

CENTRE/MARGIN (PERIPHERY)

This has been one of the most contentious ideas in post-colonial discourse, and yet it is at the heart of any attempt at defining what occurred in the representation and relationship of peoples as a result of the colonial period. Colonialism could only exist at all by postulating that there existed a **binary** opposition into which the world was divided. The gradual establishment of an empire depended upon a stable hierarchical relationship in which the colonized existed as the **other** of the colonizing culture. Thus the idea of the savage could occur only if there was a concept of the civilized to oppose it. In this way a geography of difference was constructed, in which differences were mapped (**cartography**) and laid out in a metaphorical landscape that represented not geographical fixity, but the fixity of power.

Imperial Europe became defined as the 'centre' in a geography at least as metaphysical as physical. Everything that lay outside that centre was by definition at the margin or the periphery of culture, power and civilization. The colonial mission, to bring the margin into the sphere of influence of the enlightened centre, became the principal justification for the economic and political exploitation of colonialism, especially after the middle of the nineteenth century.

The idea is contentious because it has been supposed that attempts to define the centre/margin model function to perpetuate it. In fact, post-colonial theorists have usually used the model to suggest that dismantling such binaries does more than merely assert the independence of the marginal, it also radically undermines the very idea of such a centre, deconstructing the claims of the European colonizers to a unity and a fixity of a different order from that of others. In this sense the dismantling of centre/margin (periphery) models of culture calls into question the claims of any culture to possess a fixed, pure and homogenous body of values, and exposes them all as historically constructed, and thus corrigible formations.

COLONIAL DISCOURSE

This is a term brought into currency by Edward Said who saw Foucault's notion of a **discourse** as valuable for describing that system within which that range of practices termed 'colonial' come into being. Said's ***Orientalism***, which examined the ways in which colonial discourse operated as an instrument of power, initiated what came to be known as colonial discourse theory, that theory which, in the 1980s, saw colonial discourse as its field of study. The best known colonial discourse theorist,

apart from Said, is Homi Bhabha, whose analysis posited certain disabling contradictions within colonial relationships, such as **hybridity**, **ambivalence** and **mimicry**, which revealed the inherent vulnerability of colonial discourse.

Discourse, as Foucault theorizes it, is a system of statements within which the world can be known. It is the system by which dominant groups in society constitute the field of truth by imposing specific knowledges, disciplines and values upon dominated groups. As a social formation it works to constitute reality not only for the objects it appears to represent but also for the subjects who form the community on which it depends. Consequently, colonial discourse is the complex of signs and practices that organize social existence and social reproduction within colonial relationships.

Colonial discourse is greatly implicated in ideas of the centrality of Europe, and thus in assumptions that have become characteristic of **modernity**: assumptions about history, language, literature and 'technology'. Colonial discourse is thus a system of statements that can be made about colonies and colonial peoples, about colonizing powers and about the relationship between these two. It is the system of knowledge and beliefs about the world within which acts of colonization take place. Although it is generated within the society and cultures of the colonizers, it becomes that discourse within which the colonized may also come to see themselves. At the very least, it creates a deep conflict in the consciousness of the colonized because of its clash with other knowledges (and kinds of knowledge) about the world. Rules of inclusion and exclusion operate on the assumption of the superiority of the colonizer's culture, history, language, art, political structures, social conventions, and the assertion of the need for the colonized to be 'raised up' through colonial contact. In particular, colonial discourse hinges on notions of race that begin to emerge at the very advent of European imperialism. Through such distinctions it comes to represent the colonized, whatever the nature of their social structures and cultural histories, as 'primitive' and the colonizers as 'civilized'.

Colonial discourse tends to exclude, of course, statements about the exploitation of the resources of the colonized, the political status accruing to colonizing powers, the importance to domestic politics of the development of an empire, all of which may be compelling reasons for maintaining colonial ties. Rather it conceals these benefits in statements about the inferiority of the colonized, the primitive nature of other **races**, the barbaric depravity of colonized societies, and

therefore the duty of the imperial power to reproduce itself in the colonial society, and to advance the civilization of the colony through trade, administration, cultural and moral improvement. Such is the power of colonial discourse that individual colonizing subjects are not often consciously aware of the duplicity of their position, for colonial discourse constructs the colonizing subject as much as the colonized. Statements that contradict the discourse cannot be made either without incurring punishment, or without making the individuals who make those statements appear eccentric and abnormal.

COLONIALISM

The term colonialism is important in defining the specific form of cultural exploitation that developed with the expansion of Europe over the last 400 years. Although many earlier civilizations had colonies, and although they perceived their relations with them to be one of a central *imperium* in relation to a periphery of provincial, marginal and barbarian cultures, a number of crucial factors entered into the construction of the post-Renaissance practices of **imperialism**.

Edward Said offers the following distinction: “‘imperialism’ means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; ‘colonialism’, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory’ (Said 1993: 8).

The scale and variety of colonial settlements generated by the expansion of European society after the Renaissance shows why the term colonialism has been seen to be a distinctive form of the more general ideology of imperialism. Although Said’s formula, which uses ‘imperialism’ for the ideological force and ‘colonialism’ for the practice, is a generally useful distinction, European colonialism in the post-Renaissance world became a sufficiently specialized and historically specific form of imperial expansion to justify its current general usage as a distinctive kind of political ideology.

The fact that European post-Renaissance colonial expansion was coterminous with the development of a modern capitalist system of economic exchange (see **world system theory**) meant that the perception of the colonies as primarily established to provide raw materials for the burgeoning economies of the colonial powers was greatly strengthened and institutionalized. It also meant that the relation between the colonizer and colonized was locked into a rigid hierarchy of difference deeply resistant to fair and equitable exchanges, whether economic, cultural or social.

In colonies where the subject people were of a different race, or where minority indigenous peoples existed, the ideology of race was also a crucial part of the construction and naturalization of an unequal form of intercultural relations. **Race** itself, with its accompanying racism and racial prejudice, was largely a product of the same post-Renaissance period, and a justification for the treatment of enslaved peoples after the development of the **slave** trade of the Atlantic Middle Passage from the late sixteenth century onwards. In such situations the idea of the colonial world became one of a people intrinsically inferior, not just outside history and civilization, but genetically pre-determined to inferiority. Their subjection was not just a matter of profit and convenience but also could be constructed as a natural state. The idea of the 'evolution of mankind' and the survival of the fittest 'race', in the crude application of Social Darwinism, went hand in hand with the doctrines of imperialism that evolved at the end of the nineteenth century. The sexist exclusivity of these discourses (man, mankind, etc.) demonstrated their ideological alliance with patriarchal practices, as numerous commentators have noted (see **feminism and post-colonialism**). As a result of these new formulations, colonization could be (re)presented as a virtuous and necessary 'civilizing' task involving education and paternalistic nurture. An example of this is Kipling's famous admonition to America in 1899 to 'Take up the White Man's Burden' after their war against Spain in the Philippines rather than follow their own anticolonial model and offer the Filipinos independence and nationhood (Kipling 1899:323–4). In this period, and for these reasons, colonialism developed an ideology rooted in obfuscatory justification, and its violent and essentially unjust processes became increasingly difficult to perceive behind a liberal smoke-screen of civilizing 'task', paternalistic 'development' and 'aid'. The development of such territorial designators as 'Protectorates', 'Trust Territories', 'Condominiums', etc. served to justify the continuing process of colonialism as well as to hide the fact that these territories were the displaced sites of increasingly violent struggles for markets and raw materials by the industrialized nations of the West.

In the case of the non-indigenous inhabitants of **settler colonies**, the idea of a cultural inferiority exceeded that of mere provincial gaucherie as race permeated even the construction of 'white' settlers. These were frequently characterized as having wholly degenerated ('**gone native**') from contact with other races, as in the case of white Creoles

in the West Indies (Brathwaite 1971), or, in the case of settler colonies such as Canada or Australia, as having developed specific limited colonial characteristics (physical prowess, sporting ability) but not others (cultural and social sophistication). The same practice of characterizing 'colonial' peoples by signifiers of naivety, of social and cultural provinciality and of originary taint ('Irishness', for example, was imported from the internal discriminations of Britain in the Victorian period to its colonialist constructions of both America and Australia) was a feature of English texts even as late as the early twentieth century.

This was so even for Americans, despite independence and the radical shift in their own power position in the world at large after American industrialization in the late nineteenth century (see, for example, the presentation of Americans in such late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century texts as Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories, or Shaw's *Man and Superman*). Thus the negative construction of self was as important a feature of self-representation for settler colonies as for colonies of occupation where race and the idea of an alien or decayed civilization were a feature of colonial discrimination. (Although Canada had achieved independent status in the 1870s and Australia became an independent Federation in 1900, the people of both these settler colonies retained many symbolic links that emphasized their continuing dependence on the imperial centre; thus, for example, Australians did not carry separate and distinctive national passports until 1946). By the end of the nineteenth century, colonialism had developed into a system of ahistorical categorization in which certain societies and cultures were perceived as intrinsically inferior.

In Britain, at least, and arguably elsewhere too, by the end of the nineteenth century, a domestic programme for the function of Empire could be clearly discerned, as Victorian society faced increasing internal dissension and division (Disraeli's 'Two Nations'). The doctrine of the New Imperialism was in many ways Disraeli's response to his perception that Britain was divided into two nations of rich and poor, industrial and non-industrial. Empire became the principal ideological unifier across class and other social divisions in Britain. It was to be the principal icon of national unity in the face of the widely perceived social threat of class unrest and revolution that had arisen in post-industrial British society. An **other** (the colonized) existed as a primary means of defining the colonizer and of creating a sense of unity beneath such differences as class and wealth and between the increasingly polarized life of the industrialized cities that developed the wealth and that of

the traditional countryside to which its beneficiaries retreated or retired. The colonialist system permitted a notional idea of improvement for the colonized, via such metaphors as parent/child, tree/branch, etc., which in theory allowed that at some future time the inferior colonials might be raised to the status of the colonizer. But in practice this future was always endlessly deferred.

It is significant that no society ever attained full freedom from the colonial system by the involuntary, active disengagement of the colonial power until it was provoked by a considerable internal struggle for self-determination or, most usually, by extended and active violent opposition by the colonized. It is one of the great myths of recent British colonial history in particular that the granting of independence to its colonies was the result of a proactive and deliberate policy of enlightenment on the part of the British people, a policy that distinguished British colonialism from the inferior and more rapacious European brands. Such readings are, of course, part of the construction of the ideology of late nineteenth-century imperialism in which literary representation played a vigorous part, whether actively, as in the work of Kipling, or in a more ambivalent way in the works of Conrad. Despite the anti-imperial strain in some of his writing, Conrad continues to distinguish actively between the English model of colonialism, which has 'an ideal at the back of it', and the mere rapacity of the imperialism of 'lesser breeds' of imperialists. These specious distinctions are projected back into the narratives of the rapacious Spanish conquistadores, though the British treatment of the Indians in Virginia differed from that of the Spanish only in quantity not in the degree of its brutality (Hulme 1986). Even the granting of Dominion status or limited independence to white settler cultures was the result of long constitutional and political struggles and was made dependent on the retention of legal and constitutional links with the Crown that limited the right of those societies to conduct their own affairs and to develop their own systems of justice or governance. In such societies, of course, the indigenous peoples were not granted even the most limited form of citizenship under these new constitutional models. In Western Australia, for example, even in the 1920s, the Government Department that had charge of Aboriginal affairs was called the Department of Fisheries, Forests, Wildlife and Aborigines. Recent attempts to 'offload' the guilt of colonial policies onto the colonial 'settlers' as a convenient scapegoat emphasize the periods when metropolitan, government policy was more enlightened than that of the local settlers. But in general such ideological discriminations

were in no sense alien to the spirit of the metropolitan, colonial powers that had set up these colonies, nor did this essentially discriminatory attitude on the part of the 'home' country change after the granting of federal or dominion status. Racial discrimination was, in the majority of cases, a direct extension of colonial policy and continued to receive both overt and covert support from the ex-colonial powers as well as from the newly emerging power of America throughout the period up to and even after the Second World War.

Such policies of racial discrimination reached their nadir in South African apartheid, which had its roots in earlier colonial discriminatory policies (Davidson 1994). In the case of societies where the factor of race was less easily resolved by such internal discriminatory categorizations, the importance of racial discrimination was even more obvious.

British India and European African colonies, for example, had to engage in a long and frequently bloody process of dissent, protest and rebellion to secure their independence. It is also significant that in those cases where European colonial powers held on longest, for example the Portuguese colonies, they were often able to do so and indeed were encouraged to do so by the degree to which their colonial governments were really only a front for a 'broader imperialism', as Amílcar Cabral himself noted (see **anti-colonialism**). Similarly, the nationalist government in South Africa was able to survive only because it was supported by the investment of those very countries who were supposedly opposed to the regime. Thus **colonialism**, far from disappearing as the century goes on, too often merely modified and developed into the **neo-colonialism** of the post-independence period.

CONTRAPUNTAL READING

A term coined by Edward Said to describe a way of reading the texts of English literature so as to reveal their deep implication in imperialism and the colonial process. Borrowed from music, the term suggests a responsive reading that provides a counterpoint to the text, thus enabling the emergence of colonial implications that might otherwise remain hidden. Thus a reading of Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*, for instance, can reveal the extent to which the privileged life of the English upper classes is established upon the profits made from West Indian plantations, and, by implication, from the exploitation of the colonized. By thus stressing the affiliations of the text, its origin in social and cultural reality rather than its filiative connections with English literature and canonical criteria, the critic can uncover cultural and

political implications that may seem only fleetingly addressed in the text itself. 'As we look back at the cultural archive,' says Said, 'we begin to reread it not univocally but *contrapuntally* (1993:59). The overarching implication is the extent to which English society and culture was grounded on the ideology and practices of imperialism.

COUNTER-DISCOURSE

A term coined by Richard Terdiman to characterize the theory and practice of symbolic resistance. Terdiman examines the means of producing genuine change against the 'capacity of established discourses to ignore or absorb would-be subversion' (1985: 13) by analysing nineteenth-century French writing. He identifies the 'confrontation between constituted reality and its subversion' as 'the very locus at which cultural and historical change occurred' (13).

Terdiman's work focused exclusively on French literature, but his term has been adopted by post-colonial critics to describe the complex ways in which challenges to a dominant or established discourse (specifically those of the imperial centre) might be mounted from the periphery, always recognizing the powerful 'absorptive capacity' of imperial and neo-imperial discourses. As a practice within postcolonialism, counter-discourse has been theorized less in terms of historical processes and literary movements than through challenges posed to particular texts, and thus to imperial ideologies inculcated, stabilized and specifically maintained through texts employed in colonialist education systems.

The concept of counter-discourse within post-colonialism thus also raises the issue of the subversion of canonical texts and their inevitable reinscription in this process of subversion. But Terdiman's general address to this problem is also useful here, in that an examination of the ways in which these operate as naturalized controls exposes their 'contingency and permeability'. Thus, such challenges are not simply mounted against the texts as such but address the whole of that discursive colonialist field within which imperial texts – whether anthropological, historical, literary or legal – function in colonized contexts.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY/CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

In common usage, these terms both refer interchangeably to the variety of cultures and the need to acknowledge this variety to avoid universal prescriptive cultural definitions. However, Homi Bhabha, in the essay

‘The commitment to theory’ (1988), employs the terms as oppositions to draw a distinction between two ways of representing culture. Bhabha argues that it is insufficient to record signifiers of cultural *diversity* which merely acknowledge a range of separate and distinct systems of behaviour, attitudes and values. Such a framework may even continue to suggest that such differences are merely aberrant or **exotic**, as was implicit in imperialistic ethnographies. References to cultural diversity based on an assumption of ‘pre-given cultural “contents” and customs’ give rise to anodyne liberal notions of multiculturalism, cultural exchange or the culture of humanity.

Cultural *difference*, on the other hand, suggests that cultural authority resides not in a series of fixed and determined diverse objects but in the process of how these objects come to be known and so come into being. This process of coming to be known is what brings into being and discriminates between the various ‘statements *of* culture or *on* culture’ and gives authority to the production of the fields of references by which we order them. By stressing the process by which we know and can know cultures as totalities, the term ‘cultural difference’ emphasizes our awareness of the ‘homogenising effects of cultural symbols and icons’ and places the emphasis on a questioning attitude towards ‘the authority of cultural synthesis in general’ (Bhabha 1994: 20).

The ‘difference’ Bhabha emphasizes here is clearly connected with the radical **ambivalence** that he argues is implicit in all colonial discourse. He insists that this same ambivalence is implicit in the act of cultural interpretation itself since, as he puts it, the production of meaning in the relations of two systems requires a ‘Third Space’. This space is something like the idea of deferral in poststructuralism. While Saussure suggested that signs acquire meaning through their difference from other signs (and thus a culture may be identified by its difference from other cultures), Derrida suggested that the ‘difference’ is also ‘deferred’, a duality that he defined in a new term ‘*différance*’. The ‘Third Space’ can be compared to this space of deferral and possibility (thus a culture’s difference is never simple and static but ambivalent, changing, and always open to further possible interpretation). In short, this is the space of **hybridity** itself, the space in which cultural meanings and identities always contain the traces of other meanings and identities. Therefore, Bhabha argues, ‘claims to inherent originality or purity of cultures are untenable, even before we resort to empirical historical instances that demonstrate their hybridity’.

This view is not incompatible with Fanon's idea of the development of a radical and revolutionary native intelligentsia. In fact it is specifically invoked as the defining condition for such a radical native intelligentsia as opposed to a **comprador**-class or **neo-colonialist** native élite, which merely positions itself within a totalized and controlled metaphor of cultural diversity. Such an élite, which invokes unchanging and fixed **nativist** forms, can never fully oppose the control of the dominant culture, since they define culture as fixed and unprogressive. Yet, ironically, it may be their very in-betweenness that allows a revolutionary potential for embracing change in members of the same group of native intelligentsia as **Fanonist** thought acknowledges. Bhabha suggests that 'for Fanon the liberatory "people" who initiate the productive instability of revolutionary cultural exchange are themselves the bearers of a hybrid identity . . . and they construct their culture from the national text translated into modern Western forms of information technology, language, dress . . . [transforming] the meaning of the colonial inheritance into the liberatory signs of a free people of the future' (38). Despite Bhabha's intervention in many post-colonial discussions, the terms continue to be used interchangeably in the way defined at the beginning of this entry.

DECOLONIZATION

Decolonization is the process of revealing and dismantling colonialist power in all its forms. This includes dismantling the hidden aspects of those institutional and cultural forces that had maintained the colonialist power and that remain even after political independence is achieved. Initially, in many places in the colonized world, the process of resistance was conducted in terms or institutions appropriated from the colonizing culture itself. This was only to be expected, since early nationalists had been educated to perceive themselves as potential heirs to European political systems and models of culture. This occurred not only in **settler colonies** where the white colonial élite was a direct product of the system, but even in colonies of occupation. Macaulay's infamous 1835 Minute on Indian Education had proposed the deliberate creation in India of just such a class of 'brown white men', educated to value European culture above their own. This is the *locus classicus* of this **hegemonic** process of control, but there are numerous other examples in the practices of other colonies. Whether in India, Africa or the West Indies in the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries, the first nationalists were also modernizers, whose programme was less to effect a rejection of colonialist culture than to adopt its practices. This process of political and cultural 'brokerage', as some historians have called it, involved these early decolonizers in a profound complicity with the imperial powers from which they sought to emerge as free agents. Their general attitudes and practices were necessarily imbued with the cultural and social values they had been taught to regard as those of a modern, civilized state (de Moraes-Farias and Barber 1990). Consequently, political independence did not necessarily mean a wholesale freeing of the colonized from colonialist values, for these, along with political, economic and cultural models, persisted in many cases after independence.

In colonies where a majority culture or cultures had been invaded and suppressed or denigrated by colonialist practices, the process of resisting and overthrowing these assumptions has been more obviously active.

The powerful designation of **neo-colonialism** to denote the new force of global control operating through a local élite or **comprador** class was coined by the Ghanaian independence leader Kwame Nkrumah (1965). As a socialist, Nkrumah restricted his concept of the neo-colonial operations of imperialism to the operation of the global capitalism of the West.

The **globalization** of the modern world economy has meant that political independence has not effected the kinds of changes in economic and cultural control that the early nationalists might have expected. It has even been argued by some recent commentators that the colonial powers deliberately avoided granting independence until they had, through internal discriminations and hegemonic educational practices, created an élite (**comprador**) class to maintain aspects of colonial control on their behalf but without the cost or the opprobrium associated with the classic colonial models.

As well as direct and indirect economic control, the continuing influence of **Eurocentric** cultural models privileged the imported over the indigenous: colonial languages over local languages; writing over orality and linguistic culture over inscriptive cultures of other kinds (dance, graphic arts, which had often been designated 'folk culture'). Against all these occlusions and overwritings of pre-colonial cultural practices, a number of programmes of decolonization have been attempted. Notable among these have been those that seek to revive and revalue local languages. The pressure of the global economy means that élite communication is dominated by the use of the ex-colonial

languages, notably the new 'world language' of English, whose power derives from its historical use across the largest of the modern empires and from its use by the United States.

In post-colonial societies in which alternatives exist, it has been suggested that a return to indigenous languages can restructure attitudes to the local and the indigenous cultures, and can also form a more effective bridge to the bulk of the population whose lives have continued to be conducted largely in their mother tongues. Thus, decolonizing processes that have advocated a return to indigenous language use have involved both a social programme to democratize culture and a programme of cultural recuperation and re-evaluation. In Africa, the work of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has been at the forefront of this decolonizing model (Ngũgĩ 1981a, 1986, 1993). But it has also had considerable advocacy in India where, due to the unbroken power of local languages and their literary traditions throughout the colonial period, a strong drive to revalue the literatures and other arts employing Indian languages has occurred in recent times (Ahmad 1992; Devy 1992). It is important, though, not to assume that these cultures remained untouched, and indeed the forms they often now employ, such as the novel, prose fiction, drama, magazines and television soap-opera, reflect an energetic engagement with dominant practices.

Only the most extreme forms of decolonization would suggest that precolonial cultures can be recovered in a pristine form by programmes of decolonization (see **nativism**). More recently, for example, some post-colonial African critics (Appiah 1992; Gikandi 1992; Mudimbe 1994) have questioned the bases on which such extreme decolonizing projects have been erected, arguing from a variety of different perspectives that the systems by which, to use Mudimbe's phrase, 'African worlds have been established as realities for knowledge' are always multiple and diverse, and are implicated in colonial and European orders of knowledge as much as in local ones. For example, Kenyan critic Simon Gikandi has argued that many decolonizing practices 'were predicated on the assumption that African cultures and selves were natural and holistic entities which colonialism had repressed, and which it was the duty of the African writer, in the period of decolonization to recover (if only the right linguistic and narrative tools could be developed), there is now an urgent need to question the ideological foundations on which the narratives of decolonization were constructed' (Gikandi 1992: 378).

Gikandi's analyses critique the simple equation of national narratives

and decolonizing processes and argue that discourses of **nationalism** and national liberation (or, in some later texts, of the disillusioning failure of such narratives and such nationalist discourses) are increasingly inadequate ways of analysing and correcting the problems and conflicts of the post-independence condition. For Gikandi, the task faced by African writers now, and by implication by writers in many postcolonial societies, is 'to theorise adequately . . . the problematic of power and the state' (see **post-colonial state**). Thus Gikandi argues that formulations of decolonization, such as Ngugi's in novels like *Matigari*, are 'both a symptom of the problems which arise when the narrative of decolonization is evoked in a transformed post-colonial era and a commentary on the problematics of a belated national narrative' (Gikandi 1992: 379). The projects of other writers, such as Salman Rushdie, who embrace

a 'transnational' identity and seek to critique the contemporary postcolonial state, are often dismissed as not contributing to a decolonizing process. But this is to assume an absolute contiguity between decolonization and narratives of nation and nationalism, which arguments like Gikandi's seriously call into question. In fact, the borders and images of the post-colonial nation may be fictions that allow free passage to the continuing control of the **neo-colonialism** of multinational companies and global monetary institutions. Decolonization, whatever else it may be, is a complex and continuing process rather than something achieved automatically at the moment of **independence**.

In the **settler colonies** this process can also be seen to occur in a different form. Although they were permitted political independence on the inherited British model at a relatively early stage, they often continued to suffer what the noted Australian commentator A.A. Phillips wittily characterized as 'a cultural cringe' from which they were not released by their nominal political 'independence' (Phillips 1958, 1979). Similarly, they have frequently been far less successful than other kinds of colonies in dismantling the colonialist elements in their social institutions and cultural attitudes. This is to some extent because of the peculiar hegemonic strength exerted by notions of a **filiative** connection with the Imperial centre, reiterated in phrases such as 'sons and daughters of Empire'. Such connections tended to keep the settler colonies more dependent on the apron strings of their colonial masters (Docker 1978), usually at the expense of the recognition of the rights of their indigenous peoples.

DIASPORA

From the Greek meaning ‘to disperse’ (*OED*). Diasporas, the voluntary or forcible movement of peoples from their homelands into new regions, is a central historical fact of colonization. Colonialism itself was a radically diasporic movement, involving the temporary or permanent dispersion and settlement of millions of Europeans over the entire world. The widespread effects of these migrations (such as that which has been termed **ecological imperialism**) continue on a global scale. Many such ‘settled’ regions were developed historically as plantations or agricultural colonies to grow foodstuffs for the metropolitan populations, and thus a large-scale demand for labour was created in many regions where the local population could not supply the need. The result of this was the development, principally in the Americas, but also in other places such as South Africa, of an economy based on **slavery**. Virtually all the slaves shipped to the plantation colonies in the Americas were taken from West Africa through the various European coastal trading enclaves. The widespread slaving practised by Arabs in East Africa also saw some slaves sold into British colonies such as India and Mauritius, whilst some enslaving of Melanesian and Polynesian peoples also occurred in parts of the South Pacific to serve the sugarcane industry in places like Queensland, where it was known colloquially as ‘blackbirding’.

After the slave trade, and when slavery was outlawed by the European powers in the first decades of the nineteenth century, the demand for cheap agricultural labour in colonial plantation economies was met by the development of a system of indentured labour. This involved transporting, under indenture agreements, large populations of poor agricultural labourers from population rich areas, such as India and China, to areas where they were needed to service plantations. The practices of slavery and indenture thus resulted in world-wide colonial diasporas. Indian populations formed (and form) substantial minorities or majorities in colonies as diverse as the West Indies, Malaya, Fiji, Mauritius and the colonies of Eastern and Southern Africa. Chinese minorities found their way under similar circumstances to all these regions too, as well as to areas across most of South-East Asia (including the Dutch East Indian colonies, in what is now Indonesia) and the Spanish- and later American-dominated Philippines. The descendants of the diasporic movements generated by colonialism have developed their own distinctive cultures which both preserve and often extend and develop their originary cultures. Creolized

versions of their own practices evolved, modifying (and being modified by) indigenous cultures with which they thus came into contact. The development of diasporic cultures necessarily questions **essentialist** models, interrogating the ideology of a unified, 'natural' cultural norm, one that underpins the **centre/margin** model of colonialist discourse. It also questions the simpler kinds of theories of **nativism** which suggest that **decolonization** can be effected by a recovery or reconstruction of pre-colonial societies. The most recent and most socially significant diasporic movements have been those of colonized peoples back to the metropolitan centres. In countries such as Britain and France, the population now has substantial minorities of diasporic ex-colonial peoples. In recent times, the notion of a 'diasporic identity' has been adopted by many writers as a positive affirmation of their hybridity.

DISCOURSE

This is a much used word in contemporary theory and in post-colonial criticism is mostly employed in such terms as **colonial discourse**, which is specifically derived from Foucault's use of the concept. Discourse was originally used from about the sixteenth century to describe any kind of speaking, talk or conversation, but became increasingly used to describe a more formal speech, a narration or a treatment of any subject at length, a treatise, dissertation or sermon. More recently, discourse has been used in a technical sense by linguists to describe any unit of speech longer than a sentence.

However, the Foucauldian sense of the term has little to do with the act of speaking in its traditional sense. For Foucault, a discourse is a strongly bounded area of social knowledge, a system of statements within which the world can be known. The key feature of this is that the world is not simply 'there' to be talked about, rather, it is through discourse itself that the world is brought into being. It is also in such a discourse that speakers and hearers, writers and readers come to an understanding about themselves, their relationship to each other and their place in the world (the construction of **subjectivity**). It is the 'complex of signs and practices which organises social existence and social reproduction'.

There are certain unspoken rules controlling which statements can be made and which cannot within the discourse, and these rules determine the nature of that discourse. Since a virtually limitless number of statements can be made within the rules of the system, it is these rules that characterize the discourse and that interest analysts such as Foucault.

What are the rules that allow certain statements to be made and not others? Which rules order these statements? Which rules allow the development of a classificatory system? Which rules allow us to identify certain individuals as authors? These rules concern such things as the classification, the ordering and the distribution of that knowledge of the world that the discourse both enables and delimits.

A good example of a discourse is medicine, in mundane terms we simply think of medicine as healing sick bodies. But medicine represents a system of statements that can be made about bodies, about sickness and about the world. The rules of this system determine how we view the process of healing, the identity of the sick and, in fact, encompass the ordering of our physical relationship with the world. There are certain principles of exclusion and inclusion that operate within this system; some things can be said and some things cannot. Indeed we cannot talk about medicine without making a distinction between different kinds, such as 'Western' and 'Chinese' medicine. For these are two discourses in which the body and its relationship to the world are not only different but virtually incompatible. This explains the very great resistance in Western medicine to forms of healing that do not accord with its positivistic idea of the body. Until such practices as acupuncture or herbal remedies could be incorporated into the positivistic framework of Western medicine, by being incorporated into other 'scientific' statements, they were rejected as charlatanism or superstition (they did not concur with 'truth'). It is only very gradually that such rules of exclusion, which keep a discourse intact, can be modified, because the discourse maintains not just an understanding of the world, but in a real sense the world itself. Such incursions, when not controlled, may represent a very great threat to the authority of the discourse.

Discourse is important, therefore, because it joins power and knowledge together. Those who have power have control of what is known and the way it is known, and those who have such knowledge have power over those who do not. This link between knowledge and power is particularly important in the relationships between colonizers and colonized, and has been extensively elaborated by Edward Said in his discussion of **Orientalism**, in which he points out that this discourse, this way of knowing the 'Orient', is a way of maintaining power over it. Said's work lays more stress on the importance of writing and literary texts in the process of constructing representations of the other than does Foucault's, whose concern is more widely distributed across

a variety of social institutions. Said's insistence on the central role of literature in promoting colonialist discourse is elaborated in his later work (Said 1993), where he argues that the nineteenth-century novel comes into being as part of the formation of Empire, and acts reflexively with the forces of imperial control to establish imperialism as the dominant ideology in the period. This emphasis has made Said's work of especial interest to those concerned with post-colonial literatures and literary theory.

Foucault's view of the role of discourse though is even wider, and more pervasive, since he argues that discourse is *the* crucial feature of **modernity** itself. For the discourse of modernity occurs when what is said, the 'enunciated', becomes more important than the saying, the 'enunciation'. In classical times, intellectual power could be maintained by rhetoric, by the persuasiveness of the speaker 'discoursing' to a body of listeners. But gradually the 'will to truth' came to dominate discourse and statements were required to be either true or false. When this occurred, it was no longer the act of discourse but the subject of discourse that became important. The crucial fact for post-colonial theory is that the 'will to truth' is linked to the 'will to power' in the same way that power and knowledge are linked. The will of European nations to exercise dominant control over the world, which led to the growth of empires, was accompanied by the capacity to confirm European notions of utility, rationality, discipline as truth. We can extend our example, therefore, to talk about 'Eurocentric discourse', or the 'discourse of modernity', that is, a system of statements that can be made about the world that involve certain assumptions, prejudices, blindnesses and insights, all of which have a historical provenance, but exclude other, possibly equally valid, statements. All these statements and all that can be included within the discourse thus become protected by the assertion of 'truth'.

DOUBLE COLONIZATION

A term coined in the mid-1980s, and usually identified with Holst-Petersen and Rutherford's *A Double Colonization: Colonial and Post-Colonial Women's Writing* published in 1985. The term refers to the observation that women are subjected to both the colonial domination of empire and the male domination of patriarchy. In this respect empire and patriarchy act as analogous to each other and both exert control over female colonial subjects, who are, thus, doubly colonized by

imperial/patriarchal power. Feminist theory has propounded that women have been marginalized by patriarchal society and consequently the history and concerns of feminist theory have paralleled developments in post-colonial theory which foregrounds the marginalization of the colonial subject.

However, post-colonial nationalisms do not necessarily alleviate this situation but may entrench rather than dismantle the power of patriarchy, so that women's struggle against 'colonial' domination often continues after national independence. Post-colonial feminism continues to analyse the perpetuation of gender bias and 'double colonization' even in post-independence states, seeing the persistence of 'neo-colonial' domination of women in national patriarchies. There is considerable disagreement, however, among post-colonial feminists about whether imperialism or patriarchy is the force most urgently in need of contesting. One, perhaps most celebrated example is Hazel Carby's *White Woman Listen* (1982), but similar issues are addressed by Mohanty (1984), Suleri (1992) and others.

ECOFEMINISM

Ecofeminism has become an increasingly important field in both contemporary feminist and environmental studies. Although, as Diamond and Orenstein note, ecofeminism is really 'a new term for an ancient wisdom' (Mies and Shiva 1993: 13), it first came to prominence in the early 1980s, its bases in feminist philosophy, environmental activism and the European and American peace movements of the late 1970s. The term itself was first used by Françoise d'Eauborne in 1980 (Mies and Siva 1993: 13) and was increasingly adopted by both scholars and environmental activists. Organised in response to the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster, the 1980 'Women and Life on Earth: A Conference on Eco-Feminism' focused on 'the connections between feminism, militarization, healing and ecology' (Mies and Shiva 1993: 14). The adoption of the term had also been preceded by much women's poetry and fiction in the 1960s and 70s, and has gained increasing prominence through the work of philosophers Val Plumwood and Karen Warren. It has also been adopted by other disciplines through the writing and activism of Arundhati Roy and Vandana Shiva.

Ecofeminism stresses the indissoluble connectedness – both physical and conceptual – of the earth itself, and all life on it. Humans, as a part of this community depend on earth and sea, and the life this generates for survival; but they are even more fundamentally of it, one component part of the living whole. As Val Plumwood notes, the basic interconnectedness

of all matter and psyche is such a 'truism' that it is puzzling that it should need to be remarked at all. 'But the reason why this message of continuity and dependency is so revolutionary in the context of the modern world is that the dominant strands of Western culture have for so long denied it, and have given us a model of human identity as only minimally and accidentally connected to the earth' (Plumwood 1993: 6). Even though we all have a 'formal knowledge of evolutionary biology', this disconnection 'remains deeply and fatally entrenched in modern conceptions of the human and of nature,' continuing to 'naturalize domination in both human and non-human spheres' (1993: 6).

Ecofeminists, however, reject the notion that 'man's freedom and happiness depend on an *ongoing process* of emancipation from nature, and an independence from and dominance over natural processes by the power of reason and rationality' (Mies and Shiva 1993:6). The tenets of Enlightenment reason rely for their continuing power on a number of linked and hierarchized **binarisms**: nature and culture; black and white; civilization and savagery; the human and the animal. As Mies and Shiva argue, 'wherever women acted against ecological destruction or/and the threat of atomic annihilation, they immediately became aware of the connection between patriarchal violence against women, other people and nature' (14). The 'corporate and military warriors' aggression against the environment was perceived almost physically as an aggression against our female body' (14).

To stop the exploitation and despoliation of, in Plumwood's phrase, the 'more than human' world, radical changes in Western and Western-derived capitalist thinking are required. Central to such rethinking is the dismantling of those dangerous and divisive dualisms of patriarchal economies whose modern roots in Western cultures are traceable to the dictates of reason. Reason is interrogated not, as Plumwood stresses, to instantiate the unreasonable, but to understand the historically and philosophically contingent bases of the subjugation of women, nonwestern people and the natural world.

Western rationality, which still assumes that the basis of human civilization consists in a progressive detachment from 'nature', also dominated the colonial period. The more closely associated with nature non-European peoples and women were considered to be, the more 'inherently' inferior they were; inferiority ensured and justified patriarchal/Western civilization's destruction and domination of other lands and peoples. Land itself, cast as a female and 'new' to Europeans,

was 'ripe' for conquering and taming.

The legacy of the dominant discourse, as ecofeminists recognize, is environmental devastation and on-going destruction of plants, animals and other subject peoples in the name of capitalist 'progress' identified as 'civilization.' Ecofeminism thus seeks to establish – or in the case of some colonized cultures, to *re*-establish, a sense of interconnectedness of being, through ontological change and political activism replicating the philosophy of connectedness in an amalgam of theory and practice. As its affirmation of the shared ground of all being suggests, ecofeminism (especially in the United States) has strong spiritual as well as political and scholarly dimensions; modern retrieval of the traditional confluence of material and spiritual being intimately connected to place and the earth in many pre-colonized cultures.

ECOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM

A term coined by Alfred W. Crosby (Crosby 1986) to describe the ways in which the environments of colonized societies have been physically transformed by the experience of colonial occupation.

According to this thesis, imperialism not only altered the cultural, political and social structures of colonized societies, but also devastated colonial ecologies and traditional subsistence patterns.

Crosby makes a convincing case for the success of European imperialism as having a primarily 'biological and ecological component'.

European diseases were unwittingly (and more rarely deliberately) introduced to other parts of the globe, where they decimated indigenous populations and thus facilitated European military and technological conquest. More importantly, introduced crops and livestock not only supported conquering armies and colonizing populations but, in what Crosby calls 'the Neo-Europes' (**settler colonies**), radically altered the entire ecology of the invaded lands in ways that necessarily disadvantaged indigenous peoples and annihilated or endangered native flora and fauna on which their cultures (and sometimes their very lives) depended. The 'Neo-Europes' located in those temperate zones of the northern and southern hemispheres (e.g. Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina) that most closely approximated the climate of Europe quickly became the major exporters of European food crops, even though their native biotas were considerably different and varied. 'The regions that today export more foodstuffs of European provenance – grains and meats – than any other lands on earth had no wheat, barley, rye, cattle, pigs, sheep, or goats whatsoever five hundred years ago' (Crosby 1986: 7). Arguably this has led to one of the most

profound ecological changes the world has seen. The current famines in sub-Saharan Africa can be directly related to the European insistence on the repetitive cultivation of cash crops for export to the metropolitan centres in place of the traditional crop rotation that had kept the desert at bay. As a major form of Eurospatialization, and as a most effective means of social and territorial control, ecological imperialism cannot be underestimated. Its range of meaning can be extended into the neo-colonial arena in the current Western (or 'multinational') patenting of **'third world'** plant and animal species and in the global destruction (sponsored by both Western and Asian companies) of, for instance, rain-forests. Recently it has been argued that current Western ecological awareness also has its roots in Empire (Grove 1994). In India and the Caribbean, Europeans encountered attitudes to the natural world that differed radically from their own and were more generally 'conservationist', respectful or animistic. European policies in the colonies frequently had to reach compromises with these differing attitudes.

ENVIRONMENTALISM

Perhaps the most significant change in the orientation of the Humanities in the second half of the twentieth century has been the questioning of a once taken-for-granted anthropocentrism. Since the Enlightenment, Western epistemology has relegated the extra-human world to the sciences, while the study of the human became the province of the Humanities. It is only relatively recently that the disciplines of, for instance, History, Anthropology, Philosophy, Literature and Cultural Studies have begun to reclaim the 'natural' environment as crucial to the understanding of human 'being' (both past and present) and as of intrinsic worth. The enigma of place, the nature of indigeneity, the relationship between landscape and language, settler incursions with the consequent destruction of integrated biotas, colonial exploitation of resources and enforced cash-cropping (sometimes leading to desertification) have all been subjects of post-colonial study, especially in relation to genocide and the wholesale dispossession of indigenous peoples. But it is only recently that the influences and impacts on the extra-human environment have been studied, both for their own importance and because of the increasing recognition that the more-than-human is indissolubly interwoven with the human past, present, and now future. This increasing emphasis on the 'more-than-human' is environmentalism.

Environmentalism in post-colonial discourse has its beginnings in

Alfred Crosby's account of the impact of European incursions into the Americas and the Pacific (see **Ecological imperialism**). The conquest and colonization of so many extra-European environments produced irreversible changes in land use, in flora and fauna and frequently damaged beyond repair traditionally balanced relations between indigenous communities and their environments, a relationship – unlike that of their conquerors – crucial to their understanding of their 'being' as *of* the land rather than merely on it. (These very different ontologies are particularly evident in the land claim disputes between Aboriginal and settler-descent peoples which continue today in what Alfred Crosby termed the 'Neo-Europes'. Europeans see land in terms of individual ownership, while many native traditions regarded it as the essential part of a communal (w)holism.

Imperial incursions and colonization have been regarded as environmentally destructive, yet as Richard Grove argues, the perception of what had already been lost in Europe – the sense of *intrinsic* connection between the 'more-than-human' and the human, and thus the urgency of environmental preservation – became strikingly evident in Europe's colonies, particularly in the late nineteenth century when the world's first National Parks were consequently established in the United States and New Zealand.

The legacies of that colonial past, together with neo-colonial environmental exploitation and outright destruction have energized environmental activism world wide, from the tragic case of Ken Saro Wiwa to Arundhati Roy's protest against the Namada dam project, to the desert walk for food in the S.W. United States. Much environmentalism in theory and practice has emanated from former imperial centres such as Europe and the United States. While belated recognition of the crucial importance of other forms of life on earth is both welcome and necessary, its export and sometimes imposition on postcolonized cultures invites the obvious charge of hypocrisy and generates resentment against former imperial states, which, having degraded their own and their colonies' environments in the 'interests' of progress and 'development', now encourage (or impose) the theory and practices of environmental preservation on other peoples. This also frequently creates division within post-colonized cultures themselves, where, for instance, peoples are moved off their traditional lands to make way for game parks, essentially for the benefit of wealthy tourists (see Wolch, Elder and Emmel). Demands for the 'global' preservation of endangered species frequently clash with the policies of post-colonized

governments eager to use their regained environmental sovereignty in the interests of a modern capitalism from which it is difficult for them to escape. Clashes between 'local' and 'global' environmental interests are explored in Amitav Ghosh's *The Hungry Tide* (2004). The British eco-critic Dominic Head has prioritized the 'fundamental social restructuring associated with deep ecology' over the 'provisional management strategies' of environmentalism (Head 1999: 27). For Head, as for Lawrence Buell, environmental crises and Western thought are intrinsically interwoven. 'Western metaphysics and ethics need revision before we can address today's environmental problems' (Buell 1995:2). We need, argues Buell, 'better ways of imagining nature and humanity's relation to it' (Buell 1995: 2). Ironically, some of the cultures destroyed by colonization had existed for centuries in such better ways.

ESSENTIALISM/STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM

Essentialism is the assumption that groups, categories or classes of objects have one or several defining features exclusive to all members of that category. Some studies of race or gender, for instance, assume the presence of essential characteristics distinguishing one race from another or the feminine from the masculine. In analyses of culture it is a (generally implicit) assumption that individuals share an essential cultural identity, and it has been a topic of vigorous debate within post-colonial theory. The Cartesian claim *Cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am) was the basis for the stress on the individual consciousness and the centrality of the idea of the human subject in the dominant intellectual discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The displacement of this Enlightenment concern for the individual by poststructuralist views of **subjectivity** put considerable pressure on contemporary cultural theory to revise this dominant way of conceiving of human behaviour.

Colonial discourse theory stressed this also when it drew attention to the ways of speaking and thinking that **colonialism** employed to create the idea of the inferiority of the colonial subject and to exercise **hegemonic** control over them through control of the dominant modes of public and private representation. Drawing on the critiques of language by post-structuralist theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault, colonial discourse theory contended that essentialist cultural categories were flawed. This criticism was

extended by various writers to the institutions through which individual subjectivity achieved a sense of identity, for example ideas of **race** or **nation**.

The political purpose of this critique was, in part, to expose the falsity of this mode of representing the colonial subject as an **other** to the Self of the dominant colonial culture.

Ironically, then, the very process of displacing the essentialist modes of identity ran counter to the pragmatic use of such concepts in various local agendas designed to recover a sense of self-worth and difference.

The basis of the **National Liberation Movements** of the 1960s and 1970s was a recognition of the need to recover or develop a local identity and a sense of distinction damaged by imperial and colonizing discourses. At the same time, theorists warned of the dangers of simply reversing the categories of oppressed and oppressor without critiquing the process by which such simple binaries had come into being in the first place. They also warned of the dangers of creating a new indigenous élite who would act merely as **neo-colonial** puppets for the old forces of the colonizing powers.

Theorists such as Gayatri Spivak drew attention to the dangers of assuming that it was a simple matter of allowing the subaltern (oppressed) forces to speak, without recognizing that their essential subjectivity had been and still was constrained by the discourses within which they were constructed as **subaltern**. Her controversial question 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' (Spivak 1985b), was frequently misinterpreted to mean that there was no way in which subaltern peoples could ever attain a voice (see **agency**). Such negative misreadings of Spivak's position inevitably produced counter-claims from critics such as Benita Parry who asserted the political necessity of maintaining the idea of oppositionality between the binary divisions such as black-white, colonizer-colonized, oppressed-oppressor (Parry 1987). In fact, Spivak's essay is not an assertion of the inability of the subaltern voice to be accessed or given agency, but only a warning to avoid the idea that the subaltern can ever be isolated in some absolute, essentialist way from the play of discourses and institutional practices that give it its voice. In response to this negative interpretation of her earlier work, perhaps, and in an attempt to reassert the political force resident in her theory, Spivak spoke of the need to embrace a strategic essentialism, in an interview in which she acknowledged the usefulness of essentialist formulations in many struggles for liberation from the effects of colonial and neo-colonial oppression. She remarked, 'I think we have

to choose again strategically, not universal discourse but essentialist discourse. I think that since as a deconstructivist . . . I cannot in fact clean my hands and say I'm specific. In fact I must say I am an essentialist from time to time (Spivak 1984–5: 183). And, again in the same interview she remarked, 'I think it's absolutely on target . . . to stand against the discourses of essentialism, . . . [but] *strategically* we cannot' (184).

The argument suggests that in different periods the employment of essentialist ideas may be a necessary part of the process by which the colonized achieve a renewed sense of the value and dignity of their pre-colonial cultures, and through which the newly emergent postcolonial **nation** asserts itself. However, as critics such as Edward Said have argued (Said 1993), the early National Liberation theorists such as Fanon, Cabral and James were always fully aware of the dangers of essentialism, and were always critical of the application of such essentialist discourses as nationalism and race in the construction of the modern **post-colonial state**.

EUROCENTRISM

The conscious or unconscious process by which Europe and European cultural assumptions are constructed as, or assumed to be, the normal, the natural or the universal. The first, and possibly most potent sign of Eurocentrism, as José Rabasa explains (1993), was the specific projection employed to construct the Mercator Atlas itself, a projection that favoured the European temperate zones in its distribution of size. This map of the world is not merely an objective outline of discovered continents, but an 'ideological or mythological reification of space' which opens up the territories of the world to domination and appropriation. 'The world' only acquired spatial meaning after different regions had been inscribed by Europeans, and this inscription, apart from locating Europe at the top of the globe or map, established an ideological figuration, through the accompanying text and illustrations, which firmly centralized Europe as the source and arbiter of spatial and cultural meaning.

By the eighteenth century this conception of a collective 'Europe' constructed as a sign of superiority and in opposition to the rest of the world's cultures had become firmly consolidated. Then, as now, such collective constructions existed in a troubled or ambivalent relationship with an alternative stress on the nationalism of emerging individual European nation-states and their particular cultures. European colonization of the rest of the globe, which accelerated in the eighteenth

century and reached its apogee in the nineteenth, actively promoted or facilitated Eurocentrism through exploration, conquest and trade. Imperial displays of power, both in the metropolitan centres and at the colonial peripheries, and assertions of intellectual authority in colonialist institutions such as schools and universities, and through the civil service and legal codes, established European systems and values as inherently superior to indigenous ones.

Edward Said's ***Orientalism*** examines the ways in which Eurocentrism not only influences and alters, but actually produces other cultures.

Orientalism is 'a way of coming to terms with the orient that is based on the orient's special place in European western experience' (1978: 1) or 'the western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the orient' (3). This authority is, in Said's view, a product of a systematic 'discipline' by which European culture was able to construct and manage the Orient during the post-Enlightenment period.

Eurocentrism is masked in literary study by concepts such as literary universality, in history by authoritative interpretations written from the point of view of the victors, and in early anthropology by the unconscious assumptions involved in the idea that its data were those societies defined as 'primitive' and so opposed to a European norm of development and civilization. Some cultural critics have argued that anthropology as a discipline in its classic, unrevised form came into being in such a close relationship with colonization that it could not have existed at all without the prior existence of Eurocentric concepts of knowledge and civilization. Eurocentrism is also present in the assumptions and practices of Christianity through education and mission activity, as well as in the assumed superiority of Western mathematics, cartography, art and numerous other cultural and social practices which have been claimed, or assumed, to be based on a universal, objective set of values.

EXOTIC/EXOTICISM

The word exotic was first used in 1599 to mean 'alien, introduced from abroad, not indigenous'. By 1651 its meaning had been extended to include 'an exotic and foreign territory', 'an exotic habit and demeanour' (OED). As a noun, the term meant 'a foreigner' or 'a foreign plant not acclimatized'.

During the nineteenth century, however, the exotic, the foreign, increasingly gained, throughout the empire, the connotations of a stimulating or exciting difference, something with which the domestic could be (safely) spiced. The key conception here is the introduction

of the exotic from abroad into a domestic economy. From the earliest days of European voyages, exotic minerals, artefacts, plants and animals were brought back for display in private collections and museums and live specimens were cultivated, in Kew Gardens, for example, or in the many private and public zoos established in the period. Peoples of other cultures were also brought back to the European metropolises and were introduced in fashionable salons or travelled as popular entertainment. Omai from the Society Islands, Bennelong from Australia, and later the 'Hottentot Venus' from South Africa, were displayed in European capitals as exotics. Not only indigenes from the colonies but those Europeans deemed to have had exotic experiences could also be exhibited or exhibit themselves, e.g. Eliza Fraser, who had been shipwrecked and survived among Australian aborigines, was displayed as a woman who had lived amongst savages.

The key point here, however, is made by Renate Wasserman that, 'Indians exhibited at Royal courts or turkeys and parrots in cages' could be seen as 'innocent signifiers' of an exotic other, one that could titillate the European public imagination while offering no threat since such exotics were, in her terms, 'non-systematic' (1984: 132). Isolated from their own geographical and cultural contexts, they represented whatever was projected onto them by the societies into which they were introduced. Exotics in the metropolises were a significant part of imperial displays of power and the plenitude of empires.

When the English language and the concepts it signified in the imperial culture were carried to colonized sites, through, for instance, English education, the attribution of exoticism as it applied to those places, peoples or natural phenomena usually remained unchanged. Thus schoolchildren in, for instance, the Caribbean and North Queensland could regard and describe their own vegetation as 'exotic' rather than trees like the oak or yew that were 'naturalized' for them as domestic by the English texts they read.

FEMINISM AND POST-COLONIALISM

Feminism is of crucial interest to post-colonial discourse for two major reasons. First, both patriarchy and imperialism can be seen to exert analogous forms of domination over those they render subordinate. Hence the experiences of women in patriarchy and those of colonized subjects can be paralleled in a number of respects, and both feminist and post-colonial politics oppose such dominance. Second, there have been vigorous debates in a number of colonized societies over whether gender or colonial oppression is the more important political factor in women's

lives. This has sometimes led to division between Western feminists and political activists from impoverished and oppressed countries; or, alternatively, the two are inextricably entwined, in which case the condition of colonial dominance affects, in material ways, the position of women within their societies. This has led to calls for a greater consideration of the construction and employment of gender in the practices of imperialism and colonialism.

Feminism, like post-colonialism, has often been concerned with the ways and extent to which representation and language are crucial to identity formation and to the construction of **subjectivity**. For both groups, language has been a vehicle for subverting patriarchal and imperial power, and both discourses have invoked essentialist arguments in positing more authentic forms of language against those imposed on them. Both discourses share a sense of disarticulation from an inherited language and have thus attempted to recover a linguistic authenticity via a pre-colonial language or a primal feminine tongue. However, both feminists and colonized peoples, like other subordinate groups, have also used **appropriation** to subvert and adapt dominant languages and signifying practices. The texts of feminist theory and those of post-colonialism concur on

many aspects of the theory of identity, of difference and of the interpellation of the subject by a dominant discourse, as well as offering to each other various strategies of resistance to such controls. Similarities between 'writing the body' in feminism and 'writing place' in postcolonialism; similarities between the strategies of bisexuality and cultural syncreticity; and similar appeals to nationalism may be detected (Ashcroft 1989).

In the 1980s, many feminist critics (Carby 1982; Mohanty 1984; Suleri 1992), began to argue that Western feminism, which had assumed that gender overrode cultural differences to create a universal category of the womanly or the feminine, was operating from hidden, universalist assumptions with a middle-class, Euro-centric bias. Feminism was therefore charged with failing to account for or deal adequately with the experiences of Third World women. In this respect, the issues concerning gender face similar problems to those concerned with **class**.

Mohanty, for instance, criticizes

the assumption that all of us of the same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially constituted as a homogeneous group identified prior to the process of analysis. . . .

Thus, the discursively consensual homogeneity of 'women' as

a group is mistaken for the historically specific material reality of groups of women.

(Mohanty 1984: 338)

Domatila Barrios de Chungara's *Let Me Speak* demonstrates how the material reality of different groups of women can lead to very different perceptions of the nature of political struggle. When she was invited to the International Women's Year Tribunal in Mexico City in 1974, the difference between the feminist agenda of the tribunal and her own political struggle against oppression in the Bolivian tin mines became very clear. In her view, the meeting's World Plan of Action 'didn't touch on the problems that are basic for Latin American women' (Barrios de Chungara 1977: 201). The overlap between patriarchal, economic and racial oppression has always been difficult to negotiate, and the differences between the political priorities of First and Third World women have persisted to the present. Such differences appear to be those of emphasis and strategy rather than those of principle, since the interconnection of various forms of social oppression materially affects the lives of all women. More recently, feminism has been concerned that categories like

gender may sometimes be ignored within the larger formation of the colonial, and that post-colonial theory has tended to elide gender differences in constructing a single category of the colonized. These critics argue that colonialism operated very differently for women and for men, and the 'double colonization' that resulted when women were subject both to general discrimination as colonial subjects and specific discrimination as women needs to be taken into account in any analysis of colonial oppression (Spivak 1985a, 1985b, 1985c and 1986; Mohanty 1984; Suleri 1992). Even post-independence practices of anti-colonial nationalism are not free from this kind of gender bias, and constructions of the traditional or pre-colonial are often heavily inflected by a contemporary masculinist bias that falsely represents 'native' women as quietist and subordinate.

One illuminating account of the connections between race and gender as a consequence of imperial expansion is Sander L. Gilman's 'Black bodies, white bodies' (1985), which shows how the representation of the African in nineteenth-century European art, medicine and literature, reinforced the construction of the sexualized female body. The presence of male or female black servants was regularly included in paintings, plays and operas as a sign of illicit sexual activity. 'By the nineteenth century the sexuality of the black, both male

and female, becomes an icon for deviant sexuality in general' (228). Furthermore, the 'relationship between the sexuality of the black woman and that of the sexualized white woman enters a new dimension when contemporary scientific discourse concerning the nature of black female sexuality is examined' (231). Notorious examples of prurient exoticism, such as the Hottentot Venus displayed on tour in England, provide material examples of the ways in which signs of racial otherness became instrumental in the construction of a (transgressive) female sexuality.

In settler colonies, although women's bodies were not directly constructed as part of a transgressive sexuality, their bodies were frequently the site of a power discourse of a different kind. As critics like Whitlock have argued, they were perceived reductively not as sexual but as reproductive subjects, as literal 'wombs of empire' whose function was limited to the population of the new colonies with white settlers.

GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is the process whereby individual lives and local communities are affected by economic and cultural forces that operate world-wide. In effect it is the process of the world becoming a single place. Globalism is the perception of the world as a function or result of the processes of globalization upon local communities.

The term has had a meteoric rise since the mid-1980s, up until which time words such as 'international' and 'international relations' were preferred. The rise of the word 'international' itself in the eighteenth century indicated the growing importance of territorial states in organizing social relations, and is an early consequence of the global perspective of European **imperialism**. Similarly, the rapidly increasing interest in globalization reflects a changing organization of world-wide social relations in this century, one in which the 'nation' has begun to have a decreasing importance as individuals and communities gain access to globally disseminated knowledge and culture, and are affected by economic realities that bypass the boundaries of the state. The structural aspects of globalization are the nation-state system itself (on which the concepts of internationalism and international co-operation are based), global economy, the global communication system and world military order.

Part of the complexity of globalism comes from the different ways in which globalization is approached. Some analysts embrace it enthusiastically as a positive feature of a changing world in which access to technology, information services and markets will be of benefit

to local communities, where dominant forms of social organization will lead to universal prosperity, peace and freedom, and in which a perception of a global environment will lead to global ecological concern. For this group, globalism is a term 'for values which treat global issues as a matter of personal and collective responsibility' (Albrow 1994: 4). Others reject it as a form of domination by 'First World' countries over 'Third World' ones, in which individual distinctions of culture and society become erased by an increasingly homogeneous global culture, and local economies are more firmly incorporated into a system of global capital. For this group, globalism 'is a teleological doctrine which provides, explains and justifies an interlocking system of world trade'. It has 'ideological overtones of historical inevitability', and 'its attendant myths function as a gospel of the global market' (Ferguson 1993a: 87). The chief argument against globalization is that global culture and global economy did not just spontaneously erupt but originated in and continue to be perpetuated from the centres of capitalist power. Neither does globalization impact in the same way, to the same degree, nor equally beneficially upon different communities. Proponents of 'critical globalism' take a neutral view of the process, simply examining its processes and effects. 'Critical globalism refers to the critical engagement with globalization processes, neither blocking them out nor celebrating globalization' (Nederveen Pieterse 1995: 13). Thus, while critical globalists see that globalization 'has often perpetuated poverty, widened material inequalities, increased ecological degradation, sustained militarism, fragmented communities, marginalized subordinated groups, fed intolerance and deepened crises of democracy', they also see that it has had a positive effect in 'trebling world per capita income since 1945, halving the proportion of the world living in abject poverty, increasing ecological consciousness, and possibly facilitating disarmament, while various subordinated groups have grasped opportunities for global organisation' (Scholte 1996: 53). As a field of study, globalization covers such disciplines as international relations, political geography, economics, sociology, communication studies, agricultural, ecological and cultural studies. It addresses the decreasing agency (though not the status) of the nation-state in the world political order and the increasing influence of structures and movements of corporate capital. Globalization can also be 'a signifier of travel, of transnational company operations, of the changing pattern of world employment, or global environmental risk' (Albrow 1994: 13). Indeed, there are compelling reasons for thinking globally where the

environment is concerned. As Stuart Hall puts it, ‘When the ill winds of Chernobyl came our way, they did not pause at the frontier, produce their passports and say “Can I rain on your territory now?”’ (1991: 25). The importance of globalization to post-colonial studies comes first from its demonstration of the structure of world power relations which stands firm in the twentieth century as a legacy of Western imperialism. Second, the ways in which local communities engage the forces of globalization bear some resemblance to the ways in which colonized societies have historically engaged and appropriated the forces of imperial dominance. In some respects, globalization, in the period of rapid **decolonization** after the Second World War, demonstrates the transmutation of imperialism into the supra-national operations of economics, communications and culture. This does not mean that globalization is a simple, unidirectional movement from the powerful to the weak, from the central to the peripheral, because globalism is **transcultural** in the same way that imperialism itself has been. But it does demonstrate that globalization did not simply erupt spontaneously around the world, but has a history embedded in the history of imperialism, in the structure of the **world system**, and in the origins of a global economy within the ideology of imperial rhetoric.

The key to the link between classical imperialism and contemporary globalization in the twentieth century has been the role of the United States. Despite its resolute refusal to perceive itself as ‘imperial’, and indeed its public stance against the older European doctrines of colonialism up to and after the Second World War, the United States had, in its international policies, eagerly espoused the political domination and economic and cultural control associated with imperialism. More importantly, United States society during and after this early expansionist phase initiated those features of social life and social relations that today may be considered to characterize the global: mass production, mass communication and mass consumption. During the twentieth century, these have spread transnationally, ‘drawing upon the increasingly integrated resources of the global economy’ (Spybey 1996: 3).

Despite the balance between its good and bad effects, identified by critical globalists, globalization has not been a politically neutral activity. While access to global forms of communication, markets and culture may indeed be worldwide today, it has been argued by some critics that if one asks how that access is *enabled* and by what ideological machinery

it is advanced, it can be seen that the operation of globalization cannot be separated from the structures of power perpetuated by European imperialism. Global culture is a continuation of an imperial dynamic of influence, control, dissemination and hegemony that operates according to an already initiated structure of power that emerged in the sixteenth century in the great confluence of **imperialism**, capitalism and **modernity**. This explains why the forces of globalization are still, in some senses, centred in the West (in terms of power and institutional organization), despite their global dissemination.

However, the second reason for the significance of globalization to postcolonial studies – how it is engaged by local communities – forms the focus of much recent discussion of the phenomenon. If globalism is not simply a result of top-down dominance but a transcultural process, a dialectic of dominant cultural forms and their appropriation, then the responses of local communities becomes critical. By appropriating strategies of representation, organization and social change through access to global systems, local communities and marginal interest groups can both empower themselves and influence those global systems. Although choice is always mediated by the conditions of subject formation, the belief that one has a choice in the processes of changing one's own life or society can indeed be empowering. In this sense, the appropriation of global forms of culture may free one from local forms of dominance and oppression or at least provide the tools for a different kind of identity formation.

The more recent directions of globalization studies concern the development of 'global culture', a process in which the strategies, techniques, assumptions and interactions of cultural representation become increasingly widespread and homogeneous. But, as Featherstone and Lash point out, 'only in the most minimalist sense can one speak of a "global society" or a "global culture", as our conceptions of both society and culture draw heavily on a tradition which was strongly influenced by the process of nation-state formation' (Featherstone *et al.*

1995: 2). However, global culture can be seen to be focused in mass culture, in what Stuart Hall calls a 'new globalization'. 'This new kind of globalization is not English, it is American. In cultural terms, the new kind of globalization has to do with a new form of global mass culture' (1991: 27). New globalization has two dominant features: one is that it is still centred in the West; the other is a peculiar form of homogenization, a form of cultural capital that does not attempt to produce mini versions of itself but operates through other economic and

political élites (28).

The most active area of debate in globalization studies therefore appears to be the style and nature of the process by which external and internal forces interact to produce, reproduce and disseminate global culture within local communities. This is because one of the key questions at the centre of this interaction is the nature and survival of social and cultural identity. The interpenetration of global and local cultural forces is present in all forms of social life in the twentieth century. But the extent to which globalization exhibits the effects of domination by the powerful centres of global culture, and the extent to which it offers itself to transformation by peripheral communities, is still a matter of debate.