

Zero sum games & Multiplicative weight update algorithm.

2 person zero sum games:

Rock paper scissor :

	Bob
	R P S
Alice	$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$\times P$	

entry of matrix = Alice's payoff
 $= -$ Bob's payoff.

Strategy = instructions for someone else to play on your behalf.

$$P[R] = P[P] = P[S] = \frac{1}{3}.$$

}

Bob.

R:	$\frac{1}{2}$
P:	0
S:	$-\frac{1}{2}$

Bob

R: 0

P: 0

S: 0

even-odd game :

$$\xrightarrow{0} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

if sum even then Alice's payoff
= sum.

if odd then Alice's payoff

$$= -\text{sum}$$

$$\text{Alice: } \begin{array}{ccc} 0 & \text{wp} & x_0 \\ 1 & \text{wp} & x_1 \end{array}$$

$$x_0 = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$x_1 = \frac{1}{3}$$

Alice's payoff:

Bob { 0: $x_0 \cdot 0 + x_1 \cdot (-1) = -x_1$
1: $-x_0 + 2x_1$.

$$\min \left\{ -x_1, -x_0 + 2x_1 \right\}$$

$$\min \left\{ -\frac{1}{3}, -\frac{2}{3} + 2 \cdot \frac{1}{3} \right\} = -\frac{1}{3}.$$

Alice: Pick x_0, x_1 to maximize $\min \left\{ -x_1, -x_0 + 2x_1 \right\}$.

LP

$$\max \Sigma \leftarrow \begin{array}{l} \Sigma \leq -x_1 \\ \Sigma \leq -x_0 + 2x_1 \\ x_0 + x_1 = 1 \\ x_0, x_1 \geq 0 \end{array} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \Sigma = \min \left\{ -x_1, -x_0 + 2x_1 \right\} \\ \Sigma \leq \min \left\{ -x_1, -x_0 + 2x_1 \right\} \end{array} \right\}$$

OPT: $x_0 = \frac{3}{4} \quad x_1 = \frac{1}{4}$.
payoff = $-\frac{1}{4}$

$$A = \begin{smallmatrix} & y_0 & y_1 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 \\ 1 & -1 & 2 \end{smallmatrix}$$

Bob announces strategy y_0, y_1

Alice's payoff:

$0 :$	$-y_1$	}
$1 :$	$-y_0 + 2y_1$	

$$\max \{-y_1, -y_0 + 2y_1\}$$

Bob pick y_0, y_1 s.t. $\max \{-y_1, -y_0 + 2y_1\}$ is minimized.

$$(x_1, x_2) \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} -x_2 \\ -x_1 + 2x_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

$\max z$

$$x^T A \geq z(1, 1)$$

$$[1 \ 1] \vec{x} = 1$$

$$\vec{x} \geq 0$$



duals.

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y_0 \\ y_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -y_1 \\ -y_0 + 2y_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$\min z$

$$A y \leq z \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$[1 \ 1] \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix} = 1$$

$y \geq 0$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \min z \\ -y_1 \leq z \\ -y_0 + 2y_1 \leq z \\ y_0 + y_1 = 1 \\ y_0, y_1 \geq 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\begin{cases} y_0 = 3y_1 \\ y_1 = y_4. \end{cases}$$

$$\text{payoff} = -1/4.$$



= $x^T A y = \text{pay off}$
 when Alice plays
 x & Bob plays y .

von Neumann's mil max thm :

$$\max_x \min_y x^T A y = \min_y \max_x x^T A y$$

Multiplicative weight update Algorithm (MWU).

n experts E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n

i^{th} expert on day t : loss $l_i^{(t)} \in [0, 1]$ $T = \# \text{days}$.

L^* = total loss of best expert over T days.

Strategy: Initialize $w_i = 1$ $i = 1 \rightarrow n$. $W = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i$

Each day: Expert i w.p. $\frac{w_i}{W}$
end of day: expert j : loss $l_j^{(t)}$
 $w_j \leftarrow w_j (1 - \varepsilon)^{l_j^{(t)}}$

L = expected loss suffered by MWU over T days.

$$\text{Thm: } L \leq \frac{\ln n}{\varepsilon} + (1 + \varepsilon)L^*$$

$$\underline{\text{Pf Sketch}} : \quad W(t) = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i^{(t)}$$

$$W(0) = n$$

$$\text{Best expert's weight on day } T = (1-\varepsilon)^{L^*}$$

$$(1-\varepsilon)^{L^*} \leq W(T)$$

L_t = expected loss suffered by MWU on day t .

$$W(t+1) \leq W(t)(1 - \varepsilon L_t)$$

$$\frac{(1-\varepsilon)^{L^*}}{} \leq W(T) \leq \overbrace{n}^{W(0)} \prod_{t=1}^T (1 - \varepsilon L_t)$$

$$\underbrace{L^*}_{\ln(1-\varepsilon)} \leq \ln n + \sum_{t=1}^T \ln(1 - \varepsilon L_t).$$

$$\begin{aligned} -L^*(\varepsilon + \varepsilon^2) &\leq \ln n - \varepsilon \sum_t L_t & \sum_t L_t = L \\ -L^*(1 + \varepsilon) &\leq \frac{\ln n}{\varepsilon} - L \Rightarrow L \leq \frac{\ln n}{\varepsilon} + (1 + \varepsilon)L^* \end{aligned}$$