Proof of Belief Convergence Weakly Connected - Classic Update

Bernardo Amorim

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

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min^t and max^t definition

Definition

Let's call \min^t and \max^t the minimum and maximum of the beliefs in the time t, respectively:

$$min^t = \min_{a_i \in A} Bel_p^t(a_i)$$
 and $max^t = \max_{a_i \in A} Bel_p^t(a_i)$

Useful lemmas

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Lemma

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} \min^t = L$$
 and $\lim_{t\to\infty} \max^t = U$ for some L , $U \in [0,1]$.



Proof main idea


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
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Theorem


 $\forall t \ and \ \forall a_i \in A :$

$$Bel_p^{t+|P(a_*^t o a_i)|}(a_i) \leq max^t - \delta^t$$
, with $\delta^t = \left(\frac{ln_{min}}{|A|}\right)^{|P(a_*^t o a_i)|}.(U-L)$.


• It means that, by the time $t + |P(a_*^t, a_i)|$, a_i will be influenced by a_*^t by a factor of δ^t .




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
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- But we can use two important informations to acquire an idea about the agents in the same time step.

Lemma

 $\forall a_i, a_j \in A, |P(a_i \rightarrow a_j)| \leq |A| - 1.$

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
$$\forall a_i, a_i \in A, |P(a_i \rightarrow a_i)| \leq |A| - 1.$$

• Thus, $\forall a_i$, a_i will be influenced by a_*^t in |A|-1 steps maximum.

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- a_*^t (the agent who holds the belief min^t) influenced every agent by δ^t in some time step between t and t + |A| 1.
- Since every agent influences itself throughout time, we can find an ϵ which is a common factor of influence of a_*^t over every agent in the time t + |A| 1.



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- $\frac{1}{|A|}$ is a part of ϵ because, the bigger the size of the society, the less an agent alone influences other (or even the agent influences itself).
- The part inside the parenthesis is elevated to the $|A|-1^{th}$ power because it is the maximum amount the influence of a_*^t must travel to reach a node.



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- Now the most important: the influence is proportional to the difference of *U* and *L*, which are the limits of *max* and *min*.
- The intuition behind it is that, even when min_t is closer to max_t (which happens when $min_t = L$ and $max_t = U$), a_*^t still influences the agent that holds the belief max_t , since this is the "worst case scenario", this is a bound ϵ that we holds in every case.

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
$$\max^{t} - \max^{t+|A|-1} > \epsilon$$

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• Since all beliefs must be between *min* and *max*, if their limits to infinity are equal, all limits of the beliefs to infinity are equal, as we wanted to prove.

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- I believe that we may just need to add another constant, which would be $f_{confirmation-bias-min}$, which would be the smallest $f_{confirmation-bias}$ on that society (it is not hard to see that the minimum $f_{confirmation-bias}$ throughout time is monotonic, thus the smallest one exists in t=0).

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- Every agent has belief either 0 or 1 in time t = 0, in this case beliefs converge trivially, but not to the same value.
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- Exits some agent a_k that has belief B, and $B \neq 0$ and $B \neq 1$.
- In this case my idea is that we should use the same approach we used with a_* in the proof for classic update, tracing the influence of a_k to every agent, this would guarantee that no longer exists $f_{confirmation-bias} = 0$, and then we would fall on the general case.

Next steps: Backfire-Effect

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- Unfortunately, I think that none of what was used above can also be used for the backfire-effect.
- Experiments showed that, under the backfire-effect update function, *min* and *max* are not monotonic, which is crucial for the proof showed above, thus I don't think that this is the way to prove convergence in this case.