



## **EVALUATION**

# **Final Performance Evaluation of Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability 2012-2017**

### **August 2017**

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## ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEITI	Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
AGS	Afghanistan Geological Survey
AME	Afghanistan Mining Enterprises Initiatives
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
AO	Assistance Objectives
APA	Afghan Petroleum Authority
ARCP	Afghan Rescue Coordination Project
BGS	British Geological Survey
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
DFID	Department For International Development (UK)
DO	Development Objectives
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GIRoA	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GIS	Geological Information System
GIZ	Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HQ	Head Quarters
IR	Intermediate Result
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MIDAS	Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoMP	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (formerly Ministry of Mines)

NAPWA	National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan
NEPA	National Environmental Protection Agency
OI	Office of Infrastructure
OPPD	Office of Program and Project Development
PIRS	Performance Indicator Reference Sheet
PPG	Project Preparation Grant
SDNRP	Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project
SI	Social Impact
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SME	Small/Medium Enterprise
SOW	Scope of Work
STA	Senior Technical Advisor
TA	Technical Assistance
TFBSO	Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
TL	Team Leader
TO	Task Ordered
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USGS	United States Geological Survey
USTDA	United States Trade and Development Agency

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **EVALUATION PURPOSE**

The purpose of this evaluation is to identify lessons learned in the extractives sector to influence future management decision-making. This evaluation addresses how the lack of a consistent strategy on the part of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and especially within the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP), affected the Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) program and its intended results. An equal effort is directed towards the identification of MIDAS' shortcomings in its planned and implemented support to help the MoMP establish a framework and management system for the extractives sector that both attracts investors and yields appropriate returns to the GIROA.

The primary audience for this evaluation includes USAID's Office of Infrastructure (OI) and Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD). Given the potential importance of the extractives sector to Afghanistan's long term economic self-reliance, this evaluation report will also be of interest to USAID for the development of its future plans and country development cooperation strategy.

### **BACKGROUND**

Emergence of a stable, prosperous Afghanistan depends on the development of a strong Afghan economy that provides jobs for its workers and non-donor revenue to support government activities. Numerous analyses of Afghanistan's economic development options indicate that development of Afghanistan's extractives sector is the country's best, and perhaps only, option to achieve the degree of economic growth that supports the level of job creation needed to reduce economic inequality and, therefore, reduce support for insurgents.

MIDAS was designed to assist GIROA to support and accelerate the expected rapid expansion of the extractives sector and prepare GIROA, the Afghan private sector, and the Afghan people to more effectively capture this expected windfall. Unfortunately, the inability of Parliament to pass a workable mining law, and, to a much lesser degree, the decline in commodity prices, has effectively stalled development of Afghanistan's extractives sector. MIDAS' success was predicated on the expectation that both an improved, unamended mining law would be passed by Parliament at project inception, and high international demand for extractives would continue. MIDAS struggled when neither of these conditions was realized.

MIDAS was designed with three primary program goals. Component I was intended to transform the legal and regulatory environment in the mining sector to create an investor-friendly force for the economy. Component II was intended to support the MoMP and Afghanistan Geological Survey (AGS) in the development of a "pipeline" of mineral projects for tender to international investors. Component III was intended to strengthen the capacity of the private sector to participate in the mining value chains as well as to empower mining communities to defend their rights during mine developments.

### **EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND METHODS**

In brief, this evaluation answers several questions. What did MIDAS do well? How could future donor assistance to MoMP be better structured to make it more effective under the current political and security environment? What factors were most responsible for implementation difficulties, and what can

be learned from these difficulties that will help USAID design a more effective intervention in the future? The specific questions that this evaluation addresses are:

1. To what extent was MIDAS successful in achieving its intended objectives?
  - a. What have been MIDAS' greatest achievements?
  - b. What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its intended objectives?
  - c. What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy in MoMP have on achieving MIDAS' objectives?
2. To what extent did revision of the scope of work for the MIDAS project address strategic needs of MoMP in the areas of hydrocarbons and minerals?
3. What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision-making for development of a similar technical assistance project?

The four-person evaluation team employed a mixed-methods approach using rapid appraisal techniques such as document review, semi-structured key informant interviews (KIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and informal direct observation to obtain qualitative and available quantitative data. Evaluation Team members included an evaluation methods specialist (Industrial and Systems Engineer) and a professional geologist, both with extensive experience in Afghanistan.

The Evaluation Team was fully conscious of the potential for positive bias in responses from the MIDAS team. The team also anticipated potential positive bias from MoMP respondents, because with other sources of donor support to MoMP ended, it would be advantageous to the Ministry to indicate MIDAS success to encourage USAID support for a follow-on program. To minimize the potential for individual responses to bias the evaluation, only those findings which were highlighted by three or more KIs or FGDs have been utilized. The independent confirmation of findings by three or more sources lends strength to the presented findings.

Although a formal sample frame was not developed, essentially all available MIDAS and MoMP staff were invited for KIs and FGDs.

The evaluation was limited by MIDAS' impending closeout two weeks after the team's arrival, departure of most expatriate and FSN MIDAS staff prior to the team's arrival, ongoing relocation and consolidation of MoMP into the AGS building, inconsistent access to training participants between the activity's components, and an inability to contact the 12-15 reported MIDAS-supported female interns to obtain their insights on the evaluation questions.

## **MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

MIDAS was conceived as an attempt to address and resolve the most critical issues impeding rapid development of the mining industry. Though the MIDAS interventions were and are critically needed, the planned scope was perhaps too ambitious given the project resources committed by USAID and the degree of disorder and dysfunction within MoMP. The opportunity for success was further hampered by the unexpected - though not unforeseeable - commodity price collapse that began during the MIDAS design phase and the inability of GIRA, despite numerous attempts over the preceding decade, to pass a workable mining law.



### **What were MIDAS' greatest achievements?**

Capacity building was most often cited as a minor MIDAS achievement by Component I and much less so by Component II beneficiaries. In all cases, this success is tempered by follow-on complaints that training was typically poor in quality and inadequate for intended purposes. Component I produced the most tangible products – draft policies and implementation regulations, standard mining permit applications, example mining contracts, and other similar documents. With no workable mining law in place, however, many of these products will have to be altered to comply with the next amended law. Though not planned under the original SOW, the Component I team provided critical and greatly appreciated contractual legal advice to MoMP and GIRA. MIDAS proactively supported gender issues, but changing MoMP and USAID agendas undermined several planned gender activities. MIDAS made substantial efforts to coordinate its programmatic activities with other donors to minimize duplication, but poor information dissemination within MoMP and between MoMP and its donors limited the success of this effort.

Component III was designed to teach villagers, women, local businessmen and local government officials how to manage their interactions with mining companies, and how to benefit from the development of the extractives sector. Of the three components, Component III workshops account for the majority of the training hours delivered according to the MIDAS monthly reports. Because the assessment team did not have access to Component III MIDAS team members, or to the individuals that received training in the provinces, it cannot evaluate perceptions of the effectiveness of this effort. However, the team can note that this effort was premature and, therefore, unlikely to have been particularly effective. The conditions needed to foster the expected mining boom never developed due to the absence of a workable mining law and policies adopted by the Afghan Government, so there is no legal mining industry with which nearby villagers and governments can interact.

### **What were MIDAS' greatest challenges?**

Given inadequate analysis of MoMP's critical needs and lack of identification of opportunities to capitalize on recent successful interventions at MoMP, the MIDAS program design was flawed from inception. Unlike the capacity building offered by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), MIDAS Component I and II training was regarded as irrelevant, of poor quality, too short-term, repetitive, and led by minimally to completely unqualified trainers by virtually all interviewed training recipients and their supervisors. Component III training was provided to unnamed participants in the provinces. These training recipients were inaccessible to the assessment team.<sup>1</sup> MIDAS was unable to regularly embed its staff within MoMP, so program counterparts did not benefit from regular on-the-job interactions for any of the Components. This limited interaction and constrained communications left MoMP counterparts mostly unaware of changes

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<sup>1</sup> The evaluation team was not provided with a list of training participants under Component III, and so this finding only applies to the training under Components I and II where the team was able to speak with participants and their supervisors.

and the reasons for changes in MIDAS' program focus. As a result, MoMP counterparts concluded that MIDAS was purposefully unresponsive to their stated needs.

Unrealistic expectations for the success of the exploration element of Component II caused by USAID's lack of understanding of the realities of the mining industry resulted in over-promised outcomes. Subsequent elimination of the on-budget exploration component led MoMP/AGS to conclude that MIDAS was not serious in its commitment to support exploration training.

Though well intentioned, Component I internships were too short to provide the experience levels required for MoMP employment. Furthermore, a more carefully structured internship program could have been used to facilitate the hiring of more women into MoMP. Programmatic drift due to frequent leadership changes at MoMP derailed many of the gender support programs planned by MIDAS.

**What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy at MoMP have on achieving MIDAS objectives?**

Despite efforts by MIDAS to support MoMP, the Ministry did not effectively communicate to Parliamentarians the importance of passing the Mining Law of 2014 without constraining or burdensome amendments. MoMP's inability to accomplish this task resulted in the passage of a Mining Law that limited the effectiveness of much of the Component I effort to develop implementing policy and regulations. MoMP leadership was fluid (five ministers in four years) and the Ministry lacked an entrenched middle management (20 of 23 Directorates were led by powerless caretakers) that might have slowed or restrained the abrupt policy changes instituted by each incoming Minister. Furthermore, MoMP has no long-term strategic plan to guide new ministers and restrain uninformed decisions. Unreformed bureaucratic and administrative procedures, ineffective internal information flow and internal political rivalries within MoMP undermined implementation of many of MIDAS' efforts, particularly the on-budget exploration element. MoMP did not proactively address gender issues.

**To what extent did the revision of the scope of work of the MIDAS project address the strategic needs of MoMP in the area of hydrocarbons and minerals?**

In spite of the fact that changes in the SOW were initiated at the request of each incoming minister, poor communications within MoMP and between MIDAS and its MoMP counterparts led MoMP rank and file to conclude that MIDAS abandoned programs and shifted program emphasis at random. All of MIDAS' MoMP counterparts assumed that MIDAS was simply ignoring their needs, and that MoMP and MIDAS were working on parallel unconnected project agendas. On the positive side, KIIs and FGDs with the Afghan Petroleum Authority (APA) and related MoMP Directorate staff indicate they were appreciative of the limited three-month support provided by MIDAS.

**What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision making for development of a similar technical assistance project?**

The absence of direct support and consultation with USGS was disappointing to the MoMP and led to unfavorable comparisons between the MIDAS' effort and the highly appreciated historical work in Afghanistan by USGS and TFBSO. The MoMP did not feel that its capacity building needs were addressed by MIDAS plans, or that MoMP was adequately consulted regarding Ministry needs when the MIDAS program was designed. AGS signaled that it needed significant additional assistance to improve its skills in mineral exploration and tender development functions as charged under the Mining Law of 2014, but the MIDAS effort was underfunded to accomplish this element. Widespread communications

failures impacted every aspect of MIDAS implementation, from its inability to interact effectively with its MoMP counterparts, to MoMP's inability to educate parliamentarians, to MoMP/GIRoA's inability to temper public expectations for the Afghan extractives sector.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Because of the high turnover rates within MoMP, capacity building efforts should be continued. The capacity builders must be specialists within their fields, and must be embedded with their counterparts to provide on-the-job training experiences. The MoMP must be an active partner in designing capacity building interventions. Based upon its historical success and reputation at the MoMP, the U.S. Geological Survey should be the primary agency responsible for capacity building at AGS.

MoMP complains that there is a shortage of qualified candidates to fill vacant positions. In the short-term, this can be partially ameliorated by providing year-long internships that prepare interns for MoMP employment. For such a program to be successful, MoMP must commit to hiring qualified interns. The internship program can also be used to improve gender balance in MoMP. Over the longer term, intervention at the university level will be needed to increase the qualifications of students at graduation. Given the large number of technical experts to be engaged at MoMP, a cooperative arrangement can be designed to utilize project experts to teach at university and initiate arrangements to improve the expertise of existing technical university teachers. Special scholarships or work/study arrangements to support female students is another avenue to boost opportunities for gender equality.

TORs for future extractives sector support programs should be prepared by teams who understand the extractives sector. If exploration training is to be supported under future initiatives, focus should be placed on commodities that are likely to attract international investors (i.e. gold, lithium, rare earths, etc.) and the scope of the proposed exploration program should reflect the committed funding.

There have been multiple attempts by many donors to develop a workable Mining Law for Afghanistan. A different strategy may be warranted. The Afghan public and Afghan leadership harbor many misconceptions surrounding the extractives sector and the amount of wealth it brings to the nation, as well as the extent of theft through illegal mining. A public relations education campaign combined with collection of reliable data on the amount of ongoing illegal mining might broaden support for real reform of the extractives sector. Although expensive, mining law experts with international experience must be retained to advise MoMP, along with the Executive and Parliament, to help prevent very costly delays and ill-advised legislation. U.S. senior diplomatic support should also be engaged to educate GIRoA.

Every effort needs to be made to improve coordination among donors supporting MoMP, and to improve communications between donors and MoMP leadership. It is equally important to significantly increase internal coordination and information sharing among and between MoMP Directorates and their staff. In the absence of significantly improved communication and coordination between MoMP and both the leadership and staff of any new project, the donor community should not expect improvements to program performance in the future.

MoMP needs assistance in developing a long-term strategic operations plan to reduce Ministry programmatic drift with every change of minister. Encouraging retention of a permanent middle management within the Ministry will also help to arrest some of this drift and help to build a useful institutional memory to avoid past mistakes

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **PROJECT BACKGROUND**

The reconstruction of Afghanistan's economy began immediately after the fall of the Taliban regime. Early in this process, The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), USAID, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB) and other donors recognized the potential of the extractives sector to provide jobs to the rural population and provide operating income to the GIRoA. By 2004, DFID supported the British Geological Survey (BGS) to provide capacity building for the Afghanistan Geological Survey office (AGS) and USTDA engaged USGS to conduct an assessment of Afghanistan's oil and gas potential. In 2005, USAID expanded the USGS mission to include capacity building at AGS, and the World Bank engaged USGS to provide hydrological support to the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW). USAID supported USGS activities until early 2009, when TFBSO assumed responsibility for supporting and expanding the USGS capacity building mission to both AGS and the Afghan Petroleum Authority (APA). This support continued until the close of 2014. In 2012, USAID began planning a follow-on to the sun-setting of the TFBSO effort, and designed MIDAS while commodity prices were skyrocketing and planners were assuming that Afghanistan would become the world's largest new exploration destination. MIDAS was designed to assist GIRoA to support and accelerate the expected rapid expansion of the extractives sector and prepare GIRoA, the Afghan private sector, and the Afghan people to more effectively capture this expected windfall. The subsequent collapse in commodity prices and, more critically, the inability of Parliament to pass a workable Mining Law, has effectively halted development of Afghanistan's extractives sector.

MIDAS was designed to incorporate the goals set forth in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and its companion document, the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). MIDAS aspired to promote the development of Afghanistan's extractives sector, promote the role of women in the mining industry, and simultaneously protect women from the negative impacts of mining experienced elsewhere in the world. The areas in which MIDAS intended to build capacity included:

- Data analysis and management to verify the location and quantity of mineral deposits;
- Developing, negotiating, evaluating and packaging tenders;
- Managing contracts in keeping with international standards to ensure greater transparency;
- Government revenue generation, and local economic development;
- Establishing mining policy frameworks;
- Supporting environmental compliance;
- Geo-science;
- Promoting investment; and
- Reforming mining policy and regulations.

### **Program Objectives**

Initially, the MIDAS project was designed to help MoMP tender eight to ten mineral projects to international investor in order to help the Afghan economy generate revenue and employment.

However, due to numerous changes of management and staff personnel, particularly at senior ministerial levels, the MIDAS project was frequently instructed to change programmatic direction. These changes included a request to stop large scale mineral project development and instead prioritize development of the natural gas sector. More contract management support was also requested.

MIDAS provided technical assistance to MoMP to support its transformation into the regulatory body for the extractives sector. Some steps toward this transformation had already been undertaken, but to secure the progress achieved and to further strengthen the shift of the MoMP away from its former role as a Soviet-style monopoly in the sector, more work was needed. The essence of this effort was to assist MoMP in opening the extractives sector to private investment while focusing MoMP's attention on monitoring the activities of those private firms—both large and small—to extract in a safe working environment, adhere to sound environmental protection practices, provide for sensible community development, and maximize revenue generation for the people of Afghanistan.

MIDAS' primary objectives were:

1. Reform MoMP's legal and regulatory regime for the extractives sector, including building the capacity of MoMP to professionally conduct its own activities competently based on sound legal principles.
2. Build capacity of MoMP to determine the value of the nation's natural resources. At MIDAS' completion, MoMP was expected to be able to assess the nature and extent of the nation's mineral and energy resources, with an understanding of the market concepts governing the value of those resources.
3. Support the private sector to participate in the extractives sector.

The Results Framework for MIDAS is available in Annex 5.

### **Component I – Reforming Mining Policy and Regulation**

While there have been some new legislative measures adopted for the extractives sector over the past three years, not all can be viewed as wholly supportive of the effort to transform MoMP into the regulatory body for the extractives sector, nor entirely supportive of the effort to make the extractives sector inviting, friendly and open to private investors. GIRoA must continue to press for reform in these regards and fine-tune its legal and regulatory provisions on royalty, tax, environmental and licensing matters, as well as on implementing procedures in the extractives sector, to align these provisions with world-class standards.

MIDAS' Component I provided technical assistance to MoMP to continue its effort to bring the legal and regulatory regime of its extractives sector into alignment with international norms for such sectors.

Planned Activities Under Component I:

- Continued development of legislation for the extractives sector such that the sectoral laws are aligned with international best practice to create an industry-friendly environment
- Development of regulations, including financial regulations, supporting and implementing the Mining Law
- MoMP institutional and administrative structural reform to transform MoMP into the regulatory body for the extractives sector

- Development of internal MoMP procedures to guide the day-to-day activities of the regulatory agency staff
- Provision of on-the-job instruction to the MoMP legal staff to teach them normal regulatory body activities, including drafting and analysis of extractive contracts and related documents, contract management and monitoring processes, and inspection and enforcement activities

#### Expected Component I Results:

- Development of legislative regulatory frameworks, including internal procedures, that establish MoMP as the primary regulatory authority for the extractives sector, and which promote business activities and revenue generation by being better aligned with international best practice in the extractives sector
- Substantial progress toward establishing a legal and regulatory regime for the extractives sector which encourages domestic and foreign investment in Afghanistan and ensures appropriate financial gains, rights and protections for GIROA and the people of Afghanistan
- Development of internal operating procedures within MoMP
- Development of legal capacity within MoMP such that it will be more self-sufficient in regulating the extractives sector, including in the areas of licensing, contracting, enforcement, dispute settlement, and revenue management

#### **Component II – Strengthening Capacity at the MoMP**

MoMP's needs included improving resource analysis and quantification; developing skilled financial, economic and policy analysis staff; improving administration; building mineral information databases accessible to potential investors; and creating investment promotion capacity. MIDAS intended to place emphasis primarily on financial analysis, strategic planning and transaction advisory services in support of investment tender development and subsequent contract management.

The MoMP also required additional capacity development and significant re-structuring for the Afghan Geological Survey (AGS). MIDAS intended to achieve this through on-site training, mentoring and capacity development. Technical support and advisory services to the AGS would be provided by a small, streamlined specialty group initially working in three limited areas: (1) providing MoMP with recommendations on restructuring the AGS from a Soviet-era bureaucracy into a streamlined, tightly-focused geological survey in line with those of other developing countries; (2) consolidating AGS technical data scattered around the workplace into a single location, accessible to domestic and international investors; and (3) providing GIS training and capacity development to provincial MoMP and AGS staff.

#### Planned Activities Under Component II:

- Technical assistance and implementation support to develop MoMP expertise in (1) financial and data analysis and management to verify the quantity and quality of resource deposits in line with NI 43-101 standards; (2) evaluating and packaging tenders; and (3) managing and implementing contracts in line with international standards to ensure transparency, greater government revenue generation, and local economic development. MIDAS intended to develop a structure that supported the Minister's and USAID's requests for the MoMP to become effective.
- Support to the Ministry to improve MoMP's ability to manage contracts, using existing contracts as case studies

- Building MoMP capacity for strategic planning and analysis, particularly in terms of developing a long-term view of expanding the country's extractives sector. Focus is on avoiding the "resource curse" and raising unreasonable expectations
- Development of financial and economic analysis capabilities that enable the Ministry to persuade the government of the importance of making Afghanistan's extractives sector fiscal regimes fair, transparent and globally-competitive
- Technical Assistance (TA) to improve MoMP's budgeting processes and procedures, procurement procedures and financial management practices
- Other activities that will improve the prospects for the success of this Component

**Expected Component II Results:**

- Development of capacity throughout MoMP to develop, promote and manage tenders for domestic and international investors
- Development of capacity to efficiently allocate, disburse and manage development assistance as well as appropriately manage the revenues that the extractives sector will produce

**Component III - Supporting the Private Sector and Mining Project Development**

Component III was designed to strengthen the capacity of the private sector to join the mining value chain as well as to empower mining communities to defend their rights during mine developments. MIDAS intended to strengthen communication channels in the mining industry among the government, communities, civil society organizations, and private sector entities. Empowering women to participate in the mining sector was an important part of the MIDAS mission.

**Planned Activities Under Component III:**

- Technical assistance (TA) to improve production or services in activities engaged by Afghan Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), particularly in Geo-science, construction, transportation and consulting work related to the extractives sector
- Training and TA relevant to products or services offered by Afghan SMEs
- Introduction of Afghan SMEs to new market opportunities in the mining value chain
- Facilitating the creation of jobs directly and indirectly from mining sector investments and activities
- Facilitating communication between MoMP, private sector companies, and local communities to ensure effective cooperation and development
- Development of a program to include Afghan small and medium enterprises in the research, development, and management of mines
- Assistance to women-owned SMEs to build capacity to participate in work related to mining activities
- Other activities to improve the prospects for the success of this component

**Expected Component III Results:**

- National assessment of SMEs currently participating in extractives related activities and assessments of vocational/technical educational facilities capable of training individuals for extractives related employment
- Build the Afghan Mining Enterprise Initiative (AMEI)



- Training extractives related, private sector firms to improved management practices and competitiveness
- Provision of mining awareness training to communities around mining sites
- Support Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (AEITI) in gaining compliance status
- Prepare MoMP policy and legal departments for community engagement
- Build civil society relationship with the MoMP and the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)
- Facilitate stakeholder engagement in coordination with MoMP

## **Budget**

Budgeted allocations for the MIDAS project at its inception were \$45 million U.S. dollars (USD) and fluctuated between \$38 and \$50 million USD as the scope of the project adapted. Contract modification 12, of June 21, 2016, created a final total cost budget estimate of \$38,718,328 USD.

## **EVALUATION PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE**

As highlighted in the Scope of Work (SOW), the purpose of this evaluation is to identify lessons learned in the mineral sector to influence future management decision-making. This evaluation addresses how the lack of a consistent strategy on the part of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and especially within the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP), affected the MIDAS program and its intended results. An equal effort is directed towards the identification of MIDAS' shortcomings in its planned and implemented support to help the MoMP establish a framework and management system for the extractives sector that both attracts investors and yields appropriate returns to the GIRoA.

As per USAID's Evaluation Policy, the evaluation's findings are presented as analyzed facts supported by multiple sources. The individual findings are detailed in Annex 4, with a higher-level conceptualization presented in the Findings section below. Conclusions are based on one or more key findings relative to the SOW questions listed below. Actionable and informative recommendations are based upon one or more conclusions.

The focus includes observed achievements and weaknesses related to the MIDAS project's engagement with the MoMP, and whether intended outcomes were achieved.

The primary audience for this evaluation includes USAID's Office of Infrastructure (OI) and the Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD). Given the potential importance of the extractives sector to Afghanistan's long term economic self-reliance, this evaluation report will also be of interest to USAID for the development of its future plans and country development cooperation strategy.



## EVALUATION QUESTIONS

- I. To what extent was MIDAS successful in achieving its intended objectives?
  - a. What have been MIDAS' greatest achievements?
  - b. What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its intended objectives?
  - c. What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy in MoMP have on achieving MIDAS' objectives?
2. To what extent did revision of the scope of work for the MIDAS project address strategic needs of MoMP in the areas of hydrocarbons and minerals?
3. What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision-making for development of a similar technical assistance project?

## II. METHODOLOGY

### EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS

Evaluation Team members included an evaluation methods specialist (Industrial and Systems Engineer) and a professional Geologist, both with extensive experience in Afghanistan. The team employed a mixed methods approach using rapid appraisal techniques such as document review, semi-structured key informant interviews (KIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and informal direct observation to obtain qualitative and available quantitative data. These methods helped to ensure the participation of all key stakeholders in an open environment. Annex 4 presents the blank questionnaire template that was utilized to collect responses to the evaluation questions from KIs and FGDs. Although these questions were structured and semi-structured to obtain information for individual evaluation questions, an open-ended discussion was initiated after initial responses were recorded. These forms were also used to highlight related information contained in the documents listed in Annex 2. Team member notes on the reviewed documents and responses to the evaluation questions were consolidated and coded against each SOW question, and the consolidated results are presented in Annex 4. Those findings with the highest levels of multiple source concurrence (by a combination of MoMP, MIDAS, and document sources) were selected for consideration. Tabulations of supporting comments by generic source are indicated in the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations Matrix included in Annex 4.

The evaluation team conducted teleconferences with the senior MIDAS staff members that had departed Afghanistan prior to the closure of the project. Although the MIDAS project was in the process of closing its offices, a site visit was made to undertake KIs with the remaining staff. The evaluation team also made five visits to the MoMP offices at AGS and additionally held FGDs at a venue away from the MoMP to facilitate participation by MoMP female staff and those who had not yet been assigned a new office at MoMP. MoMP Directorates were invited to nominate their section heads and senior staff whose work groups most directly interacted with MIDAS for participation in KIs. Consequently, the leadership and representative staff of the MoMP Legal, Investment Promotion, Contracts, Human Resources, Gender, Cadastre, Petroleum Authority, and Afghan Geological Survey directorates were interviewed. The team interviewed a total of 26 MoMP staff through 10 KIs and six FGDs. A special effort was made to include the few available MoMP female professionals in KIs and FGDs. Annex 3 lists the individuals who participated in KIs and FGDs. Six of the twenty-six MoMP staff

interviewed were female, and one of the nine interviewed MIDAS staff was female. Although a formal sample frame was not developed, all available MIDAS and former MIDAS staff (nine) and most available MoMP staff (26) were invited for KIIs and FGDs. All KII and FGD participants were assured of the confidential nature of their responses and that their statements would be utilized without source identification.

The evaluation team reviewed all MIDAS monthly, quarterly, and annual reports along with the draft final report (all reviewed documents are listed in Annex 2). Additional documents reviewed by the evaluation team include those produced by MoMP, SIGAR, the World Bank, DFID and others as listed in Annex 2. Information in these documents relevant to individual evaluation questions was noted and compared to corresponding comments made during KII and FGDs. Question-specific information contained in reports and documents which was independently confirmed during KIIs and FGDs was accepted as a “finding.” Published question-specific information that was contradicted during KIIs and FGDs was also noted.

Conclusions for each of the SOW evaluation questions are based upon the triangulated findings as presented in Annex 4. Recommendations are based upon those conclusions that are most strongly supported by the findings of KIIs, FGDs and document reviews. There is a ‘many to many’ relationship between findings and conclusions. Individual recommendations are based upon one or more conclusions.

## **LIMITATIONS**

The end-of-March closure of the MIDAS project constrained available time for site visits and interviews with MIDAS staff. MIDAS’ closure did not permit the evaluation team to explore elaborations on reports from MoMP staff or to hold joint FGDs to explore conflicting perceptions, given that many MIDAS staff had left Kabul. As an additional complication, the evaluation team was unable to contact the 12-15 reported MIDAS-supported female interns to obtain their insights on the evaluation questions. Lists of training participants under Component III were not provided, limiting the findings and conclusions on capacity building to the trainings conducted under Components I and II. Perhaps partially due to the confusion associated with the on-going relocation of MoMP to its new offices, no quantitative data was available from the MoMP. This limitation included the unavailability of data on the human resources and gender balance at the Ministry. MIDAS was able to provide limited disaggregated data on participation by gender in its supported training activities.

The evaluation team was fully conscious of the potential for bias in responses from the MIDAS team and MoMP staff. With this in mind, only those findings which were independently highlighted by three or more KIIs or FGDs have been utilized. The independent confirmation of findings by three or more sources lends strength to the presented findings and removes the necessity to attribute findings to a source. Although there may be an institutional bias with the MoMP, the leading findings presented in the next section were independently highlighted by almost all interviewed MoMP employees. As an added precaution, the notes from all evaluation team members were transcribed and reviewed for consistency to minimize possible observer bias.

The evaluation team observed a level of confusion on questions about changes to the work plan related to hydrocarbons and minerals. Responses to follow-up questions noted either an absence of work plan knowledge or confusion over which of many perceived changes was of interest.III. FINDINGS

## GENERAL ANALYSIS


The work completed by MIDAS *for* the MoMP is generally appreciated. However, due to a range of issues with both MoMP and MIDAS as discussed in the Findings sections, which follow, there are few results from MIDAS' work *with* the MoMP.

## FINDINGS FOR EVALUATION QUESTIONS

### Question 1a: What has been MIDAS' greatest achievement?

The drafting of regulations, contracts, legal reviews and tendering packages to implement the Mining Law of 2014 by MIDAS was enthusiastically supported as its most important achievement. There was also agreement among the MoMP and MIDAS staff interviewed that the project efforts resulted in some improvement in its technical capacity to conduct minerals exploration. The third most noted achievement appreciated by MoMP respondents is MIDAS' effort to standardize mining contract forms, field notebooks and data coding sheets. MIDAS' training support to SMEs to prepare them to participate in extractives industries (once developed) was not frequently endorsed as a leading achievement but was appreciated by senior staff in the MoMP. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of MIDAS' successes.

Figure 1: MIDAS Successes




Although not highly cited or supported in the documentation, it is important to highlight MIDAS' efforts to coordinate with other donor programs and to communicate with the staff of the MoMP. MIDAS' informal monthly meeting with various supporting partners was an important initiative to address

MIDAS successfully helped establish a Gender Office in the MoMP that was active in several of the MoMP's directorates. It is unfortunate that this office did not provide development assistance to those directorates with a preponderance of female staff. The effort to include AGS females allowed some to have an opportunity to work in the field alongside their male counterparts. Although MIDAS reports this field training for women was a "first," USGS has a long history of providing hands-on training to females in the field. These limited field trainings were most frequently cited as one of MIDAS' best successes in promoting gender issues. However, these short internships did not satisfy the one-year experience requirement that would have facilitated women's formal employment with the MoMP. Training for MoMP's Gender Directorate and departmental awareness training was also frequently cited as successfully raising gender awareness.

[illegible]

**Question 1b. What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its intended objectives?**

*Figure 3: MIDAS Challenges*



In the absence of consistent leadership with empowered directorates and a full staff complement, the MoMP could not be considered an active, responsible partner to MIDAS. The MoMP's fluid leadership, very constrained internal information flow, and cumbersome authorization processes were all challenges and contributed to other issues highlighted below. Figure 3 provides a visual summary of the challenges faced by the MIDAS project.

MIDAS faced an aggravated relationship with MoMP. MoMP leadership and staff typically had the perception that the MIDAS program was characterized by poor accountability, frequent delays, modified or canceled plans and significant micromanagement constraints to its joint efforts. The evaluation team noted frequent comments from MoMP leadership and staff that USAID/MIDAS rarely listened to MoMP. Although MIDAS made an effort to coordinate, as noted above, one of its greatest challenges was to establish a functional mechanism for collaboration and information sharing between and among USAID, MoMP and the other active donors supporting the extractives sector.

Office space availability at the MoMP along with logistical and security limitations on MIDAS clearly limited the project's ability to co-locate staff and present a more hands-on, longer-term

and field-based training approach. MoMP staff frequently noted that few MIDAS international or Afghan expert staff spent significant periods of time at the MoMP and that its support was ineffective, short-term, remote, academic and not provided in the local languages.

The staff of all MoMP directorates interviewed reported a desire and need for more capacity-building assistance with issues critical to their directorate's mission work. Perhaps due to its work plans and limited direct engagement with the MoMP, MoMP staff and directors often noted that MIDAS was too late in providing needed assistance to the cadaster and hydrocarbons directorates as well as to others. MoMP staff and leadership report that MIDAS' limited presence in the MoMP and limited engagement with its directorate-level leaders led to numerous missed opportunities to improve MoMP operations.

MoMP leadership, directorate heads and staff reported a desire for joint and routine USAID/MIDAS/MoMP consultations with USGS and with the other active donors for implementation review and plan development.

None of the 27 MoMP leadership and staff interviewed considered the MIDAS capacity building effort to be of acceptable quality. Despite the more positive reports in MIDAS' training needs assessment, AGS staff uniformly noted dissatisfaction with what was perceived to be poor quality, basic level training that did not consider the training needs of individual professionals. AGS leadership and technical professionals consistently noted that USGS had embedded numerous technical specialists within individual AGS technical departments and had provided more than a decade of on-the-job training. The MIDAS training initiative most cited as appreciated was the provision of technical generalists who worked for short time periods with AGS in the field. MIDAS was challenged to meet AGS' expectation for teachers and learning materials on par with the historical support from USGS.

Changes in development priorities with each incoming minister and MIDAS and USAID decisions limited the project's exploration focus to low value commodities, without clear acknowledgement of AGS' identification of exploration priorities. MoMP staff frequently noted that MIDAS did not keep its commitment to support MoMP and AGS with both adequate exploration training and with the development of tender data packages for potential investors. As noted above, the low level of interaction and communication between MIDAS and MoMP did not increase the visibility of MoMP's priorities with USAID. For example, one MoMP acting director indicated that he felt he was working in parallel to MIDAS, and not with MIDAS; in other words, that MIDAS was acting on its own initiative and not interacting with him or his directorate's agenda. Furthermore, the confinement of MIDAS staff to the project compound made it difficult for them to interact with MoMP in person.

Gender-related challenges faced by MIDAS include its inability to provide stronger, more focused support of the Gender Directorate initiatives, the apparent arbitrary limitation on the length of female internships, and an inability to address the shortage of qualified female technical school graduates. Because internships were less than one year in duration, the experience provided was not recognized by the GIRoA as meeting stated position requirements. Only two of the reported 15 females given internships were subsequently hired by the MoMP. The evaluation team noted the unavailability of gender-specific details or staffing tables from the MoMP's human resources department.

**Question 1c: What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy at MoMP have on achieving MIDAS objectives?**

Frequent changes in MoMP leadership, the large number of acting directors, and a high staff vacancy rate limited MoMP's ability to coordinate and share information with MIDAS and USAID. Weak information sharing among MoMP directorates was also frequently cited as an issue that resulted in poor knowledge of mandated changes to the work plan. The absence of M&E staff and of an office of international cooperation in the MoMP were also cited as constraints.

The leadership and policies of the MoMP were not stable, and its 20 acting directors were unable to make or implement long-term plans, including hiring of needed staff. Both MoMP and MIDAS staff frequently cited MoMP's time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, centralized authorization process, information bottlenecks, ineffective M&E office, and paper-bound HR department with excessive vacancies as sources of organizational inefficiency and inaction.



Organizational inertia and leadership instability likely resulted in the frequently-cited notion that the MoMP was not aggressive, clear or consistent in requesting assistance from MIDAS for pending high return initiatives (gas pipeline, artisanal mining, high value exploration site selection, etc.) or for desired increased technical collaboration with USGS.

The unstable and acting status of MoMP's leadership was noted by both MIDAS and MoMP staff as the reason that it was ineffective in its education efforts for parliamentarians, the President's Office and related committees on the intricacies of mining laws. It was also cited as a reason it was unable to effectively lobby for an unencumbered mining law in Afghanistan. Both MIDAS and MoMP staff reported receiving conflicting requests and instructions from higher GIRoA authorities.

MoMP staff noted that MIDAS did not provide support on gender issues to all MoMP directorates.

**Question 2: To what extent did the revision of the scope of work of the MIDAS project address the strategic needs of MoMP in the areas of hydrocarbons and minerals?**

While only three of 27 respondents admitted to being unaware of this change in MIDAS' SOW, knowledge of details of these changes were limited to a few respondents in more senior positions. Although some MoMP staff noted that the SOW changes were positive, the majority of interviewed MoMP staff expressed a negative response to this question. Two higher-level officials provided a very blunt negative response.

Elaboration by MoMP leadership and staff centered around the statement that MIDAS was not responsive to its needs. As listed in Annex 4, KII and FGD findings include a range of statements on the ever-changing leadership of both MoMP and USAID; the fluid work plans; and a "start-stop," micromanaged implementation. Although staff from the hydrocarbons section of MoMP highlighted a real need for capacity building, there was no appreciation for MIDAS' capacity building efforts. MIDAS' support was viewed as a parallel and independent activity.

**Question 3: What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision making for development of a similar technical assistance project?**

*The following findings are based on consolidation of the points made by various respondents when asked Evaluation Question 3. Key recommendations for future management decision making, which are based on an analysis of the results of the answers to all evaluation questions, are included in the Recommendations section of this report.*

- As independently highlighted in many KIIs, MIDAS was not based upon a common donor/investor assessment of needs with the MoMP, nor developed with the MoMP to meet the critical issues limiting investor support for the extractives sector in Afghanistan.
- Instability in GIRoA extractives sector leadership, along with the limited decision making and implementation capacity of 20 out of 23 MoMP acting directors, delayed program implementation.
- Though MoMP reported very successful historical relationships with USGS and relationships with other donors, MoMP respondents did not speak favorably regarding MIDAS/USAID's technical support.

- Figure 4: Responses to "How can donors be more effective in the current political and security environment to support Afghanistan to develop its extractives sector?"





## IV. CONCLUSIONS

### Question 1a: What has been MIDAS' greatest achievement?

The assistance that MIDAS provided in drafting implementing policies and regulations for implementation, developing commodity-standard mining permit applications, developing commodity-standard mining contracts, and providing mining contract reviews was a major benefit to MoMP. Though the Afghan Government has failed to pass a workable Mining Law, the draft policies and regulations and the standard mining permit and contract documents are adaptable to conform to whatever requirements a final Mining Law defines. Similar documents were to be created by the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project (SDNRP) Cadastre project, but that program's implementation failures make the MIDAS documents more valuable to MoMP.

MIDAS' Component I document production was steady over the term of the project, but few of these products were finalized. Typically, documents in the last stages of post-MoMP review would be returned to MoMP for re-review by the most recently appointed minister, thus slowing finalization significantly. Had the MoMP had a permanent middle- to senior-level management team and a firmly defined strategic plan, this re-review and re-approval process would have been accelerated (as a permanent staff with institutional memory and decision-making authority would have been in place to advise the new minister). The few policies, regulations and standard forms that did get final approval came into force too late to impact the mine permitting and contracts published on the MoMP website.

Though mostly outside the original MIDAS SOW, the MIDAS staff served as GIRoA's legal counsel on retainer and performed numerous contract and international agreement reviews and negotiations. These activities consistently benefited GIRoA's effort to enter into beneficial international agreements and find ways to extract themselves from unfavorable arrangements.

Though MIDAS had several limited capacity building successes in each of its three components, there were significant variations between MIDAS' perceptions of success and MoMP's perceptions. One MIDAS staff member estimated that interventions were up to 60% sustainable, whereas MoMP success estimates range from 10% to, at best, 25%. Table 1: Comparison between perceptions of program outcomes reported by MIDAS and MoMP below shows that these differences in perceptions exist across most aspects of the project.

*Table 1: Comparison between Perceptions of Program Outcomes Reported by MIDAS and MoMP*

MIDAS	MoMP
Thousands of training hours were delivered to hundreds of individuals.	(A) Professional training was mostly technically irrelevant, short-term, low quality duplication of prior training provided by un- or minimally qualified trainers.  (B) Most training was delivered in the provinces during community workshops that had no relevance to MoMP professionals.
MIDAS provided the first ever field experience for AGS women.	AGS women have been going to the field with USGS for a decade.

<b>MIDAS</b>	<b>MoMP</b>
Each MoMP minister changed MIDAS priorities.	MIDAS was disorganized and unresponsive to MoMP needs.
MoMP Finance Directorate could not administer the on-budget grant.	MIDAS canceled exploration funding.
MIDAS coordinated with donors and MoMP and created the information sharing hub.	MIDAS did not communicate program initiatives to MoMP middle management or rank and file.
MIDAS devised various on-the-job training field exploration studies at Minister direction.	Except for the very low value Bamyan granite project, MIDAS never finished a single exploration assessment.
MIDAS improved Capacity by 60%.	Capacity improvements were at best 10 to 25%.
MIDAS interacted with the directorates that the SOW obligated.	MIDAS ignored most directorates that needed and requested help.

MIDAS understood the importance of communications and coordination and took steps to coordinate its programmatic activities with other donors and MoMP. These efforts were not fully successful because MIDAS staff were not embedded in MoMP, and consequently, were unable to interact and share information and updates regularly with their MoMP counterparts. Other MIDAS-initiated forms of information sharing, such as its internet-based information hub and monthly meetings for donor staff and senior MoMP staff, were ineffective in terms of sharing information with the majority of MoMP staff.

MIDAS made efforts to support gender issues, but frequent program realignments by both MoMP and USAID undermined successful implementation.

**Question 1b: What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its objectives?**

Most of the Component I, II, and III capacity building efforts were unsuccessful. MIDAS program design and subsequent program implementation ignored a well-documented and easily accessible record of past capacity building interventions at MoMP and its directorates. As a result, most MIDAS-designed training programs assumed that MoMP staff had never previously received training. This assumption led MIDAS to retain a few technical generalists and subject matter trainers with varying levels of qualifications to provide short-term training courses. These courses were compared with training provided by USGS and TFBSO during the preceding decade, which was deemed as more effective and used embedded discipline experts

employing long-term, on-the-job training to AGS, APA, and MoMP professionals. Figure 5 provides evaluation conclusions regarding the outcome of the MIDAS capacity building effort. All of the technical specialists interviewed concluded that USGS and TFBSO, followed by BGS and GIZ, all provided more effective capacity building relative to MIDAS. A review and analysis of the training courses offered to AGS by MIDAS strongly suggests that the courses were designed ad hoc to fill observed AGS skills deficits. The course list does not give the impression that the training matched the intensive, systematic, four-year exploration training effort that had been designed. AGS would need this more intensive, systematic training to become the equivalent of GIRoA's exploration Junior, as required by the Mining Law of 2014.

MoMP attributes limited USGS expert engagement to MIDAS and USAID, contrary to MoMP priorities and expectations. MIDAS' reneging on assurances that USGS could be engaged via the on-budget monies ultimately destroyed MoMP/AGS faith in the USAID commitment to the Component II effort. The difficulties in implementing most aspects of Component II are unsurprising, given that the SOW defined in Component II was unrealistic and not achievable within the defined time frame and budgetary constraints. Furthermore, there are no known companies in USAID's contracting network that retain staff having the specific skills needed to execute Component II. Thus, mining industry specialists were contracted to provide the required services. Unfortunately, mining industry contracting realities are incompatible with USAID contracting realities. The MIDAS monthly reports for 2013, and for a significant part of 2014, show MIDAS had to replace the team of the winning Component II bid with less qualified alternatives (as AGS interviewees repeatedly emphasized). This outcome raises the unanswered question as to why MIDAS/USAID did not take advantage of USGS technical support.

The current Mining Law precludes development of the Afghan mining sector along the trajectory followed by the world's other successful mining economies. By default, AGS has become the only source for resource data that the GIRoA can access to develop property tenders (though other governments that use this approach generally experience low tender interest because private sector bidders do not trust information packages that they cannot independently verify). Given this reality, MIDAS was ineffectively implemented to build AGS capabilities needed to deliver tender data that GIRoA needs to

*Figure 5: Conclusions Regarding MIDAS Capacity Building*

### MIDAS

- Emphasis placed on quantity, not quality of training
- MIDAS staffing plan was troubled from inception, and qualified technical experts were few
- Technical training was not professionally relevant
- Internships failed to prepare interns for MoMP employment, and this was a missed opportunity in regards to female interns
- Lack of consultation led MoMP to conclude it was not a stakeholder in MIDAS
- Component III should have supported only small mining and related consulting companies
- Failure to embed staff resulted in communications breakdown with MoMP

### MoMP

- Constant replacement of MoMP ministers frequently redirected MIDAS activities
- MoMP did not support international training for female professionals

### USAID

- Unclear USAID commitment to activities demoralized implementers
- Focus on headline-grabbing wins by USAID, while more "mundane" successes are essential to implementation received less attention
- Absence of USGS negatively impacted training success
- Expectations for exploration success were unrealistic

offer properties for development.

Development of a strong mining cadastre is essential to the development of a flourishing legal mining industry. Given the importance of the cadastre and the failure of SDNRP to build one, MIDAS could have achieved an enormous project success if it could have responded to the Cadastre Directorate's pleas for help with its cadastre. MIDAS' support for the Cadastre Directorate, when finally authorized, came too late to be of any practical benefit.


The MIDAS TOR and subsequent project work plans indicated that efforts to promote gender equality were a significant organizing principle of the MIDAS program. Unfortunately, over the term of the MIDAS program, numerous policy implementation decisions significantly undermined this agenda. Cancellation of the Gender Directorate training program, which MIDAS spent months developing with the women of the Directorate, discredited purported support for gender issues in the eyes of the MoMP women.

The desire to create the impression that an abundance of training was being delivered caused MIDAS to favor easy-to-produce training courses, such as basic computer training. (Training in Microsoft applications and Google search were specifically cited by many.) Some female respondents felt that MIDAS was dismissive of their standing as technical professionals by offering them training more suited to administrative staff. Though certainly unintended, gender discrimination was a significant complaint voiced by the female professionals from MoMP. MIDAS had the opportunity to correct these missteps. After training, female participants were asked to discuss their training experience. They provided numerous recommendations for improvement, but no observable response occurred.

MIDAS could have more effectively modeled professional gender roles by hiring female expatriate geologists to provide training at AGS. USGS used this strategy very effectively and included numerous female scientists among the USGS staff embedded with AGS.

To boost support for gender awareness, MIDAS should have identified MoMP technical teams that employ disproportionate numbers of female professionals (like the chemistry and mineral processing labs) for focused support to promote career advancement. Instead, no assistance whatsoever was provided to these teams despite repeated requests

Figure 6: Gender Issues in MIDAS Implementation








Component III focused on preparing public and private sector companies to work and interact with an industry that did not exist. Even if MIDAS' Component II efforts were completely successful, there exists in USAID and in the Afghan Government an underestimation of how long it takes to build a mine and begin generating revenues.

Component III explored developing vocational technical training capacity to produce tradesmen qualified to support a mining industry that, given present legislative trends within GIRoA, may be a decade or more from emerging. More immediately, MoMP is struggling to fill its vacant positions (political considerations aside) because of the dearth of qualified applicants. Identifying strategies to boost the production of male and female university graduates qualified to fill MoMP vacancies and other similar industry positions would have been a more effective use of Component III funds.

Though the concept of the internship was sound, execution was flawed. Short (three-month) internships created the illusion that many individuals were receiving valuable experience, but a better understanding of MoMP position qualifications (political considerations notwithstanding) would have shown that three months of experience was insufficient to qualify the intern for potential MoMP hiring. As a result, few interns were permanently hired into MoMP. More carefully structured, the internship program could have been a valuable tool to prepare female professionals for permanent MoMP employment.

*Figure 8: Conclusions Regarding Communications Issues Faced by MIDAS*



MIDAS attempted to maintain coordination, communication, and collaboration among all involved stakeholders; however, the many competing demands and interests of the diverse stakeholders prevented success. Figure 8 provides a visualization of the communications issues that hampered MIDAS. At the request of Ministry leadership, MIDAS established a program of monthly coordination and information exchange meetings and set up a program information exchange website. However, with frequent changes in program focus requested by ministers and USAID (according to MIDAS staff, the program had to contend with five changes of Minister and input from four CORs and Alternate CORs);<sup>2</sup> donors' unwillingness to cede primacy over their own programs; an ineffective MoMP administrative structure in

<sup>2</sup> This is reported per MIDAS perceptions. However, there was only one COR during the project's duration, with three other individuals serving as Alternate CORs at various times.

which virtually all middle management positions were filled by powerless caretakers; and glacial contracting procedures, little was accomplished by MIDAS' effort to coordinate and collaborate.

As previously noted, MIDAS' use of embedded staff working with MoMP counterparts could have increased opportunities for crucial information flow and hastened the identification of critical MoMP barriers to adopting an investor-friendly extractives sector. Poor information dissemination, along with a fluid and constrained MoMP administration, resulted in low effectiveness perceptions reported by virtually all MoMP participants, and MoMP respondents' view of MIDAS as completely unresponsive to their needs.

**Question 1c. What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy in MoMP have on achieving MIDAS' objectives?**

*Figure 9: Issues Impairing MoMP Operations*

*Many of the difficulties MIDAS encountered were caused by impaired operations within MoMP.*

- MoMP administrative and bureaucratic procedures are archaic
- Absence of middle managers
- Lack of long-term strategic operations plan
- Staff turnover affects impact of capacity building
- Low GIRoA revenue collection capabilities
- AGS reluctance to conduct field studies due to MoMP delay or failure to pay promised per diems
- Donor purchased equipment not maintained and prematurely falls into disrepair

The endless and rapid succession of MoMP ministers significantly hampered MIDAS implementation. New ministers' inability or unwillingness to approve completed policy, regulation and contract drafts which were already approved by MOJ and other relevant ministries ensured that few of the otherwise completed Component I products became finalized. Lack of modernization of internal bureaucratic procedures is a further contributor to MoMP paralysis. Some of this programmatic drift could be reduced by a permanent proactive middle management civil service that could impede ministerial fiat, but this bureaucratic brake is absent at MoMP. As

a result, MIDAS had few tools at its disposal to counter programmatic drift. A fully endorsed MoMP mission agenda or Strategic Plan with an entrenched mid-level bureaucracy could help the Ministry stabilize its programs and resist ill-researched change. Figure 9 summarizes the conditions in MoMP that impair MoMP performance.

MoMP was unable to manage the unrealistic expectations for the nation's resource sector. The Afghan people continue to expect jobs to be created immediately, while the GIRoA expects an equally rapid filling of its treasury coffers. The degree of inflated expectation is evidenced by President Ghani's demand that MIDAS explain why the MoMP was unable to meet the 2016 mining revenue projections made by Minister Shahrani in 2011 (extrapolated to be \$1.5 billion USD based on unfounded suppositions, whereas actual 2016 mining revenues were \$20 million USD.) Such unrealistic and unfounded assumptions have very negative policy implications, including:

- A demand to accelerate mining income, precipitating the need to create income by demanding tender bid payments and exacting punitive royalties from mining concessions. These are enshrined in Mining Law amendments again and again without an understanding that these amendments themselves contribute to the revenue shortfall. Given the consistent failure of the

current approaches to breaking the cycle of Mining Law revisions and subsequent re-amendment in Parliament, a comprehensive strategy for educating the public, parliamentarians, and the Executive must be devised. If not, Afghanistan will fail to realize its mineral potential and illegal mining will persist and expand.

- The failure of the imagined \$1.5 billion USD mining windfall to materialize likely contributed significantly to the ongoing reorganization of the MoMP, given the implicit assumption of corruption losses.
- There is an underestimation of how much effort and time are required to generate revenue from a mining operation. The belief that mining will quickly rescue the Afghan economy breeds the belief that time is not critical in facilitating mining start-up, with the implied assumption that once mining is allowed, a mining economy will develop quickly.
- The Component III effort would have been better spent creating a public and parliamentary awareness of the conditions needed to promote a significant mining industry.

**Question 2. To what extent did the revisions to the SOW of the MIDAS project address the strategic needs of the MoMP in the areas of hydrocarbons and minerals?**

The attempts by MIDAS to be responsive to the ever changing MoMP programmatic agendas resulted in an unfocused programmatic drift. Projects were started and abandoned before completion with alarming frequency. The inability of MIDAS and MoMP to effectively communicate to the Directorate rank and file with details or reasons for changes discredited MIDAS in the eyes of its counterparts and significantly reduced the capacity building potential of the project.

**Question 3. What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision making for development of a similar technical assistance program?**

The design of the MIDAS program indicates that USAID was hoping for one or more headline-grabbing exploration success. This was an unrealistic expectation (especially given the proposed exploration budget) that ignores the industry average discovery success rate. Real success in developing the Afghan mining sector will come when the tedious work of building an effective regulatory and administrative framework that allows a mining industry to flourish is completed.

MoMP had more than a decade of productive on-the-job interactions with dozens of USGS technical specialists. The replacement of this highly successful technical collaboration with an unproven alternative that was not designed to deliver the range and depth of cooperation and interaction that USGS delivered as a matter of routine led to unfavorable MoMP comparisons between the MIDAS effort and the historical work of USGS.

There is a pervasive misunderstanding of the potential of the Afghan mining sector. Afghan officials do not yet understand the real cost structures within the mining industry. As a result, GIRoA continues its efforts to extract revenues from the mining industry in such a way that ensures that the industry will never develop.

Chronic communications failures at all levels – among donors, within MoMP, between MoMP and project consultants, between MoMP and GIRoA decision makers, between donors and decision makers, and between GIRoA and the Afghan people – all worked together to ensure that prospects for the



development of the extractives sector remain clouded.

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS


### Question 1a. What has been MIDAS' greatest achievement?

Despite more than a decade of capacity building interventions, there is a continued need for capacity building at MoMP given high staff turnover rates, senior staff retirements, and the sub-optimal skills of new graduate hires. USAID should ensure that future capacity building programs employ qualified trainers, and that curricula are customized to the needs of individual professionals. To the greatest degree appropriate, USAID should support on-the-job training conducted by embedded trainers/mentors to increase desired knowledge transfer. Figure 10 lists capacity building recommendations.

Assuming a workable Mining Law is passed, USAID should support on-the-job and embedded peer learning for other Component I activities, and continued mining law/mining contracts legal advice from qualified experts.

USAID should continue and increase support for internship programs. These internships should be of sufficient length that participants acquire the skills and experience needed for MoMP employment. For its part, the MoMP must make a firm commitment to guarantee employment offers to successful interns. The internship program should be structured to offer appropriate consideration to the leading female technical and legal graduates to help improve the gender balance within MoMP.

*Figure 10: Recommendations for Future Capacity Building*



Gender awareness in the MoMP can be strengthened by providing consistent support and guidance to the Gender Directorate so that it becomes operationally effective within MoMP. The MoMP and USAID should make serious efforts to ensure that female professionals are not excluded from international training opportunities. USAID should consider the establishment of scholarship programs for MoMP women to attend local institutions for specialized, intensive training in areas of critical need to the MoMP and extractives sector. To address longer term sustainability, USAID may also consider support to the several recognized Kabul and regional technical training institutions to improve the quality and relevance of their academic programs to help ensure a stream of qualified graduates for the growing sector.

USAID should limit its support for training to improve business practices in mining-related SMEs to companies specifically active in the extractives sector.

USAID should mentor the MoMP to empower the Ministry to lead donor coordination efforts. Increased involvement in Donor coordination will improve MoMP and GIRoA ownership of development plans and increase MoMP's capacity to oversee the sector. MoMP will need guidance to improve its internal communications protocols to ensure that all Directorates and their staff understand the nature and extent of planned donor interventions.

**Question 1b. What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its objectives?**

Any new TOR should be written by a team that understands the budgetary and logistical requirements imposed by the proposed SOW. Advanced understanding of the likely implications of the proposed scope should minimize unanticipated changes and implementation difficulties.


1. Given the USGS' uniformly reported high standing with the MoMP, its historical training success in Afghanistan, and its technical leadership in the field, it would be prudent for USAID to include its leadership and technical expertise in any new efforts to strengthen MoMP's management of the extractives sector.
2. The current Mining Law assigns AGS the role of GIRoA's exclusive mining Junior, thereby assigning to GIRoA a function that is typically performed by the private sector in other successful mining economies. If this status continues, AGS will require a significant upgrade in skills and operational capabilities to fulfill this function. In the likely continuation of this AGS responsibility, USAID may wish to consider the following exploration capacity building recommendations for AGS:
  - a. AGS will need experience exploring for many different commodities. They will need training in the full exploration process: initial prospect identification, early stage field prospecting and mapping, field data analysis, decision process for continued exploration merit, drill planning and program execution, sample collection and analysis, early stage resource potential calculations, and training in report writing at every stage.
  - b. AGS/GIRoA must learn that most drilling is unsuccessful, and must be prepared to budget exploration funds annually to spend on what will be mostly unsuccessful projects.
  - c. Exploration focus should be on commodities that are likely to attract FDI.
  - d. AGS will need a functioning drilling capability. Although they are not NI-43-101 compliant, shallow (100-200m) Winkie drills are inexpensive to purchase and operate, are man-portable and can be used to provide exploration training in shallow deposits.
  - e. Although specialist support (from, for example, USGS) can provide most of the required

training, commodity exploration specialists will be needed to address unique training needs.

- f. MCC expresses that GIRoA did not provide a source of phosphate supply (critical to Aynak smelter operations) as one of the reasons why Aynak development is not moving forward. Afghanistan is prospective for phosphate and comprehensive exploration for this commodity would constitute an ideal exploration training activity for AGS.
3. A functioning cadastre is critical to the development of the Afghan mining industry. Given the failure of the SDNRP cadastre program, USAID support to the Cadastre Directorate will be important to the development of a future artisanal and large-scale mining industry.
4. Future programs should hold regular meetings with MoMP Directors (preferably as embedded staff to discuss progress of program activities and identify changes to the planned program made by the MoMP Minister, USAID or program leadership. Project leadership/USAID should increase the degree of project and activity planning collaboration with MoMP to secure MoMP buy-in, which will in turn increase information flow and limit misunderstandings and missed opportunities.
5. Future programs must embed staff with MoMP counterparts, and must use technical specialists, not technical generalists.
6. A future program should provide more consistent support to gender programs. Efforts should be made to avoid cutting programs immediately before scheduled program implementation. As previously noted, other possible support includes using internships to preferentially support female interns.

*Future programming could provide scholarship support to give females specialized, professionally relevant training that will advance their careers. More generally, the quality of graduates seeking employment in certain technical fields can be improved via innovative cooperative programs that bring technical specialists retained by the project into the classrooms of leading Afghan technical universities to provide intensive, specialized short courses.*

Figure 11: Recommendations Regarding Gender Issues in Future Programming




**1c. What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy at MoMP have on achieving MIDAS objectives?**

1. USAID and future project leadership should support the MoMP to utilize existing forums to develop mechanisms for routine coordination with donors. This will help avoid duplication of effort and focus donor efforts to support MoMP needs. Resulting discussions and agreements must be openly and effectively shared with all MoMP staff.
2. USAID and future project leadership may wish to support the MoMP to create and document a mission plan that serves as a road map to inform and guide the ever-changing Ministerial leadership on its adopted long-term operational guidelines. Hopefully, such a plan might reduce the number of abrupt agenda changes that have characterized the Ministry to date.
3. USAID and future project leadership should support the MoMP to increase its capacity to inform national decision makers, the legislature, and the public on best mining law practices in the sector. All stakeholders should also be given a realistic understanding of industry cost structures and development timelines.
4. Senior US diplomatic assistance should be considered to convey to senior Afghan leadership the critical importance of a stable international best practice mining law that can attract international

investors to the negotiating table.

5. MoMP should be encouraged to fill vacancies to create an entrenched mid-level bureaucracy with technical competence that can guide Ministry leadership.
6. MoMP should streamline its bureaucratic procedures to promote efficient and timely Ministry program administration.
7. As previously highlighted, USAID support to any future capacity building effort should include the early and continuing use of embedded experts in the offices of their peer counterparts to increase learning opportunities and increase information flow.
8. MoMP should be encouraged to make a more concerted effort to hire and promote women, especially when filling administrative and professional positions less likely to violate prevailing cultural norms.
9. Longer-term improvements in female participation rates in the extractives sector are dependent on increasing the number and skills of female graduates from technical colleges. MoMP and USAID initiatives to increase both the quality of technical school training and enrollment of females would benefit the sector.


Figure 12: Recommendations Regarding MoMP Capabilities



**Question 2. To what extent did the revisions to the SOW of the MIDAS project address the strategic needs of the MoMP in the area of hydrocarbons and minerals?**

1. MoMP should consider the use of “change management” practices to improve directorate and staff knowledge, as well as staff acceptance of and participation in newly adopted program modifications or directives.
2. Although some initiatives are sometimes found to no longer support MoMP’s, the project’s, or USAID’s short-term objectives, efforts should be made to consider the disruptive effect of prematurely ending initiatives that are near finalization.

*Figure 13: Recommendations for Improving Communications in Future Programming*



**Question 3. What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision making for development of a similar technical assistance project?**

1. The involvement of sector specialists (i.e. USGS) as sector leads for donor planning and component implementation would produce high MoMP acceptance and provide needed technical excellence to the project.
2. The MoMP, the future project and USAID should establish a mechanism and forum for information sharing, planning, and evaluation with all involved parties to improve collaboration and coordination, and reduce missed opportunities for positive changes.
3. Any new program should be based upon a common MoMP/donor/investor assessment of needs and be delivered with MoMP leadership to meet the crucial issues now limiting investor support for the extractives sector in Afghanistan.
4. USAID should explore providing requested support to Environmental Geology, Minerals Laboratory, exploration, tender package development, and more generally all directorates within the MoMP.
5. USAID should explore providing the requested increased focus on field-based practical training given its results.
6. USAID should embed long-term technical support to increase communications and improve the transfer of knowledge and skills to help make MoMP less dependent upon outside technical support.
7. MoMP's consultations with lawmakers and its public relations efforts in support of the extractives industry should give a realistic picture of the expected timeframe for infrastructure requirements, as well as for financial returns to the GIRoA and to affected communities.
8. Several interviewees raised the suspicion that Parliamentary failure to pass a workable mining law may be due to an interest in protecting illegal mining activities. The rural and mountainous parts of Afghanistan are remote and difficult to observe, and illegal operators are comfortable that their illegal activities will remain hidden. High-resolution satellite imagery has a demonstrated track record of finding and tracking the development of artisanal mines from space. USAID may wish to support Afghanistan to combine satellite data with a fully populated cadastre database to reveal the extent of Afghanistan's illegal mining problem.
9. During the interviews, concern was raised that many construction materials mines were extracting more material than they were reporting, thereby avoiding tax and royalty payments. Remote sensing can be used to monitor extraction rates and calculate tonnage of materials removed. These calculated production data can be compared against reported mine production data to identify under-reporting.



## ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK



**USAID | AFGHANISTAN**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

**OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE (OI) &**

**OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT (OPPD)**

### STATEMENT OF WORK

**Final Performance Evaluation**

**OF**

**MINING INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR AFGHAN  
SUSTAINABILITY (MIDAS)**

## PROGRAM INFORMATION

<b>Program/Project Name:</b>	<i>Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS)</i>
<b>Contractor:</b>	<i>ECC Water and Power LLC</i>
<b>Contract #:</b>	<i>AID-306-TO-13-00003</i>
<b>Total Estimated Cost:</b>	<i>43,000,000</i>
<b>Life of Program/Project:</b>	<i>March 2013-Mar 2017</i>
<b>Active Provinces:</b>	<i>Kabul</i>
<b>Mission Development Objective (DO):</b>	<i>DO 1: Sustainable Agricultural-led Economic Growth Expanded IR 1.1 Employment Opportunities Increased</i>
<b>Linkage to Standard Program Structure (SPS):</b>	<i>Program Area 4.4Infrastructure Program element 4.4.1 Modern Energy Services Sub-element 4.4.1.1 Basic Energy Infra project financing. 4.4.1.2 Legal and regulatory development energy sector restructuring and corporatization. 4.4.1.7 Privatization and private investment promotion</i>
<b>Required?</b>	<i>Yes.</i>

## INTRODUCTION

The objective of the Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) project is to build capacity within the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) to develop, promote, and manage tenders for international investors. These activities are designed to strengthen business activity throughout the country and to generate revenues for the Government of Afghanistan (GoA).

MIDAS is designed to improve the MoMP's control over development and management of mining and other extractive (hydrocarbons) projects and to attract future investments into the extractives sector. The investments associated with this initiative will directly enhance Afghanistan's investment climate, as well as support Afghanistan's future infrastructure and mining sector development. Each is vital to the generation of socio-economic growth that will in turn enhance the legitimacy and governance capacity of GoA – a fundamental component of the USG's counterinsurgency vision for Afghanistan. More specifically, the objectives of MIDAS are to:

- Increase economic activity related to extractives sector;
- Increase revenue generation for GIRoA;
- Increase jobs related to mining, infrastructure, transportation, and related industries.

The work contemplated under MIDAS will be accomplished in partnership with the MoMP. Specifically, the program will increase the ability of Afghans to develop effective policies for the Afghan mining sector, as well as improve GoA's ability to collect and analyze geological data. It will also build the local capacity to plan, design, and implement tender packages through a transparent tender process. Capacity building and technical assistance efforts will ensure that Afghan counterparts are able to manage mineral resources and take a leadership role post-transition.

## BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2008, President Hamid Karzai approved the "Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS): A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction," which covers the five year period 2008 through 2013, and submitted it to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and international donor community as Afghanistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The ANDS highlights the challenges that remain to improve security, build a democratic state, and promote sustained economic development and poverty reduction, delineating a national action plan with specific policies and activities to reach targets.

The ANDS recognizes that the development of the private sector and achieving sustainable growth and employment are critical for the country's long term stability and success. Both the ANDS and the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA), an ANDS companion document, also call for promoting women's full economic participation by facilitating access to capital, marketing, skills development, business development services, and public/private partnership opportunities. Such efforts should be undertaken through effective approaches and necessary inputs for women and require developing specific strategies that enable women to equitably participate in, contribute to and benefit from the MIDAS program.

Gender analyses of the mining industry reveal several issues that require explicit resolution to ensure that (a) women as well as men are able to participate in, contribute to and benefit from the industry and (b) safeguards are established to protect women from the negative impact of mining experienced in other parts of the world. The issues are identified here, and specific responses to them must be included in Implementing Partners' proposals in accordance with USAID regulations.

In Afghanistan, as in most parts of the world, mining is widely perceived to be a masculine enterprise. Yet throughout the MIDAS program description, the only tasks remotely requiring a isometric strength test are drilling and actual road and rail construction. The areas in which MIDAS intends to build capacity include:

- data analysis and management to verify the location and quantity of mineral deposits;
- developing, negotiating, evaluating and packaging tenders;
- managing contracts in keeping with international standards to ensure transparency, greater
- government revenue generation, and local economic development;
- establishing mining policy frameworks;
- supporting environmental compliance;
- geo-science;
- promoting investment; and
- reforming mining policy and regulations.

## **PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:**

Initially, the MIDAS project was designed to help MoMP tender 8 to 10 mineral projects to international investors, to help the Afghan economy to obtain revenue generation and generate employment, however, due to frequent changes of management and staff personnel, even at Ministerial level, the MIDAS project was asked by the new Minister [Minister Saba] to change the direction of the scope. MIDAS was requested to stop trying to develop hard mineral projects, and as a priority to engage with and help develop the natural gas sector, and to assist with contract management support.

MIDAS will provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum to assist the Ministry to transform itself into the regulatory body for the extractive sector of Afghanistan. Some steps toward this transformation have already been undertaken, but to secure the progress achieved and to further strengthen the shift of the MoMP away from its former role as a Soviet-style monopoly in the sector, more work needs to be done. The essence of this work will be to assist MoMP in opening the extractives sector to private investment while focusing MoMP's attention on how to monitor the activities of those private firms—both large and small—to exact a safe working environment, sound environmental protection, sensible community development, and maximization of revenues for the people of Afghanistan.

## Objectives:

- Reform MoMP's legal and regulatory regime of the extractives sector.

This includes building the capacity of MoMP to professionally conduct its own activities based upon competent and sound legal principles.

- Build capacity of MoMP to determine the value of natural resources.

MoMP should be able to assess the nature and extent of the nation's mineral and energy resources, including the market concepts of the value of those resources.

These objectives will be supported by two project Components.

### Component I: Legal and Regulatory Technical Assistance and Support for MoMP

While there have been some new legislative measures adopted for the extractive sector over the past three (3) years, not all of them can be viewed as wholly supportive of the effort to transform MoMP into the regulatory body for the extractive sector, nor entirely supportive of the effort to make the extractive sector inviting, friendly and open to private investors. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) must continue to press for reform in these regards and continue to fine-tune its legal and regulatory provisions, among many others, on royalty, tax, environmental and licensing matters as well as implementing procedures in the extractive sector. The entire legal and regulatory framework for the extractive sector should be aligned with world class standards. MIDAS' Component I will provide technical assistance to MoMP to continue its effort to bring the legal and regulatory regime of its extractive sector into alignment with international norms for such sectors.

#### Activities under Component I:

- Continued development of legislation for the extractive sector such that the sectoral laws are aligned with World Class Standards and which create a business-friendly environment;
- Development of regulations, including financial regulations, supporting and implementing the sectoral laws.
- Sectoral institution and administrative structural transition to become the regulatory body for the extractive sector.
- Continued development of the existing Ministry of Mines and Petroleum into the extractive sector regulatory body, including development of in-house or internal procedures which guide the day-to-day activities of the regulatory agency staff.
- Work on a day-to-day basis with the legal staff of MoMP to assist in the normal regulatory body activities, including the drafting and analysis of extractive sector contracts and other documents, contract management and monitoring activities, and inspection and enforcement activities.

#### Results:

- Legislation and a regulatory framework, including internal procedures, that establishes MoMP as the primary regulatory authority for the extractive sector, and which promotes business activities and revenue generation by being better aligned with international norms for national extractive sectors.

- Substantial progress toward establishing a legal and regulatory regime, including internal procedures, for the extractive sector which encourages domestic and foreign investment in the extractive sector and ensures appropriate financial gains, rights and protections for GIRoA and the people of Afghanistan.
- Develop the legal capacity of MoMP such that it will be more self-sufficient in the future regulation of the extractive sector, including in the areas of licensing, contracting, enforcement, dispute settlement, and revenue management.

Component II: Strengthening Capacity at the MoMP: MoMP's needs include an expanded resource analysis and quantification capability for the extractive sector, skilled financial, economic and policy analysis staff, appropriately-sized operations staffed by qualified officials, databases accessible to potential investors, and investment promotion capacity. Emphasis will be placed primarily on financial analysis, strategic planning and transaction advisory services in support of investment tender development and subsequent contract management.

The MoMP also requires both enhanced capacity and a significant re-structuring for the Afghan Geological Survey (AGS), which can be supported through on-site training, mentoring and capacity development. In light of the global collapse in commodity prices during 2015 and the resulting curtailment of exploration and development activities worldwide, technical support and advisory services to the AGS would be provided by a small, streamlined specialty group initially working in three limited areas: (1) providing MoMP with recommendations on restructuring the AGS from a Soviet-era bureaucracy into a streamlined, tightly-focused geological survey in line with those of other developing countries; (2) consolidating AGS technical data scattered around the work into a single location, accessible by domestic and international investors; and (3) providing GIS training and capacity development to provincial MoMP and AGS offices and staff.

Activities under Component II:


- Provide technical assistance and implementation support to develop MoMP expertise in financial and data analysis and management to verify the quantity and quality of resource deposits in line with NI 43-101 standards; evaluating and packaging tenders; as well as managing and implementing contracts for short term results and long term sustainability in keeping with international standards to ensure transparency, greater government revenue generation, and local economic development. MIDAS should focus on developing a structure that supports the Minister's and USAID's requests for the MoMP to become "operational", introducing
- Provide implementation support to the Ministry to improve the staff's ability to manage contracts, especially using actual contracts as case studies.
- Build MoMP capacity in the areas of strategic planning and analysis, particularly in terms of taking a measured, long-term view of developing the country's extractive sector so as to avoid the "resource curse" and the creation of unreasonable expectations.
- Develop financial and economic analysis capabilities so as to enable the Ministry to persuade the Government on the importance of making Afghanistan's extractives sector fiscal regimes fair, transparent and globally-competitive.
- Conduct other activities that will improve the prospects for the success of this component.

- Provide Technical Assistance (TA) to improve MoMP capacity in budgeting processes and procedures, internal controls, procurement procedures and financial management practices.
- Conduct other activities that will improve the prospects for the success of this Component.

Results:

- Capacity throughout MoMP to develop, promote and manage tenders for domestic and international investors developed.
- Capacity to efficiently allocate, disburse and manage development assistance as well as appropriately manage the revenues that the extractives sector will produce.

## PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES





## PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this evaluation is to identify lessons learned in the mineral sector to influence future management decision-making. This evaluation should address how the lack of a consistent strategy on the part of the GoA, and especially within the MoMP, affected the MIDAS program and its intended results.

As per USAID's Evaluation Policy, the evaluation's findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence; then conclusions based on each key finding relative to the questions below and actionable and informative recommendations as appropriate.

The focus will include achievements met and weaknesses observed with regards to the MIDAS project's engagement with the MoMP; and whether the intended outcomes were achieved.

## EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. To what extent was MIDAS successful in achieving its intended objectives?
  - a. What have been MIDAS' greatest achievements?
  - b. What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its intended objectives?
  - c. What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy in MoMP have on achieving MIDAS' objectives?
2. To what extent did revision of the scope of work for the MIDAS project address strategic needs of MoMP in the areas of hydrocarbons and minerals?
3. What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision-making for development of a similar technical assistance project?

## EVALUATION DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

<b>Questions</b>	<b>Suggested Data Sources</b>	<b>Suggested Data Collection Methods</b>	<b>Data Methods Analysis</b>
To what extent did the lack of a consistent strategy in MoMP affect MIDAS's objectives?	Ministry of Mines & Petroleum  Project Reports	Key Informant Interviews	
To what extent did revision of the scope of work for the MIDAS project address strategic needs of MoMP in the areas of hydrocarbons and minerals?	Ministry of Mines & Petroleum  Project Reports	Key Informant Interviews	
What lessons learned from this program could inform future management decision-making for development of a similar technical assistance (TA) project?	Ministry of Mines & Petroleum  Project Reports	Key Informant Interviews	

## EXISTING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION SOURCES

List of documents available:

- Reports by ECC [monthly, quarterly, annually and annual workplans]
- Project Deliverables by ECC (Implementing Partner)
- Project contract and modifications (including SOW)
- M&E plan and modifications

**Note: The COR for MIDAS will provide the relevant documents as a package.** Additional background documents may be needed to support the team's preparation. These will be identified by the team pursuant to discussion with the MIDAS COR at the in-brief and at time of Work Plan submission.

## EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The team will consist of four members consisting of an expat Team Leader who will serve as the primary coordinator with USAID and the Implementing Partner and key stakeholders; an expat Technical Specialist and two Afghan Specialists/Translators. All team members shall be familiar with USAID's Evaluation Policy.

The Team Leader shall have at least eight years' experience in policy and/or institutional reform in the extractive industry coupled with evaluation experience of USAID programs. H/she shall have – excellent English writing and communication skills and leadership experience.. Prior experience in Afghanistan and prior experience with public-private partnerships is a plus.

The Technical Consultant shall have at least six years' of experience, including evaluation and assessment expertise on USAID programs in the extractive industry sector, with a particular emphasis on Minerals. Prior experience in Afghanistan is a plus.

Two Afghans with prior evaluation experience of USAID programs coupled with at least five years' experience in the Minerals sector. Individuals must be willing to travel to remote project sites if required.

## EVALUATION SCHEDULE

A six day work week is authorized for this evaluation activity. No expat field travel is envisioned for this activity. The final report is expected by the end of December 2016.

**Sample Table: Minimum LOE in days by activity for a team of 3**

Activity	LOE for Expatriate Team Lead	LOE for Expatriate [subject matter] Specialist	LOE for Afghan [subject matter] Specialist	LOE for Afghan [subject matter] Specialist	Total LOE in days
Document review-desk review	2	2			4
Travel to and from Afghanistan	4	4			8
In-brief and draft work plan	5	5	5		15
Meetings with USAID and Kabul-based interviews	3	3	3		9
Interviews in XX sites	3	3	3		9
Data analysis, preliminary report and presentation to USAID and IPs	6	6	6	6	24
Draft report and debrief to USAID	1	1	1		3
Final report	3	3			6
<b>Totals</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>72</b>

**Sample Table: Minimum LOE in days by position for a team of 3**

Proposed LOE Table

Position	Remote prep	Travel to/from Kabul	In-Country	Finalization of Report	Total
Expat Team Leader	1	4	42	4	51
Expat Specialist	1	4	42	4	51
Afghan Specialist/Translator			40		40
Afghan Specialist/Translator			40		40
SUPPORT-II Evaluation Specialist					
Totals	2	8	164	8	182

## DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

- In-briefing:** Within **48 hours** of arrival in Kabul, the Evaluation Team, will have an in-briefing with the OPPD M&E unit and the OI Team for introductions and to discuss the team's understanding of the assignment, initial assumptions, evaluation questions, methodology, and work plan, and/or to adjust the SOW, if necessary. This session will also allow the evaluation team an opportunity to discuss in some depth the intended uses of the evaluation, the evaluation stakeholders and their priorities vis-à-vis the evaluation, and USAID preferences for delivery of findings, conclusions and recommendations. The evaluation team will benefit from USAID reserving a minimum of one hour for the In-brief.
- Evaluation Work Plan:** Within **3 calendar days** following the in-brief, the Evaluation Team Leader shall provide a detailed initial work plan to OPPD's M&E unit and OI. The initial work plan will include:
  - the overall evaluation design, including the proposed methodology, data collection and analysis plan, and data collection instruments;
  - a list of the team members and their primary contact details while in-country, including the e-mail address and mobile phone number for the team leader; and
  - the team's proposed schedule for the evaluation. USAID offices and relevant stakeholders are asked to take up to **2 days** to review and consolidate comments through the SUPPORT II COR. Once the evaluation team receives the consolidated comments on the initial work plan, they are expected to return with a revised work plan within **2 days**. The revised work plan shall include the list of potential interviewees and sites to be visited.
- Mid-term Briefing and Interim Meetings:** The evaluation team is expected to hold a mid-term briefing with USAID on the status of the assessment including potential challenges and emerging opportunities. The team can also provide other stakeholders with periodic briefings and feedback on the team's findings, as agreed upon

during the in-briefing. If desired or necessary, weekly briefings by phone can be arranged.

4. **PowerPoint and Final Exit Presentation:** The evaluation team is expected to hold a final exit presentation to discuss the summary of findings and recommendations to USAID. This presentation will be scheduled as agreed upon during the in-briefing. Presentation slides should not exceed 18 in total.
5. **Draft Evaluation Report:** The draft evaluation report should be consistent with the guidance provided in Section XIII: "Final Report Format." The report will address each of the issues and questions identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. **The submission date** for the draft evaluation report will be decided upon during the mid-term or exit briefing and submitted to OPPD's M&E unit by Checchi. Once the initial draft evaluation report is submitted, the following deadlines should be followed:
  - a. OI will have **8 working days** in which to review and comment on the initial draft, after which point USAID/OPPD's M&E unit will have **2 working days** to review and consolidate all USAID comments (total of **10 working days**). OPPD will submit the consolidated comments to Checchi.
  - b. The evaluation team will then have **5 working days** to make appropriate edits and revisions to the draft and re-submit the revised final draft report to USAID.
  - c. OI and the M&E unit will have **10 working days** after the submission of the second revised draft to again review and send any final comments.
6. **Final Evaluation Report:** The evaluation team will be asked to take no more than **3 days** to respond/incorporate the final comments from the OI and OPPD. The Evaluation Team Leader will then submit the final report to OPPD. All project data and records will be submitted in full and should be in electronic form in easily readable format; organized and documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or evaluation; and owned by USAID.

## MANAGEMENT

The Checchi/SUPPORT-II project will identify and hire the evaluation team, pending the COR's concurrence and CO approval, assist in facilitating the work plan, and arrange meetings with key stakeholders identified prior to the initiation of the fieldwork. The evaluation team will organize other meetings as identified during the course of the evaluation, in consultation with Checchi/SUPPORT-II and USAID. Checchi/SUPPORT-II is responsible for all logistical support required for the evaluation team, including arranging accommodation, security, office space, computers, Internet access, printing, communication, and transportation.

The evaluation team will officially report to Checchi's SUPPORT-II management. Checchi/SUPPORT- II is responsible for all direct coordination with USAID/Afghanistan/OPPD, through the SUPPORT II COR, Mohammad Sediq Orya. From a technical management perspective, the evaluation team will work closely with the COR for SGGA Mr. Jules Jordy and Alternate COR Mr. Khalid. In order to maintain objectivity, OPPD's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit will make all final decisions about the evaluation.

## FINAL REPORT FORMAT

The evaluation final report should be about 25 pages in length, not including annexes. It should be written in English, using Times New Roman 12 point font, 1.15 line spacing, and be consistent with USAID branding policy. The report should be structured as follows:

1. Title Page
2. Table of Contents
3. List of any acronyms, tables and/or figures
4. Acknowledgements or Preface (optional)
5. Executive Summary (**3-5 pages**)
6. Introduction
  - a. Description of the project evaluated, including goal and expected results
  - b. Brief statement on purpose of the evaluation, plus a list of the evaluation questions
  - c. Description of the methods used in the evaluation (such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.), the rationale and location for field visits (if any), and a description of the numbers and types of respondents
  - d. Limitations to the evaluation, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)
7. Findings
  - a. Describe findings, focusing on each of the evaluation questions and providing **gender disaggregation** where appropriate
  - b. Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or the compilation of people's opinions
8. Conclusions
  - a. Conclusions are value statements drawn from the data gathered during the evaluation process
9. Recommendations
  - a. Recommendations should be actionable, practical and specific statements for existing programming and for the design and performance of future programming
  - b. Each recommendation should be supported by a specific set of findings
  - c. Include recommended future objectives and types of activities based on **lessons learned**
10. Annexes
  - a. Evaluation Scope of Work
  - b. Methodology description (include **any pertinent** details not captured in the report)
  - c. Copies of **all** survey instruments and questionnaires
  - d. List of critical and key documents reviewed
  - e. Schedule of Meetings and sources of information (If confidentiality is a concern, the team should discuss and agree upon an approach with USAID)
  - f. Notes from key interviews, focus group discussions and other meetings
  - g. Documentation of any changes to the SOW or evaluation process
  - h. Statement of differences (if applicable)
11. One or two page briefer of findings, recommendations and lessons learned (optional)]

## OVERALL REPORTING GUIDELINES

The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate the validity of the project's hypothesis and the effectiveness of the project. Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the statement of work and be written in highly professional English, free of grammatical and typographical error, and with professional formatting.

Any modifications to the statement of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing.



## ANNEX 2: DESK REVIEW REFERENCES AND REPORTS UTILIZED

Source	Document
MIDAS	Access to Finance study for prospective mining sites in Afghanistan, November 18, 2013. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	AID: Amendment of the Solicitation/modification of MIDAS Contract, 1 December, 2016,
World Bank	Australian Aid, The World bank. 11 July 2012. Afghanistan Resource Corridor Development: Power Sector Analysis, Executive Summary By John Irving & Peter Meier
World Bank	Australian Aid. The World bank. 23 May 2012. Afghanistan Resource Corridor Private Sector development. Local Capacity Assessment – Company Profiles Progress Report #2 By Altai consulting and corporate value associate
MIDAS	Baseline Schedule MIDAS opt Prd2, April 15, 16, Cost allocation by Resources Usage.pdf MIDAS option Year 2 Project Resources Allocations
DFID	Department of international development, March 2014. Annual review, Afghanistan Extractives Sector Support Program, started at August 2013 and ended in March 2014. The review was undertaken by the DFID London based Investment Promotion Adviser, in consultation with DFID Afghanistan Senior Private Sector Adviser and Growth and Livelihoods Team. In-country consultations included stakeholders within MoMP (Minister, Deputy Minister and senior officials), the TA implementing partner, and other stakeholders including USAID, and the US TFBSO
MoMP	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2014. Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Afghanistan Resource Corridors Project (ARCP)-World Bank Funded. Mr. Abdul Mubeen Shahab, Director ARCP / MoMP
World bank	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. May 7, 2013. Afghanistan Resource Corridors Project – ARCP – (PI45443) Project Preparation Grant (PPG) Application to ARTF Management Committee MC Meeting
MIDAS	MIDAS: November 18, 2013. Component III: Supplement document “Baseline training supply for Prospective mining sites in Afghanistan. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
MIDAS	MIDAS, November 18, 2013. SME assessment result report. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
MIDAS	MIDAS, November 18, 2013. Policies and tools to promote local value Chains in Extractive Industries in Afghanistan and Maximize Economic Opportunities for local Firm This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
MIDAS	MIDAS M and E with comments Dec 10 2014.pdf Shows performance management task schedule and performance indicators reference sheets (PIRS)

MIDAS	MIDAS Work Plan and Progress Q1 - OY2.xlsx Shows progress of activities towards achievement.
MoMP	Ministry of mines and petroleum. Afghanistan Resource Corridors Program (ARCP)
MoMP	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Afghanistan Resource Corridors project (A R C P), Annual Activity Report 2015.
FLAG Int	Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability, USAID: (October 2012 – October 2014), short information from the FLAG International web site.
USAID	Mod 1-Deliverables: Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 03 September, 2013,
USAID	Mod 2- budget realignment: Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 03 December, 2013,
USAID	Mod 3- Branding and marking, Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Branding and Implementation Plan: Amendment of the Solicitation/modification of Contract, 12 January, 2014,
USAID	Mod 4. Exercise on option Period 1: Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 01 October, 2014,
USAID	Mod 5. Option Period 1 Funding +Drilling. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 16 December, 2014,
USAID	Mod 6. DE obligation + Drilling reduction. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 15 October, 2015,
USAID	Mod 7. Incremental funding modification. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 03 March , 2016,
USAID	Mod 8. Exercise on optional period 2. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 30 March , 2016,
USAID	Mod 9. Revised Statement of work. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 05 April, 2016,
USAID	Mod 10. Incremental Funding. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 17 April, 2016,
USAID	Mod 11. Correction of mod 6. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 14 June, 2016,
USAID	Mod 12. Funding and budget. Amendment of the MIDAS Solicitation/modification of Contract, 21 June, 2016,
MoMP	MoMP. June, 2012. SDNRP-Ministry of mines. PMU. From MoMP sites.
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 2016. Afghanistan's Oil, Gas, and Minerals Industries: \$488 Million in U.S. Efforts Show Limited Progress Overall, and Challenges Prevent Further Investment and Growth. Public Affair Officer
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 20 July 2016, 30 January 2017. Economic and Social development.

	Public Affair Officer
MoMP	Sustainable development of natural resources Program. Aynak compliance monitoring project status report July 2012.
World Bank	The World bank. May9, 2012. Afghanistan Sustainable development resources by Michael Stanley, Project Lead
World Bank	The World Bank. 13-Dec-2014. Implementation Status & Results Report. Afghanistan: Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project II Public Disclosure Copy
World Bank	The World Bank. May 06, 2011. The documents of the world bank. Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant. Public of Afghanistan for a second sustainable Development of Natural resources project.
World Bank	The World bank. July 9, 2012. Afghanistan resource Corridor Development: Strategic input on the development of the Aynak Project. By consulting team: Andrés Hevia, Jorge Bande, Juan Carlos Guajardo
World Bank	The World bank. 06/09/2015. Evaluation report on Sustainable Development Of Natural Resources by Independent Evaluation Group
World Bank	The World Bank. 09 June, 2013. Implementation Status & Results Afghanistan Sustainable Development of Natural Resources
MIDAS	USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS): January 31, 2017. MIDAS final Reports. Source: MIDAS documents This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. October 2014. USAID/Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Work Plan for October 2014 - March 2016 The document was produced by the USAID
USAID	USAID. March 31, 2013. Contract - Fully Executed MIDAS TASK ORDER #AID-306-TO-13-00003 (Less OnBudget).pdf
USAID	USAID. 2016. Contract Action tracker. 20 Sep 16 MIDAS Project Tracker.xlsx
USAID	USAID. July 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E Plan) The publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. August 2015. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E Plan) The publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. April 15, 2016. MIDAS Baseline Schedule option Period 2 (APRIL 1, 2016 TO MARCH 31, 2017), MIDAS option year2, Project Resources and Cost Distribution

USAID	<p>USAID. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for May – 30 June, 2013</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 30 October 2013. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 July – 30 September, 2013</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 26 January 2014. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 October – 31 December, 2013</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 26 April 2014. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 January – 31 March, 2014</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 24 July 2014. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 March- 30 June, 2014.</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 29 October 2014. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 July – 31 September, 2014</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 26 January 2015. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 October – 31 December, 2014</p> <p>This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 12 October 2014. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) annual operational and intermediate result Annual Report for FY 2015.- October 1, 2013 - September 30, 2014. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.</p>

USAID	USAID. 30 November 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) annual operational and intermediate result Annual Report for FY 2015.- October 1, 2014 - September 30, 2015. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.
USAID	USAID. 13 November 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) annual operational and intermediate result Annual Report for FY 2016.- October 1, 2015 - September 30, 2016. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.
USAID	USAID. 29 April 2015. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Quarterly progress report, (1 January- 31 March 2015)This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. 30 July 2015. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Quarterly progress report, (1 April- 30 June 2015). This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. 30 October 2015. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Quarterly progress report, (1 July- 30 September 2015)  This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. 30 January 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Quarterly progress report, (October - December 2015) This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. 30 April 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 July – 30 September, 2016. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.

USAID	USAID. 30 July 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 April – 30 June, 2016. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.
USAID	USAID. 30 October 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 July – 30 September, 2016. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.
USAID	USAID. 30 January 2017. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) Quarterly Report for 1 October – 31 December, 2016. This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC. The report is concerned with the MIDAS project.
MIDAS	USAID. August 1, 2016. Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Stability, Training Needs Assessment Report (MOMP+AGS) to Inform Future Trainings. Source: MIDAS. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. 6 November 2016. Updated and Revised MIDAS Option Year2 (OY 2) Work Plan & accompanying MS Project Schedule ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. 11 August 2016. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), Training Assessment Report (MOMP + AGS). This document was produced and published by the USAID.
USAID	USAID. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), monthly progress reports, (30 April 2013, 31 May 2013, 30 June 2013, 31 July 2013, 31 August 2013, 05 September 2013, 05 October 2013, 05 November 2013, 05 December-2013) This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), monthly progress reports, (05 Jan 2014, 05 Feb 2014, 05 March 2014, 05 April 2014, 05 May 2014, 05 June 2014, 05 July 2014, 05 August 2014, 05 September 2014, 05 October 2014, 04 November 2014, 05 December 2014) This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.
USAID	USAID. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), monthly progress reports, (05 Jan 2015, 05 Feb, 2015, 05 March 2015, 05 April 2015, 05 May 2015, 05 June 2015, 05 July 2015, 05 August 2015, 05 September 2015, 05 October 2015, 05 November 2015, 05 December-2015) This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.

USAID	<p>USAID. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), monthly progress reports, (05 Jan 2016, 05 Feb 2016, 05 March 2016, 05 April 2016, 05 May 2016, 05 June 2016, 10 July 2016, 05 August 2016, 05 September 2016, 05 October 2016, 05 November 2016, 05 December-2016)</p> <p>This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. USAID Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS), monthly progress reports, (05 Jan 2017, 05 Feb 2017 and 05 March 2017)</p> <p>This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC.</p>
USAID	<p>USAID. 18 July 2013. Gender Report. Gender Mainstreaming at the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS)</p> <p>This document was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water &amp; Power LLC.</p>



### ANNEX 3: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED OR MET

#	Date	Title	Organization
1	Mar/15/2016	Advisor	MIDAS
2	Mar/15/2017	Advisor	MIDAS
3	Mar/15/2017	MIDAS Security Member	MIDAS
4	Mar/15/2017	Procurement Compliance Mgr.	MIDAS
5	Mar/16/2017	N/A	USAID
6	Mar/16/2017	N/A	USAID
7	Mar/16/2017	N/A	USAID
8	Mar/22/2017	Chief of Party	MIDAS
9	Mar/22/2017	Lead of Component	MIDAS
10	Mar/27/2017	Legal Advisor	MIDAS
11	Mar/28/2017	HR Acting Director	MoMP
12	Mar/28/2017	M&E Specialist MIDAS	MIDAS
13	April/2/2017	AGS Director	MoMP
14	April/2/2017	Investment Promotion Marketing Director	MoMP
15	April/2/2017	Acting Director Law	MoMP

#	Date	Title	Organization
16	April/2/2017	Gender Director	MoMP
17	Apr/4/2017	Acting Director of Cadaster	MoMP
18	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
19	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
20	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
21	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
22	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
23	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
24	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
25	Apr/4/2017	Head of Mineral Department*	MoMP
26	Apr/5/2017	Head of Marketing	MoMP
27	Apr/5/2017	Contract Expert	MoMP
28	Apr/5/2017	Finance Specialist	MoMP
29	Apr/5/2017	Gender Analyst	MoMP
30	Apr/5/2017	Petroleum Department	MoMP
31	Apr/10/2017	Engineer	MoMP

#	Date	Title	Organization
32	Apr/10/2017	Engineer	MoMP
33	Apr/10/2017	Engineer	MoMP
34	Apr/17/2017	M&E Specialist	MIDAS
35	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
36	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
37	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
38	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
39	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
40	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
41	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
42	Apr/17/2017	N/A	USAID
43	Apr/18/2017	Advisor to Minister	MoMP
44	Apr/18/2017	Special Assistant to Minister	MoMP
45	Apr/18/2017	Lawyer, Legal Assistant	MoMP
46	Apr/18/2017	Lawyer, Legal Service	MoMP

\*Several Head of Mineral department works as middle managers for individual projects at (MoMP) in Afghanistan

ANNEX 4: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS FORMS AND EVIDENCE MATRIX

I. DOCUMENT REVIEW AND KEY INFORMANT/FGD INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Date: \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/2017 Location: \_\_\_\_\_ Start time: \_\_\_\_\_ End time: \_\_\_\_\_

Evaluation Team Member: \_\_\_\_\_ Name of KII/FGD or Document:\_\_\_\_\_

Please inform participant(s) that we are collecting information to assist USAID to better plan its future support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Participants should feel free to openly discuss issues and to provide any information relevant to this effort. All discussion will be fully confidential with no attribution to any specific individual. Reports of our discussions will not contain details that would permit identification of their unique source. Please advise the participant(s) to feel free to give their best suggestions.

For documents, please provide notes on its contents related to the questions below. Please indicate NA for questions that are not addressed in the document.

Ask the following questions and please give sufficient time for the respondent to add any details of interest.	Notes on the response of the participant(s) or the documents contents that are directly related to the question. If no related responses to the question or document content, please indicate NA.	Summary indicator of the response to the question. Yes/No or two top responses in order
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<b>Ask the following questions and please give sufficient time for the respondent to add any details of interest.</b>	<b>Notes on the response of the participant(s) or the documents contents that are directly related to the question. If no related responses to the question or document content, please indicate NA.</b>	<b>Summary indicator of the response to the question. Yes/No or two top responses in order</b>
A. What MIDAS programmatic activities most improved your/your office's ability to perform Ministry duties and responsibilities?		

<b>Ask the following questions and please give sufficient time for the respondent to add any details of interest.</b>	<b>Notes on the response of the participant(s) or the documents contents that are directly related to the question. If no related responses to the question or document content, please indicate NA.</b>	<b>Summary indicator of the response to the question. Yes/No or two top responses in order</b>
B. What MIDAS activities most improved workplace participation by women professionals?		
C. What could MIDAS have done better to support you/your office's (MoMP) ability to better carry out your Ministry duties and responsibilities?		

<b>Ask the following questions and please give sufficient time for the respondent to add any details of interest.</b>	<b>Notes on the response of the participant(s) or the documents contents that are directly related to the question. If no related responses to the question or document content, please indicate NA.</b>	<b>Summary indicator of the response to the question. Yes/No or two top responses in order</b>
D. What could MIDAS have done better to improve workplace participation by women professionals?		
E. What actions could MoMP have taken to derive greater benefit from the MIDAS program?		
F. What could MoMP have done to derive greater benefit for its women professionals from the MIDAS program?		
G. 1. Over the time that you were engaged in the MIDAS program, did you see program goals and objectives change? 2. How did those changes impact your work? (try to get positive or negative and how)		
H. Did the changes to the MIDAS SOW address the changing programmatic needs of the MoMP? (try to get yes or no)		



<b>Ask the following questions and please give sufficient time for the respondent to add any details of interest.</b>	<b>Notes on the response of the participant(s) or the documents contents that are directly related to the question. If no related responses to the question or document content, please indicate NA.</b>	<b>Summary indicator of the response to the question. Yes/No or two top responses in order</b>
I. 1. As MIDAS developed over time, did you see changes in the way the program addressed issues of women professionals in the MoMP? 2. How did these changes affect your work (+ or -)?		
J. How can donors be more effective in the current political and security environment to support Afghanistan to develop its extractives sector		

II. CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS SOW QUESTIONS

MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.	Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations
A. What MIDAS programmatic activities most improved your/your office’s ability to perform Ministry duties and responsibilities?	<p>Statement (count supported/total interviews)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Training and technical capacity building (some with GIZ) has enabled some AGS Engineers to undertake minerals exploration: [27]</li><li>• MIDAS helped with drafting regulations, contracts, legal reviews and the tendering package. [27]</li><li>• Note: Several KII and FGSs report that MIDAS was 10-20% effective or relevant with many missed opportunities (A common belief is that MIDAS did not help MoMP very much and was the least effective of its donors with few of its plans/products delivered): [13]</li><li>• MIDAS produced standardized Mining Contract Forms, Field Notebook and coding sheets:. [12]</li><li>• MIDAS supported SME training for their participation in extractives industries. [9]</li><li>• MIDAS conducted a baseline needs assessment for training, SME and for training and finance institutions that could facilitate a higher level participation in the extractives sector. [7]</li><li>• MIDAS extended efforts to coordinate with other donor programs. [3]</li><li>• MIDAS supported two new directorates (Afghan Petroleum and Petroleum Support Unit) with staffing plans and operational guidelines. [2]</li><li>• MIDAS produced a Community Revenue Sharing Agreement document: [1]</li></ul>

<b>MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.</b>	<b>Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations</b>
B. What MIDAS activities most improved workplace participation by women professionals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Internship program for females with AGS females working in the Field allowed them to perform at the same level as their male peers.[14]</li><li>• Training for the Gender Directorate, awareness training and implementation. [14]</li><li>• Identified need and implemented technical training for females. [9]</li><li>• MIDAS supported the hiring of five female lawyers into MoMP. [6]</li><li>• MIDAS promoted one female. Y</li></ul>

<b>MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.</b>	<b>Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations</b>
C. What could MIDAS have done better to support you/your office’s (MoMP) ability to better carry out your Ministry duties and responsibilities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The implementation of the MIDAS project was perceived by MoMP as having: poor accountability; causing an aggravated relationship with many missed opportunities; frequent delayed, paused, modified or canceled plans with significant micromanagement constraints-- all without effective provisions for routine dialog or information sharing between the principal and eight supporting partners(Reports of a pcommon understanding that USAID/MIDAS rarely listened to MoMP). [27]</li><li>• MoMP staff and directors report that increased (requested only) long term hands-on embedded in-office and field based relevant training (with training material in local languages) would help meet their technical requirements. (Few MIDAS staff spend significant time at the MoMP) [22].</li><li>• MIDAS could have provided support and training to more of MoMP’s Directorates to help them address critical issues (i.e. the cadaster and hydrocarbons. [18].</li><li>• MIDAS/USAID could have more formally involved the USGS and the other eight active donors to the development of long term plans with a mechanism for periodic modifications for the implementations of needed training, along with organizational and legal improvements to the Ministry, and specifically to the tendering process. [17]</li><li>• MIDAS could have improved the quality of technical training and support. Many were perceived as poor quality, copies of USGS templates, at a basics level and not customized for Afghan’s needs. [14]–(Related: MIDAS should have addressed the critical shortage of qualified Afghan teachers at the ten universities providing mining related technical education and for related training institutions.).</li><li>• MIDAS did not collaborate fully with Columbia University to obtain the desired “free” assistance did not concentrate (with the MoMP’s legal department) on changes to the Mining Law to make investor funded initiatives possible. [9]</li><li>• MIDAS did not focus on high impact commodities with a strategic value. (Or helped with the exploration of the MoMP identified 16 sites). [9]</li><li>• MIDAS worked in parallel with the MoMP’s legal department rather than hand-in-hand to facilitate knowledge and skill transfer (Support for MoMP’s advisory support to Parliament could have minimized adverse changes to proposed laws). [9]</li><li>• MIDAS did not keep its “promise” to help AGS more with exploration training and the preparation of information packets for potential investors: [8]</li><li>• MIDAS could have engaged the initially proposed key personnel and give more attention to the real world skills, qualifications and history of new staff). [7]</li><li>• MIDAS should provide more support to SME and the private sector: 2XY</li></ul>

<b>MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.</b>	<b>Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations</b>
D. What could MIDAS have done better to improve workplace participation by women professionals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide support capacity building for females in all Directorates, especially the geology laboratory where most of AGS' females work. [12]</li> <li>• More female internships (especially longer term- one year plus to facilitate employment): [9]</li> <li>• Support local universities to graduate more female technical professionals: [9]</li> <li>• MIDAS could have hired more females technical staff to work with the MoMP. [8]</li> <li>• More female scholarships/internships (local especially) to MIDAS' ten identified provincial and Kabul level university mining/geology programs for an increase in the pool of technically qualified females. [7]</li> <li>• Not postpone the Gender Workshop and pushed the MoMP to hire more females: [5]</li> <li>• MIDAS' original plan would have been more effective in supporting females in MoMP. [2]</li> <li>• Added specific support for Gender Issues in its work plan. [3]</li> <li>• Implement its original plan and not curtail initiated and promised gender related projects. [2]</li> </ul>
E. What actions could MoMP have taken to derive greater benefit from the MIDAS program?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MoMP could have insisted on increased coordination and information sharing between MIDAS, MoMP and USAID and among MoMP Department--including full involvement in work plan changes and open distributed access to monitoring and evaluation reports for improved accountability (perhaps with a functioning office of international cooperation). [28]</li> <li>• MoMP could have stabilized its leadership and policies and grant full authority to its twenty acting directors to make and implement plans, including the hiring of needed staff. [26]</li> <li>• MoMP could have been more aggressive, clear and consistent in requesting assistance from MIDAS for pending high return initiatives (gas pipeline, artisanal mining, chromite, 16 exploration sites, etc.), as well as provided more office space for MIDAS at the MoMP and additionally insisted on collaboration with USGS.[14]</li> <li>• MoMP could reduce and streamline bureaucratic procedures, eliminate information flow bottlenecks, computerize its HR department, empowered its M&amp;E office, endorsed Emails as official documents and generally re-map and grant authority to its directors and responsible staff for program implementation and the hiring of needed staff. [10]</li> <li>• MoMP could have been more aggressive in its education efforts for Parliamentarians, the President's Office and related committees on the intricacies of mining laws and lobby for an unencumbered mining law in Afghanistan and to reduce conflicting request/instructions. [10]</li> <li>• MoMP could have improved developer interest with more attention to a revised investor friendly mining law and with consistent, fixed and reasonable royalty rates. [7]</li> <li>• The MoMP could have timely pay full per-Diem's and related expenses to help improve employee motivation, workplace morale and increase field activities, especially now with leadership transition, staff relocation, staff miss-allocated, and area of work reductions. [5]</li> <li>• MoMP should have insisted upon high level support for assistance from USGS. [5]</li> <li>• MoMP could have provided more support to SMEs. [2]</li> </ul>

<b>MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.</b>	<b>Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations</b>
<p>F. What could MoMP have done to derive greater benefit for its women professionals from the MIDAS program?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MoMP could independently empower women in their work and increase their access to needed technical skills, especially with scholarships at local universities, etc.. [9]</li> <li>• MoMP should increase the visibility and support to gender issues with linkages to the other departments.[9]</li> <li>• MoMP could have made stronger efforts to hire the trained female interns. [8]</li> <li>• MoMP should improve the participation of females in training (especially international) programs [4]</li> <li>• MoMP could have involved all MoMP Departments in gender issues to replicate the growing success of AGS--[3]</li> <li>• The MoMP should develop a policy to deal with work place harassment: X</li> <li>• </li> </ul>
<p>G. 1. Over the time that you were engaged in the MIDAS program, did you see program goals and objectives change? 2. How did those changes impact your work? (try to get positive or negative and how)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes aware: [25]</li> <li>• No, not aware:[3]</li> <li>• Positive. [5]</li> <li>• </li> <li>• Negative -MoMP felt MIDAS was not responsive to its needs: [7]</li> <li>• Negative -MoMP leadership changes and perceived USAID “micromanagement” resulted in too many changes and delays in the program to permit effective implementation. [6]</li> <li>• No real impact since MIDAS and the MoMP were working independently: [6]</li> <li>• Impact confined to legal and regulatory parts of MoMP with little appreciation for parallel work. [5]</li> <li>• Negative-Many projects were started but then abandoned prior to completion. [5]</li> <li>• MIDAS was confused with the addition of the Oil and Gas sector to their SOW given that the area was already (relatively) well developed. This gave the impression that USAID was unaware of Afghan’s substantial progress in the sector. [4]</li> <li>• Negative-MIDAS’ focus on legal and regulatory issues led to ignored training needs in other directorates. [3]</li> <li>• MIDAS was as responsive to MoMP as the contract allowed: [3]</li> <li>• MIDAS focused more and more on activities outside of its work plan. X</li> <li>• Difficult to develop regulations in the absence of effective laws: X</li> </ul>

MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.	Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations
H. Did the changes to the MIDAS SOW address the changing programmatic needs of the MoMP? (try to get yes or no)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Yes but not all. [15]</li><li>• Yes: Activities were reorganized to support investor friendly legislation: X</li><li>• No. real impact since MIDAS and the MoMP were working independently with no accountability and very little sharing of changes in the workplan.[13]</li><li>• No. New Minister Saba mandated hand-on training and many other changes. [3]</li><li>• No. To many changes in MIDAS work plan and too many USAID CORs with a drifting focus: [8]</li><li>• No. MoMP remained without the capacity needed to neither manage routine implementations nor high value tenders: [7]</li><li>• No. Micromanagement and limited flexibility to adapt to the changing needs of MoMP. 4X</li><li>• No. MoMP felt there was too much focus on legal issues at the expense of training needs. [2]</li><li>• No. Given the high number of off-work plan activities, the SOW could have been adapted more. X</li><li>• No.Initial work plan was good but was changed at the expense of AGS and MoMP. [2]</li></ul>
I. 1. As MIDAS developed over time, did you see changes in the way the program addressed issues of women professionals in the MoMP? 2. How did these changes affect your work (+ or -)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•</li><li>• Yes: [2]</li><li>• No: [12]</li><li>• Although five females were hired by MoMP, funding cuts by USAID left MoMP without the skills provided by these females through their MIDAS supported training. [7]</li><li>• With approximately 250-370 vacancies, the MoMP was unable to manage its human resources allocations and needs. [6]</li><li>• Reduction in funding caused the MoMP to lose female staff and for gender issues to not be addressed in other departments. [3]</li><li>• Only two of AGS' five primary functions were supported. No support to females in the Geology Laboratory or to those in the mineral exploitative sector. [1]</li><li>• Positive: [2]</li><li>• Negative: [7]</li></ul>

<b>MIDAS Evaluation Inception Report Questions.</b>	<b>Consolidated summary notes YES/NO or top two recommendations</b>
J. How can donors be more effective in the current political and security environment to support Afghanistan to develop its extractives sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Involve competent actors (i.e. USGS) as a sector lead for donor collaboration and common planning. [9].</li><li>• Any new program should be based upon a common donor/investor assessment of needs with the MoMP and developed with the MoMP to meet the critical issues now limiting investor support for the extractives sector in Afghanistan: [8]</li><li>• Support “Environmental Geology”, “Minerals”, “Laboratory”, exploration and generally all departments of the MoMP. [8]</li><li>• Focus on field based practical training with usable results. [6]</li><li>• Insist upon a fully installed Minister and a full complement of fully install Directors for its 23 departments. [5]</li><li>• Give high priority to the establishment of stability and the investor acceptance of mining laws. [5]</li><li>• Ensure routine information sharing all with involved actors and a transparent shared evaluation process to improve collaboration and coordination [4]</li><li>• In-bed technical long term support to improve the transfer of knowledge and skills to help make MoMP less dependent upon outside technical support. [4]</li><li>• New programs should be designed from the start to include females and make provisions for the technical training of females to provide a continuing supply of new trained female workers. [3]</li><li>• Improve recruitment efforts to help ensure fully qualified staff who can commit to stay with the project long term. [2]</li><li>• Include sufficient funds and oversight to support MoMP field activities [1]</li><li>• Public relations efforts should give a realistic picture of the expected returns to the GIRoA and to associated communities. [1]</li></ul>



III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

I. a. What has been MIDAS’ greatest achievement?

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>1. MoMP professionals who received on-the-job experiences under Component I reported limited new skills. Essentially all interviewed staff in the legal directorate reported no gain in skills because of inappropriate instructors, irrelevant curriculum and almost no face time with MIDAS professionals. Similarly, professionals trained under Component II reported that office-based training consisted of inferior and far too short duplication's of training previously provided by USGS. [27] [wb,mida.advi-FGD, W-FGD, adv-KII3, COP-KII2, D-KII6. MoMP-FGD5, wpq1-r,q2-r]</p> <p>2. MIDAS reports that an approximate 60% improvement in MoMP Component I capacity to draft regulations, develop standardized mining contract forms, standardized mining permit applications, and conduct legal reviews. MoMP professionals disagree, estimating a 10% - 20% capacity improvement. Although reported as not utilized as a training opportunity, MoMP senior officials and Directorate staff did express appreciation for the ‘independent’ development of legal documents, reviews and contract forms. The standard field note book was also mentioned as an appreciated MIDAS output.[27] [wb,mida.advi-FGD, adv-KII3, M&amp;E-KII2. Cop-KII2, sigar-r, D-KII6. MoMP-FGD5, lqr, mr, ta-r2, f-r]</p> <p>3.a. MIDAS reports that AGS female engineers received their first ever fieldwork experience working at the same level as their male peers yet AGS women professionals have been doing fieldwork with USGS for more than a decade preceding MIDAS: [14] [adv-</p>	<p>1. Despite years of capacity building efforts expended on MoMP by various donors, for many reasons, MoMP’s technical and administrative capacity remains limited.</p> <p>2.a. Although it can be claimed that training and capacity building programs improved the capabilities of some Component I professionals, training opportunities were missed that left other Component I staff dissatisfied. Excepting the brief field training effort, Component II training not appreciated and did little to improve capacity.</p> <p>2.b. Component I successfully produced (albeit independently) needed and appreciated contract reviews and proposals for legislative changes. However few of the products were fully implemented because the Parliament has not yet adopted a workable Mining Law.</p> <p>3. MIDAS’s support for gender issues was appreciated by some with the caveat that opportunities were missed and most MoMP Directorates were not directly addressed. Given the scarcity of technically qualified females, mechanisms to promote their entry into the field may be warranted</p> <p>4. Coordination among and within parties active in the extractives sector did not lead to improved collaboration and expected synergies.</p> <p>5. Training for mining SMEs was well intentioned but</p>	<p>1. Capacity building should be continued only with a revised approach that employs qualified trainers using curriculum that takes into consideration the needs of individual professional staff as part of a long term approach to build professionals capacity to meet MoMP identified staffing requirements.</p> <p>2. Assuming a stable and empowered MoMP leadership with both senior government commitment and a revised Mining Law, aside from needed changes in approaches to capacity building, other Component I activities are helpful to the MoMP and should continue.</p> <p>3. Gender awareness in the MoMP can be strengthened by providing consistent and long-term support to the Gender Directorate to help it reach all Directorates in the MoMP, It is necessary to also highlight the need to ensure that female staff are not excluded from any relevant training opportunity, including international opportunities. Scholarship programs for females tied to MoMP work obligations may be helpful to increase female participation in the sector.</p> <p>4. Support the MoMP to both lead donor coordination efforts to increase government and MoMP ownership of plans and to also have the capacity to oversee the sector. The acceptance and effectiveness of donor coordination can be enhanced through the leadership of responsible MoMP officials supported by informed staff.</p> <p>5. The training for mining SMEs should be limited to companies specifically active in the extractives sector.</p>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>KII3, COP-KII2, D-KII3. MoMP-FGD3, lq-r, m-r]</p> <p>3.b. MIDAS/USAID provided appreciated support for Gender Directorate’ proposal development and planned awareness training. Females in other Directorates report participation in Women’s Day activities and a nice souvenir scarf, but no other related support. However, a large portion of the planned training was canceled due to a range of program modification resulting from missed targets and higher level structural changes to the program. No women were selected for participation in MIDAS supported training outside of Afghanistan. [14] [W-FGD, advi-KII, M&amp;E-KII2, COP-KII2, D-KII. MoMP-FGD3, ga-r]</p> <p>4. MIDAS’ efforts to coordinate with other donor programs was notable but had poor MoMP awareness or participation. [3] [D-KII3. MoMP-FGD]</p> <p>5. MIDAS supported training to prepare SMEs for participation in extractives industries in the absence of an extractives industry: [9] [COP-KII2, afs-r, sme-r]</p>	<p>premature, considering that there is not yet a significant mining industry to support.</p>	

**1b. What were the greatest challenges MIDAS faced in achieving its intended objectives?**

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p><u>In the absence of consistent leadership with empowered Directorates and a full staff complement, the MoMP could not be considered an active responsible partner to MIDAS. The MoMP's fluid leadership with very constrained information dissemination within the Ministry contributed to the related findings below:</u> [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII]</p> <p>I. The following presents a conceptualization of respondent comments that were made by the great preponderance of MoMP staff and leadership. The implementation of the MIDAS project was perceived by MoMP as:</p> <p>I.a. having poor accountability,</p> <p>I.b. causing an aggravated relationship,</p> <p>I.c. being subject to frequently delayed, paused, modified or canceled plans with significant micromanagement constraints -- all with low 'face-time' and without effective provisions for routine dialog or information sharing between MoMP and Donors or within the MoMP. [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII2, D-KII4. MoMPMoMP-FGD2]</p> <p>I.d. KIIs and FGDs offered consistent reports of poor awareness of the MIDAS program after it was defined (and repeatedly redefined) by the newly presiding MoMP Minister or Acting Minister and (and sometimes President). [adv-KII, M&amp;E KII. MoMp-FGD2]</p> <p>I.e. MoMP staff and some leadership did not understand that the MIDAS program was never intended to address all of the needs of the different Directorates within MoMP.</p> <p>I.f. Frequent reports that USAID/MIDAS rarely listened to MoMP. [27]</p>	<p>I.a. MIDAS' implementation efforts were hobbled by a MoMP with changing and absent leadership, ineffective directorate leadership, and with poor mechanisms for coordination and information sharing, and logistical constraints.</p> <p>I.b. The MIDAS TOR/SOW was too ambitious from program onset and too grossly underfunded (by mining industry standards) to achieve its stated goals.</p> <p>I.c. Poor communications contributed to an unnecessary and significant deterioration in the working relationships between MoMP professionals and MIDAS team members</p> <p>2.a. The limited physical presence of MIDAS staff at the MoMP limited opportunities for interaction, information sharing and knowledge transfer..</p> <p>2.b. Internship programs were too short to develop the skill set interns needed to effectively meet the experience requirements defined in MoMP job requirements.</p> <p>2.c. Learning opportunities were lost and MIDAS lost credibility by its provision of instructors who were not subject matter experts.</p> <p>2.d. Though outside its SOW, MIDAS might have considered strategies to improve the educational qualifications of university students prior to their</p>	<p>1. Stable MoMP leadership with empowered Directorates level decision makers and a functional internal information system with streamlined processes and procedures can improve implementation of MIDAS related projects</p> <p>2.a. Given USGS's uniformly reported high standing with the MoMP, its historical training success in Afghanistan and its technical leadership in the field, it may be prudent to include their leadership and technical expertise in any new efforts to empower the MoMP and the extractives sector.</p> <p>2.b. MIDAS must embed its staff with MoMP counterparts, and it must provide technical specialists, not technical generalists.</p> <p>3.a. MIDAS should hold regular meetings with MoMP and Directorates (preferably as embedded staff) to discuss needed program changes and those made by the ministerial leadership, MIDAS or USAID</p> <p>3.b. Increased joint planning and collaboration should increase information flow to limit misunderstandings and missed opportunities.</p> <p>3.c. Any new TOR should be written by a team that understands the budgetary and logistical requirements imposed by the proposed SOW to minimize unanticipated changes.</p> <p>3.d. New exploration support should focus on commodities</p>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>[wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII2, M&amp;E-KII2, D-KII5. MoMPMoMP-FGD3]</p> <p>2. MIDAS support to the MoMP was commonly reported as short-term, remote, academic and not delivered in local languages. MoMP staff cited loss of MIDAS credibility due to examples of unqualified experts engaged to give training outside their expertise. A major reason for these criticisms, according to interviewees/FGD participants, was a failure to embed MIDAS experts (including expert Afghan nationals hired by MIDAS) within MoMP offices to regularly interact with their MoMP counterparts. USGS and TFBSO were consistently cited as having been much more effective interacting with MoMP and AGS. Failure to embed MIDAS experts within MoMP offices was viewed as a key factor in why MIDAS was unsuccessful coordinating with. MoMP/AGS midlevel management and technical professionals. (Related: MIDAS did not address the critical shortage of qualified Afghan teachers at universities providing mining related technical education. [22]. [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII4, M&amp;E-KII. D-KII3. MoMP-FGD5]</p> <p>3. Frequent assurances to MoMP that USAID would support an exploration program significantly disillusioned MoMP when exploration funding was cut from the MIDAS budget. MIDAS limited its support to a few MoMP directorates, missing the opportunity to help with critical issues in other Directorates. Support to Cadaster, the Afghan Petroleum Authority, and the Investment Promotion Directorate was not provided till the end of the program. Other Directorates received no support at all: [18] [advi-KII2, COP-KII2, D-KII4. MoMP-FGD4]. MIDAS did not focus on high-impact commodities with a strategic value. (Or follow up sufficiently with exploration of AGS-identified priority sites): [9] [wb,mida. advi-FGD, mida,advi-KII2, D-KII2. MoMP-FGD4]</p> <p>4.. Gender Issues:</p> <p>a. For programmatic reasons, some planned gender programs were</p>	<p>graduation.</p> <p>3. MIDAS faced a disappointed MoMP due to a perception of unmet 'promises'. In the absence of an exploration program, the MIDAS/USAID defined exploration program had little potential to attract the FDI needed to significantly boost income to GIRoA.</p> <p>4. Other than a shortage of qualified female engineers, lawyers and technical staff, MIDAS faced no observed or reported impediments to its efforts to improve gender balance in the MoMP.</p>	<p>that have the potential to attract FDI.</p> <p>3.e. As noted by some at the MoMP, investors are interested in high value extractives. It may be best to focus exploration efforts on these items.</p> <p>4.a. Minimize cuts, where possible, to gender programs, and refrain, where possible, from making cuts immediately prior to scheduled program implementation.</p> <p>4.b. Internship programs for females should be continued and lengthened to one year duration to give the required length of experience for employment.</p> <p>4.c. The quality of graduates in certain technical fields can be improved via innovative cooperative programs that bring technical specialists providing on-the-job training at MoMP into the classrooms of leading Afghan Universities to provide intensive, specialized short courses.</p>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>stopped immediately prior to implementation. Failure to support MoMP Directorates that have the culturally acceptable potential to employ women (laboratories and administrative Directorates) further undermined the gender effort. [W-FGD, adv-KII2, D-KII2. MoMP-FGD3]</p> <p>b. MIDAS limited its major support efforts for gender issues to a few departments, missing the departments with the most females (i.e. AGS analytical labs where most of AGS’ females work). [12] [W-FGD, adv-KII3, D-KII. MoMP-FGD2]</p> <p>c. Females with internships less than one year did not meet the one-year experience requirement for GIRoA employment and therefore could not be hired. [9] [W-FGD, M&amp;E-KII, mida.advi-KII2, M&amp;E-KII, D-KII3. MoMP-FGD5]</p> <p>d. Local universities graduate low numbers of female technical professionals: [9] [W-FGD, adv-KII2, M&amp;E-KII, D-KII4. MoMP-FGD5]</p>		

### I c. What effect did the lack of a consistent strategy at MoMP have on achieving MIDAS objectives?

Consolidated Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>I.a. The leadership and policies of the MoMP were not stable and its twenty acting directors were unable to make or implement plans, including the hiring of needed staff: [26] [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII3, COPCOP-KII2,D-KII2. MoMP-FGD2]</p> <p>I.b. MoMP staff reported time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, a centralized authorization process, information bottlenecks, an ineffective M&amp;E office, and a paper-bound HR department that was unable to fill some 200+ vacancies in the Ministry.</p> <p>I.c. Representatives of all Directorates interviewed noted an absence of a mechanism or forum to share information on MoMP's plans or on MIDAS' work plans and changes to the plan. The absence of a functioning Office of International Corporation in MoMP was cited as missed opportunity for increased information sharing within MoMP.[28] [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII4, M&amp;E-KII, COP-KII2, D-KII5. MoMP-FGD3 ]</p> <p>2.a. In the absence of an endorsed "Strategic Plan", the MoMP was not aggressive, clear or consistent in requesting assistance from MIDAS for pending high return initiatives (gas pipeline, artisanal mining, exploration and field training, etc.), nor for its desire to collaborate with technical agencies (USGS).</p> <p>2.b. MoMP did not effectively educate Parliamentarians, Parliamentary committees, or the President's Office on the intricacies of mining laws. Nor did they effectively lobby for an unencumbered mining law for Afghanistan: [10] [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII2. D-KII. MoMP-FGD3]</p> <p>2.c. Despite Component I's successful efforts to draft amendments to the Mining Law of 2014, develop implementation policies and regulations, and develop commodity specific mining permit application forms and mining contracts, few of the</p>	<p>I.a. The frequent change in MoMP leadership, with twenty out of twenty-three Directorates on acting status, limited both its ability to fully interact with MIDAS (or with other donors) and implement plans in a timely manner.</p> <p>I.b. With its frequent changes in leadership and dis-empowered Directorates, MoMP's use of centralized paper bound approval procedures introduced unplanned delays in needed decisions for implementation.</p> <p>I.c. MoMP leadership did not effectively communicate its programmatic agenda with MIDAS nor to its Directorates and staff.</p> <p>2.a. A fully endorsed MoMP mission agenda or Strategic Plan with an entrenched mid-level bureaucracy (87% of Directorate heads are acting) could help the Ministry stabilize its programs and resist rapid and un-researched changes to programs and initiatives as reportedly proposed by every new Minister or Acting Minister (5 during the four year MIDAS term).</p> <p>2.b. MoMP failure to effectively communicate to members of Parliament how and why the initially proposed Mining Law conforms to international best practice did not discourage amendments that made the law unfavorable to the investor community.</p> <p>2.c. The absence of a workable Mining Law or amendments to the flawed Mining Law of 2014 as recommended by MIDAS negatively impacted implementation of Component I efforts.)</p>	<p>1. MoMP should be encouraged to utilize existing forums and develop a mechanism for routine coordination with the wide range of donors to both avoid duplication of efforts and help focus donor programs to address MoMP needs. Resulting discussions and agreements made with supporting partners should be openly shared with all MoMP staff.</p> <p>2.a. In consultation with the donor community, MoMP needs to create and document a mission plan that serves as a road map to inform and guide the ever-changing Ministerial leaders about the long-term operational guidelines for the MoMP. Hopefully, such a plan might reduce the number of abrupt agenda changes that have characterized the Ministry to date.</p> <p>2.b. MoMP should be supported to increase its capacity to support and inform national decision makers, the legislature and the public on best practices in the sector and the associated development cost and time frame.</p> <p>2.c. Senior US diplomatic assistance should be considered to convey to senior Afghan leadership the critical importance of a stable international best-practice mining law that can attract international investors to the negotiating table.</p> <p>3.a. MoMP should be encouraged to fill vacancies and to create an entrenched mid-level bureaucracy with the technical competence to help guide ministry leadership.</p> <p>3.b. MoMP should streamline its bureaucratic procedures to permit timely implementation.</p>

Consolidated Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>documents were finalized because (a) a workable amended Mining Law was never passed by Parliament and (b) the unceasing parade of Ministers and Acting Ministers caused senior Afghan governing bodies to refer near final drafts back to MoMP for the newest Minister’s review. [advi.KII, COP-KII2, sigar-r, D-KII3. MoMP-FGD]</p> <p>3.a. The MoMP did not facilitate MIDAS to embed its staff within the Directorate level and its supporting staff nor did MIDAS effectively utilize the office space provided at MoMP.[19]</p> <p>3.b. As noted previously, MoMP’s operational and management processes were centralized, paper bound in an environment with absent, and unauthorized decision makers that were encumbered with high staff vacancy rates. [MoMP-FGD]</p> <p>4.a. MoMP reports a shortage of women with both needed technical skills and with the required experience for employment: [9] [adv-KII, D-KII. MoMP-FGD]</p> <p>4.b. MoMP did not effectively increase the visibility or support to gender issues throughout all its departments: [9] [COP-KII2. MoMP-FGD2]</p>	<p>3.a. Possibly due to the frequent changes in leadership, the acting status of the majority of its Directorates or its low respect for MIDAS’ technical competence, MoMP did not actively enabled a peer collaboration learning opportunity with MIDAS staff</p> <p>3.b. MoMP’s ‘fluid’ leadership, operational procedures and staffing shortage limited its ability to lead the extractives sector or to timely respond to partner initiatives</p> <p>4.a. In the absence of focused initiatives, the availability of qualified female graduates with the required experience is not expected to increase.</p> <p>4.b. MoMP Directorates which currently have high female participation could benefit from support by MoMP’s Gender Office.</p>	<p>3.c. Any future capacity building components should include the early and continuing use of embedded experts in the offices of their peer counterparts to increase learning opportunists and to facilitate information flow.</p> <p>4.a. MoMP should be encouraged to make a more concerted effort to hire and promote women, especially when filling administrative and professional positions that are less likely to violate prevailing cultural norms.</p> <p>4.b. Longer term Improvements in female participation rates in the extractives sector are dependent upon increased female graduates from technical colleges. Initiatives to both increase the quality of technical school training and the enrollment of females would benefit the sector.</p>



2. To what extent did the revision of the scope of work of MIDAS address the strategic MoMP needs in the area of hydrocarbons and minerals?

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p><u>Only three out of twenty-eight MoMP interviewed staff were unaware of changes made to the MIDAS SOW. However, very few reported detailed knowledge or that the changes were positive. Related comments from MoMP leadership and staff include:</u></p> <p>1. SOW changes had little impact because MIDAS and the MoMP were working independently with no accountability to one another e.g., there was very little sharing of changes in the workplan:[13] [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII2. MoMP-FGD2]</p> <p>2. Too many changes in MIDAS work plan and too many USAID CORs [8] [adv-KII2,M&amp;E-KII, D-KII]</p> <p>3. Despite the changes, MoMP still felt MIDAS was unresponsive to its needs: [7] [adv-KII2, COP-KII2, M&amp;E-KII, D-KII]</p> <p>4. Despite all the changes, MoMP remained without the capacity needed to manage either routine or high value tenders: [7] [adv-KII, sigar-r, D-KII3]</p> <p>5. MoMP leadership changes and perceived USAID “micromanagement” resulted in too many changes and delays in the program to permit effective implementation: [6] [adv-KII2,M&amp;E-KII, COP-KII2]</p> <p>6. MoMP staff reported that many projects were started but then abandoned prior to completion: [6] [MoMP-FGD2]</p> <p>7. Micromanagement limited flexibility to adapt to the changing MoMP needs: [5] [COP-KII2, D-KII, MoMP-FGD]</p>	<p>1. Despite the attempt by MIDAS to be responsive to the changing priorities of MoMP’s leadership and budgetary limitation, unexplained SOW revisions led to confusion among the Ministry’s project implementing counterparts and a failure to achieve most of the initially intended program goals.</p> <p>2. Unexplained abandonment of partially completed tasks dissipated programmatic focus, limited implementation effectiveness, and disillusioned key Ministry counterparts.</p> <p>3. Capacity development suffered as a result of unexplained changes in program priorities.</p>	<p>1. MoMP should consider the use of ‘change management’ practices to improve Directorate and staff knowledge, acceptance and participation in newly adopted program modification or directives.</p> <p>2. Although some initiatives are sometimes found to no longer support MoMP’s, MIDAS’ or USAID’s short term objectives, efforts should be made to also consider the disruptive and lost opportunity effect of prematurely ending initiatives that are near finalization.</p>




**3. What lessons learned from this program and key recommendations could inform future management decision making for development of a similar technical assistance project?**

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>1.a. USGS is the only organization considered qualified by the MoMP to provide capacity building for AGS: [9] [mida,adv-KII, D-KII, momp-FGD2]</p> <p>1.b. Insufficient funds were allocated to support the planned development of the AGS and GIRoA's primary exploration and tender development entity: [1] [mida,adv-KII]</p> <p>2. Information flow and consultation:</p> <p>2.a. MoMP Directorate level leadership and their staff both highlight that MoMP was not sufficiently consulted regarding Ministry needs when the MIDAS program was designed: [8] [adv-KII, M&amp;E-KII2, D-KII4, momp-FGD2]</p> <p>2.b. Most directorates within MoMP feel that their needs were insufficiently supported or were ignored completely by the MIDAS program. AGS is especially aggravated that its environmental geology and laboratory functions were ignored entirely: [8] [D-KII3, MoMP-FGD]</p> <p>2.c. AGS has signaled that it needs significant assistance to improve its skills in mineral exploration and tender development functions as charged under the Mining Law of 2014,: [6] [D-KII, MoMP-FGD]</p> <p>2.d The absence of embedded technical experts providing on-the-job training to their MoMP counterparts was noted by participants from every Directorate: [6] [W-FGD, M&amp;E-KII, D-KII.momp-FGD2]</p> <p>2.e. There was inadequate information flow among MIDAS, MoMP leadership, and MoMP staff leading to numerous misunderstandings about how and why most program implementation decisions were made: [4] [wb,mida. advi-FGD, adv-KII, D-KII]</p> <p>3. Afghan media reports dwell on the Nation's resource wealth and create unmet employment expectations among the Nation's people and unmet revenue expectations among the Nation's</p>	<p>1.a. The absence of direct support and consultation with USGS was disappointing to the MoMP and led to very unfavorable comparisons of MIDAS' work with the highly appreciated historical work in Afghanistan by USGS.</p> <p>1.b. MIDAS was grossly underfunded for the defined SOW.</p> <p>1.c. The MoMP did not feel that its capacity building needs were addressed by MIDAS plans.</p> <p>2. There was insufficient information transfer between USAID, MIDAS, senior MoMP officials, within the MoMP and with Parliament, the President's Office, and the Afghan public at large. (The reported paucity of daily interaction between MIDAS and MoMP staff limited opportunities for information exchange.)</p> <p>3. As evidenced by changes in the Mining Law, Afghan lawmakers and likely the general public have misconceptions and unrealistic expectation regarding the time frame and resources required for investor financial returns to benefit Afghanistan.</p>	<p>1. The Involvement of sector specialists (i.e. USGS) as sector lead for donor planning and component implementation would have high MoMP acceptance and provide needed technical excellence to the project.</p> <p>2. Establish mechanisms and forum for information sharing, planning and evaluation with all involved parties to improve collaboration, coordination and reduce missed opportunities for positive changes.</p> <p>2.a. Any new program should be based upon a common MoMP/donor/investor assessment of needs and be developed with MoMP leadership to meet the critical issues now limiting investor support for the extractives sector in Afghanistan.</p> <p>2.b. Explore requested support to Environmental Geology, the Minerals Laboratory, exploration, tender package development, and, more generally all Directorates within the MoMP</p> <p>2.c. Explore a requested increased focus on field based practical training with usable results</p> <p>2.d. Embed long-term technical support to increase communications and improve the transfer of knowledge and skills to help make MoMP less dependent upon outside technical support</p> <p>3. MoMP's consultations with law makers and its public relations efforts should give a realistic picture of the expected time frame, infrastructure requirements and financial returns to the GIRoA and to affected communities.</p>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
leadership.		

## ANNEX 5: MIDAS RESULTS FRAMEWORK



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