A Online Appendix for "Does Banning the Box Help Ex-Offenders Get Jobs? Evaluating the Effects of a Prominent Example"

A.1 Proof that ξ_D falls between ξ_n and ξ_p

After some manipulation, the derivative of ξ_D with respect to s_D can be expressed as:

$$\frac{d\xi_D}{ds_D} = \frac{\mu_n(1-\lambda_n)\lambda_p - \mu_p(1-\lambda_p)\lambda_n + (p+\delta)(\lambda_n - \lambda_p)}{[(1-s_D)\lambda_n + s_D\lambda_p]^2}$$

The sign of the numerator is the same as the sign of $\xi_p - \xi_n$. If $s_D = 0$, $\xi_D = \xi_n$. Hence if $\xi_n < \xi_p$, ξ_D is monotonically increasing in s_D until $s_D = 1$ and $\xi_D = \xi_p$. The opposite case for $\xi_n > \xi_p$ is analogous.

A.2 Hiring rates

BTB only partially limits employers' information. After the initial interview, firms are allowed to conduct a criminal background check before finalizing a hiring decision. The impact of BTB on hiring thus may differ from its impact on interviews. In this model, after the interview takes place δ is sunk and no longer factors into employers' decisions. The worker will thus be hired if q_i turns out to be sufficiently high, i.e., $q_i > w$.

Note that q_i and θ_i are joint normal random variables with correlation $\rho = \sigma_R^2/\sqrt{\sigma_R^2(\sigma_R^2 + \sigma_e^2)}$. The joint probability of an interview and being hired is thus:

$$P_{hire} = P(q_i > w, \theta_i > \xi_R) \tag{14}$$

$$= \Phi\left(\frac{\mu_R - w}{\sigma_R}, \frac{\mu_R - \xi_R}{\sqrt{\sigma_R^2 + \sigma_e^2}}; \rho\right) \tag{15}$$

where $\Phi(\cdot,\cdot;\rho)$ is the bi-variate standard normal CDF with correlation ρ. Since this CDF is an increasing function of both its arguments, hiring rates have the same comparative statics as interview rates with respect to ξ_R. Thus the range of possible effects on record- or demographic group-specific interview rates also translate into effects on hiring rates, making the theoretical effect of BTB on demographic group's average employment rates also ambiguous.

The probability of being hired conditional on an interview, however, is more complicated. To derive the conditional distribution of q_i given an interview (i.e., $\theta_i > \xi_R$), observe that (suppressing a subscript R to denote densities within a criminal record group):

$$f(q_i|\theta_i) = \frac{f(\theta_i|q_i)f(q_i)}{f(\theta_i)} \tag{16}$$

$$f(q_i|\theta_i > \xi_R) = \int_{\xi_R}^{\infty} \frac{f(\theta_i|q_i)f(q_i)}{f(\theta_i)} \frac{f(\theta_i)}{Pr(\theta_i > \xi_R)} d\theta_i \tag{17}$$

$$= f(q_i) \int_{\xi_R}^{\infty} \frac{f(\theta_i|q_i)}{Pr(\theta_i > \xi_R)} d\theta_i \tag{18}$$

$$= f(q_i) \frac{\Phi\left(\frac{q_i - \xi_R}{\sigma_e}\right)}{Pr(\theta_i > \xi_R)} \tag{19}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma_R} \phi\left(\frac{q_i - \mu_R}{\sigma_R}\right) \frac{\Phi\left(\frac{q_i - \xi_R}{\sigma_e}\right)}{Pr(\theta_i > \xi_R)} \tag{20}$$

where I have relied on the fact that $f(\theta_i|q_i) \sim N(q_i, \sigma_e^2)$. This is a type of non-standard skewed normal distribution.[29] Observe that as $\xi_R \to -\infty$, we recover the unconditional distribution of q_i. As ξ_R grows larger, the distribution develops a right skew. Notice also that as $\sigma_e \to 0$, this distribution approaches a truncated normal distribution, since the terms involving ξ_R collapse to a simple indicator function. Hiring rates can be derived by integrating this density over (w, ∞) with respect to q_i.

After the implementation of BTB, this density becomes a mixture across the two criminal

[29]The conventional skewed normal distribution is given by $f(x) = \frac{2}{\sigma}\phi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)\Phi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)$, which only coincides with this distribution under special circumstances.

record groups:

$$f_D(q_i|\theta_i > \xi_R) = \sum_{R=n,p} s_D^R \frac{1}{\sigma_R} \phi\left(\frac{q_i - \mu_R}{\sigma_R}\right) \frac{\Phi\left(\frac{q_i - \xi_D}{\sigma_e}\right)}{Pr_R(\theta_i > \xi_D)} \tag{21}$$

where $s_D^p = s_D, s_D^n = 1 - s_D$. Without a closed-form expression for the CDF of this density, is difficult to compare conditional hiring rates before and after BTB analytically. Depending on the parameterization, rates can increase or decrease. Thus, while effects of BTB for individuals with and without records on overall hiring rates go in the same direction as effects on interview rates, effects on the probability of hiring conditional on an interview need not.

A.3 Non-offender results

Due to the small size of the areas under study, datasets used in other analyses of BTB nationally such as the CPS are not suitable. The Census's OnTheMap data, which summarizes information from the confidential Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics dataset, can provide much more detail at fine levels of aggregation, but unfortunately are not available after 2014 and do not allow for sufficient demographic sub-group analysis.

Given these constraints, I use the 2007-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2017). In this dataset, the smallest identifiable geography is a Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), which nests within states and contains at least 100,000 people. I estimate Specification 13 for all individuals, black and Hispanic men, and men with no college education using various possible control areas. Because the ACS is a repeated cross-section, these regressions effectively test for differences in aggregate employment rates, adjusted for demographic composition, between Seattle and the comparison areas each year before and after BTB.

Table 9 reports the coefficients on the interaction of the treatment indicator and year or event time variable. The specifications in Columns 1-3, which test for aggregate employment, detect decreases in employment in Seattle both relative to nearby counties and Spokane before *and* after BTB. The estimates for minority men in Columns 4-6 display a similar pattern. Unfortunately, the standard errors are large enough that it is difficult to rule out large positive or negative effects. It is also difficult to detect any apparent pre-trends that would invalidate the experiment. The same is true of the specifications in Columns 7-9, which test for effects on non-college men.

Figure 10: Effects of felony and misdemeanor not excluding any periods between offense and conviction



Figure 11: Distribution of incarceration probabilities conditional on offense type



Figure 12: Effects of incarceration and probation on industry of employment



Notes: Figure is identical to Figure 6, except the outcome is an indicator for employment in the industry listed in the sub-heading, only observations with some employment are included, and only sentences in or after 2005 are used (since industry data becomes available starting in 2000). Effects can therefore be interpreted as impacts on the probability of employment in each industry conditional on having a job.

Figure 13: Treatment and control cities and counties in Washington State

A. Statewide map



B. Seattle-area cities



Notes: Panel A maps all counties in WA, with Snohomish, King, Pierce, and Spokane highlighted. Relevant city boundaries are also highlighted, but not all labeled. Additional detail on cities is shown in Panel B, which zooms in on the Seattle area.

Figure 14: Aggregate sample: Ex-offender employment and earnings by industry



Notes: Figures plot the log of raw total employment from jobs in King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Spokane Counties by industry. Only individuals released from DOC supervision before 2013 are included, so that the sample is fixed pre-BTB. Employment refers to the number of unique individuals with positive earnings from a job in that county-quarter combination. Individuals with multiple jobs in different counties (which is rare) are counted twice.

Figure 15: Probationer analysis: Raw employment and earnings



Notes: Figure plots the employment rate and the mean of log earnings (excluding zeros) for offenders on probation in Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, Spokane, and other cities in King County offices. See the text and footnotes for additional detail on sample and list of offices included in each category.

Table 5: Felony and misdemeanor conviction effects: Numerical estimates

	Earn >= min wage		Total earn		Any incar		Earn if not incar.		Earn if any	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Misd	Fel	Misd	Fel	Misd	Fel	Misd	Fel	Misd	Fel
-11	-0.0017	0.0018	0.68	7.11	-	-	0.83	6.45	-157.5**	-54.8
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(28.0)	(13.3)			(28.0)	(13.3)	(59.0)	(31.7)
-10	0.0017	-0.0014	68.3	-15.7	-	-	68.6	-16.9	-7.33	-124.4***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(35.8)	(16.7)			(35.8)	(16.7)	(66.1)	(35.3)
-9	0.0042	0.0028	64.6	0.47	-	-	65.1	-1.43	-73.2	-160.8***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(39.6)	(18.9)			(39.6)	(18.9)	(69.1)	(37.3)
-8	0.0081	0.00077	100.4*	-5.44	-	-	101.1*	-7.98	-148.0*	-263.5***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(42.9)	(20.2)			(42.9)	(20.2)	(71.9)	(38.1)
-7	0.012*	0.0031	91.0	-1.00	-	-	91.8	-4.19	-237.7**	-277.3***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(47.0)	(22.2)			(47.0)	(22.2)	(77.1)	(40.5)
-6	0.011*	0.0042	112.9*	-3.21	-	-	113.8*	-7.00	-259.5**	-326.3***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(49.9)	(23.5)			(49.9)	(23.5)	(80.0)	(42.3)
-5	0.012*	-0.0000051	89.8	-28.9	-	-	90.9	-33.3	-357.9***	-451.9***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(52.4)	(24.6)			(52.4)	(24.6)	(82.2)	(43.5)
-4	0.013*	0.00060	89.5	-54.9*	-	-	90.8	-59.9*	-387.0***	-539.3***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(54.8)	(25.4)			(54.9)	(25.4)	(82.7)	(44.1)
-3	0.012*	-0.00016	43.5	-52.0	-	-	45.0	-57.6*	-536.6***	-514.9***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(57.2)	(27.0)			(57.3)	(27.1)	(84.9)	(45.8)
-2	0.0080	-0.0077**	26.2	-122.7***	-	-	27.8	-128.8***	-559.3***	-637.6***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(60.2)	(28.3)			(60.3)	(28.3)	(88.1)	(47.7)
-1	0.0021	-0.017***	-84.1	-212.8***	-	-	-82.3	-219.5***	-819.2***	-795.6***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(61.3)	(29.4)			(61.3)	(29.4)	(89.5)	(49.3)
0	-0.074***	-0.13***	-846.5***	-1362.1***	0.027***	0.18***	-833.6***	-1147.2***	-1725.2***	-2563.7***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(68.8)	(32.7)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(69.4)	(34.0)	(105.1)	(59.8)
1	-0.072***	-0.12***	-877.6***	-1331.8***	0.030***	0.20***	-849.0***	-1030.8***	-1651.6***	-2216.2***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(71.1)	(33.9)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(71.8)	(35.3)	(108.4)	(61.2)
2	-0.067***	-0.10***	-849.4***	-1217.9***	0.030***	0.20***	-817.0***	-918.7***	-1566.3***	-2081.8***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(72.7)	(34.5)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(73.4)	(36.0)	(109.8)	(61.3)
3	-0.065***	-0.095***	-895.0***	-1155.4***	0.032***	0.17***	-857.3***	-891.9***	-1609.3***	-2061.7***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(73.7)	(34.9)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(74.3)	(36.1)	(111.5)	(61.9)
4	-0.067***	-0.086***	-882.3***	-1103.7***	0.031***	0.15***	-845.7***	-862.9***	-1559.2***	-1999.8***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(74.9)	(35.3)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(75.6)	(36.3)	(114.6)	(62.1)
5	-0.064***	-0.083***	-878.0***	-1071.3***	0.030***	0.14***	-836.2***	-853.1***	-1486.0***	-1971.2***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(77.0)	(35.8)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(77.6)	(36.7)	(116.6)	(63.5)
6	-0.071***	-0.080***	-920.8***	-1053.8***	0.030***	0.12***	-880.9***	-858.5***	-1486.7***	-1942.4***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(78.1)	(36.4)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(78.7)	(37.2)	(118.7)	(64.0)
7	-0.072***	-0.080***	-959.4***	-1046.1***	0.032***	0.12***	-914.3***	-857.7***	-1542.7***	-1889.1***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(79.8)	(36.9)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(80.5)	(37.7)	(122.4)	(65.7)
8	-0.076***	-0.081***	-1019.9***	-1052.2***	0.032***	0.11***	-972.9***	-879.9***	-1636.1***	-1849.6***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(80.5)	(37.7)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(81.1)	(38.5)	(123.3)	(67.1)
9	-0.078***	-0.079***	-990.8***	-1054.1***	0.031***	0.10***	-943.0***	-890.6***	-1484.8***	-1845.4***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(82.2)	(38.4)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(82.7)	(39.1)	(125.5)	(68.6)
10	-0.082***	-0.080***	-1069.2***	-1052.7***	0.030***	0.097***	-1028.6***	-899.6***	-1491.7***	-1810.9***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(83.4)	(39.0)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(83.9)	(39.7)	(127.6)	(69.7)
11	-0.083***	-0.083***	-1090.8***	-1073.0***	0.029***	0.094***	-1050.4***	-927.9***	-1568.3***	-1850.9***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(84.6)	(39.4)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(85.2)	(40.1)	(128.3)	(70.8)
12	-0.088***	-0.081***	-1157.1***	-1072.6***	0.028***	0.089***	-1120.7***	-939.8***	-1713.2***	-1825.8***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(85.5)	(40.3)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(86.1)	(41.0)	(132.4)	(72.5)
N	707,739	2,537,205	707,739	2,537,205	707,739	2,537,205	699,392	2,435,008	255,610	791,345
mean y	0.27	0.22	2,924.21	2,245.81	0.01	0.04	2,954.59	2,329.10	8,096.63	7,200.51
# events	8,005	28,698	8,005	28,698	8,005	28,698	8,005	28,698	7,280	25,471

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Table displays the γ_s coefficients and associated standard errors for first-time felony and misdemeanor convictions between 1997 and 2010 and aged 25 or older at the time of conviction. The outcome is given in the heading at the top of the table. For legibility, only estimates for $s \in [-11, 12]$ are displayed. $s = -12$ was normalized to zero, so coefficients reflect effects relative to three years before conviction. The event time used excludes periods between the date of the offense and the date of conviction.

Table 6: Effects of incarceration: Numerical estimates

	(1) Earnings >= min wage	(2) Total earnings	(3) Any incarceration	(4) Earnings if not incar.	(5) Earnings if any
-11 × Inc.=1	0.0033	8.78	-	8.78	-67.3
	(0.005)	(42.6)		(42.6)	(106.2)
-10 × Inc.=1	-0.0030	-27.5	-	-27.5	-69.8
	(0.006)	(56.6)		(56.6)	(121.1)
-9 × Inc.=1	-0.010	-149.3*	-	-149.3*	-264.1*
	(0.007)	(62.2)		(62.2)	(129.5)
-8 × Inc.=1	-0.0070	-133.0	-	-133.0	-216.0
	(0.008)	(71.1)		(71.1)	(140.1)
-7 × Inc.=1	-0.013	-174.9*	-	-174.9*	-395.9**
	(0.008)	(79.3)		(79.3)	(140.8)
-6 × Inc.=1	-0.0079	-111.5	-	-111.5	-172.4
	(0.009)	(83.4)		(83.4)	(152.3)
-5 × Inc.=1	-0.013	-202.2*	-	-202.2*	-272.8
	(0.009)	(81.1)		(81.1)	(145.6)
-4 × Inc.=1	-0.018*	-224.9**	-	-224.9**	-251.4
	(0.009)	(83.6)		(83.6)	(144.1)
-3 × Inc.=1	-0.013	-197.5*	-	-197.5*	-47.4
	(0.009)	(85.0)		(85.0)	(149.6)
-2 × Inc.=1	-0.016	-228.6*	-	-228.6*	-275.4
	(0.009)	(89.9)		(89.9)	(151.8)
-1 × Inc.=1	-0.010	-224.0*	-	-224.0*	-171.5
	(0.009)	(92.8)		(92.8)	(157.5)
0 × Inc.=1	-0.10***	-1024.6***	-	-	-1525.0***
	(0.010)	(99.8)			(234.7)
1 × Inc.=1	-0.16***	-1497.3***	0.93***	222.8	-1570.0***
	(0.010)	(99.8)	(0.004)	(317.5)	(289.8)
2 × Inc.=1	-0.16***	-1513.8***	0.84***	-147.7	-1619.3***
	(0.010)	(101.5)	(0.007)	(189.3)	(229.2)
3 × Inc.=1	-0.13***	-1373.6***	0.68***	-333.2**	-1431.4***
	(0.01)	(104.1)	(0.009)	(128.6)	(208.0)
4 × Inc.=1	-0.11***	-1234.6***	0.55***	-280.7*	-1498.5***
	(0.01)	(105.5)	(0.009)	(118.6)	(197.8)
5 × Inc.=1	-0.098***	-1087.9***	0.46***	-222.3	-1289.1***
	(0.01)	(105.6)	(0.010)	(115.1)	(199.5)
6 × Inc.=1	-0.086***	-1010.3***	0.39***	-266.2*	-1171.4***
	(0.01)	(107.6)	(0.01)	(114.7)	(202.5)
7 × Inc.=1	-0.070***	-893.3***	0.33***	-194.3	-1126.3***
	(0.01)	(107.9)	(0.01)	(114.7)	(207.3)
8 × Inc.=1	-0.064***	-820.3***	0.29***	-184.4	-1093.6***
	(0.01)	(109.0)	(0.01)	(115.8)	(204.5)
9 × Inc.=1	-0.056***	-716.9***	0.25***	-128.2	-869.5***
	(0.01)	(108.8)	(0.01)	(115.6)	(200.0)
10 × Inc.=1	-0.052***	-672.2***	0.24***	-139.6	-847.7***
	(0.01)	(111.0)	(0.01)	(117.4)	(197.0)
11 × Inc.=1	-0.055***	-757.5***	0.22***	-306.2**	-1125.5***
	(0.01)	(111.2)	(0.01)	(115.0)	(201.9)
12 × Inc.=1	-0.061***	-744.2***	0.21***	-300.0**	-992.2***
	(0.01)	(111.4)	(0.01)	(115.4)	(199.8)
N	3,108,198	3,108,198	3,108,198	2,998,746	997,487
mean y	0.24	2,452.92	0.06	2,607.36	7,602.44
# events	35,160	35,160	35,160	35,160	31,334

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Table displays the γ_s^I coefficients, capturing the differential effect of incarceration relative to probation, and associated standard errors for first-time convictions between 1997 and 2010 and aged 25 or older at the time of conviction. The outcome is given in the heading at the top of the table. For legibility, only estimates for $s \in [-11, 12]$ are displayed. $s = -12$ was normalized to zero, so coefficients reflect effects relative to three years before conviction. The event time used excludes periods between the date of the offense and the date of conviction.

Table 7: Nonwhite recently released sample: Difference-in-difference estimates

	All		Pierce and Snohomish		Spokane	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Emp.	Earnings	Emp.	Earnings	Emp.	Earnings
$s = -4$	-0.00224	-20.58	0.00110	-13.59	-0.0149	-44.78
	(0.0079)	(43.5)	(0.0085)	(47.7)	(0.014)	(62.1)
$s = -3$	0.00392	32.78	0.00535	42.99	-0.00167	-4.966
	(0.0071)	(37.4)	(0.0076)	(41.4)	(0.012)	(48.9)
$s = -2$	0.00377	7.837	0.00131	5.212	0.0130	17.88
	(0.0059)	(29.8)	(0.0063)	(32.2)	(0.010)	(47.1)
$s = 0$	-0.00553	26.01	-0.00659	31.74	-0.00160	5.547
	(0.0062)	(32.3)	(0.0067)	(35.0)	(0.011)	(51.2)
$s = 1$	0.00186	100.4*	0.00225	121.5**	0.000913	23.14
	(0.0071)	(40.1)	(0.0078)	(43.4)	(0.012)	(62.6)
$s = 2$	0.0148*	89.55*	0.0208**	100.3*	-0.00744	52.98
	(0.0075)	(44.3)	(0.0080)	(48.0)	(0.014)	(70.6)
$s = 3$	0.0117	82.37	0.0210*	118.1*	-0.0235	-49.98
	(0.0078)	(46.9)	(0.0083)	(50.9)	(0.014)	(71.5)
$s = 4$	-0.00206	74.27	-0.00220	100.3	-0.000986	-21.23
	(0.0082)	(52.4)	(0.0089)	(56.8)	(0.014)	(80.7)
N	328,814	328,814	298,680	298,680	214,966	214,966
Dep. Var. Mean	0.224	1125.617	0.225	1150.499	0.227	1150.650

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Table displays estimates of Specification 13 for non-white offenders. The underlined title above each pair of columns indicates the control area, e.g., Pierce, Snohomish, and Spokane counties (columns 1-2). The coefficients reported are the γ_s^T for $s \in [-4, 4]$, where $s = -1$ is omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Employment is an indicator for any positive earnings in a given quarter, while earnings is total quarterly earnings (including zeros).

Table 8: Non-white probationer analysis: Difference-in-difference estimates

	All		Neighboring		Everett		Within King Co.		Spokane	
	(1) Emp.	(2) Earnings	(3) Emp.	(4) Earnings	(5) Emp.	(6) Earnings	(7) Emp.	(8) Earnings	(9) Emp.	(10) Earnings
$s = -4$	0.0265	54.11	0.0245	42.61	0.101	225.5	0.0258	14.17	0.0463	157.0
	(0.021)	(75.9)	(0.022)	(79.8)	(0.052)	(157.5)	(0.025)	(94.2)	(0.029)	(107.6)
$s = -3$	0.0210	32.01	0.0175	23.55	0.0961*	224.6	0.0159	-19.71	0.0520	98.73
	(0.022)	(83.1)	(0.022)	(86.4)	(0.041)	(151.0)	(0.025)	(100.0)	(0.030)	(111.2)
$s = -2$	0.0199	98.83	0.0193	85.22	0.0556	175.4	0.0131	67.23	0.0208	160.1*
	(0.018)	(64.2)	(0.018)	(67.3)	(0.035)	(123.9)	(0.021)	(74.2)	(0.026)	(80.2)
$s = 0$	0.0104	-6.115	0.00777	-6.461	-0.0617	-245.5	0.0167	-4.994	0.0323	-14.53
	(0.019)	(66.0)	(0.019)	(68.8)	(0.051)	(170.6)	(0.022)	(75.0)	(0.026)	(83.1)
$s = 1$	0.0207	-19.24	0.0158	-30.31	0.0247	-16.70	0.0207	-106.4	0.0551	51.42
	(0.022)	(75.7)	(0.022)	(79.1)	(0.049)	(153.2)	(0.025)	(91.7)	(0.032)	(86.8)
$s = 2$	0.0236	61.18	0.0235	62.48	0.0215	66.31	0.0216	19.58	0.0288	54.79
	(0.021)	(82.8)	(0.022)	(86.0)	(0.052)	(166.7)	(0.026)	(97.9)	(0.028)	(104.1)
$s = 3$	0.0186	89.86	0.0191	99.62	0.152***	291.3	0.00560	44.21	0.0157	25.22
	(0.022)	(91.5)	(0.023)	(95.4)	(0.046)	(197.9)	(0.027)	(109.9)	(0.034)	(118.2)
$s = 4$	0.0154	15.12	0.0143	19.75	0.0213	-34.73	0.00389	-59.75	0.0250	-20.23
	(0.023)	(103.0)	(0.024)	(107.5)	(0.065)	(232.8)	(0.028)	(125.9)	(0.036)	(139.7)
N	192,815	192,815	178,301	178,301	81,151	81,151	138,580	138,580	86,821	86,821
Dep. Var. Mean	0.179	656.697	0.180	667.145	0.160	558.576	0.185	700.128	0.158	537.093

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Includes all non-white individuals under supervision at time t and assigned to a field office in relevant city or county. Estimates shown are the coefficient on the interaction of an indicator for assignment to a Seattle field office with event time indicators. In columns 1-2, all comparison regions are: Everett, Tacoma, other cities in King County (excluding Seattle), and Spokane. Column 3-4 excludes Spokane. Column 5-6 includes Everett only as a control. Column 7-8 includes other cities in King County only. And Column 9-10 includes Spokane only. All regressions included indicators for age (in quarters), gender, and race.

Table 9: Results for non-offenders from ACS

	All			Minority men			Non-college men		
	(1) All	(2) Nearby	(3) Spokane	(4) All	(5) Nearby	(6) Spokane	(7) All	(8) Nearby	(9) Spokane
$2009 \cdot treat$	-0.0253*	-0.0220*	-0.0459**	0.0185	0.0190	0.0112	-0.0172	-0.0136	-0.0317
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.086)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)
$2010 \cdot treat$	-0.0342**	-0.0298**	-0.0587***	-0.0711	-0.0666	-0.159	-0.0799*	-0.0710*	-0.130**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.088)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.043)
$2011 \cdot treat$	-0.0148	-0.0129	-0.0259	-0.0444	-0.0444	-0.0446	-0.0389	-0.0347	-0.0594
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.084)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)
$2012 \cdot treat$	-0.00311	-0.00221	-0.00795	0.0334	0.0325	0.0425	0.0153	0.0202	-0.0189
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.085)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)
$2014 \cdot treat$	-0.0293**	-0.0301**	-0.0228	-0.0366	-0.0418	0.0544	-0.0141	-0.0156	0.0000188
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.083)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)
$2015 \cdot treat$	-0.00911	-0.0129	0.0156	-0.0217	-0.0258	0.0356	-0.0178	-0.0212	0.00672
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)
N	167,532	147,998	46,576	9,705	9,175	2,059	34,252	29,789	7,470
Dep. Var. Mean	0.737	0.742	0.760	0.765	0.770	0.739	0.674	0.681	0.643

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Treatment and control is defined using IPUMS 2000-2010 consistent PUMAs. Treated PUMAs are 1039-1043. "Nearby" control PUMAs include 1038 and 1044-1048. "Spokane" control PUMAs include 1033. Columns labeled "All" contain both "Nearby" and "Spokane" controls. Sample in columns 1-3 includes all individuals aged 16-54 and not living in group quarters. Columns 4-6 subsets to male black and/or Hispanic men. Columns 7-9 subsets to men without any college education. All regressions include a cubic in age, PUMA fixed effects, and indicators for sex, race, and education (when not subsetting on those variables).