


SECURITY THREATS

FETT, KÜSTERS AND SCHMITZ

- ▶ <http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229>
- ▶ 307 redirect
- ▶ IDP Mix-Up



SPECIFICATION FLAWS

- ▶ Malicious endpoints attacks
 - ▶ Broken end-user authentication
 - ▶ Server side Request Forgery (SSRF)
 - ▶ Code injection attacks
 - ▶ Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
- ▶ Session Overwriting

IMPLEMENTATION FLAWS

- ▶ Client flaws
 - ▶ Replay attacks
 - ▶ Signature Manipulation
 - ▶ Token Recipient Confusion
 - ▶ ID Spoofing
 - ▶ Key Confusion
 - ▶ Sub Claim spoofing within the access token
- ▶ Identity Provider flaws
 - ▶ Sub Claim spoofing
 - ▶ Redirect URI Manipulation

REPLAY ATTACK

Header: { "alg": "HS256" }

Body: {

"iss": "http://openidConnectProvider.com/",

"sub": "user1",

"exp": 1444148908,

"iat": 1444148308,

"nonce": "40c6b33b9a2e",

"aud": "http://client.com/",

}

Signature: [AF45JF93LKD76D...](#)

SIGNATURE MANIPULATION

<header><body><signature>

TOKEN RECIPIENT CONFUSION

Header: { "alg": "HS256" }

Body: {

"iss": "http://openidConnectProvider.com/",

"sub": "user1",

"exp": 1444148908,

"iat": 1444148308,

"nonce": "40c6b33b9a2e",

"aud": "another client",

}

Signature: AF45JF93LKD76D...

ID SPOOFING

- ▶ $ID = sub : iss$
- ▶ The combination of sub and iss are the only claims that the Client can rely upon as a stable identifier !

KEY CONFUSION

- ▶ Wrong reference
- ▶ 'Session overwriting '

SUB CLAIM SPOOFING

- ▶ The sub Claim in the UserInfo Response **MUST** be verified to exactly match the sub Claim in the ID Token

SUB CLAIM SPOOFING (CLAIMS PARAMETER)

```
{ "id_token":  
  { "sub": { "value": "subOfTheVictim" } }  
}
```

REDIRECT URI MANIPULATION

- ▶ This URI MUST exactly match one of the Redirection URI values for the Client pre-registered at the OpenID Provider