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New Perspectives on New Deal Housing Policy: Explicating and Mapping HOLC Loans to African Americans

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Abstract

Scholarship on the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) has typically focused on this New Deal housing agency's invention of redlining, with dire effects from this legacy of racial, ethnic, and class bias for the trajectories of urban, and especially African American neighborhoods. However, HOLC did not embark on its now infamous mapping project until after it had issued all its emergency refinancing loans to the nation's struggling homeowners. We examine the racial logic of HOLC's local operations and its lending record to black applicants during the agency's initial 1933-1935 "rescue" phase, finding black access to its loans to have been far more extensive than anyone has assumed. Yet, even though HOLC did loan to African Americans, it did so in ways that reinforced racial segregation—and with the objective of replenishing the working capital of the overwhelmingly white-owned building and loans that held the mortgages on most black-owned homes.

Keywords

Home Owners' Loan Corporation, African Americans, homeownership, mortgages, redlining

Racial segregation in housing is now one of the most prominent topics in policy circles and in recent years has garnered increased public attention,[1] but an ongoing misunderstanding about the origins of the federal government's segregationist housing policies continues to hamstring scholarship and policy debates. Specifically, confusion surrounds the record of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC), which has been credited with saving the U.S. housing market in the depths of the Great Depression,[2] but has also earned notoriety for commissioning a comprehensive series of city maps that took race heavily into account in rating neighborhoods' supposed risk for mortgage lending.[3] Ever since Kenneth Jackson rediscovered HOLC's once-confidential "redlining" maps in the 1970s,[4] historians have debated how widely distributed the maps were and how exactly they were used, with the declining fortunes of urban neighborhoods as a backdrop.

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HOLC's mission encompassed two distinct phases: a 1933-1935 "rescue" phase in which it refinanced struggling homeowners' mortgages on generous terms, in the process freeing up capital for reinvestment, and a 1935-1951 "consolidation" phase where HOLC managed and sold off its accumulated housing inventory, with an eye on its own eventual liquidation.[5] It was during the latter phase that HOLC created its redlining maps, so these were not actually used to determine which individual homeowners (or neighborhoods) would receive government financial aid. Research has established, in fact, that the majority of emergency refinancing loans went to what HOLC later designated the lowest-rated, "C" (yellow) and "D" (red) urban neighborhoods; furthermore, African American homeowners received aid through the program.[6] The very first HOLC loan ever paid back was one made to a black woman, Mrs. Susie Mae Rakestraw of Macon, Georgia. The manager of her husband's auto repair shop, Rakestraw paid off her debt in October 1934, barely a year after refinancing their mortgage.[7]

Glossing over the break between these two phases in HOLC's mission, many observers have become fixated on a perceived disjuncture between the agency's guiding theories and actual practice—that is, its lending in areas and to borrowers it defined as "poor investment risks." While the longstanding scholarly consensus had been that race lay at the heart of New Deal federal housing agencies' appraisal calculus,[8] more recently some researchers have challenged this conclusion, for example, arguing that age and condition of housing stock constitute a better proxy for understanding why some neighborhoods were assigned lower ratings than others.[9] In any case, the fact that HOLC lent in such areas and to African Americans does not absolve the agency of wrongdoing, because New Deal-era interventions in the housing market exacerbated racial inequality in other ways.[10] By federalizing longstanding discriminatory practices in the mainstream real estate industry and applying a veneer of social scientific methodology to property valuation,[11] HOLC along with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) helped to perpetuate a still-persistent belief among whites that the presence of African Americans invariably depreciates home prices. Furthermore, by closely regulating the extent and restricting where black borrowers could take advantage of state-backed homeownership supports, the HOLC, FHA, and later the Veterans Administration (VA) contributed to a longstanding "black-white wealth gap" that has yawned increasingly wide in recent decades.[12]

To remedy misunderstandings about its record, we investigate the experiences African Americans had with HOLC during its 1933-1935 rescue phase, and survey where the agency extended its refinancing loans to black borrowers nationally. In addition, we look behind the scenes to explore how racial considerations influenced HOLC's implementation locally. This article utilizes heretofore untapped statistical and manuscript sources that enable visualization of HOLC's lending record to African American borrowers down to the census tract level, and additionally offers some sense of how the agency's state and local offices thought in racial terms, in the process of accepting applications, assessing properties, and approving loans.

Our analysis leads to some startling conclusions that drastically shift current ideas about the HOLC. First of all, far from seeking to deny African American homeowners aid during the 1933-1935 "rescue" phase, HOLC lent on black-owned properties to a much greater extent than previously understood. African Americans had dramatically lower rates of homeownership stemming from unequal access to the housing market,[13] but received HOLC assistance in rough proportion to their ownership rates in most locales.[14] Second, local HOLC records and national policy statements help to explain why: HOLC's main lending purpose was to stabilize financial markets and bail out creditors, the banks and mortgage companies that held most of the investment paper on black-owned properties. Furthermore, refinancing such homes served to keep African Americans in already-established centers of black residence—in other words, lending in black neighborhoods helped maintain racial segregation.

Seen through this lens, HOLC's lending activity during the 1933-1935 rescue phase appears far less contradictory. It was consistent with the overall New Deal priorities of serving major industries rather than emphasizing individual outcomes.[15] HOLC was by no means color-blind; from the very outset, it detailed the class and racial character of the neighborhood surrounding applicants' homes, presaging the detailed area descriptions of the mapping phase. Thus, HOLC's bailout hewed to the ideologies and racial practices of the mainstream real estate industry at the time while simultaneously preserving the New Deal's façade of fairness.

A corollary to emerge from our research is that HOLC refinancing was indeed qualitatively different than the subsequent housing programs administered by the FHA and VA. HOLC would seem to have paralleled the New Deal's public housing approach: not doing nearly enough for African Americans considering their greater need, but in many cities having extended them proportionate access, while at the same time promoting spatial separation along racial lines. However, FHA-VA was far guiltier of promoting housing inequality in its record of housing aid; as late as 1950, virtually nowhere had African Americans gained anything approaching equitable access.

In addition, we can learn a great deal about how African Americans received, evaluated, critiqued, and pushed to reform these federal housing programs just by listening to their voices, something else historians have not yet done very much of. Black journalists and civil rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Urban League from the very outset explained these programs to the African American public, urged black homeowners and prospective homebuyers to apply, featured those individuals fortunate enough to gain access, castigated the government for not hiring black personnel in these agencies, and commended federal officials whenever they did hire. Most importantly, black observers sounded the alarm as evidence of systematic discrimination emerged by 1936, and pressed for equal access, sometimes resorting to lawsuits. In extracting small concessions, this active engagement nevertheless initiated efforts to reform racist policies; if nothing else, early African American housing activism around the administration of HOLC and FHA bolsters the concept of a singular freedom struggle dating back to the 1930s, what Jacquelyn Dowd Hall famously dubbed the "long civil rights movement."[16] The example of housing also underlines the dilemma African Americans faced as they engaged with the New Deal: while its signature policies were often administered in ways that unfairly benefited whites, or actually hurt African Americans, these did provide a modicum of relief and constituted the most attention that the federal government had paid to black people since Reconstruction. Because African Americans did benefit—though not to the same extent as whites—these programs could not be easily opposed, unless through the Republican Party. In fact, most black voters came to support the New Deal in spite of its flaws, as they transferred their loyalties to the Democratic Party en masse by 1936.[17]

Initial African American Perceptions of the HOLC and FHA

The HOLC was created as a provision of the Home Owners Loan Act passed in June 1933, near the end of the "First Hundred Days" of New Deal legislation. Administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, it was empowered to refinance the mortgages of nonfarm homes to a maximum of $14,000, using bonds issued to lenders on which the interest, and after 1934 the principal was fully insured by the government. The refinanced mortgages were fifteen-year, fully amortized loans, meaning the principal was repaid simultaneously with the interest; this arrangement, more favorable to borrowers, had been pioneered by savings and loans (small shareholder-owned banks, or "thrifts") starting in the 1920s, and was a reform widely called for by New Deal housing policy advisors. Most lenders (mortgagees) agreed to turn over their mortgage holdings for government bonds, despite a lower profit margin, because a return on their investment was assured—which had previously not at all been certain, considering the large number of delinquent borrowers facing foreclosure at the time. HOLC proved extremely popular; by the time the agency stopped accepting applications on June 17, 1935, some 40 percent of the entire country's eligible homeowners had applied, with more than half receiving loans—over a million in all. By 1936, HOLC held more than 20 percent of all mortgages on nonfarm dwellings.[18] With its "rescue" phase ended, HOLC shifted focus to managing the considerable inventory of properties on which it now held the mortgages—some borrowers defaulted on their loans even despite getting refinancing aid—as well as compiling information its staff believed could prove useful in shoring up the housing market well into the future. It was then that the agency's Mortgagee Rehabilitation Division (created in July 1935) initiated "city surveys" mapping the locations of nonwhite and other neighborhoods considered to be poor future investment risks; in HOLC's four-color system of letter grades, red, or "D" neighborhoods were the lowest-rated, hence the term "redlining" since mortgage underwriting was thereby discouraged in such areas.[19] HOLC's drawn-out liquidation process ultimately concluded in 1951, at which point it basically broke even.[20]

African American newspaper editors greeted HOLC's creation with enthusiasm, explicating and promoting its agenda with hardly a suspicion of discrimination. Typical expressions called the agency "one of the best cards in the New Deal" or "welcome legislation to the million Negro home owners." An early assessment by the *New York Amsterdam News* put HOLC in the context of past abuses perpetrated against black purchasers, stating, "We are of the opinion that from this corporation the public in general and the Negro in particular will get a much sought relief from distressful conditions growing out of an attempt at home buying." Early expressions of skepticism were rarely quoted, such as one black Philadelphia real estate broker who thought the plan "excellent," but added,

> I sincerely hope that if President Roosevelt's idea in connection with the refinancing of the homes is enacted into law, that those who are appointed to administer the program will do so without regard to race, color, or creed, so that every citizen, no matter how humble, will receive a square deal.[21]

Black newspapers printed summaries of HOLC's provisions and eligibility, with the *Norfolk Journal and Guide* going further to state it would be "very glad to assist any of its readers in . . . seeing their cases through." In New York, a group called the Colored Welfare Organization sponsored a "mass meeting" in late 1933 to explain how to access HOLC aid. As the program's application deadline approached in mid-1935, the *Atlanta Daily World* urged remaining eligible homeowners to apply; this despite the fact that evidence of discrimination had already begun to emerge.[22] Incidentally, the black press would similarly explicate FHA-backed loans in "How-To" columns starting in 1934, as well as those backed by the VA starting in 1944.[23] Here too, mounting evidence of discrimination seemed to have little bearing on their promotion to aspiring homeowners.

African American observers also saw the HOLC (as well as FHA and later the VA) as potentially important symbols of political patronage and access; to the extent that black jobseekers could secure positions in these agencies, they would serve as an indication of the New Deal's actual level of commitment to African Americans, could hopefully assist their black brethren as they sought to apply for aid, and might conceivably even be in a position to influence policy.[24] On the contrary, to the extent that African Americans were shut out of the federal bureaucracy, it suggested a lack of genuine concern on the part of the Democratic Party and pointed toward where increased political leverage should be applied. Unfortunately, racial prejudice and employment discrimination meant that only a miniscule number of African Americans were ever hired at these agencies, with most holding low-level positions.[25] Quite early on, the *Philadelphia Tribune* criticized that city's HOLC office for not hiring "even a Negro cleaner"; assured that the local manager was considering the application of a black bookkeeper, the paper expressed hope that when African American homeowners showed up seeking aid, "it will be a fine thing if . . . some Negro is downstairs to talk to them when they go." Pittsburgh was praised for hiring five black men as HOLC appraisers; in other instances, individuals hired were honored with a photograph, such as a female stenographer at the Philadelphia HOLC or a "Race broker" at the Dallas office. However, the *Cleveland Call & Post*—incidentally, a Republican paper—cited a lack of African American personnel in the state's HOLC offices as a reason to withhold political allegiance from the Democrats.[26] While a pamphlet drafted for President Roosevelt's 1936 reelection campaign could tout no high-ranking African American personnel in either HOLC or FHA as a way of promoting the New Deal's benefits to blacks, it did state that the former's operations were "governed by federal law and procedure," and claim the latter engaged in "compliance with federal regulations to American property owners regardless of race, creed or color."[27]

Even as evidence of discrimination began to emerge, some African American newspapers continued to give the federal government the benefit of the doubt, blaming lack of access on individually prejudiced white administrators, and sometimes even black applicants themselves. When the Memphis HOLC head publicly stated in August 1933 that African Americans were "ineligible" for its programs, the NAACP merely wrote to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board "asking for fairer consideration." An investigation of the HOLC office in Washington, D.C., revealed that white applicants seemingly outnumbered blacks by three to one, yet concluded, "lawyers, brokers, and mortgage holders, who have been questioned by the AFRO concerning the treatment of colored homeowners by the corporation have been almost unanimous in their opinions that no discrimination is shown the race." The *Philadelphia Tribune*, while openly critical of the local HOLC office's failure to hire even a token black employee, reserved harsher words for seemingly indifferent potential beneficiaries. "Weekly and almost daily trips to the office show that one Negro in about sixty-five or seventy persons appears for Home Owners' aid," the paper claimed,

> This is either downright ignorance or a condition born of fool's gold . . . Negroes are not among those people who can afford to stand by while others walk away with the cake of something quite so valuable.

Worse, "there was actually a look of shame" on the faces of those who did apply. In a similar vein, the *Atlanta Daily World* wrote,

> The southern Negro is a very timid creature. . . . He stands back and murmurs despairingly to himself, instead of walking up to the front like a real man and asking for the things that are intended under the law.

A subsequent article scolded African American HOLC recipients who proved unable to repay their loans—and as late as 1935, by which point examples of both HOLC and FHA discrimination had been reported, the editors jumped to the latter's defense, stating,

> This is a gross injustice to the Federal Housing Administration. For they are not only making loans daily to colored property owners, but are asking that more loans be sought while it is possible to get this money at the low interest rate.

That same year the *New York Amsterdam News* expressed confidence that the government had "improved, if not entirely corrected" those "scandals" and instances "in which Negroes have been shamefully mistreated" when seeking access to New Deal housing relief.[28]

Suspicions that federal housing programs were being unfairly administered had precipitated within months of HOLC's passage in mid-1933, and solidified by late the following year once FHA came on board.[29] The Urban League's National Office began investigating evidence of discrimination early on, although no specific allegations were yet publicized; similarly, black sociology professor and Urban League official Ira DeA. Reid, in a widely reported first-year assessment, condemned HOLC along with the rest of the New Deal in general terms, writing that its programs "might just as well be administered by the Ku Klux Klan." One early complaint of discriminatory policies, leveled at the Norfolk-Portsmouth HOLC office, hit not its lending record to African Americans, but rather its blatant favoritism of white contractors for repair work. But in July 1934, the Cincinnati NAACP charged after an investigation that the local HOLC was systematically undervaluing black-owned properties, indiscriminately labeling African American neighborhoods as "blighted" and flagging applications by nonwhites as "colored." That November, Birmingham's NAACP branch set up a "special grievance committee" to address complaints from applicants who were finding it difficult to access HOLC aid "for one reason or another," but stopped short of alleging discrimination; rather, "racketeers" and "ignorance of just how to proceed" were offered by way of explanation. The following month, however, a New York City case came to light in which HOLC denied an elderly Harlem homeowner a loan on account of his race, with the NAACP acquiring damning evidence in the form of a letter from the agency to one of the state's Congressmen. Meanwhile, the *Pittsburgh Courier* reported that in Florida, black applicants had been "brusquely shunted aside until very recently," and now were being "compelled to furnish cash in order to secure government loans." By early 1935, further evidence of bias emerged, including against some white ethnics. A Detroit Congressman of Polish descent subsequently launched an investigation of that city's HOLC office, which the *Atlanta Daily World* described as "a hotbed of prejudices, discriminations and favoritism."[30] The NAACP's national secretary Walter White followed up with an inquiry to the Detroit Urban League seeking information on any known local cases of African Americans being denied access to New Deal programs, but surprisingly HOLC was not among the agencies named as offenders in the response; nevertheless, White penned a letter to New York Senator Robert Wagner asking whether a Congressional investigation of "the economic plight of the Negro under the New Deal" was warranted.[31]

Despite such concerns, reporting on HOLC and FHA in the black press over the next three years mainly covered "Negro housing" (all-black developments) backed by the latter, until the spring of 1938 when further allegations of discrimination by these agencies reemerged as an issue. Starting with the exposé of a racist FHA administrator in Lynchburg, Virginia, press coverage quickly transitioned toward an understanding of systematic racial discrimination as official policy. This evidence accumulated as black builder Raleigh H. Merritt was refused FHA backing on an African American suburban housing development outside Philadelphia, the Chicago HOLC was found to be dealing exclusively with white real estate brokers in reselling its foreclosed properties, and a prominent black Cleveland physician sued HOLC with NAACP assistance, after the agency halted the sale of a property he had purchased in an all-white neighborhood. Later that year, an Ohio senator wrote to a black Cleveland homeowner rejected for an FHA-insured loan, "I regret that you are among those whom (the FHA) does not benefit," after checking with the agency to ascertain that African Americans had secured only "a few" such loans in that city. Responding to these and similar incidents, national NAACP assistant secretary Roy Wilkins wrote the FHA in October, demanding to know whether the agency had any official policy to "regulate or restrict the purchase of homes by Race citizens," apparently receiving a denial in response. However, the *Pittsburgh Courier* was meanwhile noting

> the inescapable fact that the government's housing policy tends to perpetuate segregation. . . . Indeed, the government policy is worse than that of private realtors, some of whom have been instrumental in opening "white" districts to Negro tenants and buyers.

The paper went on to opine that African Americans themselves were "partly responsible" because they had "registered no strong and nationwide complaint," having been "hypnotized by eight or ten housing projects 'exclusively for Negroes.'"[32]

But it was the NAACP's discovery in December 1938, of Section 223 in the FHA *Underwriters Manual* requiring racial segregation—widely reported in the black press—that conclusively confirmed the existence of a systematic policy of discrimination and prompted more assertive demands for reform. Complaints relating to an all-black housing development in Jamaica (Queens), New York, had led the NAACP to persist in its inquiries despite the FHA's insistence that it did not discriminate; lead attorney Thurgood Marshall then got the local administrator to admit that the FHA designated "white" and "Negro" areas where insured loans could be secured only by members of those groups, and that it considered racially mixed neighborhoods to be "cushion areas" where it would guarantee no loans at all. Furthermore, in the "Negro" areas where it did underwrite loans, FHA would not insure those on properties valued significantly higher than the average. The NAACP subsequently acquired a copy of the *Underwriters Manual* and identified the verbiage underlying these policies. In response, NAACP executive secretary Walter White wrote to President Roosevelt demanding the removal of Section 223, adding,

> This policy is a definite discouragement to Negro citizens who wish to improve themselves and secure better housing . . . Colored people have been branded as slum-dwellers without ambition to live in good houses and yet when they seek better housing, they are told by the government that they must remain within certain areas.

The President's response, which came several months later, was not encouraging. Roosevelt, despite having "very carefully considered" the NAACP memorandum before conferring with the FHA, had determined (evasively) that the agency's policy was "a matter of public record and . . . applicable to all transactions and citizens alike, regardless of color." Furthermore, the FHA declared unsubstantiated all charges of discrimination relating to the Jamaica project.[33]

Following this confirmation that racial discrimination was official federal policy, black newspapers continued reportage on subsequent cases as well as efforts to pressure federal administrators toward fairness—such as a strident campaign against HOLC bias waged by black Detroit real estate brokers with support from African American insurance companies, churches, and the local NAACP over the second half of 1939.[34] Increasingly, however, the focus of efforts shifted from HOLC to the FHA, and specifically to changing its stated support for race-based restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. Ultimately these efforts concluded in *Shelley v. Kraemer*, the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court decision that determined such agreements were unenforceable; even so, the first legal victory against a federal housing agency came earlier and against HOLC, when in mid-1943 an African American veteran succeeded in forcing the agency to let him buy a house on an all-white block in West Philadelphia.[35] The drawn-out process whereby the federal government began to reform its exclusionary policies after 1948 has been told elsewhere, with the consensus being that these changes came as too little, too late.[36] For at least the first twenty years of federal housing policy, agencies like the HOLC, FHA, and VA strongly reinforced (and extended) racial segregation; abetted the routing of investment funds toward exclusively white and suburban residential areas; and served to perpetuate a widely held belief among the white public that the presence of African Americans triggered neighborhood deterioration and property value decline. Indeed, the government made no serious attempt to address its segregationist legacy until the passage of fair credit and neighborhood reinvestment legislation in the 1970s,[37] and to this very day, American cities and African American neighborhoods in particular continue to suffer from the effects of past lending policy.[38] Even while recognizing the effects here and as we seek to further explicate this history to the public, it is essential to conduct an analysis of census statistics that can clarify where African Americans actually did succeed in accessing HOLC refinancing, because it raises important questions about group political power and local variations in terms of access.



Figure 1. Proportional size of select cities, black population, and number of white and black homeowners, 1940.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Population and Housing: Statistics for Census Tracts* (Washington, D.C., 1942), Table 1: "Population by Race and Nativity, and Occupied Dwelling Units," and Table 4: "Dwelling Units by Occupancy Status and Race of Occupants."

Analyzing Local Lending Patterns of the HOLC

The most logical point of departure for studying black access to New Deal-era federal housing programs is to survey the state of African American homeownership at the close of the Great Depression, in 1940 (Figure 1; Table 1). That census year, the percentage of nonwhite homeownership was the highest in Nashville and Los Angeles[39]—with other notable locales where the proportion stood at around a fifth being comparatively small and located mainly in the South: Houston, Dallas, Memphis, the District of Columbia, Richmond, and Indianapolis. Particularly low rates of black homeownership characterized large northern cities including Baltimore, Chicago, Saint Louis, and of course New York City with its renter-dominated market. Across the board, white homeownership far outpaced nonwhite, typically by around double but ranging as high as three to five times in some locales—notably in Baltimore where nearly half of white households owned homes compared with less than one-tenth of nonwhite households; meanwhile, the white-to-black ratio was closest to parity in Nashville, Los Angeles, Houston, Richmond, the District of Columbia, and Dallas.[40] Racially unequal access to homeownership must be borne in mind in evaluating HOLC's significance for African Americans. That said, in the aggregate on the national level, black homeowners had just shy of their fair share of HOLC mortgages in 1940, at *95 percent of what would be expected* relative to their proportion of all

Table 1. Cities with Most Substantial Black Homeownership, with Comparisons by Race, 1940.

	Nonwhite homeowners 1940	Nonwhite homeownership rate 1940 (%)	White:Nonwhite homeownership ratio 1940	City rank (Size) 1940
Washington, D.C.	7,670	19.4	1.71	11
Memphis, TN	6,976	20.0	1.93	32
Philadelphia, PA	6,694	10.3	4.18	3
Los Angeles, CA	6,453	23.5	1.46	5
Chicago, IL	5,717	7.7	3.35	2
Houston, TX	5,301	21.8	1.72	21
Detroit, MI	5,121	14.9	2.78	4
New York, NY	5,086	4.4	3.75	1
New Orleans, LA	4,522	10.0	2.95	15
Birmingham, AL	4,438	15.1	2.64	35
Atlanta, GA	3,554	12.6	2.55	28
Baltimore, MD	3,309	8.5	5.60	7
Nashville, TN	3,275	23.9	1.42	50
Richmond, VA	3,031	19.4	1.72	45
Dallas, TX	2,875	20.8	1.81	31
Indianapolis, IN	2,765	19.1	2.04	20
Jacksonville, FL	2,709	17.7	2.12	47
Louisville, KY	2,593	17.8	2.21	25
Cleveland, OH	2,315	10.6	3.35	6
Saint Louis, MO	2,134	7.3	4.04	8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume II: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 115-17, 143-45.

homeowners (Table 2). Meanwhile, other nonwhites were seriously underserved while whites got almost exactly their expected share, considering the ratios of HOLC mortgage holdings to these populations' respective proportion. Breaking this calculation down on the local level, it emerges further that in many cities, African American homeowners readily gained access to HOLC loans at *greater than* a proportionate share, considering the ratio of their HOLC-held loans to their total proportion of homeownership (Table 3; Figure 2). Strikingly, in a number of cities including New York and Saint Louis, they got approximately twice what would be expected. Most of the major centers of black homeownership fell between parity and one- and two-thirds times what would be expected, with cities in Texas and the mid-Atlantic seaboard having particularly favorable access. Among those cities where African Americans received less than their fair share of HOLC loans, Chicago along with Memphis, Nashville, Jacksonville, and Richmond were major black homeownership centers.

A closer look at those metropolitan areas where HOLC refinanced the largest number of nonwhites' mortgages (Table 4) reveals considerable variation. Here, Omaha stands out with by far the highest level of access per thousand black homeowners, although that city was not a major African American population center; though ranking much lower on this measure, Detroit, San Antonio, Birmingham, Dayton, and Indianapolis also had relatively good access. Finally, a different pattern emerges if access per thousand black homeowners is used without regard to a given city's total HOLC mortgages held, allowing an assessment of where black homeowners had the best and worst levels of access. Among the top ten cities with the highest access rates according to this measure were not only the aforementioned Omaha, Detroit, Birmingham, Dayton, and Indianapolis but also some small ones (South Bend and Gary) and one having a minute African

Table 2. HOLC-Held Mortgages on Single-Family Properties, Compared with Owner Occupancy by Race, 1940.

	All occupied units	Owner occupied	% of total	HOLC-held mortgages	% of total	Ratio
Total	34,854,532	15,195,763		528,175		
White	31,561,126	14,418,092	94.9	503,885	95.4	1.01
Nonwhite						
Negro	3,156,545	719,771	4.7	23,714	4.5	0.95
Other	136,861	57,900	0.4	576	0.1	0.29

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume II: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 7; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 9.
Note: HOLC = Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Census gave breakdown by race only for single-family homes; however, these represented 81.9 percent of all HOLC-held mortgages in 1940.

Table 3. Ratios of African American-Owned, HOLC-Mortgaged Single-Family Properties to Black Homeownership Rate by City, 1940.

Favorable access		Proportionate access		Unfavorable access	
Jersey City, NJ	3.04	Toledo, OH	1.19	Fort Wayne, IN	0.89
Omaha, NE	2.80	Spokane, WA	1.19	Nashville, TN	0.86
New York, NY	2.28	Kansas City, KS	1.18	Memphis, TN	0.83
Saint Paul, MN	2.27	Canton, OH	1.16	Fort Worth, TX	0.81
Trenton, NJ	2.12	Gary, IN	1.15	Jacksonville, FL	0.80
Boston, MA	2.09	San Diego, CA	1.14	Chicago, IL	0.80
Newark, NJ	2.00	Kansas City, MO	1.11	Akron, OH	0.78
Denver, CO	1.95	Cleveland, OH	1.10	Seattle, WA	0.69
Saint Louis, MO	1.91	Los Angeles, CA	1.08	Portland, OR	0.65
Yonkers, NY	1.76	Cincinnati, OH	1.08	Chattanooga, TN	0.61
Flint, MI	1.74	Dayton, OH	1.06	Richmond, VA	0.57
Baltimore, MD	1.70	Miami, FL	1.01	Tulsa, OK	0.54
Rochester, NY	1.68	Salt Lake City, UT	0.99	Oklahoma City, OK	0.43
Philadelphia, PA	1.65	Grand Rapids, MI	0.98		
Columbus, OH	1.64	Milwaukee, WI	0.95		
Dallas, TX	1.61	Tampa, FL	0.92		
Washington, D.C.	1.58				
New Orleans, LA	1.56				
Pittsburgh, PA	1.56				
Charlotte, NC	1.56				
Indianapolis, IN	1.55				
Norfolk, VA	1.54				
Houston, TX	1.46				
San Antonio, TX	1.42				
Wichita, KS	1.40				
Louisville, KY	1.40				
Wilmington, DE	1.39				
Detroit, MI	1.33				
Oakland, CA	1.33				
Des Moines, IA	1.32				
Birmingham, AL	1.29				

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

Favorable access		Proportionate access	Unfavorable access
Minneapolis, MN	1.29		
Atlanta, GA	1.24		
Youngstown, OH	1.24		
South Bend, IN	1.21		

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume II: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 115-17, 143-45; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Parts 2, 3* (Washington, D.C., 1943), passim.
Note: HOLC = Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Cities excluded where HOLC held less than ten mortgages on black-owned homes.



Figure 2. Proportional size of local black homeownership base, by HOLC access ratio, 1940.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume II: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 115-17, 143-45; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Parts 2, 3* (Washington, D.C., 1943), passim.
Note: HOLC = Home Owners' Loan Corporation.

Table 4. Cities with Largest Numbers of HOLC-held Mortgages on Black-owned, Single-Family Homes, 1940.

	Total reported HOLC loans	HOLC portion of black mortgages (%)	Black population (% of total)	Rate/1,000 nonwhite homeowners
Detroit, MI	880	44.7	149,119 (9.2)	171.84
Birmingham, AL	735	45.5	106,938 (40.7)	165.62
Houston, TX	631	36.4	86,302 (22.4)	119.03
Philadelphia, PA	553	21.7	250,880 (13.0)	82.61
Atlanta, GA	496	41.7	104,533 (34.6)	139.56
New York, NY	454	22.0	458,444 (6.1)	89.26
Indianapolis, IN	436	33.0	51,142 (13.2)	157.69
Los Angeles, CA	381	17.9	63,774 (4.2)	59.04
New Orleans, LA	377	30.9	149,034 (30.1)	83.37
Dallas, TX	357	31.9	50,407 (17.1)	124.17
San Antonio, TX	339	35.9	19,235 (7.6)	167.49
Chicago, IL	328	35.1	277,731 (8.2)	57.37
Omaha, NE	303	54.2	12,015 (5.4)	264.86
Kansas City, KS	298	38.7	21,033 (17.3)	100.07
Memphis, TN	290	12.9	121,498 (41.5)	41.57
Cleveland, OH	288	31.0	84,504 (9.6)	124.41
Washington, D.C.	244	6.3	187,266 (28.2)	31.81
Baltimore, MD	242	27.9	165,843 (19.3)	73.13
Columbus, OH	241	26.0	35,765 (11.7)	136.16
Dayton, OH	194	27.1	20,273 (9.6)	158.24

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States—Housing*, vol. 4: *Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes* (Washington, D.C., 1943), Part 2: 20, 86, 236, 260, 304, 354, 406, 410, 482, 514, 544, 588, 690, 806, 814, 864, 1010; Part 3: 88, 96, 104, 120, 170, 244, 252, 394, 402, 432, 440, 448, 456, 534; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States—Population*, vol. 2: *Characteristics of the Population* (Washington, D.C., 1943), Part 1: 114; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States—Housing*, vol. 2: *General Characteristics* (Washington, D.C., 1943), Part 1: 143-45.
Note: HOLC = Home Owners' Loan Corporation.

American population (Saint Paul). On the contrary, among the bottom ten cities with the worst rates of access were some having substantial black populations (Richmond and Cincinnati), as well as ones with a small proportion of African American population (San Francisco), and small ones with a small black population (Sacramento).[41] Clearly, the considerable variation here begs for an investigation of local HOLC practices to gain insight into how lending decisions translated into these seeming discrepancies.

Finally, it is also possible to extrapolate where the largest concentrations of African American homeowners received HOLC assistance on the census tract level, by cross-tabulating demographic data with mortgage data. Tabulations of mortgage lending by census tract are available in the 1940 Census report, *Housing—Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes*, for cities of one hundred thousand or more. Analyzing these data using GIS (Geographic Information Systems) yields visualizations which give not only a sense of overall HOLC distributions by city but also the ways in which lending related to race (Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6). The more intensely racially segregated the city, the more starkly the likeliest locations where black homeowners successfully accessed HOLC aid stand out. A brief discussion of each city's historic African American population dynamics adds context to the observable distribution, with the highest concentrations of HOLC loans seen in the newest black neighborhoods and the apparent influence of restrictive covenants on settlement patterns coming across particularly starkly.



Figure 3. 1940 distribution of HOLC mortgages by census tract in Philadelphia, with African American homeowner concentrations noted. Dots scattered randomly within census tracts.
Source: Items NT2BUQ001, NT2BUQ002, NT28BU3001, and NT2BU3001, tables on race and housing occupancy in 1940 U.S. Census of Housing, from Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper, and Steven Ruggles, *IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System*, version 12.0 [database] (Minneapolis, 2017), http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V12.0; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Part 3* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 281-86.

In Philadelphia, overlaying 1940 tract-level HOLC lending with nonwhite homeownership data reveals a distribution encompassing both older, established African American neighborhoods as well as more recent, expanding areas of black settlement (Figure 3). The largest number of likely HOLC loans to African American homeowners was in the neighborhoods of West Philadelphia just north of Market Street, an area to which upwardly mobile black families had been moving since the 1890s—with the extension of streetcar service—when the housing there was still new. This area as well as North Philadelphia around Temple University actually experienced an early version of "white flight" from World War I into the 1930s, driven by an initial round of middle-class suburbanization as well as the accelerating in-migration of black Southerners, both of which phenomena commenced earlier in eastern seaboard cities like Philadelphia. However, the three most heavily black North Philadelphia tracts do not show nearly as dense a concentration of HOLC loans as in West Philadelphia. Racially manipulative sales tactics accompanied demographic transition in both neighborhoods; these areas' development before the widespread application of race-based deed restrictions meant such legal devices played a relatively insignificant role in Philadelphia compared with other cities. It is also worth noting that as the country's original northern "Black Metropolis" Philadelphia had a considerable number of black-owned banks, with some $5 million invested in the city's homes owned by African



Figure 4. 1940 distribution of HOLC mortgages by census tract in Atlanta, with African American homeowner concentrations noted. Dots scattered randomly within census tracts.
Source: Items NT2BUQ001, NT2BUQ002, NT28BU3001, and NT2BU3001, tables on race and housing occupancy in 1940 U.S. Census of Housing, from Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper, and Steven Ruggles, *IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System*, version 12.0 [database] (Minneapolis, 2017), http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V12.0; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Part 2* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 316-18.

Americans as of 1924. A surprisingly large number of HOLC loans were approved for the Old Seventh Ward, the historic black population center as chronicled by W. E. B. DuBois in *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), but which by the 1920s was an overcrowded, predominantly rental district with some of the city's oldest and most run-down housing. A sprinkling of loans is also evident in Germantown, another neighborhood where African Americans had established a foothold before 1930 but which was still less than 10 percent black at the close of World War II.[42]

Atlanta exhibits a somewhat different HOLC loan pattern, although here too, the newer black residential areas had better access (Figure 4). As a southern city, Atlanta saw an earlier upsurge in black rural in-migration, with several clusters of African American settlement solidifying in the decades immediately following the Civil War. However, segregation through deed restrictions in newer neighborhoods by the 1910s—not to mention several attempts at race-based zoning—had by 1940 brought it closer toward the pattern common in northern and western cities. The preponderance of HOLC aid went to African American homeowners on the city's West Side, which saw initial settlement as early as 1870 with the establishment of several prestigious black colleges, but a more substantial population influx in the wake of the city's 1906 race riot and 1917 Fourth Ward fire. Both prosperous and poor African American families lived on the West Side, with the extremes perhaps best represented by "Ph.D. Row" (Beckwith Street) across from Atlanta University and nearby "Beaver Slide," a ramshackle area demolished to build the University Homes public housing project in 1938. The section west of Ashby Street was declared



Figure 5. 1940 distribution of HOLC mortgages by census tract in Detroit and select surrounding areas, with African American homeowner concentrations noted. Dots scattered randomly within census tracts.
Source: Items NT2BUQ001, NT2BUQ002, NT28BU3001, and NT2BU3001, tables on race and housing occupancy in 1940 U.S. Census of Housing, from Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper, and Steven Ruggles, *IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System*, version 12.0 [database] (Minneapolis, 2017), http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V12.0; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Part 2* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 721-25.

by HOLC evaluators to be the "best negro [*sic*] area in Atlanta" with "the best type of negro residents and highest percentage of negro home ownership." Indeed, black businessman Heman Perry had already built up Washington Heights west of Ashby in the 1920s, rising black builder Walter Aiken actually gained FHA approval to build new homes for African American buyers in the vicinity, and additional subdivisions were underway as of the late 1930s (including one by a white developer). Whereas black West Side homeowners got the lion's share, another substantial loan portion went to Pittsburgh, a neighborhood established in the 1880s as a settlement of African American railroad workers and said by HOLC to be "known as a good negro [*sic*] rental area." Fewer were issued in the Fourth Ward that had housed the bulk of Atlanta's African American population from the end of the Civil War into the early twentieth century; this area, too, had been characterized by a mixture of class levels, with prominent community leaders living along "Sweet" Auburn Avenue in stately late-nineteenth century Victorian houses while impoverished families resided in a section known as Buttermilk Bottom, considered by HOLC to be "one of the city's worst slums."[43] Other historic black neighborhoods, like Summerhill and Edgewood, do not appear to have received significant numbers of HOLC refinancing loans.

Yet another pattern of African American HOLC access characterized Detroit, with its loan distribution standing out more starkly because it was an even more intensely segregated city than



Figure 6. 1940 distribution of HOLC mortgages by census tract in Los Angeles and select surrounding areas, with African American homeowner concentrations noted. Dots scattered randomly within census tracts.
Source: Items NT2BUQ001, NT2BUQ002, NT28BU3001, and NT2BU3001, tables on race and housing occupancy in 1940 U.S. Census of Housing, from Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper, and Steven Ruggles, *IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System*, version 12.0 [database] (Minneapolis, 2017), http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V12.0; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Part 2* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 124-32.

either Philadelphia or Atlanta in 1940 (Figure 5). In part, this stemmed from the more widespread use of race-based deed restrictions and covenants in Detroit's rapid geographic expansion after 1900. By far the greatest concentration of loans was in the West Side black enclave off Tireman Avenue, settled starting around 1915 by more affluent southern migrants whose numbers were dramatically augmented over the following decade by upwardly mobile families seeking to escape the increasingly overcrowded Near East Side neighborhoods of Black Bottom and Paradise Valley. Although with renewed in-migration during World War II, the West Side's trajectory would trace that of these older neighborhoods, in 1940, nearly 40 percent of its residents owned homes, few kept lodgers, and less than 20 percent of the dwellings were substandard; HOLC evaluators considered its residents to be "better class Negro." Additional concentrations of HOLC refinancing loans were made in even further outlying enclaves, with very few issued in the older black neighborhoods extending north of downtown toward the transitioning but still heavily Jewish Twelfth Street area. A substantial number of loans went to the residents of Conant Gardens, mostly African American professionals who had built new bungalows there in the late 1920s, while slightly fewer were approved for the mostly working-class residents of the peripheral Eight Mile-Wyoming enclave, established in 1921 through the involvement of the local Urban League. Both these areas played significant roles in Detroit's reputation for white homeowner resistance that started as early as 1917; in 1941, the FHA demanded that a white developer wall off the Eight Mile enclave to qualify for its mortgage guarantees, and the following year whites rioted in response to the Sojourner Truth Homes being built for black war workers just outside of Conant Gardens (whose affluent homeowners also opposed the project). Black Ford Motor Company employees living in suburban River Rouge and Ecorse also appear to have received considerable numbers of HOLC refinancing loans, unlike those in even further-outlying Inkster who received relatively few.[44]

Los Angeles's pattern of HOLC loan distribution for black homeowners resembled Detroit's (Figure 6). With an even faster rate of growth after 1900, more subdivisions in Los Angeles than anywhere else in the country were covered by race-based restrictions that excluded not just African Americans but also Asians and Latinos, making it a key battleground for litigation that would succeed in getting these invalidated by 1948. The greatest number of black HOLC loans were issued in the Central Avenue District extending south of downtown, an area where African Americans had lived among Mexican Americans and Chinese immigrants since the late 19th century, before its World War I transformation into "the bustling economic and cultural center of black Los Angeles." Home to approximately 70 percent of the city's black population in 1940, HOLC evaluators considered this "melting pot" area "thoroughly blighted" and "a fit location for a slum clearance project." A secondary concentration of loans is visible five miles to the south in Watts, a separate municipality until 1926 and initially a self-built, working-class community on marshy land, to which African Americans gravitated because it was free of racial restrictions. HOLC described Watts's housing as "substandard and . . . of the shack variety," predicting that "while slum conditions do not as yet prevail, the trend is definitely in that direction." While Los Angeles's West Side (west of Main Street) was almost totally blanketed by deed restrictions and covenants, several small pockets of black settlement did emerge, the most significant of which was West Jefferson, another locus for HOLC loan approvals. An established black middle-class stronghold by the 1930s, assessors rated it as "the best Negro residential district in the city" with "stability of values and evident pride of ownership," giving it a "high red" grade on their 1939 residential security (redlining) map. Upwardly mobile homeowners pushing out into the surrounding areas and the purchases by several black celebrities of mansions in "Sugar Hill" even further to the west would make this section the focus of the local NAACP's fight against covenants. Finally, similar to Detroit, a concentration of HOLC loans likely went to black homeowners in one suburb, Pasadena. Described as an "old unrestricted area . . . occupied by Negroes and other subversive racial elements" who worked for wealthy white families, HOLC assessors deemed the section "blighted" and "a matter of concern and doubt," affording it a "medial red" grade.[45]

HOLC Decision Making on the Local Level

What accounts for these variations on the local level, in terms of where HOLC extended refinancing loans to African Americans? And while HOLC's "residential security" (redlining) maps did not begin to be commissioned until 1936—after the application deadline for its emergency loan program had passed—how can we best explain the seeming discrepancy between the agency's initial willingness to loan on homes owned by African Americans, and its assessment shortly thereafter that lending in the neighborhoods where they lived was inherently "hazardous"? To begin investigating these questions, we can turn to HOLC's General Administrative Correspondence (1933-1936), a cache of records which until now has lain virtually untouched by historians. Consisting of 482 reels of microfilm with no available finding aid,[46] research in these records documenting the agency's state and regional office activities is quite daunting, but they offer a detailed, localized perspective unavailable in the agency's main body of textual records. The following analysis centers mostly on the Georgia State office, and especially Atlanta which also served as the headquarters for one of HOLC's eleven Regional offices. In all, the agency maintained forty-seven State offices (plus three Divisional ones serving Texas), and more than two hundred District and Sub-District offices strategically dispersed among population centers throughout the country, giving some sense of the massive undertaking awaiting scholars seeking bottom-up perspectives on such questions.[47]

An initial expectation might be that African Americans, as part of the New Deal political coalition, would have received at least a modicum of consideration in seeking HOLC refinancing loans. Of course, black voting rights were effectively denied in the South—meaning that their ability to negotiate for access to New Deal supports there was severely impaired, with perhaps the best case scenario being the control that Atlanta's African American social workers successfully exerted over some of the new federal programs targeting the city's black community.[48] Yet even in large Northern cities, considerable black political power did not automatically translate into favorable HOLC access, as in the case of Chicago.[49] However, the Roosevelt Administration's initial rush to get the program up and running—and the felt desire to demonstrate results—clearly benefited African American as well as white homeowners. Upon its debut, detractors had described HOLC as "political[ly] ridden from top to bottom" with members of Congress stridently pressing it on their constituents' behalf for aid.[50] Georgia State HOLC office correspondence gives ample evidence that applications were rushed quickly through the process with an emphasis on maintaining high "production." In January 1934, the State manager explained he was resistant to retroactively supplying character (credit) reports and photographs of properties, now required, on early applications awaiting approval. The following month, it was discovered that consent agreements for two African American homeowners had been "executed with no loan application on file in this office," and by March, HOLC's higher ups were complaining about the Georgia office's nepotism and "absurd appraisals, especially where the houses are very old and the neighborhood is bad." In April, a high-ranking administrator at the Georgia State office, George West, groused that requiring photographs was slowing down the process, especially with "cheap and Negro properties," but noted "we are endeavoring to render this service so that these applications will not be held ineligible." Six months later, West was still expressing concern that this requirement could depress applications, despite having subsumed the cost of photographs for "aged people or Negroes, generally incompetent to secure photographs and possessing no facility for photographing." Clearly, then, generating a large volume of refinancing loans represented a primary objective for HOLC in the initial "rescue" phase, irrespective of the race of the borrower.[51]

Persistence by African American homeowners also factored into their applications receiving requisite consideration by HOLC, in spite of the racial prejudices harbored by agency personnel. "We have great numbers of ignorant people, especially among the Darkies, that are very difficult to deal with and we do our best to assist them at [the] time of filing their applications, for one very good reason, i.e., if the applications are not properly accomplished they only cause us additional expense trying to perfect them," George West explained, in a racist and particularly condescending example.[52] West's prejudices apparently did not prevent him from doing his job, however. When Otis O. Neal, a black cab driver, disputed an inordinately low appraisal on his house with the assistance of a former creditor, West acquiesced in the upwardly revised estimate and the case actually triggered an investigation and temporary suspension of the appraiser responsible.[53] African Americans likely sought HOLC aid so insistently because they had few other options available for debt refinancing. Revealingly, a staffer with the Atlanta Regional Office explained in 1934 that while they encouraged applicants to first seek assistance from private lenders, it was "very doubtful" that most could meet the typical requirements of being located "in a good residential section with improved streets, sewage, lighting, gas, water, etc."—in other words, amenities beyond the reach of many black homeowners in southern cities.[54] And while racial prejudice does not seem to have automatically scotched African American borrowers' chances of receiving HOLC loans, no amount of persistence could persuade its administrators to refinance applicants they deemed ineligible or unlikely to repay. Numerous cases appear in the files where applicants specifically mentioned as black were rejected for owning properties "not worth the necessary repairs," for being in "insufficient distress," or for reasons such as being a suspected "bootlegger" or "the shiftless type."[55]

However, the records further reveal that at least some whites patronizingly considered "deserving" African Americans worthy of HOLC assistance, even as they chose to view blacks' difficulty holding onto their homes amid Depression-related hardships through the stereotypical lens of incompetence and supposed childlike nature. Basically, such whites felt the need to defend some African Americans from being taken advantage of by mortgage brokers and other predatory actors in the real estate industry. Three telling articles along these lines from the *Macon Telegraph* made their way into the Atlanta HOLC's publicity files. The first described a black minister who had naïvely signed paperwork, oblivious that there was a "mysterious Virginia [second] mortgagee" seeking to collect on his debt. The second article opened with "If your old Mandy in the kitchen forgets to put the salt in the breakfast grits for three straight mornings, perhaps she is absent minded from worry over 'money troubles,'" going on to explain how a domestic worker named "Hannah" had unwisely forgotten to ask her lender for payment receipts. In this rendition, it was HOLC's duty to intercede on behalf of hardworking but grossly incompetent "Negro help" struggling to manage their own affairs; the piece ended with the explanation that "After all, the creditor evidently did not honestly think Hannah owed him $589; for the HOLC loaned her only $570 and with that she cleared her home of all debt and had it repaired." The final article in the series introduced a black railroad worker close to retirement, foreclosed upon but who stayed put and continued paying rent to an unscrupulous creditor. Similar to the case of "Hannah," the article explained that after HOLC's intervention,

> [The] cost of repairs, back taxes and insurance premiums brought the Negro's loan to $1,200 which can be retired in 15 years with monthly payments of about $9.50, or $2.50 less than the old Negro was paying in rent on a house he owned![56]

Thus white paternalism emerges as yet another factor helping to explain why African American homeowners received HOLC aid.

Race and the Dual Market for the Mortgage Bailout

HOLC's all-white office staffers in Atlanta exhibited a Jim Crow attitude toward real estate and reflected a national approach within the agency.[57] Being recruited largely locally,[58] at least some additionally had previous experience servicing the so-called "Negro market." One appraiser with HOLC's Atlanta office, Joseph S. Shaw, explained to higher ups that he had ten years experience with First Mutual Building & Loan, writing mortgages on "Colored and white properties . . . from eight to nine thousand dollars [on] down." Yet such familiarity with African American borrowers may have been relatively unusual. The ability of a co-worker in valuing such homes in Atlanta was directly contrasted with Shaw's, with the individual in question supposedly "better on high type property, not good on cheap property or [the] Southside, or [the] negro [*sic*] section." Tellingly, a local bank employee wrote HOLC officials to complain:

> It would seem that the appraisers that are now in the Atlanta field [office] have had no experience with the medium priced residences, or colored residences, as any one handling that type of paper knows that there is a tremendous difference between the value of homes in the elite neighborhoods as compared to the working man and negro [*sic*].[59]

Similarly, most of the new hires in Birmingham—Alabama loans were administered out of the Atlanta Regional office—were apparently novices, whose work had led to the approval of that city's first batch of refinancing loans, a "great majority" of which were on "cheap, poorly constructed, negro [*sic*] houses." Ironically, the exam that the Birmingham office required of all applicants seeking fee appraiser positions explicitly tested this knowledge; one of several questions relating to black-owned properties read "How much would you show as depreciation on the average negro [*sic*] house in the City of Birmingham which was built 10 years ago?"[60]

While previous historians have balked upon encountering sources distinguishing two separate housing markets, black and white, such talk was common in the industry at the time. One Atlanta HOLC administrator instructed his appraisers, "There is best, good and poor sections in negro [*sic*] property, just insert what kind of a district it is and put 'negro' at the end."[61] Long before its redlining maps designated black neighborhoods across the country as hazardous, HOLC identified the racial makeup of applicants' neighborhoods as one feature affecting the home value. For example, loan officers designated neighborhoods as "Native white," "Foreign white," "Oriental," "Negro," or some mixed composition. Furthermore, they noted whether demographic transition was occurring and whether the "trend" (value) was static, up, or down.[62] As the Atlanta HOLC official implied, there could be multiple types of best or poor neighborhoods.

Maintaining some financial flow into black neighborhoods would help preserve the system of a racially segregated dual housing market, which in the pre-Depression period had provided profitable opportunities for investors willing to cross the financial color line. Indeed, while some African American homeowners' mortgages were held by black-owned financial institutions like the Atlanta Life Insurance Company, certain white-owned firms dealt exclusively in such "paper." "I might say the class of property on which mortgages were made by the Georgia Savings & Trust Company is Negro property," one HOLC official wrote, while a partner in a prominent Atlanta real estate firm recommended black builder Walter H. Aiken with the note that "We have loaned many thousands of dollars on dwellings which he has constructed in this territory."[63]

The most compelling explanation for African American access to government aid in HOLC's rescue phase is that refinancing black-owned homes served the agency's purpose as a bailout for mortgagees (lenders).[64] A few contemporary commentators discussed the agency's role in freeing up investment capital to facilitate economic recovery, a key objective underpinning many New Deal programs. For example, Dr. Carol Aronovici, director of Columbia University's Housing Research Bureau, wrote in 1934 that HOLC was "set up to save the foolish and over-ambitious investors including the banks." Morton Bodfish of the United States Building and Loan League once noted that HOLC provided "emergency relief to home owners and, therefore, assistance to lending institutions," and on another occasion described its activities as taking "unusual risks . . . for reasons of broad public policy."[65] In a candid admission, Federal Home Loan Bank Board member Henry A. Hoagland replied at a 1935 roundtable discussion:

> I should like to remind the gentleman who just spoke that the banks, including the savings banks and savings and loan associations, did have default of more than 30 percent on most of the loans which we have taken over. That is why we took them over. If they were good loans, the banks and the savings and loan associations would have been happy to keep them. I have talked before groups of building and loan people, savings and loan people, who have complained that we have taken over some of their good loans, and I always make them this proposal: We will be very happy to turn back to you any loans that we have taken from you. And I get no takers.[66]

At a 1936 conference held in Saint Louis, the director of HOLC's Division of Research and Statistics, Dr. Spurgeon Bell, spoke on the "activities of the Federal Government in taking over mortgage loans and thereby replenishing working capital of building and loan associations and insurance companies." Two years later after joining the Brookings Institution, Bell added,

> HOLC served not only to give direct relief to some 1,000,000 of hard-pressed home owners, but also served indirectly to place in the portfolios of hard-pressed financial institutions some $3,000,000,000 of bonds issued against these mortgages and guaranteed by the government.[67]

As the Depression slowly lifted, HOLC was further credited with reinvigorating the home building industry, from whence it was claimed had come the main push for mortgage relief—rather than from struggling homeowners who "had to be convinced of the opportunities offered by the circumstances of cheap credit."[68]

The case of Joseph Shaw, mentioned earlier as an appraiser with the Atlanta office, sheds additional light on HOLC's significance as a payout to lenders. Sanctioned by Washington officials for making what were thought to be too-high appraisals on the "cheap" property he had specialized in financing since his days with First Mutual Building & Loan, Shaw was particularly forthright in an April 1934 letter to Horace Russell, General Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that oversaw HOLC, and a previous associate of Shaw's in the Atlanta real estate industry (Russell had actually organized the city's first thrift in 1924).[69] "My attitude toward appraisals from the beginning is that one should try and get at the real value and not appraise on distress value," Shaw wrote. "Now you know there has been a world of foreclosed property on which abortive loans were made. These loan companies have thrown this property on [the] market and in some cases took what they could get," he went on, explaining that in his previous experience at First Mutual, by advertising and selling foreclosed properties instead of depending on local "real estate men," his firm had been able to recoup up to 70 percent of the peak 1928 prices on their holdings. Now Shaw sought to apply this same approach to his work as an appraiser with HOLC. "I have labored under the impression that the Board wanted to help relieve the distressed," Shaw defended his higher valuations in a somewhat disingenuous conflation of homeowners' best interests with those of mortgagees like the building and loan that had formerly employed him, against the "tight" appraisals that higher ups wanted due to the 80 percent loan-to-value threshold specified in HOLC's enabling legislation. While useful in holding down the cost of the program, one recent scholar has pointed out that borrowers saddled with debts exceeding this specified figure became eligible for principal reductions, meaning that higher appraisals benefited participating lenders by allowing them to recoup a larger portion of their investment; indeed, HOLC's appraisals purposely erred on the high side to entice reluctant lenders to exchange their mortgages for its bonds.[70] Recovering as much outstanding debt as possible was a particular concern for "thrifts" like the building and loan that had formerly employed Shaw, because these smaller, specialized lenders were invested entirely in real estate—having been founded solely to enable home purchases by working-class borrowers, who were now especially prone to unemployment and default in the deflationary, Depression-hit housing market.[71]

Shaw's correspondence further underlines the disagreement among mortgagees about where to peg valuations, as well as some subtle ways that African Americans were treated differently, despite their eligibility for HOLC refinancing and participation in the program. "While I do not have definite information as to the members of this Board," he added in a follow-up letter continuing his defense of higher appraisals, "if the rumors are correct there is only one man out of the five who is competent or rather has the experience to make an appraisal according to the H.O.L.C. formula." Shaw referred here to HOLC's three-pronged methodology for determining property values: an average of current market value, replacement value, and rental value ("capitalization"). Shaw declared,

> If they merely inspect a property and value it by the supposed present market value and do not consider the present high cost of replacement, as well as the capitalization value to which has been added the cost of repairs, you can readily see that they will get a value much under those that meet the formula.

"Rental values speak for themselves," he concluded,

> [and] I have not capitalized but few if any properties below 12%. But I have not as some of the real estate men say do penalize[d] the negro [*sic*] by capitalizing him 14% to 20%, for the home is home to a Negro just the same as White.[72]

Discounting rental income at a higher rate for black-occupied properties assumes a diminishing stream of payments; that is, capitalized rental value is inversely related to appraised value, meaning Shaw's use of a lower rate resulted in higher valuations, in keeping with his overall methodology benefiting small lenders anxious to recoup their investments. As an insider specializing in the so-called "Negro market" of the time, it also implies he understood these properties to be more valuable (profitable) than assumed by those familiar only with the mainstream (white) real estate market[73]; at the time, there was already a well-established pattern of African Americans having fewer financing options, paying more for less, and being targeted by predatory lending practices, especially excessive interest charges.[74] As for which mortgagees favored *lower* appraisals, Shaw specifically pointed to life insurance companies—large firms that had traditionally made quite conservative loans and which were then in the midst of shifting their asset portfolios away from residential mortgages.[75] Unlike the small, locally focused institutions that specialized in home loans, these companies were eager to clear their balance sheets so they could pursue more profitable investments.[76]

One of HOLC's objectives was "to indirectly recapitalize mortgage lenders" but it was not the only one. After all, even inflated appraisals helped borrowers because HOLC loans were easy to understand, on quite favorable terms, and additionally carried the option of interest-only payments for the initial three years.[77] However, HOLC's significance as a payout to lenders may have been magnified in the case of African American borrowers and their creditors, who were more likely to be small institutions like savings and loans than commercial banks or life insurance companies.[78] Although more research on the local level will be needed to further illuminate the decision making that led to African American homeowners receiving considerable numbers of HOLC loans, making creditors whole in addition to the haste with which the agency's refinancing program was implemented, persistence on the part of African American applicants, and white administrators' paternalism form the basis for a revised explanation that broadens our understanding of how race factored into HOLC and New Deal housing policy more generally.

Conclusion

Thousands of African American homeowners received HOLC refinancing loans in the initial 1933-1935 "rescue" phase; tellingly, the black-owned Atlanta Life Insurance Company responded to a 1934 inquiry: "[W]e have not made any real estate loans for more than a year, and most of the loans which we already have are being transferred to the government through the Home Owners Loan Corporation."[79] Although some observers harbored stereotypes of African Americans as "poor investment risks," the black payment record was seemingly exemplary. The HOLC Regional Director in Omaha opined about black homeowners in his region that "as a race they have been excellent borrowers and have caused little, if any, difficulty." HOLC's Regional Director in Atlanta stated, "Our experience with Negro borrowers with reference to the regularity of their payments has been most satisfactory," noting "as a general rule, a Negro will make his mortgage payments regularly as long as he is employed." The Memphis Regional Director relayed "the Negro loan has never been a problem in our servicing experience," and "We have found that if the required monthly payment is not excessive in relation to income, the colored borrower respects his obligations under his Government loan and meets the same with regularity." Finally, Dallas's Regional Director claimed,

> We have succeeded in educating our Negro borrowers, as well as our white home owners, to mail their payments in upon their loans. The brokers, many of whom did not believe it was possible, have also been entirely successful in having Negro tenants pay their rent when it was due.

It is worth repeating that the country's very first HOLC mortgagor to pay off their loan was a black woman in Macon, Georgia. In fact, it was no secret in the real estate industry that African American borrowers were reliable. In writing to Federal Home Loan Bank Board General Counsel Horace Russell, Atlanta HOLC appraiser Joseph Shaw had mentioned "[Y]ou know from our experience at First Mutual [Savings & Loan that] the negro [*sic*] pays bett[e]r than the white."[80]

Clearly, African Americans demanded access to New Deal housing supports and secured HOLC refinancing loans, at least, to a much greater extent than previously appreciated—even as they exercised caution in their expectations and criticized these federal programs' shortcomings and increasingly obvious racist dimensions. African Americans may have succeeded in gaining access to HOLC refinancing in rough proportion to their homeownership rate, but even before the agency turned toward redlining after 1935, race clearly factored into every stage of its operations; furthermore, HOLC's loans were intended to reinforce not challenge existing patterns of residential segregation, and its recapitalization of lenders disproportionately benefited the white creditors who held most of the mortgages on African American homes. Seen in this light, HOLC's refinancing of black-owned properties appears far less counterintuitive, and more in keeping with the racially discriminatory practices typical in the real estate industry of the time.[81] In a 1938 speech, Federal Home Loan Bank Board chair John H. Fahey indicated his distaste for HOLC as a necessity "forced" by lenders' risky mortgages extended to unqualified buyers, observing that "there are hundreds of thousands of disgraceful shacks in existence in this country which are still called 'homes' but which really are unfit for human habitation and should be destroyed." "Too much of the trouble with which the Home Owners Loan Corporation had to deal was due to the attempt of borrowers to live in homes which by no stretch of the imagination they could ever hope to pay for," he opined, advocating that mortgage lenders should now focus on "those families in the community who ought to have homes, or better homes, and who can afford them safely."[82] Thus after its emergency "rescue" phase ended in 1935, HOLC shifted gears to shore up the U.S. housing market along racialized lines, of which its redlining maps are the most infamous tool.

Finally, we return to the record of the FHA and later VA. Applying the earlier analysis to these agencies makes clear that in contrast to HOLC's roughly proportionate access for black homeowners, FHA-VA's record of housing supports was extremely inequitable. Recall that African Americans in 1940 garnered just shy of their fair share of HOLC mortgages, 95 percent of what would be expected considering their lower homeownership rate (Table 2). However, despite the Census Bureau's failure in 1950 to distinguish African Americans from other nonwhites, and a large proportion of properties on which the owner's race was not reported, it would appear that the FHA and VA backed mortgages for nonwhites at only about one-third of what they should have received (Table 5).[83] On the local level, this discrepancy between the HOLC and FHA-VA records could hardly be starker. While in many cities, African American homeowners actually gained access to HOLC loans with more than a proportionate share (Table 3), the only Standard Metropolitan Area (a designation the Census Bureau began using in 1950) where African Americans received beyond a proportionate share of FHA-VA backing was Youngstown, Ohio—and Detroit was the only major black homeownership center where they garnered even a roughly equitable share.[84] In all the other major metropolitan areas,

Table 5. FHA/VA-Backed Mortgages on Single-Family Properties, Compared with Owner Occupancy by Race, 1950.

	All occupied units	Owner occupied	% of total	FHA/VA-held mortgages	% of total	Ratio
Total	42,826,281	23,559,966		2,181,742		
White	39,043,595	22,240,970	94.4	1,930,964	88.5	1.04*
Nonwhite	3,782,686	1,318,996	5.6	46,289	2.1	0.38*
Negro	3,633,480	1,252,103				
Other	149,206	66,893				
Not reported				204,489	9.4	

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Housing: 1950—Volume I: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1953), 2; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Housing: 1950—Volume IV: Residential Financing, Mortgaged Nonfarm Properties, Part 1: United States* (Washington, D.C., 1952), 164.
Note: FHA = Federal Housing Administration; VA = Veterans Administration.
Breakdown by race given only for single-family homes. Also, the large portion of properties not reporting the owner's race skews the results, but it seems unlikely that disproportionate numbers of nonwhite homeowners would be among them; thus ratios calculated (*) as if whites are getting all the unreported backing.

including Atlanta where previous scholars have discussed African American developments built with FHA backing, black homeowners were severely disadvantaged in terms of access—with Washington, D.C., a longtime center of black homeownership, at the bottom of the list. Unfortunately, the existing statistical sources do not permit for any precise mapping of where the comparatively small numbers of nonwhite-owned properties backed by FHA and VA mortgage guarantees were located; thus, other materials will need to be consulted to detail this local record of unfairness, amid a shift toward subsidizing racially exclusive development instead of individual homeowners.[85]

The record and impact of the HOLC is, like the broader New Deal, one of national economic rescue and racial disparity. However, the complicated racial legacy and archival trail left by this agency continues to prompt new inquiries and methodological approaches.[86] We hope that the new findings presented here may serve as a catalyst for additional research into how exactly New Deal housing programs like HOLC's played out on the local level, and at the same time move us toward more nuanced understandings of how racial considerations informed federal housing policy and shaped patterns of access. We have learned so much in the nearly four decades since Kenneth Jackson first uncovered irrefutable evidence which helped solidify a growing scholarly and public awareness that even outside of the U.S. South, the country's historic record of racial residential segregation has been de jure, not de facto. But there still remains much to be learned. By consulting the full range of available documentation and utilizing new methods to analyze and visualize the relevant data, we will be in a better position to discern the manifold and complex ways that racial logics guided the federal government's fateful interventions in the twentieth century American housing market.

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Notes

1. See especially Ta-Nahisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” *The Atlantic*, June 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/; David Freund, “We Can’t Forget How Racist Institutions Shaped Homeownership in America,” *Washington Post*, April 28, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/28/we-cant-forget-how-racist-institutions-shaped-homeownership-in-america/; and Richard Rothstein, *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America* (New York, 2017). For an even earlier treatment, see “The House We Live in,” episode 3 of California Newsreel’s *Race: The Power of an Illusion*, dir. Christine Herbes-Sommers, Tracy Heather Strain, and Llewellyn Smith (San Francisco, 2003), DVD, 56 min.
2. Price Fishback, Jonathan Rose, and Kenneth Snowden, *Well Worth Saving: How the New Deal Safeguarded Home Ownership* (Chicago, 2013).
3. These city maps and accompanying documentation can now be viewed through the “Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America” project, http://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/.
4. Kenneth T. Jackson, “Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration,” *Journal of Urban History* 6 (August 1980): 419-52; see also his subsequent book, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York, 1985), 190-230.
5. For an example of conflating the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’s (HOLC) two distinctive phases, see Dalton Conley, *Being Black, Living in the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America* (Berkeley, CA, 1999), 36-37; for a recent study that distinguishes the two, see Ocean Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco* (Chicago, 2015), 148-73.
6. Amy E. Hillier discovered African American HOLC borrowers in “Who Received Loans? Home Owners’ Loan Corporation Lending and Discrimination in Philadelphia in the 1930s,” *Journal of Planning History* 2 (February 2003): 3-24; “Residential Security Maps and Neighborhood Appraisals: The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and the Case of Philadelphia,” *Social Science History* 29 (Summer 2005): 207-33; and “Searching for Red Lines: Spatial Analysis of Lending Patterns in Philadelphia, 1940-1960,” *Pennsylvania History* 72, no. 1 (2005): 25-47. Two other researchers went further, yet concluded HOLC’s stated policies and record were entirely disparate; see Kristen B. Crossney and David W. Bartelt, “Residential Security, Risk, and Race: The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and Mortgage Access in Two Cities,” *Urban Geography* 26, no. 8 (2005): 707-36.
7. *Atlanta Daily World*, October 31, 1934; 1930 Manuscript Census, Macon, Bibb County (GA), Enumeration District 11-28, 9A; 1934 Macon City Directory, 304, www.ancestry.com.
8. See especially Arnold R. Hirsch, “‘Containment’ on the Home Front: Race and Federal Housing Policy from the New Deal to the Cold War,” *Journal of Urban History* 26 (January 2000): 158-80; and David M. P. Freund, *Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America* (Chicago, 2007).
9. Compare James Greer, “The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and the Development of the Residential Security Maps,” *Journal of Urban History* 39 (March 2013): 275-96; Louis Lee Woods II, “The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Redlining, and the National Proliferation of Racial Lending Discrimination, 1921-1950,” *Journal of Urban History* 38 (November 2012): 1036-59; and Jennifer S. Light, “Nationality and Neighborhood Risk at the Origins of FHA Underwriting,” *Journal of Urban History* 36 (September 2010): 634-71.
10. Freund strongly emphasizes this point, rebutting Hillier’s findings; *Colored Property*, 113-18, 431n29.
11. Marc A. Weiss, “Richard T. Ely and the Contribution of Economic Research to National Housing Policy, 1920-1940,” *Urban Studies* 26 (February 1989): 115-26; Norman G. Miller Jr. and Sergey Markosyan, “The Academic Roots and Evolution of Real Estate Appraisal,” *Appraisal Journal* 71 (April 2003): 172-84; and Robert Beauregard, “More than Sector Theory: Homer Hoyt’s Contributions to Planning Knowledge,” *Journal of Planning History* 6 (August 2007): 248-71. On contemporary real estate practices, see especially Jeffrey M. Hornstein, *A Nation of Realtors®: A Cultural History of the Twentieth-Century American Middle Class* (Durham, NC, 2005); and Paige Glotzer, “Exclusion

in Arcadia: How Suburban Developers Circulated Ideas about Discrimination, 1890-1950," *Journal of Urban History* 41 (May 2015): 479-94.

12. See Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, *Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*, 2nd ed. (New York, 2006).
13. William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo, "Race and Home Ownership: A Century-Long View," *Explorations in Economic History* 38 (January 2001): 68-92.
14. Howell calculates that while African Americans made up only 3.5 percent of homeowners in 1940, they constituted 5 percent of HOLC's mortgagors; Howell, *Making the Mission*, 152. However, access varied considerably on the local level. A recent article finds below-average HOLC access in predominantly black census tracts in Cleveland; see John F. Brennan, "The Impact of Depression-era Homeowners' Loan Corporation Lending in Greater Cleveland, Ohio," *Urban Geography* 36, no. 1 (2015): 1-28.
15. See Colin Gordon, *New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935* (Cambridge, 1994).
16. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," *Journal of American History* 91 (March 2005): 1233-63; see also Patricia Sullivan, *Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996).
17. Nancy J. Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR* (Princeton, NJ, 1983).
18. Freund, *Colored Property*, 111-18, 431n33; Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal," 421-24; C. Lowell Harriss, *History and Policies of the Home Owners Loan Corporation* (New York, 1951).
19. For the most detailed explanation to date on how and why these maps were commissioned, see Greer, "The Home Owners' Loan Corporation." For the claim that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) did not directly inherit its own neighborhood rating system from HOLC, see Jennifer Light, "Discriminating Appraisals: Cartography, Computation, and Access to Federal Mortgage Insurance in the 1930s," *Technology and Culture* 52 (July 2011): 485-522.
20. A recent overview of the HOLC recalculates that the agency lost some $53 million (about 2% of its overall lending volume), whereas previous estimates were that HOLC had turned a $14 million profit upon liquidation; Fishback, Rose, and Snowden, *Well Worth Saving*, 8, 112-19.
21. *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, June 3, 1933; *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 17, 1933; *New York Amsterdam News*, July 19, 1933; *Baltimore Afro-American*, April 29, 1933.
22. *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, July 15, 1933; *New York Amsterdam News*, November 8, 1933; *Atlanta Daily World*, June 18, 1935. For summaries of the law, see *Chicago Defender*, July 15, 1933; *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, July 15, 1933; *New York Amsterdam News*, August 23, 1933; and *Baltimore Afro-American*, October 7, 1933.
23. See *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, August 18, 1934; *Philadelphia Tribune*, September 20, 1934; *Chicago Defender*, October 6, 1934; *Baltimore Afro-American*, February 2, 1935; *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, May 25, 1935; *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 19, 1939; *Chicago Defender*, February 24, 1940; *Baltimore Afro-American*, August 5, 1944; *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, September 23, 1944; *Baltimore Afro-American*, February 17, 1945; and *Cleveland Call & Post*, November 29, 1947.
24. Perhaps the best example here is the Race Relations Service established in 1938 through the efforts of Robert Weaver, Frank Horne, and Corienne Morrow, which retained some influence at the Housing and Home Finance Agency until 1954; see Hirsch, "'Containment' on the Home Front," 174.
25. As an example of the intense disapproval whites commonly held toward integrated white-collar workplaces, a Detroit bank president wrote to the local HOLC head, "My boys tell me that Negroes and white boys and girls are promiscuously mixed in a clerical organization from stenographers up . . . I am glad to advise you, however, that they now report that there is a great improvement and that things seem to be running better and that there are evidently quite a few more competent people in important posts." Eugene W. Lewis to John H. Fahey, January 27, 1934, John H. Fahey Papers, Container 7, "Home Owners Loan Corporation—General, 1933-1950" folder, FDR Presidential Library (Hyde Park, NY).
26. *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 17, 1933; *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 19, 1933; *Pittsburgh Courier*, April 7, 1934; *Chicago Defender*, October 15, 1938; *Cleveland Call & Post*, October 27, 1934.

27. Draft, "Has the Roosevelt New Deal Helped the Colored Citizen?" August 24, 1936, President's Official File #93, "Colored Matters (Negroes), 1936" folder, FDR Presidential Library.
28. *Pittsburgh* Courier, August 26, 1933; *Baltimore Afro-American*, August 12, 1933; *Baltimore Afro-American*, March 10, 1934; *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 17, 1933; *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 31, 1933; *Atlanta Daily World*, May 24, 1934; *Atlanta Daily World*, July 28, 1935; *Atlanta Daily World*, September 1, 1935; *New York Amsterdam News*, June 1, 1935.
29. For an early example of suspicions "because the Home Owners Loan Corporation asks for the racial descent of the borrower," see Herman Dreer, "The Education of the Negro with Respect to His Background," *Journal of Negro History* 19 (January 1934): 46. On the FHA's origins and discriminatory intent, see Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal," 430-33; and Freund, *Colored Property*, 118-21, 129-30, 133-34, 180-82.
30. *Baltimore Afro-American*, August 26, 1933; *Chicago Defender*, May 26, 1934; *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, June 30, 1934; *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 28, 1934; "Aid for Homeowners," *The Crisis* 41 (November 1934): 342; *Baltimore Afro-American*, December 1, 1934; *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 22, 1934; *Atlanta Daily World*, March 1, 1935. For more on the Detroit allegations, see President's Official File #644b, Box 6, "Home Owners' Loan Corp., 1935" folder, FDR Presidential Library.
31. Walter White to John C. Dancy, March 11, 1935; John C. Dancy to Walter White, March 15, 1935, and Walter White to Robert F. Wagner, March 27, 1935, all in NAACP Papers, Group I, Series C, Box 278, available as *Papers of the NAACP, Part 10: Peonage, Labor, and the New Deal, 1913-1939*, ed. John H. Bracey Jr. and August Meier (Bethesda, MD, 1990), microfilm Reel 7, frames 00160, 00164, 00183.
32. *Norfolk Journal & Guide*, March 26, 1938; *Philadelphia Tribune*, April 21, 1938; *Chicago Defender*, April 23, 1938; *Cleveland Call & Post*, May 26, 1938; *Cleveland Call & Post*, October 13, 1938; *Chicago Defender*, October 22, 1938; *Atlanta Daily World*, December 28, 1938; *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 22, 1938.
33. *Atlanta Daily World*, December 28, 1938; "Housing Authority Draws Mortgage Color Line," *The Crisis* 46 (February 1939): 54-55; *New York Amsterdam News*, March 25, 1939. For NAACP suspicions as early as 1936, see N. D. B. Connolly, "How Did African Americans Discover They Were Being 'Redlined'?" August 9, 2015, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/primary-source/redlining-holc-fha-wilkins-weaver.
34. See *New York Amsterdam News*, June 24, 1939; *Atlanta Daily World*, December 15, 1939; *Baltimore Afro-American*, December 16, 1939; and *Chicago Defender*, January 6, 1940.
35. *Philadelphia Tribune*, May 22, 1943; *Baltimore Afro-American*, June 26, 1943.
36. See Arnold R. Hirsch, "Choosing Segregation: Federal Housing Policy between *Shelley* and *Brown*," in *From Tenements to Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century America*, ed. John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin Szylvian (University Park, PA, 2000), 206-25; Andrew Wiese, *Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 2004), 138-40, 221-23; and Freund, *Colored Property*, 186-88.
37. See Rebecca Marchiel, "Neighborhoods First: The Urban Reinvestment Movement in the Era of Financial Deregulation, 1966-1989" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2015).
38. See especially Colin Gordon, *Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City* (Philadelphia, 2008), 88-98.
39. Los Angeles, incidentally, is the only city on the list which had a substantial percentage of nonwhites who were not African American.
40. This racial disparity lessened by 1950 as blacks followed the general trend of spending accumulated wartime savings on home purchases. Although black homeownership continued to lag considerably behind, by the next census in none of these cities was the white homeownership rate triple that of the nonwhite, and the ratio exceeded double in just five cities: Chicago (2.72), New York (2.58), Baltimore (2.43), Philadelphia (2.11), and Saint Louis (2.09). U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Housing: 1950—Volume I: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1953), 90-97.
41. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume IV: Mortgages on Owner-Occupied Nonfarm Homes, Parts 2, 3* (Washington, D.C., 1943), passim; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940—Housing, Volume II: General Characteristics, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 143-45.
42. Matthew J. Countryman, *Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 2006), 17, 52-53; Charles Pete T. Banner-Haley, *To Do Good and to Do Well: Middle-Class Blacks*

and the Depression, Philadelphia, 1929-1941 (New York, 1993), 46; Marcus Anthony Hunter, *Black Citymakers: How the Philadelphia Negro Changed Urban America* (New York, 2013), 9-10, 21-66, 73, 84, 89, 104, 119; James Wolfinger, *Philadelphia Divided: Race and Politics in the City of Brotherly Love* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007), 13, 16, 20.

43. Lee Ann Lands, *The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing Landscapes in Atlanta, 1880-1950* (Athens, GA, 2009), 54-56, 89-92, 101-104, 140, 151-57, 167-70, 176-77; Ronald H. Bayor, *Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century Atlanta* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), 54-55; Tera W. Hunter, *To 'Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women's Lives and Labors after the Civil War* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 48-49, 101; Karen Ferguson, *Black Politics in New Deal Atlanta* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002), 25-26, 183-91, 202-18; Wiese, *Places of Their Own*, 175-78; Kevin M. Kruse, *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism* (Princeton, NJ, 2005), 43; Area Descriptions of D-15, D-17, D-18, and D-20, available through "Mapping Inequality" website.
44. David Allan Levine, *Internal Combustion: The Races in Detroit, 1915-1926* (Westport, CT, 1976), 99-101, 129-31, 204; Richard W. Thomas, *Life for Us Is What We Make It: Building Black Community in Detroit, 1915-1945* (Bloomington, IN, 1992), 101, 136, 140-43; Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 38-41, 44; Virginia W. Wolcott, *Remaking Respectability: African American Women in Interwar Detroit* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 134-36; Lila Corwin Berman, *Metropolitan Jews: Politics, Race, and Religion in Postwar Detroit* (Chicago, 2015), 58-59; Wiese, *Places of Their Own*, 47-50.
45. Josh Sides, *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present* (Berkeley, CA, 2003), 16-19 (quote from 16), 98-99; Douglas Flamming, *Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America* (Berkeley, CA, 2005), 25-29, 66, 68-69, 97, 152-56, 221-25, 264, 289-90, 378; Scott Kurashige, *The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles* (Princeton, NJ, 2008), 27-29, 32-35, 42, 45-46, 50-51, 57-61, 162-63; Marne L. Campbell, *Making Black Los Angeles: Class, Gender, and Community, 1850-1917* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2016), 102-103, 105, 109-11, 195; Wiese, *Places of Their Own*, 34-36, 42, 51, 77; Area Descriptions of D-32, D-61, D-50, and D-6, available through "Mapping Inequality."
46. HOLC records at the National Archives II (College Park, MD), including the General Administrative Correspondence series, form a division within the Records of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (RG 195; hereafter FHLBB). On the creation of this series, an early example of the federal government using microfilming to conserve shelving space, see "Historical News," *American Historical Review* 48 (January 1943): 449.
47. On HOLC's geographic organization, see *Third Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board* (Washington, D.C., 1936), 53-55, Exhibit 1 (map) between 60-61; and *The Blue Book: A Brief Account of the Lending Operation of [the] Home Owners' Loan Corporation*, prep. C. S. Shade (Washington, D.C., 1936), 19-22.
48. Karen Ferguson, *Black Politics in New Deal Atlanta* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002).
49. On African Americans and the New Deal in Chicago, see Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (New York, 1990); and Lionel Kimble Jr., *A New Deal for Bronzeville: Housing, Employment, and Civil Rights in Black Chicago, 1935-1955* (Carbondale, IL, 2015).
50. "'Political Clearance' and the Merit System in Washington," *Social Service Review* 8 (September 1934): 541; E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the Seventy-Fourth Congress," *American Political Science Review* 29 (December 1935): 1003-4.
51. Frank Holden to Charles Jones, January 16, 1934, Roll 76, Atlanta Region, Home Owners Loan Corporation, Microfilm copies of General Administrative Correspondence 1933-36, Records of the FHLBB (hereafter Atlanta-HOLC); Frank Holden to T. D. Webb, February 6, 1934, Roll 76, Atlanta-HOLC; Charles Jones to Mr. Newton, March 15, 1934, Roll 74, Atlanta-HOLC; George West to Harold Lee, April 21, 1934, Roll 76, Atlanta-HOLC; "Minutes of Joint Meeting," May 22, 1934, Roll 78, Atlanta-HOLC; George West to William Penniman, October 11, 1934, Roll 76, Atlanta-HOLC.
52. George West to F. A. Bickert, July 16, 1934, Roll 76, Atlanta-HOLC. For an elderly widow "of mixed Indian and negro [*sic*] blood," whom the New Orleans HOLC office "probably spent more time in considering . . . than . . . any other applicant," see Waldo Pitkin to Paul Habans, October 29, 1933, Box 5, Sample of General Loan Correspondence of Home Office 1933-36, HOLC, FHLBB.

53. George West to William Penniman, April 28 and 30, 1934; George West to George Williams, April 30, 1934; and Dewald Cohen to George West, April 28, 1934, all on Roll 74, Atlanta-HOLC.
54. W. C. Lee to Sidney Smith, July 6, 1934, Roll 76, Atlanta-HOLC. On spatial disadvantage in Atlanta's black neighborhood development, see Bartow Elmore, "Hydrology and Residential Segregation in the Postwar South: An Environmental History of Atlanta, 1865-1895," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 94 (Spring 2010): 30-61.
55. "Report of Field Examiner's Work at the Georgia State Office, January 6 through January 9, 1935," Roll 233, Atlanta-HOLC; "Report of Field Examiner's Work at the Georgia State Office, December 31, 1934 to January 4, 1935," Roll 233, Atlanta-HOLC; "Report of Field Examiners for Week Ending May 31, 1935," Roll 224, Atlanta-HOLC; "Report of Field Examiners for Week Ending April 27, 1935," Roll 233, Atlanta-HOLC.
56. Even the titles are revealing: "Old Negro Preacher Gets HOLC Aid, Keeps Home," *Macon Telegraph*, September 22, 1934; "Finances Burden Negress Long Time, But Not Now," *Macon Telegraph*, September 24, 1934; "Paid 18 Years on Home, Negro is Saved by HOLC," *Macon Telegraph*, September 26, 1934, all on Roll 77, Atlanta-HOLC. For a white employer writing on a domestic worker's behalf, see Ellabert Miller to President Roosevelt, June 10, 1934, Box 16, Sample of General Loan Correspondence of Home Office, HOLC, FHLBB.
57. In private, they not infrequently incorporated racial epithets or jokes, not just in their correspondence but even in internal staff newsletters; see Sam Florence to P. W. Kniskern, May 17, 1934, Roll 69; "HOLC'um News," December 21, 1934, Roll 76; and Kirk Smith to Howard Schladt, September 5, 1934, Roll 78, all in Atlanta-HOLC.
58. On real estate industry professionals dominating both HOLC and FHA, and the industry supplying the bulk of these agencies' personnel, see Hornstein, *Nation of Realtors®*, 118-55; for a local case study of appraiser backgrounds, see Raymond Mohl, "Trouble in Paradise: Race and Housing in Miami during the New Deal Era," *Prologue* 19 (Spring 1987): 14-20.
59. "Discourse between Col. Warren Dean and Jos. S. Shaw" (early September 1933), Roll 235; Eugene Welt to Paul Vardaman, May 23, 1934, Roll 77, both in Atlanta-HOLC. Similarly, certain appraisers in Alabama specialized in "cheap property"; see "State Appraisal Advisor's Conference," March 28, 1934, Roll 69, Atlanta-HOLC.
60. L. B. Leftwich to Charles A. Jones, March 2, 1934, Roll 65; "These Questions to Be Answered . . .," enclosed with "Minutes of Meeting of State Appraisal Advisors," May 9, 1934, Roll 69, both in Atlanta-HOLC. Higher-ups also discussed procedures for appraising black-owned property; see, for example, "A meeting was held . . ." (minutes), May 19, 1934, Roll 69, Atlanta-HOLC.
61. "A meeting was called . . .," August 1, 1934, Roll 233, Atlanta-HOLC. On encountering such distinctions in the area descriptions accompanying HOLC's redlining maps, one historian could conclude only that HOLC appraisers "perpetuated a white elite and middle-class frame of reference"; Lands, *Culture of Property*, 161-62.
62. This information comes from C. Lowell Harriss's sample of HOLC loans, for his *History and Policies of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation* (New York, 1951). The sample is available as PDFs of the original cards and as a spreadsheet from the National Bureau of Economic Research at http://www.nber.org/nberhistory/historicalarchives/archives.html.
63. William Penniman to James Bruce, December 8, 1933, Roll 78, Atlanta-HOLC; A. B. Chapman to John W. Milsaps, October 26, 1934, in Series III, Sub-Series IX, box 1, folder 3, Long-Rucker-Aiken Family Papers, Atlanta History Center (Atlanta, GA).
64. Kristen B. Crossney and David W. Bartelt note "This dual role, facilitating both the homeowner and the lending industry, is not often commented on or explored in the literature." Crossney and Bartelt, "The Legacy of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation," *Housing Policy Debate* 16, nos. 3-4 (2005): 551. The most extensive quantitative analysis to date concludes "in many ways the HOLC was a lenders' program." Jonathan D. Rose, "The Incredible HOLC? Mortgage Relief During the Great Depression," *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* 43 (September 2011): 1073-1108 (quote from 1074).
65. Carol Aronovici, "Housing the Poor: Mirage or Reality," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 1 (March 1934): 149; Morton Bodfish, "Government and Private Loans on Real Estate," *Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics* 11 (November 1935): 404; Morton Bodfish, "A Sound System of Mortgage Credits and Its Relation to Banking Policy," *Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics* 11 (August

1935): 224. See also the newspaper quotes in Rose, "Incredible HOLC," 1095-96. Federal Home Loan Bank Board annual reports occasionally mentioned this dimension; see *Third Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board* (Washington, D.C., 1936), 59.

66. Homer Folks et al., "Discussion: Security in Home," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 16 (June 1935): 61. For another telling remark in the same journal issue, see Henry E. Hoagland, "The Relation of the Work of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to Home Security and Betterment," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 16 (June 1935): 49.
67. Henry B. Ward and Walter R. Miles, "The St. Louis Meeting of the American Association for Advancement of Science and Associated Societies," *Science* 83, special issue (February 7, 1936): 137; Spurgeon Bell, "Shifts in the Sources of Funds for Home Financing, 1930-1937," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 5 (Autumn 1938): 513.
68. Winfield W. Riefler, "The Obstacles to Recovery in the Building Industry," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 18 (May 1938): 18; David M. French, "The Contest for a National System of Home-Mortgage Finance," *American Political Science Review* 35, no. 1 (1941), esp. 64 (quote).
69. Horace Russell's memoir is additionally useful for his perspective as a drafter of the original HOLC legislation; see Russell, *Savings and Loan Associations* (Albany, NY, 1956), esp. 51-59.
70. Joseph Shaw to Horace Russell, April 23, 1934, Roll 235, Atlanta-HOLC; David L. Mason, *From Buildings and Loans to Bail-Outs: A History of the American Savings and Loan Industry, 1831-1995* (New York, 2004), 115; Rose, "Incredible HOLC," esp. 1074-75, 1079-80, 1090, 1100.
71. Thrifts were actually more resilient than banks, with just 1 percent failing in the first year after the Great Crash as compared with 6 percent of banks; by the end of 1932, 2 percent of thrifts had failed as compared with 20 percent of banks. Some thrifts survived the Depression by delaying foreclosure on delinquent borrowers, although this could lead to the problem of "frozen" assets; see Mason, *From Buildings and Loans to Bail-Outs*, 77-78, 117-18.
72. Joseph Shaw to Horace Russell, April 26, 1934, Roll 235, Atlanta-HOLC. For more on HOLC's valuation formula, see Rose, "Incredible HOLC," 1088-89. For further confirmation of higher capitalization rates being assessed on "cheaper colored property . . . of the shot-gun type," see Kirk Smith to Philip Kniskern, July 27, 1934, and Howard Schladt to Philip Kniskern, August 1, 1934, both on Roll 77, Atlanta-HOLC.
73. On whites' knowledge regarding the profitability of "colored" real estate, see N. D. B. Connolly, *A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Making of Jim Crow South Florida* (Chicago, 2014), esp. 166-68.
74. See Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot* (Chicago, 1922), 200-201, 219-27; T. J. Woofter Jr., *Negro Problems in Cities* (Garden City, NY, 1928), 146; President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, *Negro Housing: Report of the Committee on Negro Housing* (Washington, D.C., 1932), 78-83; and Richard Sterner, *The Negro's Share: A Study of Income, Consumption, Housing, and Public Assistance* (New York, 1943), 195-96, 409. NAACP investigator William Pickens reported in 1934 on conditions in Louisiana: "The extent of the robbery committed against colored people by mortgage holders under the New Deal is appalling. Too bad, that they [African Americans] had no home-buying organization of their own to save them from the sharks." Quoted in Sheldon Avery, *Up from Washington: William Pickens and the Negro Struggle for Equality, 1900-1954* (Newark, DE, 1989), 142.
75. J. E. Morton, *Urban Mortgage Lending: Comparative Markets and Experience* (New York, 1956), 54-55, 90-91; Eugene N. White, "Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s," in *Housing and Mortgage Markets in Historical Perspective*, ed. Eugene N. White, Kenneth Snowden, and Price Fishback (Chicago, 2014), 134-36; R. J. Saulnier, *Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies* (New York, 1950), esp. 9, 11-12, 14-15, 19, 43.
76. Surging costs of loan origination and servicing after 1929 gave insurance companies an additional incentive to clear their books. And considering their large and diverse investment portfolios, their overall losses on home mortgage loans were insignificant in the end. See Saulnier, *Urban Mortgage Lending*, 31-32, 91, 97, 99, 100, 103. For a succinct summation of the reasons why large lenders "deleveraged" during the Depression, see Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith, "Consumption and Investment Booms in the 1920s and Their Collapse in 1930," in *Housing and Mortgage Markets in Historical Perspective*, ed. Eugene N. White, Kenneth Snowden, and Price Fishback (Chicago, 2014), 110.

77. Rose, "Incredible HOLC," 1080-81, 1094 (quote); Mason, *From Buildings and Loans to Bail-Outs*, 112, 113. On the larger macroeconomic context here, see Judge Glock, *Bailouts and a Balanced Economy: A New History of the American State, 1913-1939* (New York, forthcoming), chap. 7.
78. See Sterner, *Negro's Share*, 408 (Appendix Table 54). In a further complication, some such small lending institutions were black-owned. See Department of Commerce, Division of Negro Affairs, "Negro Managed Building and Loan Associations in Philadelphia" (report), January 28, 1937, 1, for a table with HOLC bonds listed among the institutions' assets.
79. W. H. Smith to Will Wright, September 3, 1934, Atlanta Life Insurance Company Records, Series 1H, box 50, folder 22, Auburn Avenue Research Library on African American Culture and History (Atlanta, GA); see also W. H. Smith to George W. Benton, March 6, 1934, Atlanta Life Insurance Company Records, Series 1H, box 50, folder 12, and W. H. Smith to J. H. Kendall, December 4, 1933, Atlanta Life Insurance Company Records, Series 1H, box 50, folder 14.
80. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Second Annual Report of Lending Institutions Operated by Negroes* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 3; Shaw to Russell, April 23, 1934. An FHA administrator admitted on one occasion that black mortgagors had a better record of repayment than whites; Robert C. Weaver, "Race Restrictive Covenants," *Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics* 20 (August 1944): 190.
81. On contemporary real estate practices, see especially Hornstein, *Nation of Realtors®*, and Glotzer, "Exclusion in Arcadia."
82. John H. Fahey, "Better and Safer Home Ownership: A Program for Better Citizenship," *Vital Speeches of the Day* (September 1, 1938), 683, 685.
83. A recent article argues that FHA's record was less inequitable than assumed (especially compared with the private housing industry), but focuses on the period after 1950; see Judge Glock, "How the Federal Housing Administration Tried to Save America's Cities, 1934-1960," *Journal of Policy History* 28 (April 2016): 290-316. See also Charles M. Lamb and Adam W. Wye, "Do Presidents Control Bureaucracy? The Federal Housing Administration during the Truman-Eisenhower Era," *Political Science Quarterly* 127, no. 3 (2012): 445-67.
84. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1950—Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1953), 36-47; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Housing: 1950—Volume IV: Residential Financing, Mortgaged Nonfarm Properties, Part 2: Large SMAs* (Washington, D.C., 1952), passim.
85. On FHA-VA-backed developments for African Americans, see Wiese, *Places of Their Own*, 138-40. For some examples, see Donald W. Wyatt, "Better Homes for Negro Families in the South," *Social Forces* 28 (March 1950): 297-303; and Albert L. Thompson, "Negro Mortgagees and Builders in the South," *Insured Mortgage Portfolio* 18 (Fall 1953): 9-11. On Atlanta specifically, see Lands, *Culture of Property*, 166-90.
86. N. D. B. Connolly, LaDale Winling, Robert K. Nelson, and Richard Marciano, "Mapping Inequality: Big Data Meets Social History in the Story of Redlining," in *The Routledge Companion to Spatial History*, ed. Ian Gregory, Don DeBats, and Don Lafreniere (London, 2018), 502-24.

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