## **Insufficient Transport Layer Protection**

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#### **Outline**

- How OWASP views the risk
- Performing an attack against a vulnerable application
- Understanding secure cookies and how to implement them in .NET
- Forcing web forms and MVC to use a secure connection
- The risk of mixed mode content
- Using HTTP strict transport security to force secure requests
- Patterns of insufficient HTTPS and other considerations


### **OWASP** overview and risk rating

# Threat Agents

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Consider anyone who can monitor the network traffic of your users. If the application is on the internet, who knows how your users access it. Don't forget back end connections.

#### Understanding a man in the middle (MiTM) attack



The MiTM can either observe or manipulate insecure traffic



#### Getting an MiTM between victim and the server

- There are many, many ways of intercepting traffic:
  - Physically tap an Ethernet cable
  - Intercept traffic at the ISP level
  - Monitor unprotected traffic at a Wifi hotspot
  - Create a rogue wireless access point
- Rogue wireless access points are extremely easy to setup
  - We'll use a Wifi Pineapple for this example



#### **Attack scenario**



Victim Attacker

#### **Using HTTP strict transport security**

- A way to disallow the browser from making any HTTP requests to a site is to implement an HSTS header
- This can be done very simply in the BeginRequest event:

```
HttpContext.Current.Response
.AddHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000");
```

 For the next 31,536,000 seconds (12 months), the browser may not make an HTTP request to the site

#### **But HSTS has some restrictions**

- The header will only be observed if sent with an HTTPS response
- The certificate must be trusted
- The user usually still needs to be able to issue an HTTP request first that doesn't get hijacked
- Browser support is patchy:
  - Works in Chrome and Firefox
  - Ignored in Internet Explorer and Safari
- Go ahead and use HSTS it doesn't hurt but it's also far from comprehensieve

#### Other insufficient TLS patterns

- Loading login forms over HTTP, even if they post to HTTPS
  - The credentials may be protected in transit, but they can also be harvested if an MiTM has injected script into the page
- Loading HTTPS login forms inside an iframe on an HTTP page
  - The parent page is vulnerable so it may have been manipulated to load a different login form into the iframe
- Allowing a page to load over HTTP when there is no use case where it ever should
  - For example, a login page should never be allowed to load over HTTP
- Passing sensitive data such as credentials in HTTPS addresses
  - There are still multiple points where this may be logged

### SSL comes with a performance cost (just)

- Encrypting and decrypting traffic has to have some overhead on the server infrastructure
- It does, but it's very little according to Google after they moved GMail to HTTPS only:

"In order to do this we had to deploy no additional machines and no special hardware. On our production front-end machines, SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10KB of memory per connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people believe that SSL takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the above numbers (public for the first time) will help to dispel that."

#### **Even HTTPS everywhere still has risks**

#### Take a common scenario:

- User types americanexpress.com into their address bar and presses enter
- The browser defaults the scheme to HTTP and makes the request
- The server responds with an HTTP 301 "Moved Permanently" with a new location of https://www.americanexpress.com
- The browser requests the Amex website over a secure scheme
- The second step is still vulnerable as it's an HTTP request
- MiTM tools such as sslstrip can proxy traffic to a secure site backwards and forwards between HTTP and HTTPS

#### **Summary**

- There are many ways of implementing HTTPS that are insufficient
  - It's not a case of having TLS or not having it, it has to be done right
- Remember that cookies can be sensitive due to what they allow an attacker to do with them
  - Flag them as secure to minimise the risk of an MiTM attack
- Make sure that resources which require secure connections cannot be loaded over HTTP
- Ensure that secure pages do not embed insecure resources
- Use HSTS for secure sites, but remember the limited support
- Avoid the security anti-patterns: login forms over HTTP, insecure pages embedding secure login forms and sensitive data in the URL
- SSL has some overhead, just not much and it's also not fool proof