IRAQ GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY (IGPA/TAKAMUL) PROJECT

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

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CONTENTS

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Conflict: Perceived divergence of interests among parties.[1]

Structural Conflict: Economic and political structures which contribute to injustice and/or the continuation of poverty. Symbolic violence built into a culture does not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence built into the structure. However, it is used to legitimize either or both.[2]

Low Intensity Conflict: Military conflict, usually localized, between two or more state or non-state groups which is below the intensity of conventional war. It usually involves the state's use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with its policies or objectives.[3]

Do No Harm: Promoting greater awareness of potential negative violent repercussions which may occur due to the implementation of certain types of humanitarian or development assistance, the contribution of aid agencies to these repercussions, and methods which can be used in aid agency programming to anticipate and minimize such repercussions in advance.[4]

Sunni Areas: Ethnically Arab, religiously Sunni. Major areas: west, central-north, and north (Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa)

Shiite Areas: Ethnically Arab, religiously Shia. Major areas: south and south-central (Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Diwaniya, Muthanna, Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, and Babil)

Center: Baghdad (mixed population)

KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government. Ethnically Kurdish. Religiously majority Sunni.[5] Areas: Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaimaniya

The Arabization Policy: Efforts by the Iraqi state to alter the national profile of the city and governorate of Kirkuk, and encompass a swath of land from the strategic areas of Khanaqin on the Iranian border to the Sinjar area, abutting Syria. These campaigns began long before Saddam Hussein took power in 1979. For nearly 40 years, successive Baghdad governments used a variety of tactics to force Kurds, Turkomen and Assyrians from their homes and replace them with Arabs from other areas of Iraq.[6]

CS: Conflict Sensitivity

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[1] Dean G. Pruitt, *Social conflict* (McGraw-Hill, 1998).
[2] Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305.
[3] Mohan J. Malik, "The Evolution of Strategic Thought," in *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (London: Palgrave, 1999), 13-52.
[4] Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, February 1999) 74.
[5] Less than 1% are Shia, the majority of the Shia Kurds (named Failie) live in Khanqeen and Mandeli (districts in Diyala province on the Iranian border). Some Failie Kurds live in Baghdad.
[6] John Fawcett and Victor Tanner, *The internally displaced people of Iraq* (2002), 11.

CSA: Conflict Sensitivity Analysis

CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority

PCC: Property Claims Committee

TAL: Transitional Administration Law

PMF: Popular Mobilization Forces

INTRODUCTION

Conceptualization of Conflict Sensitivity "Do No Harm (DNH) Principle

Identifying the issue as "how may assistance be provided in conflict settings in ways that, rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict, help local people disengage from the violence that surrounds them and begin to develop alternative systems for addressing the problems that underlie the conflict?"[7] the basic underlying assumptions of the "Do No Harm" (DNH) principle are that conflict is an inherent part of development and social change. While international development programs have constructive outcomes, certain types of activities may have unintended negative impacts in conflict-prone societies.

Source: Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, February 1999, p. 74

In the post-Cold War world, the nature of conflict has generally changed from inter-state to intra-state.[8] One of the first major post-Cold War examples of intra-state conflict was the Rwandan genocide. In reviewing the lead-up to the conflict, the international community was deeply disturbed with the nature of the dynamics that led to the genocide. Thus, international aid agencies realized that insufficient consideration of local context can activate pre-existing cleavages in conflict-prone societies and inflate

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[7] Do No Harm Project, "Do No Harm Project: Trainer's Manual," http://www.donoharm.info/downloads/level000/Trainers_Manual_1.pdf, (November 2004), 4.
[8] Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples against states: Ethnopolitical conflict and the changing world system: 1994 presidential address," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (1994): 347-377.

inter/intra-group tensions, instead of working to mitigate communal conflicts.[9] The DNH concept, coined by Mary B. Anderson in 1999 in her pioneer work "Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War,"[10] guides international development programs to promote greater awareness of the potential negative violent consequences that may occur due to the implementation of certain activities. In addition, the Operations Manual that was published by the Collaborative Learning Projects in 2000 (CDA), entitled "Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from field experience,"[11] provides international agencies with concrete tools and methods to avoid exacerbating existing conflicts while implementing development programs.

Following CDA's and Anderson's efforts, major international aid programs started to develop systematic definitions and methodological frameworks to conduct conflict assessments and conflict sensitivity analyses, adopting the DNH principle as an integral component of international development interventions. Towards that end, USAID published its "Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) 2.0" in 2012 to develop a conflict sensitivity analysis that helps identify the dynamics of instability and violence in its areas of operations. A widely shared definition of conflict sensitivity (CS), adopted by CAF as well as other international organization literature, states that CS is "the ability of an organization to: (1) understand the context in which it is operating, particularly with respect to inter-group relations; (2) understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and (3) act upon these understandings in a way that avoids negative impacts and maximizes positive impacts vis-à-vis the conflict."[12]

Accordingly, CSA entails the effort to understand the implicit and explicit conflict dynamics in a target area, the relationship between causes of conflict and implemented programs, and how these factors interact with each other in target areas – how to maximize positive impacts on mitigating conflicts while also "doing no harm."[13]

Qualitative Methodology

Desktop Research

This analysis is mainly built off desk-based research. It provides a short synthesis of the literature on the DNH principle, CS and CSA, and conflict and the sources of violence in Iraq.

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[9] CDA, "Conflict Sensitivity Mainstreaming Efforts," http://cdacollaborative.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Conflict-Sensitivity-Mainstreaming-Efforts.pdf, (Accessed December 10, 2017), 1.
[10] Anderson, *Do No Harm.*
[11] The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., "Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience," http://badael.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/DNH_Options-for-Aid-in-Conflict.pdf, (2000).
[12] USAID Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (2012), 4. This is a shared definition mentioned in Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack. Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert and Saferworld. 2004
[13] David Keen, "When 'Do No Harm' Hurts," *New York Times,* http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/opinion/when-fear-impedes-aid.html (November 6, 2013).

Network Meetings

Constrained in both time and resources, IGPA carried out limited meetings with members (MPs) of the Council of Representatives (COR), political operatives, Provincial Government (PG) members, and Provincial Council (PC) members over a two-week period. These interviews were meant to better understand the context of conflict, as well as the enablers and drivers behind violence in the various regions of Iraq. Representatives were selected using a limited "purposive and snowball"[14] sampling methodology, which utilized trusted networks given the sensitivity of the subject matter.

Purpose

The context of conflict in Iraq has complicated and inter-related causes. IGPA's CSA aims to provide a nuanced overview of the underlying causes of conflict in Iraq, and articulate an implementation strategy that effectively includes the principle of DNH and conflict sensitivity approach in IGPA's interventions.

Outcome

IGPA's CSA will integrate a contextual conflict analysis into its implementation strategy, whereby it will develop a framework to track and respond to conflict sensitive indicators throughout the various phases of project designing, planning, and implementation. It is important to bear in mind that IGPA is not a conflict management program. Given the fragile context of post-Da'esh Iraq, where a) conflicts are numerous and exist at different levels, with various actors, stages, and intensity, and b) conflicts are often subject to rapid change and can spiral into different directions targeting different communities; IGPA will adopt a nimble strategy. The program strategy will deploy CS as a fundamental principle in designing and planning activities, and will implement activities through CS lenses, encouraging the analysis of developments during implementation and subsequent modifications to maximize effectiveness of interventions.[15]

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[14] Family Health International, "Module 1: Qualitative Research Methods Overview," https://course.ccs.neu.edu/is4800sp12/resources/qualmethods.pdf, (Accessed December 10, 2017).
[15] IGPA/DAI proposal, 9.

CONFLICT CAUSES AND DYNAMICS IN IRAQ

The Crux of the Conflict

Since the 1980s, Iraq has suffered cycles of domestic political unrest, inter-and-intra state wars, international embargo, terrorism and counter-terrorism operations, and ethno-sectarian conflicts. The new wave of conflict that manifested in Da'esh's occupation of Iraqi cities and subsequent military operations to liberate those cities and destroy Da'esh, as well as the proliferation of Iranian-backed Shia militias,[16] have created havoc and destruction in major Iraqi cities and resulted in mass displacement, loss of life, cross-border spillover, and regional proxy wars.

Politically, the state of Iraq suffers from structural and institutional weakness, corruption, unstable political arrangements, and deeply fragmented political parties. Socially, Iraqi society, similar to the rest of the Middle East, has high proportions of youth under the age of 24 (61.7 percent of the total population),[17] concurrent with high unemployment, women's marginalization, and high youth dependency rates.[18]

Currently, the decades-long uninterrupted cycles of conflicts have affected state resilience. Volatile oil prices and staggering demographic problems have contributed to enormous fiscal pressures and deficits, spending demands, and loss of revenue.[19] The persistence of such chronic conflicts threatens the unity of the state and undermines its sovereignty vis-a-vis its neighboring countries.

Conflict Identification

Conflict in Iraq is complex, emerges on social and economic levels, and derives from various ethnic, religious, economic, and social factors. Non-state actors are the main perpetrators of violent operations for political and sectarian reasons. These groups include terrorist networks and sleeper cells, Shia militias, organized crime groups, and intra-sectarian/tribal armed groups.

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[16] Mapping of the Shia Militias and their Areas of Operation: http://www.sasapost.com/iraq-shia-militia/
[17] Jack A. Goldstone., Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, *Political Demography: How population changes are reshaping international security and national politics* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 27.
Graham E. Fuller, "The youth crisis in Middle Eastern society," *Institute of Social Policy and Understanding*, http://www.youthmetro.org/uploads/4/7/6/5/47654969/youth_crisis_in_middle_east.pdf, (2004).
UNDP, "Iraq Profile," http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html.
[18] Gavin W. Jones, "Where are all the jobs? Capturing the demographic dividend in Islamic countries," in *Population Dynamics in Muslim Countries* (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012), http://elibrary.worldbank.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-1-4648-1016-9 , 36.
[19] The World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects, January 2017: Weak investment in uncertain times," (2017), 131-137.

In addition, conflict types vary across Iraqi regions. In the Sunni areas, terrorism and counter terrorism measures lead to aggressive military operations, causing enormous destructions in terms of lives and infrastructure. The southern provinces, on the other hand, suffer from intra-Shia fighting, violence associated with organized crime and tribal rivalry over irrigation systems, and illicit trade of drugs and weapons. The following sections will touch upon each of these conflict factors to provide an overview of the nature of conflict in Iraq.

Root Causes: Ethnicity, Religion, Economy, Urbanization, and Forced Migration

Ethnic and Religious Factors

Sectarian and ethnic violence is not new to Iraqi society. Ethnic divides (Arab versus Kurd, Kurd versus Turkomen) and religious divides (Sunni versus Shia) are clear forces in Iraq's society and politics, and repression based on ethnic and religious grounds is always a cause for conflict. Comparing before and after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, variations have appeared in the scale of violence, targeted sects or populations, visibility of violence (implicit vs. explicit), and nature of the perpetrators.

Before 2003, the state security apparatus conducted systematic sectarian and ethnic violence against the Shia and Kurds.[20] Following the fall of Saddam, the attack on the Shia al-Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006 represented a new segment of perpetrators[21] and a new scale of sectarian violence, triggering severe communal violence against the Sunnis.[22] During Maliki's second term, the nature of sectarian violence has changed drastically, as political sectarianism has become entrenched in state governing structures, and powerful militias have been created outside the Iraqi defense system. The Da'esh occupation of mixed population areas, such as the Ninewa valley, has had particularly disastrous consequences for Iraq's minorities since 2014. Da'esh operations against the Yazidis and Christians in the Ninewa valley and Sinjar amounted to ethnic cleansing and caused "irreparable damage to the fabric of Iraq's society…fueling inter-ethnic, sectarian and inter-religious tensions in the region and beyond."[23]

Economic Factors

Iraq is a rentier state; its economy is based on a single-commodity export. Oil counts for more than 95 percent of Iraq's revenue.[24] The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 therefore drove an acute decline in

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[20] Mainly security operations in the south in the 1970s, Anfal, chemical weapons in the Kurdistan region in the 1980s, 1990s, and the military operation against the Shia in the 1990s.

[21] During the Saddam era, the state led many of the sectarian violence operations. After 2003, militias led this effort.

[22] Robert F. Worth, "Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury," *New York Times,* http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/blast-destroys-shrine-in-iraq-setting-off-sectarian.html, (February 22, 2016).

[23] Amnesty International, *Ethnic cleansing on a historic scale: Islamic State's systematic targeting of minorities in northern Iraq,* http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/011/2014/en/6333e9b6-c803-4b17-907d-d254d1b43ecc/mde140112014en.pdf (London: Amnesty International, 2014), 5.

[24] Ibid. Please refer to Figure 2.4.11 (p. 139).

Iraq's fiscal and external balances. Second in importance to the hydrocarbon sector is the agriculture sector, which used to be a major source of revenue and employment for significant parts of the population.[25] Third comes the state-owned industrial sector, which includes aluminum factories, military and car manufacturing plants, sugar factories, drugs factories, food processing and canning plants, and carpet weaving and rug making factories. These factories were built in various Iraqi governorates between the 1960s and the mid-1990s. Fourth is a limited private sector and underdeveloped banking system. The private sector largely depends on government contracting; hence, major activities are linked to the leading political parties and widely considered as venues for much of the ongoing corruption and political violence.

Forced Migration: IDPs and Urban vs. Rural Migration

Forced migration, resulting in massive numbers of IDPs, has frequently been state policy, and has been perpetrated by successive Iraqi governments against various ethnic, religious, and political populations. There has rarely been a time when one group or another was not being expelled from their homes, a phenomenon that accounts for the underlying political basis of expulsion and forced IDPs in Iraq.

Over the last four decades, various types of state-operated expulsions have taken place. For example, Saddam's security operations against the Kurds in the 1980s and against Shia Arabs in the 1990s were instigated as a mechanism to undermine the growth of political opposition in the north and south. A systematic de-villagization process in the Kurdish areas, beginning in the 1970s and culminating in the 1988 Anfal campaign, resulted in the demolition of approximately 4,500 Kurdish villages, forcing 400,000 Kurds to leave their flattened villages to move to Kurdish cities. This created another set of socio-economic problems.[26]

Similar to the process of erasing the Kurdish villages, the Saddam regime implemented large-scale construction projects that radically altered Shia villages, either by draining their irrigation sources or simply demolishing villages that the regime considered to be "pockets of opposition" in order to establish a military presence in the tenuous border areas with Iran. Such operations resulted in 300,000 Shia IDPs during the 1990s.[27]

Most of the IDPs forced out by these policies settled in cities, and did not return to their places of origin after 2003. Additionally, sectarianism, militias' ethnic cleansing operations in provinces on the Iranian borders (Diyala and Basrah), the Da'esh occupation and liberation operations, and the recent ISF realignment operations in disputed areas have created new IDP communities from various ethnic and religious backgrounds. According to OCHA, the total number of IDPs in Iraq has reached 3.2 million.[28]

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[25] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Iraq," http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/IRQ/ (2008).
[26] Hozan Abdulrahman Hasan, *The effect of federalism on the ethnic conflict between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq* (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 2014), 10.
[27] John Fawcett and Victor Tanner, *The Internally Displaced People of Iraq* (Washington, DC: Brookings Occasional Papers, 2002), 1.
[28] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin, October 2017," https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-october-2017-issued-2-november-enku (November 2, 2017).

Forced migration and IDPs have also caused random urbanization without proper infrastructure. This rapid change in the socio-economic fabric of urban society, coupled with political and security turmoil, have caused social and economic conflicts and diminished middle-class influence on social, political, and cultural trends in Iraqi cities. The city of Mosul is a case in point.

After the toppling of Saddam's regime, domestic and regional dynamics in Mosul led to the creation of a complex set of conflicts and the proliferation of terrorist and armed groups. Sectarian policies, especially during Maliki's second term, desertification, and lack of jobs and opportunities in the rural areas of Ninewa[29] (and its adjunct Sunni governorates, i.e. Salah al-Din and Anbar)[30] have created a migratory flow of rural Sunni Arabs to Mosul. These Sunni Arabs have settled in the city's poorest and least serviced areas. Those populations relocating from villages in the south of Mosul (Hammam al-Alil, al-Shora, al-Qayara, and Tal Abta) settled in southwest Mosul (al-Mamoun, al-Rafidain, Tal al-Rumman, al-Risala, Wadi al-Ein, and al-Yarmouk). Those from the north (Tal Afar) settled in the northwest of Mosul in (al-Harmat, al-Nahrawan, al-Eslah, al-Zeraee and 17 Tamouz).[31]

It is a conventional belief among Mosul residents that these poor newcomers to the city from the adjunct regions were the most vulnerable communities to Al Qaeda and Da'esh indoctrination. Most of these peasants were radicalized and subsequently joined Al Qaeda between 2005-2007, and later assumed a leadership role in fighting for and supporting Da'esh.[32]

Minorities and IDPs

Currently, an estimated 3.2 million IDPs remain displaced across Iraq.[33] The majority of the forced IDPs – about 1.2 million, expelled by Da'esh from 2014 onwards, are minorities, and many communities have been drastically reduced in size to the point that they are now in danger of extinction in Iraq:[34]

> *"Over the course of July and August 2014, ISIS expanded dramatically into Ninewah and Salahuddin governorates, in the process uprooting entire minority communities from their historical homelands. Over the course of 24 hours on 6 August, Qaraqosh, Iraq's largest Assyrian Christian town with a history dating back thousands of years, was completely emptied of its inhabitants. As ISIS entered Shia Turkman villages, it carried out kidnappings and executions of civilians while bombing mosques and other religious sites. Some of the group's worst treatment, however, was saved for the Yezidi minority. As ISIS advanced into Sinjar, Yezidis who were not able to escape were systematically rounded up, the men executed or kidnapped and the women forced into sexual slavery."[35]*

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[29] Mainly from Tal Afar and Tal Abta. Desertification and lack of agricultural opportunities in Tal Abta has caused the abandonment of almost 50 villages.

[30] Mainly from al-Shirkat, Baiji in Salah al-Din, and Falluja and Ramadi in Anbar.

[31] UN Habitat, "City Profile of Mosul," file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/UN-Habitat_MosulCityProfile_V5%20(1).pdf, (2016).

[32] Ibid.

[33] Omar Abdel-Razek and Miriam Puttick, "Majorities and Minorities in Post-Da'esh Iraq," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 9, no. 4 (2016): 569-570.

[34] Ibid, 571.

[35] Ibid, 570-571.

Many minorities and vulnerable communities, especially in the Ninewa valley, have lost trust in the ability of the GOI to protect them or prevent further violent operations against them; thus, they are reluctant to return to their homes.

Forced migration and IDPs are among the chronic causes of political, socio-economic, and security conflicts that represent a real challenge to the stability and security of Iraq. In addition to the systematic violent operations mentioned above, the current political and security stalemate around the issue of the IDPs' return to their places of origin poses another source of conflict and threatens Iraqi society with a new set of grievances that might trigger a new wave of violence against the Iraqi state. The main areas of concern are Sherqat and Biji in Salah al-Din, and Juref al-Sakher (the name was changed after liberation to Juref al-Naser) in Babil, whereby PMFs prevent the return of IDPs. In areas around Zummar and Ninewa Valley in Ninewa, and al-Multaqa in Kirkuk, Peshmerga forces have demolished Arab Sunni villages and prevented the return of Arab Sunni IDPs. Another factor in the IDPs' dilemma is intra-tribal revenge operations. This can especially be seen in Anbar governorate; where traditional tribal rivalry has revived on the sidelines of the fight against Da'esh.

The way forward in terms of solving the IDP problem, which largely depends on the way the GOI deals with these issues – through continued expulsions or with justice and compensation - will give a clear indication of the direction of Iraq's social and political context. The path could lead to pluralism and democracy or the continued pattern of repressive rule.

Structural Causes: Democracy and Governance

Arabization and the Property Claims Committee (PCC):

Property claims in the disputed areas and the south and south-center present a structural flaw that continues to exacerbate political conflicts among various ethnic and religious factions.[36]

The CPA established the PCC through the Transitional Administration Law (TAL). The committee was later legislated to be an affiliate of the COR; therefore, a two-third's vote of the COR is required to dissolve it.[37] However, since 2003, the PCC has only settled five percent of claims, and its work is extremely politicized.

The GOI wants to dissolve the committee, using austerity measures as an excuse, but the COR objects to this and considers it a political move to undermine the committee and transfer the matter from COR jurisdiction to the Council of Ministers.[38]

The issue has recently resurfaced after GOI operations in Kirkuk avowing federal government authority in most of the disputed areas. Kirkuk is of particular concern, because various political parties representing

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[36] Interview with COR MPs Hasan Al Shemari and Qasim AlAboudi.
[37] Law no. 2 in 2006, and the amended Law no. 13 in 2010.
[38] Interview with COR MPs Hasan Al Shemari and Qasim AlAboudi.

the Kurds, Arabs, Turkomen, and Christians will mobilize the issue for political capital as they negotiate to settle other issues. Building toward the election in 2018, each political party pushes the PCC dossier to the media and public sphere. While the Kurds and Turkomen demand change and progress in solving the property claims, the Arabs want to keep the status quo and have new GOI approval to keep their rights to the agriculture lands for another season. Both positions exacerbate conflict and the mobilization of armed groups, be it the Peshmerga or PMFs, especially around the fertile agriculture areas in Dobiz, Taza, Hawija, and Daquq.[39]

Sectarianism of the Political System:

The roots of Iraq's successive security and political crises are mainly found in the "sectarianization" of Iraq's institutions and political system, and attempts to monopolize power. Maliki's second term featured a drastic shift towards the monopolization of power and sectarianization of the Iraqi governing institutions. The culmination of these aggressive policies was Maliki's heavy-handed response to an emergent Sunni protest movement in 2013, which alienated Sunnis.[40] Such measures have contributed to the emergence of Da'esh, and the heavy cost in lives, damage to infrastructure, and socio-economic problems resulting from the subsequent fights to liberate the occupied areas.

While PM Abadi has announced a national reform agenda in which he adopted policies to undo most of his predecessor's aggressive policies, he is continually challenged by fierce political rivalry (Maliki and the parliamentary bloc at the COR-Annex 3). Thus, most of the aspects of sectarianization have endured Abadi's reform policies. Heading towards the elections of 2018, the populist use of structural sectarianization will continue to dominate Iraqi politics. (Annex 2)

Regional Causes: Transnational Networks and Neighboring Countries

The Iranian Influence:

Iranian influence has further intensified and shifted from implicit political intervention to explicit proxy military agency. This major change emerged when Iran took over Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's fatwa for Shia men to volunteer to defend Baghdad and push back against Da'esh advancements in 2014. Originally, Sistani's fatwa created the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), which made a fundamental difference in the battle against Da'esh and are hailed as heroes in Iraq. Thus, many of their leaders are now looking to convert their military successes into political power.[41]

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[39] These areas are mixed areas inhabited by the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen.
[40] Fanar Haddad, *Shia-centric State-building and Sunni Rejection in Post 2003 Iraq* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 16.
[41] Emma Sky, "Mission Still Not Accomplished in Iraq: Why the United States Should Not Leave," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 6 (2017), 9-15, 15a.

Having prior militias in place with religious allegiances to Khamenei instead of Sistani, Iran was able to insert its directly funded, trained, and armed militias within the PMFs and mobilize them to further its agenda in Iraq.[42] In addition, following the Hezbollah model in Lebanon, Iran supports some of the leaders of the Iranian-backed militias to convert their military successes into political power.[43]

The Iranian intervention and the strengthening of Iran's military presence are of particular concern for the prospect of stability in Iraq. Tehran's project to create strategic depth by establishing land corridors from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea via Iraq runs through ethnically and religiously mixed areas in Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa, and therefore could undermine the legitimacy of the state of Iraq.[44] Furthermore, widely disseminated reports of the torture and murder of Sunnis at the hands of the Iranian-backed militias in the newly liberated areas have ignited fear and grievances among the Sunni population. Such reports have also led to talks about the possibility of the emergence of new terrorist groups, and Da'esh's sleeper cells resurfacing among the Iraqi political and security establishments.[45]

In addition to Iran, regional intervention, facilitated by Iraq's volatile and permissive context for cultivating clientelism, has significantly increased since the spillover of the Syrian crisis and the emergence of Da'esh in the Sunni areas on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border. Regional rivalry in Syria between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran has exacerbated proxy conflicts in both Iraq and Syria.[46]

Enabling Causes: Access to Resources and Collective Action

The politicization of economic policies to punish and subdue recalcitrant populations in specific areas has resulted in high unemployment rates, diminished the agricultural and industrial sectors, and perpetuated conflicts over resources and income in those areas. For example, during Saddam's regime, measures like land confiscation, preventing access to irrigation, and burning fertile farms were regularly used against the Shia and Kurds. These policies led to the spread of disrepair and salinity across many of the irrigated

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[42] Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Iran's Uncertain Standing in the Middle East," *The Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (2017), 109-111.

[43] Sky, "Mission Still Not Accomplished," 9-15, 15a.

[44] Recently, there were reports about a PMF military parade headed by Hadi al-Amri in Baghdad, and a police parade in Basrah, where, in a move considered to be orchestrated by Iranian operatives, the soldiers marched against the U.S. and Israel. The positive news, however, is that it created a huge backlash on social media and in public from people across Iraq, condemning the act and blaming Iran. It is worth mentioning that Iranian influence is widely detested among Iraqis, especially the Shia, and in many of the peaceful demonstrations, protestors were chanting against Iran. Video, Baghdad demonstrations, chants against Iran: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPAI21DaDlg

Akbarzadeh, "Iran's Uncertain Standing," 109-111.

[45] Amnesty International, "Iraqis fleeing IS-held areas face torture, disappearance and death in revenge attacks," https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/iraqis-fleeing-is-held-areas-face-torture-disappearance-and-death-in-revenge-attacks/ (October 18, 2016).

[46] Meltem Ersoy and Esra Ozyurek, *Contemporary Turkey at a Glance II* (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2017), 165-166.

fields.[47] Maliki deployed the same measures against the Sunnis during his second term, Da'esh used similar tools to exploit and extract revenues[48], and finally, Shia militias burned the palm groves and citrus plantations in Salah al-Din and Diyala to oust the Sunnis from strategic areas bordering Iran.[49]

Loss and destruction in the agriculture and industrial sectors have had a monumental impact on the population. The rural agricultural areas in Iraq have the highest unemployment rate in the history of the country, with nearly 50 percent of the working age population unemployed.[50] Thus, the negative effects of the collapse of oil prices, negligence of industrial plants, and deterioration of the agriculture sector in Iraq (a sector that constitutes only four percent of the GDP), will continue to generate social, economic, and security conflicts in post-Da'esh Iraq.[51]

Given that the agriculture sector has an enormous impact on generating conflicts, and has been often neglected in CSAs of Iraq, the following sections elaborate on the relationship between agriculture and the continuation of different forms of conflict in Iraq.

Agriculture and Conflict in Shia Areas

In the aftermath of the 1991 Shia uprising against Saddam, the regime started what can be described as "the war of irrigation." The campaign led to the spread of disrepair and salinity across much of the irrigated fields of southern Iraq.

Moreover, a severe drought which persisted throughout much of the Middle East from 1999 through 2001 devastated crop output in Iraq. The irrigated production of the central and southern regions suffered from 43 percent diminished water availability. Shortage of fodder resulted in forced slaughter of sheep and

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[47] UN Habitat, "City Profile of Mosul," file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/UN-Habitat_MosulCityProfile_V5%20(1).pdf (2016).

[48] Da'esh control of Salah al-Din, Anbar, and parts of Diyala from 2014-2016 have created a huge loss in wheat and other agriculture products. Before 2014, Salah al-Din ranked first in wheat production, and the area between Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala covered 52 percent of Iraq's livestock needs. The agriculture sector lost 40 percent of its production because of Da'esh occupation.
Sources: AlHayat, "The agriculture sector loses 40%,". http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/6844138/-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4--%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-40-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9, (2015).
Business Insider, "Da'esh Wheat Season Sows Seeds of Discontent," http://www.businessinsider.com/r-special-report-for-islamic-state-wheat-season-sows-seeds-of-discontent-2015-1 (2015).

[49] "Militias Turn Baghdad Belt to Ghost Towns," *AlAraby Newspaper*, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/1/28/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA (January 2017).

[50] Dr. Muthher Muhammad Salih, "The Underclass and Eastern Tyranny in Iraq," *Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning*, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2JknZwYJF35RGtUQ1ZvRXBNaUE/view (April 2015).

[51] Ibid.

compounded the impact of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 1998. An estimated one million head of livestock died due to lack of medicines. Agricultural productivity suffered from lack of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, and pesticides.[52]

Saddam's decision to drain the Arab Marshes in the south was another factor in diminishing the agricultural economy of the Shia. In the aftermath of the failed Shia uprising in 1991 and the brutality used against the community, several Shia armed groups were formed in Iran in training bases across the border with the marshes. The regime reacted by draining the marshes. Between December 1991 and February 1992, the regime's actions contributed to the destruction of 70 marsh villages and displaced 50,000 people.[53] Attacks against the Marsh Arabs continued and 5,000 Marsh Arab refugees fled to Himmet, an Iranian town across the border, where they joined a Shia refugee camp there.[54]

These measures destroyed the main source of income and humiliated a once self-sufficient agrarian community. It is also one of the main reasons for the chronic high unemployment rate among youth in the south. Successive governments in post-Saddam Iraq could not, or did not, remedy the situation. Hence, militias and sectarian extremists had fertile land for recruitment.

Agriculture and Conflict in Sunni Areas

With the tacit approval of Maliki, the Shia militias As'aeb Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ab Hezbollah have carried out retributive destruction against the Sunni agriculture communities in the Baghdad Belt[55] and Anbar. Numerous reports document the militias' operations raiding homes and burning palm groves and citrus plantations in Salah al-Din and Diyala in 2015. Recently, reports have surfaced again about the return of As'aeb Ahl al-Haq militias to the Baghdad Belt and the systematic destruction of farms and agricultural lands, in addition to the kidnapping and extortion of civilians. [56]

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[52] FAO, Iraq Report, 2008.
[53] Michael Wood, "Saddam Drains the Marsh of Arabs," *The Independent*, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saddam-drains-the-life-of-the-marsh-arabs-the-arabs-of-southern-iraq-cannot-endure-their-villages-1463823.html (August 27, 1993).
[54] Ibid.
[55] Baghdad Belt: The rural environs encircling Baghdad have an overwhelming majority of Arab Sunnis. The northeast of the belt edges mixed areas in Diyala, whereas the southeast edges a majority Shia area in Babil. The northwest and west quadrant neighbors' majority-Sunni areas with strong tribal ties. The area was known for its dense palm groves on the banks of the Tigris, and agriculture and dairy products, hence it was a traditional picnicking area for families from Baghdad and was considered Baghdad's Food Basket. The rural area suddenly became an important security zone for Baghdad in 1991, when Saddam used the Republican Guard Forces to encircle Baghdad and shield it from the advance of the Shia uprising. In post-Saddam Iraq, Al Qaeda and later Da'esh captured these strategic areas and their enabling terrains, with their dense agriculture farms and rural population. The terrorist organizations heavily exploited the area and oppressed its population, which was also attacked by Shia militias. According to the International Rescue Committee, "at least 83,000 people, the vast majority of them Sunnis, have abandoned their homes in the rural area around the capital." Reuters, "Baghdad Belt, Special Report," http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdad-specialreport-idUSKBN0JV10J20141217 (2014).
[56] "Militias Turn Baghdad Belt to Ghost Towns," *AlAraby Newspaper*, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/1/28/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD-

Da'esh control of Salah al-Din, Anbar, and parts of Diyala from 2014-2016 have created a huge loss in wheat and other agriculture products. Before 2014, Salah al-Din produced the most wheat out of all Iraqi provinces, and the area between Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala produced 52 percent of Iraq's livestock needs.[57] Iraq's agriculture sector lost 40 percent of its production because of Da'esh occupation.[58]

The loss and destruction that were created because of Da'esh, and the Shia militias in the Sunni areas, had a monumental effect on the population, especially on the youth, who constitute approximately 50 percent of the population.[59]

Based on these figures, taking Sunni and Shia areas together, the rural agricultural areas in Iraq have the highest unemployment rate in the history of the country, with nearly 50 percent of the working age population unemployed.[60] Thus, the negative effects of the collapse of the agriculture sector in Iraq, though currently constituting only four percent of Iraq's GDP, will continue to generate social, economic, and security problems in post-Da'esh Iraq.[61]

Low Intensity Conflict Types and Locations

Terrorism: Newly Liberated Areas

Da'esh has lost its strongholds in Mosul, Anbar, and Salah al-Din. The continuous military operations to recapture the towns and villages on the Iraq-Syria border have been largely successful, and violence in Iraq has fallen to its lowest level since 2014. While Iraqi intelligence about potential Da'esh attacks has significantly improved, Da'esh and its terrorist sleeper cells still threaten civilians and hinder the return of IDPs. Attacks and suicide bombs are still reported in the liberated areas of Mosul and Kirkuk, with

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%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA (January 2017).
"Warns of Demographic Change in Baghdad Belt," *AlAraby Newspaper,* https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/9/22/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF (December 2016).
[57] "The agriculture Sector loses 40%," *AlHayat,* http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/6844138/-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4--%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-40-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9 (2015).
[58] Business Insider, "Da'esh Wheat Season."
[59] UNDP, "Iraq Profile."
[60] Dr. Salih, "The Underclass and Eastern Tyranny."
[61] Ibid.

perpetrators infiltrating the area by blending in with returning IDPs.[62] According to several officials from Kirkuk, Da'esh sleeper cells are a major security challenge, and controlling the area between Tooz-Sherqat (Salah al-Din), and Hawija (Kirkuk) (about 9,000 km with a complex geography) is extremely difficult for Iraq.[63]

Military Stalemate: Disputed Areas

The GOI's military realignment operations in Kirkuk and the disputed areas in the aftermath of the Kurdish referendum on September 25, 2017 have created a new political crisis between the KRG and GOI. This, in turn, has shifted both the KRG and GOI's focus away from the fight against Da'esh and created a military stalemate in the areas of Alton Kopri (Kirkuk) and Fish Khabur (Ninewa). Further, the expanded PMF presence on the sideline of the ISF presence in Kirkuk, and the humiliating Peshmerga retreat, have created a tenuous security situation in Kirkuk's Kurdish collective towns of Imam Qasim, Shorja, and Rahimawa. Informal Kurdish armed groups have conducted continuous attacks against PMFs and ISF checkpoints.

Militias and Tribal Conflicts: South and South-Center

Militias and Transnational Allegiances

The issue of Shia militias emerged on a low scale in 2003. At that time, Iran supported Jaysh al-Mahdi and later established other militias to fight the American troops. Political and security developments, whether on domestic or regional levels, have contributed to the expansion of these militias in terms of numbers, capabilities, and roles within the Iraqi security and political establishments.

Starting his second term with the goal of securing a third term, Maliki wanted to pacify the Sunni opposition and stabilize Sunni areas using force and aggressive measures. Toward that end, Maliki relied on the militias instead of the official Iraqi Army. In addition, Maliki's efforts to encourage splits from Jaysh al-Mahdi and support the Iranian-backed militias, such as Kata'eb Hezbollah and al-Nujba, had intensified during his second term as a way to weaken the military capabilities of his Shia rivals while establishing militia forces for the al-Dawa party. For example, he supported As'aeb Ahl al-Haq (AAH), headed by Qais al-Khaza'ali,[64] to weaken al-Sadr and empower al-Dawa within the National Alliance.[65] The AAH is now part of the

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[62] Josie Ensor, "Hundreds of Mosul residents flee liberated neighbourhoods after ISIL sleeper cell attack," *The Telegraph*, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/26/hundreds-mosul-residents-flee-liberated-neighbourhoods-isil/ (June 26, 2017).

[63] Interview with MP Hasan Turan, November 22, 2017.
And: http://alnoornews.net/archives/146023/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-60-%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7/

[64] ElKhaza'ali was a member of al-Sadr's militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi, then left the militia to start his own militia with Iranian support in 2005. American troops accused ElKhaza'ali of conducting several attacks against the troops on behalf of the Iranians. He was in prison between 2007-2009, and then was released by Maliki.

[65] The National Alliance is a Shia parliamentary bloc encompassing the major Shia parties.

PMFs/Iranian-backed militia faction. The AAH has more than 10,000 fighters and is one of the first Shia militias that fought in Syria.[66]

In 2014, when Da'esh controlled most of the Sunni Areas in Iraq, Sistani issued a religious decree (fatwa) to form the PMFs. Since then, the number of Shia militias have doubled in numbers and capabilities. Iraqi sources document 79 militias active in the country since 2003, with the majority of them announcing their allegiances to Khamenei – Iran.[67]

Tribal Conflict

The power and influence of tribal leaders in Iraq diminished in the second half of the 20th century because of the modernization and secularization policies of successive Iraqi governments in the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1980s. However, tribalism was revived during the 1990s. Saddam's regime used tribal leaders to control and rule Iraqi society during the international embargo that crippled the Iraqi economy from 1990 to 2003. The Iraqi government needed to empower the landowners, the majority of whom were tribal leaders in rural areas, to increase wheat production and other strategic agriculture products. The plan was vital during the international sanctions to ensure food sufficiency, support government endurance, and enhance the government's ability to feed the Iraqi people through ration cards. Therefore, lavish government subsidies and production of the annual harvest enriched the tribal leaders and farmers of the rural areas.

While the Iraqi middle class was falling below the poverty line, the tribal leaders, peasants, and farmers were surfacing as the new elite of Iraqi society. Governorates rich with agriculture products and holding critical political status – especially Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Anbar, Diyala, Wasit, and Basrah - witnessed profound shifts in their social and economic strata. By the time the Saddam regime was toppled in 2003, tribalism and the elevated status of tribal leaders had already become a prevailing political, social, and economic factor.

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[66] European Union Study, "The Shiite Militias,"
http://www.migri.fi/download/61225_Security_Situation_in_Baghdad_-_The_Shia_Militias_29.4.2015.pdf?01abe06266acd288 (April 2015).
"Shiite militias expand influence, redraw map in central Iraq," *The National*,
http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/shiite-militias-expand-influence-redraw-map-in-central-iraq."
(December 31, 2014).
[67] Some reports about Hashed measures in the Sunni areas: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0K909K20141231
"Iraq's Killing Zone," *Chicago Tribune*, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-iraq-killing-zones-20141217-story.htm (2014).
A study about Hashed with a list of their names: (Arabic) http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/31326
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/31/iraq-pro-government-militias-trail-death
Human Rights Watch, "After Liberation Came Destruction," https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/18/after-liberation-came-destruction/iraqi-militias-and-aftermath-amerli (March 2015).
Details of the Sunnis: http://altagreer.com/%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1/

In 2007, the United States began to empower Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, and the success of the project in Falluja and Anbar quickly led to the spread of the project to the rest of the Sunni areas. American troops funded the Sons of Iraq and the Awakening Groups, which were led by Sunni tribal leaders and aimed to oust Al Qaeda.

In 2008, Maliki waged a military operation (the Knights' Charge) against al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia in Basrah and Maysan. The tribes provided valuable support in Maliki's crackdown. Recognizing this newfound power, and borrowing from the U.S. experience with the Awakening Groups and Sons of Iraq, Maliki created the Tribal Support Councils in the southern provinces: Babil, Wasit, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Basrah. He later expanded these councils to Baghdad and the Sunni provinces as well. Members of the Tribal Support Councils were offered positions and employment within the Iraqi security forces, monthly payments for tribal leaders, and a direct linkage to the prime minister's office.[68]

This structure was formed to achieve the following goals:
- To undermine al-Sadr and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council's (SIIC) control of the provincial councils and local governments in the south. In 2008, Maliki's al-Dawa Party controlled only Karbala. With the Tribal Support Councils, the al-Dawa party brought the southern constituencies under its control without elections. Therefore, the SIIC and al-Sadr were vocal against these councils, which they considered unconstitutional and the basis for a dictatorship.[69]
- To empower the al-Dawa party with a massive militia and popular support. Maliki's al-Dawa party in 2008 was the weakest among the three Shia parties in the south. The party did not have a militia similar to the Mahdi Army of al-Sadr or the Badr Forces of SIIC. The Tribal Support Councils empowered the al-Dawa party with a massive militia and channeled new supporters to the party. The councils played an important role in securing the majority of the votes for Maliki's list in the provincial elections of 2009.[70]
- To disassemble the Awakening Groups and Sons of Iraq, divide the Sunni tribes, and undermine the tribal leaders leading the Sons of Iraq forces. Maliki expanded the councils to Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Diyala. He pressured or bribed many of the tribal leaders to abandon their demands for integrating their forces in the Iraqi army and security forces.[71]

Types and Areas of the Tribal Conflicts

Tribal conflicts have become the main source of destabilization in the south (Wasit, Basrah, Maysan, and Diwaniya) and center (Diyala and Anbar) since 2014.

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[68] ISW, "Maliki Makes a Play for the Southern Tribes," http://iraqslogger.powweb.com/downloads/ISW_Report_Nov2008.pdf (2008).
Alissa J. Rubin, "Maliki's Push for Election Gains, Despite Fears," *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/middleeast/26maliki.html (January 25, 2009).
[69] ISW, "Maliki makes a Play," 4.
[70] "The Southern Tribes Against the Provincial Councils," *Neqash*, http://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/politics/2290/ (2008).
Sam Parker, "Shiite Rivalries Increasing as Provincial Elections Near," http://www.epic-usa.org/shiite-rivalries-increasing-as-provincial-elections-near/ (2008).
[71] "Disputes over the Tribal Support Councils," http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2008/10/disputes-over-tribal-support-councils.html (2008).

Abadi dissolved the Tribal Support Councils in 2015 to regain the trust of his fellow Shia political parties, Sadr and SIIC.[72] Re-strengthening the Shia alliance was crucial to mobilize support for Abadi's new government and its difficult task of defeating Da'esh and liberating the Iraqi provinces. However, Abadi's decision renewed two types of tribal conflicts: first, the conflict between the tribes and the government over power and resources;[73] and second, the intra-tribal conflicts over control of irrigation sources, lands, and smuggling/trade routes. Basrah, Maysan, and Wasit (city center Kut) provide the main examples of such conflicts.

In Basrah and Maysan, the tribes are fighting over control of the drug trade and smuggling routes between Iran and Iraq. The pro-Iranian militias have banned the use of alcohol in these governorates and facilitated the smuggling of Iranian-made drugs (Krystal, the local name for methamphetamine).[74]

In Wasit, the intra-governorate tribal conflicts are over land control and irrigation sources.[75] The inter-governorate tribal conflict, on the other hand, is with the Diwaniya governorate over investment in the disputed marshes of Dalmej.[76]

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[72] "Abadi Decides to Cancel the Tribal Support Councils," *Iraqi News Network*, http://aliraqnews.com/%D8%A8%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4/ (2015).

[73] "Abadi is outgunned in fight to disarm the tribes," *Al Monitor*, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2016/03/iraq-basra-tribes-fighting-disarmament.html (March 2016).
Rawabet Center, "Basra Tribes if the Government doesn't fight the criminals we will use our weapons," http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/38987 (2017).

[74] Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Basra Police Battle Crystal Meth epidemic," *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/16/no-one-smuggles-oil-any-more-basra-police-battle-crystal-meth-epidemic (August 16, 2016).
"Basra the Drug Hub," *The National World*, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/basra-becomes-hub-of-drug-abuse (2010).
"Police overwhelmed as drugs from Iran flood Basra," *AlMonitor*, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/basra-iraq-drug-smuggling-iran.html (October 2016).
"Drugs Wage Tribal War," *Al Sumeria*, http://www.alsumaria.tv/mobile/news/165189/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AF/ar (2016).

[75] "Wasit Provincial Council Intervene to End a Tribal Conflict," http://www.wasitpc.gov.iq/2015/09/11/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%8B-%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B9/ (2015).

[76] "AlRafidian Operation Ends (22) Tribal Conflicts in Wasit," *AlMerbad*, http://www.almirbad.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=24012017&id=33edc60d-57c1-4add-b527-8aacfab256e3 (2017).
"Police Patrols the Dilmaj Marshes to Prevent a Tribal Conflict Between Wasit and Diwania," *Al Sumeria*, http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/64012/alsumaria-news/ar# (2012).

The tribal conflicts are also exacerbated by tribal loyalties to various groups of the PMF (Hashed) militias. The historical rivalry among certain tribes has transferred to dictate their support to rival militias. Concurrently, the simmering fights among different Hashed militias over resources and influence are reflected in their tribal support. Diyala is a clear example of such conflicts. The Tameem tribe, which supports the Badr militia led by Hadi al-Amri, is currently fighting the Rabia tribe, which supports the As'aeb Ahl al-Haq militia led by Qais al-Khaza'ali, in Abu Saida town, near the Iranian border. The town is an important trading and smuggling route and part of Miqdadiya, a Sunni town. At first, the Badr and Asa'eb Hashed raided houses and conducted mass killings and random kidnappings and detentions in Miqdadiya to control the town and expel its population. However, the simmering fights between the two groups have erupted in Abu Saida, where the Tameem tribe (manifested in the Badr militia) fights the Rabia tribe (manifested in Asa'eb Ahl al-Haq). The Khazraj and Zubaid tribes have also had several clashes over control of Shifta village near the Iranian border.[77]

Da'esh control of Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa has divided the Sunni tribes between those who supported Da'esh and those who opposed it. The conflict has also revived historical tribal rivalries. In Anbar, Da'esh conducted a massacre against the Albu Namer tribe, executing about 500 men[78] who were fighting alongside the Iraqi government to liberate Heet and Therthar. These atrocities will instigate tribal revenge killings once these areas are liberated.[79]

Governance and Conflict

Structural Conflict

Iraq suffers from protracted conflicts that go far beyond the restricted timeline of political negotiations or regime change. Iraq's structural violence persists and has often instigated intra-communal violence.[80]

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[77] "Hareth AlRubai demands Abadi to intervene against Tameem Tribe," *The Baghdad Post*, http://www.thebaghdadpost.com/ar/story/2202/%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7 (2016).
"Tribal Conflicts Exacerbated by the Militias in Abu Saida-Diyala," *Bas News*, http://www.basnews.com/index.php/ar/reports/296589 (2016).

[78] "Who is Albu Nemar Tribe that Da'esh executed 500 of its men," *AlNahar*, http://www.annahar.com/article/186249-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-500-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7 (2014).

[79] "Da'esh executes 70 of Albu Namer," *Al-Arabiya*, http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2015/10/05/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%85-70-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1.html (2015).

[80] John Paul Lederach, *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Successive wars (external and internal) have created chronic capacity gaps, exhibited in the state's failure to deliver services, protection, security, and stability. Corruption, failure and abuse of the energy (oil) sector and public finance, and failure to provide adequate civil services that meet the expectations of the Iraqi public continue to contribute to grievances and serve as an entry point for conflict actors who seek to exploit the gaps for political gains.[81]

In this regard, the decentralization process is the main tool to counter the structural challenges of the Iraqi governing system. The following section explains the impact of some aspects of the decentralization process on the Iraqi governing structure and the potential for conflict eruption in certain parts of the country.

Decentralization and Conflict

The trajectory of the decentralization process in Iraq is influenced by the conflicting incentives of different key political players, and the country's institutional legacy of strong centralized bureaucracy and authoritarian regime. Subjective and political motivations such as elections, partisan calculations, power consolidation, and checking political opponents are still the main engine to advance or hinder the political process, rather than institutional or legal requirements. These motivations continue to underlie conflicts about the nature and coverage of decentralization.[82] In addition, in Iraq, conflicts over decentralization (and in certain cases recentralization) cannot be separated from historical grievances between the three main Iraqi factions - the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds.

These issues have clearly manifested in the contradictory approaches that Maliki and Abadi took in dealing with the decentralization process. Maliki's heavy-handed control of the state over two terms differs markedly with Abadi's commitment to the decentralization process, even though both operate within the same baseline governing framework.

In the aftermath of the Da'esh occupation, and the plummeting of oil prices, Abadi framed decentralization as a means to strengthen the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. Concurrently, he advanced the process of realigning GOI authority throughout the national territory, as seen in the recent operations in Kirkuk and the disputed areas to affirm GOI authority. The simultaneous move towards decentralization in certain Iraqi regions, while advancing recentralization measures in other parts of the country, carries the potential for destabilizing activities like guerrilla war. The recent attacks by informal Kurdish armed groups in Kirkuk, and the military stalemate/build-up on the frontline between the Peshmerga and ISF/PMFs in areas near Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces, are clear examples of such conflict risks.

Concurrent with the crisis with the KRG, the decentralization process in certain parts of the country has facilitated venues for non-state actors to advance their militant and trans-border agendas. For example, Diyala is one of the most important provinces for Iran's regional project, and hosts the bases of strong Iranian-backed militias such as As'aeb Ahl al-Haq and the Badr organization. The political leanings of the

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[81] Søren Schmidt, "The Role of Religion in Politics: The Case of Shia-Islamism in Iraq," *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society* 22, no. 2 (2009): 123-143.
[82] COR MP interviews: Hasan AlShamari (Shia Fathela Party) and Ameen Baker (Gorran-Kurdish change movement)

provincial government tilt towards the Badr organization, whose leader, Hadi al-Amri, heads the PMFs. The provincial government of Diyala was able to expand financial measures for generating local revenues outside the legal framework by taxing commercial tracks on the main trading routes between Baghdad and Turkey via the KRG.[83] These revenues, following the Hezbollah model, could easily be channeled to the benefit of the militias to advance the Iranian agenda.

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[83] The PC has imposed a one percent tariff on the overall value of commodities that pass through the province (Atheem district- al-Safra checkpoint). This mechanism has so far generated an average of IQD 30-50 million per day. Source: Meeting with Diyala deputy head of provincial council on October 29, 2017.

IGPA CONFLICT SENSITIVITY STRATEGY

Implementation Strategy

IGPA is not a project "working specifically *ON* conflict (i.e., to address conflict issues);"[84] instead, it operates "*IN* conflict (i.e., applying a conflict sensitive lens to ensure that programming does not have a negative impact on the conflict at hand)."[85]

Accordingly, based on the contextual overview of the Iraqi conflicts explained in the sections above, and recognizing the complexity of the country's chronic and protracted conflicts, IGPA will adopt CS strategy in all phases of activity design and implementation.

The nature of IGPA activities and objectives necessarily involves working at both the provincial and federal levels. Conflict may accordingly ensue on either level: as part of a larger controversy over the appropriateness of decentralization as a strategy for providing services; and within provinces, where the delivery of services, whether decentralized or not, may be perceived as favoring one group over another. On the federal level, IGPA will seek out "champions" of decentralization who will be helpful in both legitimizing and promoting decentralization as the preferred strategy for the delivery of services, and who will further help answer objections from critics of decentralization. Decentralization, to be successful, must bear an Iraqi face. At the provincial level, IGPA will operate in line with the following principles:

1. Ensure that programming choices demonstrate awareness of different forms of conflict and, in accordance with the "do no harm" principle, do not exacerbate them.
2. Work to establish consensus within provinces on the delivery of services as a means of demonstrating good governance.
3. Be a constant advocate for fairness in the distribution of services.
4. Be aware of the implications of program choices for increasing or diminishing conflict in the selection of partners.
5. Recognize the need for ensuring sustainability in the delivery of services through training and strengthening of financial capacities of provinces and service delivery agencies.
6. Assist the local government in communicating about its service delivery successes.
7. Seek out opportunities to find innovative ways to provide security, for example in cooperation with another donor providing infrastructure assistance while IGPA provides capacity building support.

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[84] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "Framework for conflict-sensitive programming in Iraq," https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/framework-conflict-sensitive-programming-iraq (December 31, 2007).
[85] Ibid.

8. Be aware that additional resources will be required for improved service delivery and ensure that any fees collected are done so in a transparent and fair manner.

Anchoring CS in Activity Design and Implementation

IGPA's implementation strategy is contingent on a clear understanding of the context of conflict and its interaction with project activities. The strategy aims to prevent unintentional conflict provoking, and, where possible, to mitigate and contribute to conflict prevention in the area of operation. Hence, the implementation strategy will inform all levels of interventions and all stages of a programming cycle. Deploying USAID CAF 2.0, 2012, (Figure 1), Conflict Sensitive Activity Design Tool, Conflict Sensitive Solicitation Checklist, and the Activity Design Template the following are the key issues IGPA will take into consideration to identify CS aspects of activity design and implementation.

Step 1: Contextual Understanding on Provincial Level

Under guidance from USAID, senior IGPA management will work with the technical staff leading activities to build in conflict analyses for project activities, especially for the primary interventions at the provincial level. Ideally, once we select the target provinces, we will develop conflict sensitivity analyses, in addition to gender and vulnerable population sensitivity analyses[86] for each activity undertaken, which will draw upon the best available data and an assessment of the potential effect of data gaps on the proposed activity's ability to increase or decrease conflict. Additionally, the analyses will take into account the demographic and political realities of each province in which IGPA works. To that end, and given the challenging context of data collection in Iraq, IGPA will adopt a province- and locality-specific approach by triangulating data from various sources in order to have a full grasp of the dynamics. Sources will include project staff, interviews with local partners and government institutions, and national or international CSOs such as, but not limited to, UN agencies and International Crisis Group.

Step 2: Identifying Activity Impact on Conflict

Upon the completion of the CSA, and after obtaining a strong understanding of the conflict dynamics, IGPA will determine how interventions may impact the conflict context and develop strategies to maximize positive outcomes, minimize negative side effects, and develop an understanding of how these issues may affect the project's overall effectiveness. To that end, IGPA will use a risk/opportunity analysis to identify potential risks and opportunities to mitigate potential tensions through project activities and reinforce the dynamics of peace. Given IGPA's provincial and locality focus, understanding the intra-communal/group conflict dynamics in the target provinces is of particular importance for the identification of activity impacts. Thus, IGPA will consider several factors when selecting engagement activities, including the variety of the targeted locations, ethnicities, religions, and province affirmative action toward

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[86] IGPA's subcontractor Gender Resources Inc (GRI) has developed a gender sensitivity analysis and implementation strategy. The IGPA technical team will integrate both as part of the conflict sensitivity toolkit deployed at activity design and implementation levels.

presently marginalized groups. IGPA will focus on achieving neutrality among the various groups and provinces in order to avoid any perception of favoritism.

Step 3: Strategy for Activity Implementation

This step is focused on utilizing the information obtained during contextual and activity impact analyses (steps one and two) for the specific province to mitigate potential negative impact on conflict dynamics, encourage positive outcomes, and monitor for these outcomes.

Specifically, he strategy will include the following steps:
1. What: Identify activity goal and target.
2. Who: Participants, implementers, and beneficiaries (e.g. diverse group of local officials, CSOs, diverse localities/institutions in the target province).

SaferWorld's Guiding Principles for Conflict Sensitive Approaches:

- Participatory process: the process perceived as being Iraqi and beneficial to Iraqis, not imposed by outsiders.
- Inclusive: actors, issues, and perceptions-various ethnic/religion/socio-economic background
- Ensure impartiality
- Transparent process of activity design, plan, and implementation
- Respectful of people's ownership of their conflict and their suffering
- Program Accountability
- Partnership and coordination
- Complementarity and coherence
- Timely

3. When and How: When and how the activity will occur and implementation process.
4. Strategy Inclusion: CS strategy will be part of planning and implementation discussions for the suggested activity.
5. Re-adjustment plans: Establish re-adjustment plans to address conflict prone issues as they arise. The DNH considerations are of particular impact in this regard. A decision not to move forward will be considered should potential conflict emerge, or the engagement appears to exacerbate rather than mitigate conflict.
6. IGPA management ensures that all staff take and understand that CSA is an integral component of the project and all issues should be immediately reported.

Using USAID's guide to Conflict Sensitive Activity Design Tool[87], IGPA developed an "Activity Checklist" based on USAID's Activity Design Template to secure the inclusion of both conflict and gender sensitivity analyses at activity levels of: a) designing the intervention, b) developing the SoW, and c) operationalizing the implementation:

IGPA Activity Checklist: Project Design and Implementation
Conflict Sensitivity and Gender Sensitivity

Component	Impact Pattern	Questions	Notes
Location: Where?	Distribution	• Why did we choose this location? Are there other donors/activities at work in this location? • Who is left out because of our location choices? • Does the target area benefit one identity (minority, gender, vulnerable) group more than another? • Is this location accessible to all beneficiaries? • Does the location choice of the activity send any messages about preference for one group over another? • Do authorities seek to control or manipulate the selection of beneficiaries, the location of interventions, or activity implementation in ways that are biased and may raise tensions?	The Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds are located in defined-boundaries regions. IGPA will pay extra attention to secure proximity and access to the populations located in four problematic areas so that they can participate in activities and benefit from resources: 1. Mixed communities in the disputed areas (Kirkuk, Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al-Din). 2. Pockets of Shia communities in Sunni areas, and pockets of Sunni communities in Shia areas. Examples of the former are Samara and Baled districts in the Sunni province Salah al-Din, and Tal Afar district in Ninewa. Examples of the latter are Zubair in the Shia province Basrah. 3. Religious minorities are mainly located in the Ninewa valley. 4. The capital Baghdad, which inhabits various Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and minorities. For example: the Risafa area is mainly Shia and Karekh area is mainly Sunni. The Kurds are mainly located in Falastine street and Jamila quarters, whereas the Christians are in the Karrada, Mesbah, and Zaiona areas.
Participants: For who?	Inclusion	*For who?* • Are all identity groups that exist in the context represented among beneficiaries? • Why did we choose our criteria to select a target group? Why them? Why not others? • Who did we leave out and why? • Will anticipated interventions exacerbate existing tensions (dividers) between these identity groups? • How might patterns of exclusion (e.g., gender, identity) impact access to aid? *With whom?*	Similar to above, designing project is problematic for the mixed communities. IGPA will work to address the sensitivity of beneficiary selection in the disputed areas, pockets of Sunnis and Shias communities in the opposite sect areas, and the Ninewa Valley.

Component	Impact Pattern	Questions	Notes
With whom?		• Do staff of potential partner organizations represent any particular group? • Are staff able to engage with both men and women, for example in environments where women's engagement may be limited? • Are they able to engage vulnerable populations? • Which partner authorities are involved in the activity? • Are these authorities considered representative of diverse identities (women, vulnerable populations, ethnicity, etc.)? • Are they seeking to bolster their position or legitimacy or to weaken that of others?	
Activity: What does it involve?	Operationalization	• What resources (skills, services, goods, etc.) is the activity bringing? • Are the resources appropriate for the context? For different gender identity groups? • How does the activity distribute resources? • Are certain groups benefiting more than others? • Is there resistance to the activity? By whom? Why? • What is the impact of the activity on conflict dynamics? • What is the impact of the activity on gender dynamics? • How do these resources affect different identity groups and the relations between them? • Are there security risks for beneficiaries?	IGPA's activities are mainly targeting government and bureaucracy officials on provincial level. The local government and provincial councils are politicians who were elected based on a proportional representation system. Hence, IGPA will pay extra attention in the designing its activities, as they can be highly political and be perceived as inadvertently supporting one group on the expense of the other.
Purpose: Why this activity?	Legitimization	• How does the activity advance the project purpose? • Do people in the community agree that the anticipated desired change facilitated by this activity is important? • Are there differences in needs and perceptions of women and other vulnerable or marginalized populations? • Why did we select these resources and interventions? Why this activity?	At the heart of IGPA's objectives are better service delivery and decentralization as a means towards achieving that goal. The differences in implementing the decentralization process from one province (representing one ethnic/religion component) to another is visible. For example, PM Abadi has decided to slow down the devolution process to Anbar and Ninewa on allegations of corruption and that the current local governments did not defend their provinces against Da'esh advancement.

Component	Impact Pattern	Questions	Notes
			IGPA will account for such subtle political decision in designing and implementing activities in the newly liberated areas.
Timing: When?	Consideration	• Does the planned timing of activity interventions (consultations, training, distributions, etc.) coincide with any of the conflict triggering events, such as elections? • Does the planned timing of interventions make any beneficiaries/staff vulnerable to violence? • Are times appropriate for the inclusion of women, vulnerable groups, and minorities? • Who may be left out based on our timeframes?	The context in which IGPA is launched is featured by the following: 1. Post-Da'esh Iraq 2. Post-Kurdish Referendum 3. Pre-Elections of 2018 4. Amidst Abadi anti-corruption campaign 5. Amidst a shaken social contract
Means: How?	Orientation	• How do activity operations affect gender, minority, and vulnerable groups dynamics? • Who is involved in decision-making processes? Are these processes inclusive (men, women, marginalized populations, other identity groups)? • What mechanism should we install to create safe spaces for feedback and complaints from participants and non-participants? • Do women, vulnerable populations, and other identity groups have equal access to activity information or do we need to make additional efforts at communication? • Are there risks of backlash when supporting the empowerment of women or minority groups in certain areas? If so, how do we mitigate that?	
Monitoring and Evaluation	Equity and inclusiveness	• Does the activity require context-specific quantitative and qualitative indicators for conflict sensitivity? • Does the activity require context-specific indicators that measure progress or monitor context relative to gendered dimensions of the conflict? `	1.Specific context-demographic must be taken into account in engendering targets or to ensure an equity lens is setting indicators. 2.Context-specific indicators ensures that possible consequences (intended as well as unintended, positive and negative) of community-specific dynamics are detected early on, allowing learning and adaptation to avoid contributing to/accelerating violence and tensions. For example:

Component	Impact Pattern	Questions	Notes
		• What are the adaptive management aspect considered in this activity?	• Context specific indicators to provide information on how the conflict issues relevant to the intervention are evolving. • Interaction indicators that track how the intervention is affected by the conflict, and how it affects the conflict trends, considering facts and perceptions of who benefits from the intervention. Context-specific conflict sensitivity indicators serves as an 'early warning system' for program impacts and ensures collaboration, learning and adaption (CLA) through, inter alia: • Regular review of Drivers/Connectors (tensions/enablers) for changes in dynamic between these. • Revisiting priority Drivers/Connectors to monitor and adjust prioritization as needed. • Determining which details of the activity in a specific context caused changes in Drivers/Connectors. • Identifying the Patterns of Impact, i.e. context-specific negative/positive patterns of behavior related to Respect, Accountability, Fairness and Transparency. • Identifying available options to change the patterns, with due consideration to the impact of such changes, e.g. will changes result in conflict mitigation or in amplification?

IGPA Year 1 Plan:

The following are the suggested steps for Year 1 (using USAID CAF, DAI's IGPA proposal, and DAI IGPA sample):

1. The Chief of Party (COP) holds ultimate responsibility for ensuring conflict sensitive approaches are prioritized and mainstreamed throughout IGPA's programming.

2. Other members of the IGPA leadership team, including the Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP), Senior Advisor- Political Economy Analysis, Senior Advisor- Monitoring and Evaluation, Team Leads, and the Regional Integration Director will also play key roles in setting examples for the entire staff about the importance of conflict sensitivity and how it can either support or undermine IGPA's objectives. In addition, IGPA has made sure that its HQ office in Baghdad and regional offices in Basrah and Erbil are fully representative of Iraq's various societal components, including gender and other identity groups.

3. Conduct staff training to standardize IGPA's CS approach, and demonstrate DAI's commitment to conflict sensitivity. The training will offer an overview of the CS strategies, how to conduct a conflict analysis, and how IGPA ensures a diverse representation of provinces, ethnicities, religions, and minority groups.

4. Build in CS aspects in the AMEP and complexity awareness report.

5. IGPA will ensure that staff continue to refer to the analysis and engagement strategy as activities begin. The main activity that could potentially be impacted by the CSA is the PEA. The province selection process may also be affected by conflict dynamics, as grievances may rise among the selected and non-selected or rival/neighbor provinces. Given Iraq's economic challenges and the progress of the decentralization process, and the persisting challenges of service delivery, most of the provinces are anxious to receive IGPA. In turn, this provides a programming burden and difficulties for the implementing team. Therefore, the selection process, based on the PEA, Conflict and Gender Analyses, and contextual political consideration, has yielded six representative provinces (Baghdad, Basrah, Erbil, Babil, Anbar, and Ninewa). Each of these provinces has distinguished cultural, ethnic, religious, political, and service delivery need aspects. Basrah and Babil are representative of the Shia community with a special political and economy status, e.g. Basrah is Iraq's major oil producing province. Anbar and Ninewa represent the Sunni community with diverse tribal backgrounds, in addition to the fact that they are newly liberated areas and account for the post-Da'esh era in Iraq. In addition, the selection process made sure to select two major capital cities: Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region; and Baghdad, the Iraqi capital.

6. A lessons learned session: staff share reflections on IGPA's success in mitigating conflict in Year 1 and share observations about effective strategies. As a result of this session, and the CSA and Implementation Plan will be revised to reflect these lessons and observations, and will submitted as an annex to the Year 2 activity plan.

ANNEX 1: BRIGHT SPOTS AND CHALLENGES IN IRAQI COMMUNITIES

Major Bright Spots and Challenges in the Shia Community

Bright spot: Breaking political/religious taboos and demanding practical achievements instead of reciting historical grievances have become more visible in the Shia community, especially in the south and south-center provinces. The Shia community has witnessed corruption, fraudulent religious claims, and incompetence from Shia Islamic parties firsthand. While their provinces are stable and secure, and have not suffered from major security issues like insurgency or terrorism, hardly any valuable projects have been implemented. Few tangible improvements have occurred in their standard of living, education system, health service, or general service delivery capacity since 2003. These factors, in addition to the surprising Da'esh occupation of a third of Iraq in less than three days, while Maliki was projecting the image of a strong Shia leader, have contributed to shaking the Shia's trust in their leadership. Growing popular discontent has facilitated the debate about the value of the Shia-Islamic parties, and the debate about how to mobilize Shia secular and civil forces without being perceived and prosecuted as traitors to their community's cause.

Challenges: The Iranian-backed militias, as a faction within the PMFs, are one of the major challenges facing civil movements in Shia communities. It is true that many Shia view the PMFs as saviors and heroes. However, this popular support has started to distinguish between PMFs that follow Khamenei as their religious jurisprudence and PMFs that follow Sistani. According to a 2016 study, there are 75 PMF militias, and more than 60 of them are loyal to Khamenei/Iran rather than Sistani. The PMFs that follow Khamenei are ideological and political operatives that have deepened the rifts with Sunni communities in the newly liberated areas. In addition, the PMFs have become an important income generation venue for unemployed young men.

Major Bright Spots and Challenges in the Sunni Community

Bright spot: The Sunnis have turned against their politicians, especially the members of the Sunni Islamic parties. The failed experience of peaceful demonstrations in 2012 and the difficult experience of living under Da'esh occupation (or for those who could escape, the vulnerability of being IDPs) have affected the Sunnis' political orientation. Many Sunnis now reject Islamic parties and sectarian rhetoric.

Bright spot: Sunni tribal leaders, especially those who fought against Da'esh, are emerging as potential winners for the elections in 2017. There are several efforts in this regard, especially in Anbar governorate - for example, the Albu Namer tribe. Tribalism and tribal leaders are not the ideal solution in other post-conflict cases; however, in Iraq, tribalism can recover social ties and social cohesion. Iraqi tribal leaders have cross-faction relations, a well-established tradition to maintain respect for each other, and tribal codes to keep promises made among tribal leaders regardless of sectarian calculations. Political empowerment of the Sunni tribal leaders, especially on the provincial council level, will facilitate negotiations and reconciliation among the fractured components of Iraqi society.

Challenges: There are more than 3 million Sunni IDPs in Iraq. The major Sunni cities are war-battered areas – the destruction in Al-Ramadi is more than 80 percent of the city–[88] and their return to newly liberated areas moves slowly due to political and security calculations. These factors negatively affect Sunni political participation, and further weaken the efficacy of Sunni representation in Iraqi politics. Hence, the major area of concern for the Sunnis is structural political marginalization in the next election.

Major Bright Spots and Challenges in the Kurdish Community

Bright Spot: Recent economic challenges have disrupted political networks that were engaged in schemes of organized corruption. This has opened an opportunity for structural public sector reforms, austerity policies, and the development of a more targeted system of social spending. Thus, the KRG has complied with many of the World Bank measures that were communicated as conditions for financial help[89], especially shares from the IMF loan to Iraq.[90] More importantly, these pressing challenges have strengthened demands for good governance rather than Kurdish nationalism, and broken the cult of personality surrounding leaders – the Shia and Kurdish communities share this bright spot.

Bright Spot: Societal developments are fostering liberal and progressive principles. While pockets of Islamization and conservative indoctrination still exist in parts of the Kurdistan region, especially in small towns bordering Iran (Halabja and Ranya), there have been rapid social developments in the major cities of Sulaimaniya, Erbil, and Dahuk. Several factors have converged to expedite and strengthen this development, mainly in terms of, a) affordable technology and internet services connecting the youth with global trends, b) a secular education system and the "quiet reform" of the textbooks and teachings of Islam, and c) the impact of the Kurdish diaspora.

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[88] "Iraq: 80% of Ramadi destroyed," *AlAraby*, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2015/12/30/80-of-ramadi-destroyed (December 30, 2015).

[89] The World Bank, "Kurdistan Region of Iraq Reforming the Economy for Shared Prosperity and Protecting the Vulnerable," http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/708441468196727918/pdf/106132-WP-P159972-PUBLIC-EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY-of-KRG-Economic-Reform-Roadmap-post-Decision-Review-5-30-2016.pdf (May 2016).

[90] The World Bank, "Economic Reforms Will Help Achieve Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/05/30/economic-reforms-will-help-achieve-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth-in-the-kurdistan-region-of-iraq (May 2016).

Challenge: Unstable political processes and the penetrations of political adversaries (political populism) have become embedded at deeper communal levels (e.g. Dahuk and Erbil vs. Sulaimaniya and Kalar). The ruling political parties in Kurdistan did not develop policies to achieve shared prosperity. Thus, they could not provide solutions to mitigate the negative impact of inequality, especially during financial and economic challenges. Thus, both sides – the government and the opposition – have resorted to populism, and mobilized their constituencies using subtle and controversial historical references against each other. Communal populism is detrimental to political progress, and hinders efforts to establish new political parties or make serious changes in the political framework.

Challenge: The Kurdish referendum has produced negative security and economic consequences for Kurdistan. The decision to hold a referendum, despite international advice to the contrary and encouragement to postpone the referendum, have resulted in what the Kurds perceive as the humiliating loss of Kirkuk and most of the areas that the Peshmerga captured during the fight against Da'esh. Economically, losing the oil fields of Kirkuk, along with the GOI's reduction of the KRG's share of the budget (17 percent) since 2014, has resulted in a deep recession and severe economic hardship that threatens the KRG as a federal entity within the Iraqi political and government structure.

General Conflict Dynamics and Impact on the 2018 Election

1. At this stage, it is not feasible to transform the new societal and political trends into an effective and cohesive political force that can gain a considerable win in the next election. However, empowering these bright spots to expand their space in the official political structure should be a priority. This will be instrumental in achieving good results in the next election, four to five years from now. It is crucial to prioritize sustainable development of the new political tendencies through gradual empowerment and grassroots mobilization instead of rushed steps that could disrupt their existence.
2. Many of the PMF leaders have expressed their intentions to enter the political process. In this way, Iran could achieve a second Hezbollah/Lebanon model in the Middle East. The PMFs are expected to have good results in Shia areas. In addition, the PMFs plan to indirectly participate in the Sunni areas through lists and alliances with weak Sunni factions, especially in Salah al-Din and Diyala.
3. The fragmentation of traditional alliances, and the surge in the number of political factions and splits from major political parties, pose complications and lead to twisting the legal framework to accommodate the big parties and their sub-parties' calculations. This, in turn, will undermine building and advancing solid institutional and legal foundations for elections in Iraq. For instance, it has become a tradition to amend the election law and mechanisms (e.g voter registration, voting system, election threshold, and electoral system) for each election, which does not provide a sustainable process for which Iraqi political parties can plan and prepare, especially for new and small parties.
4. The 2018 elections may be especially susceptible to conflict dynamics. Synchronized provincial and national elections will be held for the first time in Iraqi political history, and this situation will likely increase political frictions and rivalry. The elections come in the aftermath of major, highly sensitive security and political challenges. The issues of IDPs, political transformation of the militias, the Kurdish

referendum and its aftermath, and regional tension are examples of highly sensitive issues that might influence the security situation and push the country towards a new cycle of violence.

ANNEX 2: IGPA ENABLING AND CONFINING FACTORS

Enabling Factors

Popular Discontent and Social Change: Popular discontent and calls for social change will provide a permissive environment in which to work and implement activities, especially with regards to service delivery, youth, and champions of change. Iraqi society, contrary to 2004-2007, is currently receptive to international development programs and is more familiar with the concept.

The Increasing Role of Civil Society: The growing role of CSOs and activists in mobilizing demonstrations and civil resistance were the highlight of the political scene in 2016-2017. This role will increase and will need support from international development programs in the election year. In addition, there are 60 new political parties registered to run in the upcoming elections.[91] Some of them transitioned from civil society to politics, some of them have recently split from old political parties, and some are completely new to the political participation arena. This increases the demand for capacity building, and will provide a vibrant and rich environment of civil and political participation. In turn, this will enrich data collection and mapping surveys of the various kinds and levels of political participation, an important preliminary stage in the implementation of IGPA.

Financial Crisis: The current financial crisis challenges the Iraqi government's ability to cope with a) increasing public pressure for better civil services, accountability, and inclusivity, and b) managing the cost of war against Da'esh. This urgent need, which may decide the survival of the government itself, creates a permissive institutional environment to receive help, advice, activity interventions, and expertise from international donors and organizations.

Liberation and IDPs: In addition to the calamities and human suffering caused by Da'esh, the war has created two challenging and long-term problems: a) the enormous destruction of civic infrastructure in the liberated areas, and b) the IDPs. These problems affect two types of provinces: those which have been liberated (Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Mosul), and those which host the IDPs (the KRG). Therefore, the provincial governments in these areas face complicated and demanding challenges, such as the rehabilitation of civic infrastructure, reviving local economies, increasing government capacity, and promoting intra-communal peace and reconciliation. All these issues are directly linked to a successful devolution of powers, which, in turn, is an integral component of IGPA.

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[91] IHEC announcement: http://www.ihec.iq/en/index.php/news/4330.html

Confining Factors

Regional Trans-Border Security Challenges: As Iraq enters 2018, Da'esh sleeper cells still pose a threat in some parts of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Mosul, and the desert areas between Iraq and Syria, especially Wadi Houran area.

Recent victories by the Assad regime have encouraged and empowered the PMFs to expand their mission beyond Iraqi borders. For example, the media has reported that the PMFs played a role in liberating the Syrian border city of Albo Kamal in cooperation with the Syrian army. The trans-border power of the PMFs (especially the Iranian-backed militias) is widely considered by Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis to be a new tool to marginalize their political and social status.

Political Transformation of the Iranian-Backed Militias: Another area of concern is the mushrooming of various political militias. For example, in Sinjar and Ninewa valley, there are many newly formed political militias with competing political agendas. There are Christian militias formed and funded by the PMFs, and there are Christian militias which were formed and funded by the Peshmerga. The same can be said about the Yazidis, the Shabek, and many others. Furthermore, politicians such as Osama al-Nujaifi, Mutlaq, and many Sunni tribal leaders have all established militias in reaction to the Shia PMFs. Based on the mushrooming phenomena of the political role of militant non-state actors, Iraqi society will be challenged by a new process of re-militarization. A bad economy and high rate of unemployment also play huge roles in incentivizing young men to join these militias. The military apparatus has once again become the main source of income generation for young Iraqis.

Fierce Political Competition: As explained in previous sections, there are deep fragmentations and divisions across Iraqi parties, including the KRG. Fragmented politics combined with political incompetence yield populist politicians, and transform political rivalries into inter-group conflicts.

ANNEX 3: ILLUSTRATIVE MAPS OF CONFLICT DYNAMICS, CAUSES, AND ENABLING FACTORS IN IRAQ

Iraq Ethnic/Religious Divide

Source: http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml

Successive Iraqi Government Violent Operations Against Various Groups Since 1988-2017
Anfal Campaign: The Government of Saddam Against the Kurds

The Anfal Campaigns: February - September 1988

Source: https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq

The Draining of the Marshes: The Government of Saddam Against the Shia

Source: https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq

Systematic Ethnic Cleansing Against the Sunnis (e.g. Baghdad)

Source: https://cdn2.vox-cdn.com/assets/4399741/Baghdad_change_2005_2007_crop2.jpg

Sunni and Minorities 2014-2017 (e.g. Mosul IDP)

Source: UNHCR Iraq https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/mosul-weekly-protection-update-17-23-november-2017

Enabling Factor: Iraq's Energy Resource

Source: https://www.energy-pedia.com/news/iraq/exxonmobil-and-shell-sign-agreement-with-iraq-to-redevelop-and-expand-west-qurna-1-field

Political Friction and Stalemate: Maliki's Parliamentary Bloc to Undermine Abadi's Agenda

Politics Blocs and Parties in Iraq's Council of Representatives (May 6, 2016)

By Emily Anagnostos
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ANNEX 4: LIST OF POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES MILITIAS

Source: Rawabet Center for Strategic and Research Studies. "PMFs in Iraq, Creation and Future – Investigative Study": http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/31326

| ت	الاسم Name	القائد Leader	ساحة العمل Area of Operation	المرجعية الدينية Religious Jurisprudence
١	سرايا السلام/التيار الصدري	كاظم حسين العيساوي	العراق/قاطع سامراء-القيارة	العراق:محمد صداق الصدر، إيران: آية الله خامئني.Khamenei
٢	فيلق بدر-الجناح العسكري-منظمة بدر	هادي العامري	العراق- قاطع صلاح الدين،ديالى، سوريا	إيران: آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٣	كتائب حزب الله العراقي	جعفر الغانمي	العراق-قاطع الأنبار، صلاح الدين/النخيب	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٤	عصائب أهل الحق	قيس الخزعلي	العراق-قاطع صلاح الدين/النخيب، سوريا	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٥	كتائب سيد الشهداء	هاشم بنيان الولائي:أبو ''ألاء''	العراق-قاطع حزام بغداد، صلاح الدين	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٦	حركة حزب الله النجباء	أكرم عباس الكعبي	العراق-قاطع حزام بغداد، سوريا	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٧	كتائب الإمام علي	شبل الزيدي	العراق-قاطع حزام بغداد، سوريا	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٨	كتائب جند الإمام	أحمد الأسدي ''أبو جعفر الأسدي''	العراق-قاطع الأنبار وصلاح الدين.	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
٩	سرايا الخراساني	علي الياسري	العراق-قاطع حزام ومركز بغداد	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.
١٠	لواء أبو فضل العباس	أوس الخفاجي	العراق-حزام بغداد، سوريا	إيران:آية الله خامئني Khamenei.

الرقم	الاسم	القائد	الموقع	المرجع
11	سرايا الجهاد- المجلس الأعلى الإسلامي	حسن راضي الساري	العراق-الأنبار	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
12	أنصار العقيدة –المجلس الأعلى الإسلامي	جلال الدين الصغير	العراق-الأنبار	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
13	سرايا أنصار عاشوراء-المجلس الأعلى الإسلامي	كاظم الجابري"أبو أحمد الجابري"	العراق-النخيب	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
14	كتائب التيار الرسالي	عدنان أرميض الشحماني	العراق وسوريا	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
15	فرقة العباس القتالية	ميثم الزيدي	العراق-النخيب	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
16	كتائب الشهيد الأول-حزب الدعوة- تنظيم العراق هاشم الموسوي	واثق الفرطوسي	العراق-النخيس	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
17	كتائب الشهيد الصدر الأول-حزب الدعوة- تنظيم العراق هاشم الموسوي	الفريق عبدالكريم الغزي	العراق-سامراء	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
18	كتائب النخبة والغيث الحيدري- حزب الدعوة –تنظيم الداخل عبدالكريم العنزي	مناف الحسيني	العراق-الأنبار	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
19	لواء علي الأكبر- منظمة العمل الإسلامي	علي الحمداني	العراق-النخيب	إيران: آية الله صادق الشيرازي
20	لواء الشباب الرسالي	ميثم العلاق	العراق-كربلاء	العراق: آية الله محمد علي اليعقوبي
21	لواء أنصار المرجعية	حميد الياسري	العراق-سامراء	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
22	لواء أسد الله الغالب	سهيل الأعرجي	سوريا	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
23	جيش المختار	واثق البطاط	العراق-سوريا	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
24	فيلق الوعد الصادق	عمار الحداد	العراق وسوريا	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
25	كتائب أنصار الحجة	محمد الكناني	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران:آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
26	كتائب قمر بني هاشم	أبو طالب المياحي	العراق- الأنبار	العراق:آية الله كمال الحيدري

27	حزب الله الثائرون	رحمان الجزائري	العراق- حزام بغداد	لبنان: حسن نصرالله، محمد الكوثراني
28	كتيبة عماد مغنية-كتائب حزب الله العراقي	سعد الفتلاوي"أبو خالد"	العراق- الأنبار	لبنان: حسن نصر الله
29	لواء قاصم الجبارين	محمد الموسوي	العراق-النخيب	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
30	لواء الإمام القائم	طالب العلياوي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
31	كتائب أئمة البقيع	جهاد التميمي	العراق	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
32	حركة أنصار الله الأوفياء	حيدر الغراوي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
33	لواء المنتظر	داغر الموسوي	العراق- حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
34	كتائب ثائر الله	وليد الحلي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
35	كاتب القصاص	عبدالله اللامي	العراق-سامراء	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
36	كتائب أشبال الصدر	محمد حسين الصدر	العراق-سامراء	إيران: كاظم الحائري
37	كتائب ثائر الحسين	غسان الشاهبندر	العراق-النخيب	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
38	كتائب مالك الأشتر	جعفر عباس الموسوي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
39	كتائب الدماء الزكية	مؤيد علي الحكيم	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
40	لواء ذو الفقار	حسين التميمي	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
41	حركة الأبدال	جعفر الموسوي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
42	كتائب مسلم بن عقيل	أحمد الفرطوسي	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
43	لواء أنصار المهدي	ناجي الحلفي	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني

44	لواء المؤمل	سعد سوار	العراق	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
45	كتائب العدالة	سمير الشيخ علي	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
46	كتائب الفتح	كاظم السيد علي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
47	كتائب سرايا الزهراء	ممتاز الحيدري	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
48	حركة العراق الإسلامي	جمال الوكيل	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله صادق الشيرازي
49	كتائب العتبة الحسينية	عبدالمهدي الكربلائي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
50	لواء زينب العقيلة	حسن الشكرجي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
51	لواء الطف	مصطفى الموسوي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
52	كتائب الامام الغالب	محمد اللامي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
53	كتائب الامام الحسين	حسن الربيعي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
54	كتائب القيام الحسيني	محمد الخفاجي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
55	كتائب درع الولاية	علاء مهلهل	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
56	كتائب القارعة	أحمد الزاملي	العراق-حزام بغداد	العراق: آية الله السيستاني
57	كتائب يد الله	أحمد الساعدي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
58	كتائب بقية الله	مصطفى العبيدي	العراق-حزام * بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.
59	كتائب الشبيبة الاسلامية	مصطفى الموسوي	العراق-حزام بغداد	إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.

إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.	العراق-حزام بغداد	موسى الحسني	كتائب جمعية آل البيت	60
إيران: آية الله خامنئي Khamenei.	العراق-حزام بغداد	مزهر الخفاجي	سرايا الدفاع الشعبي	61
العراق: آية الله كمال الحيدري	العراق-حزام بغداد	وسام الحيدري	كتائب الطفل الرضيع	62
العراق: آية الله السيستاني	العراق-حزام بغداد	عبدالمهدي الكربلائي	سرايا المختار الثقفي	63
العراق: آية الله السيستاني	العراق-حزام بغداد	عبدالمهدي الكربلائي	سرايا لواء السجاد	64
العراق: آية الله السيستاني	العراق-حزام بغداد	سامي المسعودي- الوقف الشيعي	كتائب وعد الله	65
العراق: آية الله السيستاني	العراق-حزام بغداد	فراس العلاق	كتائب الغوث الأعظم	66
حركة مسيحية	العراق-حزام بغداد	ريان الكلداني	كتيبة بابليون	67