



# RISC-V S-mode Physical Memory Protection (SPMP)

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## Preamble



*This document is in the [Development state](#)*

*Assume everything can change. This draft specification will change before being accepted as standard, so implementations made to this draft specification will likely not conform to the future standard.*

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## Chapter 1. Introduction

This document describes RISC-V S-mode Physical Memory Protection (SPMP) proposal to provide isolation when MMU is unavailable or disabled. RISC-V based processors recently stimulated great interest in the emerging internet of things (IoT) and automotive devices. However, page-based virtual memory (MMU) is usually undesired in order to meet resource and latency constraints. It is hard to isolate the S-mode OSes (e.g., RTOS) and user-mode applications for such devices. To support secure processing and isolate faults of U-mode software, the SPMP is desirable to enable S-mode OS to limit the physical addresses accessible by U-mode software on a hart.

## Chapter 2. S-mode Physical Memory Protection (SPMP)

An optional RISC-V S-mode Physical Memory Protection (SPMP) provides per-hart supervisor-mode control registers to allow physical memory access privileges (read, write, execute) to be specified for each physical memory region.

If PMP/ePMP is implemented, accesses succeed only if both PMP/ePMP and SPMP permission checks pass. The implementation can perform SPMP checks in parallel with PMA and PMP. The SPMP exception reports have higher priority than PMP or PMA exceptions (i.e., if the access violates both SPMP and PMP/PMA, the SPMP exception will be reported).

SPMP checks will be applied to all accesses whose effective privilege mode is S or U, including instruction fetches and data accesses in S and U mode, and data accesses in M-mode when the MPRV bit in mstatus is set and the MPP field in mstatus contains S or U.

SPMP registers can always be modified by M-mode and S-mode software.

SPMP can grant permissions to U-mode, which has none by default. SPMP can also revoke permissions from S-mode.

### 2.1. Requirements

1. S mode should be implemented
2. The Sscsrind extension should be implemented to support indirect CSR access.
3. The sstatus.SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit must be **writeable**.



*The Privileged Architecture specification states the following*

*SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect, nor when executing in U-mode. SUM is read-only 0 if satp.MODE is read-only 0.*

— Supervisor-Level ISA, Version 1.13 >> "Memory Privilege in `sstatus` Register"

*In SPMP, this bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode loads and stores access to physical memory, hence the need to make it writeable.*

4. The sstatus.MXR (Make eXecutable Readable) bit must be **writeable**.



*The Privileged Architecture specification states that*

*MXR has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect.*

— Machine-Level ISA, Version 1.13 >> "Memory Privilege in `mstatus` Register"

*In SPMP, the MXR bit modifies the privilege with which loads access physical memory. Its semantics are consistent with those of the Machine-Level ISA.*

*In SPMP, this bit is made writeable to support M-mode emulation handlers where instructions are read with MXR=1 and MPRV=1.*

## 2.2. S-mode Physical Memory Protection CSRs

Like PMP, SPMP entries are described by an 8-bit configuration register and one XLEN-bit address register. Some SPMP settings additionally use the address register associated with the preceding SPMP entry. Up to 64 SPMP entries are supported.

The SPMP configuration registers are packed into CSRs the same way as PMP. For RV32, 16 CSRs, `spmpcfg0`-`spmpcfg15`, hold the configurations `spmp0cfg`-`spmp63cfg` for the 64 SPMP entries. For RV64, even numbered CSRs (i.e., `spmpcfg0`, `spmpcfg2`, ..., `spmpcfg14`) hold the configurations for the 64 SPMP entries; odd numbered CSRs (e.g., `spmpcfg1`) are illegal. Figure 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate the first 16 entries of SPMP. The layout of the rest of the entries is identical.



*The terms, entry and rule, are similar to ePMP.*

*The implementation must decode all SPMP CSRs, and it can modify the number of **writable SPMP entries** while the remaining SPMP CSRs are read-only zero.*

*The lowest-numbered SPMP entries must be implemented first.*




Figure 1. RV32 SPMP configuration CSR layout.




Figure 2. RV64 SPMP configuration CSR layout.



The SPMP address registers are CSRs named `spmpaddr0`–`spmpaddr63`. Each SPMP address register encodes bits 33–2 of 34-bit physical address for RV32, as shown in Figure 3. For RV64, each SPMP address encodes bits 55–2 of a 56-bit physical address, as shown in Figure 4. Fewer address bits may be implemented for specific reasons, e.g., systems with smaller physical address space. The number of address bits should be the same for all **writable SPMP entries**. Implemented address bits must extend to the LSB format, except as otherwise permitted by granularity rules. See the Privileged Architecture specification, Section 3.7: Physical Memory Protection, Address Matching.




Figure 3. SPMP address register format, RV32.




Figure 4. SPMP address register format, RV64.

The layout of SPMP configuration registers is the same as PMP configuration registers, as shown in Figure 5. The register is WARL. The rules and encodings for permission are explained in section 2.4, which resembles the encoding of ePMP (except SPMP does not use locked rules).

1. The S bit marks a rule as **S-mode-only** when set and **U-mode-only** when unset.
2. Bit 5 and 6 are reserved for future use.
3. The A field will be described in the following sections (2.3).
4. The R/W/X bits control read, write, and instruction execution permissions.




Figure 5. SPMP configuration register format.

## 2.3. Encoding of Permissions

SPMP has three kinds of rules: **S-mode-only**, **U-mode-only** and **Shared-Region** rules.

1. An **S-mode-only** rule is **enforced** on Supervisor mode and **denied** on User mode.
2. A **U-mode-only** rule is **enforced** on User modes and is either **denied** or **enforced** on Supervisor mode depending on the value of `sstatus.SUM` bit:
  - If `sstatus.SUM` is set, a U-mode-only rule is enforced on Supervisor mode, yet not be executable. This ensures the Supervisor Memory Execution Prevention (SMEP).
  - If `sstatus.SUM` is unset, a U-mode-only rule is denied on Supervisor mode. This ensures the Supervisor Memory Access Prevention (SMAP).
3. A **Shared-Region** rule is enforced on both Supervisor and User modes, with restrictions depending on the `spmpcfg.S` and `spmpcfg.X` bits:
  - If `spmpcfg.S` is not set, the region can be used for sharing data between S-mode and U-mode, yet not be executable. S-mode has RW permission to that region. U-mode has RW permission if `spmpcfg.X` is set, and it is restricted to read-only if `spmpcfg.X` is cleared.

- If `spmpcfg.S` is set, the region can be used for sharing code between S-mode and U-mode, yet not be writeable. S-mode has RX permission to that region. U-mode has RX permission if `spmpcfg.X` is set, and it is restricted to execute-only if `spmpcfg.X` is cleared.

4. The encoding `spmpcfg.SRWX=1000` is reserved for future standard use.

The encoding and results are shown in the [Figure 6](#):

	spmpcfg.S=0			spmpcfg.S=1		
spmpcfg	S mode Access	S mode Access	U mode Access	S mode Access	S mode Access	U mode Access
RWX	sstatus.SUM =0	sstatus.SUM =1	sstatus.SUM =x	sstatus.SUM =0	sstatus.SUM =1	sstatus.SUM =x
R - -	Deny	EnforceNoX	Enforce	Enforce	Enforce	Deny
R - X	Deny	EnforceNoX	Enforce	Enforce	Enforce	Deny
- - X	Deny	EnforceNoX	Enforce	Enforce	Enforce	Deny
- - -	Deny	EnforceNoX	Enforce	RSVD		
RW -	Deny	EnforceNoX	Enforce	Enforce	Enforce	Deny
RWX	Deny	EnforceNoX	Enforce	Enforce	Enforce	Deny
- WX	SHR RW			SHR RX		
- W -	SHR RW		SHR RO	SHR RX		SHR X

Figure 6. SPMP Encoding Table

**Deny:** Access fails.

**Enforce:** The R/W/X permissions are enforced on accesses.

**EnforceNoX:** The R/W permissions are enforced on accesses, while the X bit is forced to be zero.

**SHR:** It is shared between S/U modes with X, RX, RW, or ReadOnly privileges.

**RSVD:** It is reserved for future use.

**SUM bit:** The SPMP uses the `sstatus.SUM` (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit to modify the privilege with which S-mode loads and stores access to physical memory. The semantics of `sstatus.SUM` in SPMP are consistent with those of the Machine-Level ISA (Please refer to the "Memory Privilege in mstatus Register" subsection in the riscv-privileged spec for detailed information).

## 2.4. Address Matching

The A field in an SPMP entry's configuration register encodes the address-matching mode of the associated SPMP address register. It is the same as PMP/ePMP.

Please refer to the "Address Matching" subsection of PMP in the riscv-privileged spec for detailed information.



*Software may determine the SPMP granularity by writing zero to `spmp0cfg`, then writing all ones to `spmpaddr0`, then reading back `spmpaddr0`. If  $G$  is the index of the least-significant bit set, the SPMP granularity is  $2^{G+2}$ .*

## 2.5. Matching Logic

- SPMP entries are statically prioritized, similar to PMP entries
- The lowest-numbered SPMP entry that matches any byte of access (indicated by an address and the accessed length) determines whether that access is allowed or denied
- The SPMP entry must match **all** bytes of access, or the access fails
- This matching is done irrespective of the S, R, W, and X bits

On some implementations, misaligned loads, stores, and instruction fetches may also be decomposed into multiple accesses, some of which may succeed before an exception occurs. In particular, a portion of a misaligned store that passes the SPMP check may become visible, even if another portion fails the SPMP check. The same behavior may manifest for stores wider than XLEN bits (e.g., the FSD instruction in RV32D), even when the store address is naturally aligned.

1. If the effective privilege mode of the access is M, the access is **allowed**;
2. If the effective privilege mode of the access is S/U and no SPMP entry matches, but at least one SPMP entry is implemented, the access is **denied**;
3. Otherwise, each access is checked according to the permission bits in the matching SPMP entry. That access is allowed if it satisfies the permission checking with the SRWX encoding corresponding to the access type.



*The SPMP rules are checked for all implicit and explicit accesses in all S-mode and lesser-privileged modes. Implicit accesses in S-mode are treated as S-mode accesses.*

## 2.6. SPMP and Paging

The table below shows which mechanism to use. (Assume both paged virtual memory and SPMP are implemented.)

satp	Isolation mechanism
satp.mode == Bare	SPMP only
satp.mode != Bare	Paged Virtual Memory only

SPMP and paged virtual memory cannot be active simultaneously for two reasons:

1. An additional permission check layer would be introduced for each memory access.
2. Sufficient protection is provided by paged virtual memory.

That means SPMP is enabled when `satp.mode==Bare` and SPMP is implemented.



*Please refer to Table "Encoding of satp MODE field" in the riscv-privileged spec for detailed information on the satp.MODE field.*

## 2.7. Exceptions

When an access fails, SPMP generates an exception based on the access type (i.e., load accesses, store/AMO accesses, and instruction fetches). Each exception has a different code.

The SPMP reuses page fault exception codes for SPMP faults since page faults are typically delegated to S-mode. S-mode software (i.e., OS) can distinguish between SPMP and page faults by checking `satp.mode`, since SPMP and paged virtual memory cannot be active simultaneously (as described in [Section 2.6](#)).

Note that a single instruction may generate multiple accesses, which may not be mutually atomic.

Table of exception codes:

Interrupt	Exception Code	Description
0	12	Instruction page fault
0	13	Load page fault
0	15	Store/AMO page fault



Please refer to Table "Supervisor cause register (scause) values after trap" in the *riscv-privileged spec* for detailed information on exception codes.

**Delegation:** Unlike PMP, which uses access faults for violations, SPMP uses page faults for violations. The benefit of using page faults is that the violations caused by SPMP can be delegated to S-mode, while the access violations caused by PMP can still be handled by machine mode.

## 2.8. Context Switching Optimization

Context switching with SPMP requires storing 64 address and 8 configuration registers (RV64), creating significant overhead. To optimize this:

- In RV32: two XLEN-bit read/write CSRs called `spmpswitch` and `spmpswitchh` are added, as depicted in [Figure 7](#).
- In RV64: one XLEN-bit read/write CSR called `spmpswitch` is added, as depicted in [Figure 8](#).

Each bit controls the activation of its corresponding SPMP entry. An entry is active only when both its `spmpswitch[i]` bit and `spmp[i].cfg.A` field are set, i.e., `spmpswitch[i] & spmp[i].cfg.A != 0`.



Figure 7. SPMP domain switch registers (`spmpswitch` and `spmpswitchh`), RV32.



Figure 8. SPMP domain switch register (`spmpswitch`), RV64.



When `spmpswitch` is implemented and `spmpcfg[i].A == T0R`, an entry matches any address  $y$  where:

- $\text{spmpaddr}[i-1] \leq y < \text{spmpaddr}[i]$
- This matching occurs regardless of `spmpcfg[i-1]` and `spmpswitch[i-1]` values

The `spmpswitch` registers must be cleared on reset.

## 2.9. Access Methods of SPMP CSRs

**Indirect CSR access:** The SPMP CSRs are accessed indirectly. Each combination of `siselect` and `sireg` represents an access to the corresponding SPMP CSR.

The indirect CSR access avoids the potential cost in pipeline flushes. However, there is no ordering guarantee between writes to different SPMP CSRs, except when explicitly executing an `SFENCE.VMA` instruction with `rs1=x0` and `rs2=x0`.

<code>siselect</code> number	indirect CSR access of <code>sireg</code>
<code>siselect#1</code>	<code>sireg</code> → <code>smpaddr[0]</code> , <code>sireg2</code> → <code>smp[0]cfg</code>
<code>siselect#2</code>	<code>sireg</code> → <code>smpaddr[1]</code> , <code>sireg2</code> → <code>smp[1]cfg</code>
...	...
<code>siselect#64</code>	<code>sireg</code> → <code>smpaddr[63]</code> , <code>sireg2</code> → <code>smp[63]cfg</code>



*The specific value of `siselect#1-64` will be allocated after review by the Arch Review Committee.*

*The rationale for SPMP only assign one rule per `siselect` value is due to performance consideration. If multiple SPMP rules are assigned to each `siselect`, a jump table or additional calculations would be needed to determine which `sireg` to assess.*

*Please refer to the `Sscsrind` extension specification for details on indirect CSR accesses: [github.com/riscv/riscv-indirect-csr-access](https://github.com/riscv/riscv-indirect-csr-access)*

## Chapter 3. Extension of Resource Sharing

Given that PMP and SPMP have similar layout of address/config registers and the same address matching logic. Reusing registers and comparators between PMP and SPMP may be beneficial (in some cases) to save hardware resources. This section introduces the resource sharing extension that can support dynamic reallocation of hardware resource between PMP and SPMP.

Implementations should consider PMP/SPMP entries as a resource pool (called PMP\_Resource). Specifically, each PMP\_Resource consists of an address CSR, a configuration CSR, and associated micro-architecture state. A new M-mode CSR called `mpmpdeleg` is introduced to control the sharing of PMP\_Resource between PMP and SPMP.

In the following description, we will refer to the PMP/SPMP from the hardware perspective as PMP\_Resource, and the PMP/SPMP from the software perspective as entry.

The 16-bit CSR shown in [Figure 9](#) has one `mpmnum` field:

1. `mpmnum` is 7-bit, allowing a value of 0–64 to specify the number of PMP entries.
2. Any PMP\_Resource greater than or equal to the `mpmnum` is delegated to S-mode (SPMP). The lower numbered PMP\_Resource are left for M-mode (PMP). Delegating higher indexed PMP\_Resource to SPMP enables implementations with a single priority tree.
3. M-mode could set `mpmnum` ≥ 64 (the number of implemented PMP\_Resource), to reserve all resources for PMP.
4. M-mode could set `mpmnum` = 0 to delegate all PMP\_Resource to SPMP.
5. The reset value of `mpmnum` is 0b100\_0000.
6. The `mpmnum` is locked when `mseccfg.MML` is set (Please refer to the `Smepmp` extension specification for details on `mseccfg.MML`).




Figure 9. `mpmpdeleg` CSR format.

### Constraints:

1. With RV32, the values of `mpmnum`, can only be a multiple of 4; with RV64, it can only be a multiple of 8. This design avoids sharing the same configuration CSR between S-mode and M-mode.
2. The `mpmnum` is a WARL field. Illegal writes (e.g., values that are not multiples of 4 (RV32) or 8 (RV64)) should be ignored.
3. If the SPMP entry with lowest CSR number is configured with TOR address-matching mode, zero is used for the lower bound.



The resource sharing is **mandatory**.

The `mpmpdeleg` CSR is WARL, and allows an implementation to hardwire the PMP/SPMP split if desired.

To reduce context-switch overhead, S-mode software should evaluate the number of

---

*SPMP rules each S-mode context needs and set `mpmpdeleg.pmpnum` accordingly.*

**Addressing:**

Both PMP and SPMP entries will be supported contiguously. The PMP entries begin with the lowest CSR number, while the SPMP entries begin with `mpmpdeleg.pmpnum`. For instance, given an implementation with a total of 64 PMP Resource entries, if `mpmpdeleg.pmpnum` is set to 16 during runtime, `PMPResource[0]` to `PMPResource[15]` would map to `PMP[0]` to `PMP[15]`. The remaining entries, `PMPResource[16]` to `PMPResource[63]`, would be mapped as `SPMP[0]` to `SPMP[47]`.

From a software perspective, the SPMP entries start from `SPMP[0]`. The available number of SPMP entries can be discovered by writing to and reading from the SPMP CSRs. Illegal writes to SPMP CSRs will be ignored.

**Re-configuration:**

M-mode software can re-configure the entries for PMP and SPMP by modifying the `mpmpdeleg` CSR. A re-configuration involving locked PMP entry will leave `mpmpdeleg` unchanged.

## Chapter 4. Summary of Hardware Changes

Item	Changes
CSRs for SPMP address	64 new CSRs
CSRs for SPMP configuration	16 new CSRs for RV32 and 8 for RV64
CSR for domain switch	2 new CSRs for RV32 and 1 for RV64
CSR for resource sharing	1 new CSR
Indirect access to SPMP CSRs	64 new siselect values



## Chapter 5. Interaction with other proposals

This section discusses how SPMP interacts with other proposals.

**J-extension pointer masking proposal:** When both PM and SPMP are used, SPMP checking should be performed using the actual addresses generated by PM (pointer masking).

**Hypervisor extension:** Virtualization support for the SPMP will be an independent proposal.

**Smstateen extension:** SPMP adds readable and writable states in S-mode, which can be abused as a covert channel if the OS/hypervisor is not aware of SPMP (thus the states won't be context-switched). It is desired that SPMP occupies a bit in mstateen register of Smstateen extension, which can control supervisor access to SPMP states.