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Exploring the Connection Between Political and Social Democracy

1. Introduction

For decades, political scientists have been exploring the relationship between political democracy and social welfare. These questions have often been asked on the state level, discussing how the levels of democracy within a state affect its welfare outcomes (Jackman, 1974; Knutsen, 1974). There have also been explorations on the individual level, examining how exposure to the welfare state affects citizens' political interests and tendencies (Shore, 2019). Finally, a study using World Values Survey data has asked to what extent citizens across the world view welfare as a core part of democracy and how that varies between countries (Wegmann and Knutsen, 2016). This past work has contributed extensively to investigating what is the exact nature of the relationship between these two phenomena, and whether the projects of liberal democracy and building the welfare state are separate or related. Answering this question is essential to understanding the trajectory of modern welfare states and how they are affected by developments in political democracy, especially as many wealthy, Western states undergo democratic backsliding (Mechovka 2017; Lührmann, 2017).

I am interested in studying this relationship within the United States, though with a slightly different focus from much of the existing literature. This paper will ask whether support for liberal democracy and interest in politics in general are connected to support for welfare expansion and/or other redistributionist policies, or whether these political projects move separately within American public opinion. Based on past research, I hypothesize that there will

not be a strong relationship between these two areas of public opinion on the individual level, but that this relationship will vary more between citizens of different class statuses and partisanship.

I also ask whether this relationship changed between 2016 and 2020. The United States underwent extensive democratic backsliding during that period (IDEA, 2020), culminating in the Republican attempt to dispute the results of the 2020 election and the subsequent insurrection at the Capitol on January 6th, 2021. It is therefore worth evaluating how the relationship between democratic attitudes and feelings about welfare changed during a time when the nature of American democracy was contested and when the party generally opposed to expansions of the welfare state was engaging in activities that undermined American democracy.

This research has implications for a variety of open questions within political science and the study of U.S. attitudes about democracy and welfare. Many studies have found broad support for collectivist welfare policies in the U.S, including healthcare and job guarantees (Coughlin, 1980). However, the U.S. has also been characterized as a 'liberal' welfare state, one where benefits are means-tested, entitlements are stigmatized, and where there is steep inequality between those who receive welfare and those who do not (Esping-Anderson, 1990). One common explanation for this outcome is that class politics in the U.S. is fragmented by ethnicity and localized by community, preventing workers from seeing themselves as part of a class with shared economic interests and serving as a barrier against their organizing for social welfare (Katznelson, 1978). This research adds to this academic discussion by asking whether support for democracy plays a role in welfare opinions in the U.S.

Additionally, U.S. states have varying welfare policies (different minimum wages, a multitude of different unemployment insurance schemes, some expanding Medicaid and some not, etc.), and they also have increasingly disparate commitments to democracy, with some states

taking active measures to limit voting or make it easier to overturn elections (Alas, 2021). My research will contribute to the effort to discover whether these two phenomena are related on the level of public opinion.

Finally, the temporal aspect of this paper, wherein I compare my results between respondents surveyed in 2016 and 2020, answers whether the political developments of the Trump presidency and the ways that it may have weakened the U.S. democratic system affected the relationship between American support for democracy and that for welfare. This question is pertinent given the Republican party's commitment to shrinking the welfare state and regressive economic policies, exemplified in their attempted repeal of the Affordable Health Care Act and enactment of tax cuts for wealthy Americans, both in 2017. My paper asks whether the party's increasingly lacking democratic commitments demonstrated during the Trump presidency have made voters associate democracy with welfare more than they have in the past, as the party most associated with reducing welfare may also be associated with attempting to sabotage democracy in the U.S.

My results indicate that a link between political and social democracy does in fact exist in American public opinion in the 2020 data. I also find that a stark partisan gap exists between Republicans and Democrats when it comes to this association, with Democrats showing the same positive link as the overall population and Republicans displaying a negative one. Furthermore, by comparing my results to those from earlier survey data, I find that this relationship seems to have developed since 2016, and that the partisan gap has widened since that year as well. These findings fit into a larger body of research studying the connection between political representation and the material benefits that government provides, as well as past literature about the nature of partisan, elite signaling and how that drives public opinion in the U.S.

2. Literature Review

The question of the relationship between democracy and redistributive politics has been studied for centuries, and one of the earliest explorations of the subject was written by Eduard Bernstein, a German socialist thinker and politician. In *The Preconditions of Socialism,* Bernstein makes the case for an intricate connection between the liberal democracy and his desired vision of a socialist, economically equitable society: "With respect to liberalism as a historical movement, socialism is its legitimate heir, not only chronologically, but also intellectually" (Bernstein 147). Bernstein understands political liberalism to be a step toward realizing socialism and believes that democracy contains the seeds of redistributive politics. "The liberal institutions of modern society… do not need to be destroyed; they need only to be further developed," he says (158).

Bernstein's theoretical position that liberalism leads to socialism/redistribution points to a perceived connection between these two ideas within states, and an assortment of past studies have attempted to empirically identify such a relationship. The study most relevant to my question is "Is democracy about redistribution?" by Carl Henrik Knutson and Simone Wegmann. This paper aims to analyze whether individuals perceive economic redistribution as a core component of democracy. Using individual-level survey data, the authors gauge whether respondents ranked policies such as progressive taxation, state unemployment aid, etc. relatively high on the list of things that they consider essential characteristics of democracy. They find that few people overall, and also specifically in the United States, consider economic redistribution to be core to democratic governance. This work lends credence to the theory that there is little or no connection between the two phenomena. It also makes more specific and nuanced claims,

arguing for example that upper and middle-class citizens are less likely to display the association while those living under dictatorship are more likely.

The question explored in this study is very closely related to my own, though they differ in some ways. I am more interested in the relationship between investment in democracy and in social welfare and what this connection reveals about the interplay between these two arenas of politics within the U.S., not necessarily whether people perceive the two to be related, nor how this phenomenon varies between countries. However, the findings of this study would indicate that I should not expect a strong correlation between support for democracy and support of welfare policies.

Another related work is *The Welfare State and the Democratic Citizen*, by Jennifer Shore. This book asks the question of how the extent of a country's welfare state affects the democratic participation and attitudes of its citizens. Multiple analyses report that increasing welfare spending predicts a higher likelihood of voting, more reported interest in politics, and satisfaction with the political system. Shore's book responds to the question of whether what democracies do with regard to the welfare state matters in terms of producing a population that is invested and participates in the democratic system. By evaluating these effects while also accounting for potential state and individual-level confounders such as the strength of left parties in a given country, personal income, and union membership, among others, Shore attempts to isolate the effect of welfare spending on the strength of democracy.

The positive relationship that Shore identifies is closely related to what I am interested in studying. If Shore is correct that welfare is associated with increased democratic participation and interest, then perhaps it is reasonable to predict some correlation between support for democracy and support for welfare. Provided that citizens are able to understand how welfare

has assisted them and made them more able to participate in democracy, they might have higher support for democracy as their support for welfare rises. However, this would imply that it is support for welfare that is predicting support for democracy, not the other way around.

One other study with implications for my state-level research is Robert Jackman's paper "Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis." This paper explores the relationship between political democracy and social equality on the country level. Using aggregate measures of both political and social democracy, it finds that while there is a positive relationship between the two, this correlation is proven to be spurious when levels of economic development are also taken into account. It also rules out any non-additive relationship, demonstrating that economic development and democracy do not operate together to promote social welfare and that democracy has no significant effect once development is included in the model. Another related study from Carl Henrik Knutson also found little to no evidence for democracy reducing inequality on the state level.

The fact that Jackman and Knutson find a lack of a relationship between political and social democracy/equality on the country level is deeply pertinent to my research. It suggests that I might expect to see a similar absence of a strong correlation between support for political democracy and support for social welfare. It is also important to note that Jackman and Knutson's findings are not necessarily universally accepted, as a literature review by Gradstein and Milanovic found that, in general, democratization leads to a more equitable distribution of resources. Moreover, Jackman's findings are about democracy outcomes affecting welfare outcomes, while I am measuring how public opinion on democracy influences public opinion on welfare, so while these metrics are related, my results may not line up exactly with his findings.

3. Theory and Hypotheses

Given the above research, I have a number of expectations for my findings. On the individual level, given the non-significant findings of the Wegmann and Knutson study, I do not expect to see that support for democracy is strongly related to support for welfare in the overall population (H1). However, I do expect to see that these phenomena are linked more in the minds of Americans with experience interacting with the welfare state compared to those who had not, as welfare policies benefit this population more than they do the rich, and thus these Americans' familiarity with the welfare system would make them more likely to associate the state and its democratic nature with these policies (H2).

Welfare policies are often hyper-politicized and partisan in the United States, and so I would also expect to see that Democrats, who typically support expanding welfare and implementing progressive economic policy, are more likely to have their support for democracy positively linked to their support for welfare compared to Republicans (H3). I anticipate this result despite Jackman's findings that welfare and democracy on the country level are not related. Jackman's main explanation is that economic development is a much stronger predictor of robust welfare policies, which may be true when discussing countries in general. Within the U.S, however, I would argue that the main reason for not expanding the welfare regimes is not lack of funds but a political ideology. For example, the vast majority of the costs of Medicaid expansion are paid for by the federal government, and some states have chosen to opt out of it not because it is expensive but because legislators are opposed to it on principle (CBPP, 2021; Harper, 2021). In the U.S., it seems much more plausible that welfare opinions are guided by what citizens think the appropriate role for the government is in a democratic society, which is a very partisan issue. Therefore, I expect to see more of a connection between how people think about democracy and how they feel about welfare when grouping by partisan lean.

On the question of the difference between all of these outcomes between 2016 and 2020, I hypothesize that the partisan gap of the relationship widened during those years (H4). As the Republican party diverged sharply from traditional notions of democracy in those years, it seems logical that Republicans would increasingly associate their idea of a functional democracy with the shrinkage of the welfare state and redistributive policy, which has long been a Republican policy preference (Beauchamp, 2021).

This hypothesis is in line with the theories of Hacker and Pierson, who have long documented how the Republican Party is characterized by staunchly pro-corporate policies and antidemocratic tendencies aimed at deploying tribalism and division instead of material benefits to their voters. (Hacker and Pierson 2005, 2020). This theory would also fit into the evidence brought by *Follow The Leader*, which argues that partisan elites guide voters' policy opinions rather than the other way around (Lenz, 2012). Here, we may be seeing Republican and Democratic voters increasingly associating their support for sound political representation in general with their own economic policy goals.

4. Data and Methods

My data source for survey data is the 2020 and 2016 ANES data. This survey, run before and after every presidential election cycle, asks questions related to political identity, voter behavior, as well as relevant and timely political and policy issues, with the goal being to represent the United States voting age population. In 2016, the study was conducted using a combination of in person and online interviews, with both groups sampled using addresses from the United States' Postal Service's computerized delivery sequence file (DSF). Participants were paid for their time and to be eligible, one had to be 18 years old and living in the selected address. In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews were conducted online and over

the phone, though using the same sampling method. Weights are also calculated in order to adjust the data to account for demographic imbalances in the fields of gender, race, geography, marital status, education, and other factors.

The survey includes questions related to both respondents' feelings about politics and democracy, as well as welfare and redistributionist policies. My approach to measuring my dependent and independent variables was inspired by Professors Omar Wasow and Maya Sen's paper "Race as a Bundle of Sticks," in which the authors propose measuring race as a multidimensional combination of factors such as class, geography, dialect, etc, rather than a single categorical variable, in order to better understand the different ways that race manifests itself in society. Similarly, I understand support for democracy and spending/redistribution as being composed of a variety of factors and feelings about a wide set of issues. I will measure these components of respondents' attitudes toward democracy and spending/redistribution both individually and in aggregate in order to gain a more nuanced perspective of these phenomena.

Thus, for my independent variable, how supportive voters are of democracy, I include a number of questions from the ANES. These include questions that ask voters how important they think a number of specific institutions and norms are to democracy, such as whether media should be independent, whether there should be consequences for presidential misconduct, how respondents feel about an executive that would not have to worry about being checked by other institutions, and how respondents feel about separation of powers. While the selection of these factors and not others is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, they do represent many of the components of the American political system that aim to translate popular will into political action and prevent authoritarianism. They also align with what some theorists have identified as central characteristics of liberal democracy such as separation of powers and rule of law (Ware,

1992; Lindberg et al. 2014). Lastly, they connect to Robert Dahl's work on the importance of popular support for democratic ideals among the citizens in order for democracies to succeed (Dahl 157).

Another aspect of respondents' politics I am interested in studying has to do with how personally invested they are in democratic activities. Such questions include asking whether respondents think voting should be a duty vs. a choice, how interested respondents are in politics, whether they follow political media, and whether they follow campaigns. I also reduce these variables' dimensionality using PCA (Principal Component Analysis), creating one metric for political interest to be included in the analysis.

PCA is a common method of dimensionality reduction which allows for the variation of a set of variables to be condensed into a set of continuous metrics, or principal components. In a PCA Analysis, there are as many components as there are variables, with each component explaining increasingly less of the variation in the data. Thus, I use the first principal component of my liberal democracy variables to provide a gauge for how theoretically committed respondents are to these components of an open democracy. See Appendix 1 for more details on my PCA metrics, and Appendix 3 for analyses that regress the individual dependent variables on the independent variable PCA indices, as well as the PCA indices on the individual independent variables.

In line with the framework of Knutson and Wegman, who ask whether redistribution is a core component of democracy, rather than the other way around, I measure these independent variables against my outcome variable, respondents' support for welfare/redistribution, using multivariate OLS regression models. The decision to use democracy as my independent variable is also in line with my intention to measure whether the United States' current contestation of its

liberal democratic system, a controversy that has emerged since 2016, is displaying any impact on this relationship.

In order to measure my dependent variable, I also split ANES variables into two categories. The first measures support for spending on public schools, aid to the poor, health care, and welfare. These questions in the ANES ask whether voters think spending on these programs should increase, decrease, or be kept the same.

The other method of measuring my dependent variable emphasizes how voters think about redistributive economic policies, such as raising the minimum wage, taxing millionaires, or the government providing a basic standard of living and minimizing the economic differences between citizens in general. I compare both of the aforementioned categories of democracy support to both types of support for welfare and redistribution, in order to examine this multifaceted relationship and capture the many forms that these sentiments can take. The welfare and redistribution outcomes are also evaluated using PCA. All my PCA variables were also scaled to make their results more interpretable, and so the coefficients in the regression could be understood in terms of increases in standard deviation.

In some of my analyses, I group responses by whether they have ever received food stamps or other forms of public assistance, as Shore's analysis would lead me to believe that there might be a relationship between interactions with the welfare state and citizens' political behavior. Individuals whose democratic support is a product of positive interactions with the welfare state may be more likely to support welfare state expansion.

Inspired by the analysis of Alesina et al. (1999), Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012), and Katznelson (1978) that study how diversity affects welfare outcomes, I control for race. Other factors control for include sex, bracketed reported household income, education, and age.

Finally, I include three interaction terms in my analyses. The first is between the liberal democracy PCA index and partisanship. The idea here is to evaluate whether partisanship affects how liberal democracy impacts respondents' opinion on redistribution and spending. I also include an interaction term between the political interest PCA index and partisanship for a similar purpose. Here, I am attempting to see whether heightened political interest/attention, combined with a specific partisan lean, changes how respondents's think, per Lenz's theory that political opinions are mainly elite-generated. Finally, further testing Lenz's theory, I include an interaction term between the liberalism and political interest indices.

I perform these analyses on both the 2016 and 2020 ANES panel data, in order to understand whether the many disruptions to American democracy and the anti-democratic sentiment expressed by the Republican party during the Trump presidency had any bearing on my outcome. This meant performing these regressions on both data sets in order to see if my results are noticeably different. The results of this dual analysis illuminate how the past four years of American politics have altered these patterns in public opinion.

However, not all of the variables I want to study from the 2020 survey were included in the 2016 version. This includes most of the questions about democratic norms such as checks and balances and executive authority. I, therefore, adjusted my liberal democracy metric in the 2016 study with other variables that approximated respondents' feelings about democracy vs authoritarian government. One question asked whether respondents agreed that a leader needs to take charge of the country to set it right, even if it means bending the rules. Another asked if they agreed that ‘'Our country would be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything,' and finally if they thought a strong leader was necessary to put the country back on the right path and ‘crush

evil.' These final two questions were adopted from Altemeyer's Right Wing Authoritarianism survey, which aims to measure authoritarian tendencies in respondents (Altemeyer 1996).

5. Exploratory Data Analysis

Before conducting my regression analyses, I began with some exploratory data analysis in order to better understand the distribution of my data. I began with the 2020 ANES data. In general, respondents expressed feelings very much in harmony with liberalism and democracy as measured by the questions I selected. For example, for the questions asking to what extent respondents thought it was important to democracy that elected officials needed to face consequences for their actions, the median response was "Extremely Important," and this was also the case for the importance of the separate branches of government. The need for a free and independent press and shared facts was only slightly less supported by respondents. 73% of respondents reported following politics at least somewhat, and this statistic was 87% for following campaigns. Believing that voting is a duty was slightly rarer, but still the most common response to the question at 55%.

Figure 1:


Consequences for politicians' misconduct important to democracy (2020)
Share of Reponses
60%
40%
20%
0%
68.25%
22.87%
6.99%
0.79%
1.11%
Not important at all
A little important
Moderately important
Very important
Extremely important
Importance

Figure 2:


How interested are you in politics?
Year
2016
2020
Percentage
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
8.03
7.53
20.64
18.82
48.96
49.08
22.37
24.57
Not at all interested
Not very interested
Somewhat interested
Very interested
Interest

Responses to the questions having to do with redistribution were less supportive. Respondents were in general unsure whether the government ought to reduce inequality (with only 45% supporting this) or provide for a universal standard of living, though they did in general support raising the minimum wage and taxing millionaires, based on the median responses, with 60% of respondents supporting a minimum wage raise and 65% supporting a millionaire tax. With the exception of welfare spending, where only 29% of respondents wanted a raise in spending, the median response to all questions having to do with increasing, decreasing, or keeping spending the same on specific programs such as social security or schools was to increase spending. Spending on highways and schools was particularly popular, with 62% and 67% supporting spending increases, respectively.

Figure 3:



Figure 4:



In the 2016 data, the median response for the question asking about the need for a leader who might need to bend the rules to get things done was “Neither agree nor disagree,” with 42% of respondents at least agreeing somewhat. The median response for the question about following the direction of a strong authority was the same, but gained the support of only 32% of respondents. The median response for the need for a strong leader to “crush evil” was “Disagree somewhat ” though it garnered the support of 27% of respondents.

Figure 5:



Responses to the questions about political interest/engagement were more similar to 2020, with only slightly more agreement expressed for voting being a duty vs a choice. Responses to the redistribution-related questions were also comparable, with the only major difference being less support for reducing inequality in 2016 than in 2020. In terms of support for spending, there was also less agreement that it should be increased, with the median respondent answering that spending should remain the same on welfare and the poor.

As for the control variables, in both 2016 and 2020 the median respondent identified as a political independent, had achieved some associate's degree as their highest level of education, and was in their early fifties. Finally, in the 2020 dataset, about 30% of respondents reported receiving welfare at one point (the 2016 ANES did not ask this question).

6. Results: 2020 ANES

I began with the 2020 ANES data. The first regression analysis I conducted regressed the the first principal component of the questions referencing redistributive welfare policy (taxing millionaires, reducing inequality, government providing a standard of living, raising the minimum wage) on the first principal component of the variables that captured respondents' commitment to liberal democratic principles such as separation of powers, free press, and consequences for electoral misconduct. My results showed a positive, statistically significant association of the liberalism index on the redistribution index ($p < 0.01$). My second regression analyzed the spending principal component in terms of the liberal democracy component, and also yielded positive, statistically significant results ($p < 0.01$). See Table 1 for these results. Additionally, when testing the political interest index alone, the relationship with redistribution was significant while the spending one was not, as shown in Table 2, which contains these results for both 2016 and 2020.

Table 1

2020 Models on General Population: Liberal Democracy PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1	Spending PC1	Redistribution PC1 (with interactions)	Spending PC1 (with interactions)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib. Dem PC1	0.098***	0.100***	0.346***	0.240***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Black	-0.164***	0.193***	-0.136***	0.209***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)
White	-0.155***	-0.010	-0.181***	-0.025
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Hispanic	-0.090*	0.119**	-0.089*	0.119**
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Asian	-0.094	0.071	-0.091	0.073
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.067)
Sex	0.070***	0.059***	0.064***	0.055***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
7 Pt party ID	-0.247***	-0.205***	-0.247***	-0.205***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income bracket	-0.010***	-0.015***	-0.011***	-0.016***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.017***	-0.004	-0.018***	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Political Interest	0.206***	0.178***	0.138***	0.140***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Liberalism * Partisanship			-0.062***	-0.035***
			(0.005)	(0.005)
Pol. Interest * Partisanship	-0.051***	-0.046***	-0.035***	-0.037***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Liberalism * Pol. Interest			0.031***	0.017*
			(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	1.371***	1.014***	1.372***	1.015***
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.067)
Observations	6,475	6,475	6,475	6,475
R^2	0.376	0.309	0.396	0.316
Adjusted R^2	0.375	0.308	0.394	0.314
Residual Std. Error	0.795 (df = 6462)	0.823 (df = 6462)	0.783 (df = 6460)	0.820 (df = 6460)
F Statistic	325.062*** (df = 12; 6462)	241.182*** (df = 12; 6462)	301.952*** (df = 14; 6460)	212.742*** (df = 14; 6460)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2

Models on General Population: Political Interest PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (2020)	Spending PC1 (2020)	Redistribution PC1 (2016)	Spending PC1 (2016)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pol. Interest PC1	0.024**	0.016	-0.006	0.019
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Black	-0.191***	0.167***	0.199***	0.197***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.072)
White	-0.117***	0.026	0.069	0.080
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Hispanic	-0.084*	0.124**	0.073	0.100*
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Asian	-0.072	0.092	0.181*	0.263***
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.100)	(0.097)
Sex	0.064***	0.052**	-0.135***	-0.022
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.031)
7 Pt party ID	-0.259***	-0.218***	-0.203***	-0.230***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income bracket	-0.007***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.008	0.005	-0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	1.317***	0.961***	1.063***	1.027***
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.099)
Observations	6,475	6,475	3,727	3,727
R^2	0.353	0.288	0.237	0.284
Adjusted R^2	0.352	0.287	0.235	0.282
Residual Std. Error	0.809 (df = 6464)	0.836 (df = 6464)	0.900 (df = 3196)	0.879 (df = 3196)
F Statistic	353.003*** (df = 10; 6464)	261.033*** (df = 10; 6464)	99.342*** (df = 10; 3196)	127.065*** (df = 10; 3196)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

When including my interaction term of partisanship and the liberal democracy index, I found that as respondents became more Republican, they negatively associated liberalism with redistribution and spending by a statistically significant amount ($p < 0.01$). Additionally, as respondents paid more attention to politics, they associated redistribution and spending with liberalism as well ($p < 0.01$). Similarly, my political interest interaction term revealed that as respondents paid more attention to politics, their association between political interest and redistribution/spending fell more in line with their partisan identity ($p < 0.01$). This finding was

also borne out when separating by party: I found that Democrats displayed a positive, significant relationship between the liberalism index and both the redistribution and spending indices ($p < 0.01$), while Republicans' relationship for spending was also significant, but negative ($p < 0.01$). The positive coefficients for the Democrats was larger for both models than it was in the general population. See Appendix 2 for results grouped by party.

Grouping by whether respondents had received welfare benefits in the past, I found positive, significant results for the model testing the liberalism index's assosications with attitudes toward redistribution and spending indices ($p < 0.01$). These relationships also appeared when just testing on those respondents who had never received welfare benefits. See Appendix 2 for these results as well. In all of these analyses, I control for race, sex, income, education, partisanship, and age.

7. Results: 2016: ANES

I then moved on to the 2016 ANES. I found no significant result for the liberal democracy index on the redistribution index, and a positive one for the spending index ($p < 0.01$). Notably, when including the liberalism-partisanship interaction term, the coefficient was significant and negative ($p < 0.01$), meaning increased Republican partisanship weakened the relationship between liberalism/interest and spending even in 2016. Similarly, the political interest-partisanship interaction term was negatively significant for both the redistribution index ($p < 0.01$) and the spending one, and the liberalism-political interest interaction term was also significant and positive for both dependent variables ($p <0.01$). See Table 4 for these results.

Table 4

2016 Models on General Population: Liberal Democracy PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1	Spending PC1	Redistribution PC1 (with interaction)	Spending PC1 (with interaction)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib. Dem PC1	0.002	0.110***	0.085***	0.225***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Black	0.226***	0.237***	0.238***	0.251***
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.071)
White	0.070	0.083	0.064	0.078
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Hispanic	0.093*	0.141***	0.098*	0.148***
	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Asian	0.187*	0.292***	0.196**	0.302***
	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.096)
Sex	-0.133***	-0.019	-0.137***	-0.021
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
7 Pt party ID	-0.195***	-0.207***	-0.195***	-0.209***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income bracket	-0.012***	-0.015***	-0.012***	-0.016***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.006	-0.001	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Political Interest	0.188***	0.169***	0.151***	0.127***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Liberalism * Partisanship			-0.025***	-0.034***
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Pol. Interest * Partisanship	-0.053***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.034***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Liberalism * Pol. Interest			0.045***	0.041***
			(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	1.015***	0.993***	1.018***	0.997***
	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.097)
Observations	3,727	3,727	3,727	3,727
R^2	0.250	0.306	0.256	0.314
Adjusted R^2	0.248	0.304	0.252	0.311
Residual Std. Error	0.893 (df = 3194)	0.866 (df = 3194)	0.890 (df = 3192)	0.862 (df = 3192)
F Statistic	88.906*** (df = 12; 3194)	117.475*** (df = 12; 3194)	78.353*** (df = 14; 3192)	104.132*** (df = 14; 3192)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Testing just the political interest index, with no interaction term, yielded no significant results. See Table 2. In the 2016 analyses, I controlled for race, income, education, and age. See Appendix 2 for 2016 results grouped by party.

8. Discussion: 2020 Data

The positive relationship between the principal component of liberalism and those of both spending and redistribution refutes my initial hypothesis (H1) that such a relationship would only emerge when accounting for partisanship and past receiving of welfare benefits, and seems to reveal that there is in fact a connection between these sets of ideas in the public opinion of Americans in 2020. Importantly, no significant relationship emerges in the general public for the political interest variable for either spending, illustrating that while the ideas of liberal democracy may be connected in Americans' minds to state spending, this is not the case for general political engagement, so this offers partial support for H1.

The partisan breakdown of the liberalism metric also appears to match some of my earlier predictions that Democrats would be more likely to display this relationship than Republicans (H3). The partisanship-liberalism interaction term is also always negative and significant, indicating that the more respondents identify as Republican, the weaker the relationship between liberalism and spending/redistribution is. The politcal interest-liberalism term is always positivet, meaning the more people pay attention to politics, the stronger this relationship tends to be.

This partisan relationship also holds when splitting respondents by party identification and re-doing the analyses. Democrats displayed positive associations between liberalism and both independent variables, while Republicans had a negative relationship between liberalism and redistribution and no relationship between liberalism and spending, and all these findings offer strong support for H3. In our current politics, opinions about which party is the true defender of the democratic process have become polarized as Republicans have challenged many of the accepted norms of democracy, so it makes sense that partisans with string feelings about

supporting democracy would also align those feelings with their party's economic policy program.

The breakdown of the political interest regressions also matches this intuition. In these analyses, the interaction term between the political interest index and liberalism was always positive and significant, indicating that as respondents' increased in in the attention they pay to politics, the relationship between liberalism and redistribution/spending strenghens. This makes sense, given Lenz's theories on the elite-driven nature of public opinion, as those who pay more attention to politics maybe absorbing elite cures abot how their positions on redistribution are guided by larger theories about the nature of democracy and how a strong welfare state is a core component of a liberal system.

Moreover, when grouping by party, I saw that as Republicans become more interested in politics, they also support less spending and redistribution, and Democrats display the opposite relationship. This makes sense as one would imagine respondents' partisan political positions solidifying as they pay more attention to political news and campaigns, especially as polarization has increased in recent decades. (McCarty et al 9). Moreover, there is evidence that an increase in political information makes Democrats more able to recognize existing economic inequality while having the opposite effect on Republicans (Bartels 133-134). Thus, it follows that Democrats who pay more attention to politics would display increased support for redistributive measures, and Republicans who pay more attention would show less support.

As for the breakdown by past receiving of welfare, my initial hypotheses, that those with past experience with the welfare state would be more likely to display significant relationships, (H2) were also not reflected in the data. Both those who had received welfare and those who did not show positive relationships between the liberalism index and both dependent variables. The

only difference between the two groups was that non-welfare recipients demonstrated a significant, positive relationship between the political interest index and redistribution, while those who had received welfare did not. This runs contrary to what we might expect to see based on Shore's thesis that interactions with the welfare state increase one's engagement with politics. This may very well be the case, but it is apparent that such experiences do not have such a relationship with how citizens demonstrate the association between politics/democracy and the welfare state/redistribution.

I also conducted regression analyses, using the 2020 data, of each each dependent variable PC on the individual variables of the independent variable PCs, and the individual variables that make up the dependent PC indices on the independent variable indices, which can be found in Appendix 3.

9. Discussion: 2016 vs 2020 Data:

Directly comparing the 2016 and 2020 findings on the liberalism variable is not entirely possible, as the questions used to compose these principal components were different in the two surveys. However, the two sets of questions do gesture at similar political attitudes of respecting democratic government and procedural rules of policymaking, so it is nonetheless interesting to see that the association emerged for the redistribution variable between 2016 and 2020. This may imply that while there is a positive link between liberalism and redistribution/government spending in the minds of Americans, it developed during the politically turbulent period of 2016 and 2020 wherein America's democracy began to be seriously tested and support for democracy began to become polarized along the same lines as supporting redistribution and government spending (Beauchamp).

Other changes between 2016 and 2020 appear to offer evidence for H4, which is that the partisan gap of this relationship widened in this four year period. I hypothesized that the democratic challenges that the United States faced during the Trump presidency and its resultant polarization would increase the association between supporting traditionally Democratic policies (such as redistribution and government spending) and liberal democracy for Democrats. The data illustrate a change, as the coefficient for redistribution becomes larger for Democrats and Republicans between 2016 and 2020 (0.053 to 0.212), while the relationship for the spending index becomes significant for Republicans. (See Appendix 2). Such a change meshes well with the findings of Clayton et al., who in 2020 conducted a study which found that exposure to President Trump's tweets questioning the results of the 2020 presidential election make his supporters less likely to trust in the fair outcomes of elections, while strengthening this trust for his detractors (Clayton et al. 3-4). We see here that when partisans, responding to elite cues, each become invested in their conflicting versions of what democracy ought to look like, they are more likely to associate their vision of a democratic system with their partisan economic beliefs.

However, the findings of the political interest regressions somewhat contradicts this theory. Republicans' negative associations and Democrats' positive ones between political engagement/interest and both spending and redistribution were significant in 2016 as they were in 2020. It is also noticeable that the interaction terms for the political interest and liberalism indices in 2016 are still significant and negative, indicating that the continuous impacts of party identification on these associations also existed in 2016.

Finally, the liberalism-political interest interaction term is positive for redistribution in 2016 as it was in 2020, meaning that even in 2016 paying more attention to politics meant more of an association between liberal democratic norms and redisirtibutive policies.

10. Implications and Relevance

The political turmoil of the Trump presidency and the ongoing democratic backsliding in the U.S. has prompted pressing questions about what U.S. democracy is meant to accomplish and how committed the American political system is to its continued existence (Kaufmann and Haggard, 2019). These developments have occurred as many politicians, especially within the Democratic Party, have become more open to public investment, welfare expansion, redistribution, and pro-labor policies (Adamcyzk, 2021). This study explores whether there is a link between the desire for sound political representation and democratic norms and for material well-being, basic social services, or reductions in inequality to be enacted through government programs.

Altogether, my results indicate that such a link does exist within American public opinion: support for political liberalism as well as demonstrated political interest are associated with increased support for redistribution and government spending. Further, despite the limitations of comparing the ANES 2016 and 2020 surveys, my results point toward a lack of said relationshisp in 2016. While it is impossible to state for certain what could have caused this change (and it is certainly not a monocausal event), this shift occurred at a time when the fate of American liberal democracy was uncertain and when the traditional opponents of redistribution and spending, the Republican Party, also began to openly question the norms and regulations of the American political system. Thus, it appears reasonable to draw a connection between these two phenomena. Notably, paying more attention to politics is associated with a stronger relationship between liberalism and these economically progressive policies in both 2016 and 2020, meaning that while the overall relationship may have changed, this specific interaction has stayed the same through those four years. Being more receptive to elite-driven political

messaging through following politics thus may drive voters to connect their economic policy views with broader visions of the purpose of democracy and how it ought to be structured.

While the partisan gap in the association between liberalism and redistribution/spending exists in the 2016 data, it intensifies between 2016 and 2020, with Democrats in 2020 showing a positive association between liberalism and those two dependent variables and Republicans a negative one. Democrats during this period appear to have developed a stronger association between liberalism and redistribution between 2016 and 2020, as their party may have begun to develop a cohesive stance on how norms of liberal democracy ought to be preserved on top of their traditionally more redistributive economic policies. At the same time, Republicans developed a more negative association between liberalism and both spending and redistribution, which could signal how issues of democracy have become polarized along familiar partisan lines, with Republicans believing that their vision of democracy also necessarily is one where the government is more limited in its economic power. Importantly, however, the results from my interaction terms point to the partisan gap existing in some form in 2016 as well.

This result could point toward a trend of Republicans aligning their economic policy preferences with their political strategy before the arrival of Trump onto the political scene, a phenomenon discussed by Hacker and Pierson, who have been writing since the mid-2000s on the Republican strategy to generate economic benefits for the rich while maintaining a hold on government through antidemocratic and divisive means (Hacker and Pierson 9, 2005). More recently, in their book *Let Them Eat Tweets,* Hacker and Pierson have argued that Republicans practice what they call "plutocratic populism," wherein the party practices regressive economic policies along with an illiberal, ethnically divisive, antidemocratic politics that serve to appease its base (Hacker and Pierson 2020, 198).

Such ideas are highly relevant as Republican states across the country move to restrict voting and/or change how elections are administered in a campaign justified by false allegations of fraud in the 2020 election (Voting Rights Lab). Now, as free elections become a partisan issue along with redistribution and spending, many of the same states that have refused to enact more economically redistributive policies such as Medicaid Expansion and a minimum wage higher than $7.25 per hour are also now threatening the integrity of elections (CBPP) (USDL). As the country becomes more polarized on the state level, we may be entering a world in which the most democratic states are also the ones which support more economically equitable policy. This could further deepen the association in public opinion between social and political democracy displayed in the ANES 2020 data, which could lead to more policy polarization in these areas, creating a vicious cycle (Jordan and Bowling 2016). Esping-Anderson may have been correct to describe the United States' welfare state as limited in a general sense, but that reality could change as the nation undergoes a splintering along the lines of allegiance to democracy and enthusiasm for redistributive and materially equitable policies.

11. Limitations

When drawing conclusions from these analyses, one should be cognizant of a series of limitations. Both my dependent and dependent variables are PCA indices, none of which explain 100% of the variance of the data that they represent (see Appendix 1 for exact numbers). This means that while these indices do represent substantial portions of the variation of this data (typically ranging from 60%-80%) they cannot be taken for perfect proxies of these variables. Moreover, the choices of which variables included in the PCA indices could also be critiqued, especially when it comes to more abstract concepts such as liberal democracy or political

interest. I had to make judgment calls on which ANES variables best approximated these phenomena, but reasonable people could disagree on the inclusion/exclusion of certain variables.

Additionally, as noted above, I had to make an entirely new PCA index for support for liberal democracy between the 2016 and 2020 data, making direct comparisons involving this variable between those two years more difficult. My choices of controls were based on observing which demographic factors are typically accounted for in other studies examining public opinion and based on the past work focusing on opinion related to democracy and social welfare, though one could also criticize my research for not including enough of these potential confounders in my models.

12. Conclusion

The answers to the questions raised by this research have implications beyond our current political climate. This data indicates that support for political democracy, measured by stated liberal democratic beliefs and interest in politics, can also connote a kind of mutual solidarity that extends to supporting policies that allow for one's fellow citizens have their needs provided for, and that concern about democracy extends to concern about concrete policy outcomes, as Bernstein theorized centuries ago. This cuts against what one might expect based on Knutson and Wegman's findings that citizens in countries around the world do not believe that strong redistributive policy is core to a healthy democracy. While it is possible to interpret my results as a counterpoint to theirs, we can also understand the findings of this paper in the light of the unique modern American political environment.

Evidence for such an interpretation comes from the fact that political participation and interest also displays the association with spending, though only when scaled by partisanship. Moreover, while again, directly comparing the 2016 and 2020 results is not entirely possible, the

association of support for liberalism and certain social democratic policies did become significant between those years, and the gap in this relationship when grouping by party has also increased in magnitude since then. Such findings could show that some of the relationships identified in this paper could be a product of our very specific, hyperpolarized American political moment, and caring about a strong democracy may have nothing to do with the intricacies of welfare policy inherently.

Such a conclusion would fit well into the work of Knutson and Wegman, and the fact that I found this relationship to have developed since 2016, combined with Lenz's work on how American elites guide public opinion and Hacker and Pierson's theories on the illiberal and plutocratic practices of the Republican party, may indicate that the growing relationship between political democracy and redistribution spending could be a product of Republican rhetoric stoking both antidemocratic sentiments as well as anti-welfare and spending beliefs. This idea is supported by the fact that I found differences in this relationship along partisan lines rather than along respondents' personal experience with the welfare state. Knowing more about this interaction has the potential to better explain public opinion regarding welfare as well as welfare policy outcomes, both historically and in the future.

This paper also adds to the body of research on the connection between political and social democracy. Instead of asking whether democratic countries are more likely to support more generous welfare policies, it explores this question on the individual level within the United States, and uncovers whether American public opinion demonstrates a relationship between investment in democracy and the desire for a more economically equitable society. I find that such a relationship does exist in the general public, that it has developed since 2016, and is and has been stratified across party lines. The answers to these questions deepen the

understanding of the patterns of American public opinion when it comes to these issues and are especially relevant as American democracy undergoes a period of backsliding and the nature of the welfare state remains very much in flux. Whether this backsliding will continue, and whether the United States' welfare and redistribution policies will weaken along with its democratic institutions, remains to be seen, but this research suggests that we can perhaps expect changes in how Americans understand and value the liberal democratic system to predict changes in economic policy preferences.

Appendix 1: PCA Metrics

Both my dependent and independent variables are the first principal components (PC1) of sets of data that measure four different political/social attitudes: support for liberal democracy, political interest, support for redistribution, and support for government spending. Beginning with the ANES 2020 data, my liberal democracy PC1 consists of questions V201368, V201367, V201366, and V201369, which ask what respondents' think about the need for shared facts, separation of powers, free press, and consequences for misconduct on the part of elected leaders. This PC1 explains 58% of the variation in this data. The political interest PC1 includes variables V201221, V202406, and V202407, which measure whether respondents believe voting is a duty, choice, or neither, and how much they follow politics and political media, and it captures 85% of the variation in the data.

My first dependent variable, my redistribution PC1, includes V202325, V202377, and V201255, and V202257, which ask about a millionaire tax, whether the minimum wage should be increased, be decreased, remain the same, or eliminated, whether it is the government's job to provide jobs and universal standard of living, and whether the government should reduce inequality. This PC1 explains 63% of the variation in this data. My spending PC1 asks what spending on healthcare, public schools, the poor, and welfare should increase, decrease, or stay the same (V202379, V201303, V201318, and V201312), and explains 63% of the variation in the data.

My 2016 liberal democracy PC1 consisted of entirely different questions, V162169, V162170, and V162263, which ask whether the country needs to get rid of "rotten apples," needs a strong leader to put us on the right path, and approval of a leader who bends the rules when necessary. This PC1 captures 66% of the variation of the data. My political interest PC1 in 2016

had the same questions (V161151x, V162256, V162257), and captured 86% of the variation in the data. My redistribution metric was the same, minus the question that asked about reducing inequality (which did not factor well into this PC1), and so only had the ones about taxing millionaires, government providing jobs/living, and the minimum wage (V162140, V161189, and V162192). This PC1 captured 67% of the variation. The spending PC1 in 2016 asked about the same four spending areas as 2020, schools, the poor, welfare, and healthcare (V161206, V161211, V161209, V162193) and explained 63% of the variation.

In the creation of all PCA indices, missing/NA values were imputed using the mean of each of the components, so that there would be no missingness in the final metrics.

Appendix 2: Analysis subsetted by party and welfare status

Tables 5-8 present the analyses subsetted by party, for both 2016 and 2020.

Table 5

2020 Model, Subsetted by Party: Liberal Democracy PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (Dems)	Spending PC1 (Dems)	Redistribution PC1 (Reps)	Spending PC1 (Reps)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib. Dem PC1	0.212***	0.155***	-0.084***	-0.023
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Black	-0.123*	0.108	0.268	0.424**
	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.188)	(0.192)
White	-0.127**	-0.132*	0.094	0.101
	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.115)	(0.117)
Hispanic	-0.219***	-0.090	0.284**	0.392***
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.132)	(0.134)
Asian	-0.306***	-0.168*	0.440***	0.318*
	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.161)	(0.164)
Sex	0.066**	0.046	0.119***	0.137***
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Income bracket	0.002	-0.007***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.025***	0.039***	-0.039***	-0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	-0.003***	-0.002**	-0.003**	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.627***	0.525***	-0.408***	-0.482***
	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.147)	(0.149)
Observations	2,401	2,401	2,053	2,053
R^2	0.133	0.066	0.076	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.129	0.062	0.072	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.650 (df = 2391)	0.726 (df = 2391)	0.858 (df = 2043)	0.875 (df = 2043)
F Statistic	40.654*** (df = 9; 2391)	18.636*** (df = 9; 2391)	18.583*** (df = 9; 2043)	14.016*** (df = 9; 2043)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6

2020 Model, Subsetted by Party: Political Interest PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (Dems)	Spending PC1 (Dems)	Redistribution PC1 (Reps)	Spending PC1 (Reps)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pol. Interest PC1	0.150***	0.138***	-0.121***	-0.139***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Black	-0.145**	0.093	0.277	0.398**
	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.187)	(0.189)
White	-0.107*	-0.123*	0.066	0.061
	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.114)	(0.115)
Hispanic	-0.220***	-0.093	0.262**	0.361***
	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Asian	-0.332***	-0.190**	0.369**	0.246
	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.161)	(0.163)
Sex	0.065**	0.051	0.106***	0.107***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Income bracket	0.008***	-0.003	-0.024***	-0.022***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.028***	0.038***	-0.037***	-0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.576***	0.514***	-0.421***	-0.554***
	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.145)	(0.147)
Observations	2,401	2,401	2,053	2,053
R^2	0.091	0.058	0.086	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.055	0.082	0.077
Residual Std. Error	0.665 (df = 2391)	0.729 (df = 2391)	0.853 (df = 2043)	0.864 (df = 2043)
F Statistic	26.618*** (df = 9; 2391)	16.381*** (df = 9; 2391)	21.446*** (df = 9; 2043)	19.929*** (df = 9; 2043)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7

2016 Model, Subsetted by Party: Liberal Democracy PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (Dems)	Spending PC1 (Dems)	Redistribution PC1 (Reps)	Spending PC1 (Reps)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib. Dem PC1	0.053**	0.179***	-0.072**	0.034
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Black	0.270***	0.145	0.493*	0.839***
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.264)	(0.234)
White	0.133	0.041	-0.232	-0.019
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.206)	(0.182)
Hispanic	0.008	-0.017	0.312**	0.529***
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.132)	(0.117)
Asian	0.044	0.208	0.017	0.375
	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.258)	(0.228)
Sex	-0.182***	0.045	-0.110*	-0.075
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.057)
7 Pt party ID	0.0002	-0.009***	-0.024***	-0.025***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income bracket	0.012	0.011	-0.026**	-0.020**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Education	0.002	0.001	-0.0002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.169	0.401***	0.330	-0.047
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.260)	(0.230)
Observations	1,347	1,347	1,142	1,142
R^2	0.035	0.064	0.084	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.057	0.076	0.102
Residual Std. Error	0.814 (df = 1164)	0.820 (df = 1164)	0.961 (df = 960)	0.850 (df = 960)
F Statistic	4.714*** (df = 9; 1164)	8.840*** (df = 9; 1164)	9.803*** (df = 9; 960)	13.174*** (df = 9; 960)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8

2016 Model, Subsetted by Party: Political Interest PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (Dems)	Spending PC1 (Dems)	Redistribution PC1 (Reps)	Spending PC1 (Reps)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pol. Interest PC1	0.126***	0.127***	-0.128***	-0.123***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Black	0.280***	0.119	0.509*	0.857***
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.263)	(0.232)
White	0.150*	0.041	-0.273	-0.049
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.205)	(0.181)
Hispanic	0.009	-0.063	0.336**	0.519***
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.131)	(0.115)
Asian	0.080	0.187	-0.069	0.296
	(0.149)	(0.154)	(0.257)	(0.227)
Sex	-0.196***	0.028	-0.108*	-0.067
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.056)
Income bracket	0.0001	-0.005*	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.009	0.015**	-0.024**	-0.015
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Age	0.001	-0.0003	0.002	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.246*	0.419***	0.270	-0.202
	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.258)	(0.228)
Observations	1,347	1,347	1,142	1,142
R^2	0.056	0.038	0.094	0.125
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.031	0.086	0.117
Residual Std. Error	0.805 (df = 1164)	0.831 (df = 1164)	0.956 (df = 960)	0.843 (df = 960)
F Statistic	7.721*** (df = 9; 1164)	5.134*** (df = 9; 1164)	11.119*** (df = 9; 960)	15.273*** (df = 9; 960)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tables 9 and 10 show 2020 results subsetted by welfare status

Table 9

2020 Model, Subsetted by Welfare Recipients: Liberal Democracy PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (recipients)	Spending PC1 (recipients)	Redistribution PC1 (non-recipients)	Spending PC1 (non-recipients)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib. Dem PC1	0.093***	0.074***	0.101***	0.115***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Black	-0.249***	0.231***	-0.089	0.164**
	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.070)
White	-0.164**	0.033	-0.141**	-0.026
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Hispanic	-0.141*	0.188**	-0.062	0.082
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.062)	(0.065)
Asian	0.252*	-0.151	-0.129*	0.100
	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.075)	(0.078)
Sex	0.117***	0.048	0.033	0.048*
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.025)
7 Pt party ID	-0.208***	-0.187***	-0.264***	-0.213***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Income bracket	-0.012***	-0.019***	-0.008***	-0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.013	0.011	-0.015**	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age	-0.004***	-0.0003	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Political Interest PC1	0.209***	0.177***	0.206***	0.175***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Pol Int. * Partisanship	-0.062***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.044***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	1.247***	0.871***	1.400***	1.042***
	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.081)	(0.084)
Observations	1,948	1,948	4,433	4,433
R^2	0.289	0.268	0.416	0.325
Adjusted R^2	0.285	0.263	0.414	0.324
Residual Std. Error	0.789 (df = 1935)	0.821 (df = 1935)	0.787 (df = 4420)	0.818 (df = 4420)
F Statistic	65.668*** (df = 12; 1935)	58.949*** (df = 12; 1935)	262.346*** (df = 12; 4420)	177.730*** (df = 12; 4420)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10

2020 Model, Subsetted by Welfare Recipients: Political Interest PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1 (recipients)	Spending PC1 (recipients)	Redistribution PC1 (non-recipients)	Spending PC1 (non-recipients)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Interest PC1	0.004	0.014	0.027**	0.018
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Black	-0.249***	0.231***	-0.135**	0.114
	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.071)
White	-0.116*	0.071	-0.114**	-0.002
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Hispanic	-0.126	0.200**	-0.069	0.071
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.066)
Asian	0.260*	-0.144	-0.117	0.110
	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Sex	0.124***	0.053	0.023	0.034
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.025)
7 Pt party ID	-0.213***	-0.191***	-0.280***	-0.229***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Income bracket	-0.010***	-0.018***	-0.004**	-0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.0005	0.021*	-0.008	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age	-0.003***	0.00001	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Political Interest PC1	1.132***	0.780***	1.374***	1.012***
	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.082)	(0.086)
Observations	1,948	1,948	4,433	4,433
R^2	0.256	0.248	0.395	0.303
Adjusted R^2	0.253	0.244	0.394	0.301
Residual Std. Error	0.806 (df = 1937)	0.831 (df = 1937)	0.801 (df = 4422)	0.831 (df = 4422)
F Statistic	66.806*** (df = 10; 1937)	63.874*** (df = 10; 1937)	288.702*** (df = 10; 4422)	192.072*** (df = 10; 4422)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3: Regressions of individual variables on Principal Components, 2020 data.

Tables 11 - 14 regress the individual dependent variables on the independent variable PCA indices.

Table 11

Redistribution variables Regression on Lib Dem. PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Reduce Inequality	Tax Millionaires	Government Provide Jobs	Minimum Wage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib PCA 1	0.077***	0.061***	0.137***	0.047***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.009)
Constant	3.253***	2.908***	6.280***	3.933***
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.139)	(0.058)
Observations	6,428	6,419	5,793	6,403
R^2	0.241	0.161	0.325	0.156
Adjusted R^2	0.240	0.159	0.324	0.155
Residual Std. Error	0.731 (df = 6417)	0.701 (df = 6408)	1.591 (df = 5782)	0.710 (df = 6392)
F Statistic	204.185*** (df = 10; 6417)	122.532*** (df = 10; 6408)	278.766*** (df = 10; 5782)	118.323*** (df = 10; 6392)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12

Spending variables regression on Lib Dem. PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Healthcare	Schools	Welfare	Poor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lib PCA 1	0.082***	0.048***	0.051***	0.047***
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	2.323***	2.934***	2.756***	3.933***
	(0.090)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.058)
Observations	4,321	6,468	6,455	6,403
R^2	0.023	0.106	0.242	0.156
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.104	0.240	0.155
Residual Std. Error	0.908 (df = 4310)	0.563 (df = 6457)	0.664 (df = 6444)	0.710 (df = 6392)
F Statistic	9.987*** (df = 10; 4310)	76.290*** (df = 10; 6457)	205.212*** (df = 10; 6444)	118.323*** (df = 10; 6392)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13

Redistribution Variables Regression on Political Interest PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Reduce Inequality	Tax Millionaires	Government Provide Jobs	Minimum Wage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pol PCA 1	0.077***	0.061***	0.137***	0.047***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.009)
Constant	3.253***	2.908***	6.280***	3.933***
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.139)	(0.058)
Observations	6,428	6,419	5,793	6,403
R^2	0.241	0.161	0.325	0.156
Adjusted R^2	0.240	0.159	0.324	0.155
Residual Std. Error	0.731 (df = 6417)	0.701 (df = 6408)	1.591 (df = 5782)	0.710 (df = 6392)
F Statistic	204.185*** (df = 10; 6417)	122.532*** (df = 10; 6408)	278.766*** (df = 10; 5782)	118.323*** (df = 10; 6392)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14

Spending variables regression on Political Interest PC1

	Dependent variable:			
	Healthcare	Schools	Welfare	Poor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pol PCA 1	0.068***	-0.019***	0.035***	0.016*
	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	2.329***	2.891***	2.755***	3.919***
	(0.090)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.058)
Observations	4,321	6,468	6,455	6,403
R^2	0.021	0.101	0.239	0.153
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.099	0.238	0.152
Residual Std. Error	0.909 (df = 4310)	0.565 (df = 6457)	0.665 (df = 6444)	0.711 (df = 6392)
F Statistic	9.231*** (df = 10; 4310)	72.171*** (df = 10; 6457)	202.873*** (df = 10; 6444)	115.591*** (df = 10; 6392)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tables 15-18 regress the dependent variable PCA indices on the individual independent variables

Table 15

Redistribution PC1 Regression on Lib. Dem. Components

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution PC1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Branches	0.042***			
	(0.012)			
Consequences		0.100***		
		(0.013)		
Facts			0.080***	
			(0.011)	
Criticism				0.060***
				(0.008)
Constant	1.145***	0.911***	1.000***	1.071***
	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Observations	6,462	6,469	6,457	6,457
R^2	0.354	0.359	0.358	0.357
Adjusted R^2	0.353	0.358	0.357	0.356
Residual Std. Error	0.809 (df = 6451)	0.806 (df = 6458)	0.806 (df = 6446)	0.807 (df = 6446)
F Statistic	353.276*** (df = 10; 6451)	361.066*** (df = 10; 6458)	358.837*** (df = 10; 6446)	358.647*** (df = 10; 6446)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16

Redistribution PC1 Regression on Political Interest Components

	Dependent variable:		
	Redistribution PC1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Duty	-0.036**		
	(0.016)		
Pol. Interest		0.027**	
		(0.012)	
Pol. Media Interest			0.024*
			(0.013)
Constant	1.231***	1.261***	1.261***
	(0.095)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Observations	3,280	6,417	6,414
R^2	0.353	0.358	0.358
Adjusted R^2	0.351	0.357	0.357
Residual Std. Error	0.811 (df = 3269)	0.808 (df = 6406)	0.808 (df = 6403)
F Statistic	178.649*** (df = 10; 3269)	356.964*** (df = 10; 6406)	356.703*** (df = 10; 6403)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17

Spending PC1 Regression on Lib. Dem. Components

	Dependent variable:			
	Spending PC1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Branches	0.055***			
	(0.012)			
Consequences		0.094***		
		(0.013)		
Facts			0.073***	
			(0.011)	
Criticism				0.073***
				(0.009)
Constant	0.752***	0.584***	0.679***	0.672***
	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.075)
Observations	6,462	6,469	6,457	6,457
R^2	0.290	0.293	0.292	0.297
Adjusted R^2	0.289	0.292	0.290	0.295
Residual Std. Error	0.835 (df = 6451)	0.833 (df = 6458)	0.833 (df = 6446)	0.831 (df = 6446)
F Statistic	263.520*** (df = 10; 6451)	267.686*** (df = 10; 6458)	265.315*** (df = 10; 6446)	271.725*** (df = 10; 6446)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18

Spending PC1 Regression on Political Interest Components

	Dependent variable:		
	Spending PC1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote Duty	-0.007		
	(0.016)		
Political Interest		0.004	
		(0.013)	
Political Media Interest			0.031**
			(0.013)
Constant	1.138***	0.968***	0.895***
	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Observations	3,280	6,417	6,414
R^2	0.289	0.292	0.290
Adjusted R^2	0.287	0.291	0.289
Residual Std. Error	0.820 (df = 3269)	0.832 (df = 6406)	0.834 (df = 6403)
F Statistic	133.079*** (df = 10; 3269)	263.897*** (df = 10; 6406)	261.445*** (df = 10; 6403)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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