


# CS 188: Artificial Intelligence

## Decision Networks and VPI



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University of California, Berkeley

# Rational Preferences

## The Axioms of Rationality



# Rational Preferences

## The Axioms of Rationality

Orderability:

$$(A > B) \vee (B > A) \vee (A \sim B)$$

Transitivity:

$$(A > B) \wedge (B > C) \Rightarrow (A > C)$$

Continuity:

$$(A > B > C) \Rightarrow \exists p [p, A; 1-p, C] \sim B$$

Substitutability:

$$(A \sim B) \Rightarrow [p, A; 1-p, C] \sim [p, B; 1-p, C]$$

Monotonicity:


$$(A > B) \Rightarrow \\ (p \geq q) \Leftrightarrow [p, A; 1-p, B] \geq [q, A; 1-q, B]$$



What's the implication?

# MEU Principle

- Theorem [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944]
  - Given any preferences satisfying the previous constraints, there exists a real-valued function  $U$  such that:




# MEU Principle

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  - Given any preferences satisfying the previous constraints, there exists a real-valued function  $U$  such that:


$$U(A) > U(B) \Leftrightarrow A > B \text{ and } U(A) \sim U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \sim B$$

$$U([p_1, S_1; \dots; p_n, S_n]) = p_1 U(S_1) + \dots + p_n U(S_n)$$

- Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle:
  - A rational agent chooses the action that maximizes expected utility



# Decision Networks



# Decision Networks

In its most general form, a decision network represents information about

- Its current state
- Its possible actions
- The state that will result from its actions
- The utility of that state


Decision network = Bayes net + Actions + Utilities



- **Action nodes** (rectangles, cannot have parents, will have value fixed by algorithm)




- **Utility nodes** (diamond, depends on action and chance nodes)








# Decision Networks





# Example: Take an umbrella?



# Decision Networks

- Decision network = Bayes net + Actions + Utilities



- Action nodes** (rectangles, cannot have parents, will have value fixed by algorithm)




- Utility nodes** (diamond, depends on action and chance nodes)

- Decision algorithm:

- Fix evidence  $e$
- For each possible action  $a$ 
  - Fix action node to  $a$
  - Compute posterior  $P(W|e,a)$  for parents  $W$  of  $U$
  - Compute expected utility  $\sum_w P(w|e,a) U(a,w)$
- Return action with highest expected utility

Bayes net inference!



# Example: Take an umbrella?

- Decision algorithm:

- Fix evidence  $e$
- For each possible action  $a$ 
  - Fix action node to  $a$
  - Compute posterior  $P(W|e,a)$  for parents  $W$  of  $U$
  - Compute expected utility of action  $a$ :  $\sum_w P(w|e,a) U(a,w)$
- Return action with highest expected utility

Bayes net inference!

A	W	U(A,W)
leave	sun	100
leave	rain	0
take	sun	20
take	rain	70

Umbrella = leave

$$EU(\text{leave}|F=\text{bad}) = \sum_w P(w|F=\text{bad}) U(\text{leave},w)$$

$$= 0.34 \times 100 + 0.66 \times 0 = 34$$

Umbrella = take

$$EU(\text{take}|F=\text{bad}) = \sum_w P(w|F=\text{bad}) U(\text{take},w)$$

$$= 0.34 \times 20 + 0.66 \times 70 = 53$$

Optimal decision = take!

W	P(W)
sun	0.7

W	P(W F=bad)
sun	0.34
rain	0.66


W	P(F=bad W)
sun	0.17
rain	0.77

Umbrella



Weather

Forecast  
bad

U




# Decision network with utilities on outcome states



# Value of Information

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# Value of information

- Suppose you haven't yet seen the forecast

- $EU(\text{leave} \mid \cdot) = 0.7 \times 100 + 0.3 \times 0 = 70$

- $EU(\text{take} \mid \text{ } ) = 0.7 \times 20 + 0.3 \times 70 = 35$

- *What if you look at the forecast?*

- If Forecast=good

- EU(leave | F=good) = 0.89x100 + 0.11x0 = 89

- EU(take | F=good) =  $0.89 \times 20 + 0.11 \times 70 = 25$

- If Forecast=bad

- EU(leave | F=bad) = ~~0.00 + 0.66x0 = 34~~


- ~~$EU(\text{take} \mid F=\text{bad}) = 0.34 \times 20 + 0.66 \times 70 = 53$~~

- $P(\text{Forecast}) = \langle 0.65, 0.35 \rangle$

- Expected utility given forecast

- $$= 0.65 \times 89 + 0.35 \times 53 = 76.4$$

- Value of information =  $76.4 - 70 = 6.4$



# Value of information contd.

- General idea: value of information = ***expected improvement in decision quality*** from observing value of a variable
  - E.g., oil company deciding on seismic exploration and test drilling
  - E.g., doctor deciding whether to order a blood test
  - E.g., person deciding on whether to look before crossing the road
- Key point: decision network contains everything needed to compute it!
- $VPI(E_i | e) = \left[ \sum_{e_i} P(e_i | e) \max_a EU(a | e_i, e) \right] - \max_a EU(a | e)$



# VPI Properties

VPI is non-negative!  $VPI(E_i | e) \geq 0$



VPI is not (usually) additive:  $VPI(E_i, E_j | e) \neq VPI(E_i | e) + VPI(E_j | e)$



VPI is order-independent:  $VPI(E_i, E_j | e) = VPI(E_j, E_i | e)$



# Decisions with unknown preferences

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- In reality the assumption that we can write down our exact preferences for the machine to optimize is false
- A machine optimizing the wrong preferences causes problems



I'm sorry, Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that




# Decisions with unknown preferences

---

- In reality the assumption that we can write down our exact preferences for the machine to optimize is false
- A machine optimizing the wrong preferences causes problems
- A machine that is explicitly uncertain about the human's preferences will defer to the human (e.g., allow itself to be switched off)

# Off-switch problem (example)



$$EU(\text{act}) = +10$$

$$EU(\text{wait}) = (0.4 * 0) + (0.6 * 30) = +18$$

# Off-switch problem (general proof)

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- $EU(act) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} P(u) \cdot u \, du = \int_{-\infty}^0 P(u) \cdot u \, du + \int_0^{+\infty} P(u) \cdot u \, du$
- $EU(wait) = \int_{-\infty}^0 P(u) \cdot 0 \, du + \int_0^{+\infty} P(u) \cdot u \, du$
- Obviously  $\int_{-\infty}^0 P(u) \cdot u \, du \leq \int_{-\infty}^0 P(u) \cdot 0 \, du$
- Hence  $EU(act) \leq EU(wait)$