we make a colossal mistake, taking it for granted.We see democracy not as the most fragile of flowers that it really is, but we see it as part of our society's furniture. We tend to think of it as an intransigent given. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and his great imitators in Beijing have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that it is perfectly possible to have a flourishing capitalism, spectacular growth, while politics remains democracy-free. Indeed, democracy is receding in our neck of the woods, here in Europe. Earlier this year, while I was representing Greece the newly elected Greek government in the Eurogroup as its Finance Minister, I was told in no uncertain terms that our nation's democratic process our elections could not be allowed to interfere with economic policies that were being implemented in Greece. At that moment, I felt that there could be no greater vindication of Lee Kuan Yew, or the Chinese Communist Party, indeed of some recalcitrant

我们犯了巨大的错误，认为民主是理所应当的。我们没有把民主视为它本应该是的最脆弱的花朵，而是把它视为社会家具的一部分。我们倾向于认为它是无需妥协的赋予。新加坡总理李光耀，和他在北京的伟大模仿者们，在超出合理的怀疑声中证明了，在没有民主的政治情况下，资本主义可以以惊人的速度繁荣起来。确实，民主在我们所在的区域正在退步。就在欧洲，今年的早些时候，当我作为财政部长带领希腊 --新选举产生的希腊政府 --在欧元集团参加会议。我被明确地告知我们国家的民主过程 --我们的选举 --不被允许介入将要在希腊实施的经济政策。在那一刻，我感到这是对李光耀总理，或者是中国共产党来说是绝佳的辩护，事实上一些反对我的朋友不断地告诉我，

friends of mine who kept telling me

民主会被禁止，

当它威胁要改变些什么的时候。

that democracy would be banned

if it ever threatened to change anything.

今天，在这里，我想要向你们展示，

Tonight, here, I want to present to you

一个关于真实民主的经济案例。

an economic case

for an authentic democracy.

我想要邀请你们加入我

来一起重新相信，

I want to ask you

to join me in believing again

李光耀、

that Lee Kuan Yew,

中国共产党、

the Chinese Communist Party

和欧元集团

and indeed the Eurogroup

错误地相信

我们可以不需要民主 --

are wrong in believing

that we can dispense with democracy --

我们需要真正的和

强有力的民主。

that we need an authentic,

boisterous democracy.

没有民主的话，

And without democracy,

我们的社会就会是污秽龌龊的，

our societies will be nastier,

我们的未来会是惨淡的

our future bleak

我们伟大的新科技会被浪费。

and our great, new technologies wasted.

提到浪费，

Speaking of waste,

请允许我来指出

一个正在威胁着我们的经济的

allow me to point out

an interesting paradox

有意思的悖论。

that is threatening

our economies as we speak.

我称之为双峰悖论。

I call it the twin peaks paradox.

第一个高峰你们理解 --

One peak you understand --

你们知道，你们认识它 --

you know it, you recognize it --

它是一座债务的高山，

投射着长长的阴影，

is the mountain of debts

that has been casting a long shadow

遍及美国，欧洲，乃至全球。

over the United States,

Europe, the whole world.

我们都认识到这座债务高山。

We all recognize the mountain of debts.

但很少人意识到它有一个双胞胎。

But few people discern its twin.

一座闲置现金堆砌而成的山峰。

A mountain of idle cash

它来自于有钱人和大公司的存款。

belonging to rich savers

and to corporations,

他们（有钱人和大公司）害怕去投资，

too terrified to invest it

去投资可以产生收入的

生产活动。

into the productive activities

that can generate the incomes

这样的生产活动能够

尝清那座债务高山，

from which you can extinguish

the mountain of debts

还可以制造出

人类急需的物品，

and which can produce all those things

that humanity desperately needs,

比如绿色能源。

like green energy.

现在，让我向你们

展示两个数字。

Now let me give you two numbers.

在过去的三个月里，

Over the last three months,

在美国，

英国和欧元区，

in the United States,

in Britain and in the Eurozone,

我们投入了总计

3.4 万亿美元

we have invested, collectively,

3.4 trillion dollars

在能够创造财富的物品上--

on all the wealth-producing goods --

例如工业厂房，机械，

things like industrial plants, machinery,

办公大楼，学校，

office blocks, schools,

道路，铁路，机器，

等等，等等。

roads, railways, machinery,

and so on and so forth.

3.4 万亿美元听起来

似乎是一笔巨款

$3.4 trillion sounds like a lot of money

直到你拿去跟在相同国家中、

until you compare it to the $5.1 trillion

在我们的金融机构中，

that has been slushing around

in the same countries,

闲置的5.1万亿美元比较。

in our financial institutions,

在同样的时间段内，

什么也没做，

doing absolutely nothing

during the same period

除了让股票市场膨胀，

让房产价格上涨。

except inflating stock exchanges

and bidding up house prices.

所以一座债务大山，

和一座闲置现金大山，

So a mountain of debt

and a mountain of idle cash

形成了两座山峰，

没能够让正常的市场运营

form twin peaks,

failing to cancel each other out

来使两者平衡。

through the normal

operation of the markets.

结果就是薪酬停滞，

The result is stagnant wages,

有超过四分之一的25-54岁的

more than a quarter of 25- to 54-year-olds

in America, in Japan and in Europe

美国人、日本人、

和欧洲人没有工作。

out of work.

随之而来地，是总需求的降低，

And consequently, low aggregate demand,

循环往复，

which in a never-ending cycle,

加剧投资者对前景的悲观，

reinforces the pessimism of the investors,

投资者们惧怕着低需求量，

于是就不再投资 --

who, fearing low demand,

reproduce it by not investing --

就像俄狄浦斯王的父亲，

exactly like Oedipus' father,

神预言他的儿子长大之后会杀了他，

who, terrified

by the prophecy of the oracle

而他对此感到害怕，

that his son would grow up to kill him,

于是不知不觉中创造了各种条件，

unwittingly engineered the conditions

以至于后来俄狄浦斯王，

他的儿子，真的杀了他。

that ensured that Oedipus,

his son, would kill him.

这是我对于资本主义的争论。

This is my quarrel with capitalism.

它的挥霍无度，

Its gross wastefulness,

所有闲置的现金，

all this idle cash,

应该用于改善人民的生活，

should be energized to improve lives,

发展人类的才能，

to develop human talents,

和真正地去资助所有的科技，

and indeed to finance

all these technologies,

绿色科技

green technologies,

这对于保护地球来说

绝对是很重要的。

which are absolutely essential

for saving planet Earth.

相信民主可能是这一切的

答案的我是对的吗？

Am I right in believing

that democracy might be the answer?

我相信是的，

I believe so,

但在我们继续之前，

but before we move on,

我们所说的民主是什么？

what do we mean by democracy?

亚里士多德将民主定义为

Aristotle defined democracy

是一个体制，在这个体制中，

政府是由占着绝大多数比例的

as the constitution

in which the free and the poor,

自由人和穷人来掌控的。

being in the majority, control government.

当然，雅典时代的民主制度

把很多人排除在外。

Now, of course Athenian democracy

excluded too many.

女人，移民以及，

当然地，奴隶。

Women, migrants and,

of course, the slaves.

但是，如果仅基于

有多少人被排除在外，

But it would be a mistake

就去否定古老的

雅典民主制度的意义的话，

to dismiss the significance

of ancient Athenian democracy

这么做是错误的。

on the basis of whom it excluded.

雅典民主中更值得肯定的，

What was more pertinent,

而且时至今日仍值得肯定的，

and continues to be so

about ancient Athenian democracy,

是它包括了贫穷的劳工们，

was the inclusion of the working poor,

授予他们不仅仅言论自由，

who not only acquired

the right to free speech,

更重要的，最重要的是，

but more importantly, crucially,

给予他们政治批判的权利。

they acquired the rights

to political judgments

他们在国家事务政策的制定过程中

that were afforded equal weight

被赋予同等的权利。

in the decision-making

concerning matters of state.

现在，当然，

雅典民主没有延续下去。

Now, of course, Athenian

democracy didn't last long.

就像燃烧得十分明亮的蜡烛，

很快就燃烧殆尽。

Like a candle that burns brightly,

it burned out quickly.

确实，

And indeed,

我们当今的自由民主制度

并不是产自于古代雅典。

our liberal democracies today

do not have their roots in ancient Athens.

他们产自于大宪章、

They have their roots in the Magna Carta,

1688年的光荣革命，

in the 1688 Glorious Revolution,

还有美国宪法。

indeed in the American constitution.

雅典民主集中于无主的平民，

Whereas Athenian democracy

was focusing on the masterless citizen

和赋予贫穷的劳工们权力，

and empowering the working poor,

我们的自由民主制度

是建立在大宪章的传统上，

our liberal democracies are founded

on the Magna Carta tradition,

一个为富人所建立的宪章。

which was, after all,

a charter for masters.

确实，自由民主，

只有在它可以完全

And indeed, liberal democracy

only surfaced when it was possible

分割政治领域和经济领域，

to separate fully the political sphere

from the economic sphere,

从而把民主过程

限定在政治领域，

so as to confine the democratic process

fully in the political sphere,

使经济领域 —

leaving the economic sphere --

商业企业，如果你想的话 --

the corporate world, if you want --

成为一个不受民主限制的地带

的时候浮现。

as a democracy-free zone.

现在，在我们当今的民主，

Now, in our democracies today,

经济领域和政治领域的分离，

this separation of the economic

from the political sphere,

当它开始发生的时候，

the moment it started happening,

这种分离引发了两者间

无情的、史诗般的较量，

it gave rise to an inexorable,

epic struggle between the two,

经济领域侵占统治着政治领域，

with the economic sphere

colonizing the political sphere,

把政治领域的权力吞噬掉。

eating into its power.

你们有没有想过，

为什么政治人物不是他们原有的样子？

Have you wondered why politicians

are not what they used to be?

这并不是因为他们DNA退化了。

It's not because their DNA

has degenerated.

（笑声）

(Laughter)

而是因为，今天在政府里面的人

并没有权力，

It is rather because one can be

in government today and not in power,

因为权力已经从政治领域转移到了

because power has migrated

from the political to the economic sphere,

分离的经济领域中。

which is separate.

确实，

Indeed,

我说出了我对资本主义的争论。

I spoke about my quarrel

with capitalism.

如果你们仔细想想，

If you think about it,

这有点像一群肉食动物，

it is a little bit like

a population of predators,

成功地大批杀害了

它们赖以生存的猎物，

that are so successful in decimating

the prey that they must feed on,

最终自己挨饿。

that in the end they starve.

同理，

Similarly,

经济领域殖民统治

并蚕食了政治领域，

the economic sphere has been colonizing

and cannibalizing the political sphere

在这样的一种状况下

逐渐削弱了自己，

to such an extent

that it is undermining itself,

造成了经济危机。

causing economic crisis.

企业的力量正在崛起，

Corporate power is increasing,

而政治产出正在贬值，

political goods are devaluing,

不平等正在上升，

inequality is rising,

总需求正在降低，

aggregate demand is falling

大公司的总裁们害怕

用他们公司的资金进行投资。

and CEOs of corporations are too scared

to invest the cash of their corporations.

资本主义越是成功地把人民群众

从民主中剔除，

So the more capitalism succeeds

in taking the demos out of democracy,

两座山峰就会越来越高，

the taller the twin peaks

人力资源和人类的财富

and the greater the waste

of human resources

也就更多地被浪费掉了。

and humanity's wealth.

无疑的，如果这是正确的，

Clearly, if this is right,

我们必须重新把

政治和经济领域连结在一起，

we must reunite the political

and economic spheres

并且让人民群众来掌控着

使它变得更好。

and better do it

with a demos being in control,

就像是古代的雅典民主，

在没有奴隶，

like in ancient Athens

except without the slaves

也不把女人和移民排除在外

的前提下。

or the exclusion of women and migrants.

现在，这不是一个新颖的想法。

Now, this is not an original idea.

马克思主义左翼分子

在100多年前就有这样的想法，

The Marxist left

had that idea 100 years ago

然而并没有做得很好，不是吗？

and it didn't go very well, did it?

我们从苏联解体中

吸取到的教训是

The lesson that we learned

from the Soviet debacle

只有当贫穷的劳工们被重新授权，

奇迹才会发生。

is that only by a miracle

will the working poor be reempowered,

就像古代雅典时代那样，

as they were in ancient Athens,

没有制造新形式的暴行和浪费。

without creating new forms

of brutality and waste.

但有现在有一个另外的解决方案：

But there is a solution:

消灭贫穷的劳工。

eliminate the working poor.

资本主义正在这样做，

Capitalism's doing it

通过用自动装置，安卓系统，机器人

来取代低薪的劳工。

by replacing low-wage workers

with automata, androids, robots.

问题是，

The problem is

只要经济和政治领域是分离的，

that as long as the economic

and the political spheres are separate,

自动化会让两座山峰越来越高，

automation makes the twin peaks taller,

浪费会更加巨大，

the waste loftier

社会矛盾会加剧，

and the social conflicts deeper,

包括 --

including --

很快，我相信 --

soon, I believe --

在像中国这样的地方。

in places like China.

因此，我们需要重新装配，

So we need to reconfigure,

我们需要使经济和政治领域

连结在一块，

we need to reunite the economic

and the political spheres,

但我们更应该要做的，是使那块

重新团结在一起的领域民主化，

but we'd better do it

by democratizing the reunified sphere,

以免我们最终落入

监视狂般的超级独裁政权，

lest we end up with

a surveillance-mad hyperautocracy

让电影黑客帝国，

看起来像是纪录片。

that makes The Matrix, the movie,

look like a documentary.

所以，问题并不是资本主义能否在

So the question is not

whether capitalism will survive

在它推动的科技创新中存活下来。

the technological innovations

it is spawning.

更有趣的问题是，

The more interesting question

资本主义是否会被

像是黑客帝国这样的反乌托邦社会取代，

is whether capitalism will be succeeded

by something resembling a Matrix dystopia

或是被更类似于

星际迷航的社会取代，

or something much closer

to a Star Trek-like society,

由机器来服务人类，

where machines serve the humans

人们把精力花费在探索宇宙当中，

and the humans expend their energies

exploring the universe

和沉迷于冗长的

有关于在某些古代，例如雅典时代的，

and indulging in long debates

about the meaning of life

和高科技集市当中生命的意义。

in some ancient, Athenian-like,

high tech agora.

我想，我们能够乐观起来。

I think we can afford to be optimistic.

但是像星际迷航一样的乌托邦，

But what would it take,

而不是黑客帝国那样的反乌托邦，

what would it look like

看起来是怎么样的呢？

而创造它需要些什么呢？

to have this Star Trek-like utopia,

instead of the Matrix-like dystopia?

实际上，

In practical terms,

请允许我简略地

allow me to share just briefly,

分享一些例子。

a couple of examples.

在企业层面，

At the level of the enterprise,

试想一个资本市场，

imagine a capital market,

在其中你工作赚取资本，

where you earn capital as you work,

你的资本跟着你，

从一个工作到下一个工作，

and where your capital follows you

from one job to another,

从一个公司到下一个公司，

from one company to another,

而这个公司--

and the company --

你正巧在那时工作的那间公司--

whichever one you happen

to work at at that time --

被某个正巧在那里工作的人

全权拥有。

is solely owned by those who happen

to work in it at that moment.

所有的收益流，从资本，到收益，

Then all income stems

from capital, from profits,

以及雇佣劳动的概念都会被废弃。

and the very concept

of wage labor becomes obsolete.

消除掉不工作却拥有着公司

和在公司工作

No more separation between those

who own but do not work in the company

却不曾拥有这间公司之间的人的间距，

and those who work

but do not own the company;

消除掉资本和劳动之间的

拔河比赛；

no more tug-of-war

between capital and labor;

消除掉投资和存款间的

巨大缺口；

no great gap between

investment and saving;

最后，两个高耸的山峰

就会消失。

indeed, no towering twin peaks.

在全球政治经济学层面，

At the level of the global

political economy,

试想某个时刻，

imagine for a moment

我们的国家货币有一个

自由浮动的兑换汇率，

that our national currencies

have a free-floating exchange rate,

伴随着一个通用的，

全球的，电子的，

with a universal,

global, digital currency,

由国际货币基金组织，

one that is issued

by the International Monetary Fund,

二十国集团G20所发行的，

the G-20,

代表全人类的货币。

on behalf of all humanity.

并且进一步想象一下，

And imagine further

所有的跨国交易

都用这种货币来标价 --

that all international trade

is denominated in this currency --

我们称它为 “宇宙币”，

let's call it "the cosmos,"

用宇宙币为单元--

in units of cosmos --

每个政府都会同意

根据他们国家的贸易逆差，

with every government agreeing

to be paying into a common fund

或是根据他们国家的贸易顺差，

a sum of cosmos units proportional

to the country's trade deficit,

来向一个共同基金

投入成比例的宇宙币。

or indeed to a country's trade surplus.

试想这个基金

是被用于投资绿色科技，

And imagine that that fund is utilized

to invest in green technologies,

尤其是在世界上

缺乏投资基金的地方。

especially in parts of the world

where investment funding is scarce.

这不是一个新的想法。

This is not a new idea.

实际上，这是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯

It's what, effectively,

John Maynard Keynes proposed

在1944年的布莱顿森林会议上

所提出来的。

in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference.

但问题是，

The problem is

在那时，他们没有科技去实现它。

that back then, they didn't have

the technology to implement it.

现在我们有了，

Now we do,

尤其是在一个重新连结的

政治和经济领域的背景下。

especially in the context

of a reunified political-economic sphere.

我向你们描述的这个世界，

The world that I am describing to you

同时是自由的，

is simultaneously libertarian,

因为它使被赋予权力的

个体们优先化，

in that it prioritizes

empowered individuals,

马克思主义，

Marxist,

由于它将局限于历史的垃圾箱，

since it will have confined

to the dustbin of history

资本和劳动之间的分割，

the division between capital and labor,

还有凯恩斯主义，

and Keynesian,

全球化的凯恩斯主义。

global Keynesian.

总的来说，

But above all else,

它是一个我们能够想象的，

一个真正的民主世界。

it is a world in which we will be able

to imagine an authentic democracy.

这样的世界会出现吗？

Will such a world dawn?

或者我们会沦落到变成

一个黑客帝国般的反乌托邦吗？

Or shall we descend

into a Matrix-like dystopia?

答案就在我们将要共同做出的

政治选择中。

The answer lies in the political choice

that we shall be making collectively.

这是我们的选择，

It is our choice,

我们最好用民主的方法

来进行选择。

and we'd better make it democratically.

谢谢。

Thank you.

00:14:01

布鲁诺·吉桑尼：亚尼斯 ...

Bruno Giussani: Yanis ...

你在自我介绍中称自己为

自由派马克思主义者。

It was you who described yourself

in your bios as a libertarian Marxist.

马克思主义与今天的演讲

有怎样的相关性呢？

What is the relevance

of Marx's analysis today?

亚尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯：

如果与我刚刚的演讲内容相关，

Yanis Varoufakis: Well, if there was

any relevance in what I just said,

马克思主义就是与此相关的。

then Marx is relevant.

因为重新连结

政治和经济最主要的意义在于—

Because the whole point of reunifying

the political and economic is --

如果我们不这么做，

if we don't do it,

那么科技创新就会促使

then technological innovation

is going to create

总需求呈现大幅下跌，

such a massive fall in aggregate demand,

也就是拉瑞·萨默斯所说的

长期性经济停滞。

what Larry Summers

refers to as secular stagnation.

随着这个危机

从世界某个区域向外扩散，

With this crisis migrating

from one part of the world,

就像现在这样，

as it is now,

它将使得我们的民主不稳定，

it will destabilize

not only our democracies,

甚至是那些不是特别热衷于自由民主的

新兴国家。

but even the emerging world that is not

that keen on liberal democracy.

如果这个论述成立的话，

那么马克思主义绝对是相关的。

So if this analysis holds water,

then Marx is absolutely relevant.

BG：在你的演讲中，

你提到了新加坡和中国，

BG: During your talk

you mentioned Singapore and China,

还有在昨天晚上的演讲嘉宾晚宴上，

and last night at the speaker dinner,

你对西方是如何看待中国的

表达了非常强烈的观点。

you expressed a pretty strong opinion

about how the West looks at China.

你愿意分享一下吗？

Would you like to share that?

YV：好吧，这有

很大程度上的虚伪。

YV: Well, there's a great

degree of hypocrisy.

在我们的自由民主制度下，

一种民主的假象。

In our liberal democracies,

we have a semblance of democracy.

因为我们被限制了，

正如我在演讲中所说的，

It's because we have confined,

as I was saying in my talk,

民主仅在于政治领域，

democracy to the political sphere,

然而一切活动发生的那个领域 --

while leaving the one sphere

where all the action is --

经济领域 --

the economic sphere --

成为了完全不民主的区域。

a completely democracy-free zone.

在某种意义上，

In a sense,

用比较前瞻的话说就是，

if I am allowed to be provocative,

中国今天就像是19世纪的英国。

China today is closer to Britain

in the 19th century.

因为请记得，

Because remember,

我们想要把自由主义和民主

连在一起的意图 --

we tend to associate

liberalism with democracy --

是错误的，历史上来说。

that's a mistake, historically.

自由主义，自由，

就像是约翰·斯图加特·密尔。

Liberalism, liberal,

it's like John Stuart Mill.

约翰·斯图加特·密尔对于民主过程

持非常怀疑的观点。

John Stuart Mill was particularly

skeptical about the democratic process.

所以你所看到的现代中国的发展，

就是一个跟英国在工业革命时期

So what you are seeing now in China

is a very similar process

非常相似的发展过程，

to the one that we had in Britain

during the Industrial Revolution,

尤其是从第一次工业革命

和第二次工业革命的之间的过渡期。

especially the transition

from the first to the second.

所以对中国在

And to be castigating China

做西方社会19世纪做过的事

for doing that which the West did

in the 19th century,

而进行苛责是很虚伪的。

smacks of hypocrisy.

苏联的经验告诉过我们。

This is the experience

of the Soviet Union.

当你想要让已经无法存活的经济系统

When you try to keep alive

得以继续存活，

an economic system

that architecturally cannot survive,

通过政治意愿和霸权主义这样的方式，

through political will

and through authoritarianism,

你也许能够成功地将它延迟，

you may succeed in prolonging it,

但是当转变发生的时候，

but when change happens

便会是突发的，而且是灾难性的。

it happens very abruptly

and catastrophically.

Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of China

The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll

see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be

almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected

that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian

economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here

that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.

A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will

have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis

projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two

fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion

people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.

And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern

era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a

developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the

world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very

different civilizational roots.

Now, I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that as countries modernize, they also

westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of

competition, markets and technology. It is not. It is also shaped equally by history and culture.

China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental

respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China?

How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment,

by and large, is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms,

using Western ideas. We can't. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to

understand what China is like, just as a beginning.

The first is this: that China is not really a nation-state. Okay, it's called itself a nation-state for the

last hundred years, but everyone who knows anything about China knows it's a lot older than this.

This was what China looked like with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. at the end of the

warring-state period -- the birth of modern China. And you can see it against the boundaries of

modern China. Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2,000 years ago. And you can see

already it occupies most of what we now know as Eastern China, which is where the vast majority

of Chinese lived then and live now.

Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China its sense of being China, what gives the

Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the

nation-state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the

civilization-state. I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very

distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships

like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the

civilization-state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world,

is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization-state, rather than as a

nation-state. And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's

big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we

often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in

many ways very decentralized. You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even

though we think this to be the case. It's never been the case.

So this is China, a civilization-state, rather than a nation-state. And what does it mean? Well, I

think it has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. The first is that the

most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization.

You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown -- the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire.

It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly

the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization-state, together.

The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong

Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional

proposition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West

believed them. "Window dressing. When China gets its hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the

case." Thirteen years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was

in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally

enough, in nation-state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically

the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation-state mentality.

But you can't run a country like China, a civilization-state, on the basis of one civilization, one

system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it

will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.

Let me offer you another building block to try and understand China -- maybe not sort of a

comfortable one. The Chinese have a very, very different conception of race to most other

countries. Do you know, of the 1.3 billion Chinese, over 90 percent of them think they belong to

the same race, the Han? Now, this is completely different from the world's [other] most populous

countries. India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil -- all of them are multiracial. The Chinese

don't feel like that. China is only multiracial really at the margins. So the question is, why? Well

the reason, I think, essentially is, again, back to the civilization-state. A history of at least 2,000

years, a history of conquest, occupation, absorption, assimilation and so on, led to the process by

which, over time, this notion of the Han emerged -- of course, nurtured by a growing and very

powerful sense of cultural identity.

Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could

never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country

together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural

difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are

not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.

Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the

state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West

overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the

state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys

more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And

the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it's obviously got nothing

to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy. And the

reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special -- it enjoys a very

special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization,

of the civilization-state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.

And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is

continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church,

against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power

of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It's had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way

in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western

history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas

we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or

defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state

as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a

member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese

view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It's embedded in society in a different kind of way

to what is the case in the West.

And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is

a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past.

Know that China believes in the market and the state. I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the

late 18th century, said, "The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated

than anything in Europe." And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more or less the case

ever since. But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. The state is

everywhere in China. I mean, it's leading firms -- many of them are still publicly owned. Private

firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for

the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of

other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the one-child policy.

Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an

illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was

constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C. and was finally completed in the seventh

century A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there's a

long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to

explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other

expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to

understand the difference that is China -- the civilization-state, the notion of race and the nature of

the state and its relationship to society.

And yet we still insist, by and large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing

on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts. If you want to

know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen

to China are incorrect -- this is the reason. Unfortunately, I think, I have to say that I think attitude

towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It's kind of arrogant. It's arrogant in

the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. And

secondly, it's ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there's a very

interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And Paul Cohen argues that

the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it's not. In many

ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world

that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of

the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest

of the world, in fact, which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West -- have been

thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies. And

therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.

I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. -- a third of the world's

population lives there. Now the largest economic region in the world. And I'll tell you now, that

East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is

about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present. Because what's

happening? Back to that chart at the beginning, the Goldman Sachs chart. What is happening is

that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old

developed countries, but by the developing world. We've seen this in terms of the G20 usurping

very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the

West is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a

year ago -- Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table.

When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is

going to happen in the future.

And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become

increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that

we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I'm afraid -- take Europe; America

is slightly different -- but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about

the way the world is changing. Some people -- I've got an English friend in China, and he said,

"The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an

exaggeration. But there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Europe is

increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. I mean,

Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in its confidence. Take the 19th century, for

example. But this, alas, is no longer true.

If you want to feel the future, if you want to taste the future, try China -- there's old Confucius.

This is a railway station the likes of which you've never seen before. It doesn't even look like a

railway station. This is the new Guangzhou railway station for the high-speed trains. China

already has a bigger network than any other country in the world and will soon have more than all

the rest of the world put together. Or take this: now this is an idea, but it's an idea to be tried out

shortly in a suburb of Beijing. Here you have a megabus, on the upper deck carries about 2,000

people. It travels on rails down a suburban road, and the cars travel underneath it. And it does

speeds of up to about 100 miles an hour. Now this is the way things are going to move, because

China has a very specific problem, which is different from Europe and different from the United

States: China has huge numbers of people and no space. So this is a solution to a situation where

China's going to have many, many, many cities over 20 million people.

Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we

see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be

bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big-picture positive for this world. For 200

years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That's what

Europe and North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India -- between

them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on,

represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and

cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not

known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must

welcome, surely, this transformation, and we will have to learn about these civilizations.

This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great

voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East

Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus

crossed the Atlantic. (Laughter) Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by Zhu Zhou in 1368. I

think they're playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.

Welcome to the future. Thank you.

在现代史上从未有过

世界上最大的经济体是发展中国家，而不是发展中国家

发达国家。第二，在现代史上第一次

世界——我认为中国将成为什么样的世界——不会来自西方，也不会来自非常非常

不同的文明根源。

现在，我知道西方普遍认为，随着国家的现代化，它们也会

西化。这是一种错觉。这是一种假设，现代性只是

竞争、市场和技术。不是的。它同样受到历史和文化的影响。

中国不像西方，也不会变得像西方。它仍将是非常基本的

尊重非常不同。现在最大的问题是，我们如何理解中国？

我们如何理解中国是什么？我们现在在西方遇到的问题，

总的来说，传统的方法是我们用西方的术语来理解它，

使用西方思想。我们做不到。现在我想给你提供三个基本要素

了解中国是什么样的，只是一个开始。

首先，中国不是一个真正的民族国家。好吧，它被称为民族国家

过去的一百年，但是任何对中国有任何了解的人都知道它比这个古老得多。

这就是中国在公元前221年秦朝胜利时的样子

战国时期——近代中国的诞生。你可以看到它的边界

现代中国。或者紧接着就是2000年前的汉朝。你可以看到

它已经占据了我们现在所知的中国东部的大部分地区，这是绝大多数地区

中国人生活在当时和现在。

这件事的非凡之处在于，是什么赋予了中国作为中国的感觉，是什么赋予了中国

中国人对什么是中国人的感觉，不是来自过去一百年，不是来自

民族国家时期，这是发生在西方的，但是如果你愿意的话

文明国家。我在想，比如说，像祖先崇拜这样的习俗

国家的独特概念，同样，一个非常独特的家庭，社会关系的概念

比如说关系，儒家的价值观等等。这些都是来自

文明国家。换句话说，中国不同于西方国家和世界上大多数国家，

是由它的文明感塑造的，它作为一个文明国家而不是作为一个文明国家而存在

民族国家。还有一件事需要补充，那就是：我们当然知道中国的

人口13亿，人口众多，人口众多，地理位置优越。我们

往往没有真正意识到的是，中国是一个极其多元化和非常多元化的国家

很多方面非常分散。你不可能仅仅从北京经营这样规模的地方，甚至

虽然我们认为是这样。从来都不是这样。

所以这是中国，一个文明国家，而不是一个民族国家。这是什么意思？嗯，我

认为它有各种深刻的含义。我给你两个快速的。首先是

中华民族最重要的政治价值是团结，是中华文明的维护。

你知道，2000年前，欧洲：崩溃——神圣罗马帝国的分裂。

它分裂了，从那以后一直是分裂的。中国，在同一时期，完全进入了

相反的方向，非常痛苦地把这个巨大的文明、文明国家，紧紧地抱在一起。

第二个可能是平淡无奇的，那就是香港。你还记得洪的移交吗

1997年由英国到中国？你可能还记得中国宪法

建议是。一国两制。我敢打赌在西方几乎没有人

相信他们。”粉饰。当中国掌权香港时，那将不是

十三年来，香港的政治和法律制度与现在不同。

1997年。我们错了。为什么我们错了？我们错了，因为我们认为，很自然

够了，以民族国家的方式。想想1990年的德国统一。怎么了？嗯，基本上

东方被西方吞没了。一个国家，一个体系。这就是民族国家的心态。

但是你不能在一种文明的基础上，管理一个像中国这样的文明国家

系统。它不起作用。事实上，中国对香港问题的反应

会对台湾问题作出自然的反应：一个文明，多个制度。

让我为你提供另一个可以尝试了解中国的基础——也许不是一个

舒服一点。中国人对种族的概念与大多数人截然不同

国家。你知道吗，在13亿中国人中，超过90%的人认为他们属于

同样的种族，汉族？现在，这与世界上人口最多的国家完全不同

国家。印度、美国、印度尼西亚、巴西——它们都是多种族。中国人

别这样想。中国只是处于边缘的多民族国家。所以问题是，为什么？嗯

原因，我认为，本质上是，再次回到文明国家。至少有2000年的历史

多年来，一段征服、占领、吸收、同化等历史，导致了由

随着时间的推移，汉人的观念逐渐形成--当然，是由

强烈的文化认同感。

这段历史经验的最大优点是，没有汉人，中国可以

从来没有在一起。汉人的身份是维系这个国家的水泥

一起。其最大的缺点是汉族文化观念薄弱

区别。他们真的相信自己的优越感，而且他们不尊重那些有优越感的人

不是。因此他们的态度，例如，对维吾尔人和藏人。

或者让我给你我的第三个组成部分，中国国家。现在

中国的国家和社会与西方大不相同。现在我们在西方

绝大多数人似乎认为——至少在现在——的权威和合法性

国家是民主的功能。这个命题的问题在于，中国政府享受

中国人比任何西方国家都更具合法性和权威性。以及

这是因为——嗯，我认为有两个原因。显然什么也没有

因为用我们的话说，中国人当然没有民主。以及

原因是，首先，因为中国的国家被赋予了一种非常特殊的——它享有

作为中华文明的代表、体现和守护者，具有特殊的意义，

文明国家。这就像中国接近一种精神角色一样。

第二个原因是，在欧洲和北美，国家的权力

不断受到挑战——我是说在欧洲传统中，历史上反对教会，

反对其他阶层的贵族，反对商人等等——一千年来，权力

中国政府没有受到挑战。它没有真正的对手。所以你可以这样看

中国的权力建设与西方的经验有很大的不同

历史。结果，顺便说一句，中国人对国家的看法截然不同。鉴于

我们倾向于把它看作是一个入侵者，一个陌生人，当然是一个权力需要被限制或

定义和约束下，中国人根本看不到这个国家。中国人看待国家

作为一个亲密的人——不仅仅是作为一个亲密的人，作为一个家庭的一员——不仅仅是作为一个

家庭成员，但作为一家之主，家庭的族长。这是中国人

对国家的看法——和我们的非常非常不同。它以另一种方式融入社会

对于西方的情况。

我想告诉你们，实际上，在中国，我们要处理的是

一种新的范式，它不同于我们过去所想的任何东西。

要知道中国相信市场和国家。我是说，亚当·斯密，已经在

18世纪末，有人说：“中国市场更大、更发达、更复杂

而且，除了毛泽东时期，这种情况或多或少一直存在

从那以后。但这与一个极其强大和无处不在的状态结合在一起。国家是

在中国到处都是。我的意思是，它是领先的公司--其中许多仍然是公有制。私人

无论公司有多大，比如联想，在很多方面都依赖于政府的资助。目标

经济等等都是国家规定的。当然，国家的权力流向了很多

我们熟悉的其他领域也有独生子女政策。

此外，这是一个非常古老的国家传统，一个非常古老的治国传统。我是说，如果你想

长城就是其中之一。但这是另一条，这是大运河

第一次建造于公元前5世纪，最终于公元前7世纪完工

它走了1114英里，连接了北京、杭州和上海。所以有一个

我想这对我们有很大帮助

解释一下我们今天所看到的，它有点像三峡大坝和其他许多大坝

中国国内国家能力的表现。所以我们有三个构建块来尝试

了解中国的不同之处——文明国家、种族观念和

国家及其与社会的关系。

但我们仍然坚持认为，我们可以通过简单的绘画来了解中国

关于西方的经验，用西方的眼光看，用西方的概念。如果你想的话

你知道为什么我们总是把中国弄错了——我们对即将发生的事情的预测

对中国来说是不正确的——这就是原因。不幸的是，我想，我不得不说我认为我的态度

对中国是一种小西方人的心态。有点傲慢。太傲慢了

我们认为自己是最好的，因此我们有普遍的衡量标准。以及

其次，它是无知的。我们拒绝真正解决差异问题。你知道，有一个

美国历史学家保罗·科恩的一本书中有趣的一段。保罗·科恩认为

西方认为自己可能是所有文化中最国际化的。但事实并非如此。在许多方面

当然，这是最狭隘的，因为200年来，西方一直在世界上占据主导地位

其实不需要了解其他文化，其他文明。因为，在最后

有朝一日，如果有必要的话，它可以走自己的路。而那些文化——实际上是其他文化

事实上，与西方相比，世界上一直处于一个非常弱势的地位

因此被迫了解西方，因为西方存在于这些社会中。以及

因此，他们在许多方面都比西方更具世界性。

我是说，以东亚问题为例。东亚：日本、韩国、中国等，占世界的三分之一

人口居住在那里。现在是世界上最大的经济区。我现在就告诉你

东亚人，来自东亚的人，对西方的了解远远超过西方

关于东亚。现在这一点恐怕与现在非常密切相关。因为什么

发生了什么？回到开始时的图表，高盛图表。正在发生的是

从历史的角度来看，这个世界正在被驱动和塑造，而不是由旧的

发达国家，但是发展中国家。我们从20国集团的篡夺中看到了这一点

很快G7或G8的位置。这有两个后果。首先

西方正在迅速失去其在世界上的影响力。有一个戏剧性的例子

一年前——哥本哈根气候变化大会。欧洲没有坐在最后的谈判桌上。

上次是什么时候发生的？我敢打赌那大概是200年前的事了。这就是事实

将来会发生。

第二个暗示是，世界将不可避免地成为

我们越来越不熟悉，因为它将被文化、经验和历史所塑造

我们不太熟悉，也不熟悉。最后，恐怕——拿欧洲和美国来说吧

有点不同，但总的来说，欧洲人，我不得不说，是无知的，不知道

世界正在改变。有些人——我在中国有个英国朋友，他说，

“欧洲大陆在梦游中被遗忘。”嗯，也许这是真的，也许那是一个

夸张。但还有另一个问题伴随而来的是欧洲

与世界越来越脱节，这是对未来的一种丧失。我是说，

当然，欧洲曾经一度对未来充满信心。以19世纪为例

例子。但是，唉，这不再是真的了。

如果你想感受未来，如果你想尝尝未来，那就试试中国——那里有古老的孔子。

这是一个你从未见过的火车站。它看起来不像

火车站。这是新的广州高铁火车站。中国

已经拥有比世界上任何其他国家都大的网络，而且很快就会超过所有国家

全世界的人都在一起。或者拿这个来说：现在这是一个想法，但这是一个有待尝试的想法

就在北京郊区。这里有一辆特大巴士，在上层甲板上可载2000辆左右

人。它沿着郊区的一条公路行驶，汽车在它下面行驶。确实如此

速度高达每小时100英里。这就是事情发展的方向，因为

中国有一个非常具体的问题，既不同于欧洲，也不同于美国

国家：中国人口众多，没有空间。所以这是解决

中国将会有很多很多超过2000万人口的城市。

好吧，那我想怎么结束呢？那么，我们对这个世界的态度应该是什么

看到我们面前发展得很快吗？我想它会有好的方面，而且会有

不好的地方。但我想说的是，最重要的是，一个对这个世界有积极意义的大局。200美元

多年来，世界基本上是由一部分人统治的。那是什么

欧洲和北美有代表性。中国和印度等国家的到来

他们占世界人口的38%——还有其他国家，比如印度尼西亚和巴西等等，

是过去200年来最重要的民主化行动。文明和

被忽视的文化，没有声音，没有人倾听，没有人倾听

知道了，在这个世界上会有不同的代表性。作为人文主义者，我们必须

当然，欢迎这种转变，我们将不得不学习这些文明。

这里的这艘大船是郑和在15世纪初用他的大船

航行于南中国海、东海和印度洋以东

非洲。它前面的小船是80年后，克里斯托弗·哥伦布在船上

横渡大西洋。（笑声）或者，仔细看看这幅朱周于1368年制作的丝卷。我

以为他们在打高尔夫球。天啊，中国人甚至发明了高尔夫球。

欢迎来到未来。非常感谢。