Module 1

Attacks on Computers and Computer Security:

Need for Security, Security Approaches, Principles of Security Types of Attacks, Security Mechanisms, services & attacks, A Model for Network Security, Network Access Control, Extensible Authentication Protocol.

1.1 The Need for Security

1.1.1 Basic Concepts

- Initial computer applications had no, or very little security as the importance of data was not realized then.
- ➤ hen computer applications were developed to handle financial and personal data, the need for security arose. With this realization, security began to gain prominence and security mechanisms began to evolve.
- Examples of security mechanisms:
 - Provide a user id and password to every user, and use that information to authenticate a user
 - Encode information stored in the databases, so that it is not visible to users who do not have the right permissions.
- Organizations employed their own security mechanisms to provide basic security. As technology improved, newer applications began to be developed and the basic security measures were not sufficient.
- > Further with the evolution of the biggest computer network, Internet, the need for right security policy, technology implementations became very important.
- > Example of information traveling from Client to server over the internet.




Fig 1.1 Information travelling from a client to a server over the internet

> From the user's computer, the user details such as user id, order details such as order

id and item id and payment details such as credit card information travel across the Internet to the merchant's server. The merchant's server stores these details in its database.

- > The various security holes in this are:
 - An intruder can capture the credit card details as they travel from the client to the server.
 - Once the merchant receives the credit card details and validates them so as to process the order and later obtain payments, the merchant stores the credit card details into its database. An attacker can succeed in accessing this database and gain access to all the credit card numbers stored there.

1.1.2 Modern Nature of attacks

The salient features of the modern nature of attacks are:

- Automating attacks: Humans dislike repetitive and difficult tasks. Automating them
 can cause destruction more rapidly. Rather than producing fake currency on a mas
 scale, modern thieves will excel in stealing a very low amount from million bank
 accounts in a matter of a few minutes.
- **Privacy concerns:** Collecting information about people and later misusing it is turning out to be a huge problem. The data mining applications gather, process and tabulate all sorts of details about individuals. People can illegally sell this information.
- **Distance does not matter:** Thieves would earlier attack banks, as banks had money. These days Money is in digital form and moves around using computer network. It is easier for modern thief to attempt an attack on the computer system of the bank, sitting at home.

1.2 **Security Approaches**

1.2.1 Trusted systems

- ➤ A trusted system is a computer system that can be trusted to a specified extent to enforce a specified security policy.
- > Trusted system uses the term reference monitor, an entity at the logical heart of the computer system which is responsible for all decisions across controls.
- > The reference monitor should be tamperproof, always be invoked and small enough so that it can be independently tested.
- ➤ The mathematical foundation for trusted systems was provided by two independent, yet interrelated works. In 1974, a technique called as Bell-LaPadula model was devised which was a highly trustworthy computer system designed as a collection of objects (files, disks and printers) and subjects (users, processes or threads)

1.2.2 Security Models

An organization can take several approaches to implement its security model. The various approaches are:

- a) **No security**: This is the simplest model with no security at all.
- b) **Security through obscurity**: In this model, a system is secure simply because nobody knows about its existence and contents. This approach cannot work for too long, as there are many ways an attacker can come to know about it.
- c) **Host security**: In this scheme, the security for each host is enforced individually. This is a safe approach, but the complexity and diversity of modern sites/organizations makes the task harder and difficult to scale.
- d) **Network security**: Host security is tough to achieve as organization grows and becomes more diverse. In this technique, the focus is to control network access to various hosts and their services, rather than individual host security. This is a very efficient and scalable model.

1.2.3 Security Management Practices

Good security management practices always have a good security policy which takes care of 4 key aspects.

- 1) Affordability: How much money and efforts does this security implementation cost?
- 2) **Functionality**: What is the mechanism of providing security?
- 3) **Cultural issues**: Does the policy gel well with people's expectations, working style and beliefs?
- 4) Legality: Does the policy meet the legal requirements?

Once a security policy is in place, the following points should be ensured.

- Explanation of the policy to all concerned.
- Outline everybody's responsibilities.
- Use simple language in all communications.
- Accountability should be established.
- Provide for exceptions and periodic reviews.

1.3 Principles of Security

The four chief principles of security are:

- 1) Confidentiality
- 2) Authentication
- 3) Integrity
- 4) Non repudiation

Two more principles that are linked to the overall system are:

- 5) Access control
- **6)** Availability

1) Confidentiality

- > The principle of confidentiality specifies that only the sender and the intended recipient(s) should be able to access the contents of a message.
- > Confidentiality gets compromised if an unauthorized person is able to access a message. Example of compromising the confidentiality of a message is shown in Fig 1.2.




Fig 1.2 Loss of confidentiality

- ➤ Here the user of computer A sends a message to the user of computer B. Another user C gets access to this message, which is not desired, and therefore, defeats the purpose of confidentiality.
- **Example:** A confidential email message sent by A to B, which is accessed by C without the permission or knowledge of A and B. This type of attack is called as **interception**. "Interception causes loss of message confidentiality"

2) Authentication:

- > Authentication establishes **proof of identities**.
- > The authentication process ensures that the origin of an electronic message or document is correctly identified.
- ➤ For instance, suppose that user C sends an electronic document over the Internet to user B, posing as user A. How would user B know that the message has come from user C, who is posing as user A.




Fig 1.3 Absence of authentication

- ➤ **Example:** User C posing as user A, sends a funds transfer request (from A's account to C's account) to bank B. The bank will transfer the funds from A's account to C's account, thinking that user A has requested for the funds transfer. This type of attack is called as **fabrication.**
- "Fabrication is possible in the absence of proper authentication mechanisms"

3) Integrity:

- ➤ When the contents of a message are changed after the sender sends it, but before it reaches the intended recipient, the integrity of the message is lost.
- ➤ **Example:** Suppose you write a cheque for \$100 to pay for the goods bought from the store, but in the account statement it is observed that the cheque resulted in a payment of \$1000! This is the case of loss of message integrity.
- Fig 1.4 demonstrates loss of integrity. User C tampers (modifies) a message originally sent by user A, which is actually destined for user B.
- ➤ User C somehow manages to access the message, change its contents and send the changed message to user B. Neither A nor B knows that the contents of the message were changed after user A had sent it. This type of attack is called as **modification**.
- "Modification causes loss of message integrity"




Fig 1.4 Loss of integrity

4) Non repudiation:

- > There are situations where a user sends a message and later refuses that the message was sent. This is repudiation (refuse to accept).
- **Example:** User A could send a fund transfer request to bank B over the internet. After the bank performs the funds transfer as per A's request, A could claim that he never sent the fund transfer request to the bank.
- > Thus, A repudiates, or denies the fund transfer instruction.
- > The principle of non-repudiation defeats such possibilities of denying something, having done it.

"Non repudiation does not allow the sender of a message to refuse the claim of not sending that message".

5) Access control:

- > The principle of access control determines who should be able to access what.
- For instance, we should be able to specify that user A can view the records in a database, but cannot update them. However, another user B might be allowed to make updates as well. An access control mechanism can be set up to ensure this.
- Access control is broadly related to two areas: role management and rule management.
- **Role management** concentrates on the user side (which user can do what)
- Rule management focuses on the resources side (which resource is accessible, and under what circumstances).
- ➤ Based on the decisions taken here, an access control matrix is prepared, which lists the users against a list of items they can access (it can say that user A can write to file X, but can only update files Y and Z).
- An access control list (ACL) is a subset of an access control matrix.
- "Access control specifies and controls who can access what."

6) Availability:

- > The principle of availability states that resources (information) should be available to authorized parties at all times.
- **Example:** Due to the intentional actions of another unauthorized user C, an authorized user A may not be able to contact a server computer B as shown in fig 1.5.
- This would defeat the principle of availability. Such an attack is called as **interruption**.
- "Interruption puts the availability of resources in danger"




Fig 1.5 Attack on availability

7) Ethical and Legal issues:


- ➤ The ethical issues in security systems are classified into four categories:
 - Privacy deals with the right of an individual to control personal information
 - Accuracy deals about the responsibility for the authenticity, fidelity and accuracy of information.
 - Property talks about the owner of the information and about who controls access.
 - Accessibility deals with the issue of type of information an organization has the right to collect.
- ➤ While dealing with legal issues, there is a hierarchy of regulatory bodies that govern the legality of information security which can be classified as follows:
 - International -e.g International Cybercrime Treaty
 - Federal e.g. FERPA, Patriot Act
 - State e.g. UCITA
 - Organization e.g. Computer use policy

1.4 Types of attacks

Attacks can be classified into two views: A common man's view and technological view.

1.4.1 Attacks: A general view

Attacks can be classified into three categories:



Criminal attacks -

In this, the aim of attackers is to maximize financial gain by attacking computer systems. Some of the criminal attacks are listed below:

Attack	Description				
Fraud	Modern fraud attacks concentrate on manipulating some aspect				
	of electronic currency, credit cards, electronic stock certificates, cheques, letters of credit, purchase order, ATMs etc.				
Scams	Some forms of scams are sales of services, auctions, multi-leve				
	marketing schemes, general merchandise and business				
	opportunities etc. People are tempted to send money in retur				
	great profits, but end up losing their money.				
Destruction	The main motive behind these attacks is some sort of grudge.				
	Example: Some unhappy employees attack their own				
	organization; terrorists strike at bigger levels				
Identity theft	An attacker does not steal anything from a legitimate user,				
	instead he becomes that legitimate user!				
	Example, it is much easier to manage to get the password				
	someone else's bank account or to actually be able to get a				
	credit card on someone else's name. That privilege can be misused				
	until it gets detected.				
Intellectual	Intellectual property theft ranges from stealing companies' trade				
property theft	secrets, databases, digital music and videos, electronic				
	documents and books, Identity theft, Intellectual property theft				
	software and etc.				

Brand theft	It is quite easy to set up fake Web sites that look like real W				
	sites. It is difficult for a common user to know if she is visiting the				
	real Bank site or an attacker's site?				
	Innocent users end up providing their secrets and personal				
	details on these fake sites to the attackers.				
	The attackers use these details to then access the real si				
	causing an identity theft.				

Publicity Attacks

- Occurs because the attackers want to see their names appear on television news channels and newspapers for publicity. These types of attackers are usually not hardcore criminals.
- They are people such as students in universities or employees in large organizations, who seek publicity by adopting a novel approach of attacking computer systems.

Legal attacks

- This form of attack is quite novel and unique. The attacker tries to make the judge or
 jury doubtful about the security of a computer system.
- The attacker attacks the computer system and the attacked party (Bank or organization) manages to take the attacker to the court. The attacker tries to convince the judge that there is inherent weakness in the computer security system and exploits the weakness of the judge.

1.4.2 Attacks: A Technical view

The types of attacks on computers and network systems can be classified into two categories:

- (a) Theoretical concepts behind these attacks
- (b) Practical approaches used by the attackers.

a) Theoretical Concepts

The principles of security face threat from various attacks. These attacks are classified into four categories, as mentioned namely:

Interception -

- This attack results from violating confidentiality.
- It means that an unauthorized party has gained access to a resource. The party can be a person, program or computer-based system.
- Example: Copying of data or programs and listening to network traffic.

> Fabrication -

- This attack results from violating authentication.
- This involves creation of illegal objects on a computer system.
- Example: The attacker may add fake records to a database.

Modification -


 This attack results from violating Integrity. The attacker may modify the values in a database.

Interruption

- This attack results from violating availability.
- The resource becomes unavailable, lost or unusable.
- Example: Causing problems to a hardware device, erasing program, data or operating system components.

These attacks are further grouped into two types:

- Passive attacks
- Active attacks



Passive attacks

- Passive attacks are those, wherein the attacker indulges in eavesdropping or monitoring of data transmission.
- The attacker aims to obtain information that is in transit.
- The term passive indicates that the attacker does not attempt to perform any modifications to the data.
- Passive attacks are harder to detect.
- The general approach to deal with passive attacks is to think about prevention, rather than detection or corrective actions.

Passive attacks do not involve any modifications to the contents of an original message.

Passive attacks can be further classified into two sub-categories. These categories are:

- Release of message contents
- Traffic analysis.


> Release of message contents:

- When a confidential email message is sent, it is desired that only the recipient is able to access it. Otherwise, the contents of the message are released against our wishes to someone else.
- Using certain security mechanisms, we can prevent release of message contents. For example, we can encode messages using a code language, so that only the desired parties understand the contents of a message, because only they know the code language.
- However, if many such messages are passing through, a passive attacker could try to
 figure out similarities between them to come up with some sort of pattern that provides
 the attacker some clues regarding the communication that is taking place.
- Such attempts of analysing (encoded) messages to come up with likely patterns are the work of the **traffic analysis attack**.

Active attacks

- The active attacks are based on modification of the original message in some manner or the creation of a false message. These attacks cannot be prevented easily.
- They can be detected with some effort and attempts can be made to recover from them.


 These attacks can be in the form of **interruption**, **modification** and **fabrication**.
- In active attacks, the contents of the original message are modified in some way.
- Trying to pose as another entity involves **masquerade (interruption)** attacks.
- Modification attacks can be classified further into replay attacks and alteration of messages.
- Fabrication causes **Denial Of Service (DOS)** attacks.
- This Classification can be shown as follows:



- **Masquerade** is caused when an unauthorized entity pretends to be another entity.
 - Example: User C might pose as user A and send a message to user B. User B might be led to believe that the message indeed came from user A. In masquerade attacks, an entity poses as another entity.
 - Example, the attack may involve capturing the user's authentication sequence (e.g. user ID and password). Later those details can be used to gain illegal access to the computer system.
- **Replay attack** is caused when a user captures a sequence of events or some data units and re-sends them.
 - For instance, suppose user A wants to transfer some amount to user C's bank account.
 - Both users A and C have accounts with bank B. User A might send an electronic message to bank B, requesting for the funds transfer.
 - User C could capture this message and send a second copy of the same to bank B. Bank B would have no idea that this is an unauthorized message and would treat this as a second and different, funds transfer request from user A.
 - Therefore, user C would get the benefit of the funds transfer twice: once authorized, once through a replay attack.
- **Alteration of messages** involves some change to the original message.
 - For instance, suppose user A sends an electronic message Transfer \$100 to D's account to bank B. User C might capture this and change it to Transfer \$1000 to C's account.
 - Both the beneficiary and the amount have been changed instead, only one of these could have also caused alteration of the message.
- **Denial Of Service (DOS)** attacks make an attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing some services, which they are eligible for.
 - For instance, an unauthorized user might send too many login requests to a server using random user ids one after the other in quick succession, so as to flood the network and deny other legitimate users from using the network facilities.

1.4.3 The Practical Side of Attacks

• The security attacks can happen at the application level or the network level and can be classified into broad categories: **Application-level attacks** and **Network-level attacks**



> Application-level attacks:

These attacks happen at an application level, i.e. the attacker the attempts to access, modify or prevent access to information of a particular application or the application itself.

Example: Trying to obtain someone's credit card information on the Internet or changing the contents of a message to change the amount in a transaction, etc.

Network-level attacks:

These attacks generally aim at reducing the capabilities of a network by a number of possible means. These attacks generally make an attempt to either slow down or completely bring to halt, a computer network.

This can lead to application-level attacks, because once someone is able to gain access to a network, they can access/modify at least some sensitive information, causing havoc.

1.4.4 PROGRAMS that ATTACK

Programs that attack computer systems to cause some damage or to create confusion are:

- Virus
- Worm
- Trojan Horse
- Applets & ActiveX Controls
- Cookies
- JavaScript VBScript & Jscript

1) Virus

- Virus can be used to launch an application-level attack or a network level attack virus.
- A virus is a computer program that attaches itself to the legitimate program code and runs when the legitimate program runs causing damage to the computer system or to the network.
- It can infect other programs in that computer or programs that are in other computers but on the same network as shown in figure 1.6.




Figure 1.6 Virus

- In this example, after deleting all the files from the current user's computer, the virus self-propagates by sending its code to all users whose email addresses are stored in the current user's address book.
- Viruses can also be triggered by specific events (e.g. a virus could automatically execute
 at 12 PM every day). Usually, viruses cause damage to computer and network systems
 to the extent that it can be repaired, assuming that the organization deploys good
 backup and recovery procedures.

During its lifetime, a virus goes through four phases:

- (a) **Dormant phase:** Here, the virus is idle. It gets activated based on certain action or event (e.g. the user typing a certain key or certain date or time is reached, etc). This is an optional phase.
- (b) **Propagation phase:** In this phase, a virus copies itself and each copy starts creating more copies of self, thus propagating the virus.
- (c) **Triggering phase:** A dormant virus moves into this phase when the action/event for which it was waiting is initiated.
- (d) **Execution phase:** This is the actual work of the virus, which could be harmless (display some message on the screen) or destructive (delete a file on the disk).

Viruses can be classified into the following categories:

- (a) **Parasitic virus:** This is the most common form of viruses. Such a virus attaches itself to executable files and keeps replicating. Whenever the infected file is executed, the virus looks for other executable files to attach itself and spread.
- (b) **Memory-resident virus:** This type of virus first attaches itself to an area of the main memory and then infects every executable program that is executed.
- (c) **Boot sector virus:** This type of virus infects the master boot record of the disk and spreads on the disk when the operating system starts booting the computer.
- (d) **Stealth virus:** This virus has intelligence built in, which prevents anti-virus software programs from detecting it.
- (e) **Polymorphic virus:** A virus that keeps changing its signature (i.e. identity) on every execution, making it very difficult to detect.
- (f) **Metamorphic virus:** In addition to changing its signature like a polymorphic virus, this type of virus keeps rewriting itself every time, making its detection even harder.
- (g) **Macro virus**. This virus affects specific application software, such as Microsoft Word or Microsoft Excel. These viruses affect the documents created by users and spread easily since such documents are very commonly exchanged over email. There is a feature called as *macro* these application software programs work, which allows the users to write small useful utility programs within the documents. Viruses attack these macros and hence the name **macro virus**.

2) Worm:

- A worm is similar to a virus, but different in implementation. A virus modifies a program (i.e. it attaches itself to the program under attack) whereas a worm does not modify a program. Instead, it **replicates itself again and again.**
- The replication grows so much that the computer or the network on which the worm resides, becomes very slow, finally coming to a halt.
- The basic purpose of a worm attack is different from that of a virus. A worm attack attempts to make the computer or the network under attack unusable by eating all its resources. This is illustrated in figure 1.7
- A worm does not perform down any destructive actions and instead, only consumes system resources to bring it down.




Figure 1.7 Worm

3) Trojan Horse

- A Trojan horse is a hidden piece of code, like a virus. The main purpose of a virus is to
 make some sort of modifications to the target computer or network whereas a trojan
 horse attempts to reveal confidential information to an attacker.
- The name (Trojan horse) is due to the Greek soldiers, who hid inside a large hollow horse, which was pulled by troy citizens, unaware of its contents. Once the Greek soldiers entered the city of Troy, they opened the gates for the rest of Greek soldiers.
- In the same way, a Trojan horse could silently sit in the code for a Login screen by attaching itself to it. When the user enters the user id and password, the Trojan horse could capture these details and send this information to the attacker without the knowledge of the user who had entered the id and password.
- A Trojan horse allows an attacker to obtain some confidential information about a computer or a network. The attacker can then use the user id and password to gain access to the system. This is shown in figure




Figure 1.8 Trojan Horse

4) Applets and ActiveX Controls:

- Applets and ActiveX controls were born due to the technological development of the World Wide Web (www) application of the Internet.
- The Web consists of communication between client and server computers using a communications protocol called as Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
- The client uses a piece of software called as Web browser. The server runs a program called as Web server.
- In its simplest form, a browser sends a HTTP request for a Web page to a Web server. The Web server locates this Web page (actually a computer file) and sends it back to the Web browser, again using HTTP.
- The Web browser interprets the contents of that file and shows the results on the screen to the user. This is shown in Fig. 1.9.




Figure 1.9 HTTP connection between client and server

- Here, the client sends a request for a Web page called as www.yahoo.com/info, which the server sends back to the client.
- Many Web pages contain small programs that get downloaded onto the client along with the Web page itself. These programs then execute inside the browser.
- Sun Microsystems provides Java applets for this purpose and Microsoft's technology makes use of ActiveX controls for the same purpose.
- Both are small programs that get downloaded along with a Web page and then execute on the client. This is shown in Fig. 1.10.




Figure 1.10 Applet sent back along with a Web page

Here, the server sends an applet along with the Web page to the client.

- Usually, these programs (applets or ActiveX controls) are used to either perform some
 processing on the client side or to automatically and periodically request for information
 from the web server using a technology called as client pull.
- For instance, a program can get downloaded on to the client along with the Web page showing the latest stock prices on a stock exchange and then periodically issue HTTP requests for pulling the updated prices to the Web server.
- To prevent these attacks, Java applets have strong security checks as to what they can do and what they cannot. ActiveX controls have no such restrictions.
- A number of checks have been in place to ensure that neither applets nor ActiveX controls can do a lot of damage and even if they somehow manage to do it, it can be detected.
- Java applets (from Sun Microsystems) and ActiveX controls (from Microsoft Corporation) are small client-side programs that might cause security problems, if used by attackers with a malicious intention.

5) Cookies:

- Cookies were born as a result of a specific characteristic of the Internet. The Internet uses HTTP protocol, which is stateless.
- Suppose that the client sends an HTTP request for a Web page to the server. The Web server locates that page on its disk, sends it back to the client and completely forgets about this interaction!
- If the client wants to continue this interaction, it must identify itself to the server in the next HTTP request. Otherwise, the server would not know that this same client had sent a HTTP request earlier.
- Since a typical application is likely to involve a number of interactions between the client and the server, there must be some mechanism for the client to identify itself to the server each time it sends an HTTP request to the server.
- For this, cookies are used. Cookies are the most popular mechanism of maintaining the state information (i.e. identifying a client to a server). A cookie is just one or more pieces of information stored as text strings in a text file on the disk of the client computer (i.e. the Web browser).
- Actually, a Web server sends the Web browser a cookie and the browser stores it on the
 hard disk of the client computer. The browser then sends a copy of the cookie to the
 server during the next HTTP request.
- This is used for identification purposes as shown in Figs 1.11 (a) and 1.11 (b).




Figure 1.11a Creation of cookies




Figure 1.11b Usage of cookies

This works as follows:

- (a) When you interact with a Web site for the first time, the site might want you to register yourself. Usually, this means that the Web server sends a page to you wherein you have a form to enter your name, address and other details such as date of birth, interests etc.
- (b) When you complete this form and send it to the server with the help of your browser, the server stores this information into its database. Additionally, it also creates a unique id for you. It stores this id along with your information in the database (as shown in Fig. 1.11(b)) and also sends the id back to you in the form of a cookie.
- (c) The next time you interact with the server, you do not have to enter any information such as your name and address. Your browser would automatically send your id (i.e. the cookie) along with the HTTP request for a particular page to the server (as shown in Fig. 1.11b)).
- (d) The server now takes this id, tries to find a match in its database and having found it, knows that you are a registered user. Accordingly, it sends you the next page.

6) JavaScript, VBScript and JScript

- A Web page is constructed using a special language called as Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML). It is a tag-based language. A tag begins with the symbol <> and it ends with </>.
- Between these boundaries of the tags, the actual information to be displayed on the
 user's computer is mentioned. As an example, let us consider how the tag pair and
 can be used to change the text font to boldface.
- When a browser comes across this portion of a HTML document, it realizes that the portion of the text embedded within the and tags need to be displayed in boldface. Therefore, it displays this text in boldface.
- In addition to HTML tags, a Web page can contain client-side scripts. These are small programs written in scripting languages like JavaScript, VBScript or Jscript, which are executed inside the Web browser on the client computer.
- For instance, let us assume that a user visits the Web site of an online bookshop. Suppose that the Web site mandates that the user must place an order for at least three books. Then, the web page can contain a small JavaScript program, which can ensure that this condition is met before the user can place the order. Otherwise, the JavaScript program would not allow the user to proceed. Note that HTML cannot be used for this purpose, as its sole purpose is to display text on the client computer in a pre-specified format. To perform dynamic actions, scripts are needed.
- These scripts can be dangerous at times. Since these scripts are small programs, they can perform a lot of actions on the client's computer. There are restrictions on the actions of a scripting program. Incidents of security breaches have been reported, blaming the scripting languages.

1.4.5 Dealing with viruses

• The detection, identification and removal of viruses' steps is shown in figure 1.12




Figure 1.12 Virus elimination steps

- Detection of viruses involves locating the virus, having known that a virus has attacked. Then we need to identify the specific virus that has attacked. Finally, we need to remove it. For this we need to remove all traces of the virus and restore the affected programs/files to their original states. This is done by anti-virus software.
- Anti-virus software is classified into four generations as shown in figure 1.13




Figure 1.13 Generations of anti-virus software

The key characteristics of the four generations of anti-virus software.

1st generation

• These anti-virus software programs were called as **simple scanners**. They needed a virus signature to identify a virus. A variation of such programs kept a watch on the length of programs and looked for changes so as to possibly identify a virus attack.

2nd generation

• These anti-virus software programs did not rely on simple virus signatures. Rather, they used heuristic rules to look for possible virus attacks. The idea was to look for code blocks that were commonly associated with viruses. Another variation of these anti-virus programs used to store some identification about the file (e.g. a message digest) to detect changes in the contents of the file.

3rd generation

 These anti-virus software programs were memory resident. They watched for viruses based on actions, rather than their structure. Thus, it is not necessary to maintain a large database of virus signatures. Instead, the focus is to keep watch on a small number of suspect actions.

4th generation

These anti-virus software programs package many anti-virus techniques together (e.g. scanners, activity monitoring). They also contain access control features, thus attempts of viruses to infect files.

- There is a category of software called as behavior-blocking software, which integrates with the operating system of the computer and keeps a watch on virus-like behavior in real time.
- Whenever such an action is detected, this software blocks it, preventing damages. The actions under watch can be:
 - Opening, viewing, modifying, deleting files
 - Network communications
 - Modification of settings such as start-up scripts
 - Attempt to format disks
 - Modification of executable files
 - Scripting of email and instant messaging to send executable content to others

The main advantage of such software programs is that they are more into virus prevention than virus detection. In other words, they stop viruses before they can do any damage, rather than detecting them after an attack.

1.4.6 Specific Attacks

1) Sniffing and Spoofing:

- On the Internet, computers exchange messages with each other in the form of small blocks of data, called as packets. A packet, like a postal envelope that contains the actual data to be sent and the addressing information.
- Attackers target these packets, as they travel from the source computer to the destination computer over the Internet. These attacks take two main forms:
 - (a) Packet sniffing (also called as snooping) and (b) Packet spoofing.
- Since the protocol used in this communication is called as Internet Protocol (IP), other names for these two attacks are: (a) IP sniffing and (b) IP spoofing.

a) Packet sniffing:

- Packet sniffing is a passive attack on an ongoing conversation. An attacker need not hijack a conversation, but instead, can just observe (i.e. snif) packets as they pass by.
- To prevent an attacker from sniffing packets, the information that is passing needs to be protected in some ways. This can be done at two levels:
 - (i) The data that is traveling can be encoded in some way or
 - (ii) The transmission link itself can be encoded.
- To read a packet, the attacker needs to access it. The simplest way to do this is to control a computer through which the traffic goes. Usually, this is a router. However, routers are highly protected resources. Therefore, an attacker might not be able to attack it and instead, attack a less protected computer on the same path.

b) Packet spoofing:

- In this technique, an attacker sends packets with a false source address. When this happens, the receiver (i.e. the party who receives these packets containing false address) would inadvertently send replies back to this forged address (called as spoofed address). This can lead to three possible cases:
 - i) The attacker can intercept the reply If the attacker is between the destination and the forged source, the attacker can see the reply and use that information for hijacking attacks.
 - ii) **The attacker need not see the reply** If the attacker's intention was a Denial Of Service (DOS) attack, the attacker need not bother about the reply.
 - iii) **The attacker does not want the reply** The attacker could simply be angry with the host, so it may put that host's address as the forged source address and send the packet to the destination. The attacker does not want a reply from the destination, as it wants the host with the forged address to receive it and get confused.

2) Phishing:

- In Phishing, attackers set up fake Web sites, which look like real Web sites. It is simple
 to create Web pages as it involves simple technologies such as HTML, JavaScript, CSS
 (Cascading Style Sheets), etc. Learning and using these technologies is quite simple.
 Phishing works as follows.
- The attacker decides to create his own Web site, which looks very identical to a real Web site. For example, the attacker can clone Citibank's Web site. The cloning is so clever that human eye will not be able to distinguish between the real (Citibank's) and fake (attacker's) sites now.
- The attacker sends an email to the legitimate customers of the bank. The email itself appears to come from the bank. For ensuring this, the attacker exploits the email system to suggest that the sender of the email is some bank official (e.g. accountmanager@citibank.comn).
- This fake email warns the user that there has been some sort of attack on the Citibank's
 computer systems and that the bank wants to issue new passwords to all its customers
 or verify their existing PINs, etc. For this purpose, the customer is asked to visit a URL
 mentioned in the same email.
- When the customer (i.e. the victim) innocently clicks on the URL specified in the email, she is taken to the attacker's site and not the bank's original site. There, the customer is prompted to enter confidential information, such as her password or PIN.
- Since the attacker's fake site looks exactly like the original bank site, the customer
 provides this information. The attacker gladly accepts this information and displays a
 Thank you to the unsuspecting victim. In the meanwhile, the attacker now uses the
 victim's password or PIN to access the bank's real site and can perform any transaction
 as if he/she is the victim!

3) Pharming (DNS Spoofing):

- > This attack was earlier known as **DNS spoofing** or DNS poisoning is now called as **pharming attack**.
- ➤ With the Domain Name System (DNS), people can identify Web sites with human-readable names (such as www.yahoo.com) and computers can continue to treat them as IP addresses (such as 120.10.81.67).
- ➤ For this, a special server computer called as a DNS server maintains the mappings between domain names and the corresponding IP addresses. The DNS server could be located anywhere. Usually, it is with the Internet Service Provider (ISP) of the users.

Example: The DNS spoofing attack works as follows.

• Suppose that there is a merchant (Bob), whose site's domain name is www.bob.com and the IP address is 100.10.10.20. Therefore, the DNS entry for Bob in all the DNS servers is maintained as follows: www.bob.com 100.10.10.20

- The attacker (Trudy) manages to hack and replace the IP address of Bob with his own (say 100.20.20.20) in the DNS server maintained by the ISP of a user(say Alice).
 Therefore, the DNS server maintained by the ISP of Alice now has the following entry: www.bob.com 100.20.20.20
- Thus, the contents of the hypothetical DNS table maintained by the ISP would be changed. A hypothetical portion of this table (before and after the attack) is shown in Figure below.

DNS Name	IP Address	DNS Name	IP Address
www.amazon.com www.yahoo.com	161.20.10.16 121.41.67.89	www.amazon.com www.yahoo.com	161.20.10.16 121.41.67.89
www.bob.com	100.10.10.20	www.bob.com	100.20.20.20
200	***	20.00	***

Before the attack

After the attack

- When Alice wants to communicate with Bob's site, her Web browser queries the DNS server maintained by her ISP for Bob's IP address, providing it the domain name (i.e. www.bob.com). Alice gets the replaced (i.e. Trudy's) IP address, which is 100.20.20.20.
- Now, Alice starts communicating with Trudy, believing that she is communicating with Bob! Such attacks of DNS spoofing are quite common and cause a lot of havoc.

1.5 SECURITY MECHANISMS

Table 1.3 lists the security mechanisms defined in X.800. The mechanisms are divided into those that are implemented in a specific protocol layer, such as TCP or an application-layer protocol, and those that are not specific to any particular protocol layer or security service. These mechanisms will be covered in the appropriate places in the book. So we do not elaborate now, except to comment on the definition of encipherment. X.800 distinguishes between reversible encipherment mechanisms and irreversible encipherment mechanisms. A reversible

Table 1.3 Security Mechanisms (X.800)

SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS

May be incorporated into the appropriate protocol layer in order to provide some of the OSI security services.

Encipherment

The use of mathematical algorithms to transform data into a form that is not readily intelligible. The transformation and subsequent recovery of the data depend on an algorithm and zero or more encryption keys.

Digital Signature

Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery (e.g., by the recipient).

Access Control

A variety of mechanisms that enforce access rights to resources.

Data Integrity

A variety of mechanisms used to assure the integrity of a data unit or stream of data units.

PERVASIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS

Mechanisms that are not specific to any particular OSI security service or protocol layer.

Trusted Functionality

That which is perceived to be correct with respect to some criteria (e.g., as established by a security policy).

Security Label

The marking bound to a resource (which may be a data unit) that names or designates the security attributes of that resource.

Event Detection

Detection of security-relevant events.

Security Audit Trail

Data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security audit, which is an independent review and examination of system records and activities.

Security Recovery

Deals with requests from mechanisms, such as event handling and management functions, and takes recovery actions.

Table 1.3 Continued

SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS

Authentication Exchange

A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity by means of information exchange.

Traffic Padding

The insertion of bits into gaps in a data stream to frustrate traffic analysis attempts.

Routing Control

Enables selection of particular physically secure routes for certain data and allows routing changes, especially when a breach of security is suspected.

Notarization


The use of a trusted third party to assure certain properties of a data exchange.

1.3 SECURITY ATTACKS

A useful means of classifying security attacks, used both in X.800 and RFC 4949, is in terms of *passive attacks* and *active attacks* (Figure 1.1). A passive attack attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources. An active attack attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation.

Passive Attacks

Passive attacks (Figure 1.1) are in the nature of eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions. The goal of the opponent is to obtain information that is being transmitted. Two types of passive attacks are the release of message contents and traffic analysis.






Figure 1.1 Security Attacks

The **release of message contents** is easily understood. A telephone conversation, an electronic mail message, and a transferred file may contain sensitive or confidential information. We would like to prevent an opponent from learning the contents of these transmissions. A second type of passive attack,

traffic analysis, is subtler. Suppose that we had a way of masking the contents of messages or other information traffic so that opponents, even if they captured the message, could not extract the information

from the message. The common technique for masking contents is encryption. If we had encryption protection in place, an opponent might still be able to observe the pattern of these messages. The opponent could determine the location and identity of communicating hosts and could observe the frequency and length of messages being exchanged. This information might be useful in guessing the nature of the communication that was taking place. Passive attacks are very difficult to detect, because they do not involve any alteration of the data. Typically, the message traffic is sent and received in an apparently normal fashion, and neither the sender nor receiver is aware that a third party has read the messages or observed the traffic pattern. However, it is feasible to prevent the success of these attacks, usually by means of encryption. Thus, the emphasis in dealing with passive attacks is on prevention rather than detection.

Active Attacks

Active attacks (Figure 1.1b) involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream and can be subdivided into four categories: masquerade, replay, modification of messages, and denial of service. A <u>masquerade</u> takes place when one entity pretends to be a different entity (path 2 of Figure 1.1b is active). A masquerade attack usually includes one of the

other forms of active attack. For example, authentication sequences can be captured and replayed after a valid authentication sequence has taken place, thus enabling an authorized entity with few privileges to obtain extra privileges by impersonating an entity that has those privileges.

Replay involves the passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission to produce an unauthorized effect (paths 1, 2, and 3 active).

<u>Modification of messages</u> simply means that some portion of a legitimate message is altered, or that messages are delayed or reordered, to produce an unauthorized effect (paths 1 and 2 active). For example, a message meaning "Allow John Smith to read confidential file *accounts*" is modified to mean "Allow Fred Brown to read confidential file *accounts*."

The <u>denial of service</u> prevents or inhibits the normal use or management of communications facilities (path 3 active). This attack may have a specific target; for example, an entity may suppress all messages directed to a particular destination

(e.g., the security audit service). Another form of service denial is the disruption of an entire network, either by disabling the network or by overloading it with messages so as to degrade performance. Active attacks present the opposite characteristics of passive attacks. Where as passive attacks are difficult to detect, measures are available to prevent their success. On the other hand, it is quite difficult to prevent active attacks absolutely

Security Services

Table 1.2 Security Services (X.800)

AUTHENTICATION

The assurance that the communicating entity is the one that it claims to be.

Peer Entity Authentication

Used in association with a logical connection to provide confidence in the identity of the entities connected.

Data-Origin Authentication

In a connectionless transfer, provides assurance that the source of received data is as claimed.

ACCESS CONTROL

The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource (i.e., this service controls who can have access to a resource, under what conditions access can occur, and what those accessing the resource are allowed to do).

DATA CONFIDENTIALITY

The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.

Connection Confidentiality

The protection of all user data on a connection.

Connectionless Confidentiality

The protection of all user data in a single data block

Selective-Field Confidentiality

The confidentiality of selected fields within the user data on a connection or in a single data block.

Traffic-Flow Confidentiality

The protection of the information that might be derived from observation of traffic flows.

DATA INTEGRITY

The assurance that data received are exactly as sent by an authorized entity (i.e., contain no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay).

Connection Integrity with Recovery

Provides for the integrity of all user data on a connection and detects any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of any data within an entire data sequence, with recovery attempted.

Connection Integrity without Recovery

As above, but provides only detection without recovery.

Selective-Field Connection Integrity

Provides for the integrity of selected fields within the user data of a data block transferred over a connection and takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified, inserted, deleted, or replayed.

Connectionless Integrity

Provides for the integrity of a single connectionless data block and may take the form of detection of data modification. Additionally, a limited form of replay detection may be provided.

Selective-Field Connectionless Integrity

Provides for the integrity of selected fields within a single connectionless data block; takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified.

NONREPUDIATION

Provides protection against denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication.

Nonrepudiation, Origin

Proof that the message was sent by the specified party.

Nonrepudiation, Destination

Proof that the message was received by the specified party.

.6 A MODEL FOR NETWORK SECURITY

A model for much of what we will be discussing is captured, in very general terms, in Figure 1.2. A message is to be transferred from one party to another across some sort of Internet service. The two parties, who are the *principals* in this transaction, must cooperate for the exchange to take place. A logical information channel is established by defining a route through the Internet from source to destination and by the cooperative

use of communication protocols (e.g., TCP/IP) by the two principals. Security aspects come into play when it is necessary or desirable to protect the information transmission from an opponent who may present a threat to confidentiality, authenticity, and so on.

All the techniques for providing security have two components: A security-related transformation on the information to be sent. Examples include the encryption of the message, which scrambles the message so that it is unreadable by the opponent, and the addition of a code based on the contents of the message, which can be used to verify the identity of the sender. Some secret information shared by the two principals and, it is hoped, un know to the opponent. An example is an encryption key used in conjunction with the transformation to scramble the message before transmission and unscramble it on reception.6 A trusted third party may be needed to achieve secure transmission. For example, a third party may be responsible for distributing the secret information.




Figure 1.2 Model for Network Security

to the two principals while keeping it from any opponent. Or a third party may be needed to arbitrate disputes between the two principals concerning the authenticity of a message transmission. This general model shows that there are four basic tasks in designing a particular security service: Design an algorithm for performing the security-related transformation. The algorithm should be such that an opponent cannot defeat its purpose. Generate the secret information to be used with the algorithm. Develop methods for the distribution and sharing of the secret information. Specify a protocol to be used by the two principals that makes use of the security algorithm and the secret information to achieve a particular security service. Parts One through Five of this book concentrate on the types of security mechanisms and services that fit into the model shown in Figure 1.2. However, there are

other security-related situations of interest that do not neatly fit this model but are considered in this book.

A general model of these other situations is illustrated in Figure 1.3, which reflects a concern for protecting an information system from unwanted access. Most readers are familiar with the concerns caused by the existence of hackers, who attempt to penetrate systems that can be accessed over a network. The hacker can be someone who, with no malign intent, simply gets satisfaction from breaking and entering a computer system. The intruder can be a disgruntled employee who wishes to do damage or a criminal who seeks to exploit computer assets for financial gain (e.g., obtaining credit card numbers or performing illegal

money transfers). Another type of unwanted access is the placement in a computer system of logic that exploits vulnerabilities in the system and that can affect application programs as well as utility programs, such as editors and compilers. Programs can present two kinds of threats:

- **Information access threats:** Intercept or modify data on behalf of users who should not have access to that data.
 - Service threats: Exploit service flaws in computers to inhibit use by legitimate users.




Figure 1.3 Network Access Security Model

NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL

Network access control (NAC) is an umbrella term for managing access to a network.NAC authenticates users logging into the network and determines what data they can access and actions they can perform. NAC also examines the health of the user's computer or mobile device (the endpoints).

Elements of a Network Access Control System

NAC systems deal with three categories of components:

• Access requestor (AR): The AR is the node that is attempting to access the network and may be any device that is managed by the NAC system, including workstations, servers, printers, cameras, and other IP-enabled devices. ARs are also referred to as supplicants, or simply, clients.

- **Policy server:** Based on the AR's posture and an enterprise's defined policy, the policy server determines what access should be granted. The policy server often relies on backend systems, including antivirus, patch management, or a user directory, to help determine the host's condition.
- Network access server (NAS): The NAS functions as an access control point for users in remote locations connecting to an enterprise's internal network. Also called a media gateway, a remote access server (RAS), or a policy server, an NAS may include its own authentication services or rely on a separate authentication service from the policy server. Figure 16.1 is a generic network access diagram. A variety of different ARs seek access to an enterprise network by applying to some type of NAS. The first step is generally to authenticate the AR. Authentication typically involves some sort of secure protocol and the use of cryptographic keys. Authentication may be performed by the NAS, or the NAS may mediate the authentication process. In the latter case, authentication takes place between the supplicant and an authentication server that is part of the policy server or that is accessed by the policy server.




Figure 16.1 Network Access Control Context

The authentication process serves a number of purposes. It verifies a supplicant's claimed identity, which enables the policy server to determine what access privileges, if any, the AR

may have. The authentication exchange may result in the establishment of session keys to enable future secure communication between the supplicant and resources on the enterprise network.

Typically, the policy server or a supporting server will perform checks on the AR to determine if it should be permitted interactive remote access connectivity. These checks—sometimes called health, suitability, screening, or assessment checks—require software on the user's system to verify compliance with certain requirements from the organization's secure configuration baseline.

For example, the user's antimalware software must be up-to-date, the operating system must be fully patched, and the remote computer must be owned and controlled by the organization. These checks should be performed before granting the AR access to the enterprise network. Based on the results of these checks, the organization can determine whether the remote computer should be permitted to use interactive remote access. If the user has acceptable authorization credentials but the remote computer does not pass the health check, the user and remote computer should be denied network access or have limited access to a quarantine network so that authorized personnel can fix the security deficiencies. Figure 16.1 indicates that the quarantine portion of the enterprise network consists of the policy server and related AR suitability servers. There may also be application servers that do not require the normal security threshold be met.

Once an AR has been authenticated and cleared for a certain level of access to the enterprise network, the NAS can enable the AR to interact with resources in the enterprise network. The NAS may mediate every exchange to enforce a security policy for this AR, or may use other methods to limit the privileges of the AR.

16.2 EXTENSIBLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748, acts as a framework for network access and authentication protocols. EAP provides a set of protocol messages that can encapsulate various authentication methods to be used between a client and an authentication server. EAP can operate over a variety of network and link level facilities, including point-to-point links, LANs, and other networks, and can accommodate the authentication needs of the various links and networks. Figure 16.2 illustrates the protocol layers that form the context for EAP.




Figure 16.2 EAP Layered Context

Authentication Methods

EAP supports multiple authentication methods. This is what is meant by referring to EAP as *extensible*. EAP provides a generic transport service for the exchange of authentication information between a client system and an authentication server. The basic EAP transport service is extended by using a specific authentication protocol, or method, that is installed in both the EAP client and the authentication server. Numerous methods have been defined to work over EAP. The following are commonly supported EAP methods:

- **EAP-TLS** (**EAP Transport Layer Security**): EAP-TLS (RFC 5216) defines how the TLS protocol (described in Chapter 17) can be encapsulated in EAP messages. EAP-TLS uses the handshake protocol in TLS, not its encryption method. Client and server authenticate each other using digital certificates. Client generates a pre-master secret key by encrypting a random number with the server's public key and sends it to the server. Both client and server use the pre-master to generate the same secret key.
- EAP-TTLS (EAP Tunneled TLS): EAP-TTLS is like EAP-TLS, except only the server has a certificate to authenticate itself to the client first. As in EAPTLS, a secure connection (the "tunnel") is established with secret keys, but that connection is used to continue the authentication process by authenticating the client and possibly the server again using any EAP method or legacy method such as PAP (Password Authentication Protocol) and CHAP (Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol). EAP-TTLS is defined in RFC 5281.

- EAP-GPSK (EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key): EAP-GPSK, defined in RFC 5433, is an EAP method for mutual authentication and session key derivation using a Pre-Shared Key (PSK). EAP-GPSK specifies an EAP method based on pre-shared keys and employs secret key-based cryptographic algorithms. Hence, this method is efficient in terms of message flows and computational costs, but requires the existence of pre-shared keys between each peer and EAP server. The set up of these pair wise secret keys is part of the peer registration, and thus, must satisfy the system preconditions. It provides a protected communication channel when mutual authentication is successful for both parties to communicate over and is designed for authentication over insecure networks such as IEEE 802.11. EAP-GPSK does not require any public-key cryptography. The EAP method protocol exchange is done in a minimum of four messages.
- **EAP-IKEv2:** It is based on the Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2), which is described in Chapter 20. It supports mutual authentication and session key establishment using a variety of methods. EAP-TLS is defined in RFC 5106.

EAP Exchanges

Whatever method is used for authentication, the authentication information and authentication protocol information are carried in EAP messages.




Figure 16.3 EAP Protocol Exchanges

RFC 3748 defines the goal of the exchange of EAP messages to be successful authentication. In the context of RFC 3748, *successful authentication* is an exchange of EAP messages, as a result of which the authenticator decides to allow access

by the peer, and the peer decides to use this access. The authenticator's decision typically involves both authentication and authorization aspects; the peer may successfully authenticate to the authenticator, but access may be denied by the

authenticator due to policy reasons. Figure 16.3 indicates a typical arrangement in which EAP is used. The following components are involved:

- **EAP peer:** Client computer that is attempting to access a network.
- EAP authenticator: An access point or NAS that requires EAP authentication prior to granting access to a network.
- **Authentication server:** A server computer that negotiates the use of a specific EAP method with an EAP peer, validates the EAP peer's credentials, and authorizes access to the network. Typically, the authentication server is a Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server. The authentication server functions as a backend server that can authenticate

peers as a service to a number of EAP authenticators. The EAP authenticator then makes the decision of whether to grant access.

This is referred to as the **EAP passthrough mode**. Less commonly, the authenticator takes over the role of the EAP server; that is, only two parties are involved in the EAP execution. As a first step, a lower-level protocol, such as PPP (point-to-point protocol) or IEEE 802.1X, is used to connect to the EAP authenticator. The software entity in the EAP peer that operates at this level is referred to as the **supplicant**. EAP messages containing the appropriate information for a chosen EAP method are then exchanged between the EAP peer and the authentication server.