

Bit Coin

↑
Digital
Currency

Alternatives
Smart Contracts

Key ideas : Concepts

+ Proof of Work (PoW)

⇒ Cryptopuzzle — originally
invented
for SPAM
email

Alternatives
Proof of
Stake
(PoS)

+ Blockchain (Dist. Ledger)

⇒ Ordering on operations
(txns)

Read/Write
shared State

Alternatives
Private
Blockchain
(not open)

+ P2P + Byzantine threat model


Arbitrary peer
Behavior

+ Eventually Consistency ?


If you wait long enough
then everyone will observe same state

Blockchain

Intercepted: Man in the middle




\Downarrow




- x MIM: at most can Replay the msg
- x Double Spending still a problem

\Downarrow




Bank \Rightarrow Distributed P2P Context

"Make everyone the Bank" \Rightarrow Bank is public/transparent
 \Rightarrow all peers in the system track the ledger of txns



- x double spending
 - x Concurrency
 - x Incentives
 - x Trust
- PoW
 +
 Blockchain
 Reward P2P peers
 Assumptions about
majority of nodes
 non-malicious



Any two (majorities) overlap

Requires to
know the
of nodes in
system

\Rightarrow Easy to Join
 \Downarrow
 Easy to create
 "Sybils" by 1 person
 \Rightarrow Sybil Attack

Proof of Work (PoW)



① Make validation of txns in the network "difficult" (Why? A: Sybils)

⇒ You need real physical resources (CPU cycles for computing PoW)

② Incentives for nodes to compute PoW
 ↳ Reward for solving a PoW ⇒ # of BTC
 ↳ Scales with amount of CPU cycles

③ Transactions come with a fee that is given to a node that "validates" it using PoW

txn, ... txn_n



Block

Identity (pubkey) of miner

(M1) Check txn_i valid (consistency check)

(M2) Solve a cryptopuzzle (PoW)

$h = \text{sha-256}$ hashing fn.

Find a nonce value s.t.

$$h(\text{Block}) \leq \text{target value}$$

i.e., $h(\text{Block}) = \underbrace{0x00...00}_{\text{leading zeroes}} \text{SAF42}...$

Difficulty for PoW task
 # of leading zeroes

Key Conditions for PoW

1. Difficult to find nonce
2. Easy to verify the nonce

Mining generates reward to miner (in BTC form)

⇒ Race between miners to mine blocks ⇒ Mining pools for cooperation


Miners have to balance
of txns in a block
with the fact that other
miners are already
mining

Select some
of txns
(Bound on block size)

BTC mining
reward
is generated
until ~2140

↓
After 2140
Mining is incentivized
using only tx fees

Missing: Ordering of txns
($txn_1 \leq_{time} txn_2$)



To mine a block
a miner has to
pre-commit to
where the block
will go in
Blockchain


Miners $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Work along the longest Chain (that they know)} \\ \text{Keep track of all forks (the entire tree)} \end{array} \right.$

In short term "longest chain" is unclear $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Race cond. in mining} \\ \text{Network latency} \\ \text{Network connectivity} \end{array} \right.$
 But... in long term "longest chain" is stable

\Rightarrow txn is not "confirmed" unless $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{① txn is on longest chain} \\ \text{② Must have 5 blocks that follow it} \end{array} \right. \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Essential for total order} \\ \text{heuristic} \end{array} \right.$
 "6 confirmations"


Implications: ① Blocks are immutable: "ledger" \rightarrow Append Only
 ② Difficult to create a fork
 + Convince network to follow it

\rightarrow Requires maj. of CPU power



txn A } txn B conflict: "double spend"

Bitcoin Overview



The End