expelled in the early 1920s and 1944. Together with the Turkish-Greek population exchange of the early 1920s, that action made Greek Macedonia virtually completely Greek. (xiii) Some 30,000 refugees from Tajikistan had been forced to leave their homes during the civil war.⁵⁶ (xiv) In the 1991 census, Hungarians in Vojvodina numbered 430,946 or 22% of the population of 2.13 million. Since then, 35,000 have fled in response to real or perceived anti-Hungarian activity.⁵⁷ (xv) Saddam Hussein gassed some 5,000 people in the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war. At this time, more than 100,000 Kurds were forcibly relocated to areas on the Saudi border.⁵⁸ (xvi) In Bhutan, the government is repressing and torturing the Nepali speaking minority, forcing thousands to flee to Nepal and India.⁵⁹ (xvii) On Cyprus, before the Turkish intervention of 1974, there were 120,000 Turkish Cypriots, or less than 20% of the total. Turkish settlers were brought in. Turks and Greeks on the island were displaced, to the order of 150,000 Greeks and 45,000 Turks. (xviii) In the early 1950s, Malaysia forcibly resettled over 500,000 rural Chinese into new villages (and in an attempt to neutralize their anti-government sentiments, provided them with some basic needs).⁶⁰

Given the popularity of ethnic cleansing as a method of the demographic struggle for power, a discussion of the methods by which ethnic cleansing is achieved is in order.

1. *Coerced departures* Individuals or entire communities are simply given a time period during which they must vacate their homes, alternatively they are forced at gunpoint to collect their belongings with no lead time. Examples abound in the current Yugoslav war. In Eastern and north-western Bosnia, Serbs forced Muslims, often at gunpoint, to vacate their homes.⁶¹ On 29 October 1991, Croatian radio gave Serbs 48 hours to leave their homes. The announcer called it a 'depopulation plan'. On 1 November 1991, there followed mass destruction in which 58,000 Serbs were evicted from 250 villages in western Slavonia in Croatia.⁶²

The Demographic Struggle for Power

2. *Harassment to induce departure* People will leave their homes, their land and their jobs if conditions are made sufficiently difficult for their continued survival. Whether they perceive to be threatened by death if they fail to comply, or simply to be prevented from functioning in the workplace or in the neighborhood, their perceived harassment induces migration. It is difficult to define the parameters of voluntary and involuntary migration under duress: the resultant migration *de facto*, translates into a situation similar to coerced departure, although it differs from it *de jure*.

There are numerous ways in which members of a target ethnic group may be pressured and harassed to relocate. Sometimes, rights such as police protection are denied a certain group. There is evidence of this form of harassment in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia.⁶³ Economic pressures are sometimes exerted on a target population. These include the dismissal of members of an ethnic group, or the negation of their property rights. Examples of the former are the loss of employment experienced by Russians in Tajikistan; examples of the latter include the eviction of former Yugoslav Army members from their homes in Croatia, known as *delozacija*.⁶⁴

In addition to economic harassment, rape has recently received much attention as a result of the Yugoslav war. Based on the investigation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, rapes in the former Yugoslavia have been divided into five categories, and only in one of these is harassment the goal.⁶⁵ When it is a policy of harassment, women of a target ethnic group are humiliated and terrorized and as a result of the experience, are likely to migrate from the contested territory. Rapes are a part of most war experiences, and according to Enloe, they are usually not random violence but rather are structured by 'class and ethnic inequalities'.⁶⁶ She describes how, amidst the rapes that took place in the Persian Gulf War, ethnicity and class strongly determined which women were more likely to be raped.⁶⁷ Inter-ethnic rapes have characterized the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although, despite all the publicity, the evidence pertaining to extent is not at all clear.⁶⁸

Another form of harassment that is evident in many less developed countries is the placing of landmines on land that one hopes to vacate or prevent people from inhabiting. While this practice amounts to indiscriminate killing since it can affect anybody regardless of ethnicity, age or gender, in effect the ethnicity is controlled since mines are placed in regions inhabited by the targeted undesirable group. Although land-

Forced Population Movements

mines were prohibited in 1983, their use continues unabated, and their scope has been enlarged. According to *The Economist*, 'some 100 million mines lie scattered in more than 60 countries' thus manipulating migratory trends and preventing refugees from returning home.⁶⁹ The countries where this practice is most common are Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia.

3. Cultural cleansing Ethnic groups are pressured into leaving a territory if the symbols of their culture are eradicated. The practice has come to be called cultural cleansing, and includes the destruction of churches, temples and mosques, the destruction of museums and historical collections, of art work, sacred books, etc. Moreover, it includes the elimination of minority educational institutions, the suppression of minority languages, the obstruction of contacts with relatives abroad, and the dissolution of ethnic communities, and possibly the falsification of historical data and population statistics.

Cultural cleansing is practiced by numerous ethnic groups. Bosnian Serbs have destroyed numerous Muslim cultural sites in Bosnia in an effort to eradicate 'evidence of Islam in the Serbian historical space'.⁷⁰ Croats have destroyed symbols of Orthodoxy in western Slavonia.⁷¹ Hungarians are protesting cultural cleansing of their peoples because Gheorghe Funar, the Romanian nationalist mayor of Cluj, wants to conduct archaeological digs at the site of a monument to the medieval Hungarian leader, King Mathias.⁷²

4. Payment for expulsion It is possible to eliminate a target population from a region by paying another state to absorb its members. Germany has recently engaged in this form of ethnic cleansing by signing an agreement with the Romanian government to repatriate Roma (Gypsies): it is estimated that \$20 million is being given to reintegrate some 50,000 Romanian Gypsies.⁷³

5. Genocide Genocide is included in this section, despite the fact that it vastly differs from ethnic cleansing, in order to clarify some of the confusion that has accompanied press reports from the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Genocide connotes an attempt to purify a region of an undesirable population that entails *extermination*, while ethnic cleansing entails *forced relocation*. The U.N. convention that deals with genocide defines it as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole

The Demographic Struggle for Power

or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group'.⁷⁴ According to this definition, genocides have been more common than usually assumed, including at least three in this century: the massacres of Armenians under Turks in 1915–16, the Nazi holocaust in World War II, and the Hutu extermination of Tutsis in Rwanda. The first, namely that of the Armenians, involved the death of perhaps as many as 800,000 or more Armenians. Their numbers are deeply contested, as the Turkish government persists in denying the massacres, but there is little doubt that large numbers of people were relocated, and killed under tortuous conditions, resulting in a decrease of the Armenian population from perhaps 1,800,000 to some 32,500.⁷⁵ The second genocide, performed by the Nazis during World War II, entailed the organized death of millions of Jews in what became known as the Holocaust. However, it was not uniquely the Jews that suffered during this time, as the basic tenants of the policy of Aryanization was carried out in the German occupied territories against local undesirables: in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, etc.⁷⁶ The third genocide involved the Hutu and the Tutsis. According to the U.S. Committee on Refugees, the massacres in Rwanda constituted a planned genocide and were not the result of armed clashes.⁷⁷ By July 1994, some 500,000 people had been killed; 10,000 bodies flowed into Uganda down the Kagera River over a short time in May 1994 and hundreds of bodies washed ashore south of Entebbe.⁷⁸

Despite the fact that these three cases are the most pronounced, there are numerous examples of people claiming genocide in other instances. In addition to claims that Blacks in the United States are being subjected to genocide,⁷⁹ some say that the Nuba in Sudan are victims of genocide because of their Christian or animist beliefs.⁸⁰ Others claim genocide of Indians in Guatemala by the government army: in the early 1980s, the government killed tens of thousands (and forced 1 million Mayas to flee their homes during 1980–1985).⁸¹ Some claim genocide of Hungarians in Romania: it is reported that in 10 May 1983, Ceausescu gave a speech in which he declared all ethnic groups, and especially the Hungarians, to be slaves of the 'Romania master-race'. It is claimed that there was a concerted effort to call on Romanians to 'clean the land of Hungarians parasites ... squash them, exterminate them, anywhere you can find them'.⁸² It has been claimed that in 1975–76, the Muslims and Christians of Lebanon engaged in 'genocidal massacres' against each

Forced Population Movements

other, including tortuous dehumanization of victims.⁸³ In the former Yugoslavia, the Muslims are said to have undergone genocide at the hands of the Serbs in the 1990s. Serbs claim genocide against them was conducted in 1941 in Croatia and Bosnia.

The above examples serve to point out that, while extermination of a peoples is a practice attempted by many ethnic groups across the globe, it is not to be confused with ethnic cleansing. This is not to belittle the suffering and agony caused by ethnic cleansing of any population, but merely to point out the importance of clear definitions. Mass population evictions are not the same as mass population extermination: forced population transfers with the goal of cleansing a region cannot be equated with the goal of eliminating a peoples.

By way of conclusion, the difference between planned population transfers that have been arrived at by consensus and the unplanned transfers void of a concensus must be emphasized. Most of the examples of inter-ethnic population transfers described above are of the unplanned variety, characterized by coercion. In these, people are forced to leave their homes without any effort at compensation, negotiation, or plan for future residence, thereby amplifying the human suffering that is entailed in any relocation. This suffering may be decreased if population transfers are planned and negotiated. Examples of such transfers are those that occurred when Punjab was partitioned and millions of people, distinguished by religion, crossed between India and Pakistan. Also, when the Turks and the Greeks exchanged populations in 1922–23, their negotiated settlement resulted in the transfer of some 2 million people. Finally, in this category is the expulsion of the Germans at the end of World War II, at which time over 10 million Germans were resettled. If more inter-ethnic populations transfers were planned, the damage to people and property would be significantly lower.

PART II: A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF POPULATION TRANSFERS

When populations are forced to relocate, the economic costs to the individual, the receiving region, and the losing region are enormous. Some elements of the cost/benefit analysis of population transfers are discussed below. The fact that targeted ethnic groups do get relocated, despite the costs borne by the losing region, indicate that the benefits

The Demographic Struggle for Power

perceived to be associated with the purification of the territory exceeds the costs. Nationalist desires for ethnically pure territory may or may not take economic factors into account, but the sustained drive for purification implies that an ethnically compact region is highly valued.

(i) Individuals

In different ways, both the voluntary and involuntary migrant conducts a cost-benefit analysis of relocating and acts according to its outcome. While the odds for involuntary immigrants are largely against their staying (as in the case of Indians in Uganda, or more recently, Muslims in eastern Bosnia), they nevertheless make a rational assessment, in which death may factor as a cost. Benefits may be calculated as continued living, the possibility of refugee status in a host country, and the possible beginning of a new life. Alternatively, in cases when there is a possibility of a population exchange, then migrants have the hope of resettlement in the home of a reciprocally undesirable individual from another region (such as in the case of Muslims and Hindus in Punjab, or Greeks and Turks).

(ii) Receiving regions

In addition to the impact on the individual, forced population movements make an economic impact also at the level of the state. The receiving region makes a cost-benefit analysis in advance of opening its doors to immigrants. The greatest potential benefit to the receiving region is that derived from the inflow of skilled workers whose training took place at the expense of another government – in other words, ‘brain gain’ which complements another country’s ‘brain drain’. Indeed, countries such as the United States and Switzerland have been absorbers of qualified workers for decades: it is estimated that the United States saved some \$4 billion in training costs of its labor force from World War II until the 1960s.³⁴ The benefits of skilled immigrants extend beyond their earning and productive capacity to the general atmosphere they bring with them: for example, the Cuban community in South Florida has invigorated the area with its enthusiasm and drive.

Another potential benefit to the receiving region is the inflow of financial assets that often accompanies a new population. This ranges from the financial input that regions such as Croatia have received from

Forced Population Movements

the German and U.S. governments in the course of 1992 to help cope with the refugees from Bosnia, to the direct payment by Germany to the Romanian government to take back refugees that have relocated to Germany over the course of decades. These direct payments can motivate a country to absorb both involuntary and voluntary immigrants. The U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees estimated that the budget necessary to deal with displaced peoples from the Yugoslav war is of the order of \$15 million per month.⁸⁵ In February 1992, the International Red Cross announced that it would have to more than double its budget from 16 to 37 million Swiss Francs to deal with displaced peoples in the former Yugoslavia, and the Croatian government announced that it was spending 3 million DM per day caring for 320,000 refugees.⁸⁶ In the Balkan crisis today, the receiving regions are able to reap benefits in the form of financial help for the refugees they host.⁸⁷

In addition to the skill of its immigrant workers, receiving regions have the benefit of a population willing to perform undesirable and dangerous jobs, many of which would often not be performed by indigenous workers (witness migrant farm workers from Mexico in the United States or street sweepers from Turkey in Switzerland). Furthermore, these workers are often not adequately protected by laws and thus may be easily dismissed in the case of an economic downturn.

Costs are incurred by the receiving region. The most direct costs are those associated with resettlement, even when it is temporary: policing, transportation, water and health controls, and so on. However, there are other costs that are indirect and often take time to emerge. Most notable among these is the envy of the indigenous population that perceives its livelihood is threatened, its costs are rising, and the competition for scarce resources has been unfairly sharpened. These issues have spurred a rise in anti-foreign sentiment across Germany in the early 1990s.

When the result of the cost-benefit analysis is negative, the costs of accepting evicted refugees leaves a mark on the state economy. The magnitude of the pain associated with refugees is perhaps best exemplified by the effects on the Greek economy after the population exchange of 2 million people with Turkey in 1922–23: Mazower attributes some aspects of the Greek slump in the late 1920s directly to the refugee crisis.⁸⁸ More recently, the economic crisis in Yugoslavia can in part be explained by the increased demand and shrinking supply of goods and services caused by the influx of refugees. The governments of both

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Serbia and Croatia are claiming that the costs associated with the inflow of refugees is presently too large for their societies to bear, a sentiment that is manifesting itself in the desire of both Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman to speed up the end of the Bosnian war. This strain is real, despite the fact that, most refugees are currently housed by family and friends: indeed, relief officials say that Serbia has lodged 96% of its refugees in private homes, a situation almost without precedent.⁸⁹

(iii) Losing regions

The most pronounced long term loss associated with the outflow of evicted individuals is in terms of human capital (also known as 'brain drain'). While scholars disagree as to how to measure the magnitude of the loss,⁹⁰ they agree that the price a losing region pays in terms of economic growth potential is great. Losses are incurred when a state pays for education and training of individuals that another state then gets cost-free. Clearly, the more trained the refugees, the greater the loss. From ancient times, brain drain has been a problem to societies: indeed, the movement of intellectuals from Athens to Ptolemy's library in Alexandria and from Constantinople to Western Europe led to the awakening of one culture at the expense of the other.⁹¹ More recently, a large movement of human capital left Europe for the United States to escape conditions associated with both fascism and communism. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been much population movement out of the Balkans. While only a small part of it is due to forced population transfers, it is nevertheless noteworthy because of its magnitude: it is estimated that 20,000 educated Albanians left Albania between July 1990 and February 1991 in search of employment opportunities.⁹² Bulgaria also lost some 200,000 people in 1989, most of whom were young people: this is expected, according to Joly, to have a very damaging effect of the economic development of the country.⁹³ Official Bulgarian figures claim that in 1990 alone, 248,000 people left the country, and over 60% were between the ages of 15 and 39.⁹⁴ From Serbia and Montenegro, there is evidence that 100,000 to 150,000 educated professionals left during 1992, vacating numerous positions for academics, engineers and doctors.⁹⁵ The replacement cost to the Balkan states is high. It has been estimated that each B.A. takes some four years to replace, while Ph.D.s take seven years.

In addition to brain drain, the losing region suffers from the

Forced Population Movements

employment and productivity that the individual would have contributed, as well as loss of the emigrant's taxes (resulting in a decrease in government revenue). Other costs that are usually associated with migration are not relevant in the case of forced eviction: for example, the loss of the refugee's savings (which would result in a decrease in the rate of investment) is irrelevant because the nature of the eviction is such that savings tend to be appropriated before departure; also, the loss of the refugee's fertility (resulting in a decrease in the future human capital pool) is perceived as a positive aspect of the eviction because it will decrease the future size of the undesirable ethnic group.

PART III: CONCLUSIONS

Population transfers aimed at achieving political aims, while not a new phenomenon, have become more pronounced in the post-Cold War disorder. In part, this is due to the current popularity of the principle of self-determination based on ethnicity, which underscores the importance of the ethnic (or religious) composition of a population. However, the importance of numbers in determining both the political and economic power of a group relative to others is only valid in a legal system in which rights are based on groups rather than individuals. Such a system is different from one based on the Renner/Bauer model, according to which 'national rights should be accorded to individual persons rather than exclusively to territorial groupings'.²⁶ As long as the ethnic group rather than the individual is the relevant unit within society, pressures will exist to increase the relative numbers of 'desirable' people. As long as nationalists think that they can achieve self-determination on the basis of the ethnic population of a territory, then they will strive to create an ethnically pure population in the region or regions they covet. The quickest way to achieve this goal is by forcing populations to relocate. Refugees carry with them emotional baggage that can translate into political support for nationalist policies to a degree unlikely among peoples not directly touched by this experience. Hence the popularity of the practices of ethnic dilution, consolidation, and cleansing. In addition to being despicable and immoral, policies of population transfers entail costs that continue to manifest themselves over the long run in both the economic and political spheres.

In closing, it should be noted that forced population transfers, if they

The Demographic Struggle for Power

are not complete and permanent, only postpone and aggravate inter-ethnic conflict, they rarely terminate it. As the evidence from the Palestinian refugee camps clearly shows, the desire to return and reclaim one's former territory is passed on to future generations with an intensity that gains momentum over time. Unless evicted individuals are resettled permanently and integrated into their new homes, the danger of long-term disorders posed by forced evictions cannot be discounted. However, if evictions are complete and permanent, then they may in fact be the precursors to peace. Indeed, the eviction of some 8 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe at the end of World War II undoubtedly paved the way for peace and reconciliation because it solved the German question. So too, the eviction of Serbs from Croatia and the eviction of Muslims from Eastern Bosnia created homogeneous areas where uprooted refugees are not likely to return. The new ethnically pure regions may turn out to be the building blocks for peace in the region.

NOTES

- 1 Helen Jackson, *A Century of Dishonor*, New York: Indian Head Books, 1993 (first published in 1880), quote on jacket and p. vii.
- 2 *The New York Times*, 24 October 1993.
- 3 Clinton Baily, *The New York Times*, 29 December 1993.
- 4 It must be noted that differential inter-ethnic voluntary migration rates may also cause reversals in population ratios. However, these are often more likely to be caused by pursuit of land and food (for example, massive Bengali migration into Assam threatens the population ratio). As such, they are not part of a policy in the demographic struggle for power, and thus were not within the scope of this study.
- 5 Leon Gordenker, *Refugees in International Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 63.
- 6 Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, p. 314.
- 7 Furthermore, the U.S. State Department estimated that if Bosnia becomes partitioned into three ethnic states, it would result in the relocation of 600,000 more Muslims, some 300,000 Croats and 350,000 Serbs. *International Herald Tribune*, 14 July 1993.
- 8 Many of these refugees are housed outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia, where there is evidence of saturation. Indeed, the refugee-weariness of the 1980s is turning into refugee-phobia of the 1990s, as in-migration becomes a political issue and the ills of western states become increasingly blamed on the incoming migrants (witness the platform of the Lombard League in Italy). It must be noted, however, that the reluctance is largely limited to the West, in part because it is the most desired destination: considering the receptive

Forced Population Movements

welcome refugees have received elsewhere in the world in the past decade, such as Malawi (which is hosting 950,000 refugees although its population is only 9.5 million people) and Pakistan (which has taken in 3.6 million Afghan refugees), the western effort pales in comparison.

- 9 OMRI Daily Digest, no. 120, 21 June 1995.
- 10 U.S. News and World Report, 30 November 1992, p. 36.
- 11 *La Repubblica*, 20 August 1992.
- 12 Not all governments that cause population movements do so out of design or malice. Indeed, some are simply incompetent, and are unable to lead their populations or offer them adequate standards of living, for example: government incompetence led to hunger in Somalia and Ethiopia, while political instability in Lebanon in the 1970s led to chaos, and both created destabilizing population movements.
- 13 Gordenker, see in note 5, pp. 52–9.
- 14 Leo Kuper, *Genocide*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981, pp. 104–5.
- 15 *The New York Times*, 4 September 1994.
- 16 Joly points out that the Croatian refugees were relocated to Istria ‘in order to dilute the Italian-speaking population there and possibly bolster support for the ruling Croatian Democratic Community party in an area where they had previously been defeated in elections’. Daniele Joly, *Refugees – Asylum in Europe*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p. 87.
- 17 Ibid., p. 86.
- 18 OMRI Daily Digest, 23 May 1995.
- 19 The Transylvanian World Federation, *Genocide in Transylvania*, Astor, FL: The Danubian Press, 1985, p. 23. While this may be a somewhat biased source, there are no others available.
- 20 RFE/RL, *Daily Report*, 17 June 1994, p. 4.
- 21 *The New York Times*, 30 October 1994.
- 22 Moreover, there is a pressure on land in the north due to privatization, so movement to the south would solve two problems (*The Economist*, 30 April 1994, p. 60).
- 23 Zalman Shoval quoted in *The New York Times*, 7 May 1994.
- 24 *Miami Herald*, 26 August 1994.
- 25 *The New York Times*, 5 September 1994.
- 26 RFE/RL, *Daily Report*, 14 April 1994, p. 6.
- 27 Theodore Wright, ‘The Ethnic Numbers Game in India: Hindu–Muslim conflicts Over Conversion, Family Planning, Migration and the Census’, in William C. McCready, ed., *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983, p. 419.
- 28 OMRI Daily Digest, no. 113, 12 June 1995.
- 29 Indians in the tropical areas were especially vulnerable to these diseases. Blacks were brought in to replace them (indeed, this is where the black slaves were very prominent: by the end of 16th century, 40,000 African slaves had been imported to Mexico, adding yet another race to the social structure).
- 30 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ‘A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, p. 110.
- 31 It is interesting to note that despite its frequency across the globe, it was only condemned by the World Court on 8 April 1993.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 32 Bell-Fialkoff, p. 110.
- 33 Procopius, *Secret History*, New York: Dorset Press, 1992, p. 89.
- 34 One of the largest cases of ethnic cleansing in Europe in modern times, that of the Germans from Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, is often forgotten. At this time, some 10 million Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe. Recently, the Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock compared the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, since some 3 million Germans were expelled and all their property confiscated. *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 18 May 1994, p. 7.
- 35 To the order of some 1 million people, mostly women and children (Kuper, see in note 14, p. 144). Stalin deported Balkars *en masse* in 1944. Yeltsin, in 1994, signed a decree to repatriate some of the Balkars, return historical names to settlements and localities, and to give special consideration to pension arrangements for those deported (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 4 March 1994, p. 3).
- 36 William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, p. 90.
- 37 *The New York Times*, 16 June 1994.
- 38 *The New York Times*, 1 August 1994.
- 39 This was done in the following: Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara and Neven Simac, *Le Nettoyage Ethnique: Documents Historiques sur une Ideologie Serbe*, Paris: Fayard, 1994.
- 40 *The New York Times*, 4 November 1993.
- 41 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 45, 13 November, 1992, p. 77.
- 42 *RFE/RL, News Brief*, 13–16 April 1993, p. 12.
- 43 *The Economist*, 6 February 1993, p. 53.
- 44 *The New York Times*, 19 November 1993.
- 45 *The Economist*, 28 May 1994, p. 35.
- 46 *The Economist*, 11 June 1994, p. 47.
- 47 The army claims that they did move people in order to protect them from the PKK, the Kurdish party (Workers Party of Kurdistan). Jeri Laber, 'The Hidden War in Turkey', *New York Review of Books*, 23 June 1994, p. 47.
- 48 Laber, p. 47.
- 49 Mark Danner, *The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War*, New York: Vintage, 1994.
- 50 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 20 June 1994, p. 4.
- 51 *International Herald Tribune*, 16–17 July 1994.
- 52 Iran gives shelter to many refugees (2 million from Afghanistan), but the Azeris pose a special danger, since there are Azeris in Iran that found themselves on the wrong side of a border that was drawn in 1828 (indeed, 20 million people). *The Economist*, 6 November 1994, pp. 49–50.
- 53 *The New York Times*, 13 July 1994.
- 54 *The New York Times*. 5 June 1994.
- 55 *The New York Times*, 8 June 1994.
- 56 But many have returned to their homes in May 1994, after some of the civil war subsided (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 24 May 1994, p. 4).
- 57 Moreover, the number of people that declare themselves Hungarian has declined, as a result of assimilation, high birth and low death rates, and emigration (*RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol 2, no. 48, 3 December 1993, p. 43).

Forced Population Movements

- 58 Gurr, see in note 6, p. 228.
- 59 *Miami Herald*, 25 May 1994.
- 60 Richard Stubbs, 'Malaysia: Avoiding Ethnic Strife in a Deeply Divided Society', in Joseph Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 294.
- 61 *The New York Times*, 16 June 1994.
- 62 William Dorich in *The New York Times*, 3 September, 1994.
- 63 For example, Serbs from Croatia do not enjoy police protection nor the same legal rights as other citizens, and are urged to relocate to Serbia (*Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 May 1994).
- 64 While the Croatian government declared moratorium on this practice in December 1993, by then several hundred were removed, and the practice continues. Indeed, 97% of those 'delodged' are Serbs and they are replaced in their homes by Croat soldiers (*Evropske Novosti*, 8 February 1994). This tallied with a statement by President Tudjman, 'Why are there 6,000 apartments with Serbs inside and you, Croatian invalids, haven't got any?' (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 12 July 1994, p. 7)
- 65 The categories of rape include the following: 1. rape by individuals and small groups raping in conjunction with looting and intimidation, in the absence of war, 2. rape by individuals and small groups in conjunction with fighting, rape usually in public, 3. rape by individuals or small groups of people in detention, 4. sexual assaults for the purpose of terrorizing and humiliating people, as a part of ethnic cleansing, 5. rape of women detained in hotels for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in women (*The New York Times*, 12 June 1994).
- 66 Enloe, *Sexual Politics*, p. 168.
- 67 The least likely to be raped were the U.S. female soldiers, yet over 20 were raped by their fellow U.S. soldiers. In Kuwait, Asian women were more likely to be raped than Kuwaiti, and upper income were less likely than lower income women. See Cynthia Enloe, see in note 66, chapters 5, 6, 7.
- 68 See Jacques Merlin, *La Verite Yugoslav Ne Sout Pas Toutes Bonnes a Dire*, Paris, 1994.
- 69 *The Economist*, 27 November 1993, p. 42.
- 70 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 16 December 1993, p. 5.
- 71 Davidov et al., *War Damage Sustained By Orthodox Churches in Serbian Areas of Croatia in 1991*, Belgrade: Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, 1991.
- 72 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 27 June 1994, p. 9.
- 73 *The New York Times*, 26 September 1992.
- 74 Kuper, see in note 14, p. 210.
- 75 Ibid., p. 113.
- 76 Indeed, some 16 million Poles and Russians were also slaughtered or died in captivity. Ibid., p. 124.
- 77 A special session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in May 1994 passed a resolution stating that the slaughter in Rwanda was, in fact, genocide; in Rwanda, it is called 'nettoyage' or 'cleaning up'. *The New York Times*, 7 September 1994.
- 78 *The New York Times*, 28 May 1994. Much of this is due to the historical animosity

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- between the Tutsis and Hutus: between 20,000 and 100,000 Tutsi were killed during 1959–1966, and 150,000 Tutsis were driven into Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire. See Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth, 'Arming Genocide in Rwanda', *Foreign Affairs*, vol 73, no. 5, p. 88.
- 79 R. Z. Hallow, 'The Blacks Cry Genocide', *The Nation*, CCVIII, 28 April 1969.
- 80 *The Economist*, 17 September 1994, p. 48.
- 81 At another time, Cope said 50,000–100,000 Maya Indians fled in early 1980s. Douglas Cope, 'Race Relations in Latin American: Case Studies in Mexico and Guatemala', lecture to the Brown Club of Dade and Broward Counties, Miami 23 June 1994.
- 82 Posters containing these manifestos were reprinted in *Der Kurier*, Austria, 29 April 1983.
- 83 Kuper, see in note 14, pp. 103–4.
- 84 D. N. Chorafas, *The Knowledge Revolution*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968, p. 56.
- 85 Joly, see in note 16, p. 83.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- 87 There has been much ill feeling among the Serbian authorities because, although the Serbs are housing one-quarter of all the refugees, they receive only 14% of the western aid for refugees (*The New York Times*, 28 November 1992).
- 88 Mark Mazower, *Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 129–42.
- 89 *The New York Times*, 28 November 1992. This is putting excessive strain on urban families that are not self-sufficient in food, since according to official Yugoslav statistics, the concentration of refugees is in the major cities of Serbia and adjoining areas (Republicki Zavod Za Statistiku, Republika Srbija, 'Izbegla Lica', in *Saopstenje*, no. 11, January 1993, Table 1).
- 90 T. W. Shultz estimated losses on the basis of educational costs, Becker, Mincver and Bowman emphasized internal rates of return. For a discussion of these, see Robert Myers, *Education and Immigration*, New York: David McKay Co., 1972, p. 178.
- 91 According to Gustave Arlt, 'Without the brain drain from Constantinople [1204–1453], it is hard to imagine what the later history of Europe might have been'. Chorafas, see in note 84, p. 7.
- 92 *Transition*, 2, no. 2, February 1991.
- 93 Joly, see in note 16, pp. 77, 78.
- 94 Horizont, *Bulgarian Radio*, 23 January 1991, cited in *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 6, 5 February 1993), p. 58.
- 95 *RFE/RL, News Brief*, 28 December–8 January 1993, p. 14.
- 96 Renner and Bauer wrote about the situation in which 'national or ethnic groups were so interspersed geographically that any neat division between "their" territories was impossible'. Peter L. Berger, 'Preface', in Uri Ra'anan et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. ix.

Demographic Change Through Boundary Alterations: Secession and Irredentism

No matter what territorial redistributions might take place,
some minorities would be left behind in the reshuffling.

JOSEPH ROUCEK¹

The states tear nations apart; it is not surprising that the
nations want to tear the states apart.

KARL RENNER²

No boundaries are intrinsically good or bad.

J. R. V. PRESCOTT³

RUSSIA HAS SOME 20 million Russians living on the outskirts of its boundaries; Albania has approximately 1 million ethnic Albanians living in neighboring states; Serbia and Hungary have approximately one-third of their populations residing outside their state boundaries. If boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnicities, the above states would be significantly bigger and more powerful.¹ Historically, the effort to reunite the above dispersed peoples under single rule has motivated many leaders and has been embodied in the concepts of Greater Albania, Greater Russia, Greater Serbia, etc. Such sentiments of reunification are not limited to the former Soviet Bloc. Numerous populations find themselves spread over several countries and desire to unite their territories and create a new country, as for example, Spanish and French Basque provinces, or Kurdish regions in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Very few

The Demographic Struggle for Power

have succeeded: the creation of Israel had as aim to unite dispersed peoples and the unification of West and East Germany was aimed at uniting Germans in one state.

Efforts to redress boundaries that are perceived as unsatisfactory are a form of the demographic struggle for power. Indeed, when peoples find themselves outside of their preferred state boundaries, whether through war, migration or negotiation, ethnic leaders may strive to alter the composition of their population by redrawing boundaries so as to include territory populated with the desired peoples. This chapter contains a discussion of boundary alterations that occur in order to change the demographic balance in favor of one ethnic group relative to others. The underlying motivation for such boundary alterations is self-determination of ethnic groups, expressed in secessionist and irredentist aspirations, and achieved by negotiation and/or war. Secession entails the breaking away of a region and the attainment of sovereignty by its population. Irredentism entails the unification of separated peoples and the establishment of their sovereignty on the united territory. Secessionist and irredentist sentiment has flourished during the 1990s: indeed, while in the past century, successful secession has been limited to several cases, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, international recognition of newly independent countries basing their legitimacy on their right to ethnic self-determination has increased dramatically.

The demographic implications of such a trend are vast. By negotiation or war, a boundary is redrawn and a minority becomes a majority, while a majority becomes a minority. The frame of reference changes, and with it, the rights, obligations, social standing and welfare of ethnic groups changes. Secession, as a method of altering the relative size of the ethnic population, can be relatively painless insofar as it may be quick (as in Slovenia but not Eritrea) and without much contention (as in Norway and Slovenia but not in Bosnia-Herzegovina). In either case, the demographic composition of the region is altered. This chapter contains a discussion of secessionist and irredentist aspirations that underlie negotiations and war in the pursuit of boundary changes.

BOUNDARIES AND BOUNDARY CONFLICTS

A boundary is the line that marks the limits of a state's sovereignty. Huber said 'territorial sovereignty is, in general, a situation recognized and delimited in space, either by so-called natural frontiers as recognized

Change Through Boundary Alterations

by international law, or by outward signs of delimitation that are undisputed or else by legal engagements entered into between interested neighbors, such as frontier conventions, or by acts of recognition of states within fixed boundaries.⁵ According to Boggs, ‘the location of the boundary ... determines for millions of people the language and the ideas which children shall be taught at school, ... the kind of money they shall use, the markets in which they must buy and sell; it determines the national culture with which they shall be identified, the army in which they may be compelled to serve, the soil which they may be called upon to defend with their lives.’⁶

Geographers, political scientists, historians and international lawyers have pondered the question of what determines optimal boundaries of states. While natural boundaries formed a natural barrier between peoples, the present world boundaries are mostly artificial and the result of wars and conquests, mostly of European powers and mostly over the past two and a half centuries. In the ancient and feudal world, the concept of border zones was more important than line boundaries. Indeed, while in the early times, borders were not lines but border marches, when population pressures increased, the border marches disappeared. When population expanded and states began to use all their resources, the boundary started becoming important. Today, the concept of boundary and territory is closely related: boundaries remain lines marking limits, while territory is the area of jurisdiction.

As a result of states having conflicting interests and views and historical interpretations, boundary disputes have been a constant source of conflict among sovereign states. Prescott describes several kinds of boundary disputes.⁷ First, the *territorial dispute* results from the desire for a territory by more than one state. In this case, the boundary usually does not coincide with ethnicity, or natural barriers, but may in fact have been superimposed (such as by colonial powers, as throughout Africa) or resulted by the conclusions of war (such as the boundary between Austria and Italy). Alternatively, in the aftermath of boundary decisions, some developments may take place that warrant reconsideration of a boundary, such as the discovery of valuable mineral deposits in areas of Peru, Chile and Bolivia that resulted in calls for new boundaries by those that deemed they were short-changed. Second, *positional disputes* concern the actual location of the boundary. In these cases, the general boundary of a state was agreed to, but there was little need at the time to demarcate it, leaving ample room for future

The Demographic Struggle for Power

misinterpretations. An example of this is the nebulous boundary between Oklahoma and Texas which became an explosive issue in 1919 when the oil boom reached the contested area. Moreover, the boundary between India and China has not been recorded by location in historical documents, leading to several wars over the effort to actually demarcate it. The desired goal of both positional and territorial disputes is the change in the boundary. That is not true of the third and fourth disputes. The third is the *functional dispute*, which applies to state functions applied at the boundary. This was more relevant in past times, when borderlands or frontiers were far from the legal center, and thus were subject to much banditry and crime. The fourth dispute involves some trans-boundary resource known as *dispute over resource development*. The most common sources of such disputes are rivers, lakes, continental shelf, mineral deposits, etc. For the purposes of this book, the first type of boundary dispute is the most relevant.

There are two steps involved in changing or setting boundaries: delimitation and demarcation. The former deals with the actual agreement of the location of the boundary, while the latter deals with the physical demonstration of the delineation. Disputes may arise if there are boundaries that have not been delineated (for example, between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Algeria and Morocco, both before and after the turn of the century), or have not been demarcated (such as following the creation of the Albanian state, and between Ethiopia and Sudan at the turn of the century). Indeed, sometimes, while states may agree in principle on the location of the boundary, when the time comes for the actual demarcation, misunderstandings arise.

BOUNDARY ALTERATIONS THROUGH SECESSIONIST AND IRREDENTIST ACTIVITY

According to a dictionary definition, secession is 'the act of withdrawing formally from membership in an organization, association, or alliance'.⁸ In its application to international events, the term has come to be associated with the breaking of ties (political, economic, etc.) by one group of people and their territory from the larger political unit of which it was a part.⁹ The distinction between separatist, irredentist, ethno-territorial and secessionist movements is often blurred.¹⁰ Horowitz distinguishes between secession and irredentism in the following

Change Through Boundary Alterations

fashion: 'Secession is an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part. Irredentism is a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders. ... Irredentism involves subtracting from one state and adding to another, new or already existing; secession involves subtracting alone.'¹¹ It is possible to distinguish between irredentism and secession in the modern world by distinguishing 'nationalist movements' according to their aims: the desire to create a Kurdistan inhabited by Kurds residing in Iraq, Turkey and Iran is irredentist in nature, as is the desire of Hungarians residing in Romania to unite their land with Hungary. The demand for independence by Corsicans from France is simply secessionist, as no further link is sought with another state. Sometimes the two types of movements are extremely close and the distinction between them becomes blurred, as in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, whose initial desires were irredentist and then became secessionist. Similarly, the Ibo and Hausa of Nigeria, as well as inhabitants of Southern Sudan, over time became secessionists. Because of the ease with which these movements sometimes float across the borders of academic definitions, all these examples exhibit a characteristic that Horowitz describes as 'convertibility of claims'.¹² Other times, what begins as one type of movement among an ethnic group gives rise to another type of movement among another group that perceives a threat associated with the emergence of the former movement. Examples of this abound in the early 1990s: the secessionist movement of Croatia gave birth to the irredentist movement of Krajina where the Serbian population demands unification with Serbia; the secessionist movements of Moldova and Georgia from the Soviet Union resulted in the awakening of the Russians and the South Ossetians that wanted unification with the Russia and North Ossetian Autonomous Region respectively.

(i) Secession

There are two aspects of secession that warrant elaboration for the purposes of understanding how the boundary changes associated with it are useful in augmenting ethnic size: the relationship between secession and territory, and the relationship between secession and ethnicity.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

(1) *Secession and territory* Secession is by definition associated with territory. A population makes a claim on some land, its homeland, on the basis of religious, historical, or economic reasons. It is the strength of these ties to that land that give secessionists the drive that they often have. It is this same bond to land that prevents the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes by what outsiders may rationally and cold-bloodedly suggest, namely planned population movements. Since secession involves the leaving of a state by a group of people *and the taking of some land with them*, those populations demanding secession that do not inhabit continuous territory or are widely dispersed within a state, are clearly disadvantaged. Usually, the seceding region is at the outskirts of the union. In other words, it has one international border (when it does not, as in the case of Tatarstan, then secession raises difficulties if nothing else because of its geography and its repercussions on its economic survival). Another concern with respect to territory is that the geographical location of the seceding territory clearly plays an important role in secession: if Quebec secedes from Canada, the Maritime provinces will not be continuous with Ontario and the rest of Canada, leading to the fear of a situation such as East and West Pakistan, divided by India. Other examples are Cabinda, the secessionist oil-rich territory of Angola that is divided by Zaire; Armenia and Azerbaijan both divided by each other; and Kaliningrad (Konigsberg), which since the independence of Lithuania, has been separated from Russia by a sovereign state. The issue of territorial continuity is so compelling and so clearly threatens the linkage between regions that the Israeli government is willing to discuss the creation of partial autonomy for Palestinian lands on the west Bank provided they are not continuous and therefore would not one day pose a secession threat.

It is for reasons of territory that we rarely find ethnically based secessionist movements in the 'New World' including the United States and Australia.¹³ These states are composed of immigrants that have left their historical soil, and in that process have given up the passions and rights that are associated with secessionist territorial demands. At the same time, the indigenous inhabitants of the 'New World' have been so decimated and demoralized by the colonizers that they have not succeeded in making strong claims on territory: indeed, the Eskimos and Cree Indians of northern Quebec and their newly established rights to territory are an exception rather than the rule in the Americas.¹⁴

Territory is closely related to the question of boundaries. Clearly, if

Change Through Boundary Alterations

secession involves the rupturing of territorial integrity of a state, the next question to be answered is how to draw the new state boundaries. Legal experts are finding the present time especially wanting in theoretical and practical answers to this question. When the territory that is to secede is uncontested, or unequivocally populated by one ethnic group, then boundary determination is easier.

(2) *Secession and Ethnicity* Must secessionist activity by definition involve an ethnic group? Most examples in history and in the present time indicate that indeed, an identification of an ethnic group is a precondition. Indeed, in the world of the 1990s, in which nationalist sentiment has largely taken on a separatist bend, most movements for secession are in fact ethnically based. In the words of Conner, and later Shiels, most of the cases of secessionist activity that characterize the world in the 1990s are cases in which ethnonationalism has taken on elements of ethnic separation.¹⁵ In the absence of an ethnic group, the secessionist movement may take on several forms. It may be a simple border dispute, of which examples in South America abound, or it may be the result of problems of federalism, such as the southern confederacy that led to the United States Civil War.¹⁶ Today, Lombardy represents the most glaring example of non-ethnic attempts at separation, in which the population of northern Italy supports a divorce from central and southern Italy from whose population it does not differ ethnically. In all of these cases, strong economic motivations, rather than ethnicity, became a leading component of secessionist activity.

Ethnically based boundary issues, although always in existence, have achieved a new notoriety in the recent past, mostly due to the breakup of the Soviet Union and its cartographic ramifications. It is estimated that there are presently 76 potential border disputes in the former Soviet Union, most of them based on ethnic claims, and of the 23 inter-republican borders, only three are not contested.¹⁷ In addition, there are presently 32 civil wars raging across the world, many of them ethnically based and territorially motivated.¹⁸ While the past few years have witnessed an increase in ethnically motivated boundary disputes, this does not imply that the creation of new states must be accompanied by ethnic turmoil. Indeed, numerous newly emerging states never experienced ethnic pressure over boundary issues. In fact, regions such as those in Soviet Central Asia never experienced a separatist movement of any kind: Zaslavsky points out that 'their independence was not

The Demographic Struggle for Power

achieved through self-determination but rather imposed on them from outside.¹⁹

(ii) Irredentism

Irredentist sentiment underlies efforts by leaders to alter the composition of their population by engaging in the conquest or annexation of territory populated with the desired peoples. Whether this boundary alteration is achieved through war or negotiation, its rationale is that members of an ethnic group are divided across different states when they desire to be united under a single sovereignty. Irredentism then comes from the fact that peoples are spread out farther than the state boundaries under whose jurisdiction they reside. Uri Ra'anan said that sometimes states are larger than nations, while at other times, nations are larger than states.²⁰ When the latter is the case, then irredentism is rampant, as, for example, in Kashmir, Sri Lanka, North Ossetia, and the Trans-Dniester Republic. Indeed, in the former Soviet Union, most of the ethnic groups spill beyond the borders in which they reside. This is largely the result of Moscow's policy of divide and conquer, when forced migrations by ethnicity were enacted and borders were drawn to cut across ethnic conglomerations. In Africa, where borders were also drawn with little regard for ethnicity, there are several irredentist claims: Morocco has claims on Algerian territory, Somalia claims parts of Ethiopia and Kenya, and Ghana claims parts of the Ivory Coast.

The Balkans are particularly prone to irredentist sentiment as a result of ethnic spillage of populations outside of their titular states. In this respect, the Serbs are the most spread out, inhabiting sections of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.²¹ Indeed, the Serbs are second only to the Hungarians both in terms of population size as well as in terms of the relative size of their diaspora: some 11.5 million Hungarians live in Hungary, plus 2 million in Transylvania, 350,000 in Serbia, 600,000 in Slovakia, 170,000 in Ukraine. Croats live in Herzegovina and Bosnia; Albanians live in Serbia, Macedonia and Greece; Macedonians live in Bulgaria and Serbia; Serbs live in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia, etc. Greeks and Slovenians are the populations most concentrated within their state boundaries. The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia want to join Serbia in what has come to be called Greater Serbia, the Croats in Bosnia want to join Croatia in a Greater Croatia and the Albanians in Kosovo want to join Albania in a Greater Albania. If

Change Through Boundary Alterations

these border changes were successful, the map of the Balkans would look very different indeed. Moreover, if the Romanians in Moldova and in the Ukraine succeed in their efforts to join their territory to Romania, the size of the Romanian titular majority would increase, as would their power relative to other groups. There is evidence of irredentist sentiment among the Hungarians in Transylvania (and Slovakia and northern Vojvodina) who find themselves on the wrong side of a border.

(iii) Self-determination on the basis of ethnicity

Given the lack of congruence between ethnic and state borders and the ethno-territorial pressures discussed above, one has to consider the ethnic basis for redrawing boundaries and therefore the question of self-determination on the basis of ethnicity. The ethnic quest for self-determination is rooted in democratic principles of the right of peoples to determine their fate, specifically their right to self-rule. Accordingly, the Basques, the Corsicans, the Scots, the Punjabis, the Tibetans, the Karen and others demand the right to rule themselves. However, while the concept of self-determination of nations was a popular Romantic idea in the nineteenth century, soon after its partial application in the real world, it became clear that it was fraught with problems. Two problems stand out. First, the principle of self-determination has been applied inconsistently across the globe: the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey are denied the right to self-determination, as are the East Timorese, but the Slovenians are not. If the principle of self-determination is to be applied, then it must be applied to all those who want it, with no inconsistency or discrimination. The issue of inconsistency is at the root of the war in former Yugoslavia: as pointed out by Zametica, ‘if the Croats, or Muslims, had the right to pursue self-determination, why not the Serbs? If the Croats and Muslims could secede from Yugoslavia, on what grounds could the Serbs be denied the right to secede from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina?’²² Moreover, in an interview, the Albanian foreign minister claimed ‘We will not hesitate to demand that all Albanians live in their ethnic territories. It is not just to refuse them self-determination.’²³ Indeed, if the Serbs in Krajina want self-determination on the basis of their majority status, then why not the Albanians in Kosovo?²⁴

The second problem has to do with the negative effect that the creation

The Demographic Struggle for Power

of ethnic states, on the basis of the principle of self-determination, has on non-titular minorities. Indeed, the pursuit of self-determination in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century has proved not to be a universally democratic choice. While in a way self-determination seems most democratic, since it allows the individual to determine which country he or she wants to be a part of (even if, in the extreme, the population shrinks to one), in an atmosphere of rabid nationalism, it creates a situation in which democratic rights are conferred by ethnic group, at the cost of non-members. According to Etzioni, ‘The great intolerance breakaway states tend to display toward minority ethnic groups heightens polarization [among groups].’²⁵ This is true of Estonia, leading to accusations of ‘Estonian apartheid’,²⁶ as well as of Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia.²⁷ Hayden points out that the new successor states of Yugoslavia all have constitutions that are less democratic with respect to minority rights than the last Yugoslav federal constitution before the breakup.²⁸ For example, the Constitution of Yugoslavia of 1992 claims that the official language is Serbian written in the Cyrillic script (note that, as in the Croatian constitution, the term *Serbo-Croatian* as a language is not used). The Croatian constitution of December 1990 clearly proclaims the rights of the Croatian nation without mention of the 15% Serbian population, which was given equality under the previous constitution. In Slovenia, the 1989 amendments to the constitution create, according to Hayden, ‘a three-tiered set of national privileges: first, the “sovereign Slovenian nation,” second, the “autochthonous minorities” [Italians and Hungarians, very small in number], and third (with no constitutionally recognized cultural rights), members of any other national group, who in fact form the largest minority populations in Slovenia.’²⁹ In Macedonia, the constitution of November 1991 is based on the rights of the Macedonian nation and does not grant Albanians, who form up to 40% of the population, the same rights as the Macedonians.³⁰ Thus, nationalist tendencies have become legalized in the constitutions. These undemocratic tendencies have emerged when minorities become majorities and majorities become minorities, since, as Jaszi points out, ‘the political morals of an oppressed nation change when it comes to power.’³¹

Thus, given the above problems of self-determination on the basis of ethnicity, as well as the pressure for boundary changes in the early 1990s, some principles according to which boundary changes will occur

Change Through Boundary Alterations

must be formulated. This set of principles must then be applied consistently across the regions in which ethno-territorial pressures are exerted. Indeed, much of the bloodshed in former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Turkey and Iraq, etc. might have been avoided if the West had been consistent in its application of principles with which to determine independence, legitimacy of secessionist movements and inviolability of borders.

The inconsistencies and the double standard of international policies (primarily western) with respect to self-determination can be illustrated by three issues. First, western leaders proclaim to want to protect *the integrity of borders*. This is the principle being applied to regions such as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But which borders do they want to protect? The principle has not been applied to the borders of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. By what logic or by the application of which principles does the West decide to protect some sub-national borders and not an international border? Indeed, the West did not respect the integrity of Yugoslavia's borders when it recognized Slovenia and Croatia, yet was insistent about recognizing the integrity of Croatian borders. This makes no sense, given that there is no reason to believe that internal boundaries of Yugoslav administrative units should be enshrined while international boundaries need not. Furthermore, as long as the Yugoslav federation existed in its political configuration, then there was reason to continue the boundaries as Tito created them. Once that ended, the logic of holding internal boundaries as sacred disappeared. For the sake of comparison, a country such as Switzerland has a constitution that forbids the changing of its international borders. The individual cantons do not have the right to secede. In addition, in the discussion of Quebec's possible secession from Canada, it is openly acknowledged that Quebec will not be allowed to take with it all its present territory. Logically, Croatia should not be allowed to take with it territory whose population chooses not to go, as for example the (Serbian) Krajina region of Croatia. Thousands of Serbs and Croats have died in the battles over this issue.

Second, western leaders support the concept of self-determination as determined with *the use of referenda*. However, they are selective in their choice of *which* referendum is acceptable. The western world was put on the spot with the proposed referendum of the Bosnian Serbs on whether to accept the Vance–Owen peace plan. It was rejected by the West as a sham, despite its obviously democratic aspects.³² While the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

referendum of the Slovenian population on its secession was acceptable as the basis for international recognition, the referendum of the Serbs of Krajina was not. Furthermore, the western leaders have no clear policy on *who* is to be allowed to vote in a referendum to make it acceptable. In all likelihood, if all citizens of Yugoslavia participated in a vote on Slovenian secession in 1990, the outcome would not have been in favor of secession. For the purpose of comparison, it should be recalled that in 1979, the entire French population voted in the referendum for the independence of New Caledonia, not only the islanders. Moreover, the constitution of Spain, a country that has recognized the seceding republics of Yugoslavia, explicitly prohibits a referendum on secession of any of its regions. In South Africa, Mandela only recently discussed the possibility of a referendum for white Afrikaners who seek a homeland in South Africa.³³

Third, western leaders seem unable to determine the conditions under which to grant *international recognition* to newly seceded regions. There are numerous countries in the world that have functioned as states for years, but with no formal recognition, thus limiting their participation in the international political and economic system. For example, Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1975, yet still remains unrecognized. Turkish Cyprus has been recognized by Turkey in 1974, and no other country. New states across the former Soviet Union have pursued self-determination but remain unrecognized: they have signed friendship treaties and have endorsed integration within the CIS. These are: South Ossetia, Dniester Republic Abkhazia and Karabakh founded the Association of Unrecognized States, in May 1994 and invited others to join.³⁴ The process by which western leaders decide who to grant recognition to is fraught with difficulties, as the example of the former Yugoslavia shows. The EC hastily drew up a shopping list of conditions, including the protection of rights for minorities, and proceeded to recognize Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite France's (short-lived) objections based on the view that Croatia did not fulfill the minority-protection criterion. At the same time, the western powers delayed full recognition of Macedonia, which together with Slovenia, is the most deserving of recognition if judged by the minority issue. Western hesitation in the Macedonian case is due to Greece's rejection of President Tito's creation of a 'Macedonian identity' within Yugoslavia. However, other creations of Tito's are not rejected, such as his redrawing of internal boundaries. Such inconsistency in recognition

Change Through Boundary Alterations

can only lead to further deterioration of the situation. According to Simmie and Dekleva, 'The [European] Community cannot contribute to destabilization nor create potential difficulties for its own members by interfering in the internal affairs of extra-Community nations. Such interference would include the recognition of parts of existing states as separate nations.'³⁵ Dyker adds, 'Of one thing we can be sure. Any western attempt to take sides in the political dramas now unfolding [in Yugoslavia] would almost certainly have a perverse effect.'³⁶ Indeed, even Bosnian president Alia Izetbegovic was not in favor of early recognition of any Yugoslav republics.³⁷

BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS THROUGH NEGOTIATION

The Peace of Westphalia (1648) set the precedent for international law insofar as it established the rights of states to sovereignty over a defined territory.³⁸ Since that time, efforts at changing those territorial boundaries were usually met with resistance. Prescott described conditions under which boundary negotiations, with the aim of altering the delineation, occur between states.³⁹ First, when a conflict of interest either arises or is about to arise, then competing parties are compelled to negotiate over boundaries (for example, between Britain and France over their colonial ambitions in the Niger Basin in 1897). Second, when a state is losing a war, it may be willing to enter into negotiations pertaining to boundaries in order to preserve some territory and measure of autonomy (as for example at the end of the Mexican–American war in 1848, when the U.S. got territory, but Mexico got independence). Third, if there is an unclear border, states will enter into negotiations in order to regularize administrative situations at the boundary of its jurisdiction (as occurred when Britain and Germany in 1899 delineated the border of their Gold Coast and Togoland colonies to overcome the administrative problems that had arisen there).

Numerous African states had their boundaries determined by the European colonial powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885 with little regard for ethnic, cultural or political boundaries that existed at the time.⁴⁰ Indeed, in pre-colonial Africa there were no European-style states within fixed borders, although identifiable empires and some states did exist. However, the boundary line was not common, but a frontier zone that was fluid and dynamic did exist. So, boundaries were drawn on the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

basis of countries that already occupied them (either by war, or through negotiation resulting in treaties with local African chiefs), on the basis of unoccupied land that seemed natural extensions, and had as goal the avoidance of war between European powers. Shaw described several types of occupation by colonial powers: effective occupation of *terra nullius* (when it is argued that non-Europeans inhabiting territories had no sovereign rights over those territories), ‘cession’ (according to which European powers entered into bilateral treaties to acquire territory from local sovereigns), and ‘conquest’ (taking possession of territory through war).⁴¹

The evolution of European state borders has been more complex than in any other region as a result of the population migrations and the expanding and contracting empires. As a result of these circumstances, the boundaries of European states have taken on a large importance and are thus regulated in great detail. The resulting states are of smaller size than on any other continent, and few have borders today that approximate what they were some 400 years ago (with the notable exception of Switzerland, Spain and Portugal). Because so many of the boundaries in Europe were determined by war and occupation, the peace treaties that addressed them will be treated in the following section.

The above examples are ones of general border disputes and determination. However, there have also been cases of secessionist activity that were resolved through negotiation. While most successful secessions occurred by war, some stand out as relatively peaceful: these include the recent examples of Slovenia in Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states of the Soviet Union, and the less recent example of Norway’s secession from Sweden. While the first two may not be viewed as secession because they occurred in the context of a general unravelling of the entire country, the basic principles of negotiation are the same. Indeed, in all of these, negotiations pertaining to the boundaries of the regions (delimitation) had to precede the marking and the establishment of new border crossings (demarcation). In some cases, where the boundaries were not contested, this was a relatively simple procedure, as the administrative boundaries were simply taken to be the new international boundaries. The case of Slovenia is interesting insofar as its boundary is not contested with the center (or what is left of Yugoslavia), but rather with Croatia, another secessionist republic, and with Italy. Slovenia and Croatia disagree on the delimitation of both the land boundary on Istria, as well as the maritime boundary in the Adriatic Sea.

Change Through Boundary Alterations

Slovenia and Italy disagree on the boundaries between the two countries. The argument of the Italians is based on the fact that the Osimo Treaty, which delineated the boundaries between Italy and Yugoslavia, was signed with Yugoslavia, but given that Yugoslavia no longer exists, the terms of the treaty are invalid and the boundary is up for renegotiation.⁴² Negotiations pertaining to both of these boundary disputes are currently in progress.

BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS THROUGH WAR

(i) War, occupation and conquest

Territorial alterations are sometimes accompanied by war. According to Shaw, the reasons why territory is an issue in wars include historical claims on territory under another state's jurisdiction, ethnic claims when the territory is inhabited by members of titular nationalities at home, geographic claims that bring in the concept of a natural boundary, and economic claims that request access to a resource.⁴³ Secessionist and irredentist claims are ethnic, often also rooted in historical and economic issues. In the case of secession, a region may simply wish to secede in its present administrative borders from the center, and is willing to go to war in order to achieve its goal. Examples of this include the cases of secession of Eritrea and Bangladesh, which, while successful, were extremely costly and deadly. The examples of unsuccessful attempts is more common: the attempted secessions of Katanga and Biafra caused civil wars with significant loss of lives and extensive economic disruption to both the regions and the states. The unsuccessful efforts at secession of East Timor and the Karen region in Myanmar were equally bloody, with an estimated one third of the population decimated in the former. There is an ongoing war in Southern Sudan and in Sri Lanka as ethnic populations attempt to secede, despite decades of inconclusive war. Presently, the most significant cases of secession related violence are Bosnia-Herzegovina and Nagorno-Karabakh. In both cases, millions of people have been displaced; hundreds of thousands killed; the damage to property has been great, as entire villages decimated and hospitals, schools and industries rendered non-functional.

Even in the absence of outright war between the secessionist region and the center, sporadic violence may characterize the conflict. Examples

The Demographic Struggle for Power

include Punjab and Bougainville, among others. In Punjab, the secessionist goals of setting up an independent nation, Khalistan, was first approached through terrorist activities, starting in the 1970s and culminating in the murder of Indira Gandhi. In Bougainville, the battle between secessionist rebels and government troops has resulted in the closing of the principal copper mine, which is costing the national government \$1000 per minute in lost revenue.⁴⁴ The magnitude of economic impact of this rebel activity is so high that it has resulted in the escalation of violence by the central government.

When boundaries are contested and war occurs because a region wants more territory than is located within its boundaries, then occupation and conquest take place.⁴⁵ As a result of the outcome of war, based on certain claims, one region may occupy or conquer another, extending its rule and administration into the new territory. Modern examples of occupation abound: the Indian occupation of Goa (based upon the fact that historically it was a part of India before it was illegally occupied by the colonialists); the Indonesians made a similar claim on East Timor when the Portuguese vacated; Saddam Hussein made territorial claims on Kuwait based on historical borders.⁴⁶ Post-World War II examples include: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Grenada and Panama (in these cases, these governments supposedly requested intervention by an outside occupying power); Kuwait, Western Sahara and East Timor (in these cases, the occupying countries were interested in permanent control, hence completely imposed their laws and regulations); Israel (where the land is disputed between warring factions) and Bangladesh, Cyprus and more recently Yugoslavia (where the issue of self-determination is pitted against the principle of inviolability of borders).⁴⁷

(ii) Post-war peace negotiations

In preparation for the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson commissioned Walter Lippmann to lead a group of four in an effort to redraw the boundaries of Eastern Europe. The result of this project, which involved poring over maps and statistics pertaining to the area, was the basis of Wilson's 14-point program. However, many of Lippmann's suggestions, mostly having to do with territorial arrangements, were not heeded, leading him not only to pull out of the project but also to remark: 'Looked at from above, below, and from every side I can't see anything in this treaty but endless

Change Through Boundary Alterations

trouble for Europe, and I'm exceedingly doubtful in my own mind as to whether we can afford to guarantee so impossible a peace.⁴⁸ He felt that drawing boundaries that placed large numbers of people in a foreign state was bound to imply future trouble. This view was supported by Gugliermo Ferraro, who in 1925 wrote that the borders of the Balkan states could not survive in the long run.⁴⁹ Today, almost 75 years later, the world is once again under pressure to redraw Balkan boundaries, and Lippman's and Ferraro's words might be applied to the various proposed peace plans for Bosnia.

In Europe, peace treaties following wars to a large extent focused on both boundaries and territory. Indeed, the post-Napoleonic boundary settlements, as expressed in the Peace of Paris of 1814, resulted in new boundaries across Europe, which were further modified by the Versailles Peace Treaties in 1919–1920. This last treaty was very comprehensive, as it laid the groundwork for the creation of new states (such as Albania) and the redefinition of others that for long were part of crumbled empires. Boggs points out that 'of the approximately 17,000 miles of international boundaries in Europe in 1937, about 4,500 miles were new boundaries with no counterpart in 1914.'⁵⁰

In Asia, the Great Wall of China represents an ancient boundary that no longer serves as such, and water bodies represent boundaries between regions, such as that between Iraq and Iran in the Shatt al-Arab, while mountains represent the boundary between India and the Soviet Union. However, other boundaries were born out of usually laborious negotiations that often involved give and then take in other regions. These include the Afghanistan–Russia boundary (between Great Britain and Russia at the end of the 19th century); the Afghanistan–India boundary (in the late 1800s); the India–Tibet boundary (involving Great Britain and China in the early 1900s); the Afghanistan–Iran boundary (in the 1930s); the Turkey–Iran boundary (which was formally marked only in 1913–14); the Iraq–Turkey boundary (signed and marked in 1923); the Iraq–Syria boundary (defined in 1920 and modified in 1932 by the French mandate in Syria and the British mandate in Iraq).

Similarly, numerous boundaries in Africa were achieved by negotiations. These negotiations have mostly taken place since 1880 and indeed a comparison of maps then and now reveals just how much alteration there has been in boundaries. African boundaries were drawn by colonial powers with little concern for indigenous peoples, cultures and histories. As a result, there are an inordinate number of straight line

The Demographic Struggle for Power

boundaries, seen nowhere else in the world. Alternatively, easy demarkers, such as rivers and river basins, were adopted. Some of the boundaries reached by negotiation include: South-West Africa (the eastern boundary was determined by British and Germans in 1890); Libya (negotiations and treaties between Italy on one side, and France, Egypt or Great Britain on the other); Somaliland (negotiations between British and Italians in 1894); Belgian Congo and Rhodesia (border determined by agreement between Great Britain and Belgium in 1894). These are just some of the many almost arbitrary lines that were drawn (though coupled with economic interests and political exigencies) across the African continent.

In South America, most of the boundaries that exist were established in times of peace by negotiation: indeed, all ten of Brazil's boundaries were reached in peace. The earliest attempt at boundary negotiation was the division between Spanish and Portuguese spheres in 1493. Over time, smaller states developed within those zones. While there were undoubtedly overlapping claims, these were not cause for armed confrontation. Indeed, one of the longest boundaries in the world, that of Argentina and Chile, was determined by negotiation in 1881.

In the Middle East, desert boundaries formed some natural boundaries between regions. Of interest here is the boundary of Kuwait, which, according to Boggs, had arcs of circles forming parts of its boundaries.⁵¹ The semi-circular northern boundary, defined by convention between the United Kingdom and Turkey, was signed on 29 July 1913, but was never ratified. This in part explains the claims by Iraq on Kuwaiti territory.

CONCLUSIONS: THE DEMOGRAPHIC REPERCUSSIONS OF BOUNDARY ALTERATIONS

Irrespective of how a boundary adjustment has been made, the demographic outcome is the same. A secessionist region can, with the act of secession, transform its previously minority ethnic group into a majority. Similarly, an irredentist region, by separating from one union and joining another, can increase the relative size of its dominant ethnic group. Whether secessionist or irredentist, the attempt to redraw boundaries is based, according to Anthony Smith, on nations attempting to become nation-states.⁵² Examples of this effort abound across the globe: witness the efforts of the Basques in Spain and France, the Kashmiris

Change Through Boundary Alterations

in India and Pakistan, and the Ossetians in North and South Ossetia. Irredentism and secession is (and has been) also present across the Balkans. The clearest examples are among the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia who want to join Serbia in what has come to be called Greater Serbia, the Croats in Bosnia who want to join Croatia in a Greater Croatia, the Albanians in Kosovo to join Albania in a recreation of World War II Greater Albania. Such a redrawing of the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia would have, among others, the effect of strengthening the size of the titular majority, thus making the minorities even smaller percentages than they are. Indeed, whether one is in an ethnic majority or minority depends only on ones frame of reference. A Serb in Kosovo is in the minority if only Kosovo is considered. If all of Serbia is considered, that Serb is in the majority. So attempts at boundary alterations are attempts to alter the frame of reference. Other examples include the Romanians: if the Romanians in Moldova and the Ukraine were to succeed in their efforts to join their territory to Romania, the size of the Romanian titular majority would increase, both absolutely and relative to other groups. There is also evidence of irredentist sentiment among the Hungarians in Transylvania, as well as the Greeks in Albania, all of whom find themselves on the wrong side of a border.

These efforts to redefine borders are in part due to the fact that political borders across the globe do not necessarily coincide with ethnic boundaries.⁵³ A few definitions are in order to illustrate this point: As described in chapter 1, a state is a legal-territorial concept referring to that set of structures and institutions that seek to maintain control over a population within a specific geographical area. A nation refers to a group of people who share culture, history and usually language in a specific territory and who give political expression to this common identity. A nation-state is a state in which national and political borders coincide. In most cases, they do not. Indeed, according to Connor, of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 are ethnically homogeneous.⁵⁴ In 25 states, one ethnic group accounts for more than 90% of the population, while in an additional 25 states it accounts between for between 75 and 90%. In 31 states, the dominant ethnic group represents 50 to 75% of the population, and in 39 states, it represents less than half. It is also noted that in 53 states, the population is divided into more than five significant groups. In many of these cases, the multiethnic states have worked out an elaborate system of mutual tolerance and a *modus vivendi* has emerged among ethnic groups sharing a common political

The Demographic Struggle for Power

space. This explains the numerous regions in the world where the political and ethnic boundaries do not coincide, yet there is no turmoil at present, such as Alsace, Switzerland, and large parts of Africa.⁵⁵ However, in other regions, ethnic groups that straddle borders want to revise them: according to Renner, ‘States tear nations apart; it is not surprising that the nations want to tear the states apart.’⁵⁶ The experience of various countries demands special attention, in light of the present ethnic conflicts. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia institutionalized ethnicity by the creation of ethno-territorial administrative units as part of a federation. This created the backbone of the Soviet nationalities policy.⁵⁷ Oftentimes the borders were drawn arbitrarily in what seemed to be a policy of divide and conquer. The result was a complex and often contradictory combination of ethnic-based borders and the lack of them, as ethnic groups vied and competed against each other in the climb up the administrative status ladder.

It is clear now, with so many ethno-territorial movements raging across the world, that mere border changes will not and cannot satisfy everyone. Indeed, what Roucek wrote in 1939 is still true: ‘Boundary changes have never settled the problems of all groups involved. Bulgaria mourns Dobrodja and Macedonia, Greece weeps over Epirus; Hungarians have been proclaiming vociferously their *nem nem soha* (“no no never”) over the lost Transylvanian districts.’⁵⁸ It is also clear that principles for implementing boundary changes have to be chosen on the basis of which ethno-territorial movements will be recognized. If the principle of ethnic majority (demography) is adhered to, then Croatia stands to lose parts of Krajina and parts of Istria; Montenegro stands to lose parts of Muslim-populated territory to the west; Serbia stands to lose some districts in Vojvodina and the Sandzak, as well as Kosovo; Bosnia must be partitioned into three parts, with the Serbs getting most of the rural territory while Muslims get most of the urban centers and much of Herzegovina must go to the Croats. Macedonia would also be split, as eastern regions are inhabited by Albanian Muslims and some western areas by Bulgarians. And this is only Yugoslavia: if the principle were applied to the entire Balkans, a similar pattern would emerge.

The process of border changes across the globe has been ongoing for centuries and few historically large states will be satisfied without the restoration of the boundaries they enjoyed at their peak. That is an impossible feat, since claims are mutually exclusive and would

Change Through Boundary Alterations

necessitate a manyfold increase in the size of global territory (indeed, to satisfy the demands of Balkan states, the area would have to be enlarged fivefold). On the verge of the twenty-first century, world leaders should be able to devise political and social systems that can accommodate differences in ethnicity and come up with viable political and economic solutions to border problems.

NOTES

- 1 Joseph S. Rousek, *The Politics of the Balkans*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1939, p. 5.
- 2 Karl Renner (writing under the pseudonym of Rudolf Springer) is quoted in Theodor Hanf, 'Reducing Conflict Through Cultural Autonomy: Karl Renner's Contribution', in Uri Ra'anana et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 35.
- 3 J. R. V. Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1965, p. 22.
- 4 In fact, the border claims (based on ethnicity) of Serbia, Hungary and Albania are mutually exclusive.
- 5 M. Huber, quoted in Malcolm Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 221.
- 6 S. Whittemore Boggs, *International Boundaries*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, p. 5.
- 7 Prescott, see in note 3, p. 109.
- 8 William Morris, ed., *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969, pp. 1171–2.
- 9 In the academic literature, the definition of secession varies in emphasis according to author. Secessionist movements tend to have the following characteristics, as defined by Premdas: there is an organized struggle, a demand for territorial self-government, common language, religion or ethnicity, a perception of self-determination as a right, and the desire to be a state in the international organization (Ralph R. Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, pp. 15–16).
- 10 Ethnoterritorial movements differ from secessionist movements insofar as the former is broader, and encompasses both secession and irredentism. A separatist movement differs from a secessionist movement insofar as the demands of the former consist of increased autonomy in one or many areas, whereas in the latter, full independence is part of the definition of success.
- 11 Donald Horowitz, 'Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections', in Naomi Chazan, ed., *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp. 9–10.
- 12 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
- 13 Canada is a rare exception, as is the effort by Western Australia to secede from the federation in 1933.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 14 *The New York Times*, 29 March 1992.
- 15 Frederick L. Shiels, ed., *Ethnic Separatism and World Politics*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984, and Walter Connor, 'Politics of Ethno-nationalism', in *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1, 1973, pp. 1-21.
- 16 Other historical examples of non-ethnic secession include Panama's departure from Colombia, Venezuela's exit from Gran Columbia in 1830 and Syria's exit from the United Arab Republic in 1961. In the 1990s, the proposed secession of northern Californian counties, as well as Staten Island from New York City do not involve ethnicity.
- 17 *The Economist*, 13 July 1991, p. 22.
- 18 Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., *Internal Conflict and Governance*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- 19 Victor Zaslavsky, 'Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies', *Daedalus*, 121, no. 2, spring 1992, p. 98.
- 20 Uri Ra'anana 'Nation and State: Order out of Chaos', in Uri Ra'anana et al., eds., in *State and Nation Multi-ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 6.
- 21 The Yugoslav distinction of the peoples, adopted by the census, distinguished between 'peoples' *narodi* and 'nationalities' (*nacionalnosti*). This distinction is relevant in a discussion of what ethnic groups are irredentist and which are secessionist. *Narodi* are those whose population centers are located mainly within the Yugoslav federation (such as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.), while *nacionalnosti* refer to those ethnic groups that have their homelands in neighboring states (Albanians and Hungarians). Despite equality in law among 'nations' and 'nationalities', such a distinction makes hierarchies among peoples at least insofar as it distinguishes their rights with respect to irredentism and secession – one is allowed by the constitution while the other is not.
- 22 John Zametica, 'The Yugoslav Conflict', *Adelphi*, Paper 270, Summer 1992, p. 23.
- 23 Alfred Serreqi, quoted in *Post-Soviet/East European Report*, vol. 9, no. 39, 1 December 1993, p. 3.
- 24 This is a point of great contention among Serbs. Some say the claims of Albanians and Serbs are not comparable because Serbs in Kosovo have historical rights, and these offset the present demographic bias in favor of the Albanians.
- 25 Amitai Etzioni, 'The Evils of Self-Determination', *Foreign Policy*, 89, Winter 1992-93, p. 33.
- 26 *La Repubblica*, 29 June 1993.
- 27 *The Economist*, 31 July 1993, p. 45. With respect to the Slovak constitution and its treatment of minorities, see *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 43, 30 October 1992, pp. 39-42.
- 28 Robert Hayden, 'Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics', *Slavic Review*, 51, no. 4, Winter 1992.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 30 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 46, 20 November 1992, p. 16.
- 31 Oszkar Jaszi (1926), cited in Peter Sipos, 'National Conflicts and the Democratic Alternative in the Austro Hungarian Monarchy and Its Successors', in Uri Ra'anana et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 105.

Change Through Boundary Alterations

- 32 Indeed, even Secretary General Boutros-Ghali announced that the U.N. will not recognize the results, despite the request by the Bosnian Serbs that the U.N. monitor the balloting (*RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 12 May 1993, p. 8).
- 33 *Wall Street Journal*, 3 June 1994.
- 34 *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 6 July 1994, p. 4.
- 35 James Simmie and Joze Dekleva, eds., *Yugoslavia in Turmoil: After Self-Management?*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, p. xviii.
- 36 David A. Dyker, *Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt*, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 184.
- 37 This was revealed to U.N. representative Cyrus Vance; Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 235.
- 38 See Malcolm Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 2.
- 39 Prescott, see in note 3, pp. 56–8.
- 40 However, the Berlin Conference did recognize at least implicitly, the existence of African sovereign entities.
- 41 Shaw, see in note 38, pp. 31–46.
- 42 See Milica Z. Bookman, *Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, chapter 2.
- 43 Shaw, see in note 38, pp. 192–6.
- 44 See Milica Z. Bookman, *The Economics of Secession*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 158.
- 45 For a difference of occupation and conquest, see Eyal Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, Princeton University Press, 1993.
- 46 Major earlier occupations include: Around World War I, the first was the German occupation of Belgium (1914–1918), and the Allied occupation of the German Rhineland (following the Armistice Agreement of 1918). World War II witnessed a larger number of occupations: among the Axis powers, Italy annexed Ethiopia and Albania, Japan set up various puppet states throughout south-east Asia, and Germany both annexed and set up puppet states. The Soviet Union at this time also extended into other's territory and annexed lands previously independent. Among the Allied powers, Great Britain occupied some territories in Africa (such as Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Libya). The United States occupied French North Africa, and together with other Allied troops, occupied Italy. At the completion of the war, both Germany and Japan were occupied by the Allies.
- 47 Benvenisti, see in note 45, p. 149.
- 48 Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980, p. 158.
- 49 Gugliermo Ferraro, *Tragedija Mira: Od Versaja do Ruha*, Rome, 1925.
- 50 Boggs, see in note 6, p. 113.
- 51 Ibid., p. 137.
- 52 Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991, p. 15.
- 53 See, for example, Jaroslav Krejci and Vitezslav Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, among others.
- 54 Walter Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?', *World Politics*, 24, 1972, A320.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 55 The countries of Asia and Africa tend to be ethnically heterogeneous, often with compact minorities residing in compact territories. Many of those are divided by international boundaries drawn arbitrarily with little regard to ethnic composition. In Africa alone, the number of ethnic groups divided by international boundaries abound: the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin; the Hausa in Nigeria, Niger, and Ghana; the Berbers in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya; the Bakongo in Angola and Zaire, et cetera. See A. I. Asiwaju, ed., *Partitioned Africans*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. As a result of these imposed unnatural boundaries, Ali Mazrui suggested that the near future will bring about a dramatic redrawing of boundaries across the African continent, *The Economist*, 11 September 1993, p. 28.
- 56 Karl Renner, quoted in Theodor Hanf, 'Reducing Conflict Through Cultural Autonomy: Karl Renner's Contribution' in Uri Ra'anan et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991 p. 35.
- 57 According to Zaslavsky, 'It combined divisive measures and integrative techniques to prevent the organization of alliances between neighboring ethnic groups, to undermine the capacity of any nationality to act as a unified entity, and to co-opt the crucial sectors within each nationality into the Soviet regime', Zaslavsky, p. 99.
- 58 Rousek, see in note 1.

Economic Pressures and Incentives Underlying Demographic Change

Some [preferential] policies are formally stated and openly pursued, whereas many others are adopted *sub silentio*.

DONALD HOROWITZ¹

Making Chinese educational opportunities more expensive [in Malaysia] reduces the stock of human capital of individual Chinese [since the Chinese are] being forced to pursue a higher education abroad.

MICHAEL WYZAN²

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, LEADERS have applied economic pressures and offered economic incentives to their populations in order to manipulate their behavior. Sometimes, these pressures and incentives have been targeted for a specific segment of the population and sometimes the goal has been to alter the demographic structure of the society. Such economic pressures are the focus of this chapter.

According to Horowitz: ‘Systems of economic relations can crystallize around *opportunities afforded and disabilities imposed* by government policy on particular ethnic groups’ (italics mine).³ Thus, government policy may enhance and decrease the present and future welfare of specific populations. More importantly for the purposes of this book, such policies have, directly or indirectly, an effect on demographic variables. These policies include economic incentives to induce procreation, assimilation and relocation. Moreover, legislation that discriminates by

The Demographic Struggle for Power

ethnic group with respect to taxes, property rights, labor conditions and economic development shapes the economic reality of target populations. By extension, policies shaping economic realities also contribute to secessionist and irredentist sentiment among populations.

From the perspective of the western liberal, democratic tradition, in which individual rights are respected and ethnic origin is considered largely irrelevant in the eyes of the law, it may seem unlikely that leaders would or could sponsor or induce discrimination by ethnicity (or race or religion). Examples of legalized discrimination in 'non-democratic' parts of the world are considered, in the words of Saffran, 'oppressive and inelegant',⁴ and are viewed with concern by human rights activists. Indeed, examples such as the prohibition of Russians to own land in Latvia; the Iraqi draining of Shiite marshes, and employment restrictions against blacks in South Africa, are but some of the cases in which peoples are judged by ethnicity. Yet, even in societies in which the democratic tradition reigns, evidence of economic incentives is not far away in their history, and evidence of the manifestations of policies of economic pressures (if not the policies themselves) is clearly visible. For example, the fact that in the United States, blacks pay higher taxes on suburban property may not be the result of direct policy to discourage the migration of blacks into urban areas, but the manifestation of it is real, as is its demographic consequence.⁵

Economic aspects of ethnic policies as well as differential economic policies have rarely been studied by economists. The study of inter-ethnic relations in general have been neglected by economists, since they are perceived to fall in the domain of anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists.⁶ As a result, the recent research by Michael Wyzan on the economic aspects of differential treatment of ethnic groups and that of Thomas Sowell on preferential policies around the world, begin to fill the void in the literature.⁷ However, to the extent that scholars in any field have addressed the issue of selective treatment of ethnic groups, they have omitted the link between differential policies and demographic shifts. Indeed, the study of preferential policies and affirmative action has been discussed in the literature insofar as it contradicts the concept of merit as the grounds for success within a system.⁸ Also, these types of policies were studied to ascertain their effectiveness in coping with ethnic conflict and the role of economic factors in persistent ethnic inequality. To the extent that preferential policies can eliminate the source of ethnic conflict, and to the extent that they can

Economics and Demographic Change

offset economic inequality, they are then judged worth the negative side effects such as cost and bias against some groups. Such research leaves unanswered questions pertaining to the link between selective policies and induced demographic changes.

PART I: DIRECT ECONOMIC INDUCEMENTS

Economic inducements that affect demographic structure can be divided into those that have a direct effect on a demographic variable and those that affect demographics only indirectly. Both direct and indirect economic inducements may be either overt or camouflaged. The former are those whose goals are clearly stated and intent is unmistakable (for example, the South African regulation that restricts land ownership of blacks). The latter are those inducements that may be interpreted as having other or multiple intents (for example, tax concessions for large families).

The most direct economic inducements are those that induce people to procreate, to assimilate and to relocate. While inducements to procreate have been discussed in chapter 5, it is worth reiterating that the microeconomic theory of fertility and the law of demand underlie pronatalist policies. In other words, to the extent that children can be treated as consumer goods, a decrease in their price will result in an increase in their demand. In an effort to offset the cost of childbearing and childrearing, leaders have provided their populations with a variety of compensatory packages. These include one or more of the following: lump sum payments to parents for the birth of each child, children's allowances to be paid out over a period of years, the counting of child-rearing years towards pensionable years, loans at low interest rates, housing vouchers, and a favorable tax structure. There are even proposals to give preferential treatment in the granting of employment and licenses for private enterprises to families with large numbers of children in order to stimulate procreation.⁹ These financial inducements to procreate are rarely limited to a select ethnic group, and indeed sometimes it is not intended for a select group only. However, to the extent that selectivity in breeding is a goal of a nationalist leadership, the intent of these policies is camouflaged by simply restricting them by income group or region, categories that are often related to ethnicity and race.

Leaders also offer economic inducements in order to increase the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

numbers of people that assimilate into the dominant culture. The most effective economic inducement with respect to assimilation is that of participation in the dominant economy. Indeed, assimilation with respect to language, religion and citizenship enables individuals to become economically and socially more mobile and thus entails the expectation of higher economic benefits in the form of salary, promotion, etc. (for example, in Bulgaria, the Turks had greater access to employment if they agreed to the Bulgarization of their names). Another economic inducement had to do with land: the conversion into the principal religion may be accompanied by rights to land ownership (indeed, during the Ottoman Empire, the conversion of Slavs into Islam in Bosnia carried with it rights to land and territory not enjoyed by the *raja*, or the remainder of the population). Moreover, participation in the dominant economy also entails enjoyment of the benefits of distributive fiscal policy.

Ethnic leaders also directly induce populations to relocate using economic incentives.¹⁰ To induce in-migration, leaders pay (directly or indirectly) for the relocation of target populations (for example, Serbian authorities have provided Serbian families with economic incentives such as housing and employment to induce migration into Kosovo).¹¹ To induce dispersal of peoples, leaders offer economic benefits to target populations (for example, Hungarian graduates from vocational schools and universities have been offered employment or assigned to jobs outside their communities. Romanians are encouraged to replace them through offers of high incomes and housing opportunities in the Hungarian communities¹²). To reduce the likelihood that temporary population relocations will become permanent, some leaders have instituted policies that act as economic disincentives for long-term stay (in Switzerland, guest workers enjoy public benefits, such as education, only in nine month cycles, thereby encouraging annual repatriations¹³). Sometimes, leaders pay directly for population relocations. The recent example of Germany, as it paid Romania for the repatriation of Romanian Gypsies, and Bulgaria for some 25,000 Bulgarians, is a clear example of the provision of financial inducement in order to remove an undesirable people from its territory.¹⁴ Sometimes, the expulsion is done by economic means but in a roundabout manner: in Saudi Arabia, one million Yemeni workers lost their jobs and were denied residency permits, and thus were forced to repatriate.¹⁵ An example of direct payment for an inflow of people is that of the African Americans. In this case,

Economics and Demographic Change

economic incentives encouraged members of competing tribes to capture and sell each other's members into slavery, and at the same time, decrease the population of those tribes in the home territories. American blacks were forcibly transplanted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during the period of the slave trade through the desire of individuals for economic gain and a demographic struggle for power between tribes. Lastly, the example of payment to allow people to leave the country is that of Romania under Ceaușescu, when it was said to have sold exit visas to Jews for \$10,000 per head.

PART II: INDIRECT ECONOMIC INDUCEMENTS

While not all economic policy directly affects the demographic structure, policy that makes an ethnic group feel less welcome, curtails its rights, and suppresses its economic development may indirectly achieve the same result.

Indirect economic policy is based on discrimination between ethnic groups within society. Such discrimination is sometimes enshrined in the constitution, as described in chapter 5. This entails the use of the constitution, by the leadership, to publicly identify the dominant ethnic group (or race) and grant its language official status. This explicit expression of an ethnic or linguistic hierarchy need not necessarily indicate the institutionalization of discrimination, although under conditions of pre-existing inter-ethnic hostility, it tends to bode ill for the non-titular population. This was clearly true of the constitutions of Sri Lanka, the new post-Yugoslav states, as well as the new Baltic post-Soviet states. In addition to those, the Malaysian constitution contains an amendment (no. 53) which grants the government the right to have quotas for Malays for positions in public service, scholarships, and permits and licenses. In Israel, where there is no constitution, there is a discrepancy in government thinking on the question of institutionalized discrimination: According to Klimov, on the one hand, the Declaration of Independence (1948) establishes a Jewish state for Jews from the diaspora (thereby elevating Jews in the state to a special status), on the other hand, it promises equal rights regardless of race or religion. In South Africa, laws and practices that evolved over the past several centuries, including the policy of apartheid, in effect codified the superiority of whites over blacks. This was manifested in numerous spheres of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

economic life, including the removal of blacks from 'white' urban areas and their confinement to homelands (*bantustans*) which were to offer employment, housing and simultaneously restrict movement.¹⁶

Not all economic discrimination is necessarily enshrined in the constitution. Programs based on discrimination may be associated with only some governments (such as the 'Sinhala only' policy in effect until Jayewardene came to power in 1977, or the policy of 'Northernization' espoused by the First Nigerian Republic), or only some sectors (such as land restrictions in Fiji or restrictions of shares in new companies in Indonesia).

Indirect policies that act as economic inducements to the population to engage in activities that affect the demographic structure of societies include selective regulations pertaining to property ownership, discrimination in labor issues, selective tax policy, selectivity in development projects, ethnic discrimination in education, selective use of prices, and manipulation of natural resources. These are discussed below.

(i) Selective regulations pertaining to property ownership

(1) Land In most developing countries (as well as in many more developed countries), land provides the principal source of sustenance for a large portion of the population. Land is a source of employment, of income, of status, and of pride. As a result, regulations that determine rights to land ownership are by definition a sensitive matter, especially when they entail discrimination based on ethnicity.

Examples of such discrimination abound. In some cases, it is direct and applied with righteousness. The most blatant and large-scale case is that of South Africa: the Land Act of 1913 prevented blacks from owning land outside of a few arid, worthless parcels, thereby allotting 90% of the territory to whites. The Land Act resulted in the segregation and forced resettlement of blacks on ten ethnic reserves, where since 1960, 3.5 million blacks have been forcibly resettled because they constituted a 'surplus population'.¹⁷ This continued into the 1990s: now President Mandela is faced with the unpleasant task of dismantling the land laws.¹⁸ In addition, blacks have not had equal access to agricultural bank loans and support of local government in rural development programs.

South Africa is not alone in discriminatory land practices. Land

restrictions have characterized numerous countries throughout their histories as well as in the present. Some past examples that greatly influenced ownership patterns include that of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Decree of Omar II from the *Koran-al-Raya*, across the Ottoman Balkans, Orthodox Christians and Jews were restricted in owning property: ‘the acquisition of real property and houses is reserved for Moslems’.¹⁹ Another historical example is the United States. The Sioux Indians lived on territory in South Dakota that is rich in mineral deposits. The United States Congress never purchased the land, but rather passed legislation annexing Indian territories, and claimed that the tribes had agreed to the transfer. Since 1920, the Sioux have been suing the government for that land from which they were evicted.²⁰

In most of these cases, newcomers had advantages that helped push original settlers onto marginal lands. This happened with blacks with the coming of the Afrikaners, the Indians with the coming of the white man, and even among local groups in Africa, such as the animist peoples of northern Cameroon, who were pushed out by the pastoralist Fulani and the trader Hausa.²¹ However, the loss of land rights is not limited to cases of newly arrived immigrants. Indeed, in Turkey, in the aftermath of the Graeco-Turkish war, Greeks lost the rights to own land. In Malaysia, the foreign and merchant laborers, such as the Indians and the Chinese, that were imported during colonialism had no territorial rights.

At present, changes in the post-communist period have resulted in land policies and practices that are to the detriment of the non-titular nationalities. Indeed, in Latvia, legislation prohibits Russians from owning land.²² In Kosovo, while there is no legislation to support discrimination against Serbs in the purchase of land, there is anecdotal evidence that suggests widespread refusal to sell land to Serbs, as Albanians tend to sell to Albanians.

Such practices are not confined to the former communist countries. In Fiji, land has been reserved for Fijians, despite the fact that some one half of the population is composed of Indians. According to Mayer, land could be leased to Indians but only at exorbitantly high rents, thus effectively preventing their long-term sustenance from the land.²³ In the Middle East, there has been an influx of Muslims into the previously Christian city of Bethlehem on the West Bank. There is evidence of Muslim resistance to selling property to Christians, perhaps in order to tilt the population in favor of Muslims. A resident of the area explained

The Demographic Struggle for Power

that Muslims are ‘committed to the religious aspect of owning land more than Christians’.²⁴

Finally, there are instances in which land legislation has unintentionally had discriminatory effects on various ethnic groups. In Kazakhstan, the introduction of legislation supporting private ownership of land is under debate and has been postponed because of its discriminatory effect: it is expected that it will be the Russian population that will be able to purchase land leading to a situation in which the semi-nomadic rural Kazakhs have no property rights on territory they have traditionally inhabited.²⁵

(2) *Housing* While housing is closely related to land, it is not a principal source of income across the globe. It is, however, associated with the satisfaction of basic human needs for shelter, and thus regulation restricting ownership or lease of housing touches the very core of human existence. For this reason, legislation restricting housing rights of individuals by ethnicity or race have been at the core of criticism by the international community. This lack of housing rights has been in the following cases. In South Africa, blacks were only allowed housing on their homelands, and it was illegal to acquire or rent housing in the white urban areas (in 1986, the pass laws were repealed, and blacks were allowed to relocate to the urban areas). Similar to the South African concept of passes that restricts mobility of blacks, is the system of permits that existed in the Sudan: the Passports and Permits Ordinance was introduced in 1922, which gave the leader the authority to close parts of the country to people and thus restrict inter-ethnic mobility. In Hungary, some 40% of Hungarian Gypsies live in ‘segregated rural ghettos’ in small towns and villages.²⁶ Since there is much popular resentment about integrating Gypsies, urban housing is rarely available to them. Finally, an integral part of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia is the eviction of targeted ethnic groups from their homes. This process of eviction entails signing over of property rights, under duress, to those executing the evictions. Under those circumstances, ethnicity determines the right to own property in a given territory.

(3) *Capital and business* By regulating the ethnicity of capital owners and by instituting preferences by ethnicity in business dealings (such as in the granting of licences), the leadership is able to discriminate and control the ethnic structure of the economy. Such preferential policies put some

Economics and Demographic Change

groups at a disadvantage while bolstering others.²⁷ While these policies do not necessarily succeed in achieving equality or redressing past injustices, they often succeed in eradicating a business class from a region.

The case of Malaysia is noteworthy: by introducing the New Economic Policy, the authorities attempted to increase the capital and investment capacities of the Malay population that had been traditionally underrepresented in industry, especially relative to the Chinese. According to the policy, 30% of equity had to be set aside for Malay interests, and Malay distributors had to be used as much as possible, with a minimum of 30% of turnover. The restructuring of corporate wealth was to be overseen by several new public enterprises created for this purpose (the National Trust for Indigenous People, the Urban Development Authority and the National Corporation, for example). The last had as task, for example, to facilitate 'Malay ownership of industrial and commercial enterprises'.²⁸

Moreover, in Malaysia, the Malays have preferential access to the stock market. Wyzan describes how the government funded enterprises purchase stock, which they hold in trust for the Malays.²⁹ Horowitz describes a similar experience in Indonesia, where a specified percentage³⁰ of shares in new companies must be held by the indigenous population. In the Philippines, an informal program has emerged according to which Muslims are given preference in bank loans over others insofar as they are exempted from meeting formal requirements (such as credit-worthiness for loans).³¹

A clear example of the eradication of the business class comes from Turkey, where a capital levy was introduced in 1941, ostensibly for all ethnic groups. However, its real goal was the eradication of the Jewish bourgeoisie and its replacement by Muslims. The exorbitant fees and the stringent regulations pertaining to their payment did in fact succeed in dramatically reducing the Jewish component of the Turkish business community.³²

(ii) Labor issues

(1) Employment restrictions Selected ethnic groups are subject to restrictions in employment that determine under what conditions they may work, where they may work, and what types of jobs they may perform. Most often such restrictions are unspoken and lack a formal legal enactment, so that the titular ethnic group relies to institutionalized

The Demographic Struggle for Power

discrimination to perpetuate its position in society. However, in some instances, employment restrictions are in fact legalized. In South Africa, since World War I, the best occupations, skilled and semiskilled, were reserved for whites. Moreover, in the 1920s, the statutory color bar was established in the labor market. In Israel, Arabs are restricted from employment insofar as they operate in a tightly regulated labor market, regulated through the restriction of travel. Indeed, Arabs are required to obtain a travel permit, which is only issued, following approval, by the nearest Jewish labor exchange.³³

(2) *Ethnic discrimination in hiring* While ethnic discrimination in hiring is most easily identified in government jobs, it remains more pervasive in the private sector. With respect to government positions, ethnic discrimination is most likely to occur in the executive branch or the civil service and most often as a result of preferential legislation. Examples include the following: When the Donoughmore Constitution was adopted in Sri Lanka in 1931, it delineated a system of territorial representation, thereby largely excluding Tamils from the executive branch of government. In Israel, very few Arabs work in the civil service with the central government: while their exclusion from the Ministry of Defense is justified, Klinov claims that it is prevalent also in the offices of the Bank of Israel, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Social Security Institute.³⁴ In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy is a program of affirmative action, instituted after the 1969 race riots. This program strives to achieve 'ethnic restructuring', so that the structure of employment per sector will reflect the ethnic composition. This in effect meant that those sectors in which the Chinese were overrepresented would be altered to reflect their composition of the population (35.8%).³⁵ In Nigeria, where Southerners dominated in the civil service during the 1950s, a policy of northernization was introduced which succeeded in reversing the composition of the civil service so that Northerners outnumbered Southerners by 1965.³⁶ Lastly, in Andhra Pradesh (India), a certain percentage of government positions has been reserved for Teluganas.

In the private sector, ethnic discrimination occurs as employers prefer to work with members of their own ethnic group. As a result, minority workers are at a disadvantage and have difficulty breaking into work places. Various forms of affirmative action regulation have restricted but not eradicated that practice. Weiner and Katzenstein point out that

people from Kerala, in India, have searched for employment outside of their state and found themselves discriminated against despite their high levels of education.³⁷ In the former Yugoslavia, cases of ethnic discrimination were also evident. According to Bartlett, there has been an Albanization of employment in Kosovo.³⁸ Indeed, the Serbs in Kosovo were not being hired in part to encourage their out-migration from the region. Presently, Serbs are the target of ethnic discrimination in hiring in Croatia: it is estimated that some 40,000 Serbs were dismissed from their jobs in Croatia just before the civil war broke out.³⁹

(3) *Legalized wage discrimination* Selected ethnic groups may receive remuneration packages that differ from those of the titular ethnic group. The principal component of this package is salary, although health benefits and pensions may also be affected. Wage discrimination may be the result of legislation, such as in South Africa, where white unions were given the right to collective bargaining, while black workers' wages were established by the Wage Board.⁴⁰ Alternatively, the government may create conditions that indirectly allow the institutionalization of ethnic wage discrimination, such as in Romania, where President Ceausescu abolished hourly wages and wage by piece-work in 1983, replaced it with a merit system, which gave the right to the work overseer to determine merit. It is claimed that, as a result of this policy, Hungarians received lower income during this period.⁴¹

(4) *Linguistic restrictions in employment* If linguistic regulations limit the official language in a place of employment, then those who are not proficient are either excluded from the labor force altogether, or relegated to the fringe in low-skilled employment. While the use of language as a weeding tool has been identified in the past in many settings, it has recently become the cornerstone of labor policies. For example, in Sri Lanka the constitution of 1972 reaffirmed that Sinhalese was the only national language, to be used in official business in the north and east where Tamil predominates. As a result, large numbers of civil servants were retired.⁴² In Wales, employment discrimination against those who spoke no Welsh was so intense leading to the claim that there was 'apartheid based on language'.⁴³

Linguistic restrictions in employment have become very popular in the new states that emerged from the former Soviet Bloc. In Estonia and Moldova, legislation has been passed eliminating the use of Russian

The Demographic Struggle for Power

in the workplace and introducing the local languages, Estonian and Moldovan, over a period of several years. The result of such legislation was to remove native Russians, especially those that failed to assimilate by learning the local language, from positions coveted by the native population. The further result was to leave these populations without a means for a livelihood, little prospect of achieving a means, and thus with no option but to relocate.

(5) *Ethnic differentiation in promotion* Ethnic discrimination in the labor markets may also express itself in discrimination at the time of promotion. While hard evidence of this is sparse, some analyses of labor markets have identified differential promotion rates by ethnicity (for example, in the context of the Israeli labor markets, Klimov has suggested that there is slower promotion of Arabs than of Jews⁴⁴).

(6) *Forced labor of selected ethnic groups* Forced labor of selected ethnic groups has been present in countries in which ethnic differentiation has been institutionalized and the legal system does not provide protection to the targeted ethnic group. Forced labor implies that coercion is used to extract labor services from people, without remuneration. For example, it is claimed that ethnic Hungarians were used as forced laborers in Romania for the building of the Black Sea–Danube canal. According to Meyer and Stanglin, ‘During the last 30 years, about a half million people were used as free slave laborers on the project, most of them Hungarians from Transylvania.’⁴⁵ Also, during both world wars, Germans used Polish labor as forced labor, and Stalin ordered numerous ethnic groups to be transplanted to Siberia to be used as forced labor.

Given that data pertaining to forced labor is not readily available, it is difficult to infer just how much of forced labor is drawn from minority ethnic groups. Programs may be presented to the entire population, but only some ethnic groups *de facto* became affected. In Myanmar, there are presently two programs involving forced labor: one seems to be ethnic-specific, while the other seems not to be. The program that drew labor from all ethnic groups is the reconstruction of parts of Mandalay in preparation for the tourist season: it required three labor days from each adult.⁴⁶ However, the recruiting program, whereby young males are used as porters for the military in the forest areas in eastern Myanmar, is not aimed at the entire population. The males are recruited from the eastern rural regions, exactly those regions in which the military is

fighting rebels. While there is no hard evidence that all these youths are indeed of specific ethnic groups, the location of their residence prior to recruitment indicates that they are not of the titular majority.⁴⁷

(iii) Selective tax policy

Differential taxation is used to selectively favor or burden one ethnic group relative to others. Variations in tax rates and selective use of tax incentives are ways in which taxation can be discriminatory. The goals embodied in differential taxation may be (i) to induce out-migration of an undesirable group (for example, in Croatia after President Tudjman came to power, property taxes for non-Croatians were higher than for Croatian residents, providing a financial inducement for Serbs to relocate). Sometimes, differing property taxes are not legislated, but occur despite the best intentions stated in the taxing legislation and have the effect of relocating a specific group (for example, there is evidence that blacks in the United States pay higher property taxes than whites on homes of similar value: a study by Beveridge shows that, in suburban areas, blacks pay 58% more than whites, and 30% more in urban areas).⁴⁸ (ii) To punish a peoples for some committed acts, (iii) to raise revenue, with the burden borne disproportionately by one group, (iv) to selectively foster economic well-being by granting tax incentives to some peoples (for example, in Sri Lanka, in order to increase the economic development of the Sinhalese regions, tax incentives were used. A tax exemption for seven to ten years, a turnover tax of 2% instead of an income tax for 15 years, as well as exemption from export and import taxes and foreign exchange controls were introduced⁴⁹). (v) To indicate a conciliatory mood towards some ethnic groups (for example, after the granting of Palestinian self-rule in 1994, the terms for the economic relations dictate that Israel will transfer to the Palestinians 75% of income tax paid by Palestinians working in Israel).⁵⁰

These modern examples are but continuations of past discriminatory practices. In South Africa, until 1914, a set of discriminatory laws existed for the Asian population (which consisted mostly of indentured immigrants from India). Among these laws was a special tax of three pounds sterling that the Asian population was required to pay.⁵¹ In the Ottoman Empire, the *haraj* was collected from the non-Muslims. It was a stiff and debilitating tax paid to the Sultan. Another form of tax was the collection of the tribute of blood, namely, the removal of non-

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Muslim boys aged six to ten from their families forever, their forced conversion to Islam, and their training for membership in the sultan's janissary corp (to eventually fight their own people).

Another historical example pertains to colonial times in South America (roughly 1492 until 1825), when the mulatos and the Indians were forced to pay tribute to the colonial powers while the Spanish population was exempt. This discriminatory practice persisted until the early part of the twentieth century. Moreover, during this period, there were two 'republics' operating in many areas, especially Mexico and Guatemala: one was for the Spaniards and one for the Indians. They had different laws, and could be kept separate because one was rural and the other urban. Today, while there is no system of differential taxation by ethnicity built into legislation across South America, two republics *de facto* still exist: there are two legal systems at work, but it is not clear if they are distinct because of ethnicity or level of income.⁵²

(iv) Development projects

Discrimination by ethnicity is sometimes evident in economic development policies and programs. Authorities discriminate in several ways: they may neglect a region inhabited by an undesirable ethnic group with the goal of further impoverishing the target population and perhaps inducing out-migration. Alternatively, governments may inject money into a region inhabited by the target group in hope of stimulating economic growth that will in turn stimulate assimilation. Examples of both policies abound. East Timor is a case of stimulated economic development, where living conditions have improved since the arrival of the Indonesian army. While it is not clear that a proliferation of schools, medical facilities and churches offsets the political repression of the invasion, it is nevertheless an indication of investment that has been made into the region.

Examples of regional neglect are found in many countries, including the Indian reservations in the United States and the Hill Tribe regions in India. In Sri Lanka, Hubbell points out, the discrimination against Tamil areas in the allocation of development funds: of the 40 government sponsored enterprises established between independence and 1981, only six were in the Tamil regions of the north and east.⁵³ When projects were introduced into Tamil regions, such as large scale irrigation projects, they were accompanied by the resettlement of Sinhalese

Economics and Demographic Change

peasants. In the Sudan, the southern regions (Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and the Upper Nile) received significantly less government investment and resources than the north. Even during the period of the Condominium, development projects were concentrated in the north, around Khartoum, and in the valley of the Nile. Abdallah claims that this imbalance was reflected in the fact that the per capita product of the south was 50% below the national average. This lack of balance continued into the modern period: in 1983–84, gross domestic investment in the south was 33% below the national average, and 60% of the north.⁵⁴

(v) Ethnic discrimination in education and training

In an effort to tilt the ethnic composition of the workplace in favor of one group, various discriminatory practices in education and training may be followed. These may include discriminatory admission requirements in schools, according to which members of an ethnic group are granted special rights. This occurred in Sri Lanka during 1972–77, where discriminatory admission requirements to universities enabled Sinhalese with lower grades to be admitted. Moreover, the policy of ‘standardization of marks’ gave preference to Sinhala speakers by giving them extra points on entrance examinations to university simply by taking the exam in Sinhala. In Tanzania, it is estimated that the required secondary school admission scores are 180 for the population of Kilimanjaro, whereas from other regions only 140 is required.⁵⁵

Alternatively, legislation may vary financial benefits by ethnic group. In this case, one group may be selected to receive financial inducements in the form of scholarships or grants, and thereby make education relatively less costly and increase its participation in the educational system. In Malaysia, there is a quota system for scholarships which had as goal to increase the Malay population that pursues education. Another consequence was that it made education more expensive for Chinese (who now lost scholarship opportunities), inducing a larger number of them to study abroad. Another component of the total cost of education is the cost of books and supplies. If these are made cheaper for one ethnic group, it is likely to change the ethnic composition of students. This occurred in Kosovo, where education is offered in both Albanian and Serbian, but according to Indic, Albanian textbooks are sold more cheaply than textbooks in Serbian.⁵⁶

The Demographic Struggle for Power

(vi) Selective use of prices (price discrimination)

The selective extension of price supports occurs to achieve goals that may alter the long-term composition of the population. Price differentials by ethnicity may be introduced to enable one ethnic group to achieve a higher rate of economic growth (for examples, price preferences to Malay construction firms bidding for government contracts. Such preferences have as their aim in the long run the undercutting of the Chinese in private sector business, where they were traditionally dominant). Alternatively, the government may extend price incentives in order to encourage behavior that supports its particular ideology (in South Africa, in order to encourage employment of whites, special tariff protection was awarded to industries with a high proportion of white workers, also called 'civilized' labor⁵⁷). In addition, selective use of prices may have as goal the relocation of some peoples (for example, the mayor of Teheran instituted a policy in the 1980s to drive up prices of necessities, including rents, in order to induce out-migration of new arrivals from the countryside⁵⁸).

(vii) Manipulation of natural resources

Governments are known to alter geography in order to force undesirable people to move from desirable territory. By making it more difficult and more expensive to live on a territory, the population may view relocation as the only viable option, and thereby alter the demographic composition of the region. A clear example of this has been going on in Iraq, where the government has been trying to dislodge the Shiite Muslims from southern Iraq since 1992 by diverting water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and thus dry up more than half of the vast wetlands. The economic effects of this are great: the fish are no longer available, rice cannot be grown, the water buffalo are restricted in their movement, and water has become too salty for drinking. The resulting scarcity has greatly affected the fresh water price (it is selling for \$1 per bucket.).⁵⁹ The result of this draining of the marshes is that it has pushed thousands of people into neighboring Iran (some 200,000 residents are said to have departed from the marshes since mid-1993).⁶⁰

Food is another resource whose accessibility has been withheld and offered selectively by governments. While food policies are often couched in politically palatable terms, they often have different effects on

different ethnic groups. For example, during the 20 year struggle for Eritrean independence, there seemed to be a conscious policy of starvation in Eritrea by the Ethiopian government (in order to control the activities of the separatists). As most of the separatists were of a single ethnic group, the starvation policy was *de facto* aimed at one group. Similarly, in the USSR, the famine that occurred after the collectivization of agriculture can be viewed, according to Wyman, as a policy of starvation directed against the Ukrainian peasants, since they formed the majority of the Kulak class targeted for extinction.⁶¹ Also, the attacks on the rural peasant areas in El Salvador and Honduras ostensibly to eradicate supporters of Marxism were simultaneously focused on the indigenous population that was overrepresented in those areas. Finally, Turkish officials have used a variety of means to evict Kurds from South-eastern Turkey. During 1993–94, they are said to have cut off food, fuel and supplies. The Turkish army has also adopted scorched-earth tactics to prevent livelihood of the population that depends on agricultural activities.⁶² These efforts have succeeded in altering the relative composition of the population in the region, as more than 800 Kurdish villages have been evacuated since 1990.

(viii) Selective consumer rights

Economic discrimination against selected ethnic groups may take the form of denial of consumption rights. In the absence of discriminatory practices, all individuals have the right to purchase goods and services. However, at times such rights are denied to a selected ethnic group. Such economic discrimination may take the form of denial of services, such as refusal to sell services in restaurants, clubs, and stores (for example, in Moravia, Gypsies are currently denied access to swimming pools and in restaurants⁶³).

**PART III: REGIONAL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
AND SECESSION**

Economic discrimination against target groups may cause members of that group to respond to declining economic standards by relocating from the region, by assimilating into the majority, by decreasing their fertility, etc. Sometimes, when an ethnic group is territorially

The Demographic Struggle for Power

concentrated and has claims to that territory (historical or demographic), then its collective response to economic discrimination may take the form of secessionist aspirations and demands for sovereignty on the territory it inhabits.

Preferential economic policies result in secessionist aspirations because they promote perceptions of economic injustice. Preferential policies lead a region to reappraise the costs and benefits of membership in the union. This appraisal extends to both objective macro conditions as well as the preferential policy aimed at rectifying those conditions.

Preferential policies may entail above-average contribution to the national budget, insufficient benefit from the national budget, unfavorable terms of trade resulting from price manipulation, unfavorable regulation pertaining to investment and foreign inflows of resources, etc. They may all elicit a sense of economic injustice, depending upon the relative economic position of a region. Relatively low-income regions might attribute their relatively inferior economic position to inadequate and insufficient preferential policies that might have led to unfair practices and exploitation of their resources. Relatively high-income regions may perceive themselves as the economic backbone of the state, while their neighbors drain their resources and restrain their growth. Thus, states with wide regional disparities in income constitute a ripe environment for perceptions of injustice at all levels of income.

According to Horowitz, ‘enforcement of preferential policies breeds secession among advanced, population-exporting groups; the withdrawal of such policies breeds secession among backward groups.’⁶⁴ In a study of the economic basis of secession, the author also found that secessionist aspirations are found among the relatively more developed as well as the relatively less developed regions.⁶⁵ Indeed, it is clear that perceptions of economic exploitation may be experienced by regions that are more or less developed relative to the nation, as is evident in Italy (Lombardy as well as the Mezzogiorno), India (Punjab as well as Kashmir), Yugoslavia (Slovenia as well as Macedonia) and in the former USSR (Lithuania as well as Turkmenia). The high-income, sub-national regions enumerated above are presently experiencing a tax revolt, reflecting a saturation with what they perceive to be unfair drainage of their resources for preferential policies in the less developed regions. At the same time, the less developed regions are lobbying for increased spread effects of national development, as well as a change in the redistributive policy. Perceptions of economic injustice influence

Economics and Demographic Change

the revaluation of the relative costs and benefits of belonging to a national union, and when costs outweigh benefits, economic factors are then mingled with ethnic, religious, or cultural factors, to form a set of demands that sometimes take the form of 'we want out'.⁶⁶

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has described some of the ways in which economic policies can selectively discriminate against some ethnic groups. It is not possible to assess to what degree those policies have served to alter the demographic structure of the society. However, it is evident that the pursuit of discriminatory policies in support or against a selected ethnic group may have negative repercussions for the economy. The fact that many governments engage in selective economic pressures in order to achieve a given demographic result, despite the costs incurred, implies that the expected benefits of a demographic restructuring of the ethnic composition is high (for example, the denial of development projects in Sri Lanka to regions inhabited by undesirable populations, despite the high rate of economic returns those regions promise and the expulsion of a target population (the Turks) from Bulgaria under conditions of extreme shortage of labor).

NOTES

- 1 Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 654.
- 2 Michael Wyzan, 'Ethnic Relations and the New Economic Policy in Malaysia', in Michael Wyzan, ed., *The Political Economy of Ethnic Discrimination and Affirmative Action*, New York: Praeger, 1990, p. 72.
- 3 Horowitz, see in note 1, p. 12.
- 4 William Saffran, 'Nations, Ethnic Groups, States and Politics: A Preface and an Agenda', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1, spring 1995, p. 2.
- 5 *The New York Times*, 17 August 1994.
- 6 Gary Becker published a study on the economics of discrimination which can apply to gender and ethnic groups. This highly controversial work focused attention on gender and race in the economy (Gary Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination*, University of Chicago, 1957).
- 7 Wyzan, see in note 2; Thomas Sowell, *The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective*, New York: W. Morrow, 1983.
- 8 See Horowitz in note 1, and Myron Weiner and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, *India's Preferential Policies: Migrants, The Middle Classes and Ethnic Equality*,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- University of Chicago Press, 1981. Since the two largest cases of documented and overt programs occurred in Malaysia and India, most of the literature on the subject is specific to these cases.
- 9 This is part of the pronatalist legislative package in Croatia, described in Enloe, *Sexual Politics*, p. 242.
- 10 Alternatively, economic inducements may attempt to prevent relocation: since 1 November 1994, outsiders moving into Beijing are required to pay a fee of \$11,600. *The Economist*, 17 September 1994, p. 4.
- 11 This takes place especially in those regions of Kosovo that, upon an eventual partition of Kosovo, might belong to Serbia. (*Duga*, 16 April 1994, p. 78).
- 12 The Transylvanian World Federation, *Genocide in Transylvania*, Astor, FL: The Danubian Press, 1985, p. 38.
- 13 Indeed, the Swiss have laws that limit the duration of work permits, thus workers from Turkey, Spain, Italy and Portugal are encouraged to retain strong ties with home, ethnic organizations and consulates. See Patrick R. Ireland, *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- 14 RFE/RL, *Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 47, 27 November 1992, p. 64.
- 15 In this case, it was as punishment for Yemeni support of Iraq during the Gulf War.
- 16 The practice of providing employment in small industries did not in fact become established.
- 17 *The New York Times*, 31 May 1994.
- 18 In the formulation of land reforms, the question of compensation of confiscated lands has to be addressed. Discussion is already underway for the establishment of a land claims court.
- 19 Other restrictions on non-Muslims include: the prohibition to make repairs on their buildings, to build their churches, to sue each other, to wear the same type of clothing as Muslims, to ride a horse with a saddle, to wear weapons or wide belts, or to speak loudly. They must, on the other hand, build special hostels for Muslim travellers, host Muslims (with 'full hospitality') for three days, greet Muslims with 'full respect'. Moreover, Muslims are permitted to plow up and sow over all old cemeteries 'of the miscreants'. For the full text of the Decree of Omar II, see Appendix III in Vladimir Dedijer, *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992, pp. 436–7.
- 20 They were awarded \$106 million in 1980, which they have refused to accept since it is deemed too little. *The Economist*, 23 July 1994, p. 28.
- 21 See Remi Clignet, 'Conflict and Culture in Traditional Societies', in Joseph Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 71.
- 22 *The Economist*, 25 July 1994, p. 51.
- 23 Adrian C. Mayer, *Indians in Fiji*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 62.
- 24 *Wall Street Journal*, 1 July 1994. Moreover, the city has completely changed composition in the past few decades, as Muslims have moved in in search of employment, and in the process have dislocated the Christians from the occupations they traditionally held (they were over represented in political and economic power, relative to their numbers): in 1970, there were 5 mosques,

Economics and Demographic Change

- while in 1994 there are close to 70.
- 25 This legislation has been rejected in the past by Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Kazhegeldin until December 1994, at which time it has been endorsed for unexplained reasons (see *RFE/RL, Daily Report*, 13 December 1994).
- 26 Lynn Turgeon, 'Discrimination against and Affirmative Action of Gypsies in Eastern Europe' in *Wyzan*, p. 161.
- 27 The benefits of such preferential policies are perceived to offset the costs associated with the resulting corruption as front people are used, for a fee, in order to obtain licences and make contract bids.
- 28 *Wyzan*, see in note 2, p. 65.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- 30 Horowitz, see in note 1, pp 655–6.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 655.
- 32 Individuals were given two weeks to pay the capital levy, and failing that, their businesses were confiscated and in some cases they were sent to concentration camps.
- 33 Ruth Klinov, 'Arabs and Jews in the Israeli Labor Force: A Comparison of Education and Earnings' in *Wyzan*, see in note 2, p. 7.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 35 *Wyzan*, see in note 2, p. 54. There are two goals of this program: one is to decrease the bias of Chinese employers in the private sector against hiring Malays, and the other is to offset this imbalance by denying access to some civil service positions to the Chinese.
- 36 Horowitz, see in note 1, p. 655.
- 37 Kerala is the state with the highest literacy rate in India as a result of its comprehensive educational policies. As a result of discriminatory practices in other states, surplus labor from Kerala has been forced to migrate to search for employment in Persian Gulf states. Weiner and Katzenstein, see in note 8, p. 134.
- 38 Will Bartlett, 'Labor Market Discrimination and Ethnic Tension in Yugoslavia: The Case of Kosovo' in *Wyzan*, see in note 2, pp. 197–216.
- 39 *The New York Times*, 3 September 1994.
- 40 Mats Lundahl, 'Will Economic Sanctions End Apartheid in South Africa? What Simple Analytical Models Can tell Us', in Michael *Wyzan*, see in note 2, p. 84.
- 41 Transylvanian World Federation, see in note 12, p. 52.
- 42 The Sinhalese claimed that this was necessary to redress the wrongs brought upon them by the discrimination against them and in favor of the Tamils during the rule by Britain.
- 43 This was claimed by the Archbishop of Wales. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, 'Managing Competing State and Ethnic Claims' in Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds., *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983.
- 44 Klimov, see in note 33, p. 18.
- 45 It is claimed that, among the 60,000 dissidents, priests and landowners, there were numerous Hungarians who perished in the project. Michael Meyer and Douglas Stanglin, 'Romania's Danube Connection', *Newsweek*, 30 January 1984, quoted in The Transylvanian World Federation, 1985, see in note 12, p. 24.
- 46 In the project, all residents of Mandalay have been required to devote free labor to the tourist projects.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 47 *The New York Times*, 17 July 1994. See also, *The Economist*, 11 November 1995, p. 36.
- 48 The New York Times, 17 August 1994. While it is improbable that this is the result of direct discrimination and racism, the fact remains that the price of suburban living for the black family is higher.
- 49 L. Kenneth Hubbell, 'Political and Economic Discrimination in Sri Lanka', in Wyzan, see in note 2, p. 129.
- 50 *Miami Herald*, 30 April 1994.
- 51 The laws also restricted population movements and residence of the Asians to Natal Province. It is noteworthy that at the time of these special laws, the Asian population outnumbered the whites.
- 52 Douglas Cope, 'Race Relations in Latin America: Case Studies in Mexico and Guatemala', lecture given to the Brown Club of Dade and Broward Counties on 23 June 1994.
- 53 Hubbell, see in note 5, p. 125.
- 54 Adil Eltigani Ali Abdalla, 'Ethnic Conflict in the Sudan', in Wyzan, see in note 2, pp. 146, 149.
- 55 Horowitz, see in note 1, p. 662.
- 56 Trivo Indic, quoted in Will Bartlett, 'Labor Market Discrimination and Ethnic Tension in Yugoslavia: The Case of Kosovo', in Wyzan, see in note 2, p. 208.
- 57 This policy was prevalent in the 1920s. See Mats Lundahl, 'Will Economic Sanctions End Apartheid in South Africa? What Simple Analytical Models Can Tell Us', in Wyzan, see in note 2, p. 84.
- 58 The number of migrants is estimated to be in the millions. *The Economist*, 11 December 1993, p. 48.
- 59 *The New York Times*, 3 November 1994.
- 60 A CIA report published in September 1994 claims that the number of Shiites leaving the marshes is more than 100,000–150,000 (*Miami Herald*, 8 September 1994). The number in the text is from *The New York Times*, 16 November 1994.
- 61 Wyzan, see in note 2, p. ix.
- 62 *The Economist*, 11 June 1994, p. 47.
- 63 OMRI Daily Digest, 20 October 1995.
- 64 Horowitz, see in note 1, p. 675.
- 65 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, *The Economics of Secession*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- 66 This term, proposed by Peter Leslie, is described in chapter 1.

The Political Economy of Engineered Demographic Change

Any attempt to increase the population size of one ethnic group relative to others is confrontational. As such, it is clearly not meant to dissuade ethnic leaders and nationalist populations against ethnic conflict. In fact, the *goal* of increasing ethnic populations is based on the underlying view that, with successful demographic engineering, an ethnic group will gain dominance over others. Similarly, the *methods* for population augmentation involve processes that are antagonistic to selected ethnic groups. Indeed, relocating population, forcing assimilation, and encouraging population growth of a target population are all antagonistic acts. Such confrontational policies are resented by those they are meant to affect, and are bound to provoke an intensification of nationalist sentiment and amplify demands for ethnic rights (be they cultural or secessionist). Therefore, where the demographic struggle for power is overt, there is little evidence of conciliatory thinking in inter-ethnic relations. Since ethnic regulation implies the elimination or suppression of ‘other’ ethnicities, instead of easing inter-ethnic animosities and improving inter-ethnic relations, the demographic struggle for power portends the perpetuation of inter-ethnic conflict.¹ In their discussion of conflict termination and management, McGarry and O’Leary claim ‘some modes of ethnic conflict regulation seek to eliminate or terminate ethnic differences, whereas others seek to manage the consequences of ethnic differences’.² Most policies described in this book, such as population transfers and economic pressuring, seek to terminate ethnic differences by eliminating the source of the perceived problem, namely by altering the numerical balance between ethnic

The Demographic Struggle for Power

groups. Such goals and policies prevail when leaders identify their power with the size of their ethnic group.

There is no reason to believe that the demographic struggle for power, in full swing in numerous countries across the globe, will subside in the near future. Indeed, the continuation of the struggle in the former Yugoslavia, the mutually exclusive demands of the increasingly vocal ethnic groups across the globe (such as in the Middle East, the Transcaucasus and the Balkans), and the vehemence of pronatalist expressions at the UN Population Conference of 1994, all clearly bring this issue to light.

The demographic struggle for power would terminate if ethnically heterogeneous states became nation-states, namely, if they became homogeneous and cleansed of minorities, eliminating the source of inter-ethnic power struggles. However, the achievement of such ethnic homogeneity implies the success of policies of demographic engineering. The pursuit of these policies entails harming some ethnic groups. The infliction of such harm is not looked upon favorably in the international environment, making the forceful pursuit of ethnically clean territories a politically incorrect goal. While minor policies of demographic engineering are considered an internal matter and thus overlooked and/or tolerated by the international community, more serious abuses of human rights are subject to close international scrutiny. Attempts are made to control behavior of states through a variety of international rules and regulations (for example, the Geneva Convention on Genocide), however, such attempts pit international legislation against the internal legal system which tends to be biased in favor of the ethnic group in power (that is conducting the objectionable demographic policies). Given the unacceptability of the most effective demographic policies (such as forced population transfers, genocide, etc.), methods for eliminating the demographic struggle for power must be found that harm no one while making the total population better off.

With this goal in mind, the discussion in this chapter returns to the link between ethnic size and economic and political power proposed in chapter 2. It is suggested that such a link is most obvious in countries in which sub-state administrative and ethnic boundaries coincide, and therefore ethnic demands are articulated along regional lines. Such sub-state divisions foster and accentuate inter-ethnic conflict as groups attempt to solidify their numbers within their territories, leading ultimately to inter-ethnic harassment and possibly secessionist

Engineered Demographic Change

aspirations and war. If internal boundaries do not coincide with ethnicity, the link between ethnic size and power is reduced to the local level where it does not threaten the overall stability at the state level and can be diffused more easily. This is not to say that the question of ethnicity disappears altogether – indeed, national minorities and their grievances continue to exist at the local level. However, there they fester and remain, failing to affect the state and to make an impact at the international level. Cooperation and compromise are more likely to succeed when territorial ambitions are contained and are not the basis for minority aspirations and majority fears. Thus, when administrative and ethnic boundaries do not coincide, the chances of formulating a successful policy of democratic coexistence among ethnic groups is enhanced.

The discussion about administrative boundaries and the demographic struggle is preceded by the description of a contemporary case of comprehensive demographic engineering, namely, that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the demographic conflict has been taken to an extreme degree in the form of a gruesome war. The description of the demographic struggle in Bosnia should be put into the context of the discussion of ethnic and administrative boundaries that follows it.

PART I: BOSNIA: CONTEMPORARY COMPREHENSIVE DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING

Bosnia stands out as a case of demographic engineering in which the war of numbers played itself out over time, and due to a variety of external and internal circumstances, has resulted in a war of militias.³ A brief introduction to the conflict raging today will precede a discussion of each of the methods of demographic engineering discussed in the above chapters.

At the time of writing, Bosnia-Herzegovina is the scene of a gruesome civil war, in which three peoples (the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims) are battling each other for their lives, their property, and their mutually exclusive territorial goals. Despite the efforts of some players in this war to internationalize the conflict,⁴ this is a civil war between three religious-ethnic groups that, driven by nationalism, history, and self-preservation, fight for territory in which to proclaim their nation-states.⁵ Moreover, two factions, namely

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, are irredentist in nature and desire ultimate union with Croatia and Serbia respectively.

The war broke out in April 1992, in response to the international recognition of a sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian population of Bosnia, which amounted to some 32% of the total and had property rights to some 60% of the territory,⁶ boycotted the secession referendum and began taking steps to ensure that, in the event of Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serbs and their territory would not leave the Yugoslav union. Thus, the logic behind the onset of hostilities was the same as in Croatia insofar as *all* ethnic groups demanded the right to exert their right to self-determination. Again, as in Croatia, the dispute between the sides was aggravated by the international community, not because it granted recognition, but rather because it did so selectively, quickly, and in the absence of protective measures for the newly created minorities.

The ensuing civil war between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims resulted in vicious battle, loss of lives, loss of property, and loss of the ideal of inter-ethnic harmony. It also resulted in the proclamation of several self-declared regions: the Serbian Republic (in spring 1992) and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (in summer 1992, and elevated to republic status in summer 1993). Then, in September 1993, Fikdar Abdic proclaimed the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, centered in the Bihać area, and thus seceded from the Muslim territories of Bosnia ruled by Izetbegovic. Under the guidance and insistence of the United States, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims formed a federation, to be united in a confederal arrangement with Croatia. This seemed to change the situation on the land, as the Croats and the Muslims ceased to battle each other. Indeed, one major cooperative offensive against the Serbs in the Bihać area resulted in the ouster of Fikret Abdic and the transfer of territory to the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic. However, another offensive in Bihać in the fall of 1994 by government troops resulted in a counter-offensive by the Serbs and their retaking of the previously lost territory. Finally, the Dayton Peace Accord succeeded in bringing about peace to the region by, paradoxically, retaining a unified Bosnia while simultaneously dividing it into two regions: one under the control of Bosnia Serbs (49% of the territory) and another under the control of Bosnian Muslim and Croat Federation (51% of the territory).

Engineered Demographic Change

The civil war in Bosnia was preceded and accompanied by a struggle for numerical supremacy. Although it waxed and waned, this struggle has characterized Bosnia for at least the past century. It includes the following.

(i) Demographic statistics

The territory of Bosnia has always been religiously/ethnically heterogeneous.⁷ However, the relative numbers of the principal population groups have changed over time. According to the Austro-Hungarian census of 1879 in Bosnia, 42.8% were Orthodox Serbs, 38.7% were Muslims (Serbs and Croats), and 18% were Catholics (Serbs and Croats). These numbers are not strictly comparable with those in the subsequent years: before, both Serbs and Croats could be Catholics, while now, Catholicism is defining focus of Croat ethnicity. In 1931, the census grouped peoples by religion: the Orthodox numbered 44.5%, the Muslims 30.9% and the Catholics 20.3%.⁸ By 1991, Muslims were the majority, accounting for 43.7% of the population, followed by the Serbs 31.3% and the Croats 17.3%. The Yugoslavs amounted to 5.5% of the Bosnian population. These numbers indicate that over time, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been changing in such a way that the proportion of Serbs dropped dramatically (from a high of 44.5% to 31.3%) while the proportion of Muslims increased (from 30.9% in 1931 to 43.7% in 1991). During this time, the proportion of Croats decreased slightly (from 20.3% to 17.3%). The dramatic changes in the relative numbers of Serbs and Muslims are due to the systematic killing of Serbs during World War II, to out-migrations of Serbs since World War II, and to the low birth rates of Serbs relative to the Muslims.

Statistics pertaining to the steady decrease of Serbs in Bosnia provoke nationalist responses among Bosnian Serbs that resent becoming a minority on territory where they were, until recently, a majority (hence the war cry of the Bosnian Serbs: ‘Bosnia is Serbian’). Those same statistics fuel the self-confidence of the Muslim population that perceives its numbers bolster its rights to Muslim leadership in the region.

Another battle of demographic statistics may be entitled ‘who gets the former Yugoslavs’. In the post-World War II period, the number of people that have identified themselves as Yugoslavs in census enumerations has been on the increase, culminating in 1981. However, in the heated atmosphere prevailing in 1991, Yugoslavs as a category almost

The Demographic Struggle for Power

disappeared from the census, especially in Bosnia (Yugoslavs dropped from 8% in 1981 to 5% in 1991).⁹ Given the irrelevancy of such a hybrid national category in times of competing nationalisms, there is an attempt by all nationalist ethnic leaders to appropriate the Yugoslavs. To the extent that the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats or the Bosnian Muslims succeed in embracing the Yugoslavs, they add to their numbers and thus bolster their claims to a larger proportion of the population. The battle for the Yugoslavs is based on differing views as to who, in fact, are the Yugoslavs? Some Yugoslavs are products of mixed marriages. Since there exists no prescribed pattern of ethnic determination, ethnic definition is the result of choice, interest or pressure (in other words, it is not prescribed that the paternal nor the maternal ethnicity is of necessity inherited by the child, as it is in some religions: Jewish identity, for example, is transmitted through the mother, while Christian Orthodoxy is transmitted through the father). Some people have chosen to identify themselves as Yugoslav because they view Yugoslavism as a political expression of preferences rather than an ethnic orientation. They have associated themselves with the concept of Yugoslavia, often in spite of a homogeneous heritage. The demise of the idea of Yugoslavia has been accompanied by the demise of the Yugoslav identity. So, to which ethnic group do these Yugoslavs now belong? There is evidence that the politically committed Yugoslavs have largely been Serbs, who have adhered to the idea of Yugoslavia to a greater extent than members of other ethnic groups. However, in the absence of hard evidence as to the ethnic orientation of Yugoslavs, the appropriation of this group by any of the competing ethnic leaders serves only to fuel the fires.¹⁰

(ii) Pronatalist policies

The leaders of the three warring factions are encouraging their peoples to procreate in order to become more numerous. This goal is especially relevant in view of the losses associated with the war, in which some 200,000 people were killed and some 2 million migrated. The evidence of this encouragement of natality in order to offset the losses, comes from various indirect sources. Among Bosnian Croats, the family-related teachings of the Catholic Church have taken on a new importance. Pronatalist policies in Croatia, as described in chapter 4, have been adopted in the Croat regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. With

respect to Bosnian Serbs, there is evidence of encouragement of procreation among the nationalist leadership, specifically in order to bolster their numbers relative to other groups: indeed, the words of Zeljko Raznjatovic (who said that Serbian women should all have four children to offset the Muslim Albanians who ‘produce like rabbits’¹¹) reflect the sentiment prevailing in Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims have experienced a baby boom in Sarajevo during the two years of war: in chapter 4, it was described how the population is encouraged to procreate in order to offset the war losses.

(iii) Assimilation

The territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes a border between three religions, namely Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim. It represents the farthest eastern border of the Catholic Church, the farthest north-western border of the Muslim world, and the farthest western border of the Orthodox Church. As a result, Bosnia has been characterized by conflict throughout its history because, as all border areas, it has been subject to religious dilutions and conversions, and thus each religion perceived the need to strengthen its hold on the territory. Indeed, it is at the fringes, farthest from the center, that all cultures and religions are the weakest and thus reinforcements must be the strongest. All religious institutions in Bosnia competed for members and pressured non-believers to convert and assimilate.

At the present time, the question of what it means to assimilate in Bosnia does not have a simple answer. At least two strains of assimilation presently exist in the region: first, there is the process of assimilation into the three ethnic/religious orientations, which entails becoming more Muslim, more Serb (or Orthodox), and more Croat (or Catholic). Second, there is the process of assimilation into the ‘Bosnian identity’ that is heterogeneous in nature and embraces diversified populations. However, not only is assimilation into a Bosnian identity hindered by the parallel assimilation into individual Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic identities, but also the concept of a multi-ethnic Bosnian identity has been transformed by the breakup of Yugoslavia. Indeed, Bosnia was truly a heterogeneous region, in which overall inter-ethnic harmony characterized the past 50 years. However, with the failure of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia to retain its cohesion, it became impossible to retain a multi-ethnic Bosnia. As long as polarized mother states exist to inspire

The Demographic Struggle for Power

both the Serbs and the Croats, it is unlikely that the majority of the Bosnian populations will be happy with a multi-ethnic solution. The pre-war multi-ethnic identity,¹² based solely on regional attributes, is increasingly hard to maintain given the realities of the war. Therefore, since Bosnia was recognized as a state in 1992, it has been necessary to create a Bosnian identity to replace the shattered one and to provide cohesion to the population. *De facto*, this new Bosnian identity is increasingly becoming equated with the Muslim identity, as this is the only one of the three groups that has no mother identity to assimilate with. Oddly, in Bosnia the creation of a Bosnian identity follows the creation of the Bosnian state, instead of the other way around.¹³

Concomitants of the creation of the new Bosnian identity include the creation of a Bosnian language and a Bosnian church. With respect to language, recent efforts have entailed the differentiation of the language from Serbo-Croatian. Indeed, a dictionary of the Bosnian language has been constructed by linguists. One participant in the effort to 'Bosnianize' the language spoken among Bosnian Muslims is Senahid Halilovic, who traces the differences among the language spoken by the Muslims and claims that it developed differently from Serbian and Croatian and is inseparable from Islam.¹⁴ In reality, the language spoken on the territory of Bosnia is not distinct from Serbo-Croatian and varies only in dialect. The script and the vocabulary is identical. Moreover, there is evidence of feeble attempts to create a Bosnian Church. This has roots in the Bogomil religion, originally from Bulgaria, that existed in some parts of Bosnia before the Ottoman penetration and is now being reconstructed. However, the success of this Bosnian Church is unlikely given the evidence of simultaneous Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox religious education.¹⁵

(iv) Population movements

As described in chapter 6 and Appendix II, there have always been population movements across Bosnian territory, although they intensified in this century. The 1990s have witnessed the largest migrations to date. In a period of two years, some 2 million people left their homes. As a result of the waves of ethnic cleansing that occurred, Muslims left Eastern Bosnia, Serbs left Western Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats left Central Bosnia, and Muslims left Croat villages in Central Bosnia.

Engineered Demographic Change

(v) Boundary changes

When Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia, the issue of internal borders became critical since the one-third Serbian population rejected independence and opted for staying within Yugoslavia.¹⁶ Moreover, the Croats in Herzegovina and central Bosnia preferred self-rule on territory that they could eventually annex to Croatia. Thus, the issue of internal boundaries, specifically their location and their constitutional meaning, needed resolution. The international community refused to allow battle on the ground to determine borders and instead insisted on pursuing a negotiated solution. The efforts of the international community pertaining to borders include the following plans. The first, the Lisbon Accord, drawn up and signed by the three warring sides in March 1992, was more favorable for the Muslims than later plans. According to the plan, the Muslims would have received 44% of the land, and only 18% of their population would have been living outside of the Muslim provinces. The Serbs also would have received 44% of the land, but 50% of their population would have been outside. Finally, the Croats would have received 12% of the land, and 59% of their population would have been outside their territory. Despite the signing of the plan and its favorable terms, President Izetbegovic, encouraged by the United States to seek a unitary state within the administrative boundaries of Titoist Bosnia, rescinded his signature, and the war began in earnest.

A second map was proposed by the international community in the spring of 1993. The Peace Conference in Geneva almost achieved the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into eight to ten ethnically based regions with a loose central government. This Vance–Owen Peace Plan, named after UN mediator Cyrus Vance and EC mediator David Owen, was replete with problems since its inception. First, the map contained a series of Nagorno-Karabakhs, or unconnected ethnic enclaves, that were unviable economically or politically. Second, the plan called for a strong unitary central government, which satisfied only the Muslim side (some 40% of the population). The Croats and the Serbs opposed such a political form, opting instead for a loose confederation of republics.¹⁷ Third, the plan would have been agreed to under severe international pressure and thus would have had to entail substantial foreign support in the form of troops, infrastructure and capital to create and then maintain the peace. None of these were forthcoming from the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

West, already exhausted from its failed and unpopular efforts in this Balkan crisis, and offers from the Muslim countries were rejected in order not to increase Muslim influence in Europe. For all these reasons, the plan had no hope of bringing about stability in the region.

The third map was proposed by the so-called Contact Group (consisting of the United States, France, England, Germany and Russia) in spring 1994. It provided for a division of Bosnia that would grant the Bosnian Serbs control over 49% of the territory, while the federation of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims would control 51%. This map has been accepted by the Croats and the Muslims but rejected by the Serbs for the following reasons. First, it does not provide for continuous Serbian areas, but rather allocates to the Serbs territory that is militarily unviable. Second, the areas allocated to the Serbs are not viable economically, as the fertile land, the industrial complexes and the natural resources are designated for the Muslims and Croats. A third point is not directly related to maps, but rather to the constitutional arrangements: the Contact Group plan foresees an asymmetrical confederation between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims with Croatia, but not between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. In July 1995, the map and its concomitant constitutional arrangement has not been accepted by the Bosnian Serbs. While the Serbs did agree to decreasing the territory under their control to 53%, they refuse to sign without constitutional concessions. This underscores the importance of the constitutional issue and the necessity of retaining symmetry among the population groups in Bosnia: the war has not persisted because of 4% of territory, but rather over disagreement about constitutional issues.

A few words are warranted pertaining to the federation between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims that was created (under U.S. auspices) in 1993. As the demarcation of territorial limits of territory to be controlled by this federation is still unclear, so too many constitutional and administrative aspects are unresolved. However, some disagreements pertaining to questions of demographic struggle are already visible. For example, with respect to rule and political representation, the Bosnian Muslims prefer a unitary system based on majority voting such as existed before the war (this clearly gives them the advantage). The Bosnian Croats, who are less numerous, want equality between the two people and voting structures under which they cannot be outvoted. Moreover, there is a dispute over the demarcation of cantonal borders, the setting up of new municipalities and the reorganization of

Engineered Demographic Change

existing ones. In other words, how internal administrative boundaries will be drawn up and whether they will reflect ethnicity, remains unresolved.

(vi) Economic pressures

During the Ottoman Empire, inhabitants of Bosnia who converted to Islam were given economic advantages in the form of land grants, rights to own property and rights to engage in economic transactions. In the modern period, Muslims have increasingly enjoyed advantages in Bosnia: these advantages have increased in the early 1990s and culminated in the virtual elimination of non-Muslims from positions of power. Indeed, there is evidence of dismissals of non-Muslims from state-run firms, hospitals and the military.¹⁸ The party in power, headed by President Alija Izetbegovic, represents a one-party state in which loyalty to the party is a condition for patronage positions, and sympathetic Croats and Serbs are left with nowhere to go but their mother states, Croatia and Serbia. Similar economic pressures are evident in the Serbian and Croatian regions, directed towards the 'outside' ethnic group. Moreover, in all areas where ethnic cleansing is practiced, the destruction of one's home or the reallocation of that home to another family, represents the loss of a major asset. Thus, without residence and employment, there is little incentive or feasibility to remain on a given territory.

PART II: SEVERING THE LINK BETWEEN SIZE OF ETHNIC POPULATIONS AND POWER (SEPP)

In order to find solutions to the Bosnian quagmire and to avoid violent inter-ethnic warfare in the many places across the globe that might implode and turn into a similar multi-faceted struggle, it is necessary to examine the possibilities for fostering a compromising political framework. In the formulation of an institutional mechanism that can provide solutions to the inter-ethnic conflict that underlies demographic struggles for power, the role of the state is crucial. Indeed, it provides the political framework within which a solution can be devised.

The proposal offered in this chapter, namely to sever the link between ethnic size and power, has roots in the literature on the role of the state,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

nation-building, democracy, and inter-ethnic conflict. There is a vast literature on nation-building which focuses on political development under conditions of modernization and economic growth and is based on the experience of the western industrialized states. Theories of nation-building have tended to minimize the disruptive effects of ethnic diversity, assuming that they will disappear in the integrative process of assimilation associated with the establishment of the modern state.¹⁹ However, the divisive ethnic issue has been the principal obstacle to political development in Third World states, former communist states, and to a lesser degree in the industrialized western states. The solution proposed below for dealing with the demographic struggle for power attempts to build and reinforce existing states while recognizing the ethnic issue and addressing it.

Another body of scholarly literature recognizes the existence and perseverance of ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict and offers a solution based on fostering democracy in multi-ethnic states. This ‘consociational solution’, originally constructed by Arend Lijphart, relies on peaceful coexistence of several ethnic groups, entails an equal partnership among groups and thus avoids domination by any one group. The solution stimulated much discussion among political scientists and underwent much criticism and praise. Its relevance for our purposes is limited by the assumption that the relative sizes of ethnic groups stay constant. In reality, relative ethnic population sizes are dynamic: they change over time as a result of both natural factors as well as the success of policies of demographic engineering described in the text. Indeed, since the overriding goal of the demographic struggle for power is to alter the relative size of ethnic groups, and since this goal is often achieved, the consociational solution suffers limitations in its applicability. This limitation was first identified by Kellas: ‘consociationalism is most likely to work if the segments (nations or ethnic groups) do not change in size or in importance relatively to one another.’²⁰ While Kellas then proceeds to provide examples of situations in which such a democracy failed to function because relative ethnic numbers changed (notably, Lebanon), he did not expand the topic further and draw demographic implications as this was not the focus of his research.

Horowitz also criticized the consociational model and proposed some important solutions to the problem of escalating inter-ethnic conflict within multi-national states.²¹ He claimed that some of the consociational model’s assumptions are too restrictive to be useful and

Engineered Demographic Change

offered a more flexible model for political accommodation. His solution is based on the breakdown of ethnic units (while in consociationalism, ethnic units are maintained). Such a breakdown would entail the dissolution of ethnic cohesion, which, according to Horowitz, could be done by preventing ethnic boundaries from corresponding with administrative boundaries. Brass also recognized the role played by the administrative boundaries, especially in inciting separatist sentiment: ‘examples of institutional mechanism that may influence the development of separatist movements are the demarcation of administrative areas to conform to presumed ethnic boundaries ... and the creation of a federal system of government based upon cultural-linguistic-territorial groups.’²² Thus, despite the fact that some scholars have argued that ethnic groups should be treated in a group within society (indeed, Lijphart has stated that ‘ethnic groups normally serve as the basic building blocks for a political system’²³), there are conditions in which their cohesiveness should be discouraged. One of these conditions is when there is inter-ethnic conflict (or a predisposition for it) and when administrative and ethnic boundaries coincide. While both Horowitz and Brass recognize the role played by ethnicity and administrative boundaries, neither directly ties the issue to population policies and demographic issues. Here, the link is drawn between those boundaries and the severance of the link between size and power.

The positive link between the size of a group and political and economic power is most clearly observable in ethnically heterogeneous countries in which (i) the efforts to contain inter-ethnic conflict and competition are confrontational rather than conciliatory and (ii) inter-ethnic antagonism is expressed in regional demands that are articulated along ethnic lines. The former consists of policies that are part of the war of numbers, as described throughout the book. The latter occurs because ethnic groups concentrated in clearly demarcated territories are more likely to make ethno-territorial demands and to perceive their primary association or loyalty to the ethnic group rather than another interest group. If ethnic demands could be disentangled from regional (or territorial) demands, then the link between the size of an ethnic group and political and economic power would be severed (or at least reduced). This, in turn, is one way to avoid the spiraling demographic struggle for power among various ethnic groups.

The severance of the link between size and power is achieved by ensuring that sub-state administrative boundaries do not coincide with

The Demographic Struggle for Power

ethnic boundaries and therefore that ethnic leaders are prevented from articulating demands along ethnic lines, but rather must do so on regional lines.²⁴ Such a step encourages multi-ethnicity and the identification of common interests that are primarily regional and individual in nature, rather than ethnic (including those based on class, economic interests, etc.). The redrawing of administrative boundaries has two effects. First, it diversifies the ethnic composition of the population because it includes new minorities and excludes members of the majority. Second, it alters the perimeters of traditional or historical territorial boundaries associated with an ethnic group, and thus over time, reduces its claim to the land.²⁵ Together, these two effects decrease and diffuse inter-ethnic conflicts over territory. The weaker the territorial concentration of the ethnic group, the harder it is to identify the link between size and power. Thus, for example, in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, the demands of non-titular ethnic groups are not location-specific. Indeed, while ethnic Vlah and Gypsy parties exist and they demand rights for their peoples, these tend to focus on some common interest other than territory.

The administrative disassociation between ethnicity and territory effectively decreases the pressures for sovereignty and self-determination based on ethnicity. This aspect of secessionist and irredentist sentiment is diffused if the boundaries of the ethnic territory are not reflected in the internal administrative system nor recognized by the authorities. Breuilly said, ‘nationalism is one particular response to the distinction between state and society. It seeks to abolish that distinction.’²⁶ Ensuring that the ethnic and administrative boundaries do not coincide dilutes the drive to abolish the distinction between state and nation, and tends to have the effect of reducing the striving for political self-determination and the nationalism that drives it. It follows that the concept of the sovereign state, as a birthright of all ethnic minorities, ceases to be the aspired goal. Territorial ambitions become redirected, compromise becomes the norm, and cooperation becomes the cohesive factor in the plural state. This does not alter the discrepancy between loyalties that ethnic groups feel, namely the divergent loyalty to the nation and to the state (a distinction discussed at length by Walker Connor²⁷). Instead, loyalty to the nation, or ethnic group, ceases to be associated with territorial ambitions for sovereignty remains after sub-state boundaries are redrawn. The reduction of inter-ethnic conflict to a lower administrative level does not necessarily eliminate it, but reduces it to a level

Engineered Demographic Change

from which it cannot cause state-level disturbances. Diffusion of nationalist sentiment is likely to be achieved.

Ensuring that ethnic and administrative boundaries do not coincide is a form of political engineering that entails the implementation of a carefully developed policy by central authorities. It is a bold step under any circumstances, and especially unpopular in the 1990s when ethnically-based movements for self-determination are rampant and violence associated with efforts to achieve ethnic sovereignty is at an all time high. Efforts to alter administrative boundaries may be encountered with fierce resistance by the nationalist elements among ethnic minorities. This resistance is accentuated when the central authorities are of an ethnic group that is perceived to dominate and repress other groups. To counter this resistance, and to implement the administrative change, the state needs to take on the role of a manager (Rothchild and Olorunsola described this role under conditions of inter-ethnic conflict as one 'subsumed within the state's agreed upon regulatory processes'²⁸). In this role of manager, the state must also strive for impartiality. Since the state alone has the right to redraw internal boundaries, and since the goal of such a territorial redistribution is not to deepen cleavages in society but rather to reduce them, the state is called upon to rise above nationalist aspirations and to keep focused on long-range state-level goals. In some cases, such a view of the state may appear removed from reality, as it may be over ambitious to expect rational behavior when dealing with nationalism and ethnic conflict. However, the goal of balanced state-level conduct, devoid of nationalist emotion, is essential in any effort to reduce inter-ethnic conflict.

In the demographic struggle for power, the extent to which the sub-state administrative boundary coincides with the ethnic boundary is crucial irrespective of the political characteristics of the state. Irrespective of whether the country in question has a unitary or federal political system, and irrespective of the degree of decentralization that it enjoys, it is the region that *de facto* formulates ethnic demands to the center (this book will not address the merits and demerits of federalism as a mechanism for addressing ethnic conflict). The difference between a unitary and federal system rests on the mechanisms by which a region can make those demands on the center and the nature of demands that are considered acceptable, while decentralization describes the degree to which responsibilities are delegated to the region.²⁹

There is wide variety across the globe with respect to the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

permutations between political system and degree of decentralization (some federations are highly decentralized (former Yugoslavia, Canada), some enjoy limited decentralization (India, Czechoslovakia), some contain special status regions (Tibet in China; Kashmir in India), some unitary states have special status regions (Bougainville in Papua New Guinea; Corsica in France; Transylvania in Romania between 1952 and 1960), while some unitary states are highly centralized (affecting regions such as East Timor, Northern Sri Lanka, Kurdistan, Southern Sudan, Lombardy).³⁰ All these states, given that they are experiencing inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflict, are presently assessing the degree to which their internal administrative boundaries contribute to the problem and prevent a solution. As a result of this spirit of introspection, some alterations have occurred: for example, Ethiopia has recently introduced a new system of administrative divisions that will attempt to accommodate the 70 ethnic groups that exist.³¹ Introspection has also resulted in a confirmation of the status quo: for example, following the political turmoil of the 1980s, there is no new effort at ethnic accommodation in Guatemala, where Maya Indians comprise some 50% of the population and have no regional demarcations of territories throughout which they could partake in administration of their lands. Below are some descriptions of countries experiencing inter-ethnic conflict in which ethnic and administrative boundaries do coincide, and some in which they do not.

(i) When ethnic and administrative boundaries coincide

When the boundaries of ethnic groups and the sub-state administrative boundaries of their territories coincide, then both the region and the center perceive the importance of ethnicity: the region will tend to formulate its demands according to ethnic interests, and the center will direct policy at ethnic groups rather than regions. Regional demands become primarily ethnic demands.

In order to offset the spiraling of inter-ethnic conflict into regional demands for ultimate secession and to decrease the possibilities of conflict resulting in war, central governments may take steps to appease ethnic populations. Some forms of political organization may be introduced to diffuse ethnic conflict and discourage independence movements: indeed, policies such as territorial devolution, regional autonomy, and federation may all be viewed as attempts to satisfy some elements of the

Engineered Demographic Change

population and thereby decrease the chances for extended battles for independence or increased autonomy. Sometimes these arrangements are successful in the long term (for example, in Spain and Switzerland), while at other times, they are rejected or withdrawn prior to implementation (for example, Kurdish autonomy status in Iraq, Eritrean special status within Ethiopia and concessions to the Moros in the Philippines and the Tamils in Sri Lanka). In some instances, the decentralization of powers to the regions has proved unsuccessful in harnessing and discouraging secessionist movements and those movements that demand more rights and less obligations between regions and center. Indeed, according to Friedlander, ‘autonomy relationships during the twentieth century were mainly designed as placebos to frustrate independence movements and offset secessionist pressures ... In almost every instance, grants of autonomy were reluctantly given and ungratefully received.³² Several examples of regional autonomy are described below, and it is clear that as long as ethnic and administrative boundaries coincide, decentralization of economic and political powers by region will not necessarily reduce the secessionist pressures and in all likelihood will only fuel the secessionist fires.³³

(1) *Territorial devolution in unitary systems: Spain* One strategy to decrease ethnic conflict is the system of territorial devolution, according to which regions are granted rights, powers and resources by the center and thus enjoy some measure of self-rule. This occurs within a unitary political system, although elements of the system resemble federations.³⁴ A current example is the Autonomous Community system in Spain, which was introduced with the constitution of 1978.³⁵ The distinguishing feature of this system is that the transfer of powers occurs according to negotiations on a case by case basis, rather than uniformly across all regions.³⁶ In some of the cases, the regional division of Spain coincides with the ethnic division, so that Catalonia and the Basque provinces are able to articulate ethnic demands by region. The principal problem that has emerged in this system of devolution is the domino effect, according to which an ever-increasing number of regions want ever-increasing powers. Indeed, while the original concept was that only the historical autonomous regions would have this power (the Basque Provinces, Catalonia, and Galicia), however others soon followed in their requests.

The experience of Spain during the 1970s and 1980s was similar to that of several West European states, including Britain and Belgium,

The Demographic Struggle for Power

which have also attempted to resolve inter-ethnic and linguistic disputes entirely through the devolution of powers. In Belgium, the discrepancy between ethnic population and economic power in the state led to constitutional reform in the 1970s that increased the decentralization of power by setting up and redefining the power in three administrative regions: Flanders, Wallonia and the bilingual Brussels.³⁷ The regions had control over public works, the environment, employment, health and transport.³⁸ There are indications that the next session of Parliament will bring further reforms of the constitutional system, devolving more powers to the regions (including foreign trade, overseas aid and farming). In addition, the Flemings resent subsidizing the poorer Wallonia, and are presently proposing the devolution of social security to the regions in order to redress that problem.³⁹

(2) *Federation along ethnic lines: Czechoslovakia, India, and Ethiopia* Prior to its breakup in 1992, Czechoslovakia was composed of Slovakia and the Czech lands, both of which were inhabited largely by their titular ethnic groups. Indeed, there were very few Czechs inhabiting Slovakia (1%) and few Slovaks in the Czech lands (3%).⁴⁰ The political system was a federation of these two republics.⁴¹ However, ethnic demands were increasingly voiced in both republics, especially in Slovakia which demanded rectification for past injustices: it was deemed that its lower economic development was due to the nature of its economic ties during the union.⁴² After the elections of 1990,⁴³ the Czechoslovak Parliament passed laws outlining an enlargement of the regional role.⁴⁴ According to these, the center retained responsibility for national defense, foreign policy and economic and financial strategy, despite efforts by the Slovak leaders to decrease the center's authority in these matters. The republics are responsible for remaining matters. Despite these additional regional powers, the Slovak population nevertheless expressed a desire to secede, and in January 1993, two states were proclaimed.

India is a federation composed of 22 states (actually sub-states, but to be consistent with Indian terminology, they will be referred to as states) whose boundaries were drawn on the basis of the linguistic and ethnic composition of the population. As a result, the Punjabis, the Assamese and the Kashmiris voice their demands on the basis of their regions that they perceive to be their ethnic territories and historical homelands. What powers do these ethnic states actually have? Although India is said to have a decentralized political system characterized by

Engineered Demographic Change

grassroots popular participation (the *panchayat raj*), the power allocated to the states lags behind other decentralized nations such as Yugoslavia and Canada. Indeed, the concept of a strong center underlies the principles of the Indian constitution, and results in the following division of power among the center, state, and local levels. With respect to economics, foreign economic relations, general economic policies such as the federal level plans, monetary policy, some price controls, exchange rates, customs duties and inter-regional aid all fall under the control and guidance of the center. In addition, the center is responsible for setting the regulations pertaining to the mix of private and public ownership, as well as the regulation of monopolistic activities. The center assumes the responsibility for banking and some taxation, as well as issues pertaining to social welfare. The Indian Constitution divides responsibilities by placing them on one of three lists: the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List. The first two contain matters whose jurisdiction is clear, but the last list refers to those items that are jointly determined by the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures.⁴⁵ This leaves to the states and the local levels⁴⁶ essentially those issues that are of regional concern, such as land issues, some transportation issues, some inter-regional trade, etc. The responsibilities and benefits at the state level are insufficient to satisfy ethnic demands in regions such as Assam, Kashmir and Punjab.

Since 1993, Ethiopian authorities have given increased importance to ethnicity. This new awareness entailed the following: each individual was required to be registered according to ethnicity (there are some 80 ethnic groups in the region); the use of local languages was encouraged (Amharic ceased to be the official language); political parties, which proliferated after decades of one-party rule, were based on ethnicity. Most importantly, in 1994 the regional boundaries were altered to enable major ethnic groups to control their own territory. These nine territories are united in a highly decentralized federal arrangement. Most noteworthy about this union is that it grants each region the right to secession, following approval of Parliament. The reasoning behind granting such extensive rights to ethnic groups is that ethnic conflict will be diffused and wars such as the one for Eritrean independence will be avoided. The new emphasis on ethnicity in Ethiopia is to be contrasted with the virtual lack of ethnic acknowledgment in independent Eritrea. Indeed, while a multiparty system is soon to be introduced in Eritrea, the constitution will prohibit basing political

The Demographic Struggle for Power

parties on ethnicity.⁴⁷ Moreover, there will be no territorial division by ethnicity.

(3) *Regional decentralization, a de facto confederation: the former Yugoslavia*
As mentioned above, former Yugoslavia was a clear example of a state in which administrative boundaries coincided with ethnic boundaries and the articulation of ethnic demands occurred by region (with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Moreover, during 1974 to 1989, Yugoslavia was among the most decentralized federations in existence, with extensive powers allocated to the republic and very few to the center. The first sign of a loosening of central ties came with the 1965 economic reforms and was followed by amendments to the constitution in 1967 and 1968 that increased control of republics over federal policy making.⁴⁸ Further amendments to the constitution in 1971 included the decentralization of economic functions, including the transfer to republics of capital resources (previously controlled by the federal leadership), and the adoption of new principles of procedure for their disbursement. The 1974 constitution gave regions priority in taxation, monetary and fiscal policy, as well as balance of payments recording.⁴⁹ Banking also became highly decentralized, with financial concerns operating on a republic level. Some of these measures gave regions the incentive for increased regional economic self-sufficiency, whereas others gave them the capacity for it. In addition, the regional powers extended to the financial affairs of enterprises and to communes. Moreover, the regional administrations became responsible for social issues, social security system, transportation and law and order. Under these conditions of extensive decentralization, regions had ample flexibility in the interpretation and implementation of central policies. Regions took liberties to push federal policies to the limit, reflecting an effort to satisfy their regional demands, protect their regional needs, and pursue their regional self-interest. This interpretation of central policies to suit regional interests resulted in the fragmentation of the national economy. The most serious aspect of this trend was the fragmentation of markets, which entailed duplication of production and services as part of the general waste at each spatial level.⁵⁰ Thus, one serious ramification of regional decentralization is the ungluing of the national economy and the ascendancy of the regional economy. Another is that it set the groundwork for the breakup of the state because it was tied to ethnic cultural and political rights: according to Walter Connor, 'It is

Engineered Demographic Change

evident that the Yugoslav policy of granting limited autonomy to culture groups has not furthered the cause of unity.⁵¹

(4) ‘*Special status*’ decentralization There are some countries that have given their ethnic regions special powers in response to demands that were explicitly ethnic in origin. This selectivity in regional policy is evident in unitary states as well as federations, and cuts across levels of development and economic systems. The result is an asymmetry in center-state relations since regional appeasement placates a demanding region without giving comparable autonomy to other regions whose conditions do not warrant it. Examples include Scotland,⁵² Kosovo,⁵³ Corsica,⁵⁴ and Bougainville,⁵⁵ among others.

(5) *Centralized unitary regions* Ethnic borders coincide with administrative borders in several regions of the world in which ethnic demands (and even secessionist tendencies) are encountered under highly centralized governments that grant little power and responsibility to the regional level: such as Tibet (China), East Timor (Indonesia), Casamance (Senegal), Southern Sudan⁵⁶ (Sudan), and Transylvania (Romania).

(ii) When ethnic and administrative boundaries do not coincide

A system in which ethnic territorial demarcations do not coincide with administrative boundaries may be conducive to fostering an environment in which inhabitants perceive individual and regional interests above those of their ethnic group. Under these conditions, the individual and the broader society become the focus of demands, and the ethnic or clan mentality may dissipate over time. Inter-ethnic conflict becomes less likely or less vehement.

Below are several examples of states in which ethnic and administrative boundaries do not coincide. In Nigeria, following the conclusion of the civil war that prevented the secession of the Ibos in Biafra, internal administrative boundaries were redrawn so as not to reflect the ethnicity of the population. Before the war, there were three main administrative regions (and one small one) each controlled by a dominant ethnic group. In May 1967, the central government replaced 4 regions with 12 states, and then in 1976 it added 7 more, making a total of 19. This primarily served to alter the balance of power within the country: it decreased the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

power of the larger groups (the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Ibo) and increased the power of some smaller ethnic groups. The redistribution of power occurred because the Hausa became dispersed across six states, the Yoruba across five and the Ibo across two. It is Horowitz's assessment that this administrative redistribution unequivocally reduced the ethnic tensions at the center.⁵⁷

In order to lessen inter-ethnic conflict in the Katanga area, administrative boundaries throughout the Congo were altered. An explanation of the background of this alteration is warranted. When Belgium ruled the Congo, Katanga, the wealthiest region with one of the world's largest concentration of mines, was ruled directly from Belgium.⁵⁸ When the Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960, Katanga province declared its independence 11 days later. War broke out and raged until 1963, when Katanga was reintegrated under central authority. As in the case of Biafra, the central authorities took measures to ensure that future secessionist movements would not threaten the nation. One of these measures included the adoption of a new constitution that was to transform the Congo into a federal republic of 20 states. It entailed the breakup of Katanga into three separate states: presently, Katanga is known as Shaba province, and it was broken into the following three states: Lualaba, Nord Katanga and Katanga Orientale.⁵⁹

Between the two World Wars, Yugoslavia had a system of internal boundaries that did not correspond to the ethnic configuration of the country. During this interwar period, two different versions of non-ethnic administrative divisions existed, composed first of 33 administrative units, then after 1929, of 10 (9 of which came to be called *banovine*, plus the City of Belgrade). These units, described in Table 9.1, were innovative insofar as they did not correspond to ethnic divisions; instead they represented geographical configurations (each *banovina* carried the name of its principal river). Such a regional administrative system may have achieved the goal of decreasing the importance of ethnicity, but the pressure from the Croats was too strong and the central government too weak to resist it. In 1939, the central government ceded to Croatian pressure to form the *banovina* of Croatia, which included the Coastal and Drava *banovine*, as well as parts of Dunav, Vrbas, Zeta and Drina. As a result of the 'ethnification' of one *banovina*, the pressure for similar treatment for the other ethnic groups grew, as did animosity that the non-ethnic system was violated. The outbreak of World War II ruptured the entire effort.

Engineered Demographic Change

Table 9.1. Administrative territories of Yugoslavia

<i>Pre-1914 regions</i>	<i>Banovine (1929–1938)</i>	<i>Republics (1946–1991)</i>
Slovenia	Drava	Slovenia
Dalmatia, Slavonia, Croatia	Sava, Coastal, Zeta	Croatia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Vrbas, Drina, Zeta	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Vojvodina, Northern Serbia	Morava, Dunav, Drina, City of Belgrade	Serbia
Montenegro	Zeta	Montenegro
Southern Serbia	Vardar	Macedonia

The system of *banovine* was dropped after World War II and replaced by a federal system according to which the administrative boundaries largely coincided with ethnic boundaries (with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Such map drawing was deficient because it was inconsistent: some ethnic groups were awarded regions while others were not. Indeed, while Slovenes became concentrated in Slovenia, Montenegrins in Montenegro, and Macedonians in Macedonia, the Serbs and the Croats were not all enveloped in their republics. Croats were left out of the demarcations of Croatia, mostly in Herzegovina and Montenegro. Large numbers of Serbs found themselves in the neighboring republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, two autonomous republics were carved out of Serbia, on the grounds of satisfying the minorities residing there. While this may have been valid in Kosovo, where over half of the population in 1951 was Albanian, the argument certainly did not hold in Vojvodina, where less than 20% were Hungarian. The fact that similar status was not extended to the Croats of Herzegovina and the Serbs of Croatia highlighted the inconsistency that was the chief characteristic of the federal internal boundaries of Yugoslavia.

PART III: CONCLUSIONS

While Bosnia is a clear example of a demographic struggle for power, it is not the only one. Indeed, the evidence of stimulated demographic changes in the Balkans should be put in the global context with respect to both time and space, as was done in chapters 4–7. Thus, the current problems in the Balkans, as well as their solution, must be viewed as a

The Demographic Struggle for Power

continuation of a struggle that has been ongoing and in which population numbers are crucial. As long as inter-ethnic numbers and sizes are important in connoting economic and political power, the inter-ethnic struggle, whether active or passive, will continue. Reducing the coincidence between ethnic and administrative boundaries will at least decrease the intensity of that struggle, if not eliminate it entirely. Moreover, to the extent that it harms one ethnic group, such a harm is offset by the benefit to the total population.⁶⁰

Not all countries in which ethnic boundaries are non-coincident with administrative boundaries are successful in reducing inter-ethnic conflict. Indeed, there are numerous cases in which internal boundary alterations did not succeed in eliminating the conflict (such as Romania), although it is unclear how much worse the conflict might have been in the absence of the alteration. Nevertheless, severing the link does point out a possible direction for inter-ethnic conflict resolution that is vastly different from efforts at appeasing groups that were popular in the post-World War II period, such as the granting of extensive political, economic, and cultural rights to minorities concentrated in specific territories. Indeed, the example of Yugoslavia, where rights of ethnic groups were among the most extensive in the world, shows how the coincidence of ethnic and administrative boundaries can be destabilizing for both the country and its regions.

This destabilization is especially clear during periods of economic decline or stagnation. When administrative and ethnic boundaries coincide, the political system becomes a conduit through which ethnic groups vent their ethnic grievances. Ethnic grievances become economic grievances in periods of economic decline: when the entire state economy is shrinking, then the struggle for the economic resources is accentuated by the fact that ethnic groups perceive their group is singled out for economic decline. In numerous locations across the globe, the economic decline first ignited the inter-ethnic conflict, as there was an increase in scarcity and less abundance to go around. So too, it is an economic revival that would best diffuse it: an improvement in the economic conditions of the region would alleviate a major source of competition among ethnic groups. It is in this spirit that Doder proposed that the future of Yugoslavia should be characterized by economic reconstruction efforts rather than military intervention on the part of the West.⁶¹

Engineered Demographic Change

NOTES

- 1 Unless, of course, they are completely successful and result in the complete elimination of undesirable people. This is discussed below.
- 2 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 5.
- 3 The internal circumstances are described in the text. The external circumstances include the end of the cold war (and thereby the end of the need for a buffer communist Yugoslavia), the unification and therefore strengthening of Germany (a principal supporter of secession of Croatia), among others.
- 4 This has consistently been the goal of the Muslim President Izetbegovic, as he has tried to involve foreign states, especially the United States, in the conflict. Internationalizing the conflict was also partially achieved by the international community with its recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, thereby making any intervention from the Serbs in Serbia or the Croats in Croatia international aggression.
- 5 The goal of ethnically pure states was clearly stated by both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats at the onset of the war. The Bosnian Muslims have persisted in advocating a multi-ethnic state, although the reality of such a state is slipping away with time. Indeed, by 1995, the Bosnian Muslim army was 90% Muslim, as were numerous other institutions. Striving to retain (at this point, to create) a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia is futile given the impossibility of retaining a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. This inconsistency of the concept of multi-ethnicity as applied to the Yugoslav context is discussed in Daniel Salvatore Schiffer, 'Bosnie: Le Poids de L'Historie', *Le Figaro*, 14 June 1995.
- 6 Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 213.
- 7 As discussed in chapter 3, questions of ethnicity and religion in Bosnia are not conclusively answered. While Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims are ethnically the same by some definitions, they do differ by religion and therefore by historical experience. Today, their vision of their past and their future, as well as their sense of belonging and their national aspirations have clearly increased their differences so that they are no longer merely religious. For the sake of simplicity and conformity with the rest of the book, the three groups are referred to as ethnic groups.
- 8 *Unity Herald*, vol. 3, no. 3, fall 1993, p. 3. In Croatia, the decrease in the proportion of Serbs in the population is also evident. In 1941, the German military representative to Zagreb wrote that 31% of the population were Serbs. In 1991, this number had been reduced to 14%.
- 9 Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia, *The 1991 Census in Yugoslavia: Statistics and Policy*, UN Economic and Social Council, Conference of European Statisticians, May 1992, p. 4.
- 10 Some Serbian writers have taken for granted that all Yugoslavs are Serbs. See Jovan Ilic, 'Characteristics and Importance of Some Ethno-National and Political-Geographic Factors Relevant for the Possible Political-Legal Disintegration of Yugoslavia' in Stanoje Ivanovic, ed., *The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade: Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, 1992.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 11 *Vanity Fair*, June 1994, p. 170.
- 12 Some writers, notably William Pfaff, claim that President Izetbegovic is a true multi-nationalist who attempted to create a multiethnic state (and by implication was prevented from doing so by nationalists of other ethnic/religious groups. See William Pfaff, 'Invitation To War', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3, summer 1993). In fact, the Bosnian Muslims do not have a good historical track record with respect to their tolerance of other ethnic groups sharing their geographical space. Indeed, their behavior toward the Serbs during Ottoman rule and especially during the World War II indicates an unwillingness to apply the principle of 'live and let live'.
- 13 The creation of the state is curious in and of itself, since Bosnia was only a territorial demarcation and does not have a modern history of sovereignty. As pointed out by Conor Cruise O'Brien, it 'has never been a state in its history' (see Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'We Enter Bosnia at Our Peril', *The Independent*, 23 April 1993) and this fact must underlie all international efforts to create one. Indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of Serbia; it was part of the Ottoman Empire; it was annexed by Austria; it was part of Yugoslavia and it was part of Independent Croatia during World War II.
- 14 *Serbian Unity Congress*, No. 66, 15 December 1994, p. 2.
- 15 *Miami Herald*, 21 November 1994.
- 16 That goal was later dropped and replaced by the goal of a separate region within Bosnia that has the right to ultimate confederation with Serbia and the Serbian territories in Croatia.
- 17 While there is evidence that the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina among the Serbs and Croats has been under discussion for at least two years, it was publicly stated by both Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic as a possibility only when the new peace plan, reached in Geneva during the summer of 1993, was rejected by the Bosnian Muslim delegation.
- 18 *Miami Herald*, 21 November 1994.
- 19 Among the scholars associated with nation building and integration are: Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton University Press, 1960; David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago University Press, 1965; Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building*, New York, 1966, etc.
- 20 James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 139.
- 21 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*.
- 22 Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1991, p. 51.
- 23 Arend Lijphart 'The Power Sharing Approach' in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 499.
- 24 It is interesting to note that ethnic and administrative boundaries tend to coincide at the sub-state level much more frequently than they do at the state level. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 7, Connor found that very few states are nation-states, yet most of those that are not contain ethnically based sub-state boundaries. This seeming contradiction is the result of variation in ethnic policies and the institutional arrangements that have been made to address regional rights and minority rights.

Engineered Demographic Change

- 25 The evidence from across the globe shows that time is not the only variable that determines when an ethnic group gives up its historical claims to a given territory. There are cases in which much time has passed and passions aroused by perceived territorial injustices have not abated (such as in Hungary and Transylvania), while in other cases, shorter time spans have been sufficient to eradicate notions of historical claims from the collective psyche (such as in Alsace).
- 26 John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, p. 374.
- 27 Walter Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 81.
- 28 Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, 'Managing Competing State and Ethnic Claims', in Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds., *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p. 2.
- 29 What is the difference between a decentralized and centralized state with respect to the powers at the central and regional levels? Following is a list of involvements and responsibilities that are distributed among the various levels of power. In all the states under study, the central government is responsible for foreign affairs, defense, criminal law and state security. In addition, some centers also have the right to abolish states, to reorganize states, or to take over the administration of states, such as in India, while others have the right to expel regions, such as the Malay Republic. In the realm of economic responsibilities, foreign economic relations, general economic policies such as state plans, monetary policy, some fiscal policy, some price controls, exchange rates, customs duties and inter-regional aid all fall under the control and guidance of the center. In addition, the center is responsible for setting the regulations pertaining to the mix of private and public ownership, as well as the regulation of monopolistic activities.
- 30 The classification of regions into these categories is exacerbated by the dynamism that characterizes center-region relations and the evolving distribution of power among administrative levels. Even inter-regional relations that have been static for decades have not been immune to the recent worldwide shifts in the balance of power. Although most of these changes have been in the direction of increased decentralization of regions, such as in former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, we are also witnessing a trend towards increased centralization, such as in Tibet.
- 31 There are 70 'nationalities' in Ethiopia, all of them small except for eight. There will be nine new regions, and each will have one group predominate (except in the Southern region and the capital). Each language group would have the right to its language and culture in those regions. The draft constitution gives each region the right to self-determination and secession (*The Economist*, 4 June 1994, p. 44).
- 32 Robert A. Friedlander, 'Autonomy in the Thirteen Colonies: Was the American Revolution Really Necessary?', Yoram Dinstein, ed., *Models of Autonomy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981, p. 136.
- 33 One of the rare exceptions to this rule is that of Switzerland. The system of power-sharing among the three major language groups in the Federal Council and in society as a whole has been so successful, yet difficult to reproduce. This is true, in part because of the high level of development across the country and

The Demographic Struggle for Power

the relative economic equality among the participants. Also crucial is that political decisions are made on the basis of referendum, in which all people participate and thus control events. Moreover, questions of linguistic origin of the leadership are avoided because there is no prime minister, and rotation of other leaders takes place by seniority.

- 34 How does this system of autonomous communities differ from a federation? In the latter, powers are shared on the basis of the inherent rights of both levels of government, whereas in the former the devolution of authority and resources from the center to the regions occurs on a negotiated basis. See Robert P. Clark, 'Spanish Democracy and Regional Autonomy: The Autonomous Community system and Self-Government for the Ethnic Homelands' in Joseph R. Rudolph and Robert J. Thompson, eds., *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the Western World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, p. 18.
- 35 Despite the large degree of decentralization that this system affords the regions, it was considered preferable to federations which are seen, especially by the armed forces, as the beginning of the unraveling of Spain and the end of Spanish unity.
- 36 In 1983, the state of autonomous communities was created, and regions assumed jurisdiction over matters like town and country planning, public works, environmental protection, culture and education. Financial arrangements are negotiated with each autonomous community on a five-year basis, beginning in 1986. The Basque provinces have the greatest amount of decentralization, insofar as they control their own health and educational systems, the police force and they levy local taxes. That last privilege is not shared by Catalonia, for example.
- 37 Since its creation in 1830, the French speakers dominated the Belgian state, even though they were outnumbered by the Flemish. However, by the 1950s, Flanders became the wealthier province, causing resentment among the population. For a discussion of the Belgian decentralization, see Alexander B. Murphy, 'Evolving Regionalism in Linguistically Divided Belgium', in R. J. Johnston, David B. Knight and Eleonore Kofman, *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, London: Croom Helm, 1988.
- 38 *The Economist*, 12 October 1991, p. 50.
- 39 Belgium has had ingenious ways and compromises of solving the problem of heterogeneity of population, such as the Fourons, French-speaking communities living in Flanders.
- 40 See Milica Z. Bookman, 'War and Peace: The Divergent Breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 31, no. 2, 1994, p. 184.
- 41 As a result of this federal arrangement, the center controlled foreign policy, national defense, material resources of the federation, protection of the federal constitution, while the economic jurisdiction in the following areas was shared by the regions and the center: planning, industry, currency, transport, as well as wage and social policies. The center alone was responsible for the administration of national budgets. Despite this scheme for center-regional relations, there was a centralizing trend, as exemplified by the restoration of the crucial role of the center when measures were adopted, only one year after federation, to give federal organs the power to abolish policies that conflicted with the central plan. The trend was further intensified with the constitutional

Engineered Demographic Change

amendment of 1971, according to which various economic powers granted to the regions during federation were returned to the center: planning, finance, labor and social welfare, and construction. Lastly, those matters which previously were of joint jurisdiction came under the power of the federal ministries. This was done with the aim of 'integrating' the economy and 'consolidating' the regions.

- 42 Especially with respect to the amount and nature of central capital investment. See Bookman, 'War and Peace', see in note 4, p. 178.
- 43 During these elections, the Slovak government became composed of a fragile coalition between Public Against Violence, the Christian Democratic Movement and the Democratic Party. The first of these strongly favored federation. The National Party, which only held 22 seats in the 150 member Parliament, was in favor of independence for Slovakia. *The New York Times*, 25 October 1990.
- 44 *The New York Times*, 13 December 1990.
- 45 See Anirudh Prasad, *Centre and State Powers Under Indian Federalism*, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1981, and Tarun Chandra Bose, ed., *Indian Federalism: Problems and Issues*, New Delhi: K. P Bagchi and Company, 1987.
- 46 The local level consists of the village, the block and the zila.
- 47 *The Economist*, 6 May 1995, p. 46.
- 48 These amendments required all federal legislation to be approved by the Chamber of Nationalities and that the number of representatives in it was to double. See Steven Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia*, Princeton University Press 1983, chapter 1.
- 49 This was to be done by increasing the powers and duties of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, the renamed Chamber of Nationalities. Although a federal level chamber, this is clearly a body that represents the interests of regions in all those economic areas that in the past generated conflict.
- 50 The existence of such regional decentralization in the context of a heterogeneous state resulted in ethnic demands for equality that entailed the duplication of activities, as each ethnic group in each region demanded its own facilities. According to Cochrane, 'Each *opstina* wants its own steel mill, its own oil refinery: each village wants its own meat-packing plant. Local investment funds are directed to such projects regardless of their economic viability.' (Nancy Cochrane, 'Republic and Provincial Barriers in Yugoslav Agricultural Marketing', presented to the meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Hawaii 1988). In industry, Lydall writes, 'investment projects are duplicated, enterprises in one republic or province are protected from competition from enterprises in other republics and provinces, ... obstacles are put in the way of financial flows across republican and provincial borders' (Harold Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 81).
- 51 Connor, see in note 27, p. 15.
- 52 London has attempted to appease the Scottish population. The nationalist party in Scotland demanded increased decentralization in 1974, after the discovery of the North Sea oil. While other nationalist groups within the United Kingdom, notably the Welsh, were concerned with language and culture issues, the Scots were concerned with having to share the revenues of the oil with the

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- center. However, a referendum to create a Scottish Assembly and to devolve numerous powers to the region showed insufficient support among the population that decided benefits of union outweighed the benefits of increased decentralization. The election of 1992 did not indicate a dramatic swing in the sentiment of the population, however, the question of increased Scottish political power and representation will have to be addressed. See Anthony Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 95.
- 53 Kosovo is one of the special status regions within Yugoslavia, and is inhabited largely by Albanians (in 1991, some 87% of the population). It is a sub-republic region in which ethnic and religious issues dominate in the power struggle among peoples with mutually exclusive demands and conflicting claims on land and history. In 1947, Kosovo was the 'Autonomous Kosovo-Metohija Region', then became the 'Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija' in 1963, and then graduated to the 'Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo' in 1969. The distinction between these titles is not purely semantic, but rather reflects differences in power within the federation. This ascendancy in the power of the region dates to 1966, when following the ousting of Rankovic, policy towards the minorities took a turn. The Albanians from Kosovo were appeased by various components of a new regional policy. First, there was an increased inflow of money in development projects, amounting to 30% of the Federal Development Funds and 24% of the World Bank development credit to Yugoslavia. In a five-year period during the 1970s, some 150 million dollars were pumped into it annually (Alex Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo*, Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, no. CLXX, 1984, p.161). Second, they were given cultural rights by the introduction of Albanian as the main language of education and the media. The 1974 constitution further gave the region *de facto* republic status, with a separate Assembly. In March 1989, there was a reversal of this political decentralization, when the Serbian government made constitutional amendments and lifted the autonomous status of the region, and thereby once again integrated Kosovo into Serbia in the way that it was prior to its separation by the Tito government. In October 1991, the Kosovo Republican Assembly met in secret and approved a measure to declare that 'the Republic of Kosovo is a sovereign and independent state'.
- 54 In Corsica, inhabited largely by Corsicans, autonomy laws were enacted in 1982 and 1983, as part of the decentralization efforts of the Mitterand government. These measures gave the island powers to legislate in the areas of agriculture, coastal fishing, communications, land-use planning, transport, technological research, vocational training, education and culture. The central government retained powers of police and financing, thus not weakening the integrity of the state. See William Saffran, 'The French State and Ethnic Minority Cultures: Policy Dimensions and Problems', in Joseph R. Rudolph and Robert J. Thompson, see in note 34, p. 147.
- 55 Bougainville is an island that belongs to Papua New Guinea, but racially, its population is closer to that of the Solomon Islands. It was also able to extract special concessions from its center. Papua New Guinea is a unitary state that exerts central control over its territories and in which regions do not have well-developed bureaucracies to address themselves to regional issues. However, Bougainville differs from other regions insofar as it has proven most capable

Engineered Demographic Change

of exploiting a central concession on regional power. Indeed, in the aftermath of Independence from Australia (1975), under pressure from the Bougainvillians (and Papuans), the central government agreed to set up a provincial government with some measure of financial and administrative autonomy, as well as a Ministry of Decentralization. In 1977, the Organic Law on Provincial Government was passed, which spelled out the mechanics of local governance as well as the source of local revenues. However, the revenues that could be raised by this law were insufficient for the running of local government, let alone to fund activity in the regional economy. For a discussion of decentralization, see D. M. Fenbury, *Practice Without Policy: Genesis of Local Government in Papua New Guinea*, Canberra: The Australian National University, Development Studies Center Monogram, no. 13, 1980. For a discussion of Bougainville's efforts at establishing its decentralized region, see Harry Gailey, *Bougainville 1943–1945: The Forgotten Campaign*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991; also, Ralph R. Premdas, 'Decentralization and Development in Papua New Guinea' in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

- 56 Southern Sudan is not an administrative entity, but actually consists of three provinces.
- 57 It did, however, transfer conflict to the sub-state level where it is more manageable. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, p. 604.
- 58 The relationship between the wealth of Katanga and its secessionist tendencies has been addressed by the author elsewhere: Milica Zarkovic Bookman, *The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development: Regional Disparities and Inter-regional Conflict*, New York: Praeger, 1991, chapter 4.
- 59 See Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*, Princeton University Press, 1965, chapter 18.
- 60 The total population is assumed to be better off because inter-ethnic conflict (that probably would have been violent since it would entail changing borders) is avoided. However, that solution would not necessarily be Pareto-optimal. The criterion of Pareto-optimality assumes that no one is hurt by the change, and at least some are made better off. While the total population may be made better off, the ethnic group that vied for territorial concessions of the 'we want out' variety will perceive itself as worst off.
- 61 Dusko Doder, 'Yugoslavia, New War, Old Hatreds', *Foreign Policy*, 91, Summer 1993, p. 22.

This page intentionally left blank

Appendix

Brief Description of Ethnicity and Inter-ethnic Conflict in Selected Regions

THE FOLLOWING BRIEF descriptions of regions with inter-ethnic conflict serve to supplement and explain the background and the information presented in the tables in chapter 2.

1. SUDAN

The civil war in the southern Sudan began approximately in 1964 and has continued to the present with a respite during 1969 until 1983. In this inter-ethnic conflict, a conglomeration of southern tribes are fighting against the northern population. These southern tribes, of which the Dinka are the largest, make up 30% of the Sudanese population: they are Christian or animist, and they are black African. The northerners are brown Africans and Muslims. Southern Sudan consists of the regions of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and the Upper Nile. Although the southern regions of Sudan produced the strongest secessionist movements, some also emerged in the north: before independence, these developed among the Beja and after 1964, among the Fur and the Nuba ethnic groups.¹ The Sudan People's Liberation Army, composed mostly of Dinkas, is the political entity presently controlling much of the southern countryside outside of Juba, and some six smaller towns.²

The war is largely the result of an effort by the Arab north to eliminate non-Arab ethnic groups in their effort to create a pure Islamic state. In addition to military action, the north's efforts in the south have included starvation of the local population by the blockage of food inflows, and

The Demographic Struggle for Power

in the western part of the country, by the burning of villages. The central government is said to be conducting this war by arming Arab ethnic groups, and increasingly directly intervening on their behalf.³ In response, the southern populations have become more adamant in their demand for independence. This demand has its roots in 1953, when the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement for independence of the Sudan was signed. At this time, no southern leaders were consulted. This was later cited as one of the reasons why the Southerns were not bound by the agreement that did not involve their participation.⁴ This neglect of the south was also evident in 1991, when the military government decreed a federal system, dividing Sudan into nine states, each of which is to be responsible for local administration and tax collection. The Southern Sudan regions had a separate regional constitution prior to federation, and the present arrangement in effect decreases their power.

2. NIGERIA

Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960. Although Ibo feelings of injustice were percolating at the time of independence, it was not until the population census of 1962–63 that they came into the open, as the census results pointed to an upcoming change in political representation according to new demographics (this census and its effects are described in chapter 3). Violence mounted and war broke out in 1967, following the vote in the Eastern Region's Assembly to secede from Nigeria and the consequent proclamation of the Independent Republic of Biafra. The secession included the retention of all tax revenues paid in its territory, and the taking over of all federal services on its territory. The war ended in January 1970, when the republic went out of existence.

At the time of the Biafra war, Nigeria was a federation consisting of four regions. After the civil war, new subdivisions were created, as described in chapters 3 and 9.

3. RWANDA

In April 1994, President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda was killed in an air crash. That event led to a blood-bath between the ruling Hutu and the rebel Tutsi, in which over 2 million people were displaced and half a million were killed. By mid 1995, the majority of those refugees still languished in refugee camps in Zaire.

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

Before the civil war of 1994 that convoluted Rwanda and led to a dramatic alteration in the ethnic population of the country, the Tutsi and the Hutu were the dominant tribes, with populations of approximately 15% and 85% respectively. There is an on-going debate as to what exactly distinguishes the Tutsi from the Hutus: perhaps the only difference is that the Tutsi are descended from nomadic pastoral people that moved and infiltrated (invaded?) from the north, while the Hutu were a people of cultivators that inhabited Rwandan territory earlier. The two peoples cannot be distinguished by their appearance. In modern times, the Tutsi adopted the Hutu language, but introduced a caste system according to which the Hutu were farmers that did not partake in the government.

The demographic struggle for power among the Tutsi and the Hutu peoples that captured the attention of the world in 1994 must be viewed in historical context. The Tutsi were the warriors that dominated the political scene until the Europeans arrived in the 19th century. The Belgians ruled Rwanda in the U.N. Trust Territory of Rwanda-Urundi. With the approach of independence, it seemed to the majority Hutu that they would then be subjugated by the minority Tutsi, and thus they rebelled. Two political parties, representing these two groups, began a violent campaign before independence. During this time, homes were destroyed and 20,000 displaced people wandered the countryside (many of these were Tutsis that sought refuge in refugee camps in Uganda and the Congo), and the violence was only stopped by Belgian military intervention. Elections occurred in 1960, and given that they were based on universal suffrage, the majority Hutu easily won. Independence was achieved in 1962, the Hutu took control and the Tutsi hierarchy collapsed. Since then, the Tutsis have been planning their return from neighboring states and into power.

4. UGANDA

Uganda is inhabited by numerous ethnic groups that fall into the category of Nilotic North and the Bantu South. The Bantu speakers represent some 70% of the Ugandan population. Of these, the Ganda are the largest single ethnic group, accounting for some 20% of the population. In addition to the indigenous African populations, Uganda was also inhabited by Asians, including Pakistanis, Indians and Indians (75,000 in 1969), as well as some West Europeans (10,000). The inter-

The Demographic Struggle for Power

ethnic conflict occurred between the indigenous populations and the foreigners, mostly the Asians.

This conflict percolated for years because the Asians, concentrated in the cities, were a powerful commercial minority that controlled middle and high levels of the country's economy. As a result, the majority population that was excluded from this lucrative sector perceived themselves to be the exploited majority. This perception was manipulated and further accentuated by President Idi Amin, who replaced Milton Obote, the first President after Uganda won its independence (from Great Britain in 1962). In 1972, to win the support of the African population, Amin expelled the Asian population that had not taken Ugandan citizenship (most preferred to retain their British passports). The expulsion occurred under unfavorable circumstances, as people were swiftly herded out of the country, their property was confiscated and their assets could not be taken out of the country. Thus, the Asian population was cleansed from Uganda and their businesses and property appropriated.⁵

5. SOUTH AFRICA

The Republic of South Africa, where the minority white population ruled over the majority black population until 1990, is included in this study because of the demographic struggle between whites and blacks that took place in order to offer legitimacy to the minority rule. Non-whites outnumber whites six to one. There are several major racial groups, as recognized by the (now repealed) South Africa's Population Registration Act of 1950: Afrikaaners, English-speakers (both white), African, Colored, and Asian. The Africans constitute three-fourths of the population and have the highest birth rates.

Since the first constitution was adopted in 1909, the government has instituted various methods of control and elimination of the black community from the mainstream of white life. This policy, broadly called apartheid, included the separation of the races in virtually all aspects of economic, social and political spheres. Most important among these were the following. First, black homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were created within the boundaries of South Africa. These regions are recognized by the South African government as independent (but not recognized by any other state). Blacks were pressured into relocating to these unviable and discontinuous territories, in part because they lacked property rights outside these territories.

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

Indeed, the Natives Land Act, passed in 1913, limited the areas in which blacks could purchase land. Second, the black population did not have voting rights; the Coloreds and the Asians were extended the franchise by the constitution of 1983. Third, African political parties were banned, effectively eliminating a peaceful channel for political vent. Fourth, a separate development policy for blacks and whites was pursued in all spheres, including education, health, welfare, and cultural life. Fifth, with respect to employment and wages, the differences between the whites and blacks were stark and maintained as such. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 defined the levels of employment that members of each racial group were allowed to occupy. Wages were commensurate with levels of employment.

6. LEBANON

The inter-ethnic conflict in Lebanon is primarily between the Muslims and the Maronite Christians, although the recently arrived Palestinians also play a part in the conflict. The conflict between the two groups was clearly set to boil over when the French mandate expired, the British soldiers that represented the Allies during World War II left, and the country was to receive independence in 1946. During the French rule, the minority Christian population was disproportionately represented in political and economic spheres, causing displeasure among the more numerous Muslims. To this internal struggle was added the role played by Israel, the Palestinian refugees and Syria, all of whose contributions and participation resulted in the breakout of civil war in 1975.

Today, Lebanon is effectively partitioned along the Green Line, which passes through the center of Beirut. The north is ruled by a Christian government, and the south by a leftist government consisting of Druze, Muslim and Palestinians. Fighting has continued, and the precarious balance that was maintained at the time of independence is now aggravated by the clear increase in the population of the Muslims, as discussed in chapter 3.

7. ISRAEL

Israel was created in 1948 following the partition of Palestine by the United Nations. Numerous wars have been fought with its Arab neighbors, including those of 1948–49, 1956, 1967, and 1973. The last two

The Demographic Struggle for Power

resulted in the occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights by Israel. Rejection of the occupation by the Palestinian population has taken various forms, most notably the Intifada, which resurfaced anew in December 1987. This was an uprising following 20 years of occupation whose aim was to call attention to the demands of the population for self-government and independence. Israel responded by armed suppression of the revolt, as well as economic measures such as restrictions on labor employed in Israel. The PLO has been the leading spokesman for the Palestinians, although it does not enjoy unanimous support across the territories. Indeed, the Peace Agreement, signed in 1994, has accentuated the divergence between the PLO leadership and segments of the population that has arisen in the recent past.

The occupied territories, with the exception of the Golan Heights, are inhabited by Palestinians. They are Sunni Muslims that have inhabited the area before the Jews began returning in the 1880s. These people are presently non-citizens, and subject to discriminatory treatment in a variety of areas.⁶

There are various reasons why Israel is included in a study of the demographic struggle for power. First, there are differential birth rates among the Israelis and the Palestinians: this difference is recognized by leaders of both peoples, as are the long term consequences of such differences. The demographic consequences of such birth rates are in part offset by the large scale in-migrations of Jews from the former Soviet bloc countries. Leaders of both groups encourage high population growth. Second, Israel has followed a policy of ethnic dilution in the occupied territories: it encouraged the settlement of Jewish newcomers to those territories and thus diluted the Palestinian population. This raises many potential problems, both if the territories are annexed to Israel in a long-term relationship (Israel would then be altering its demographic composition in favor of the Palestinian population) or if they were returned to Palestinian rule (then the Jewish settlers would become minority populations in a foreign country).

8. TURKEY

The demographic struggle for power in 20th century Turkey occurred between several ethnic groups. First, intolerance of the Armenians by the majority Turk leadership lead to the 1915 genocide of the Armenians and the concomitant out-migration of the remaining Armenians, all of

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

which radically altered the population composition of Anatolia. Second, following the war with Greece in 1921, some 1.5 million Greeks left Turkey, resulting in a new ethnic composition of the population in the Eastern Mediterranean regions, as well as in the European part (Turkish Thrace). Third, Jews were pushed out of Turkey as a result of laws pertaining to property and capital levies. Fourth, the Turkish policy of simultaneous assimilation and negation of the Kurds in south-east Anatolia is presently the most serious minority issue facing the country. Indeed, the Kurdish rebels have been under attack by the government forces, as described in chapter 6.

Kurds are Muslims of Indo-European stock (Turkik) that inhabit territories of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria and USSR. While the greatest proportion of the territory and the population (10 million) lies within Turkey, the wealthiest territory, containing oil fields, is in Iraq. The position of the Kurdish population is very tenuous in Turkey. The use of the Kurdish language in Turkish schools is illegal. Kurds can vote, but cannot have their own political parties or media. They are not officially recognized as a minority (they are 'mountain Turks') although the much smaller minority groups of Greeks, Jews and Armenians are. The mention of the word Kurdistan is illegal, so newspapers print (...) in place of it.⁷

The Treaty of Sevres, which carved Iraq, Syria and Kuwait out of the former Ottoman Empire, promised Kurds some measure of local autonomy and recognized their right to form an independent Kurdish state in the eastern portion of what later became Turkey. But when Kemal Ataturk came to power in Turkey, his nationalistic policies prevented the treaty from being implemented and there was no further discussion of the creation of Kurdistan.

9. IRAQ

Reports vary on the size of the Kurdish population. According to one source, there are 20 million Kurds dispersed across the world with 3.5 million in Iraq.⁸ Another source puts the number in Iraq at 2.8 million, and total at 10 million worldwide.⁹ Since Iraq became a state in 1921, the Kurds have been engaged in a struggle with Bagdad. The Kurds in Iraq are represented by two main groups both of which control guerilla forces; the Kurdish Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Kurdistan. These two parties have tried to bury their differences in recent years, and together with other smaller parties including the Communist, Socialist and Marxist, to form the Iraqi Kurdistan Front.

In 1946, with the help of the Soviets, a short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was set up in northern Iran.¹⁰ In 1970, the Kurds signed an agreement with the central government which gave them an autonomous Kurdish region and allowed Kurdish language to be taught in schools. But the agreement collapsed and produced the major Kurdish rebellion of 1974. After the allied war against Iraq in 1991, and the subsequent weakening of the government of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds have demanded full autonomy for the traditional Kurdish lands.¹¹

In addition to the Kurds, there is also an ongoing demographic struggle for power with the Shiite Muslims that inhabit the southern marshes. Although the Shiite Moslems have an affinity with the Iranians, their movement is not one for the unification of their territory with that of Iran, but rather for increased freedom of expression within Iraq.

10. PUNJAB (INDIA)

Punjab is a very fertile stretch of land spanning both India and Pakistan. It was divided among the two countries at the time of independence to accommodate the demands of both Hindus and Muslims. In 1966, the Indian Punjab was further subdivided into Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh in order to account for linguistic differences. Punjab is inhabited by Sikhs (60%) and Hindus (some 40%). Punjab has among the highest rates of economic growth in India, resulting in an income per capita rivaled only by the most industrial state, Maharashtra. However, politically, Punjab has been in turmoil because of the activities of some secessionist Sikhs who advocate autonomy from the center. As a result, Punjab has had a special status within India insofar as it, along with Kashmir and Assam, have been under the President's Rule, implying that their local governments are suspended and they are ruled directly from the center.

Although the Akali Dal Party, the principal Sikh party in Punjab, was set up in 1944, it was not until the time of Indian Independence that it started agitating for autonomy. In 1960 it was clear that no agreement could be reached, and the leader of the party, Tara Singh, called for a

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

campaign of civil disobedience. In 1944, the leaders of the Akali Dal established a committee whose goal was to devise a scheme for the establishment of an independent Sikh state, in the case of the Partition of the subcontinent. However, this never came to pass because, unlike Pakistan and India, the Sikhs were not a majority in any one region. Although the border changes of 1966 were rectified, it was then too late for independence in the spirit of the Partition. Although the Akali Dal is the party that has been in favor of the establishment of an independent state, it is difficult to gauge the popularity of secession because of the center's suspension of the local political mechanism and the postponement of elections.

11. ASSAM (INDIA)

Assam is a state of India, located in the north-east corner. The region is inhabited by Assamese, Muslims and Hindus and is characterised by a lack of inter-ethnic harmony. The animosity stems largely from the perceptions of encroachment that the Assamese feel due to the high rates of in-migration of bordering Bengali-speaking Hindus and Muslims. This migration has led to changes in the relative size of ethnic groups. Indeed, projections are that the Assamese may in fact have become a minority in their own state (there are no reliable recent population statistics since the state was dropped from the 1991 census due to the inter-ethnic violence).¹²

The champion of Assamese rights has become the United Liberation Front of Assam, the militant wing of the All Assam Students' Union that gained recognition in 1979 as the leader in the pressure for secession. In February 1993, thousands of people were killed in ethnic violence. In the summer of 1994, the violence between the Bangladeshi Muslims and members of the indigenous Bodo tribe escalated. The response of the Indian government has been to send in troops, because the local population is also secessionist and in favor of severing ties with India (freeing them to deal more easily with the Muslim population). The state government has attempted to stem the flow of immigrants, such as by constructing fences along the border with Bangladesh. The new arrivals are vying for land, of which there is not much. The violence involves the burning of each other's villages and refugee camps to force out-migration.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

12. SRI LANKA

Although the Sri Lanka Tamils account for 12.6% of the population of the entire island, within the four northern districts, where they are a majority, they range from 50.6% to 95.3% of the population.¹³ The Sri Lanka Tamils are distinguished from Indian Tamils, who are descendants of nineteenth-century migrants from India. They tend to stay out of the conflict that has emerged between the dominant Sinhalese and the Tamils, and has devastated the country over the past few decades.

Sri Lanka is a unitary state, characterized by what has been called Sinhalese Political Buddhism.¹⁴ Following Tamil challenges to that kind of unitary rule, a special status was awarded to the Northern and Eastern Provinces in which the Tamils are the majority of the population. Although some Sri Lanka Tamils may have desired association with the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, such a union is no longer viewed positively (due to the intervention of the Indian army in the conflict, which was perceived as unfriendly towards the Tamils). Although ethnic politics has been an aspect of Sri Lanka for the past three decades, it was only in the mid-1970s that the Tamil United Liberation Front adopted the specific goal of establishment of a separate state. Since no direct measures of secessionist aspirations exist among the Tamils, Kearney has taken various local and national elections as indicators of popular support for the separatist movement. According to his study, the elections in 1977, 1979 and 1981 suggest popular endorsement.¹⁵

13. INDONESIA

The Portuguese left their colony of 400 years and the East Timorese declared their independence on 28 November 1975. They were annexed to Indonesia nine days later and became Indonesia's twenty-seventh province in 1976. The official Indonesian version of events claims that the people of East Timor exercised their right to self-determination when their National Assembly voted to integrate with Indonesia.¹⁶ East Timor has been maintained as a special and 'closed' province since then. As such, it receives security and personnel from the center and is subject to separate political and economic regulations.

Before the annexation of East Timor, the entire population in the region was Timorese (Catholic). Presently, 20% of the population

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

consists of Muslim inflows from other regions of Indonesia.¹⁷ The population of East Timor in 1973 was 626,546, and only a slight increase is noted over the decades, despite in-migration from resettlement programmes.¹⁸ Such a small population increase is due to high death rates: it is estimated that some 100,000 to 200,000 people perished in the resistance to the Indonesian Army.¹⁹ Many of these are members of the Fretelin (acronym for the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), who have now been reduced significantly, to 200–400 (according to government estimates) or 5,000 (according to Fretelin spokesmen). Nevertheless, they remain popular (according to anecdotal evidence from the sporadic reports by foreigners that have been in the region after the 14-year ban on travel to the territory was lifted) and support for the Indonesian government is very limited among the population.

There has also been substantial nationalist and secessionist activity among Aceh on the western edge of the archipelago. In the past, there was secessionist activity among the West Papuans in Irian Jaya.²⁰

14. PAPUA NEW GUINEA

The principal inter-ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea is taking place between the mainland and the inhabitants of Bougainville. Bougainville is an island some 500 miles off the western coast of Papua New Guinea, only six miles from the north-western Solomon Islands. The entire district of Bougainville comprises Bougainville and Buka, together with two Melanesian and three Polynesian outliers. The distance from the mainland creates a natural barrier between center and region, and dilutes the power that the center can exert on the island. Historically, Bougainville's ties to the Solomon Islands are stronger than to Papua New Guinea. Bougainville was part of the Solomon Islands prior to the 1880s, at which time it was pulled apart by Germany and Great Britain. When Australia came to rule the region, it accepted this territorial division determined by the Anglo-German Convention of 1899, and thus incorporated Bougainville into the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Thus, the island's history, through colonial administrations of the British, the Germans and the Australians, was tied to the mainland rather than the Solomon Islands. Bougainville was granted a semi-autonomous status, the only of its kind in the nation, to appease the irredentists that

The Demographic Struggle for Power

demanded a separate nation at the time of Papua New Guinea won independence from Australia in 1975. This status gave it more decentralization than the remaining regions. In 1988, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army resurfaced after dormancy since 1975. Although the rebels only numbered about 100, they enjoyed much support among the population, unlike the separatism of the early 1970s, which was not supported by the northern island population.²¹

The inhabitants of Bougainville have darker skins than people of the mainland, whom they refer to as 'redskins'. Ethnically the population is closer to the Solomon Islands, a link that was further consolidated by the inter-marriages and the extensive trade that took place. However, there are about 20 language groups on the island, so the homogeneity does not extend to language. Population statistics of this region are imprecise: the first measure of the population was taken in 1966 and entailed a 10% sample of the population. Later estimates varied widely in their results.²²

15. CHINA

China is presently experiencing conflict among several of its peripheral border ethnic groups. Clashes between the center and Muslims in Xinjing Province have involved the Kirghiz ethnic minority as well as Uygurs, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks and Uzbeks. Members of these same ethnic groups live across the borders of some former Soviet republics, where they enjoy self-rule, and provide a role model for the Muslim populations within China. To date, all movements for autonomy have been rapidly suppressed by the central authorities.

The conflict between the Chinese majority at the center and the Tibetans in Tibet has been long-standing. The Chinese government recently celebrated the anniversary of 40 years since the 'peaceful liberation of Tibet'. China invaded Tibet in 1950. However, there is a great debate as to whether China has rights to the territory, and therefore whether it was even an invasion. This is described in a study by Grunfeld: the position of the Tibetans, according to the Dalai Lama, is that Tibet was independent, having had a continuous central government from at least the seventh century, and that the Chinese had no right, as they were never present in Tibet. The view of the Chinese government is that this central government was merely a local, not

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

national one, and that the links between China and Tibet were set up by imperial marriages since the mid-thirteenth century. Grunfeld concludes that ‘Tibet has always had a special relationship with China – a relationship that never demonstrated independence (as we use the term now); but nor did it demonstrate Tibet to be “an integral part of China”’.²³

Passive resistance to the Chinese has existed since the invasion of Tibet in 1950. However, the revolt of 1959, when the Tibetans were crushed after demanding the withdrawal of the Chinese and the end to Han assimilation, was indeed violent. It was only since 1987 that regular (and peaceful) demonstrations for independence have been occurring. One of the reasons why the resistance to Beijing has been peaceful is because it was led by Buddhist monks who profess pacifism.²⁴

There are 2.12 million Tibetans and 79,000 Han Chinese living in Tibet.²⁵ There has been significant in-migration of the Han Chinese in this province so that the Tibetans presently constitute only 75% of the population.

16. MALAYSIA

The British came to parts of Malaysia in the early 1800s and remained there until 1957, when Malaysia became independent (there was a brief interlude of Japanese rule during World War II). Some of the islands of what is presently Malaysia have been federally united since 1896 and although the composition of regions has changed since then, as has the name, today Malaysia remains a federation of 13 states governed by a constitutional monarchy. With the Malaysia Agreement of July 1963, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) were federated with the existing regions of Malaya to form Malaysia (Singapore has since become an independent country).

Malaysia has experienced much inter-ethnic conflict in its modern history. Its population consists of Chinese, Malays, Indians and others. Ethnic Malays comprise some three-fifths of the inhabitants; they are mostly Muslim and speak an Austronesian language (Bahasa Malaysia) which is the national language. Chinese make up one-third of the population, and the remainder is from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This population distribution is by no means the same across the country, as different regions contain different percentages of each group.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Malaysia had one of the highest birth rates in Asia – it has decreased in the 1980s, more significantly among the Chinese and the Indians. Such differences in fertility, coupled with perceptions (and reality) of inter-racial economic inequality (discussed in chapter 8), led to widespread inter-race riots in the 1960s between the ethnic Chinese, Malayas and to a lesser degree the Indians.

17. MYANMAR

Myanmar, formerly Burma, is the site of much inter-ethnic conflict, the most important of which is taking place with the Karen peoples that inhabit the eastern region of the country. Other ethnic groups that are expressing desire for secession are the Shan and the Kachin. In addition, the Muslims of Arakan (in the north-west) have recently demanded increased autonomy, which raises fears in the center that they will secede and perhaps pursue alignment with Bangladesh.

The Karen are ethnically different from the majority of Myanmar's population. They are Christian in religious orientation, setting them apart from the Buddhists and Muslims to the West. There is no information pertaining to the proportion of Karens in what was formerly Karen state: the 1983 population census minimizes ethnicity by stating that only 33, 227 people are non-Burmese (amounting to 0.1% of the population). This includes the Karen, as well as six more ethnic groups.²⁶ Other sources claim the Karen constitute 7% of the population.²⁷

When the Panglong Agreement was signed in 1947 between Burma and the British, ethnic groups within Burma were promised autonomy in the union of Burma, as well as the right to secession. With independence in 1948, political disputes began, and numerous ethnic groups took up arms against the central government. Further, the military takeover in Burma in 1962 occurred because ostensibly the civilian government of U Nu had endangered the Union by making unnecessary concessions to the demands for autonomy of the ethnic groups. The Karen were placed under direct military administration and thus lost all semblance of autonomy. Guerrilla warfare ensued. In the early 1990s, the central government of Myanmar suspended its military operations in the Karen areas and proclaimed the desire to reach a negotiated solution. This is viewed with distrust, but is also perceived as an admission that the junta is unable to win the war against the rebels.

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

18. AUSTRALIA

The Aborigines inhabited Australia before the arrival of white men. They endured much hardship for over a century before they began making demands and receiving attention. Indeed, their lives and lifestyles have changed dramatically since the nineteenth century and the implementation of the white man's (bloody) policy of 'pacification by force'. In the late 1920s, the government established reserves for the Aborigines, and granted them Australian citizenship. It was only in 1963, following protests, that Aborigine rights to land received attention and only in 1972 that the government took steps to improve their welfare. However, the Aborigines do not speak with a unified voice, so their demands are varied: in the north, the focus is on land ownership and control, as well as compensation for mineral exploitation on their land, while in the south, the focus is on integration rather than assimilation, in other words, the retention of a separate identity of the Aborigines within Australian society.

According to the census of 1986, there are less than 228,000 Aborigines left in Australia, amounting to some 2% of the population. With the exception of the Aborigines, Australian society is relatively homogeneous, in part because of previous restrictions on non-white immigration.

19. GUATEMALA

There are two main ethnic groups in Guatemala, the Ladinos and the American Indians. The former are of mixed Hispanic and Indian descent, they comprise some 45% of the total population, and they tend to be concentrated in the urban areas. Moreover, they tend to dominate in commerce and politics, along with the whites (5%). The Indian population amounts to 45% of the population, although in the rural western highlands it reaches some 75%. These people use some 20 languages, all of Mayan origin. The official language is Spanish.

The present conflict between the Indian and the Ladino population has its roots in the arrival of white man to the Americas. However, in the contemporary period, the most overt and large-scale efforts at altering the demographic structure of the country came in the early 1980s. The mostly Ladino government was responsible for massacres

The Demographic Struggle for Power

and ethnic cleansing of entire villages: during this time, thousands of Indians were driven into Mexico. Indeed, during 1980–85, some 1 million Maya Indians were uprooted from their homes (see chapter 6). The fact that this cleansing followed shortly after the discovery of oil in the northern provinces seems to indicate a desire to clear those lands for others to appropriate.

20. MOLDOVA

The region of Bessarabia has for two centuries been the focus of strain between Romanians and Russians. In the early 1800s, Turkey dominated the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Moldavia reached from the right bank of the Dniester River to across the Prut River as far as the Carpathians. In 1812, Russia annexed the region between the rivers (i.e., Bessarabia), while the rest remained under Turkish rule until 1878, when it became part of the independent state of Romania. After World War I, Bessarabia was integrated into Romania, a move that was never recognized by the Soviet Union. This led to the ceding of Bessarabia (and northern Bukovina) to the Soviet Union in mid-1940 and the subsequent return of both regions to Romania in 1941 (Romania was Germany's ally).²⁸ After World War II, the regions were integrated into the Soviet Republic of Moldavia.

Despite the formal recognition in 1947 by the Romanian government of the Soviet integration of Bessarabia, the Bessarabian question has remained a sore point in Soviet-Romanian relations. Ethnic Romanians made up 65% of the population²⁹ and refused to be Russified in the decades under Soviet rule. They retained their language and in the turmoil of 1989 expressed interest in integration with Romania. Then, when the Turkish-speaking Gagauzi expressed a desire to secede and the Russians west of the Dniester agitated for an independent state, the Moldavians were left with a dilemma as to what path and which alliance to pursue. Despite immediate moves to revert to the Latin script and increased requirements for the use of Romanian language in public life, support for reunification with Romania was not widespread, according to polls in the newly renamed Moldova.³⁰ Similarly, the sentiment in Romania is one of ambivalence. The voice favoring unification with Moldova is weaker than that opposing, and is understandably stronger in the western regions of the country, around Jassy.³¹

Moldova's President Snegur is presently more concerned with events on the eastern side of the Dniester River, where the largely Russian and Ukrainian population proclaimed the Trans-Dniestrian Republic and formally seceded from Moldova in September 1990.³² This act occurred in retaliation for the nationalist push for reunification with Romania and the accompanying legislation that harassed non-Romanians (such as making Romanian the state language,³³ re-Latinizing the alphabet and adopting a flag and state seal very similar to those of Romania). The situation was further aggravated when, in September 1993 General Aleksandr Lebed was elected as deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the 'Dniester Republic' on a platform calling for unification with Russia. For these reasons, the demands for joining Romania have subsided as the government is focusing on efforts to calm the Trans-Dniestrans.³⁴

21. UKRAINE

In Ukraine, there are presently several sources of inter-ethnic conflict. The most important one that is threatening the split of the country is between the Russified eastern population and the Ukrainian nationalist western population. This struggle between the Ukrainian populations culminated in 1994 in Crimea, with the election of a highly pro-independence (from Ukraine) and pro-Russian government that has even set Crimean clocks by Moscow time.

In part, the conflict has developed because neither the eastern nor the western population is entirely content in the post independence era. This discontent is due, to a large extent, to the realization that sovereignty is not necessarily accompanied by material benefits. Shattered hopes, impatience, and unrealistic expectations manifest themselves in a nostalgic attempt to recreate past economic securities, as occurred especially among the Russified population of the east: according to *The Economist*, 'They [Ukrainian leaders] were more interested in flags and army uniforms, the symbols of independence, than in economic strength.'³⁵ Those shattered hopes may also impose a more pragmatic review of economic relations with one's ex-state. This is evident in the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States³⁶ when Ukraine, as numerous other newly independent states have 'volunteered to transfer sovereignty to Russia in the hope of reviving their economies through reintegration with it'.³⁷ The willingness of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

some former Soviet republics to explore renewing ties with Russia have to do with the realities of economics. Indeed, even Ukraine, which had the best chances for viability and success as an independent economy, has been experiencing economic difficulties and its voters voted in April 1994 to give some one-third of the parliament seats to the revived Communist Party, making it the largest party in parliament. This vote, concentrated in the eastern regions, implies both a rejection of the economic reforms that are widely perceived to blame for economic hardships and nostalgia for the past that might carry with it the opening of a window to reintegration with Russia where the standard of living is now several times higher than in the Ukraine.³⁸

The resentment of the Ukrainians towards the Russian population has its roots in history. In 1654, an agreement was signed between Moscow and the Cossacks in a part of present Ukraine. However, the rights of Ukraine were gradually reduced under this treaty, and any elements of its autonomy was abolished in 1783. Furthermore, the partition of Poland in 1793–96 brought the remaining parts of Ukraine under Russian control. Ukraine became a part of the USSR in 1922, and during the 1930s eastern Polish territories were incorporated as Western Ukraine. In 1940, northern Bukovina was ceded by Romania and incorporated, and in 1945, Ruthenia was ceded by Czechoslovakia.

22. TAJIKISTAN

Tajiks, the principal peoples of Tajikistan, are Sunni Muslims who speak a Persian dialect. They have a very high rate of population growth: less than half of the population is under 20 years of age and one-third of the population is less than 9 years old.

Russia took over much of Tajikistan in the 1860s. After the Russian Revolution, portions of the region were included into what became the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Republic and the Bukharan Peoples Soviet Republic. Some administrative boundary alterations occurred in 1924, which finally resulted in the creation of the Tajik Republic in 1929. When the Soviet Union unravelled, Tajikistan also declared independence.

The inter-ethnic conflict in Tajikistan is between the Russian population and that of the Tajiks. Despite the accelerated rate of economic development that occurred in the region as a result of its incorporation in the Soviet Union, especially with respect to education,

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

infrastructure and industrialization, the resentment towards the Russians and the Soviet center has been consistent and persistent. As a result, independence from the Soviet Union has led to efforts at eradicating the Russian influence in the economy and the society. Such an effort is met with resistance from the Russians that have adapted and integrated to life in the region.

23. CHECHNYA

Chechnya and Ingushetia are inhabited by peoples that are of the same religion (Islam), and perhaps even the same tribe. In 1944, Stalin charged both peoples of collaboration with the Germans, sentenced them to penal servitude, and relocated them *en masse* to Kazakhstan. Under Krushchev, they were reinstated and invited to return to their homelands. However, upon their return, the Ingushetians found their land inhabited by the Ossetians (Christian converts originally from Persia, and traditionally friendly with the Russians). Chechnya and Ingushetia were a single republic until they split into separate administrative entities in June 1992. They have yet to decide on their borders or how their populations are to be divided. In the entire region, there are 52.9% Chechens, 11.7% Ingushi and 29.1% Russians.³⁹ In Chechnya itself, one fifth of the population is Russian. There are approximately 1 million Chechenens across the Russian Federation.

Chechnya, presently an autonomous republic within the state of Russia, is rich in oil and minerals. It is of crucial importance to the Russians insofar as it contains an oil pipeline that runs between the Caspian and Black seas. Chechnya has gained notoriety in 1994 as a result of the inflow of Russian troops attempting to oust President Dудаев, who was elected to power on the platform of Chechen independence. Although the region declared its secession from the Russian Federation in 1991, it was not until December 1994 that Russian President Yeltsin ordered the Russian army to subdue the restive population.

24. LATVIA

The Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union led the struggle for secession from the Soviet Union and thus set the groundwork for the breakup of the Soviet Union. These regions were independent states between the two World Wars. However, following the invasion by Hitler

The Demographic Struggle for Power

during World War II, the Soviet army came to the rescue, and remained there after the war ended as a result of the agreement between Hitler and Stalin (which assigned Latvia to the Soviet sphere of influence in 1939). The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1940 and in that year became a member of the Soviet Union.

As in numerous other former Soviet states, an inter-ethnic struggle is presently taking place between the Russian population that has in-migrated into Latvia during the past half century and the local population of Latvian ethnicity. Decades of resentment towards the Russians were expressed in stringent post-independence regulations that restricted the rights of the Russian population. The citizenship, language and employment laws that were introduced at the time of independence are discussed in chapter 5.

25. ROMANIA

Hungarians are the largest minority in Romania. The Hungarians in Transylvania were autonomous in the seventeenth century, then became part of Austria in the eighteenth century, part of Hungary in 1848, and were ceded to Romania in 1920 by the Treaty of Trianon. During World War II, Transylvania was attached to Hungary once again, then reverted back to Romania when the war ended. Thus this region has gone back and forth between Romania and Hungary four times in the last century and is regarded by each as national territory.

In 1952, the 'Autonomous Hungarian Region' was established, giving the population little more than bilingual street signs. Repercussions of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 against the Soviets were also felt among the Hungarian population in Transylvania, provoking anti-Hungarian measures. In 1960, the autonomy and special status of the region ceased to exist, since an administrative reorganization of the region resulted in the taking of some Hungarian villages and the addition of non-Hungarian villages in order to change the demographic character of the region.⁴⁰

The population of Transylvania is approximately 7 million, of which some three-fifths are Romanian and the rest are Hungarian (2 million), as well as some 400,000 Germans and some Serbs and Ukrainians.⁴¹ Although Romanians are the strict majority in this region, some pockets are mostly Hungarian, such as the county of Harghita, where they make up 85% of the population.⁴²

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

Although dissatisfaction with the Romanian leadership has been prevalent among the Hungarian population since the incorporation of the region into Romania, open discontent has been voiced only in 1989. Indeed, some claim that it is the Hungarian bishop, the Reverend Laszlo Tokes, that instigated the demise of the Ceausescu government by his defiance of the regime and his support of demonstrations in Timisoara. There have continued to be clashes between the ethnic Hungarians and Romanians, as the former press for more autonomy, while the latter fear that these demands for autonomy would lead to a full fledged separatist movement. This is feared in part because it is Romania's richest province.

26. ALBANIA

When Albania was created and its borders drawn, the largest dispute came from within Greece. This dispute, like others of its kind, was based on the ethnic composition of the resident population. According to the figures compiled by the League of Nations in 1922, Northern Epirus contained 112,329 Orthodox Christians and 113,845 Albanian Moslems.⁴³ At present, the size of the Greek population is under dispute: the Greeks claim that there are 400,000 Greeks in Northern Epirus, while Albanians put the figure at 58,000 in 1989.⁴⁴ For some years during this century, a segment of what is now Albania was under Greek rule. Indeed, the Protocol of Corfu gave Northern Epirus to Greece. This decision was revoked in 1921 by the Ambassador's Conference, and the region has since been part of Albania. Although this territorial claim is not officially made by the Greek government, there are some public figures that are in favor of the restoration of Greek rule to the region.⁴⁵ There is even a U.S. Senate resolution (from 1944) supporting Greece's demands for the return of the region to Greece.⁴⁶ The Movement for the Recovery of Vorio Epirus, although not significant in either politics or numbers, is nevertheless a cause for concern in the Tirana government, which views with suspicion its southern neighbor and its potential desires for Albania's dismemberment. It has managed to translate its message to the Greek population, so that the concept of the Albanization of the Greek community in Albania has become an accepted fact.⁴⁷

A crisis developed in the summer of 1993 when the Albanian government deported an Orthodox priest from Albania, ostensibly for fomenting nationalism among the Greek population in southern Albania. The move caused outrage in Greece and resulted in the intensification of

The Demographic Struggle for Power

Operation Broom, an effort to expel illegal Albanian immigrants from Greece. By July 1993, some 30,000 Albanians had been deported, and negotiations have proceeded as to how to calm the situation. Meanwhile, the Greek population has become hopeful that their condition within Albania has reached the ears of the Greek politicians,⁴⁸ while the Albanians fear this new meddling in their internal affairs.

27. KOSOVO (YUGOSLAVIA)

Albanians are the majority population of Kosovo, and they demand secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia (this aspiration differs from Krajina, described below, where the population only wants to secede from Croatia but not Yugoslavia). However, the Serbian population of Kosovo rejects such a move because they view secession as the prerequisite for a possible union with Albania, and possibly also with the western part of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. After Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, in January 1992 the ethnic Albanians that inhabit the western region voted on forming their own state and seeking union with Kosovo.⁴⁹

The question of the ethnic composition of Kosovo lies at the heart of the present crisis. While population estimates are discussed in detail in chapter 3, the historical context of the population composition is described here. There was a time when the region of Kosovo was predominantly inhabited by Serbs, as noted by the bookkeepers of the invading Ottoman Empire. Progressively over the centuries, the portion of Serbs decreased and that of Albanians increased. Since World War II, various factors contributed to altering the demographics of the region, including: illegal border crossings from low-income and repressive Albania, high fertility rates among the Albanian population (the highest in Europe, over 2.5%), terror against Serbs with the aim of large scale evacuations, and Tito's policy of relocating 500,000 Serbs from Kosovo to Vojvodina.⁵⁰

The validity of the Albanian claim to independence rests on their quest for self-determination as espoused by their political parties and parliament. A document was signed in July 1990 by Albanian delegates to the suspended Parliament declaring Kosovo a republic with 'the same constitutional status as the other republics'. However, the Serbs claim that this parliament has no validity, since autonomy of the region was a false creation during Tito's time aimed at decreasing the power of Serbia.

Indeed, Serbia held a referendum in which the overwhelming majority voted to reincorporate Kosovo into Serbia and to reinstate the pre-existing territorial and political structure. In June 1990, Serbia further passed a 'special circumstances' law giving it power to take over from the regional authorities by suspending the Kosovo Assembly and Executive Council. Then, on 25 May 1992, the Albanian population of Kosovo voted in a referendum on secession, and over 90% of the votes were in favor. The Serbian population did not partake in the vote. To date, the crisis in Kosovo remains unresolved.

28. CROATIA

The inter-ethnic war in Croatia began in the aftermath of Croatia's demands for secession from Yugoslavia. The nationalist government of President Franjo Tuđman came to power without the support of the majority of Croats.⁵¹ Nevertheless, when a referendum about independence was held in May 1991, over 90% of the population favored the dissolution of the present federal system and the establishment of a sovereign independent nation, linked in a loose confederation with Yugoslavia's other republics.⁵²

The present problems in the region, although deeply rooted in historical relationships, became exacerbated in the aftermath of anti-Serb legislation adopted by the Tuđman government. This included the following: 1. Serbs were relegated to the status of a minority; whereas the Declaration of the Basic Rights of Nations and Citizens of Democratic Croatia, passed in 1944, gave the Croats and Serbs equality under law, the new constitution of Croatia, adopted in December 1990, relegated the Serbs to a minority in the eyes of the law.⁵³ 2. Their cultural rights were denied insofar as they lost the right to use the Cyrillic alphabet in the schools and the media. 3. Serbs were dismissed from positions in the police and the administration.⁵⁴ At the same time, a law was passed according to which non-resident Serbian property owners in Croatia were forced to pay higher real estate taxes on property held in Croatia. The Serbs of Krajina took offense at the anti-Serbian sentiment portrayed by the Tuđman government, refused to give up their arms during the summer of 1990, and barricaded their villages so as not to be accessible to the Croatian forces. Hostilities continued and intensified since Serbs of Krajina refused to secede from Yugoslavia. More importantly, they refused to live under a Croatian government

The Demographic Struggle for Power

they perceived to be similar to the fascist government that had ruled during World War II, when a third of their population perished.⁵⁵ Consequently, the Serbs of Krajina held a referendum in May 1991 to determine the populations desires pertaining to secession. The sentiment was clear: if Croatia secedes from Serbia, Krajina will secede from Croatia. Indeed, the overwhelming response of the population was in favor of joining the Republic of Serbia and remaining within Yugoslavia. The war that broke out in June 1991 was not over the right of Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia, but rather over the territory that Croatia should be allowed to take with it. At the beginning of August 1991, the Croatian government drew up a plan offering its Serb minority the key concessions it had sought one year earlier, including home rule, control over the local police and greater political power. However, it was too little and too late. The Krajina region had already set up its own government and proclaimed itself an autonomous region.

The Serbian Republic of Krajina, with headquarters in Knin, consists of 12 communes in Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Dordun and Slavonia. It covers an area of some 7,900 square kilometers and has a population of 268,400. It was set up on 30 April 1991, complete with its own legislative, administrative and executive bodies. Within Tito's federation, Krajina had no special status within the republic of Croatia. It never enjoyed the status of autonomous region that was granted to Vojvodina, which had a significantly lower percentage of minority population. However, it did have a special status during the Austro-Hungarian rule. At this time, Krajina was called Vojna Krajina (Military Krajina) and it served an important function for the Austrian Empire. It was populated over the centuries by Serbs evading the Ottoman Empire, and in exchange for land grants, they agreed to defend the Empire, and thereby Europe, from Turkish invasion. As such, Vojna Krajina was a separate administrative-political territorial unit, ruled directly by Vienna, and did not come under the jurisdiction of the Croatian parliament until 1881.⁵⁶

29. MACEDONIA

The importance of Macedonia is indicated by its location in the heart of the Balkans. Roucek claims that 'whoever dominates the Vardar Valley [the heart of Macedonia] is master of the Peninsula'.⁵⁷ The possession of Macedonia has historically been the strategic ambition of three Balkan powers: Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece.

When Slovenia and Croatia seceded, Macedonians feared that they would be subject to hegemony of a larger Serbian majority within the Yugoslav federation. Thus the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), the interwar pro-Bulgarian and anti-Yugoslav party, was revived in the form of the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity. In September 1991, Macedonia held a plebiscite on sovereignty, indicating that despite the problems associated with independence, the region wanted to hop on the secessionist bandwagon with Slovenia and Croatia. When the European Community set forth guidelines that it would follow for the recognition of former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia (and Slovenia) satisfied the requirements. However, it was not granted recognition until two years later because of Greek opposition.

On the surface, there seems to be harmony between the Albanians, Serbs and Macedonians. In addition, there is a Roma population that has been called 'a success story' – 'the Roma of Macedonia appear to enjoy a far more advantageous situation than do their counterparts in Greece, Bulgaria or Romania'.⁵⁸ However, below the surface, there is another dimension to the inter-ethnic situation. There have been some incidents that have dampened the relative inter-ethnic harmony: for example, there were violent anti-Muslim demonstrations in Skopje in February 1993; there are reports that Albanians want to declare a western Macedonian autonomous republic;⁵⁹ the main Macedonian Roma parties are requesting the creation of a state for the Romas (Romanistan);⁶⁰ and there is the fact that the Macedonian constitution does not accord non-Macedonians the same status as it does to Macedonians. The least belligerent group at this time is the Serbian population of Macedonia. It amounts to a mere 2.4% of the population and is located in several districts on the northern border with Serbia. Despite the attention of the media on this group as a potential cause of the spill over of the Bosnian crisis into Macedonia, there is little evidence that such a move will come. Indeed, it is much likelier that, if a crisis occurs, it will be the result of irredentist aspirations of the Albanian population. The demands of the Albanian population in Kosovo are closely related to those of the Albanian population in neighboring Macedonia, where 20%–40% of the population is ethnically Albanian.⁶¹ Their demands include, at the most, secession from Macedonia (and the fusion with Kosovo and possibly Albania), and at the least, greater autonomy and cultural rights within Macedonia (see the section on Kosovo).

The Demographic Struggle for Power

30. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The struggle within Bosnia-Herzegovina is covered in depth in chapter 9, so will not be addressed here except to say that it is a struggle for power between three ethnic groups, the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. These three groups, long time inhabitants of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are presently fighting a war to determine what the boundaries of their territories will be, now that the umbrella union that accommodated them all, namely Yugoslavia, no longer exists.

31. BULGARIA

In its post-World War II history, the existence of Turks, Macedonians, Pomaks, Vlahs and other minorities has alternatively been disregarded and addressed by the Bulgarian authorities. That there is presently no overt conflict between these ethnic groups is in part an indication of the success of Bulgarian policy of assimilation. This policy has entailed efforts to induce name changes, religious conversions and forced re-settlement. According to Poulton, 'Since 1945, the Bulgarian authorities have made repeated attempts to induce the Pomaks to change their names, renounce their faith and become integrated into the socialist Bulgarian state. Some Pomak activists and their families were resettled ...'⁶² However, the most overt case of forced assimilation is that of the ethnic Turks, perhaps because the size of the population involved was the largest. In 1984, Turks were offered the possibility to Bulgarize their names and change their religion, give up their traditional clothing or else lose their jobs and their rights to education. The economic realities of these economic repercussions forced large numbers of Turks to emigrate to Turkey: it is estimated that in 1989, some 300,000 Turks left for Turkey. Of these, 130,000 had returned by 1990, and it is unclear how many of these have since assimilated.

32. CYPRUS

The conflict between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, while dormant, is by no means over. It has once again become a major issue of domestic politics.⁶³

Historically, Cyprus was inhabited mostly by Greeks until the Ottoman invasion in the sixteenth century. In 1878, the British assumed

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

control of the island and remained there until 1960, when under pressure of the Greek independence movement, they left and it gained independence. However, one-fifth of the population (720,000 people) is Turkish, and this population refused to live under Greek proportional control in politics. A coup in 1974 led to the uprising of the Turks, aided by the army from the mainland, and the establishment of the current status quo; that is, one-third of the country is currently known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (formally established in 1983 and recognized by only Turkey), and the Greek section is the Republic of Cyprus. Since 1974, UN peacekeeping troops have been maintaining peace, and negotiations for a long-term settlement have not progressed.⁶⁴

The Turkish population controls a segment of the land that is in excess of its population proportion, and the land it controls has a greater concentration of manufacturing. Nevertheless, the income per capita in the Greek section remains higher.

33. GERMANY

While an inter-ethnic conflict in Germany is not presently evident (with the possible exception of minor neo-fascist activity aimed against foreigners), it was included in this study because of its pervasive World War II efforts at altering the demographic structure of its country and others under its control. Germany represents the most extensive modern example of the demographic struggle for power. Since the coming to power of Adolf Hitler, a policy had been enacted to eradicate the country of Jews and other ‘undesirable’ minorities. These policies intensified progressively over time and included the following: with respect to economic pressures, Jews were dismissed from various jobs, their businesses boycotted and vandalized. Then, laws were enacted between 1933 and 1938 that entailed the confiscation of Jewish property and the assessment of huge fines. Finally, Jews were denied property rights to business and land. Second, there was a process of de-assimilation, according to which Jews were stripped of their citizenship, they were not allowed to attend public schools and could not marry or associate with non-Jews. Third, Jews were first confined in their living spaces to ghettos in the cities, and later were herded off to the east into concentration camps. Thus, they were subject to massive ethnic cleansing. Fourth, some Jews were organized into labor battalions and

The Demographic Struggle for Power

used for exhausting work after which they died, in part as a result of the work and in part as a result of the inadequate nutrition and sanitary conditions. Fifth, as part of what became known as the final solution, Jews were exterminated in death camps in which some 4–6 million people died.

34. ITALY

The conflict presently engulfing Italy is based on a north/south divide, according to which the more developed north, especially Lombardy, is pitted against the less developed south that it perceives to be siphoning central funds without contributing to them.⁶⁵ However, this study focuses on the demographic struggle for power in the Alto Adige. This region in the southern Tyrol, was once a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was granted to Italy at the end of World War I. At the time, it contained a largely Germanic population. Since the time of transfer of power, the following methods of demographic struggle occurred. First, the change of the borders put some 300,000 people on the wrong side of the border. Those who were previously part of a majority found themselves a minority. Second, the Italian government, especially after 1922, followed a policy of assimilation and Italianization, discouraging the use of the German language. Despite the fact that the region was granted special status in 1948, this autonomy status allowed for the sustainance of cultural identity but did not allow political or economic autonomy. The pertinent statute was altered in 1969 to include greater administrative and economic control by the ethnic Germans. Third, the government encouraged migration of Italians into the area which resulted in the changing composition of the population.

All of these forms of demographic struggle have had their negative effect on the sentiments of the original population. Currently, not only is the German population resentful of its rule by the Italians and is expressing a desire for separatism, but also the Italian minority is resentful of the preferential treatment that the Germans are enjoying.

35. SPAIN

There are two regions in Spain, inhabited by two different peoples, that have consistently threatened the unity of Spain: the Basque Provinces and Catalonia. The 1978 Constitution of Spain accommodated Spain's

regional groups by creating 17 autonomous regions according to which regions negotiate their rights and obligations with the central government. Thus, the Spanish state underwent a transformation from a unitary state into one based on 17 regional governments. Autonomy granted the Basque Provinces, as well as Catalonia, the power to elect their own parliaments, to control taxation, education and police, as well as to supervise broadcasting.

The Basque Provinces include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya. Population statistics of the region are hard to judge, since one Autonomous Community (of the Pais Vasco) does not include the largest Basque province, Navarra. The other three, Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya contain 5.6% of the population (and 1.5% of the land and 8.2% of the income of Spain and only 6% of the members of the Congress of Deputies).⁶⁶

The centrist Basque Solidarity Party, as well as the Herri Batasuna (People's Unity, the political wing of the E.T.A., in Basque, the initials for Basque Homeland and Liberty) affirm the right of the Basque peoples to 'territorial political unity' in the four Basque provinces of Spain and the three Basque regions in France. However, irredentist sentiment is not a crucial issue on the agenda of neither the Spanish nor French Basques. The most vociferous group that pushes for Basque separation from Spain is the E.T.A.. The E.T.A. began fighting for independence during the highly centralized rule of Francisco Franco, but increased in momentum and in terrorist activities in 1968. Since the Napoleonic Wars, the Basque Provinces have been the greatest challenge to the Spanish government.

Catalonia includes Barcelona, Tarragona, Gerona and Lerida. In 1716, the Castilian crown imposed itself on Catalonia from Madrid. The question of what determines a Catalan is difficult to answer. The leader of Catalonia for the past 12 years, Jordi Pujol, claims that anyone that lives and works in Catalonia is a Catalan.⁶⁷ Although there are Catalonian regions in France, their populations tend to be more concerned with language rights within France than with unification with their Spanish counterparts.

In 1939, the Franco regime dismantled all regional political institutions, and for a while in the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed that the Catalan nationalism was dead. However, it resurfaced again during the 1970s. Since the imposition of Castilian control over Catalonia, the region and the center have not stopped feuding. There are two leaders

The Demographic Struggle for Power

of Catalonia who are nationalist in orientation: Jordi Pujol, who has headed the coalition government (Convergence and Union Parties) of the past 12 years, and who is in favor of as much autonomy as possible within Spain, and Angel Colom whose Republican Left Party wants outright independence. However, the separatist party received only 8% of the vote in 1992.⁶⁸

36. NORTHERN IRELAND

There has been turmoil between the peoples of Northern Ireland for decades on the basis of religious diversity. The majority of the population of Ireland is Catholic, while Protestants constitute a majority in the six counties of Northern Ireland.

In 1921, the landmass of Ireland was partitioned into two states. Immediately at Partition, it was clear that this new administrative change would not be supported by some.⁶⁹ The Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended in 1972, and since then the region has been ruled directly from Westminster. The Sinn Fein party (the political arm of the Irish Republican Army), has the support of about 11% of the voters. Polls of the population indicate that the desire for independence is not widespread, even among the Catholic population; according to the Economic and Social Research Institute of Dublin, in 1979, 39% of Catholics in Northern Ireland favored unification, while 49% preferred to remain within the U.K.⁷⁰

NOTES

- 1 See Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in Sudan*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 147.
- 2 The Southern Sudanese have found themselves at a disadvantage after their patron, President Mengistu of Ethiopia, was overthrown in 1991. Indeed, that marked the turning point for the Sudan People's Liberation Army, since they lost their sanctuary, their communications base and the necessary supplies and arms to sustain their fight. This has contributed to the near defeat of the rebels in May 1992.
- 3 See *International Herald Tribune*, 4 July 1990.
- 4 See Peter Russel and Storrs McCall, 'Can Secession Be Justified? The Case of the Southern Sudan' in Dunstan M. Wai, ed., *The Southern Sudan, The Problem of National Integration*, London: Frank Cass, 1973, pp. 116, 119.
- 5 Businesses were taken over, often by those with little commercial expertise

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

- which allowed them to collapse and consequently resulted in the breakdown of the Ugandan economy
- 6 See Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, pp. 222–5.
- 7 *Wall Street Journal*, 3 December 1990.
- 8 Ibid., 3 December 1990.
- 9 Ibid., 18 October 1990.
- 10 Ibid., 27 March 1991.
- 11 See Edmund Ghareeb, *The Kurdish Question in Iraq*, Syracuse University Press, 1981.
- 12 *The New York Times*, 11 February 1991.
- 13 Derived from Department of Census and Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing, Sri Lanka*, 1981, Preliminary Release No. 1, Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics, 1981.
- 14 See A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988, chapters 1–2.
- 15 See Robert Kearney, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka', in *Asian Survey*, vol. XXV, no. 9, p. 909.
- 16 Communiqué by Embassy of Indonesia in Washington, printed in the *New York Times*, 5 January 1991.
- 17 *New York Times*, 21 October 1990.
- 18 M. Hadi Soesastro, 'East Timor: Question of Economic Viability' in Hal Hill, ed., *Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia Since 1970*, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 210, Table 8.1.
- 19 *New York Times*, 21 October 1991.
- 20 See Peter Hastings, 'Timor and West Irian: The Reason Why', in J. A. C. Mackie, ed., *Indonesia: The Making of a Nation*, Canberra: The Australian National University, Research School of Pacific Studies, 1980.
- 21 See James Griffin, 'Movements for Separation and Secession' in Anthony Clunies Ross and John Langmore, *Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 120.
- 22 L.P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea*, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1970.
- 23 A. Tom Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987, p. 231.
- 24 Another reason is the extreme suppression of political liberties that the central government and the communist party have exerted upon the Tibetans.
- 25 *New York Times*, 7 October 1990. Tibetans also inhabit regions of Qinghai Province, which came under Chinese rule in the 18th century.
- 26 See David Steinberg, 'Myanmar in 1991', *Asian Survey*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1992.
- 27 *The Economist, The World in Figures 1981*, London: The Economist Newspaper, p. 164.
- 28 This region is presently part of the Ukraine, where there are some 135,000 to 200,000 Romanians living (in Chernivtsi Oblast). They have been demanding cultural autonomy and increased relations with Romania. The Ukraine has been lenient with these demands.
- 29 Alan J. Day, *Border and Territorial Disputes*, 2nd edn., Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1987, p. 86.
- 30 *FRE/FL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 9, 26 February 1993, p. 15.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 31 The events leading up to the possible unification between Moldova and Romania have been tumultuous. Several Moldovan members of parliament are in favor of a gradual unification with Romania, while President Snegur is opposed. Romania has proposed a 'treaty of fraternity and integration' with the Romanian-speaking majority of Moldova, which was turned down. Other Romanian overtures are economic in nature: it has offered economic assistance (in August 1993) if Moldova does not ratify participation in the CIS. Incidentally, this was to be financed by the Fund for Integration with Moldova, and it was to offer Moldova a lucrative alternative to economic association in the CIS. Ultimately, a less ambitious economic package was signed in September 1993. Also, the chairman of the Parliament, Petru Lucinschi, who is overwhelmingly popular, is leaning towards an eastern orientation for Moldova, rather than a western one. These are all setbacks for the pro-unification lobby.
- 32 This new republic includes territory that was part of Ukraine. Stalin attached it to the part of Romania that it annexed, in order to dilute the Romanian population. The territory also includes the disputed town of Bender, claimed by both sides. There has also been significant speculation in the press about Romanian military participation in the Moldovan conflict in Dniester, which the Defense Ministry was forced to reject in April 1992 (*RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 18, 1 May 1992, p. 51).
- 33 As a challenge to Moldovan sovereignty, the Gagauz Supreme Soviet annulled the Romanian language laws in September 1993.
- 34 *New York Times*, 21 May 1993.
- 35 'Survey', *The Economist*, 7 May 1994, p. 3.
- 36 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the organization that came into being in 1991 to foster links between 11 of the former 15 republics, has replaced some of the economic links provided by the central Soviet state. While the members of CIS have the satisfaction of knowing they are in a voluntary association (as exemplified by the fact that they have choices: for example, some members have retained central control of their armed forces, while others, such as Ukraine, have opted for independent armies), in reality many of the inter-regional links vary little from those before 1990.
- 37 *The Economist*, 18 September 1993, p. 51.
- 38 *The Economist*, 'Survey', 7 May, p. 5.
- 39 *Globe and Mail*, 8 October 1994.
- 40 John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi and Louis J. Elteto, eds., 'Chronology of Transylvanian History', in John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi and Louis J. Elteto, eds., *Transylvania, The Roots of Ethnic Conflict*, Kent State University Press, 1983, pp. 31–3.
- 41 George Schopflin, 'Transylvania: Hungarians Under Romanian Rule', in Stephen Borsody, ed., *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988, p. 130.
- 42 *New York Times*, 12 November 1990.
- 43 P. N. Pipinelis, *Europe and the Albanian Question*, Chicago: Argonaut, Inc., 1963, p. 67. Another census was taken by the Turks in 1909, according to which 128,050 of a population of 223,611 were Greek Orthodox. This estimate has been claimed to be an underestimate, given the desire of the Turkish census

Ethnicity and Conflict in Selected Regions

- takers to augment the size of the Muslim population. Henry Baerlein, *Southern Albania* (Chicago: Argonaut Inc., 1968), p. 7.
- 44 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 33, 20 August 1993, p. 32.
- 45 One such figure is the Archbishop Sevastionos in Konitsa in Epirus (Christopher Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, p. 101).
- 46 *RFE/RL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 33, 20 August 1993, p. 31.
- 47 *Balkan News*, 11 July 1993, p. 6.
- 48 Part of the reason that the Mitsotakis government has responded so strongly to the expulsion of the Orthodox cleric is that the opposition party, PASOK, has made an issue of it and Prime Minister Mitsotakis wanted to show strength on the issue. I was in Greece at the time of the expulsion, and it was certainly the principal topic of debate in political circles as well as in the media.
- 49 *New York Times*, 13 January 1992.
- 50 See Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo*, Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984, chapters 12–14.
- 51 For a discussion of the political regulations that enabled this to occur, see Robert Hayden, 'The Partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 22, 28 May 1993.
- 52 *New York Times*, 20 May 1991.
- 53 *Narodne Novine*, no. 59, 1990.
- 54 See David Martin, 'Croatia's Borders: Over the Edge', *New York Times*, 22 November 1991.
- 55 Given the 1991 war in Croatia, one cannot but draw parallels with Croatia's independence efforts during World War II. At that time, Hitler installed a puppet regime under the leadership of Ante Pavelic. During his rule, the Ustashes (extreme right wing) committed atrocities against the Serbs (and Jews and Gypsies) on their territories in order to create an ethnically pure Croatia. Croatia was the only German satellite region except for Romania that had its own Final Solution. According to the Wiesenthal center, the concentration camps in Croatia were the fiercest outside of Germany and it is estimated that around 500,000 Serbs perished at the hands of the Croats. There is much controversy over this number, a discussion of which is contained in the article by Kaplan, that also discusses how President Tudjman claims, as late as 1991, that the Holocaust never happened and that what little deaths occurred were because the Jews killed the Serbs. (A discussion of the book reissued in 1991 by President Tudjman, a historian, is contained in an article by Robert Kaplan 'Croatianism: The Latest Balkan Ugliness' in *The New Republic*, 25 November 1991. Tudjman claims that the numbers killed in Croatia were significantly lower than those accepted by both the Yugoslav government and international organizations. Moreover, he goes on to say that the three groups the Ustasha killed, Serbs, Gypsies and Jews, actually killed each other: 'According to Tudjman, the mass murder of Serbs by Croats during World War II is not an issue, since not all that many Serbs were killed in the first place, and those who were slaughtered were mainly done in by the Jews. Case closed.' See p. 18.)
- 56 See Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia 1740–1881*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- 57 Joseph Rousek, *The Politics of the Balkans*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 138.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- 58 *FRE/FL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 19, 7 May 1993, p. 42.
- 59 This threat was made by the leaders of the Albanian minority in Macedonia if the Albanians did not receive the same rights as the Macedonians (*Guardian*, 17 November 1992).
- 60 *FRE/FL, Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 19, 7 May 1993, p. 42.
- 61 The official statistical abstract counted 20%, but the Albanian sources claim 40%.
- 62 Hugh Poulton, *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991, p. 111.
- 63 Indeed, the new Political Spring party has accorded Cyprus importance, and its leader, Samaris made travel there a priority. *Athens News*, 4 and 5 July 1993.
- 64 The United Nations has been pressing ahead on negotiations in Cyprus, in part to avoid comparisons with the standstill in Croatia. *Athens News*, 8 July 1993.
- 65 This sentiment is expressed most succinctly by the political party Lega Lombarda, headed by Umberto Bossi, whose platform is the federalization of Italy.
- 66 Robert Clark, 'Spanish Democracy and Regional Autonomy: The Autonomous Community System and Self-government for the Ethnic Homelands', in Joseph Rudolph and Robert Thompson, eds., *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the Western World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, p. 20.
- 67 *The Economist*, 21 March 1992, p. 54.
- 68 Ibid., 21 March 1992, p. 54.
- 69 See John Darby, 'The Historical Background', in John Darby, ed., *Northern Ireland, The Background to the Conflict*, Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983.
- 70 C. C. O'Brien, *Neighbours*, London: Faber and Faber, 1980, p. 81.

Select Bibliography

- Alonso, William and Paul Starr (eds.), *The Politics of Numbers*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1987.
- Andreopoulos, George J. (ed.), *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.
- Barracough, Geoffrey (ed.), *The Times Atlas of World History*, Third Edition, Maplewood, New Jersey, Hammond, 1989.
- Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew, 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993).
- Berelson, Bernard, *Population Policy in Developed Countries*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1974.
- Birch, Anthony, *Nationalism and National Integration*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
- Bogosavljevic, Srdjan (ed.), *Bosna i Hercegovina Izmedu Rata i Mira*, Belgrade: Dom Omladine, 1992.
- Bonacich, Edna, 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities', *American Sociological Review*, 38 (October 1973).
- Bookman, Milica Z., *Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- *The Economics of Secession*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Brass, Paul R., *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991.
- 'Ethnicity and Nationality Formation', *Ethnicity*, 3 (September 1976).
- Breuilly, John, *Nationalism and the State*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- Cadzow, John, Andres Ludanyi and Louis Elteto (eds.), *Translyvania, the Roots of Ethnic Conflict*, Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1983.
- Casley, D. J., and D. A. Lury, *Data Collection in Developing Countries*, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- Connor, Walter, *Ethnonationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1994.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- ‘Politics of Ethnonationalism’, *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1, 1973.
- ‘Nation Building or Nation Destroying’, *World Politics*, 24, 1972.
- Cvijić, Christopher, *Remaking the Balkans*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991.
- Davis, Rufus, *The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Day, Alan J., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, Second Edition, Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1987.
- Day, Lincoln H., ‘Catholicism and Fertility: A Cross-Cultural Analysis’, in David Chaplin (ed.), *Population Policies and Growth in Latin America*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971.
- Dedičić, Vladimir, *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992.
- Despres, Leo (ed.), *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies*, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975.
- Eberstadt, Nicholas, ‘Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2 (May/June 1994).
- Enloe, Cynthia, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Epstein, Vivian Xenia, ‘The Politics of Population in Latin America’, in David Chaplin, *Population Policies and Growth in Latin America*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971.
- Esman, Milton (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Etzioni, Amitai, ‘The Evils of Self-Determination’, *Foreign Policy*, 89 (Winter 1992–93).
- Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia, *The 1991 Census in Yugoslavia: Statistics and Policy*, Statistical Commission and Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva: Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1 May 1992.
- Francis, E. K., *Inter-ethnic Relations*, New York: Elsevier, 1976.
- Feiner, Susan, *Race and Gender in the American Economy*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
- Friedlander, Robert A., ‘Autonomy in the Thirteen Colonies: Was the American Revolution Really Necessary?’, in Yoram Dinstein (ed.), *Models of Autonomy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981.
- Furnivall, J. S., *Colonial Policy and Practice*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

Select Bibliography

- Glazer, N., and D. P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Goose, Stephen D., and Frank Smyth, 'Arming Genocide in Rwanda', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 5 (September/October 1994).
- Gurr, Ted Robert, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
- Guyot, James F., 'The Puerto Rican Population of New York City: Who Counts Depends on How You Count', in *New York City Perspectives*, 2, no. 2, 1975.
- Hechter, Michael, *Internal Colonialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Heer, David, 'Three Issues in Soviet Population Policy', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 3, no. 3 (September 1977).
- Hobsbawm, Eric, 'The New Threat to History', *New York Review of Books*, 16 December 1993.
- Hobsbawm, E. J., *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- Hroch, Miroslav, 'Linguistic Conflicts in Eastern Europe and Their Historical Parallels', in Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga Vorkunova (eds.), *Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World*, London: Macmillan, 1992.
- Huntington, Samuel, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993.
- Ireland, Patrick R., *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Joly, Daniele, *Refugees – Asylum in Europe*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
- Karpat, Kemal H., *Ottoman Population 1830–1914*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Kellas, James G., *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Kennan, George F., *The Other Balkan Wars*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993.
- Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Random House, 1993.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- Kostunica, Vojislav, 'The Constitution and the Federal States' in Dennison Rusinow (ed.), *Yugoslavia, A Fractured Federalism*, Washington: The Wilson Center Press, 1988.
- Krejci, Jaroslav, and Vitezslav Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Kuper, Leo, *Genocide*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.
- McCarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict*, London: Routledge, 1993.
- McCready, William C. (ed.), *Ethnicity Culture and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983.
- McIntosh, C. Allison, *Population Policy in Western Europe*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1983.
- McIntyre, Robert J., 'Pronatalist Programs in Eastern Europe', *Soviet Studies*, 27, vol. 3 (July 1975).
- Merlino, Jacques, *Les Vérités Yougoslaves Ne Sont Pas Toutes Bonnes à Dire*, Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1993.
- Messina, Anthony, Luis Fraga, Laurie Thodebeck and Frederick Wright, *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.
- Montville, Joseph V., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.
- Moskoff, William, 'Pronatalist Policies in Romania', in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 28, no. 3, April 1980.
- Murphy, Alexander B., 'Evolving Regionalism in Linguistically Divided Belgium', in R. J. Johnston, David B. Knight and Eleonore Kofman, *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, London: Croom Helm, 1988.
- Narroll, R., 'Ethnic Unit Classification', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1964.
- Olzak, S., and J. Nagel (eds.), *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1986.
- Palmer, Stephen E., and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971.
- Paris, Edmond, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia: A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres*, Chicago: The American Institute of Balkan Affairs, 1961.
- Parsons, Carole W. (ed.), *America's Uncounted People*, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1972.
- Pfaff, William, *The Wrath of Nations*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.

Select Bibliography

- Poulton, Hugh, *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991.
- Premdas, Ralph R., S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- Prescott, J. R. V., *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1965.
- Ra'anana, Uri, et al. (eds.), *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Richmond, Anthony, *Immigration and Ethnic Conflict*, London: Macmillan, 1988.
- Rudolph, Joseph Jr, and Robert Thompson (eds.), *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the Western World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar (ed.), *Internal Conflict and Governance*, London: Macmillan, 1992.
- Sen, Amartya, 'Population: Delusion and Reality', *The New York Review of Books*, 22 September 1994.
- Shaw, Malcolm, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Shiels, Frederick L. (ed.), *Ethnic Separatism and World Politics*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984.
- Smith, Anthony, 'Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15, no. 3, July 1992.
- Sowell, Thomas, *The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective*, New York: W. Morrow, 1983.
- Waring, Marilyn, *If Women Counted*, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988.
- Warwick, Donald P., 'The Politics and Ethics of Field Research', in Martin Bulmer and Donald P. Warwick (eds.), *Social Research in Developing Countries*, Chichester: John Wiley, 1983.
- Weiner, Myron, and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, *India's Preferential Policies: Migrants, The Middle Classes and Ethnic Equality*, University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- World Bank, *World Development Report 1993*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Wriggins, W. Howard, and James F. Guyot, 'Demographic Change and Politics', in W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, *Population, Politics and the Future of Southern Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- Wright Jr., Theodore P., 'The Ethnic Numbers Game in India: Hindu-Muslim Conflicts Over Conversion, Family Planning, Migration and the Census' in William C. McCready (ed.), *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, New York: Academic Press, 1983.
- Wyzan, Michael, 'Ethnic Relations and the New Economic Policy in Malaysia', in Michael Wyzan (ed.), *The Political Economy of Ethnic Discrimination and Affirmative Action*, New York: Praeger, 1990.
- Zametica, John, 'The Yugoslav Conflict', *Adelphi*, Paper 270 (Summer 1992).
- Zarkovich, S. S., *Quality of Statistical Data*, Rome: FAO of the United Nations, 1966.
- Zenner, Walter P., *Minorities in the Middle*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Index

- Abkhazia 131
Afghanistan 114, 122–3, 135
Africa 1, 4, 22, 81, 163, 174–5
Albania 76, 245–6, 257; Albanian Albanians 6; Democratic People's Party 51, 70, 73 ethnic demands and 29; Ghegs 6, 60, 76, 111; Greeks living in 61, 129, 165; Party of Democratic Prosperity 51, 70, 73; problem over language 111; shut primary schools that teach in Greek 112; Tosks 6, 60, 76, 111; wants northern Albanians to settle in south 127
Albanians 8, 19, 55, 60, 147
Albanians of Kosovo 19, 48, 52, 62, 82, 155, 165
Alonso, William 17, 50, 56, 80
Angola 135, 152
anti-measles vaccinations, problems in giving 93, 102
apartheid system 83, 107, 175
Armenia 117, 132, 152
Ashanti, economic power 25
Asia 1, 4, 13, 81
Assam 35–6, 48, 55, 74, 233 assimilation 105–6; citizenship and 116–17, 120; definitions of 106–7; demographic engineering and 33, 38; religious conversions 113–15; *see also* coerced assimilation and methods of assimilation
Association of Unrecognized States (1994) 158
Australia 239
Austrian Constitution (1876) 19
Austro-Hungarian census (1879) 197
Azerbaijan, divided by Armenia 152

Baaklini, Abdo I. 11, 32, 69
Balkan crisis, financial help for hosts of refugees 139
Balkans: census politicization 48, 71; conversion to Islam during Ottoman Empire 114; ethnicity and 1, 6–7; in- migration and titular majority 128; irredentist sentiment because of ethnic spillage 154
Bangladesh 81, 93–4, 123, 127, 161
Barth, Fredrik 5, 32
Bedouins, multiple nationality 54
Belgium 72, 86, 113, 210
Bengalis 55, 74
Berlin Conference (1885) 159
Bharatiya Janata party (India) 90, 115
Bhutan, repression of Nepali-speaking minority 133
birth and death rates, data on 95–7
Boggs, S. Whittemore 149, 163–4
Bogosavljevic, Srdjan 48
Bosnia: Clinton's policy in 13; demographic statistics of 48; identity equated with Muslim identity 200; *jihad* and 114; religiously/ethnically heterogeneous area 197, 217; rise in Islamic teaching in schools 112; Russian resettlement in Serbian territories of 128; Serbs striving for independence 52
Bosnia-Herzegovina 250; changes in population 197; demographic engineering 4; integrity of borders 157; inter-ethnic rapes 134; role of religion 113, 198; secession of 148, 161; Serbs in 154
Bosnian Croats 6, 59, 196, 198, 202
Bosnian Muslims 6, 59, 199, 202
Bosnian Serbs 6, 59, 196, 199
boundaries: boundary conflicts and 148–50; ethnic groups and 28–9
boundary alterations: demographic change through 147–8; demographic engineering and 33–4, 38–41; negotiation and 159–61; post-war peace negotiations 162–4; secessionist and irredentist activity 150–1; war and 161–2
'brain drain' 122, 138, 140
'brain gain' 138

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- Brandenburg (East Germany), payment for new babies 86
Bras, Paul R. 4–5, 9, 11, 30–1, 205
Brazil 81, 83, 88, 164
Brazilian Association of Doctors of the State of Guanabara 93
Breuilly, John 10, 12, 206
Buddhism 113
Bulgaria 250; birth rate 81; classification of Bulgarians 6; expulsion of Turks despite labor shortage 189; Gypsy migrants and 128; negation of Macedonians 60; size of Turkish population in 48; Turks and language (1970s) 112, 174; Vlachs and Pomak Turks dispersed across 129
Bulgarian census (1992) 48, 54, 56, 61, 63, 72
Bulgarians 6

Cambodia 123, 135
Canada 2, 83, 113, 152, 157, 208
Casamance (Senegal), centralized unitary region 213
Catholic Church 88
census: conflicts; inter-ethnic and 49–50; environment of 50–1; goal of 51–3; goals of respondents 54–6; politicization, cases of 64–71
census specifications: conflict, sources of 56; definition 56–62; definition of administrative boundaries 62; definition of language and script 62–4
centralized unitary regions 213
Chechnya 19, 35, 37, 123, 243
China 12, 25, 115, 208, 236–7
Christian Churches, conversion and 114–15
class, ethnicity 11
Clinton, President Bill 13
coerced assimilation 110; discouragement of non-official languages 112–13; linguistic conversions 110–11; prohibition of minority language 111–12
coerced departures 133
Cold War, end of 13
Colombia, curtailment of population growth 93–4
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 126, 241, 256
communism, secessionist movements and 14
confederation, definition 29
Congress of Berlin, statistics on Armenians in Ottoman regions 52
Connor, Walter 5, 8–9, 153, 165, 206, 212
'consociational solution' 204

Constitution of Yugoslavia (1992) 156
Contact Group 202
Corsica 213, 222
cost benefit analysis: individuals 138; population transfers and 137–8; receiving regions and 138–40
Croatia 247–8, 257; assimilation efforts 4; census and 72; conversions to Roman Catholic religion and 114; costs of inflow of refugees 140; dilution of Istria by Croat refugees from Slavonia 126; evidence of ethnic cleansing of Muslims and 131; finance from USA and Germany for refugees 138–9; integrity of borders 157; Istria region has grievance against 24; Jewish emigration during World War II 124; laws to increase births 91, 198; prohibition of Cyrillic script 64; refugees from Serbia and Banja Luka to be resettled in Western Slavonia 128; spending on refugees 139; higher taxes for non-Croats 183; women to stay at home 85
Cuba 123
cultural cleansing 135
cultural pluralism, definition 106–7
Cyprus 158, 162, 250–1, 258
Czechoslovakia 58, 116, 210

Dayton Peace Accord 196
death rates, inter-ethnic differentials and 94
Declaration of Independence (1948) for Jews 175
demands on political system, size and 18–20
demise of communist ideology, constructive and destructive nationalism and 12
Democratic People's Party (Albania) 51, 70, 73
demographic change, 171–3; direct economic inducements to 173–5; indirect economic inducements to 175–6
demographic engineering: economic pressures and 3, 34, 38; ethnic cleansing and 130; political characteristics 41; pronatalist policies 33, 38; relationship to ethnic dominance 42; size of ethnic population and 204
demographic engineering in Bosnia 195–7; assimilation 199–200; boundary changes 201–3; demographic statistics 197–8; economic pressures 203; population movements 200; pronatalist policies 198–9

Index

- Demographic Engineering Index (DEI) 18, 38–41
demographic engineering policies 2–4, 18, 32–4
demographic statistics 47–9; source of conflict 49–50
demographic struggle for power 2, 14, 17, 34–42, 215
dispute over resource development, boundaries and 150
- East Germany, negative population growth 81
East Timor 35–6; highly centralized unitary state 208, 213; Indonesian immigrants 126; mass killings and evictions by Indonesian government 132; self-determination and 155; stimulated economic development 184; unsuccessful attempt at secession 161
- Eastern Europe: cleansed their states of Germans 124, 130; Czechs deny citizenship to Gypsies 116; economic insecurity in 13; fear and census responses 55; Hitler's government and refugees 123; Roma (Gypsies) and power 27, 44; self-determination in 156; women in transition from communism to capitalism 92, 97–8
- EC, list of conditions for international recognition 158–9
- economic development: demographic engineering and 41; ethical and racial conflict and 30–1; GDP per capita and 36–7
- economic insecurity (1990s) 12–13
- economic pressures, demographic engineering and 34, 38
- economic rewards, size and 21–2
- Economist, The* 70, 131, 135, 241
- Egypt 83, 89
- El Salvador 123, 132, 187
- engineered demographic change, political economy of 193–5
- Enloe, Cynthia 79, 83, 97, 134
- Eritrea 148, 161, 187
- Esman, Milton J. 5, 30
- Estonia 81, 112, 117, 156, 181–2
- Ethiopia 22, 208, 211–12
- ethnic cleansing 4, 122–3, 125, 129–33
- ethnic conflict, 'social mobilization' and 30
- ethnic consolidation 122, 125, 128–9
- ethnic dilution 122, 125–7
- ethnic discrimination 3
- Ethnic Dominance Index (EDI) 35, 39, 40
- ethnic group(s): definitions 5–6; economic differentiation by 26; importance of population size 48–9; inequality and 23; manipulation of demographic characteristics 2; merging groups to increase size 59–60; methods for population augmentation 193; nation and 7; negation of distinctiveness 60–2; spatially concentrated or dispersed 28–9, 45; subdivision to decrease size 57–9
- ethnic nationalism 9
- ethnic parties, size of ethnic group and 20
- ethnic and regional boundaries coincide, ethnic group concentrated in region 24
- ethnic size: dynamic 204; political and economic power 3, 194; productive inputs on a territory 22
- ethnicity 1, 11–12, 14, 155–9, 195
- ethno-nationalism 9
- Europe 4, 13
- fear of fertility 80–3
- Federal Statistical Office (Yugoslavia) 54, 69
- federation, definition 29, 35
- Federation of Islamic Countries Medical Organizations 89
- Fiji 83, 176–7
- Florida (South), Cuban migrants 127, 138
- former Soviet Union: adoption of children by westerners 90; censuses and 64; denial of citizenship in Russian diaspora 116; economic insecurity and 13; ethnicity and 1, 4; fear and census responses 55; potential border disputes 153–4; reveled in size 12; self-determination for new states but unrecognized 158; women in transition from socialism to capitalism 92
- former Yugoslavia 7; Bosnian Muslims and census 59; censuses and 64, 71; Croats and Serbs want to increase their numbers 59; demographic struggle for power 194; displaced persons in 122, 139; ethnic and administrative borders did not coincide 214–15; eviction of targeted ethnic groups 178; genocide of Muslims by Serbs (1990s) 137; harassment to induce departure 134; highly decentralized federation 208; inconsistency over self-determination 155, 157; Macedonians and 60; maternity leave and pay 85; permissive language policy 19, 112–13; regional

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- decentralization, *de facto* confederation 212–13; Yugoslavs and Slavic Muslims 58–9; work pattern of Serbs in 25, 44
- France: Basque provinces and 147, 164; Catholic church and birth control 88; Corsica and secession 151; Corsica and special status 208; Maghrebis minority and language 8, 113; nationalism in nineteenth century 10; parental allowance for children 86; prohibition of Breton language 111; restrictive language policy 113
- Francis, E.K. 9, 19, 115
- Friedlander, Robert A. 209
- functional dispute, boundaries and 150
- gastarbeiter* 108, 118
- Gellner, E. 6, 31
- Geneva convention (1949) 126
- Geneva Convention on Genocide 194
- genocide 135–7
- Georgians (Russia) 131, 151
- Germany 251–2; economic difficulties 13; economic migrants and 122; Jewish emigration during World War II 124; national unification (1871) 9; negation of *gastarbeiter* 108; paid Bulgaria to take Bulgarians 174; paid Romania to take Gypsies 135, 174; Poles as forced labor during wars 182; relocation of Gypsies 128; Sorbs in 19; Turks, economic power of 25; unification of East and West 13, 83, 148
- Ghana 57, 154
- Ghegs 6, 60, 76, 111
- global political insecurity, internal political insecurity 13
- Gordenker, Leon 122, 124
- Great Wall of China 163
- Greco-Turkish war (1922) 124, 177
- Greece: antiquity of 12; census and 72; refugee crisis (1920s) 139; size of Turkish population in 48; statistics of Greeks in Anatolia 52; tax structure to help raise children 86; underestimation of minorities 48
- Grunfeld, A. Tom 236–7
- Guatemala 61–2, 136, 208, 239–4
- guest workers 138–9
- Gurr, Ted Robert 5–6, 8, 25, 106, 114
- Guyana, ethnically biased land policy 22
- Guyot, James F. 17, 47, 71, 80–1
- Gypsies 27, 44, 55, 116, 128, 135, 140, 174, 187
- Habsburg Empire, independence in 10, 58
- harassment to induce departure 134–5
- Hausa 48, 67, 71
- Hawaiians, cleansed from their territory 133
- Hechter, Michael 6, 31
- Hendre, S.L. 79, 82, 90
- Holocaust 130, 136
- Horowitz, Donald 5; boundaries 151; census 50, 71; ethnicity 20, 22, 25, 27; inter-ethnic conflict 204–5, 214; language 105, 110; preferential policies 171, 179, 188; ranked and unranked societies 11
- Hroch, Miroslav 9, 111
- Hungary 13, 85, 88, 92, 147, 154
- Hussein, Adel 89, 93
- Ibo 48, 67, 151
- independence 9
- India: anti-colonial nationalism 10; Bengalis and Assamese and language 55; census to increase Hindu count 59; demographic struggles 2, 29; economic pressures 4; federation along ethnic lines 210–11; Freedom of Religion Bill (1970s) 115; government positions for Telanganas in Andhra Pradesh 180; guesses population between census 48; high birth rate among Muslims 82; Kerala, discrimination against people from 181; limited decentralization of federation 208; negation of language differences 63; neglect of Hill Tribe regions 184; occupation of Goa 162; partition displaced Muslims and Hindus 123; plurality of official languages 113; politicization of census 64–5; population growth among Hindus and Muslims 89–90, 98; retention of English language 109; Sikhs and census 48; special status of Kashmir 208; untouchables and Buddhism 60; upward mobility in census classification 56; ways of changing numerical ratio 32; *see also* Kashmir
- Indo-China, Chinese population movements and war 124–5
- Indonesia 83, 93–4, 176, 179, 234–5
- inequality among ethnic groups and regions 23–4
- ‘initial census’ definition 64
- integration and assimilation, definitions 106–7
- integrity of borders, application of 157
- inter-ethnic differentials, death rates and 94

Index

- inter-ethnic political competition 21, 30–1
inter-ethnic turmoil, decennial census
enumerations and 47
'inter-ethnic war of numbers' 1–2, 14
internal colonialism 106
International Labor Organization 7
international recognition, conditions for
granting 158
International Red Cross, budget for
displaced people 139
involuntary migrations 123–5
Iran 108, 114–15, 147
Iran–Iraq war, Halabja, Kurds gassed 133
Iraq 231–2; claims on Kuwait 162, 164;
draining of Shiite marshes 172, 186;
germ warfare against Kurds 94; Kurds in
147, 155; Kuwait invasion sent
Palestinians out of Persian Gulf 123;
refused new census 72; religion and
political favors 22
irredentism, definition 148, 151, 154–5
Islam 89, 113–14, 117, 174, 203
Islamic Declaration 89
Israel 229–30; aim to unite dispersed
peoples 148; Arab population and
growth rate 82; Arabs in tightly
regulated labor market 180; dilution of
population in Gaza Strip and West Bank
126–8; in-vitro fertilization and 89; Law
of Return 116; Palestinian rights on
West Bank 152; slower promotion for
Arabs 182; special status of Jews 175; tax
from Palestinian workers to be sent back
to Palestine 183; unskilled labor in 25,
44; *see also* Jews
Italy 252, 258; abortion illegal 84; antiquity
of 12; birth control 88; boundary
dispute with Austria 149; economic
emigration to America 123; highly
centralized unitary state 208;
immigrants from Africa and 128;
Italianization of Germanic population in
Alto Adige (1922) 111–12; Jews as
minority people in 8; Lombardy and
grievance against the union 24, 153, 188,
208; money for birth under Mussolini
79; multiethnic party systems 20;
national unification 9, 58; negative
population growth 81, 99
Japan, economic difficulties 13
Jews: emigration from Germany during
World War II 124; expelled throughout
Europe and history 130; Law of Return
and 116; pronatalist policy 79; religious
law on contraception 88–9; size and
power before creation of Israel 27;
various classifications of 57
jihad 25
Karen 113, 161
Kashmir 19, 48, 113, 128, 154, 164–5, 188
Kellas, James 5, 7, 9, 11, 31, 204
Kennedy, Paul 82, 98
Kenya 20, 25, 27, 44, 50, 82
Kindergeld (West Germany), monthly
allowance for child rearing 86
Klinov, Ruth 175, 180, 182
Kontinent (Bulgarian newspaper) 61
Koran, natality and 89
Kosovo 246–7; Albanian textbooks cheaper
than Serbian 185; Albanians as special 6;
Albanianization of employment 181;
census participation and 48, 54; refusal
to sell land to Serbs 177; separatist
movement 24; special status
decentralization 213, 222
Kuper, Leo 115, 125
Kurdistan 151, 208
Kurds 94, 133, 147, 151, 155, 208
labor issues: development projects 184–5;
employment restrictions 179–80; ethnic
differentiation in promotion 182; ethnic
discrimination in education and training
185; ethnic discrimination in hiring
180–1; forced labor of selected ethnic
groups 182–3; legalized wage
discrimination 181; linguistic
restrictions in employment 181–2;
manipulation of natural resources
186–7; selective consumer rights 187;
selective tax policy 183–4; selective use
of prices 186
landmines 135
languages, census and negation of
differences between 63
Latvia 117, 156, 172, 177, 243–4
Lebanon, 229; census problems 66, 68–9;
demographic struggles 2, 21, 66, 204;
genocidal massacres 136; Muslim
population growth rate 82; no census
since 1932 72, 78; power of Maronite
Christians 27
Libya, population growth rates 82
Lijphart, Arend 30, 204–5
Lisbon Accord (1992) 201
Lithuania 116, 152, 188

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- losing regions 140–1
loyalty, state and 8
Luxembourg, maternity leave and benefits 85–6
- Macedonia 248–9; boycott of census by Albanians in 48, 54, 69; Bulgarian language prohibited 111, 119; census (1994) 51, 53, 66, 69–71, 73; constitution (1991) 156; economic exploitation 188; fears of Albanians about census 53, 71; language classification of Macedonians 6; pro-Bulgarian Party for Human Rights and census 70; Turkish language schools torn down 112
- McGarry, John 130, 193
- McIntosh, C. Alison 17, 79
- Malawi, whites leave 124
- Malaysia 237–8; ethnically biased education policy 22, 175, 185; New Economic Policy 179–80; population movements 125, 133; price preferences for Malay construction firms 186; work, ethnic patterns in 25, 44
- Mariel boatlift 127
- Mauritius, census (1978), unpublished 72, 78
- medieval Europe 25, 26
- Messina, Anthony 8, 30
- methods of assimilation, 107–8; education 108–9; institutions 109; language 109; negation of existence of minorities 108; symbols 109
- Mexican–American war (1848) 159
- Mexico, USA fears of fertility in 83
- Middle East 25, 82, 116, 122, 164, 177
- minority ethnic group 8, 25
- Moldova 240–1, 256; law (1989) replacing Russian with Romanian language 112, 181–2; nationalism in 10; Romanians in want to join Romania 155; Russian language removed from workplace 181–2; secessionist movement 151
- Montenegrins, census and 58, 75
- Moravia, swimming pools and restaurants out of bounds for Gypsies 187
- Morocco, claims on Algerian territory 154
- Mozambique 124, 135
- multi-party systems, class lines and 20
- multiethnic states, *modus vivendi* of 165–6
- Myanmar 48, 113, 161, 182–3, 238
- Nagorno-Karabakh 161
- natality and family planning 86–8; ethnic leaders and 90–2; religious leaders and 88–90; Third World leaders and 92–4
- nation, definitions 7–8, 165
- nation-state 7–9, 165
- ‘national awakening’ 9
- National Corporation (Malaysia) 179
- National Statistics Bureau (Macedonia), census and 70
- National Trust for Indigenous People (Malaysia) 179
- national unification 9
- nationalism 7–8, 10–12
- New York Times* 121
- Nigeria 225; census (1962–63) 4, 66, 67–8, 71; civil war 68; ethnic and administrative boundaries do not coincide 213–14; ethnic party system 20, 29, 35–6; Ibo and Hausa are secessionists 151; ‘Northernization’ and 176, 180; politicization of population census 48; statistics and ethnic sizes 18, 20
- North Africa 4, 54
- North Ossetia: ethnic cleansing in 123; irredentism 154, 165
- Northern Ireland 25, 113, 254
- O’Leary, Brendan 130, 193
- Olugbemi, Stephen O. 20, 67
- Osimo Treaty 161
- Ottoman Empire: Christians and Jews restricted in owning property 177; converts to Islam rewarded 117, 174, 203; economic conversion 4; *harrāj* collected from non-Muslims 183; independence and 9–10; millet system, religious communities and 26; statistics and subjected peoples 52, 57–8
- Pakistan 63, 77, 89
- Palestinians 25, 114, 122, 125, 142
- Papua New Guinea 235–6; special status of Bougainville 208, 213, 222–3; sporadic violence in Bougainville over secession 162
- Paris Peace Conference (1918) 162
- ‘Partners in Population and Development: A South South Initiative’ (planning program) 94
- payment for expulsion 135
- Peace Conference in Geneva 201
- Peace Conference in Versailles 52
- Peace of Paris (1914) 163
- Peace of Westphalia (1648) 159
- Persian Gulf War, ethnic and class rapes 134
- Peterson, William 55, 57

Index

- Philippines 20, 93, 179
Poland: abortion outlawed (1993) 84, 88; birth rate 81; cut backs in day care 85; definitions in censuses 58; dilution by Germans 126; economic insecurity 13; Jewish emigration during World War II 124
political engineering, definition 207
political reshuffling on world scene (1990s) 13
Pomaks 6, 129
population measurement, demographic engineering and 32–3, 38
population movements 121–3
population size and power in 1990s, background 12–14
population transfers: cost benefit analysis of 137–8; demographic engineering and 33, 38
Portugal 86, 160
positional disputes, boundaries and 149–50
post-cold war, inter-ethnic conflicts 2
post-communist world, methods of demographic engineering 32–4
post-World War II involuntary migrations 124
Prescott, J.R.V. 147, 149, 159
Project Camelot 93
pronatalist policies 79–80, 83–4; children and employment 85; demographic engineering and 33, 38; encouragement 84; financial inducements 85–6; restrictions on birth control and abortion 84
Punjab 19, 48, 62, 161–2, 188, 232–3
Punjabi-speaking Hindus, Hindi-speaking and 55
Quebec 10, 157
Ra'anan, Uri 5, 7, 154
race, ethnicity and 11
Radiane (Indian journal) 89
refugees 122–3, 125, 139, 140
regional preferential treatment, secession and 187–9
'Renewal of the Republic of Croatia' program 91
Renner, Karl 147, 166
Rhodesia, whites leave 124
Roman Catholic doctrine, pronatalist 88
Romania 244–5; abortion outlawed (1966) 84; birth rate 81; demands of minorities not location-specific 206; demographic struggles 2, 216; discouragement of foreign adoption of children 90; ethnic wage discrimination 181; genocide of Hungarians 136; Gypsies accused of identifying themselves as Hungarians 55; Gypsy migrants and 128; Hungarian forced labor for Black Sea–Danube canal 182; Hungarians dispersed across 129; Hungarians want to unite their land with Hungary 151; prohibition of birth control 80; sold exit visas to Jews 175; statistics and ethnic sizes 18; Transylvania has special status in 208; underestimation of minorities 48; unitary state and ethnic demands 29
Roucek, Joseph S. 147, 166, 248
Russia: Armenians and Russian citizenship 117; communist revolution and refugees 123; decrease of Western sects allowed in 115; foreign adoptions of children and 90; Kazakhstan bureaucracy 22; Kazakhstan, problems over land ownership 178, 191; nationhood and the tsars 58; population growth 81; proposal to relocate Russians in Siberia 126; Russians living outside boundaries of 147; statistics and Bulgarians 52; women to stay at home 85
Russian Orthodox Church, abortion and 90
Rwanda 36, 226–7; genocide among Hutu and Tutsi peoples 94, 136, 145; harassment to induce departure 134
San Stefano Treaty 52
Sarajevo, birth boom since 1992 91, 199
Saudi Arabia 53, 72, 174
Scotland 10, 213, 221
secession, aspects of 151; definitions 148, 151; ethnicity and 153–4; territory and 152–3
Security Council 13
selective regulations pertaining to property ownership: capital and business 178–9; housing 178; labor issues 179–87; land 176–9
self-determination, ethnicity and 14, 155–9
separatist movements 24–5
SEPP (Size of an Ethnic Population and its Power) 17–18; coincidence of economic and political power 25–6; ethnic heterogeneity and 28–9; exceptions to 26–7; level of economic development 30–1; political system and 29–30; and no universal suffrage 26; severing the link

The Demographic Struggle for Power

- between 203–8; size and economic power 21–5; size and political power 18–21; when ethnic and administrative boundaries coincide 208–9; when ethnic and administrative boundaries do not coincide 213–15
- Serbia 82, 140–52, 147
- Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (1994) 91
- Serbs 6; alarm at falling birth rate 91; census and 72; expelled from Herzegovina and western Slavonia 130; minority in Kosovo 8, 174; national unification across Yugoslavia 10; spread over the Balkans 154
- Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic cleansing and 130
- Shaw, Malcolm 160–1
- Shiels, Frederick L. 9, 153
- Singapore 80, 109
- size: ‘critical mass’ and 17; demands on political system and 18–19, 22; demographic engineering and 27; economic rewards and 21–2
- size of ethnic population and power *see* SEPP
- slavery 4, 174–5
- Slovenia 2, 10, 24, 148, 155–6, 160, 188
- Smith, Anthony 5–8, 11, 164
- social integration, definition 106
- Somalia 13, 123, 135, 154, 158
- Somaliland (1995), West not recognized 158
- Sorbs 19
- South Africa 228–9; Afrikaans for black South Africans 110; best occupations reserved for whites 180; blacks only allowed housing in homelands 178; blacks removed from their land 131, 173; Boer population movements 125; considering English as official language 109; discriminating tax from Asians 183; employment restrictions on blacks 172; Land Act (1913) 176; no universal suffrage 26; passes for blacks to restrict mobility 178; population growth of black people 82; possibility of referendum for white Afrikaners 158; special tariff protections for employing whites 186; wage discrimination 181
- South America 4, 57, 93, 102, 164
- South Korea, assimilation through education 108–9
- South Ossetians, unification with North Ossetian Autonomous Region 151, 165
- South-East Asia, Chinese as moneylenders 25
- Soviet Union: borders of Baltic states determined peacefully 160; collapse of 13; emigration of Jews from 122–3; famine affecting Ukrainian peasants 187; forced resettlement of Cossacks in Stalin era 123; Germans leave after World War II 124; Heroine award for women with more than five children 79–80; Muslims and birth rate 82; population movements after breakup 124; Russification of schools 110; self-determination in 156; Stalin resettled entire nationalities 130, 182; *see also* former Soviet Union
- Spain 209–10, 252–4; abortion illegal 84; Autonomous Community system (1978) 209; Basques as minority people 8, 147, 164; Catalans in 19; expulsion of Jews and Moors 4; forbids referendum on secession of its regions 158; Jews converted or were banished 114; language policy 113; long-standing borders 160; separatist movement in Catalonia 19, 24
- ‘special status’ 29, 35, 41–2, 213
- Sri Lanka 234; denial of development projects to undesirables 189; discrimination against Tamil areas 184; Donoughmore Constitution (1931) 180; ethnic party systems 20; highly centralized unitary state 208; irredentism in 154; role of religion 113; Sinhala as official language (after 1956) 112, 181; Sinhalese admitted to universities with lower grades 185; Tamils desires irredentist but later secessionist 151; tax incentives for Sinhalese regions 183
- Starr, William 17, 50, 56, 80
- state, definition 165
- state, the, loyalty and nationalism 8
- states, multi-ethnic character 8
- Sudan 225–6; accepted Eritreans 123; census (1955), unclear boundaries and 62; economic power of Palestinians in 25; ethnic party systems 20; highly centralized unitary state 208, 213; Nuba and genocide 136; Passports and Permits Ordinance (1922) 178; population growth rate 82; Southern 208, 213, 223; southern regions receive less investment than the north 185
- Switzerland 18, 138–9, 157, 160, 174