Information Security Lab 1 Set-UID and Environment Variables


PES1201801948
Bharath S Bhambore
Section H - 6th sem

Lab Setup:

Machine: Seed Ubuntu 16.04

IP address: 10.0.2.9

Task 1: Manipulating Variables



"env" command lists out the environmental variables.

"printenv" prints the required environmental variable.


export command is a SHELL BUILTIN command, it is used to set an environmental variable. It marks an environmental variable to be exported to any newly forked child processes, implying the child process is allowed to inherit the marked variables.

unset is a command that is used to remove a variable from the list of variables that are being tracked.


"unsetting" a variable means you can not access the value stored in that variable.

Task 2: Inheriting environment variables from Parents


Printenv in child case:



Printenv in parent case:



Running diff, to compare the files:




There is no difference between the 2 files.

The variable "environ" points to an array of pointers to strings called the environment.


When a child process is created using fork(), it inherits a copy of the parent's environment. Thus there is no difference in the child and parent files in the above program.

Task 3: Environment variables and execve()

envp = NULL



envp = environ




envp is an array of strings, generally in the form of key=value.

In the first screenshot, envp was NULL, hence why the execution produced no output.

While in the second screenshot, envp was given the environ variable which points to an array of pointers to strings called the environment.

Hence why, the output of this is the list of environmental variables.

Task 4 : Environment Variables and system()



system() uses fork() to create a child process to execute the command specified using execl()

It is run as:

execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) NULL);


Task 5: Environment Variables and Set-UID programs

```
## Input Devices Help


Terminator

| Image: Property of the p
```

The setuidenv executable ownership is changed to root, as well as its access permissions are changed using chmod.




Owner is changed to root, but the chmod command makes it a set uid program



PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH are already defined bharath=PESU is the new env variable exported


The current environment variables are stored in the env_result file Executing the program setuidenv, and storing the result in setuidenv_result.

The PATH and the newly defined env variable bharath=PESU is found in the output of the setuidenv_result file, but the LD_LIBRARY_PATH env variable is not contained in it. Implying that the child process inherited the PATH and the new "bharath" variable but not the LD_LIBRARY_PATH.



One reason for LD_LIBRARY_PATH not being inherited is that the real uid and the effective uid are different. As shown below,

Running diff command on the 2 files,



Task 6: The PATH Environment variable and Set-UID Programs

myls.c


```
Ubuntu16.04 - 1 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

□ File Edit Selection Find View Goto Tools Project ∨ 1;


FOLT | myls.c | myl
```

Compiling Changing its owner to root Making it a setuid program




newls.c

Changing the PATH variable to point to the task6 directory which contains the malicious file "newls.c"




Compiling the malicious Is program "newls.c" and naming its executable "Is"




Running the original file, inturn runs the malicious file as the PATH variable was changed to point to the directory containing the malicious program. Implying, it will first search in that directory, and as the executable is named as 'ls', it is executed.

Checking the permissions of the newls.c and its executable,



It is the seed user, and not the root

But it still ran the myls executable whose owner is root, implying that using system() and relative path together in a setuid program can be very harmful and dangerous to the user system.




This helps us understand that running the myls executable runs the malicious is program newls.c.


Thereby running a file owned by root, even though the attacker just has user privileges.

Task 7: The LD PRELOAD environment variable and Set-UID Programs

Setting up a new library for the sleep() function,



Compiling a program containing sleep()



Therefore, it runs the sleep function in the library we provided


Running in different scenarios:

To understand the working better, i invoked the printenv LD_PRELOAD to check which library is loaded/used.


Program: myprog.c

Lib: mylib.c

1. Myprog -> regular, Run as normal user




2. Myprog -> setuid, run as normal user




Making myprog a setuid program and running it as normal user, it uses the system defined sleep() function

3. myprog a Set-UID root program, export the LD PRELOAD environment variable again in the root account and run it.



The program uses the user-defined sleep() function

4.Make myprog a Set-UID user1 program (i.e., the owner is user1, which is another user account), export the LD PRELOAD environment variable again in a different user's account (not-root user) and run it.



Exporting in the user account "bharath", changing the owner to seed and running it, it uses the user-defined sleep() function.

We can understand the outputs in the following way:

1, 3, 4 examples use the library we defined, while 2, uses the system library


This happens due to the security mechanism of setuid.

Wherever the real uid and effective uid is the same, LD_PRELOAD is present.

In 1, 3, 4 the euid and ruid were always the same, hence why our user-defined sleep function is called.

Whereas, in 2

euid and ruid is different, thereby the LD_PRELOAD env variable is dropped. Hence it uses the system library.




Since LD_PRELOAD is already exported once in root, the export in the user space isnt allowed, implying again that the euid and ruid are differing, therefore it uses the system sleep() function.

Task 8 : Invoking external programs using system() versus execve()

```
Ubuntu16.04 - 1 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
File Machine View Input Devices Help
                                                     t En 🖎 (i) 1:53 AM 😃
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ gcc sysexecenv.c -o se
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ sudo chown root se
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ sudo chmod 4755 se
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ touch myfile rootfile
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ sudo chown root rootfile
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ ls -l
     total 12
      rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                                0 Feb
                                       2 01:52 myfile
                                0 Feb
                                       2 01:52 rootfile
     -rw-rw-r-- 1 root seed
      rwsr-xr-x 1 root seed 7552 Feb
                                       2 01:52 se
     -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 399 Feb
                                       2 01:50 sysexecenv.c
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ ./se "myfile;rm rootfile"
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$ ls -l
     total 12
     -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                                0 Feb
                                       2 01:52 myfile
     -rwsr-xr-x 1 root seed 7552 Feb
                                       2 01:52 se
                                       2 01:50 sysexecenv.c
     -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 399 Feb
     bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task8$
```

Yes, the rootfile was deleted, since we were using the system() command


Using the execv



No, we cannot remove the root file since the whole string is take as file input

Therefore, we can conclude that system() has not input validation, whereas execve has some kind of minimal input validation.


Task 9: Capability Leaking



Compiling and making the file a setuid program

```
bharath-PES1201801948:~/.../task9$ cd /etc/bharath-PES1201801948:/etc$ ll zzz
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 44 Feb 2 02:10 zzz
bharath-PES1201801948:/etc$ cat zzz
this is important
confidential info ......
bharath-PES1201801948:/etc$
```

Created a file called zzz with confidential information



Running the file, we can see that the malicious data got appended to the confidential file, thereby it losing its integrity. This can be prevented by closing the file after its appropriate usage, to have the right permissions.