Pathways to Personalism in Autocratic Regimes: Domestic and Foreign Factors

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Abstract

This is a Ph.D. project proposal. It focuses on the concept of (autocratic) personalism, which is defined as the concentration of power of one man over the ruling elites. Further, personalism is understood as a latent dimension of autocratic rule. The main research questions I ask in this project are: Which are the domestic and foreign factors that help dictators personalize? Under which conditions do dictators personalize? The main objective of this project is thus to understand and analyze how personalization of power in autocratic regimes rises. Therefore, I will analyze different domestic and foreign factors which can, potentially, help dictators personalize. These factors are: (1) foreign aid; (2) Foreign Direct Investment; (3) multiparty elections; (4) interstate wars; and (5) civil wars. Using panel data of all autocratic regimes in the period 1946-2010, I aim through three papers to give an answer to the questions. In this proposal I explain the theoretical framework on personalism, and the research design of the project.

Key words: Autocratic regimes; Personalism; Latent dimension; Foreign Aid; Foreign Direct Investment; Multiparty elections; Interstate Wars; Civil Wars; Project proposal.

Word count: 8105

1 Introduction

Today, seventy per cent of the world's population is living under autocratic rule. In fact, the latest *Democracy Report* by the V-Dem Institute states that "the level of democracy by the average global citizen in 2021 is down to 1989 levels" (Boese et al. 2022: 6). Countries traditionally regarded as democratic like the USA have suffered a substantial decline in the last years, and the year 2020 was the "15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom [and] the long democratic recession [continued] deepening" (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021: 1). That year was the worst since 2006 with countries suffering a decline in their democratic scores. Moreover, electoral autocracies, this is, autocracies that hold periodic elections, have been increasing in number since the end of the Cold War (Gandhi and Reuter 2013; Kim and Kroeger 2018; Miller 2015, 2020). In the same context, we can see that personalism in autocratic regimes has been increasing since 1946, specially since the fall of the Soviet Union (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017).

In fact, personalism in autocratic regimes is the central concept of this research. It is defined as the concentration of power of one man over the ruling elites, and further, it is understood as a latent characteristic of autocratic rule (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Wright 2021). By latent characteristic I mean a feature shared among all autocracies: this feature varies within and across regimes, over time. Therefore, rather than understanding autocracies through typologies, I understand them as dynamic regimes that can change over time[1]. In order to analyze this variation, I will use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) novel data on personalism. This is the first, and most relevant, contribution of this PhD project.

The overall and global rise of personalism can be explained by two dynamics[2]. First, the fall of ideology-based regimes in the late 1980s that led to a change in the geopolitical environment which created post-ideological autocracies that have personalism at its core. And second, the increasing number of autocratic regimes that emerged as the product of a process of authoritarianization –such as Putin's, Chávez's or Erdogan's regimes–, specially since the year 1990: "the rise of authoritarianization has meant that a growing number of autocrats are facing weaker, less coherent elite inner circles, paving the way to greater personalization" (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017: 10).

These explanations, though, are about the overall and global rise of personalism. We do not know which are the specific factors that can help explain the rise of personalism; this research will try to find them. Therefore, I ask: *which are the domestic and foreign factors that help dictators personalize?* In this sense, *under which conditions do dictators personalize?* The objective is clear: *to understand and analyze how personalization of power in autocratic regimes rises*. The domestic and foreign factors I am going to analyze are the following: (1) foreign aid; (2) Foreign Direct Investment; (3) multiparty elections; (4) interstate wars; and (5) civil wars. In sum, I will analyze resources, elections and conflict. In this regard, it matters how personalist dictatorships work, because:

> Personalist rule brings with it a host of negative outcomes compared to other types of authoritarian systems. A wide body of political-science research shows that personalist dictators pursue

[1] See the third section of this proposal for a further explanation.

[2] Figure 1 shows the mean of personalism for each year across autocratic regimes in the period 1946-2010. I wish to thank Irene Rodríguez-López for her generous help to create this figure.

> the most risky and belligerent foreign policies, and they are the most apt to invest in nuclear weapons and provoke interstate conflict. When these autocrats fall, their regimes are the least likely of all dictatorship types to democratize. (Frantz et al. 2021: 95)



Figure 1: Mean of personalism per year (1946-2010). Own elaboration, data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018). Note: the green line shows the aggregated mean levels of personalism in the period 1946-2010; the blue line shows the tendency and the confidence intervals.

The objective and the research question are explained and justified by the following assumptions. The first one is conceptual: an autocracy is defined as a regime which does not hold periodic, free and fair elections, but further, it is a regime mainly characterized by "the absence of an independent authority that would enforce mutual agreements and the ever-present potential for violence. [...] Furthermore, a country ceases to be a democracy the moment a few key mechanisms –especially electoral rules and the respect of certain liberties– are circumvented, even if nonviolently" (Svolik 2012: 16). My second assumption is built on Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) framework: institutions shape the political power, and both, institutions and political power, are endogenous. Thus, democracies and autocracies differ in the fact that, in the former, institutions are binding, though in autocracies, they might be non-binding. This is: binding institutions are those that put constraints on power, while non-binding institutions are those which do not put constraints on power.

The main contribution of this research –this is, the use of new data on personalism– is not the only one: the three papers will fill different gaps in the literature. First, if the findings of my first paper support the hypothesis that foreign aid and FDI might be foreign factors that help dictators personalize, we will be able to state that not only natural resources, and specifically oil (Fails 2020), but also other economic resources are used by dictators to increase their power, and moreover, we will be able to link this to the concept of aid conditionality, this is, aid given to autocracies provided they liberalize, for instance, through holding multiparty elections (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015)[3]. I consider this a crucial policy implication:

[3]Notice, though, that aid conditionality is a phenomenon mainly of the post-Cold War period. Yet, as shown in Figure 1, the higher

if dictators increase power using these resources, it will mean that democratic regimes have been contributing actively to the concentration of power by them.

Second, as stressed by Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017), this research will analyze, in the second paper, elections as a phenomenon and not related issues such as legislatures and parties. This is relevant because legislatures and parties can exist in autocracies that do not hold elections, though the literature has focused on these two kind of institutions and have used them, sometimes, as proxies for elections.

Third, following the challenges which are needed to analyze the effects of elections in autocracies stressed by Seeberg (2014: 1279–1280), this study will specify "the conditions under which elections can be expected to work either for or against the regime" and it will control for factors like "natural resources and international interventions".

Fourth, linking the relevance of the first two papers, this research might highlight the fact that multiparty elections in autocracies might not be a signal of democratization: "Multiparty transitions require incumbents to focus on a targeted event—elections with opposition parties—while consolidation requires more complex political changes" (Dietrich and Wright 2015: 218). Cases like Russia or Venezuela illustrate that also autocracies held them. This is important in the sense that democratic countries establish relationships with these regimes, but more importantly, they help them. I also consider this a crucial policy implication.

Fifth, if the results of the third paper support the argument that conflict might be a factor that helps dictators personalize, this will also shed light on how dictators act, and how democratic regimes should react to these behaviors. In this sense, if dictators start armed conflicts to increase personalism, the consequences and costs of these actions go beyond that autocratic state: history tells us many things.

Finally, this research will shed light, in general, on personalistic dictatorial regimes, and I will assess policy implications and I will give policy recommendations in order to better understand them and deal with them.

This proposal is structured as follows. First, I review the extant work on personalism. Second, I explain my research design: the data and dependent variable, and my paper division. Finally, I propose the calendar of the Ph.D. Project.

2 Extant Work: Personalism

Autocratic politics are characterized by different interactions, which can be argued in terms of conflict. The first one is the so-called "problem of authoritarian control", which is the interaction of the dictators and the ruling group vis-à-vis the population; the second one is argued as "the problem of authoritarian power-sharing", which is the interaction of dictators vis-à-vis the ruling elites (Svolik 2012). This project focuses on this last conflict of autocratic rule, and specifically, it focuses on one possible outcome: personalism. In short, it is defined as the concentration of power of one man over the ruling elites, though personalism has further implications. In GWF's words:

> The defining feature of personalist dictatorship is that the dictator has personal discretion and

levels of personalism are, indeed, in this period.

> control over the key levers of power in his political system. Key levers of power include the unfettered ability to appoint, promote, and dismiss high-level officers and officials, and thus to control the agencies, economic enterprises, and armed forces the appointees lead. In such regimes, the dictator's choices are relatively unconstrained by the institutions that can act as veto players in other dictatorships, especially the military high command and the ruling party executive committee. (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014: 70–71)

The dynamics inside the leadership group are, mainly, two: "(1) a cooperative effort aimed at keeping all of them […] in power and (2) noncooperative interactions in which different members/factions seek to enhance their own power and resources at the expenses of the others […]" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018: 67). These interactions, though, are crucially influenced by two conditions: (1) the elites are not a unitary group, and (2) the dictator is in a resource-advantage position. What this entails is the fact that dictatorial regimes, as being defined above as regimes in which no independent authority makes rules self-enforcing, are constantly under power struggles in which violence is always a plausible solution. This is crucial in order to understand which are the power-sharing agreements that will be established, and also how these agreements will be established. Violence, thus, is always a solution, and this violence can be exert either by the dictators (*e.g.*, purges) or by the elites (*e.g.*, coup d'état)[4].

Yet, there is an important question that needs to be addressed: why would a dictator agree to constrain his power? Why would a dictator agree to share power? Autocrats agree to tie their own hands when they face a credible threat by the elites. Under these conditions, dictators are in a precarious position: power is shared and binding institutions, this is, institutions that constrain power, are established (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). Therefore, under the assumptions that commitment is not possible and that autocratic politics are characterized by monitoring problems and informational asymmetries, stable agreements of power-sharing are only achieved through strong formal institutions which are self-enforcing: "Institutions do have the capacity to prevent unnecessary, regime destabilizing conflicts in authoritarian politics, but only when institutionalized "rules of the game" rest on mutual advantage and respect the power of key participants. [...] [A]uthoritarian institutions must be self-enforcing" (Svolik 2012: 15). Thus, they will be of this nature only if the possibility of any alternative coalition to rise at the expenses of the current ruling group does not exist[5]. In essence, "institutions can credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites. [...] Institutions that empower and identify specific challengers help to solve elite coordination problems, therefore better allowing them to hold incumbents accountable. Institutionalization limits executive power by creating conditions that actually *threaten* the leader" (Meng 2020: 5).

A great example of a binding institution are term limits and/or constitutional succession procedures, specifically in the case of PRI's ruling in Mexico. Every six years, elections were held in order to replace the president. This institutional arrangement lasted from 1916 until the year 2000, which makes the PRI's

[4]The elites, in fact, are the ones who more frequently remove dictators from power, basically through coups (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, 2018; Kendall–Taylor and Frantz 2014; Meng 2020; Svolik 2012). I follow the understanding of coups in Svolik (2012: 4): it is a "forced removal of an authoritarian leader by *any* regime insider, not necessarily the military".

[5]See Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) for a formal model of self-enforcing coalitions.

autocratic rule one of the longest in the past century. The presidential term limits that structured the ruling made personalism impossible to rise, and in fact, it scores 0 for the whole period (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Magaloni 2008; Meng 2020, 2021).

Another example of these arrangements are (the usually defined as) dominant-party dictatorships, such as China or the USSR. These regimes had the party as the core institution of the regime, and it was this party who decided who was the leader. Nevertheless, under some conditions, these agreements were not self-enforcing. Stalin or Mao achieved great levels of personal power, at the expenses of the elites, even under power-sharing agreements that based the regime.

China's and USSR's examples underline the fact that dictators can increase their personal power, and therefore, personalism can emerge. It rises when institutions are non-binding, or even when institutions do not exist. This happens, thus, when dictators do not face a credible threat by the elites. Institutions, if they exist, will be used in order to reward, punish, divide or coopt (Wright 2008). What this distinction underlines is the fact that institutions in autocratic regimes can be understood as institutionalization or not: this will depend on the content of the institution and not on the fact they exist. Therefore, we can state that institutionalization is the opposite phenomenon of personalism. In Meng (2020: 12) words: "institutionalization depersonalizes the ways in which the regime is run by constraining the leader's ability to make arbitrary decisions in the future".

So far I have explained how institutions might constrain or not the dictators' power, and how the interactions of autocrats vis-à-vis the elites is what explain either of the outcomes. These institutional arrangements are, indeed, path dependent. Notwithstanding, there might be other events or non-static conditions that can change the institutional arrangements of autocratic regimes. In this direction, personalism can increase provided the aforementioned credible threat disappears. Or the other way around: personalism can decrease provided the credible threat appears. Though more importantly, personalism can also increase due to other factors and shocks.

In this regard, the conditions before the seizure of power determine if a dictator will be able to personalize. Thus, if there is a united and disciplined elite, the dictator will not be able to do so. Yet if there is a factionalized and undisciplined elite, the dictator will be able to concentrate power (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). In Meng (2020: 17) words: "Initially strong leaders are never incentivized to build credible ruling organizations because they are able to remain in power without making institutional commitments to other elites". The underlying explanation of this lies in the fact that, first, as being the elite a disunited and non-unitary group, it is difficult for them to make a credible threat, and second, "most members of the support group remain willing to support the dictator even when he unilaterally reduces their access to benefits because they are still better off inside the inner circle than excluded from it" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018: 65). In sum, all the decisions that are made before the seizure, as being path-dependent, will last afterwards.

However, this differs between leaders, either being the first or a subsequent one of a regime. In fact, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018: 87) show that, on average, "[d]uring his first three years in office, the first regime leader [...] increases the level of personalism nearly 0.15 point on the (0, 1) scale. For subsequent regime leaders, the gains in personalism are less than half of this". Further, first leaders who have already

been able to personalize, also increase their levels of personalism by 0.07 points from year four until year ten of their tenure, while those who are not able to do so, do not personalize in the next years. The logic under the initial gains of first leaders and subsequent ones lies in the fact that, when there is a replacement of the incumbent, there is also a renegotiation of power division: in sum, the elites have learned from past struggles.

The concentration of power of first leaders is also influenced by two institutions: political parties and the military. Those leaders who have a support party before the seizure are less likely to increase their levels of power because the party provides organization, thus the elites have more bargaining power. In fact, "less than one-third [...] of first dictators who face an inherited support party concentrate power [...], but nearly half [...] of those who do not bargain with [it] do so" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018: 91).

For what concerns the military, the same logic applies. Factionalized militaries cannot bargain in the same way as unfactionalized armies: of first dictators, "fifty-four percent [...] who face a factionalized military concentrate power, while only 38 percent of those who face a more unified military do so" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018: 91).

This two institutions, though, have other implications on the capabilities of a dictator who wants to personalize. The creation of a political party is argued as another tool for personalization. By doing so, dictators will be "less dependent on the coercive apparatus", and second, they might change the composition of the elites (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2017: 24). This point is important because the creation of a civilian support organization is a survival strategy used by dictators who face a factionalized army. Under the assumption that promises must be credible in both sides of the equation, dictators who have come into power or must deal with factionalized armies are less protected. Even if they agree to share some power, they cannot trust they will not be ousted through a (so-called) rogue coup: high-ranked officials cannot prevent a coup led by low-ranked officials in factionalized armies because discipline cannot be enforced. To secure their positions, dictators create these civilian support organizations in order to be less dependent on the army and to deter them from staging a coup because armies are less likely to act against civilians (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). However, in the opposite direction, dictators can hold into power through repression, which is more likely to be used in dictatorships with a higher degree of personalism (Escribà-Folch 2013; Frantz et al. 2020).

However, apart from the initial and structural conditions of the regime, there are other contextual events that can help dictators to concentrate power. One example of this is the type of entry. Autocrats are more likely to personalize if they enter power through an irregular way, such as a coup (Sudduth and Bell 2018). Coups are understood as information-revealing events that demonstrate their strength, and under these circumstances, "successful coups […] temporarily diminish elites' capabilities to remove dictators and, thus, provide a window of opportunity for the dictators to take steps to consolidate power" through purges (Sudduth 2017: 1768). These purges, then, decrease the probability that the elites will be able to credibly threaten him.

On the other hand, though, to survive a coup attempt can also create a window of opportunity for the dictator to personalize following a similar logic of seizing power through one. Because this event reveals elite discontent, in the first place dictators can take actions in order to be more protected against further elite

rebellions; second, it also reveals that the leader is strong enough to face a direct challenge by his support group, and thus, making elite's threats less credible; and third, dictators will be able to identify who is loyal, and who is not (Timoneda, Escribà-Folch, and Chin 2021).

Finally, the last factor which help dictators personalize is natural resources, and specifically, oil. Higher rents coming from oil increase the degree of personalism, because dictators can use this rents to, mainly, co-opt (Fails 2020; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015).

In sum, personalism can rise as a consequence of different factors: the initial conditions and some structural factors, yet also contextual and foreign events, which can happen at the same time and might influence each other. It is here where my research question emerges. Might there be other domestic and foreign factors that can be used in order to increase personalism?

In the next section I develop the research design I plan to perform. In short, my first paper will address whether foreign aid and foreign direct investment (two foreign factors) are personalizing tools, my second paper will address whether multiparty elections (domestic factor) are a tool to personalize and, finally, my third paper will address whether interstate and civil wars (conflict) might increase personalism. Firstly, though, I will discuss my data and dependent variable.

3 Research Design

3.1 Data

To measure the effect of domestic and foreign factors on personalism I will use panel data of all autocratic regimes (4591 regime-year observations) in the period 1946-2010 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). It is important to understand that I will not use country-year panel data, but regime-year panel data: the fact that there are two dictatorships in a country does not mean they are equal, even if they are consecutive autocratic regimes. What matters, as explained in the literature review, is the institutional framework each regime has. In sum, my unit of observation is autocratic regime, which differs from autocratic spell[6].

The dependent variable is the *latent measure of personalism* from the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) data set on autocratic regimes. Notice that I have been referring to personalism as something that might increase or might decrease, in a dynamic way. It is crucial to understand that it is here understood as a latent characteristic of autocracies. Wright (2021) argues that autocracies are characterized by three latent dimensions: the *party*, the *military* and the *personal*. These dimensions identify features of autocracies and, crucially, they vary over time, across and within regimes. This "allows us to measure variation […] that cannot be captured in exclusive regime categories" (Wright 2021: 9). Thus, they differ from existent typologies which are time-invariant measures of autocracies and that identify regimes as, for instance, a military dictatorship through the entire duration of it. This, hence, does not allow us to see any variation of the autocracy's ruling characteristics.

[6] An autocratic spell is "the consecutive calendar years a country is ruled by some form of dictatorship" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014: 322). Consider Cuba: Batista's regime is idiosyncratically different than Castro's regime, even though they are consecutive autocracies in the same country. See *Appendix B* for a list of all autocratic regime-cases, the first and last years.

A great example to see this difference is China: since the Communist victory in 1949, China is a classic example of a dominant-party dictatorship. However, Mao was able to concentrate power at the expense of the elites, specially during the Cultural Revolution. China was still (coded as) a party-based dictatorship, but personalism scored extremely high during this period. After his death, personalism decreased significantly (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Song and Wright 2018; Wright 2021). Another example of this could be the Soviet Union, a dominant-party dictatorship, during Stalin's rule. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show, graphically, these two examples.



Figure 2: Evolution of personalism in China. Own elaboration, data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)



Figure 3: Evolution of personalism in the Soviet Union. Own elaboration, data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)

Personalism, thus, is labeled as a latent dimension of autocracies, and it is validated through factor anal-

ysis in Wright (2021). The measure is developed following a parsimony rule, and it is constructed with an Item Response Theory (IRT) Two-Parameter Logistic Model (2-PL). It has eight explanatory indicators: (1) *security apparatus*, (2) *creation of a paramilitary*, (3) *party executive*, (4) *rubber stamp*, (5) *appointments*, (6) *new party*, (7) *promotions*, and (8) *purges*. These indicators capture different things which, theoretically, explain or help explaining personalism. These indicators are coded as 0 or 1 through the whole period (1946-2010) and for every autocratic regime in the data set:

> There is substantial overlap among these indicators, both because dictators who use one strategy for concentrating power in their own hands often use others as well and because one piece of historical information can sometimes be used to code more than one indicator. (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018: 82)

Thus, the degree of personalism is a continuous variable which takes values between 0 and 1, the latter being the maximum degree of personalization. Figure 4[7] shows the distribution of personalism, per five year periods (1946-2010). Notice how the median values for each period increases every period, but more important, notice also how the interquartile range narrows down, specially since the end of the Cold War. This illustrates how autocracies have been personalizing since 1946[8].



Figure 4: Distribution of personalism by five-year periods (1946-2010). Own elaboration, data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)

Finally, Gandhi and Sumner (2020) have created another measure of personalism, though it does not exactly capture the same phenomenon. Specifically, it measures the consolidation of power, rather than personalism[9].

[7] I wish to thank Irene Rodríguez-López for her generous help to create this figure.
[8] See *Appendix C* for more descriptive statistics of the data.
[9] See *Appendix A* for an in-depth explanation of GWF's and Gandhi and Sumner's measures. The *Appendix* also discusses and compares both measures, which justify the choice of using GWF's.

3.2 Paper Structure

3.2.1 First Paper

In my first paper, I want to analyze the relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) and personalism. I ask: what is the effect of foreign aid and FDI on personalism?

The existing literature on autocratic regimes has found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to be in countries with unearned incomes or non-tax revenues, such as natural resources (Wright 2008; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015). In fact, using this new personalism index, Fails (2020: 777) found that oil incomes increase the degree of personalism, yet "these findings connect increases in rents to greater personalization, but do not identify the specific ways in which leaders use these resources to consolidate their personal hold on power".

There is a vast literature which highlights the fact that those countries dependent on natural resources have negative effects on their democratic levels: there is a resource curse[10]. In this sense, "natural resources and foreign aid share common characteristics: they can be appropriated by corrupt politicians without having to resort on unpopular, and normally less profitable, measure like taxation" (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008: 171). They demonstrate that there is, indeed, a curse of aid: those countries dependent on foreign aid have worse democratic levels and institutions. Their findings support the view that "foreign aid could lead politicians in power to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to appropriate these resources and try to exclude other groups from the political process. [...] The success of this rent seeking activities requires a low degree of accountability [...] and weak institutions" (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008: 170. 171).

Autocracies, by definition, are regimes with "bad" and weak institutions. In sum, countries with extractive political institutions that do not protect property rights (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). They are countries which, in general, are poorer, which makes them more likely to be targets of aid.

Furthermore, democracy can be promoted in different ways, being one of the most frequent the so-called aid conditionality: it "involves a threat to cut aid if the target does not meet certain political conditions, such as holding multiparty elections. If conditions are met, aid increases or remains; if conditions are not met, aid is cut." (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015: 77).

As we have seen in Figure 1, on average, after the end of the Cold War, there is a substantial decrease on personalism rates. Though more importantly: after the first years of decreasing, personalism started to increase in a constant way. This is crucial in terms of aid conditionality. In this period (1990s), different mechanisms have been argued in favor of the relationship between aid and democracy transition. Nevertheless, as Dietrich and Wright (2015) show, many of these then new multiparty systems collapsed. The argument underlining this phenomenon is that:

> When dealing with dictators, donors employ economic development assistance to buy political reform that is largely procedural in nature, such as legalizing opposition parties and holding

[10] See Sachs and Warner (2001), Auty (1990). For the relationship between natural resources and civil wars see Ross (2003), all cited in Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008).

> multiparty elections. While these reforms are sufficient for "formal" transitions to multiparty regimes, they may not necessarily alter the balance of power between the incumbent and opposition groups. Nor do such reforms necessarily require elites to change their political practices. This makes transitions relatively cheap for many dictators. (Dietrich and Wright 2015: 217).

Foreign aid can be classified into two main groups: (1) economic aid and (2) democratic assistance. While the first one goes to governments, and in the post-Cold War period has been linked to aid conditionality, in the second type of aid donors invest either to governments or civil society organizations in order to improve institutions, mainly institutions for democracy. However, the problem is that, in the second type, many difficulties arise, and aid aimed to the civil society represents a little percentage of the totality of aid given (Dietrich and Wright 2015).

Furthermore, there is also FDI. It is the "net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor." (Escribà-Folch 2017: 68). Whilst foreign aid is normally understood as inflows from government to government, FDI are private investments to a foreign country. Yet, this might not be the general picture regarding how it works.

In fact, Escribà-Folch (2017) shows that the stabilization hypothesis –that which argues that FDI contributes to dictatorship's durability– has empirical support, while the liberalization hypothesis –that FDI helps to democratize– and the state-capture hypothesis –that FDI creates instability that leads to autocratic transition– do not. This basically suggests that dictators and the elites can control where FDI goes, which helps them to increase their rents: "Similar to natural resources and aid, FDI may end up, at least partially, accruing to regime cliques despite being a private capital flow" (Escribà-Folch 2017: 66).

This paper, thus, addresses two foreign incomes which can (potentially) increase dictators' personal power. I argue that foreign aid and FDI increase the degree of personalism. Dictators can use these rents to co-opt and buy the support of individuals form the elites, who at the same time, will compete against each other to increase their benefits and power. Moreover, with these rents, dictators will be able to exclude other rival individuals. The hypotheses I propose are in Table 1.

HYPOTHESIS 1	More foreign aid increases personalism levels.
HYPOTHESIS 2	More FDI increases personalism levels.
HYPOTHESIS 3	Economic aid is more likely to increase personalism levels than democratic aid.

Table 1: Hypotheses for the first paper.

In order to test them, I will use panel data of all autocratic regimes for the period 1960-2010. The period of observations, rather than beginning at the year 1946, will start in the year 1960 because this is the first year

we have data on foreign aid and FDI. The observation will be autocratic regimes. My dependent variable will be the *latent index of personalism*, as explained in the previous section. My two independent variables will be *foreign aid* and *FDI*. Both will be measured as the absolute number of aid or FDI in a given year, though it will also be interesting to investigate if the variation and the accumulated amount of aid and FDI also influences personalism. I will get the data from the World Development Indicators and they will be logged.

In this paper I will control for different things. These controls are going to be the ones which are mainly used in the literature, such as GDP per capita, population or Cold War, and also controls related to autocracies and dictators, such as regime age, time in power of the leader of whether the leader is the first or subsequent one.

For what concerns the methodological aspects of this paper, there is one thing that needs to be addressed: endogeneity. In Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004:F201, F205) words: "Endogeneity of aid in the growth regression has been recognised and discussed at least since Papanek (1972), and almost all of the recent aid effectiveness studies test for biases in the estimated parameters resulting from endogeneity of aid. [...] [A]id allocations respond to lagged income. This underlines the importance of modelling aid as an endogenous regressor".[11] In sum, the vast majority of the literature treats aid's endogeneity through Instrumental Variables (IV)[12]. This means that the literature provides many different instruments that can be used, which will be chosen at its precise moment. Furthermore, endogeneity is also problematic for FDI. In this sense, even though the characteristics of FDI are different than foreign aid's, it is net inflows of private investors to foreign countries, many times to underdeveloped countries, like dictatorships. Thus, I will also use IV for this variable.

3.2.2 Second Paper

In the second paper I ask: What is the effect of autocratic multiparty elections on personalism? Here I will address whether a domestic factor can increase personalism. Hence, I will try to uncover the relationship between both issues.

Regarding multiparty elections, some things need to be considered. First, I follow a minimal definition of multiparty elections –if there is more than one party in the contest– and I assume that they will not be free nor fair elections as being elections in autocratic regimes. Second, following my second assumption, multiparty elections can be binding or non-binding. This is fundamental because not all autocratic regimes use institutions for the same purposes, nor all institutions produce the same outcomes.

However, why is the research question of this paper relevant? We are facing a paradoxical event here, which might seem counter-intuitive: personalism and multiparty elections in autocracies have been increasing at the same time. Regimes such as Russia or Venezuela are examples of this: high rates of personalism, but still, multiparty elections are regularly held. In fact, this is a very important point: if we define autocra-

[11] Even tough this quotation refers to aid and growth, there are many examples in the literature that address endogeneity of aid and, for instance, institutions. As an example of this, Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008: 176) posit that "[a]s aid may flow to countries whose institutions are getting worse, we need instruments for foreign aid".

[12] See Dietrich and Wright (2015) and Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008)

cies for the absence of free and fair elections, there are, indeed, autocratic regimes that hold multiparty elections, but are still considered autocracies. These "regimes are defined as autocracies with legal multiparty competition for the legislature [...]. What distinguishes them from democracies is that this electoral competition is rendered unfair or insufficiently free due to regime control and manipulation" (Miller 2020: 3). Figure 5[13] shows the frequency of legislative and executive elections and the mean of personalism in the period 1946-2010.



Figure 5: Frequency of legislative and executive elections per year and mean of personalism (1946-2010). Own elaboration, data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018). Note: the blue line shows the tendency and the confidence intervals of total elections (aggregation of legislative and executive elections); the vertical red line shows the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, multiparty elections in autocratic regimes are also important for the fact that they make regimes last longer (Lust-Okar 2006). However, the possibility of facing a coup increases in the aftermath of an electoral event (Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig 2017; Wig and Rød 2016). This suggests that elections, even though they make regimes last longer, can also create turmoil situations.

Finally, there is another fact that make multiparty elections worth to study. Democratic transitions are more likely to happen when the collapse of the regimes is not coerced and is non-violent, and even though coups are the most frequent way through which dictatorships fall, electoral defeats are the most likely regime failure-type since the end of the Cold War, just shortly ahead of popular uprisings (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Kendall–Taylor and Frantz 2014). This can be explained by the simple fact that elections have increase in frequency since 1991, but still, the trend of increasing personalism at the same time makes many questions arise.

Hence, is there a relationship between them? Might elections be a tool to personalize? I argue that multiparty elections are, indeed, used by dictators to concentrate more personal power. They will try to divide the elites, but also to engage, organize and co-opt individuals from the elite, opposition and citizenry.

[13] I wish to thank Irene Rodríguez-López for her generous help to create this figure.

These two strategies, however, are also influenced by other factors. For instance, the nature of the elections (whether they are legislative or executive) will matter, and further, the outcome of the electoral event too. It is not the same, from the dictator side, to win or to lose the elections: to win them might be a signal of his strength, whilst to lose them of his weakness. The hypotheses I propose are in Table 2.

HYPOTHESIS 1	Multiparty elections are likely to positively affect personalism levels.
HYPOTHESIS 2	Executive multiparty elections are more likely to positively affect personalism levels.
HYPOTHESIS 3	To lose a multiparty elections will decrease personalism levels.

Table 2: Hypotheses for the second paper.

To measure the effect of multiparty elections on personalism I will use panel data of all autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2010. There are 4591 observations and I use different data sets as sources. My unit of observation will be autocratic regime. My dependent variable will be the *latent index of personalism*, as explained in the previous section. My two main independent variables are *Legislative elections* and *Executive elections*, which are coded independently as dummy variables. The data is from the NELDA 6.0 data set on elections that provides information about elections celebrated in the period 1945-2020, with election rounds being the unit of observation (Hyde and Marinov 2012)[14].

Whether to choose or not an electoral event depends on the fact that there are, at least, two parties contesting in the elections. This is explained by the variable *NELDA3*, which "indicates whether at least one opposition political party existed to contest the election. [...] An opposition party is one that is not in the government, meaning it is not affiliated with the incumbent party in power [...]. (Hyde and Marinov 2012:Codebook). Further, if there is more than one round of an election, I include them as only one event. Finally, it will be interesting to also investigate the effect of the aggregate number of elections an autocratic regime has held. In this sense, it could be that it is not an isolated event that makes personalism levels increase, but the sum of many events that, together, makes dictators personalize.

In this paper I will control for different issues. These controls are going to be the ones which are mainly used in the literature, such as GDP per capita, population or Cold War, and also controls related to autocracies and dictators, such as regime age, time in power of the leader of whether the leader is the first or subsequent one. In this paper, further, it is going to be important to control for things related to elections: for instance, the outcome of the event.

For what concerns the methodological aspects of this paper, again, there is one thing that needs to be addressed: endogeneity[15]. In this regard, the type of entry of the dictators is related to the possibilities of

[14] See *Appendix C* for descriptive statistics of the data.

[15] I wish to thank Jonas W. Schmid for his suggestion in that respect.

concentrating power, and also are elections: thus, to seize power through an electoral event is very likely to influence the amount of power dictators will be able to concentrate, and also the probabilities of holding elections during their time in office. Thus, I will develop a structure of lags of my independent variables in order to solve this problem. Finally, there is one final concern to address: while personalism is coded yearly every 1st of January, elections are coded daily, when the event was held. This can be problematic because the effect should, theoretically speaking, happen in the short term, and the way both variables are coded might make it difficult to estimate the real effect of elections on personalism.

3.2.3 Third Paper

As it has been stated at the end of the introduction of this proposal, personalist dictators are the most likely to begin wars. Both interstate and civil wars are the worst outcome of any political bargain and it can be said that are the worst policy any statesman can pursue. In this third paper I want to analyze interstate and civil wars, in sum, conflict, and the effect on personalism. In this sense, we can understand them both as domestic and/or foreign factors. In sum, I ask two main questions: what is the effect of interstate wars on the degree of personalism? What is the effect of civil wars on the degree of personalism?

In this regard, this paper contributes to the literature in the sense that, as being war the worst possible outcome of domestic and international politics, it will shed light on whether they are used for specific reason: this is, to concentrate more power. In Goemans (2000: 555) words: "a rational explanation for war requires not only and explanation of why the participants could not reach agreement without fighting but also why they fought as long as they did before agreeing to stop.". And further, "[d]espite seeming like an obvious pathway of inquiry, the relationship between the struggle for power and large-scale political violence has been undertheorized in the heavily structuralist civil war literature" (Roessler 2011: 301).

Regarding the concept of war, some things need to be considered. First, by war I mean an armed conflict, this is, "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year", but moreover, by war I specifically mean "[a] state-based conflict or dyad which reaches at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a specific calendar year" (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2022). Therefore, one defining property of a war is the intensity of the armed conflict.

Second, the other feature of wars, which is the one that distinguishes between interstate and civil wars, is "who" fights. We can define the first one as an international conflict in which two or more states (or governments) fight against each other, while the second one as a "conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries." (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2022). Overall, these definitions of "war", "interstate war" and "civil war" are somehow established in the literature, and shared among many scholars, though with some differences among them. For the sake of simplicity, I will not dive further into it[16].

There is a vast literature on wars. The fact that dictators, and specially personalist dictators, are who

[16] Some examples of this are the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Cederman and Vogt (2017) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2022). For an in-depth review of the different conceptual definitions and coding rules of civil war by different scholars, see Sambanis (2004)

initiate wars more commonly is well established in the literature. A possible explanation of this is linked to the dictator's fate: "the risk of post-exit punishment causes dictators to behave differently than they would otherwise. [...] In personalist dictatorships, most leaders [...] face exile, imprisonment, or death after ouster" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014: 321)[17]. We must take into account that the punishment dictators might suffer can come from different situations: they can lose power because of a coup, they can face a popular uprising, or they can lose a war.

In this direction, Goemans (2000: 569) found that dictators, in contrast to mixed-regime's leaders[18], are more likely to stay in power after a defeat in a war, and they are "only likely to suffer a sever punishment when they lose disastrously". Yet it is different to lose office than to suffer a post-exit punishment, and compared to democratic leaders, when dictators lose a war, the likelihood of losing office increases, while on the other hand, the likelihood of staying in power increases if they win (Debs and Goemans 2010).

Furthermore, "[w]hile the lack of institutionalized mechanisms for removing undesired leaders [in dictatorships] means that removal is relatively rare, it also means that the associated punishment can be quite severe. [...] Thus, institutions of accountability generate two countervailing effects, and it is not clear which dominates." (Schultz, 2001: 14-15, cited in Debs and Goemans (2010: 431–432)). This suggests that if there are binding institutions, going to a war is more costly because there will be more accountability and an easier replacement. Yet, under the conditions of non-binding institutions, going to war might not be that costly: there will be a rational calculation of the possibilities of winning the war, and also about the possible gains in bargain, but because nature determines the outcome of the war, the costs of losing are not extremely high because they will be in the long term while, in the mid-term, the benefits of increasing personal power might exist.

These last issues are very important. We must assume that dictators will decide their policies through rational calculations. If they will only suffer a sever punishment if they lose the war disastrously, to initiate one might not be a bad decision provided they, indeed, have a chance of winning. However, there is an important point that must be said: the most important threat dictators face is a coup perpetrated by the ruling elites.

Autocrats exclude dangerous members that could oust him, and this strategy decreases the probability of facing a coup, but, on the other hand, it increases the probability of facing a civil war: "elite bargaining and the incumbent's strategies of political survival can be significant as drives of large-scale political violence as are underlying structural conditions or bad neighborhoods" (Roessler 2011: 338). What this suggests is that the theorized strategies to personalize can make dictators more vulnerable to other actors (Grundholm 2020), but moreover, this underlines the endogenous nature of conflict and personalism.

However, the findings by Roessler might differ between the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010: 421) argue that "[t]he end of the Cold War is associated with (1) the decline of rebel capacity, (2) the decline of state capacity, and (3) the emergence of new post-communist states". Thus, even though states lost state capacity, the rebels too, and because states are generally stronger than

[17]Notice, though, that these findings are using typologies rather than latent characteristics as I do. Nevertheless, there is a high correlation between personalist regime-type and personalism as latent dimension.

[18]Notice that this analysis was done using Polity III data.

other non-state actors, to be vulnerable to outsiders does not critically affects dictators[19].

Thus, autocrats care about their fate and the way this fate comes. Chiozza and Goemans (2011: 2–3) argue that "the fate of leaders and the political processes of leadership turnover shape leaders' decisions to initiate international conflict". This argument suggests that the answer of why leaders initiate conflict lies on domestic politics, rather than international antagonism. This point is, indeed, very important: if dictators think they will increase their personal gains in the domestic environment from starting an international conflict, they will initiate one, provided some underlying conditions, this is, if the likelihood of a forcible removal from office is high: "leaders [...] have little to lose and much to gain from [...] conflict", and thus, war can be profitable and *ex post* efficient for leaders (Chiozza and Goemans 2011: 5). In fact, this argument collides with a well-established explanation of war, in which it is *ex post* inefficient (Fearon 1995), though it is very important to acknowledge it.

In this line, Chiozza and Goemans propose two mechanisms in order to solve the commitment problems of autocratic politics through international conflict: (1) fighting for survival and (2) gambling for survival. Starting form the former, "simply sending soldiers to fight can increase a leader's chances against his opponents" (Chiozza and Goemans 2011: 19). In this sense, the military is forced to obey the orders to not being identified as plotters, just by sending them to fight, and also "an invasion across the border increases the probability of decisively defeating domestic rebels" (Chiozza and Goemans 2011: 25).

In the latter, to win a war gives legitimacy, increases the capabilities and resources, but more importantly, "victory decreases the probability of a coup, because victory inhibits attempts to coordinate to remove the leader [...]" (Chiozza and Goemans 2011: 25), while also striking the first increases the probability of winning the conflict (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Fearon 1995). On the other hand, to lose the war (disastrously) might increase the probability of losing office: the military will be weakened, thus making the leader more vulnerable, while if the defeats is followed by a foreign imposed rule, almost by definition the former government will be ousted.

In sum, leaders who face a threat of a violent removal from office have a lot to gain, but little to lose from conflict. This is the case of autocrats: as we have stated before in this proposal, violence is always a plausible solution on autocratic politics, and from the dictators' point of view, the main objective they have is to be as less vulnerable as possible, and this means to be as much protected from coups as they can.

My argument goes in line with Roessler (2011): under the conditions of commitment problems, for a dictator it will be better to be coup risk free, and therefore, the possibilities of (civil) war will increase. Further, my argument also builds on Chiozza and Goemans (2011): the more likely a violent removal from office is, the more benefits a dictator can get from conflict. Thus, I argue that dictators use wars in order to concentrate more power. Further, dictators who have a low degree of personalism will initiate a war to increase their personalism. Because to be punished is not likely unless they lose disastrously, they might use the war as a zero-sum game: they will have little to lose, but a lot to gain. In a similar direction, dictators with high degree of personalism will also initiate wars to increase their personalism: the argument here is that, because they have discrete power, they will use it without fearing they are going to get ousted and

[19] See *Figure 2* in Kalyvas and Balcells (2010: 422).

punished. Nevertheless, what matters here is not only the fact that a war might start, but the consequences of the war itself. Thus, the outcome of the war matters, and who initiates it too: the first strike gives advantage to whom it does it. In sum, is it the conflict itself, the onset, the ongoing or the outcome? This entails the endogenous nature of conflict. The hypotheses I propose are in Table 3.

HYPOTHESIS 1	Interstate wars increase personalism levels.
HYPOTHESIS 2	Civil wars increase personalism levels.
HYPOTHESIS 3	To win a war increases personalism levels.

Table 3: Hypotheses for the third paper.

To measure the effect of interstate and civil wars on personalism I will use panel data of all autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2010. There are 4591 observations and I use different data sets as sources. My unit of observation will be autocratic regime. My dependent variable will be the *latent index of personalism*, as explained previously. The independent variables will be *Interstate War* and *Civil War*. I will get the data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 21.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021). In this data set there is data on the type of war, the sides who fought, start and end dates and other information.

In this paper I will control for different issues. These controls are going to be the ones which are mainly used in the literature, such as GDP per capita, population or Cold War, and also controls related to autocracies and dictators, such as regime age, time in power of the leader of whether the leader is the first or subsequent one. In this paper, further, it is going to be important to control for things related to ethnicity, geography of the terrain or ideology of the contenders.

Concerning the methodological aspects of this paper, I will conduct a synthetic control method in order to asses the causal effect of wars on personalism[20]. This methodological approach has been used to test the causal effect of failed coups on personalism (Timoneda, Escribà-Folch, and Chin 2021), and what I aim to study has similar characteristics: even though the independent variables are not the same, the dependent variable is. In this sense, a "synthetic control method is based on the idea that, when the units of observation are a small number of aggregate entities, a combination of unaffected units often provides a more appropriate comparison than any single unaffected unit alone. [...] A synthetic control is defined as a weighted average of the units in the donor pool" (Abadie 2021: 393, 395)[21]. Thus, because the number of autocracies that have suffered either an interstate or civil war is not large, a synthetic control approach is suitable. In Timoneda, Escribà-Folch and Chin's words:

[20] See Abadie (2021), Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015), and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) for a formal explanation of how synthetic control method works.

[21] By "donor pool" we mean "the set of potential comparisons, $j = 2, ..., J + 1$ is a collection of untreated units not affected by the intervention" (Abadie 2021: 394).

> By generating a donor pool from similar cases where no treatment occurred, we can estimate the counterfactual response by the treated unit absent the treatment (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). Synthetic controls use a data-driven process to determine the weights that make the control group closely resemble the treatment group before the treatment occurs. The response by the control group can then be considered the counterfactual response for the treatment group, allowing inference. (Timoneda, Escribà-Folch, and Chin 2021: 17)

Finally, there is one last item to be discussed. If personalist dictators are the most likely to initiate wars, this is, the higher the degree of personalism, the more likely to initiate wars, there is a problem of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the proposed synthetic control method proposed above will (potentially) solve this problem, given it uses treatment and control groups.

4 Calendar of the Ph.D. Project

	Course 2021-2022	**Course 2022-2023**	**Course 2023-2024**
Project proposal	**X**		
1st Paper	**X**	**X**	
2nd Paper		**X**	
3rd Paper		**X**	**X**
Thesis Defence			**X**

Table 4: Calendar of the Ph.D. Project

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Appendices

A The Latent Measure of Personalism *versus* The Measure of Consolidation of Power

In this appendix I aim to discuss two measures of personalism: the latent measure of personalism by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018; henceforth GWF) and the measure of consolidation of power by Gandhi and Sumner (2020; henceforth GS). I will, first, explain both measures individually and, second, I will discuss them in comparison to argue why I consider GWF's a better approximation of the phenomenon I aim to study in my research. Nevertheless, we should start from the point that both measures are theoretically explained and empirically validated, and that the comparison I will establish here is only related to this concrete research: there might be instances in which Gandhi and Sumner's measure is a better choice.

A.1 The Latent Measure of Personalism (GWF, 2018):

The latent measure of personalism is theoretically explained in the seminal book by GWF (2018) and it is validated in Wright (2021). According to Wright (2021), autocratic rule is characterized by three latent characteristics: the *party*, the *military* and the *personal*. They change over time, within regimes and across regimes, and allows researchers to address questions that could not be answer with previous data on autocratic regimes, which classified them in static typologies.

The latent measure of personalism captures the *personal* dimension. With eight indicators (parsimony rule), they use an Item Response Theory Two-Parameter Logistic Model (ITR 2-PL) to construct the continuous measure, which takes values between 0 and 1, being 1 the maximum degree of personalism.

The indicators they use capture different things which, theoretically, explain or help explaining personalism. These indicators are coded as 0 or 1 through the whole period (1946-2010) and for every autocratic regime in the data set:

> There is substantial overlap among these indicators, both because dictators who use one strategy for concentrating power in their own hands often use others as well and because one piece of historical information can sometimes be used to code more than one indicator. (GWF, 2018: 82)

The indicators and what they capture are explained in the following lines (GWF, 2017, 2018: 80-82):

1. **GWF-Indicator 1 (*Security Apparatus*):** It captures whether the leader controls the security forces: *Does the regime leader personally control the security apparatus?*

   > Personal control of internal security agencies increases the dictator's information advantage over other members of the dictatorial elite as well as his ability to use violence against them. The dictator's advantage comes not only from his access to the information collected, which he can keep from other members of the inner circle, but also from his ability to order security officers to arrest his colleagues. (GWF, 2018: 80)

2. **GWF-Indicator 2 (*Creation of paramilitary*):** It captures whether the leader controls the security

forces: *Does the regime leader create paramilitary forces, a president's guard, or new security force loyal to himself?*

> Dictators use paramilitary forces to counterbalance the regular military when they see it as unreliable. The creation of armed forces directly controlled by the dictator increases the concentration of power in that it reduces the regular military's ability to threaten the dictator with ouster if he fails to share or consult. (GWF, 2018: 80)

3. **GWF-Indicator 3 (*Party executive committee*)**: It captures the relationship between the dictator and the party leadership or executive committee: *Does the regime leader control appointments to the party executive committee?*

> The dictator has concentrated power, we argue, if he chooses top party leaders rather than party leaders choosing him. (GWF, 2018: 80).

4. **GWF-Indicator 4 (*Rubber stamp*):** It captures the relationship between the dictator and the party leadership or executive committee: *Is the party executive committee absent or simply a rubber stamp for the regime leader's decisions?*

> It identifies party executive committees that serve as arenas for hammering out policy decisions rather than as rubber stamps for policy and personnel choices made by the dictator (rubber stamp). We see discussion of policy alternatives and disagreements over choices, which are reported in the media and in secondary sources, as indications that the dictator has not concentrated policy-making power. The absence of policy disagreements indicates the opposite. (GWF, 2018: 81)

5. **GWF-Indicator 5 (*Appointments to high office*)**: *Does access to high office depend on personal loyalty to the regime leader?* It captures "the dictator's control over appointments to important offices in the government, military, and ruling party" and it is the only indicator which derives from secondary literature (GWF, 2018: 81).

6. **GWF-Indicator 6 (*Create new party*)**: It captures the country-years which dictators created a new ruling party: *Did the regime leader create a new support political party after seizing power?*

> The variable new party identifies country-years in which autocracies organize new ruling parties. We consider the dictator's creation of a new support party a strategy for adding personal loyalists to the dictatorial inner circle. Bringing new members into the dictatorial elite dilutes the power of existing members (usually those who helped seize power) and increases the weight of the faction supporting the dictator. We code a new support party if the dictator or a close ally created a new party after the seizure of power or, in a few cases, during an election campaign before authoritarianization. When a dictator organizes a ruling party, he chooses its leadership. Such parties rarely develop sufficient autonomous power to constrain the dictator. (GWF, 2018: 81)

7. **GWF-Indicator 7 (*Military promotions*) and GWF-Indicator 8 (*Military purge*)**: They capture the relationship between the dictator and the military: GWF-I7 – *Does the regime leader promote officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or partisan group, or are there widespread forced retirement of officers from other groups?* GWF-I8 – *Does the regime leader imprison/kill officers from groups other than his own without a reasonably fair trial?*

   > [W]hether he promotes officers loyal to himself or from his tribal, ethnic, partisan, or religious group (*promotions*) and whether he imprisons or kills officers from other groups without fair trials (*purges*). Dictator-controlled promotions and purges demonstrate the dictator's capacity to change the command structure of the military, and thus the composition of military decision-making bodies. If the dictator can control the composition of the officer corps, the military cannot make credible threats to oust him if he fails to share power. (GWF, 2018: 81-82)

A.2 The Measure of Consolidation of Power (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020):

The measure of consolidation of power is theoretically explained and empirically validated in Gandhi and Sumner (2020). The authors argue that to survive in power is the product of either the consolidation of power of the dictator or power-sharing agreements (two different equilibria). We can infer from existing works by Gandhi (see Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007) that the second equilibrium happens when the elites are not able to credibly threaten the dictator.

Therefore, in order to capture these equilibria, the authors construct a measure of consolidation of power for the period 1946-2008, of 597 individual leaders and 134 countries, which takes values between -3 and 3, being 3 the maximum degree of consolidation:

> We develop a measure of the consolidation of power that incorporates indicators of key behaviors that are theoretically associated with the phenomenon. With our measure, we are able to capture the variation in the concentration of power that exists both across leaders and within the tenure of a single leader. Finally, because the inner workings of dictatorships are opaque (Barros 2016), we conceive of the consolidation of power as a continuous latent trait that can be measured by leveraging as much information as possible on its observable manifestations. Consequently, we rely on an item response theory (IRT) model for time series cross sectional data to produce estimates of leaders' concentration of power (Copelovitch, Gandrud, and Hallerberg 2018; Fariss 2014; Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2018; Linzer and Staton 2015; Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010; Treier and Jackman 2008). (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1546)

The indicators and what they capture are explained in the following lines (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1548-1550):

1. **Indicators that capture the freedom from the military and party constraints**:

   (a) **GS-Indicator 1:** ***No regime party***: It captures the following:

> [A] ruler who does not govern with a regime party does not need to contend with this rival organization. *No regime party* is coded 1 if the leader rules without the support of an official governing party and 0 otherwise. Yet since most dictators have parties, we distinguish between real and puppet parties by tracking their origins and frequency. Autocrats that found parties are much less likely to be constrained by them than those who inherit such institutions. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1548)

(b) **GS-Indicator 2: *(Party) Founded while in power***: It captures the following:

> *Founded while in power*is coded 1 beginning in the year the ruler founds the regime party and every year afterward, 0 otherwise. In addition, the installation of various regime parties during a leader's tenure is a sign of any one party's institutional weakness. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1548)

(c) **GS-Indicator 3: *Multiple parties***: It captures the following:

> *Multiple parties* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if a leader has been associated with more than one party and zero otherwise. Only 10% of observations are leaders who were associated with multiple parties. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1548)

(d) **GS-Indicator 4: *Military involvement***: It captures the following:

> [It is based] on Svolik's (2012) coding of military involvement on authoritarian rule. He distinguishes among four types of rule: (1) civilian executive with no evidence of military intervention in matters unrelated to national security (civilian), (2) civilian executive with military involvement in domestic affairs (indirect), (3) a professional soldier as executive heading a government that formally incorporates the armed forces in decision-making (direct, corporate), and (4) a professional soldier as executive with little corporate involvement by the military (direct, personal). Leaders who fit into categories 2 and 3 are clearly constrained: civilian executives constrained by the military and military executives constrained by their colleagues. Categories 1 and 4 include leaders who are less likely to be constrained by the military as an institution and, therefore, more likely to be personalist. Consequently, we create a dichotomous indicator, *Military involvement*, which takes the value 1 if the military as an institution indirectly or directly constrains the executive and 0 otherwise. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1548-1549)

2. **Indicators that capture the control over political office:**

(a) **GS-Indicator 5: *Military purges***: It is based on Sudduth (2017; see Gandhi and Sumner, 2020). It captures the following:

> *Military purges* takes the value 1 in the year a military purge occurs and for every year afterward within a leader's tenure. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1549).

(b) **GS-Indicator 6: *Domestic purges***: It is based on Banks (2011; see Gandhi and Sumner, 2020). It captures the following:

> [W]e also include *Domestic purges*, Banks's (2011) indicator of "any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition," which is coded in the same manner. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1549)

(c) **GS-Indicator 7: *Cabinet change***: It is based on Banks (2011; see Gandhi and Sumner, 2020). It captures the shuffling of individuals from the elite in the cabinet positions in order to make it more difficult for them.

> We systematically capture major attempts at shuffling with Banks's (2011) measure of *Cabinet change*, which we have coded to take the value 1 in the year a new premier is named or 50% of the cabinet posts are assumed by new ministers. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1549).

(d) **GS-Indicator 8 (*Two positions*), GS-Indicator 9 (*Three or more positions*) and GS-Indicator 10 (*No position*)**: These three indicators capture whether the dictator occupy different political positions. Logically, the more positions he occupies, the more power he will have consolidated.

> *Two positions* is a dichotomous indicator that takes the value 1 for every year that a leader occupies two official political positions and 0 otherwise. *Three or more positions* is a dichotomous indicator that takes the value 1 for every year that a leader occupies at least three official positions, 0 otherwise. […] *No position* takes the value 1 if the ruler was the de facto chief executive without an official title, 0 otherwise. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1549).

(e) **GS-Indicator 11: *Family in office***: It captures whether the dictator has appointed relatives in key positions, a strategy used by most dictators who achieve to consolidate power. Relatives are, in essence, the most loyal individuals.

> [W]e collapse our information into a dichotomous indicator, *Family in office*, which takes the value 1 if any of the leader's immediate family occupies political office and 0 otherwise. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1549-1550).

3. **Additional indicators:**

(a) **GS-Indicator 12: *Dictator before transition***: There are some leaders who were dictators before becoming a democratic president after transition.

> *Dictator before transition* takes the value 1 for all country-years in which a leader rules as a dictator before becoming a democrat. These leaders are more likely to govern as personalists when they are dictators than democrats (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1550).

(b) **GS-Indicator 13: *No formal collective***: It captures whether there is a collective leadership.

> *No formal collective* takes the value 1 when the executive is not formally collective, 0 otherwise. The absence of formal collective authority should make it easier for any one individual to become a personalist leader. (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1550).

A.3 Discussion: The Latent Measure of Personalsim *versus* The Measure of Consolidation of Power:

In this section I aim to discuss both measures in order to justify why I will use the latent measure of personalism (GWF, 2018) as my dependent variable. We should start from the statement that both measures are theoretically explained and empirically validated. They capture, in essence, the same phenomenon, which is the concentration of power of one man over the ruling elites, though they, because of the different indicators used for their construction, differ on the approximation of the phenomenon. This is relevant: I consider the latent measure of personalism a better approximation of it.

The justification lies in the fact that, first, it is understood as a latent characteristic of autocratic rule, and even though I will only use the *Personal* dimension, it should be understood as one among three latent characteristics. And second, the way it is theoretically justified (i.e., the unity and discipline of the elites) really captures how personalism rises. In contrast, Gandhi and Sumner (2020) do not provide a convincing argument of how the two possible equilibria (i.e., power-sharing or consolidation of power) can be really achieved.

In relation to this last point, there are several things to be said about the indicators used in both measures. First, both measures are based on a parsimony rule, yet GWF's (GWF) is better in this issue: rather than using thirteen indicators, they use eight.

Second, the number of indicators has other implications: it could be argued that Gandhi and Sumner have not merged indicators that could have been used together, both theoretically and empirically. For instance, they use two indicators to capture purges (*Military purges* and *Domestic purges*), while GWF use one indicator (*Purges*) that capture only those against the military officers. I consider this important: what Sudduth (2017) argues is that dictators purge the elites when their options to oust the dictator are low. The elites are both civilian and military actors, though the ones who are able to do a coup are the military, because they are the ones who hold the weapons. Therefore, *Military purges* and *Domestic purges* could have been either merged or only used the one which captures the purges against military.

Other indicators by Gandhi and Sumner which capture similar things that could have been merged are *Two positions*, *Three or more positions*, and *No position*. In this sense, it would have been easier and better (following a parsimony rule) to use one indicator that capture whether the leader occupies more than one position, yet to occupy only one position does not mean he will not be able to consolidate/personalize. In fact, there are other indicators in GWF's measure that capture important things such as the control of the party executive committee or the appointments to high office: in a situation where the dictator only controls the presidency, but he controls both the party and the appointments, he will be able to consolidate power even if he does not occupy more than one position. And, logically, a dictator who does not hold any position will not be able to consolidate power and, in fact, only 19 observations of the whole data set are coded as 1 in this specific indicator.

Furthermore, GWF argue that political parties can be tools for dictators either when they create them or when they control an existing one. Consider the following example: Stalin did not create the CPSU in the USSR, though he had a strong control of its executive committee and the appointments to high office. He had

high levels of personalism. Another example could be Franco in Spain: he took control of an existing party. Therefore, *GS-I1* and *GS-I3* do not really add that much information: first, the vast majority of the leaders have a party (so *GS-I1* does not really add information); second, *GS-I3* does not really add information either because, as they state, "only 10% of observations are leaders who were associated with multiple parties" (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020: 1548). *GS-I3*, in contrast, captures the same as the indicator *New Party* by GWF.

In addition, the argumentation of the indicator *Military involvement* is not really convincing. Gandhi and Sumner (2020: 1548) argue that "leaders who fit into [Svolik's] categories 2 and 3 are clearly constrained: civilian executives constrained by the military and military executives constrained by their colleagues". These two categories imply that there is a "(2) civilian executive with military involvement in domestic affairs (indirect), (3) a professional soldier as executive heading a government that formally incorporates the armed forces in decision-making (direct, corporate)". The *GS-I4* equals 1 if the military constrains and 0 if it does not.

Several things can be said here: first, the theoretical background does not really match the empirical indicator; second, and related to the first, GWF have four indicators that capture better the relationship between the dictator and the military: *Security apparatus*, *Creation of paramilitary*, *Promotions*, and *Purges*. In this sense, the fact that the military is part of the decision-making process or that it has an involvement in domestic affairs does not really matters nor constrains the leader's power provided, for instance, these individuals have been promoted by the dictator. Therefore, when these four indicators by GWF are coded as 0, the military will be a powerful actor, while if they are coded as 1 it will not be, though it does not mean they will not be into high-ranked positions in the inner-circle.

Finally, the last two indicators by Gandhi and Sumner do not add information. *GS-I12* is coded as 1 if the leader was a dictator and continues in power after a democratic transition. Nevertheless, we should not care about whether they continue in power after a transition because it is a different institutional arrangement and, in fact, is not really coded as an autocratic regime (hence, it is out of the sample). And further, those dictators that continued in power after a democratic transition are usually dictators for whom transition was cheaper: they already had developed an important institutional and organizational apparatus which make it easier for them to compete under democratic rule.

Consider the example Gandhi and Sumner use for this indicator: the case of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. He took power in 1979 and in 1992 he became the democratic president of the country after democratic elections. Ghana was a country dependent of foreign aid, and in the 1990s, donors established some conditions to this aid: to liberalize the regime. Rawlings won the (presumably democratic) elections in 1992 and in 1996, and in the year 2000 he retired. In fact, this is the last year in which GWF code Ghana as an autocratic regime because Rawlings' party lost the elections and democracy was, finally, really achieved in Ghana. Yet, in 2008 and 2011, Rawling's party won again the elections, though without him as the leader.

What this case exemplifies is the fact that there are institutional arrangements that are more likely to transition to democratic or semi-democratic rule: this arrangements under autocratic rule are, in sum, large party organizations that makes it cheaper for the dictatorial elite to democratize because they will still have a big chance of continuing in power after a transition to democracy. In the same direction, those dictator-

ships in which the military had a strong power are also more likely to transit to a democracy. Huntington summarizes it:

> After democratization a former monopolistic party is in no better position than any other political group to reinstate an authoritarian system. The party gives up its monopoly of power but not the opportunity to compete for power by democratic means. When they return to the barracks, the military give up both, but they also retain the capacity to reacquire power by nondemocratic means. The transition from a one-party system to democracy, consequently, is likely to be more difficult than the transition from a military regime to democracy, but it is also likely to be more permanent. […] The leaders of personal dictatorships were less likely than those of military and one-party regimes to give up power voluntarily. Personal dictators in countries that transited to democracy as well as those that did not usually tried to remain in office as long as they could. This often created tensions between a narrowly based political system and an increasingly complex and modern economy and society. […] Transitions to democracy from personal dictatorship thus occurred when the founding dictator died and his successors decided on democratization, when the dictator was overthrown, and when he or she miscalculated the support that the dictator could win in an election. (Huntington, 1991: 120-121)

In addition, the last indicator has a similar critique as *GS-I12*. By definition, a collective ruling will not be either personalist or power consolidated because there will be more than one individual ruling. Therefore, it does not really make sense.

Furthermore, there are practical reasons to choose GWF's rather than Gandhi and Sumner's. First, the period GWF captures is from the year 1946 to 2010, while in Gandhi and Sumner's finishes at the year 2008. Second, even though I do not use typologies to classify the autocratic regimes, these two measures are about autocratic regimes based on different typologies. GWF's measure is based on GWF data set (GWF, 2014) that classifies regimes as either dominant party, military, personalist, monarchies or hybrids (between the first three types) regimes. Gandhi and Sumner's is based on CGV's typology (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) which classifies regimes as either monarchic, military or civilian. These differences are important. The following lines provide an example of these differences:

> Besides the identification of transitions from one autocratic regime to another, the main difference between our data and the CGV data is our definitions of—and hence rules for coding—regime types. In keeping with our theoretical emphasis on the interests represented in the leadership group, we distinguish "military rule," by which we mean rule by an officer constrained by other officers—sometimes labeled rule by "the military as an institution"—from rule by a military strongman, which we label personalist. We define personalist regimes as autocracies in which discretion over policy and personnel are concentrated in the hands of one man, military or civilian. […] Distinguishing more collegial military rule from rule by a military strongman requires coding and combining a number of items designed to assess the dictator's power relative to other officers. Examples of these items include one that identifies who controls the security apparatus and one about whether the dictator has had other officers killed or jailed.

> In the CGV data set, in contrast, nondemocratic country-years are identified as military-led if the dictator wears or ever wore a uniform, thus grouping military strongmen with constrained military dictators in one category. (GWF, 2014: 319)[22].

Last but not least, in Table A1 and in Table A2 there are the number of observations of each indicator from both measures. As we can observe, Gandhi and Sumner's indicators have many missing values. This is problematic.

Indicator	0	1	Missing	Total
Security apparatus	1854 (40.38)	2737 (59.62)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Creation of paramilitary	2967 (64.63)	1624 (35.37)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Party executive committee	3131 (68.20)	1460 (31.80)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Rubber stamp	3199 (69.68)	1392 (30.32)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Appointments to high office	1635 (35.61)	2956 (64.39)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Create new party	3848 (83.82)	743 (16.18)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Military promotions	2648 (57.68)	1943 (42.32)	0 (0)	4591 (100)
Military purges	2913 (63.45)	1678 (36.55)	0 (0)	4591 (100)

Table A1: Summary statistics of GWF - Indicators (percentages in parentheses). Own elaboration, data from GWF (2018)

Indicator	0	1	Missing	Total
No regime party	3395 (66.59)	1695 (99.84)	8 (0.16)	5098 (100)
Founded while in power	2251 (44.15)	1134 (22.24)	1713 (33.60)	5098 (100)
Multiple parties	3066 (60.14)	327 (6.41)	1705 (33.44)	5098 (100)
Military involvement	677 (13.28)	4383 (85.97)	38 (0.75)	5098 (100)
Military purges	798 (15.65)	1426 (17.97)	2874 (56.38)	5098 (100)
Domestic purges	359 (7.63)	1897 (36.86)	2830 (55.51)	5098 (100)
Cabinet change	1506 (29.54)	2981 (58.47)	611 (11.99)	5098 (100)
Two positions	2686 (52.69)	1803 (35.37)	609 (11.95)	5098 (100)
Three or more positions	3842 (75.36)	647 (12.69)	609 (11.95)	5098 (100)
No position	4470 (87.68)	19 (0.37)	609 (11.95)	5098 (100)
Family in office	3131 (61.42)	841 (16.50)	1126 (22.09)	5098 (100)
Dictator before transition	100 (1.96)	4998 (98.04)	0 (0)	5098 (100)
No formal collective	34 (0.67)	5063 (99.31)	1 (0.02)	5098 (100)

Table A2: Summary statistics of GS - Indicators (percentages in parentheses). Own elaboration, data from Gandhi and Sumner (2020)

To sum up, I consider that GWF measure of personalism captures better the phenomenon I aim to study, both theoretically and empirically. Nevertheless, Gandhi and Sumner's is a great measure that can be use in many different research. In fact, I consider it is a great measure to use for replication tests in my own research in order to increase the validity and reliability of my findings.

[22] See GWF (2014) for a further discussion of the differences between GWF and CGV datasets.

A.4 Appendix A's Bibliography

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B Autocratic regime-cases list

In Table A3 there is the list of all autocratic regimes, first and last years and dictator's names that appear in the data set (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018).

Regime-case's Name	First Year	Last Year	Regime-case's Name	First Year	Last Year	Regime-case's Name	First Year	Last Year	Regime-case's Name	First Year	Last Year
Afghanistan 29-73	1930	1973	Congo-Brz 60-63	1961	1963	Ivory Coast 99-00	2000	2000	Poland 44-89	1945	1989
Afghanistan 73-78	1974	1978	Congo-Brz 63-68	1964	1968	Ivory Coast 00-NA	2001		Portugal 26-74	1927	1974
Afghanistan 78-92	1979	1992	Congo-Brz 68-91	1969	1991	Jordan 46-NA	1947		Romania 45-89	1946	1989
Afghanistan 96-01	1997	2001	Congo-Brz 97-NA	1998		Kazakhstan 91-NA	1992		Russia 93-NA	1994	
Afghanistan 09-NA	2010		Congo/Zaire 60-97	1961	1997	Kenya 63-02	1964	2002	Rwanda 62-73	1963	1973
Albania 44-91	1945	1991	Congo/Zaire 97-NA	1998		Korea North 48-NA	1949		Rwanda 73-94	1974	1994
Algeria 62-92	1963	1992	Costa Rica 48-49	1949	1949	Korea South 48-60	1949	1960	Rwanda 94-NA	1995	
Algeria 92-NA	1993		Cuba 52-59	1953	1959	Korea South 61-87	1962	1987	Saudi Arabia 27-NA	1928	
Angola 75-NA	1976		Cuba 59-NA	1960		Kuwait 61-NA	1962		Senegal 60-00	1961	2000
Argentina 43-46	1944	1946	Czechoslovakia 48-89	1949	1989	Kyrgyzstan 91-05	1992	2005	Serbia 91-00	1992	2000
Argentina 51-55	1952	1955	Dominican Rep 30-62	1931	1962	Kyrgyzstan 05-10	2006	2010	Sierra Leone 67-68	1968	1968
Argentina 55-58	1956	1958	Dominican Rep 63-65	1964	1965	Laos 59-60	1960	1960	Sierra Leone 68-92	1969	1992
Argentina 58-66	1959	1966	Dominican Rep 66-78	1964	1965	Laos 60-62	1961	1962	Sierra Leone 92-96	1993	1996
Argentina 66-73	1967	1973	Ecuador 44-47	1967	1978	Laos 75-NA	1976		Sierra Leone 97-98	1998	1998
Argentina 76-83	1977	1983	Ecuador 63-66	1945	1947	Lesotho 70-86	1971	1986	Singapore 65-NA	1966	
Armenia 94-98	1995	1998	Ecuador 70-72	1964	1966	Lesotho 86-93	1987	1993	Somalia 69-91	1970	1991
Armenia 98-NA	1999		Ecuador 72-79	1971	1972	Liberia 44-80	1945	1980	South Africa 10-94	1911	1994
Azerbaijan 91-92	1992	1992	Egypt 22-52	1923	1952	Liberia 80-90	1981	1990	Soviet Union 17-91	1918	1991
Azerbaijan 93-NA	1994		Egypt 52-NA	1953		Liberia 97-03	1998	2003	Spain 39-76	1940	1976
Bangladesh 71-75	1972	1975	El Salvador 31-48	1932	1948	Libya 51-69	1952	1969	Sri Lanka 78-94	1979	1994
Bangladesh 75-82	1976	1982	El Salvador 48-82	1949	1982	Libya 69-NA	1970		Sudan 58-64	1959	1964
Bangladesh 82-90	1983	1990	El Salvador 82-94	1983	1994	Madagascar 60-72	1961	1972	Sudan 69-85	1970	1985
Bangladesh 07-08	2008	2008	Eritrea 93-NA	1994		Madagascar 72-75	1973	1975	Sudan 85-86	1986	1986
Belarus 91-94	1992	1994	Ethiopia 89-74	1890	1974	Madagascar 75-93	1976	1993	Sudan 89-NA	1990	
Belarus 94-NA	1995		Ethiopia 74-91	1975	1991	Madagascar 09-NA	2010		Swaziland 68-NA	1969	
Benin 60-63	1961	1963	Ethiopia 91-NA	1992		Malawi 64-94	1965	1994	Syria 46-47	1947	1947
Benin 63-65	1964	1965	Gabon 60-NA	1961		Malaysia 57-NA	1958		Syria 49-51	1950	1951
Benin 65-67	1966	1967	Gambia 65-94	1966	1994	Mali 60-68	1961	1967	Syria 51-54	1952	1954
Benin 67-69	1968	1969	Gambia 94-NA	1995		Mali 68-91	1969	1991	Syria 57-58	1958	1958
Benin 69-70	1970	1970	Georgia 91-92	1992	1992	Mauritania 60-78	1961	1978	Syria 62-63	1963	1963
Benin 72-90	1973	1990	Georgia 92-03	1993	2003	Mauritania 78-05	1979	2005	Syria 63-NA	1964	
Bolivia 43-46	1944	1946	Germany East 49-90	1950	1990	Mauritania 05-07	2006	2007	Taiwan 49-00	1950	2000
Bolivia 46-51	1947	1951	Ghana 60-66	1961	1966	Mauritania 08-NA	2009		Tajikistan 91-NA	1992	
Bolivia 51-52	1952	1952	Ghana 66-69	1967	1969	Mexico 15-00	1916	2000	Tanzania 64-NA	1965	
Bolivia 52-64	1953	1964	Ghana 72-79	1973	1979	Mongolia 21-93	1922	1993	Thailand 44-47	1945	1947
Bolivia 64-69	1965	1969	Ghana 81-00	1982	2000	Morocco 56-NA	1957		Thailand 47-57	1948	1957
Bolivia 69-71	1970	1971	Greece 67-74	1968	1974	Mozambique 75-NA	1976		Thailand 57-73	1958	1973
Bolivia 71-79	1972	1979	Guatemala 54-58	1955	1958	Myanmar 58-60	1959	1960	Thailand 76-88	1977	1988
Bolivia 80-82	1981	1982	Guatemala 58-63	1959	1963	Myanmar 62-88	1963	1988	Thailand 91-92	1992	1992
Botswana 66-NA	1967		Guatemala 63-66	1964	1966	Myanmar 88-NA	1989		Thailand 06-07	2007	2007
Brazil 64-85	1965	1985	Guatemala 66-70	1967	1970	Namibia 90-NA	1991		Togo 60-63	1961	1963
Bulgaria 44-90	1945	1990	Guatemala 70-85	1971	1985	Nepal 46-51	1847	1951	Togo 63-NA	1964	
Burkina Faso 60-66	1961	1966	Guatemala 85-95	1986	1995	Nepal 51-91	1952	1991	Tunisia 56-NA	1957	
Burkina Faso 66-80	1967	1980	Guinea 58-84	1959	1984	Nepal 02-06	2003	2006	Turkey 23-50	1924	1950
Burkina Faso 80-82	1983	1987	Guinea 84-08	1985	2008	Nicaragua 36-79	1937	1979	Turkey 57-60	1958	1960
Burkina Faso 82-87	1983	1987	Guinea 08-10	2009	2010	Nicaragua 79-90	1980	1990	Turkey 60-61	1961	1961
Burkina Fas 87-NA	1988		Guinea Bissau 74-80	1975	1980	Niger 60-74	1961	1974	Turkey 80-83	1981	1983
Burundi 62-66	1963	1966	Guinea Bissau 80-99	1981	1999	Niger 74-91	1975	1991	Turkmenistan 91-NA	1992	
Burundi 66-87	1967	1987	Guinea Bissau 02-03	2003	2003	Niger 96-99	1997	1999	Uganda 66-71	1967	1971
Burundi 87-93	1988	1993	Haiti 41-46	1942	1946	Nigeria 66-79	1967	1979	Uganda 71-79	1972	1979
Brurundi 96-03	1997	2003	Haiti 50-56	1951	1956	Nigeria 83-93	1984	1993	Uganda 80-85	1981	1985
Cambodia 53-70	1954	1970	Haiti 57-86	1958	1986	Nigeria 93-99	1994	1999	Uganda 86-NA	1987	
Cambodia 70-75	1971	1975	Haiti 86-88	1987	1988	Oman 41-NA	1742		UAE 71-NA	1972	
Cambodia 75-79	1976	1979	Haiti 88-90	1989	1990	Pakistan 47-58	1948	1958	Uruguay 73-84	1974	1984
Cambodia 79-NA	1980		Haiti 91-94	1992	1994	Pakistan 58-71	1959	1971	Uzbekistan 91-NA	1992	
Cameroon 60-83	1961	1983	Haiti 99-04	2000	2004	Pakistan 75-77	1976	1977	Venezuela 48-58	1949	1958
Cameroon 83-NA	1984		Honduras 33-56	1934	1956	Pakistan 77-88	1978	1988	Venezuela 05-NA	2006	
Cen Afr Rep 60-65	1961	1965	Honduras 63-71	1964	1971	Pakistan 99-08	2000	2008	Vietnam 54-NA	1955	
Cen Afr Rep 66-79	1966	1979	Honduras 72-81	1973	1981	Panama 49-51	1950	1951	Vietnam South 54-63	1955	1963
Cen Afr Rep 79-81	1980	1981	Hungary 47-90	1948	1990	Panama 53-55	1954	1955	Vietnam South 63-75	1964	1975
Cen Afr Rep 81-93	1982	1993	Indonesia 49-66	1950	1966	Panama 68-82	1969	1982	Yemen 18-62	1919	1962
Cen Afr Rep 03-NA	2004		Indonesia 66-99	1967	1999	Panama 82-89	1983	1989	Yemen 62-67	1963	1967
Chad 60-75	1961	1975	Iran 25-79	1926	1979	Paraguay 39-48	1940	1948	Yemen 67-74	1968	1974
Chad 75-79	1976	1979	Iran 79-NA	1980		Paraguay 48-54	1949	1954	Yemen 74-78	1975	1978
Chad 82-90	1983	1990	Iraq 32-58	1933	1958	Paraguay 54-93	1955	1993	Yemen 78-NA	1979	
Chad 90-NA	1991		Iraq 58-63	1959	1963	Peru 48-56	1949	1956	Yemen South 67-90	1968	1990
Chile 73-89	1974	1989	Iraq 63-68	1964	1968	Peru 62-63	1963	1963	Yugoslavia 45-90	1968	1990
China 49-NA	1950		Iraq 68-79	1969	1979	Peru 68-80	1969	1980	Zambia 67-91	1968	1991
Colombia 49-53	1950	1953	Iraq 79-03	1980	2003	Peru 92-00	1993	2000	Zambia 96-NA	1997	
Colombia 53-58	1954	1958	Ivory Coast 60-99	1961	1999	Philippines 72-86	1973	1986	Zimbabwe 80-NA	1981	

Table A3: Autocratic regimes list. NA ≡ right-censored cases still in power December 31, 2010.

C Descriptive Statistics

In this Appendix there are descriptive statistics of the data I will use in my project.

C.1 Descriptive statistics of personalism

Period	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Period 1 (1951-1955)	233	.3640	.2667	0	1
Period 2 (1956-1960)	254	.3645	.2665	0	1
Period 3 (1961-1965)	359	.3393	.2400	0	1
Period 4 (1966-1970)	421	.3747	.2683	0	1
Period 5 (1971-1975)	461	.4118	.2712	0	.8873
Period 6 (1976-1980)	478	.4184	.2922	0	1
Period 7 (1981-1985)	467	.4420	.3023	0	1
Period 8 (1986-1990)	435	.4603	.2960	0	1
Period 9 (1991-1995)	361	.4453	.2707	0	1
Period 10 (1996-2000)	347	.4780	.2533	0	1
Period 11 (2001-2005)	305	.4782	.2545	0	1
Period 12 (2006-2010)	292	.4795	.2558	0	1
Total (1946-2010)	4591	.4199	.2558	0	1

Table A4: Summary statistics of personalism by five-year periods (1951-2010) and in total (1946-2010). Own elaboration, data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018)

Personalism	Frequency	Percent	Pers.	Freq.	Perc.	Pers.	Freq.	Perc.
0	744	16.21	.4332061	5	0.11	.6302201	18	0.39
.1141215	24	0.52	.4338208	140	3.05	.6329274	8	0.17
.1291783	23	0.50	.4403033	2	0.04	.6333652	4	0.09
.1362545	63	1.37	.4427674	10	0.22	.6380196	8	0.17
.1521997	48	1.05	.4445213	50	1.09	.643944	3	0.07
.1682892	163	3.55	.4446514	1	0.02	.6452139	23	0.50
.1869729	44	0.96	.4473824	1	0.02	.6458987	15	0.33
.196444	44	0.96	.4498591	8	0.17	.6547202	1	0.02
.2211685	8	0.17	.4544731	1	0.02	.6559307	2	0.04
.2330222	2	0.04	.4640943	1	0.02	.6578031	20	0.44
.2344182	4	0.09	.4690643	6	0.13	.6611537	20	0.44
.2459791	12	0.26	.469291	15	0.33	.6623275	103	2.24
.2479598	85	1.85	.4763908	36	0.78	.6686773	8	0.17
.2492389	162	3.53	.478278	7	0.15	.6739805	43	0.94
.2514765	98	2.13	.4844007	6	0.13	.6864074	55	1.20
.2592449	7	0.15	.4889077	1	0.02	.6909822	18	0.39
.2646181	4	0.09	.4899856	61	1.33	.7092441	5	0.11
.2720812	1	0.02	.4910234	37	0.81	.7122425	9	0.20
.2748962	11	0.24	.491878	2	0.04	.7178633	37	0.81
.2768927	13	0.28	.4929163	2	0.04	.7208824	4	0.09
.2881107	1	0.02	.4939952	11	0.24	.7288857	1	0.02
.3044864	3	0.07	.4956619	140	3.05	.7296492	1	0.02
.3122026	6	0.13	.5046662	4	0.09	.7346462	1	0.02
.3187908	43	0.94	.5064353	38	0.83	.7429705	9	0.20
.3208128	2	0.04	.513961	1	0.02	.7453671	10	0.22
.3267593	15	0.33	.5160933	7	0.15	.7467368	6	0.13
.3290006	6	0.13	.5207706	72	1.57	.7488574	37	0.81
.3310004	1	0.02	.5261923	14	0.30	.7612236	4	0.09
.3327566	9	0.20	.5273516	2	0.04	.7627152	27	0.59
.3338924	42	0.91	.5315485	36	0.78	.7753657	17	0.37
.3440163	18	0.39	.5345654	4	0.09	.7815722	120	2.61
.34514	15	0.33	.5387909	18	0.39	.8016372	11	0.24
.3470087	1	0.02	.5407192	4	0.09	.8116502	1	0.02
.3539801	2	0.04	.5413129	8	0.17	.8313035	2	0.04
.3568128	176	3.83	.541819	23	0.50	.8481093	1	0.02
.3587632	49	1.07	.5460467	7	0.15	.8646434	38	0.83
.3679819	1	0.02	.5485927	2	0.04	.8719397	152	3.31
.3696843	30	0.65	.5533461	3	0.07	.887376	79	1.72
.3707859	20	0.44	.5625951	4	0.09	1	151	3.29
.372717	1	0.02	.5644156	2	0.04			
.3780437	35	0.76	.5673903	62	1.35			
.3799664	4	0.09	.5684661	4	0.09			
.3975529	31	0.68	.5796489	16	0.35			
.4004165	2	0.04	.5845026	139	3.03			
.4071966	7	0.15	.5903795	107	2.33			
.4083446	4	0.09	.5923752	4	0.09			
.415837	1	0.02	.5946109	7	0.15			
.4168751	1	0.02	.6059228	9	0.20			
.4196175	132	2.88	.6064526	7	0.15			
.4215081	26	0.57	.607945	3	0.07			
.4225851	32	0.70	.6108832	9	0.20			
.4270882	21	0.46	.6135548	2	0.04			
.4291991	14	0.30	.6167533	6	0.13			
.4310861	6	0.13	.6185502	35	0.76			

Table A5: Frequency and percentages of values of personalism (1946-2010). Frequency observations are country-years. Own elaboration, data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018)

C.2 Descriptive statistics of multiparty elections

Variable		Frequency	Percentage
Legislative elections	**0**	4055	88.32
	1	536	11.68
	Total	4591	100
Executive elections	**0**	4320	94.10
	1	271	5.90
	Total	4591	100

Table A6: Summary statistics of legislative and executive elections, by country-year. Own elaboration, data from Hyde and Marinov (2012)

Legislative elections	Executive elections		Total
	0	**1**	
0	3954	101	4055
1	366	170	536
Total	4320	271	4591

Table A7: Matrix of legislative and executive elections, per country-year. Own elaboration, data from Hyde and Marinov (2012)