



Security Assessment Report



Aave Stewards

August 2025

Prepared for:

Aave DAO

Code developed by TokenLogic



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Project Summary

Project Scope

Project Name	Repository (link)	Latest Commit Hash	Platform
Rewards Steward	https://github.com/bgd-labs/aave-stewards	PR#23	Solidity

Project Overview

This document describes the manual code review findings of **Aave Stewards**. The following contract list is included in our scope:

src/finance/RewardsSteward.sol

The work was undertaken from **August 15, 2025**, to **August 18, 2025**. During this time, Certora's security researchers performed a manual audit of all the Solidity contracts.

Protocol Overview

RewardsSteward is a minimal Aave steward focused on incentives operations. It lets anyone trigger reward claims on behalf of the DAO's **Collector**, and sweep incidental assets from the steward to the **Collector**, while guaranteeing all value flows only to the **Collector**. It holds no governance power and no custodial state; it simply integrates with **RewardsController** once set as the authorized claimer. This design enables fast, low-friction rewards ops without requiring new votes for routine actions.

Findings Summary

The table below summarizes the findings of the review, including type and severity details.

Severity	Discovered	Confirmed	Fixed
Critical	-	-	-
High	-	-	-
Medium	-	-	-
Low	-	-	-
Informational	-	-	-
Total	-	-	-

Severity Matrix

Impact	High	Medium	High	Critical
	Medium	Low	Medium	High
	Low	Low	Low	Medium
		Low	Medium	High
Likelihood				

Audit Goals

1. Integration correctness

- a. Verify function signatures and argument order match the controller API exactly: `claimRewardsOnBehalf/assets, amount, COLLECTOR, COLLECTOR, reward` and `claimAllRewardsOnBehalf/assets, COLLECTOR, COLLECTOR`, and that observed semantics match controller expectations.

2. Value-flow and Auth invariant

- a. Confirm that claims succeed only after `setClaimer(COLLECTOR, address(this))` is set in `RewardsController`, and that both claim paths send rewards exclusively to `COLLECTOR` with no third-party redirection surface.

3. Rescue mechanics

- a. Ensure ERC20 rescue is capped to the contract's actual token balance and uses `safeTransfer`, and ETH rescue forwards exactly `address(this).balance` via raw call. Verify both rescue paths send assets exclusively to `COLLECTOR` with no redirection surface.

4. Permissionless claiming safety

- a. Validate that open triggering only affects timing. Confirm `Collector's receive` is a no-op, streams are created only via `createStream` by a funds admin, incoming rewards do not create or mutate streams, and `streamId` increments only on explicit creation.

Coverage and Conclusions

1. Integration correctness

- a. Signatures and argument order match the controller definitions :
`claimRewardsOnBehalf/assets, amount, COLLECTOR, COLLECTOR, reward` and
`claimAllRewardsOnBehalf/assets, COLLECTOR, COLLECTOR`. Semantics align with controller expectations and were written without parameter mismatch.

2. Value-flow and Auth invariant

- a. Claims succeed only when `setClaimer(COLLECTOR, address(this))` is set in `RewardsController`. Both claim paths direct rewards to `COLLECTOR`. There is no call surface that redirects value to third parties.

3. Rescue mechanics

- a. ERC20 rescue caps to the contract's actual token balance and uses `safeTransfer`.
ETH rescue forwards exactly `address(this).balance` via a raw call. Both rescue paths direct assets to `COLLECTOR` only.

4. Permissionless claiming safety

Open triggering changes only timing. `Collector's receive` does nothing, and stream state changes occur only through `createStream` by a funds admin. Incoming rewards do not create or mutate streams, and the `streamId` counter increments only when explicitly instructed.

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