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Contextualising 'Turkification': nation-building in the late Ottoman Empire, 1908–18*

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ABSTRACT. This article offers an analytical framework for understanding the peculiarities of the Ottoman Empire's nationality policies in the second constitutional period (1908–18). It will examine the extent to which the nationality policies of the Young Turks can be perceived as a nation-building project, and question whether it is reasonable to apply the term 'Turkification' to these policies. The primary goal of the paper in this context is to identify how and to what degree a nationalist outlook shaped imperial polices of the late Ottoman Empire. Engaging in a critical dialogue with the existing historiography, the article argues that 'Turkification' should be conceptualised solely as a project of nation-building in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. It was only one of the policies employed by the imperial elite and it coexisted with other imperial policies ranging from centralisation to decentralisation, assimilation to dissimilation and integration to homogenisation. The paper concludes by contending that only by contextualising and understanding this complexity and only by taking geographical variations into account can the peculiarity of 'Turkification' be grasped.

Introduction

The main purpose of this article is to offer an analytical framework for understanding the peculiarities of the Ottoman Empire's nationality policies in the second constitutional period (1908–18), which can be identified with the indirect and direct rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP), also known as 'Young Turks'. Within the framework of this broad research agenda, the article aims to take up a contextual analysis of the implementation of 'Turkification' and nationalisation, as well as of the centralisation policies of the

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Young Turks with particular emphasis on the existence or non-existence of the influence of a nationalist outlook on these policies.

To be more specific, this article will examine the extent to which the nationality policies of the Young Turks can be perceived as a nation-building project. As a corollary question, it will explore whether it is reasonable to apply the term 'Turkification' to these policies. Most importantly, to what degree did the nationalist outlook shape the nationality policies in the Ottoman Empire in the second constitutional period?

In addressing these research questions, my primary concern is to develop an analytical standpoint through which the problems of the historiography dealing with the *problematique* of 'Turkification' are re-evaluated. In this respect, two major positions in the existing historiography can be identified, perhaps with some degree of simplification.

The first position concerns the overextension of the meaning of 'Turkification'. The term is applied to depict sundry centralising measures with slight consideration given to how the nationalist outlook influenced these measures. Broad ranges of policies from administrative integration (Haddad 1994) to economic nationalisation (Toprak 1982) and cultural assimilation (Dündar 2001) are designated under the banner of 'Turkification'. A clear illustration of this viewpoint can be found in the argument advanced by Mahmoud Haddad who identifies the centralisation policies of the CUP in the Arab provinces with 'Turkification'. He also claims that 'Turkification' in the education system and administration began to be exercised during the period of Abdülhamid II, especially after 1895. Sina Akşin joins in this tendency when he makes reference to how the 'Turkification' policies of the Young Turks in Albania ignited the revolt of Albanians against Ottoman rule (2001: 308–9). He does not discuss in what sense the policies of the Young Turks differed from the centralisation measures of the nineteenth century, let alone the fact that he does not attempt to specify the meaning of 'Turkification'.

If the overextension of the meaning of 'Turkification' is one end of the spectrum, the other is the categorical denial of the use of the concept for depicting the empire's nationality policies. For example, Shisller asserts that the programme of the Young Turks cannot be considered as a policy of 'Turkification'. Introducing a fruitful argument by pointing to the linkage between nationalism (according to her, ethno-nationalism) and 'Turkification', she gainsays it as a category to conceptualise the programme of the Young Turks, which '. . . had to do with the desire to create a state of formally equal citizens with strong loyalty to the Ottoman State . . .' (2003: 15). In raising this argument, Shisller makes reference to Hasan Kayalı's extensive study (1997) on the relationship between the Young Turks' regime and the Arabs. In this study, Kayalı shows cogently that, rather than Turkism versus Arabism, the character of the tensions between the Young Turks and the Arabs resided in the issue of centralisation versus decentralisation. As will be discussed below, this argument is to a large extent successful in interpreting the character of Young Turks–Arab relations. Nevertheless, he falls into the

trap of generalising the practices implemented in one region as the overall policy of the Young Turks. What I will try to show throughout this study is that this argument is as problematic as the one identifying the centralising measures with 'Turkification'.

The aforementioned double-edged classification inevitably simplifies the complexities of the arguments of each author, not to mention the fact that it by no means represents an exhaustive review of the literature. Nevertheless, it is still safe to argue that the historiography in question is unable to grasp the peculiarities of the nationality policies in the late Ottoman Empire. The problem is not exclusively one of terminological turmoil. It is indeed fully legitimate to come up with a specific definition of 'Turkification' in order to depict various policies related especially to centralisation and unification in the empire. The crucial problem is the inability of the existing historiography to distinguish to what extent a set of policies designated as 'Turkification' was put into the service of nationalism. In other words, the confusion does not arise from the attribution of various meanings to 'Turkification' but the introduction of another variable into the equation, that is, nationalism.

Conceptualising 'Turkification'

What this paper particularly suggests is that the term 'Turkification' ought to be conceptualised as a project of nation-building in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. In other words, it has to be categorised as a specific policy pattern that aimed to construct a national core in the empire. This has two dimensions. The first is the geographical nationalisation of specific areas in order to turn them into a basis wherein the nation-building project would be implemented. This process is to be seen as one of distinguishing the imperial core that has to be transformed into a nation from the periphery of the empire. The second dimension concerns the question of which peoples and communities of the empire are to be included in the empire's core nation. This results in the *assimilation* of some communities and the *dissimilation* of others on the basis of inclusion into or exclusion from the core nation. To put it in a nutshell, the article categorises Turkification as a 'nationalist' project of nation-building but nothing else. It was set in motion in a specific part of the domain of the empire, namely, Anatolia. That is to say, it was a project of nation-building implemented not in the lands of the empire as a whole but in a specific region.

Once put in this way, it is easier to distinguish the project of 'Turkification' from other imperial policies. First of all, it stemmed from the nationalist disposition of the Young Turks but did not necessarily accompany it. As will be discussed in the next section, the idea of establishing Turkish domination in the empire relates to the influence of Turkish nationalism on the mindset of the Young Turks. However, this did not pave the way for territorial and demographic measures of nation-building, that is, Turkification.

Second, Turkification, when implemented, coexisted with other sorts of imperial policies to which the Young Turks resorted. In what they regarded as the periphery of the empire, the Young Turks continued to practice the measures that emerged long before they seized power, that is, centralisation and modernisation conflated with the 'civilising mission' the reforming elites assigned to themselves, and decentralisation to which the Young Turks unwillingly resorted to maintain the unity of the empire. Besides demonstrating how nation-building was put into effect, the article is also concerned with these measures in order to show the various dimensions of the imperial policy on the one hand, and the novelty of the programme of Turkification in Ottoman history on the other.

At this stage, one more important point needs to be emphasised. The programme of Turkification was indeed a novelty that can be attributed to the Young Turks. But the confluence of the centralisation policies with a colonialist attitude towards peripheral subjects was not. The character of this imperial policy has been exposed by recent scholarship on the Hamidian era of the empire. The pioneering works of Selim Deringil (1998 and 2003) and Ussama Makdisi (2002) have revealed the changing character of the interaction between the imperial centre, the peripheral regions and the subjects of the empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. What they have pointed out is that the modernisation efforts in this period were concomitant with the endeavours of the imperial centre to disseminate its values to the peripheries. The reforming elites aimed to civilise the not-yet-*Ottomanised* communities and to bring (or assimilate) them into the value system of the centre. The official ideology of Ottomanism, which emerged as the child of Tanzimat reforms (1839) and which was intermingled with an Islamic discourse during the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), became the ideological justification regarding the *civilising mission* of the Ottoman reformers (Deringil 1998).

It is impossible to depict in detail the transformation of state–subject relations before the second constitutional era due to the limited focus of the article. Suffice it to emphasise that being an integrationist policy intermingled with a colonialist outlook towards the periphery, the policies I have alluded to above had nothing to do with the policy of Turkification if the term is taken as the nationalist goal of nation-building, as this article does. More importantly, this colonial outlook continued to mark the attitudes of the Young Turks towards the subjects of the peripheral regions that were left outside the region wherein a Turkish national core was to be constructed.

In what follows, the policies of the Young Turks will be categorised into two periods. It will be shown that the first period, from 1908 to 1913, witnessed the gradual ascendance of Turkish nationalism. This resulted in the re-interpretation of the principle of Ottomanism in line with the motto that Turkish nationality is the dominant nationality of the empire. However, this did not bring about Turkification. It will then be demonstrated that Turkification began to be implemented in the second period, from 1913 to the end of World War I. By means of settlement and deportation policies, the Young

Turks sought to nationalise Anatolia as the base of a Turkish national core. Throughout the whole discussion, the different measures of centralisation and decentralisation as well as existing condescending attitudes of the Young Turks towards the periphery will be displayed alongside Turkification policies.

From İttihad-ı Anasır to the dominant nationality of the empire, 1908–13

From the beginning of the second constitutional era, Turkish nationalism became publicly more visible compared to the preceding period.[1] Alongside similar trends among the other nationalities of the empire, the ideas related to Turkish nationalism, which had begun to flourish during the second half of the nineteenth century, came to be organised around journals and associations such as *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association), *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens), *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Country) and *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth).

However, when it comes to the influence of Turkish nationalism on the Young Turks' policies, we see that the Ottoman patriotism formulated under the motto of *İttihad-ı Anasır* (unity of different communities in the Empire), rather than Turkish nationalism, gave its colour to their political discourse (Yıldız 2001: 73). Indeed, the spirit of constitutional revolution of 1908 was more Ottomanist than Turkist (Ahmad 1982: 401). At the outset, Young Turks seemed to be devoted to Ottoman patriotism as well, concerned with making Ottomanism viable by including rather than excluding the non-Turk and non-Muslim elements, as opposed to its Islamist interpretation generated by the previous regime of Abdulhamid (Ahmad 1982: 406).

However, the Ottomanist spirit of the second constitutional period started to change in the perception of various nationalities when they confronted the centralising policies put into practice by the CUP. The representatives of the non-Muslim communities now expressed their grievances about the pressures of 'Turkification'. In the re-opened Ottoman Parliament these were consistently rejected by the government. For example, the parliament almost became a battleground between the non-Muslim deputies and the members of the CUP during the discussions on the Law of Associations. Non-Muslim deputies criticised the government, pointing to the pressures of Turkification imposed on the non-Muslim population.[2] In another case, *Levand Herald*, *Proodos* and *Telogos*, the Greek newspapers that were published in the Ottoman domains, were brought onto the agenda of the parliament due to their castigation of the Ottoman government for resorting to Turkification policies. But the government, as usual, rejected this claim and harshly criticised these newspapers for their 'seditious' actions.[3] It is also noteworthy that the Arab deputies disparaged the government with similar concerns as well. For example, Mustafa Efendi, the deputy of Hamas, implied this concern, pointing out that the government did not take into account the regional differences as could be seen from the appointment of only Turkish speaking officials to Hicaz, Basra, Yemen and Trablus.[4]

Accordingly, from the very first years of the second constitutional period, the Ottoman governments were accused of Turkification by various nationalities. However, the validity of those charges is open to discussion. Even in the period preceding the constitutional revolution, similar sorts of accusations were made. Although the state had endeavoured to Ottomanise its subjects, the non-Turkish communities had sporadically decried state policies as a Turkification process in the guise of growing centralisation running through the domains of the empire (Hanioğlu 2002: 86).

As a matter of fact, what stirred up the condemnation of Turkification in the first years of the constitutional period were the same kind of reactions raised against the centralisation policies. Added to this was the Young Turks' aggressive interpretation of Ottomanism. Their brand of Ottomanism was distinguished by the increasing stress on the formula that Turks were the dominant nation of the Empire (Hanioğlu 2001: 295–302). Before and after the constitutional revolution, the journals close to the CUP made many appeals on this issue, insisting that other nationalities should fall into line behind the dominant nation of the Turks. Before the Balkan Wars, even the most important ideologues of Turkish nationalism, such as Ziya Gökalp, had promulgated their adherence to Ottomanism, shaped around the dominant position given to the Turkish nationality (Arai 2003: 92–103, 145–7). Only a relatively marginal group of Turkish nationalists, composed mainly of Tatar-Turkish immigrants from Russia, like Yusuf Akçura, repudiated Ottomanism in favour of the pan-Turkist project.[5]

Hence if there was one shift in the implementation of the centralisation policies between 1908 and 1913, it stemmed from this understanding of Ottomanism. The Young Turks longed to assert their imperial sovereignty over Ottoman domains. For this reason, they regarded as intolerable any kind of obstacle to this aim, from local privileges to the existence of foreign influence. They endeavoured to impose the initiative of the centre to an unprecedented degree.

Also seen as an obstacle were the ethnic and cultural privileges of the diverse nationalities that had to be levelled. This was to be achieved by continuing the policy of Ottomanisation that had been rooted in Islamist interpretation of the idea of Ottomanism. However, Young Turks carried this one step further and sought to make the Turks the predominant nationality in the cultural, economic and political spheres.

In fact, more than Turkification, tensions between the government (which was controlled by the CUP)[6] and the representatives of non-Turkish – particularly the non-Muslim communities – resided in this interpretation of Ottomanism. The latter longed to see Ottomanism as an umbrella identity in which they indisputably prospered in economic, political and cultural terms. According to Hristo Dalçef Efendi, for example, 'that an Ottoman's being Bulgarian, Arab or Turkish is not an obstacle to the union. If there is only one thing that leads us to unity and coming together, it is our common interests'.[7] In the view of the state, however, Ottomanism had a completely different

meaning, which was lucidly expressed by the Grand Vizier İbrahim Hakkı Pasha in the Ottoman Assembly.

> Coming to the point of citizen, learning Turkish has greatest importance in that case too. Since, a person who does not know Turkish will be deprived of some rights [*hukuk*]. For example, he will not be able to be deputy. But there is one more important thing. What is it? Citizens should be of the same opinion on the matters that are connected to the life of the state. Namely, they should interpret and view the future of the state in the same manner and they should posses the same sentiment. This is absolutely the objective that the Government and Kanun-i Esasi are looking for. The homogeneity of education and culture (terbiye) is desired.[8]

The promulgation and the implementation of the Law on Associations most clearly demonstrated this approach. Issued on 23 August 1909, this law prohibited the opening of political associations that were based on racial and national distinctions (Ahmad 1995: 85). As mentioned earlier, the negotiations on this law met with harsh criticisms, condemning the government for applying Turkification by promulgating this law.

However, the primary goal of the law in question was by no means the cultural assimilation of sundry communities into Turkishness. Above all, it aimed to prevent the evolution of ethnic awareness of the nationalities into political programmes. For example, a Jewish association, *Histadorot Çivinit Otomanit*, which was founded in order to disseminate Hebrew language-history and to facilitate the settlement of Jews in Palestine, was forced to close down. Relying on the Law on Associations, the justification for this decision was the claim that this association had political and national objectives.[9] However, a Jewish school, *Hocat Azra ve Sibyan Bağçesi*, 'which was established in order to spread the idea of Zionism could not be closed'.[10] It was decided that this school would continue to educate Jewish children unless its curriculum was found to be against the policy of the state. Similar measures were imposed on the non-Turkish Muslims' associations as well. For example, a club that belonged to the Circassian community, *Çerkez İttihad ve Teavün Cemiyeti* (Circassian Unity and Mutual Assistance Association), was sanctioned, because of its name.[11]

Accordingly, the state policies served more to hinder the flourishing of separatist political programmes among the nationalities, than impose cultural assimilation. This aim becomes clearer when we look at the language policy. The CUP's political programme of 1908 included the clauses which declared the official language of the empire as Turkish. It also decreed that teaching of Turkish in elementary schools should be obligatory.[12]

However, the 1876 constitution had already designated Turkish as the official language of the Ottoman Empire. Neither the clause designating the official language nor any other reference to language in the constitution was modified in 1908, nor thereafter (Kayalı 1997: 91). In addition, the aforementioned clauses of the CUP programme with respect to education by no means indicate an assimilative mentality. First of all, the adoption of Turkish as the medium of elementary education had started before 1908. More

importantly, there is a difference between the teaching of Turkish in elementary education and its adoption as a general language of instruction. The state opted for the former in the aftermath of 1908. The overall educational policy of the second constitutional period, however, allowed the use of local languages as well (*ibid*.: 90–1). This demonstrates that assimilation was not the primary objective. Rather, the integration of the society into the imperial administrative and social system remained the primary purpose.

The policies of the state in terms of language in the constitutional period differed from the earlier era in one respect, which had a lot to do with the formula of dominant nationality. The state in this period was stricter in carrying out the clauses of *Kanun-i Esasi* (the constitution) regarding the official language. It was emphasised very often that the official language of the Empire was Ottoman, which practically meant Turkish. For instance, the non-Muslim communities were warned not to use Greek or Armenian in their official correspondence.[13] Non-Turkish Muslims also took their share of the sensitivity concerning the use of Turkish. The petitions written to the state had to be in Turkish not Arabic. The members of the town councils were to be selected out of Turkish-speaking people for the same reason.[14]

In another case, the government was informed about an Arabic-published newspaper, *el-Arab*, which disseminated the idea that Arabic had been accepted as the official language of the empire. The reaction of the government is an edifying one. It was held that such gossip damaged the idea of Ottomanism and the unity of the empire. Arabic was only allowed as the educational language in Arabic in the Arab provinces. Therefore, *el-Arab* ought to have been officially warned and even closed down if it continued to propagate similar ideas.[15]

Indeed, these examples proved that the state did not attempt to Turkify the non-Turkish communities. More than Turkification, the civilising mission of the state vis-à-vis the peripheries retained its importance in the period at hand. The issue of educating and settling the nomads of the Asian parts of the Empire came very often onto the agenda of the Ottoman Assembly.[16] The Kurdish tribes were especially subject to *ıslahat* (improvement).[17] This was reflected in the practices of the government as well. However, the implementation of the improvement and civilisation of the peripheries made the weakness of the state apparent. One example illustrates the dramatic combination of the condescending attitude towards the periphery and the weak material base of the state to achieve the aim of civilising backward subjects.

The chiefs of the Kurdish *Haydaranlı* and *Zilan* tribes requested from the local branch of central administration the assignment of a teacher for the education of their children. Living in the Patnos region of the Erzurum province, these tribes were so 'backward' and 'illiterate' that they were using the mosque and the school, which had been constructed eighteen years before, as barn and hayloft. The local official considered 'the coming of an illiterate Kurdish Bey [Ali Bey] to a government agency to say that "our emancipation is possible only with education. Since we don't read and know . . . [and] due to

our ignorance, we remained backward from every nation'" to be telling. But the striking point is that the same tribe chiefs also offered to pay the salary of their prospective teacher 'since the government does not currently have a teacher working with a salary'. The local official then asked the central government to create a fund to benefit from this *unexpected* mood of the backward tribes by opening at least some schools in the region.[18]

The government also allowed, even promoted, the opening of private schools for the education of Kurdish tribes. For instance, a school established by a Kurdish association called *Kürt Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Association for Spreading Education) in order to instruct the Kurdish boys, was exempt from taxation.[19]

It should be noted here that the establishment of the Kurdish-based schools was not prevented. On the contrary, the intention of civilising, but not Turkifying, the Kurdish population paved the way for Kurdish education. The association *Kurt Hevi*, for example, applied to the government for permission to establish a school in Istanbul. The purpose of this school was to improve Kurdish literature and language as well as to educate, train and increase the cultural level of the Kurdish subjects. As a result, the government allowed the establishment of the school in Istanbul.[20]

At the same time, the government had to struggle with rival centres for the loyalties of its subjects. Among these were the missionary activities, which had concerned the Hamidian reformers as well (Deringil 1998; Rogan 1999). For example, Protestant missionaries were abundant in Viranşehir seeking to convert the Yezidi population. The government put a large amount of effort into preventing the activities of *Amerikan Misyoner Cemiyeti* (American Missionary Association).[21] Another group was *Meşik Amerikan Misyoner Cemiyeti* (Meşik American Missionary Association), whose activities disturbed the government as well.[22] Apparently, the conversion of Yezidis to Protestantism was seen as detrimental to the goal of ensuring the attachment of the subjects to the empire.

On the whole, what characterised the tension between the state and the nationalities of the empire in this period was centralisation versus decentralisation rather than Turkification. This determined the nature of relations between the state and not only the non-Muslim communities, Armenians and Greeks, but also Arabs, Albanians, Kurds and so on. The growing emphasis of Young Turks on the formulation of a dominant nationality did not pave the way for Turkification.

From dominant nationality to Turkification: the construction of a national core in Anatolia, 1913–18

The breaking point in the thorny relationship between centralisation and nationalisation came when the empire lost significant parts of its territories in the Balkans. The Balkan Wars and the Albanian revolt, which resulted in

independence, were crucial developments in this respect. Precipitated after the CUP seized the monopoly of the empire's administration by a coup d'état in January 1913 (Zürcher 2000: 157), the nationalist project of Turkification was launched in a deliberate manner.

A combination of different factors was influential in leading the Young Turks to the Turkification policies. First of all, the two Balkan Wars led to the loss of Macedonia and Thrace. The end of Ottoman presence in the Balkans left the empire as a conglomerate of today's Anatolia and the Arab provinces. In the face of the fundamental truncation of the empire's territories and its mostly non-Muslim and non-Turk population, the appeal to Turkish domination in the empire became stronger. Above all, the Albanian revolt acted as a catalyst in transforming the already existing Turkish consciousness of the Young Turks into the policies of nationalisation. Albanians played a vital role throughout the history of the empire as reliable soldiers and statesmen (Karpat 2001: 369). More importantly, the Young Turks regarded them merely as a Muslim people with a slightly developed political ideal. They believed that by managing them and exerting pressure they could make them docile Ottomans who would serve as an example to other nationalities (Skendi 1967: 391). Therefore, after Albanian independence, the Young Turks concluded that it was impossible to reconcile different interests and attain a unified empire through an Ottomanist policy (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 289). Thereafter, they saw Turkification as a more reasonable policy option than it had been hitherto.

The Turkification policy implemented by the Young Turks had various dimensions. The nationalisation of the economy by the replacement of non-Muslims with Muslim-Turks constituted one of the most important, gaining impetus after 1914 (Zürcher 2000: 158–9).[23] The national economy was to be led by a Turkish bourgeoisie that would supplant Armenian and Greek commercial classes that had long dominated the trade and financial sectors. Through the Language Reform (1915), for example, the use of foreign languages for economic transactions was prohibited in order to promote the participation of Muslim-Turks in economic activities (Keyder 1995: 90).

More importantly, coupled with the nationalisation of the economy were the attempts at demographic and territorial nationalisation. However, nationalisation or Turkification in this sense was not consistently implemented in all the territories of the empire. Underlying the project of Turkification was the creation of a national core in the empire rather than the overall Turkification of the empire's territories and subjects. Thus the Young Turks employed different measures in the different regions of the empire and for the different communities. These measures embodied a series of policies from cultural assimilation and geographical nationalisation to centralisation and decentralisation. From the broader perspective of imperial polity, the former category of measures brought about the policy of Turkification performed with nationalist objectives while the latter category served the goal of maintaining the unity of the empire and gaining the allegiance of the periphery to the imperial polity.

Ensuring loyalty: decentralisation in the Arab provinces

The Turkification of the Arab provinces was not one of the items on the agenda of the Young Turks. At the time when the Turkification measures were being carried out in Anatolia, as will be investigated below, in the Arab provinces, the Young Turks appealed to Islamic unity under the Caliph. Indeed, this was a position developed as a response to the growing power of the opposition among the Arabs to the centralisation policies of the Ottoman Empire. Until 1913, the majority of Arab leaders in Syria and Egypt called for reform of the provincial administration and greater autonomy for the Arab provinces. In June 1913, the Arab opposition expressed itself explicitly in a congress, which formulated the demands of the Arabs in favour of decentralisation (Thomas 1976: 317). Faced with this reaction, the primary objective of the Young Turk policy vis-à-vis the Arabs was to ensure their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, which had nothing to do with the policy of Turkification. In other words, the aim of CUP rule was to hinder the turn of the Arab decentralisation movement into an Arab nationalism with a separatist programme.

Therefore, besides the ideological accent on Islamic unity, the Young Turk regime made many concessions to the Arabs. Although strong emphasis on centralisation and an aversion to decentralisation characterised the Young Turks' ideological mindset, in practice, they were obliged to take a step back from their distinguishing stance throughout the second constitutional period. Having failed to contain the revolt of Imam Yahya, which was espoused by the Shiite population, a measure of autonomy and financial concessions was given to Yemen in October 1911, in exchange for ending the revolt and declaring loyalty to the Sultan (Kayalı 1997: 81–115). Hence the Arab provinces turned out to be another region that was provided with relative autonomy.

The new General Law on Provincial Administration of 26 March 1913 is notable in this respect for its decentralising devices (Findley 1980: 320–1). Yet its clauses were not confined to Arab provinces but covered the whole empire. As a matter of fact, the pressure for reform imposed on the Porte by the foreign powers was one of the primary reasons for the promulgation of this law. The major goal of this pressure was to convince the Ottoman Empire to give autonomous status to the Armenian cities of Eastern Anatolia. This part of the empire had always been subject to external intervention due to the separatist tendencies of the Armenian population and the conflicts between Kurds and Armenians. The pressure intensified after the revolution of 1908. To counter this pressure, the CUP proposed the overall reformation of the provincial administration in order to avert the autonomy of Eastern Anatolia, which was regarded as a threat to the unity of the empire.[24] To be sure, foreign pressure was not the only reason. The failure of centralisation to retain regions affected by autonomist sentiments became apparent after the Albanian revolt and the subsequent separation of Albania (Kayalı 1997: 130–1). Similar developments would have been highly probable in the Arab regions had the government continued to exercise strict centralisation.

However, the Provincial Law did not satisfy the Arab opposition. It was designed to render local demands for autonomy obsolete by stipulating limited local administration such as the local governance of tax revenues (*ibid.*: 132). Even so, with its dual character embodying simultaneously the elements of central and local administration, the new law also involved many stipulations asserting central control over the locality (Findley 1980: 310). Thus it was not sufficient to placate the tension of the Arab provinces, such as Beirut and Damascus (Kayalı 1997: 130–4). The government, therefore, moved to undertake additional measures in order to come to grips with the Arab opposition. With another decree adopted in April 1913, the use of Arabic in law courts was accepted and it was sanctioned as the medium of instruction in schools. Official communications were also allowed to be conducted in Arabic (*ibid.*: 135–41). It was also resolved that the officials appointed to the Arabic-speaking regions should either belong to the Arab nationality or speak the local language. In some cases, the government provided the officials with six-months-long Arabic courses before they were sent to the region.[25]

Accordingly, ensuring loyalty to the empire was doubtless the major goal in the Arab provinces. But the concessions given to Arabs demonstrate the limits of centralisation policy. Lacking adequate material capacity to impose the authority of the centre, the Young Turks resorted to the delegation of power more than centralisation in the final years of the empire.

Constructing a national core: Turkification in Anatolia

At the time the Arab provinces were provided with relative administrative autonomy and language rights, Anatolia became the very region wherein Turkification policies were implemented. Indeed, the notion of Anatolia as the fatherland of the Turks had emerged long before the CUP rule. The sensitivity with respect to the economic and social welfare of this region voiced in the press during the Hamidian era was gradually transformed into an appeal to its Turkish character before the constitutional revolution (Kushner 1977: 50–5). The drought of 1872 followed by another alerted the Ottomans to the significance of a homeland, of Anatolia, the land on which the empire had been founded. This was followed by the claim that all Anatolians were ethnically of Turkish stock (Göçek 2002: 33).

Before the constitutional revolution, the Young Turks looked on this region in the same way. Symbolised by the name of a Young Turk journal, *Anatolia*, which was issued in Egypt, some branches of Young Turks that espoused Turkism, like the journal of *Şuray-i Ümmet*, incorporated the idea of Anatolia as the homeland of Turks into their hazy ideology.[26] Hence the truncation of Macedonia with the Balkan Wars drew their attention more seriously to the cradle of the empire and its Turkish stock (Dündar 2001: 36–8).

In order to Turkify Anatolia, the Young Turks set in motion numerous measures, besides the economic nationalisation that went with economic

boycotts against non-Muslims. Among these measures was the replacement of the locals' non-Turkish names with Turkish ones (Yıldız 2001: 82). But the most important weapon of Turkification turned out to be the settlement and forced-migration policies. The primary goal that the Young Turks aimed to achieve by means of demographic measures was to purify Anatolia from non-Muslim elements, especially Greeks and Armenians. Having strong national consciousness, they could not be transformed into loyal Ottomans and thus they were subject to the dissimilatory policies of the empire, accentuated especially after the beginning of World War I.

Forced migration and settlement policy

The initial method of purification of Anatolia of non-Muslim elements was the exchange of populations. It was first carried out at the end of 1913 and involved the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Formulated by the treaty of peace that was signed after the second Balkan War on September 29, 1913, the population exchange resulted in the deportation of 48,570 Muslims from the Bulgarian territory and 46,764 Bulgarians from the Ottoman Empire's Thrace region (Ladas 1932: 20).

Having succeeded in exchanging the Bulgarians of Thrace, the CUP government sought to reach a similar agreement with Greece. Its primary goal was to expel the Greek population living in the Aegean coast of Anatolia. On the basis of this consideration, the CUP government proposed an exchange of population in May 1914, similar to the agreement reached with Bulgaria (Mourelos 1985: 393–4). By that time, in order to force the consent of the Greek government to this proposal, the government had already engaged in a systematic persecution of Greeks living in the Aegean coast and Thrace by forcefully driving them to the interior of Anatolia (Psomiades 1968: 61). Four days after the suggestion, the Greek government announced its consent to the exchange of population on a voluntary and simultaneous basis (Ladas 1932: 21–2). But shortly afterwards, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers and the negotiations were suspended before the exchange could be implemented.

What had not been accomplished through the exchange of population was carried out with the policy of forced migration and settlement. The Young Turks initially endeavoured to settle Muslim immigrants in the regions formerly inhabited by non-Muslims in order to fortify Anatolia's Turkish and Muslim composition. After the Balkan Wars and during World War I, approximately 435,000 Muslim immigrants entered the Ottoman domains (Behar 1996: 62). The government sought to settle them in the villages (*karye*) of non-Muslims, especially of Greeks. This policy was sharply criticised by the deputies of non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Assembly. They stated that they respected the attempts of the government to promote the economic activities of Muslims and Turks, which was a reflection of the policy of economic nationalisation. However, these residents beseeched the government

to stop the deliberate settlement of Muslim immigrants in the villages of non-Muslim communities.[27]

The response of the government was, in contrast, to intensify the process of Turkification by resorting to the policy of forced migration. Although small-scale migrations of Greeks and Armenians from Anatolia to Russia had occurred in the nineteenth century, the serious mass exodus of the Christian population began with World War I (Akgündüz 1998: 112). In May 1915, approximately one year after the beginning of World War I, the CUP government passed a law to regulate the relocations of the groups that were considered potential traitors, a method to justify deportations.

Although the actual content of this law did not directly target the Armenians, they were the first group to be expelled (Dündar 2001: 64). This was perhaps one of the most dramatic events of the twentieth century because the Armenian deportation practically resulted in the massacre of thousands of people. Greeks were the other group to be relocated. The government did not issue any special instruction for their relocation. A number of them were transferred to the inner regions of Anatolia and some of them were driven out to Greece. According to the estimation of Stephen Ladas, in 1914, 115,000 Greeks were driven out of Eastern Thrace and sought refuge in Greece; 85,000 Greeks from the same region were deported to the interior of Anatolia; and 150,000 of them were ejected from the coastal region of Western Anatolia and fled to the shores of Greece (Ladas 1932: 16).

On the other hand, the settlement of Muslim immigrants in the regions from where the non-Muslims were deported came to be a significant dimension of the Turkification policy (Dündar 2001: 65). The CUP government also resorted to the *celp* policy, a method that attempted to bring the Muslims living outside Ottoman boundaries to settle in those regions in order to increase the numbers of the Muslim population in strategic regions (*ibid.*: 71–2).

Geographical nationalisation and the assimilation of Muslim communities

Evidently, the nation-building policies of the Young Turks targeted to a certain degree non-Muslims. The nationalisation of economic activities went together with the attempts to exclude the Greek commercial class from the economic sphere. Moreover, having identified them as perfidious elements, the government unleashed the harsh measures aimed at *cleansing* Anatolia from Armenian and Greek populations. In the context of the Ottoman Empire, however, it is still controversial to term these policies as Turkification. In this regard, the position of the Young Turks vis-à-vis the non-Turkish ethnic Muslims is critical in order to appraise whether it was Turkish nationalism that brought about the policy of Turkification.

This position is critical for two reasons. First of all, it is important to distinguish wartime measures from the deliberate policy of nation-building in Anatolia. The deported Greeks and Armenians had inhabited very sensitive regions. Eastern Anatolia where the Armenians lived was crucial in the face of

the Russian expansion during the war. Likewise, the expelled Greeks resided mainly in the western coasts of Anatolia, which were ominously close to Greece's sphere of influence. Seen from this aspect, the relocation of these two communities had strategic importance for Ottoman military goals. Therefore, it is not easy to distinguish whether their deportation was motivated by the nationalist objective of homogenising Anatolia or whether they were purely strategic military acts. Second, leaving aside the military objectives, the deportation of non-Muslim communities and the settlement of Muslims in the regions deserted by them served *Islamisation* more than Turkification of Anatolia. It would have been difficult to term the Young Turks' policies a case of Turkification if only this policy had been carried out.

In this respect, the relationship between the Young Turk regime and the non-Turkish ethnic Muslims is crucial in that it reveals the influence of Turkish consciousness on the practices of the Young Turks. The Turkification measures were not confined to the non-Muslim elements. Rising Turkish nationalism during the Young Turks rule was bound up with increasing sensitivity to the ethnic, religious and linguistic peculiarities of the Muslim subjects. For this reason, the expulsion of the non-Muslims was accompanied by efforts to assimilate the non-Turkish Muslim communities. But the working out of this process was a complicated one. On the one hand, what the Young Turks had inherited from the Hamidian era held its place in their mindset. The condescending attitude continued to characterise the way in which they saw the periphery, that is, the backward and uncivilised parts of the empire. On the other hand, alongside the backwardness that they attributed to the peripheral subject went the objective of Turkifying Anatolia. The combination of these two outlooks resulted in the differential treatment of non-Turkish ethnic Muslims, which had a lot to do with the geographical dimension of Turkification.

The process operated perhaps most smoothly in the case of Balkan immigrants. The influence of assimilation policies found strong reflection in their settlement. The CUP government did not view the newcomers as a homogenous group of people. Different linguistic and ethnic groups were subject to different settlement policies. The major aim of this strategy was to promote their assimilation into Turkish culture on the one hand, and not to allow the clustering of the same ethnic group in the same region on the other.

In the case of Albanian immigrants, for example, the government was keen to place them in areas far away from the Balkans. For this reason, some regions, such as Çatalca, Edirne, İstanbul, İzmir and Karesi, were forbidden to the settlement of Albanian immigrants (Dündar 2001: 114). Furthermore, the government sought to scatter them among the Turkish population of Anatolia in accordance with their assimilatory goals (*ibid.*: 114–16). Similar measures were taken for the settlement of Bosnian immigrants. There was no regional restriction for them. But facilitating their assimilation into Turkish culture was the major concern of the government (*ibid.*: 124). For the settlement of both Albanian and Bosnian immigrants, the government resorted to a provision according to which, in a region, the total number of

the immigrants should be below ten per cent of the total Turkish inhabitants (Ağanoğlu 2001: 117).

Regarding the subjects inhabiting the Asian domains of the empire, however, the functioning of the Turkification process was much more complicated. It is true that the assimilative measures were not pursued only for the immigrant communities of the Balkans. The Young Turks also desired to homogenise Kurds, Arabs and other subjects of the empire on the basis of Turkishness. Nevertheless, only those who immigrated to or resided in the blurred boundaries of Anatolia were targeted by the Young Turks' Turkifying device. This concern paved the way for the different treatment of Kurdish refugees who fled to Anatolia and the Kurdish populated regions that were seen as part of Anatolia, and the Kurds of, say, Iraq and Syria. While the former category was to be Turkified, the latter category, whose assimilation was undesirable in the eyes of Young Turks, retained its peripheral status.

Illustrating this policy pattern is the shift in the interest of the imperial centre vis-à-vis the Kurdish tribes. On 8 June 1914, a questionnaire was sent to provincial administrative units, asking for information about the Kurdish tribes. This was a very detailed survey including questions ranging from the language spoken among the tribes to the framework of their relations with their Turkish neighbours and the organisation of their tribal structure. The government was meticulous in gathering information. It was emphasised that the surveys had to be filled in very carefully and completely.[28] Apparently, the CUP regime was concerned with the prospect of assimilating the Kurdish tribes. Hence their settlement was in line with this viewpoint. The Kurdish refugees were to be dispersed among the Turkish population of inner Anatolia (Dündar 2001: 127–8).

It is striking that the settlement of the Kurdish refugees in the 'vicinity of southern regions, such as *Urfa*, *Zor*, was strictly forbidden' (*ibid.*: 141). Moreover, in order to 'make them appropriate (*mufid*) elements', the Kurdish refugees that existed in Diyarbekir, Sivas, Erzurum and Elazığ were to be sent to inner Anatolia (*ibid.*: 144). These were the regions in which Arabs and Kurds were abundant. Therefore, the settlement of Kurdish refugees in those regions would have resulted either in their *Arabisation* or ensured the preservation of their nationality as they continued to live 'as a detrimental element' (*ibid.*: 141).

This last point reveals a very important dimension of the nationalisation policy pursued by the CUP regime. In a sense, it struggled with the Arab influence on the non-Turkish Muslims. It sought to re-settle the Kurds and other non-Turkish Muslim groups in inner Anatolia that was far from the Arabic sphere of influence. This was the case for the Arab refugees as well. Although the overall Turkification of Arabs did not concern the Young Turks, those Arab refugees who were exiled from Syria or Musul were dispersed in Anatolia (*ibid.*: 100–4).

As a matter of fact, the aforementioned policy pattern reveals the geographical dimension of nation-building carried out in the final years of

the empire. The policy guide of the imperial centre was to get rid of non-Muslims from Anatolia and Turkify those Muslims on the basis of the ethnic and cultural category of Turkishness. Building on this device, the Young Turks endeavoured to homogenise Kurds, Arabs, Lazs, Circassians and other non-Turkish Muslim communities residing in or immigrants to the lands that were regarded as the core of the Turkish nationality.

Nevertheless, Turkification was in the making only within this region. Outside the borders of Anatolia, the Young Turks did not try to nationalise Muslim nationalities. On the contrary, identities were taken as given. This was accompanied by the identification of the Turkish pools that existed in the periphery as the most reliable element of the empire. In the Sincar district of Musul Province, for example, the CUP regime struggled to end the blood feud among the Turks. They were seen as 'very valiant (*ceri*) and courageous (*cesur*) Turks ... who have hitherto maintained their nationality and at the same time number (*adat*) as well as customs, even though they were surrounded by Arabs, Kurds and Yezidis ... they have one race, one language and one creed ...'. The enduring vendetta among the Turkish subjects was considered to be detrimental to the state's interests in Musul.[29]

While the subjects of Turkish origin were viewed in this way, the Young Turks continued to regard the other communities of the periphery as backward and uncivilised. In a report that was addressed to the central government, the administrative problems existing in Musul were attributed to the 'ignorance' of the local people who were assigned to the local administration and military service. The category of reference in this report was the wisdom of the Anatolian people which was compared to this 'remote and savage neighborhood' (*havali ba'id ve vahşetgah*). In order to overcome the administrative problems in the region, it was emphasised that the officials must be of Anatolian origin and they should govern this underdeveloped and backward region by replacing the natives.[30]

Where is Kurdistan? The expansion of Anatolia

A significant question springs to mind at this juncture. Where was the Anatolia in which the Turkish national core was supposed to be established? The answer to this question was blurred in the minds of the Young Turks. This is illustrated by a debate that took place in the Ottoman Assembly in which none of the deputies could answer the question of where Kurdistan was. After some discussion, the deputies decided to delegate the duty of finding out the answer to this question to a commission that was concerned with reform in the area.[31] Given the fact that Kurdistan was an adjacent area to Anatolia, the confusion that followed this question revealed clearly that the borders of Anatolia were unclear.

As a region in a multiethnic empire wherein the Turkish national core was to be constructed, the actual boundaries would emerge as a result of the expansion of the imperial centre. In this regard, the purging of the Armenians

from Eastern Anatolia resulted in the incorporation of this region unequivocally into a Turkish national core. The way in which the Greeks were treated in Western Anatolia can also be considered in relation to the expansion of national core.

In fact, a similar process was under way during the war in today's Southeastern Anatolia, Syria and Iraq. The CUP regime sought to expand the boundaries of the region in which the Turkish national core was constructed. Under war conditions, the settlement of Turks in some regions was put at the service of the aim of geographical Turkification. While non-Turkish Muslims were located in inner Anatolia, the government put much effort into strengthening the Turkish composition of some Kurdish and Arabic areas by settling those people who were seen as ethnically and culturally Turkish. Urfa, Maraş and Ayıntab were among this sort of region. It was resolved that refugees that were considered 'Turk' and other 'Turkified' elements must be settled in these cities, where Arabs and Kurds constituted the majority (Dündar 2001: 141). Some Turkish refugees, who had been settled in Syria, were transferred to Halep and Adana although the former was excluded from being a Turkish settlement region in 1916 (*ibid.*: 171–2), which suggests that by then the government had given up the aim of Turkifying this city. In a decree sent to the cities located on the southern borders, Bağdat, Bedre, Horasan, Hanikin, Mendeli and Divaniye, the centre requested information about the percentage of the Turkish population in comparison to Arabs and Kurds, as well as about the spoken languages, educational and economic conditions of those districts. Apparently, the goal was to find out whether the Turkish population could be turned into the majority there (*ibid.*: 171).

Apparently, the CUP regime endeavoured to expand the borders of the Turkish national core that was in the making. In this regard, the policies of settlement and forced migration turned out to be the major instruments that served Turkification. The deportation of non-Muslim communities brought about the religious homogenisation of Anatolia, which was strengthened by the settlement of Muslims in place of the expelled population. Along with the settlement policy, the central regime attempted to assimilate non-Turkish ethnic communities on the one hand, and to Turkify some regions on the other.

Concluding remarks

The most appropriate way to conclude this article is to return to my research questions and the introductory comments on the historiography of the case at hand in the light of what has been discussed so far. The article's initial question was the extent to which the nationality policies of the late Ottoman Empire can be perceived as a nation-building project. As a corollary question, it was also asked to what extent it would be reasonable to apply the term

Turkification to the nationality policies of the late Ottoman Empire and to what degree they were shaped by Turkish nationalism.

What this article has suggested is that Turkification should be taken as a term that refers to the nation-building project that emerged in the second constitutional period. Above all, it was an attempt to create a Turkish national core at the heart of the imperial conglomerate. In this sense, it differed from the other imperial policies, despite coexisting with them, since it was not implemented in the whole body of the empire.

The key problem with the existing historiography is that it is analytically fallacious to conceptualise the different dynamics of imperial policy implemented in different periods and in different regions only in reference to the concept of Turkification, to determine whether it existed or not. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, the imperial centre deployed a range of policies from centralisation to decentralisation, assimilation to dissimilation and integration to homogenisation. The article has shown that the relative weight of these different devices changed not only over time but also regionally, but they intermingled in shaping the direction of the imperial policies. In this respect, the matter is not just whether Turkification existed or not. What is more important is that it was only one of the central policies employed by the governing elites and it coexisted with others when it took its place on the agenda of the empire as a result of the rise of nationalism.

Therefore, the answer to the initial question of whether the late Ottoman nationality policies can be perceived as nation-building is affirmative, but only to a degree. It is affirmative only for specific periods and only for specific regions and subjects, as previously discussed. In the regions that were left out of the project of building a national core, the imperial domination was to be continued. But the main objective here was to ensure their loyalty to the empire rather than assimilating them into ethnic and cultural category of Turkishness.

One significant question arises at this point. Why did the Young Turks resort to Turkish nationalism instead of seeking to integrate Muslim and non-Muslim elements under the umbrella of Ottomanism and Ottoman citizenship? It is of course possible to generate a good deal of reflection on this question, which would take us to the alternative political programmes the Young Turks could have pursued. However fruitful such musings might be, they are bound to be speculative. I believe that we should instead try to understand the character of Turkish nationalism that the Young Turks stood for by situating it into its historical context. This is of course not an easy task and certainly beyond the limits of the present article which is mainly concerned with the Turkification policies. Still, some final remarks on the character of Turkish nationalism could be of some value as a prelude to future research.

The question that has been asked above relies on the assumption that Turkish nationalism and Ottomanism were two different political pro-

grammes. Yet it is not necessarily true to contrast Turkish nationalism and Ottomanism as two different options that were available to the Young Turks.

First, there was no unique idea of Ottomanism that we can single out. It is more appropriate to talk about Ottomanisms rather than Ottomanism. As indicated earlier, non-Muslims and the CUP interpreted it in fundamentally different ways. Furthermore, the idea of Ottomanism supported by the liberal wing of the Young Turks movement, *Entente Liberale*, which built on the premises of economic, political liberalism and decentralisation (Keyder 1997: 38), was fundamentally different from that of the CUP. Indeed, one would expect to encounter as many interpretations of Ottomanism as there are different national, religious and social groups (Çetinkaya 2004: 189–99; 2002).

Second, the Young Turks' nationalism was not unrelated to Ottomanism anyway. Ottomanism and Turkish dominance were not contradictory in the eyes of the Young Turks because they believed that the integrity of the empire could be saved only if the Turkish nationality undertook the initiative as *millet-i hakime* (dominant nation). This is why they did not need to take issue with the principle of Ottomanism when they wanted to reorganise the empire under the leadership of Turkish nationality. In short, Ottomanism and Turkish nationalism did not stand as two different alternatives to the Young Turks. It is more appropriate to argue that Ottomanism was reformulated by the CUP under the influence of Turkish nationalism.

The point that has to be emphasised is that the goal of their nationalism was not to create the nation-state of Turks by dissolving the empire. Nor was Turkification a project of transforming the whole empire into a nation-state. Turkification was a project of nation-building, aiming to keep the unity of the empire under the domination of a Turkish national core. Hence, the Young Turks' Ottomanism was capable of surviving even alongside the Turkification policies. This is all the more important if we remember that the CUP regime continued to emphasise unity in the Arab provinces and to view the peripheral subjects as ignorant and savage – to be eventually Ottomanised.

Thus, once we accept that Ottomanism was subject to different interpretations, the links between Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism and Turkification are not difficult to see. It is even possible to argue that the Turkification policies relied on the changing content of Ottomanism at the level of state ideology that gradually singled out Islam as the base of identification during the period of Abdulhamid II (Deringil 1998; Karpat 2001). In a sense, Turkification evolved out of Ottomanism more than breaking from it. What the Young Turks did was to combine the ethnic identification of Turkishness with the older pattern of Islamic interpretation of Ottomanism. While the effect of the latter led to the exclusion of non-Muslims from the emerging Turkish nation, the former necessitated the assimilation of non-Turkish Muslim communities into the ethnic and cultural category of Turkishness.

Accordingly, questions such as whether Turkification existed or not, or whether the Young Turks could have pursued Ottomanism instead of Turkish nationalism, are too simple to understand the complexities of the late

Ottoman Empire's nationality policies. The growing influence of nationalism on the imperial policies was by no means a smooth process and the relationship between older forms of identifications and nationalism is perhaps more complicated than it looks at first glance.

Notes

1 For an extensive review of Turkish nationalist ideas and journals during the second constitutional era, see Masami Arai (2003).
2 MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 2 İçtima: 115, 07/07/1325–07/07/1909, pp. 446–57, see especially p. 448, for Hiristo Dalçef Efendi's castigation of the government for applying the Turkification policy.
3 MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 2 İçtima: 47, 14/03/1325–14/03/1909, pp. 479–87.
4 MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 3, İçtima: 36, 16/02/1324–16/02/1908, p. 123.
5 For pan-Turkism and the ideas of Yusuf Akçura, see Francois Georgeon (1999: especially 51–113).
6 For the strong influence of the CUP on government policies between 1908 and 1913, see Sina Akşin (2001: 121–210).
7 MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 2, İçtima: 39, 30/01/1325–30/01/1909, p. 123.
8 MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 1, İçtima: 13, 25/11/1326–25/11/1910, p. 467.
9 BBA–DH.İD, no: 126/58, 27/R/1332–24/03/1914.
10 BBA–DH.İD, no: 30/-1/46, 23/Ş/1329–18/08/1911.
11 BBA–DH.MUİ, no: 81/44, 29/Z/1327–11/01/1910.
12 For the political programme of the CUP, see Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1998: 70–164).
13 BBA–DH.İD, no: 126/3, 05/L/1328–09/10/1910.
14 BBA–DH.MUİ, no: 103/-2/1, 06/C/1328–14/06/1910.
15 BBA–DH.MUİ, no: 69-2/1, 19/S/1328–19/02/1911.
16 See, for example, MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 1, İçtima: 82, 16/05/1325–16/05/1909, pp. 18–19.
17 See, for example, MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 1, İçtima: 73, 04/05/1325–04/05/1909, p. 461.
18 BBA–DH.İD, no: 26-1/36, 27/S/1329–27/02/1911.
19 The name of the school was *Kürt Mekteb-i Meşrutiyet* (Kurdish School of Constitution) BBA–DH.MUİ, no. 60/2, 18/M/1328–30/01/1910.
20 BBA–DH.İD, no: 126/43, 16/M/1331–26/12/1912.
21 BBA–DH.EUM.THR, no: 5/29, 10/N/1327–25/09/1909.
22 BBA–ZB, no: 335/8, 28/Ha/1325 (Rumi)–28/7/1909.
23 For an extensive analysis of the nationalisation of the economy, see Zafer Toprak (1982).
24 F.O. 40170/19208/13/44, 27/August/1913, from Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 'The Near East. The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia', London: 1928 Vol: X, part: I, pp. 504–15.
25 BBA–DH.KMS, no: 65/35, 15/L/1331–17/09/1913.
26 For the Turkist ideas of the Young Turks before 1908, see Şerif Mardin (2003), especially, pp. 261–75 for the flourishing of the thought of Anatolia as the homeland of Turks.
27 MMZC, Devre: III, Cilt: 1, İçtima: 26, 23/06/1330–23/06/1914, pp. 606–14.
28 BBA–EUM.MTK, no: 77/52, 08/Ş/1332–02/07/1914.
29 BBA–DH. H, no: 43/323117, 16/L/1332–07/09/1914 in *Musul–Kerkük ileİlgili Arşiv Belgeleri* . . . pp. 337.
30 BBA–DH.IUM, no: E-40/1, 14/Za/1335–01/09/1917 in *Musul–Kerkük ile İlgili Arşiv Belgeleri* . . . pp. 353–79.
31 MMZC, Devre: I, Cilt: 6, İçtima: 133, 01/08/1325–01/08/1909, pp. 396–8.

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