

# Consensus Costs and Conflict in a Collective Movement

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
# Collective Movement

- ▶ Observed in nature
  - ▶ Flocking of birds
  - ▶ Shoals of fish
  - ▶ Migrating wildebeests
- ▶ Benefits in nature
  - ▶ Increased foraging success
  - ▶ Protection from predators
- ▶ Benefits in robot swarms
  - ▶ Robustness
  - ▶ Flexibility
  - ▶ Scalability



# Costs

- ▶ Compromise is not an option [2]
- ▶ Individual may not achieve goal
- ▶ Getting pizza when wanting tacos



Background  
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Methods  
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Results  
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Conclusions  
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# Conflict

- ▶ Conflict arises from differing preferences [1]
  - ▶ Often ignored in collective movement systems
- ▶ Decisions can take longer but
- ▶ Could be useful when compromise is not an option

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Methods  
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Results  
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
Conclusions  
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# Research Hypothesis

**Conflict minimizes consensus costs in collective movements while allowing for group cohesion**

# Collective Movement Model


- ▶ Based on observations of natural systems [4] [3]
  - ▶ Capuchin monkeys
  - ▶ Validated in sheep
- ▶ Modifications
  - ▶ Discrete time
  - ▶ Movement
    - ▶ Multiple Initiators
  - ▶ Destination Preferences
  - ▶ Conflict



# Decision Rules

## Three decision-making events

- ① Initiate a movement
- ② Follow an initiator
- ③ Cancel a movement



# Decision Probabilities

Initiate

$$\tau_i = \frac{1}{\tau_o} \quad (1)$$

Follow

$$\tau_r = \alpha_f + \beta_f \frac{N - r}{r} \quad (2)$$

Cancel

$$C_r = \frac{\alpha_c}{1 + (r / \gamma_c)^{\epsilon_c}} \quad (3)$$

Background  
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Conclusions  
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# Discrete Time

- ▶ **Do Nothing** decision needed
  - ▶ Decisions made at every time step
  - ▶ Individuals continue doing what they were doing
- ▶ Must do something if current leader changes groups

# Modified Decision Probabilities


Initiation

$$\tau_i = \frac{k}{\tau_o} \quad (4)$$

Following

$$\tau_r = \frac{1}{k} \left( \alpha_f + \beta_f \frac{N - r}{r} \right) \quad (5)$$

# Conflict Implementation



# Conflict Calculation


$$C_i = \frac{|\theta|}{\pi} \quad (6)$$

$C_i$  Conflict for individual  $i$

$\theta$  Conflict angle  $[-\pi:\pi]$


# K Factor as Function of Conflict

$$k = 2C_i \quad (7)$$




# Evaluation Environments


Minimum Initial Conflict



Moderate Initial Conflict



Maximum Initial Conflict



# Simulations

- ▶ 3 treatments were used on each environment
  - ▶ No conflict and no consensus costs (*Baseline*)
  - ▶ No conflict and consensus costs
  - ▶ Conflict and consensus costs
- ▶ No consensus costs means that the entire group prefers the same destination
- ▶ 1,000 simulations per environment
- ▶ 20,000 max time steps

Background  
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
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
Conclusions  
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# Minimum Initial Conflict Movement Histories

Without Conflict



With Conflict




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
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# Minimum Initial Conflict with 10 Individuals



# Minimum Initial Conflict with 50 Individuals




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## Minimum Initial Conflict with 10 Individuals




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Conclusions  
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## Minimum Initial Conflict with 50 Individuals



# Conclusions

- ▶ Addition of conflict
  - ▶ Balanced consensus costs with individual preferences
  - ▶ Significantly improved individual success
- ▶ Consensus costs cause individuals to not achieve their goals
  - ▶ Up to 50% in our simulations
- ▶ If we don't want to pay consensus costs, conflict successfully reduces them

# Future Work

- ▶ Can we balance consensus costs and individual preferences?
- ▶ Multi-objective Optimization
- ▶ Use a more tunable decision-making model [5]
- ▶ Add predation and uninformed agents
- ▶ Improve movement (e.g., Flocking)

# Acknowledgments

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Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

## Questions?

Videos and other materials can be found at:

[www.csne.snu.edu/tag/gecco2014/](http://www.csne.snu.edu/tag/gecco2014/)

Source code can be found at:

[github.com/snucsne/bio-inspired-leadership](https://github.com/snucsne/bio-inspired-leadership)

# References

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Conflicts of interest and the evolution of decision sharing.  
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278(1712):1697–1704, 2011.

# Supplemental

# Initiation Probability

$$\tau_i = \frac{1}{\tau_o} \quad (8)$$

$\tau_i$  - initiation rate

$\tau_o$  - initiation rate constant

Assumes all agents within a group are identical

# Following Probability

$$\tau_r = \alpha_f + \beta_f \frac{N - r}{r} \quad (9)$$

$\tau_r$  - follow rate

$\alpha_f$  and  $\beta_f$  - constants

N - number in the group

r - number following initiator

# Cancellation Probability


$$C_r = \frac{\alpha_c}{1 + (r/\gamma_c)^{\epsilon_c}} \quad (10)$$

$C_r$  - cancel rate


$\alpha_c, \lambda_c$  and  $\epsilon_c$  - constants

r - number following initiator


# Conflict




# Moderate Initial Conflict with 10 Individuals




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
# Moderate Initial Conflict with 10 Individuals




## Moderate Initial Conflict with 50 Individuals




## Maximum Initial Conflict with 10 Individuals



# Maximum Initial Conflict with 50 Individuals



# Maximum Initial Conflict with 10 Individuals



## Maximum Initial Conflict with 50 Individuals

