FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-In-Persons Mid-term Performance Evaluation

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ACRONYMS

a2i	Access to Information
ACT	Actions for Combating Trafficking-in-Persons
AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
BC/TIP	Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons
BMET	Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CBSG	Capacity Building Service Group
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CTC	Counter-Trafficking Committee
DAM	Dhaka Ahsania Mission
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DEMO	District Employment and Manpower Office
DG	Democracy and Governance
DO	Direct Observation
DoS	United States Department of State
EQ	Evaluation Question
ET	Evaluation Team
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GI	Group Interview
GO	Government Organization
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
GO-NGO	Government/Nongovernment
HQ	Headquarters
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IO	International Organization
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Intermediate Result
IRB	Institutional Review Board
JATI	Judges Training Institute
JFA	Justice for All
KII	Key Informant Interview

M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoEWOE	Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPA	National Plan of Action for Combatting Human Trafficking
NRM	National Referral Mechanism
OKUP	Ovibashi Karmi Unnayan Program
PHR	Protecting Human Rights
PSHTA	Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act
RI	Relief International
SI	Social Impact, Inc.
SOW	Scope of Work
TIP	Trafficking-in-Persons
TOT	Training-of-Trainers
TTC	Technical Training Center
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WI	Winrock International
YPSA	Young Power in Social Action

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

While Bangladesh has taken great strides toward achieving its Millennium Development Goals,[1] numerous economic and social factors remain that fuel labor migration and lead to exploitation and human trafficking. In 2016, 757,731 people (15.6% female) migrated for employment through official government channels,[2] along with unknown numbers who utilized irregular means. Both men and women—whether they use regular or irregular migration channels—are at-risk of being exploited, trafficked, and abused.

Funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Counter Trafficking in Persons (BC/TIP) Activity is an $4,996,728 activity implemented by Winrock International (WI) and has a period of performance of October 24, 2014 through October 23, 2019. Its objective is to reduce the prevalence of trafficking in persons (TIP) in Bangladesh. The activity assumes this will be accomplished through "4 Ps": Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Partnership. The activity targets 25 of the 64 districts in Bangladesh and, at the time of the evaluation, involved 12 sub-grantees.[3]

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE

The objective of this performance evaluation is to establish whether the activity is on course to meet its objectives; assess the efficacy of the management structure in meeting the objectives thus far; evaluate BC/TIP implementers' performance to date; assess sustainability plans of the activity; and make recommendations to USAID/Bangladesh concerning current BC/TIP implementation and future programming. USAID and WI will use the evaluation findings and recommendations for course correction in the implementation of the BC/TIP activity and to inform future programming. The audience for this mid-term performance evaluation includes USAID/Bangladesh, the United States Embassy in Bangladesh, WI, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), and other bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors working to combat TIP in Bangladesh.

EVALUATION DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The evaluation employed a mixed-methods design consisting of document review, key informant interview (KIIs), group interviews (GIs),[4] focus group discussions (FGDs), and a mini-survey. The evaluation team (ET) collected data in four districts (Dhaka, Cox's Bazar, Jessore, and Rajshahi) from mid-September to mid-October 2017, and conducted the mini-survey with additional survivors in other districts over the phone. The ET conducted 30 KIIs including 52 individuals (18 female, 34 male). Key informants included representatives from USAID, WI, BC/TIP sub-grantees,[5] non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, GoB partners, and survivors of TIP. The ET conducted 28 FGDs/GIs with

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[1] Millennium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress Report 2015. General Economics Division, Bangladesh Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh: Dhaka.

[2] Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training, Bangladesh. Web. Accessed October 28, 2017.

[3] Agrogati, BSEHR, Change Maker, DAM, Proyas, Rights Jessore, Sachetan, SHISUK, YPSA, and new partners BITA, OKUP and RDRS

[4] Group Interviews were originally designed as FGDs. However, in situations with fewer than five participants these discussions were re-categorized as GIs.

[5] The following sub-grantees were included in the evaluation: Capacity Building Service Group, Dhaka Ahsania Mission, Proyash, Rights Jessore, Sachetan, Young Power in Social Action.

BC/TIP training participants,[6] involving 155 individuals (61 female, 94 male). The mini-survey reached 30 survivors (12 conducted during the KIIs with survivors and 18 conducted over the phone) who were direct beneficiaries of BC/TIP. The ET performed data triangulation to cross-verify and cross-validate findings and identify correlations between findings.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES BEEN ACHIEVED?

OVERALL OBJECTIVE: REDUCE THE PREVALENCE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN BANGLADESH

FINDINGS

The activity does not measure the prevalence of TIP, nor use a proxy to measure this. During the first year, the indicator was changed from the United States Department of State's (DoS's) TIP Report tier ranking to the number of actions taken by communities, local governments, and GoB to prevent TIP. While actual prevalence cannot be measured by people's impressions, numerous respondents (8 FGDs), in three fieldwork locations, expressed a belief that TIP in Bangladesh has been reduced.

CONCLUSIONS

There are many factors that may impact the prevalence of TIP in a country. Some factors, such as changes in poverty in Bangladesh or protections for migrants in destination countries, are beyond the scope of the activity to address. BC/TIP interventions may not reduce the overall prevalence of TIP, especially during the timeframe of the activity, but could lead to an improved framework for addressing TIP and thus to improved protection of the civil and human rights of Bangladeshi citizens. Successes in achieving the BC/TIP intermediate results (IRs) are discussed below.

IR1: INCREASED CAPACITY OF LEADERS AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY TO IDENTIFY AND PREVENT TIP

FINDINGS

In Rajshahi, Jessore, and Cox's Bazar, Peer Leaders[7] (8 female, 7 male) and ANIRBAN members (10 female, 12 male) provided examples of identifying both survivors and those at-risk in their communities and referring them for services. Respondents in three KIIs, including implementing partners (IPs[8]) and GoB, reported that some local governments are reluctant to dedicate time and resources to Counter-Trafficking Committees (CTCs). However, far more respondents (7 FGDs and 6 KIIs) pointed to the effectiveness of CTCs they have engaged. Pre-decision migrants demonstrated familiarity with legal migration channels. Sub-grantees indicated a need to reach both men and women to be effective and that they have designed activities accordingly.

CONCLUSIONS

- Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN are seen as effective messengers to inform people about the risks of irregular labor migration, as well as identify and refer TIP survivors and those at-risk.
- CTCs exhibit varying levels of engagement on TIP, with many of those activated by BC/TIP being very engaged.

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[6] FGDs and GIs included ANIRBAN, a survivors' voice group, Peer Leaders, police, prosecutors, panel lawyers (government funded attorneys to represent victims of crimes), psycho-social counselors, potential migrants, and others.
[7] FGDs with Peer Leaders only took place in two of the three fieldwork locations.
[8] IPs refers to WI and its sub-grantees.

IR2: IMPROVED ACCESS OF TRAFFICKING VICTIMS TO ASSISTANCE

FINDINGS

Capacity Building of Service Providers: All BC/TIP protection partners from the fieldwork locations mentioned their use of the case management process and emphasized how this is used to assess survivor's needs and provide services accordingly. The activity is behind on the number of individuals trained to provide counseling services. FGDs with counselors indicated that the training changed their understanding of counseling. Mini-survey respondents who received counseling services (only 4 out of the 30 survivors surveyed; 3 female and 1 male) said that counseling helped them move forward with their life and reduced feelings of fear.

Direct Service Provision: BC/TIP sub-grantees provide a wide range of services to survivors, including shelter, counseling, and livelihood support. The activity exceeded its Year 1 target for survivors assisted, fell behind in its Year 2 target, and is falling behind in its Year 3 target. While survivors generally rated the services they received highly, a few of the mini-survey respondents received each type of service. Of the 30 survivors surveyed, six (20%; two female, four male) did not receive any services at all and an additional four (13%, 2 female, 2 male) had been promised services that they had yet to receive. There was general consensus from a wide range of stakeholders (13 KIIs and FGDs) that female survivors have a harder time integrating back into the community, and that there are more services available for female survivors (11 KIIs, GIs, and FGDs). Respondents noted that counseling services are more readily available to those who reside in shelter homes. A number of stakeholders (5 KIIs and FGDs), including some counselors, indicated that male survivors are more resilient and in less need of assistance, especially counseling services. On the other hand, male survivors said that they "suffered torture," "felt helpless," and were "shattered," indicating that they could have benefitted from counseling.

Improved Referral System: BC/TIP worked with their protection partners to develop district-level service directories in 10 districts. In two districts that the ET visited, the directories were familiar to a variety of protection partners. In the other district, the directories were known only by the BC/TIP protection sub-grantee and ANIRBAN. The directories were not familiar to any of the CTCs in any of the districts. ANIRBAN and sub-grantees in all fieldwork locations indicate that they refer survivors for assistance to government and civil society service providers. Peer Leaders in one location and community-based organizations (CBOs) in another indicated that they also refer to organizations other than BC/TIP grantees.

CONCLUSIONS

- Training increased counselors' knowledge and use of new techniques, but there is need for more capacity building as well as counseling supervision and mentoring. Counseling services are not reaching all of the survivors who may need it, with men being particularly neglected.

- Services expanded as a result of the push for referral services and the development of the service directories. However, use of the directories is limited to few stakeholder groups, primarily sub-grantees.

- Support provided to survivors is still not sufficient to meet their needs.

IR3: INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTORS TO TRAFFICKING VICTIMS

FINDINGS

The activity fell behind in meeting its law enforcement training targets in the first year due to delays in getting permission from police authorities. In FGDs, KIIs, and GIs with criminal justice actors, respondents found training to be of good quality and the trainers knowledgeable. However, the clear majority of those trained are unable to apply what they learned because they have not handled a single TIP case. The Judges Training Institute (JATI) expressed its commitment to include training on the TIP

law, Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act (PSHTA), into its regular schedule of training courses.

CONCLUSIONS

- The activities implemented under this IR are not leading to achievement of the activity objectives. While the training designed and provided by WI was well respected and appreciated by the recipients, it is not reaching criminal justice actors who handle TIP cases.

- In the case of judges, BC/TIP training was so well received it will be replicated by JATI and integrated into their in-service training program. Training for the other law enforcement actors has so far been conducted as one-off training opportunities and not integrated into existing academies or in-service training mechanisms.

IR4: EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED PARTNERSHIPS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS

FINDINGS

WI and its sub-grantees have taken numerous actions to coordinate with other counter-trafficking stakeholders in the country, including GoB, NGOs, CBOs, and international organizations (IOs). BC/TIP participates in a number of national-level anti-trafficking committees, such as the TIP Government/Nongovernment (GO-NGO) Committee, and also provided support for drafting and launching of the National Plan of Action for Combatting Human Trafficking (NPA), 2015-2017. Two key government counterparts have not supported BC/TIP activities, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE). Work with the Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET) was delayed so the activity worked instead at the local level with District Employment and Manpower Office (DEMO) offices. WI was supposed to leverage US$2,000,000 for cost sharing toward BC/TIP activities, but has fallen behind in its targets due to significant difficulties in gaining interest among national and multinational companies.

CONCLUSIONS

- WI has made considerable efforts to build partnerships across all elements of the activity, reaching out to a wide range of GoB and NGO stakeholders. These partnerships have helped to support achievement of the activity's objectives. The activity is unlikely to succeed in achieving the expected financial contribution from other donors or the private sector barring unforeseen circumstances. Most of the support the activity has been able to leverage has been from government and civil society partners.

EQ2: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OR NON-ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES?

FINDINGS

Enabling Factors: BC/TIP sub-grantees drew on existing relationships and developed new ones with CBOs and local government service providers to expand the provision of services to survivors, to identify criminal justice partners, and to improve coordination amongst counter trafficking stakeholders. The personal dedication of many of the activity's stakeholders has also been an important factor enabling success and sustainability of activity results.

Hindrances: IPs frequently mentioned resource constraints with respect to all activity components. Staff turnover was noted as an issue particularly for CTCs and police, but also in regard to IPs. Another key factor that hinders the prevention of safe migration is the cost of migration through official channels. Respondents mentioned that social costs for survivors who file a case and corruption in the legal system prevent successful prosecution of TIP cases.

CONCLUSIONS

- WI and its partners built on achievements from prior TIP activities. IPs also drew on relationships from prior TIP programming, as well as other activities, to expand partnerships and leverage the limited resources under all activity components.

- Resource constraints, both human and financial, have hindered achievement of activity results and limited the effectiveness of interventions.

- Successful prosecutions are limited by a number of factors beyond the scope of the activity.

EQ3: HOW EFFECTIVE HAS THE USAID'S BC/TIP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE (WI, SUB-GRANTEES, AND USAID) BEEN IN IMPLEMENTING THE ACTIVITY AND MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ACTIVITY RESULTS?

FINDINGS

All sub-grantee stakeholders interviewed and one GoB stakeholder had a positive perception of WI's management of BC/TIP. Stakeholders also noted instances of less effective financial, contractual, and human resources management. According to key informants from the donor and IP respondent groups, budget constraints have been a management challenge since the start of the activity. BC/TIP has requested two budget realignments in the first three years of implementation.

Regarding staffing, one stakeholder did not find WI's home office management to be very effective. More than one key informant was concerned about WI's selection of a Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) and the current lack of management support for the Chief of Party (COP).

CONCLUSIONS

- For the most part, the BC/TIP management structure has been effective at implementing the activity. Exceptions include financial and contractual issues that delayed planned activity expansion into new districts. WI management of its relationships with USAID and the recruitment of a DCOP have also been less effective.

- Funding for BC/TIP has been insufficient to effectively implement an activity of such a large geographic and programmatic scope.

EQ4: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE ACTIVITY BEEN ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF ITS SUB-GRANTEES?

FINDINGS

Sub-Grantees: BC/TIP contracted Capacity Building Service Group (CBSG) from March 2015-October 2016 to implement organizational capacity building support for sub-grantees.[9] At the end of the intervention, none of the BC/TIP sub-grantees qualified for a USAID transitional grant.[10] However, qualitative interviews indicate that BC/TIP nevertheless increased sub-grantees organizational capacities to varying degrees. All relevant sub-grantee stakeholders gave examples of how the organizations have developed, especially with regards to working more systematically and efficiently.

ANIRBAN: In all FGDs with ANIRBAN members, participants spoke about how, through BC/TIP's help, ANIRBAN has strengthened itself as a survivors' voice group. ANIRBAN groups expressed motivation to continue their work and strengthen their abilities as a cohesive survivors' voice group, as well as a need for continued support, both for capacity building and for registration as an organization.

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[9] Fixed Amount Award by Winrock International to CBSG, 2015
[10] One BC/TIP sub-grantee had previously met the qualifications for a transition grant, and was therefore not included in the capacity building intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

- BC/TIP, through CBSG, improved sub-grantees' management in some areas, but all five sub-grantees interviewed still need further organizational capacity building. Areas for further strengthening include monitoring and evaluation (M&E), transparency in the recruitment of sub-grantee staff, further familiarity and use of USAID formats, and consistent application of USAID organizational best practices.

- BC/TIP has built the organizational capacity of ANIRBAN groups in different districts. However, additional support is needed for them to operate as a registered and independent organization.

EQ5: WHAT MAJOR CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABILITY HAS THE ACTIVITY ENCOUNTERED?

FINDINGS

Enabling Factors: ANIRBAN, Peer Leaders, and CTC members reported that they will continue their TIP prevention activities even once BC/TIP ends. Stakeholders believed that the BC/TIP partners who were aware of the service directories would continue to use them. In all FGDs with individuals trained by BC/TIP, participants stated that their capacity has been built and that they could continue to use the knowledge gained to assist TIP survivors and those at-risk. BC/TIP completed training-of-trainers (TOT) with select Technical Training Center (TTC) trainers,[11] CTC trainers,[12] and ANIRBAN leaders.[13] BC/TIP is exploring options to integrate BC/TIP's curriculum on PSHTA into JATI's basic training for all judges, as well as TIP training into the curriculum for new recruits at the police academy.

Hindrances: Stakeholders identified threats to sustainability, including that a lack of funds will limit effectiveness of Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN, and that without development of a formalized referral mechanism leading to a National Referral Mechanism (NRM), utilization of the service directories will be threatened. There is significant turnover of individuals trained by the activity, but there do not appear to be plans in place to roll out training once TOT is provided. In one relevant KII with an IP, participants stated that BC/TIP has not consistently monitored the outcomes of the few TOTs that have occurred, and could not articulate exactly how many more individuals those trainers have trained, nor the quality or frequency of those trainings.

CONCLUSIONS

- Members of Peer Leaders, ANIRBAN, and CTCs demonstrated a personal commitment to continue their referral and awareness-raising activities after BC/TIP ends. At the same, there is a possibility that some elements (e.g. community meetings) may not continue due to funding constraints or lack of momentum.

- BC/TIP has taken some steps to promote sustainability of training outcomes, but overall BC/TIP training for stakeholders does not include a sufficient sustainability plan or component.

EQ6: HOW EFFECTIVELY HAS USAID'S BC/TIP COORDINATED WITH OTHER USAID/BANGLADESH ACTIVITIES, I.E., DG, ECONOMIC GROWTH, POPULATION HEALTH NUTRITION AND EDUCATION, FOOD DISASTER AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN ACHIEVING ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTING TO OTHER USAID/BANGLADESH ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES?

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[11] BC/TIP Annual Performance Report, Year Two (October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016); Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 2017 (April - June 2017)
[12] BC/TIP Annual Performance Report, Year Two (October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016)
[13] BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 2, Fiscal Year 2017 (January - March 2017)

FINDINGS

At the national level, BC/TIP coordinated with Justice For All (JFA) and Access to Information (a2i)—both USAID activities within the Democracy and Governance (DG) sector. JFA introduced BC/TIP staff with NLASO for legal aid for survivors and with JATI to train judges. BC/TIP coordinated with a2i to make service directories accessible in digital form and develop TIP training videos. At the district level, BC/TIP sub-grantees are coordinating with Smiling Sun clinics under the USAID-DFID NGO Health Service Delivery Project (NHSDP), as well as with the USAID-supported Protecting Human Rights (PHR) DG activity to provide referrals for survivors. BC/TIP also coordinated with two recipients of grants from the DoS Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (DoS/J/TIP), Relief International (RI) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to avoid implementation overlap and share training materials. According to KIIs, more follow up from both parties could have increased the effectiveness of collaboration.

CONCLUSIONS

- BC/TIP made considerable efforts to coordinate with other USAID/Bangladesh and DoS/J/TIP activities, with evidence of effectiveness at both the national and local levels. At the same time, interviews suggest that more follow up between partners would increase effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAID

Mid-term: For BC/TIP

1. USAID should provide more funding or reduce the scope of the activity (EQ1, EQ2, EQ3). Consider redirecting resources from the prosecution component and into survivor services.
2. USAID should add an additional management position to BC/TIP (EQ3). The individual would assist the COP in management functions and provide oversight of and improve coordination across the activity's component managers, freeing up time for the COP to focus on higher-level partnerships and communication.

Long-term: For Future TIP Programming

3. USAID should redesign TIP programming to address the factors hindering successful prosecution of TIP cases (EQ1, EQ2). Provide intensive mentoring and support, working with police and prosecutors from investigation through prosecution of individual cases.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

Short-term: For Immediate Action

4. Improve survivor access to services (EQ1):
   - Assess the needs of male survivors and develop delivery mechanisms to make services more accessible for all survivors.
   - Dedicate more capacity building support and sufficient staffing for counseling services.
5. Develop a more robust mechanism for monitoring survivor services (EQ1, EQ3).
6. Establish a verification mechanism to ensure coordination across activity elements (EQ1).
7. Strengthen budget and contractual management, especially ensuring timely sub-grant administration and sufficient cash flow for partners (EQ3).

Medium-term: Before BC/TIP Completion

8. Improve survivor access to services (EQ1):
   - Increase awareness of service directories so that all relevant stakeholders know how to access and use them.
   - Link survivor services to prosecution interventions.

9. Develop a multistage process for moving from district service directories to a national referral mechanism (EQ1, EQ5, EQ6).
10. Increase sustainability of BC/TIP training interventions utilizing in-service training mechanisms and developing roll-out plans for TOT (EQ1, EQ5).
11. Strengthen ANIRBAN and Peer Leader components through continued organizational capacity building and training (EQ1, EQ4).
12. Redirect efforts to engage the private sector to small local companies (EQ1).

LESSONS LEARNED

- Flexibility is essential to mitigate constraints and pursue opportunities.
- Cross-component cohesion can have unexpected multiplier effects: interventions undertaken for one component can advance another.
- Smooth coordination between the IP field office in Bangladesh, the IP HQ, and USAID is critical for effective implementation.
- Relationship building is critical to effective partnerships, especially with government.
- Adequately fund all elements of a TIP activity or reduce the scope.
- Allocating scarce resources to train individuals who cannot utilize the training is not effective.

I. INTRODUCTION

While Bangladesh has taken great strides toward achieving its Millennium Development Goals, numerous economic and social factors remain that fuel labor migration and lead to exploitation and trafficking in persons (TIP). Women and young people are particularly economically vulnerable with very low rates of participation in the labor force.[14] As a result, women and youth are more likely to be receptive to offers of work involving internal and international migration.

To reduce the prevalence of TIP in Bangladesh, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Bangladesh supports the Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP) Activity, a five-year activity implemented by Winrock International (WI), in partnership with 12 sub-grantees.[15] The BC/TIP Activity builds on previous USAID-funded activities to counter TIP in Bangladesh. BC/TIP targets 25 districts prone to TIP (125 upazilas, 375 unions, and 3,750 villages) with interventions in all four areas of emphasis: prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership. The activity began October 24, 2014 and is due for completion October 23, 2019, with an estimated total budget of $4,996,728.

The objective of BC/TIP is to reduce the prevalence of TIP in Bangladesh through: strengthened capacity of communities and local institutions to identify trafficking victims and take action; improved access of survivors to high-quality assistance; increased responsiveness of criminal justice actors to TIP survivors and to prosecute TIP crimes; and effective partnerships among stakeholders to combat TIP (see the BC/TIP Results Framework in **Table 1** below). To achieve its prevention objectives, the activity works with counter-trafficking committees (CTCs) in target communities, Peer Leaders, and the survivors' voice group ANIRBAN, among others. To improve survivors' access to quality services, the activity works with local, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), as well as with their prevention partners, to increase victim identification and referral. The activity provides services directly to survivors of trafficking through sub-grantee NGOs. Survivors include both males and females. To address its prosecution objectives, the activity targets police, prosecutors, and other law enforcement actors. To address its partnership objectives, the activity engages with key government stakeholders, as well as NGOs and international organizations (IOs) involved in related activities.

This report details the results of a mid-term performance evaluation of BC/TIP conducted by Social Impact, Inc. (SI) for USAID/Bangladesh. In what follows, the evaluation team (ET) lays out the activity background, evaluation methodology, findings and conclusions organized by evaluation question, lessons learned, and recommendations for USAID and WI going forward.

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[14] Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone. United Nations Development Programme: New York.
[15] Agrogati, BSEHR, Change Maker, DAM, Proyas, Rights Jessore, Sachetan, SHISUK, YPSA, and new partners BITA, OKUP and RDRS

II. THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM AND USAID'S RESPONSE

THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

Labor migration from Bangladesh is an important source of income for the country, bringing in over 162 billion USD in remittances in 2016. In 2016, 757,731 people (118,088; 16% female) migrated for employment through official government channels.[16] In addition, many people use irregular channels for migration, although the number of these each year is unknown. Young women are particularly vulnerable as they are legally excluded from the regular migration channels until they reach they age of 25.[17] Therefore, young women interested in labor migration have no choice but to utilize irregular channels with the assistance of unregistered agents. However, in Bangladesh, both men and women— whether they use regular or irregular migration channels—are at-risk of being exploited, trafficked, and abused. Much work is still needed in Bangladesh to address the problem. The United States Department of State (DoS) indicates that the number of trafficking victims identified has decreased as have the number of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. There is no formal referral mechanism and NGOs report cases of re-trafficking due to insufficient services. DoS also notes that migrant workers are vulnerable to TIP due to high recruitment fees and illegal recruitment mechanisms.[18]

USAID'S RESPONSE

To address this development problem, USAID/Bangladesh has funded programming to combat TIP since 2000. USAID began counter trafficking programming in Bangladesh with small grants to local NGOs.[19] In 2005, USAID funded the Counter-Trafficking Interventions in Prevention, Protection, and Prosecution for Victims of Trafficking in Persons Project. This was a three-year project implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).[20] In 2008, USAID launched the Actions for Combating Trafficking-in-Persons (ACT) Project implemented by Winrock International (WI). This project aimed to expand the definition and legal framework to include labor trafficking and engage government entities to reduce exploitation through labor recruitment processes. It also sought to increase prosecution of TIP cases, improve services for survivors, and expand awareness-raising efforts.

Also implemented by WI, BC/TIP began in 2014. The goal/purpose of BC/TIP is to reduce the prevalence of TIP by building on the successes of previous activities, building the capacity of government and NGO actors to prevent TIP incidents, improving protection services for survivors, strengthening prosecution efforts, improving coordination efforts, and strengthening policies. This objective is expected to address the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) Sub-Intermediate Result (Sub-IR) 1.3.3: Improved protection of civil and human rights. The activity's intermediate results reflect the four pillars of combatting TIP as defined by the United States Government (USG): Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Partnership.

The BC/TIP objective is to be achieved through the following intermediate results (IR) and Sub-IRs:

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[16] Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training, Bangladesh. Web. Accessed October 28, 2017.

[17] Barkat, Abul & Manzuma Ahsan. Gender and migration from Bangladesh: mainstreaming migration into the national development plans from a gender perspective, p. 31. ILO Country Office for Bangladesh: Dhaka, 2014.

[18] U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report: 2017. Washington, DC

[19] USAID Anti-Trafficking in Persons Programs in Asia: A Synthesis. 2009. Chemonics International, Inc.: Washington, DC

[20] Counter-Trafficking Interventions in Prevention, Protection and Prosecution for Victims of Trafficking in Persons in Bangladesh: End of Project Evaluation. 2008. International Organization for Migration: Dhaka

Table 1: BC/TIP Results Framework
- IR 1: Prevention: Strengthened capacity of communities to identify and prevent TIP
Sub-IR 1.1 Increased capacity of leaders in target communities to identify and prevent TIP Sub-IR.1.2 Increased capacity of local institutions to prevent trafficking incidents
IR 2: Protection: Improved access of trafficking victims to assistance
Sub-IR 2.1 Increased consistency and quality of support offered by TIP survivor service providers Sub-IR 2.2 Improved referral system for TIP survivors
- IR 3: Prosecution: Increased responsiveness of criminal justice actors to trafficking victims
Sub-IR 3.1 Criminal justice actors demonstrate increased understanding of their roles and responsibilities in providing support to TIP survivors and prosecuting traffickers
- IR 4: Partnership: Effective and coordinated partnerships among stakeholders
Sub-IR 4.1 Improved coordination among GoB and NGOs to combat TIP and migration abuses Sub-IR 4.2 Private company and international donor efforts leveraged to support prevention, protection, and prosecution

The development hypothesis for BC/TIP is as follows: If the capacity of community members is strengthened to identify and take actions against trafficking incidents/traffickers; if access of trafficking survivors to various support services is improved; if the responsiveness of criminal justice actors is increased; and if all concerned stakeholders partner to combat trafficking in a coordinated and effective way, then the prevalence of human trafficking in Bangladesh will be reduced. A reduced prevalence of human trafficking will lead to improved protection of civil and human rights of Bangladeshi citizens.

The following assumptions are held to be critical to achieving the activity's objectives:

- GoB is supportive of BC/TIP and its implementing partners (IPs);
- Bangladesh is politically stable, and hartals and blockades do not significantly hamper activity interventions;
- Corruption in Bangladesh does not outweigh the effectiveness of institutions to function, and traffickers themselves are not embedded within institutions;
- Targeted communities are willing and able to participate in TIP-related activities;
- Local-level agencies are willing to perform their responsibilities under the National Plan of Action for Combatting Human Trafficking (NPA);
- There is effective cross-border cooperation with countries where traffickers are identified;
- Criminal justice actors are interested and willing to improve prosecution practices; and,
- Private recruiting agencies comply with legal recruiting processes.

III. EVALUATION PURPOSE, USE, AND QUESTIONS

Through the Democracy and Governance (DG) Programs' Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Support Activity task order, USAID/Bangladesh engaged Social Impact, Inc. (SI) to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of USAID's BC/TIP Activity implemented by WI.

The objective of this performance evaluation is to assess actual results against targeted results and establish whether the activity is on course to meet its objectives; assess the efficacy of the management structure in meeting the objectives thus far; evaluate BC/TIP implementers' performance to date; assess sustainability plans of the activity; and make recommendations to USAID/Bangladesh concerning current BC/TIP implementation and future programming.

The evaluation will be used for course corrections in the implementation of the BC/TIP activity. USAID expects WI to take the findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this evaluation report into consideration as it shapes the activity and strategy going forward. The report will also be used by USAID to inform future programming.

The audience for this mid-term performance evaluation includes USAID/Bangladesh, the United States Embassy in Bangladesh, WI, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), and other bilateral and multilateral donors working to combat human trafficking in Bangladesh.

This mid-term performance evaluation focused on the Evaluation Questions (EQs) below. These reflect some minor changes from the original evaluation Scope of Work (SOW), based on discussions with USAID.[21] See **Annex A** for the EQs as originally stated in the SOW.

RESULTS

1. To what extent have activity objectives been achieved?
2. What are the major factors influencing progress toward achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

3. How effective has the USAID's BC/TIP management structure (WI, sub-grantees, and USAID) been in implementing the activity and making progress toward the achievement of activity results?

SUSTAINABILITY

4. To what extent has the activity been able to contribute towards strengthening the capacity of its sub-grantees?
5. What major challenges to sustainability has the activity encountered?

COLLABORATION

6. How effectively has USAID's BC/TIP coordinated with other USAID/Bangladesh activities, i.e., DG, Economic Growth, Population Health Nutrition and Education, Food Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance in achieving activity objectives and contributing to other USAID/Bangladesh activity objectives?

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[21] Based on discussions with USAID during a kick-off call and in-brief presentation, SI finalized the EQs and revised their order to reflect USAID's indicated priority; specifically, what is now EQ 6 was originally in the SOW as EQ 3. Of note, in answering EQ 2, the ET assessed whether any of the activity assumptions noted above were factors influencing progress toward achievement of the BC/TIP objectives. In answering EQ 6, the ET explored BC/TIP's coordination with other USG programs (e.g. U.S. Department of State J/TIP activities) to the extent that it is relevant and feasible.

IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

EVALUATION DESIGN

This mid-term performance evaluation began with a remote client kick-off meeting on August 16, 2017, including representatives from the ET and USAID/Bangladesh, during which the ET confirmed USAID's intended use for the evaluation. The ET submitted a work plan with a draft evaluation design to USAID prior to arrival in-country. The ET presented the final evaluation design to USAID during an in-country in-brief on September 18, 2017 and to WI on September 19, 2017. Fieldwork in Bangladesh lasted approximately three and one-half weeks, from September 17 to October 10, 2017. This included an in-briefing presentation to USAID/Bangladesh at the start of fieldwork, data collection in Dhaka and three BC/TIP implementation districts (Jessore, Cox's Bazar, and Rajshahi), and separate presentations of preliminary findings to USAID/Bangladesh and WI at the end of fieldwork.

The ET consisted of four members: two international experts, both female (Team Leader and Evaluation Specialist), and two Bangladeshi experts, one male and one female (National Specialist and Research Assistant). The ET was accompanied by an interpreter for data collection in Dhaka, Jessore, and Cox's Bazar. The sub-team that collected data in Rajshahi was accompanied by a separate interpreter.

Except for a few interviews,[22] the ET collected data together as a full team in Dhaka and part of the time in Jessore. The ET then split into two sub-teams for the remainder of the time in Jessore. After Jessore, one sub-team (Team Leader and Research Assistant) collected data in Cox's Bazar while the second sub-team collected data in Rajshahi (Evaluation Specialist and National Specialist). The ET was accompanied by an interpreter for all interviews conducted in Bangla. The full ET convened again in Dhaka at the end of data collection to complete preliminary data analysis. Post fieldwork, the ET conducted a phone-based mini-survey with survivors and interviewed additional respondents via email.

The evaluation utilized a mixed-methods approach that included multiple qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. To guide fieldwork, the ET developed semi-structured data collection protocols (**Annex C**) tailored for different stakeholder groups, including: USAID; WI and its sub-grantees;[23] volunteer groups, such as Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN;[24] partnership stakeholders, such as GoB and NGOs; and individuals trained by the activity, such as CTC members, police, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, counselors, District Employment and Manpower Office (DEMO) staff, and Technical Training Center (TTC) trainers.

Protocols were designed with consideration of privacy and sensitivity for trafficking survivors at the fore, and they also took international best practices into account.[25] For quality assurance purposes, the ET audio-recorded interviews with all respondents except survivors.[26] Prior to primary qualitative data collection, the ET obtained informed consent from all relevant respondents to participate and, if applicable, record the interview. The evaluation design, protocols, and consent forms were reviewed and approved by SI's Institutional Review Board (IRB).

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[22] Due to respondent availability, a few interviews in Dhaka were scheduled simultaneously, which necessitated that the ET split into sub-teams to complete them.

[23] WI and its sub-grantees are referred to throughout as IPs.

[24] ANIRBAN is a survivors' voice group established under the ACT project. The group is currently informal with no legal status and is run by and for survivors.

[25] Best practices include the World Health Organization's Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Interviewing Trafficked Women (2003) and the National Institute of Health's Policies and Guidance for Research involving Human Subjects.

[26] The ET strove at all times to create a comfortable and safe environment for survivors during in-person interviews. The ET did not record interviews with survivors as a precaution against survivor discomfort.

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Document Review: The ET conducted a review of documents produced by and relevant to BC/TIP in order to better understand BC/TIP activity design and implementation, identify initial findings for the EQs, and develop data collection protocols to capture primary data to supplement or cross-check information provided in the background documents. Categories of data sources include: BC/TIP activity documents, Bangladeshi policies related to trafficking, reports on trafficking in Bangladesh, and USAID policies and documents. A full list of documents reviewed is provided in **Annex E.**

Key Informant Interviews: The ET conducted key informant interviews (KIIs) either with individuals or small groups, using semi-structured interview protocols tailored to stakeholder groups. Key informants included representatives from USAID, WI, BC/TIP sub-grantees (including Capacity Building Service Group [CBSG]), NGO partners, GoB partners, and trafficking survivors. The ET conducted a total of 30 KIIs including 52 individuals (18 female, 34 male).

FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DATA COLLECTION METHODS BY DISTRICTS, N=76 (KIIS/GI/FGD/MINI-SURVEY)

Focus Group Discussions and Group Interviews: The ET conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) and group interviews (GIs)[27] with participants from stakeholder groups that received training and other support under BC/TIP across the prevention, protection, and prosecution spectrum, including: Peer Leaders, ANIRBAN members, CTC members, police, prosecutors, panel lawyers, CBOs, DEMO and TTC staff, counselors, and potential migrants. The ET required that five participants be present in order to conduct an FGD in which participants engaged with each other in a dialogue. If less than five participants were present, the ET conducted the interaction as a GI. The ET conducted a total of 28 FGDs/GIs (21 FGDs, 7 GIs) involving 155 individuals (61 female, 94 male).

Mini-Survey: Given geographic and time constraints, the ET was only able to conduct KIIs with a limited number of survivors. To supplement the KIIs with survivors and to provide quantitative data regarding survivors' satisfaction with services, the ET also carried out a mini-survey with survivors. The ET administered the mini-survey in two ways: 1) in-person, as part of the KII with a survivor, and 2) over the phone. The ET conducted the mini-survey in-person with 12 survivors (4 female, 8 male) as part of KIIs, and the Research Assistant conducted the mini-survey over the phone in Bangla with 18 additional survivors (9 female, 9 male),[28] for a total of 30 mini-survey respondents (13 female, 17 male). Sampling for the phone-based mini-survey was designed to reach survivors from districts other than those visited during fieldwork.

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[27] Group Interviews were originally designed as FGDs. However, in situations with fewer than five participants these discussions were re-categorized as GIs.
[28] The ET originally sampled 66 individuals (33 primary respondents and 33 designated alternates), in order to ultimately include 30 phone-based mini-survey respondents, in addition to the mini-survey administered to 12 survivors during KIIs. However, the ET was only able to successfully contact and include 18 survivors in the phone-based mini-survey.

Combined, the ET conducted data collection with a total of 225 respondents (88 female, 137 male).[29] **Figure 1** illustrates the distribution of data collection methods by district. See **Annex B** for a full evaluation design matrix and **Annex F** for a list of respondents per stakeholder group.

SAMPLING

The ET purposively sampled for respondents in the four districts in which it conducted in-person data collection based on the following criteria: 1) concentration of stakeholders and activities (i.e. how many partner offices are located or services offered in a given district); 2) geographic diversity (i.e. no more than one district sampled in a given BC/TIP programmatic cluster); and 3) logistical feasibility (e.g. number of team members and ability to split into sub-teams; ability to travel between sites within daylight hours). See **Annex H** for a map of data collection districts.

The ET used a purposive sampling approach to identify candidates for KIIs, using either of two criteria: 1) their proximity to and knowledge of BC/TIP, and 2) experience with the human trafficking situation in Bangladesh.

Survivors for KIIs and the mini-survey were selected using a stratified random sampling approach. Using a list provided by WI of survivors who received services under BC/TIP, the ET first separated the list of survivors into gender and district strata. The ET then randomly sampled potential respondents within these strata.[30] The ET shared the selection of primary respondents and alternative respondents with WI's sub-grantees and asked the sub-grantees to acquire verbal permission from the survivors to participate in the mini-survey. If the primary respondent refused or was not available, then the sub-grantee contacted the designated alternate. In some cases, an additional list of respondents had to be selected because the sub-grantee had lost contact with the survivor.

The ET randomly sampled FGD/GI participants from a series of trainee lists provided by WI. The ET then asked WI to invite the selected individuals to participate in the FGD. If a selected participant was unavailable, then the ET selected an alternate participant. FGDs included both male and female participants and were not intentionally sex-segregated. This is because within many of the FGD types, there is already a bias toward one gender. For example, police and prosecutors who received training are primarily male, and Peer Leaders are primarily female. This would make it difficult to find enough FGD participants of each sex for each FGD stakeholder type in each district. To the extent possible, the ET ensured that both sexes were represented in the FGDs to capture any differences in perspective.

DATA ANALYSIS

Prior to data collection, the ET developed preliminary codes aligned to possible themes that could emerge in respondents' answers to the EQs. The ET refined and added to the codebook as new themes emerged during data collection. Team members conducted internal debriefs at least every two days during fieldwork to discuss a) evidence collected, patterns, and discrepancies that helped answer the EQs, and b) any adjustments that were needed in the evaluation schedule or data collection protocols. ET members took KII and FGD/GI notes in real-time, cleaning and sharing electronic summaries on a rolling basis throughout fieldwork. Prior to departing Bangladesh, the ET conducted preliminary content

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[29] Although total participant counts are included here, FGDs, GIs, and KIIs were analyzed as single units for the purpose of extracting findings. For example, if a theme was brought up in five FGDs containing eight participants each, the ET reported the theme as occurring in five FGDs, rather than counting the number of individuals in each FGD who expressed the theme.

[30] The ET utilized a systematic sampling technique whereby the ET first separated the list of survivors into strata based on the sub-grantee providing services, then selected a random starting point within a list of survivors, and repeatedly selecting every nth individual in the list (the number being determined by the number of survivors in the strata and the number of individuals desired) until they reached the desired number of survivors for the sample. If the primary selected survivor was not available, the ET selected the survivor immediately after the primary survivor to serve as an alternate.

and comparative analyses—noting any congruences and differences between stakeholder groups, as well as between male versus female participants—and captured preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations in a matrix that categorized analysis by EQ. The matrix: a) ensured that the ET prepared a systematic and thorough response to each EQ prior to the out-brief at USAID/Bangladesh, b) verified that preliminary analysis accounted for gender and social dimensions, c) identified any gaps where additional clarification or analysis may be necessary, and d) served as the basis for developing the evaluation report. After team debriefings, interview notes were subsequently coded using the finalized codebook and re-analyzed by the Team Leader and Evaluation Specialist using Dedoose qualitative analysis software. For quantitative mini-survey data, the ET utilized Microsoft Excel to tabulate and quantify responses to closed-ended questions or rating scales, and additionally analyzed the survey results by sex. The ET used data triangulation to cross-verify and cross-validate the findings that emerged from using multiple data collection methods (i.e. KIIs, mini-survey) and data sources (i.e. sub-grantees, GoB).

LIMITATIONS

Potential Biases: This evaluation utilized a random sampling approach for FGD/GI participants and survivors, therefore mitigating against *selection bias* (i.e. the likelihood of selecting the most active, responsive, or engaged stakeholders). At the same time, participants who were randomly selected had the opportunity to decline the invitation, and as such it is possible that individuals with strong opinions or experiences may have self-selected to participate.

As is common in qualitative research, it is also possible that *recall bias* (i.e. an individual misremembering or remembering some details and not others) and *response bias* (i.e. an individual's response being influenced by a perceived social or cultural norm or personal gain) are present in this evaluation. The ET mitigated against recall by triangulating information heard by multiple data sources to increase the validity of the evaluation findings. The ET mitigated against response bias by clearly stating in the informed consent script the lack of any explicit risks or benefits to participation in the evaluation.

There is the possibility of *translation bias* for data collection methods implemented in Bangla and using live English-Bangla interpretation. The ET mitigated against this bias by having local evaluation team members review notes that were taken in English—while translated through an interpreter—by the Team Leader and the Evaluation Specialist. As an additional quality assurance check, the local evaluation team members listened to, and independently translated, a sub-set of FGD recordings conducted by the opposite sub-team, as a means of cross-checking the translations.

Sampling and Design Limitations: Given the time allotted for fieldwork, the ET conducted qualitative data collection in only four of the 25 districts where BC/TIP is implemented. As such, the ET is unable to generalize findings beyond a sampling of direct respondents in four districts to stakeholders in all districts. However, the ET purposively selected data collection sites and samples to capture as much of BC/TIP's diversity as possible. Similarly, given the small sample size for the mini-survey, findings from this data collection method are not intended to be statistically significant or produce generalizable data. Rather, the information from the mini-survey was meant to supplement KIIs with survivors and increase the perspectives from this important stakeholder group.

The ET encountered three challenges that affected sampling while in the field. The first was the presence of the Durga Puja and Ashura holidays during fieldwork. The ET was able to meet some stakeholder groups in communities during this time, but not government officials. Second was the response to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Cox's Bazar. Because some local BC/TIP stakeholders were preoccupied with the response efforts, the ET was unable to visit Ukhia upazila in Cox's Bazar or meet with district CTC members from Cox's Bazar. Third, it was challenging for the ET to meet with police officers trained by the activity, as these stakeholders needed special permission to leave their posts to participate, had been transferred to farther away upazilas, or did not express interest in participating. As a result, the sample

only includes four respondents from this group. For police and other training stakeholder groups with small sample sizes, the findings included in this report should be taken as indicative of their experiences, but they cannot be generalized to all individuals who received training under BC/TIP.

Lastly, as previously mentioned, the ET did not intentionally sex-segregate FGDs. Due to the mixed-sex FGD design, it is possible but unconfirmed whether gender dynamics may have influenced participants' behavior during FGDs. The ET attempted to mitigate any adverse effects due to gender-dynamics by ensuring that multiple individuals of both sexes were included in FGDs to the extent possible, and used facilitation techniques to ensure that individuals from both sex groups had an opportunity to voice their opinions.

V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES BEEN ACHIEVED?

OVERALL OBJECTIVE: REDUCE THE PREVALENCE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN BANGLADESH

FINDINGS

BC/TIP does not measure the prevalence of human trafficking in Bangladesh. The indicator used by WI to measure achievement of the overall objective has changed since the beginning of the activity, starting with the DoS TIP Report ranking for Bangladesh. During Year 1, the indicator was changed to "number of actions taken by communities, local governments, and GoB to prevent TIP" in an effort to have a measurable indicator that reflects all BC/TIP components. The activity appears to be on track for meeting the targets established for this indicator. However, the number of actions taken by the government and community to prevent TIP is not necessarily reflective of changes in the prevalence of TIP in the country. See **Annex D** for a table of performance monitoring indicator data for each IR.

The prevalence of trafficking cannot be measured by people's impressions, although many informants perceived a decrease—basing this opinion on cases they were personally familiar with or that gained media attention. Numerous respondents (8 FGDs) in three fieldwork locations – including Peer Leaders, CTCs, ANIRBAN, CBOs, panel lawyers, and pre-decision migrants – expressed a belief that human trafficking in Bangladesh has been reduced. The extent of the reduction was an area of disagreement among FGD participants with some stating that it has been eradicated and others observing a modest reduction. When probed, most indicated that they were referring to a reduction in irregular migration. In two FGDs with law enforcement, respondents felt that trafficking had increased or that it was unchanged but that traffickers had changed their methods. Exemplifying how widely opinions varied, in one FGD with CBOs, one CBO claimed that no trafficking incident has happened in its working area while another CBO from the same district stated that it identified approximately 50 survivors. Some key informants also expressed concern that Rohingya refugees are vulnerable to TIP, which could increase prevalence in the country.

CONCLUSIONS

* There are many factors that may impact the prevalence of TIP in a country. Some of these factors, such as changes in poverty in Bangladesh or protections for migrants in destination countries, are beyond the scope of the activity to address. BC/TIP is designed to build the capacity of Bangladeshi institutions and organizations to address the issue, to raise awareness in the communities, and to protect survivors. These continued efforts, while they may not reduce the overall prevalence of TIP, especially during the timeframe of the activity, lead to an improved framework for addressing TIP and thus to improved protection of the civil and human rights of Bangladeshi citizens. Successes in achieving the BC/TIP intermediate results are discussed below.

IR1: INCREASED CAPACITY OF LEADERS AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY TO IDENTIFY AND PREVENT TIP

FINDINGS

A significant number of respondents (5 KIIs, GIs and FGDs), including Peer Leaders, ANIRBAN, CTCs, IPs, and police, stated that communities are more aware of TIP than before and have a better and broader understanding of the issue (i.e., recognizing labor trafficking and the trafficking of men as well as that people can be trafficked through the official labor migration channels). BC/TIP focused prevention efforts on building the capacity of community members (specifically Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members) and institutions, CTCs, TTCs, and DEMOs to prevent TIP in their communities. The activity also provided direct pre-decision and pre-departure training for potential migrants and conducted other

awareness-raising interventions. Additionally, BC/TIP encouraged and promoted identification of survivors by Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members.

Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN: The activity has provided Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members with a variety of capacity-building interventions, including trainings, workshops, and support for awareness-raising activities in their communities. In Year 1 and Year 2, BC/TIP exceeded its targets for the number of Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members trained to prevent TIP (**Annex D**). In Rajshahi, Jessore, and Cox's Bazar, Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members provided evidence of their impact on prevention in the community. They and a wide range of other stakeholders pointed to the effectiveness of Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members in not only raising awareness, but also preventing individual cases of potential TIP. They stated that community members interested in migration seek advice from them to check whether offers are authentic and legal.

In all FGDs (5 of 5) with Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members, participants indicated that they are treated with respect in their communities and this is reflected in their membership on many CTCs (as confirmed by sub-grantees). In one fieldwork location, participants reflected on BC/TIP's predecessor ACT intervention and noted the increased strength of ANIRBAN as an organization: "Under ACT there were CTCs, but they did not allow us to join them. Now, under BC/TIP, [ANIRBAN] is more powerful and they accept us in their CTCs." One Peer Leader echoed a common theme regarding the confidence ANIRBAN members have gained due to support received: "When I first received life skills training from ANIRBAN, I was not very confident; but slowly when I became popular in my area, my confidence level went up."

CTCs: BC/TIP is on track to meet its targets for the number of CTC members trained. However, it has fallen slightly behind on the number of CTCs activated. Two IP stakeholders indicated that local elections, which resulted in turnover of the majority of elected CTC members, necessitated directing scarce resources to reinforcing efforts with those CTCs. Additionally, one stakeholder mentioned that delays in contracting new sub-grantees slowed down efforts to engage new CTCs.

Respondents imparted mixed perceptions about the effectiveness of CTCs in preventing TIP in their communities. Respondents in three KIIs, including IPs and GoB, reported that some local governments are reluctant to dedicate time and resources to CTCs. Engagement of CTCs varies depending on the commitment of individuals, in particular the union chairman and secretary. However, many more respondents (7 FGDs and 6 KIIs) pointed to the effectiveness of CTCs they have engaged, noting the need for continual follow-up to ensure success. CTC members themselves noted that they deal with the issue of TIP during their work on other topics, e.g., agricultural or health issues. Other examples include providing services for survivors and those at-risk, enrolling them in government welfare and assistance programs, assisting survivors to file cases and negotiate for compensation, and talking to those at-risk to prevent them from being trafficked. IPs state that ANIRBAN and Peer Leader participation in their local CTCs helps push the CTCs to stay active. Notably, 10 unions (of 80 activated by BC/TIP) demonstrate a commitment to the CTC through a dedicated budget for TIP activities. One CTC stated that it budgeted 200,000 BDT (USD $2,500) for TIP in fiscal year 2018.

DEMOs/TTCs: BC/TIP originally intended to work with the Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET) to integrate safe migration training into government TTC programs. However, the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE) has yet to issue approval for this intervention. Instead, BC/TIP worked with private TTCs and, to a lesser extent, local DEMOs. Additionally, WI trained potential and registered migrants on safe migration and TIP through DEMOs, private TTCs, partners, and Peer Leaders.

BC/TIP trained 58 government and private TTCs, including four DEMO staff and seven local government officials, to provide safe migration training to students and potential migrants.[31] In two FGDs with private TTCs and DEMOs, respondents indicated that they spread safe migration messages to trainees (in the case of TTCs) and potential migrants (in the case of DEMO). Respondents felt that BC/TIP training was effective and of high quality. However, TTC respondents stated that only those teachers who were trained by BC/TIP integrate safe migration training into their classes. The other trainers at the TTC do not. There was insufficient data to assess how the few DEMO staff trained have integrated any knowledge gained into their regular activities, and one stakeholder reported that BC/TIP is not monitoring training provided to migrants by DEMO staff. While it could not be confirmed by the ET, according to activity documents, DEMO invited all registered migrants in Satkhira, Jessore, and Jamalpur from the BMET database for training.[32]

Pre-Departure and Pre-Decision Training for Migrants: BC/TIP has fallen behind on its targets for the number of potential migrants trained. Pre-decision migrants interviewed by the ET were all trained by BC/TIP sub-grantee staff. In both FGDs held with pre-decision migrants, respondents found the training to be very helpful. They expressed familiarity with legal migration channels and the need for a cost benefit analysis before migrating. Some stated that they changed their mind about migrating: "I had a plan to go through illegal channels and had a passport, but having a training with Rights Jessore, I [decided not to go]." They also expressed a desire to prevent others from becoming victimized: "I will tell them the legal process to go abroad so they don't fall prey to the traffickers. If they want to go they have to check the information, their ID, their purposes. If we go outside we have to calculate how much we will be benefitted going there."

Identification of Survivors and Those At-risk: Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN gave numerous examples of identifying both survivors and those at-risk in their communities and referring them for services. BC/TIP exceeded its Year 2 target for identification of survivors and those at-risk and achieved 83 percent of the Year 3 target at the time of the evaluation. For ANIRBAN, this aspect of prevention is linked to protection issues, as ANIRBAN members not only refer survivors for services, but also receive basic counseling training to guide interactions with survivors.

In seven FGDs and three KIIs in Rajshahi, Jessore, and Cox's Bazar, multiple stakeholders (sub-grantees, ANIRBAN, Peer Leaders, CTCs) indicated that CTCs are providing services to survivors and those at-risk. One CTC member clearly cited service provision as a responsibility: "We can link that person with [the sub-grantee] and they have linkages with other services, but our responsibility is to provide some support too." CBOs in two fieldwork locations indicated that training provided by BC/TIP helped increase their knowledge of what constitutes TIP and safe migration, how to identify survivors, survivors' experiences, and services available. Referring those at-risk to services, especially to livelihood support services, demonstrates implementation of Recommendation 1, EQ1 from the final evaluation of the ACT project to explore alternative approaches to prevention "addressing elements which lead to vulnerability to trafficking."[33]

Under BC/TIP, referrals of survivors for services have come primarily from ANIRBAN, CTCs, local NGOs, and community members and leaders. These four sources accounted for 54 percent of referrals in Year 1, 71 percent in Year 2, and 73 percent at the time of the evaluation in Year 3. According to one stakeholder, 80 percent of survivor identifications during the predecessor ACT intervention came directly from sub-grantees. BC/TIP demonstrates a shift in that the vast majority come from local

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[31] BC/TIP DEMO/TTC Training Database
[32] 2016 Annual, p. 26
[33] *ACT Final Evaluation Report 2014.* Arlington, VA: Social Impact, Inc. 2014.

community sources. BC/TIP reporting also indicates that most identifications are through the community and only 16 percent of identifications (at the time of the evaluation in Year 3) are from sub-grantees.[34] See **Annex D** for statistics on the sources of referrals of survivors for services.

Gender Issues in Prevention: IPs expressed awareness that prevention activities need to reach both men and women to be effective and reported that interventions were designed accordingly. In two KIIs, sub-grantees specifically indicated that they try to maintain gender balance among Peer Leaders, who are key actors in raising awareness in communities. Two respondents also pointed out different ways that men and women access information. Courtyard meetings, they find, are attended primarily by women. Door-to-door sessions are designed specifically to reach women who stay at home. Community meetings and school sessions have mixed attendance. Men, they find, are the primary audience at rallies and shop meetings.

CONCLUSIONS

- BC/TIP has been effective in building the technical capacity of community leaders and local government in raising awareness about TIP and informing the community about the risks of irregular labor migration and how to use official migration channels. Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN are seen by most stakeholders to be effective in delivering these messages. Additionally, BC/TIP built their capacity to effectively identify TIP survivors and those at-risk and guide them to support services. These services act as an additional method of prevention, moving beyond awareness-raising to addressing the factors that make individuals vulnerable to being trafficked.

- BC/TIP has been effective in building the capacity of targeted CTCs. CTC members who engaged with BC/TIP expanded their understanding of their role to include not only awareness raising but also provision of government assistance for survivors and those at-risk. Continuous follow-up and engagement with stakeholders is needed to maintain momentum, but this has been limited due to the activities' resource constraints (human and financial).

- Pre-decision/pre-departure training for migrants shows potential, but more effort is needed to develop the capacity of TTCs and DEMOs to undertake this training independently and sustainably.

IR2: IMPROVED ACCESS OF TRAFFICKING VICTIMS TO ASSISTANCE

FINDINGS

SUB-IR 2.1 – INCREASED CONSISTENCY AND QUALITY OF SUPPORT OFFERED BY TIP SURVIVOR SERVICE PROVIDERS

BC/TIP focused on two main areas to achieve Sub-IR 2.1: utilization of the survivor services guide to provide survivor-centered services using a case management process, and building the capacity of individuals providing counseling services. Additionally, BC/TIP sub-grantees provided services to survivors both directly and through referral.

Survivor Services Guide / Case Management: The indicator to measure success under Sub-IR 2.1 is the number of BC/TIP partners utilizing survivor service standards. According to the PMP, BC/TIP is meeting its targets (**Annex D**). All BC/TIP protection partners interviewed mentioned use of the case management process and emphasized how it is used to assess survivors' needs and provide services accordingly. One survivor even mentioned the case management process when interviewed by the ET. While BC/TIP did provide training for other organizations and government entities on the survivor service guidelines developed under ACT, the ET did not collect enough data on these efforts to assess results. There are also no indicators used by BC/TIP to measure the impact of this intervention.

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[34] Data compiled from BC/TIP reporting: BC/TIP annual performance reports 2015 and 2016 and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarterly reports for Year 3.

Counseling: BC/TIP is behind its target on the number of individuals trained to provide counseling services. However, many of those trained enhanced their understanding of counseling, and there was universal agreement among FGD participants that they learned new techniques for helping their patients. They gave many examples of cases where they applied new techniques. Additionally, in all four FGDs, respondents described how counseling training changed their approach to clients. They learned that some of their past approaches were not constructive, such as: asking intrusive or inappropriate questions, questioning the survivor about why they went abroad in the first place; reacting emotionally to the survivor's story; not ensuring confidentiality; and imposing decisions on clients. In one FGD with training participants, counsellors mentioned that they learned techniques for providing counseling by telephone and one survivor interviewed stated that the emotional support she received over the telephone was critical for her.

> _Earlier we used to cry. When survivors cried we also cried. Now we know that we can't do this. This is not part of counseling. We learned we should not be emotional when we hear their story; we should not be emotional like crying...We were taught how to sit, how to react, not to touch their body, etc. and it is helping a lot._
>
> –FGD with Counselors

Only four of 30 mini-survey respondents indicated that they received counseling services (3 female, 1 male), while 26 (10 female, 16 male) did not recall receiving counseling at all. The ET tried to explain what counseling might entail, but this did not change the majority of responses. It may be that survivors did not receive counseling services or that they did not categorize the sessions as counseling. For example, one female survivor said that she shared her problems with one of the female staff and "overcame the sense of suffocating." She did not recognize this support as counseling. Mini-survey respondents rated counseling 2.8 (out of 3) and said that it helped them move forward with their lives and reduced feelings of fear. Two of the four who received counselling said that they continue to receive counseling, as needed, by phone. Two respondents who did not rate the counseling services related life skills training to counseling, stating that it reduced their trauma and helped them learn to manage stress. Respondents noted that counseling services are more readily available to those who reside in shelter homes. Those who do not are less likely to receive counseling services. All four survivors who indicated in the mini-survey that they received counseling services also spent some time at a shelter home, although half of those who stayed at a shelter did not state that they received counseling services.

The assessment of counseling staff capacity conducted under BC/TIP and the counseling training that followed demonstrate implementation of Recommendation 3, EQ2 in the final evaluation of the ACT project to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment of counselors and provide support to increase their capacity.[35]

Direct Service Provision: As of June 2017, BC/TIP assisted 819 survivors: 540 male (66%) and 279 female (34%). Despite increasing the portion of referrals from local communities, BC/TIP exceeded its Year 1 target, fell behind its Year 2 target, and is falling behind the Year 3 target (**Annex D**). Through in-person and telephone interviews with 30 survivors (13 female, 17 male), the ET collected data on survivors' opinions about the services they received directly through BC/TIP and through referral. Survivors were asked to rate services on a scale of 1 – 3 with 1 being dissatisfied (_Ashantushta_), 2 being adequate or "so-so" (_Motamuti_), and 3 being very satisfied (_Khub Shantushta_). Respondents were also asked to explain why they rated services as they did. This data is presented in **Table 2** below.

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[35] _ACT Final Evaluation Report 2014._ Arlington, VA: Social Impact, Inc. 2014.

TABLE 2: MINI-SURVEY RESPONDENTS' RATING OF SERVICES RECEIVED

Rating	Shelter		Life Skills Training		Education Support		Vocational Skills Training		Job Placement		Support to Open a Business		Legal		Counseling	
Sex	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1- Dissatisfied	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
2 - So So	0	4	1	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	1
3-Very Satisfied	1	3	11	8	0	0	2	1	0	2	7	3	0	1	1	2
Number of respondents rating this service	8		21		0		6		3		11		8		4	
Percentage of respondents rating the service	27%		70%		0%		20%		10%		37%		27%		13%	
Average Rating	2.5		2.9		0.0		2.5		2.7		2.9		1.8		2.8	

BC/TIP has faced challenges in providing sufficient services to survivors.[36] In two KIIs and four FGDs, respondents across three districts indicated that services for survivors were not sufficient to fully address their needs. In particular, respondents indicated that livelihood support services were too meager and vocational choices were limited. IPs noted that a lack of resources resulted in a reliance on referral to services provided by the government and other NGOs. These findings are confirmed by interviews with survivors. Of the 30 survivors interviewed by the ET, six (20%; 2 female, 4 male) did not receive any services at all and an additional four (13%, 2 female, 2 male) had been promised services that they had yet to receive (see **Figure 2** below). The majority of these survivors were assisted by the same sub-grantee.

FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO RECEIVED VARIOUS SERVICES, DISAGGREGATED BY SEX

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
[36] Quarterly report, Year 3, Quarter 3, p. 51

Shelter: Twenty-seven percent of mini-survey respondents (7 female, 1 male) stated that they received shelter services. The service was rated on average 2.5 (out of 3). There are two kinds of shelters supported under BC/TIP: short-term transit shelters where survivors stay for a few days, such as those run by Sachetan and Shisuk; and longer-term shelters, such as those run by Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM) and Young Power in Social Action (YPSA). Transit shelters received an average rating of three, and all three survivors interviewed who stayed at such shelters made positive comments about the staff and their treatment. Longer-term shelters received mixed reviews. They had only female residents who gave them an average rating of 2.5. Two survivors stated that the shelter felt like a prison, and one said that one staff was verbally abusive and involved in immoral behavior. On the other hand, one survivor at the same shelter stated that the staff was good, and three survivors felt that the environment was good and the food satisfactory, noting: "The shelter had facilities for praying, singing, and sewing. If anyone wanted to learn any of the things, they could."

Life Skills Training: Life skills training was highly valued by survivors. Over 70 percent of mini-survey respondents (9 female, 12 male) stated that they received training, more than any other service. They rated life skills training on average 2.9 (out of 3). Survivors stated that training helped them reduce stress and focus on their future, learn how to avoid re-trafficking, prepare for reintegration into their family and community, and gave them courage, confidence, and strength. Several survivors talked about life skills training when asked about counseling because of how it helped their emotional recovery. One sub-grantee also described life skills training as the start of the case management process because it is utilized to begin the assessment of the survivors' needs.

> _[Life skills] training was very important for me and helped me a lot. That training was useful for me personally and for starting my business, as I started thinking toward the future._
>
> –Interview with Male Survivor

Education Support: While support to return to school is available through BC/TIP, no mini-survey respondents received this support and none said that they needed or wanted it. One survivor said that she was offered education support but declined it as she needed to earn money. One survivor is attending school, but without support from BC/TIP. It should be noted that the ET interviewed only adult survivors. It is possible that younger survivors are more likely to utilize this service.

Vocational Skills Training: Twenty percent of mini-survey respondents (1 female, 5 male) stated that they received vocational skills training. They rated this service on average 2.5 (out of 3). One respondent indicated that the vocations offered are limited. One male survivor commented that "They offered only mechanical, electrical, and tailoring. For women, they only offered beautician classes."

Five other respondents said that they already had a skill, and two had the specific skill that was offered to them. Two respondents indicated that the training they received was insufficient to properly learn the trade. Only two respondents gave positive reviews of the training: one said that it helped him learn how to sell agricultural products, and the other appreciated the teacher. IPs stated that, due to budget constraints, they have to rely on training available for free or reduced rates and therefore have limited options to offer survivors.

Job Placement: Ten percent of mini-survey respondents (1 female, 2 male) stated that they received a job placement. They rated this service as 2.7. However, one person had recently been offered the job and had not yet begun working, and another person works for the sub-grantee. Only one survivor respondent was actually placed with an employer external to BC/TIP. Additional monitoring by WI is necessary to determine the survivor's job satisfaction.

Support to Open a Business: Thirty-seven percent of mini-survey respondents (3 female, 8 male) stated that they received support to open a business. They rated this support highly at 2.9. Some respondents noted that encouragement and planning support was very helpful. For business inputs such as small

equipment or rent, support ranged from 10,000 BDT (US$125) to 40,000 BDT (US$500). While one respondent said this was sufficient, five stated that it was not enough support to open a business and one respondent is now planning to get a job instead as her business does not provide her with sufficient income.

Legal Aid: Twenty-seven percent of mini-survey respondents (4 female, 4 male) gave legal aid the lowest rating of all services at 1.8 (out of 3). One additional female respondent indicated that she received legal aid but did not rate the service. Women indicated that they were satisfied with the lawyer but not with the outcome of their cases. Men were mostly disappointed with the outcome of or lack of progress on their cases. Recommendation 2, EQ 2 from the ACT final evaluation report was to support survivors to file successful compensation claims. This recommendation has been partially implemented. BC/TIP encouraged all sub-grantees to utilize the support of Shisuk to file compensation claims on behalf of survivors through BMET. According to IPs, a total of 104 cases were filed with BMET, but only 15-16 resulted in compensation claims to reimburse survivors for the official fees paid to recruitment agencies. It should be noted that respondents indicated that migrants usually pay far more than the official fees and that the compensation claims process is only available for those who migrated through official government channels. Additionally, Shisuk was dropped as an implementation partner and the new partner who is expected to take its place in handling these cases, Ovibashi Karmi Unnayan Program (OKUP), had just begun its work at the time of the evaluation. BC/TIP supported survivors to file 153 cases with the police (see Indicator 3.3 in **Annex D**, table of Performance Monitoring Indicator Data). While no informants pointed to a successful prosecution case, several noted that as a result of filing cases with police, survivors can often receive a negotiated settlement with the recruiter/trafficker.

Gender Issues in Protection: Significant gender issues were identified during discussions of survivor services. There was general consensus from a wide range of stakeholders (13 KIIs and FGDs) in all evaluation fieldwork districts that female survivors have a harder time than men with reintegrating in their communities. As a result, many respondents found that women were very reluctant to reveal the truth about what they experienced while trafficked. This sentiment was echoed by one female survivor: "My desperate intention was not to disclose my problems and issue in the community. I have a daughter. I need to arrange her marriage. If community people know my situation, nobody will show their interest to marry my daughter."

At the same time, there was a general perception across stakeholder groups and in all fieldwork districts (11 KIIs, GIs and FGDs) that there are more services available for female survivors, especially from government but also from BC/TIP. This sentiment was echoed by both male and female survivors. One male survivor relayed that "Females receive more support. They do not take male victims seriously. Females are put first. Females are invited to things and I am not." A number of stakeholders (5 KIIs and FGDs) indicated that male survivors are more resilient and need less assistance, especially counseling services. In one counseling FGD, counselors indicated that men do not need counseling as they "can easily forget things." In two other counseling FGDs, counselors indicated that males need less counseling than females. On the other hand, male survivors told the ET that they "suffered torture," "felt helpless," and were "shattered."

SUB-IR 2.2 – IMPROVED REFERRAL SYSTEM FOR TIP SURVIVORS

Sub-IR 2.2 refers to the development of district-level service directories that constitute a referral system. BC/TIP worked with protection partners to develop these directories in 10 districts, in all three districts visited by the ET. In two districts, the directories were familiar to a variety of protection partners such as ANIRBAN and CBOs, as well as Peer Leaders in one district and a prevention sub-grantee in another. In one district, the directories were known only by the BC/TIP protection sub-grantee and ANIRBAN. The directories were not familiar to any of the CTCs in any of the districts. One national-level partner NGO that works on TIP in some of the same districts was also not familiar with the directories. **Figure 3** illustrates the changing proportion of referrals received from various

sources over the first three years of activity implementation (see **Annex D** for a full table of data on sources for referrals).

ANIRBAN and sub-grantees in all fieldwork locations indicated that they refer survivors to government and civil society service providers. Peer Leaders in one location indicated that they also refer survivors to organizations other than BC/TIP sub-grantees. In one district, CBOs indicated that they attended a workshop from a BC/TIP sub-grantee on identification of and service provision to survivors as well as on service directory utilization. They found this very useful and were able to give examples of survivors they identified as well as referrals to a range of different organizations for different services.

FIGURE 3: PERCENT OF REFERRALS RECEIVED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES

Two survivors (both male) interviewed by the ET stated that they were repatriated to Bangladesh by an international organization that did not refer them onward for local assistance. As a result, it was many months before they were identified by someone in the community who referred them to the sub-grantee for assistance. This finding is supported by data gathered during an assessment mission in Bangladesh for another donor during which a local service provider stated that it returned a survivor to Cox's Bazar district, but did not refer the survivor to a service provider in Cox's Bazar.[37]

CONCLUSIONS

- Training increased counsellors' knowledge and use of new techniques, but there is a need for more technical capacity building as well as counseling supervision and mentoring. Counseling services are not reaching all survivors who may need it, with men being particularly neglected. The ways that male survivors characterized their own mental state indicate they could have benefitted from counseling services. There are several reasons why survivors are not receiving counselling, including the fact that those in shelters are more likely to receive counseling services both while in the shelter and after departure and men are less likely to stay in shelters. Additionally, resource constraints limit available counseling services as those providing counseling not only have a large pool of clients to serve but also have other activity responsibilities.

- Services expanded as a result of the push for referral services and the development of the service directories. However, support provided to survivors is still not sufficient. The majority of survivor-respondents received no livelihood support services. There is also a mismatch between survivors' needs and interests and the livelihood support being provided. One reason for this is the limited funding available from BC/TIP and the reliance on referrals for service provision. Sub-grantees try to offer vocational training and other services that are available for free from government or NGOs in their area and cannot therefore always provide the type of training that the survivor needs to pursue their preferred livelihood option. Additionally, few survivors are receiving compensation.

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[37] Ruth Rosenberg, unpublished notes from interviews with TIP stakeholders in Bangladesh, 2017

Human resource constraints may have resulted in survivors not receiving sufficient support, with staff being too busy to follow-up with survivors to assess their needs and identify appropriate and available options to meet them.

- There are gaps in service provision resulting from a lack of a national referral mechanism (NRM). Victims may be identified by an organization in another country or another district, but are not always referred for services and support once they are repatriated home. The DoS 2017 TIP Report also notes the lack of a NRM as a shortcoming and an issue that should be addressed.[38] While the service directories are useful, especially for expanding the range of services available and reducing the cost of service delivery, they are not a substitute for a NRM, not only because of the lack of awareness about the service directories, but also because a NRM imparts obligations for action and referral upon agencies and organizations that are party to it.

IR3: INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTORS TO TRAFFICKING VICTIMS

FINDINGS

SUB-IR 3.1 – CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTORS DEMONSTRATE INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN PROVIDING SUPPORT TO TIP SURVIVORS AND PROSECUTING TRAFFICKERS

The approach taken by BC/TIP to provide one-off training for a small cadre of police and prosecutors does not reflect Recommendation 1 or 2, EQ 3 from the final evaluation of ACT to "provide more intensive long-term, on-the job-assistance for a small cadre of police, prosecutors, and judges," and to "[integrate] training into existing training mechanisms."[39]

Prosecuting TIP Cases: BC/TIP worked closely with the Judges Training Institute (JATI) to develop and deliver a training course on the TIP law, PSHTA. This was so successful that JATI expressed its commitment to include training on the PSHTA into its regular schedule of training courses. Training for the other law enforcement actors has so far been conducted as one-off training opportunities and not integrated into existing academies or in-service training mechanisms.

The activity fell behind in meeting its law enforcement training targets due to delays in getting permission from the Inspector General of the Police (IGP) to conduct police training, which was not received until May 2016, nearly two years after the start of the activity.[40] By Year 2, BC/TIP was able to obtain IGP approval for regional training at police in-service training centers. One respondent positively stated that the training with the police was so successful that it has changed the opinion of the IGP who recently gave his approval for BC/TIP to work across all police institutions. In the words of this key informant: "We do a post mortem after an action… What worked, what didn't, why? How do we do it better, what did we learn? If we try 1-2 times and it doesn't work then we change the approach." As a result, BC/TIP has delivered police training in two divisions of Bangladesh. However, approvals were not granted to work with the TIP Police Monitoring cell.[41]

All but one group of criminal justice respondents said that the training was of good quality and the trainers were knowledgeable. In all six FGDs, KIIs, and GIs with police, prosecutors and panel lawyers, all but one respondent indicated that they are unable to apply what they learned because they have not handled a single TIP case. This finding is confirmed by another respondent who stated that few trainees

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[38] *Trafficking in Persons Report*, Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2017.
[39] *ACT Final Evaluation Report 2014.* Arlington, VA: Social Impact, Inc. 2014.
[40] *BC/TIP Annual Progress Report*. Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2016. p.57.
[41] *Ibid.*

have handled TIP cases[42] and by a post-training assessment that found only one of 13 trained police had used the training directly.[43] In two cases, both in the same district, evaluation respondents indicated that they are not in a position whereby they would receive TIP cases – for example in a court that does not handle TIP cases. Criminal justice respondents also noted that they are not referred cases from BC/TIP IPs. In other words, when IPs assist survivors to file cases, they are not connecting them with BC/TIP trained police or panel lawyers.

Selection of police for training is a complicated process and leaves little room for the IP to select candidates. The IP indicated that they encourage the police to select female candidates whenever possible, but there are very few women on the police force. Candidates once selected then have to be vetted through USAID clearance processes. However, even if the activity had complete control over whom to train, identifying officers who are likely to handle a TIP case would be difficult as there are no specialized TIP units other than at police headquarters. Any police first responder or investigator could come in contact with a case.

Law Enforcement's Role in Providing Support to TIP Survivors: A number of informants (five KIIs, GIs and FGDs) from various stakeholder groups, including psycho-social counsellors and CBOs indicated that police treat survivors well and help them to file a complaint. However, only one respondent linked a positive change in the police to BC/TIP training.

> _Earlier it appeared that they may have gone willingly, but now we check thoroughly to find out whether there is any force used ... Now we understand that force is involved._
>
> –Interview with Police

Additionally, two groups of law enforcement actors reported changes in their own attitudes toward or treatment of survivors after the training.

BC/TIP also coordinated with NLASO in order to engage panel lawyers to represent survivors. BC/TIP provided training to 40 NLASO and DLAO officers and 180 panel lawyers.[44] None of the panel lawyers interviewed had assisted with any TIP cases, nor did any of the other stakeholders bring up any successful prosecutions when asked about such cases. Additionally, BC/TIP reporting does not reference any cases taken up by panel lawyers since the activity began coordinating with NLASO. There are no panel lawyers specifically tasked with handing TIP cases and the activity does not have sufficient resources to train all of the panel lawyers in its target districts.

CONCLUSIONS

- In the case of judges, BC/TIP training was so well received it will be replicated by JATI and integrated into the in-service training program. This reflects implementation of the recommendation made in the final evaluation of the ACT project to integrate training for judges into the judicial academy.[45]

- The interventions implemented under this IR are not leading to achievement of BC/TIP objectives. While the training designed and provided by WI was well respected and appreciated by the recipients, it is not reaching those criminal justice actors who handle TIP cases. The activity does not have sufficient resources to provide one-off training to all of the relevant law enforcement actors in the target districts to ensure that those who receive TIP cases will have been trained. It is

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[42] Although the respondent claimed that trainees have not handled TIP cases, the respondent clarified that some trainees have been able to utilize the training to investigate other types of cases.
[43] _BC/TIP Annual Progress Report._ Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2016, p. 66.
[44] _BC/TIP Annual Progress Report._ Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2016, 57 and _BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report 1st Quarter_, Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2017,
[45] Ibid.

also not clear that such training is sufficient to address the myriad of factors that make TIP cases so hard to pursue (see EQ2 below).

IR4: EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED PARTNERSHIPS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS

FINDINGS

SUB-IR 4.1 – IMPROVED COORDINATION AMONG GOB AND NGOS TO COMBAT TIP AND MIGRATION ABUSES

WI and its sub-grantees have taken numerous actions to coordinate with other anti-trafficking stakeholders in the country, including government organizations (GOs), NGOs, CBOs, and IOs. Examples of these partners include: Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), Ministry of Women and Child Affairs (MOWCA), MoEWOE, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Access to Information (a2i),[46] Relief International (RI), Justice and Care, UNODC, GIZ, Plan Human Rights, and UNDP.[47] These efforts are appreciated by partners interviewed by the ET, as exemplified by one NGO partner who said, "I feel that their work is very impactful because they have been able to engage

> *The work they've been doing with the government agencies is very important. No other agencies involved in Bangladesh for TIP have been able to engage government agencies the way they [WI] have done. We have other NGOs in this sector but not many have been able to successfully engage government.*
>
> –Interview with Partner NGO

other actors, NGOs, the government, and the private sector." Maintaining these partnerships can be time consuming however and both BC/TIP and its partners are busy implementing their own activities. As one BC/TIP partner said: 'I think it starts with good intentions and the desire to support each other, but sometimes it might need a little nourishment and follow up. BC/TIP participates in a number of national level anti-trafficking committees such as the TIP Government/Nongovernment (GO-NGO) Committee, MoEWOE Vigilance Task Force and the NPA Implementation Committee).[48] BC/TIP provided support for drafting and launching of the 2015-2017 NPA,[49] the National Conference on the NPA: From Adoption to Implementation and three divisional NPA conferences coordinated with MOHA on CTCs' Roles and Responsibilities.[50] According to one stakeholder, the activity had planned for eight divisional conferences on the NPA, but have not been able to undertake the others due to pending approvals from MOHA. MOHA approvals are likely delayed due to staff turnover.

At the national level, BC/TIP has also reached out to a number of government, NGO and private sector partners to expand awareness raising efforts. Some of these efforts include awareness raising on two Internet sites – Bongo and Maya[51] and awareness raising through government sites and services such as a2i and UDCs.[52]

At the local level, partnerships have been especially critical for survivor services. Numerous and varied stakeholders point to the meager funds available for survivor services. WI and some of its partners state that using referrals has been essential for expanding services for survivors given their budgetary constraints. Local CBOs and CTC report strong relationships with BC/TIP sub-grantees.

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[46] Access to Information is a program of the Government of Bangladesh, designed to improve access to information and services for all citizens, especially the underserved.

[47] *BC/TIP Annual Progress Report 2015*. Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2015. and *BC/TIP Annual Progress Report 2016*. Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2016,

[48] *BC/TIP Annual Progress Report 2015*. Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2015, p.25

[49] *BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report 2nd*[t] *Quarter*, Little Rock, AZ: Winrock International, 2015, p.5

[50] 2016 Annual, pg. 8; Quarterly Report, 2017, 3rd Quarter, p. 45

[51] 2015 Annual, p. 8; 2016 Annual, p. 64

[52] BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 2017 (April - June 2017)

SUB-IR 4.2 – PRIVATE COMPANY AND INTERNATIONAL DONOR EFFORTS LEVERAGED TO SUPPORT PREVENTION, PROTECTION, AND PROSECUTION

WI was supposed to leverage US$2,000,000 for cost sharing toward BC/TIP activities.[53] WI fell behind in its Year 2 target, the only available data point at the time of the evaluation (**Annex D**).

Two relevant stakeholders stated that BC/TIP approached numerous large national and multinational corporations as well as business associations to support the activity. However, they faced significant difficulties in gaining their interest. The IP indicated that companies did not want to be associated with TIP so they changed their approach using the labor market and encouraging them to support internships and employment. While this did not work at the national level, BC/TIP sub-grantees have had more success at the local level in getting the support of private companies. Support has mostly been in-kind, in providing internships for survivors, for example. Most of the contributions the activity has been able to leverage have been from government and civil society partners through in-kind support for training, awareness raising and survivor services.

CONCLUSIONS

- WI has made considerable efforts to build partnerships across all elements of the activity, reaching out to a wide range of GO and NGO stakeholders. These partnerships have helped to support achievement of the activity's objectives.

- BC/TIP was unable to leverage support from the private sector at the national level. Sub-grantees have successfully engaged the private sector at the local level for in kind support. While the activity may meet its cost-share requirements through in-kind contributions, it is unlikely to succeed in achieving the expected financial contribution from other donors or the private sector, barring unforeseen circumstances.

EQ2: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OR NON-ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES?

ENABLING FACTORS

Relationships: WI and its sub-grantees drew on existing relationships and developed new ones to support implementation of BC/TIP in all programmatic areas. As exemplified by BC/TIP reporting and confirmed in KIIs, WI made considerable efforts to meet and establish relationships with new organizations, both local and international. They developed relationships with a2i and private sector companies to support expansion of awareness-raising efforts. They drew on existing relationships with CBOs and local government service providers to expand the provision of services to survivors. They leveraged existing relationships to build new ones with criminal justice actors such as JATI and NLASO.

Dedication: The personal dedication of many stakeholders has clearly been an important factor enabling success and sustainability of results, this was mentioned most often by informants with respect to Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members.

Complementary Activities: Three respondents stated that government efforts have also played a role in raising awareness of the general public about TIP and safe migration. These mass media efforts complement the engagement of ANIRBAN, Peer Leaders, CTCs, and other local institutions in raising awareness in their communities.

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[53] BC/TIP Cooperative Agreement, Attachment B, Program Description, p. 2

Budget Limitations: IPs stated that budget limitations drove an emphasis on partnerships to achieve activity objectives and provide services to survivors. One reason that partnerships have expanded so rapidly under BC/TIP is that WI added partnership as an obligation to its sub-grantees (KII with IPs).

HINDRANCES

Resource Constraints: Informants frequently mentioned resource constraints in respect to all activity components. Resource constraints negatively impacted the quality of service provided. Most BC/TIP protection partners have identified large numbers of survivors each year but have few staff available to develop individual assistance plans, monitor service deliver, or provide counseling. Additionally, resource constraints limit the services that can be offered to survivors. For example, one sub-grantee stated that there was an interest among female survivors in driving courses but BC/TIP did not have sufficient funds to pay for these courses. BC/TIP does not have sufficient resources to provide refresher training requested by multiple informants from a range of stakeholder groups. Counselors in all four FGDs indicated a need for more training. However, BC/TIP does not have any resources set aside for additional training, mentoring services, or counseling supervision. Resource constraints also limit the amount of follow-up that can be provided by BC/TIP with stakeholders. CTC members in one FGD complained that BC/TIP spent time and resources training them, but did not support awareness raising efforts in the community.

Staff Turnover: Staff turnover was noted as an issue particularly for GoB, CTCs, and police, but it was also mentioned in regard to TTCs, Peer Leaders, ANIRBAN members, and IPs. Recent local government elections resulted in a substantial amount of turnover in CTCs, which means that BC/TIP must invest time into developing new relationships as well as resources into training new CTC members. Changes in key partners at MOHA delayed progress on national policy efforts particularly on the development of the new NPA. Similarly, some partners identified turnover in IP staff as a factor that slowed down implementation.

Government Support: One of the activity's critical assumptions was that the GoB would support BC/TIP and its IPs. Two key government counterparts, the IGP and MoEWOE, have not supported BC/TIP activities. This has impacted the direction of activities. Work with the police was delayed and then modified due to the IGP not approving support to the Police Monitoring Cell. As a result, the activity adapted its plans by expanding its target to include capacity building of other law enforcement actors and eventually was also able to provide training to police in some districts through police in-service training centers.

Similarly, when BC/TIP could not obtain MoEWOE approval to work with BMET, BC/TIP worked instead at the local level with DEMO offices. WI with USAID support, adapted its plans and began providing TOT to government and private TTCs as well as local DEMO offices on safe migration for pre-decision and pre-departure migrants.[54] In Year 3 BMET responded to BC/TIP's request to integrate a TIP awareness module into TTC training courses for migrants. BMET's requirements for inclusion exceeded the activity's budget for the intervention.[55]

Lack of Official Status for Volunteers: While Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN are seen by many stakeholders to be very effective, in at least one FGD in each fieldwork location, ANIRBAN and Peer Leaders indicated that a lack of official identification makes their work more difficult—especially approaching potential survivors or those at-risk whom they do not already know.

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[54] BC/TIP Annual Performance Report, Year Two (October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016), p. 29
[55] BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 2017 (April - June 2017)

Cost of Legal Migration: Another key factor that hinders the prevention of safe migration is the cost of migration through official channels. A few informants noted that illegal recruiters offer to pay all up-front costs with migrants reimbursing them after they start earning money. For the poorest families, using these illegal recruiters is the only way they can afford to migrate.

Factors Hindering Prosecution:

- Counselors, survivors, and sub-grantees from all three fieldwork districts mentioned the social costs that survivors face if they try to file a case. In particular, women face social condemnation from their community and risk not only their own reputation but the reputation of other women and girls in their family. Panel lawyers and other respondents also pointed to the time involved in pursuing a legal case. The cases can stretch on for months or even years and the survivor must make multiple trips to the town where the court resides and often spend all day there. Not only are costs incurred for the travel expenses but survivors must also factor in lost earnings.

- Corruption in the legal system was mentioned by respondents in six KIIs and FGDs as a reason why TIP cases are not pursued. Most of these respondents mentioned specifically the power and influence of the recruiters/traffickers. Corruption was identified in the activity's critical assumptions as factor that could inhibit achievement of the activity results.

- BC/TIP sub-grantees as well as law enforcement actors, such as police and prosecutors, indicated that TIP cases are very difficult to win due to a lack of witnesses and other evidence.

CONCLUSIONS

Enabling Factors

- WI and its partners drew on relationships from prior TIP programming, as well as other activities, to expand partnerships and leverage the limited resources under all activity components.

Hindrances

- Resource constraints, both human and financial, have hindered achievement of activity results and limited effectiveness of interventions. While the IPs have attempted to mitigate these effects by proactively seeking partnerships, the constraints have still impacted activity achievement. Technical capacity building efforts undertaken by the activity are hindered by staff turnover, by resource constraints that limit follow-up with trained individuals, and by a lack of an effective sustainability plan. Ongoing efforts to integrate training into JATI, the police academy, and with BMET will go a long way toward mitigating these factors.

- Achieving results under the prosecution component are limited by the numerous factors that hinder successful prosecution in the country. BC/TIP interventions are not designed to address most of these factors, thus limiting the effectiveness of the activity.

EQ3: HOW EFFECTIVE HAS THE USAID'S BC/TIP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE (WI, SUB-GRANTEES, AND USAID) BEEN IN IMPLEMENTING THE ACTIVITY AND MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ACTIVITY RESULTS?

FINDINGS

From the perspective of one key informant, one of the management strengths of BC/TIP was acting on lessons learned from ACT and other counter-trafficking activities in Bangladesh. Indeed, the ET observed ways that BC/TIP has incorporated management-related recommendations from the ACT final evaluation report, including putting a greater emphasis on M&E data (i.e. maintaining comprehensive PMP

data and using sub-grantee performance data to determine grants) and maintaining the collaborative approach used by WI in many areas of programming.[56]

Implementation of the collaborative approach mentioned above is observable in that all sub-grantee stakeholders asked about the activity's management (7 out of 7 KIIs[57]) and one GoB stakeholder had a positive perception of WI's management of BC/TIP. Reasons given for this positive perception include WI's supportiveness, effective communication, and management flexibility. Stakeholders mentioned how WI facilitated interactions and meetings for them with other partners, provided feedback on reports and shortcomings in activity implementation, and provided regular monitoring of BC/TIP activities. One sub-grantee noted that even though its interventions fell under IR 1, WI supported its efforts that contributed to other IRs as well. Other sub-grantees appreciated the "good communication channels" with WI and how regular communication occurred through phone calls, quarterly meetings with all partners, monthly/quarterly reports, level of effort (LOE) reports, and visits to field locations by WI staff. Stakeholders also recognized WI's "experienced staff" as a factor for effective management, as well as the fact that WI "prioritizes field-level issues." In summarizing WI's management, one stakeholder stated, "WI's organizational culture is to be supportive, not to get in the way." Other stakeholders echoed this sentiment, expressing that WI "respects [our] organization ethics" and "do[es] not interfere in our management." Stakeholders also found USAID's management of the activity to be supportive and positive, with active participation and support from the Agreement Officer's Representative (AOR).

Despite the identification of numerous aspects of positive management, stakeholders also noted instances of less effective financial, contractual, and human resources management. Key informants identified that delays and inadequacies in funding allocation of sub-grants negatively impacted BC/TIP's ability to extend sub-grantee contracts and has affected implementation as well. BC/TIP was supposed to expand implementation from 15 to 25 districts by the end of Year 3 (December 2016), and would need additional sub-grantees to do so.[58] In the view of one key informant, this was an ambitious timeframe. Beginning in November 2016, WI posted the requests for application (RFA) for new sub-grantees, asked existing sub-grantees to submit proposals for new activities and corresponding budgets, and had to complete pre-award assessments for all new sub-grantees prior to submitting a request for approval to USAID. According to the key informant, this process resulted in extended negotiations with sub-grantees and WI's eventual realization—perhaps occurring too late, according to at least two key informants—that there were insufficient funds to cover the cost of expanding into the 10 new districts.

According to key informants from the donor and IP stakeholder groups, budget constraints have been a management challenge since the start of the activity. In 2016, BC/TIP reported a budget shortfall and received a contract modification that increased the budget from $2,950,000 to $4,996,728. This provided some additional funds for expanded activities.[59] WI notified USAID of another budget shortfall in April 2017 and submitted a revised request for approval of existing and new partners that would fund partner activity at a lower level through December 2017. This would also allow WI and USAID time to agree on budget realignment and a new work plan; the latter process is still ongoing at the time of writing this evaluation report. USAID rejected one new proposed sub-grantee—causing an additional delay as WI searched for a replacement—but otherwise approved all other new and existing sub-grantees.

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[56] Final Performance Evaluation of the Actions for Combating Trafficking-in-Persons (ACT) Program, 2014, p. 39
[57] The ET conducted eight KIIs including seven sub-grantees (this includes CBSG, as well as two separate KIIs with YPSA). Within the YPSA KIIs, questions about management were asked in one KII but not the other.
[58] BC/TIP Annual Implementation Plan: October 1, 2016 – September 30, 2017.
[59] AID-388-A-14-00003 USAID's BC/TIP Modification No. 6

According to IP respondents, the delay in WI's prime budget approval and increase in obligation has constrained their ability to increase sub-grant amounts and uniformly extend the period of performance (POP) for sub-grantees,[60] and thus to expand to more districts. As a solution for dealing with this delay in finances, sub-grantees were expected to use their core funding and receive reimbursements from BC/TIP once the budgeting issues are resolved. However, according to one sub-grantee, they were able to use their core funding for some BC/TIP elements but not for others. In this case, key informants reported that the lack of funds has ultimately resulted in a gap in survivor services, work falling behind schedule, delays in acquiring NGO Affairs Bureau approval, reduced staff morale, and staff using their own funds to pay for office expenses.

Regarding BC/TIP's payment schedule to sub-grantees, three sub-grantees explicitly stated they did not have any issues with the monthly payments schedule. However, one sub-grantee expressed that the monthly payments and monthly work planning have constrained them. If there are any questions about monthly invoices, reimbursement is delayed such that there are no funds available for the current month's expenses. From WI's point of view, the activity previously implemented a quarterly payment schedule but found this to be administratively burdensome and thus switched to a monthly schedule. According to this stakeholder, financial delays due to the monthly scheduling have at times arisen when a sub-grantee was unable to provide proper documentation, necessitating some back-and-forth before processing the payment.

Last, regarding staffing, one stakeholder did not find WI's home office management to be very effective. This stakeholder reported a lack of responsiveness from the WI home office and noted that cooperation between the WI home office and USAID could be better. Related to this comment, another key informant believed that the turnover of two WI home office staff in 2016 was a challenge to WI's relationship with USAID and the BC/TIP in-country team. More than one key informant was also concerned by WI's selection of a Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP). In the activity design, a DCOP was supposed to replace the Chief of Party (COP) in Year 4.[61] However, in 2016, after two DCOPs left shortly after being hired and the expenditure of time and resources this entailed, the position was eliminated altogether. As a result, the COP stayed on and the money for the DCOP position was repurposed to provide additional administrative staff for BC/TIP, including an additional M&E person. All relevant stakeholders interviewed (3 out of 3 KIIs) agreed that this shared management decision on the part of USAID and WI was the most effective decision. The one drawback to this approach mentioned by one key informant is that the COP does not have someone to share senior management level responsibilities related to programming and financial/administrative management.

CONCLUSIONS

- For the most part, the BC/TIP management structure has been effective at implementing the activity. Exceptions include financial and contractual issues that delayed planned activity expansion into new districts. In some instances, these issues negatively affected the cash flow of sub-grantees and services for survivors. Monthly payment schedules, though convenient for WI, appear to be more burdensome and less efficient for some sub-grantees. WI management of its relationships with

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[60] Approvals and signing of sub-grantee contracts varied. According to KIIs, WI had processed award increases for three sub-grantees as early as April 2017 since there were no issues at that time related to shortfalls or compliance with these partners. Other sub-grantees with balances remaining from their current obligations received no-cost extensions to enable them to continue current and any new activities prioritized by the BC/TIP team. Other sub-grantees with balances remaining from their current obligations received no-cost extensions to enable them to continue current and any new activities prioritized by the BC/TIP team.

[61] Quarterly Report, 2016, Quarter I

USAID and the recruitment of a DCOP have also been less effective, and the current lack of a DCOP puts all managerial responsibility on the COP.

- Since the beginning, funding for BC/TIP has been insufficient to effectively implement an activity of such a large scope, resulting in two budget realignments in two consecutive years.

EQ4: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE ACTIVITY BEEN ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF ITS SUB-GRANTEES?

FINDINGS

Sub-Grantees: In its activity design, USAID tasked BC/TIP with "build[ing] the capacity of Bangladeshi organizations working in TIP prevention to manage programs funded directly by USAID and other donors."[62] To achieve this objective, BC/TIP contracted Capacity Building Service Group (CBSG) from March 2015-October 2016 to implement organizational capacity building support for sub-grantees.[63] The indicator for measuring this objective was, "Number of partners received transitional grants at the end of Year 2 of BC/TIP."[64] BC/TIP did not meet this indicator's target of two partners as no sub-grantee qualified for a USAID transitional grant.[65]

CBSG began capacity building implementation in May 2015 by conducting organizational capacity assessments of all eight partner organizations.[66] CBSG's assessment report noted major capacity building needs, including better understanding and practices of work planning processes, better financial and human resource policies and procedures, better understanding of how to prepare technical bids for USAID, and established administrative policies and procedures for travel, per-diem, and procurement.[67] Based on the assessment results, CBSG implemented 18 months (October 2015-December 2016) of capacity building support that included basic training for all partners, followed by more comprehensive support and mentoring for the three highest scoring partners—Rights Jessore, Sachetan, and YPSA. At the end of the training period, YPSA emerged as the most prepared of BC/TIP's sub-grantees to receive a transitional grant, with the caveat that this partner still needed to improve in key areas. According to KIIs with USAID, IP, and stakeholder respondents, BC/TIP put forth YPSA as a candidate for a USAID transitional grant, but USAID deemed that YPSA was not able to meet the readiness criteria.

Despite the fact that sub-grantees were not ready for transitional grants at the end of the organizational capacity building support, the CBSG partner assessment and qualitative interviews indicate that BC/TIP nevertheless increased sub-grantees' organizational capacities to varying degrees. These data sources also point out current organizational strengths and weaknesses. For YPSA, Sachetan, and Rights Jessore, all three organizations scored "Low" or "Low to Moderate" risk in the areas of Staff Time Management, Accounting & Bookkeeping, Segregation of Duties, and Gender Integration. However, areas where one or more of the organizations scored "High" risk—and thus need to strengthen—included Board Composition & Responsibility, Succession Planning, Strategic Planning, among others.[68] See **Annex D** for the full risk assessment results for these three sub-grantees.

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[62] BC/TIP, AID-388-A-14-00003, Attachment B: Program Description
[63] Fixed Amount Award by Winrock International to CBSG, 2015
[64] BC/TIP Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, 2016
[65] One BC/TIP sub-grantee has previously met the qualifications for a transition grant and was therefore not included in the capacity building intervention.
[66] CBSG adapted USAID's Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool (OCAT) and Local Organization Pre-Award Survey (LOPAS) for this process.
[67] _BC/TIP Capacity Building Initiatives: Summary Assessment and Capacity Building Roadmap_, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: CBSG, 2015)
[68] _BC/TIP Partner Assessment for USAID Transition Fund_, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: CBSG, 2017)

In qualitative interviews, all relevant sub-grantee stakeholders (5 out of 5 KIIs, including CBSG[69]) gave examples of how the organizations have developed, especially with regard to working more systematically and efficiently. Examples of improvements in their systems and procedures varied by sub-grantee and included established policies, better financial systems, regular work planning and reporting, and better internal controls. Different stakeholders stated that organizational developments have led to improved teamwork, planning efficiency, better communications, ability to put together more effective proposals, and ability to comply with external audits if needed. To achieve these results, stakeholders identified templates and frequent support such as mentoring and follow-up visits as facilitating factors. One sub-grantee said of CBSG: "Their approach is very practical. They never do things for us, rather they help us to do things ourselves."

All relevant sub-grantees interviewed (5 out of 5 KIIs) also recognized that, while progress was made, more can be done to improve organizational capacity. For example, with regard to gender mainstreaming and sex disaggregation of data, one stakeholder believed the organizations have the ability to do this "if tasked with it and given the tools," but would not naturally implement it. Stakeholders identified inadequate M&E of sub-grantee-level activities (i.e. indicator tracking and reporting), lack of transparency in the recruitment process of sub-grantee staff, a continued need to learn about USAID's myriad formats, and inconsistent implementation of organizational practices as some of the aspects where sub-grantees continue to struggle. One key informant speculated that this lack of consistency in applying organizational practices occurred in some instances due to staffing constraints, and in other instances from sub-grantees' tendency to conform to different donor standards depending on the activity being implemented: "They may follow standards for WI but not for other organizations. USAID is very strict and expects appropriate practices across the board."

ANIRBAN: In all three FGDs with ANIRBAN members, participants spoke about how, with BC/TIP's help, ANIRBAN has strengthened itself as a survivors' voice group. In two FGDs, ANIRBAN members specifically mentioned that their registration as an institution is in process. In all three FGDs, participants brought up that their group has organizational bank accounts—generating organizational funds from individual and joint savings, with some earned through business support provided by BC/TIP. One ANIRBAN group mentioned that it is now doing regular work planning, while two groups stated that they hold regular ANIRBAN meetings. One group reported that it coordinates with other ANIRBAN around the country through mobile phones in order to enhance the relationship between ANIRBAN groups.

ANIRBAN groups expressed motivation to continue their work and strengthen their abilities as a formal organization: "By December we will apply for registration…BC/TIP will end in a year's time – we need to keep ANIRBAN as an organization – we will still be there." At the same time, evidence suggests that ANIRBAN groups are not currently strong enough to function on their own and need more support. ANIRBAN groups stated that they still need training on how to write reports and proposals for donor funding. For one ANIRBAN group, FGD participants recognized that they need to increase their membership, as they did not have the required numbers to register at the time of the evaluation.

CONCLUSIONS

- BC/TIP, through CBSG, improved sub-grantees' management in some areas, but all five sub-grantees interviewed need further organizational capacity building as none qualified for a USAID transitional grant when the capacity building interventions ceased in 2016. Areas for further strengthening

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[69] DAM has already qualified for a USAID transitional grant prior to BC/TIP, therefore Sachetan, YSPSA, Rights Jessore, Proyas, and CBSG are counted as sub-grantee stakeholders relevant to organizational capacity building support.

include but may not be limited to M&E, transparency in the recruitment process of sub-grantee staff, further familiarity with and use of USAID formats, and consistent application of USAID organizational best practices.

- BC/TIP has built the organizational capacity of ANIRBAN groups in different districts. ANIRBAN groups show a desire to strengthen themselves as cohesive survivors' voice group in order to continue anti-TIP work and report that they are using organizational bank accounts, conducting regular meetings and work planning, and coordinating with ANIRBAN in other districts. However, additional support is needed for them to operate as a registered and independent organization.

EQ5: WHAT MAJOR CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABILITY HAS THE ACTIVITY ENCOUNTERED?

FINDINGS

Enabling Factors: ANIRBAN, Peer Leaders, and CTC members reported that they will continue their TIP prevention activities even once BC/TIP ends. Stakeholders expressed sentiments such as, "even if BC/TIP was not there we would do [TIP prevention] everyday as a CTC member," and, "the awareness will be transferring from me to my children and in this way, we'll be surviving." Yet the most promising indicator of sustainability came from two FGDs conducted in an upazila where BC/TIP support had already ended. Peer Leaders and CTC members from this location reported that they, as well as ANIRBAN members, have "continued their awareness raising and referral activities from a humanitarian point of view," although they are no longer doing courtyard meetings or school events due to lack of funds.

In KIIs and FGDs with sub-grantees, WI, USAID, and counselors, respondents expressed a similar confidence in ANIRBAN, Peer Leaders, and CTC members to continue TIP-prevention work. One prominent sustainability factor brought up by multiple stakeholders was that members of these groups are "local people" and as such will remain active in the community. For some stakeholders, the fact that CTC, NLASO, VTF, and MOHA were government bodies meant that they would persist in their counter-trafficking missions or would at least exist without BC/TIP funding. Another sustainability factor mentioned in one FGD with ANIRBAN members and one KII with a sub-grantee was that ANIRBAN and Peer Leaders developed connections with other government bodies and NGOs working on TIP and will draw on these resources once BC/TIP ends. ANIRBAN, WI, and USAID stakeholders also identified the move toward registration as a promising factor for sustainability of ANIRBAN in particular.

With regard to continuing protection services, participants in five KIIs/FGDs (one CTC FGD, one counselors FGD, two sub-grantee KIIs, and one IP KII) believed that the BC/TIP stakeholders would continue to use the service directories. All three sub-grantees interviewed that ran shelters mentioned using the case management guidelines developed under the predecessor activity to BC/TIP, and one sub-grantee explicitly pointed out that it will continue to use the case management guidelines even after BC/TIP ends. Similarly, counselors in all four FGDs stated that their capacity has been built and that they will continue to use the knowledge gained to counsel others. This theme of enduring personal capacity was echoed in all FGDs with training participants within the prevention and prosecution realms (e.g. police, prosecutors, pre-decision migrants, CBOs, etc.) and acknowledged in KIIs with sub-grantees.

With regard to building the capacity of others to continue TIP-related training, two key informants stated that JATI has intentions to integrate BC/TIP's curriculum on PSHTA into JATI's basic training for all judges, and BC/TIP is also exploring options to integrate TIP training into the curriculum for new recruits at the police academy. BC/TIP also completed some training-for-trainers (TOTs) with select

TTC trainers,[70] CTC trainers from BC/TIP and RI partner NGOs,[71] and ANIRBAN leaders,[72] though there have been challenges with the effectiveness and sustainability of this effort.

Hindrances: As noted above, one Peer Leader group spoke about how without BC/TIP it is no longer conducting certain counter-TIP interventions (e.g. courtyard meetings) due to lack of funding. In one FGD with ANIRBAN, participants believed that they are not able to "put the same kind of pressure on service organizations" as BC/TIP, presumably to connect survivors to services. In one FGD with CTC members, some participants offered a more nuanced perception, stating that "we say things will continue but you don't really know if that'll be true," and that "things will continue but not with the same momentum."

One key informant brought up the issue of government ownership and support. It is this individual's opinion that without district-level support from the government to use the service directories and make it a formalized mechanism, then sustainability of that resource will be threatened. So too would services for survivors if the government does not realize and act to ensure comprehensive support for survivors. As previously described in the findings for EQ1, lack of service provider awareness of the directories is also a threat to sustainability.

Qualitative evidence suggests that sustainability of the training model has not been thoroughly established, especially given the amount of turnover of individuals trained by the activity. As previously mentioned in the findings for EQs 1 and 2, several CTC members, police, counselors, and other individuals trained by the activity have already turned over, either because of the nature of their position (e.g. CTC members who are elected can be replaced) or through attrition (e.g. counselors or TTC staff who change jobs). In FGDs with stakeholder groups trained, participants acknowledged that when those who turned over are replaced, the new individuals need training. For example, one TTC mentioned that four of the eight staff members trained had already left the organization. In the two FGDs with DEMO and TTC staff, participants spoke about how as individuals trained by BC/TIP they had integrated the TIP material into their training modules as expected, but that trainers who were not trained by BC/TIP did not necessarily do this. In this FGD, participants did not mention any mechanism to systematically ensure that new individuals are being trained, nor was someone designated as an in-house trainer for others. In one relevant KII, participants stated that BC/TIP has not consistently monitored the outcomes of the few TOTs that have occurred and could not articulate exactly how many more individuals those trainers have trained, nor the quality or frequency of those trainings.

Last, even for those individuals who have not turned over, refresher trainings were consistently identified across stakeholder groups as a necessary intervention to maintain technical acumen and provide quality services. Key informants on the implementation side agreed with the need for refresher training but stated that BC/TIP does not have adequate funding to conduct them.

CONCLUSIONS

- Members of Peer Leaders, ANIRBAN, and CTCs demonstrated a personal commitment to continue their referral and awareness-raising activities after BC/TIP ends. The sustainability of these groups is facilitated by their linkages to other TIP organizations, cross-fertilization between groups, including government entities (e.g. Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN being part of CTCs), and their status as local and trusted community members. At the same time, there is a possibility that some elements (e.g. community meetings) may not continue due to funding constraints or lack of momentum.

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[70] BC/TIP Annual Performance Report, Year Two (October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016); Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 2017 (April - June 2017)
[71] BC/TIP Annual Performance Report, Year Two (October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016)
[72] BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 2, Fiscal Year 2017 (January - March 2017)

- Protection partners continue to use the case management guidelines, and there is evidence that partners who are currently aware of the service directories will continue to use them as well, given IPs' assertions of how useful they find the directories, so far. At the same time, service directories should be more widely promoted, as use of referral directories makes service provision more sustainable for TIP survivors and those at-risk. But to be truly sustainable BC/TIP will need to address district governments' ownership, updating, and formalization of the directories and system for providing comprehensive support for survivors and those at-risk.

- BC/TIP has taken some steps to promote sustainability of training outcomes, but overall BC/TIP training for stakeholders does not include a sufficient sustainability plan or component that addresses issues of turnover among those trained, training new hires, or the need for refresher trainings to maintain service quality. Some TOTs were provided, but without clear follow-on implementation plans—such as an established training schedule or procedures for how and when the new trainers would train others—for how the trainings would be further rolled out by the individuals trained. Nor was there evidence of a firm monitoring plan to make sure such trainings by new trainers meet BC/TIP quality standards.

EQ6: HOW EFFECTIVELY HAS USAID'S BC/TIP COORDINATED WITH OTHER USAID/BANGLADESH ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTING TO OTHER USAID/BANGLADESH ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES?

FINDINGS

At the national level, BC/TIP's coordination with Justice For All (JFA),[73] under the USAID/Bangladesh DG portfolio, enabled the activity to establish linkages with protection partners. According to KIIs, JFA introduced BC/TIP staff with NLASO for legal aid for survivors, and with JATI to train judges. Furthermore, one respondent reported that BC/TIP and JFA exchange information on vetting of police officers, to the benefit of both activities. As previously noted, BC/TIP additionally collaborated with a2i,[74] a UNDP and USAID supported activity in the DG sector, in order to make service directories accessible in digital form and develop TIP training videos. According to one KII, USAID staff have been supportive in facilitating these introductions between USAID activities.

According to KIIs and activity quarterly reports, at the district level BC/TIP sub-grantees are coordinating with Smiling Sun clinics under the USAID-DFID NGO Health Service Delivery Project (NHSDP) and the USAID Protecting Human Rights (PHR)[75] activity within the DG sector.[76] In confirmation, two sub-grantees in different districts reported that they refer survivors to Smiling Sun for health services, thus contributing to BC/TIP Sub-IR 2.1.

Outside of USAID programming, BC/TIP also coordinated with two partners involved in DoS Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (DoS/J/TIP) programming: RI and UNODC. According to KIIs, both BC/TIP and RI were working to activate CTCs, and through coordination were able to avoid overlap in implementation districts. BC/TIP also shared a few TIP-related materials with RI, though the evaluation did not find evidence that content exchange between the two activities was used. More follow up from both parties could have increased the effectiveness of this collaboration. Under the prosecution objective, BC/TIP and UNODC shared police training lists to avoid overlap.

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[73] JFA is implemented by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC)
[74] a2i is implemented by the GoB Prime Minister's Office
[75] PHR is implemented by Plan International
[76] BC/TIP Quarterly Performance Report, Fiscal Year 2016, Quarter I (October -December 2015)

The ET did not interview representatives of JFA or Smiling Sun, and so cannot access to extent to which BC/TIP collaboration has impacted these activities.

CONCLUSIONS

- BC/TIP made considerable efforts to coordinate with other USAID/Bangladesh and DoS/J/TIP activities, with evidence of effectiveness at both the national and local levels. At the same time, interviews suggest that more follow up between partners to move collaboration forward would increase effectiveness.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAID

MID-TERM: FOR BC/TIP

1. **USAID SHOULD PROVIDE MORE FUNDING OR REDUCE THE SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITY (EQ1, EQ2, EQ3).** The activity does not have sufficient resources to achieve the planned objectives. This shortage affects all four BC/TIP components. Resource restrictions not only limited proposed interventions, but also resulted in too few staff to provide sufficient follow-up to ensure successful outcomes. USAID and WI should consider redirecting resources from the prosecution component to other activity areas, particularly to survivor services such as counselling and livelihood support. Many of the prosecution interventions are not having the desired results, given that most individuals trained have not handled any TIP cases.

2. **USAID SHOULD ADD A MANAGEMENT POSITION TO BC/TIP (EQ3).** BC/TIP could benefit from having another layer of management and supervision. The position could be similar to the DCOP position envisioned in the original BC/TIP design. The individual would assist the COP in management functions and provide oversight of and improve coordination across the activity's component managers. Relieving the COP of some responsibilities would free up time for the COP to focus on higher-level partnerships as well as communication with WI HQ and USAID. USAID should work with WI (both at headquarters and in Bangladesh) to ensure that enough time and resources are dedicated toward recruiting capable candidates. If considering this recommendation for future programming, ensure that the dual COP/DCOP management structure is consistent for the life of the activity.

LONG-TERM: FOR FUTURE TIP PROGRAMMING

3. **USAID SHOULD DESIGN TIP PROGRAMMING TO ADDRESS THE FACTORS HINDERING SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF TIP CASES (EQ1, EQ2).** USAID should consider piloting an approach that would provide intensive mentoring and support in one district for police and prosecutors, thereby working with police and prosecutors from investigation through prosecution of individual cases. Alternatively, USAID could consider shifting the prosecution component away from TIP programming and into more specialized rule of law programming.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

SHORT-TERM: IMMEDIATE ACTION

4. **IMPROVE SURVIVOR ACCESS TO SERVICES (EQ1):**

   - Assess the needs of male survivors and develop delivery mechanisms to make services more accessible for all survivors. Find ways to provide services to survivors who live in remote areas as well as to those who need to earn a living while receiving services. Some survivors, for example, expressed a desire for vocational training but felt they could not receive training while financially supporting their families.

   - Dedicate more support to counseling. Prioritize training and other capacity building support aimed at making counseling more accessible to men and hard-to-reach survivors (e.g. survivors living in geographically remote communities, or survivors who may be resistant to counseling). Build capacity of counsellors through mentoring and counseling supervision. Ensure sufficient staffing for sub-grantees so that counselors have sufficient time to dedicate to clients.

5. **DEVELOP A MORE ROBUST MECHANISM FOR MONITORING SURVIVOR SERVICES (EQ 1, EQ3).** The number of survivors who received no or limited services from BC/TIP

indicates that there is a need for increased monitoring. WI should consider using a random sampling method to contact survivors after a certain number of months from their initial identification to verify that they received the services as reported by sub-grantees, that those services met their needs, and that there are no outstanding service needs. While ensuring privacy and confidentiality of each survivor, WI should address any inadequacies related to the performance of sub-grantees.

6. **ESTABLISH A VERIFICATION MECHANISM TO ENSURE COORDINATION ACROSS ACTIVITY ELEMENTS (EQ1).** BC/TIP has made efforts to coordinate across activity components, for example by encouraging prevention partners to share the service directories with Peer Leaders and CTCs. However, the evaluation found that this is not happening in practice. Similarly, BC/TIP has trained police and panel lawyers but there is little evidence that protection partners refer survivors who want to file cases. BC/TIP should put mechanisms in place to ensure that cross-sector coordination is regularized and that coordination recommendations are implemented by partners.

7. **STRENGTHEN BUDGET AND CONTRACTUAL MANAGEMENT (EQ3):**

   - WI should improve cash flow management to ensure sufficient funds.

   - To ensure that there are no gaps in survivor service provision or other programming, WI needs to ensure that sub-grantees receive new grants in time to process them through the NGO Affairs Bureau before existing agreements end.

   - WI should ensure that sub-grantees have access to three months' cash flow. WI could continue processing payments monthly but could reimburse sub-grantees based on quarterly cash flow projections.

MEDIUM-TERM: FOR BC/TIP ACTIVITY

8. **IMPROVE SURVIVOR ACCESS TO SERVICES (EQ1):**

   - Increase awareness of service directories so that all relevant stakeholders—including CTCs, Peer Leaders, law enforcement actors, and others—access and know how to use them.

   - Link survivor services to prosecution interventions. Currently, there is limited follow through from law enforcement for the few survivors who file cases. Law enforcement actors trained by BC/TIP requested that the activity coordinate with them when a survivor wants to file a case. Linking survivors with police and panel lawyers trained by BC/TIP at the outset of the process may help improve prosecution outcomes for the State and the survivor. Even if the prosecution is not successful, out-of-court settlements could provide survivors some, if limited, financial compensation.

9. **DEVELOP A MULTISTAGE PROCESS FOR MOVING FROM DISTRICT SERVICE DIRECTORIES TO A NRM (EQ1, EQ5, EQ6).** While district directories have been effective in expanding survivor services and, in some cases, survivor identification, they do not substitute for a NRM. BC/TIP could adopt a multistage process whereby WI first attempts two approaches to establishing a referral mechanism. One should be developed at the national level among members of the GO-NGO Committee. BC/TIP could advocate with these stakeholders to agree to a limited referral mechanism among themselves. This would be a first step to enhance services for survivors and especially to ensure that survivors identified and assisted in one country or in one district or division will be referred for support when repatriated to their home district. A second step would be to develop a pilot district referral mechanism in which the obligations and responsibilities of key stakeholders to identify victims and support and refer survivors are defined. Such a district-level referral mechanism could be used to demonstrate how a NRM operates in practice.

10. **INCREASE SUSTAINABILITY OF BC/TIP TRAINING INTERVENTIONS (EQ1, EQ5).** Continue to integrate training into in-service mechanisms and further develop the TOT mechanism. Because of the wide range of law enforcement actors in Bangladesh who could receive TIP cases, BC/TIP should integrate training for police, prosecutors, judges, and panel lawyers into existing academic and/or in-service training mechanisms rather than continue to provide one-off training courses. Doing so would ensure that all relevant law enforcement personnel eventually receive TIP training. For pre-decision and pre-departure training, BC/TIP should continue to advocate with BMET for integration into TTC courses as well as with private TTCs to ensure that all students, not just those with teachers trained by BC/TIP, receive safe migration training. For TOTs conducted, BC/TIP should work with TOT recipients and their organizations to develop a schedule that maps how and when these new trainers will conduct trainings (such as for new staff). To make sure that the trainings are accurate and of high quality, BC/TIP staff should provide intermittent monitoring and observation as both a quality assurance and coaching mechanism.

11. **STRENGTHEN ANIRBAN AND PEER LEADER COMPONENTS (EQ1, EQ4).** BC/TIP should continue to invest in ANIRBAN's organizational capacity building, providing training opportunities for members and leadership whenever possible. Prioritization should also be given to assist district ANIRBAN groups through the official registration process. BC/TIP may need to facilitate this by providing appropriate expertise, such as legal support. In the interim, in order to approach community members about sensitive migration issues and ensure that their official capacity is recognized both Peer Leaders and ANIRBAN members need some sort of identification, such as an identification card, business card, or t-shirt, when they conduct awareness raising and survivor identification activities in the community.

12. **REDIRECT EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO SMALL LOCAL COMPANIES (EQ1).** WI efforts to leverage support from the private sector have not been fruitful. Given resource constraints, further pursuing these efforts is not recommended. Rather, BC/TIP should encourage partners to engage small companies at the local level—which has so far been found to be more effective.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

- **Flexibility is essential to mitigate constraints and pursue opportunities.** BC/TIP encountered difficulties in getting approvals to work with some government partners: the Police Monitoring Cell and BMET. While WI continued to pursue these partners, it also pursued related opportunities such as training first responders and police investigators in some divisions and building the capacity of private TTCs and local DEMO offices to provide safe migration training to potential migrants.

- **Cross-component cohesion can have unexpected multiplier effects.** Interventions undertaken for one component can advance another component. For example, the service directories developed under the protection component were found to be helpful for those identifying people at-risk under the prevention component. Criminal justice actors who had not received cases of TIP since completing BC/TIP training said that it would be helpful if the organizations assisting survivors under the protection component would bring cases to their attention. It is important to ensure that all activity partners maximize these cross-sector interventions.

- **Smooth coordination between the IP field office, IP HQ, and USAID is critical for effective implementation.** Respondents indicated that some of the delays in sub-grant administration and budget realignment approvals were due to extended negotiations between WI Bangladesh, WI HQ, and USAID. Ongoing communications and timely budget forecasting and approvals between all three management stakeholders is needed to ensure that sub-grantees and BC/TIP programming are not negatively affected by administrative delays.

- **Relationship building is critical for effective partnerships, especially with government.** Relationships have been critical to so many aspects of the success of BC/TIP. WI and its sub-grantees drew on existing relationships and developed new ones to support implementation of BC/TIP in all programmatic areas. These relationships supported awareness-raising efforts, expanded service provision to survivors, and built bridges to the criminal justice community. It is worthwhile for USAID and IPs to ensure sufficient time and resources are available to establish and maintain relationships.

- **Either adequately fund all elements of a TIP activity, or reduce the scope.** BC/TIP is a comprehensive activity covering a large geographic area as well as all four elements of countering TIP: prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership. The level of funding allocated was not sufficient to achieve these objectives in all locations. USAID and the IP must work together to allocate adequate funding for the full scope of the activity or limit the scope (either by reducing geographic coverage or reducing the number and breadth of objectives).

- **Allocating scarce resources to train individuals who cannot utilize the training is not effective.** Criminal justice actors trained by BC/TIP overwhelmingly indicated that they have not had an opportunity to utilize the knowledge gained because they have not been assigned any TIP cases. Currently in Bangladesh it is not possible to anticipate which law enforcement actors will be assigned a TIP case; therefore, mechanisms need to be developed to integrate TIP training into general training mechanisms for these actors (e.g., the police academy, JATI for judges, law schools) rather than holding one-off training courses for small groups of stakeholders.

ANNEX A: EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

Scope of Work

for the Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-In-Persons (BC/TIP)

External Mid Performance Evaluation

USAID/Bangladesh

Office of Democracy and Governance

Activity/Project Name: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-In-Persons (BC/TIP)

Contractor: Winrock International (WI)

Agreement Officer Technical Representative (AOR): Habiba Akter

Cooperative Agreement/contract number: AID-388-A-14-00003

Total Estimated Cost (TEC): $4,996,728

Life of Project/Activity: Oct. 24, 2014 - Oct 23, 2019

Activity Geographic Regions: National coverage

Mission Objective (MO) and Development Objective (DO): MO - Bangladesh, a knowledge-based, healthy, food secured and climate resilient middle-income democracy; DO - Citizen confidence in governance institutions increase

1. Background

Built on the foundation laid by the Actions for Combating Trafficking-in-Persons (ACT) program (ACT, 2008-2014), Winrock International (WI) developed a five-year Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP) program which is funded now by USAID Bangladesh with a budget of $4,996,728. BC/TIP aims to reduce the prevalence of human trafficking in Bangladesh through: strengthened capacity of communities to identify trafficking victims and take action; improved access of trafficking victims to assistance; increased responsiveness of criminal justice actors to trafficking victims; and effective partnerships among stakeholders to combat trafficking. BC/TIP targets 25 districts prone to trafficking (125 upazilas, 375 unions, and 3,750 villages) with interventions in all four areas of emphasis - prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership (see Figure 1 below).

The objective of BC/TIP is to reduce the prevalence of human trafficking in Bangladesh. The goals and objectives also reflect the four pillars of Trafficking-In-Persons (TIP) activities as defined by the United States Government: Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Partnership.

The BC/TIP objective and goal will be achieved through the following intermediate results (IR):

- IR 1: Strengthened capacity of communities to identify and prevent trafficking in persons;
- IR 2: Improved access of trafficking victims to assistance;
- IR 3: Increased responsiveness of criminal justice actors to trafficking victims; and,
- IR 4: Effective and coordinated partnerships among stakeholders.

To accomplish these goals, BC/TIP will connect local and national government representatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the business community and citizens to spearhead efforts to prevent trafficking-in-persons, protect and reverse damages to survivors, and prosecute crimes of perpetrators.

Achievement of IR 1: PREVENTION - ensures that communities and institutions understand the problem of trafficking-in-persons and are able to mitigate its risks and identify victims. Sub IR 1.1 addresses the capacity of individuals and leaders to take specific steps to identify and address trafficking threats and refer victims for assistance. That, coupled with increased capacity of institutions to provide services to at-risk individuals (Sub IR 1.2) will lead to reduced vulnerability to trafficking.

Achievement of IR 2: PROTECTION - ensures that victims are consistently identified and receive a comprehensive package of protection services. By ensuring standards of care and support are implemented and the quality of counseling is improved (sub IR 2.1), it is expected that survivors will have access to appropriate services. Furthermore, the range of services and their quality will be increased through improved referral systems (Sub IR 2.2).

Achievement of IR 3: PROSECUTION - ensures victim-friendly prosecution of trafficking crime under the new legislation. In order to achieve that, criminal justice actors need to understand the legal framework governing human trafficking and migration, their responsibilities under the law and learn practical tools on victim and trafficker identification, interviewing, investigation techniques and collaboration with communities and service providers. These efforts will be coupled with coordinated advocacy to expand government oversight and improved monitoring of labor recruitment agencies.

Achievement of IR 4: PARTNERSHIP - ensures that TIP, as a complex phenomenon, is addressed comprehensively by a variety of institutions working together. Collaboration between NGOs and government (Sub-IR 4.1) will ensure government accountability and coordination and consistency of governmental and nongovernmental trafficking prevention and protection services. On the other hand, engagement of private sector and other development programs will lead to increased reach of prevention efforts and improved services for trafficking survivors.

The BC/TIP results framework presented below (see Figure 1) delineates how BC/TIP activities, sub-intermediate results and intermediate results contribute to the project objective, as well as the larger project goal and USAID development objective.

Figure 1: BC/TIP Results Framework

DO 1 Citizen confidence in governance institutions increased

DO 1 – IR 1.3: Access to justice improved

Goal – CDCS Sub-IR 1.3.3: Improved protection of civil and human rights

Objective: Reduce the prevalence of human trafficking in Bangladesh

IR 1: PREVENTION: Strengthened capacity of communities to identify and prevent trafficking in persons	IR 2: PROTECTION: Improved access of trafficking victims to assistance	IR 3: PROSECUTION: Increased responsiveness of criminal justice actors to trafficking victims	IR 4: PARTNERSHIP: Effective and coordinated partnership among stakeholders to combat trafficking established
Sub-IR 1.1 Increased capacity of leaders in target communities to identify and prevent TIP	Sub-IR 2.1 Increased consistency and quality of support offered by TIP survivor service providers	Sub-IR 3.1 Criminal justice actors demonstrate increased understanding of their roles and responsibilites in providing support to TIP survivors and prosecuting traffickers	Sub-IR 4.1 Improved coordination among GOB and NGOs to combat TIP and migration abuses
Activity 1.1 Implement Peer Leaders program; conduct issue-based public mobilization campaigns on root causes of TIP; conduct orientations for migrant workers	Activity 2.1 Train Winrock partners on Winrock survivor standards and GOB shelter standards; strengthen case management and coordination of survivor services; strenghthen mental health support services; train CBOs to deliver reintegration support		Activity 4.1 Participate in GOB committees to strenthen implementation and enforcement of anti-TIP and safe migration laws; advocate at national and district levels for implmentation of PSHTA and OEMA; provide technical support and training to the Police Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Cell
Sub-IR.1.2 Increased capacity of local institutions to prevent trafficking incidents	Sub-IR 2.2 Improved referral system for TIP survivors	Activity 3.1 Conduct multi-disciplinary trainings, networking, and capacity building for criminal justice actors and NGOs and conduct yearly follow up	Sub-IR 4.2 Private company and international donor efforts leveraged to support prevention, protection, and prosecution

Activity 1.2. Mobilize Counter-Trafficking Committees, train District Employment and Manpower Offices' Monitoring and Enforcement Wing, and local NGOS to prevent TIP; build capacity of recruiting agencies to promote safe migration	Activity 2.2 Improve coordination among providers and defferentiate areas of expertise through TIP referral system		Activity 4.2 Link with other programs and private sector networks to increase the breadth and depth of trafficking prevention and protection services.

The map below shows planned geographic reach of the project

Figure 2: BC/TIP target geographic districts

The development hypothesis for BC/TIP is as follows:

If the capacity of community members is strengthened to identify and take actions against trafficking incidents/traffickers; if access of trafficking survivors to various support services is improved; if the responsiveness of criminal justice actors is increased; and if all concerned stakeholders partner to combat trafficking in a coordinated and effective way, then the prevalence of human trafficking in Bangladesh will be reduced. A reduced prevalence of human trafficking will lead to improved protection of civil and human rights of Bangladeshi citizens.

Critical Assumptions

Critical assumptions for effective program implementation include:

- Government of Bangladesh (GOB) is supportive of BC/TIP and its implementing partners;
- Bangladesh is politically stable and *hartals* and blockades do not significantly hamper program activities;
- Corruption in Bangladesh does not outweigh the effectiveness of institutions to function and traffickers themselves are not embedded within institutions;
- Targeted communities are willing and able to participate in TIP-related activities;
- Local level agencies are willing to perform their responsibilities under the National Plan Action (NPA);
- There is effective cross-border cooperation with countries where traffickers are identified;
- Criminal justice actors are interested and willing to improve prosecution practices; and
- Private recruiting agencies comply with legal recruiting processes.

III.   Objectives of the Evaluation

The objective of this mid-term performance evaluation is to assess actual results against targeted results, and establish whether the activity is on course to meet set objectives; assess the efficacy of the management structure in meeting the objectives thus far; evaluate BC/TIP implementers' performance to date; assess sustainability plans of the activity; and make recommendations to USAID/Bangladesh concerning current BC/TIP implementation and future programming.

The audience for this mid performance evaluation includes USAID/Bangladesh, US Embassy state department in Bangladesh, Winrock International and other bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors working to prevent trafficking incidents in Bangladesh.

The findings of the report will be used in course correction of the implementation of the BC/TIP activity. USAID expects the implementers of the activity to shape their activity and strategy considering the findings of this evaluation report. The findings of this report will also be used to inform future programming.

IV.   Evaluation Questions

This Scope of Work is for a mid-term performance evaluation of the BC/TIP program implementation from Oct 2014 to June 2017. The evaluation should review, analyze, and evaluate the BC/TIP program using the following prioritized questions. The evaluation should make conclusions based on the findings, identify opportunities and make recommendations for improvement. In answering these questions, the Evaluation Team should assess both the performance of USAID and that of the implementing partner(s).

Results:

1. To what extent have activity objectives been achieved?
2. What are the major factors influencing progress toward achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
3. How effectively has USAID's BC/TIP coordinated with other USAID/Bangladesh projects, i.e., DG, Economic Growth, Population Health Nutrition and Education, Food Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance in achieving activity objectives and contributing to other USAID/Bangladesh activity objectives?

Management and Administration:

4. How effective has the USAID's BC/TIP management structure (WI and its sub-grantees, and USAID) been in implementing the activity and making progress toward the achievement of activity results? Is the current structure the most efficient way of managing and achieving project objectives?

Sustainability:

5. To what extent has the activity been able to contribute towards strengthening the capacity of its sub-grantees?
6. What major challenges to sustainability has the activity encountered? What measures should be taken to ensure sustainability of program achievements?

V.   Proposed Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation team is encouraged to use a mixed method approach that would include the use of different qualitative and quantitative tools to tease out qualitative and quantitative information, and suggest alternative approaches during the planning stage. For example, given the sensitive nature of this activity, the evaluation team could suggest alternative or additional approaches that can maximize data collection and analysis.

The evaluation methodology may include the following tools; however, the evaluation team is encouraged to propose new methods of data collection and analysis in the work plan:

1. Desktop Review of Key Documents and Initial Analysis:

The Evaluation Team shall review relevant USAID and sector specific documents, as well as key documents from USAID's implementing partners and outside sources. A list of documents is included in Annex A.

The Evaluation Team will use this literature to develop an initial response to the questions listed in Section III, and to set forth hypothesized cause-effect relationships that can be tested through field research and interviews. The Evaluation Team will also use the information from desk review to design tools for conducting key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

2. Conduct Interviews in the field:

The Evaluation Team will conduct interviews with USAID/Bangladesh, relevant USAID/ Washington staff, program participants, implementing partners, sub-contractors and sub-grantees, relevant GOB representatives, civil society representatives, the media, donors, and other relevant stakeholders. The Team should create a sampling frame to conduct interviews of stakeholders and field visits with 1-2 sub-grantees under each type of sub-grant. The Evaluation Team's work plan should include an interview list and proposed field visits.

3. Conduct Focus Group Discussions

The evaluation should conduct focus group discussions with the target beneficiaries and other stakeholders involved in implementation of the BC/TIP program. To measure clients' satisfaction as well as program effectiveness, along with other tools, the team should conduct focus group discussions with media, civil society, elected officials and local and regional government officials in targeted regions.

The Team will build on the proposed methodology and provide specific details on the evaluation methodology in the Evaluation Work Plan (see Deliverables below). The evaluation will be participatory in its design and implementation and the evaluation methodology will be finalized through further review and discussion between USAID/Bangladesh and the Evaluation Team. The methodology narrative should discuss the merits and demerits of the final evaluation methodology. In the final evaluation report, the evaluator should also detail limitations and how these limitations were addressed or how limitations were taken to account in proposing recommendations. The Evaluation Team will design appropriate tools for collecting data from various units of analysis. The tools will be shared with USAID during the evaluation and as part of the evaluation report.

The information collected will be analyzed by the Evaluation Team to establish credible answers to the questions and provide major trends and issues.

VI.   Existing Sources of Information

USAID/Bangladesh DG Office will provide documents for the desk review that are not available from other sources and contact information for relevant interviewees. The list of documents is presented in Annex A. Understandably, the list is not exhaustive and the Evaluation Team will be responsible for identifying and reviewing additional materials relevant to the evaluation.

VII.   Deliverables

All deliverables are internal to USAID and the evaluation team unless otherwise instructed by USAID. Evaluation deliverables include:

Evaluation Team Planning Meeting (s) – Essential in organizing the team's efforts. During the meeting (s), the team will review and discuss the SOW in its entirety, clarify team members' roles and responsibilities, work plan, develop data collection methods and instruments, review and clarify any logistical and administrative procedures for the assignment and prepare for the in-brief with USAID/Bangladesh.

Evaluation Design and Work Plan – Complete a detailed work plan (including task timeline, methodology outlining approach to be used to answer each evaluation question, and describe in detail the team responsibilities, and the data analysis plan). The draft work plan will be submitted within 5 working days before the international evaluation team members depart for Bangladesh to conduct fieldwork; the final work plan will be submitted within 3 days after the international team members' arrival in Bangladesh.

Evaluation Design Matrix – A table will be prepared that lists each evaluation question and the corresponding information sought, information sources, data collection sources, data analysis methods, and limitations. The matrix should be finalized and shared with USAID/Bangladesh before evaluation fieldwork starts. It should also be included as an annex in the evaluation report.

Data Collection Instruments – Data collection instruments will be developed and submitted to USAID/Bangladesh during the evaluation design phase prior to the commencement of the evaluation

fieldwork. The completed evaluation report should also include the data collection tools, instruments and list of people interviewed as an annex in the evaluation report.

In-brief Meeting – An in-brief meeting with USAID/Bangladesh will be held within 2 working days of international team members' arrival in Bangladesh.

Mid-term briefing and interim meetings - The Evaluation Team Leader (or his/her delegate) will brief the DG M&E program Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) on progress with the evaluation on a weekly basis, in person or by electronic communication. Any delays or complications must be quickly communicated to USAID/Bangladesh as early as possible to allow quick resolution and to minimize any disruptions to the evaluation. Emerging opportunities for the evaluation should also be discussed with USAID/Bangladesh.

Debriefing with USAID – A PowerPoint presentation of initial findings, conclusions and preliminary recommendations will be made to USAID/Bangladesh before the international team members depart Bangladesh.

Debriefing with Partners - The team will present major findings from the evaluation to USAID partners (as appropriate and as defined by USAID) through a PowerPoint presentation prior to the team's departure from the country. **The debriefing will include a discussion of achievements and activities only**, with no recommendations for possible modifications to project approaches, results, or activities. The team will consider partner comments and incorporate them appropriately in drafting the final evaluation report.

Draft Evaluation Report – The Evaluation team will analyze all data collected during the evaluation to prepare a draft Performance Evaluation Report and submit the report within 15 working days after the departure of international team members from Bangladesh. The draft report must be of a high quality with well-constructed sentences, and no grammatical errors or typos. The report should answer ALL the evaluation questions and the structure of the report should make it clear how the evaluation questions were answered. The draft report must meet the criteria set forth under the final report section below. USAID will provide comments on the draft report within 10 working days of submission. The Evaluation Team will in turn revise the draft report into a final Performance Evaluation Report, fully reflecting USAID comments and suggestions.

Final Report - The Evaluation Team will submit a final Performance Evaluation Report that incorporates Mission comments and suggestions no later than ten working days after USAID/Bangladesh provides written comments on the draft Performance Evaluation Report. The format of the final report is provided below.

The final report must meet the following criteria to ensure the quality of the report:

- The evaluation report must represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).

- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

The format of the final performance evaluation report should strike a balance between depth and length. The report will include a cover sheet, table of contents, list of figures and tables (as appropriate), glossary of terms (acronyms), executive summary, introduction, purpose of the evaluation, scope and methodology, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. Where appropriate, the evaluation should utilize tables and graphs to present data and other relevant information. The report should include, in the annex, any "Statement of Differences" by any team member or by USAID on any of the findings or recommendations. The report **should not exceed 30 pages**, excluding annexes. The report will be submitted in English, electronically in both word and PDF forms. The report will be disseminated within USAID. Upon instruction from USAID, DG M&E activity contractor will submit (also electronically, in English) this report **excluding any potentially procurement-sensitive information** to Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) for dissemination among implementing partners, stakeholders, and the general public. The DEC submission must be within three months of USAID's approval of the final report.

All quantitative data, if gathered, must be (1) provided in an electronic file in easily readable format; (2) organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation; (3) owned by USAID and made available to the public barring rare exceptions. A CD with all the data could be provided to the COR.

VI.   Team Composition/ Technical Qualifications for the Evaluation Team

This Evaluation Team will be comprised of three key personnel: a team leader (US/TCN Evaluation Specialist), two team members (Local Sectoral Specialist), and one evaluation assistant. The qualification of the team lead and team members will be consistent with Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) RDMA/Bangkok requirement.

VII. Illustrative Budgeted Level of Effort (LOE)

Below is the illustrative budgeted LOE per position for this activity. Illustrative LOE may be modified based on the complexity of the activity and in accordance with the approved work plan. The Contractor will monitor labor costs across all task order activities to ensure that the approved budget for Labor costs is not exceeded.

Illustrative Budgeted LOE			
	Team Leader	Team Member	Local Sectoral Specialist (1)
Document Review and Work Plan	5	3	2
Fieldwork, Data collection and Analysis, and Presentation	26	26	20
Draft Evaluation Report	10	7	3

Final Evaluation Report	3	2	0
Total LOE	44	38	25

VIII.   Conflict of Interest

All evaluation Team members will provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest, or describing an existing conflict of interest relative to the program being evaluated. USAID/Bangladesh will provide the conflict of interest forms.

IX.   Scheduling and Logistics/Logistical Support and Government Furnished Property

The proposed evaluation will be funded and implemented through the new DG Monitoring and Evaluation Activity. The activity implementer will be responsible for all offshore and in-country administrative and logistical support, including identification and fielding appropriate consultants. Their support includes arranging and scheduling meetings, international and local travel, hotel bookings, working/office spaces, computers, printing, photocopying, arranging field visits, local travel, hotel and appointments with stakeholders.

The Evaluation Team will be required to perform tasks in Dhaka, Bangladesh and also travel to activity sites within the country. The Evaluation Team should be able to make all logistic arrangements including vehicle arrangements for travel within and outside Dhaka and should not expect any logistic support from the Mission. The Team should also make their own arrangement on space for Team meetings, and equipment support for producing the report.

Schedule – tentative

Task / Deliverable	Proposed Dates (2017)
Client kick off call	Week of 8/7
Internal Team Planning Meeting #1 (remote)	Week of 8/14
Review background documents and preparation for fieldwork; develop work plan and data collection tools	8/21 – 8/31
Draft work plan submitted to USAID/Bangladesh	9/11/2017
Travel to Bangladesh by expat team members	9/15/2017
Internal Team Planning Meeting #2 (in country)	9/17/2017
In-brief with USAID/Bangladesh	9/18/2017
Submit Final Work Plan to USAID	9/20/2017

Data collection	9/19 – 10/6
Data analysis in-country	
Weekly updates to COR	Once a week (on a pre-determined day) during the weeks of 9/17, 9/24, and 10/1
Evaluation Team submits **draft presentation** for USAID/Bangladesh DG Team review; data analysis continues after submission	10/8 (before noon)
USAID provides comments (as needed) on draft presentation; team continues fieldwork	10/8 (by COB)
Presentation and debrief with DG Team and USAID/Bangladesh	10/9/2017
Debrief meetings with key stakeholders	10/9/2017
Expat team members depart Bangladesh	10/10/2017
Produce draft report	10/11 – 10/31
Submit **Draft Evaluation Report** to USAID/Bangladesh	11/1/2017
USAID and partners review draft and provide **comments**	11/2/-**11/22**
Review draft comments, edit, finalize report	11/23 – 12/6
Submit **Final Evaluation Report** to USAID/Bangladesh	12/8

X.   REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The total pages, excluding references and annexes, should not be more than 30 pages. The following content (and suggested length) should be included in the report:

Table of Contents, Acronyms, List of tables and figures

Executive Summary - concisely state the project purpose and background, key evaluation questions, methods, most salient findings and recommendations (2-3 pp.);

Introduction – country context, including a summary of any relevant history, demography, socio-economic status etc. (1 pp.);

The Development Problem and USAID's Response - brief overview of the development problem and USAID's strategic response, including design and implementation of the BC/TIP and any previous USAID activities implemented in response to the problem, (2-3 pp.);

Purpose of the Evaluation - purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 pp.);

Evaluation Methodology - describe evaluation methods, including strengths, constraints and gaps (1 pp.);

Findings and Conclusions - describe and analyze findings for each objective area using graphs, figures and tables, as applicable, and also include data quality and reporting system that should present verification of spot checks, issues, and outcomes (12-15 pp.);

Lessons Learned - provide a brief of key technical and/or administrative lessons on what has worked, not worked, and why for future project or relevant program designs (2-3 pp.);

Recommendations – prioritized and numbered for each key question; should be separate from conclusions and be supported by clearly defined set of findings and conclusions. Include recommendations for future project implementation or relevant program designs and synergies with other USAID projects and other donor interventions as appropriate (3-4 pp).

Annexes – to include statement of work, documents reviewed, bibliographical documentation, evaluation methods, data generated from the evaluation, tools used, interview lists, meetings, focus group discussions, surveys, and tables. Annexes should be succinct, pertinent and readable. Should also include, if necessary, a statement of differences regarding significant unresolved difference of opinion by funders, implementers, or members of the evaluation team on any of the findings or recommendations.

The report format should be restricted to Microsoft products and 12-point type font should be used throughout the body of the report, with page margins one-inch top/bottom and left/right.

Annex-A: Documents for review will include, but are not limited to the following:

- Cooperative Agreement of BC/TIP
- Grant Agreement with sub-grantees
- Quarterly Narrative Reports
- Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan
- Work Plan
- Sub-grantee reports
- TIP reports (country reports)
- Bangladesh Democracy and Governance Assessment, ARD report, August 2009
- USAID/Bangladesh Strategy, Annual Reports, Operational Plan, Performance Monitoring Plan, DQA report, CDCS relevant sections on Democracy and Governance and Results Framework
- GOB Poverty Reduction Strategy and other relevant GOB documents
- Department of State's Annual Trafficking in Persons Reports

ANNEX B: EVLAUATION DESIGN MATRIX

Evaluation Question	Relevant Activity Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods
EFFECTIVENESS: 1. To what extent have activity objectives been achieved?	• # Unduplicated people (at-risk or survivors) identified by targeted communities and referred to at least one support service • # Of CTCs established and fully functioning • # Unduplicated Peer Leaders, including ANIRBAN members, trained by BC/TIP to combat TIP • # Survivors of TIP receiving services with USG assistance • # WI partners implementing the 2014 ACT Standards and Protocols for Survivor Services and new GOB minimum standards of care and services for trafficking survivors • # Counselors, social workers and other health care workers who received training in using TIP-specific trauma and care tools to track survivors' progress toward recovery • % Of trained criminal justice personnel with an increased level of knowledge on rules and laws governing TIP, migration, and overseas employment, and legal support for TIP survivors • # Of TIP victims assisted in filling cases and provided with legal assistance • # Public and private sector partners engaged in public mobilization	1. USAID B/CTIP AOR 2. WI 3. Sub-grantees 4. CBSG 5. Peer Leaders 6. ARNIBAN 7. Survivors 8. Training Recipients 9. NGO and Private Sector partners 10. GoB	-Document review - KIIs - FGDs - Mini-survey	• Content Analysis • Trend Analysis • Gap Analysis • Comparative Analysis • Gender Analysis

	campaigns and participating in employment programs for vulnerable groups and TIP survivors • # Anti-TIP policies, laws or international agreements strengthened with USG assistance			
EFFECTIVENESS: 2. What are the major factors influencing progress toward achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?		1. USAID B/CTIP AOR 2. WI 3. Sub-grantees 4. CBSG 5. Peer Leaders 6. ARNIBAN 7. Survivors 8. Training Recipients 9. NGO and Private Sector partners 10. GoB	-Document review - KIIs - FGDs - Mini-survey	• Content Analysis • Trend Analysis • Gap Analysis • Comparative Analysis • Gender Analysis
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION: 3. How effective has the USAID's BC/TIP management structure (WI and its sub-grantees, and USAID) been in implementing the activity and making progress toward the achievement of activity results?		1. USAID B/CTIP AOR 2. WI 3. Sub-grantees 4. CBSG	-Document review - KIIs	• Content Analysis • Gap Analysis • Comparative Analysis • Gender Analysis
SUSTAINABILITY: 4. To what extent has the activity been able to	# of Partners received transitional grants at the end of year II of BC/TIP	1. USAID B/CTIP AOR 2. WI 3. Sub-grantees 4. CBSG	-Document review - KIIs	• Content Analysis • Trend Analysis • Gap Analysis • Comparative

contribute towards strengthening the capacity of its sub-grantees?		5. Peer Leaders 6. ARNIBAN	- FGDs	Analysis • Gender Analysis
SUSTAINABILITY: 5. What major challenges to sustainability has the activity encountered?		1. USAID B/CTIP AOR 2. WI 3. Sub-grantees 4. CBSG 5. Peer Leaders 6. ARNIBAN 7. Training Recipients 8. Survivors 9. NGO and Private Sector partners 10. GoB	- Document review - KIIs - FGDs - Mini-survey	• Content Analysis • Gap Analysis • Comparative Analysis • Gender Analysis
COLLABORATION: 6. How effectively has USAID's BC/TIP coordinated with other USAID/Bangladesh activities, i.e., DG, Economic Growth, Population Health Nutrition and Education, Food Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance in achieving activity objectives and contributing to other USAID/Bangladesh activity objectives?		1. USAID B/CTIP AOR 2. WI 3. Other USAID/Bangladesh program AORs	- Document review - KIIs	• Content Analysis • Trend Analysis • Gap Analysis • Comparative Analysis • Gender Analysis

ANNEX C: DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOLS

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT - KII

[Internal Note: Evaluators must review this form in detail with all informants before the interview and be sure that they understand it clearly before obtaining their signature. If the informant is illiterate or expresses discomfort signing the form but verbally consents to proceeding with the interview, the evaluator may sign the form to indicate that they received verbal consent.]

Purpose: Assalamualaikum/Adab. Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. My name is [NAME]. I am a researcher from an organization called Social Impact, a company that is based in the United States. Our team is in Bangladesh to conduct research about the work of Winrock International. Winrock International provides assistance and training to local organizations around Bangladesh who work to combat human trafficking. You have been asked to participate today so that we can learn more about the support you received from [Winrock, or grantee/partner XX]. We are independent consultants who have no affiliation with those who provided you with assistance.

Procedures: If you agree to participate, we will ask you about your experience with the program. The interview will take about 1 hour. Although we will publish our findings in a public report, all of your answers will be kept confidential. This means that although we may use a quote from you, we will not use your name in the report. Names of all respondents will be kept separately from the notes.

To make sure we accurately record your answers, we would like to use a recorder during the discussion. The recording will not be shared with anyone outside of our team members. If you do not want to be recorded you can decline the recorder but still participate in the discussion, without penalty.

Risks/Benefits: There are no known risks or direct benefits related to your participation in this study; however, your inputs may lead to recommendations that help combat trafficking in Bangladesh and improve services to survivors.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this interview is completely voluntary. You do not have to agree to be in this study. You are free to end the interview at any time or to decline to answer any question which you do not wish to answer. If you decline to participate in the interview, no one will be informed of this. It will in no way affect the support you receive from the activity or its partners.

Do you have any questions at this time? *[Interviewer should answer any questions]* If you have any questions about this study in future, you may contact Mr. Jamal Chowdhury at jamalchowdhury50@gmail.com

Do you agree to participate in the interview? Do you agree to be recorded as part of this interview?

I agree to participate in the interview: ☐ Yes ☐ No	I agree to have the interview recorded: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Name or ID number:	
Signature: Date:	
Verbal consent received (evaluator initials):	

INFORMED CONSENT SCRIPT – KII WITH SURVIVORS

Evaluators must review this form in detail with all informants before the interview and be sure that they understand it clearly before obtaining their signature. If the informant is illiterate or expresses discomfort signing the form but verbally consents to proceeding with the interview, the evaluator may sign the form to indicate that they received verbal consent.

Purpose: Assalamualaikum/Adab. Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. My name is [NAME]. I am a researcher from an organization called Social Impact, a company that is based in the United States. Our team is in Bangladesh to conduct research about the work of Winrock International. Winrock International provides assistance and training to local organizations around Bangladesh who work to combat human trafficking. You have been asked to participate today so that we can learn more about the support you received from [Winrock, or grantee/partner XX]. We are independent consultants who have no affiliation with those who provided you with assistance.

Procedures: If you agree to participate, we ask you to discuss your experience and opinion of the training and services you received. The interview will take about 1 hour of your time. Although we will publish our findings in a public report, all of your answers will be kept confidential. This means that although we may use a quote from you, we will not use your name in the report. Your name is not being kept in any evaluation documents or files. You are being identified by a numeric code.

To make sure we accurately record your answers, we would like to record the discussion using a recorder. The recoding will not be shared with anyone outside of our team members. If you do not want to be recorded you can decline the recorder but still participate in the discussion, without penalty.

Risks/Benefits: There is no large risk involved in your participation in this interview. The questions will not involve sensitive or personal information. You will only be asked questions about the services and or training you have received. Please inform us if you feel uncomfortable or unsafe in the location chosen for the interview. You will not receive any direct benefit or compensation for participating in this study, but inputs may lead to recommendations that help combat trafficking in Bangladesh and improve services to survivors.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this interview is completely voluntary. You do not have to agree to be in this study. You are free to end the interview at any time or to decline to answer any question which you do not wish to answer. If you decline to participate in the interview, no one will be informed of this. It will in no way affect the support you receive from the activity or its partners.

Do you have any questions at this time? *[Interviewer should answer any questions]* If you have any questions about this study in future, you may contact Mr. Jamal Chowdhury at jamalchowdhury50@gmail.com Do you agree to participate in the discussion? Do you agree to be recorded as part of this discussion?

I agree to participate in the interview: ☐ Yes ☐ No	I agree to have the interview recorded: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Name:	
Signature: Date:	

PROTOCOL FOR IN-PERSON MINI SURVEY AND KIIS FOR SURVIVORS WHO RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM THE PROJECT

A. Demographic Info:

1. **ID:** [write SURVIVOR # in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Sex of respondent:	
5. BC/TIP local NGO partner service provider:	
6. District:	
7. Upazila:	
8. Union:	

B. Questions

EQ #	Survey/KII Questions	Answers			
		Dissatisfied	**Neutral** – it was ok	Very satisfied	I did not receive this service
	Please rate your satisfaction with the services you received from the project [Interviewer should read the number and rating aloud before beginning so the respondent is familiar with the options. If respondent chooses 'N/A', skip to the next question.] [If the survivor was offered the service but DECLINED it, please probe why they declined it]	1	2	3	N/A
1	1. How satisfied were you with the SHELTER support?	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2	a) Please provide some details as to why you rated shelter as you did (open-ended)				
1, 2	2. Was the SHELTER support sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No			
1	3. How satisfied were you with LIFE SKILLS Training?	1	2	3	N/A

1, 2		a) Please provide some details as to why you rated life skills training as you did (open-ended)				
1, 2		b) Can you give some examples of how you have or have not been able to apply the skills you learned in your daily life? (open-ended)				
1, 2		4. Was the LIFE SKILLS support sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No			
	1	5. How satisfied were you with support for EDUCATION (note if formal or non-formal)?	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2		a) Please provide some details as to why you rated education as you did (open-ended)				
1, 2		b) Can you describe the education support you received? Probes: How far did you go in school? Did you go to regular school or a special school?				

1, 2		6. Was the EDUCATION support sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No			
	1	7. How satisfied were you with JOB SKILLS / VOCATIONAL TRAINING	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2		a) Please provide some details as to why you rated job skills/vocation training as you did (open-ended)				
1, 2		b) Can you please describe the job skills/vocation training you received? Probes: Which aspects of the training were most/least useful to you? Are you currently employed in that line of work? Why/why not?				
1, 2		8. Was the JOB SKILLS/VOCATIONAL TRAINING sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No			
	1	9. How satisfied were you with support for JOB PLACEMENT	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2		a) Please provide some details as to why you rated job placement as you did (open-ended)				

1, 2	b) Can you please describe the job placement you received? Probes: What kind of work? What sort of company? How long have you been employed there? Are you satisfied with your job/salary/work hours/work environment?	

1, 2	10. Was the JOB PLACEMENT support sufficient to address your needs (yes/no)? please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No

		1	2	3	N/A
1	11. How satisfied were you with support for OPENING A BUSINESS?	1	2	3	N/A

1, 2	a) Please provide some details as to why you rated entrepreneurship as you did (open-ended)	

1, 2	b) What support did you receive to open your own business? Probes: Are you satisfied with the money you earn? The hours you work? The work environment?	

1, 2	12. Was the support to OPEN YOUR BUSINESS sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No

		1	2	3	N/A
1	13. How satisfied were you with LEGAL ASSISTANCE	1	2	3	N/A

I, 2	a) Please provide some details as to why you rated legal assistance as you did (open-ended)				
I, 2	b) Can you please describe the legal assistance you received? Probes: Were you satisfied with the outcome of the case? How were you treated by legal actors? Did you receive compensation?				
I, 2	14. Was the LEGAL ASSISTANCE sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No			
I	15. How satisfied were you with PSYCHO-SOCIAL COUNSELING	1	2	3	N/A
I, 2	16. Please provide some details as to why you rated counseling as you did (open-ended)				
I, 2	17. Can you describe the counseling you received? Probe: How often do you see the counselor? Did you set goals together for what to achieve in counseling? Did you do activities or take tests or just talk with each other? Did s/he give you advice? (open-ended)				
	18. Was the COUNSELING sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.				
I	19. Other: specify	1	2	3	N/A

1, 2	a) Please provide some details as to why you rated [other] as you did (open-ended)	
1, 2	20. Was the support for this other service sufficient to address your needs (Yes/No)? Please explain your answer.	☐ Yes ☐ No
1, 2	21. How were the services different for women versus men?	
1, 2	22. (ask women) What more could be done to improve services for female survivors?	
1, 2	23. (ask men) What more could be done to improve services for male survivors?	
	Use the space below to record any comments by survey/KII respondent regarding their responses to above questions	

PROTOCOL FOR KIIS WITH SUB GRANTEES

A. Demographic Info:

1. ID: [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Sex of respondent:	
5. Name of NGO/Sub-grantee:	
6. Function/Job of the individual:	
7. District:	
8. Upazila:	
9. Union:	

B. Questions for Sub grantees

EQ #	KII Questions	Answer
1, 2	Please tell us about your main achievements to date to ... (refer below to relevant objectives for their sub-grant with WI) a. Prevention: build capacity in the local communities to prevent TIP? ...identify survivors or those at-risk? b. Protection: improve the quality of services for survivors? Improve referral services for survivors? **c.** Prosecution: raise LE actor's understanding of their obligation to survivors; raise their understanding of their roles and responsibilities to prosecute traffickers	
	2. How did WI/BC/TIP help/support you to achieving the results you just described? Probe: Refer to support received from BC/TIP – training for their staff, training for partners, mentoring, other?	
I	3. What other factors have enabled or constrained your organization's ability to achieve your BC/TIP prevention/protection/prosecution objectives? Please give specific examples. Probe *Prevention:* Factors which help you better identify victims of trafficking; factors which make it difficult to identify victims in the community. Factors which make it difficult to prevent people from migrating illegally. Protection: Factors which have enabled/constrained improvements to the quality of counseling services? Factors which enable or constrain development and use of referral system Prosecution: factors which make it difficult to influence the behavior of law enforcement actors; factors which enabled you to influence law enforcement actors.	

1, 2	4. Gender:
	   a. Prevention: How are gender issues taken into consideration in the ways in which you address prevention?
	   b. Protection: What factors have enabled/constrained your ability to meet the needs of both male and female survivors?
	   c. Prosecution: In what ways are male and female survivors treated differently by LE actors or have different legal service needs.	

4	5. Due to CBSG support, how has your organizational capacity changed with regards to the organization capacity assessment (OCA) elements? Probe: Can you give specific examples of anything you have changed as a result of the CBSG support?	
5	6. What is needed to maintain the capacity building successes that you have achieved so far?	
5	7. How would you characterize the importance to your organization qualifying for a USAID transition grant?	
3	8. What more can BC/TIP do to assist your organization in qualifying for a transition grant from USAID?	
3	9. What aspects of BC/TIP management have been most effective? What aspects have not been less effective? Why?	
2	10. If you could change anything about BC/TIP to make it better, what it would be?	

Cross Check on other BC/TIP project elements undertaken by other project partners

1. What are the biggest constraints to successful prosecution of trafficking cases?

2. Have you referred any VOTs for services using the service directory? How was the quality and effectiveness of the services they received?

3. What do you think has been the biggest results of the awareness raising interventions in the communities?

PROTOCOL FOR KII WITH PARTNERSHIP STAKEHOLDERS (GOB, PRIVATE SECTOR, NGOS)

A. Demographic Info:

1. **ID:** [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Sex of respondent:	
5. Name of Stakeholder/Type:	
6. Function/Job of the individual:	
7. District:	
8. Upazila:	
9. Union:	

B. KII Questions for Partnership Stakeholders

EQ #	KII Questions	Answer
1	1. Please briefly describe your involvement with WI/BC/TIP. Probe: What support did you/your organization receive from BC/TIP? What do you / your organization do vis-a-vis TIP?	
	2. How effective and why has BC/TIP been (or your organization as a result of BC/TIP support) in improving the (prevention of trafficking, protection of victims or prosecution of traffickers)? Please give examples. Probes (depending on partner): Prevention: Do community leaders have an increased capacity to identify and prevent TIP (as a result of BC/TIP interventions)? Do local institutions have an increased capacity to prevent trafficking (as a result of BC/TIP interventions)? Protection: Have there been changes in quality of services provided to survivors (as a result of BC/TIP interventions)? Has there been improvements to a referral mechanism for victim services (as a result of BC/TIP interventions)? Prosecution: Have there been changes in law enforcement actors' response to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases (as a result of BC/TIP interventions)? Have there been changes in law enforcement actors'	

	responsiveness to victims in trafficking cases (as a result of BC/TIP interventions)?	
	3. Which BC/TIP interventions do you believe to be most effective so far and why? Least effective? Probes: What factors have supported or impeded the success of these interventions? Prevention: What factors have made BC/TIP successful or unsuccessful in CTC activation? What factors have made the GO-NGO Committee successful or unsuccessful? What factors have made the MOEWOE Vigilance Task Force successful or unsuccessful? Prosecution: What factors aid or impeded successful prosecution and how does BC/TIP address these?	
1, 2	4. What are the factors that have enabled or constrained implementation of national legislation, regulations, or policies to prevent trafficking (i.e. PSHTA and the OEMA [Overseas Employment and Migration Act], NAP)?	
1	5. What unintended outcomes, positive or negative, from the activity have you seen thus far, if any?	

I	6. How and to what extent has BC/TIP addressed the different needs of males and females as part of its anti-trafficking programming? Probe: How does gender play a role in your work and the activities you've described (VTF, CTC, NGO-GO Committee, Prosecution)? Are there any issues related to gender that have aided or impeded success of the project?	
3	7. What aspects of BC/TIP management have been effective? What aspects have not been effective? Why? Probes: Program implementation? Admin? Finances (disbursement of funds)?	
5	8. To what extent and how are the positive outcomes you've described likely to continue in the future?	
2	9. If you could change anything about BC/TIP to make it better, what it would be? Probe: What additional support could you/your organization use in future to better engage on the TIP issues we've discussed?	

PROTOCOL FOR KII WITH USAID

A. Demographic Info:

1. ID: [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Sex of respondent:	
5. Name of Stakeholder/Type:	
6. Function/Job of the individual:	

B. KII Questions for USAID

EQ #	KII Questions	Answer
1, 2	What factors have enabled or constrained BC/TIP from achieving its IRs and the overall objective? Probe: Can you please tell us about the activity design and how the results/objective were chosen and measured?	
1	Which BC/TIP interventions do you believe to be most effective so far and why? Least effective?	

I	What unintended outcomes, positive or negative, from the program have you seen thus far, if any?	
I, 2	How and to what extent has BC/TIP addressed gender as part of its programming? Probe: Are there any issues related to gender that have aided or impeded success of the project?	
3	To what extent has WI effectively managed the program so far (programmatic, admin, finance)? Probe: How would you describe WI selection of sub-grantees? Rate of expansion to new districts? Why did USAID not approve the recent selection of a new prosecution partner?	
3	How can WI improve its management moving forward?	
4	What have been the factors that have enabled or constrained the organizational capacity building of sub-grantees and ANIRBAN?	

4	How can WI improve its capacity building of sub-grantees and ANIRBAN moving forward?	
6	What have been the factors that have enabled or constrained BC/TIP coordination with other USAID programs?	
6	Should and how can BC/TIP better coordinate with other USAID programs moving forward?	
5	Which elements of the program and its outcomes do you think will continue once BC/TIP ends? Probe: Which will continue without USAID funding?	
2	What lessons were learned in the implementation of the BC/TIP Activity?	
I	13. How have you implemented any of the recommendations from the previous ACT evaluations?	

PROTOCOL FOR KII WITH WI

A. Demographic Information:

1. **ID:** [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Sex of respondent:	
5. Age:	
6. Name of Stakeholder/Type:	
7. Function/Job of the individual:	

B. KII Questions for WI

EQ #	KII Questions	Answer
1, 2	What factors have enabled or constrained BC/TIP from achieving its IRs and the overall objective? Probe: Can you please tell us about the activity design and how the results/objective were chosen and measured? Probes (depending on partner): Prevention: How has BC/TIP been successful or not been successful in increasing capacity of leaders to identify and prevent TIP? How has BC/TIP been successful or not been successful increasing capacity of local institutions to prevent trafficking? Protection: How has BC/TIP been successful or not been successful in improving the quality of services provided to survivors? How has BC/TIP been successful or not been successful in improving (developing) a referral mechanism? Prosecution: How has BC/TIP been successful or not been successful in supporting law enforcement actors to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases? How has BC/TIP been successful or not been successful in supporting law enforcement actors to improve responsiveness to victims?	

I	Which BC/TIP interventions do you believe to be most effective so far and why? Least effective? Probes: Prevention: Why were some old sub-grantees dropped from the activity? Protection: How did the trauma counseling training address the issues identified in the trauma counseling assessment by BC/TIP? How were participants selected? How are the district level referrals mechanisms being used in the districts? Prosecution: How are the activities under prosecution meant to achieve the IR? How have you addressed the difficulty getting approvals from gov for the planned activities under this IR? Partnership: How are the activities under partnership meant to achieve the IRs?	
I	What unintended outcomes, positive or negative, from the program have you seen thus far, if any?	
1, 2	How and to what extent has BC/TIP addressed gender as part of its programming? Probe: Are there any issues related to gender that have aided or impeded success of the project?	

3	To what extent has WI effectively managed the program so far (programmatic, admin, finance)? Probe: How would you describe your selection of sub-grantees? Rate of expansion to new districts? Why did USAID not approve the recent selection of a new prosecution partner?	
3	How can WI improve its management moving forward?	
4	What have been the factors that have enabled or constrained the organizational capacity building of sub-grantees and ANIRBAN?	
4	How can WI improve its capacity building of sub-grantees and ANIRBAN moving forward?	
6	What have been the factors that have enabled or constrained BC/TIP coordination with other USAID programs/JTIP programs? Probe: Have you had any coordination with other USAID programs or USG (JTIP)?	
6	Should and how can BC/TIP better coordinate with other USAID programs moving forward?	

5	Which elements of the program and its outcomes do you think will continue once BC/TIP ends? Probe: Which will continue without USAID funding?	
2	What lessons were learned in the implementation of the BC/TIP Program?	
1	13. How have you implemented any of the recommendations from the previous ACT evaluations?	
N/A	14. Do you have any other feedback that you would like to share that was not covered by these questions?	

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT – FGD

Evaluators must review this form in detail with all informants before the start of the FGD and be sure that they understand it clearly before obtaining their signature. If the informant is illiterate or expresses discomfort signing the form but verbally consents to proceeding with the interview, the evaluator may sign the form to indicate that they received verbal consent.

Purpose: Assalamualaikum/Adab. Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. My name is [NAME]. I am a researcher from an organization called Social Impact, a company that is based in the United States. Our team is in Bangladesh to conduct research about the work of Winrock International. Winrock International provides assistance and training to local organizations around Bangladesh who work to combat human trafficking. You have been asked to participate today so that we can learn more about the support you received from [Winrock, or grantee/partner XX]. We are independent consultants who have no affiliation with those who provided you with assistance.

Procedures: If you agree to participate, we ask you to discuss your experience and opinion of the activities and services implemented under the BC/TIP program. The discussion will take about 2 hours of your time. Although we will publish our findings in a public report, all of your answers will be kept confidential. This means that although we may use a quote from you, we will not use your name in the report. Names of all respondents will be kept separately from the notes. To preserve confidentiality for everyone, we also ask you not to share anything we discuss here today with anyone outside of this group. To make sure we accurately record your answers, we would like to use a recorder during the discussion. The recoding will not be shared with anyone outside of our team members. If you do not want to be recorded you can decline the recorder but still participate in the discussion, without penalty.

Risks/Benefits: There are no known risks or direct benefits related to your participation in this study; however, your inputs may lead to recommendations that help combat trafficking in Bangladesh and improve services to survivors.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this interview is completely voluntary. You do not have to agree to be in this study. You are free to end the interview at any time or to decline to answer any question which you do not wish to answer. If you decline to participate in the interview, no one will be informed of this. It will in no way affect the support you receive from the activity or its partners.

Do you have any questions at this time? *[Interviewer should answer any questions]* If you have any questions about this study in future, you may contact Mr. Jamal Chowdhury at jamalchowdhury50@gmail.com Do you agree to participate in the discussion? Do you agree to be recorded as part of this discussion?

I agree to participate in the interview: ☐ Yes ☐ No	I agree to have the interview recorded: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Name:	
Signature: Date:	

FGD PROTOCOL: INDIVIDUALS TRAINED BY THE PROJECT (PROS/PANEL LAWYERS, PEER LEADERS, SOCIAL WORKERS/TRAUMA COUNSELLORS, DEMO/TTC)

a)   Demographic Information:

1. **FGD ID:** [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Stakeholder type:	
5. District:	
6. Upazila:	
7. Union:	

Respondent #:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Sex of respondent:										
18 or above? (Y/N)										

b) Questions

EQ #	Discussion Questions (Probes)	Answers
1	Theme: Effectiveness 1. In what ways did the training provided by BC/TIP increase your capacity to [XXX insert objective, such as "counsel trafficking survivors" or "prevent trafficking in my community"] Probes: a) For prevention: What are the main obstacles to combatting trafficking in your community? b) For protection: What are the main obstacles to successful reintegration of survivors of trafficking? c) For prevention and protection: What are the main obstacles to successful identification of victims of trafficking? d) For law enforcement: What are the main obstacles to successful investigation and adjudication of trafficking cases in Bangladesh? e) In what ways, if any, did the training increase your capacity to address these obstacles? f) What new information did you learn?	
1	Theme: Effectiveness 2. What have you been able to apply from the training in your work? Probe: a) Please provide examples of how you have or have not been able to apply lessons learned	
2	Theme: Effectiveness (Factors) 3. Why do you think the trainings were/were not effective in enabling you to reach the objective? Probes: a) What about the trainings did you like/not like? b) Was the training designed to meet a gap in your knowledge base? c) Were the trainers knowledgeable about the subject matter?	

	d) Were there factors in your community, the legal/political/social environment that helped or prevented you?	
1	Theme: Gender 4. How did the training affect men and women differently? Probes: a) How did the training address the different needs of male survivors versus female survivors? b) Did the training address the different needs of male and female participants?	
5	Theme: Sustainability 5. How likely are the positive outcomes you described to continue into the future? Why/why not?	
5	Theme: Sustainability 6. What else do you or your community need in order to address trafficking in your community? Probe: a) Other training or capacity building, or something else? b) What other recommendations do you have for BC/TIP to help support you in addressing the main trafficking obstacles in the future?	

FGD PROTOCOL: POTENTIAL MIGRANTS PROVIDED PRE-DECISION TRAINING BY THE PROJECT

a) Demographic Information:

1. **FGD ID:** [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Stakeholder type:	
5. District:	
6. Upazila:	
7. Union:	

Respondent #:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Sex of respondent:										
18 or above? (Y/N)										

b) Questions

EQ #	Discussion Questions (Probes)	Answers
1	Theme: Effectiveness 1. What did you learn during the pre-decision training provided by BC/TIP?	
1	Theme: Effectiveness 2. What have you been able to apply from the training? Please provide examples of how you have or have not been able to apply lessons learned. a) How did the training help you make decisions about migrating? b) What steps did you take as a result of the pre-decision training you attended?	
2	Theme: Effectiveness (Factors) 3. What was it about the trainings that made them effective or NOT effective in enabling you to make decision about migration? a) What about the trainings did you like/not like? b) Was the training designed to meet a gap in your knowledge base? c) Were the trainers knowledgeable about the subject matter? d) Were there factors in your community, the legal/political/social environment that helped or prevented you?	
1	Theme: Gender 4. How did the training address the different needs of male migrants versus female migrants?	
5	Theme: Sustainability 5. What else do you or your community need in order to help people migrate safely? a) Other training or capacity building, or something else? b) What other recommendations do you have for BC/TIP to help support you and your community in deciding to migrant safely?	

PROTOCOL FOR FGDS WITH ANIRBAN, PEER LEADERS, AND CTCS

a) Demographic Information:

1. **FGD ID:** [write name in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. District:	
5. Upazila:	
6. Union:	

Respondent #:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Sex of respondent:										
18 or above? (Y/N)										

b) Questions

EQ #	Discussion Questions (Probes)	Answers
1	**Theme: Effectiveness** 1. What have you achieved as ANIRBAN/Peer Leaders/CTC in your community related to preventing trafficking? Probes: a. What is your role in preventing trafficking? How have you been successful or unsuccessful in fulfilling that role? b. What <u>impact</u> have your activities made regarding trafficking? What change do you see in the community as a result of your activities? Please give examples of impact.	
1, 2	**Theme: Effectiveness** 2. How did the support you received from BC/TIP help you in reaching these achievements? Probe: a) What aspects of BC/TIP support were useful for you in preventing trafficking? What aspects were not useful? b) What other factors help/hinder your ability to prevent trafficking? c) How is your work different now compared to how you worked before BC/TIP support?	
1, 2	**Theme: Effectiveness** 3. How did the support you received from BC/TIP affect your capacity to identify survivors of trafficking or those at-risk? Probe: a) What aspects of BC/TIP support were useful for you in identifying survivors? What aspects were not useful? b) What other factors help/hinder your ability to identify	

	TIP survivors? c) Do you have sufficient capacity to identify survivors? What else do you need to increase your capacity?	
1, 2	Theme: Gender 4. How has BC/TIP affected your ability to meet the needs of men versus women who are vulnerable to trafficking? Probe: A. How do you work with men? How do you work with women? Are the approaches the same or different? B. How can services for survivors be improved to better meet the needs of male/female survivors or those at-risk?	
4, 5	Theme: Capacity Building (ANIRBAN ONLY) 5. How has BC/TIP built the capacity of ANIRBAN as an organization? Probes: a) What support have you received from BC/TIP to build the capacity of ANIRBAN? b) What steps has ANIRBAN taken toward maintaining itself without BC/TIP project support? c) What are the barriers to ANIRBAN's sustainability? d) What additional support does ANIRBAN/Peer Leaders need to improve prevention and identification efforts in communities? e) What efforts have you made to registering as an official organization? Describe successes and difficulties.	
5	Theme: Sustainability 6. To what extent and how are the positive outcomes you've described likely to continue in the future? Probes: a) How likely is ANIRBAN/Peer Leaders/your CTC to continue efforts to prevent trafficking when BC/TIP funding	

	ends? Please explain. b) If they would continue, would they be off the same quality without further support from BC/TIP? Would the level of impact be the same? c) What support would help make your activities and impact more sustainable?	
	Theme: Recommendations 7. How would you change BC/TIP to better address trafficking in your area?	

c) Cross Check on other Project IRs (if time allows)
   b. To whom are the survivors referred to for services?
   c. How do you assess the effectiveness of services available for survivors in your community?
   d. Have you seen a directory of service providers for your district? (show directory to group)

MINI SURVEY

PROTOCOL FOR PHONE-BASED MINI SURVEYS FOR SURVIVORS

A. Demographic Info:

1. **ID:** [write SURVIVOR # in the coding sheet and enter the ID code on this interview form]	
2. Interviewer Name:	
3. Primary Notetaker Name:	
4. Sex of respondent:	
5. BC/TIP local NGO partner service provider:	
6. District:	
7. Upazila:	
8. Union:	

B. QUESTIONS

EQ #	Survey/KII Questions	Answers			
		Dissatisfied	**Neutral** – it was ok	Very satisfied	I did not receive this service
	Please rate your satisfaction with the services you received from the project [Interviewer should read the number and rating aloud before beginning so the respondent is familiar with the options. If respondent chooses 'N/A', skip to the next question.] [If the survivor was offered the service but DECLINED it, please probe why they declined it]	1	2	3	N/A
1	24. How satisfied were you with the SHELTER support?	1	2	3	N/A
1	25. How satisfied are you with the <u>results</u> of the SHELTER support?	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2	26. Please provide some details as to why you rated shelter as you did (open-ended)				
1	27. How satisfied were you with LIFE SKILLS Training?	1	2	3	N/A
1	28. How satisfied were you with the <u>results</u> of LIFE SKILLS Training?	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2	29. Please provide some details as to why you rated life skills training as you did (open-ended)				
1	30. How satisfied were you with support for EDUCATION (note if formal or non-formal)?	1	2	3	N/A

I	31. How satisfied were you with the _results_ of the support for EDUCATION (note if formal or non-formal)?	I	2	3	N/A
I, 2	32. Please provide some details as to why you rated education as you did (open-ended)				
I	33. How satisfied were you with JOB SKILLS / VOCATIONAL TRAINING?	I	2	3	N/A
I	34. How satisfied were you with the _results_ of the JOB SKILLS / VOCATIONAL TRAINING?	I	2	3	N/A
I, 2	35. Please provide some details as to why you rated job skills/vocation training as you did (open-ended)				
I	36. How satisfied were you with support for JOB PLACEMENT?	I	2	3	N/A
I	37. How satisfied were you with the _results_ of the support for JOB PLACEMENT?	I	2	3	N/A
I, 2	38. Please provide some details as to why you rated job placement as you did (open-ended)				
I	39. How satisfied were you with support for OPENING A BUSINESS?	I	2	3	N/A
I	40. How satisfied were you with the _results_ of the support for OPENING A BUSINESS?	I	2	3	N/A
I, 2	Please provide some details as to why you rated job placement as you did (open-ended)				
I	41. How satisfied were you with LEGAL ASSISTANCE?	I	2	3	N/A
I	42. How satisfied were you the _results_ of with LEGAL ASSISTANCE?	I	2	3	N/A

1, 2	43. Please provide some details as to why you rated legal assistance as you did (open-ended)				
1	44. How satisfied were you with PSYCHO-SOCIAL COUNSELING?	1	2	3	N/A
1	45. How satisfied were you with the <u>results</u> of PSYCHO-SOCIAL COUNSELING?	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2	46. Please provide some details as to why you rated counseling as you did (open-ended)				
1	47. Other: specify	1	2	3	N/A
1	48. How satisfied were you with the <u>results</u> of this service?	1	2	3	N/A
1, 2	49. Please provide some details as to why you rated [other] as you did (open-ended)				

DIRECT OBSERVATION

CHECKLIST FOR SHELTER VISITS (DIRECT OBSERVATION)

Check off all that are present at the facility

Shelter visits must be pre-arranged with the implementing partner managing the shelter. Ideally these visits will take place as part of the KII with the implementing partner. Inform the shelter manager that you are utilizing a checklist to see how the standards developed by the project are implemented in practice. No photos should be taken. Evaluators must be careful and respectful of the private living spaces of the individuals residing at the shelter. For bedrooms and bathrooms, look in from the door only, do not touch individuals' belongings, bedding, bath products and the like. You may greet residents politely but do not ask them questions.

Facility Name:

Facility District/Upazila/Union:

Postings

- ☐ Mission statement including purpose of org, services provided and qualifications of org and staff are posted
- ☐ Beneficiary rules and duties are posted
- ☐ Rights of beneficiaries are posted
- ☐ Complaints procedure posted
- ☐ Staff rules and duties are posted
- ☐ Security rules and regulations are posted
- ☐ Roster of chores / cleaning duties, etc.

Security Provisions

- ☐ Security measures – alarms, locks, bars, etc.
- ☐ Security measures – posted emergency numbers

General Space

- ☐ Is shelter space inviting and comfortable?
- ☐ Is there space for recreation?
- ☐ Is there outdoor space?
- ☐ Counseling rooms, offices, are relatively private and sound proof to ensure confidentiality
- ☐ Staff office has desk, computer, chair, shelf, phone, safe, etc.
- ☐ Is the space appropriate for the age group of beneficiaries?
- ☐ If children are in residence – shelter has children's beds, games, play area, children-centered activities, books, pencils, etc.

Personal Space

- ☐ Is there space for privacy? Number of people per room? Per bathroom?
- ☐ Bedrooms have one bed per person, night tables, good lighting, etc.?
- ☐ Do beneficiaries have a locked space for their belongings?
- ☐ Are the bedrooms and bathrooms clean and hygienic?

Review of Beneficiary File

- ☐ signed documents regarding acceptance of the rules and duties
- ☐ Completed interview/case background
- ☐ Evaluation report / needs assessment

- [ ] Assistance plan signed by beneficiary
- [ ] Counseling plan, including goals and objectives
- [ ] Updates of assistance / counseling plan
- [ ] Confidentiality statement
- [ ] Communications with other organizations regarding the case
- [ ] Custody document (in case of minors)
- [ ] Security system for case files is noted (protected electronic files or locked safe)

Notes by Observer

ANNEX D: TABLES

SOURCES FOR REFERRALS OF SURVIVORS FOR SERVICES						
Organization	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
	Year 1		Year 2		Year 3	
ANIRBAN	29	23%	77	23%	106	29%
CTC	6	5%	13	4%	67	18%
Community/Community leader	23	18%	113	34%	6	2%
Sub-grantees	15	12%	86	26%	33	9%
Local NGO	9	7%	31	9%	88	24%
Court	5	4%		0%		0%
INGO	1	1%		0%		0%
Government			3			
Integrated survivor	7	6%		0%		0%
Police Station	7	6%	5	2%	4	1%
Journalist	2	2%		0%	1	0%
Survivor	5	4%		0%	53	14%
IOM	13	10%		0%		0%
Demo	3	2%		0%		0%
Network Member					5	
CBO					2	
Youth Leader					1	
TOTAL	125		328		366	

PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATOR DATA

WI, BC/TIP PERFORMANCE INDICATOR DATA, IR1 PREVENTION

SI	Indicator	Baseline Value	Original LOP Target	Life of Program (LOP)	Y1 Target	Y1 Actual	Y2 Target	Y2 Actual	Y3 Target	Year 3 Actual to June
1.1	# Actions taken by communities, … to prevent TIP	-	-	20,116	TBD	706	4406	4406	5000	Yearly Reporting
1.2	% Of target population that shows an awareness of TIP (1.5.3-13)	30%	TBD	80%	-	-	-	-	-	End Project Reporting
1.3	# Unduplicated people … referred to at least one support service	0	5000	7000	300	223	1500	1901	1976	1648
1.4	# Of CTCs established and fully functioning	0	TBD	200	10	0	90	80	50	Yearly Reporting
1.5	% Trained Counter-Trafficking Committee members with increased knowledge of roles and responsibilities	0	85%	85%	85%	-	85%	88%	85%	Yearly Reporting
1.6	# Unduplicated Peer Leaders … trained to combat TIP	0	500	600	50	200	150	179	221	46
1.7	# People in targeted populations … exposed to a USG-funded mass media campaign … about TIP (1.5.3-14)	0	5,000,000	5,000,000	1,000,000	1,670,020	1,200,000	657,082	1,200,000	1,155,131

1.8	# Migrants with BC/TIP training on safe migration, TIP, migrants' rights, and redress mechanisms	0	40,000	10,000	2000	525	10000	2262	2412	1333
1.9	# Recruiting agencies providing safe migration information to migrants	TBD	25	25	0	1	5	0	14	2
1.10	# Unduplicated Counter-Trafficking Committee members with BC/TIP training in their roles and responsibilities	0	2000	2000	0	18	300	464	700	672
1.11	# District Education & Manpower Office (DEMO) officials with BC/TIP training on safe migration & TIP	0	200	84	20	0	50	23	25	33

WI, BC/TIP PERFORMANCE INDICATOR DATA, IR2 PROTECTION

SI	Indicator	Baseline Value	Original LOP Target	Life of Program (LOP)	Y1 Target	Y1 Actual	Y2 Target	Y2 Actual	Y3 Target	Year 3 Actual to June
2.1	% Annual change in survivors referred to BC/TIP service providers by other agencies	1	20%	20%	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.2	# Survivors of TIP receiving services with USG assistance (1.5.3-18)	0	2000	2000	100	125	550	328	660	366
2.3	# Winrock partners implementing the 2014 ACT … for trafficking survivors	0	4	6	4	4	4	4	6	4
2.4	# Counselors, social workers and other health care workers with training in TIP-specific trauma and care tools to track survivors' progress	0	120	120	20	0	50	20	60	39
2.5	# Consultation/ research conducted with partners to develop referral directories	0	25	25	2	3	10	10	7	0
2.6	# District-level referral directories of service providers developed	0	25	25	2	3	10	7	7	0

WI, BC/TIP PERFORMANCE INDICATOR DATA, IR3 PROSECUTION

SI	Indicator	Baseline Value	Original LOP Target	Life of Program (LOP)	Y1 Target	Y1 Actual	Y2 Target	Y2 Actual	Y3 Target	Year 3 Actual to June
3.1	% Of trained criminal justice personnel with an increased knowledge on TIP, migration, and overseas employment, and legal support for survivors	0	80%	80%	-	-	80%	85%	80%	Yearly reporting
3.2	# Host nation criminal justice personnel who received USG-funded anti-TIP training (1.5.3-17)	0	815	950	100	34	300	303	250	151
3.3	# Of TIP victim assisted in filling cases and provided with legal assistance	0	200	350	10	8	50	108	100	37

WI, BC/TIP PERFORMANCE INDICATOR DATA, IR4 PARTNERSHIP

SI	Indicator	Baseline Value	Original LOP Target	Life of Program (LOP)	Y1 Target	Y1 Ach.	Y2 Target	Y2 Ach.	Y3 Target	Year 3 Ach. to June
4.1	# Anti-TIP policies, laws or int'l agreements strengthened with USG assistance (1.5.3-16)	0	3	3	0	0	1	1	1	1
4.2	Total $ value of in-kind and financial contributions leveraged from private sector for TIP prevention and protection activities	0	$2,000,000	$2,000,000	-	-	$500,000	$393,867	$500,000	-
4.3	# Local government officials who participated in district-level, multi-stakeholder workshops on TIP, safe migration, and responsibilities of CTCs	0	3500	3500	0	61	300	118	Indicator dropped	0
4.4	# Of staff members of Police Anti Trafficking monitoring cell who received orientation on case management and dissemination of information	0	TBD	0	Need Assessment	-	25%	0	Proposed to drop	-
4.5	# Public and private sector partners engaged in public mobilization campaigns and participating in employment programs for vulnerable groups and TIP survivors	0	30	50	0	7	11	28	10	8
4.6	# of Partners received transitional grants at the end of year II of BC/TIP	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	-

CAPACITY BUILDING RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS

Data Source: CBSG, BC/TIP Partner Assessment for USAID Transition Fund, January 2017

Criteria No	Organizational Areas and Systems	Level of Risks		
		Rights Jessore	Sachetan	YPSA
1	Mission & Vision	Low	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
2	Organizational Structure	High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
3	Board Composition & Responsibility	High	High	Low to Moderate
4	Succession Planning	High	High	Low to Moderate
5	Travel Policies and Procedures	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low
6	Procurements	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate
7	Fixed Assets Control	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Moderate to High
8	Staff Time Management	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate	Low
9	Staff Professional and Salary History	High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
10	Staff Salary and Benefit	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate	Low
11	Accounting & Bookkeeping	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate
12	Financial Planning	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
13	Variance Analysis	Low to Moderate	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
14	Allowable & Unallowable Cost	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate

15	Direct & Indirect Cost	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
16	Segregation of Duties	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate	Low
17	Financial Personnel	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
18	Sources of Funding	High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
19	Financial Control	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
20	Audit and Review	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate
21	Strategic Planning	High	High	Low to Moderate
22	Program Planning	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
23	Program Reporting	High	High	Low to Moderate
24	Monitoring & Evaluation	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
25	Staff Level	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate	Low
26	Staff Performance Management	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Low to Moderate
27	Decision Making	High	Moderate to High	Low
28	Absorptive Capacity	High	Moderate to High	Low
29	Gender Integration	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate	Low to Moderate
30	Branding and Marking	Moderate to High	Moderate to High	Moderate to High

ANNEX E: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

BC/TIP Activity Documents:

1. *USAID/Bangladesh. Activity Indicators – Q1 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
2. *USAID/Bangladesh. Activity Indicators – Q2 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
3. *USAID/Bangladesh. Activity Indicators – Q3 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
4. *USAID/Bangladesh. Activity Indicators – Q4 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
5. *USAID/Bangladesh. Activity Indicators – Q1 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
6. *USAID/Bangladesh. Implementation Plan – Year 1: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID. Print.
7. *USAID/Bangladesh. Implementation Plan – Year 2: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID. Print.
8. *USAID/Bangladesh. Implementation Plan – Year 3: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID. Print.
9. *USAID/Bangladesh. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
10. *USAID/Bangladesh. Core Performance Indicators – Q1 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
11. *USAID/Bangladesh. Core Performance Indicators – Q2 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
12. *USAID/Bangladesh. Core Performance Indicators – Q3 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
13. *USAID/Bangladesh. Core Performance Indicators – Year 2 and Q4 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
14. *USAID/Bangladesh. Core Performance Indicators – Q1 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
15. *USAID/Bangladesh. Core Performance Indicators – Q3 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
16. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q1 2015: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015. Print.
17. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q2 2015: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015. Print.
18. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q3 2015: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015. Print.
19. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q4 2015: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015. Print.
20. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q4 and FY2015 Annual Summary: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015. Print.
21. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q1 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
22. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q2 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
23. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q3 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.

24. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q4 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person*s *(BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
25. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q4 and FY2016. Annual Summary: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person*s *(BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
26. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q1 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person*s *(BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
27. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q2 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person*s *(BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
28. *USAID/Bangladesh. Quarterly Report – Q3 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Person*s *(BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
29. *USAID/Bangladesh. Staff travel information summary – Q1 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
30. *USAID/Bangladesh. Staff travel information summary – Q3 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
31. *USAID/Bangladesh. Staff travel information summary – Q4 2016: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2016. Print.
32. *USAID/Bangladesh. Staff travel information summary – Q1 2017: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017. Print.
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34. *USAID/Bangladesh Office of Democracy and Governance. Scope of Work for the Actions for Combatting Trafficking-in-Person (ACT) Program External Mid-Term Performance Evaluation (n.d.).*
35. *USAID/Bangladesh Office of Democracy and Governance. Scope of Work for the Actions for Combatting Trafficking-in-Person (ACT) Program External Performance Evaluation (n.d.).*
36. *USAID/Bangladesh Office of Democracy and Governance. Scope of Work for the Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP) External Mid Performance Evaluation (n.d.).*
37. Winrock International. BC/TIP Capacity Building Initiatives. Report on Summary Assessment and Capacity Building Roadmap. Capacity Building Service Group, 2015.
38. Winrock International. ANIRBAN database – July 2017.
39. Winrock International. CTC and Migration training database.
40. Winrock International. DEMO TTC Training database – Prevention Component.
41. Winrock International. List of CBO Working with Survivors of Protection partner.
42. Winrock International. List of other USAID project support to BC/TIP.
43. Winrock International. Ministry focal points for BC/TIP.
44. Winrock International. Panel Lawyers Orientation Database – Prosecution Component.
45. Winrock International. Peer Leaders Database – Prevention Component.
46. Winrock International. Performance Indicator Achievement.
47. Winrock International. Prosecutor Training Database – Prosecution Component.
48. Winrock International. *Sub Grantee List.*
49. Winrock International. Sub Grantee Working Area.
50. Winrock International. Sub Grantees Working Location.
51. Winrock International. Sub Grantees Working Location – Prevention Component.
52. Winrock International. Survivors Database – Protection Component.
53. Winrock International. Trauma Counseling training participants database – Protection Component.
54. Winrock International. *USAID/Bangladesh. Annual Progress Report: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP).* Little Rock: AZ, 2016.

BC/TIP Sub-Agreements

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ANNEX F: LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Note: Respondent names have been omitted to adhere to IRB requirements.

DONOR		
Organization	District	Sex
USAID	Dhaka	F
USAID	Dhaka	F
Total	2 Female | 2 Total	

IP		
Organization	District	Sex
WI	Dhaka	F
WI	Dhaka	M
WI	Dhaka	F
WI	Dhaka	M
WI	Dhaka	F
Total	3 Female | 2 Male | 5 Total	

PARTNER		
Organization	District	Sex
a2i	Dhaka	M
a2i	Dhaka	M
MOHA	Dhaka	F
JATI	Dhaka	M
NLASO	Dhaka	M
Relief International	Dhaka	M
Vigilance Task Force, MoEWOE	Dhaka	F
Total	2 Female | 5 Male | 7 Total	

SUB GRANTEE		
Organization	District	Sex
YPSA	Chittagong	F
YPSA	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA	Cox's Bazar	M
CBSG	Dhaka	M
CBSG	Dhaka	M
DAM	Jessore	M
DAM	Jessore	F
DAM	Jessore	F
DAM	Jessore	M
DAM	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore	Jessore	M
Sachetan	Rajshahi	M
Sachetan	Rajshahi	F
Sachetan	Rajshahi	M
Sachetan	Rajshahi	F
Proyas	Rajshahi	M
Proyas	Rajshahi	M
Proyas	Rajshahi	M
Total	**7 Female	19 Male	26 Total**	

SURVIVOR		
Organization	District	Sex
YPSA (associated org)	Bandarban	M
Sachetan	Chapai Nawabganj	F
YPSA (associated org)	Chittagong	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
DAM	Jessore	M
ANIRBAN	Jessore	M
DAM (associated org)	Jessore	F
DAM (associated org)	Jessore	F
DAM (associated org)	Jessore	M
DAM (associated org)	Jessore	M
DAM (associated org)	Jessore	F
DAM (associated org)	Khulna	F
DAM (associated org)	Khulna	F
Shishuk (associated org)	Meherpur	F
Sachetan (associated org)	Naogaon	M
Sachetan (associated org)	Naogaon	F
Sachetan (associated org)	Naogaon	M
DAM (associated org)	Naogaon	F
Shishuk (associated org)	Narsingdi	M
Sachetan	Rajshahi	F
Sachetan	Rajshahi	F
Sachetan (associated org)	Rajshahi	M

DAM (associated org)	Satkhira	F
Shishuk (associated org)	Satkhira	M
Total	13 Female | 17 Male | 30 Total	

TRAINEE_ANIRBAN

Organization	District	Sex
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	M
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	M
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Rajshahi	F
ANIRBAN	Rajshahi	F
ANIRBAN	Rajshahi	M
ANIRBAN	Rajshahi	M
ANIRBAN	Rajshahi	M
ANIRBAN	Rajshahi	M
Total	10 Female | 12 Male | 22 Total	

TRAINEE_CBO

Organization	District	Sex
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
Shibo bash khaita kha shangho	Jessore	M
Alar patha community resource center	Jessore	M
NISHANA	Jessore	M
Thanapara Swallaw	Rajshahi	M
Shapla Gramin	Rajshahi	M
Total	1 Female | 11 Male | 12 Total	

TRAINEE_COUNSELORS

Organization	District	Sex
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
OKUP	Dhaka	F
Justice and Care	Dhaka	F
TARANGO	Dhaka	F
BNWLA	Dhaka	F
ANIRBAN	Dhaka	M
Rights Jessore	Jessore	F

DAM	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
DAM	Jessore	M
DAM	Jessore	M
DAM	Jessore	M
ANIRBAN	Jessore	F
Juvenile Corrections Center	Jessore	M
Sachetan	Rajshahi	F
Sachetan	Rajshahi	F
Total	**14 Female | 8 Male | 22 Total**	

TRAINEE_CTC

Organization	District	Sex
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	F
YPSA (associated org)	Cox's Bazar	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F

Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Total	16 Female | 24 Male | 40 Total	

TRAINEE_DEMOTTC

Organization	District	Sex
MTC (TTC)	Dhaka	M
MTC (TTC)	Dhaka	M
ASDC (TTC)	Dhaka	M
ASDC (TTC)	Dhaka	M
DEMO	Jessore	M
DEMO	Jessore	M
TTC	Jessore	M
TTC	Jessore	M
TTC	Jessore	M
TTC	Jessore	M
Total	10 Male	10 Total	

TRAINEE_PANEL LAWYER

Organization	District	Sex
N/A	Cox's Bazar	F
N/A	Cox's Bazar	M
DLAC	Rajshahi	F
DLAC	Rajshahi	M
DLAC	Rajshahi	M
DLAC	Rajshahi	M
Total	2 Female	4 Male	6 Total	

TRAINEE_PEER LEADER

Organization	District	Sex
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M

Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
ANIRBAN	Jessore	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Total	**8 Female	7 Male	15 Total**	

TRAINEE_POLICE

Organization	District	Sex
N/A	Cox's Bazar	M
N/A	Cox's Bazar	M
Police	Rajshahi	M
Total	**3 Male	3 Total**	

TRAINEE_PRE-DECISION

Organization	District	Sex
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	M
Rights Jessore (associated org)	Jessore	F

Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	F
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Proyas (associated org)	Rajshahi	M
Total	6 Female	11 Male	17 Total	

TRAINEE_PROSECUTOR		
Organization	District	Sex
N/A	Cox's Bazar	M
N/A	Cox's Bazar	F
N/A	Cox's Bazar	M
N/A	Cox's Bazar	M
N/A	Cox's Bazar	F
Court	Rajshahi	M
Court	Rajshahi	F
Total	3 Female	4 Male	7 Total	

SUMMARY

DISTRICTS OVERVIEW			
District	#Male	#Female	#Total
Bandarban	1	-	1
Chapai Nawabganj	-	1	1
Chittagong	1	1	2
Cox's Bazar	38	14	52
Dhaka	14	11	25
Jessore	50	31	81
Khulna	-	2	2
Meherpur	-	1	1
Naogaon	2	2	4
Narsingdi	1	-	1
Rajshahi	29	24	53
Satkhira	1	1	2

ANNEX G: MAP OF EVALUATION SITES

ANNEX H: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

|	
Name	Ruth Rosenberg
Title	Consultant
Organization	Social Impact
Evaluation Position?	■ Team Leader ■ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	Contract No. AID-486-I-14-00001; Order No. AID-388-TO-17-00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	■ Yes ☐ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	1. I evaluated a previous iteration of the BC-TIP Project. In 2014, on behalf of Social Impact, I conducted an evaluation of USAID's trafficking in persons project, implemented by Winrock International. 2. I have done work in the past, primarily as a consultant, for the International Organization for Migration, which might be seen as a competitor to Winrock International on human trafficking issues.

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*Ruth Rosenberg*
Date	8-1-2017

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Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Jean-Camille Kollmorgen
Title	Evaluation Specialist
Organization	Social Impact
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ■ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	Contract No. AID-486-I-14-00001; Order No. AID-388-TO-17-00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	Activity/Project Name: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-In-Persons Contractor: Winrock International (WI)
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ■ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*Jean-Camille Kollmorgen*
Date	*august 1, 2017*

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Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	CHOWDHURY, A.J.M IFJALUL HAQUE
Title	National Sectoral Specialist
Organization	Social Impact
Evaluation Position	☐ Team Leader ☑ Team Member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	AID-486-I-14-00001; Order No. AID-388-TO-17-00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	1. Activity/Project Name: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP); Contractor: Winrock International
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☑ Yes ☐ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 1. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 2. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 3. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 4. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 5. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 6. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	In 2013-2014, I worked as a short-term consultant for Winrock International (WI), Actions for Combating Trafficking in Persons (ACT) project. It was an assignment to review, consolidate and harmonize the WI/ACT quantitative and qualitative data collected through partner narrative reports/quarterly tables. Also to assess how the knowledge and skills learned in the training provided by ACT project have been put into practice and assess whether the training activities were suitable in terms of contents, timing, participants and other aspects. My work on this assignment did not include involvement in project implementation and did not have nay involvement in the design of the BCTIP activity.

In 2014 I applied for DCOP position in WinRock International. However, I was not selected during the screening process. |

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*[signature]*
Date	26th October 2017

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Kalpana Rani
Title	Interpreter/Research Assistant
Organization	Social Impact
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	AID-486-I-14-00001; Order No. AID-388-TO-17-00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	Activity/Project Name: Bangladesh Counter Trafficking-in-Persons (BC/TIP); Contractor: Winrock International
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 1. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 2. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 3. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 4. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 5. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 6. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*Kalpana R*
Date	14 August 2017

U.S. Agency for International Development

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